Contentious Politics and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution

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Declaration

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Abstract

The three articles that make up this thesis consider the diverse forms of contentious politics and mass mobilization that emerged during the 25th January Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and its aftermath. The first article, discussing the eighteen days of anti-Mubarak protest, pays special attention to the position of the Egyptian army in and around Midan al-Tahrir, and recounts how protestors sought to co-opt and neutralize the threat posed by regime forces. It finds that fraternizing protestors developed a repertoire of contention that made situational, emotional claims on the loyalty of regime troops. The second article explores the role of elections and protests during the failed democratic transition away from authoritarian rule that began on 11 February with Mubarak's resignation and ended on 3 July 2013 with a military coup. Highlighting the Muslim Brothers’ demobilization and privileging of procedural democracy following Mubarak’s ousting, it offers an alternative account of where and when Egypt's democratic project went wrong. The final article considers opposition to the 3 July coup and in particular the effects of state repression on the daily street protests launched by the Muslim Brothers and their allies in the post-coup period. Far from being defeated, anti-coup contention, it is suggested, has instead been contained in ways that have made protest less visible and less disruptive over time. Taken as a whole, the thesis suggests new ways to understand and explain the 25th January Revolution, its trajectories and legacies.
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Before I embarked on my doctoral studies, Richard and Judith Stewart supported me during a year spent studying Arabic at Damascus University in 2009. The LSE Government Department paid for me to complete an intensive Arabic language summer school at Institut Français du Proche-Orient (IFPO) Aleppo, while a Study Abroad Studentship from the Leverhulme Trust allowed me to spend the 2010-2011 academic year at IFPO Damas for language training and further study. The Leverhulme also supported an eight month Visiting Research Fellowship in the Department of Political Science at the American University in Cairo from May-December 2011. Research studentships from the LSE and the Economic and Social Research Council left me free to pursue academic (and other) interests, for which I am extremely grateful.

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A Note on Transliteration

I have used a simplified version of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* transliteration system when rendering Arabic words into the Latin alphabet. Diacritics are used for the Arabic letters ‘ayn (ʿ) and hamza (ʾ), as well as the long vowels alif (ā), wāw (ū) and yaʾ (ī). When quoting chants or songs, I follow the Egyptian pronunciation and use g (gīm) instead of j (jīm). Likewise, I give ‘el’ rather than ‘al’ for the definite article and elide short and long vowels where appropriate. I also use Anglicized variants of places and names, which are spelled according to convention.
Advice from us to the Greeks: keep your stone in your hand, your scarf on your face and yeast in your pocket and kill anyone who tells you that the military will protect the revolution.

———Egyptian activist during Greek anti-austerity protests, 12 Feb. 2012
Introduction

Three years ago, on 25 January 2011, several thousand Egyptian protestors outmanoeuvred Interior Ministry-controlled Central Security Forces (CSF) to reach Midan al-Tahrir in downtown Cairo, triggering eighteen days of unruly and boisterous mass protests in the streets and squares of Egypt’s cities against the regime of Husni Mubarak. When Mubarak, a seemingly well-fortified dictator of thirty years, resigned on 11 February 2011, many believed that a definitive rupture had occurred. Over subsequent months and years, however, a parlous and deeply flawed democratic transition, unfolding under the direction of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), revealed a new set of problems and ambiguities for Egypt’s self-styled ‘revolutionaries.’ With military powers and old regime prerogatives still intact, the rapidly-convened coalition of forces that had come together in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere fragmented, as narrow partisanship trumped coalition building.

The eventual triumph of the Muslim Brothers’ candidate Muhammad Mursi in the second round of presidential elections held in June 2012 seemed to presage a new institutional rubric in which the state apparatus would, at the very least, be brought under democratic control, but instead revived abiding anxieties and uncertainties about Islamist takeover and dictatorial intent. Two years after Mubarak’s removal, a second round of mass protests, this time against Mursi’s presidency, paved the way for a military coup that took place on 3 July 2013, precipitating an ongoing process of elite reconstitution that has since seen Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, a field marshal and former defence minister, installed as president in an elliptical return to Mubarak-style authoritarianism. After a prolonged absence,
the CSF have fully redeployed to the streets of Egypt’s cities, better armed and more numerous than before, charged with enforcing a new protest law that criminalizes opposition to the military-backed government. Over three thousand anti-coup protestors have been killed by security forces in the past year alone, while tens of thousands have been detained. The arm of Egyptian State Security tasked with monitoring Egypt’s Islamist movements and political dissidents, which was nominally disbanded following the January 25th Revolution, has been reconstituted. A reinvigorated elite-level politics has not produced a model of governance responsive to the protestors’ original demands for “ʿaish, hurriyya, ʿadāla igtimāʿiyya” (bread, freedom, social justice). Human dignity (karāma insāniyya), which sometimes replaces social justice as the third demand, continues to be routinely violated through the state’s use of torture and calibrated sexual violence against its opponents.

Against this backdrop of disappointments, reversals and retrenchments, the trajectories and legacies of what is now known as the 25th January Revolution present important puzzles for students of contentious politics. Eschewing top-down, structuralist and culturally essentialist explanations, the account offered here suggests, across three research articles, that the patterns of political change in post-Mubarak Egypt can be usefully illuminated by a political sociology of the new modes and dynamics of contentious politics arising from the events of early 2011. Read as a single omnibus, the articles propose a tripartite periodization of Egyptian politics, covering the eighteen days of mass mobilization, the democratic transition and the post-coup period, through which to consider both the causes and the consequences of Mubarak’s removal at the hands of irrepressible ‘People power.’
Research Questions

Scholarly treatments of the 25th January Revolution have provided some preliminary answers to the ‘who,’ ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the mobilization. However, as is inevitable with any emerging and fast-moving topic, lacunae abound: there remains a need for a great deal of further empirical research on both the eighteen days of protest and its aftermath. I propose, therefore, three research questions to be considered in the articles.

Question 1: How did anti-Mubarak protestors succeed in co-opting or neutralizing the threat posed by security forces assumed loyal to the Mubarak regime?

In comparative studies of the 2011 Arab revolts, the Egyptian military’s failure to use force against protestors is frequently referenced as the key variable in determining the mobilization’s success (e.g. Barany 2011; Kandil 2012; Nepstad 2013). Accounting for the military’s ostensible defection from the Mubarak regime, these studies adopt an explanatory framework rooted in historical institutionalism and tend to stress three factors: the military’s professionalism; its status as a non-sectarian conscript force; and its declining position at the apex of state power relative to the Interior Ministry and the Egyptian business elite led by Mubarak’s son, and heir apparent, Gamal Mubarak. However, these accounts frequently overlook the role played by the military in facilitating regime attacks against anti-Mubarak protestors and fail to explain the killings of peaceful protestors by the army in the post-Mubarak democratic transition. This article advances a quite different account of the military’s role in the 25th January Revolution, suggesting
that far from abandoning the Mubarak regime, the military leadership may have come to question the reliability of key armoured units stationed in and around Midan al-Tahrir as a result of fraternization between protestors and soldiers. In doing so, the article explores the micro-interactive and emotional dimensions of contentious politics.

**Question 2: How can we explain the derailing of Egypt’s democratic transition?**

Against an emerging conventional wisdom according to which Mursi and the Muslim Brothers’ Islamist agenda and power-grabbing tendencies singularly undermined the post-Mubarak democratic project (e.g. Brownlee 2013; El-Sherif 2014; Lust, Soltan and Wichman, n.d.), the second article offers an alternative explanation for Egypt’s failed democratic transition by considering several factors that predated Mursi’s election and contributed to his demise. In particular, the article examines the Muslim Brothers’ decision to demobilize and privilege electoral and constitutional forums in the months following the 25th January Revolution. Extant theories of democratization insist that protest and mass mobilization are exogenous to the unfolding of a successful transition (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). I aver by contrast that the Brothers’ commitment to sit out further protest and focus on electioneering actually worked against post-Mubarak democratization, precipitating the breakup of the revolutionary coalition that had ousted Husni Mubarak and thus leaving Mursi fatally isolated during his brief presidential tenure when faced with a ‘deep state’ determined to roll back new forms of elected civilian democratic authority.
Question 3: How can we explain the pattern of mobilization in Egypt since the 3 July 2013 coup?

The focus of the third and final article shifts to the post-coup period and considers the nature and extent of opposition to the 3 July 2013 coup. In the year since the military seized power, Muslim Brothers and Mursi supporters in the Egyptian anti-coup movement have launched daily street protests, which have continued in spite of a wave of arrests and the routine use of live ammunition and birdshot to disperse protestors (Ketchley 2013). The relationship between repression and mobilization – frequently referred to as the repression-mobilization nexus – is an enduring puzzle for students of contentious politics, with few robust and generalizable findings (Davenport, Johnston and Meuller 2004). This article looks to explain how repression has impacted the anti-coup mobilization through its effect on the modalities, locations and timings of anti-coup protest. By studying shifts along these different axes, we can begin to consider how repression conditions both the variability and viability of contentious politics. This argument suggests that, far from being defeated, anti-coup protestors have adapted to regime repression, but that their contention has become less visible and less disruptive as a result.

In the following sections, I consider several problems of conceptual identification related to the 25th January Revolution. I then outline the notion of contentious politics pursued in this study, before specifying my methodological and substantive contributions in more detail.
The 25th January Revolution

Was the 25th January Revolution a revolution? The answer to this question has important implications for how we conceptualize the mobilization of January-February 2011 and the trajectory of the events that followed. On the one hand, a significant number of Egyptians certainly referred to it as such. My informants frequently prefaced their recollection of events with “fi ayām al-thawra...” (in the days of the revolution) or “fi waqt al-thawra...” (in the time of the revolution).

Those who had joined the protests in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere were “thuwār” (revolutionaries).¹ Non-participants were members of “hizb al-kanaba” (the party of the sofa), while the revolution’s opponents were “al-nizām” (the regime) and later “al-filūl” (literally, the remnants [of the regime]). Protestors killed during the mobilization were “shuhadāʾ thawrat khamsa wa ‘ishrīn yanāyir” (martyrs of the 25th January Revolution). This “revolutionary idiom” (Sewell 1979), replete with a chorus of jokes, put-downs and internet memes, infiltrated newspaper coverage, television chat shows and even the press releases issued by the SCAF in the year following Mubarak’s departure.² Such a process of naming and narration was undeniably significant, not only in constituting the lived experiences of anti-Mubarak protestors, but also in legitimating and authenticating the protestors’ demands in light of the country’s revolutionary heritage (Sabaseviciute 2011; Cole 2013; see also Selbin 2010).

On the other hand, it seems much harder to justify an analytical categorization of ‘revolution’ when reflecting on the trajectory of post-Mubarak politics, even given that the scholarly definition of what constitutes a revolution

¹ Later, to be a “revolutionary” narrowed considerably and came to be marked by a double rejection of the old regime and the Muslim Brothers.
has expanded considerably in the past decade. Worth considering here is a new literature on contemporary revolutions that argues that the revolutions of the late twentieth century onwards differ in several important ways from those that preceded them. If the classic model of a “social revolution” (Skocpol 1979) involved protracted and frequently violent mobilizations to transform the social and economic order of semi-agrarian societies, today’s ‘revolutions’ are found to be “negotiated” (Lawson 2005), “electoral” (Bunce and Wolchik 2006), “non-violent” (Nepstad 2011) and at least nominally “democratic” (Thompson 2004) in their ethos. These revolutions are more urban and compact, lasting only weeks or months (Beissinger 2013; 2014), while the new measure of revolutionary ‘success’ is increasingly the ousting of an incumbent authoritarian leader (Nepstad 2011: xiv). According to this definition, revolutions are, therefore, more a “mode of regime change” (Beissinger 2014), than an outcome-centric characterization of state breakdown (e.g. Goldstone 1991: 10-11), or a project of radical – political, social or economic – transformation.

Scholars working in this vein have been quick to adopt the 25th January Revolution as evidence of this new modality of revolutionary action (Nepstad 2011: xv; Beissinger 2013: 574, 2014). But despite several ostensible parallels that can be drawn with the 25 January repertoire of contention, political developments in Egypt in the three years and more since Mubarak’s demise suggest that this designation was premature. Under the SCAF’s guardianship, the Mubarak-era state was never upended, and it remains resolutely intact today. Nor, as I will go on to argue in chapter 2, did the 2011-2012 parliamentary and 2012 presidential

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3 For a careful and thoughtful critique of ‘democratic revolutions,’ see Beissinger (2013).
4 Accordingly, revolutions are increasingly seen as pathways to political liberalization, which strengthen rather than challenge the liberal international order (Lawson 2012: 12).
elections result in civilians exercising meaningful democratic control over the state. Given all this, it seems clear that no democratic or political revolution, even in the expanded analytical sense, can be said to have occurred.

So what do I mean by the 25th January Revolution? According to my analysis, substantiated in greater detail over subsequent chapters, the eighteen days of the 25th January Revolution are better captured by the concept of a “revolutionary situation” (Tilly 1978: ch.7; El-Ghobashy 2011) in which an alternative claim to sovereignty in the name of “the people” (al-sha’b) formed the basis of a countrywide mobilization against the regime of Husni Mubarak (see chapter 1). That revolutionary situation was never properly established and quickly subsided into a conventional democratic transition on 11 February 2011, following which constitutional and electoral forums came to structure a formal political process that unfolded under the direction of the military. Throughout this phase, Egyptians continued to mobilize outside of the transitional process; there were even several episodes when the country appeared poised to return to a revolutionary situation, for instance during the events of Muhammad Mahmud Street in late November 2011, when protestors tried, unsuccessfully, to recreate

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5 An alternative perspective argues that a “long-term revolutionary process” (Achcar 2012: 17; see also Abdelrahman 2014) is underway in Egypt that will continue so long as the underlying socio-economic grievances that gave rise to the original mobilization remain unaddressed. Operating in a Marxian, historical materialist vein, the longue durée view cautions against prematurely calling time on whether the 25th January Revolution was or was not a revolution, deduced from short-term successes or failures. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how this analysis survives the events of 3 July 2013 and the subsequent crackdown. Revolutions, as “second wave historical sociology” (Adams, Clemens and Orloff 2005) has argued (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991; Tilly 1996; Goodwin 2001; Foran 2005), do not simply flow from the objective contradictions of capitalism and class; rather, they unfold via particular pathways of state breakdown and require both coherent organizations capable of weathering sustained repression and innovative tactics to broker new alliances and mount effective challenges to the regime’s apparatus of coercion. For these reasons, revolutionary outcomes, Tilly (1978: ch.7) reminds us, remain extraordinary and exceptional events, precisely because most revolutionary situations and revolutionary forces are defeated by incumbent powers.
the conditions of early 2011 and replace the SCAF with a civilian-led national salvation government (see chapter 2).

Egypt's democratic transition failed on 3 July 2013 following the military coup. In the subsequent period, the revolutionary idiom of 2011 has been superseded by an evergreen discourse of *haybat al-dawla* (awe of the state; see El-Ghobashy in *MERIP* 2013; Tripp 2013: 5; Shokr 2014), employed to justify several regime-orchestrated massacres of pro-Mursi supporters, the detention of many of those who instigated the mobilization against Mubarak, and the new protest law. An anti-coup movement led by the Muslim Brothers has launched daily street protests using a repertoire of contention evolving out of that employed in the 25th January Revolution (see chapter 3). However, their efforts have been blunted by unprecedented repression, a fragmented political landscape (a consequence of the failed democratic transition), the anti-coup protestors' refusal to take up arms, the tendency of Egypt's poorest to equate protest with socioeconomic threat (Chalcraft 2014: 179), and international and regional support for the consolidation of the military-backed regime.

Against this backdrop, *thawrat khamsa wa ʿishrin yanāyir* (the 25th of January Revolution) remains commonly accepted shorthand in Egypt for referring to the eighteen days of popular protest that began on 25 January and which ended with the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. It is in this delimited sense that I use it.

**Contentious Politics**

Although more substantial reviews of existing approaches will be conducted in the articles themselves, it will be useful at this stage to consider the heuristic framework adopted in this thesis. The approach pursued here is informed, most
obviously, by the contentious politics literature associated with Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly’s (2001) *Dynamics of Contention* (DOC). That study sought to decompartmentalize the study of revolution, social movements, riots and other modes of transgressive collective action, and view them instead as belonging to a shared continuum of episodic, public and collective claim making between challengers and regimes (Ibid. 5). Viewed in this mode, the 25th January Revolution, democratic transition and anti-coup mobilization do not represent distinct processes or phenomena but can be usefully understood and illuminated by analyzing who is making claims, how those claims are made, the objects of those claims and regime responses to claim making.

In the analytical argot of the contentious politics literature, the ways in which people make claims is constrained by the available “repertoire of contention.” Tilly (1977) first introduced the “repertoire” metaphor to describe the evolving subset of protest tactics used in France between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. This drew on one of Tilly’s (1978: ch.6) earliest and arguably most productive insights: that when people act collectively, they only do so in a limited number of ways. Expanding upon this in later works, Tilly argued that:

The word repertoire helps describe what happens by identifying a limited set of routines that are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice. Repertoires are learned cultural creations, but they do not descend from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda; they emerge from struggle. People learn to break windows in protest, attack pilloried prisoners, tear down dishonoured houses, stage public marches, petition, hold formal meetings, organize
special-interest associations. At any point in history, however, they learn only a rather small number of alternative ways to act collectively. The limits of that learning, plus the fact that potential collaborators and antagonists likewise have learned a relatively limited set of means, constrain the choices available for collective interaction. (1995: 41-42)

Michael Biggs (2013: 408-409) usefully reformulated Tilly’s stance into two inter-related propositions: “repetition is far more likely than adoption; adoption is far more likely than invention.” Tilly (2008: 68) suggests that invention usually proceeds via a process of incessant, small-scale innovation from existing tactics. Once invented, however, innovations can quickly drop out of the repertoire entirely and be forgotten (Soule 1999). The conditions under which protest tactics are invented ex nihilo and subsequently spread is less well theorized. In chapter 1, I will discuss a fraternization repertoire used by anti-Mubarak protestors that made claims on the loyalty of regime troops. Tracing the provenance of individual contentious performances, I find that fraternization performances adhered to Tilly’s claim making model as protestors’ innovated on pre-existing scripts to signal their solidarity with police and soldiers. In chapter 3, I use event data to consider how the anti-coup movement’s repertoire of contention has been transformed by repression.

Repertoires are, in turn, related to the object of claim making. A powerful illustration of this approach is presented in Tilly’s (1995; 1997) work on popular contention in Great Britain. Tilly showed that by the late eighteenth century the increasingly visible role of elections and parliament in organizing public life led to the “parliamentarization of contention”, meaning that parliament became an object
of contention. This shift was in turn inflected in the means and timings of contention (see Tilly 2005). Marches, demonstrations, petitions and rallies began to revolve around single issues and parliamentary debates. Short term objectives previously achieved by violent means were replaced by longer-term struggles and associational activities structured around the rhythms of parliamentary life. By 1800, Tilly surmises, the parliamentarization of contention saw “ordinary people abandon a whole array of claim making means that had produced substantial results in the short run and on the local scale; price-fixing seizures of grain, public shaming of workers who accepted less than the going wage, direct attacks on poorhouses, and similar enforcing actions that accomplished their objectives in many cases” (1997: 268). In chapter 2 we will encounter a process not dissimilar to that described here by Tilly, as I consider the demobilizing pressures of democratic transitions in which social movements are incentivised to pursue more routine, procedural politics as a consequence of a shift in the sites of claim making – from the contentious street to the chambers of a parliament – following democratic breakthroughs (see also Robertson 2010: ch.5).

The relational and processual approach of the contentious politics literature invites clarification regarding the epistemological status of historical events and the narratives and memories of participants. As Tilly (2003: 5-8) notes, the conventional explanatory strategy pursued by social scientists has been to privilege either the ideas of participants, or their behaviour. It is worth quoting Tilly at length. “Ideas people stress consciousness as the basis of human action. They generally claim that humans acquire beliefs, concepts, rules, goals, and values from their environments, reshape their own (and each other’s) impulses in conformity with such ideas, and act out their socially acquired ideas...Behaviour
people stress the autonomy of motives, impulses, and opportunities...Behaviour people often take a reductionist position, saying that ultimately all collective phenomenon sum up nothing but individual behaviours.” (Ibid.: 5) In contrast, “Relation people make transactions among persons and groups far more central than do idea and behaviour people. They argue that humans develop their personalities and practices through interchanges with other humans, and that the interchanges themselves always involve a degree of negotiation and creativity.” (Ibid. 5-6). Tilly’s “contentious social interactionism,” notes Randall Collins (2010: 7), strives for a middle ground between phenomenological individualism and a holistic analysis of social structures, and thus shares much in common with the work of John Dewey and the pragmatist philosophical tradition.6 In subsequent chapters, we will encounter episodes in which prior historical events and memories might suggest deeper semantic connections than that accounted for in Tilly’s framework. For example, the fraternization performances identified in chapter 1 may well derive from cognate antecedent imaginaries related to the military’s claimed role in the articulation of Egyptian nationhood. While not discounting such semantic connections, a relational approach ultimately privileges the dynamics of the situations in which protestors and soldiers interacted as being ultimately formative in deciding the nature and outcome of those interactions.

It is important to note, however, that the present study is not singularly structured around a search for “mechanisms” of the kind advocated in DOC and Tilly’s (2003; see also Tilly and Tarrow 2007) later work. In DOC, mechanisms are presented as the building blocks of social scientific enquiry – the “workhorses of

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6 Tilly attributes this aspect of his work to the influence of sociologist Harrison White. See Krinsky and Mische (2013).
explanation” (McAdam Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 30) – and are defined as, “delimited sorts of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.” (Ibid. 25). Through a series of paired comparisons – of imperial breakdown, democratization and revolution – twenty two mechanisms are proposed, including category formation, “[the] creation of a set of sites sharing a boundary distinguishing all of them and relating all of them to at least one set of sites visibly excluded by the boundary” (Ibid. 316); scale shift, “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging their claims and identities” (Ibid. 331); and brokerage, “the linking of two or more unrelated sites” (Ibid. 333). These mechanisms “seldom operate on their own.” Rather, they “typically concatenate with other mechanisms into broader processes” such as revolutions (Ibid. 27).

The mechanisms and processes of DOC are plagued, however, by conceptual vagueness and ambiguities (Chalcraft 2013; Kurzman 2013). “It is arbitrary,” McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly note, “whether we call brokerage a mechanism, a family of mechanisms, or a process” (2001: 27). Several mechanisms appear interchangeably as processes over the course of the book. The precise effects and status of mechanisms are also wholly underspecified, a criticism acknowledged by DOC’s authors (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: xii; McAdam and Tarrow 2011): they appear both as explanatory variables and as ad hoc causal statements (see Opp 2009: ch.10). This has been compounded by a tendency to simply adduce further mechanisms, “mechanism talk” as Tarrow (2012: 25) calls it, to account for unexplained variance. For all these reasons, mechanisms are perhaps the least utilized aspect of the DOC project.
As such, the present study draws on several important insights that have emerged from DOC and other cognate work, but sees DOC less as a template to follow and implement wholesale, than as a point of departure from which to develop a relational, non-hydraulic and agent-centred explanation for the key moments and puzzles emerging from the 25th January Revolution.

**Methods and Data**

This thesis draws on two years of fieldwork, involving multiple research trips, carried out in Egypt between 2011 and 2014. It marshals several different types of evidence, including event data, informant testimony, newspaper articles, survey data, video footage and still photography. In the following section, I summarize my data collection methods, while considering some strategies for combining and triangulating different kinds of qualitative data to best address the research questions outlined earlier and to avoid the pitfalls arising from conducting research on unfolding events.⁷

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⁷ To avoid potential biases introduced by incomplete or partial information, I followed the approach advocated by social movement scholars in privileging “hard” observations (i.e. the who, where and when of events and episodes) over “soft” observations (i.e. the opinions and extrapolations of informants and journalists) (see Auyero 2007: 21; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2004: 72). When citing testimony from informants with a self-interest in narrating their role in a positive light – for example, Muslim Brothers recounting the part played by movement members in defending Midan al-Tahrir during the 25 January Revolution – I treated their accounts critically and sought alternative sources that could independently confirm their testimony. Of course, this strategy cannot mitigate the emergence of new sources that may emerge later on. For example, one striking feature of the primary source material that has become available since the 25 January Revolution is a dearth of candid memoirs penned by members of the military and security forces reflecting on their experiences during the eighteen days of mass mobilization and the subsequent democratic transition. If and when such sources do become available, this may lead to the revision, reformulation or, indeed, confirmation, of several of the counter-factual scenarios laid out in chapters 1 and 2.
Semi-Structured Interviews

In total, I conducted sixty semi-structured interviews in both Arabic and English. Since protestors are a relatively closed population, my primary method for selecting informants was snowball-based sampling. I aimed to conclude every interview by asking my informants whether they could introduce me to anyone who they thought could contribute to my research. I also conducted targeted interviews in which I approached individuals who had a public biography that made them of interest. Interviews were primarily recorded using handwritten notes and typically lasted around sixty minutes, although some went on for considerably longer. I conducted follow-up interviews on several occasions. Sometimes, situation permitting, I took notes on a laptop. I have also drawn on personal correspondence with protestors not available for face-to-face interviews.

With regards citing testimony and considerations of anonymity, I made it clear to informants that I would use only their first name. This was due to the risks informants face when speaking to foreign researchers on sensitive topics such as the military, or the anti-coup movement. Because of the frequency of certain names, I have used a single digit to distinguish between informants. For example: Abdullah1, Abdullah2, Abdullah3, etc. When citing interview testimony with senior Muslim Brothers who reside outside of Egypt, I gained consent to use their full names. On one occasion when a Muslim Brother asked to be quoted anonymously, I have referenced their testimony as “interview with Muslim Brother”. In two cases (that I know of), I have included interview testimony with anti-coup organizers.

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8I was especially conscious that shortly before I began conducting interviews on the role of the army in the 25th January Revolution, the Egyptian activist and blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad had been arrested and sentenced to three years in prison by a military court for a blog post (2011) entitled, “The army and the people wasn’t ever one hand [Sic]” in which he accused the military of conspiring against anti-Mubarak protestors during the eighteen days of mobilization.
who are active in Egypt and who used a pseudonym to conceal their identity. These and several other interviews were conducted from London using the internet client Skype and were facilitated by members of the anti-coup movement who were known to me.⁹

Video and Photographic Evidence

Within hours of protestors reaching Midan al-Tahrir on 25 January 2011 still photographs and video footage uploaded to social media sites had already come to constitute a searchable digital archive. The digitization of social processes and the ubiquity of camera-equipped mobile phones present new opportunities to study contentious politics. For chapters 1 and 3, I assembled an extensive photographic and video archive from internet-based searches¹⁰ and the personal ‘archives’ that informants had saved on mobile phones, memory sticks and hard drives.¹¹ Video footage and still photographs uploaded to social media frequently had time stamps, or were uploaded shortly after the event that they captured, or included captions providing additional context,¹² while visual materials obtained from informants were accompanied by detailed commentaries of the events in question.

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⁹ I found that Skype-based interviews were quite limiting as a data collection method. Where I had no prior relationship with an interviewee, informants tended to be less forthcoming compared to in-person interviews. I also found that the snowball method travelled poorly to the medium. I attribute this to the lack of visual interaction (internet speeds in Egypt are rarely fast enough to support a video feed), which meant that I appeared as an unfamiliar, disembodied voice. Skype-based interviews did, however, provide me with opportunities to speak to anti-coup protestors living outside of Cairo and Egypt’s other major cities, areas that I would have found difficult to visit in-person.
¹⁰ I primarily searched Youtube, Bambuser and Flickr – sites that support Arabic-language search terms and which are popular in Egypt.
¹¹ Because I began conducting fieldwork in the months following the 25th January Revolution, informants frequently had the same SIM cards and laptops, meaning that the data was to hand during interviews. The ubiquity of Bluetooth, a free wireless data transfer technology, meant that I could acquire videos and photographs to study later.
¹² Most social media sites provide a function to contact the video uploader. For one video uploaded to Youtube, showing protestors attacking army vehicles as they deployed to Midan al-Tahrir on the
Of course, video footage and still photographs have limitations. Both show events in real time, and thus one never sees the macro context directly. Instead, the macro is constructed through concepts and metaphors. This requires large amounts of data with snippets of micro-interactions sutured together to give a sense of the larger pattern. Due to the latent possibilities of misinterpreting the significance of events, I used an arbitrary rule of thumb requiring two further corroborating sources, either informant testimony or the published journalistic record, before citing footage. This also demanded some degree of judgement and an intimate knowledge of the case. For example, when studying video or photographs of sequences of interactions between protestors and soldiers in Midan al-Tahrir, I found that the urban environment, including shop signs, adverts, or even the shapes of buildings in the background, provided invaluable clues as to where the action was taking place. Other observational data, such as light levels to gauge the time of day, the presence or absence or certain actors, and the use of certain chants and not others, all helped to situate recordings in their proper context. With this kind of detective work, video footage and still photographs allow us to view dimensions of contentious episodes that might otherwise fall beneath the threshold of historical visibility. We also get a very different perspective on how protest unfolds. Captured in real time, contention appears unruly and emotional, with micro-interactions appearing to be formative in explaining situational outcomes (Collins 2008).

13 I owe this point to Randall Collins (personal correspondence 9 Sept. 2013).
**Event Catalogue**

An event catalogue is a “set of descriptions of multiple social interactions collected from a delimited set of sources according to relatively uniform procedures” (Tilly 2002: 249). Event catalogues have a long history in the study of contentious politics (e.g. Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; Tilly 1995), with data usually drawn from newspapers, journals and periodicals (Franzosi 1987; Maney and Oliver 2001; Earl et al. 2004). The event catalogue (n=2685) that I draw on in chapter 3, derives from protest reports published in the print edition of the Muslim Brothers’ Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) daily newspaper, *al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala*.14

Because of the nature of the source, i.e. a partisan newspaper reporting on its own activities, I began by conducting a pilot study, coding all the protests as reported in *al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* in September 2013. To check for reporting bias, I compared the reporting with video footage uploaded to dedicated anti-coup channels on Youtube and Bambuser.15 I then took a random sample of protest reports (by date and location) between June and February 2014, and conducted a further search. In all, I matched protest reports published in *al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* to over two hundred videos and live streams of anti-coup protests.

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14 In the six months following the 3 July coup, *al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* was the most reliable source for coverage of the anti-coup mobilization. An enforced media blackout meant that the vast majority of anti-coup protests went unreported in the Egyptian press. International news media, meanwhile, rarely operate outside of Cairo, and foreign correspondents lacked both the resources and the editorial inclination to report on the daily anti-coup protests taking place across the country. The anti-coup movement has recently begun to publish its own event data, see here: [http://www.coupmonitor.com/protest-map.html](http://www.coupmonitor.com/protest-map.html).

15 Most governorates have a Youtube and Bambuser (for live streaming) account, which act as aggregators for anti-coup protest footage and photographs. These accounts are maintained by one of several ‘against the coup’ movements (harakāt didd al-inqilāb). One reason for the anti-coup movement’s meticulous recording and uploading of protests is to generate video footage for *Al Jazeera Mubashir Misr*, the Egypt-focused channel of the Qatar-based satellite network. *Mubashir Misr* provides anti-coup protestors with pre-paid 3G-enabled smart phones (usually Galaxy Samsung S4s), which come with high quality cameras that can be used to record and stream the protests (interview Yousef 1 Feb. 2014; interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014). As I subsequently discovered, protest reports carried in the FJP newspaper were simultaneously posted to the FJP’s online news website (now defunct), often accompanied with videos or livestreams of the protests, making searches of social media unnecessary.
One representative protest report reads as follows (see Figure 1):

The city of Damietta witnessed a march that began in front of al-Matbuli mosque following Friday prayer, in which thousands of residents participated. The rally toured Abdulrahman Street, arriving at the Nile Corniche, where the participants formed a human chain by the side of the road, holding photographs and posters denouncing the coup (*al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala*, 14 Sept. 2013: 1).

Figure 2 shows how this is coded in the event catalogue. I found video footage of the Damietta protest on the Damietta anti-coup movement Youtube channel. Comparing the article with the video record gives a sense of the accuracy of the reporting. The video has been clearly edited for length and lasts for eight minutes. In the bottom right-hand corner of the video is a date stamp and a banner that reads “Damietta – March al-Matbuli mosque – 13/09/2013.” In the video we see protestors assemble outside of a mosque before marching down a main road until they reach the Nile Corniche, where the protestors form a human

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8 مسیرات تجوب
مختلف أنحاء دمیاط

باقی شوارع دمیاط الجديدة. كما
شهدت مدينة دمیاط سریعاً من امام
سعد المبرک على صلاة الجمعة،
شارکه فيها الآلاف من الآلاف وعُلی
شارع عبد الرزاق منصور إلى مُناری
الخیل، حيث استفاد المشارکین في
سلسلة بشرة على جابر السراب
واقع الحور وال числ و القند معتددة
بالانقلاب العسكري المسرور. كما
شهدت مناطق البصرة وكتیب الداعیة
وكثر النشأة ومدينة الأوفیا ولاية
السعودیة، على صلاة الجمعة.
شارکه فيها الآلاف الآلاف عشیرین
الشعارات المنضدية للانقلاب، و ملفت
شعارات راية وصور الشهداء.

Figure 1. *al-Hurriyya wa-š-’Adala*, 14 Sept. 2013: 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Protest size</th>
<th>First repertoire</th>
<th>Second repertoire</th>
<th>Protest start location</th>
<th>Protest end location</th>
<th>After Friday prayer</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Against the coup mvmt</th>
<th>Ultras</th>
<th>Repression (Deaths, wounded, arrests)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13/09/13</td>
<td>Damietta</td>
<td>Damietta</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>Rally</td>
<td>Human chain</td>
<td>Mosque</td>
<td>Main road</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Anti-coup event catalogue entry #1459.
chain, holding banners and chanting anti-coup slogans.\textsuperscript{17} The number of protestors appears consistent with the reporting.\textsuperscript{18} The most significant discrepancy is a failure to note the large number of women in the crowd. Other protest reports do record female participation and this is a variable that appears in the event catalogue, including for protests in Damietta, suggesting that this is an issue of underreporting, but not a systematic reporting bias. Tallied against the video footage, the Damietta protest report otherwise appears highly accurate, with date, protest location, size and repertoire faithfully relayed.

There is evidence to suggest a more general underreporting of protests. For instance, I found videos of anti-coup protests uploaded to social media sites that were not reported in the newspaper. FJP journalists acknowledge this underreporting and attribute it to the challenges of obtaining protest reports when the paper was being clandestinely produced (personal correspondence Mustafa 28 Nov. 2013). While there was no apparent geographic bias in report selection, it did appear to be the case that larger actions or those that came under attack, or involved some innovative tactic, were more likely to be reported on days with high numbers of protests.

\textsuperscript{17} The Corniche is coded as a “main road”. As will become apparent in chapter 3, there is an important distinction between a “main road” and a “residential street.” This nuance derives from protest reports themselves. A main road, such as the Damietta Corniche, is a high-traffic, public area. It thus follows that protests in these spaces are more disruptive and more visible than a residential street populated by housing and small businesses. In the lexicon of anti-coup protest reports, protests that begin or end on main roads, or other high-traffic areas such as a Corniche, are referenced as “\textit{turuq ra’isiyya}” (main roads). By contrast, anti-coup protests that begin or end in residential areas are recorded as occurring in “the local streets of the neighbourhood” (\textit{fi shawārī’al-hayy}).

\textsuperscript{18} For protest size, I followed the inferential coding convention used in the European Protest and Coercion Dataset (Francisco n.d.). Reports frequently described protest size using terms such as “thousands,” “tens of thousands,” and “hundreds of thousands,” instead of definite numbers. Checked against the video evidence, I decided to use a conservative inference in which “tens” would be coded “10;” “hundreds” would be coded “100;” thousands would be coded “1000;” tens of thousands” would be coded “10000;” and “hundreds of thousands” would be coded “100000.” Following Francisco, to distinguish inferences from reported numbers, I record the inference with a final 1, e.g. 11, 101, 1001, and so on.
Figure 3. Online survey posted to female student anti-coup movement in Assiut (above) and the survey posted to the Facebook page of an anti-coup organizer (below).
Online Survey

In March 2014, I conducted an anonymous 27-question survey (n=287) in the closed Facebook groups and social media forums used by the anti-coup movement (see appendix).\(^\text{19}\) I used the survey platform Smart Survey because it supports Arabic language formatting and provides enhanced security features. The survey had an SSL encryption to prevent eavesdropping and was completely anonymous, collecting no IP or Geolocation data on participants. To ensure the integrity of the data, I limited the survey to one response per IP address. Because of the method of distribution, I insisted that the survey be posted with a standard blurb so as to avoid influencing the results (this was not always followed, although I saw no deliberate attempt to bias the response). I documented the distribution of the survey by taking screenshots as it was posted to the groups and profiles used by anti-coup activists (see Figure 3).

Online surveys suffer from a selection bias towards the most highly educated. Ideally, I would have conducted an in-person survey on anti-coup protests in several governorates. However, this proved impossible due to the risks posed to both informants and researchers. As such, I use the data tentatively and only to illustrate points otherwise supported by informant testimony.

The Structure of the Thesis

Each chapter is presented as a standalone research article with its own research question, literature review, data and methods. As such, I have decided not to

\(^{19}\) I did so with the help of two informants who administrate closed Facebook groups used by the ‘against the coup’ movements.
include a glossary, but instead to reintroduce acronyms and translations in each chapter where relevant.

Chapter 1 uses video evidence, still photographs, Egyptian newspaper reports and informant testimony to explore the micro-interactions between protestors, the police and later the Egyptian army. Through a social interactionist lens, it argues that the chants, physical embraces, interactions with military vehicles, graffiti and more, belonged to an improvised fraternization repertoire that made immediate, emotional claims on the loyalty of regime troops. The effects of fraternization contained the possibilities of violence and forged a precarious solidarity that was co-opted by the military to legitimate its assumption of executive powers in the post-Mubarak democratic transition.

Turning to the post-Mubarak democratic transition, chapter 2 draws on interviews with Muslim Brothers and the movement’s publications. It begins by considering the part played by the Muslim Brothers in the 25th January Revolution and the nature of the revolutionary coalition that emerged in Egypt’s streets and squares. It then spotlights the Brothers’ demobilization and privileging of electoral and constitutional forums in the first eighteen months of the transition. The chapter argues that the Brothers’ decision to sit out further protests to focus on elections facilitated the breakup of the revolutionary coalition that had ousted Mubarak and insulated the SCAF from street-level mobilization, leaving bad legacies for Mursi’s year in office.

Chapter 3 begins by situating the Muslim Brothers’ decision to counter-mobilize in the months before the coup. Drawing on interviews with leading Muslim Brothers and anti-coup activists, it traces the origins of the anti-coup movement to a decision in December 2012 by the Muslim Brothers to establish a
street presence to defend Mursi’s presidency and considers the events leading up to the 3 July coup, the Brothers’ strategy of occupying public squares, and the formation of new ‘against the coup’ movements. Using event data and informant testimony, the chapter then charts how the repertoire, sites and timings of anti-coup contention were transformed by repression following the killing of over a thousand anti-coup protestors of 14 August 2014.

A concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the three articles and considers several unresolved questions, before concluding with some suggestions for new avenues for future research in the study of contentious politics and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution.
Chapter 1

“The army and the people are one hand!”
Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution*

el-geysh we-l-sha'b iyd wāhda! (The army and the people are one hand!)
———Chant first heard in Cairo, 28 Jan. 2011

At 5:00 p.m. on the afternoon of Friday, 28 January 2011, the Egyptian army was deployed onto the streets following three days of escalating protests. The order to leave barracks coincided with the withdrawal from Alexandria, Cairo, and the Suez of Interior Ministry-controlled Central Security Forces (CSF), the shock troops of President Hosni Mubarak’s regime, along with all other branches of Egyptian police, including prison guards and traffic police. Hours earlier, on this day anointed the “Friday of Anger,” columns of protestors from Cairo’s different neighborhoods and popular quarters had clashed with CSF units as they struggled to converge at Midan al-Tahrir, the locus of the previous days’ protests. A pitched battle was fought on the Kasr el-Nil Bridge as CSF troops blocked protestors advancing from Giza to downtown Cairo and the road to Tahrir. As elsewhere, the battle for Kasr el-Nil lasted most of the afternoon and culminated in the bottom-up defeat of the CSF, but only after protestors endured armored vans plowing indiscriminately into their ranks and seemingly endless volleys of tear gas, water cannon, and shotgun pellets. By early evening, increasing numbers, bloodied from the afternoon’s fighting, began arriving in the Midan. Approaching Tahrir, many of

them, in some cases still pursuing vestiges of the CSF, would encounter newly arriving armored units of the Egyptian army.

How protestors came to terms with the army's deployment amidst unprecedented mobilizations against Mubarak's seemingly entrenched dictatorship has hitherto received little to no attention in either Arabic or English-language journalistic accounts, or in the emerging academic literature on the 25th January Revolution. I address this lacuna by drawing on informant testimonies, Arabic and English-language newspapers and blogs, and analysis of photographs and video footage to recount fragmentary micro-histories of these encounters, from the first rush to surround newly arriving Egyptian army armored personnel carriers (APCs) to sustained protestor-soldier interactions over the course of the revolution.

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20 One important exception is Atef Said (2012: 405–11), who draws on informant testimony detailing protestors' reactions to the army's arrival. I thank an anonymous CSSH reviewer for bringing this paper to my attention, and Atef Said for sharing his paper prior to its publication. I note that our informants highlight many of the same episodes, a point that is especially suggestive given the dearth of published accounts. Another relevant study is that published by Jeffrey Alexander, who has called the 25th January the "performative revolution" (2011). While I am receptive to Alexander's stress on performance, his list of sacred and profane objects in protestor performances omits the Egyptian army entirely, despite the vast array of performances, many of which I will discuss here, that include or reference the army (ibid.: 18). Alexander's omission can seem justified if one accepts his claim that to those in Tahrir, "by the evening of 29 January, the side that the army was taking had become manifest and clear" (ibid.: 79). In contrast, I aver that the army was prominent in protestor's performances precisely because their position vis-à-vis the struggle to oust Mubarak was, to many protestors, manifestly unclear, and these performances figured as kinds of claim-making.

21 I followed the 25th January Revolution on an al-Jazeera live stream ensconced in a French research institute in Damascus, Syria. I arrived in Cairo in May 2011, just as Syrians intensified their own mobilizations against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Interviews were conducted in both Arabic and English. I include on two occasions email correspondence with protestors who were not available for face-to-face interviews. I found it impossible to trace soldiers stationed in the Midan—the Egyptian Central Military Command is not a researcher-friendly institution—while appeals to the relatives of these soldiers to forward to me their recollections went largely unanswered. As a result, the picture that emerges is an incomplete one, told almost exclusively from the perspective of civilian protestors. When citing informant testimony, I use the first name to preserve the condition of anonymity under which testimony was gathered.

22 Newspaper articles were sourced from the newspaper archives at the American University in Cairo. I reviewed the print editions of the three major "independent" Arabic-language newspapers in Egypt at the time—Al-Dostor, Al-Masry Al-Youm, and Al-Shorouk—and the English-language Egyptian Daily Gazette.

23 I assembled an extensive photographic and video archive from Internet-based searches and material shared by protestors. The video footage I reference has been edited and uploaded to my Youtube channel: www.youtube.com/user/nfketchley.
fifteen days from the army’s initial deployment to Hosni Mubarak’s resignation. Drawing on these largely occluded interactions, I address a question that recurs both in histories of political struggle and in the ongoing Arab Spring: how did protestors succeed in co-opting or neutralizing the threat posed by security forces assumed to be loyal to a regime that was determined to end protest?

With that puzzle in mind, I develop a social interactionist approach to explain the prevalence of protestors chanting in the name of the army, graffiting and climbing aboard military vehicles, sleeping in tank tracks, and physically embracing and posing for photographs with soldiers, in and around Midan al-Tahrir. I bring these together by excavating a category of action common to histories and handbooks of social protest: fraternization. Fraternization is an intuitively familiar idiom of contentious street politics that dates back to at least the eighteenth century. Then, insurgent Europeans would mount barricades and call out to those regime forces sent to put down their insurrection, entreating them to listen to their demands, hoping that, “face-to-face contact and a frank sharing of perspectives would forge an indissoluble bond capable of overcoming any initial antagonism” (Traugott 2010: 209). The effects of fraternization on army discipline during the 1848 French Revolution were so disastrous that army officers would later order that any approaching fraternizer be shot, lest their soldiers succumb (ibid.: 211).

Leon Trotsky (2003 [1932]: 136–44) became perhaps the most famous proponent of fraternization, when, in his history of the Russian Revolution, he encouraged future revolutionaries to get physically close so that they might provoke that “psychological moment” when soldiers could contemplate to which
side they belonged. Such was the association between fraternization and revolutionary socialism that it was first formally studied by an English aristocrat, Katherine Chorley, who, in her bid to combat the “Militant Left,” warned military officers of its dangers: "An important method for tampering with the morale of troops ... used where the soldiers are dispersed in relatively small numbers in such a way that there can be personal contact between them and the insurgent population ... [fraternization] implies any method of winning sympathy, from direct argument and persuasion to the generation by one means or another of that subtle emotional sense of an underlying community of sentiment and interests between troops and people" (1973 [1943]: 158–59). Fraternization continues to be prescribed by such luminaries of protest as Gene Sharp (1980: 250; 2005 [1973]: 146–47), doyen of non-violent direct action and compiler of "how-to" protest manuals, as a tactic to usurp the grip of an occupying military power.

In this paper, I build on new theoretical directions and empirical priorities in the study of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2006a; 2008), and literatures on the micro-interactional aspects of ritual (Goffman 1971; 1972; Collins 2004) and violence (Collins 2008), to pose fraternization as a repertoire of contentious performances that make immediate, situational claims on the loyalty of regime security forces. During the 25th January Revolution, fraternization performances initially emerged as improvised techniques of micro-
conflict avoidance. This occurred first with CSF troops during protests on 28 January, and continued later in and around Midan al-Tahrir after protestors attacked newly arriving tanks and APCs. During other episodes, fraternizing protestors made claims on army units to guarantee their security, especially when threatened by other pro-Mubarak forces. Thanks to these and other performances, protestors and soldiers developed a polyvalent repertoire that came to ritualistically structure protestors-soldier interactions by producing visceral, if often contingent feelings and symbols of protestors-soldier solidarity. Here, I explore fraternizing and the “generative power of the practices of protest” (Dzenovska and Arenas 2012: 675) in constructing a precarious “internal frontier” (Laclau 2007), which balanced protestors’ desires for security with their demands to bifurcate Mubarak’s governmental apparatus from what would become a re-aggregated claim to sovereignty in the name of the army and the people.25

The social interactionist lens through which I marshal instances of fraternization in Tahrir can be traced back to Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s Dynamics of Contention (2001). That work set out to de-compartmentalize the study of riots, strikes, revolutions, social movements, and other transgressive modes of politics, and view them instead under the common rubric of contentious politics, defined as “episodic, public, collective interaction

25 I am indebted to two of the anonymous CSSH reviewers for their detailed comments that helped me to develop this point and for the phrasing of a “precarious” solidarity. Parenthetically, it is important to note that I refer, rather conveniently, to “protestors” to signify a mobilized bloc interacting with the army. This might appear unsatisfactory on two fronts: First, in Arabic-language accounts from the 25th January Revolution, this bloc is usually referred to in the plural as mutazāhirūn (demonstrators) and only on occasion as muhtajūn (protestors). I use the latter for stylistic purposes. Second, I do not account for the ways in which protestors developed their own repertoire to sustain a frontier that overcame social heterogeneity to make claims in the name of “the people.” I am, in effect, leaving untold the process of mobilization. This itself is worthy of study, and is left unresolved here except in discussing, apropos of fraternizing with the army, how fraternization performances coordinated action in the name of “the people” when protestors made claims on soldiers.
among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants” (ibid.: 5). My mode and manner of analysis, following Tilly and his “recovering structuralist” (Tarrow 2006) collaborators, is agentic and relational, and treats “social interaction, social ties, communication and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 22).

“People” Tilly noted, “make claims with words such as condemn, oppose, resist, demand, beseech, support, and reward. They also make claims with actions such as attacking, expelling, defacing, cursing, cheering, throwing flowers, singing songs, and carrying heroes on their shoulders” (2008: 6). In this, Tilly would observe that political contention often resembles, “loosely scripted theatre” (2006a: 41). By way of two appropriately theatrical metaphors, he suggested that “presenting a petition, taking a hostage, or mounting a demonstration constitutes a performance linking at least two actors, a claimant and an object of claims ... [and] performances clump into repertoires of claim-making routines” (ibid.: 35).

Ultimately, Tilly sets out to show how repertoires of contention delimit the possibilities of popular politics, and how this process is shaped by, and in turn shapes, political regimes; especially a regime’s degree of democratic participation and its capacity to police dissent. I depart from Tilly to travel in the opposite direction, toward the micro-interactional dimensions of contentious claim-making and the formativeness of contentious performances in shaping situational

26 This revisionist turn has not been universally well received; see Mobilization (2003) and McAdam and Tarrow (2011).
In making this move, I take inspiration from Randall Collins (2010) in asking how a contentious performance makes claims on regime agents through stimulating feelings of solidarity, and comes to figure as an interaction ritual—“a mechanism of mutually focused emotion and attention producing a momentarily shared reality, which thereby generates solidarity and symbols of group membership” (Collins 2004: 7).

### How to Protest Smartly

During the 25th January Revolution, fraternization performances were not limited to coping with the army’s unexpected arrival. Protestors also fraternized with black-uniformed CSF troops, although this occurred only sporadically and involved a much narrower range of performances. Spectacular video footage exists, for example, of protestors fraternizing with a CSF unit in Alexandria on 28 January.

As protestors approached a line of truncheon and shield-wielding CSF, there was

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27 This compliments Tilly’s (2008: 35) own call for more refined evidence on performances and repertoires that, “look inside individual episodes to analyze the interplay of actors, interactions, and contentious claims.” In this regard, a Tilly-inspired social interactionist account of occupied Midan al-Tahrir is implicitly taking a position regarding the sociology of crowds. The study of crowds dates to Le Bon (1977 [1896]), who was concerned with supposedly anarchic crowds in the French Revolution. Le Bon and his interlocutors would go on to establish crowds as a central concern for the new discipline of sociology (see Borch 2012). That early literature has, however, been much maligned by social historians for its propensity to pathologize crowds as irrational, threatening, and driven by criminal intent (Rudé 1959; Lefebvre 1965). In one of Tilly’s (1978) earliest studies he explicitly distanced himself from the singular analysis of crowds, pursuing instead a rationalistic and structuralist conception of collective action tied to macro-processes of social change. In a later work, Tilly (2006b) re-engaged the study of crowds to explore how movement members organize themselves in public using the principle of “WUNC”—collective worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment—to legitimize their claim-making. How a sociology of contentious crowds grounded in the micro-interactive dimensions of claim-making would relate to Tilly’s goal of a unified theory of contentious politics is one of the unfulfilled promises suggested by this and Tilly’s last work (2008) on contentious performance.

28 The study of contentious politics as played out in emotional and ritual-laden fields is not without precedent (see, variously, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000; 2001; 2007; Collins 2001; Aminzade and McAdam 2001). These works, though, tend to remain conceptually and empirically limited to what might be thought of as the meso-level of social movement organizations, either in terms of framing processes, resource mobilization, or political opportunity structures, and so, therefore, do not account for the micro-interactive and emotional aspects of contentious performances.

no clash: rather, protestors moved to kiss, hug, and embrace individual soldiers, all the while disrupting their formation. While individual troopers attempted to maintain their distance, others were physically encircled, remonstrated, and pleaded with. In the video, the effects of these interactions are profound: both protestors and soldiers visibly moved to tears.

In and around Tahrir, it is important to note, women were often in the vanguard of would-be fraternizers; this suggests that fraternization as contentious performance belies the masculine, exclusivist solidarity implied by the word’s etymology. In Cairo on the same day, for instance, the image of a woman kissing the cheek of a CSF trooper featured in both local and international news coverage (see Figure 4). In that photograph, the trooper continues to stare straight ahead, seemingly unaffected by the kiss; a clue to his emotional detachment? The riot helmets of his colleagues are visible over his shoulder, perhaps suggesting a unit whose internal discipline and solidarity remains intact. Later that afternoon, near the famous Groppi restaurant in downtown Cairo, further incidents of fraternization occurred when advancing protestors isolated twenty CSF troopers. That unit had exhausted its ammunition and found itself cut off from the main CSF lines barring protestors’ advance to Midan al-Tahrir. Surrounded, protestors moved to embrace them, chanting, “These are poor men following orders.” They then formed a cordon around the riot police and escorted them to safety, while the protestors were soon subjected to fresh attacks from CSF units stationed further down the road who fired tear gas at them (el-Refai 2011).

Likewise, this photograph’s popularity recalls a set of fraternization performances familiar to contemporary histories of contentious politics in which both male and female protestors hand out flowers, kiss members of security forces, or place flowers in rifle barrels as happened variously during anti-Vietnam protests in the United States, the Portuguese “Carnation Revolution” of 1974, and the Filipino People Power Revolution.
Figure 4. A woman kisses a member of the CSF, Cairo, 28 Jan. 2011 (Lefteris Pitarakis/AP/Press Association Images).
These instances of fraternizing with the CSF were exceptional, and most CSF interactions with protestors were characterized by violence. Informants frequently attributed this to an irreconcilable hatred for the CSF, who are frequently brutal in their policing of street politics, although as the examples above indicate this does not rule out fraternization entirely. Alternatively, we might observe that the CSF were trained in crowd control and equipped with ranged weapons including water cannon, shotguns, rubber bullets, and tear gas. The tactics they employed leading up to the army’s deployment made liberal use of these weapons, the emphasis being on controlling space and maintaining distance between the two sides, which made fraternization impossible in most cases. Even when protestors encountered units of riot police in non-conflict situations, the CSF engaged in techniques of intimidation. One observer, during the prelude to the march on Kasr el-Nil, recalled, “When the first protestors appeared ... the policemen closed ranks. They began to stamp the heels of their boots rhythmically on the tarmac, and to let out low, guttural sounds. It was meant to be a scary warning. And it worked” (Trombetta, 2013: 142).

This question of distance remains key in many respects. The relative absence of fraternization with ranged-weapon wielding CSF troops is broadly consistent with micro-sociological studies (Collins 2008), which suggest that the frequency and intensity of violence is situationally affected by distance and shared emotional moods.31 By intimidating protestors, maintaining distance, and attacking with ranged weapons, the CSF increased both the fear of further

31 For further evidence of this dynamic, Khalid Fahmy (2013) details how, on 28 January, after setting off on a march from Giza to Tahrir his group unexpectedly encountered a CSF trooper wielding a tear gas gun. As the distance between the two sides narrowed and amid salvoes of teargas, Khalid recounts, “He shouted at us, ‘Don’t come any closer’ and we responded, ‘So don’t shoot at us.’ He shook his head and said in a clear Upper Egyptian accent, ‘This is wrong. There’s something wrong here.’ He lowered his gun and collapsed weeping.”
confrontations and the situational tension experienced by CSF troops and protesters alike, all the while negating the possibility of interactional solidarity and making further violence more likely. As the examples above suggest, and as we will encounter later, fraternization performances were initially used by protestors to transform these emotional moods, to try to inculcate feelings of solidarity between fraternizer and fraternized in ways that limited the opportunities for violence to break out.

Fraternizing with the CSF and later the army has been claimed as a tactic by the “April 6” Movement, a prominent youth activist group that conducted activist training focused on protest tactics prior to 25 January. They taught chants and embodied actions similar to those that I will identify in the fraternization repertoire. Similarly, an anonymously authored Arabic-language protest handbook entitled, “How to protest smartly” and illustrated by women physically embracing and posing for photographs with CSF soldiers (see Figure 5), circulated in Cairo days before 28 January, urging activists to, “try to bring individual policemen and soldiers to the side of the people” (Kayfa Tathūr bi-Hadāʾa 2011: 3). I largely discount the relevance of both of these sources due to my repeated inability to locate graduates of protest workshops, or readers of such manuals, during the formative moments when protestors began to fraternize. Instead, fraternization appears to have emerged, not under the direction of trained activists, or from learned maneuvers outlined in handbooks, but rather in a

Collins (2008: ch. 2) suggests this is why snipers, fighter pilots, and drone operators tend to inflict the highest casualty rates, since distance from those deemed hostile, coupled with greater technical competence and ranged weaponry, allows for the overcoming of confrontational tension and fear. We find here a link with Gene Sharp’s writings on non-violent action. Members of “April 6” have known connections with Serbia’s Otpor movement, which was partially inspired by Sharp’s work. Arabic-language versions of his The Politics of Nonviolent Action circulated in Egypt prior to 25 January (Rosenburg 2011). Still, I tend to concur with As’ad AbuKhalil (2011), who argues that Sharp’s influence has been overstated, mostly to sate the desire among commentators to locate a Western “guiding hand” behind the 25th January Revolution.
Figure 5. “The police and the people together against oppression. Long live Egypt!” (Kayfa Tathūr bi-Hadā‘a: Ma‘lūmāt wa Taktikāt Hāmma 2011: 22).
manner akin to what James C. Scott (1979) has called, “the revolution in the revolution.” In other words, there appears to have been a strong element of improvisation and innovation in these actions quite independent of any orchestrating hand or radical leadership. Protestors arriving to Midan al-Tahrir responded to the introduction of a new force in Egyptian street politics by improvising claim-making performances that sought to establish the “norms of co-mingling” (Goffman 1971: xi) between protestors and soldiers, ineluctably drawing those army units to the revolution’s side.

**Fraternizing the Egyptian Army**

At the end of a busy news day, international news media on 28 January showed nighttime Cairo, army vehicles passing through the streets. That evening’s Associated Press (2011) package was typical of the coverage: it showed footage of protestors ostensibly welcoming tanks and APCs, before reporting that the headquarters of Mubarak’s NDP party were ablaze, Egyptian Internet service providers had cut access, and mobile phone coverage had been similarly disrupted, and then concluding with scenes from the monumental battle for the Kasr el-Nil bridge.

In and around Midan al-Tahrir the situation was manifestly more complicated. As far as I have been able to establish, the first documented encounter between protestors and soldiers occurred around 5:20 p.m.: tanks and APCs were reported entering downtown Cairo and heading for the state radio and television stations at Maspero, not far from the National Museum’s entrance to Midan al-

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34 For a discussion on the “leaderful” (as opposed to “leaderless”) character of the 25th January Revolution, see Chalcraft 2012.
The arrival of a lone, Soviet-era, Egyptian Army APC near the 6 October bridge was captured by *Al-Jazeera English Live*. In this footage, daylight is giving way to dusk as the 5:30 p.m. *maghrib* (sunset) prayer approaches. A crowd of some thirty protestors sights the vehicle and immediately surrounds it, gesticulating, beckoning others to join. Young men quickly begin to haul themselves aboard. The crowd around the APC increases to eighty or a hundred as more protestors arrive. The soldiers atop are largely left undisturbed. Within a few seconds, the APC begins to reverse away. Those who had successfully climbed aboard the APC jump free. A small number give chase as the vehicle backs away.

That same, lone APC was caught on camera shortly afterward by *Al Jazeera Arabic Live*, only a few hundred meters from where the first, fleeting interaction took place. Dusk has not yet arrived, suggesting that little time has passed. The APC has broken down and is being pushed by soldiers. In a 50-second clip, seven pedestrians walk past the vehicle, paying it no attention. Two young men sit on the Nile’s bank looking out away from the stricken APC. Traffic continues to move around it. The camera pans out to the 6th October Bridge above. Protestors cross the bridge from the Giza side, heading toward Maspero and Tahrir, passing abandoned cars, the remnants of the afternoon’s traffic.

35 *Al-Dostor’s* live blog of the day’s events, updated despite limited Internet access in the country, gives a good account of the army’s movement as they left barracks and moved into the city (*Al-Dostor* 2011a).
38 This apparent obliviousness to events is a reminder, omitted from breathless accounts of the 25th January Revolution, that Cairo did not simply stop functioning with the occupation of Midan al-Tahrir. For the eighteen days of the revolution, outside of protest hotspots (including pro-Mubarak counter-demonstrations), life for the vast majority of the city’s residents continued at varying degrees of normality. The main disruption was the withdrawal of police; popular committees were established in residential areas that maintained their own patrols and often constructed checkpoints limiting the flow of traffic. The city’s unmobilized residents would form a competing frontier that spoke in the name of “the people,” the so-called *hizb al-kanaba* (party of the sofa), a term adopted by Egyptian chat shows, newspapers, and social media to signify the millions of seemingly apathetic Egyptians who followed the 25th January Revolution on television.
It is here we begin to see the incipient contours of the fraternization repertoire. From that first rush to surround the soon-to-be-broken-down APC, we find a fraternization performance that amounts to a ritualized trespassing. The juxtaposition above is particularly useful in delineating the emergence of trespassing as a contentious performance belonging to the fraternization repertoire. This dynamic is rendered all the clearer by understanding the ubiquity of the military and its boundaries in Egypt. Any Egyptian taxi driver picking up fares in Cairo or one of Egypt’s other cities, either prior to or after the 25th January Revolution, would as a matter of routine encounter the army in everyday life.

Traveling from the outskirts to the center of Cairo, our imaginary taxi driver will drive by numerous barracks, administrative buildings, army hotels, and officers’ clubs, army-specific bank branches, pharmacies, and sports clubs, and other elements of a literal military-industrial complex, which as a percentage of the national economy is “too vast and dispersed to estimate with any confidence” (Marshall and Stacher 2012: 12). Around sensitive military installations or presidential buildings, or when crossing into a different governorate or approaching the Suez Canal, our driver must pass through manned military checkpoints.

In this partial cityscape, military space is well organized and respected, with clearly defined borders. Military installations often have high walls and watchtowers, and it is common to see signs around them written in Arabic and English announcing that photography is forbidden. As I discovered while researching this paper, photographing army vehicles, be the photographer a

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39 Here the suggestion is that fraternization began as individual performances that coalesced into a repertoire as the days passed. I am grateful to Sidney Tarrow for encouraging me to consider this point.
40 On the micro-interactive aspect of borders, markers, and territories, see Goffman (1971: 40–44).
northern European male or his Egyptian brother-in-law, is only possible if done surreptitiously. People passing through military checkpoints tend to go to extraordinary lengths to observe the boundary markers soldiers place around their territory. On my daily walk from Dokki in Giza, I passed through two military checkpoints to access a shortcut via the Pakistani and Yemeni embassies and arrive at the metro station. Soldiers stationed there had placed crowd-control barriers on the corners of both entrances, partially blocking the pavement. Pedestrians, I observed, would seldom sidestep the barrier, manned by a soldier who was frequently bored; they preferred instead to step down into the road, continue there for 20 meters until they passed the second checkpoint, cross another small road, and remount the pavement. The pavement on my shortcut had effectively become military territory.

During the fifteen days between the army's initial deployment and Mubarak's resignation, there emerged a set of performances which through their emulation and recursion challenged this “right of separateness” (Goffman 1972: 69) enjoyed by the army, and came to figure as interaction rituals. The response by protestors at first sighting army vehicles was to trespass, first by surrounding the vehicle and then by hauling themselves aboard. Pedestrians passing the stricken APC otherwise respected the established boundaries of military space. In shaping micro-interactions, the mounting of Egyptian army vehicles asserted a right to physical co-presence that allowed for other kinds of fraternization later. One cannot overstate the importance of trespassing and the demand to share military space in literally setting the stage for other fraternization performances. Goffman explains, “It is apparent that a precondition for the performance of ... rituals is that the giver and the receiver be in contact, whether face-to-face or mediated. No
contact, no interpersonal ritual” (1971: 71). One of my key arguments here is that as physical distance between protestors and security forces decreases, we should find an attending increase in ritualized interaction and a decrease in sociological distance; that is to say, the embodied representation that “the army and the people are one hand” is a plausible performance. If fraternization requires physical co-presence, it is equally apparent that accessing police, soldiers, or other arms of a state’s apparatus of violence is often difficult: security forces jealously guard the boundaries of their territories and their right to organize that space.

Egyptian soldiers did not simply surrender their vehicles in this regard. In the first encounter with protestors, the APC reversed away when it seemed about to be enveloped by the crowd. As protestors continued along the Nile Corniche, still clashing with the rearguard of retreating CSF units, they encountered further APCs on the road to Maspero. Initially, when approaching the first such army vehicle, protestors took shelter behind it from CSF tear gas and rubber bullets. Many more stood off the vehicle’s sheltering flank to arc stones at the CSF; the APC marked the new frontline of the protestors’ offensive. After the CSF troops retreated, numbers remained with the APC. No longer gathered on just one side, they corralled the vehicle with their bodies, the most enterprising pulling themselves on board. Informants reported soldiers manning the vehicles initially trying to stop this, often demanding that the crowd open up so as to allow the vehicle free movement. Indeed, this was a common scene in footage from 28 January and into the next morning, as soldiers attempted to assert control over their vehicles. As will

41 See footage: [http://youtu.be/mYYgTohq_YY](http://youtu.be/mYYgTohq_YY).
42 See footage: [http://youtu.be/WA55CKbqBo4](http://youtu.be/WA55CKbqBo4). This Associated Press video, filmed on the morning of 29 January on the road to Tahrir from Maspero, shows a soldier trying to push a protestor off his APC. Protestors below hold an Egyptian flag penned with the slogan, “Down with Mubarak” as they chant, “The army and the people will complete the task.” After passing the flag to their comrade
become apparent, though, protestors could not be deterred in their trespassing, and they made continual claims to access military vehicles and their personnel, all indicative of a crowd that accepted no boundaries aside from those of its own making, especially boundaries that might allow soldiers to remain neutral bystanders in the struggle against Mubarak.

The Army and the People Are One Hand!

As night fell, protestors gathered outside Maspero, near the National Museum entrance to Midan al-Tahrir. The situation was in flux, and running battles between CSF units and protestors on the road leading to Maspero had been replaced by an uneasy calm. Newly arrived Egyptian army units in APCs and battle tanks, some identifiable by their claret and blue insignia as belonging to the Republican Guard, had taken position outside Maspero. Armed soldiers wearing gas masks—necessary given the volume of tear gas fired by the recently departed CSF—manned the windows and entrances to the large, convex building.

In video recorded by the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm, protestors can be seen climbing atop stationed army vehicles, many waving flags and cheering on their comrades.43 It is outside Maspero that we hear for the first time protestors chanting, “The people and the army are one hand.”44 The footage continues with a Republican Guard officer using his signal flag to hit a protestor trying to board an APC. In informant testimony, the interactions with the army have been described above, he tries to hand it to the soldier and when he refuses to take it, attempts to wrap him in it. Clearly exasperated by the persistence of the protestor, the soldier gives up and moves on to remove the next trespasser.


Here the chant takes the form “The people and the army are one hand,” as opposed to “The army and the people are one hand.” I came across both instances regularly and interchangeably, both on that night and during the 25th January Revolution generally. However, in the formulation adopted by the military post-revolution, the army always precedes the people.
as a negotiation, in which a shared emotional mood of victory after having defeated the hated CSF was tempered by fear of the Guards attacking (interview Youssef 13 Aug. 2011; interview Abdullah 13 Oct. 2011).\footnote{The protestors had good reason to suspect the Republican Guard. Egyptian press would report their facilitating pro-Mubarak rallies outside the presidential palace, and even distributing posters of the President to his supporters (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 3 Feb. 2011: 6).} One informant, Khalid, told me that ad hoc meetings were held between protestors and army officers to try and establish what the army’s role was to be in the unfolding events (interview Khalid 13 Oct. 2011). From his own ethnographic data, Atef Said speaks of the army’s presence as a “black box”—an unknown element that provoked “anxiety and uncertainty” (2012: 408). While elated by the unprecedented defeat of the CSF, nobody was sure what would happen next.

The army had only twice before been deployed onto Egyptian streets: once in 1977 during the Bread Uprising (Intifādat al-Khubz; alternatively Thawrat al-Harāmiyya, “the Thieves’ Revolution”), and again in 1986 to put down a revolt by CSF officers. On the evening of 28 January, these previous interventions were referenced to highlight the potential threat of soldiers attacking protestors. One activist who arrived in Midan al-Tahrir after setting off on a march from a populous district in eastern Cairo recounts:

Rumours ran in Tahrir that Mubarak ordered the army to descend in the streets. How did the protesters feel towards the army? On several occasions since I joined the march in Nasr City, and till we reached Tahrir, some protesters were calling on the army to intervene and “protect them from the police” like what happened in Tunisia. And when tanks showed up in Tahrir speeding towards Garden City to protect the U.S. and U.K. embassies, many protesters cheered their arrival. But at the same time, I also witnessed
several occasions where the protesters intervened with anger against those who were chanting for the army, shouting: “Well, hasn’t the army been ruling now since 1952? Aren’t they responsible for the Egypt we have today? Didn’t they kill protesters in 1977? Who gave them the orders to intervene, Mubarak, right?” All those were questions and arguments that broke out on several occasions (el-Hamalawy 2011).

There is no sense that such historical episodes provided any interaction rituals or repertoire of contention for protestors to draw on when dealing with the army; these had to be improvised. 46 Outside of Maspero, nobody, least of all the newly deployed soldiers, seemed to know what part the army was to play in events. In response to the ambiguity of the situation, the crowd began to chant anew, demanding that Mubarak issue a statement.

At 10:50 p.m., a column of battle tanks and APCs departed from Maspero and approached Tahrir. Meanwhile, some remaining units of the CSF continued to fire tear gas and live ammunition into Tahrir from roads leading to the Interior Ministry. A rumor quickly spread that the army were coming to reinforce the CSF. As the column of army vehicles entered the Midan in single file, protestors chanted, “Are you with us, or are you with them?” Hazem, a veteran of the pitched battles fought that day on Kasr el-Nil bridge, describes the protestors’ reaction to the army’s arrival: “In general, as the army came into the square that night there was a very mixed mood—not just between protestors, but within them. It was a mix of fear and joy—as in ‘Yay, the army is here boys,’ to ‘Shit, they’re sending the army to attack us.’ I myself felt a lot like this. Rumors were erupting constantly. On the one

46 For an historical overview of the Egyptian army in state-society relations see, variously, Abdel Malik (1968); Fahmy (1997); Ramadan (1977); Springborg (1987); Kandil (2012).
hand, there was an initial belief that the army was here to take on the remaining police units guarding the Ministry of Interior. Then there was the rumor that they came to join forces with the police and would begin to attack us once they took hold of the square” (interview Hazem 9 Nov. 2011). To expand briefly on the content of the rumors: earlier in the afternoon during the battle for Kasr el-Nil, military police jeeps were reportedly seen re-supplying CSF units with tear gas and live ammunition as a military helicopter hovered over Tahrir. After the protestors had broken through CSF lines, a lone APC entered the Midan at speed, heading for the remnants of the CSF near the Interior Ministry. Protestors threw stones at it with little effect before it sped off.

Whether the rumors of the military rearming the CSF were true is not so important as that they sowed fear of further confrontations and situational tension in Tahrir when the army arrived. About 30 minutes after the column of army vehicles began to enter Tahrir a tank sat isolated in front of the Egyptian National Museum, some 400 meters from the center of Tahrir, its path blocked by protestors.47 The remaining vehicles continue on. A crowd of about a hundred people surrounded the tank and five young men climbed onto the turret to douse the tank with petrol before setting it alight. Stones were thrown at the vehicle, their ricochets audible in the video footage recorded by protestors. When the petrol proved ineffective, the young men poured it on rags, set them alight, and posted them in the tank’s vents. The vehicle “smoked-out,” the soldiers scrambled free, only to be attacked by members of the crowd.

Closer to the epicenter of Tahrir, more army vehicles were being attacked. One dramatic video captured on a mobile phone shows an APC entering the Midan

47 See footage: http://youtu.be/pjx_0YXs_Hw.
and skirting the western edge of Tahrir. Approximately twenty protestors run towards the APC, throwing stones. A second APC approaches, roof ablaze. The protestors who had been throwing stones stop and watch the vehicle. The second APC then wheels towards the protestors, mounting the pavement and scattering the stone throwers. The APC stops. Stone throwing reaches a new intensity as protestors surge towards the army vehicle chanting, “God is Great!” The number of protestors swells to about fifty. The fire on top of the APC goes out. Since the first APC’s appearance, less than a minute has elapsed: the second APC sits motionless. A voice (the cameraman?) shouts, “Set it on fire, set it on fire!” and the crowd takes up this chant. The stone throwing intensifies, and another voice shouts, “Stop, stop!” and now this chant is taken up, seemingly by the same voice previously calling for the fire. The crowd swells further. A man shouts, “Stop hitting them.” An element of the crowd begins to chant for the soldiers to surrender and this continues and develops in intensity as more voices join. A small group of protestors climbs on top of the APC, a fire is lit at the back of the vehicle. Somebody, possibly one of the fire lighters, exclaims, “There’s somebody inside, get him out!” The crowd around the burning APC thins out, and the protestors come to resemble spectators.

Aside from some surviving photographs (see Figure 6), this episode of protestors attacking army units in Tahrir is completely absent from any journalistic account of the 25th January Revolution. While I will not sustain this

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49 Alisdare, who arrived minutes after the initial attack, recalled metal poles being placed in the APC’s tracks to immobilize it (personal correspondence Alisdare 13 Jun. 2013).
50 I have been otherwise unable to establish the fate of those soldiers attacked; the Egyptian military has, however, acknowledged the deaths and injury of soldiers during the 25th January Revolution (Al-Dostor 2011c).
detailed narrative to cover the full period for which soldiers and protestors shared Tahrir, these few hours on the night of 28 January seem especially important. Here,
Figure 6. An Egyptian army APC on fire in Midan al-Tahrir, 28 Jan. 2011 (Goran Tomasevic/Reuters).
the action appears “eventful” (Sewell 2005) rather than following any structural, cultural, or ideological logics linked to the historical position of the Egyptian army in society, or to the fact that, its being a conscript army, most households have a male relative completing or having completed military service. Informants like Khalid, who had completed military service and, outside of the situation at hand, held a positive view of the Egyptian military, told me they felt threatened by the army’s presence during this and many of the other episodes I will discuss here. This is not to overstate or stylize the argument—several informants were equally insistent that Egyptian soldiers were irrevocably on the side of protestors, and celebrated their arrival. Here, an understanding rooted in the situational dynamics in which soldiers and protestors found themselves interacting explains these contradictory positions.

While the available chronology of events is partial, what we do know happened before, during, and after the attack maps well onto Randall Collins’s ideal-type of a “forward panic”:

A forward panic starts with tension and fear in a conflict situation. This is the normal condition of violent conflict, but here the tension is prolonged and built up; it has a dramatic shape of increasing tension, striving towards a climax.... There is a shift from relatively passive—waiting, holding back until one is in a position to bring a conflict to a head—to be fully active. When the opportunity finally arrives, the tension/fear comes out in an emotional rush.... Running forward or backward, in either case they are in an overpowering emotional rhythm, carrying them on to actions that they would normally not approve of in calm, reflective moments (2008: 85).
Upon the army’s arrival in Midan al-Tahrir a similar emotional release is observed, and then swiftly reined in. In the second attack, a voice is heard encouraging protestors to set the APC on fire, which is then echoed by other protestors who rush to attack the vehicle. Almost immediately the same voice calls for restraint. These contradictions, or reassessments, Collins argues, accompany the building up and release of emotional energy. In this sequence of events, what appears formative are the features of the situation—the buildup of tension, the existing situation of violence and continued presence of the CSF, the role played by rumors, and the point at which tension spilled over into a forward panic. For my discussion, what is key are the next moves that protestors make after exiting the emotional tunnel of attack.

Returning to the Midan, a military truck had followed the column of tanks and APCs and was similarly surrounded by protestors. The soldiers in the cab were pulled out and attacked, and informants reported ransacking of the truck’s cargo and the discovery of food rations. Soldiers manning nearby tanks then moved to intervene, and a protestors was pushed to the ground. While this drama unfolded, protestors commandeered the smoked-out tank, and even managed to pilot it forward a few meters (Shalaby 2011). A search of the tank discovered boxes of ammunition, tear gas canisters and grenades and, like the food, these were distributed to protestors in the Midan. Other army vehicles and soldiers were likewise attacked with two smoldering military jeeps littering Tahrir the next morning. One had been stopped and commandeered earlier in the evening as it entered Tahrir and found to contain live ammunition before being set ablaze (El-Hamalawy 2011).
When it appeared the situation would deteriorate further, informants recall, a group of protestors crowded round the remaining parked tanks chanting, “The army and the people are one hand” (interview Abdullah 2 21 Jul. 2011). In an act of micro-conflict avoidance, I would suggest, protestors chanted for the army as a means to dissipate fear of further confrontations and bring under control the situational anxiety felt by both sides. Fraternization techniques superseded any prolonging of attacks on soldiers, despite protestors being armed with weapons seized from the army, weapons many suspected had been intended for the CSF. That protestors did not, in effect, militarize the revolution, speaks to the constraints of the broader 25th January repertoire of contention, which cautioned against militarization through the chanting of silmiyya (peaceful) protest.

Significantly, it is here and elsewhere that we find the nascent formation of a new frontier in the struggle against Mubarak through the articulation of the collective subject of “the people.” Particularly cogent is Ernesto Laclau’s (2007) argument that the emergence of “the people” as a collective actor exists not as an a priori category, but proceeds instead through the formation of an antagonistic internal frontier, differentiating “the people” from power via the naming of demands. One chant from the broader 25th January repertoire that we will encounter below illustrates this well: *al-sha’b yurid isqāt al-nizām* (the people want the overthrow of the regime). In chanting “The army and the people are one hand” protestors would extend this frontier to include newly deployed soldiers, with the

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51 It has been suggested to me that the chant, “The army and the people are one hand” owes its origins to the slogan, “Muslims and Christians are one hand” (alternatively, “The people of the Book are one hand”). Just weeks before 28 January, this version of the “one hand” metaphor was invoked by activists looking to rally inter-communal support following the much publicized bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on 1 January (Colla 2012: 12). If this was indeed the origin of the chant, protestors chanting, “The army and the people are one hand” adhered to Tilly’s contentious claim-making model by innovating on a publicly available, shared script to signal a non-sectarian solidarity.
Mubarak regime present as the silent Other: the army and the people were one hand in their struggle to overthrow the regime.

To grasp how a political frontier forms we must, as Dzenovska and Arenas (2012: 645) have insisted, account for the concrete political practices that made it possible. One protestor, Alia, describes the chant’s emergence thusly: “The army and people are one hand’ was certainly a strategy for non-violence in the beginning—it wasn’t a statement—we weren’t welcoming the army. For some it was more like ‘You, we have nothing against’ [or] ‘You we won’t attack,’ and for others it was ‘Let’s be one hand,’ [but] it certainly wasn’t an announcement of the status.” (personal correspondence Alia 27 Sept. 2011) Accordingly, this was, then, a precarious and incomplete solidarity, an act of micro-conflict avoidance, rather than the formation of a new collective actor.

When explaining the de-escalation, informants also attest to a protracted lull in fighting with the CSF on the eastern side of Tahrir, which contributed to a temporary abatement of the shared mood of impending violence. Protestors, for their part, immediately sought to establish face-to-face contact with soldiers. One informant spoke of protestors—who had minutes before been throwing stones—embracing soldiers whose tanks were by then parked in the Midan. Protestors posed for photographs with soldiers; others hugged them, shook their hands and kissed their cheeks.

Recounts Hazem, “Eventually … once the tanks had all parked, protestors began to join them on top of the tanks and talk to them…. Conversation and laughter soon broke out and protestors began taking pictures with their phones standing next to military personnel and their tank. Food was shared between protester and soldier” (interview Hazem 9 Nov. 2011). Above all, in the wider
context of the army’s deployment, this episode provides an important backdrop to explaining the confrontational fear and tension that surrounded the army’s presence and the mechanisms that protestors adopted to avoid the outbreak of further violence.

While some protestors attacked newly arriving army vehicles, others set about establishing their own system of markers on them. Graffiti on tanks and APCs represented a new way to contest the army’s claim to organize its own territory. The graffiti tended to draw on chants and slogans from the larger 25th January repertoire: often variations on a theme of “The people want the overthrow of the regime” and “Leave, Mubarak”. What Mona el-Ghobashy (2011: 13) has described as the “branding of public goods” is illustrative of how fraternizing protestors could enact a symbolic trespassing that broke down the distinction between a military space and a public space claimed by the protestors. Army vehicles became canvases, encoded with the protestors’ contestation announcing the protestors’ shared focus of occupying Tahrir until Mubarak was deposed.

The graffiti itself was almost completely anti-Mubarak in content. From my review of photographs, I found no explicitly pro-army slogans graffitied on vehicles. When graffiti did mention the army it tended to highlight its ties to the Mubarak regime, while drawing it into the wider symbolic field of protestors’ contention. The graffiti on one APC read, “This is Egypt’s army, not Mubarak’s army.”

Another piece of graffiti from the same vehicle proclaimed: “We were betting on the Egyptian army, that it would not sell its children; but we found out the truth, that it had sold the Egyptian people for its president.” As a fraternization performance, graffiting tanks and APCs further challenged the army’s claims to

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52 I am grateful to Mariam Aboelezz for sharing this photograph with me.
ownership of that space, in turn placing those vehicles on the side of the protestors. Protestors arriving in the Midan over the following days would report feeling reassured by the graffiti, emboldening them to approach the vehicles, a logic related by one informant, Ahmad, as, “If the army has let us [the protestors] do this, they must be on our side” (interview Ahmad 10 Jul. 2011).

One, Two, Where Is the Egyptian Army?

I have suggested that the chant, “The army and the people are one hand” was a contentious performance that protestors employed situationally when they felt threatened by the army units in their midst, or when trying to de-escalate protestors-soldier violence. This was almost always face-to-face action, which through its recursion became an interaction ritual invoked, if not always successfully, in situations when protestors-soldier coexistence was threatened. Even in response to threatening actions by military units some distance away (including episodes of fighter jets over-flying the Midan, unsettling protestors with their sonic booms), or the presence of a military helicopter hovering overhead, protestors directed their chants at army units closer at hand.53

A second use of chanting occurred when protestors were, while in the presence of army units, either threatened or under attack by remnants of the CSF or pro-regime loyalists. The first instance of this that I have been able to identify comes on the morning of 29 January. Video shows three APCs maneuvering their vehicles between protestors and shotgun-wielding CSF units on a road leading to

53 In episodes of low-flying F-16s on 30 January, informants reported a mood of impending attack, to which they responded with chants of, “The army and the people are one hand.” This is captured on footage: [http://youtu.be/FQhy3c3cRN0](http://youtu.be/FQhy3c3cRN0) and [http://youtu.be/UTQWVMvBTPLA](http://youtu.be/UTQWVMvBTPLA). Atef Said (2012: 408) corroborates this fear of attack, reporting that his informants considered such episodes “an attempt to terrorize protesters and disperse them.”
the Interior Ministry. The intervention is not totally on the side of the protestors. As protestors threw stones at CSF troops, individual soldiers tried to restrain them, and minor scuffling broke out. Nevertheless, the protestors persisted. A gunshot then rang out, fired from the CSF side. The crowd started to chant, “One, two, where is the Egyptian army?” The footage cuts to the APCs aligned on the street, offering maximum shielding to the protestors who continue their skirmish with the CSF.

Another example is that of Captain Maged Boules, or the “Lion of Tahrir.” Boules became a hero to those occupying Tahrir after he confronted pro-regime baltagiyya (approximately, thugs) approaching the Midan from the Talaat Harb entrance on 2 February (Al-Shorouk 2011: 5; Al-Ahram 6 Oct. 2011). In video footage, we see Boules confronting the approaching thugs before retreating towards his APC at the entrance to Tahrir. Brandishing his pistol, Boules repeatedly fires in the air. As the column continues to advance, more soldiers appear, heading to collect their weapons from the hatch of the APC. As one soldier kneels to load his rifle, protestors begin to chant, “The people and the army are one hand.” The chant quickly spreads. The footage ends with protestors jumping up and down, the column of advancing thugs halted, protestors and soldiers buzzing with the emotional energy of averting attack. A weeping Boules is then embraced by protestors after mounting the APC to be cheered by the crowd and proclaimed with further chants of, “The people and the army are one hand” (see Image 4).

Chanting at the army took on particular significance during the Battle of the Camel on 2 February, so-called after pro-regime elements, thugs, and plainclothes
police attacked Tahrir, many riding horses or camels. For a full day and night, the
two sides exchanged stones and Molotov cocktails. During lulls in the fighting,
protestors approached army units, entreating them to intervene, chanting, “Where
is the Egyptian army?” During one episode when a tank at the National Museum
entrance did intervene, with soldiers firing guns above the heads of regime thugs
and driving their vehicle forwards, protestors chanted, “The army and the people
are one hand.” Meanwhile, according to one informant, Ahmad, those in the center
of the Midan misunderstood the situational context and panicked, thinking the
army had opened fire on protestors (interview Ahmad 10 Jul. 2011).

The Battle of the Camel was doubly important not only as the last serious
attempt by the Mubarak regime to displace the occupation of Tahrir, but also for
reminding protestors of the ambiguous position of the army. This is borne out
through the situational analyses protestors themselves developed through their
interactions with soldiers. Informants frequently identified army units positioned
at both the Kasr el-Nil and National Museum entrances to Tahrir as actively
collaborating with the Mubarak regime. It was at Kasr el-Nil that regime elements
successfully entered the Midan and it was outside the National Museum that the
fiercest fighting continued into the next day. Informants explicitly accused those
soldiers of being complicit in the attack or of not intervening to protect the
protestors when asked.\footnote{This was a view shared by military personnel, too. One soldier who had been deployed days
earlier remembered, “One of my friends in Tahrir called. He was hysterical, crying and screaming:
‘Where is the army, where were you? Nobody intervened, they left us.’ … It was one of the most
difficult moments of my life. It was clear that the army was complicit one way or another: either it
was indirectly supporting what was happening, or refusing to intervene, which is the same” (Ahram
Online 2013).} When implored to intercede to stop the advance of
regime supporters after fighting initially broke out in front of the National
Museum, soldiers refused, insisting their duty was simply to secure the area (AI-
Masry Al-Youm, 3 Feb. 2011: 5). Later, as regime thugs broke onto the roofs of buildings opposite the National Museum to rain Molotov cocktails down onto protestors sheltering behind impromptu barricades below, the army again ignored calls to step in (Egypt Gazette 2011b: 2). As the battle raged, one eyewitness described how “Egyptian soldiers looked on, lined up motionless in their armored vehicles in the middle of the two opposing sides” (Trombetta 2013: 143).

After the Battle of the Camel a series of confrontations broke out between units of the Egyptian army and protestors. These centered on burnt-out trucks improvised into barricades outside the National Museum. The following morning tanks attempted to tow these away and protestors, fearing the loss of their fortifications, immediately moved to block the army, physically surrounding their vehicles. In several instances scuffles broke out between protestors and soldiers only to be defused, with protestors physically restraining their comrades and chanting pro-army slogans (interview Ahmad 10 Jul. 2011; interview Alaa 13 Nov. 2011). In this and other instances, we find small numbers of violent protestors brought under control by members of their own side via fraternization performances. These confrontations, informants feared, were provoked by regime agents provocateurs whose goal was to draw the army into attacking the protestors. Fraternizing was thus utilized on two fronts: first, to constrain the behavior of the violent minority by setting an alternative mode of interaction with soldiers, and second, to signal to army units a pacific intent by returning to now familiar interaction rituals signaling protestor-soldier solidarity. The barricades were otherwise left untouched.

A further point of contention arose from the handing over to the army of tens of thugs and undercover policemen detained by protestors after the attack.
These detention practices continued until Mubarak’s resignation, with suspected agents provocateurs kept in the “people’s prison”—the stairway to the closed Sadat metro station that services the Midan (Al-Shorouk 2011: 5; Al-Masry Al-Youm, 7 Feb. 2011: 5). Many believed that, once handed over, these pro-regime elements were simply set free by the army so they could again terrorize the protestors.

Despite their sharing the Midan for nearly a week, the actions of the army remained for many a constant source of distrust and suspected malfeasance. The army would declare on 31 January, three days after their initial deployment, that they would not use force to put down the mobilizations, but not until 3 February, after the Battle of the Camel had been lost by the regime, did the military offer to guarantee the security of protestors in the Midan, and it was all the while calling on them to demobilize and vacate Tahrir (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 3 Feb. 2011: 7). This commitment soon took the form of stop and search checkpoints at the Midan’s entrances (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 5 Feb. 2011: 6). Informants, however, complained of soldiers stopping the flow of food and medicine, and protestors continued to maintain their own cordon around the Midan, checking identity cards and searching newcomers. When explaining this duplication to me, Alaa, who had manned a checkpoint, insisted the protestors’ cordon was there both to assert their control of the Midan and because, “We didn’t trust the army.” (interview Alaa 13 Nov. 2011)

**What Is the Love Story with the Tanks?**

What is the love story with the tanks? So reads the title of an *Al-Masry Al-Youm* article of 2 February 2011 (p. 12), seemingly one of the few Egyptian journalistic accounts published during the revolution that focused specifically on protestor-
soldier interactions. The title echoed a question posed by an Egyptian army officer stationed in Tahrir whose tank was surrounded by men and women taking photographs of their friends atop the vehicle. In Tahrir, the article noted, tanks had been transformed into sites for taking photographs. Those being pictured often made victory signs and waved Egyptian flags. Soldiers had tried to stop the climbing on the tanks, but were overrun by the large number of photograph hunters. “Please cooperate with us and stay away” the army officer implores, “and make our job easier.”

Posing for photographs was one of a set of fraternization performances that involved trespassing upon army vehicles in non-violent situations, performances we first encountered on the night of 28 January and which quickly became an emergent symbol of army-protestor solidarity, to be emulated as long as protestors and soldiers were physically co-present.57 I have already catalogued how, in fighting the CSF, protestors used newly deployed APCs as physical cover. In other instances, tanks at the Kasr el-Nil entrance to Midan al-Tahrir were literally incorporated into protestors’ barricades. All these performances made immediate claims on the soldiers manning those vehicles to give security to the protestors, or to neutralize any future threat those units posed. Posing for photographs underlines a further dimension to the fraternizing of soldiers in Midan al-Tahrir comparable to what Dzenovska and Arenas (2012) have called a, “barricade sociality.” In this, posing for photographs was one of many embodied fraternization performances that both reflected and made possible a protestor-

57 So synonymous did this act become with being in Tahrir during the 25th January Revolution that it gave rise to the popular (and characteristically sarcastic) Egyptian Facebook meme, “I didn’t take a photograph next to the tank” (ana matsawartish ganb al-dababa). Walking through Midan al-Tahrir in the summer of 2011, it was commonplace to see visitors to the Midan recreate such images, suggesting that to do so had come to be seen as a politically contentious act.
soldier solidarity. These interpersonal rituals, designated by Goffman (1971: 194–99) as “tie-signs”—hugging, kissing, shaking hands, a protestor's arms around the shoulders of a soldier, a soldier hoisted on the shoulders of protestors—all enacted a political frontier: the army and the people together in occupied Tahrir in the face of regime oppression. These tie-signs took on a particular consequentiality, for instance with the “Lion of Tahrir,” after soldiers committed to intervene on behalf of protestors, or when protestors attempted to diminish the risk of protestor-soldier violence as occurred on the night of 28 January, and, indeed, on the few occasions protestors fraternized with the CSF.

Tie-signs were key to sustaining this frontier: they communicated information regarding intentions and the nature of relationships, both to those interacting and to wider audiences. If everyday tie-signs inform third parties as to the nature of the relationship, these tend to map to degrees of familiarity. Fraternization tie-signs are in this sense exceptional, since the usual rules of embodied action are suspended. In a successful fraternization performance protestors and security forces, people almost always unconnected outside of the situation at hand, sign highly-intimate relations that collapse everyday social heterogeneity, such as gender, class, or other group membership.

The ritualistic mounting of army vehicles was not exclusively the domain of protestors. Army officers used tanks and APCs as platforms from which to address those occupying the Midan. Upon the army's deployment on 28 January, officers commanding army units in the Midan delivering such speeches would be interrupted and interrogated, with questions shouted at them demanding to know
whether they were with or against Mubarak.\footnote{See el-Amrani’s (2011) account of a speech by a one-star general in Tahrir on 29 January, in which he describes “an amazing moment when a charismatic one-star general addressed the public…. People kept shouting, are you with or against Mubarak? He answered that his mission is making sure the looting stops, and that the issue of who governs is the people’s decision, not the army’s, and that government should be civilian. Of course there is mounting tension and uncertainty about where the army stands. There are so few tanks (maybe twenty to thirty) and personnel around Midan Tahrir that I feel they could easily be overwhelmed.”} Speeches took a somewhat different form after 4 February when senior military officers, surrounded by bodyguards, began to take tours of Tahrir. These included Field Marshal Tantawi, Mubarak’s then Minister of Defence and head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), who visited the midan to be greeted by chants of, “O Field Marshal, O Field Marshal, we are your children in Tahrir” (\textit{Al-Masry Al-Youm}, 5 Feb. 2011: 5). These addresses were received with a greater degree of reverence, and when assurances were offered as to the army’s loyalty to the protestors’ cause, rewarded with chants of, “The army and the people are one hand.” Still, despite the invoked paternalism of protestors’ chants and the frequency of these speeches, informants who were present later reported officers who walked through the Midan being accosted by protestors demanding to know if the army would attack them (interview Khalid 13 Oct. 2011).

This was symptomatic of the lingering uncertainty and anxiety many retained concerning the army’s presence, a point well illustrated by a further addition to the fraternization repertoire: sleeping in the tracks of tanks and APCs. The first instance of this was reported on 5 February after tanks stationed in Tahrir started their engines (\textit{Egyptian Gazette} 2011a: 1).\footnote{An earlier version of this performance came on 30 January as eight tanks entered Tahrir. Journalists reported protestors rushing up to the tanks shouting, “God is great!” before lying in their path. Their advance blocked, soldiers and protestors engaged in a tense standoff lasting several hours. Eventually, an army officer mounted one of the tanks and addressed the crowd, assuring them that the tanks would not encroach any further into the Midan (\textit{Star} 2011; \textit{Guardian} 2011).} Just as in the earlier, 28 January episode in which protestors attacked newly arriving army units, a rumor
preceded this action, this time suggesting the tanks planned to withdraw from the
Midan in anticipation of a renewed attack by regime loyalists. Records of the
rumor are unclear as to whether the army was supposed to be participating in the
attack, or else complicit in coordinating it. In response to the tanks’ engines
starting, protestors quickly surrounded tanks and APCs in Tahrir. The logic of this
performance was seemingly that, following the corporeal surrounding of army
vehicles individual units could be isolated and made responsible for the protestors’
security. If graffiti made military vehicles in Tahrir symbolically compromised, the
sleeping in vehicle tracks made them operationally so. Physically encircled and
unable to move, the Egyptian army had effectively lost these vehicles and their
crews by 6 February, along with any semblance of a military order organizing a
contiguous territory. Protestors would remain encamped there until Mubarak’s
resignation on 11 February, as physical and symbolic forms of defense against the
predations of the Mubarak regime.

Conclusions
To mark the first anniversary of the 25th January Revolution, a convoy of Egyptian
army APCs drove through central Cairo. Each vehicle flew a national flag and had
emblazoned on its side, “The army and the people are one hand.” Commercial
billboards on Cairo’s main thoroughfares were rented, proclaiming, “The 25th
January Revolution—the army protected it. The army and the people ... are one
hand,” accompanied by images of children posing for photographs on tanks

60 This fear of attack may have been exacerbated by the visit on 5 February of army general Hassan
Ruweini. Flanked by soldiers, he approached the protestor's fortifications, which led protestors to
link arms to block his entry into the Midan. Journalists present reported protestors preparing for an
attack after Ruweini’s bodyguard partially dismantled a barricade, prompting protestors to chant
“We will die here!” While no attack materialized, protestors voiced their suspicions of the army to
journalists present (Atlantic 2011).
stationed in Midan al-Tahrir. Similar posters appeared outside the many army barracks and military administration buildings located in and around the city (see Figure 7).

In post-Mubarak Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces have used the residual symbols of fraternization performances as a source of political capital, employed to legitimate their assuming executive control at Mubarak’s departure. Those symbols of fraternization, the storage vessels for the ephemeral feelings of protestor-soldier solidarity, have been detached from the wider symbolic universe of revolutionary Tahrir and put to work elsewhere.61 In SCAF’s narrative, the army’s role during those fifteen days is to be fêted as one intended to safeguard peaceful protest against the Mubarak regime.62 That the SCAF was able to plausibly draw on these symbols of fraternization speaks to the deep re-imagination of politics that fraternizing protestors and their contentious performances made possible in re-aggregating a claim to sovereignty in the name of “the people” in opposition to the increasingly desperate and violent actions undertaken by the Mubarak regime. This bifurcation of governance from sovereignty was not missed by the regime, as epitomized by its announcement on 7 February, and later relayed via a Greater Cairo-wide SMS message, that the police force would be returning to the streets under its pre-Mubarak motto, “The police are in the service of the

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62 Nowhere is this more evident than in the “messages” through which SCAF communicated with the Egyptian citizenry, and specifically its 2011 messages, many of which invoke SCAF’s claims to a stake in the post-Mubarak order on the basis of defending the 25th January Revolution and not using force against protestors. The messages are available at: https://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Armed.Forces.
Figure 7. “The army and the people are one hand.” Poster outside Egyptian military checkpoint on Suez Road, Cairo. Feb. 2012 (author's photo).
This was followed, shortly after Mubarak’s resignation, with posters plastered around the city declaring, “For Egypt: The army, the police and the people are one hand,” dubiously signed-off by the “Youth of Egypt” (see Figure 8).

As this paper has argued, and contrary to SCAF’s posturing, it is wrong to assume that protestors singularly embraced the army’s new role in street politics, or that protestors-solder solidarity was unequivocal. I have suggested instead that protestors surrounding and hauling themselves aboard army vehicles, chanting for the army, graffiting tanks and APCs, and tie-signing with soldiers, constituted instances of claim-making. These protestor-soldier interactions were in themselves sites of action, sites at which protestors and soldiers forged a new political frontier through their performances. Theoretically, this has involved a conception of contentious performance that captures ritualistic claim-making at the micro-interactive level. Exploring the micro-interactive dimensions to one episode of contention reveals a good degree of improvisation and innovation on scripted performances in response to situational dynamics. Key here is taking seriously the capacity for claims made on the agents of regime power to decide situational outcomes, primarily by affecting emotional moods and stimulating feelings of solidarity. In Tahrir, that solidarity was at once fragile and contingent, having constantly to be remade as protestors fraternized with army units stationed in their midst in an attempt to both neutralize any potential threat they posed and sway their loyalty by forging common bonds and a shared political horizon. This dissonance and an attending polyvalence in performances was acknowledged by

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63 Under Mubarak, the motto had been changed to, “The police and the people in the service of the nation.”
Figure 8. "For Egypt: The army, the police and the people are one hand." Poster on wall in downtown Cairo. May 2011 (author’s photo).
protestors themselves, one of whom described a “mix of feelings/actions toward the army … on the one hand we have chanted the people and the army are one hand, and on the other, protestors decided to sleep under tanks and block them from encroaching on the square or dispersing the Tahrir sit-in” (quoted in Said 2012: 409). As a political frontier borne of the practices of street politics, this frontier was for many protestors only ever actualized situationally, by what became ritualized fraternization performances, and by interventions by brave soldiers such as Maged Boules, or the sixteen army officers who reportedly came to the Midan to declare solidarity with the protestors (Reuters 2011). Many of them were later prosecuted in military courts for this.64

Preliminary comparative studies of the 2011 Arab revolts have tended to reproduce SCAF’s narrative, taking as their point of departure the decision by Egypt’s generals not to intervene as having decided the course of the 25th January Revolution (see Barany 2011). This, even though the military leadership only cut Mubarak loose on 10 February, which triggered his resignation the following day. In the absence of reliable accounts from Egypt’s military command concerning the fifteen days the army were deployed, we can only speculate on the formativeness of fraternization in shaping the trajectory of the revolution. The question remains whether an order for the army to attack protestors was ever issued. The SCAF themselves have released a series of contradictory statements, claiming they refused an order to fire on protestors in Tahrir, only to later retract the claim (Egypt Independent 2011). The trial of Mubarak and others implicated in the killing

64 See the case of Major Ahmad Shuman who appeared in the Midan wearing a uniform to call for Mubarak’s dismissal. Despite being initially pardoned, Shuman was later rearrested and sentenced to six years in prison by a military court (Al-Shorouk 2012).
of protestors has otherwise failed to resolve this question with testimony given by Field Marshal Tantawi and Sami Anan (then army chief of staff), heard in camera.65

There is a counterfactual argument to be made that hangs on the reliability of army units in Tahrir to follow orders, as perceived by their officers. In Tahrir at least, there was a breakdown of all semblance of a separate military discipline and authority structure standing apart from protestors’ claims to control the Midan. In response, red-bereted military police were later drafted into Tahrir in an attempt to bolster the discipline of the army units stationed there. In issuing any order to attack those occupying the Midan, senior army officers would have been forced to question the reliability of troops in Tahrir and their solidarity with those who had for days been embracing them, posing for photographs atop their vehicles, and chanting in their name.66

If fraternization succeeded in separating the army units in Tahrir from military command and control structures, the Egyptian military soon developed countermeasures. On 9 March 2011, during one of the army's periodic “clearings” of Tahrir, protestors hastily linked arms and chanted to a column of approaching soldiers, ”The people and the army are one hand.”67 Others attempted to tie-sign with soldiers, all the while imploring them not to destroy the protestors’ encampment. Faced with overwhelming odds and the threat of violence, these protestors fell back on a fraternization repertoire that communicated their

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65 While we do not have an official court transcript of these exchanges, it is commonly understood that Tantawi denied receiving an order to fire. This is contradicted by video footage that shows a soldier in the Midan telling protestors that his unit had disobeyed an order to attack on 7 February, although I could not otherwise corroborate this. See footage at: http://youtu.be/hRHnX6CcbAw.

66 To develop this argument one would have to account for how protestors outside of Cairo received the army’s deployment. Newspaper reports record, for example, the army “intervening” in street battles between protestors and pro-regime forces in the port city of Damietta and in Ismailia on 2 February (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 3 Feb. 2011: 4). Which side these interventions benefited, and what if any role fraternization performances played in provoking those interventions are just a few of the questions for further research.

solidarity with the army. But here their performances fell flat—the column, marshaled at a distance by military police and kept in tight discipline at a running pace, followed orders. The tents in the Midan were dismantled and protestors beaten by gangs of thugs.

After this and other episodes of contentious street politics, new performances quickly supplanted fraternization when interacting with the army. Peaceful protestors were killed by soldiers at Maspero in October 2011, and then on Muhammad Mahmud Street in late November 2011 and outside the Defence Ministry in Abbasiyya in May 2012. These events occurred alongside allegations of torture, forced virginity testing, and the army’s repressive policing of street politics and labor agitation. By the revolution’s first anniversary, new chants had innovated on the old: “The people and the people are one hand!” and “The army and the police are one dirty hand!”
Chapter 2

“Elections are the solution!” Muslim Brothers, Mass Mobilization and Egypt’s Failed Democratic Transition*

\[\text{al-intikhābāt hīyya al-hall! (Elections are the solution!)}\]
\[\text{——— al-Hurriyya wa-l-'Adala, 22 Nov. 2011}\]

On 22 November 2012, Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi issued a constitutional declaration retroactively placing his presidential decrees beyond the purview of Egypt’s courts. The declaration came just weeks before the country’s Supreme Constitutional Court was due to rule on the legitimacy of Egypt’s latest constituent assembly, which had been tasked by Mursi with drafting a new constitution. In April, the Higher Administrative Court had dissolved the assembly’s first incarnation, citing membership irregularities. This was followed in June by an expedited ruling from Egypt’s infamously dilatory Supreme Constitutional Court, annulling the election results for parliament’s lower house – the first freely elected parliament since the Free Officers seized power in 1952 – on a technicality. Mursi and his supporters insisted that these judicial interventions amounted to a conspiracy between Egypt’s judges and Mubarak-era regime figures known as filūl (literally, remnants) to eviscerate the institutions newly elected after the 25th January Revolution. Judicial oversight could therefore only return when a new constitution was passed by a national referendum. In a sound bite that featured prominently in both domestic and international news coverage, liberal


While Mursi’s ostensible power grab persuaded an already ambivalent international audience that he and his movement, the Muslim Brothers, had only a weak commitment to the constitutional niceties required for a successful transition away from authoritarian rule, the Brothers’ high-minded, dismissive attitude to the objections of Egypt’s largely secular opposition triggered a new cycle of protests demanding Mursi’s resignation. Organized under the banner of the National Salvation Front and galvanized by the Tamarrod (rebellion) petition campaign, these protests reached their apogee outside of the Presidential Palace and in the streets of downtown Cairo on 30 June 2013. On 3 July 2013, the military seized upon these protests to stage a coup. Since then, a military-backed government has imposed a bloody crackdown not only on supporters of the Muslim Brothers, but also on many of the secular and liberal activists and movements who participated in the 25th January Revolution and later mobilized against Mursi. According to one widely-cited estimate, over three thousand opponents of the new military regime have been killed and up to forty thousand arrested (WikiThawra 2014a; 2014b). A ‘counter-revolution’ has seen the coronation of a field marshal as president, the restoration of Mubarak-era figures to public office and a near-total retrenchment of the civic and political freedoms enjoyed since Mubarak’s downfall.

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68 The number of anti-Mursi protestors on 30 June has been a matter of some debate. While supporters of Tamarrod cite figures ranging from fourteen to thirty million protestors, subsequent analysis by journalists using aerial photographs of protests has suggested a more plausible upper threshold of three million protestors countrywide (see *BBC* 16 Jul. 2013; Brown 18 Jul. 2013; *al-Jazeera* 19 Jul. 2013).
How can we explain the derailing of democratic transition in Egypt? If the modal outcome of post-Cold War democratic transitions is to produce ‘hybrid regimes’ (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010) in which military powers and former regime prerogatives largely remain intact while newly elected civilian authorities consolidate only a limited degree of democratic authority, then the full-blown return to military rule in Egypt in less than three years presents a puzzle. This article addresses the role played by elections and protests in contributing to the failure of the transition. More specifically, I examine the consequences of the Muslim Brothers’ demobilization following the 25th January Revolution and the movement’s decision to put its faith in a transition administered by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), electoral mechanisms and the authority of a new parliament and president. In doing so, my argument looks to build upon – but also departs from – an emerging literature according to which Mursi’s auto-golpe (Brownlee 2013), the Muslim Brothers’ organizational introversion (El-Sherif 2014), and the movement’s Islamist identity (Lust, Soltan and Wichman n.d.) fatally, and all too predictably, undermined the democratic transition. Such a singular focus on movement attributes and the indubitable failures of Mursi’s tenure in office, neglects broader structural and processual dynamics that predate Mursi’s election and relate to the nature of the revolutionary coalition that ousted Husni Mubarak, the traditions and legacies of Mubarak-era machine politics, regional and international opposition to Egyptian democracy, and concerted efforts by entrenched powers and old regime holdovers to subvert attempts to open up the state to democratic control.

Though the article’s empirical terrain is mainly focused on the eighteen months following Mubarak’s ousting, the argument has broader implications for
how we understand the trajectory of Mursi’s brief tenure in office, future democratization and mobilization in Egypt, as well as how we account for the relationship between elections and protests during episodes of democratic transition away from authoritarian rule in late Third Wave democratization.

Demobilization and ‘mere electioneering’ are typically seen as unproblematic, if not desirable, in extant theories of democratic transition. Such is the legacy of a ‘top down’ transitology approach that views mobilization and popular politics as exogenous to the unfolding of a successful transition (Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; for overviews and critique see Collier 1999: ch.1; Bermeo 2003: ch.1). Social movements and mass protest, this literature acknowledges, are frequently harbingers of democratization and key elements in bringing about democratic breakthroughs (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 53–54; Linz and Stepan 1996: ch.4). However, once a regime has been toppled, the tactical imperative for a successful democratic transition, if it is to avoid alienating the middle classes, business elite, military and reformist factions within authoritarian regimes, must be to moderate the “threat from below” (Bermeo 1997) pushing for social justice and other forms of redress. Accordingly, a transition is most likely to succeed if it is guided into a sequence of elite-level strategic interactions involving regime reformers and the leaders of a centrist opposition (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986). Even studies that emphasise the positive role played by ‘civil society’ in democratization processes have argued that for transitions to be successful – that is, for democracy to be consolidated – civil society, and by implication transgressive contention, must quickly be subordinated to the norms and procedures of ‘political society’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 10).
This conclusion finds support in scholarly accounts of democratization in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Central America, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, which have found that transitions away from authoritarian rule frequently coincide with the demobilization of social movements and a decline in transgressive contentious politics – even if many of those same scholars lament the passing of popular forces capable of deepening the democratization process (Canel 1992; Oxhorn 1994; 1996; Hipsher 1996, 1998; Sandoval 1998; Pickvance 1999; Sidel 2014; Trejo 2014).

Accounting for the demobilizing pressures of democratization, these studies stress developments in the political process: as polities transition away from authoritarian rule following democratic breakthroughs, movements demobilize, shifting their focus from the street to securing a foothold in formerly closed state institutions via elections. Anticipated electoral success further incentivises demobilization, with movement leaders looking to pursue their agendas in the chambers of parliaments and in the corridors of executive power (Robertson 2010: ch.5). Benedict Anderson (1998: 266) calls this the “Janus-face of electoralism”: the promise of electoral authority and access to state power and patronage also commands the domestication and pacification of more popular modes of politics.

In the subsequent discussion, I find that the Muslim Brothers’ demobilization following the 25th January Revolution confirms the political process thesis outlined above. However, rather than produce the kind of conservative and constrained consolidation typical of post-Cold War

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69 This is not to suggest a deterministic relationship. As Ekiert and Kubik (1999) have chronicled, democratic transitions in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Slovakia saw increased protest resulting from the ineffectiveness of political parties and the paucity of official channels for participation. Nancy Bermeo (1997) has also shown that mobilization continued throughout transition periods in Spain and Portugal in ways that actually strengthened democratization efforts.
democratization, I will argue that the Brothers’ attempts to restrict a democratic transition to a process of negotiation, transaction and electioneering, actually worked against the post-Mubarak democratic project. In this, to echo Adrienne LeBas (2011: 7), democratization in Egypt proved to be “considerably more contentious than the transitions that have served as the empirical base for the transitology theory of past decades.”

Making use of the Muslim Brothers’ publications, interviews with movement members and Arabic and English language newspaper accounts, I begin by considering the Muslim Brothers’ role in the 25th January Revolution and the nature of the coalition that emerged in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere. I then explore how the Brothers’ decision to privilege electoral politics and their commitment to sit out months of protests against military rule was problematically enhanced by the evaporation of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), and the inability, or unwillingness (Abdelrahman 2013; Gerbaudo 2013), of Egypt’s other revolutionary actors to develop a competitive electoral infrastructure of their own, precipitating the break-up of the revolutionary coalition that had removed a well-fortified dictator a year earlier. Finally, I return

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70 In particular, I draw on the daily print edition of the “Freedom and Justice” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala) newspaper published by the Muslim Brothers’ political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party. The Brothers’ daily newspaper carried interviews with parliamentary candidates, op-eds by the movement’s leading thinkers and press releases issued by the Brothers’ leadership, as well as articles reflecting on the transition and the Brothers’ role in the 25th January Revolution. While the first edition featured an article by Muhammad Mursi, then Chairman of the FJP, proclaiming that “this is the paper for the people, not for a political party” (al-Hurriyya w-al-ʿAdala, 28 Oct. 2011: 3) in reality, it was paid for indirectly by the Brothers and drew its content from a readership composed almost exclusively of the Brothers’ membership (interview Mustafa 9 Jun. 2013). As such, it can be read as a conversation between the Brothers’ leadership and its membership at a time of intensifying protest throughout the country and amid calls to abandon SCAF’s transition and return to Midan al-Tahrir.

71 Interviews were conducted between July 2011 and April 2014. Unless citing the Muslim Brothers’ spokespeople, I use first names only, in order to preserve the condition of anonymity under which testimony was gathered.

72 By revolutionary coalition, I mean the forces, parties and actors who mobilized against the Mubarak regime and who shared a minimal commitment to the opening up of the Egyptian state to democratic control.
to the circumstances surrounding Mursi’s ousting and suggest that the infrastructure of elections and the Brothers’ demobilization undermined a more coalitional approach to the transition, leaving the movement catastrophically isolated later to confront a ‘deep state’\textsuperscript{73} determined to roll back Mursi’s democratic authority.

\textbf{The 25th January Revolution}

As Lucan Way (2011: 24) noted just after Mubarak’s downfall, an absence of international support for democratization in Egypt – Jason Brownlee (2012) subsequently described US policy regarding Egypt as amounting to “democracy prevention”\textsuperscript{74} – meant that the transition’s success hinged “almost entirely on...[the] domestic balance of power between pro- and anti-democratic forces.”\textsuperscript{75}

The coalition that cohered in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere during the 25th

\textsuperscript{73}The term ‘deep state’ (\textit{al-dawla al-ʿamiqa}) consciously borrows from the Turkish context, in which a state within a state – composed of senior military officers, members of the judiciary, media and security services – is said to exercise power outside of formal democratic controls (see Unver 2009). Hesham Sallam (2012) offers a useful definition of the Egyptian deep state: “The ‘deep state,’ broadly speaking, refers to a diverse set of longstanding, powerful bureaucratic interests entrenched inside the Egyptian state and inherited from the previous political order, including, but not limited to, military institutions and domestic security agencies. While these various bureaucratic interests do not exhibit any ideological or political cohesion, they are all unified by a commitment to resisting any attempts by outside political forces, particularly elected officials, to undermine the financial and institutional autonomy that these organizations have garnered over the course of decades. In some sectors of this deep state, this autonomy is reflected through the prevalence of “special private funds” and off-budget spending that are subject to minimal oversight, and that afford these agencies a great deal of discretion in running their own affairs away from formal lines of accountability.”

\textsuperscript{74}We should also consider the implacable opposition to democratization in Egypt from Saudi Arabia and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. After leading a military intervention into Bahrain in early 2011 to crush a pro-democracy uprising, Saudi Arabia has gone on to play a key role in propping up Egypt’s economy, providing aid in the form of financial deposits and petroleum products totalling several billion dollars following the 3 July coup. Following the massacre of anti-coup protestors at two protest camps on 14 August 2013, the Saudi government even committed to meeting any financial shortfall should Western governments cancel aid in protest at the military-backed government’s brutal tactics (\textit{Washington Post} 19 Aug. 2013).

\textsuperscript{75}Instances of demobilization during successful democratic transitions in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and elsewhere might even appear over-determined given that demobilization in those cases was offset by strong regional and international support for democratization, which significantly raised the costs of backsliding by old regime holdovers (see Levitsky and Way 2010).
January Revolution enjoyed few natural advantages in this regard. The years before Mubarak's ousting had seen new connections made between the Muslim Brothers, liberals in the form of ElBaradei’s National Association for Change and Ayman Nour's al-Ghad party, leftists and Nasserites (El-Hamalawy 2007; Abdelrahman 2009; Hamid 2014: 144-145). These followed several protest initiatives and petitions in which the Brothers joined with the anti-war (and later anti-Mubarak) Kifaya movement, the Revolutionary Socialists and several others to coordinate protest activities (Gunning and Baron 2013: chs.1-3). But these intersections – while marking an important departure from the mutual suspicion and antagonism of previous decades – were tentative and never properly institutionalized. The Brothers’ youth members were usually the leading edge in brokering these relationships, with the Brothers’ leadership, which saw the parliament, not the street, as “the engine for political reform in Egypt” (Shehata and Stacher 2012: 162), acting as a brake on deeper collaborations.

Against this backdrop, the Muslim Brothers failed to fully mobilize on the first day of protests of the 25th January Revolution; irrevocably undermining Mursi and the Brothers’ claims later to exercise their democratic authority in the name of the revolution. Both scholarly and journalistic accounts of the revolution frequently reference this failure to commit to 25 January as evidence that the Muslim Brothers were opportunistic latecomers, or even as entirely absent from the action (for a review, see Mellor 2014; Hellyer 2014). According to the Brothers, the decision not to mobilize can be traced back to an extraordinary meeting held on 24 January between the movement’s leadership in Cairo and Egyptian State Security, who threatened to suppress the movement if it called its members out into the streets (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala, 17 Nov. 2011: 10). The Brothers, reluctant
to risk the movement’s sizeable social welfare infrastructure on a protest that could claim only indeterminable support, heeded the warning. Still, a handful of the Brothers’ branches did mobilize on 25 January, as did large numbers of the movement’s youth, many of whom had helped plan the protests in coordination with the April 6 youth movement, elements from the National Association for Change, and the Democratic Front Party (Wickham 2013: ch.7; see also Gunning and Baron 2013: 168-175). As a pre-condition of their participation on 25 January and in a bid to limit any backlash should the protests flop, the Brothers’ leaders demanded that members not chant Brothers slogans like “Islam is the Solution” while protesting, and forbade them from self-identifying as movement members if speaking to news media (interview Sara 14 Mar. 2014).

On 27 January, demonstrators having reached Midan al-Tahrir on 25 January and well-attended protests having been held in Alexandria, Gharbiyya, Ismailia, Suez and Aswan, the Brothers’ leadership abandoned its initial hesitancy and instructed its branches to mobilize for the “Friday of Anger” protests planned for the next day (interview Mona 30 Apr. 2014). In an attempt to decapitate the movement and force it to demobilize, State Security made good on its earlier threat, detaining 500 leading Brothers in Cairo on 28 January (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 17 Nov. 2011: 10). The move failed. According to one estimate produced shortly after Mubarak’s ousting, over one hundred thousand Brothers took to the streets.

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76 Those arrests led to a now infamous episode in which Muhammad Mursi, along with members of the Guidance Bureau, was imprisoned in the Nile Delta city of Wadi al-Natrun, only to escape on 29 January when the Interior Ministry opened Egypt’s prisons in a bid to destabilize the country (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 26 Jun. 2013: 5). The circumstances of Mursi’s escape went on to form the basis of a conspiracy theory (and later a court case) promulgated in Egyptian media in the year before the coup that he had been freed by Hamas, the Gaza-based offshoot of the Muslim Brothers—a narrative that attempts to discredit the 25th January Revolution as a foreign plot to weaken Egypt (see Ahram Online 12 May 2013).
streets on 28 January (al-Ahram Weekly Online 2011a). For many Muslim Brothers this was their first opportunity to strike back against a security state at whose hands they had suffered decades of arbitrary detention and harassment. By way of illustration, when I visited the Suez Canal city of Ismailia in the autumn of 2011, local Brothers proudly showed off the gutted State Security office as evidence of their part in inflicting a defeat on the Interior Ministry-controlled security forces.

With Midan al-Tahrir occupied and anti-regime protests breaking out across the country, the Brothers were playing an as yet largely unacknowledged role in sustaining the mobilization. In Tahrir, their presence was co-ordinated by Osama Yassin (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 10 Nov. 2011: 10), who would go on to become Youth Minister in Mursi’s cabinet. In interviews with Egypt’s secular activists, the Brothers’ efforts, marshalled through their superior organizational structure, are credited with sourcing many of the supplies vital to maintaining the occupation during its early days (cited in Gunning and Baron 2013: 179-180). The Brothers likewise played a pivotal role in defending Tahrir against attack, including during the ‘Camel Battle’ of 2 February, when pro-regime thugs threatened to overrun the protestors’ barricades at the National Museum entrance to the Midan (interview Abdullah3 20 Aug. 2011). “They [the Muslim Brothers] were at the forefront,” reported one Coptic protestor, “They defended all of us. This is a fact” (cited in al-Ahram Weekly Online 2011b).

That the principal actors of Egypt’s democratic breakthrough are frequently portrayed as having emerged from outside Egypt’s defined oppositional

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77 Both Carrie Wickham (2013: 162) and Gunning and Baron (2013: 175) have previously cited this number as a credible estimate.
hierarchies is partly due to the Muslim Brothers, wary of overshadowing the secular face of the protests and so provoking an ‘American veto’ fearful of an Islamist revolution (Hamid 2014: 140-141; Wickham 2013: 169), did not publicize their presence in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere. The Brothers instead deferred to the “horizontalist” (Chalcraft 2012) spirit that characterised the mobilization, taking a back seat to a broader conception of ‘the People’ opposing the regime. Of course, this was also a matter of expediency: the Brothers were impressed by the scale and success of the mobilization, and fully aware that “Egyptians were not protesting for the Muslim Brothers. If it had been just us [the Brothers] taking to the streets, then there wouldn’t have been a revolution” (interview Mona 30 Apr. 2014).

Electoral Alliances and Machine Politics

After Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February, the SCAF looked to foreclose eighteen days of unruly contention by calling on Egyptians to abandon protest, while seeking a political dialogue with Egypt’s Mubarak-era opposition in general and the Muslim Brothers in particular. In its early embrace of the Brothers, the SCAF invited the movement to play a leading role in a democratic transition. The first actualization of this commitment came on 15 February, when the SCAF appointed

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78 Hazem Kandil (2014: 15) has claimed that leading Brothers Mursi and Saad al-Katatni met with head of Egyptian General Intelligence Omar Suleiman on 1 February 2011 to “enter into secret negotiations...for a larger share of power in return for stopping the revolt.” The available record does not support this. Pro-SCAF news websites (e.g. albawabhnews 2014) have made similar claims of a meeting on 1 February in which Suleiman offered to release imprisoned senior Brothers in return for the movement vacating Tahrir, but note that the Brothers refused any deal. Speaking on al-Jazeera on 3 February, Mursi denied that the movement had met with Suleiman (see http://youtu.be/xW6d9-2pJBE). What is clear is that Suleiman publicly called for a dialogue with the Brothers on 5 February, following which the movement attended a meeting along with fifty other representatives of the Tahrir occupation (Al-Masry Al-Youm 5 Feb. 2011: 1). Whatever the inducements to demobilize offered were, they clearly failed: the Brothers left the meeting publicly committing to continue the protests until Mubarak was removed (New York Times 6 Feb. 2011).
an eight-member committee to propose constitutional amendments to the 1971 constitution in preparation for fresh parliamentary and presidential elections. Subhi Salih, a Muslim Brother and former Member of Parliament, was the committee's sole representative of Egypt's Mubarak-era opposition movements.

Two weeks after Mubarak's ousting, the Muslim Brothers announced the formation of the Freedom and Justice Party to compete in future elections (Al-Masry Al-Youm 22 Feb. 2011). The Muslim Brothers had long cultivated electoral ambitions. In 1942, Brothers founder Hassan al-Banna and several of the movement's candidates were forced to withdraw from the parliamentary elections under threat of internment (Lia 1998: 256-268; Heyworth-Dunne 1950: 39-40). The Wafd's rigging of the elections in 1945 denied the Brothers access to parliamentary representation for a second time, leading to a split in the movement's leadership and the rise of the Special Section, an underground paramilitary unit that brought the Brothers into violent confrontation with successive governments (Lia 1998: 270-271). These confrontations culminated in the movement's suppression by the Palace in 1948 and again in 1954 by Gamal Abdel Nasser (Mitchell [1969] 1993). Following the Brothers' partial rehabilitation by Anwar al-Sadat in the 1970s, the movement renounced violence and turned instead to Egypt's parliament and syndicates to advance its religiously inspired social reform agenda (Wickham 2002). Later, in the 1980s, the Brothers' candidates began running on electoral lists with the Wafd and later the Labor party and in spite of routine electoral fraud formed the main opposition to the NDP in parliament (El-Ghobashy 2005; Shehata and Stacher 2012).

The Brothers' parliamentary activities were abruptly curtailed in late 2010 when a nakedly fraudulent election contrived to wipe out the Brothers'
representation once and for all. With Mubarak gone, the Brothers’ embeddedness in Islamic associational life, along with its national network of branches, charities and grassroots activities, ensured that the movement possessed the experience and the infrastructure to perform well in elections (see Blaydes 2011: ch.8; Masoud 2014). Conscious that no other party or actor from the 25th January Revolution coalition possessed a comparable political machine, the Muslim Brothers, Shadi Hamid (2014: ch.6) argues in his book-length study of the Brothers’ role in the transition, initially tried to appear magnanimous in offering concessions to other opposition groups. To offset any latent suspicions of impending Muslim Brother electoral domination, Hamid notes, the Brothers committed to contesting a plurality and not a majority of seats, while spearheading the formation of the Democratic Alliance, an electoral coalition of pro-25th January Revolution parties that would run under a single national electoral list and aim to produce a “national revolutionary majority” (Ahram Online 23 Mar. 2011).

According to this reading of the movement’s intentions at this stage of the transition, the Muslim Brothers were aware that the rapidly convened “negative coalition” (Beissinger 2013) of the 25th January Revolution, united primarily in its opposition to the Mubarak regime, had to be reconfigured into a positive electoral one.

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79 In the run-up to the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, Essam el-Erian would boast, “We will reach voters in their homes and places of gathering and talk to them directly about the nation and its future and about the FJP and its program... This will have the greatest impact on voting, and no competitor can compete with us in this domain. You [Muslim Brothers] are, thank God, the most organized and present in all areas of society” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 12 Nov. 2011: 16).

80 The Muslim Brothers initially restated their adherence to al-mushāraka wa laysa al-mughālab (participation and not domination) in the political process, a position first adopted in the years following the 1992 Algerian elections when an Islamist victory provoked a military coup (see Brown 2012a). As the transition progressed, however, the number of seats the FJP planned to contest began to change, with FJP candidates going on to contest half of all the seats in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. The Brothers’ decision to put forward a presidential candidate only served to deepen misgivings about the movement’s domination of post-Mubarak politics.
However, the Democratic Alliance, as Nathan Brown (2011) noted at the time, was a strange and imperfect vehicle for such an avuncular enterprise, one that effectively sought to “divvy up the seats in advance”. Still, insists Hamid, this was “the centerpiece of its [the Brothers’] efforts to essentially allow weaker parties to ride the coattails of its electoral success” (2014: 144). The telos of this initiative, the Brothers publicly insisted, would be a competitive parliamentary system. “Everyone must act,” explained Mohamed el-Beltagy, a leading Brother and former MP, “so we can reach the point where we become like the rest of the countries in the world, with three or four strong parties. We [the Brothers] will not forever remain in the position of not seeking power, the majority or the presidency. This is a temporary position until the time there are forces that can compete” (cited in Ahram Online 23 Mar. 2011). However, more critical accounts of the Brothers’ role in the transition (e.g. Kandil 2014: ch.4) have questioned the movement’s commitment to coalition building, pointing to the insular structure of the movement and its religious mission. This fear was certainly shared by many non-Islamist members of the revolutionary coalition, who believed that the Muslim Brothers’ commitment to political pluralism would not survive the movement taking power, a fear that the Brothers did too little to assuage.

What is not in dispute is that shortly after its founding in the summer of 2011, the Democratic Alliance could claim over thirty members, including the liberal Wafd, the Nasserite Karama party, and the leftist Tagammu party.81 This, however, proved to be one of several short-lived examples of post-Mubarak revolutionary cooperation. By autumn, parties began to break away from the Democratic Alliance to form their own electoral blocs, many complaining of the

81 For a history of the Democratic Alliance, see Ahram Online (2011).
Muslim Brothers’ domineering leadership and its insistence on controlling seat allocations on the electoral list (e.g. Masrawy 3 Sept. 2011; al-Jazeera 7 Oct. 2011; al-Masriyyun 14 Oct. 2011). With the onset of the first round of the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, the Democratic Alliance had been reduced to a core of several fairly minor parties, encompassing Islamists, centrists, liberals and Nasserites, and headed by the FJP (Figure 9).

While the weight of scholarly and journalistic attention has rightly focused on the Brothers’ inattentiveness to maintaining good relations with other members of the revolutionary coalition, the failure of liberal and secular forces outside of the Democratic Alliance to build political parties with meaningful links to Egypt’s electoral constituencies remains one of the frequently elided dynamics undermining the transition. As Nathan Brown remarked on the eve of the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, “When such movements had a political demand, they resorted to the device that worked so well earlier [in 2011] – the public demonstration – and avoided the long task of party building” (Brown 2011). This, despite the emergence of new secular opposition groups competing in elections as early as the mid-2000s, including the aforementioned Kifaya movement, as well as Ayman Nour’s failed presidential campaign in 2005 (see Oweidat et al 2008; El-Mahdi 2009). Having provided the catalyst for the 25th January Revolution, Egypt’s non-Islamist ‘revolutionaries’ instead came to claim a moral authority to dictate the trajectory of post-Mubarak politics that was disproportionate to any democratic representation they could muster at the ballot box. Indeed, many of these figures came to reject SCAF’s role and the democratic transition in toto as a

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82 This is not to suggest that they were simply feckless. Rather, as Tarek Masoud (2008; 2014) has catalogued, they were struggling to negotiate Egypt’s “electoral ecology”, which places high entry barriers to newcomers due to the centrality of patronage in swaying electoral loyalty and the propensity for voters to support those already embedded within their social networks.
parting imposition by the Mubarak regime designed to short circuit a mass mobilization that still retained much of its energy. With few illusions of an electoral breakthrough, anti-SCAF (and later anti-Mursi) protestors were immunized from the domesticating imperatives of democratic procedures and electoralization. This ‘gap’ between the political demands of a cohort of protestors and activists, energized by the momentous events of the 25th January Revolution, and the possible spectrum of representation that could be produced by the infrastructure of elections, meant that large tranches of the revolutionary coalition pursued a parallel political track, mobilizing pressure from the street as a means of intervening into the formal transitional process.
Figure 9. “Map of Egyptian political parties: First phase of 2011 Parliamentary Elections” (Jacob Carbonari in The Arabist 17 Nov. 2011).
This electoral landscape was made all the more uneven by the evaporation of the NDP as an electoral vehicle for old regime interests (see Blaydes 2008; Menza 2012). Speaking in the spring of 2011, Hazim Kandil (2011) predicted that NDP politicians would win at least a third of seats in any new parliament, whether running under the NDP banner or as independents in the event that the party was banned. A forty per cent share of the vote, he suggested, could not be ruled out. Such a scenario remained eminently plausible when the Higher Administrative Court dissolved the NDP in April 2011, but placed no embargo on former members standing for election. The prospect of a reconstituted NDP certainly preoccupied the Muslim Brothers: they spent the transition lobbying the SCAF for a ‘Political Isolation Law’ disbarring former NDP members from standing for parliament and the presidency for five years.\(^3\) As it subsequently transpired, the NDP machine was only reactivated in June 2012 for the nearly triumphant presidential campaign of the Mubarak-era Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq (Masoud 2014: 205).

In its absence, conservative forces associated with the Mubarak regime secured only a handful of seats in the parliamentary elections. This, in turn, had unforeseen consequences for the trajectory of the transition. If, in most democratic transitions, the first competitive parliamentary elections following a democratic breakthrough reveals the residual strengths and continuing entrenchment of local bosses and old regime figures (Hagopian 1996; Hite and Cesarini 2004; Robison and Hadiz 2004; Hedman 2006; Magaloni 2006), and thus compels compromises, backroom deals and coalition-building on behalf of the pro-democratic forces, this did not occur in the Egyptian case. Instead the formal, electoral realignment that

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\(^3\) When this was not forthcoming, the Brothers championed measures to expose former regime candidates, including defacing election posters and publishing lists of *filūl* running as independent parliamentary candidates or on party lists, and running “catch a *filūl*” campaigns on social media (*al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 3 Nov. 2011: 5; *al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 11 Nov. 2011: 2).
emerged following the 25th January Revolution clustered around a series of alliances in which no grouping outside of organized political Islam commanded an electoral infrastructure capable of delivering votes nationwide. It was in this context that the Muslim Brothers became the largest party in the 2011-2012 parliament (Figure 10), followed, more unexpectedly, by the ultra-religious Salafi Nour Party (see Lacroix 2012). This left the Muslim Brothers with an unusual, even excessive, level of electoral success and parliamentary (and later presidential) representation, out of sync with the political spectrum of forces that had cohered in Midan al-Tahrir. Such a result ultimately proved beyond what the revolutionary coalition could sustain, as the Brothers’ claims to be countering the old regime through the ballot box quickly began to appear far more like indefinite electoral dominion and irrelevancy for the rest of Egypt’s reinvigorated political scene.

Figure 10. Results of al-Majlis al-Sha’b elections, Nov. 2011-Jan. 2012.
Mobilization and Demobilization

Prior to holding parliamentary and presidential elections, a timetable for the transition and several amendments to the 1971 constitution, including amendments stipulating presidential term limits and restrictions over the executive’s ability to impose a state of emergency, had to be voted on in a national referendum. The Brothers campaigned for a “yes” vote, arguing that a fixed schedule for the transfer of power from the SCAF to an elected civilian government was vital to the success of the transition. The “no” vote was led by Egypt’s secular revolutionaries and established liberals, who argued that a constitution should be codified before elections were held to avoid a document written by a parliament dominated by narrow party interests – a pre-emptive move that tacitly acknowledged the Brothers’ electoral advantage. The tone and manner in which the referendum campaign played out has been characterized as one of the transition’s “original sins...pitting Islamists and non-Islamists against each other for the first time...[meaning] debates that were really about the sequencing of the transition became, at least publicly, about religion” (Hamid 2014: 145). The 18 March referendum passed with seventy-seven percent approval on a forty-one percent turnout. This process saw the evaporation of much of the goodwill that had characterized relations between the different elements of the revolutionary coalition up to that point.

While the decision was never explicitly announced, for the Brothers the passing of the referendum meant that the political focus should shift from maintaining a presence in Tahrir to seeing the transition’s timetable of elections and constitutional reform implemented. As one Brother recalls:
With Mubarak gone, we faced a choice: we could stay in Midan al-Tahrir and continue protesting, keep the military out of politics and start the transition later, led by the revolutionaries. But who would lead it? And how would they be chosen? And would Egyptians accept that figure as legitimate? We did not believe that Tahrir alone had sufficient legitimacy to dictate the country’s will. That’s why we supported the March referendum. When the people voted “yes” and gave the transition legitimacy, we focused on the process of change: the elections and the new constitution... we thought that step-by-step reform was preferable to a more revolutionary path.

(interview Abdullah al-Haddad 20 Feb. 2014)

Thus, the Brothers’ gradualist approach was sutured to a narrow, procedural conception of democratization that the movement adhered to following the 13 March referendum. In this, there was a clear pact with the military, whether implicit or otherwise, in which the Brothers would acquiesce to the SCAF’s oversight of the transitional period and a continuation of the military’s Mubarak-era prerogatives in return for the ‘normalization’ of the movement and a commitment to transfer power to an elected civilian government according to the timetable set out in the 19 March referendum. If this appears unremarkable in context of other Third Wave transitions, the Brothers’ decision to demobilize did not produce the kind of conservative consolidation seen elsewhere.

By the summer of 2011 the Muslim Brothers were conspicuously absent from the milyūniyya (million-person) protests that were agitating for justice for the martyrs of the revolution, the reform of Egypt’s Interior Ministry and security services, the prosecution of Mubarak-era regime figures, and, ultimately, the end of
military rule itself. Midan al-Tahrir was intermittently reoccupied. Egypt’s activists called for a second revolution against the SCAF. Demonstrations agitating for social justice were also held, as well as strike actions by a newly emerging trade union scene. The SCAF dismissed these as *fe‘awi* (factional) demands and, on occasion, brutally policed the protests (Sallam 2011). In early July 2011, a *milyûniyya* planned by April 6 did elicit some concessions: elections were delayed until November to allow Egypt’s new political forces to consolidate; several ministers in the transitional government were dismissed for their links to the Mubarak regime; and most spectacularly, Mubarak finally appeared in court on corruption charges and for ordering the killing of protestors during the 25th January Revolution (see Cole 2012: 490-493).

The Muslim Brothers remained aloof from the protests, arguing that further protest would drain popular support for the 25th January Revolution and lead to an electoral surge for old regime figures who promised a return to the relative stability and security of the Mubarak era (e.g. *al-Hurriyya wa-l-‘Adala* 31 Oct. 2011: 3).84 Disruptive protest, the Brothers insisted, also threatened the transition timetable and thus could prolong military rule. As one FJP editorial explained:

> The people must protect the revolution by policing the political process and ceasing unnecessary protests and strikes that can create the conditions for a counter-revolution...Some people are expecting a crisis to occur before or during the elections; the results might be manipulated, or an incident like Maspero [when soldiers attacked a Coptic protest, killing twenty eight] will happen, or the *filûl* will return.

84 This is a sentiment that echoes the logic of the transitology literature.
Everything is possible, which is why all efforts must be directed towards securing the elections... This way, the people can visualize a safe and secure exit from the transitional period. We were capable of a revolution and deposing a dictator who ruled for thirty years, we must now protect the elections... The revolution must carry forward its thoughts and protect its demands and gains, which is the role of the new parliament. (*al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 30 Oct. 2011: 10)

To the Brothers, protestors resembled “football hooligans... ready to destroy the transition because their team didn't win [the 18 March referendum]. These hooligans would only recognize the referendum if the result was “no”, but since the people said “yes” now all they want to do is protest about poverty, unemployment and illiteracy” (*al-Hurriyya wa al-ʿAdala* 2 Nov. 2011: 4). Tahrir's crowd of disorganized revolutionaries, would be best served by acting analogously to the Brothers: demobilizing and forming their own party (interview Mustafa 9 Jun. 2013). Failure to heed this advice, the Brothers’ newspaper opined, would prevent the youth movements propelled to prominence during the 25th January Revolution from capitalizing on the elections; instead of occupying Tahrir and holding *milḥūniyyāt*, they were better off knocking on doors and canvassing the electorate (*al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 30 Oct. 2011: 5). People power should be reserved for securing the ballot.85 The case for demobilization was further strengthened by the calculation that Egypt’s looming balance of payments crisis, lack of investor confidence, failing tourism industry and high inflation – all problems that the

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85 One FJP proposal that was met with limited enthusiasm was the use of ‘popular committees’ of the type formed during the 25th January Revolution; staffed by revolutionaries from across the political spectrum, they would be responsible for policing polling stations (*al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 30 Oct. 2011: 5; *al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 2 Nov. 2011: 5; *al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 4 Nov. 2011: 7).
Brothers looked set to inherit – were exacerbated by protests and the political vacuum created by the transition (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 9 Nov. 2011: 7). Economic immiseration could therefore only be alleviated by “the parliament of the revolution” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 2 Nov. 2011: 6). In a speech to FJP members in July 2011, Mursi made the link, frequently asserted elsewhere, between the parliamentarization of politics and a return to economic growth. FJP members must ‘bring politics indoors’: competitive elections and increased productivity would solve the country’s problems, not further protest (IkhwanOnline 17 Jul. 2011). Or, as one FJP mantra daubed on the walls of Cairo’s popular quarters had it: “A true revolutionary rebels against corruption, and once he removes it, calms down to build and prosper” (cited in Youssef 3 Mar. 2013).

In the search for explanations of the Muslim Brothers’ decision to demobilize, a common trope portrays the Brothers as almost congenitally risk-averse, with no stomach for chaotic street politics (e.g. al-Arian 2013). An alternative reading paints the Brothers as a “counter-movement” (Alexander 2011; see also Kandil 2014) whose demobilization was evidence of their co-optation by the SCAF. My argument, by contrast, avers that the Brothers used protest strategically, depending on their reading of the political process. Accordingly, this did not preclude the movement from mobilizing. On 29 July and 18 November 2011 the Brothers went en masse to Egypt’s squares in protest against what Linz and Stepan (1996: 82) call “reserve domains”: conditions unilaterally imposed (or threatened) by the SCAF on the post-Mubarak constitutional order. In many ways, these mobilizations underline the limits of any deal between the Brothers and the military. The July mobilization followed several statements from the Brothers threatening to stage protests if the timetable mandated by the 19 March
referendum was not adhered to (Egypt Independent 27 Jun. 2011). When the SCAF publicly entertained a proposal to have binding supra-constitutional principles tie the hands of any future parliament, the Brothers made good on their threat, mobilizing for the Friday protest in Midan al-Tahrir of 29 July in a show of force. For many Brothers this constituted their first return to Tahrir since the revolution. Marshalled by FJP members in high-vis jackets, the hundred thousand or so assembled protestors conveyed a simple message: the Brothers’ demobilization was a matter of tactical restraint only, and was subject to review. The Brothers were ostensibly behaving just as the democratization literature counsels: demobilizing to pursue their electoral ambitions, but retaining the option to protest in the event of backsliding (see Linz and Stepan 1996: 9-10).

After the supra-constitutional principles – commonly referred to as the Silmi document after its author, Deputy Prime Minister Ali El-Silmi – were belatedly published in November 2011, the Muslim Brothers again descended upon Tahrir for a milyūniyya, titled the “Friday of One Demand”. Their grievance was Article 9, which stated that “The SCAF is the sole actor on all matters related to the SCAF and its budget and the president shall be the supreme head of the armed forces and the defence minister is the general leader of the armed forces. The president can declare war after obtaining approval from the armed forces and parliament” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 2 Nov. 2011: 5). The Brothers’ stance remained unchanged: any attempt to undermine the omnicompetence of the post-

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86 The 29 July protests spectacularly backfired on the Brothers, provoking the first split in the Democratic Alliance when the Tagammu party withdrew to form a new electoral bloc after the Brothers failed to endorse the party’s demand of an end to military trials for civilians (Jadaliyya 2011). The fallout did not end there. Thousands of Nour Party Salafis defied an agreement to abstain from religious slogans by chanting for an Islamic state, leading to the protest pejoratively being known as “Kandahar Friday”. As Stéfan Lacroix (2012: 4) notes, the 29 July protests presaged a growing rift between the Brothers and the Nour party, with the Brothers publicly distancing themselves from the Salafis after the event.
Mubarak parliament or the autonomy of the executive branch, and any restrictions imposed on the constitution writing process by the military-backed transitional government, would be countered with street protests.

Speaking in early November, Mursi had warned that the Silmi document could provoke a second revolution if it was not withdrawn, and the Brothers’ leadership committed to a programme of rolling protests that would continue “no matter the consequences” until the initiative was abandoned (al-Hurriyya w-al-ʿAdala 3 Nov. 2011: 1; 7). In an increasingly rare instance of coordination with Egypt’s other revolutionary groups, the Brothers planned the protests with April 6 and other members of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition. When the day of protest arrived on 18 November, the FJP newspaper ran the headline: “Egyptians return to Tahrir to defend the gains of the revolution,” pledging that: “The Muslim Brothers and its allies will engage in street protests to protect the transition and demand that the SCAF transfer power to a civilian government and cancel the supra-constitutional principles” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 18 Nov. 2011: 1).

Following the milyūniyya, the Brothers continued to put pressure on the SCAF, the Brothers’ usually laconic Deputy Supreme Guide and political powerhouse Khairat al-Shater threatening an escalation in protest if the military did not rescind the Silmi document (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 20 Nov. 2011: 1). “Protest,” the FJP newspaper concluded, “are the only message that the military understands” (Ibid.: 7). However, an unanticipated consequence of the Brothers’ mobilization was soon to test the movement’s resolve to pursue a confrontational path with the military. When the Brothers vacated the Midan after the conclusion of the milyūniyya, families of the martyrs killed during the 25th January Revolution re-occupied Tahrir. In the early hours of Saturday morning, Interior Ministry-
controlled security forces attacked the encampment. Within hours, protestors had returned to the Midan in greater numbers, provoking further clashes with police who responded with shotgun pellets, tear gas and rubber bullets.

Finally, it seemed, Egypt’s revolutionaries had the chance to bring about the second stage of the revolution that they had been agitating for since the summer (see Ryzova 2011). By 20 November, protestors in Tahrir were attempting to break through police lines on Muhammad Mahmud Street to reach the Interior Ministry, demanding the return of the military to its barracks and the formation of a civilian national salvation government. Amid the violence, video footage circulated of Egyptian soldiers and policemen casually piling up the bodies of dead protestors. The images swelled the ranks of the protestors, leading to a series of pitched street battles known as the “Events of Muhammad Mahmud Street”, in which the momentum, for the first time since Mubarak’s ousting, seemed to rest with the reinvigorated protestors. As protests spread to the governorates of Alexandria, Beheira, Daqahliyya, Fayyum, Gharbiyya, Ismailia, Port Said, Sharqiyya and Sohag, the Brothers’ Guidance Bureau convened on 21 November to formulate a response (al-Hurriyya wa-‘Adala 22 Nov. 2011: 1; 4). At that meeting, it appears, the Brothers’ leadership resolved to gain assurances from the SCAF that the elections would be held on time before committing to going to Tahrir or not. In communicating the rationale behind this decision, Essam el-Erian, a senior Brother and FJP official insisted:

The Brothers are caught between two choices, neither of them easy: either the Brothers go down to the Midan and so risk widening the scope of the conflict and delay the elections, or we hold back and abstain from
mobilizing our members while inevitably facing accusations from other political parties and the revolutionary youth that we have abandoned the revolution. (Ibid.: 1)

El-Erian’s anticipation of the opprobrium of the revolutionary coalition was to prove prescient. In a fateful decision that would cost the movement the amity and trust of many, the Brothers concluded that “Elections are the solution!” (Ibid.: 1) At the height of the most serious and sustained challenge to military rule following Mubarak’s ouster, the Brothers met with SCAF and used their street presence as leverage to gain three major concessions: the rescinding of the Silmi document; a law to bar the *filūl* from competing in future elections; and a commitment that the elections would be held on time and power transferred to an elected civilian government by July 2012 (*al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 23 Nov. 2011: 1). Having secured the SCAF’s assurances that the transitional timetable would be adhered to, the Brothers committed to staying out of Tahrir. In an editorial titled “Why we went and why we didn’t go” the FJP’s newspaper explained:

The Brothers went to protest on 18 November to ensure the integrity of the transitional process and continue the fight against the *filūl*...However, we will refrain from returning to the Midan as our presence will push the country into further bloody violence and delay the elections, which are the real goal of the revolution. (Ibid.: 13)

Shortly thereafter, the Brothers went further, publicly turning on the protesters. The violence in Tahrir was the work of thugs – “their goal: delay the elections” (*al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala* 24 Nov. 2011: 2). The *filūl* were singled out as instigators of the violence; they were “exploiting the situation to spread chaos in
the country” (Ibid. 3). The Brothers’ message was monotone and predictable: “Delay the election: revolutionaries beware, we will go backwards.” (Ibid. 8-9) A minority of Brothers under the direction of Mohamed el-Beltagy did defy the leadership, calling on the membership to mobilize to Muhammad Mahmud Street and continue the revolution against the SCAF (Al-Masry Al-Youm 23 Nov. 2011). Upon entering Tahrir, el-Beltagy was confronted by anti-SCAF protestors who accused the Brothers of selling out their fellow revolutionaries for electoral gain. Under pressure, he withdrew from the Midan.

When the parliamentary elections went ahead as scheduled, the Brothers welcomed the first round of voting, proclaiming that: “Egyptians have finally moved legitimacy from the streets to the elected institutions!” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 30 Nov. 2011: 9) Egypt’s youth activists, meanwhile, finding their path to the Interior Ministry blocked, decamped from Muhammad Mahmud Street to hold a sit-in in front of the prime minister’s office. Again, violent clashes broke out between protestors and soldiers. The Brothers stayed away. The movement’s leadership, one senior Brother confided, feared that if the protests escalated, the SCAF might use this as a pretext to annul the election results (cited in El-Amrani 2012). In response to the violence, the Brothers adopted a more critical line, publicly condemning the SCAF for their heavy-handed policing of protest (e.g. al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 19 Dec. 2011: 1). But this appeared almost as an afterthought, noncommittal and non-heroic.

“It was at this point,” observes Chayma Hassabo, “that the revolutionaries’ opposition to the Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, transcended mere ideological differences” (cited in Ahram Online 21 Nov. 2012). In the eyes of many, the Brothers had revealed themselves as unprincipled opportunists. ”They only
care about their own self-interest as a party,” concluded one protestor in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections, “They were not with us in any of our battles. They left us by ourselves in the square.” (cited in New York Times 9. Jun. 2012).

Activists who had rallied in defence of the Brothers prior to the 25th January Revolution now saw the movement as willing to sacrifice them in the pursuit of their political ambitions (see Ali 2014). The Events of Muhammad Mahmud Street, synonymous with the Muslim Brothers’ betrayal, became a fixture in the revolutionary calendar, eclipsed only by 25 January itself. As one youth activist related shortly before the first anniversary of the protests:

While the military were discarding our brothers’ bodies in the trash, and the police were draining their eyes [a reference to police aiming birdshot at protestors’ eyes], the Brothers were preparing for parliament. While the revolutionaries were chanting “ya Tantawi [the head of SCAF], tomorrow your fate will be Gaddafi’s,” the Brothers were knocking on doors urging people to vote. Muhammad Mahmud will remain a black mark in the history of the Muslim Brothers. It was a shame that history will never forget and time will not erase...That is why we won’t stand with them in future protests. (cited in Masrawy 14 Nov. 2012)

The Muslim Brothers’ demobilization was particularly damaging for the clear implication that by staying away, the Brothers had insulated the SCAF from the protestors’ demands to reset the transition and have the military relinquish power there and then. Symbolically, this failure to come to the defence of Tahrir and instead privilege partisan electioneering took on an exaggerated importance in the revolutionary narrative; it was on Muhammad Mahmud Street that the first
anti-Brother chants were heard, presaging future confrontations between the movement and other members of the revolutionary coalition. Taken together, the fallout from the Brothers’ failure to mobilize during this and other episodes is evidence of the “deeper effects” (LeBas 2011: 15) of protest during late Third Wave democratization: namely, in sustaining or undermining broad democratic fronts during parlous and prolonged transitions. The Muslim Brothers “uncoordinated demobilization” (Tarrow 1995), a product of their strategic reading of the transition and relentless electoralism, undermined the efficacy of protest in deepening the democratization process, while facilitating the division of the revolutionary coalition along unequal electoral lines. Notwithstanding one final act of cooperation – when many of Egypt’s youth and protest movements rallied behind Mursi’s candidacy as the lesser of two evils in the second round of the presidential elections to defeat the old regime candidate Ahmad Shafiq – the coalition that had ousted Mubarak was irrevocably split (see Elgindy 2012; Alim 2013).

**Political Isolation**

The Muslim Brothers’ failure to maintain good relations, memories and linkages with other political forces in the eighteen months following the 25th January Revolution left bad legacies for Mursi’s year in office. Repeated overtures to prominent liberal and secular figures, such as the Nasserist and presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi, to fill the position of Vice-President, and the liberal figures of Ayman Noor and Muhammad Elbaradei to head the new cabinet as Prime Minister, were rebuffed (see *Daily News Egypt* 26. Jun. 2012). Egypt’s youth activists, including Ahmad Maher, one of the founders of April 6, likewise turned
down positions in Mursi’s government. Mursi’s failure to attract a more inclusive government at this early stage ensured that he quickly became reliant on a narrow band of Islamist fellow travellers, giving succour to his opponents later on who claimed that the office of the presidency was subordinated to the Muslim Brothers’ leadership.

Mursi’s isolation was compounded by the Supreme Constitutional Court’s dissolution of the lower house of parliament days just before the presidential run-off in a “judicial coup” (Brown 2012b), designed, so one of the court’s Mubarak-appointed judges boasted, to leave only the shell of a presidency and have SCAF assume legislative powers and thereby have full control of the constitution writing process (cited in New York Times 3 Jul. 2012). The ‘parliament of the revolution’ had lasted just six months. Having performed poorly in the elections, non-Islamist forces protested against SCAF’s power grab, but did not mourn the passing of the legislature, reflecting a growing ambivalence felt by many in the revolutionary coalition towards the newly elected institutions.

This also marked a new and unanticipated development in the transition: the judicialization of post-SCAF politics. When Mursi wrestled legislative power from the SCAF in August 2012, judicial interventions against the legal basis of the country’s newly elected institutions continued. It is against this backdrop that Mursi issued the poorly conceived 22 November 2012 constitutional declaration; a maladroit manoeuvre that the Brothers insisted was necessary to outflank further judicial action against the constituent assembly and the upper house of parliament (see Hamid 2014: 157). The constitutional declaration, though rescinded following the passing of the constitution in a referendum weeks later, provoked a new cycle of protest, led by many of the leading figures of the 25th January Revolution who
accused Mursi of dictatorial intent. In stark contrast then to the Muslim Brothers’ expectations that political contestation would telescope into democratically elected forms of civilian authority following parliamentary and presidential elections, Mursi’s presidency was, instead, swiftly defined by the ‘deparliamentarization’ of politics, the result of repeated judicial interventions into the political process and escalating protest against his rule. Having come to underestimate the power and significance of mass mobilization during the transition, Mursi and the Muslim Brothers proved to be particularly vulnerable and spectacularly inept at responding to the challenges that their erstwhile revolutionary allies mounted from Egypt’s squares and streets. As Nathan Brown (2013a: 50) has argued, the Supreme Constitutional Court’s refusal to ratify an electoral law for a new parliament ensured that the opposition’s energies were channelled not into an electoral campaign, but rather further mobilization.

Journalistic accounts of Mursi’s brief presidential tenure and the circumstances of his ousting suggest that, far from being endowed with pharaoh-like powers, there were very real limitations on the authority of his elected office vis-à-vis a ‘deep state,’ comprising members of the judiciary, state media, military and Interior Ministry-controlled police and security services, that had spent two years consolidating its position following the 25th January Revolution (El-Amrani 2012; Sallam 2012; Brown 2013b). Despite efforts to appease these entrenched powers, Mursi’s former ministers claim that he only ever enjoyed titular control over the state apparatus (al-Jazeera 22 Jul. 2013; Mada Masr 8 Sept. 2013). As several scholars and journalists have argued, this deep state was instrumental in creating the conditions for Mursi’s removal; it is alleged to have withheld key public services in a destabilization campaign designed to erode public confidence.
in his already divisive and unpopular presidency (see Brown 2013a, 2013b; New York Times 10 Jul. 2013; Le Monde diplomatique Aug. 2013; New York Times 30 Oct. 2013; Pioppi 2013; Roberts 2013). In particular, these accounts call attention to the decision by the police to withdraw completely from their duties in the months leading up to the 30 June 2013 protests. In the resulting security vacuum, a run on petrol stations, combined with prolonged power cuts and water shortages during high summer and a violent insurgency led by Islamic militants in the Sinai, served to exacerbate the sense of crisis gripping the country. All this would play out in tandem with a sustained media campaign that sought to delegitimize the Muslim Brothers as a ‘terrorist’ organization, and the democratic project as a foreign conspiracy (El-Amrani 30 Jun. 2013; Elmasry 2013, 2014; Wall Street Journal 28 May 2014).87

Journalists have also begun to document the role of the Egyptian military and security services in funnelling material and logistical support to the Tamarrod movement that spearheaded calls for Mursi to step down. These reports, which cite senior members of Egypt’s Interior Ministry and state bureaucracy, suggest that Tamarrod’s leadership enjoyed substantive, clandestine links with the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, who saw the movement as an opportunity to redeploy ‘People power’ against Mursi’s democratically elected government (Reuters 10 Oct. 2013; Reuters 20 Feb. 2014). These claims have been repeated in interviews and statements given by several former Tamarrod members, including two of the movement’s founders; they recall regular meetings with retired army officers and former regime figures acting as intermediaries for Egyptian state

87 In the post-coup period, this media campaign has gone on to advance an eliminationist discourse, justifying the routine use of live ammunition and other repressive measures against the Muslim Brothers and anti-coup protestors.
security and the military leadership (Naguib 2013; Giglio 7 Dec. 2013; Frenkel and Atef 15 Apr. 2014) to co-ordinate protest activities in the months leading up to 30 June. Ahmed Maher (2014) of April 6 has claimed that in February 2013, he was approached by State Security to lead protests against Mursi. When he declined, the Interior Ministry, he suggests, began to cultivate Tamarrod. While ultimately reserving judgement as to the extent and formativeness of these connections as we await further scholarly investigations into this important dimension of Egypt’s failed transition, there is good reason to suspect that anti-democratic forces bearing the imprimatur of the deep state, in ways reminiscent of ‘elite-orchestrated’ protest in Central Asia (Radnitz 2010), South Asia (Brass 1997), Southeast Asia (Hedman 2006) and Latin America (Auyero 2007), exploited the divisions between the Brothers and other members of the 25th January coalition by facilitating and then co-opting the 30 June protests that would pave the way for Mursi’s removal and a return to military rule.

Conclusions

As I have argued, the post-Mubarak democratic project failed not because the Muslim Brothers eschewed procedural democracy, but because they eschewed mass mobilization and a more broadly coalitional approach to the transition. Here, a series of provisional and contingent factors – the evaporation of the NDP, the failure of Egypt’s liberal and secular forces to develop a competitive political machine of their own, and the particular pathways of regime breakdown – ensured

88 Tamarrod received significant financial backing from the Mubarak-era business elite and in particular from the billionaire Naguib Sawiris, whose business interests had been pursued by Mursi’s government for tax evasion totalling over one billion dollars (New York Times 10 Jul. 2013; Kenner 10 Jul. 2013). In the months after the coup, it was announced that Sawiris had stopped paying the fines imposed by the Mursi government and was appealing the original settlement (Washington Post 18 Jan. 2014).
that the Brothers’ electoralism and demobilization, a common theme of other Third Wave democratic transitions, magnified and exaggerated divisions within the revolutionary coalition, without ever producing a definitive outcome that could bind those who appear to have held real power: the deep state (see Brown 2013).

Revisiting the transitional period through the Muslim Brothers’ writings, the conviction that if competitive elections were held, the will of the new parliament and the new president could not be usurped appears axiomatic in the movement’s thinking. As a result, any initial constraint or attempts at coalition building soon gave way to electoral hubris and a sense of entitlement, premised on the disastrous miscalculation that democratically elected forms of civilian authority alone were sufficient both to legitimize the Brothers’ corporate agenda and to reduce the power and insulation of old regime holdovers. As one Brother later conceded, “We thought that once we had the legitimacy to write a new constitution, backed up by a new parliament and new democratic institutions, any counter-revolution could be defeated” (interview Abdullah al-Haddad 20 Feb. 2014). This retreat from mass mobilization and privileging of electoral and constitutional forums is a prominent feature of Brothers’ critical reappraisals of the movement’s missteps following the 25th January Revolution, beginning with the movement’s demobilization following the 18 March referendum. “The revolution,” reflects Abdel Mawgoud al-Dardery, a leading FJP figure, “should have continued” (cited in Jadaliyya 15 Aug. 2013).89

89 Amr Darrag, one of Mursi’s ministers echoes al-Dardery’s assessment: “We underestimated the power of the deep state. We thought that just having the revolution and elections, the deep state would diminish automatically or gradually. When parliamentary elections took place and only 13 members from felouls made it, we thought it was a strong indication that they don’t have much influence. But maybe at that time they were still gathering themselves. As time passed, we found that they have much more influence. They managed to have their candidate be the second top presidential candidate. If you go through the government, as I did as minister, you find out that they
For all the reasons outlined above—electoral ambitions, status as a privileged transitional partner, a commitment to gradualism—it nevertheless remains difficult to envisage a counterfactual scenario in which the Brothers continued to mobilize in early 2011 and force the military to cede power to an unelected civilian set of authorities. Somewhat easier to imagine is some combination of the Democratic Alliance staying together, or Egypt’s non-Islamist revolutionary parties performing better at the ballot box, or the Brothers not fading out of street politics to focus on elections and mobilizing in support of a national salvation government after the SCAF, with the publication of the Selmi declaration, signalled its intentions to remain a state within a state. In that case, the Brothers would have become a senior partner in a coalition of forces, with a presence in parliament and Midan al-Tahrir, bound by power-sharing and compromise, instead of being left with few allies to defend an isolated and unpopular president against the predations of old regime forces opposed to the democratic project launched by the 25th January Revolution.

Since the coup, the Muslim Brothers have regrouped to launch almost daily protests across the country (Ketchley 2013). But they have done so without the support of Egypt’s other revolutionaries, though many of the secular and liberal activists and movements who participated in the 25th January Revolution have found themselves subject to the same repression. In November 2013, the Brothers issued the first of several invitations to those activists to put aside their differences and reunite against the military and the counter-revolution (al-Shorouk 27 Nov. 2013). The offer has not been taken up. To mark the second anniversary of the

are really deeply rooted everywhere. A more revolutionary path would have been necessary to expedite reform” (Mada Masr 8 Sept. 2013).
Events of Muhammad Mahmud Street, the Brothers declared their solidarity with the planned commemorative protests in Midan al-Tahrir, but elected to stay away fearing a confrontation (Al-Hurriyya wa al-’Adala 15 Nov. 2013: 1). Above Muhammad Mahmoud Street protestors hung a banner that read: “No filūl, no military, no Brothers.”
Chapter 3

The How, Where and When of Repression and Mobilization: The Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Anti-Coup Movement*

On 28 June 2013, members of the Muslim Brothers and supporters of Egyptian president Muhammad Mursi occupied Midan Raba’a al-Adawiyya, a public square in eastern Cairo, in anticipation of street protests calling for Mursi’s resignation scheduled for 30 June. The choice of Raba’a was not coincidental. The Muslim Brothers have a long association, dating back to the Sadat era (interview Ibrahim Munir 19 Jun. 2014), with the Raba’a al-Adawiyya mosque, which gives its name to the Midan. A week earlier, on 21 June, there had been a dress rehearsal for the occupation: supporters of President Mursi held a large demonstration in Raba’a anointed the “Friday of Rejecting Violence.”90 In the days and weeks following Mursi’s removal by a military coup on 3 July, pro-Mursi occupations were established in public squares in Alexandria, Assiut, Aswan, al-Bahr al-Ahmar, Beni Suef, Daqahlia, Giza, Minya, North Sinai, Suhag and Qina.91 In governorates without an occupation, hastily assembled convoys of cars, buses and coaches, from

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90 The Muslim Brothers had previously staged other protests in Raba’a: on 4 and 6 June 2013, for instance, they held demonstrations in the Midan in solidarity with Syrian opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

91 Occupations were established in Midan al-Qa’id Ibrahim in Alexandria, Midan Omar Makram in Assiut, Midan al-Shuhada’ in Aswan, Midan al-Mudiriyaa in Beni Suef, Midan al-Nahda in Giza, Midan al-Dahar in Hurghada, outside the Olympic Stadium in Mansoura, Midan al-Balas in Minya, Midan Masjid al-Nasr in North Sinai, Midan al-Thaqafa in Suhag, and Midan al-Sa’a in Qina.
as far away as Gharbiyya, Menoufia, Port Said, Suez, and Wadi al-Jadid, ferried several hundred protestors at a time to reinforce the Raba’a occupation.

Thus began a countrywide mobilization that has seen daily protests against the coup continue in the face of what Amnesty and Human Rights Watch (2014a) have described as “repression on a scale unprecedented in Egypt’s modern history”. Figure 11 shows the extent of anti-coup protests during the first six months of the mobilization. Two trends are immediately discernible: protests became markedly smaller, but no less frequent over time. Repression peaked on 14 August 2013, when several anti-coup occupations, including the occupation at Raba’a al-Adawiyya, were violently dispersed by the new military-backed government: at least a thousand anti-coup protestors were killed (EIPR 2014; Human Rights Watch 2014b). The 14 August massacres would establish a precedent whereby soldiers and Interior Ministry-controlled security forces routinely used live ammunition, tear gas and birdshot to disperse anti-coup protests. According to one widely cited estimate, in the year following the coup over three thousand anti-coup protestors have been killed and nearly forty thousand regime opponents arrested by the military-backed government (WikiThawra 2014a; 2014b).

How can we explain the pattern of mobilization in Egypt since the coup? The effects of repression on protest – what the contentious politics literature refers to as the repression-mobilization nexus – are notoriously capricious (Davenport, Johnston and Meuller 2004). Studies have found that repression leads to a decline in protest because of the additional ‘costs’ of repression (Olzak, Beasley and Olivier 2003; Tilly 1978: 100). Alternatively, repression has been shown to generate an increased incidence of post-repression protest, known as
Figure 11. Anti-coup protest participation and protest frequency. Data missing 13-18 Oct. Peak mobilization came on 19 Jul. 2013 when over seven hundred thousand anti-coup protestors mobilized in thirteen governorates for the “Friday of the People Break the Coup.”
“backlash” (Francisco 1995, 1996, 2004a, 2004b). Particularly violent repression can figure as a “transformative event” in the life story of a mobilization, leading to a higher incidence of backlash over time (Hess and Martin 2006; Martin 2007). Others have argued that there is no linear relationship between repression and mobilization at all. Rasler’s (1996) study found that mobilization resembles a U shape, in which repression has a short-term negative effect and a long-term positive effect on protest participation (see also Opp and Roehl 1990). Brockett (1995; 2005), meanwhile, has argued that the relationship between repression and protest participation takes on an inverted U shape: limited repression incentivises protest, while higher levels encourage demobilization. As David Cunningham concludes, “the most notable finding has been the fact that seemingly all possible relationships have been supported by empirical work in this area” (2003: 47).

Faced with this indeterminacy, scholars have started to look beyond protest quantity as the dependent variable, instead asking a very different set of questions about the qualitative impact of repression on the dynamics of contentious politics (Davenport and Eads 2001; Chang and Kim 2007; Chang 2008; Moss 2014; for a review see Earl 2011). This article contributes to this literature by considering how repression has influenced the timings, sites and modalities of anti-coup mobilization.92 By shifting the locus of enquiry from the quantity of protest to its qualities, we can better understand how the social coordinates of action condition the variability and viability of transgressive contention during episodes of repression. Such is the premise of this study.

92 The definition of ‘repression’ requires some preliminary remarks. I adopt a fairly conventional measure of state-centric repression as including overt, coercive measures (e.g. violence, killings, and arrests). There are other kinds of repression (e.g. sexual harassment, surveillance, repression by private individuals, etc.) that certainly apply in the Egyptian case, but which I do not properly consider for lack of data (see Earl 2011: 265-266).
In outline, I argue that anti-coup protests ‘moved’ in response to state violence during the first six months of the anti-coup mobilization. Following the clearing of the anti-coup occupations on 14 August, protestors relocated: from squares, outside government buildings and main arterial roads, to side streets and university campuses. As repression continued, the horizontal linkages between associational spaces and sites of protest became harder to sustain, contributing to the parochialization of contention. Coeval to this shift in the sites of contentious claim making was a corresponding change in the repertoire of contention. Protest became mobile, more ephemeral and less disruptive. Static occupations and demonstrations outside government buildings were superseded by farāsha (butterfly) sit-ins and human chains. Repression dictated the timings of protest, too. Anti-coup protestors became familiar with police shift patterns; they began mobilizing early in the morning and late at night, allowing them to mount longer actions in high-traffic areas unavailable to them during the daytime. This was not without consequence. Night-time protests were safer, but less conspicuous; early morning protests increased visibility, but limited participation.

Taken together, the relationship between repression and anti-coup mobilization followed a process of “tactical interaction and innovation” (McAdam 1983; 2013). Absent a hydraulic relationship between episodes of state violence and incidents of protest, anti-coup protestors and the military-backed government interacted through an iterative and dialogic process of move and countermove, which power disparities between challenger and regime prevented from achieving equilibrium. In this, anti-coup protestors were able to sustain their high risk

93 Here, I am expanding the repression-mobilization debate to address questions of concern to a literature on space and contentious politics (for a review, see Tilly 2000).
activism by mobilizing at the interstices of regime power – in mosques, side streets and universities – but the form and quality of their contention was impaired as a result. Protest became shorter, localized and more nimble; thus we might conclude, contention’s ability to inspire and encourage was diminished as protest became less visible and “positive feedback” (Biggs 2003; 2005) was inhibited. Repression does not just raise the ‘costs’ for individuals engaging in collective action, this argument suggests, but may also shape the locations and trajectories of ‘how,’ ‘where’ and ‘when’ contention can and cannot emerge and unfold in authoritarian contexts.

I use an original event catalogue (n=2685) of anti-coup protests and semi-structured interviews with anti-coup protestors to chart the evolving dynamics of the anti-coup mobilization. I begin by positioning the decision by the Muslim Brothers and pro-Mursi supporters to mobilize in the run-up to the 3 July coup and consider some of the organizational features of the anti-coup movement. I then use event data and informant testimony to analyse the effects of repression on the modalities, sites and timings of anti-coup protest. Finally, I address the implications for the anti-coup movement and suggest how the findings of this

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94 An event catalogue is a, “set of descriptions of multiple social interactions collected from a delimited set of sources according to relatively uniform procedures.” (Tilly 2002: 249). This anti-coup event catalogue is compiled from protest reports published in the Muslim Brothers’ Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) newspaper, al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala. Each entry records the date of a protest, governorate, village/town/city, repertoire, protest start location, protest end location, time of day, whether the protest began following prayer, crowd composition, description of repression, and protestors’ chants and slogans. To check for reporting bias, a random sample of stories was checked against videos uploaded to Youtube and the live streams of protests updated daily to the anti-coup movement’s social media pages. Tallied against the video evidence, reports proved highly accurate, though, there is sufficient evidence of underreporting to conclude that protest frequency is likely to be higher still. When examples of protest and repression between 1 May and 31 January 2014 are given without citation, the data comes from the event catalogue.

95 Interviews were conducted between February and July 2014. Unless citing the Muslim Brothers’ spokespeople, I use the first name to preserve the condition of anonymity under which testimony was gathered.
study might offer a basis for better understanding the legacies of the 25th January Revolution.

**Returning to the Streets**

To explain the origins of the 2013 anti-coup mobilization, it is necessary to go back two years, to crucial decisions made by the Muslim Brothers following the 25th January Revolution that removed Husni Mubarak. With the departure of Mubarak, the Muslim Brothers demobilized, boycotting further protests calling for social justice and an end to military rule, equating the revolution’s goals rather with constitutional reform and democratic authority achieved through the ballot box. That first protest cycle culminated in the “Friday of the Last Change” and the events of Muhammad Mahmoud Street in November 2011. On the streets, Egyptians were calling upon the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to relinquish executive authority to a civilian-led, national salvation government. But the Brothers decided to sit out these and other contentious episodes, insisting that further protest would destabilize the country and that “elections are the solution.” *(al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala, 22 Nov. 2011: 1; see Chapter two)*

The Muslim Brothers endorsed the SCAF’s rule during the first year of the transitional period; their victories in parliamentary and presidential elections paved the way for the second protest cycle of the post-Mubarak era in which they found themselves the objects of protest. The Brothers’ decision to mobilize dates back to violent clashes outside the Ittihadiyya presidential palace in early December 2013, when pro-Mursi supporters, led by Muslim Brothers, confronted a sit-in calling for his resignation organized by the National Salvation Front. Amid scenes of hand-to-hand fighting and accusations of both sides torturing detained
protestors, eleven died, eight of them Muslim Brothers. “Following Ittihadiyya,” one Muslim Brother recalls, “whenever there was an anti-Mursi protest, we aimed to hold a counter-demonstration. We decided that we had to show Egyptians, the army and the media, that there was support for Mursi in the streets” (interview Abdullah al-Haddad 20 Feb. 2014).

With anti-Mursi sentiment growing throughout the country, the Muslim Brothers found themselves defending their network of headquarters, offices and charities from attack. One of the first assaults on the Brothers’ infrastructure came in December 2012 when their headquarters in Ismailia, the Suez Canal city where the movement was founded in 1928, was set on fire. Further attacks followed. On the second anniversary of the 25th January Revolution, two FJP offices in the Nile Delta cities of Mansoura and Damanhour were burnt down. It is unclear who was behind these attacks, although there is evidence to suggest local residents angry with what many saw as Mursi’s autocratic and ineffectual presidency played a role. The Brothers, meanwhile, were convinced that the attacks formed part of a destabilization campaign carried out by filūl (literally, remnants) – former members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. The Interior Ministry-controlled police, they noted, rarely intervened to protect the buildings and their occupants.

Such attacks escalated in the weeks leading up to the 30 June protests. Between 18 June and 3 July 2013, thirty eight regional headquarters and offices were gutted, most during a three day period from 28 June to 1 July (see Table 1). Meanwhile, the 30 June protests called for by the Tamarrod (rebellion) petition

96 In Ismailia, for example, opposition to the Brothers grew throughout early 2013 to culminate in residents parading through the centre of the city bearing effigies of Mursi and other leading Muslim Brothers during their Spring Festival (Al-Masry Al-Youm 4 May 2013). This tradition of effigy burning dates back to the British occupation.
Table 1. Pre-3 July coup attacks on Muslim Brother and FJP offices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location (governorate, town/city, office)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 June</td>
<td>al-Gharbiyya, Tanta (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June</td>
<td>Kafr el-Sheikh, Madinat Dessouq (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June</td>
<td>al-Sharqiyya, (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>al-Sharqiyya, Zagazig, (MB office); al-Daqahlia, (MB office); Fayoum (MB office); Alexandria, Semouha (MB office); Kafr el-Sheikh, Baltim (FJP office); Kafr el-Sheikh, Baltim (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>al-Beheira, Housh Eissa (FJP office); al-Beheira, Shubra Khit (MB office); al-Daqahlia, Aga (FJP office); al-Gharbiyya, Madinat Basyoun (FJP office); Port Said, Port Said (FJP office); Beni Suef, Madinat Beni Suef (MB &amp; FJP offices); Port Said, Port Fuad (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>Fayoum, Fayoum (FJP office); Cairo, al-Muqattam (MB HQ); al-Gharbiyya (FJP office); al-Daqahlia, al-Sinbelawin (MB &amp; FJP offices); Alexandria, Mintaqat al-Hadara al-Jadida (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>al-Gharbiyya (MB office); al-Gharbiyya, Madinat Basyoun (MB office); al-Qalyubiyya, Madinat al-Qanatir (FJP office); al-Sharqiyya, Zagazig (MB office); al-Sharqiyya, Fayqu (FJP office); al-Sharqiyya, Abu Hamad (MB office); al-Sharqiyya, Qaryat al-Azaziyya (FJP office); al-Sharqiyya, Markaz Dirb Najm (FJP office); al-Menoufia (FJP office); Assiut (FJP office); Kafr el-Sheikh, Baltim (FJP office); Kafr el-Sheikh, Madinat Bila (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Beni Suef, Madinat Beni Suef (MB school); al-Qalyubiyya, Madinat Banha (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 July</td>
<td>al-Menoufia, Markaz Ashmun (FJP office)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

campaign were gathering momentum, encouraged by statements from the military calling on Mursi to make concessions. The Brothers, who had long threatened to mobilize their supporters if the movement’s electoral authority was threatened, fell back on a repertoire pioneered during the 25th January Revolution, formulating plans to occupy public squares across the country and forming units of “ultras” to lead street protests should the military intervene. On 30 June 2013 the twenty-fifth milyūniyya (million-person protest) in eight months saw unprecedented numbers gather outside the Presidential Palace and on the streets.

97 Launched in May 2013, pro-Mursi ultras mimic the hyper-masculine, high-octane performances of Egypt’s football firms and are tasked with leading chants and motivating the crowd. The original ultras, the Ultras Nahdawi, have since spawned several regional spinoffs, whose members wear specially printed T-shirts, play drums and let off fireworks during protests.
of downtown Cairo demanding early elections to end the presidency of Muhammad Mursi. The military, led by then Defence Minister (now president) Field Marshall ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, seized the protests as a pretext to launch a coup on 3 July.

Despite these setbacks, Muslim Brothers were initially optimistic that the coup could be reversed through protest. One informant recalls Brothers watching the documentary film *The Revolution Will not be Televised* (2002) in the days following the coup (interview Abdullah4 10 Jun. 2014). The documentary, which recounts how a military coup against Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez was defeated by a combination of people power and a loyal presidential guard, was shared on the Brothers’ closed social media pages, complete with Arabic subtitles. With Raba’a occupied, a document circulated among senior Brothers and pro-Mursi supporters outlining several possible scenarios (interview Mona 30 Apr. 2014). Included in the analysis were lessons to be drawn from previous coups, including case studies of coups in Chile, Spain, Turkey and Venezuela. The Brothers’ strategy of rolling protests was premised on a best case scenario in which Mursi could be returned to the presidential palace if elements within the military aligned with anti-coup protestors on the street. This scenario also anticipated pressure from the United States and the European Union on the military leadership to respect the democratic process. An alternative scenario envisaged Mursi being reinstated on an interim basis pending fresh presidential elections.98 The most pessimistic scenario, and one that the Brothers increasingly

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98 The interim reinstatement of Muhammad Mursi was the primary demand of the anti-coup movement in the period addressed by the present study. This was dropped in May 2014 when the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy endorsed the ‘Brussels declaration’ – a ten-point political programme seeking to build a broad front against the military-backed government (see *ikhwanWeb* 2014).
prepared for, was of a violent crackdown comparable to that suffered in 1954 when Gamal Abdel Nasser suppressed the movement.

This early period was characterized by intense organization. That the anti-coup movement has been able to sustain a daily protest presence is thanks in large part to a series of organizational innovations enacted by the Muslim Brothers and other members of the anti-coup movement (under the umbrella of the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy) at this stage of the mobilization. Historically a highly centralized, cadre-based social movement organization *par excellence* (Lia 1998; Wickham 2013), the Brothers’ response to the arrest of large numbers of the movement’s leadership immediately following the military’s seizure of power was to adopt a greatly decentralized structure in which Brothers and non-Brothers organized alongside one another in anti-coup occupations, and later, in several ‘against the coup’ movements (*harakāt didd al-inqilāb*). The formation of these movements – Youth Against the Coup, Students Against the Coup, Women Against the Coup, and others – in Raba’a in early July 2013 amounted to a kind of ‘strategic prepositioning’ of what Dieter Rucht (2014) has classified as “action groups”: small, informal movements that rely on face-to-face interaction and that are capable of organizing autonomously at the local level whilst simultaneously

99 The National Alliance to Support legitimacy officially comprises fifteen Islamist parties, including the Muslim Brothers’ political wing, the FJP. However, informants insist that the Alliance exists in name only, issuing press releases and statements, but having little to no role in organizing protests (interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014).

100 With Mursi detained, the new government set about rounding up the Muslim Brothers’ leadership. By 5 August, two hundred and twenty eight Muslim Brothers had been arrested, many of them senior and mid-ranking members. They included Saad al-Katatni, the chairman of FJP; the Deputy Supreme Guide, Khairat al-Shatir; and several members of the Guidance Bureau, the movement’s executive decision making body. On 20 August, General Guide Muhammad Badie was detained. Several of the prominent Brothers who remained at large took refuge in Midan Raba’a al-Adawiyya and Midan al-Nahda, while others fled the country for exile in London, Doha and Istanbul.
operating as components in a larger network.\(^{101}\) By September, these ‘against the coup’ movements had become semi-independent of the Muslim Brothers’ organizational hierarchy, even if their core memberships were young Muslim Brothers and Muslim Sisters.\(^{102}\) For example, in the first months of the mobilization local branches of Students Against the Coup were assigned a senior Muslim Brother supervisor (*mushrif*) to coordinate protest actions. This system of formal oversight was, however, almost immediately abandoned due to youth members rebelling against a controlling hand that they saw as out of touch with the realities on the ground (interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014).\(^{103}\) Informants suggest that the Brothers’ formal organizational role in the ‘against the coup’ movements quickly became financial – putting up bail money for detained anti-coup protestors and providing financial support to the families of ‘martyred’ protestors – though

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\(^{101}\) The first ‘against the coup’ movement was Youth Against the Coup. Formed on 5 July following an onstage conference at Raba’a, its organizational model called for flat networks of activists each working in one of three areas: media (to publicize the protests); political (to organize the protests); and social work (*al-Hurriyya wa al-Adala* 22 Jul. 2013: 7). Social work was subsequently dropped to focus on protest activities. Addressing the crowd at Raba’a, Emad Shahin, a professor of political science at the American University in Cairo, outlined the rationale for these new protest movements: “The coup is still in a fluid state. It has not been consolidated. This conflict will be resolved on several fronts – the most important of which will be protest from the street. For this, we need to build new movements that can overcome the violence of the police and their thugs.” (*al-Hurriyya wa al-Adala* 21 Jul. 2013: 7)

\(^{102}\) An online survey (n=287) I conducted in April 2014 and posted in the closed Facebook groups and social media forums used by ‘against the coup’ movements to coordinate protest strategy, found that over a third (thirty seven per cent) of survey participants who had taken part in an anti-coup protest self-identified as a Muslim Brother or Muslim Sister (see Ketchley and Biggs 2014). This number is slightly higher than the modal estimate given by non-Brother informants of Muslim Brother participation in anti-coup protests. Respondents were also asked which party they supported in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. Ninety four per cent of respondents indicated support for an Islamist party.

\(^{103}\) This system also extended to coordinating protests with Muslim Sisters. If Muslim Brother members of Students Against the Coup wanted to coordinate university campus protests with Muslim Sisters, they had to do so via their respective supervisors. This system proved so unwieldy that it was quickly replaced by male and female members organizing together (interview Sarah 20 Feb. 2014; interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014).
they also took charge of publicizing protests through the movement’s various media platforms (Ibid.).

**Reertoire of contention**

How the anti-coup movement mobilized has changed over time in response to repression. Figure 12 shows the frequency of marches (masīrāt), sit-ins (waqafāt), human chains (salāsil bashariyya), occupations (i’tisāmāt) and demonstrations (muthāharāt) as a percentage of anti-coup protests between June and November 2013. Demonstrations and marches were both kinetic and disruptive modes of contention and may appear indistinguishable but for their focus. Demonstrations made direct claims on regime power and either began or concluded outside of government buildings; marches, meanwhile, moved from point A to point B and aimed to mobilize anti-coup sentiment while contesting the government’s control over the streets. A sub-type of march not shown in Figure 11 is a masīra hāshida (gathering march). This was a protest that visited several mosques, ‘gathering’ the faithful and passers-by, before moving on to a pre-agreed destination. Sit-ins, human chains and occupations were all static forms of protest that varied in terms of timing and size. Sit-ins were temporary, lasting at most a few hours. Occupations were more permanent and required an infrastructure to support them. Human chains were the smallest and least disruptive mode of protest, typically involving around ten protestors who stood by the side of a high traffic road or major building, chanting anti-coup slogans and holding posters and banners.

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104 The Brothers’ local branches (maktab idārat al-shu‘ab) continued to play a key role in organizing non-‘against the coup’ movement protests, especially Friday protests.
105 In rural areas, marches frequently involve participants riding motorcycles or tuk-tuks.
106 Outside of major cities, human chains differ considerably. Planned at a village-level, often a week in advance (interview Youssef 20 Apr. 2014), they tend to be much larger, attracting participants.
What is immediately striking about the anti-coup mobilization is how recursive the repertoire is; providing empirical confirmation for Charles Tilly’s (1978, 1995, 2008) insight that when people protest, they do so in only a limited number of ways. The only period where we find significant deviation away from these five tactics is in August.107 This was primarily due to the high number of funeral processions resulting from the 14 August killings that simultaneously from several villages who line the sides of one of the major highways connecting Cairo with Alexandria, Upper Egypt and the Nile Delta cities. Because the state’s coercive apparatus is concentrated in urban areas, participants face little threat of punitive action.

107 Other limited tactical innovations included a call in August to boycott household products produced in military-owned factories in addition to brands, companies and media outlets operated by pro-coup figures. The boycott never gained traction and was quietly dropped. Another failed innovation was a “petrol protest” which called on drivers to fill up their tanks at government-owned petrol stations, before turning off their engines and abandoning their vehicles, effectively blockading the forecourt. More successful, albeit little-used, innovations included a petition campaign, blockading roads, ‘protest marathons’ in which young men run through major thoroughfares, theatrical retellings of the coup and its aftermath, and ‘data shows’ – projecting images or video footage of regime violence on the sides of public buildings.
served as anti-coup protests. There is also little evidence to support a mechanical relationship between repression and ‘radicalization’. Beginning with Lichbach’s (1987) essay on the subject, several scholars have argued that the violent repression of nonviolent protest will cause a movement to adopt more violent tactics. This thesis has been applied to the study of Islamist mobilization in Mohammed Hafez’s (2003) Why Muslims Rebel. Hafez theorizes that Islamist movements pursue violence when they are subject to reactive, indiscriminate repression, while simultaneously being excluded from the political process. A corollary claim is that under these conditions we should expect to see the adoption of highly centralized, exclusivist organizational structures (see also della Porta 1995). Given the scope parameters of the theory, the Egyptian anti-coup movement should be an exemplar of these dynamics. However, as I have discussed elsewhere (Ketchley 2013, 2014b), isolated episodes of violence attributed to pro-Mursi supporters notwithstanding – including attacks on police stations, government buildings and churches in the aftermath of the 14 August massacres (EIPR 2013), as well as the use of Molotov cocktails and improvised weapons on protests108 – the anti-coup movement did not morph into a violent Islamist insurgency.

Instead, repression came to reconfigure a repertoire of non-violent contention. The 14 August massacres therefore represent a clear discontinuity, both in terms of the unprecedented scale of the killing, and also in their bringing to a close a phase of the mobilization in which large occupations and demonstrations featured prominently. By occupying squares in thirteen governorates, the anti-

108 In December anti-coup protestors began to bring fireworks, powerful gas-powered potato guns and Molotov cocktails on marches, either to confront the police (firebombing empty police cars was a popular tactic), or to form a rearguard should the protest be attacked.
coup movement drew on a modality of protest pioneered during the 25th January Revolution. The occupation of Midan al-Tahrir, David Patel (2014) has argued, solved a fundamental problem of mass mobilization by communicating to would-be protestors how, where and when people were protesting. This model, Patel suggests, is especially effective in making public and conspicuous the scale of contention in authoritarian contexts where information is otherwise tightly controlled and disinformation rife.¹⁰⁹

As in the 25th January occupations, anti-coup protestors, often accompanied by their families, continuously occupied squares, with other protestors reinforcing the occupations on coordinated days of protest and the largest protests held after Friday prayers or during specially-called milyūniyya (million-person) protests.¹¹⁰ These occupations also provided important logistical functions in towns and neighbourhoods where the Muslim Brothers’ network of offices and headquarters had been attacked. In this sense, an anti-coup occupation operated in the tradition of a long history of protest camps, keeping protestors fed and cared for by a well-staffed infrastructure of workshops, kitchens, pharmacies, and field hospitals (see Feigenbaum, Frenzel and McCurdy 2013). Occupations were also spaces in which previously unconnected people could come together and plan ways to challenge the coup, for instance with the formation of the ‘against the coup’ movements. The Rabaʿa occupation even had its own FM radio station, followed on 15 July by a television station, 25 Ahrar, broadcasting from the Midan. Despite the arrest of the Brothers’ leadership and several attacks on anti-coup

¹⁰⁹ This argument draws on preference falsification models in which would-be protestors calculate the risk of protesting as a function of the size of the crowd (Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994).
¹¹⁰ And like the largest protests of the 25th January Revolution, these were given names: the 5 July ‘Friday of Yes to Legitimacy, No to the Military Coup’; the 12 July ‘Friday of Marching’; the 19 July ‘Friday of the People will Break the Coup’; the 2 August ‘Friday of Egypt Against the Coup’; and so on.
protests, the anti-coup movement began life as a well-resourced and sophisticated mobilization, capable of sending hundreds of thousands of protestors onto the streets.

When it was attacked on the morning of 14 August, the Raba’a occupation had lasted forty seven days, longer than any previous occupation of Midan al-Tahrir. Occupations in Alexandria, Giza, Beni Suef, Qina, Aswan and Assiut were also cleared. The immediate effect of the crackdown was to further decentralize the mobilization. This saw local branches of ‘against the coup’ movements take on an increasingly important role in organizing protests as coordination moved online and into offline associational spaces such as university dorms, mosques and private households. Following 14 August, anti-coup protestors adopted a four-fingered salute on a yellow background – a gesture deriving from Rabi’a (fourth), the first name of the female Sufi saint who is the Midan’s namesake. It quickly became synonymous with opposition to the military-backed government.

111 The first instance of regime forces using live ammunition against anti-coup protestors came on 8 July when Republican Guard units attacked a pro-Mursi sit-in outside the Republican Guard Officers’ Club where it was believed Mursi was being held: sixty seven anti-coup protestors were killed. Several anti-coup protestors were also killed on 19 July when police opened fire on an anti-coup occupation in Mansoura and on 27 July police and soldiers attacked a march that had departed from the Raba’a al-Adawiyya occupation as it was passing the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier (known locally as al-Manassa) on its way towards downtown Cairo, killing over a hundred protestors. Though serious and tragic, these episodes look to have had little effect on the mobilization as a whole. Protestors continued to mobilize outside the Republican Guard building, the anti-coup occupation in Mansoura still attracted tens of thousands of participants during Friday protests, and marches left Raba’a al-Adawiyya for downtown Cairo with the same frequency. In fact, in informant testimony, these early instances of regime violence are highlighted as formative episodes in the forging of an activist mentality, with greater consideration given to the provision of first aid and to new techniques to deal with tear gas and shotgun pellets (interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014).

112 In early August, around ten per cent of all anti-coup protests were organized under the banner of an ‘against the coup’ movement. By mid-September, these groups were responsible for over half of all anti-coup protests. Anti-coup activists relied heavily on closed social media groups, some of which, informants suggest, had several thousand members, to share tactics and coordinate national days of protest. To avoid detection (when anti-coup protestors are arrested police often search their mobile phone or laptop for evidence of protest activity [interview Sara 15 Mar. 2014]) these groups were given innocuous names. One example of a now defunct group used to plan marches in Cairo was, “I love Cristiano Ronaldo” (interview with Muslim Brother 20 Mar. 2014).
Static occupations fell out of the repertoire entirely when security forces began routinely using live ammunition against large crowds. Demonstrations outside of heavily-defended government buildings also became too dangerous. Demonstrations began to be held with greater frequency in October. However, as I show in the subsequent section, these were primarily held outside administrative and security offices on public university campuses. Almost immediately, then, the effects of repression following the 14 August killings can be seen to have made contention less disruptive. Marches, protestors’ favoured tactic for their manoeuvrability and impact, continued to be launched, but their form was altered in response to the threat of regime attack. Gathering marches became impossible as large numbers of protestors drew the attention of security forces. Marches also sped up. Informants recall that anti-coup marches prior to the 14 August typically lasted for several hours, travelling long distances to reach a pre-agreed terminus. By November, marches in most Cairo neighbourhoods frequently dispersed after twenty minutes in anticipation of regime violence (interview Sarah and Hoda 26 Feb. 2014).

The frequency of sit-ins and human chains increased after the clearing of the anti-coup occupations. Human chains became the default tactic on weekdays when there was a low turnout. The high frequency of human chains after September thus reflected and reproduced declining protest numbers, as local iterations of the anti-coup movement struggled to sustain a daily protest presence in the face of a wave of targeted arrests. Sit-ins were held primarily in university faculty buildings and on the roads in front of mosques. A more risky form of sit-in, 113

113 There were several attempts to re-establish an occupation, beginning on 16 August in Midan Ramses in downtown Cairo. All were thwarted by security forces using live ammunition and birdshot.
pioneered in Assiut in September and quickly adopted elsewhere, was the waqfat al-farāsha (butterfly sit-in). Combining a sit-in with a flash mob, butterfly sit-ins allowed protestors to temporarily take over highly symbolic spaces, such as main roads or public squares, assemble long enough to record the protestors chanting against the military and the Interior Ministry, and then move on (see al-Jazeera 10 Sept. 2013). One anti-coup protestors explained the butterfly sit-in’s popularity: “The farāsha pisses off the police. You go to a place and stay there for ten minutes or just long enough that the security forces are alerted, and then you leave for another location” (interview Muhammad 26 Feb. 2014). But these insurgent tactics had an impact on the efficacy of anti-coup protest. Given their speed, necessary to outmanoeuvre the authorities, protestors were only visible momentarily and were afforded few opportunities to interact with people on the street. As one organizer later reflected, butterfly sit-ins allowed protestors to regain a sense of agency and momentum, but as tools for challenging the coup, they soon proved to be a “tactical dead end” (interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014).

As the anti-coup repertoire became more nimble in response to regime violence, protests themselves became the preserve of young men and women. Qualities that mattered less in sustaining occupations, i.e. being able to run fast and carry heavy loads, became essential attributes. In turn, the opportunities for many Muslim Brothers and pro-Mursi supporters to participate in demonstrations, marches and sit-ins narrowed considerably. Moreover, as I discuss in the next section, while the military-backed government could not stop anti-coup protestors from protesting entirely, it could strongly influence where those protests unfolded.
Sites of Contention

Anti-coup event data allows us to present a stylized illustration of the ways in which sites of contention have shifted as a consequence of repression over the first six months of the mobilization. Figure 13 shows the most frequently recurring protest start locations (shown as weighted white nodes) and protest end locations (weighted red nodes). Connections between nodes (shown as directed edges) show the tendency for protest to move from location A to location B. To give an example, between 28 June and 14 August there were three hundred and nine protests that began in a mosque, of which one hundred and four – over a third – ended in a public square. The thickness of the edge connecting the “Mosque” and “Square” nodes is weighted to reflect this proportion. In the month after the crackdown began, only seventeen marches departed for a square, less than one percent of all mosque-originating protests. Instead, the overwhelming majority of marches moved through residential side streets. By November, this had developed into a clearly discernible trend: anti-coup marches were avoiding main roads, squares and government buildings where security forces were most heavily concentrated and where the possibility of attack was highest.

In Figure 13, isolated nodes or nodes with few or light edges, reflect a high proportion of static protests. Consider here the frequency of university protests. Beginning with the start of the new academic year in September, these protests escalated in early October in response to the heavy-handed policing of an anti-coup sit-in at al-Azhar University. Solidarity demonstrations, sit-ins and strikes soon spread to al-Azhar’s other campuses and tertiary institutes, as well as at the universities of Cairo, Ain Shams, Assiut, Zagazig, Mansoura and several others. These protests were mainly organized by Students Against the Coup and bucked
Figure 13. Protest start and end locations, 28 June–30 November 2013. Directed edges show horizontal linkages between start (white nodes) and end locations (red nodes).
the general trend, growing in frequency and size as students began coordinating their actions across several faculties. In November, there were a hundred and four protests on Egyptian university campuses. Crucially, however, these protests rarely left university gates. When protests increased in October, the regime had responded by posting armed police and soldiers at campus entrances with orders to open fire on any march or demonstration attempting to leave. The effect of repression was to confine and isolate student contention, ensuring that protests could neither scale up nor make common cause with other sectors.

Another way to visualize how repression can shape the sites of protest is to spotlight one neighbourhood and consider how the routes of marches and demonstrations changed over time. Figure 13 shows the path taken by a ‘gathering march’ that set off following the Friday Sermon from Muhandiseen in Giza to Midan al-Nahda, a public square located next to Cairo University, for the 9 August protest anointed the “Friday of the Eid of Victory”. Elsewhere in Giza, marches were also heading off to Midan al-Nahda from the neighbourhoods of Umraniiyya and al-Haram. The Muhandiseen march begins outside of the Khalid Ibn al-Walid mosque, before moving on to al-Maghfira mosque and then Mustafa Mahmud mosque. The protestors’ ranks had swelled to several thousand before the march turned down al-Batal Ahmad ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Street to arrive at Midan al-Nahda. The march lasted for several hours and concluded with speeches delivered

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114 This represented the evolution of a tactic honed under the Mubarak regime. Writing in 2003, Asef Bayat noted: “Students at Cairo University, for example, often stage protest marches inside the campus. However, the moment they decided to come out into the street, riot police are immediately and massively deployed to encircle the demonstrators, push them into a corner away from public view and keep the protest a local event” (2003).

115 In March 2014, this saw al-Azhar students use sledgehammers and crowbars to fashion temporary exits in the campus perimeter walls, from which they surged out onto Mustafa Nahas Street. See footage: [http://youtu.be/uwZWVXKCPOM](http://youtu.be/uwZWVXKCPOM).

116 Near-identical protests were also held in Alexandria, Cairo, Fayoum, Beni Suef, Suez, Assiut, al-Bahr al-Ahmar, Sharqiyya and Ismailia.
from the stage erected in the Midan. This use of space perfectly mirrors the repertoire of the 25th January Revolution, with Midan al-Tahrir replaced by Midan al-Nahda.\(^{117}\) Indeed, these were often the same mosques from which marches were launched on the pivotal “Friday of Anger” of 28 January 2011. Near identical anti-coup protests – with marches leaving mosques after Friday prayers for squares and main roads – were held that day in towns and cities in Alexandria, Assiut, al-Bahr al-Ahmar, Beni Suef, Cairo, Damietta, Luxor, Sharqiyya and Ismailia.

After the 14 August massacres, anti-coup protestors continued to use mosques as staging points, but the destinations of their marches had changed. Figure 15 traces the route of a march departing from al-Mahrusa mosque in Muhandiseen. The date is 13 September. At this point, nearly a month has passed since the occupation of Midan al-Nahda was violently dispersed. As on every Friday since 14 August, the square was sealed off by army APCs and plainclothes police fanned out into the side streets alert to any approaching marches. Knowing this, protestors set off instead for Gamiʿat al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya Street, the busiest street in Giza. The march made it halfway down Gamiʿat al-Duwal before the protestors found their path blocked by black-uniformed Central Security Forces, who fired tear gas into the crowd. The march quickly dispersed. Prior to the 14 August, nearly a quarter of all protests leaving mosques arrived at a main arterial road. These protests were public and disruptive, with participants holding aloft posters of the deposed president Muhammad Mursi, chanting: “we are the people and these are our words: when Mursi comes back, we'll go home” \((\text{ihna al-sha’b,})\)

\(^{117}\) It is worth noting that these are often the same mosques from which protests were launched during the first days of the 25th January Revolution.
Figure 14. Anti-coup ‘gathering march’ from three mosques to Midan al-Nahda, 9 Aug. 2013.
By contrast, in September, only six marches (less than one per cent) departing from a mosque arrived at a main road.

The use of mosques as associational spaces for organizing and launching anti-coup protests is a constant of the mobilization. As well as providing a natural constituency for the Islamist-dominated movement, mosques offered an additional advantage in the urban ecology of contention: in many Egyptian neighbourhoods particular mosques have a reputation for playing host to protests following the conclusion of prayer. This meant that would-be protestors did not need access to formal protest networks to participate; they simply needed to turn up. As one informant, Youssef, relates,

For Friday protests, I don’t check online. All week social media is telling us what to do. But for Fridays I don’t need to think about it. It’s a part of your life. If you want to protest after prayer you know which mosque to go to. So you go and protest and then hang out with your friends. I don’t like to say this, but protest has even become a part of the prayer itself. People start chanting in the mosque the second the prayer has finished. It’s always the same chant first: “hasbuna allah wa ni’ma al-wakil” [literally, God is our sole and best representative, akin to: God will punish those responsible]. Then we chant “yasqut, yasqut hukm al-’askar!” [down with military rule!] and go out into the streets (interview 20 Apr. 2014).

These low coordination costs ensured that marches departing from mosques on Friday afternoons consistently drew the largest crowds, despite the

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118 Following 14 August, this chant changed to, “we are the people and these are our words: military rule over our dead bodies” (ihna al-sha’b wa-di kilmitna, ‘askar yahkum ‘ala guthitna).
Figure 15. Anti-coup march from al-Mahrusa mosque to Gami‘at al-Duwal al-Arabiyya Street, 13 Sept. 2013.
regime’s attempts to deny the anti-coup movement this space.\textsuperscript{119}

Figure 16 also concerns al-Mahrusa mosque. By early November the security presence in Muhandiseen had increased considerably. Following the conclusion of the Friday sermon, protestors assembled outside the mosque and marched through residential side streets before arriving at al-Radwan mosque, where one would imagine the protestors offered prayers before heading home. The march was over within minutes and avoided detection. By December, the number of marches in Muhandiseen setting off following Friday prayer dropped almost to zero. Muhandiseen had become what anti-coup protestors call a “closed area” (interview Sara 15 Mar. 2014) due to the high probability that a protest would be attacked. Driving this development was a new regime tactic which involved stationing CSF units every five hundred meters or so along major roads. Armed with shotguns and tear gas grenades, they stood guard beside their ‘boxes’ – the distinctively-shaped paddy wagons favoured by the Interior Ministry – alert to the approach of any protest. Paid \textit{baltagiyya} and police informants reported back if they detected protestors passing through the side streets. It was still possible to protest in these areas, but only at night and always outside of the Friday afternoon slot when the security presence was especially heavy. The result was that would-be anti-coup protestors living in the area either travelled to

\textsuperscript{119} Since the 14 August crackdown, police have raided hundreds of mosques associated with the Muslim Brothers and their affiliates. Another regime tactic was to station security detachments at mosque entrances on Friday mornings, or else prohibit imams from giving the Friday sermon. In September 2013, the Ministry of Religious Endowments announced that only graduates of the state-run al-Azhar University would be allowed to deliver sermons, while optimistically pledging to close the tens of thousands of unlicensed mosques that have proliferated in recent decades (see Gaffney 1991). According to the government’s own statistics, there were over ninety five thousand mosques in Egypt at the last count in 2008 (Arab Republic of Egypt – Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 2009). Twenty thousand were unlicensed \textit{zāwiya} (corner) mosques. All anecdotal evidence suggests that this number has increased significantly in the past six years, with new \textit{zāwiya} mosques continuing to open even in spite of the September 2013 moratorium.
Figure 16. Anti-coup march from al-Mahrusa mosque via residential streets to al-Radwan mosque, 8 Nov. 2013.
another neighbourhood where there were less police, or they stayed at home (Ibid.). This tactic of striating public space with armed police was rolled-out across Egypt’s major cities. Four months after the dispersal of the Raba’a and al-Nahda occupations, anti-coup protestors celebrated any protest held in the ‘closed’ neighbourhoods of Giza, Cairo and Alexandria.

But just as the Egyptian state struggled to regulate places of worship (churches being a notable exception), it had only a shaky grip over large tranches of urban space outside of central metropolitan areas. As Salwa Ismail (2006) has documented, since the 1980s neo-liberal economic reforms have precipitated the retreat of a distributive state and the reengagement of a security state whose primary purpose is regime survival. As a result, Egypt’s popular quarters, home to millions of Egyptians, have become increasingly autonomous and characterized by their informality, with the state’s will enforced by hired thugs. During the first days of the 25th January Revolution, at least a hundred police stations in Cairo’s popular quarters were attacked by local residents, many burnt to the ground (Ismail 2011, 2013). Security has never fully returned. Because of the unevenness of the regime’s presence in these areas, the anti-coup movement enjoyed far more room to manoeuvre.

120 Another frequently reported connection between repression, participation and protest location was the reputation of the local police station. In certain neighbourhoods, police acquired a reputation for sexually harassing and sometimes raping, female anti-coup protestors. The police station in Nasr City in north-east Cairo was particularly infamous for using sexual violence against detained protestors. As a result, female anti-coup protestors in Nasr City travelled to al-Matariyya, a nearby suburb, where the police were known not to arrest women (interview Sarah 20 Feb. 2014; Sarah and Hoda 26 Feb. 2014; Sara 15 Mar. 2014). This was not out of charity or misplaced benevolence: informants report that in al-Matariyya, as in Helwan and Shubra, local residents had surrounded and threatened to burn down police stations on previous occasions when female protestors had been detained, prompting their release (interview Youssef 1 6 Feb. 2014).

121 Beginning with Janet Abu-Lughod’s (1971) account of the “City Victorious,” there have been several excellent histories and social anthropologies of the development of urban space in Egypt. See variously, Singerman (1995), Rodenbeck (1999) and Abaza (2001).
Of course, where a protest occurs matters a great deal, both in symbolic terms and in terms of the material structures that shape the protest environment. In interviews, anti-coup protestors often put a gloss on this dynamic: one anti-coup activist in Alexandria insisted, “Squares are only the symbol of the revolution. But now if you go there on a march, it’s a suicide mission. They fill the square with informants who report to security if more than ten people gather. So we have made squares out of the side streets” (interview Muhammad 26 Feb. 2014). But side streets are not squares.\textsuperscript{122} As Navid Hassanpour (2013) has argued, the narrow vistas common to Egypt’s popular quarters and suburbs – the result of an architectural style that promotes high density living – impede the flow of information and encourage network disruption. It was for this reason, he suggests, that Mubarak’s decision to cut mobile phone and internet access on 28 January 2011 so spectacularly backfired. In the absence of information from other sources, residents had to leave their neighbourhoods to find out what was going on – a process that saw many chance upon marches en route to Midan al-Tahrir.

However, the nature of this urban space has similarly contributed to a parochialization of anti-coup protests and therefore diminished the impact of the hundreds of marches that were launched following the 14 August massacres. With squares and main roads mostly out of reach, the potential audience for these anti-coup actions was limited to shopkeepers, \textit{bawwābin} (doormen) and the relatively low density foot and vehicle traffic that moves through these areas.\textsuperscript{123} As the

\textsuperscript{122} This is a point tacitly acknowledged by other anti-coup protestors who rue the missed opportunities that such spaces afforded. “We didn’t know how lucky we were having a square,” says one, “we took it for granted. We always thought that we would be able to go back” (interview Youssef1 6 Feb. 2014).

\textsuperscript{123} Conversely, Cairo’s narrow residential side streets are frequently invoked as contributing to the success of the first days of protest in the 25\textsuperscript{th} January Revolution. As marches moved through side streets in a bid to avoid the police, it is argued, crowd sizes were amplified, appearing larger and
Egyptian media scholar Muhammad ElMasry (2014) has observed, by pushing contention into the side streets, anti-coup protests were rendered “invisible,” to the vast majority of Egyptians.

Timing of Contention

Conscious of this dynamic, and in a bid to circumvent security forces and reach a wider audience, anti-coup protestors experimented with the timings of their protests. The “7 al-Subh” (7 in the morning) movement, in particular, is accredited with pioneering the tactic of protesting in the early morning. Founded in Alexandria in September 2013, and with branches in Cairo and the Nile Delta governorates of Beheira, Sharqiyya, Kafr el-Sheikh and Menoufiya, 7 al-Subh are known for holding sit-ins outside schools and forming human chains beside main roads during the rush hour. According to Muhammad, one of 7 al-Subh’s founders, the movement emerged out of a realization that regime attacks on anti-coup protests intensified in the late afternoon, especially around 5pm, when security forces were most active: “Protests lasted for ten minutes before the police came,” he recounts, “so we started going out in the mornings. Suddenly we found that we could protest for over an hour because the police were only just coming on duty and the baltagiyya were still sleeping off that night’s tramadol [a prescription pain killer] and hashish” (interview Muhammad 26 Feb. 2014). The number of early morning protests grew steadily, taking off in late December after the Muslim

124 In October 2013, the arrest of twenty one female members of 7 al-Subh members gained international media attention after they were given lengthy prison sentences (later suspended) for participating in an anti-coup protest in Alexandria.
Brothers were designated a terrorist movement. In the second week of January alone, forty six anti-coup protests – over half of all protests mounted that week – were held before 8am, with protesters lining the sides of major roads chanting to passing commuters, “Dihku ‘alayku wa qâlu irhâb, wa ihna girân al-bâb fi al-bâb” (they fooled you and called us terrorists, but we are your next-door neighbours).

The decision to protest at 7am underlines how repression both confined and constrained the possibilities for contentious politics. Morning protests in high traffic areas still carried risks and thus required planning via a closed network. Usually protests were planned in advance with a message sent out the night before via peer-to-peer smartphone apps, usually Viber or WhatsApp, to a trusted list of anti-coup protestors (interview Sara 15 Mar. 2014). With the protestors assembled, there were few opportunities for sympathetic onlookers to participate, save for beeping a car horn in support, as most were on their way to work or taking children to school. In this sense, 7am human chains and sit-ins were the antithesis of post-Friday sermon ‘gathering marches’. Whereas gathering marches in the first months of the mobilization aimed to build a critical mass of anti-coup sentiment in the streets, 7am protests could only hope to communicate a message of ongoing struggle.

Night-time protests are another example in which the regime’s capacity to control urban space changed depending on the time of day. Protests beginning after 9pm began in mid-July during Ramadan, a period that coincided with a steep decline in crowd sizes. With most anti-coup protestors fasting, actions were moved to after the Tarawîh prayer, a time when large numbers of Egyptians visit friends and relatives, or stay at home to watch specially produced television soaps (musalsalât). Following the clearing of the anti-coup occupations in August,
weekday marches again switched timings, with many beginning after the ‘Isha prayer, when the majority of police come off their shift. These ‘night marches’ (masīrāt layliyya) and night sit-ins (waqafāt layliyya), measured by the frequency of attacks over time, were proportionally the safest protests and thus consistently attracted large numbers of women, middle-aged men and children. However, this did not mean that night time protests were completely out of reach of the regime. Police stations, if they heard reports of a night protest, would instruct the state electricity company to shut off the grid to that particular neighbourhood, leaving the protestors to march in the dark (interview Youssef 6 Feb. 2014).

Conclusions

As I have argued in this article, the repression-mobilization nexus can be illuminated by studying shifts along the different axes – modalities, sites and timings – of contention in response to regime violence. Here, neither repression nor mobilization appears as a unitary phenomenon. Rather, a dialogical cycle of tactical innovation, regime countermeasure and further innovation saw a diminution in the variability and viability of anti-coup contention over time, as anti-coup protestors struggled to negate the regime’s monopoly over the apparatus of coercion. This dynamic saw protest becoming increasingly mobile, but also less visible, as the sites and times available for protest became circumscribed, boxing the mobilization into increasingly smaller social spaces. Protestors could hold butterfly sit-ins in strategically sensitive areas or hold a human chain by a high traffic road in the morning – but they couldn’t occupy a public square or blockade the entrance to a government building without risking heavy casualties.
Consequently, anti-coup protest rapidly became concentrated in those spaces where the regime enjoyed less influence, with contention becoming less spectacular and less disruptive as a result. In this, the unevenness of the regime’s presence in wider Egyptian society and the anti-coup movement’s ability to evade and outmanoeuvre the Egypt’s security forces speak to the organic relationship between power and contention; in turn, evoking political geographies of protest, repression and space found elsewhere in the region (Schwedler 2012; 2013; Tripp 2013). Driving this process was the effect of repression on the horizontal linkages between associational spaces and sites of protest. Prior to the 14 August crackdown, anti-coup marches left mosques and squares, and travelled long distances to arrive at their pre-agreed destination, often a public space that resonated with the mobilization’s demands. The scale and ferocity of regime repression after the 14 August ensured that protestors moved to mosques in outlying neighbourhoods and popular quarters and stayed there, marching through residential side streets before dispersing. University campus protests were similarly contained.

Far from being defeated, opposition to the 3 July coup and the new military-backed government has instead been delimited in ways that recall Asef Bayat’s (2003) observation that, “The metaphorical street is not deserted, so much as it is controlled.” In the process, the Muslim Brothers have been transformed into a street protest movement. This has interesting, and as yet not fully revealed, implications for the movement’s future. With the Brothers’ senior leadership languishing in jail or abroad and many of its middle-ranking members in hiding, the movement is increasingly being represented by its female and youth members mobilizing in some of the poorest and most deprived areas of Egypt. They are the
generation of the 25th January Revolution. In their early twenties, many came of age in the initial occupation of Midan al-Tahrir. They have, though, struggled to build a mass movement along the lines that emerged in early 2011. This is partly due to the anti-coup movement’s failure to transcend institutional and social differences; a legacy of Mursi’s disastrous presidency and the Muslim Brothers’ culpability in siding with the military during many of the early exchanges of the democratic transition. But more fundamentally, authoritarian regime learning has ensured that the 25th January Revolution repertoire of occupying squares and disrupting urban space is, in the short-term at least, no longer viable.
Conclusion

How can we understand the 25th January Revolution, its trajectories and legacies? From a series of vantage points, this thesis has pursued an analytical and empirically-grounded account of the particular ways in which Egyptians have mobilized (or demobilized) in the three years since Mubarak’s ousting. Eschewing top-down, structuralist and culturally essentialist explanations, this thesis has proposed a processual, agent-centred and bottom-up account that addresses the key questions and puzzles arising from the eighteen days of mass mobilization, the failed democratic transition and the post-coup period. Taken together, the three articles suggest that the 25th January Revolution and its aftermath can only be understood by paying close attention to the evolving dynamics of contentious politics witnessed in Egypt over the past several years.

In particular, the thesis has shown how changes in the repertoire of contention and developments in the post-Mubarak political process were driven by contentious interactions between the Mubarak-era state and a range of challengers mobilizing under the banner of the 25th January Revolution. With a view to explaining the military’s role during the initial eighteen days of mass mobilization, I began by developing a focused account of the micro-interactive dimensions of protestor-soldier relations in and around Midan al-Tahrir. How protesters respond to the deployment of security forces assumed loyal to a regime determined to end protest is often summed-up in the dyad of “fight or flight.” In this chapter, I considered a third option: fraternization. The practices that came out of these encounters, I argued, were situational and should be understood vis-à-vis an improvised fraternization repertoire that made immediate, emotional claims
on the loyalty of regime forces. Through a relational and social interactionist lens, I explored the prevalence of pro-army chants, graffiti, the mounting of military vehicles, physical embraces, sleeping in tank tracks and posing for photographs with soldiers in and around Midan al-Tahrir during the 25th January Egyptian Revolution. I drew on the contentious politics literature, as well as micro-sociologies of violence and ritual, to suggest that, from initial techniques of micro-conflict avoidance, protestors and their micro-interactions with soldiers forged a precarious “internal frontier” that bifurcated governance from sovereignty through the performance of the army and the people as one hand in opposition to the Mubarak regime. However, while fraternization contained the possibilities for protestor-soldier violence through the forging of a precarious solidarity, these performances were later appropriated by the SCAF to legitimate its assumption of executive powers in the post-Mubarak democratic transition.

I then considered the role played by elections and protests in the first eighteen months of the post-Mubarak democratic transition. Proposing an alternative account for the derailing of the post-Mubarak democratic project, I detailed the consequences of the Muslim Brothers’ retreat from mass mobilization and the movement’s decision to put its faith in a transition administered by the SCAF, electoral mechanisms and the authority of a new parliament and president. As I argued in this chapter, what makes the Egyptian case so striking and so different from other cases of democratic transition, is the nature and extent of the electoral victories achieved by the Brothers, first in parliamentary terms and then in the 2012 presidential election, alongside the effective absence of any real electoral representation for other members of the revolutionary coalition and the near-complete absence of representation for old regime figures associated with
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. Taken together, these absences rendered the Brothers’ electoral victories problematically excessive, as power-sharing, compromise and coalition-building, all essential for the kinds of conservative democratic consolidation typical of late Third Wave democratic transition, never occurred. Drawing on the comparative politics and democratization literatures on elections in Egypt, I related these electoral victories to the Brothers’ social movement infrastructure, their prior experiences in competing in national elections and the advantages accrued the movement’s its nestled position at the heart of Islamist associational life. These factors left the Brothers well placed to take advantage of the first national post-Mubarak competitive elections, while other revolutionary forces were left to advance their agenda by mobilizing in the streets and squares of Egypt’s cities, instead of mounting an effective resurrection of the secular opposition vote that had featured so prominently in the parliamentary and presidential elections of the mid-2000s.

The post-25 January cycle of contention brought large sections of the revolutionary coalition into conflict with the SCAF and the military-backed transitional government, culminating in a series of spectacular street battles that reached their apogee during the Events of Muhammad Mahmud Street in late November 2011. As I went on to argue, despite the Muslim Brothers performing well – perhaps too well – on election day, their fading out of street-level mobilization and the leadership’s decision not to participate alongside other members of the revolutionary coalition in anti-SCAF protests, left the movement with a problematic status in Midan al-Tahrir, and with few allies willing to defend Egypt’s newly elected democratic institutions against the ‘deep state.’ In this, the Brothers’ retreat from mass mobilization in anticipation of securing its place in the
state was a gross strategic error, as the movement’s insistence on restricting the
post-Mubarak political process to a series of procedural interactions, negotiations
and pacts doomed both the movement in the eyes of the wider revolutionary
coalition and played a key role in scotching the post-Mubarak democratic project
itself. Here, pace extant theories of democratic transition, we might very well
conclude that contentious politics in transgressive mode plays a meaningful role in
late Third Wave democratization, both in keeping together rapidly convened
negative coalitions, such as the revolutionary coalition that cohered in Midan al-
Tahrir and elsewhere during the eighteen days of mass mobilization, and in
deepening the democratization process. As the Egyptian case clearly demonstrates,
movements well placed to benefit from the first elections following an initial
democratic breakthrough ignore street-level mobilization at their own peril.

The final substantive chapter mapped the patterns of mobilization and
demobilization after the 3 July coup. Following Mursi’s ousting, the Muslim
Brothers and members of the anti-coup movement have launched daily protests in
the streets and squares of Egypt’s cities, and these have continued in spite of
massive and unprecedented repression. The relationship between repression and
anti-coup mobilization – as measured by the modes, sites and timings of protests –
suggests that while anti-coup protestors have creatively adapted to regime
violence, protest has nevertheless been circumscribed in ways that have led to the
effective marginalization of the mobilization and allowed the new military-backed
government to achieve a degree of hegemony. Viewed in this mode, the hegemonic
position achieved by Egypt’s current president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, was only
possible through the deployment of unprecedented state violence against anti-
coup protestors and cemented via a series of regime victories in taking control, and
effectively defending key strategic spaces. Following the loss of the anti-coup occupations established in the early days of the mobilization, the anti-coup movement’s attempts to claim and create alternative ‘squares’ failed in the face of repression, after which the mobilization faltered as a succession of alternative sites for mobilization became ‘closed spaces’. Against this backdrop, the argument advanced in chapter 3 has broader implications for how we study the relationship between repression and mobilization. As the Egyptian case vividly illustrates, the ‘where’ of protest appears critical, as daily protests in residential areas, staged with the intention of sidestepping regime violence, failed to build and sustain a level of mobilization necessary to topple an entrenched adversary. As such, repression should be understood not only in terms of its effects on individuals and on the extent of collective action, but also in terms of claims and effects on social space, in ways reminiscent of the ‘Haussmannization’ of the mid-nineteenth century European city and its impact on the possibilities for popular mobilization (see variously Gould 1995; Harvey 2006; Traugott 2010).

An interesting and underappreciated dynamic that has emerged as a result of the anti-coup mobilization is the transformation of the Muslim Brothers into a street protest movement. This marks an unprecedented rupture with the Brothers’ “accomodationist” (Abed-Kotob 1995) strategy, pursued since the partial rehabilitation of the movement in the 1970s, which limited the movements activities to providing welfare services to Egypt’s poorest and standing for positions in Egypt’s legislature and syndicates (Wickham 2002; El-Ghobashy 2005). An aversion for contentious street politics is also a hallmark of the early history of the movement, with the Brothers’ founder Hassan al-Banna more inclined to advance the movement’s agenda through petitions and telegrams to the
Palace than through rambunctious and unruly street protests (see Lia 1998; El-Awaisi 1998; Amin 2003). As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Muslim Brothers’ decision to boycott the regular Friday protests in the first eighteen months of the post-Mubarak democratic transition can also be related to the movement’s historic prioritization of electoral and constitutional means. The Muslim Brothers’ decision to pursue a strategy of rolling street protests has important implications then for the evolution of what remains of Egypt’s largest and most organized social movement.\textsuperscript{125} While chapter 2 explored the seemingly impending embourgeoisement\textsuperscript{126} and parliamentarization of the Muslim Brothers during the post-Mubarak democratic transition, the account advanced in chapter 3 finds the Brothers most active in Egypt’s popular quarters and rural areas, mobilizing support amongst the urban poor of Cairo, Giza and Alexandria, as well as in the agricultural governorates of the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt. The trajectory of the anti-coup movement, in turn, foregrounds an important discussion concerning the efficacy of non-violent protest. Since the 2011 mobilizations across the Arabic-speaking Middle East, the imperative for better understanding the repression-mobilization nexus has never been greater, especially in context of scholarship that stresses the long-term returns of “non-violent civil resistance” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Nepstad 2011). The travails of the anti-coup mobilization, however, as well as goings-on elsewhere in the region (Syria, Bahrain and Libya), suggest that not only does repression frequently succeed in demobilizing protestors that

\textsuperscript{125} While the Muslim Brothers have never published official membership figures, the movement is commonly assumed to have over half a million paid members. Parenthetically, and by way of comparison, shortly after its founding the Brothers’ Freedom and Justice Party claimed to have over a million members, of whom almost half were Muslim Brothers (Martini, Kaye and York 2012: 9).

\textsuperscript{126} For more on the embourgeoisement thesis, see Gilbert Achcar’s (2012: ch.6) especially unflattering account of the Muslim Brothers’ business activities and embrace of neoliberal economic policies in the Mubarak-era.
adopt such tactics, but that protestors can sometimes be better served by adopting
more violent methods (Ukraine) and confronting repression head-on (see
Goldstone 2014). A question that merits critical consideration, but which is left
unresolved here, is whether nonviolent tactics work as well for Islamists as they
are claimed to do for other civil resistance campaigns (this argument is anticipated
by Hamid 2009). 127

If, in subsequent months and years, members of the anti-coup movement
and the Muslim Brothers decide to take up arms, or switch their allegiance to
causes such as the Islamic State currently active in Iraq and Syria, it will have been
after more than a year of overwhelmingly non-violent street protests in defence of
a democratically elected president. As I showed in chapter 3, there was no
hydraulic relationship between the denial of gains made by Islamists at the ballot
box and violence. It remains to be seen, however, how long the Muslim Brothers’
leadership will able to retain control over its membership having lost central
coordination in the organization, especially as any attempt by the Brothers’
imprisoned leadership to reach an accommodation with the military will almost
certainly result in large swathes of the Muslim Brothers’ youth – who have played
a key role in sustaining a daily street protest presence despite the regime’s routine
use of live ammunition and birdshot against protestors – turning against the
movement’s hierarchy. This underlines the potential for the Brothers’ youth to

127 Key here is the external context. Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth emphasise the part
international, i.e. U.S. and European, actors play in the success of nonviolent contention:
“Externally, the international community is more likely to denounce and sanction states for
repressing nonviolent campaigns than it is violent campaigns.” (2008: 12). Violent repression of
nonviolent mobilization, they argue, also elicits greater sympathy and legitimacy, and thus more
readily translates into advocacy for that cause (Ibid. 15). Does this apply to the Arabic-speaking
Middle East and in particular to Islamist movements using non-violent tactics? Recent history
would suggest not. Declining U.S. hegemony in the region, combined with enduring geostrategic
cynicism regarding the Suez Canal, access to Persian Gulf oil and gas, and guaranteeing Israeli
security saw muted condemnations from Western governments to the 14 August massacres and the
subsequent crackdown.
affect a “radical flank effect” (Haines 2013) on the overall direction of the movement as they militate against any recognition of the post-Mursi government or accepting a political accommodation that stops short of the full realization of the anti-coup movement’s stated goals (see El-Sherif 2014). With many of the movement’s senior leadership receiving lengthy custodial sentences and the movement’s Islamic associational and welfare activities suspended indefinitely in favour of sustaining a street protest presence, the result may well prove to be a far-reaching metamorphosis of the Muslim Brothers, as authority shifts to the youth generation of the 25th January Revolution. If this does occur, it will be further evidence of the generative effects of the eighteen days of mass mobilization in early 2011.

It is therefore obvious that the articles that make up this thesis represent only a point of departure. Several further puzzles, questions and topics suggest themselves. In particular, there is a need for extensive empirical research into the events surrounding the 30 June 2013 protests that paved the way for a military coup. Was this a spontaneous ‘People power’ revolution in the mould of the 25th January Revolution against an autocratic Islamist president, as the military and the Tamarrod movement have insisted? Or did the military and Interior Ministry-controlled security forces, as I proposed in Chapters 2 and 3, play an important role in orchestrating and stimulating these mobilizations? While journalists have begun to uncover clandestine links between Tamarrod and the state security apparatus, other possible research avenues suggest themselves. One is to consider the role played by police and state agents in the 30 June crowds. Video footage of the protests shows senior police officers in uniform heading marches to Midan al-Tahrir, often held aloft on the shoulders of ostensibly civilian protestors, leading
chants and waving Egyptian flags. In one video of a march departing for Tahrir from outside the Police Officers’ Club in Dokki, a plainclothes police officer, identifiable by the pistol holster under his arm, instructs the assembled crowd, “If you’ve got a uniform, go and put it on.” Were these officers acting as concerned citizens or were they present in a more coordinated, institutional capacity? And to what degree did these interventions lead and direct the mobilization?

We also know very little about anti-Mursi protests outside Cairo. While large crowds were recorded in Midan al-Tahrir and outside the Ittihadiyya Presidential Palace, there has been scarce documentation of mobilizations in Egypt’s other major cities. Was this a predominantly Cairo-centric phenomenon, and if so, how does this inform our understanding of state power, the distribution of support for the 25th January Revolution and the possibilities for future anti-coup mobilization? If mobilizations occurred elsewhere, how did their timings, planning and coordination compare to the Cairo protests? Do we also see a similar role played by local iterations of Tamarrod, or were they inspired and enabled in other ways? To what extent were these protests facilitated and influenced by the intermediation of businessmen, local bosses and former NDP politicians? A study employing the heuristic framework developed is this thesis, marshalled alongside

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128 See footage: [http://youtu.be/cCM0jekx0DU](http://youtu.be/cCM0jekx0DU). A common scene relayed in this footage was the use of the chant, “The people and the police are one hand!” Interestingly, the “one hand” metaphor was also used by pro-Mursi supporters in the streets near the Rabaa al-Adawiyya occupation in Medinat Nasr. When news of the coup broke, many chanted “The army and the people are one hand,” as army officers wrestled with Mursi supporters trying to climb aboard their vehicles (The Guardian 3 Jul. 2013). Of course, the different valences of the “one hand” metaphor belie a common heritage: both draw on the repertoire of claim making employed during the 25th January Revolution, while illustrating how different actors and coalitions draw on the same modalities of protest, even as power configurations change.
video footage, still photographs, informant testimony and event data, would be highly instructive indeed.\textsuperscript{129}

Insofar as I can only gesture towards these and other unresolved questions and puzzles raised over the course of the present study, it is apparent that there is a need for a great deal of further study on the 25th January Revolution, its trajectories and legacies; studies that will only be enriched by the passage of time, as further sources, voices and perspectives become available. Having itself been born of a series of eventful encounters in Cairo in the revolutionary spring of 2011, when I might otherwise have been safely ensconced in the Egyptian national archives studying a quite different series of mobilizations playing out in an earlier moment in world historical time, it is hoped that this thesis has, at the very least, put down some markers for ongoing research into the 25th January Egyptian Revolution and suggested some potentially profitable avenues for future scholarship on the dynamics of contentious politics more broadly.

\textsuperscript{129} A close comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between other episodes of mass mobilization involving the redeployment of 'People power' by conservative forces against democratically elected governments, as has recently occurred, for example, in Thailand under the aegis of the 'Yellow Shirts,' suggests a further dimension to the 30 June protests to be considered and resolved.
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مظاهرات ضد الإنقلاب في مصر

في فصل كأكمل الاستبيان التالي:

1. احتفظ اكاديمي بجامعة لندن أقوم ببحث ودراسة عن التظاهرات ضد الإنقلاب في مصر.
2. الاستبيان مكون من 27 سؤالاً ولا يستغرق من الوقت أكثر من 5 دقائق. نتائج هذا الاستبيان مستندة في بحث أكاديمي.
3. جميع الإجابات في هذا الاستبيان سرية ومستقلة. من فضلك أكمل الاستبيان مرة واحدة.
4. إشرائه عبر أصدقاءك ومشاركة في حركات ضد الإنقلاب.
5. شكرًا على مشاركتك.
6. egyptprotestsurvey@gmail.com

1. هل تعيش الآن في مصر الآن؟
   - نعم
   - لا

2. هل شاركت في أي مظاهرة ضد الإنقلاب في مصر؟
   - نعم
   - لا

3. هل إنتميت لأي من التظاهرات ضد الرئيس السابق حسني مبارك ما بين 25 يناير و 11 فبراير 2011؟
   - نعم
   - لا

4. هل شاركت في أي تظاهرات قبل ثورة 25 يناير؟
   - نعم
   - لا

5. هل شاركت في إعفاء سيدات رأسية الجديدة أو أي من الاعتقادات الأخرى مثل سيدين العقل إبراهيم بالإسكندرية مثل ميدان النسيم؟
   - نعم
   - لا
لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم

لا أعلم
16. بناءً على ما ذكرته حول احترام القانون، يُرجى كُلًا من الأسئلة الـ 19.
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

17. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في اليوم الأول من الشهر الثالث?
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

18. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الأول من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

19. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثاني من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

20. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثالث من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

21. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الرابع من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

22. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الخامس من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

23. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع السادس من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

24. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع السابع من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

25. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثامن من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

26. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع التاسع من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

27. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع العاشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

28. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الحادي عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

29. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثاني عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

30. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثالث عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

31. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الرابع عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

32. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الخامس عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

33. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع السادس عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

34. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع السابع عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

35. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثامن عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

36. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع التاسع عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

37. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع العاشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

38. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الحادي عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

39. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثاني عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

40. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثالث عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

41. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الرابع عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

42. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الخامس عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

43. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع السادس عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

44. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع السابع عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

45. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثامن عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

46. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع التاسع عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

47. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع العاشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

48. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الحادي عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

49. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثاني عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

50. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثالث عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

51. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الرابع عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

52. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الخامس عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

53. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع السادس عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

54. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع السابع عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

55. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثامن عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

56. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع التاسع عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

57. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع العاشر عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

58. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الحادي عشر عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

59. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثاني عشر عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.

60. هل قمت بإجراء مسح على الفقار في الأسبوع الثالث عشر عشر عشر عشر من الشهر الثالث؟
1. لا
2. يُرجى الإجابة.
15. هل أنت عضوًا في الإخوان المسلمون/الأخوات المستمعات

اسم
لا
آرض الإجابة

16. هل أعلنت صوتك في الانتخابات البرلمانية في 2011-2012؟

نعم
لا
آرض الإجابة

من أي حزب من الأحزاب في الانتخابات البرلمانية في 2011-2012؟

17. هل أعلنت صوتك في الانتخابات الرئاسية في 2012؟

نعم
لا
آرض الإجابة

من أي حزب من مرشحي الرئاسة في انتخابات 2012؟

18. في أي محافظة تعيش؟

لا يوجد مستوى من الإجابة

19. هل تسكن (إي) في الريف أم الحضر؟

الريف
الحضر
لا أعلم
20. الاسم:

21. ذكر / أنثى:
- ذكر
- أنثى
- آخر الإجابة

22. الدين:
- مسلم
- مسيحي
- كاذب
- آخر الإجابة

23. هل تصلب يومياً؟
- دائماً
- سلموفوف
- أحياناً
- آخر الإجابة

24. المرحلة التعليمية:
- إبتدائي
- ثانوي
- تكميلي أو أكاديمي
- كالذين
- باحتراف
- آخر الإجابة

25. هل تعمل (بن):?
- نعم
- لا
- آخر الإجابة

26. هل أنت؟
- مساعدات (من العمل)
- ربة منزل
- طالبة أو طالب
- معلقة (من العمل أو ليست من وأبيها)
- آخر الإجابة

27. ما هو دورك في العمل؟
إذا كان لديك أكثر من وظيفة، إختر وظيفتك الرئيسية:

- مدير (أعمال)
- مدير (-dashboard)
- عمل في منشأة بها 10 عامل أو أقل
- مهندس مدني
- مهندس (ألعاب)
- مهندس (طبيعة)
- عامل (بضائع)
- عامل (زيارتي)
- موظف (إدارة)
- موظف ( desea)
- موظف (لغة)
- موظف (تحديث)
- موظف (خدم)
- موظف (ми)
- موظف (جهة)

أرض الإجابة