Whose party? Whose interests? Childcare policy, electoral imperative and organisational reform within the US Democrats, Australian Labor Party and Britain’s New Labour

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

LONDON

AUGUST 2014
DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

The US Democrats, Australian Labor Party and British Labour Party adopted the issue of childcare assistance for middle-income families as both a campaign and as a legislative issue decades apart from one and other, despite similar rates of female employment. The varied timing of parties’ policy adoption is also uncorrelated with labour shortages, union density and female trade union membership. However, it is correlated with two politically-charged factors: first, each party adopted childcare policy as their rate of ‘organised female labour mobilisation’ (union density interacted with female trade union membership) reached its country-level peak; second, each party adopted the issue within the broader context of post-industrial electoral change, when shifts in both class and gender-based party-voter linkages dictated that the centre-left could no longer win elections by focusing largely on a male, blue-collar base. Were these parties driven to promote childcare in response to the changing needs of their traditional affiliates (unions), or was policy adoption an outcome of autonomous party elites in search of a new electoral constituency?

Using both qualitative and quantitative techniques, this research analyses the correlates of policy adoption and the specific mechanisms through which party position change on the issue took place (e.g. legislator conversion versus legislator turnover). It finds that parties largely adopted the issue as a means to make strategic electoral appeals to higher-educated, post-materialist and in particular, female voters. However, the speed in which they were able to make these appeals (and hence, the time at which they adopted the issue) was contingent on the speed in which elites were able to reform their party’s internal organisation and specifically, wrest power away from both the unions and rank-and-file members in order to centralise decision making power on election campaigns, executive appointments and candidate selection processes into the hands of the leadership.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Having been warned (several times) that the PhD is a long and lonely process, it was one that I approached with trepidation. Yet throughout this endeavour, countless people have allayed my fears. From the start, my supervisor, Jonathan Hopkin provided guidance, support and encouragement. His interest in the subject and enthusiasm for political discussion made this process an enjoyable one.

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<tr>
<td>ACSPA</td>
<td>Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTU</td>
<td>Australian Council of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Americans for Democratic Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>Aid to Families with Dependent Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSCME</td>
<td>American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOP</td>
<td>Australian National Political Opinion Poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Australian Pre-school Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSF</td>
<td>Australian Public Service Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>All women shortlists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Blue-collar workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAGEO</td>
<td>Council of Australian Government Employee Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Commonwealth Child Care Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Child Development Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Constituency Labour Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLPD</td>
<td>Campaign for Labour Party Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMEs</td>
<td>Coordinated Market Economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>Committee for Political Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWA</td>
<td>Communication Workers of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNC</td>
<td>Democratic National Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECEC</td>
<td>Early childhood education and care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEOC</td>
<td>Equal Employment Opportunity Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>Equal Rights Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAM</td>
<td>International Association of Machinists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>Labour Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMEs</td>
<td>Liberal Market Economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSF</td>
<td>Low-skilled service sector workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Childcare Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOW</td>
<td>National Organization for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPCC</td>
<td>National Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWPC</td>
<td>National Women’s Political Caucus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEO</td>
<td>Office of Economic Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMOV</td>
<td>One member one vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWOS</td>
<td>One woman on a short list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLP</td>
<td>Parliamentary Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG</td>
<td>Policy Review Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Shadow Communications Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Socio-cultural professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>German Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Confederation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAW</td>
<td>United Auto Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>VoC</td>
<td>Varieties of Capitalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>Work Incentives Program</td>
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<td>WPA</td>
<td>Works Progress Administration</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Background and Research Question
Less than twenty years ago the post-war social policy framework, in which income-related social insurance protected breadwinners and their dependent families from the trials of old age, illness and disability was deemed a “frozen welfare state landscape” too electorally perilous to retrench (Esping-Andersen 1996, 24). Yet as welfare state analysts recognised that, across the OECD, several types of benefits that catered to “old social risks” were being re-indexed and in de-facto terms, scaled back (Korpi and Palme 2003, Bonoli 2005), scholars began to pay attention to one sector of the welfare state experiencing a period of growth: work/family reconciliation policies. Governments in the OECD have responded to the exigencies of a post-industrial economy, whereby deindustrialisation and tertiarisation have prompted a significant increase in not only female labour force participation but also the proportion of part-time and temporary employment (Bonoli 2005, Häusermann 2010, Fleckenstein & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011) by developing social policies that address such “new social risks.” Examples include pensions that cover employees with discontinuous work patterns and paid parental leave following childbirth, etc. (Bonoli 2005, Jenson and St-Martin 2006, Huber and Stephens 2006). Affordable childcare is a central component of work/family reconciliation since it is argued to fulfil a number of functions: it boosts income tax receipts by supporting dual-earner families and allowing lone-parents to enter the labour market, it ensures employers are supplied with a large pool of labour, fosters child development and according to some, promotes social mobility (Esping-Andersen 1996).

Yet access to affordable childcare varies from country to country, as governments have responded to increased demand for childcare both at different times and in different ways, often out of sync with their designated “worlds of welfare” or “variety of capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990, Hall and Soskice 2001). For example, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 display a great deal of variation in spending on family benefits and on childcare expenditure across the OECD.1 Countries within the ‘liberal welfare regime’ are highlighted in Figure 1.2

---

1 Excluding lone-parent benefits.
However, the value of total childcare spending can be a poor indicator of the actual costs parents face. Figure 1.3 displays the total childcare assistance awarded to an average earning, dual-income family via services, cash benefits and tax breaks across the OECD. These are offset against each country’s average childcare fees in order to calculate the net costs to parents.

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Figure 1.1 Family benefits as % GDP, 2008 (Source: author calculation based on OECD 2011)

Figure 1.2 Childcare expenditure as % GDP, 2007 (Source: author calculation based on OECD 2011)

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2 Reasons for this include OECD accounting standards (which, for example, count the UK’s Working Tax Credit as a childcare expenditure despite the fact it benefits parents with children of all ages), inflationary effects of demand-led subsidies on childcare fees, a fragmented childcare market and high overhead costs, etc.
Looking at the ‘liberal market economies’ of interest to this research, one can see that a dual-earner, average income family in Australia would pay 14% of their net family income towards childcare, relative to 23% in the US and 27% in the UK. Yet, variation within this regime type extends beyond spending levels and policy outputs: countries in the liberal welfare regime display greater variation in the time at which their political parties adopted the issue of childcare than they do on overall spending and net-cost patterns. Specifically, centre-left parties in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States – countries that are all classified as ‘liberal market economies’ (Hall and Soskice 2001) and ‘liberal welfare regimes’ (Esping-Andersen 1990)⁴ – illustrate this schism quite well. Despite having similar levels of female employment since the 1960s, each of these parties placed the issue of childcare assistance for middle-income families⁵ on their agenda at quite different times: in the US, Democrats first placed universal childcare on their party platform and passed legislation to provide universal access to subsidised childcare places during the late 1960s and early 1970s, legislating heavily on the issue between

---

³ Dual earning family earning their country’s average wage with two children, aged two and three, in full-time childcare.  
⁴ Frank Castles argued in 1985 that the Australian welfare state occupied what should be a fourth category of Esping-Andersen’s “three worlds”: the “wage earners’ welfare state.” Castles based his assertion on Australia’s high-level minimum wage policies, a strong degree of corporatism (through the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, its powers weakened from the 1990s before being abolished in 2010), and the fact that Australia’s means-tested social insurance policies benefited a wider range of incomes than did those in the US and the UK. Notwithstanding, Esping-Andersen reports that Australia as of the 1980s had a comparatively low level of social expenditure, above-average levels of private social expenditure (i.e. on health and pensions) and a system dominated by means-tested benefits (1990, 70-75). This suggests that an expensive, centrally funded, universal childcare system would not seem as natural a fit for the Australian welfare state as it would, for example, the Danish. In other words, this research suggests that when comparing the Australian welfare state to its counterparts in Britain and the US, there are more similarities than differences relevant to our question.  
⁵ As opposed to “welfare to work” childcare policy, wherein childcare provision/fee assistance is strictly means-tested so as to shift low-income parents into the labour market. Definitions under Section 1.4 will elaborate on this point.
Over ten years later, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) turned childcare assistance into a popular campaign issue when it ran the 1983 federal election on the promise of an “Accord” with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) that would define childcare as part of the “national social wage.” During the 1984 federal election, the ALP pledged to nearly double the number of childcare places in the country in what was, according to Brennan, the “biggest promise made by the Government during the campaign” (Brennan 1998, 165, 176). Yet it would be another 14 years before childcare access and affordability became a widely discussed and politically contested issue in the UK, during Labour’s 1997 general election campaign.

In light of this temporal variation, the question guiding this research asks, ‘Why did centre-left parties in Australia, the UK and the US adopt childcare assistance for middle-income families at different times, given their similar female employment rates and similar welfare state regime types?’ In analysing the causes of such variation, it attempts to identify the determinants that lay behind each party’s decision to adopt the issue, estimating the extent to which parties did so in the aim of appealing to new electoral constituencies and the extent to which they were coaxed by party-linked interest groups (namely trade unions). While this work addresses these issues largely from a ‘party politics’ lens, and specifically locates itself in the party change and party position change literature, it also adopts into its framework components that are shared with the welfare state development body of literature, in particular power resources. Its findings bear relevance to the discussion surrounding left party change in the post-industrial era or, as Kitschelt (1994) described it, a ‘transformation’ of social democratic parties. It does not attempt to provide a comprehensive model explaining childcare policy adoption but instead, within the context of social democratic party change, addresses the relative importance of interest group pressure and electoral imperative.

1.2 Case Selection

This research takes a ‘most similar systems design’; there are certainly differences between the three countries at hand and perhaps the most obvious of these are institutional: the US is federal country, operating under a presidential system and a bicameral legislature, Australia is a federal, parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature and the UK is a unitary Parliamentary system with a de-facto unicameral legislature. Yet their similarities are clear: for most of the post-war era, party systems in all three countries have been dominated by two major political parties or

---

6 After initially welcoming a landmark childcare bill, The Child Development Act, President Nixon took issue with an administrative change made to the bill in Conference Committee. He vetoed the final version in December 1971. This will be elaborated on in Chapter Three (Morgan 2001).

7 To the extent that the House of Lords does not typically introduce legislation as do the Australian and US Senates, particularly when said legislation requires spending and/or raising tax.
permanent coalitions,\textsuperscript{8} each of the three countries are characterised as welfare state spending ‘laggards’ (Wilensky 2002, Castles 2009) and as ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs) (Hall and Soskice 2001). Moreover, the institutional differences between the US and the British/Australian legislatures may not prove to be a crucial barrier to comparison, given that this thesis asks why parties adopted childcare in both legislative and electoral terms\textsuperscript{9} at different times from each other, rather than whether or not a particular childcare bill was passed through the legislature and signed into law. This limits the potential risks that could arise from comparing systems with different numbers of veto points or executive-legislative relations.

a. United States

Parties’ attention to childcare can be measured in legislative or electoral terms, for example by the number of words, sentences and specific policy commitments relating to non means-tested childcare in party platforms (Figure 1.4).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.4.png}
\end{figure}

The number of childcare related bills introduced into the legislature is another measure: Patsy T. Mink (D-HI) introduced the country’s first universal pre-school and childcare bills in 1967 and 1969 (Cohen 2001, 32). Subsequent interest in the issue arose in the House Education and Labor Committee, with leading Democrats in both legislative chambers working alongside an array of

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{8} In Australia, the Liberal Party holds a permanent coalition with the National Party (formerly the Country Party), though the Coalition is often referred to simply as ‘the Liberals.’ UK Labour did face a formidable challenge during the 1983 and 1987 general elections when a group of breakaway Labour Party members formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and ran both elections in an ‘Alliance’ with the (then) Liberal Party, winning nearly 25% of the vote in 1983 (relative to 27 and 42% for Labour and the Conservatives, respectively), and 23% in 1987, relative to 31 and 42% for Labour and the Tories. The Alliance was disbanded in 1988 (House of Commons 1984, 1987).
\item\textsuperscript{9} By either campaigning on the issue or co-sponsoring/debating childcare legislation.
\end{itemize}
interest groups to develop a universal childcare policy (the Child Development Act) throughout 1969 to 1972; separate bills followed up through the mid 1970s. A related measure is the number of times House Democrats co-sponsored a middle-income related childcare bill in a given Congress (Figure 1.5). Here, the increase in attention to childcare between the late 1960s to mid 1970s becomes apparent.

![House Democrats co-sponsoring childcare legislation, 1967-1991](image)

Figure 1.5 House Democrats co-sponsoring childcare legislation, 87th-97th Congresses (Source: Congressional Record 1965-74, Thomas 2014)

The first spate of attention to the issue, in terms of both manifesto words and policy proposals occurred in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Childcare again became a Democratic-party focus during the mid and late 1980s (particularly in manifesto terms), somewhat outstripping the attention it received during the early 1970s though as Chapter Three will outline, these proposals for the most part advocated means-tested rather than universal benefits and services  (Cohen 2001, Karch 2013).10 Moreover, the point of interest is why such a sudden increase in attention first happened in the 1970s and on a comparative level, predated those spates of attention in Australia and the UK by roughly ten and 25 years, respectively.

b. Australia

During 1972, Australia’s Liberal-Country governing Coalition passed the Commonwealth Child Care Act (CCA), the first federal-level intervention into the Australian childcare market. However neither the Act’s funding mechanism nor its intended beneficiaries were clearly identified and throughout the 1970s, federal outlays remained stagnant (going mainly to pre-

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10 Of interest is the 1984 platform, which as Figure 1.4 shows, displayed the highest level of attention childcare since 1972. This was the year that Walter Mondale, Senate sponsor of the 1971 Child Development Act, ran for President.
schools rather than day care centres) (Brennan 1994, 115, 203). The issue largely stayed out of the ALP and the Coalition’s legislative agendas, as well as their party platforms. It was not until the late 1970s/early 1980s and specifically the 1983 and 1984 federal elections that the ALP campaigned on the issue of childcare access and funding in particular. In the run up to the 1983 election they also signed a ‘Prices and Incomes Accord’ with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), which formalised an agreement for wage restraint in return for an increase in the “social wage” – childcare being denoted as key component of said wage – and the Accord being a central element of the ALP’s campaign. During the 1984 campaign the ALP promised to expand by 50% the number of subsidised places available to children from families of all incomes, at a total cost of AU $100 million; at the time this was the largest childcare campaign pledge of any Australian political party in history (Brennan 1998, 176). Returning to power in 1984, the ALP extended fee relief for families earning up to $30,000 (it had been $20,000 under the Coalition Government) and increased the number of universally available Commonwealth-funded childcare places by over 60% in their first two years of government.

The increase in ALP attention to the issue can be seen via the number of words referring to childcare in their national party platforms and also, the number of sentences and specific commitments made on the issue in ALP Federal Leaders speeches (see Figures 1.6 and 1.7).

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**Figure 1.6 Childcare mentions, commitments in ALP federal leader speeches, 1969-1987** (Source: Australian Politics, 2014)

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11 The 1983 and 1984 elections were deliberately held in close proximity: the double dissolution that ended the Coalition’s Fraser Government in 1983 disturbed the typically similar schedule of House and Senate elections; as such the 1984 election was held 18 months early, in order to bring the House and Senate election schedule back into line (Nethercote 2001, 330).

12 Largest peak-level trade union confederation in Australia.
Whilst there was a spate of attention (measured by words and sentences devoted to the issue) following the 1972 Child Care Act, this mostly levelled off, as did any policy commitments, until the early 1980s. Party position change on the issue can also be measured by the number of times ALP legislators raised the issue during Parliamentary debates. Figure 1.8 depicts the increase in childcare discussion that occurred amongst ALP legislators in the House of Representatives from the 26th to 34th Parliament (1969-1987), with a peak of attention to the issue in the early-mid 1980s.13

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13 Whilst there was a noticeable drop during the 33rd federal parliament (1983-84), this can largely be attributed to the fact that 10 weeks out of the parliamentary year were spent campaigning for the 1984 election, which occurred only 1.5 years after the March 1983 federal election.
For nearly all of the post-war era, British childcare was a highly decentralised and poorly funded policy, with a scarce amount of places in either the publicly run or the private sectors (Randall 2000). By the early 1990s there was only one childcare place per every nine children under the age of eight in England (Walfogel and Garnham 2008), leaving 94% of mothers who required childcare to have to rely on their family for help (Hakim et al, 2008). Party competition over childcare policy was so minimal that in 1984, the Thatcher Government were able to classify workplace nurseries as a ‘perk’ and institute a tax on parents whose children utilised them (Randall 1996, 183, Policy Studies Institute, 1989, 57). The Labour Party, in opposition since 1979 and undergoing a period of modernisation under Neil Kinnock from the mid-to-late 1980s, began to increase their attention to childcare in their party programmes and platforms; there was a heightened focus on childcare during the 1992 election that continued under John Smith’s leadership and after his death in 1994, rose again under Tony Blair. In 1997, Labour’s campaign manifesto touted a “National Childcare Strategy” which included universal provision “to match the requirements of the modern labour market” (Labour Party 1997).

Figures 1.9-1.11 depict the increase in Labour Party attention to the issue as measured in three different ways: 1) the number of words referring to childcare in Labour Party manifestos, 2) the number of sentences related to and specific policy commitments on childcare in Labour Party Leader’s speeches at the annual conference and 3) the number of times Labour Party MPs mentioned childcare during parliamentary debates. There was a sharp increase in words about childcare in Labour Party manifestos from 1992, as well as an increase in childcare spending commitments from the mid 1990s. Figure 1.11 displays increased attention to the issue as measured by mentions in parliamentary debate. Here, attention to the issue seemed to occur sooner (i.e. from the 50th Parliament, 1987-1992) than it appears when policy adoption is measured by manifesto words or leader commitments. By the 52nd Parliament (1997-2001), the proportion of Labour MPs debating the issue had more than doubled since the 49th Parliament (1983-87).
Figure 1.9 Number of childcare-related words in Labour Party manifestos, 1966-2001 (Source: Labour Party, 1966-2001)

Figure 1.10 Childcare related sentences, spending commitments in Labour Leader conference speeches, 1975-2000 (Source: Labour Party, 1966-2000)

Figure 1.11 Labour MPs’ debates on childcare, proportion of Labour MPs debating childcare, 1970-1991 (Source: House of Commons Hansard, 2013)
1.3 Theoretical Framework

a. Structural foundations

Whilst this research anchors itself in the party change and party position change literature, it attempts to link these works to the body of literature on welfare state development. In terms of party position change, it identifies a puzzle of temporal variation (parties adopted childcare at different times) and employs David Karol’s (2009) models of party position change in order to disentangle two hypothesised drivers of childcare policy adoption: electoral imperative and interest group pressure. Its findings are situated in the discussion surrounding both the transformation of social democratic parties’ electoral bases and internal organisational structures during the post-industrial era. The following section intends to guide the reader through the structural foundation of the research question and then introduce the theoretical framework from which it attempts to answer the question.

A structural-functionalist approach to explaining why the US Democrats, Australian Labour Party and British Labour Party adopted childcare three decades apart from one and other (US in the early 1970s, Australia in the early 1980s and the UK in the mid-to-late 1990s) would first look toward underlying demand for childcare provision, perhaps best indicated by female labour force participation rates. However, these countries experienced a similar trajectory of female employment from the early 1960s to the 2000s: Figure 1.12 below displays similar levels of absolute and relative growth in female employment across all three countries, despite parties having adopted the issue at such different times. General unemployment trends also display little correlation: where we might expect childcare to be adopted during periods of below average unemployment (i.e. during a stark labour shortage) the Democrats began advancing childcare policy during the early 1970s, when total unemployment ranged between 5 and 5.6% against a 35-year average (1965-2000) of six per cent (BLS). The average unemployment rate in Australia between 1972 and 2000 was roughly six per cent; when the ALP promoted childcare during the mid 1980s it was higher – at roughly eight per cent (ABS). Between 1970 and 1999, the UK’s average unemployment rate was 7.5%; in the three years surrounding the 1997 election (1996-1998) it averaged 6.4% (Denman 1996, ILO). The inference being that, across the board, these parties did not adopt childcare policy during times of significant labour shortages.
Taking a cue from Korpi’s (1983) *Democratic Class Struggle*, a power-resources approach would suggest that parties and left-power (i.e. trade union strength) ‘matter.’ In all three countries under scrutiny it was centre-left parties that first adopted the issue of childcare. Yet the ‘parties matter’ thesis is not entirely conclusive: whilst Democrats led on the childcare issue, they were not without support from leading Congressional Republicans; just as Australia’s Liberal-National (centre-right) Coalition promised federal childcare assistance during campaigns in the early 1980s, albeit on a lower scale than the ALP. Nor does trade union strength, another key component of the power resources approach, clearly explain why the three parties at hand adopted the childcare issue at such different periods in time; as Figure 1.13 shows, US trade unions underwent a decline in membership approximately 20 years before their counterparts in the UK and Australia, yet relative levels of decline do not seem to correlate with childcare policy introduction.

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14 Measures of maternal employment display similar trends to female employment in that the countries experienced similar absolute and relative levels of it. Maternal employment according to age of child would also prove helpful however reliable data for each country is not available earlier than the 1980s.

15 Promises included tax expenditures such as making childcare tax deductible but not serviced-based increases in provision (Brennan 1998, 176-177).
In all three countries the union movement also saw a significant shift in its membership demographics, with females joining at a faster rate than males. As with female labour force participation, female trade union membership (women as a per cent of total trade union membership) remained at fairly similar levels in both absolute and relative growth terms from 1960 to the mid 1990s across all three countries (see Figure 1.14). Although one might argue that an increase in female trade union membership would persuade union leaders to address feminist issues and childcare in particular, the largely similar level of female unionisation rates across all three countries displays little association with the timing of childcare policy introduction.

However, one could also measure the aggregate strength of organised female labour by interacting trade union density with female trade union membership, thereby providing a rough indicator of the overall strength and density of organised female labour. Figure 1.15 indicates that when the product of trade union density and female trade union membership reached its
peak in a given country, that country’s centre-left party adopted childcare assistance policies. One could argue that this simply reflects a correlation with broader patterns of labour market change, yet some qualitative evidence (Perrigo 1996, Bashevkin 2000, Brennan 1998, Cohen 2001) suggests that left-party politicians were influenced by the increasing feminisation of unions, a core constituency. This is despite the fact that in each country, females have held few trade union leadership roles relative to men, even in predominantly female unions (Kirton and Healy 2010, 2013).

![Organised female labour mobilisation, 1960-2010](source: author calculation from Visser 2011)

But whilst there is a temporal correlation between organised female labour mobilisation and the adoption of childcare policy, the body of literature surrounding party competition and social policy development would suggest that one also consider a second correlate: parties’ electoral aims (Häusermann 2006, Fleckenstein 2010, Fleckenstein and Lee 2014, Morgan 2013). Was their adoption of childcare at that particular point in time also correlated with a shift in class and party-voter linkages? Each of the three centre-left parties did adopt the issue of childcare in the midst of electoral flux, chiefly characterised by 1) a decline in traditional party-voter alliances such as class and 2) the erosion of the traditional ‘gender vote gap,’ wherein women as an aggregate voting bloc tended to favour conservative, as opposed to left or indeed centre-left, parties (Randall 1987, Norris 1996, Inglehart and Norris 2000, Manza and Brooks 1998).
Figures 1.16 and 1.17 show the evolution of both the Alford and Thomsen indices, two measures of class voting across each country, which display a loosening of traditional class-party alliances between the 1960s and the 1990s. Each party also adopted childcare policy in the midst of a weakening of the traditional gender vote/identification gap, the extent to which women vote for or identify with a particular party in greater/lesser proportion than men. Figures 1.18-1.20 display the weakening of the traditional gender identification gap (wherein a higher proportion of women than men identified with conservative parties) as measured in two ways: the margin in which women are more likely than men to identify with conservatives and the margin in which men are more likely than women to identify with left-leaning parties: here it is apparent that as the centre-right’s advantage with female voters (relative to male voters) declined from the 1960s, the left’s disadvantage with women (relative to men) began to decelerate and eventually, reverse. This is not to suggest that ‘women voters’ are in actuality a monolithic bloc but instead point to the broad or indeed superficial fundamentals that the three parties – before the onset of professional pollsters and sophisticated analyses – may have absorbed at the time.

16 Whereas the Alford index is the traditional, absolute measure of class voting (proportion of working class voting left minus the proportion of middle class voting left), the Thomsen index is the log-odds ratio of the Alford. This has become preferred to the Alford as it is not sensitive to overall popularity of political parties (Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 2001, 27).

17 Most studies (see for example Norris 1996, 1999) refer to the gender-vote gap, however the data analysed here looks at gaps in party identification as it looks for longer-term shifts in party allegiance.

18 The ‘traditional’ gender vote gap refers to the observed cross-country pattern in which women tended to identify with conservative parties at a higher rate than did men (see for example Norris 1999, Inglehart and Norris 2000).

19 Several studies have pointed out the extent to this is untrue: for example Seltzer et. al. argue that in the US, race and income cross-cut gender just as Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010) argue that class cross-cuts gender.
Figure 1.18: Gender identification gaps, Australia, 1967-1987 (Source: Australian National Political Attitudes Study, 1967-1979; Australian Election Study, 1987)

Figure 1.19 Gender identification gaps, UK, 1964-2001 (Source: British Election Study, 1964-2001)
The shifts outlined above offered both threats and opportunities for centre-left parties: they were at risk/in the process of losing their male, ‘blue-collar’ base but at the same time stood to gain from the middle class and female voters whose allegiance to centre-right parties was also beginning to wear away. Yet although such electoral change clearly displays the incentive for parties to develop particular social policies that would attract new voting blocs into their (shifting) electoral constituencies,\(^{20}\) these shifts do not correlate as neatly with each party’s childcare policy adoption as we might expect them to do, if electoral change were the sole determining mechanism behind the timing of childcare policy adoption. For example, the traditional gender identification gap (wherein women disproportionately identify with conservative parties) dropped earlier and steeper in the UK than it did in Australia, and until the late 1970s it did so at a steadier rate than even in the US. This does not match the order of childcare policy adoption, wherein the Democrats moved first in the late 1960s/early 1970s, the ALP in the late 1970s/early 1980s and the Labour Party not until the mid-to-late 1990s. Figures 1.16 and 1.17 indicate that the drop in class-party linkages which occurred in the UK between 1970 and 1980 was far steeper than that which occurred in either the US or Australia, suggesting that by 1980 UK Labour would have had as much electoral incentive to develop a universal childcare policy as did the Democrats and ALP at that same point in time – and yet Labour did not act on that incentive until the 1990s.

The party competition literature also draws attention to a third factor: the role of internal party organisation, suggesting that parties endowed with ‘strategic capacity’\(^{21}\) have an easier and

\(^{20}\) See for example Morgan (2013), Huber and Stephens (2000).

\(^{21}\) See Kitschelt (1994 and 1999). This will also be elaborated upon in Chapter Two.
indeed quicker time changing or developing policies in order to cater to newly desired electoral constituencies. Kitschelt (1993, 1994) states that either an autonomous leadership or a diverse and dynamic membership base can foster strategic capacity. Schumacher et. al. suggest that such capacity is higher in ‘leadership-dominated’ parties, where the party elite are not beholden to party-linked interest groups and/or staid, entrenched activists (Schumacher, Vries and Vis 2013; Marx and Schumacher 2013; Schumacher 2013). In fact, near to the time that each party adopted childcare policy they each underwent a process of internal reorganisation that included 1) the introduction of gender-based reforms, like quotas on internal party decision making bodies, such as platform committees and executive bodies (US, Aus, UK), as well as gender-based quotas on candidate selection, such as ‘one woman on a shortlist’ (OWOS) and ‘all-women shortlists (AWS)’ (UK) and 2) reforms that were largely framed as ‘democratising’ but which essentially diminished the power of party-affiliated interest groups (namely trade unions) and centralised power into the hands of party elites. Examples include reducing the power of the union vote at party conferences as well as reducing the strength of the union vote in candidate selections (Aus, UK) and leadership elections (UK), and democratising candidate selection so as to reduce the unions’ ability to act as powerbrokers at conventions (US). The reduction of union dominance helped empower higher-educated, non-trade unionist party members who once might have been assumed to be constituents of the centre-right, but who now allied with social democratic parties on non-redistributive issues (often referred to here as ‘post-materialists’).22

As will be discussed throughout Chapters Three through Seven, these internal reorganisations occurred fastest in the Democratic Party, which had fewer veto points to prevent reform than did Labour and a stronger leadership than the ALP. Reform occurred next in the ALP, where the federal party was able to take advantage of the party’s decentralised structure and a series of exogenous circumstances in order to intervene in state-level parties and stipulate particular conference delegation/candidate selection requirements.23 It took the longest in UK Labour, where any reforms had to make their way through 1) a battling contingent of factions within the party and 2) a decision making structure with multiple veto points, wherein any rule changes needed to pass through at least three forums24 including the conference floor, where voting was heavily dominated by trade unions and for a time, the hard-left.25 The approximate amount of time that elapsed between the initial decline in either the Alford or Thomsen indices and enactment of a party-centralising reform was six years in the US, relative to five in Australia and

22 This will be discussed further in Chapter Two, with specific reference to Inglehart (1977) and Inglehart and Rabier (1986).
23 In 1970 and 1980 the federal branch of the Australian Labour Party directly intervened into its state branches, citing corruption (Jupp 1982). This will be detailed in Chapter Four.
24 These include the National Executive Committee (NEC) policy/rules committee (depending on the type of reform) the NEC itself and the Party Conference.
25 Unions comprised 90% of conference votes before the conference voting reform of 1990 (Russell 2005, 40).
twelve in the UK; the amount of time between the initial decline in the traditional gender vote gap and the enactment of gender-based reforms was five years in the US, 12 years in Australia and 20 in the UK (see Table 6.4).

b. Explaining party position change

The three correlates of childcare policy introduction as outlined above – organised female labour mobilisation, electoral incentives and party reform - display varying levels of consistency with each other. On the one hand, it seems viable to hypothesise that when party-linked interest groups, such as trade unions, change their policy stance on a particular issue, their affiliated political party will respond by changing their policy stance in the same direction. Thus, one might hypothesise that when organised female labour mobilisation (female trade union membership interacted with trade union density) neared its peak, trade unions would have placed increased pressure on their affiliated parties to advance the childcare issue, and the parties would have responded accordingly. But what about electoral incentives? Figures 1.16-1.20 suggest centre-left parties stood to benefit by promoting policies, such as childcare, that appealed to disaffected centre-right voters, such as middle-income and female voters. How can we disentangle the driving forces of interest group influence versus electoral strategy? Was one more influential than the other in persuading parties to adopt the issue?

Moreover, the first and third variables appear to be in direct odds with one and other: as discussed above, just as peak-level organised female labour mobilisation occurred in each country, political parties were undergoing a process of internal reorganisation, which in each case presented here, resulted in a significant reduction of trade unions’ power and influence within political parties. In other words, if parties can be organised along a spectrum from activist-dominated to leadership-dominated, these parties were undergoing a transition in which they moved towards the leadership end of the scale. How could trade union pressure have driven parties to adopt childcare when parties were at the same time reducing union power and influence within internal party decision making structures?

David Karol’s (2009) models of party position change may be able to reconcile this apparent inconsistency by providing a theoretical framework that allows a researcher to both understand and disaggregate the proportion of party position change that was driven by interest groups and the proportion driven by party elites’ electoral imperatives. Much of the literature related to/stemming from Carmines and Stimson’s (1981) seminal work on issue evolution suggests that party position change is driven by autonomous party elites in search of a new constituency.26 The

26 Carmines and Stimson (1981) also focus on replacement amongst voters.
mechanism through which position change occurs is elite replacement: the gradual replacement of older party elites with younger party elites allows room for these new elites to both develop ties to, and develop policies that cater to, a new electoral constituency. As a result, the process of party position change is gradual. However, from the early 2000’s a small body of research began to question whether all party position change was driven by strategic elites and occurred via elite turnover. They also questioned whether these new positions were always stable (see for example Wolbrecht 2000, Wolbrecht 2002, Karol 2009).

In particular, David Karol (2009) analysed roll call votes on six different US public policies and found that on several issues the Republican and Democratic parties changed their positions in response to the shifting demands of their key party-linked interest groups. Moreover, these position changes did not all occur gradually and via elite replacement, but quite abruptly and via legislator ‘conversion.’ Karol formalises his analyses into three ideal-type party position change models (two of which may help the theoretical puzzle displayed above): he identifies the impetus for change (either party politicians in search of votes or party-linked interest groups pushing for a new policy) which is associated with the autonomy of party-elites in the position change process, the speed of party position change, the dominant mechanism through which it occurs (legislator replacement or conversion) and the stability of the party’s new position (Karol 2009, 19).

The first model, “coalition maintenance,” is in stark contrast to Carmines and Stimson’s ‘issue evolution’ model: it states that party position change occurs when parties respond to new and/or changing demands “by groups already ensconced within their party coalition” (Karol 2009, 18). Here, party elites have little autonomy in the position change process: their actions are driven by policy demanders (i.e. party-linked interest groups) who are able to ‘convert’ party-elites to their newfound position. Thus the turnover of party elites plays a non-existent to minor role in mechanising party position change due to the fact that party elites will already be tied to the policy demander at hand - party elites will simply be ‘converted’ to a new position. The speed of policy change is quite quick – “because it does not require politicians to foster new ties to new

27 Only two of Karol’s three models are relevant and as such discussed here. The third model, “coalition expansion,” states that “party leaders adopt a new position to improve their standing with the public generally.” In that sense, this model is more akin to coalition group incorporation as party elites are autonomous throughout the process and do not require replacement to embrace the issue. However, these are typically “groupless” issues, in Karol’s words “because the shift is promoted by neither the demands of a party’s current or prospective organized constituency.” Party leaders will have the freedom to make the change occur at quite a rapid pace (because whilst the issue may not have any supporters, it has neither organised detractors). Yet the fact that the issue is groupless suggests that their newfound position has little to keep it stable as parties leaders are not motivated by specific constituencies, existent or prospective, unlike in the first two models (Karol 2009, 20).
groups, or voters to alter their loyalties” – and the new position should remain relatively stable, so long as the policy demander’s preferences remain so (Karol 2009, 18-19).

The second model, “coalition group incorporation,” seems to have more resonance with Carmines and Stimson: here party elites design policy positions so as to attract a specific bloc of voters. Party elites will have a great deal of autonomy whilst targeting voters with new positions on a popular political issue, although the longer these new groups are incorporated into a specific party’s electoral coalitions, the more said groups become powerful policy demanders in their right. The gradual nature of change and the requisite wooing of new groups suggests that elite turnover plays a significant role in this model, since party incumbents would be unlikely to break with old alliances and reformulate relationships with quite different types of electoral constituencies (e.g. new middle classes and post-materialists) (Karol 2009, 19). Coalition group incorporation, applied to this research, would feature a linear relationship between the functional and political incentives for childcare (female employment and electoral coalitional change). Yet adoption of the issue requires the party to make appeals to non-traditional electoral constituencies with whom longstanding party-elites have had little contact. As such, we would expect childcare policy adoption to be a slow process, fostered by the arrival of younger, higher-educated and perhaps indeed more female legislators, who tend to both identify and form relationships with post-materialists and new middle classes more so than they do the party’s traditional constituencies, who mobilise along the materialist (as opposed to post-materialist) axis of party competition (Kitschelt 1994).

This study hypothesises that the process that produced position change amongst each of these parties is one that resembles coalition group incorporation, however it suggests that policy adoption is mediated by the speed of each party’s internal organisational reform. In an era of shifting electoral coalitions, centre-left party elites responded to the potential gains that could be made amongst previously unreachable electoral constituencies (middle-income, educated and female voters, i.e. new middle classes) by developing work/family balance policies that would appeal to them, such as childcare. This process would naturally be slow: older party elites and members would have few ties to the aforementioned voting blocs and their related interests, and thus the party as a whole would need to experience turnover in its ranks in order to form ties with these new groups. These new party elites would resemble the constituencies they seek to

28 Karol points out that the longer these new groups are incorporated into a specific party’s electoral coalitions, the more said groups become powerful policy demanders that “gain leverage over the party’s elected officials, leading them to increasingly reflect the group’s preferences rather than overall sentiment in a state or district” (Karol 2009, 19).
29 See for example Inglehart (1977) and Knutsen (2008).
attract more so than they would reflect their predecessors (i.e. party elite replacement would mechanise childcare policy adoption in this case).

However the process, gradual as it is, is contingent upon ‘strategic flexibility’ (Kitschelt 1994). Organisational barriers (either stemming from the leadership or the rank-and-file) that prevent the party from both recruiting a different set of elites and developing left-libertarian/progressive social policies that would appeal to a new electoral constituency limit said flexibility. Once internal organisational reforms are produced (and thus barriers to new policies and appeals to new voters are eradicated), party elites and the rising intake of the party’s post-materialist members and legislators will be able to reach out to new groups by legislating and making electoral appeals on socially progressive policies such as childcare. As such, this hypothesises a linear model, akin to coalition group incorporation wherein electoral coalitional change and female employment form the functional and political incentives for childcare policy adoption, however party reform serves as an intervening variable, mediating the speed at which parties are able to adopt the issue. A summary of Karol’s two competing models and this study’s hypothesis appear in Table 1.1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Structural preconditions</th>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Intervening variable</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition group maintenance</strong> (Karol 2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trade union pressure</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Legislator conversion (fast)</td>
<td>Childcare policy adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Rise in female employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition group incorporation</strong> (Karol 2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral imperative (distinct opportunity to capture new voting blocs)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Legislator replacement (slow)</td>
<td>Childcare policy adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Rise in female employment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Electoral change</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral imperative (distinct opportunity to capture new voting blocs)</td>
<td>Party reform: public relations and internal organisational</td>
<td>Legislator replacement (slow but speed contingent on party reform process)</td>
<td>Childcare policy adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Rise in female employment</td>
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<td>2. Electoral change</td>
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Table 1.1 Model comparison (Source: Karol, 2009)

This hypothesis does not deny that there was any influence from trade unions; in fact the case studies will show that union confederations in both Australia and the US were involved in promoting childcare issues and drafting legislation. However, it suggests that union influence, relative to that of electoral imperative, is weak. Moreover, it implies that by the time each
country’s union movement reached peak-level organised female labour mobilisation (when one would expect them to lobby for childcare), their power within the three political parties at hand had already been reduced.

In order to determine what actually drove party-elites to adopt childcare as an electoral issue (and why this occurred over three different decades) it is necessary to try and disentangle the impact of interest groups (i.e. trade unions) from that of strategic party elites as well as to identify the possible intervening role of party organisational reform. Just how autonomous were party elites in this process; how influential were trade unions; and how easy was it for the party to develop legislation and platforms that would appeal to new blocs of voters?

1.4 Methodology and Methods

a. Methodological approach

This is a most similar systems design that tests whether the temporal variance of parties’ childcare policy adoption can be attributed to variables frequently cited to be behind party position change (electoral imperative, interest group influence), and in so doing tests whether or not these parties’ policy adoption processes fit into either Karol’s (2009) coalition group maintenance or incorporation models, or into the hypothesis outlined above. It does so by employing a comparative historical analysis and supplementary quantitative analyses that are designed to produce what George and Bennett term a "structured focused comparison." George and Bennett characterise a "structured focused compassion" as one in which:

“The method is ‘structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulating of the findings of the cases possible. The method is ‘focused’ in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 67).

This research attempts to meet those requirements in the sense that it has “asked general questions that reflect the research question” (George and Bennett 2005, 67). Specifically, the research objective asks: “Why did these parties adopt childcare at different times, given similar levels of female employment?” The general sub-questions, asked in each case, that reflect the research objective include:
1. ‘What role can we attribute to electoral change?’
2. ‘What role can we attribute to interest group (i.e. trade union) influence?’
3. ‘What role can we attribute to party-elite replacement?’
4. ‘Did party-elite replacement produce intra-party demographic change?’
5. ‘Is there an intervening effect between electoral change and childcare policy adoption that can be attributed to internal party reorganisation?’

This analysis is focused in that it limits itself to a specific set of independent variables (electoral change, elite replacement/conversion, trade union pressure and party reorganisation and/or modernisation) and examines these in each of the three cases. It does not attempt to find a single, overarching causal mechanism that lies behind childcare policy adoption, nor explain current policy in each country, but rather, it seeks to measure the relative impact that a set of limited but theoretically relevant variables have had on the three parties’ childcare policy timing.

The use of one of Mill’s methods (i.e. the most similar systems design) does offer potential pitfalls. For example, Hopkin (2002) notes that, “there will almost always be enough differences between cases to ‘over determine’ the dependent variable, making it difficult to establish which differences are key and which are not” (Hopkin 2002, 254). Additional concerns related to the use of a most similar systems design include, as Gering points out, the fact that “one must code cases dichotomously (high/low, present/absent)” when using this design. This is problematic in the sense that whilst electoral change can be roughly dichotomised as ‘high/low’ or indeed ‘present/absent,’ it is not as simple to try and dichotomise the extent to which trade unions pressured political parties on childcare or even the extent to which political parties’ internal organisation can be characterised as shifting from activist to leadership dominated, or vice-versa. As Gering notes, “Unfortunately, the empirical universe does not always oblige the requirements of Millean-style analysis” (Gering 2006, 133).

Attempts are made to mitigate this first risk (‘over determination’) by employing within each case study a form of process tracing that George and Bennett term an ‘analytical explanation.’ This method of process tracing “converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms” (George and Bennett 2005, 211). In particular, this analytical type of process tracing allows one to “point out variables that were otherwise left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases or even a single case” (George and Bennett 2005, 215). In other words, the use of process tracing in this comparative historical analysis allowed the researcher, at the beginning, to identify any potentially spurious variables and then led the researcher to focus on
the specific set of factors discussed here (and employ a structured focused comparison), thus reducing the risk of over determination.

This research has tried to address the second concern – dichotomisation – through structuring my case studies into two broadly different types of components: first, it (qualitatively) traces the history of childcare policy in each country and then places the issue of childcare into each country’s larger electoral context (i.e. class and gender dealignment); it then analyses each of the specific variables under consideration: electoral change in both class and gender party alignments (which is a largely quantitative analysis as it tracks change in both those alignments over time),\textsuperscript{30} trade union pressure on parties over childcare (a qualitative description and analysis) and party reorganisation/modernisation (a qualitative description and analysis).

Although the qualitative approach leaves little room for dichotomisation, it is then supplemented by the second component of each study, which analyses co-sponsorship of childcare legislation and parliamentary debates on childcare in order to (quantitatively) measure proxies for the relative influence of trade union pressure (the ‘conversion’ effect) versus legislator turnover (the ‘replacement’ effect) on childcare policy adoption. Where there is little conversion effect we might find minimal to absent trade union influence on childcare policy adoption, and where there is a conversion effect we would find presence/high union influence. OLS regressions test for an association between a legislator speaking on childcare/co-sponsoring legislation and having characteristics associated with either unionism or post-materialism. Results are dichotomised in the sense that they provide information on the presence/absence of a statistically significant relationship between the variables. The study is able to dichotomise party reform by pinpointing the years in which 1) gender-based and 2) party centralising reforms were first enacted, and then comparing when these variables were present/absent in each country. So for example, in 1972, when the US Democrats were in the midst of adopting childcare as an electoral issue, the party had already undergone both gender-based and party centralising reforms. At this same time, the ALP had already enacted a party-centralising reform but not a gender-based reform; the enactment of either type of reform was, as yet, absent in the British Labour Party.

\textbf{b. Mixed methods design}

This thesis relies on mixed methods in that both qualitative and quantitative approaches are employed to illustrate and corroborate findings on party position change, electoral change, shifts in party elite characteristics, trade union influence, electoral strategy and internal organisational reform. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) describe mixed methods research as “[s]tudies that are

\textsuperscript{30} And thus is comparable with other countries as it can be roughly dichotomised into high-low level change.
products of the pragmatist paradigm and that combine the qualitative and quantitative approaches within different phases of the research process” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, 19). The specific mixed-method applied to this research is a modified ‘exploratory sequential’ design in that it “starts by qualitatively exploring a topic before building to a second, quantitative phase” (Creswell and Plano-Clark 2011, 86). There is an interactive relationship between the qualitative and quantitative strands of research in that for example the qualitative findings that question the role of trade unions as a driver of party position change are instrumentalised into the OLS regressions, which test for an the association between union background (UK and Aus) or union rating (US) with either debating or co-sponsoring childcare legislation.

However, the variant on this exploratory sequential analysis is the fact that it is multi-stage or in other words, ‘iterative,’ in that there are multiple phases of qualitative and quantitative research (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009, 278). Specifically, the qualitative analysis finds temporal variation in the three parties’ adoption of childcare policy, whilst a subsequent quantitative comparison attempts to find correlations between various social-structural variables and said policy adoption, such as employment rates, union density, organised female labour mobilisation, left-party power and electoral change. The positive correlations found between organised female labour mobilisation and electoral change are further explored in a qualitative analysis, in which each case points to mixed evidence on the impact of unions, positive evidence on the impact of party-elite turnover and electoral strategy, and beyond that, positive evidence on the impact of party organisational reform as a mediating variable. In order to corroborate the qualitative findings, a further quantitative stage uses both Rapoport and Stone (1994) and OLS regressions to disaggregate between the relative importance of trade union influence and legislator turnover (i.e. replacement of materialist ‘left-right’ oriented party elite with post-materialist party-elite), whilst a simple matrix comparing organisational reform within the three parties attempts to test whether the duration and intensity of reform does indeed mediate the impact of legislator replacement on childcare policy adoption.

Although the qualitative and quantitative strands are interactive with one and other, their mutual usage allows for a degree of ‘triangulation,’ wherein “the results of an investigation employing a method associated with one research strategy are cross-checked against the results of using a method associated with the other research strategy” (Bryman 2006, 611). The “incompatibility thesis” would suggest that qualitative and quantitative strands are epistemologically divergent and thus incompatible (see for example Guba 1987, Smith 1983), however a defence of mixed-methods research would argue, in Tarrow’s words, “[w]ithin a single research project, the combination of qualitative and quantitative data increases inferential leverage” (Tarrow 2010,
Indeed, he notes that the sort of triangulation allowed via mixed-methods “is particularly appropriate in cases in which quantitative data is partial and qualitative investigation is obstructed by political conditions” (Tarrow 2010, 108). In this research, solely employing quantitative analyses would be too parsimonious (and the three cases would likely not allow enough data points) to identify the impact of changing electoral behaviour on parties’ electoral strategies and the complex relationship between trade unions and the advocacy of work-family policies. Its qualitative analysis, although pointing to the importance of electoral strategy and party organisational reform, does feature a degree of conflicting evidence on the importance of unions. As such quantitative methods are a helpful instrument with which to corroborate qualitative findings, and a pragmatic mixed-methods design in general increases the ‘inferential leverage’ that would have been yielded by employing either quantitative or qualitative strands in isolation.

c. Hypotheses and variables
As discussed above, this study’s guiding question is, “Why did the US Democrats, Australian Labor Party and British Labour Party” adopt childcare policy as an electoral and as a legislative issue decades apart from one and other, given similar rates of female labour force participation?”

It explores the extent to which parties’ adoption of childcare was driven by their main party-linked interest group (trade unions) and the extent to which it was driven by electoral strategy. In other words, it tests whether the adoption process fits into Karol’s (2009) coalition group maintenance model, coalition group incorporation model, or a model of coalition group incorporation mediated by party organisational reform.

It hypothesises that parties adopted childcare policy in a process that most closely resembles coalition group incorporation mediated by party organisational reform: this suggests that both rising female employment and electoral change are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for childcare policy adoption, as they respectively provide party elites with the “functional underpinnings” (Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, 146) and political incentive for childcare policy adoption. However, the modernising goals of enterprising party elites would come into conflict with both a) older guard incumbents and b) affiliated organisations such as industrial unions, both of whom were reticent to campaign on or approve a new, socially progressive issue

32 Which would attribute causality to trade union pressure.
33 Which would attribute causality to electoral imperative (i.e. autonomous party elites who develop policies in search of a new constituency).
that encourages female employment or attracts the party’s attention away from its traditional constituency. The ease in which party modernisers could advance work/family balance issues\textsuperscript{34} such as childcare would be contingent on the speed in which they could push through party reforms that 1) increased female representation in several levels of the party and 2) centralised power in the hands of leadership and away from affiliated interests, such as trade unions.

This study hypothesises that organised female labour mobilisation and, more specifically, the impact of trade unions will be neither necessary nor sufficient for a party to adopt childcare as an electoral or a legislative issue because, despite the correlation between organised female labour mobilisation and policy adoption, 1) their power with parties will have already have been diminishing; 2) fractionalisation between the male-dominated industrial and rising number of female-dominated service unions will have prevented a unified lobby that actively pushed their affiliated party to pass a universal childcare policy; 3) even in cases where unions did pressure parties to act on childcare, their goals would have been in line with the party modernisers (and their new constituents) anyway.

- The dependent variable is \textit{the time at which a party adopts childcare policy as an electoral or as a legislative issue.}

Measurement: This thesis identifies three time points at which centre-left parties first ‘embraced’ or ‘adopted’ (both terms used interchangeably throughout) childcare policy: 1972 (US), 1983 (Australia) and 1997 (UK). These focal years are selected because they were the federal/general election years in which the party first advocated the need for universal childcare and promised a specific policy for doing so; moreover each of the parties were also legislating on the issue either immediately before (US) or after (UK and Australia) the election. It is also necessary to adopt specific points in time in order to operationalise the Rapoport and Stone model and the OLS regressions. Although the specific years are convenient time points for measurement, it can be said and indeed Figures 1.4-1.11 display, that the Democrats’ attention to the issue was raised during the broader time period between the late 1960s and early 1970s, whereas the ALP through the early 1980s and the UK from the early-to-mid 1990s. A fine-pointed date in time helps with the quantitative analyses but qualitatively it is more reasonable to suggest that parties ‘adopted’ the issue over a period of a few years surrounding the specific years identified above.

Policy adoption or party position change (used interchangeably) can be measured in two different ways: legislative or electoral. Although as shown in Figures 1.4-1.11, the two occur broadly in tandem with one and other across all three countries; in the UK legislative attention to

\textsuperscript{34} In terms of highlighting it during an election campaign and/or debating/co-sponsoring it in the legislature.
childcare predated electoral attention to the issue by approximately five to ten years.\textsuperscript{35} When relevant, this research will make specific reference to childcare policy adoption/position change in the ‘legislative’ or ‘electoral sense.’

\begin{itemize}
  \item[i)] \textit{Legislative}

  The legislative measurement identifies when legislators increased their attention to the issue by either discussing it in parliamentary debate (UK and Australia) or co-sponsoring childcare legislation (US). The US case measures party position change according to the proportion of House Democratic legislators who co-sponsored childcare bills at points Time 1 (T1) and Time 2 (T2),\textsuperscript{36} whereas the UK and Australia cases focus on the number of Labo(u)r MPs who raised the issue of childcare during parliamentary debates at T1 and T2. Any debate mention that is negative in terms of childcare as a concept or state subsidies for childcare are excluded.\textsuperscript{37}

  There are two main reasons why party position change in the US is measured by House Democratic co-sponsorship of childcare bills whereas in Australia and the UK, it is measured by parliamentary debate mentions. They include: 1) parliamentary systems, where the opposition do not introduce bills as in the US, offer far less room for gathering data because for example, Labour would not have been able to introduce a single bill between 1979 and 1997.\textsuperscript{38} By contrast, they could bring up the issue in debates as often as they desired; 2) a digital record of US House debates is not available until the year 1973, however the policies of interest, such as the CDA, predate that. Finally, whereas authors such as Karol (2009) employ US Congressional roll call votes to measure party position change, this research measures co-sponsorship rates, given that several of the childcare bills included in the study were never put to the floor for a full vote. Roll-call votes would, as such, further restrict the amount of data available for analysis. More broadly, the advantage of the legislative measure of childcare policy adoption (relative to the electoral measure) is that it allows the researcher to analyse a specific sample of people (all House Democrats/Labo(u)r MPs at a given time) and associate each individual with their proclivity to co-sponsor/debate childcare in quantitative analyses such as linear regressions.

  \item[ii)] \textit{Electoral}

  Electorally, childcare policy adoption/party position change can be measured by the number of words appropriated to the issue on party manifestos/platforms, in leaders speeches and specific

\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{35} Whereas manifesto attention to childcare increased in 1992 and strong manifesto policy commitments commenced from 1997 (which will be outlined in Chapter Five), MPs increased their attention to the issue, as measured by parliamentary debate, from the 49\textsuperscript{th} Parliament (1987-1992).

\textsuperscript{36} Time periods of analysis will be elaborated further in Chapters Three through Six but they are, roughly: 1969-1991 in the US; 1970-2001 in the UK and 1968-1987 in Australia.

\textsuperscript{37} This will be elaborated on further in Chapters Four and Five.

\textsuperscript{38} Excluding the rare instance of a private member’s bill.
policy commitments in speeches/manifestos. This measurement is helpful because election statements are perhaps the most direct way of appealing to new voters, and this research hypothesises that electoral appeals drove childcare policy adoption. Whilst the party’s manifesto is a good indicator of a party’s general stance on an issue, data on each and every person who produced said manifesto, the way every party member voted on it and the extent to which each of the policies were welcomed by the party at large is unclear in all three parties. Given that there is no information on the demographics/background of every single party member, their role in various campaign functions and their overall power at a given time, it is impossible to quantitatively find the mechanism that produced childcare policy adoption (in electoral terms) within these three political parties. However, throughout this research qualitative links will be drawn between childcare policy attention in the electoral sense (e.g. in manifestos and leader’s speeches) and organisational reforms: for example, the correlation between a 1972 Democratic Party mandate that women should hold 40% of the seats on party platform committees and the rather steep incline in the number of words dedicated to childcare that appeared in that same year’s election manifesto (see Chapter Three).

-The independent variables are:

1. Electoral imperative

Measurement: Electoral strategy or electoral imperative (used interchangeably) implies that parties adopted childcare policy as a means of appealing to a new constituency and thus, winning either votes, seats or office. This assumes that they had viable gains to be made from doing so. It cannot be directly measured but is indicated by proxy in a number of ways throughout the case studies. These include:

i) An analysis of electoral coalitional change in the era surrounding each party’s adoption of childcare policy. These analyse the extent to which declines in traditional gender and class-based party-voter linkages offered opportunities and constraints for the three parties at hand. Based upon Kriesi’s (1999) discussion of the primacy of access to higher education for explaining shifts in party-voter linkages (which will be discussed in the next chapter) education, rather than class, is considered alongside gender. This research will interchangeably refer to the group of post-war, higher-educated voters who align with left parties not on the traditional left-right economic axis but on a libertarian/authoritarian axis, as the ‘new middle class,’ ‘new politics’ or ‘post-

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39 The US-based Convention Delegate Surveys would be helpful to the extent that they provide background data and policy preferences for delegates to the Democratic and Republican conventions. However, these surveys only began in 1972 and as such will not show how change in delegates fostered the adoption of childcare policy that this study argues to have occurred in and around 1968-1972.

40 Also referred to as the materialist/post-materialist axis.
materialist’ voters \(^{41}\) (see for example Knutsen 2008, Inglehart 1977, Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995).

ii) Qualitative evidence (i.e. secondary source material) that notes specific strategies to attract new voters.

iii) Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) analysis: where replacement effects dominate the model it is clear that party position change is mechanised by legislator replacement rather than conversion. This is linked to the idea that a party’s motivation for adopting childcare is driven by their desire for new voters. However the mechanism that actually produces this is legislator turnover, as the party will need to court members/legislators who bear similar traits to those electoral groups that they are seeking to attract, rather than rely on long-term incumbents who would need to revise their alliances with more traditional blue-collar constituencies and form new ties to post-modernist, ‘new politics’ voters.

iv) OLS regressions: these test for an association between a legislator debating/co-sponsoring childcare legislation and several characteristics. \(^{42}\) Where the association between debating/co-sponsoring and having a university education or being female is positive and statistically significant (and having a trade unionist background is either not significant and/or is negative) we can infer that the replacement of older legislators with post-materialist oriented legislators might have helped drive forward childcare policy adoption. The strength and direction of these associations would either corroborate or dampen the replacement effect as found by Rapoport and Stone.

2. Trade union pressure

Trade union pressure is also measured by proxy in several different ways.

i) This research tests whether the correlation of organised female labour mobilisation (trade union density x female trade union membership rates) suggests that feminisation of unions and their attendant power on centre-left parties pushed these parties to adopt childcare policy.

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\(^{41}\) This concept will be elaborated on in Chapter Two.

\(^{42}\) These include gender, education (i.e. university) and trade union background. In the UK and Australia, trade union background signifies that an MP had in fact previously worked for a union whilst, in the US, where Congressional biographies in Sharp (2000) indicate that this is quite rare, the AFL-CIO’s COPE score, a measurement of pro-labour voting as measured by that interest group, is employed.
ii) Trade union pressure can also be evaluated via qualitative (largely secondary source) evidence, which points to the pressure (or lack thereof) that trade unions placed on parties to act on the particular ‘new social risks’ that correlated with increased female labour force participation.

iii) As with electoral strategy, trade union pressure is also proxied by the ‘conversion’ results from the Rapoport and Stone model. If the results show that childcare policy adoption (party position change) was largely driven by conversion then we may expect that a group with close ties to the party (i.e. trade unions) was able to convince legislators to change their position of either ambivalence and/or opposition to the issue and go out of their way to either co-sponsor legislation or debate the issue. However, OLS regressions would be needed to corroborate this.

iv) Whilst the Rapoport and Stone results may point to evidence of conversion, the OLS regression results will indicate whether that conversion is indeed associated with legislators who have a unionist background.\textsuperscript{43} A positive and significant association between debating/ co-sponsoring childcare legislation would indicate that union interests might have helped drive legislators’ newfound attention to the issue.

-My (hypothesised) intervening variable is:

1. \textit{Internal party reorganisation/party organisational reform}

Measurement: In this research, party modernisation refers to a comprehensive process that includes both change in public relations strategies and a change in internal organisational structure. Party organisational reform refers specifically to micro-level changes, such as instituting gender-based quotas and reducing union power in party decision making structures, which can de facto increase the relative strength of new politics/post-materialist party members/legislators. These changes will be detailed in each of the case study chapters as well as in the comparative analysis, Chapter Six. Because the parties all have had different organisational structures and are thus coming from different starting points, it is difficult to devise a single measurement for such organisational reforms: as such both the case studies and the comparative analysis chapter will highlight reforms in a broader sense, i.e. the length of time reforms took and the extent to which reforms a) brought in and indeed promoted minority members (for example gender-based quotas) and b) the extent to which they centralised power at the expense of either the rank-and-file membership or affiliates such as trade unions.

\textsuperscript{43} Or, in the US, a high COPE score.
-My control variables include

1. *Rates of female employment in both absolute and relative terms (similar)*
2. *Welfare state regime type/variety of capitalism (similar)*

In testing which of three models (Karol’s two models and this research’s hypothesis) fits parties’ childcare policy processes, the research runs through a series of analyses within each case study chapter.

1. As outlined above, this study will first provide a brief historical analysis of childcare policy and the politics surrounding it in each country.

2. It will then analyse the amount of electoral change that both preceded and surrounded parties’ adoption of childcare as an electoral issue, focusing specifically on shifts in class and gender based party allegiance.

3. It next analyses parties’ response to such electoral change: 1) their attempts to target particular voters and 2) their attempts at internal party reorganisation, i.e. securing both gender-based representation and party-centralising reforms (i.e. reducing the power of traditional blue-collar male groups).

4. Next it analyses the extent to which each country’s trade union movement prioritised childcare or indeed pressured political parties to develop childcare policies that would be of assistance to middle-income families, taking into account fractionalisation within the union movement and in particular, discord between female and male-dominated unions within the same confederation.

5. It then supplements those largely qualitative analyses by employing tests that attempt to account for party position change by disaggregating between the effects of a) legislator conversion, which is a proxy for interest group (in this case, trade union) pressure and b) legislator replacement, which is a proxy for electoral imperative (i.e. party elites adopting the issue and the rest of the party gradually warming to it by the intake of new/replacement of old legislators).

It uses two main tests to try and disaggregate the relative impact of conversion and replacement on party position change, Rapoport and Stone’s 1994 model of political change⁴⁴ and multiple linear regressions. Whereas the Rapoport and Stone model indicates the total amount of party

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⁴⁴ See Rapoport and Stone description in Chapter Three.
position changed accounted for by conversion, replacement and mobilisation, the OLS regressions tests for associations between legislators who positively debated/co-sponsored middle-income childcare policies and age, gender, education and trade union background. These latter tests indicate whether legislators advocating the issue were of a traditional socialist-capitalist politics or of a more post-materialist, ‘new politics’ background.

The OLS regressions supplement the Rapoport and Stone findings in two ways: while Rapoport and Stone identify the causal mechanism behind change (i.e. they will inform whether the adoption of childcare policy in the legislature was mechanised by either conversion, replacement or mobilisation), the OLS regressions can help shed light on which of these variables of interest helped drive that mechanism. For example, if the Rapoport and Stone models find that legislator conversion was the dominant mechanism behind change, we may assume that party-linked interest groups such as trade unions were the forces that ‘converted’ said legislators, although this would be no more than educated conjecture. If however, the OLS regressions find a positive and significant association between having a trade union background and frequently debating/co-sponsoring childcare then we may be more confident that legislators were driven to adopt the issue because of pressure from their longstanding interest groups.45 Second, the structure of the Rapoport and Stone model treats a legislator’s co-sponsorship/debate mentions as a binary variable (i.e. they either did or did not do so). This is helpful for explaining broad party change but less so when assessing the gradations of legislator attention to the issue (Rapoport and Stone would treat a legislator who mentioned childcare ten times in a single parliament the same as they would a legislator who mentioned it once). The OLS regressions, however, treat the number of bills co-sponsored/number of debate mentions in a particular Congress/Parliament on a continuous scale.

However, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.4, there are strong reasons for the use of binary logistic regressions, under which the dependent variable is not the number of times that a legislator co-sponsored a childcare bill or debated childcare, but simply whether or not they did so. The need for a binary dependent variable is driven by the fact that there is a non-normal distribution of the number of times that legislators did debate/co-sponsor during a given

45 The reverse is also true: if replacement appears to be the dominant mechanism, we may assume that the new legislators who frequently spoke on/co-sponsored childcare issues were associated with characteristics of post-materialist political actors (such as university education, being female, having alliances with socially progressive interests, etc.), however we could not be sure that they in fact had different backgrounds from their predecessors. If the OLS regressions find a significant and positive association between childcare co-sponsorship/debate mentions and characteristics typically associated with post-materialist, new politics groups, then we can be more confident that the influx of left-liberal/post-materialist party members, legislators and voters was the driving force behind childcare policy adoption.
legislative session.\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, there can be as many as 90\% of legislators who, in a given parliament, never co-sponsored/debated at all.\textsuperscript{47} As such, logistic regressions are run using the same independent variables as in the OLS regressions however the dependent variable is binary: whether or not a legislator debated/co-sponsored. The results of these models will be noted in each of the case studies and the tables themselves are located in Appendix D.

6. In order to test whether the replacement effects discussed above do in fact correlate with socio-demographic change amongst each party’s legislators, it provides overtime demographics on House Democrats, ALP, Labour MPs. This will display the extent to which there was/was not a replacement of male, unionist oriented legislators with higher-educated and often female legislators.

7. It then summarises the qualitative/quantitative findings and reaches a broad conclusion about the main forces that drove the party to adopt childcare as an electoral or legislative issue (i.e. electoral imperative versus interest group pressure) and conclude on the extent to which internal party reorganisation played an intervening role in allowing parties to be able to do adopt the issue.

Each case study chapter (3-5) follows the same structure, in order to yield greater comparative leverage. Chapter Six then provides a conclusive analysis: identifying variation in the processes (i.e. strength and weaknesses of each variable) that occurred across all three parties and largely confirming this study’s hypothesis.

The structured-focused comparison described above allows testing for each of the below sub-hypotheses:

\begin{itemize}
    \item H1: Electoral change should precede childcare policy adoption and it should contain shifts in both class and gender based party alliances.
    \item H2: There should be qualitative evidence of parties attempting to target middle class/female voters.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{46} For example, during the UK’s 52\textsuperscript{nd} Parliament 42\% of Labour MPs debated childcare and the average number of mentions was 1.19. Yet, in an OLS regression particular outliers (for example one Labour MP who raised the issue 34 times) may skew results.

\textsuperscript{47} This is the case during the UK’s 48\textsuperscript{th} Parliament. The minimum percentage of co-sponsors/debaters in the US and Australian cases was 20\%. 
H3: Rapoport and Stone tests should indicate that party elite replacement accounted for a greater proportion of party position change than legislator conversion.

H4: OLS regressions should indicate that each party’s childcare supporters were of a more ‘new politics’ than traditional socialist-capitalist/left right background (i.e. being female and/or higher education should have positive and higher correlation with advancing childcare policy than should being male and/or having a trade union background).

H5: There should be limited or at least mixed qualitative evidence of trade unions lobbying political parties for action on childcare.

H6: Party organisational reform should precede childcare policy adoption; the timing should differ across each country in accordance with the order in which each country’s centre-left party adopted childcare policy and should predate or at least be correlated with shifts in the dominant characteristics of a party’s legislators.

d. Sources
This study relies on primary documents, including party manifestos, leaders’ speeches and party strategy documents (e.g. Fabian Society paper written by Labour MPs such as “Winning Women’s Votes”48). For historical context it also relies on primary and secondary accounts of childcare policy formation, party politics and indeed party reform and modernisation strategies. Finally, it uses electoral and legislative databases (the American National Election Study, Australian Election Study, Australian National Political Attitude Study, British Election Study, US Congressional Record, Hansard – Parliament of Australia and Hansard – UK Parliament) in order to 1) gather electoral data 2) gather information about childcare legislation co-sponsorship and voting, and 3) analyse the discussion of childcare in parliamentary debates. Interviews were employed during the inductive phase of this research. Whilst they were helpful in building a narrative, the responses from respondents on either side of the framework (i.e. party or union) were biased in terms of attributing causation to their own side. As such, this thesis follows Karol’s framework and analyses party position change through a mix of qualitative, corroborated by more quantitative material.

e. Definitions

1. Childcare assistance for middle-income families: the dependent variable of this research is the time at which the parties under examination (US Democrats, Australian Labor Party, British Labour Party) adopted childcare policy as a legislative or an electoral issue. However, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, it refers specifically to childcare policy that assists ‘middle-income’ families. The Child Development Act fits this, as it was a universal programme with income-sliding fees; Australia’s federally funded childcare programme was of the same structure. Childcare policies both promoted and implemented under UK’s New Labour included many means-tested programmes but they also subsidised capital costs for new start-ups and offered all parents 12 free hours of care per week, amongst other benefits. Therefore, ‘childcare assistance for middle income families’ refers to any service or benefit that is not 1) limited to lone parents and/or 2) premised upon a welfare to work scheme. This distinction is important because this thesis tests whether parties adopted childcare policies so as to attract new middle class/post-materialist voters and the new middle classes would not benefit from a narrowly means-tested policy. Thus references to this are not included in parliamentary debate counts, nor are such bills considered in the analysis of House Democrat co-sponsorship rates. Throughout this work, unless noted, the term ‘childcare’ refers to programmes that benefit all families. Any references to means-tested childcare will be denoted as such.

2. Childcare or ‘early education’? Many national systems of ‘early childhood education and care’ integrate pre-school and ‘care.’ For example the Danish government, like its fellow Scandinavian counterparts, offers a system of childcare in which children are provided full day care (in line with their parents’ working hours), but also engage in pre-school lessons. By contrast, childcare has not consistently been seen as an ‘integrated’ concept in Australia, the US and the UK (Penn 2000, 37). Whilst the distinction is not clear cut (i.e. it could be drawn according to any number of metrics, such as the number of qualified teachers or the ages of children) the key concept here is provision length: pre-school/early education operates on a sessional basis and, in in these countries, does not typically involve a full day’s provision, whereas childcare or ‘daycare’ does. There are political ramifications attached to this distinction as legislators and voters of a socially conservative view might oppose the family-implications of subsidising full-day childcare, as it encourages female employment or indeed subsidises parents’

49 For example, any bills in which childcare is provided only on a welfare to work basis are excluded, as well as any debate mentions of the like. However, a bill or debate mention would be included if, in addition to a welfare to work, or lone-parent only provision, it advocated expenditure and/or programmes that benefit families of all income types. An example of this 1983’s HR 1603 in the US, which had provisions for free care for low income families but also expanded funds for the Child Care Development Block Grant, which could be used to subsidise capital costs for new childcare centres and thus increase provision overall (Congressional Record, 1983).
‘choice’ to work, but they would not be opposed to early childhood education\(^{50}\) (Randall 2000, 65; Brennan 1994, 77-78). Therefore this thesis includes any debates and/or pieces of legislation that subsidises childcare alongside pre-school,\(^{51}\) but it excludes any debates or legislation focused exclusively on part-time pre-school.

3. Party position change: this term is used interchangeably with childcare policy adoption as it indicates the point at which a party changed their official stance and adopted the issue either in the legislative or in the electoral sense. Electorally, it is measured by the strength of particular commitments (i.e. promising to double the number of places) or quantitatively (words in a manifesto), where legislatively it can be measured qualitatively (i.e. depth of childcare legislation) but is largely measured quantitatively: the proportion of MPs/House Democrats who debated/co-sponsored childcare at T2 minus the proportion who did so at T1.

1.5 Main findings
This study will find that parties introduced childcare policy in response to electoral change (i.e. electoral imperative), but that the speed of their response was conditioned by the speed of their internal party reform processes, i.e. the ease in which they were able to achieve reforms that a) adopted gender-based quotas and b) allowed party leaders to centralise power and thus diminish the internal-party power of affiliated interest groups, namely trade unions, which by extension increased the relative power of post-materialist/new politics legislators and party members.

This is not to suggest, however, that the parties under consideration are purely leadership-dominated institutions, free from the dictates of organised interests and powerful constituencies – far from it. This rather points to the difficulty in organising political coalitions around social policies that are essential to a large swathe of middle-income voters but have a diffuse, unorganised array of beneficiaries. It also speaks to the Janus-faced nature of affiliating powerful interests, such as unions, into a political party: before reorganisation processes altered the operating structure of the Democrats, ALP and Labour Party, trade unions would have had far more influence in pushing parties to campaign for – and attempt to legislate on – long-term, universal childcare funding. However their claims today will not be heard as loudly.

\(^{50}\) For example Margaret Thatcher, as education minister, proposed a system of publicly funded pre-school but opposed such a scheme offering care (Randall 2000, 65). Brennan notes that in the early 1970s ALP education minister and “devout Christian” Kim Beazley Snr. was “very sympathetic” to the pre-school movement but not full day childcare (Brennan 1994, 77-78).

\(^{51}\) For example, the ‘free entitlement’ of 12.5 hours early education offered by New Labour allow parents to spend their hours (now 15) at any approved early childhood education and care centre. While parents can claim their free hours at centres that exclusively run part-time pre-school programmes, they can also claim them at childcare centres that offer full day care.
1.6 Contributions/importance
This study provides a contribution to welfare state research by attempting to take factors commonly associated with social policy development, such as power resources, and integrating them into the broader body of political party literature, specifically using concepts related to party competition and internal party politics. By blending the welfare state development and party competition bodies of literature, it is able to explain outcome variation amongst cases that most welfare state development theories would predict to have similar outcomes. This thesis also attempts to provide a contribution to the subfield of party position change by taking two competing models of party position change (Carmines and Stimson vs. Karol), both of which have been predominantly located in the context of US politics, and applying those models to a cross-country analysis.

The actual findings lend itself to the body of literature surrounding change and transformation in social democratic parties: on the one hand it provides an additional empirical account of centre-left parties shifting from a mass party towards a more electoral-professional structure as discussed in Katz and Mair (1995) and Panebianco (1988). On the other hand, it also provides an empirical account quite closely linked to Herbert Kitschelt’s 1994 work, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*, which emphasises the importance of internal party organisation in determining the likelihood of a party undertaking a strategic appeal such as the ones discussed in this thesis. Here we see that, as Kitschelt discussed, large-scale social change brought with it a change in traditional partisan alignments that required left parties to develop new forms of programmatic appeals in order to attract new social constituencies. However, the likelihood of a party making such a strategic adjustment is in part contingent upon their intra-party political organisation. The study’s emphasis on party organisational reform as an intervening variable determining the speed of childcare policy adoption is in keeping with Kitschelt’s (1994) assertion that “[e]xternal political-economic constraints imposed on social democratic parties are less decisive than the internal constraints and opportunities for strategic adjustment and renewal generated by changing competitive situations within a party system and the dynamic of political choice inside party organizations” (Kitschelt 1994, 4).

Its findings point to the need for coalitions in favour of childcare policies to couch their demands in a strong electoral case. Yet, the fact that parties have not consistently continued to prioritise childcare following their initial embrace of the issue suggests that when parties adopt an issue due to electoral imperative (rather than interest group pressure) they may not continue to prioritise it on a long-term basis. This will be discussed further in the study’s concluding chapter.
1.7 Thesis structure

A theory and literature review appears in Chapter Two, highlighting the relevant bodies of literature that guided this research’s framework. Chapters Three through Five are the case study chapters, ordered in accordance with childcare policy timing: the US Democrats, the Australian Labor Party and lastly, the British Labour Party.

The case study chapters are structured so as to include a qualitative description of the political history of childcare in each country, followed by an analysis of electoral change and another two sections on party response to that change (1. the extent to which parties targeted female and middle-income voters, and 2. the depth and timing of their internal reform processes). The next section critically analyses qualitative evidence on the extent to which trade unions embraced childcare policy, prioritised it and indeed lobbied their affiliated political parties on it.

Next, an analysis of both co-sponsorship rates and debates on childcare supplements the qualitative analyses by attempting to disaggregate whether a party’s shift towards childcare policy was mechanised by legislators who were converted to the issue (thus lending credence to trade union power thesis) or by legislator replacement (thus lending credence to electoral imperative thesis). This is done in three ways: 1) examining legislator demographic shifts in the three decades surrounding childcare policy adoption, which highlights the extent of change produced by legislator turnover 2) operationalising a model put forth by Rapoport and Stone (1994) that disaggregates the proportion of party position change driven by legislator conversion, replacement and mobilisation, and 3) employing a series of multiple linear regressions that estimate the strength of association between a legislator’s demographic background, union history and higher-education, and the number of times they either co-sponsored a bill related to or entered a debate on childcare.

Chapter Six provides a comparative analysis of the case study results, bringing them together in order to address the hypotheses set out in this chapter. Chapter Seven concludes and discusses possible avenues for further research.

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52 ‘Change’ in this sense is measured the proportion of legislators who co-sponsored /debated childcare at the beginning of our time period of interest as compared to the number who co-sponsored/debated at the end of that time period.

53 Binary logistic regressions are also run. These are referenced in each case study and their results are included in Appendix D.
Chapter Two: Theory and Literature Review

2.1 Introduction
The research question that guides this study asks why the US Democrats, Australian Labor Party and British Labour Party adopted childcare policy decades apart from each other, given their similar rates of female employment. The following chapter will review the two larger bodies of literature that have informed this study’s theoretical framework, first focusing on the ‘welfare state development’ approach and second, the ‘party politics’ approach. Throughout, it will note where particular subsets of literature, and specific works, are helpful or unhelpful in addressing the research question. It will summarise by drawing these contributions into an outline of the theoretical framework as described in Chapter One.

2.2 Welfare state growth approaches to social policy development
The broad body of literature loosely grouped under the comparative welfare state development tag provides a wide array of theories with which to test this research’s guiding question. Yet, despite the ease in which some of these theories can be tested, they do not necessarily produce helpful findings. For example, basic tests stemming from the functionalist approach (e.g. female employment, labour shortages) fail to explain the temporal variation of policy adoption across our cases. Differences in macro-political institutions such as executive-legislative relations and veto points would help explain cross-country variation in childcare provision if this research was focused on said legislation actually being signed into law, which it is not. They are not as helpful when this study’s point of interest is party policy adoption. However, a handful of the works which will be reviewed below do point to variables that this analysis should take into account: contradicting theories over the extent to which unions might help/hinder childcare policy development and to a lesser extent, whether a ‘critical mass’ of female legislators is correlated with the timing of a party’s childcare policy adoption. The following sections will outline the relevant streams of welfare state development literature, indicating both where it contributes to the theoretical framework used to answer the research question, as well where it lacks specific relevance to the question or cases at hand.

a. Structural-functionalist approach to social policy development
A glance at female employment rates would seem a natural starting point for this study; such a functionalist approach to social policy development analyses the underlying socio-economic factors that would drive demand for childcare provision. Building upon Wilensky’s (1975) ‘logic of industrialism’ framework, functional explanations have suggested that ‘new social policies’ are an apolitical response to the increasing number of citizens no longer protected by the traditional, male breadwinner-dominated welfare state (i.e. single parents, unskilled labour) (see
for example Bonoli 2005). Each political party studied in this thesis did adopt the childcare issue within the broader context of rising female employment rates. However, as discussed in Chapter One, there is no correlation between female employment and childcare policy adoption: each of the three parties adopted childcare during different decades despite the fact that female employment rates were (in both absolute and in relative growth terms) quite similar across all three countries between the early 1970s, when the US Democrats placed childcare on their party programme and on their legislative agenda, just as they were similar in 1997, when New Labour became the first British party to campaign and comprehensively legislate on childcare.\(^{54}\)

Although the social and economic change that occurred over the past four decades has transformed risk structures, and hence the demand for new social policies, the functionalist argument appears to gloss over the potentially obstructive mediation of variables ranging from political institutions and interests, to patterns of party competition and internal party organisation.

b. Welfare state/political economy typologies

i. Three Worlds of Welfare

Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “three worlds of welfare” provides a helpful lens through which to understand the impediments that stand before parties who attempt to develop universal social policy within a liberal welfare state, a category to which the US, UK and Australia all qualify.\(^{55}\) His welfare regime consists of three ideal-type welfare state models: liberal, conservative-corporatist and social democratic, premised upon the way in which each ideal-type decommodifies labour, stratifies citizens and provides public/private goods. Esping-Andersen’s liberal welfare state is one in which “means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance plans predominate.” He further notes that “[b]enefits cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state dependents” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 26). So while this typology allows us to understand the typical character of the welfare states relevant to this thesis and by extension, some of the barriers that may stand in front of social policy development, the cross-country temporal differences in childcare policy adoption are unlikely to be explained by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three “words of welfare,” given that all three parties under examination operated in states that have typically been classified under the same regime-type.

Lewis’s seminal 1992 article criticised Esping-Andersen’s typology for ignoring the gendered implications of labour decommodification. Lewis’s response typologises welfare states

\(^{54}\) Nor, as set out in Chapter One, is there a correlation between policy adoption and unemployment rates.

\(^{55}\) See Footnote 4 in Chapter One for Castle’s (1985) description of Australia as “wage earners’ welfare state” and why this classification does not necessarily impede within-type comparison for our research.
according to their capacity for fostering women’s labour force participation. For example, Lewis classified Britain in 1992 as a “strong male-breadwinner state” characterised by a social security system that provided first tier pension and unemployment benefits to men – who were meant to be active in the labour market - and second tier benefits to women, whose work was in the private sphere. Thus, “social policies were not permitted to undermine the man’s responsibility to provide for dependents” (Lewis 1992, 163). The implications of such systems included lower levels of female employment than those seen in ‘moderate’ (France) and ‘weak’ (Sweden) male breadwinner regimes, alongside lower rates of childcare provision and other work/family balance policies (Lewis 1992, 162-63).

Additional scholars have also classified states according to their ‘strong,’ ‘weak’ or ‘modified’ male breadwinner/female carer regimes (see for example Sainsbury 1999, O’Connor 1993), whilst political scientists and social policy analysts have taken great strides towards quantifying state support for female employment (Bradshaw and Finch 2002, Gornick et. al. 1997, Gornick and Meyers 2004). These works are critical to understanding the historical and institutional barriers that stand before the development and implementation of universal childcare policies. However like the ‘three words’ typology, they do not seem to provide many clues as to why there was such a temporal difference in childcare policy adoption between the Democrats, Labour and the ALP, given the fact they operated in similar welfare states and male breadwinner systems. Moreover, the male breadwinner typologies do not help us identify the specific drivers behind change in each welfare state, specifically the shift from a male breadwinner model to what Orloff (2006), Lewis and Campbell (2007) and Lewis (2009) would eventually deem an ‘adult-worker’ model, wherein state policy provides assistance to keep two-parent families in work.  

### ii. Varieties of Capitalism

Whereas Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds’ focuses its lens on labour decommodification, Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism (2001) typologises broad systems of capitalism according to 1) labour market regulations (i.e. centralised/decentralised wage bargaining, union strength, compressed/flexible wages, ease of hiring/firing) 2) product market regulation 3) finance regulations (i.e. access to short term vs. patient capital) and 4) income inequality. The approach contrasts coordinated market economies (CMEs) – characterised by high levels of industry-specific training, long tenure at firms, capital-labour bargaining and, in general, a high level of investment in employees – against liberal market economies (LMEs), wherein general skills,  

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56 Lewis identified Britain as an adult-worker model in 2009, stating “[i]n line with the core policy goal of increasing women’s employment rates, there has been a shift away from policy assumptions based on the existence of a male breadwinner/female carer model towards the promotion of an adult worker model family” (Lewis 2009, 120).
lower levels of job protection and lower levels of firm-level investment in employees and short-term capital dominate (Hall and Soskice 2001). Whilst the framework at first glance may seem of little relevance to the research question, Estevez-Abe (2009) explains that there are gendered implications stemming from these two ideal-types: in CMEs like Germany, political actors such as trade unions and social democratic parties may be unlikely to promote policies that foster female labour participation because women’s employment is often characterised by temporary breaks for care work and/or flexible hours; as such, women’s occupations would likely be less-skill intensive and hence lower paid, all of which run the risk of wage depression. By contrast, employees in liberal market economies (LMEs) would in theory be quite neutral, if not welcoming, towards female labour force participation due to flexible labour markets and higher wage dispersion. In other words, political actors would have little impetus to develop costly childcare policies and would instead be likely to leave work/family solutions to the exigencies of the market, wherein very low-paid carers can provide solutions for middle and high-earning families (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2009, Morgan 2005). As Fleckenstein argues with respect to Germany and the UK, both systems had fostered a male-breadwinner system, but whilst Germany, a CME, “‘produced’ this outcome with a pro-active ‘general family support’ approach,” England, an LME, did so “largely indirectly with a ‘market-oriented’ model of family policy” (Fleckenstein 2010, 791).

Morgan (2005) nicely illustrates this argument in a comparison of childcare provision across Sweden, France and the US. Morgan’s VoC account emphasises cross-country variation of institutions that affect wage dispersion; pointing out that where wage-setting institutions are weak (LMEs), the resultant inequality fosters an affordable childcare market for higher earners, versus CMEs, where labour regulations (and consequent lower wage dispersion) bar carers from being as poorly paid as they would be in LMEs and thus so costly that they would be out of most middle-income families’ reach. Such high cost care would require substantial government investment. 57 The lack of specific skills training associated with LMEs (and the fact that one cannot increase productivity in care services— in other words, ‘the Baumol effect’) ensures that low-paid, untrained labourers will “cycle in and out of child care employment as needed.” Morgan states: “the low wages and poor conditions of the workers who staff these services provide an essential subsidy to the child care industry, allowing these services to exist” (Morgan 2005, 249-250). Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth (2010), like Morgan, also pick up on

57 There is however, a great deal of variance in public childcare provision amongst CMEs, with countries such as Sweden having high levels of female employment and publicly provided childcare compared to other CMEs such as Germany and the Netherlands. Morgan explains that the high cost of childcare provision in CMEs is a result of labour market regulation, which makes the private services developed in LMEs “more difficult to sustain and thus force the issue onto the [CME’s] political stage,” adding “[t]o the outcome of those debates reflects forces beyond those identified by the varieties of capitalism,” including “[p]olitical ideology, the pressures of interest organizations, and fiscal motivations” (Morgan 2005, 259).
the character of inequality amongst females within LMEs and argue that it may inhibit cross-class coalition building amongst women who would otherwise coalesce in favour of better governmental childcare assistance. The authors note that in the “fluid labor markets” where female labour force participation is already high: “women at the top of the income ladder may feel that they have more in common with the men above them than with the women below them. Class politics crosscuts gender politics more in the United States than in Europe, and this makes majority coalitions in favour of new initiatives for gender equality hard to assemble” (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, XIV, XV).

These Varieties of Capitalism-based approaches do not provide a single framework with which to answer the research question but they do provide us with a few important points to consider. For example, given that it is supposedly difficult to form a broad interest coalition around universal childcare policy in countries with such wide wage bands (i.e. high levels of income inequality), one should analyse the types of voters that the Democrats, ALP and Labour sought to appeal to when they adopted childcare policy: were they appealing to a broad coalition, or in fact targeting higher or lower income voters? Also, Estevez-Abe (2009) suggests that trade unions would be opposed to work-family policies such as childcare in CMEs, given its potential impact on wages, but how might trade unions react to childcare policy proposals in LMEs such as the US, UK and Australia? Was union influence a key driver? Or was it so low at the time of policy adoption that their stance on childcare did not have a political consequence?

c. Institutionalism

The institutionalist approach, which emphasises how the ‘rules of the game’ (Steinmo et. al. 1992) structure policy preferences, bargaining, coalition choice, etc. finds itself much at home in the welfare state development literature. Indeed, a host of rational-choice institutionalist studies have highlighted the impact of institutional variables (type of executive system, number and placement of veto points, rules of electoral competition, state centralisation, etc.) upon welfare effort (Hicks and Swank 1992; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993). The rational-choice subsection of institutionalism tends to focus on economic factors such as trade dependency (Cameron 1978), GDP (Rodrik 1998) and formal political institutions, such as veto points (Immergut 1990, Huber et. al. 1993; Huber and Stephens 2000; Pierson 1994; Tsebelis 2002), electoral systems (Lijphart 1991, Iversen and Soskice 2006, Lijphart 1999) and strength of the left, as measured by left party power and/or trade union density rates (Pampel and Williamson 1988; Hicks and Misra 1993; Bradley et. al. 2003). These variables, such as veto points, are useful in models that attempt to predict the likelihood of childcare bills passing through a legislature, though they do not necessarily determine the likelihood of a political party
adopter childcare as an election issue.\textsuperscript{58} Whereas the relevance of ‘left party power’ for our research question will be elaborated upon under the party politics sector of this chapter, the institutional and socioeconomic factors listed above come short of explaining party policy change and cross-country variation in policy adoption, given that none of the three political parties under examination experienced significant economic change and/or change in their formal political institutions that correlate or even closely predate their adoption of childcare policy. However, certain institutions, such as wage bargaining systems (including their attendant political opportunity structures) may be relevant to the extent that they mediate public debate and consultation between employers, labour and political elites on issues ranging from wage restraint to childcare.\textsuperscript{59}

Historical institutionalist approaches take account of how formal institutions structure politics and analyse how feedback effects and path dependence of particular policies shape the possibilities for future institutional change itself (see for example Thelen 1999, Pierson 1994). Paul Pierson states, “[i]f Interest groups shape policies, policies also shape interest groups,” since “[t]he organizational structure and political goals of groups may change in response to the nature of the programs that they confront and hope to sustain or modify” (Pierson 1994, 40).

Karch’s (2013) analysis of pre-school politics in the United States is an excellent example of this: Karch explains that after Nixon’s veto of the CDA, which would have operationally funded universal non-profit childcare from the federal level, child development advocates saw states as a more amenable venue for passing early childhood legislation. State leaders such as governors and state-level legislators, who felt they were wrongly bypassed in the CDA legislation, worked with child development advocates to set up state-level childcare offices and assistance programmes, thus becoming powerful stakeholders in the country’s childcare system. Proposals for federal-level programmes were thereafter hindered in the sense that they often risked reproducing efforts already underway in some states and also, met resistance from state leaders who were no longer willing to be circumvented (Karch 2013, 86-105). Karch’s work, which traces change in US pre-school policy from the immediate post World War II era to the current US administration, illustrates the key mechanisms that have driven policy shape over time (splits among interest coalitions, venue shopping and the role of states as childcare stakeholders).

\textsuperscript{58} Electoral systems/number of parties in a legislature are relevant to the extent that they shape patterns of party competition and, as a consequence, electoral strategy – this will be touched upon under the party politics section of this chapter. However, as set out in Chapter One, this study suggests that the US, UK and Australia have similar electoral systems in the sense that all of the countries under examination have non-proportional representation and single member district systems (in both the US and UK federal and central government elections are run on first past the post, Australia has runoff preferential voting for the Senate and single transferable vote for the House). Moreover, the US has two main parties, the UK has mostly been dominated by two, with 1983 and 2010 being an exception and Australian politics feature three main parties though the two of these three (Liberal and National) have a permanent coalition, opposing the ALP.

\textsuperscript{59} See the ALP case study on this point.
However, it offers less insight into the cross-country comparison at hand: why parties operating in countries with similar fundamentals adopted the issue at different times.

By contrast, Morgan (2006) provides a comparative historical analysis of work-family policies in the US, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, arguing that the different forms of organised religion that dominated each country in the 19th century went on to shape different patterns of political competition, and following from that, different ideologies and different norms/popular preferences towards working women, the effects of which still were felt into the 20th century (Morgan 2006). Morgan’s book is essential to identifying the extent to which, in the US, religious-based path dependency effects provided a stumbling block to the type of work-family policies seen in France or Sweden and it helps one contextualise the forces that so fanatically implored Nixon to veto the Child Development Act in 1971. It offers less insight into the specific variables that portended policy change, as childcare quickly moved to the top of the US legislative agenda and gained an increasingly large role in the Democrats’ manifestos in the early 1970s. This is, in part, because Morgan’s account explains the roots of cross-national variation amongst states with three different types of breadwinner models (US, Netherlands, France/Sweden) rather than explain late 20th century policy proposals from parties that operated in quite similar male breadwinner models, such as the US, UK and Australia.

Historical institutionalist approaches, like the VoC and ‘three worlds’ works, offer several important sub-questions to consider, though they do not provide a clear framework through which the research question can be answered. For example, the historically driven opposition to full-time female employment in the US may have augured the CDA’s failure but it is unclear how it affected the timing of the Democrats’ childcare policy proposal and why that proposal happened first in the US. The feedback effects of previous policies and the impact of venue shopping could have, in theory, prevented the ALP and British Labour from adopting childcare policy as early as the Democrats did. However, at that time there would have been few existing stakeholders in Britain to push back against central government childcare plans; and in Australia, the ALP’s embrace of childcare as identified in this research consisted of increasing funds to a pre-existing, minimally-financed programme. As such, they did not run the risk of angering the states/early childhood stakeholders because they were not constructing or overlaying a new, competing childcare policy but rather, increasing expenditure on a minimally funded albeit, pre-existing, policy.

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60 In terms of organised interests that would object to publicly funded or provided childcare provision, such as private, for-profit childcare interest groups.
2.3 Party politics approach to social policy development

There are several theoretical strands emerging from the party politics approach to welfare state development that are of relevance to the research question at hand. For example, the traditional power resources (‘parties matter’) thesis assumes a linear relationship between left party power and social policy output\(^{61}\) whereas a subsequent strand of literature questions whether the traditional party-linkages of the industrial era remain relevant in the post-industrialist age (Kitschelt 1994, 1999; Häusermann 2006, 2010; Kriesi 1998, 1999; Oesch 2006), thus suggesting that the link between left power and generous welfare effort may not be as linear or robust as imagined. Shifting electoral constituencies may require left parties to make strategic appeals to different types of voters in order to remain electorally viable: these strategic appeals often call for parties to change or develop new policy positions.\(^{62}\) A third strand of party politics literature, issue evolution and party position change (Carmines and Stimson 1981, 1986, 1989; Wolbrecht 2000, 2002; Karol 2009), discusses the drivers behind such adjustment and examine the specific mechanisms through which it occurs (party elite turnover or party elite conversion).

Yet as Kitschelt (1994) so convincingly demonstrates, the strategic appeals that a party should make in order to win seats or office is often the opposite of the appeals that it actually does make. A party’s internal political climate and organisational structure often hinder its strategic flexibility to make the ‘correct’ appeal to particular voters, and in so doing propose policies that are attractive to these voters (Schumacher, Vries and Vis 2013; Schumacher 2013, Schumacher and Marx 2013). However, this research suggests that parties’ organisational structures do not always remain idle and that changes in organisational structure provided the Democrats, ALP and Labour with the strategic flexibility needed to make appeals to new constituencies, such as on childcare policy. The following section will elaborate on the relevant strands of party and party competition literature as outlined above, noting how they relate to this study’s research question and contribute to its analytical framework.

a. Power resources\(^{63}\)

The ‘power resources’ approach posits a linear relationship between the strength of the left and positive social policy output. It contends that the welfare state evolved through a series of distributive conflicts and that cross-country variation in social spending reflects, to a large extent, historical conflict between capital and labour. According to this approach, ‘party matters’: the strength of left parties and/or trade unions, relative to business organisations and

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\(^{61}\) For more on this see Häusermann, Picot and Geering (2012).

\(^{62}\) See for example Fleckenstein (2010), Fleckenstein and Lee (2014), Morgan (2013).

\(^{63}\) The power resources approach is also employed in the welfare state development literature, however it is here classified under the party competition approach, given the prominence with which the ‘parties matter’ thesis exists in the party competition approach.
centre-right parties can explain both cross-time and cross-country variation in welfare state development. This is essentially a ‘bottom-up’ argument: a party’s policy is designed to serve the needs of its constituency. This partisan-based thesis has engendered wide support through several of the large-N quantitative analyses noted above, which are located in the rational choice institutionalism approach to welfare state development (Pampel and Williamson 1988; Hicks and Misra 1993; Bradley et. al. 2003). How would a traditional ‘parties matter’ thesis fit into the research question at hand? It was the centre-left in each of the three countries that first embraced childcare policy as an electoral issue, yet this correlation bears little relevance to the fact that they did so at such different times. Moreover, the assertion would be unlikely to hold up in a larger-N comparison: Fleckenstein (2010), for example notes that from the early 2000s Germany’s Christian Democrats (CDU), a centre-right party, not only followed up but greatly expanded upon the Social Democrats’ commitment to public childcare expansion, a policy reversal well at odds with the CDU’s longstanding tradition of social conservatism. Other variables employed in the power resources approach, such as trade union density and female trade union membership, also display little correlation with parties’ adoption of childcare policy, as noted in the introductory chapter.

Whereas the power-resources oriented works cited above identify either left party strength or trade union density as a predictor of social policy output, several studies that have sought to explain the development of work-family balance policies have ‘gendered’ the ‘strength of the left’ variable, analysing instead the strength of the female union movement, the women’s rights movement and the number of women in parliament (the third is often dubbed the ‘critical mass’ theory). For example, Bonoli and Reber (2010) analyse cross-country variation in childcare expenditure and find a positive, significant association between expenditure and the number of women in parliament. Flipping that logic on its head, several works have also concluded with the seemingly logical point that where women’s organisations are fragmented, policy development is often staggered, if not scant (Marchbank 1996, Randall 2000, Williams 2009). However, Lewis (1992) warns against the assumption that work-family policies arise directly from female political mobilisation: “in both France and Sweden women played little part in securing such advantages as accrued to them from the respective welfare regimes.” In Sweden, she argues, female gains were not so much the result of female political mobilisation but the consequence “of the desire to increase the size of the labour force” (Lewis 1992, 171). This is in keeping with Morgan’s assertion that in 1960s and 70s Sweden and Denmark, both the social

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64 For a review see Childs and Krook (2008).
65 They also attribute causality to spending on old-age policies, finding that when they control for total social spending there is a negative association between old age and childcare spending, thus a ‘crowding out’ effect exists (Bonoli and Reber 2010, 115).
democratic parties and the unions were more pragmatic than gender-altruistic in that they developed policies that encouraged female employment in response to labour shortages: “Both labor unions and employers viewed such policies as important for promoting economic growth, a position that helped build a consensus across the political spectrum” (Morgan 2003, 287).

Rather than looking at the strength of the women’s movement and the strength of the left in isolation from one and other, Huber and Stephens (2000) provide a gender-based approach to the power resources model that analyses the combined forces of working women and potential political allies, such as trade unions or left parties. The authors suggest a mutually reinforcing relationship between social-structural change and power resources:

“Increasing women's labor force participation is expected to generate demands for a greater public role in caregiving and thus pressures for an expansion of welfare state services. Where such demands and pressures are supported by powerful political allies, they tend to result in policies that facilitate the combination of paid work and family-care obligations, such as the provision of public day care and elderly care and parental leave insurance” (Huber and Stephens 2000, 327).

This finding has some resonance with the correlation displayed in Chapter One, which points to an association between the timing of a party’s childcare policy adoption and the peak of their organised female labour mobilisation rates (the product of female trade union membership and trade union density). But while Huber and Stephens (2000) assert that high rates of female labour participation, when coupled with a powerful political ally, will result in the development of work/family reconciliation policies, it is somewhat unclear whether and/or when powerful political allies (i.e. parties or unions) have a compelling incentive to partner themselves with the interests of the female labour force. This is particularly the case if doing so would risk alienating another core element of their electoral coalition – a factor that will be elaborated on in the following sections. For example, Rosenbluth, Salmond and Thies point out that “both social democratic and liberal parties are somewhat constrained by their core constituencies from issuing pure policy-based appeals to working women” (Rosenbluth et. al. 2006, 167). According to the authors, social democratic parties are limited to the extent that male-dominated labour unions fear that the entrance of female labour (which often implies temporary career breaks) will cause employers to lower wage and benefit packages. Liberal party supporters, on the other hand, would reject increased public expenditure and/or the prospect of additional taxes and mandates on employers that would be required to fund work/family reconciliation policies (Rosenbluth et. al 2006, 168).
Rosenbluth et. al. (2006) yet again bring up the issue of organised labour placing a constraint on a social democratic party’s ability push forward work-family policies that encourage female employment. They note:

“The problem for social democratic parties is partial incompatibility with the interests of their core voters, the predominantly male union membership. Unions succeed for their members, in part, by creating barriers to entry into the labor force. Incumbent male workers might fear that the extension of union membership and benefits to women, who require flexibility and compensation for time spent with children, might lead employers to respond by reducing the average male wage and benefit package” (Rosenbluth, et. al., 167-68).

This is similar to the argument set out in the gendered-VOC account discussed in the previous section, which suggests that at least in CMEs, unions were unlikely proponents of work-family policies (Estevez-Abe 2009). Lewis (1992) notes that British unions served to ‘enforce’ the male breadwinner model, stating that “it became part of the badge of working class male respectability to keep a wife, enforced by a strong trade union movement as well as by the discourse of social reform” (Lewis 1992, 166), whereas Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) find that the impact of trade unions in workplace negotiations for occupational-based workplace families was “limited” in Germany and “negligible” in Britain. Arguments such as Rosenbluth et. al. (2006) that suggest unions oppose positive female employment policies belie the data showing a rise in female union membership across advanced industrial democracies, and in the three countries under examination in this thesis. In Britain for example, women’s trade union membership underwent a substantial climb from the 1960s, with female union membership increasing by 111% between 1961 and 1980, versus just 17.5% for men (Gelb 1989, 69). By 2012 female trade union membership was 29% versus 23% for men, the difference being statistically significant (ONS 2012). By the late 1980s, women in the US also had higher rates of trade union membership than men (Gelb 1989, 76). Even during the 1990s and 2000s union membership was higher amongst Australian women than men (ABS 2011).

On the other hand, increases in female union membership have not moved in tandem with increases in female union leadership, suggesting perhaps a lack of female agency in unions: Ledwith states that as of 1999, “[w]orldwide, women account for less than a third of members in

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66 Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser also point to larger a body of literature discussing the impact of unions in workplace negotiations for work-family policies, analysing whether highly unionised companies have stronger work-family policies (for example Morgan and Milliken 1992, Budd and Mumford 2004, Dex and Smith 2001). The insight into unions’ role at the workplace negotiation level is helpful for generating a picture of how highly work-family policies place on different unions’ workplace negotiation agendas however this study is focused upon unions’ lobbying efforts with political parties.

67 Despite declines in union membership as a whole.
the highest [union] decision making bodies,” noting that a 2011 survey of 55 European trade union confederations from 30 countries showed of 43 presidents only four were women, of 74 vice presidents 28 were women, of 40 secretary generals 10 were women, and of 18 deputy secretary generals only six were women” (Ledwith 2012, 191). Of the top ten largest unions in Britain, women made up roughly 50% of their total membership in 2008, yet comprised 33% of National Executive members, 41% of Trades Union Congress (TUC) delegates and 32% of paid staff members. The picture is similar in the US: women made up approximately 55% of union membership during 2011 but held just 30% of officer and executive board positions (Kirton and Healy 2013, 39-41).

The case study chapters explain the complex relationship between unions, female workers and parties in greater detail, however the inconsistencies above suggest that an alliance between unions and women, which perhaps should be strong given that women’s membership is key to union survival,68 is not guaranteed. This factor could be driven by institutional stickiness within unions’ own organisational structures: for example Ebbinghaus argues that unions “do indeed lag behind structural changes,” noting that in Western European countries apart from the Nordics and Belgium, “blue-collar workers still represent a large share of membership while they are a in a clear minority position in post-industrial labour forces” (Ebbinghaus, 2006, 127). Or as the US and British case studies will show, a high degree of variance in gender balance across unions, with some unions actively promoting gender-based quotas within their own structures and their affiliated party structures (as in the UK) as well as lobbying for universal childcare (as in the US), but a level of decentralisation amongst unions such that these demands never reached confederation level leadership. Ledwith notes, “So we can conclude that women are represented as members, but not recognized as leaders” (Ledwith 2012, 191). These examples speak to a key question underlying this research: can we reasonably expect trade union movements to have made a concerted effort to push parties on childcare? And if parties decided to ally with working women and propose childcare policies without trade union encouragement, did they risk alienating their traditional, male blue-collar base?

A key implication of the traditional ‘parties matter’ thesis is that it often assumes that parties within the same ‘family’ (e.g. social democratic, Christian democratic, conservative) are likely to compete for their associated constituencies using similar appeals. Lynch (2006) however notes that there are historically-derived, cross-country variations amongst parties within the same ‘family,’ with some operating on particularistic (i.e. developing policies that reward a limited

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68 See for example Craver 1998, p. 25.
albeit crucial base of voters) and others, programmatic modes of competition (which results in more inclusive social policies). Lynch explains that current cross-country variation on the age orientation of welfare state spending is driven by an interaction between the way social policies were historically structured and the aforementioned modes of party competition over these policies. In countries where benefits have been occupationally based, parties tend to compete in a more particularistic manner and expenditure patterns are likely biased towards the elderly. In countries where benefits have traditionally been universally oriented, parties tend to have a more programmatic mode of competition and thus have an easier time implementing social insurance policies for the citizenry at large. Whereas the US is categorised as an occupationally based welfare state with particularistic modes of party competition, both Australia and the UK have more universal welfare state systems, operating on more programmatic modes of party competition (Lynch 2006, 10-11). As Chapter Three will show, this makes the Democrats’ 1971 childcare legislation that was essentially universal (a federally funded program available to all children under five with fees on an income sliding scale) even more noteworthy and indeed, somewhat of anomaly as none of their subsequent childcare programmes were as universally oriented as the Child Development Act.

The following section will address shifting party-voter linkages in the post-industrial era and as a consequence, the rise of a new, communitarian dimension over which left parties need to compete in order to remain electorally viable (Kitschelt 1994). In doing so, it discusses the need for parties to make strategic appeals that attract a more educated middle class electorate without deterring their traditional base. It then goes on to explain how the likelihood of a party making these appeals is conditioned by the party’s own internal politics and organisational structure.

b. Social structural change and partisan alignments in the post-industrial era

Political competition, it has traditionally been theorised, operates around a limited number of cleavages: for example Lipset and Rokkan (1967) traced four lines of party competition across Western Europe and North America (centre vs. periphery, church vs. state, land vs. industry and capital vs. labour). But the partisan stability implied by such historically rooted cleavages eroded, Dalton notes, just around the time that partisan stability in and of itself became “conventional wisdom” (Dalton 2002, 133). In fact, Inglehart’s 1977 study of political attitudes in Western Europe found that as countries became wealthier, younger, higher-educated, citizens were “socialized during an unprecedentedly long period of unprecedentedly high affluence,” hypothesising that, “[f]or them, economic security may be taken for granted, as the supply of water or the air we breathe once could.” Whereas their parents and grandparents may have been
focused upon materialist concerns, this group tended to mobilise on “post-bourgeois” issues, “relating to the need for belonging and to aesthetic and intellectual needs.” This change in political values, Inglehart predicted in 1977, “may have a long-term tendency to alter existing patterns of political partisanship” (Inglehart 1997, 991-992). By the 1980s and early 1990s, both Inglehart and Rabier (1986) and Franklin, Mackie and Valen’s (1992) cross-country analysis of partisan alignment highlighted a weakening in the link between social cleavage and partisan alignment, with Inglehart and Rabier finding electoral importance in “New Politics issues concerning the quality of life, the role of women, and the implications of recent technological developments concerning the environment and the nature of modern warfare” (Inglehart and Rabier 1986, 479), and Franklin et. al. identifying higher levels of partisan volatility (at both the individual and aggregate levels), correlated with, in Dalton’s words, a “common set of new post materialist issues that emerged on the stage in these nations” (Dalton 2002, 133).

Inglehart and Norris’s (2000) developmental theory of the gender gap argues that “structural and cultural trends common to post-industrial societies” also had an impact on gender-based party-voter linkages and “realigned women towards parties of the left” (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 447). The authors map shifts in gender-vote linkages across Western Europe alongside social-structural change, hypothesising that the ‘traditional gender vote gap,’ wherein women identified with conservative parties in greater proportion than men, has eroded as women’s employment and take-up of higher education has increased:

“Virtually all preindustrial societies emphasized childbearing and child-rearing as the central goal for women, and their most important function in life; careers in the paid workforce were predominantly male. In post-industrial societies gender roles have increasingly converged due to a structural revolution in the paid labor force, in educational opportunities for women, and in the characteristics of modern families. These major changes in sex roles can be expected to influence women's and men's political behavior. Studies suggest that female participation in the paid labor force has had a significant impact on female voting behavior, for example, in terms of political participation” (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 446).

Although their theory relates to the broader implications of post-materialism on political values for both men and women as set out in Inglehart (1977), the authors imply that there is also a materialist driver behind the gendered realignment: “[w]omen’s support for parties of the left may be encouraged by pervasive patterns of horizontal and vertical occupational segregation. Working women are often overrepresented in low-paid jobs and as public sector professionals and service providers in education, health care, and welfare services” (Inglehart and Norris 2000,
Brooks and Manza (1998) analyse the reversal of gender party alignment in the US and argue that the development of the ‘modern gender vote gap,’ wherein women vote left in greater proportion than men, is attributable to the increase in female employment that has occurred since the 1950s and 1960s, controlling for women’s views towards both social provision and the women’s movement. Whilst the authors do not dismiss arguments suggesting that shifts towards the left on behalf of both men and women are in some part driven by post-materialist attitudes, they argue that for US women voters in particular, the driver may be somewhat materialistic:

“More women are dependent on an activist public sector for access to jobs, public social provision for help with childcare and other parental responsibilities, and (especially as actual or potential single mothers with lower-paid employment prospects) income maintenance programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. As the party that has been more receptive to building or maintaining such social programs, the Democrats have thus benefited from the increasing proportion of women in the workforce since the 1950s” (Manza and Brooks 1998, 1259).

So what is the actual evidence surrounding stability and change in party-voter linkages? Several studies point to a strong shift in gender-based linkages within advanced industrial democracies: women began to vote for left parties in greater proportion than men. The trend is argued to have happened first in the US, before occurring in advanced democracies in Western Europe (Norris 1996, Giger 2009, Inglehart and Norris 2000). Whereas US women tended to identify with Republicans in greater proportion than men, this pattern began to erode from the late 1960s and was reversed by the 1980s, with for example 54% of women voting Democrat in the 1996 presidential election, as compared to 43% of men (see Manza and Brooks, 1998; Trevor 1999, Inglehart and Norris 2000 on the US gender vote gap). In 1996 Pippa Norris identified a ‘gender generation gap’ across Western Europe; using Eurobarometer data she noted that, at the time, “women were more left wing than men” in Germany, Spain, Portugal and the US, as measured by the gender vote gap.69 Whilst British women as a whole were still more right-wing than men, this trend was on the decline amongst younger women, who, like their American and Western European counterparts were increasingly more left-wing. For example, the gender vote gap declined from 17 percentage points in 1959 to just one in 1987 (and six in 1992). Whereas in 1992 the gender vote gap for women aged 30-64 and 65+ was 8 and 18 percentage points, respectively, it was -14 for women under the age of 30 (Norris 1996, 333-336). By 2000, Inglehart and Norris found a continuing erosion of the traditional gender vote gap in Britain and an increasing left-lean on the part of women across Western Europe. Using a slightly different

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69 Calculated as the difference in the proportion of women and men who support conservative/right parties. A positive number indicates conservative lean whilst a negative number denotes a left-lean.
scale the authors found the proportion of women who identified with the left increased in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, W. Germany, Britain, Canada, Ireland and the US between 1981 and 1990, even though women as a whole remained more conservative in absolute terms in Belgium, France, Britain and Ireland (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 448). The gender identification gap in Australia steadily declined from 9.5 to 2.5 between 1967 and 1987 (ANOP 1967, 1969; AES 1979, 1987).

The strength of class voting has also varied over time and across countries: in 1996 the Alford Index, a measure of class voting that ranges from 0-1 found Australia with the lowest level (.06), the US with a medium level (.10) and Britain with the highest of our case studies (.18). Yet these figures provide just a snapshot in time: Dalton shows that Alford index scores were halved in Germany and the UK between 1960 and 2000, and nearly halved in the US over that same time period (Dalton 2002, 153). Between 1945 and 1990 Australia’s Alford index dropped 41% (Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 2001, 27). While the traditional class voting approach would link vote choice to a binary variable measuring occupation (manual or non-manual), the demise of industry, coupled with the rise of largely white-collar and civil sector employment is argued to have generated a ‘new middle class,’ who, in Daltons words “does not own capital as the old middle class did but also differs in lifestyle from the blue-collar workers of the traditional proletariat” (Dalton 2002, 148). In fact, several authors have discussed the manner by which deindustrialisation has shifted traditional class-cleavage voter alignments throughout the OECD, weakening the ties between blue-collar workers and left political parties (Oesch 2006, Kitschelt 1994, Häusermann 2006). Häusermann (2010) explains that three trends, deindustrialisation (including the rise of service sector dominance), the expansion of new middle classes via the “educational revolution” (Kriesi 1998), and the “feminization of the labour force” have “deeply transformed the class structure of the labour market, by creating new classes of privileged or precarious workers” thereby generating “horizontal differentiations of the middle classes” (Häusermann 2010, 13).

Kriesi in particular argues that increased access to higher education has transformed political value structures and created groups of ‘haves’ and ‘have-not’s.’ According to Kriesi “one of the main forces of contemporary societal change” is the new “educational revolution.” Said

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70 Measured by a 10-point ideology scale from the World Values Survey.
71 Congressional elections surveyed.
72 While Dalton finds that “historical class alignments persist” in the US, UK and Germany, with the working and ‘old middle’ classes giving “disproportionate” support to parties on the left and right respectively, “the new middle class now constitutes the majority of voters,” and it “holds ambiguous partisan preferences…normally located between the working class and the old middle class in its left/right voting preferences” (Dalton 2002, 148).
revolution is based upon the expansion of higher education and is linked to welfare state expansion, and broad economic changes ("tertiarization and reorganization of the production process"). Kriesi states:

“To some extent, the expansion of higher education constitutes a functional perquisite for the modernization of the state and the economy: it provides the personnel to fit the newly created positions, to implement the new production regimes and to handle the newly developing technology. That is, education has become a crucial factor in the reproduction of the social structure” (Kriesi 1999, 400).

According to Kriesi, the “expansion of higher education has a ‘liberalizing effect’” in that it shifts political value orientations towards anti-authoritarianism and emancipatory goals73, whereas those who have not benefited from the expansion of higher education (i.e. low-skilled workers) “will be excluded from access to the new middle class” and “end up in poorly paid, often unstable job positions with no or only limited prospects for occupational mobility.” Their newfound precarious position74 lends itself to threats from immigration and globalisation, and in Kriesi’s words, “not having undergone the ‘liberalizing’ effect of education” they “tend to have a rather parochial and authoritarian political orientation,” leading towards social conservatism (Kriesi 1999, 403). Häusermann, noting the impact of deindustrialisation, tertiarisation and the educational revolution, goes on to articulate a more complex class schema and notes that left parties today draw mostly on a combination of “blue-collar workers (BC), low-skilled service sector workers (LSF) and high-skilled socio-cultural professionals (SCP, the new middle classes),” leaving Social Democratic parties “torn between two poles”: “their ‘old’ industrial constituency” (BC) but also, since the 1970s, a “new left” constituency of higher-skilled middle classes, women, and public sector workers (Häusermann 2010, 14). Kitschelt also points to relevant social-structural differences:

“The work and market experiences of blue collar workers and white collar workers are often not significantly different. Instead, divisions in the workforce based on education, occupation, gender and employment sector are likely to shape citizens’ political consciousness and their availability for political appeals in more powerful ways than class” (Kitschelt 1994, 6).

73 However, he also points out that this effect is conditioned on their specific occupational placement and that there is indeed a cleavage within the ‘new middle classes,’ with professionals defending their work autonomy leaning more social democratic than do the more organisationally-tied managers and technocrats (who prefer the status quo and middle ground, respectively) (Kriesi 1999, 402).

74 In contrast to the ‘golden age’ of the welfare state when they were, according to Kriesi, “among the chief beneficiaries” of the production system (Kriesi 1999, 402).
Indeed, Huber and Stephens (2001) large-N quantitative analysis of welfare state growth, found that the explanatory value of left party power became increasingly weak after 1970. This is often interpreted to mean that parties' representative functions have ‘hollowed,’ in that they no longer represent the interests of their traditional core cleavages.⁷⁵ So how does one explain the purported “hollowing” out (Mair 2013) of parties' representative functions? A ‘bottom-up’ approach to party politics would simply update the ‘parties matter’ thesis with left parties’ new middle class constituents, theorising a linear relationship between ‘left’ power and social policy output, whilst stating that the post-industrial ‘left’ represents a different set of constituents than it did in the industrial age. The implication being that studies which found that parties no longer represented their constituents’ interests (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2000, Mair 2006) were simply attempting to match left parties with the wrong type of constituents. Alternatively, the party-competition strand of the literature would, according to Häusermann et. al., contextualise party preferences by taking account of existing welfare state institutions, secondary political cleavages (e.g. libertarian-authoritarian, agrarian-urban, etc.) and a party system’s spatial configurations (Häusermann et. al. 2012, 228-230). This approach ascribes parties far more autonomy than does the traditional ‘parties matter’ thesis:

“[W]hile the traditional approach sees party politics as driven by social constituencies and their interests, party competition approaches focus on the relative autonomy of parties as organizations and the independent logic of the interaction between parties” (Häusermann et. al. 2012, 236).

For example, Picot (2009) argues that the German Social Democrats (SPD) took the unlikely policy of abolishing unemployment allowance and reducing unemployment insurance because there had been a slight rightward shift in public opinion on the Hartz Reforms⁷⁶ and the SPD calculated that there was no party on their left to which their constituents, unhappy with reforms, could escape. However, there are gradations of strength in this approach: whilst a pure party competition approach would ignore traditional party-voter links altogether and assume that parties have ultimate autonomy to develop new policies in order to capture any type of voter that would win them seats (treating party competition as an independent variable); a modified approach would still assume that a party needs to maintain some linkages with a set of voters and/or balance linkages between types of voters, but that the development of secondary dimensions of party competition (i.e. different cleavages), spatial positioning of parties,

⁷⁵ See for example Mair (2013).
⁷⁶ A series of reforms to the German labour market made between 2002-2005.
institutional barriers, etc. structures the policy decisions they make (treating party competition as an intervening variable):

“[T]he orientation of a party can be determined by its social constituency (in line with the traditional or updated assumption), but the extent to which this goal is actively pursued, i.e. the policy choice, is limited by party competition” (Häusermann et. al. 2012, 237).

Additional works have discussed the impact of social-structural driven change on class schema and how its attendant effects on political alliances have increased the dimensionality of party competition and social policy development (Oesch 2006, Kitschelt 1994, Häusermann 2006). For example, Kitschelt states that “the transformation of the economic structure that expanded the proportion of labor market participants who are highly educated, work with clients, and are female, has shifted the main axis of voter distribution from a simple alternative between socialist (left) and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing left-libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives” (Kitschelt 1994, 31). If the traditional left (socialist) to right (capitalist) spectrum is depicted as a horizontal line, then left-libertarian to right-authoritarian dimension can be depicted as a vertical line cutting through the middle of the socialist-capitalist axis. According to Kitschelt, this leaves social democratic parties with two separate dilemmas: on the one hand, their position on the new vertical dimension requires them to decide “whether they will rely more on traditional, less educated blue collar, working-class voters or more on highly educated white collar employees.” On the other hand, “[i]f they move to the socialist left, they will lose the growing pool of highly educated, predominantly male workers in internationally competitive manufacturing and service industries who no longer support further growth of the public sector they also face trade-offs within the working class.” However, moving towards the socialist left, according to Kitschelt, is “likely to preserve support among less educated workers in industries that are protected from international competition” (Kitschelt 1994, 33). Thus Kitschelt concludes, class is no longer a viable dimension for social democratic parties to compete on:

“On the socialist-capitalist axis, then, social democrats choose not between a pure class and cross-class strategy, but between mobilizing different segments of the working class. As a consequence, class politics is no longer the foundation of a broadly successful social democratic coalition” (Kitschelt 1994, 33).

In fact, Kitschelt states, “where socialist or bourgeois governments lost when presiding over a weak economy in the 1980s, the main winners were not in the opposite political camp, but parties running primarily on noneconomic platforms” (Kitschelt 1994, 68). Policies of interest
may include the “environment, urban planning, health care, and women’s role in society” (Kitschelt 1994, 4). In line with this secondary value axis, Häusermann (2006, 2011) suggests that conflict over welfare state reform in general – and work/family policies in particular – is bidimensional in the sense that voters and political actors not only disagree with each other over the socioeconomic ‘distributional’ conflict’ but also the ‘libertarian-traditionalist’ value dimension (Häusermann 2006, 8). As such, the political feasibility of childcare policy adoption may well be contingent upon both the incentives and risks a party runs by placing itself within a particular quadrant of this bidimensional sphere of conflict.

Fleckenstein (2010) analyses the adoption of work-family balance policies by the British Labour Party and the German Christian Democrats, both of whom operated in male-breadwinner and in Britain, service-lean welfare states. He attributes the change in policy to electoral competition for female votes and by extension, the party modernisation required to appeal to such voters: “the Labour Party, after continuous electoral defeats, engaged in party modernisation, which not only involved greater female representation but also revised family and childcare policies” (Fleckenstein 2010, 802). Fleckenstein also demonstrates that strategic appeals for women’s votes are not limited to left parties: the German Christian Democrats, suffering during the late 1990s and early 2000s at the expense of the modern gender vote gap, pursued a programme of party modernisation in order “to widen the electoral appeal of the party, for which ‘women-friendly’ policies were considered imperative” (Fleckenstein 2010, 802). Fleckenstein and Lee (2014) analyse the development and subsequent distributional shape of work-family balance policies in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Korea, and note “the critical importance of party and electoral competition for the emerging new political equilibrium for employment-oriented family policies, which are viewed as a means to attract young and especially female voters” (Fleckenstein and Lee 2014, 623). Similarly, Morgan (2013) analyses the development of work-family policies in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, attributing causality to electoral competition and party modernisation: “in each country, party officials confronted with declining traditional constituencies turned their attention to women, an increasingly dealigned electorate that had not developed solid ties to other parties…[t]o reach out to these voters, party officials increased the role of women within their party organizations and changed their electoral platforms, with the former development reinforcing the latter” (Morgan 2013, 74). Fleckenstein (2010) highlights the Labour Party’s “modernisation agenda,” stating that after the 1987 election, its Shadow Communications Agency called for the party to be re-branded as “more woman-friendly” as the Labour-linked Fabian Society released a pamphlet deeming female voters crucial for Labour’s electoral success. Morgan (2013) similarly highlights the party modernisation process that occurred within Labour:
“Each [lost election between 1979 and 1992] reinforced a modernization drive in party ideology and internal functioning, including growing professionalization of campaigns and more sophisticated electoral targeting. The party leadership centralized power in its own hands while traditional core organizations, such as labor unions, were marginalized. Acutely aware’ of the decline of their working-class constituency, Labour leaders began casting about for ways to reel in new voters” (Morgan 2013, 86).

These accounts suggest that there are at least two separate but related components of modernisation: 1) the use of sophisticated polling to identify strategic electoral targets and the development of public relations campaigns that make the party’s image more appealing to said targets and 2) specific internal organisational reforms that may either diversify rank-and-file party members (by applying quotas for particular demographics, etc.), which would both change the party’s image and perhaps encourage a push for new types of social policies, or apportion more power to the party leadership, thus giving them more autonomy to direct the tone of election campaigns and make strategic appeals (including developing appropriate policies) to a desired set of voters (Kitschelt 1994, 1999). It would be difficult to achieve a modernised image without having undergone internal organisational reforms that allowed the leadership to control elections and manage candidate selection processes, so as to ensure a viable crop of modern candidates run under the party’s banner.

The following section elaborates on the specific mechanisms through which strategic appeals and their attendant policy proposals are developed: are they the result of autonomous party elites or perhaps interest group pressure? Does a party’s embrace of these strategies occur gradually via legislator turnover or quickly, as legislators and party elite become ‘converted’ to the idea of developing new policy proposals so as to appeal to different types of constituencies? It will first discuss Carmines and Stimson’s (1981) influential work on issue-evolution before going on to discuss subsequent works on the mechanics of party position change, such as Wolbrecht (2000, 2002); Karol (2009) and Schumacher (2013).

c. **Party responses to electoral change:**

We can see how party-voter linkages become eroded and how parties often need to compete on two different axes competition, but what does this tell us about issues? What are the driving forces behind a party’s decision to adopt or change position – is it always in the aim of a strategic electoral appeal or can it be induced by pressure from party-linked interest groups? And what is the actual mechanism that produces party position change?
i. Issue evolution

Carmines and Stimson’s issue evolution model sees change as being driven by a new issue that “cuts across” existing patterns of party competition (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 11). However, unlike realignment theory, the large-scale partisan shifts caused by this evolution do not occur within a singular ‘critical election,’ but instead are slow and continuous, more akin to V.O. Key’s (1959) concept of a ‘secular realignment’ (Carmines and Stimson 1981, 108). As such, the mechanism behind partisan change is not the conversion of party identifiers or party elites occurring in an abrupt manner, but instead is argued to occur via replacement: in order for issues to change the party system, “parties must take up visibly different positions on the issue.” This partisan change is likely to be quite gradual, given the politicians’ fear of ‘flip-flopping’ (Karol 2009, 13) and the “limited turnover of party elites”; as such the party will need to “recruit new identifiers with distinctive issue positions” which of course takes time (Carmines and Stimson 1981, 109).

Strategic elites are another implication of the model: in order to capitalise on a new issue that cuts across the existing pattern of party competition, elites must select newly arising issues that they believe will win them votes: by targeting issues with the enough resonance and staking out differentiating positions on them in order to win votes (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 6). The implications of this are two-fold as 1) party elites are autonomous in their ability to develop differentiating positions on issues that they believe will eventually earn them votes and 2) party elites lead the mass public: by staking out different issue positions they set the stage for the electorate to follow and amend their partisan identification within the context of parties’ new stances on the issue. This, as a corollary, implies a strong office-seeking view to Carmine and Stimson’s model. The theory attributes far less power to party activists, who instead of driving

Realignment, first raised by V.O. Key (1955), suggests that change in the party system occurs abruptly and with permanent consequences. Its driver is the emergence of an issue that produces intense reactions and, crucially, in Carmines and Stimson’s words, “cut[s] across rather than reinforce the existing bases of support for political parties” (Carmines and Stimson 1981, 107). The dominant strand of realignment literature suggests that these issues led to such a disruption in the party system that, within the course of a single ‘critical election’ the majority party loses electoral dominance and is overtaken by a minority party, who thus benefits from realignment. Later iterations of realignment theorised that the shift in the distribution of partisan alignments occurs in a periodised manner (Burnham 1970). Realignment theory came under attack from the 1980s: Carmines and Stimson (1989) famously disagreed with the concept of dichotomising elections into being ‘realigning’ (i.e. critical) or not, just as they argued that there is little empirical evidence supporting the occurrence of “large-scale partisan conversions, since all realignments occurred before we began seriously to study individual party identification” (Carmines and Stimson 1981, 107). The notion of realignment implies a permanent, coherent shift in partisan identification, yet additional arguments claim there has been no real realignment since the New Deal realignment of 1932 (Mayhew 2002). The supposed onset of dealignment (Beck 1977) suggested that there was little scope for subsequent partisan realignment.

Defined by Carmines and Wagner as “heterogeneous set of overlapping groups that include delegates to national and state nominating conventions, major financial contributors to parties and candidates, and the thousands of state and local officeholders and party officials” (Carmines and Wagner 2006, 70).
party elites’ to select a particular policy, “reinforce the issue cues of party elites and provide an additional mechanism through which the mass public can become aware of the policy preferences of the political parties” (Carmines and Wagner 2006, 71).

ii. **Party position change**

From the early 2000s a body of literature began to question whether all party position change was driven by strategic elites and occurred via elite turnover, with little scope for legislators to reverse themselves on particular issues. David Karol (2009) analyses Congressional roll-call votes on six key issues in the US and finds that in contrast to Carmines and Stimson’s (1989) conclusions about racial politics, the Republican and Democratic parties changed their relative positions on several issues in response to the shifting demands of their key party-linked interest groups. Moreover, these position changes did not all occur gradually and via elite turnover, but quite abruptly and via legislator ‘conversion.’ Simply put, legislators had “flip-flopped” (Karol 2009, 24). As outlined in Chapter One, Karol (2009) places party position change into three different models: the first model, dubbed ‘coalition group maintenance,’ posits a linear relationship between the demands of party linked interest groups and party policy. Once a group “already ensconced within [the party’s] coalition” changes its position, the party follows suit. The implications of this are that party leaders have little autonomy: we would see legislators convert positions in order to meet with the party-linked group’s new stance. As such, the gradual, over time (legislator) replacement process, as described by Carmines and Stimson is unnecessary. Party position change happens quickly in this case, given the party does not need to form ties to a new group but simply maintain old ones. In this case the driver of change is interest group and/or activist pressure whereas the mechanism is legislator conversion (Karol 2009, 18-19).

An example of coalition maintenance is trade policy: until the 1960s Republicans generally held a high-tariff and Democrats a low-tariff policy stance which even survived the incorporation of trade unions into the Democratic fold during the 1930s. Yet unions became increasingly worried about job losses, a partial outcome of President Kennedy’s 1962 Trade Expansion Act. As they moved towards a protectionist stance their traditional allies in Congress, Democrats, followed suit: “Forced to choose between old friends and old positions they chose the former…The same year the AFL-CIO [the largest US trade union confederation] reversed itself the [Democratic-led] House passed a bill imposing import quotas on textiles, shoes and several other products” (Karol 2009, 41).

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79 As noted in Chapter One, two of these models are relevant for the research question at hand.
‘Coalition group incorporation,’ Karol’s second model, is the inverse of coalition group maintenance and very much reflects Carmines and Stimson’s issue evolution. Party elites in this model are not constrained actors at the hands of party-linked interest groups and activists but instead, autonomous strategic agents who design particular policy positions so as to appeal to specific sets of voters. Given that the party as a whole will need to reflect any newfound position (i.e. any appeal to a new electoral constituency), the speed of overall position change will be gradual: party elites (and in particular legislators) will need to be replaced with new elites who can form ties with these new constituencies and indeed whose demographics are more reflective of the constituencies that they aim to add to their party’s electoral coalition. In this model the driver of change is electoral strategy whilst the mechanism is legislator replacement (Karol 2009, 28-30).

Karol’s (2009) example of coalition group incorporation is abortion and the US Republicans: whilst Democratic voters had for the most part held strong anti-abortion views, Republicans, comprised of a fair amount of wealthy, educated Protestants maintained a more liberal stance until the late 1970s/early 80s. Yet President Richard Nixon’s small margin election victory in 1968 prompted his quest to expand the Republican coalition, and in doing so he targeted white southerners and in particular the “Silent Majority,” a grouping of white middle/working class Northern Democrats – typically Catholic – who had long voted Democratic. By the 1972 election he advanced an increasingly anti-abortion position – antithetical to the position of most Republican identifiers as they remained in Karol’s words, “at least slightly more pro-choice than Democrats” until the mid 1980s. Nixon adviser and speechwriter Pat Buchanan suggested he make a strategic overture to the “working class Catholic mother” (Karol 2009, 62-64). And indeed Nixon’s 1972 landslide victory included an increased number of Catholic voters. Nixon’s initial policy revision set off a slow process of party polarisation on the issue, with Republicans and Democrats – both in Congress and the White House, increasingly differentiating themselves on the issue to the point where decades later, Republican Party Platforms became quite solidly anti-abortion (Karol 2009, 62-84).

Karol’s primary quantitative method for disaggregating the impact that legislator turnover and legislator conversion have on party position change is Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model. The model, which measures a party’s position at T1 and T2, takes account of the average position of ‘stayers,’ who lasted throughout the time period under examination as well as ‘dropouts,’ and ‘newcomers,’ and indicates the proportion of change attributable to replacement, conversion and
Whereas Karol’s (2009) party positions are calculated by roll call votes amongst US Congressional Representatives, Wolbrecht (2002), discussed below, also employed Rapoport and Stone and calculated party position change using US Convention Delegate Surveys that included feeling thermometers on several key social and economic issues.

Wolbrecht’s (2002) analysis of party policy reversal on the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) attributes causality to elements of both coalition maintenance and coalition group incorporation: whilst the Democrats were gradually embracing increased social liberalism, trade unions, a key Democratic constituency, dropped their opposition to the ERA after a Supreme Court ruling struck down certain provisions of protective employment legislation. The party – which had previously been ambivalent if not averse to adopting a pro-ERA policy stance – quickly reversed its position and embraced the ERA. The mechanisms producing change are both replacement (Congressional Democrats were increasingly post-materialist) and conversion (the party’s move towards the ERA was hastened by the changed demands of the party’s traditional policy demander, the unions). At the same time, Wolbrecht finds that with the Republicans, elite replacement (a slower process), seems to have been behind the party’s increased, long-term resistance (if not hostility) towards the ERA and several women’s rights issues as new, increasingly conservative politicians made their way into the party (Wolbrecht 2002, 254-273).

The application of Karol’s framework to this study’s research question is indeed quite helpful in determining both the drivers behind and the actual mechanisms that produced childcare policy adoption within each party; whereas Carmines and Stimson focus largely on policy change via autonomous elites, Karol’s framework allows us to try and disentangle the impact of trade unions (bearing in mind the correlation between organised female labour mobilisation and childcare policy adoption) from that of electoral strategy.

iii. Party position change: cross-country comparisons

Carmines and Stimson (1981), Wolbrecht (2002) and Karol (2009) each developed and tested their theories in the context of US political institutions and amongst US political parties – the question remains how much relevance these models have in other advanced democracies’ party systems. There is a body of literature that has examined the factors that induce parties to respond to exogenous shocks and compete with each other in quite different ways, finding that parties are more likely to change their positions after electoral loss (Somer-Topcu 2009; Budge et. al 2010), that parties change their position in response to environmental factors such as globalisation, unemployment etc. (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009) and that parties are likely to change their position in line with median voter shifts (Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009; Adams at el. 2004).

Mobilisation is the entry of newcomers in excess of the number of dropouts. It indicates the proportion of change that goes beyond replacement.
However, it is unclear why parties may exhibit different responses to largely similar exogenous and environmental factors, as the US Democrats, ALP and British Labour did.

Three recent papers (Schumacher, Vries and Vis 2013; Marx and Schumacher 2013; Schumacher 2013) aim to do this by, like Karol, focusing on parties’ internal politics and drawing a distinction between parties who are elite-led or activist-led, based on Laver and Hunt’s 1992 party organisation surveys.\(^8\) Schumacher, Vries and Vis (2013) place 55 parties (from 10 European countries) on a scale from activist-dominated to leadership-dominated and use the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Budge et. al. 2001) data to analyse a host of their policy positions between 1977 and 2003, finding that leadership dominated parties “respond to shifts in the mean voter position and to office exclusion, while activist-dominated parties respond to party voter changes,” thus suggesting that the success of party leaders in activist-dominated parties is contingent on appealing to activists whilst party leaders in leadership-dominated parties “aim to reap electoral gains and obtain political office in order to safeguard their power within the party…as well as enjoy the material benefits of office” (Schumacher, Vries and Vis 2013, 474). Schumacher (2013) similarly uses CMP and the Laver and Hunt party organisation data to analyse why historically “pro-welfare” Social Democratic, Socialist and Christian Democratic parties (33 parties across 14 countries between 1977 and 2003) adopted policies that sought a leaner/higher conditionality welfare state. He finds that activist oriented parties will tend to adopt positions which are in accordance with their party voter’s median policy stance; leadership oriented parties will adopt the position of the median voter in the larger electorate and finally, parties which are neither clearly activist or leadership dominated – if/when they are rejected from office, will shift their position in the opposite direction of their previous stance (Schumacher 2013).

Finally, Marx and Schumacher (2013) also identify the intraparty balance of power between party leaders and party activists as the intervening variable that determines whether or not Social Democratic parties will embrace neoliberal labour market policies. Here, however, the authors focus on three case studies of European Social Democratic parties (in Spain, the Netherlands and Germany) and rather than rely on the Laver and Hunt (1992) survey data, they adopt a qualitative approach to measuring the activist/leader dominance in a party’s organisational structure, tracing parties’ changes with regard to several informal and formal balance of power measures, in particular, candidate selection procedures, the number of MP’s allowed on a party’s executive board, eligibility for voting in party conferences, and funding from/ decision making

\(^8\) Laver and Hunt’s (1992) expert surveys ask party members if party leaders are influential in setting party policy and also whether activists are influential in setting party policy. Schumacher et. al (2013) construct a scale running from zero to 30 by subtracting the values of the first question from the second question (Schumacher et. al 2013, 4).
of affiliates (i.e. trade unions). However Marx and Schumacher (2013) are unique to the above studies as they note that parties – and in particular the British Labour Party – may change their organisational structure over time, becoming more leadership than activist-led or vice-versa.

This is a challenge to studies that assign static organisational descriptions to parties. In fact, the idea that party organisations shift over time has been overlooked so much so that in their latest update to the Laver and Hunt 1992 data (Benoit and Laver 2006) did not ask the 1992 survey questions on activist and leadership policy-setting influence, stating that the questions “were also never used in subsequent research using the Laver-Hunt data” (Benoit and Laver 2006, 133). Yet party internal organisation, and more specifically change in said organisation, is quite fundamental to this research: it hypothesises that parties were able to make strategic appeals to new electoral coalitions, and in so doing develop appealing policies, such as middle-income childcare assistance because they underwent a process of internal organisational reform, reducing barriers to what Kitschelt (1994) dubs ‘strategic flexibility.’ This idea that as party-voter linkages change, party type and internal organisational structure subsequently change, has been a popular strand of the party politics literature since the 1990s. The following section will first address broader evidence of party change, and in particular the work of Katz and Mair (1995) before going on to discuss Kitschelt’s (1994, 1999) argument that a party’s ability to make strategic appeals is conditioned by their micro-level organisational structure, and the extent to which the balance between rank-and-file activist, party leadership and legislative leadership allow room for making strategic electoral appeals.

d. Party change and internal organisational reform

i. Macro-changes in party type

The political party and party change literature have produced a host of ideal-type party categories, with Katz and Mair (1995) suggesting, broadly, a continual occurrence of party change over time: from the elite-led ‘cadre party’ (Duverger 1954) of the 18th and 19th centuries82 to the industrialised era’s ‘mass party’ (Neumann 1956), the ‘catch-all’ party of the post-war era and finally, the ‘cartel party,’ wherein parties are entrenched in the state and collude to prevent the development of competitive parties. The transition from the ‘mass’ to the ‘catch-all’ or indeed ‘electoral-professional’ (Panebianco 1988) is of relevance here as it seems to coincide with the rise of new politics issues and indeed the political popularity of childcare in the US, UK and Australia.

82 Elite-led parties were, in Katz and Mair’s (1995) words, “the people who made up the politically relevant elements of civil society and the people who occupied the positions of power in the state were so closely by ties of family and interest that even when the two groups were not simply coterminous, they were heavily interpenetrating” (Katz and Mair 1995, 9).
The ‘mass party’ ideal type arose with industrialisation and the expansion of suffrage; it is a formal, bottom-up organisation wherein, as Katz and Mair argue, “the fundamental units of political life are pre-defined and well-defined social groups” (Katz and Mair 1995, 7). Because the party programme is “not just a bundle of policies…but a coherent and logically connected whole,” party unity and party discipline are, Katz and Mair argue, “not only practically advantageous, but also normatively legitimate.” On the same token, the party’s legitimacy to act on behalf of a particular social group requires an organisational structure capable of transmitting “mass input into the party’s policy-making process,” just as it requires the “supremacy of the extra-parliamentary party” (Katz and Mair 1995, 7). Since, under this ideal-type, parties compete on the basis of social groupings, they win elections not by converting members of other social groups to join but rather, by mobilising from within their own group. Key characteristics, as set out by Katz and Mair, include party work and party campaigning that is “labour intensive”; party finance contingent on members’ fees/contributions; a relationship between rank-and-file members and the elite which is characterised by bottom-up accountability; and a membership base that is “large and homogenous,” where “membership [is] a logical consequence of identity” (Katz and Mair 1995, 18).

The stability of mass parties began to erode, Katz and Mair argue, after the conclusion of the “big battles for political and social rights that had united the emerging constituencies of mass parties in a way that could not be maintained once these rights were won” adding that the “need for solidarity was further reduced when the state began to provide on a universal basis the welfare and educational services that before had been the responsibility of the party” (Katz and Mair 1995, 12). Indeed, Kircheimer’s (1966) identification of the “catch-all party” disrupted this notion of stable parties built on pre-existing social groupings: instead he argued parties from both the left and the right began to converge on a party model characterised by “de-ideologisation, weak electoral links, and centralisation of power around the party leadership” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 308). The ideal-type ‘catch-all’ party, according to Katz and Mair (1995), required not the mobilisation of specific social groups but instead the conversion of – and competition for – individuals from heterogeneous backgrounds; the party would be financed by a variety of sources, campaigns would be both labour and capital intensive, party-elite/rank-and-file relations would be of a top-down variant and membership would be open and encouraged and, in contrast to mass parties, “marginal to [an] individual’s identity” (Katz and Mair 1995, 18). Panebianco (1988) took this idea further, arguing that there was an “increasing professionalization of party organizations,” wherein ‘experts’ become “more useful to the
[party’s] organization than the traditional party bureaucrats, as the party’s gravitational centre shifts from the members to the electorate” (Panebianco 1988, 264).

In fact, whilst cautioning that “no party completely fits” these ideal types, Panebianco ascribes five key organisational dimensions to Kircheimer’s ‘catch-all’ model that were often “overshadowed” in light of the sociological implications that Kircheimer’s model implied. They include “de-ideologicalisation,” or indeed “the reduction the party’s ‘ideological baggage’”; a heightened dependence on interest groups but not interest groups as they have typically been envisaged: there will occur “the transformation of collateral, religious, trade union organizations into interest groups with weaker and less regular party ties”; “members loss in political weight,” coupled with a decline in the number of rank-and-file members; increasing power of party leaders and their heightened reliance on external interests for both finance and “keeping in touch with the electorate” and “weaker and more discontinuous party-electorate relations” (Panebianco 1988, 263). The shifting weight of interest groups appears an important factor: Mair, Mueller and Plasser (2004) note that as parties begin the transition towards becoming a catch-all party, there will be a decrease in ties to traditional interest groups, (Mair, Mueller and Plasser 2004, 13). So for example, parties on the left may seek to decrease their ties to traditional interest groups, such as trade unions, whilst simultaneously appealing to other groups, such as those aligned to post-materialist values.

ii. Internal organisational reform

Kitschelt asserts that party organisation, as discussed above, affects both the direction and the stability/volatility of a party’s electoral appeals (Kitschelt 1994, 207). His models of party organisation are more complex than the leadership vs. activist oriented framework as outlined by Schumacher et al, and retreat to a more micro-level than the party type models outlined above: Kitschelt develops four ideal type party-organisational models: in 1) “centralist clubs,” both leaders and activists have “strategic capacity,” and there is a “stratified internal conflict system” that incorporates “heterogeneous constituencies but permit[s] party leaders to manage the internal plurality of political voices are argued.” Kitschelt argues this party type is the most amenable to responding to left-libertarian and “liberal market” challenges because rank-and-file members are able to develop new policy positions and place them before the leader but apportions the leader enough power that they “are not forced to match [the rank-and-file’s positions] one by one.” 2) “Decentralised clubs,” which apportion greater strategic capacity to the rank-and-file party members, at the expense of the highly accountable party leader. Whereas new political inputs come “from below” leaders have “little opportunity to express a unified stance in interparty competition.” 3) a Leninist cadre party allocates nearly all strategic power to
leaders, at the expense of the rank-and-file. Kitschelt asserts that the model “may be efficient as long as a socialist party can be reliable on a homogenous and stable electoral following that does not generate new demands.” Finally, the 4) “decentralized mass party” is one in which neither the leadership nor the rank-and-file have strategic capacity. These parties are characterised by a large “bureaucratic apparatus” with “strict rules of leadership accountability”; it creates a strategic inertia that according to Kitschelt “is not necessarily counterproductive electorally, as long as electoral demands remain stable and a party is insufficiently competitive to capture the pivot of the electoral system” (Kitschelt 1994, 215-216).

For example, Kitschelt in 1994 characterised British Labour as a “decentralised club” style of party, given that, in the early 1980s its central party apparatus had little control over leader selection, the leadership had little control over the party conference, the party’s legislative and executive wings were poorly integrated, and the union-party link was indeed very tight. Whilst Labour could have, according to Kitschelt, reaped electoral rewards had they sharply pivoted to the materialist right, the leadership’s minimal autonomy meant that the party continually drifted to the left (Kitschelt 1994, 228-229). As Kitschelt explains, its “loose cadre organization made it overly responsive to radical leftist stirrings promoted by activists who proceeded to dismantle leadership autonomy and prevent the party from choosing a vote or office-seeking strategy against its major conservative antagonist, which emphasized the agenda of market efficiency” (Kitschelt 1994, 244-245). The impact of such party organisation is, Kitschelt explains, critical to a party’s electoral success because it structures the type of appeals a party is able to make:

“A party faces greater adjustment problems of its organization structure to new competitive conditions the more entrenched the historically grown structures of mass party organization that resist debureaucratization (path dependent learning). Often only momentous electoral crises enable party activists to mobilize around new political visions and leaders, who then refashion a party’s formal statutes and actual power distribution” (Kitschelt 1994, 36).

But what determines when and to what extent a political party may embark on the ‘transformation’ from a mass party to a catch-all/electoral professional one? Panebianco identifies two “two main variables which most influence speed and intensity of transformation.” First, the level of party institutionalisation prior to the beginning of transformation: a party with a long period of prior existence and strong institutional structures for both internal and parliamentary practice is better equipped to “resist transformatory pressures.” The second variable, also identified by Kirchheimer, is party system fragmentation: as larger parties are
likely to face more transformatory power than “the less fragmented the party system, the more it is controlled by few large organizations; change will thus begin sooner and take place more quickly” (Panebianco 1988, 265).

As we know from the Chapter One, all three parties under consideration underwent a process of party modernisation preceding childcare policy adoption. As the case studies will discuss, some processes were easier and swifter than others, as the degree of change that occurred in both the public relations and especially, internal organisational components of modernisation varied. The effects of such micro-level party reform are of critical importance to this study and as such, party organisation cannot be treated as a static variable. Although parties may have had an incentive to court new voters by issuing strategic appeals and developing particular policies, and even if there was a degree of demographic shifting amongst a party’s legislators (i.e. arrival of new politics MPs), its ability to run campaigns of a different tone, appeal to new interest groups and recruit candidates who if elected, would develop social policies not in keeping with the traditional left socialist – right capitalist dimension of party competition is contingent upon them having an organisational structure that fosters what Kitschelt calls ‘strategic flexibility.’ In other words, it is those micro-level internal organisational reforms that allowed electoral imperative to finally translate into strategic policy proposals. As such the next questions might ask: did each party under consideration transition towards a single model of organisation (e.g. centralised club)? Why did some parties transition quicker than others? To what extent can one argue that institutionalisation and party system fragmentation explains the different speeds in which the Democrats, ALP and Labour reorganised their internal structures?

2.4 Conclusion
The bodies of work considered in this chapter have informed the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter One. Whereas much of the literature grouped under ‘welfare state development’ might explain cross-country variation in childcare policy passage or indeed expenditure, it struggles to explain the research question at hand, given that the countries operated in the same welfare state/breadwinner typologies at the time of childcare policy adoption. Moreover, this research is not focused upon the factors that increase the likelihood of a childcare policy being passed and signed into law but rather, the factors that caused a party to campaign on, debate and promote the issue – even if it was never to be signed into law. However, Estevez-Abe’s (2009) gendered account of the Varieties of Capitalism framework does bring with it a question of relevance to this thesis: what was the role of trade unions in pushing these parties to adopt childcare? This question is relevant because, as discussed under the power resources strand of the party politics literature, the time at which each of three parties adopted childcare as an
electoral and legislative issue correlates with the time at which their level of organised female labour mobilisation peaked. Is this correlation causal, or perhaps spurious? Literature and data surrounding women and unions suggest the evidence is mixed: whilst on the one hand growth in female union membership had begun to outstrip that of men’s across the three countries by the time each party adopted childcare as an electoral and a legislative issue, Ledwith (2012) notes that females have still not made proportionate inroads into union leadership structures. Lewis (1992) argues that unions historically served to reinforce the (British) male breadwinner model. Karol (2009) suggests that on the one hand, parties could have been driven to adopt childcare in line with the trade union demands (coalition maintenance) but also notes that electoral strategy and in particular the search for new types of voters (coalition group incorporation) often drives forth new policy stances.

And indeed, each country adopted childcare policy within the much broader context of large-scale social-structural change (Kitschelt 1994, Häusermann 2006, 2010; Kriesi 1998, 1999; Oesch 2006) and party-voter alignments that increasingly differed from those of the post-war, industrial age. Summarising crudely, studies such as Inglehart (1977), Inglehart and Rabier (1986) and Kitschelt (1994) indicated a decline in ‘class voting’ and a rise in voters who identified more with ‘post-materialist’ or ‘new politics’ issues such as environment, women’s rights, etc., than they did traditional economic distributional issues. Knutsen (2008) explains that these “new middle class” voters would traditionally have identified with centre-right parties but began to mobilise on issues beyond left-right materialism and they, alongside the “better-educated strata, are most likely to support the ‘post-materialist left’” (Knutsen 2008, 5). Inglehart and Norris (2000) Manza and Brooks (1998) also found shifts in gender-based party-voter linkages across advanced industrial democracies, wherein women – led by the young – increasingly supported left parties in greater proportion than did men. Kitschelt (1994) pointed out that the declining salience of class as a vote-winning issue and noted that left parties who were successful during the 1980s based their strategic appeals on noneconomic issues, seeking voters who may identify on the left of the socialist-capitalist dimension of party competition but also anchor themselves far more towards the libertarian end of the libertarian-authoritarian axis of party competition (Kitschelt 1994, 33). And indeed, Fleckenstein (2010) and Morgan (2013) argue that electoral imperative drove both the German Christian Democrats and British Labour Party to adopt the childcare policy issue.

But what explains the temporal variation of childcare policy adoption between the Democrats, ALP and Labour? Why, after they each began to experience volatility in the electoral coalitions (on both class and gender terms) did they take different amounts of time to make strategic
appeals to post-materialist (and in particular female) voters by placing childcare on their agenda? The attention to internal party organisation, highlighted in particular by Kitschelt (1994, 1999), Schumacher, Vries and Vis (2013) and Schumacher (2013) suggests that parties are often obstructed from making vote-winning strategic appeals by their internal organisational structures, or to put it crudely, having too much power vested in either the rank-and-file members at the expense of the leadership, or too much power vested in the leadership who presides over a staid, membership base. Yet party organisation is not always static: several centre-left parties in the post-industrial era have changed their broad ‘type,’ transforming from a mass party towards a more leadership oriented, less union-driven ‘cartel’ (Katz and Mair 1995) or ‘electoral professional’ party (Panebianco 1988), as clearly explained in Dalton (2002) and Mair, Mueller and Plasser (2004). Perhaps then, the varying amount of time between electoral change and party policy adoption that occurred amongst the Democrats, ALP and Labour can be explained by the time needed to make their party a) more diverse at the membership level and/or b) more powerful and autonomous at the leadership level.

The following three case study chapters will outline the general history of childcare in each country and the partisan political context in which it was developed. Bearing in mind the two competing sub-questions of this study (‘was policy adoption a response to interest group - trade union – pressure or to strategic electoral imperative?’), it will qualitatively analyse the trade unions’ history with childcare policy promotion alongside their general treatment of female members. It will then explore the extent of change in the party’s electoral coalition, noting where gaps needed to be filled and where the opportunities to attract new types of voters presented themselves. Employing the Rapoport and Stone (1994) model, it will attempt to quantitatively disaggregate the proportions of party position change on childcare that were mechanised by conversion (which suggests parties changed position in direct response to interest group demands) and legislator replacement (which suggests that parties adopted the issue as their legislators turned over and new types joined the fold). Multiple linear regressions are also employed to test whether the legislators who either debated or co-sponsored childcare legislation had a traditional left background (i.e. male and having a trade union background) or indeed a background more akin to members of the post-materialist, new-left generation (i.e. an increase in females on the left, university education, high scores from left-liberal interest groups, etc.). But even if it finds that the effects of elite replacement outweighed those of conversion (i.e. electoral imperative drove parties to adopt childcare policy more so than trade unions did), what explains the variation in timing between the three parties? The chapters will also outline the difficulty and speed of internal organisational reform that occurred within the three parties, whilst the analysis
in Chapter Six will compare all of these processes and elaborate upon the mediating effect of party reform on the timing of each party’s adoption of childcare policy.
Chapter Three: Ever tried. Ever failed. US Democrats and universal childcare policy

3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the US Democrats’ adoption of childcare policy, which occurred in both electoral and legislative terms during the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a particular spate of attention surrounding the Child Development Act in 1970 and 1971. The chapter attempts to identify the driving force behind the party’s position change (i.e. their adoption of childcare policy), with a specific focus on the extent to which it was driven by party elites who sought to add new middle class and women voters to their electoral coalition and the extent to which change was driven by party-linked interest groups and activists, notably trade unions, whose membership was becoming increasingly female during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

It will first trace childcare policy as it developed in the US between the 1930s and 1970s and then analyse the issue in the context of two separate, yet related events: 1) US parties’ shifting electoral coalitions and their consequent efforts to attract new voters and 2) the Democratic Party’s modernisation process, which was centred upon internal organisational reforms that sought to reduce union influence, democratise candidate selection and empower women, minority and youth participants. It will then qualitatively assess the trade unions’ efforts to promote childcare policy. In an attempt to build upon the qualitative analyses, it employs two quantitative tools: 1) Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model for disaggregating political change, which will show whether the Democrats’ adoption of childcare policy can be attributed more to legislator replacement or to legislator conversion and 2) OLS regressions that test for an association between a legislator co-sponsoring childcare legislation and their gender, education, and rankings from two think tanks, the socially liberal advocacy group, Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO’s political arm, the Committee on Political Education (COPE). It will then combine the findings of the qualitative and quantitative analyses in order to discuss the relative importance of electoral imperative and trade union pressure on the party’s adoption of childcare policy, and note the extent to which this adoption was mediated by the party’s internal organisational reforms.

3.2 Breaking new ground: childcare policy from the Great Depression to the 1990s
Although the US has long been considered a ‘welfare state laggard,’ typically characterised by low levels of direct social expenditure and meagre means-tested benefits, the Democratic-led Congress in 1971 passed legislation to develop a multi-billion dollar, federally funded network of non-profit childcare centres. Childcare would be universal – free for children from families

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83 What Karol (2009) would deem coalition group incorporation.
84 Karol (2009) would deem this coalition group maintenance.
with an annual income below $6,970 and available on an income-contingent sliding scale fee for families above that income level. The initiative, sponsored by Democrats Walter Mondale (MN) in the Senate and John Brademas (IN) in the House, garnered not only wide bipartisan support but also attracted several Republican co-sponsors in each legislative chamber, both of which easily passed the bill – The Comprehensive Child Development Act (CDA) – before being vetoed by President Richard Nixon. The CDA has been identified as a “critical juncture” for childcare in the United States and indeed, it marked a newfound attention to the issue that whilst included some moderate Republicans, would be largely dominated by Democrats. Shortly after Nixon’s veto, the Democratic Party’s 1972 platform, written for the 1972 McGovern-Nixon Presidential campaign, pledged for the first time a commitment to universal childcare and also for the first time, it included a section wholly dedicated to the “Rights of Women.” Childcare would remain, at least on the Party Platform a Democratic commitment, with every Party Platform between then and 1988 including a promise to develop affordable childcare for all (Woolley and Peters 2013).

However, the CDA’s Congressional success and its particular popularity amongst Democrats may not have seemed a given, at least to someone familiar with the Democratic Party of the 1950s and 1960s: both political parties have been characterised as holding a somewhat ambivalent stance towards women’s rights during that era, in particular the Democrats when it came to their positions on equal rights for women and female employment issues (Wolbrecht 2000, 2002). The Democrats’ lack of support for these issues was partially rooted in conflict over equality versus protection: while the Republican Party endorsed the Equal Rights Amendment in 1940, the Democrats were long quiet on the matter, in part because their trade union base wanted to maintain protective employment rights for women, which in effect hindered their ability to take up full-time work on an equal basis to men. Wolbrecht notes, “the few Congressional votes on the issue during the 1950s confirm[ed] this alignment” (Wolbrecht 2002, 239). Upon passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act both the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) began to interpret Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment, as a provision that applied to sexual, in addition to racial (and other types of) discrimination. With the trade unions’ case against women’s equality largely evaporated, the Democratic Party began to take on a more progressive approach to women’s rights, moving beyond the traditional ‘equality’ issues long supported by the Republican Party, and tackling some of the compensatory second wave feminist issues that the GOP would 85

Approximately twice the national poverty level (Morgan 2001).

86 See for example Karch (2013, p. 7).

eventually come to find uncomfortable, such as childcare, protection from violence, abortion, and reproductive rights (Wolbrecht 2000, 152-157).

Long before this partisan realignment on women’s rights both political parties had already touched upon the childcare issue, albeit in a targeted and emergency-based context: during the Great Depression publicly funded ‘emergency’ nursery schools were developed and sponsored by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) as a way to provide temporary employment for out of work teachers (Karch 2013, 36). Funding was mostly withdrawn after the war’s end and the issue remained off the immediate post-war national political agenda apart from 1954, when the tax code was revised to allow a deduction for employment-related dependent care expenses. This allowed working adults who earned up to $4,500 to deduct adult or child care costs worth up to US $600 a year (Karch 2013, 44). In 1962, the National Day Care Committee was successful in lobbying Congress to resume operational funding for some targeted child care programmes, a policy they had not undertaken since the end of World War II. Norgren states that Congress “tentatively recommitted funds” under the Public Welfare Amendments to the Social Security Act. The coalition behind the amendments were, according to Norgren, “disparate,” as they reflected “traditional day care advocates with a social welfare, child focused viewpoint and a new congressional ‘workfare’ caucus that considered day care a necessary adjutant to welfare reform and job training programs”(Norgren 1981, 131).

This ‘workfare caucus’ passed legislation again in 1967 - this time an amendment to the Social Security Act that unintentionally established a childcare programme that fostered greater demand for such services. Norgren states the intention of the amendment “appeared clear - the equation of expanded daycare with a reduction in welfare dependence.” And indeed, the legislation covered up to 75% of the costs of childcare for any parent participating in the government’s Work Incentives Program (WIN) or any parent receiving benefits on the Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) programme. However as Norgren points out, the liberal eligibility requirements helped create a working to middle class childcare constituency:

“Ironically, the impact of the 1967 legislation was not on welfare rolls. The funding authorization and liberal eligibility guidelines did encourage substantial growth in the number of day care centers. Enrolment in New York City’s day care program, for example, rose dramatically from 8,000 children in 1970 to 15,000 in 1971. The children enrolled, however, were primarily the offspring of the already employed mothers of working and occasionally middle class, professional background” (Norgren 1981, 132).
In 1967, during the 90th Congress, Rep. Patsy T. Mink (D-HI) introduced the first childcare and early years education bill with universal benefits: the Pre-school Centers Supplementary Education Act (H.R. 10572), which aimed to improve the quality of childcare in non-profit centres through a $300 million increase in federal funding to states for educational services and equipment that would be allocated according to the proportion working mothers in each state. Mink intended for the bill to benefit all working mothers, as opposed to providing a targeted service\(^{88}\) (Cohen 2001, 32). While Mink’s bill never moved beyond committee, it drew Congressional attention beyond targeted childcare or compensatory pre-school programmes such as Head Start, and pointed to the fact that childcare supply was in no way meeting demand: a March 1969 Library of Congress report stated that only a small proportion of needs would be met, largely because the existing government assistance programmes were limited to low-income families: “As far as the non-needy general public is concerned, there are at present no federal programmes or proposals which would be expected to provide it with day care facilities and services on any significant scale” (Karch 2013, 62).

At the time, contextual conditions for a non-means tested childcare policy seemed ripe. Karch states that three forces helped drive childcare and pre-school onto the national political agenda during the late 1960s and early 1970s: a rising rate of maternal employment, research in cognitive psychology that emphasised the importance of early years for child development and a political backdrop that “was conducive to major expansions of government activity,” in which Karch is referring to the socially progressive ‘Great Society’ policies advanced by the Johnson administration between 1964-1968 (Karch 2013, 7). Moreover, public opinion was increasingly favourable to state assistance for childcare, as Morgan states:

“A 1943 Gallup poll showed that 56 percent of mothers would not use government day-care centers even if they were free, and other anecdotal evidence showed that parents associated day care with poor families, and were unwilling to put their children in such services. By the 1960s, this mood began to change. Head Start and other early child education programs established for low-income children reported middle class parents trying to secure a place for their children in these services. A 1970 Harris poll found that 64 percent of women and 51 percent of men favored the idea of setting up ‘many more day care centers.’ A 1969 survey showed 68 percent of women and 59 percent of men explicitly in favor of the federal government providing these centers” (Morgan 2001, 222-223).

\(^{88}\) When explaining her reasoning behind the bill she stated: “I was a young attorney working full-time and needed care for my children, more than just custodial care. I saw what a tremendous problem it was in my community, and realized that if it was a problem for me, then it must be a problem for others” (Cohen 2001, 32).
The shortage of childcare places was a concern to labour organisations, which in 1969 lobbied to amend the Taft-Hartley Act by allowing trade unions and employees to set up trust funds in order to provide childcare services for their members/employees. Cohen claims that “Labor organizations were strong supporters of child care in the late 1960s,” noting that “[u]nion leaders testified before Congress that initiatives sponsored by employees and unions were insufficient to meet the needs of their members,” as at the time members such as the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers were nearly 80% female (Cohen 2001, 28). The bill passed the House 354-1. By the 91st Congress, Democrats, beyond Mink, had picked up on the issue and promised in their 1968 Party Platform to “finance… services necessary to enable people to undertake training and accept jobs—including improved recruitment and placement services, day-care centers, and transportation between work and home” (Woolley and Peters, 2013). In 1969, Mink reintroduced the Pre-school Centers Supplementary Act, whilst Reps. John Brademas (D-IN) and Ogden Reid (R-NY) introduced the Comprehensive Pre-school Education and Child Day Care Act of 1969 – the precursor to the Child Development Act that eventually passed Congress – and Sen. Walter Mondale (D-MN), who, alongside 21 Democratic co-sponsors introduced the Headstart Child Development Act of 1969 (Congressional Record 90th Congress).

During 1969, Mondale had sent a letter asking Marian Wright Edelman of the Washington Research Project to help coordinate a coalition that would provide input on the shape of his and Brademas’ prospective childcare legislation. Edelman went on to form a diverse coalition that included labour, women’s and civil rights groups that would debate, design and lobby the bill. The bill, as drawn up by Edelman’s ‘ad hoc coalition,’ envisioned a childcare programme that was meant to encourage child development rather than simply provide a custodial function; it would be universally available – free for low-income families with wealthier families paying fees on an income sliding scale, encourage parental involvement, require a “substantial investment” and be based upon “local flexibility and control” – perhaps the most controversial element. This last requirement, that the federal government directly fund not-for-profit sponsoring bodies, as opposed to channelling money through state governments, was largely driven by civil rights leaders such as Edelman, whose experience with Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) programmes in the US South led them to believe that state governments could not be trusted to act as non-discriminatory sponsors, and that smaller entities such as municipalities and community groups should be able to set up childcare centres directly (Karch 2013, 69-70).
There were political actors on both sides of the left-right spectrum who offered a warm reception to the concept of federal childcare support. In fact, at various points in the CDA’s development Republicans strengthened and co-sponsored the bill, even at one point offering counter-legislation that would offer further benefits to children from middle-income, dual earner families (Morgan 2001, Cohen 2001, Roth 1976). The Nixon administration’s final specifications for their preferred childcare legislation were quite similar to the original bill put forth by Brademas in the House (Cohen 2001, 47), though the main sticking point was the issue of prime sponsorship. Whereas Edelman, Mondale and the civil rights groups favoured a low prime sponsorship number, so as to allow community action groups, small municipalities and trade unions to run their own childcare programmes, Brademas and many of his Democratic colleagues in the House were less concerned with designing legislation specifically to empower community groups. Congressional Republicans and the Nixon administration, supportive of this latter goal, were very much unsympathetic to the former (Morgan 2001, 229-231). Brademas, who stated that the prime sponsorship issue was “without question” the most difficult component of the legislation debated in committee, worked with John Dellenback (R-OR) to develop a compromise position with the Nixon administration, at 100,000 (Steiner 1975, 109). However, Carl Perkins (D-KY), chair of the full House Education and Labor Committee, first in committee offered an amendment to lower the bill’s prime sponsorship population to 10,000, which was rejected by Republicans and “a few Democrats.” Perkins’ amendment was eventually successful on the House floor and resulted in the evaporation of most Republican support for the bill, aggravating both the Nixon administration and state officials who felt they would be bypassed (Karch 2013, 79).

The CDA passed through the Senate by a 49-12 roll call vote, just as the House passed it on September 30, 1971 by a margin of 251-115. However, the differences on prime sponsorship levels forced the bill into Conference Committee, where Perkins took the highly unusual step of excluding the bill’s author, Brademas, from the group. Perkins’ leadership in further reducing the prime sponsorship requirement – to 5,000 – is said to have left Republicans incensed, with five out of six of the House Republicans thereafter refusing to sign the conference report (Karch 2013, 80-81). Still, on December 2nd the Senate adopted the Conference Report 63017 and the House approved the measure by a margin of 211-187 (Govtrack 2013). The end result appeared to be an extremely decentralised funding mechanism that would bypass state and large-city governments and directly appropriate funds towards any community or organised group of more than 5,000 people, meaning that it would enable community and civil rights organisations to develop childcare programmes without state interference (Morgan 2001, 229).
President Nixon, who at the time was being harangued by far-right columnists and organisations such as the Manhattan 12, and facing a primary challenge by conservative Republican Congressman John Ashbrook (R-OH), prepared to veto the bill. As Morgan explains, “the legislation seemed to Nixon and others in his administration to be more a product of civil rights and other social activists than an effort to address the material concerns of Middle America.” When his veto became definite, a battle broke out within the administration over how harsh a tone his veto message should strike (Morgan 2013, 232-233). The conservatives won out and in his December 9, 1971 veto message, Nixon described the bill’s goals as being “overshadowed by the fiscal irresponsibility, administrative unworkability, and family-weakening implications,” later adding: “There is a respectable school of opinion that this legislation would lead toward altering the family relationship. Before even a tentative step is made in this direction by their government, the American people should be fully consulted” (Woolley and Peters 2013). Apparently, however, the Republican administration did not view federal expenditure on childcare in and of itself to be so morally objectionable: the next day Nixon put in place a system of childcare tax deductions, which disproportionately benefited middle and high-income dual-earner families and formed the baseline policy – later converted into a tax credit -- through which most middle and upper-income American families receive federal childcare assistance today (Morgan 2001, Cohen 2001, Roth 1976).

Whilst many in the House saw Nixon’s veto as an indication that he would be unwilling to pass any type of universal childcare programme, a bipartisan group in the Senate remained more optimistic: at the start of the 1972 Congressional session Sens. Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), Jacob Javits (R-NY), Robert Taft Jr. (R-OH) and Walter Mondale (D-MN) introduced the Comprehensive Headstart, Child Development, and Family Services Act (Karch 2013, 107). Though similar to the CDA, it included concessions with regard to prime sponsorship, increasing the figure to 25,000 and lowering the first year’s fiscal authorisation by 40%. The legislation did in fact pass the Senate (73-12), however, just as many on the left argued that the Democrats had conceded too much to the right, Karch notes, “these concessions [by the Democrats] were insufficient to generate any enthusiasm among conservatives” (Karch 2013, 108). And indeed there was little momentum behind the legislation in the House as the bill was never brought to a

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89 For several reasons: Nixon’s moderate if not left-leaning public policy proposals, such as a national health insurance programme, a guaranteed minimum income, his trip to China, etc.

90 Morgan notes that: “Conservatives in the Nixon administration benefited from their relationships with the conservative newspaper Human Events and columnists like James Kilpatrick, especially because Buchanan controlled the news summary that Nixon read. After arranging to have someone write a conservative column on the CDA, they could slip it in the daily news summary to shape the President’s opinions on the legislation. Kilpatrick’s 1971 editorial, “Child Development Act—to Sovietize Our Youth,” called the bill “the boldest and most far-reaching scheme ever advanced for the Sovietization of American youth. . . .This bill contains the seeds for destruction of Middle America’’” (Morgan 2001; 234).

91 The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit.
vote: Karch notes that, “By the time the House took up the new bill, the looming election cast doubt on its prospects. Many southern Democrats hoped to avoid votes on social issues that might identify them with the [poorly performing] campaign of Senator George D. McGovern (D-SD); they preferred to spend the rest of the term campaigning in their districts” (Karch 2013, 109).

It would not be until 1975 that a comprehensive childcare services bill akin to that of 1971 was debated the legislature. The Child and Family Services Act of 1975 again sought to address some of the concerns that stemmed from the vetoed 1971 legislation: it featured a more modest appropriations schedule and enhanced state responsibility,92 as indeed several childcare lobbies saw states as a more amenable venue93 (Karch 2013, 119). The same childcare coalition that worked on the 1971 legislation delivered the bill to liberal New York Republican, Jacob Javits, in the Senate and Brademas in the House (Karch 2013, 177). However, the bill’s demise was eventually sealed by discord within the coalition itself: during the 1975 hearings an insurmountable divide occurred between the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), who wanted the public schools to become the sole provider of any new early years programme and the rest of the coalition, who wanted to maintain the original prime sponsorship, non-profit operating basis. The AFT threatened to block all labour support for the bill and indeed, without any AFL-CIO support to bolster the bill above the already poor context,94 it died in the water (Steiner 1976, 246-47).

Democrats continued to subsequently introduce legislation, with key pieces in 197995, 198396 and 198997. However, each year the number of bills introduced became fewer and the bills that were introduced became more tightly means-tested.

92 States who developed their own offices of childcare or grant plans did not look kindly on the prospect of the federal government reproducing or trampling over their efforts. Leaders hailing from these states – and there were thirty-seven of them at the time the 1975 legislation was introduced – testified that they would prefer federal support for their pre-existing state-level programmes (Karch 2013, 119).

93 This strong role for states reflected the reality of childcare assistance at the time: the failure of the federal childcare bill in 1971 meant that most states picked up on the issue to some degree: by 1975, 37 states had either an office of child development, a plan for such an office, or an office operating in at least one part of the state (Karch 2013, 119).

94 Contextual conditions included the rise of the ‘new right’ activist groups, an anti-childcare letter campaign, Republican President (Gerald Ford) in office, declining economic conditions, toxicity of childcare post 1971 veto (Morgan 2001, 234-235).

95 In 1979 Sen. Alan Cranston (D-CA) introduced a childcare bill that sought to avoid the pitfalls of a prime sponsorship debate, by designating states the power to choose where funding should be appropriated, including the possibility of not-for-profit groups. However, Cranston’s Child Care Act of 1979 was based upon need. Karch notes that “the coalition that had come together in 1971, splintered in 1975” and was “‘hopelessly divided’ by 1979” (Karch 2013, 127). Moreover, Edward Zigler, director of the Office of Child Development during Nixon’s presidency, notes that the Carter administration was opposed to the bill, with one official testifying before Congress that the administration did not believe that all working families supported or needed centre-based childcare assistance and that they were happy with their current, often informal arrangements. Cranston withdrew the bill (Zigler 1991, 44). The failure of Cranston’s 1979 bill also signalled a strong decline in Congressional interest over the issue, which coupled with the arrival of conservative President (Ronald Reagan) in 1980 and the rise of ‘new...
3.3 Democrats and childcare in context: wearing blue and white collars in the 1960s and 1970s

a. Democrats’ shifting electoral coalition: childcare in the electoral context

By the late 1960s, when the CDA was in its development, the fundamentals of New Deal-era partisan alignment were beginning to undergo a substantial shift (Petrocik 1987, Morgan 2001, Rae 1992). From roughly the 1930's to the late 1960's American political conflict had largely been structured according to a single dimension: economic class, where low and lower-middle income voters leaned Democratic and middle-high income voters Republican. According to Rae, this alignment came about during the Great Depression, when labour had actively mobilised. Seizing on economic strife and emerging weaknesses within the Progressive era pattern of voting alignment, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democrats “refocus[ed] the debate on economic class issues” and poached disaffected working class and low-income voters from the Republicans, thereby adding the urban working class, organised labour, small-scale farmers and Northern blacks to the Democrats’ existing coalition of immigrants and Southern whites (Rae 1992, 635).

With time, Democratic efforts to broaden their coalition – such as President Truman’s embrace of selected civil rights issues and activists – alienated white southerners, who went on to form a group of “Dixiecrats,” conservative Southern Democrats that in Congress often aligned with Republicans against the national Democratic Party. By the late 1960s, virulent, cultural divisions such as those over Vietnam, civil rights, feminism, abortion, patriotism, domestic communism, etc., according to Rae, “tore fissures through the [Democratic] party.” While the liberal intellectual component of the party “abhorred” the pro-war attitude of Democratic labour champions, such as President Johnson and 1968 Democratic Presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey, blue-collar and labour Democrats found their Democratic counterparts that fell to the right’ activist groups against any childcare legislation represented, in Karch’s words, “a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to major [childcare] policy change” (Karch 2013, 136).

96 Rep. Geraldine Ferraro’s (D-NY) 1983 child care and welfare bill, HR 1603 predominantly benefited low-income families by supplementing Title XX funds to means-tested childcare programmes but also offered benefits to middle and upper-income families: it sought to increase the amount of childcare expenses that could be claimed back via the Dependent Care Tax Credit from 20% to 50%, and to grant tax exempt status to childcare providers whose caregiving allowed parents to remain in employment. Despite receiving 80 co-sponsors, the context for such measures was so that the bill never moved beyond committee.

97 In 1987 Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), along with 126 sponsors from the House and 22 from the Senate, introduced the Act for Better Childcare, which would have lowered costs for families earning up to 115% of their state’s median income. The bill passed the Senate – via voice vote – on June 23, 1989, but its differences with House legislation were never resolved and instead, during the 1990 budget negotiations the Bush administration quickly agreed to a compromise: a targeted programme consisting of a block grant that catered to providers who cared for low-income children (the Child Care and Development Block Grant) which would support both quality improvement and operational costs. The bill also included an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, a supplemental tax credit for infants, made the Dependent Care Tax Credit refundable and introduced an “At-Risk child Care Program” – an entitlement for families at risk of going on welfare (Cohen 2001, 127-130).
left of the political spectrum on cultural issues to be “contemptuous toward middle- and working class people who did not happen to be black or Hispanic” (Rae 1992, 636-40).

These accounts do tend to be supported by National Elections Studies data, as Hout, Manza and Brooks explain:

“After 1964 professionals shifted rapidly towards the Democrats; routine white-collar workers followed at a slower pace. At about the same time, the self-employed and skilled blue-collar workers shifted in the Republican direction. The self-employed had split between Democrats and Republicans; they became strong Republicans. The skilled blue-collar workers had been strong Democrats; they began to split their votes and were actually strong Republicans in 1988” (Hout, Manza and Brooks 1999, 88).

These claims are reflected in Figures 1.16 and 1.17, the Alford and Thomsen indices, both of which display a decline in class voting in the US during the post-war era. Moreover, during the 1972 election, women for the first time voted in greater proportion for the Democratic candidate than did men, at 38 to 37% respectively (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 445). There was a clear age-dynamic to this trend, in that younger women were more likely to vote Democratic than their older counterparts. Reasons for this gender-based shift are numerous – and often debated – but much emphasis has been placed upon younger women’s increased access to higher education and their concomitant embrace of secularism (Inglehart and Norris 2000) and postmodern values (i.e. libertarianism, gender equality, self-expression) (Inglehart 1977), their increasingly large role in the labour force, and in particular, their specific place in the labour force (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 446).

Trends in the American National Election Studies do seem to display a shift in the Democrats’ electoral coalition with regard to gender and education, highlighting an opportunity for the Democrats to make up for their losses with lesser-educated males by making strategic electoral appeals to women with higher levels of education.

As outlined in Chapter One (and displayed in Figure 1.20), there has been an approximate linear reversal in the traditional gender identification gap in the US, wherein women were long associated with right over left party identification. For example, US women were less likely than US men to identify as Democrats in 1952 (a difference of -3%) and thus more likely to identify as Republican (a difference of +2.4%). These distinct gender-based party identification patterns began to converge in the mid 1960s, remain close during the 1970s and then quite dramatically
diverge from the 1980s, such that by 1996 the difference in females who identified as Democrats to males who identified as Democrats became positive - at over 13% and the difference in the percentage of females who identified as Republican to the percentage of males who identified as Republican became negative – at -12%.

The following section attempts to present a more detailed illustration of electoral change by analysing party identification according to gender and education. The longitudinal trends presented here indicate a slight overall reversal in partisan identification amongst higher-educated males and females between 1952 and 1996: during the 1950s and early 1960s, when the American National Election Study began, higher-educated women identified as Republican in greater proportion than they did Democrat (see Figure 3.1 below). However by the mid 1960s a degree of volatility commenced and no clear trend could be established until 1976, after which higher-educated women typically identified as Democratic in greater proportion than they did Republican (1988 and 1994 being exceptions), thereby reversing their original Republican bias.

![Figure 3.1 US party identification: female, some college - advanced degree](Source: American National Election Studies, 1952-1996)

Higher-educated men almost mirrored this trend: Figure 3.2 shows that whilst from the beginning of the election study, higher-educated men identified with both parties in roughly equal measure, by 1978 a clear trend began, wherein higher-educated men would increasingly identify as Republican in greater proportion than they would Democrat.

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98 The intention is not produced a sophisticated analysis examining the specific class and occupational based voting patterns as outlined by Oesch (2006) but rather to present electoral trends as the parties, then, may have seen them.
Trends remained more stable amongst lesser-educated males and females, who consistently identified as Democrat more so than Republican: whereas between 1952 and 1996 there was a slight downward trend in the proportion of lesser-educated women who identified as Republican, no such trends emerge amongst lesser-educated men (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4).
The proportion of respondents identifying as independent did, however, increase amongst all demographics. For higher-educated males and females, this increase occurred largely during the late 1960s to mid 1970s, declining thereafter. It was lowest amongst higher-educated women (reaching a peak of 11.4% in 1974). The increase in independent identification, however, was more permanent amongst lesser-educated respondents of both genders, who from the 1970s continually identified as independent in greater proportion than their higher-educated counterparts. On average, 16% of both male and female lesser-educated respondents identified as independent between 1972 and 1996 (versus 11% of higher-educated men and eight per cent of higher-educated women). This suggests that Democrats, whom this group traditionally would have supported, needed to appeal to new voters so as to make up their loss of lesser-educated voters.

Figure 3.5 views 1972 as a snapshot in time and shows that the decline in traditional partisan identification as displayed between 1952 and 1972 seems mirrored by the fact that all four groups increased their independent identification at rates varying from seven percentage points (females with higher education) to 12 percentage points females with lower-education levels. The only groups that increased their level of identification with a specific party were lesser-educated males, who identified as slightly more Republican (which perhaps hints at Democrats’ future struggle for the demographic) and higher-educated females, who identified as slightly more Democratic (which perhaps hints at Democrats’ future opportunities). The direction of these (albeit small, two percentage points) changes mimicked broader claims emerging from literature on gender-based party realignment (i.e. Norris and Inglehart 2000) and/or a decline of traditional left-right materialist voting (Inglehart 1977, Inglehart and Rabier 1986).
But without the benefit of foresight, what sort of electoral coalitional change might the Democratic elite have been aware of during the early 1970s, when they were in the process of adopting childcare policy? By applying the Pedersen index of electoral volatility\(^99\) to the identification patterns of each of the four demographics, we can measure between every two years from 1954 until 1972 the volatility of each group, and the average volatility they displayed in the run up to the Democrats’ childcare policy adoption. Figure 3.6, below, shows that whereas the average amount of volatility displayed between 1954\(^100\) and 1972 amongst all groups of respondents was 5.33. Women with both lower and higher-education levels displayed the most volatile partisan identification trends, with the average volatility rate of lesser educated women being 5.64 and higher-educated women, 7.18, therefore suggesting an opportunity for Democrats to bring these groups into their electoral coalitional fold.

\(^{99}\)Typically employed to address volatility between parties in a multi-party system by calculating changes in each party’s election results from year to year, the figure is equal to the net percentage of respondents from a particular gender/education category that changed their identification (see for example Pedersen 1999).

\(^{100}\)1954 is used rather than the American National Election Survey’s starting point, 1952, because volatility must be calculated using two consecutive elections and starting at 1952 would not allow us to use 1972 at an endpoint, whereas starting at 1954 would.
Electoral coalitional volatility, using Pedersen index, 1954-1972

Figure 3.6 Pedersen index of electoral coalitional volatility, US, 1954-1972 (Source: American National Election Studies)

b. **Electoral and organisational responses to post-materialism: the party responds to class and gender-based shifts**

   i) Reforming internal party organisation: gender-based and party-centralising amendments

   The party’s shifting electoral base coincided with an array of internal organisational reforms, driven in part by the desire to make the Democratic Party more representative of its voters and members. The 1968 convention in Chicago, marked by the violent repression of anti-war, civil rights and various protestors on its surrounding streets, was also tarnished inside the International Amphitheatre by a presidential selection process that reflected the preferences of a handful of party insiders who favoured establishment candidate Hubert Humphrey over the majority of grassroots supporters and primary voters, who had chosen anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy. Whereas McCarthy had won a plurality of votes in the primaries, Humphrey had declined to enter any, instead relying on his ability to win over the convention delegates whose votes weren’t locked in by a primary, most of whom reflected the old traditional Democratic party insider (i.e. older, white and often union-oriented males). As 1972 Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern, explains, “[i]n no [primary] election did [Humphrey] win more than a tiny fraction of the votes. Yet he arrived at the Convention the clear favorite for the nomination, with perhaps 1,700 delegates out of a total of 2,500 pledged to him” (McGovern 1970, 43).

Indeed the mismatch between the convention delegates’ and party grassroots’ candidate preferences resulted from a variety of state party rules that made convention delegate selection processes inaccessible to rank-and-file Democrats by being unclear, expensive, or simply closed off. This had a particularly negative impact on the number of minority, female and middle class
(e.g. new politics or post-materialist) delegates selected to attend the conference and by extension, set the party platform and choose the party’s presidential candidate. A subsequent investigation into what went wrong found, in McGovern’s words, “a widespread pattern of delegate selection by party bosses, small committees and rigged conventions.” In particular McGovern reported that in “many” states voters selected local party officers without any knowledge that those officers would go on to select convention delegates, let alone any knowledge of the delegates’ candidate preferences, adding that “Even in some primary states, it is unlawful for candidates for delegate to the National Convention to list their Presidential preference on the ballot.” Beyond that, ten states “had no codified rules available to Democrats who wished to participate in the delegate selection process,” an additional three had “no rules at all governing selection process” and that “in many more states, rules, if they existed were so inaccessible as to be useless to Democrats wishing to inform themselves of how to participate in party affairs” (McGovern 1970, 43).

The end result was a convention made up of delegates largely unrepresentative of the party’s emerging support base: in Chicago women made up just 13% of total delegates, with only one delegation featuring a women chairperson. 18 state delegations had no voting delegates under the age of 30 and 13 other delegations had just one under 30. McGovern found that in Chicago “blacks were not represented in proportion to their numbers in the population, and even less so in proportion to in proportion to their numbers in the Democratic Party (McGovern 1970, 43-45).

The undemocratic selection of uncommitted (or at least publicly uncommitted) delegates was a boon to the labour movement, who quite differently from British and most Australian unions, purported non-partisanship. Whilst unions were well represented at the Democratic National Convention (the AFL-CIO for example, held in 1968 200 out of a total 3,084 delegates) unions as a whole rarely came out in support of a specific Democratic candidate. This guise of ‘non-partisanship’ however, did not prohibit union leaders from involving themselves in the selection process but instead, simply protected union bosses’ individual political choices from any sort of need for internal union-wide voting:

“A strong union president could endorse a candidate without undertaking any serious process of internal consultation and then could promote that candidate behind the scenes, protected by a façade of neutrality. This informal and unpublicized means of exercising influence almost never required the mobilization of the rank-and-file prior to the general election, nor did it draw significantly on union financial and organizational resources. The only exception was found in those few states where primaries were held; there, national unions might seek to mobilize their members to vote for the leadership’s favourite
candidate. In general, though, it was entirely possible for a labor leader to accomplish much for a candidate simply by bargaining with and persuading delegates and party elites prior to and at the convention itself” (Dark 2001, 79).

In 1968 AFL-CIO president George Meany abandoned his non-partisan stance and supported the candidate he identified as pro-labour: Humphrey. Dark notes that whilst Meany’s AFL-CIO had approximately 200 delegates, it claimed to hold influence over roughly 600 as they were in Dark’s words “indebted to labor for campaign support.” The AFL-CIO deemed their influence in the convention and in particular, Humphrey’s nomination a success however Dark states that it was “precisely the nature of that success that would generate a counterattack from the very forces who had been vanquished at the Democratic National Convention” because “Humphrey’s nomination had been attained the ‘old-fashioned way’ -through the traditional methods of political brokerage” (Dark 2001, 82-83).

And indeed the uproar and riots surrounding the Democrats’ 1968 convention directly inspired the appointment of a commission to analyse the organisational challenges facing the party. Humphrey, as acting leader of the Democratic Party immediately following his presidential election defeat in November of that year, agreed to a commission that by the next presidential election (1972), would implement reforms in the party’s nomination system. Following the tumult of 1968, Humphrey appointed liberal Senator Fred Harris (D-OK) to choose the commission members and also approved Harris’s selection of liberal Sen. George McGovern (D-SD) to lead the commission, in what Arthur C. Paulson described as an attempt to “retrieve his liberal soul by approving reformers to lead the party and its reform process” (Paulson 2000, 107). The key tenets of the McGovern-Fraser Commission’s recommendations surrounded increasing the party’s representativeness and democratising both its convention delegate and by extension, candidate selection procedures: of the 18 ‘guidelines’ issued to state Democratic parties, states would now be required “to encourage representation on the national convention delegations of minority groups, young people, and women in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the state” (DeClerico and Davis 2000, 86). The impact was clear: between the 1968 and 1972 conventions, the number of African-American delegates more than doubled, from seven to fifteen and the number of female delegates approximately tripled, from thirteen to forty (Marshall 1981, 46). However, women’s gains were not achieved without discord: any power within the convention that was apportioned to women and minority delegates

101 McGovern was later replaced as commissioner by Donald Fraser when he decided to seek the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination.
102 Alternately, Cohen et. al describe Humphrey’s decision as “a concession he hoped would unify the party” (Cohen et al 2008, 158).
103 Formally known as the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection.
was perceived, in eyes of the AFL-CIO leadership, and in particular its leader George Meany, in Dark’s words “as little more than an effort by ‘white collar elites’ to take power away from unions and other working class constituencies” (Dark 2001, 85).

The de-facto quotas set out in McGovern-Fraser were largely due to the efforts of emergent feminist organisations. In particular, the National Women’s Political Caucus, which at one point wrote the Democratic National Committee (DNC, Democratic Party executive) and threatened to send feminist lawyers to challenge state credentials were the Commission’s “reasonable representation” rule not interpreted to mean that that women should be represented in each state delegation in the same proportion as the state’s population (which would thus be a majority). The NWPC had important supporters both within the Democratic Party (such as the Center for Political Reform and Americans for Democratic Action) and within the Commission: Donald Fraser, who took McGovern’s leading post once the latter ran for the Democratic Presidential nomination, was married to a leading NWPC activist and according to Young, “intervened forcefully with Democratic leaders to advocate an interpretation of the rules that would guarantee 50 percent representation for women” (Young 2000, 89).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African-Americans (% of all delegates)</th>
<th>Women (% of all delegates)</th>
<th>Under 30 (% of all delegates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Democratic National Convention delegates, per cent (Source: Marshall 1981, 46)

The commission is perhaps best known for its candidate selection reforms, which required that delegates to the convention be selected in a democratic manner (i.e. as opposed to being appointed/running without committing to a candidate) and that delegate selection procedures be open to all candidate members. Specific requirements included that those running to be a delegate expressly stated (and were bound to) their support for a particular Democratic candidate, so that “candidates would be awarded delegates in proportion to their share of support from Democratic voters, so long as they qualified by meeting a threshold of at least 15 percent of

104 In actuality, Lisa Young states that the “leaders of the NWPC did not expect that the party would agree to anything close to 50 percent representation for women,” noting that the “nation-wide network of feminist lawyers” as an “empty threat,” given they had “almost no local state organization in place at the time” (Young 2000, 89).
the vote”\textsuperscript{105} (Paulson 2000, 108). Although these reforms did not mandate states to hold primary elections, as Paulson explains, “state parties and legislatures would find it easiest to comply with participation rules by passing primary laws” \textsuperscript{106} (Paulson 2000, 108).

As a result of the new primary system, Dark argues “labor leaders could no thus no longer sustain their traditional role as power brokers, bargaining with a discrete set of elite actors” (Dark 2001, 84). The requirement that all delegates must be first, democratically selected, and second, bound to a candidate prior to the convention helped removed labour leaders of their traditional brokering influence at the convention, and of their ability to endorse a particular candidate without any internal polling in their own organisation. George Meany’s feelings about the reforms can largely be summed up in his statement that he would not endorse the 1972 Democratic Presidential candidate George McGovern in part because “The Democratic Party has been taken over by people named Jack, who look like Jills and smell like Johns” (Perlstein 2008, 695). Meany and Alexander Barkan, director of the AFL-CIO’s lobbying arm, the Committee on Political Education (COPE) intended for the AFL’s non-endorsement in 1972 to bully the party into abolishing the McGovern-Fraser reforms. However, Meany and Barkan’s control over the AFL-CIO did not represent a unified viewpoint amongst the labor movement. Dark notes that “[d]espite the views of the AFL-CIO establishment, several important unions actually supported the reform efforts.” The UAW’s political director served on the McGovern-Fraser Commission and the UAW itself provided much-needed funding for the commission. Moreover, there were several other unions, which despite being affiliated with the AFL-CIO supported the reform: the Communication Workers of America (CWA), International Association of Machinists (IAM), American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Dark claims “The UAW and its allies supported party reform in the hopes of forging lasting alliance with the activists who had surged into the party in the late 1960s” (Dark 2001, 85).

Part of the division between Meany and many of the more progressive unions was rooted in union type and membership:

“These leaders, mainly from unions composed of either industrial workers (CWA, IAM) or the growing ranks of service and public sector employees (AFSCME), were strongly committed to advancing policies at the national level that ranged from the protection of union organizing rights to the expansion of the welfare state. The more liberal Democratic Party that reform might bring about was likely to fulfil these national

\textsuperscript{105} Additional requirements included that all delegate selection procedures occur within the year of the convention, be advertised and held at a time available for most members (Paulson 2000, 108).

\textsuperscript{106} Only 16 states had primary elections in 1968.
policies. These liberal unions were also led by men who possessed a broader, sometime seven social democratic, conception of the purposes of the labor movement. Because of their ideological commitments, they supported a more programmatic, policy-oriented system—a goal that the liberal reformers also claimed as their own” (Dark 2001, 85).

By contrast, Dark states that “Meany and his allies in the AFL-CIO hierarchy and the building trades” “sought to deepen an alliance with the city machines, traditional party leaders, and sometimes even southern conservatives on behalf of the procedural status quo and the existing distribution of power within the national party” (Dark 2001, 85).

Whilst the McGovern-Fraser reforms’ impact on candidate selection, and in particular, the unintended institutionalisation of presidential primaries has been widely discussed, it also had an immediate and significant impact not just on presidential candidate selections but also on the make-up of the convention and as a corollary, the diversity of representation on the party’s platform committee (Shafer 1983, 439, 450). Wolbrecht (2002) links the increased proportion of women, minority and socially liberal delegates to changes in the Party Platform and specifically, its growing emphasis on women’s and work/family issues such as childcare. Perhaps more specifically, new rules surrounding the platform process allowed ten per cent of the platform committee’s 150 members the chance to bring up any additional proposals at the national conference for an up or down platform vote, which naturally diversified the types of platform proposals. More influential, however, was the manner in which the new conference delegation requirements fostered female participation on the committee: of the 150-member platform committee, 44% of its members were female, all four of the committee’s vice-chairs were female and seven of the 15 drafting committee members were women, including popular left-wing legislator, Rep. Bella Abzug (D-NY) (Herbers, 1972). A disgruntled male from the Florida delegation remarked on the initial platform committee meetings: “I have heard a lot about health care, day care and a lot of other benefits. I haven’t heard one word about where the money is coming from” (NY Times, 1972).

Whereas one would expect such transformational reforms to take several years or more, it took just two years from the appointment of a commission lead for the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to adopt the McGovern-Fraser reforms. The speed of reform correlates with several key institutional features of the Democratic Party and indeed the specific personal and political contexts operating at the time: institutionally, the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Party does not include (and thus allot votes) to trade union affiliates, as

107 In part due to its ability to empower well-funded activists (see for example Bawn at al 2012).
occurs in the UK and Australia. In addition, DNC meetings occurred twice a year and thus limited the opportunities for further debate before the next election. In the run up to the DNC’s annual meeting in February 1971, Chairman Larry O’Brien, who was characterised as a “compromise” between a ‘reformer’ and ‘regular’ party member (Apple 1971), first introduced the proposed reforms to the Executive Committee and received their approval before moving on to the full committee. This way they would, in Schafer’s words, “arrive with the explicit endorsement of a range of recognized party figures” (Shafer 1983, 369). Apart from discord over the inter-state delegate apportionment formula, the meeting went smoothly, with proposed reforms passing seven yes to four no (Shafer 1983, 372). When the full committee met two days later, similar issues arose with respect to inter-state apportionment however the remaining 18 recommendations were voted on as a bloc and approved by voice-vote over the course of a single afternoon (Shafer 1983, 379).

The unions’ influence was also minimised because COPE, the political arm of the AFL-CIO, “didn’t track very tightly” on the specific guidelines and hence advise their allies on the committee. Schafer states: “It wasn’t so much that they didn’t like the product, as they didn’t like the whole operation, COPE was not actively concerned about the guidelines. A better tactic for COPE would have required intimate knowledge, and then finding problems. But they didn’t have anybody in the know who was tracking on it” (Shafer 1983, 388). As such the ease of reform seems to have been in fostered in part by personal loyalty as well as COPE’s own mishandling of the issue and in particular their lack of direct representation on the committee. Of importance were also the institutional arrangements of the McGovern-Fraser committee itself, the manner in which most power was vested in the chairman and the little opportunity that existed for state parties to challenge him.

**ii) Targeting Female Voters**

The extent to which the Democratic Party developed a centralised, concerted effort to attract female voters ahead of either the 1968 or 1972 elections (and thus predating the CDA) is somewhat unclear. On the one hand, efforts to institutionalise female representation into Democratic Party decision making bodies had a direct impact on the make-up of policy committees, such as the platform committee, which in turn correlates with a perceived increase in attention towards female voters on the whole of the party. Young asserts that while the McGovern-Fraser reforms “had a limited impact on the DNC”\(^{108}\) the increase in women did bode well for the 1972 Democratic Party platform:

\(^{108}\) Since DNC committee members were appointed by “state parties, which were, for the most part, still controlled by party regulars” (Young 2000, 91).
“The close ties between the NWPC leadership and the McGovern campaign, coupled with the perception of party strategists that feminist issues might win electoral support, meant that all but one of the key items on the movement’s agenda were included in the party’s 1972 platform document” Young 2001, 901).

According to Young, “McGovern strategists believe that the political mobilization of women constituted an important new resource for their candidate” (Young 2000, 89). For example, Jeanne Kirkpatrick109 quotes Frederick Dutton, a lead McGovern strategist as saying that “the feminist factor ‘affects our campaign organization, the symbols that we signal, the issues that we choose and their personality and style of our candidate’” (Kirkpatrick 1976, 381). Kirkpatrick added:

“Dutton and other McGovern strategists believed that the ‘Nylon Revolution,’ as one termed it in an off-guard moment, constituted an important new resource for a candidate like McGovern. The belief rested on the assumption widely held among some spokespersons and fellow travellers of the women’s movement, that new women entering politics in unprecedented numbers were more humanistic, liberal, and generous, than the men who had hitherto dominated politics” (Kirkpatrick 1976, 381-82)

But as much as feminist groups such as the NWPC were able to convince McGovern of the growing importance of the ‘women’s vote,’ McGovern had limits; for example he refused feminists’ demands that a pro-abortion plank appear in the 1972 platform (Wolbrecht 2000, 37). Still, Nixon’s landslide victory over McGovern in 1972 led ‘regulars’ in the Democratic Party to believe that the reforms were “responsible for the nomination of a presidential candidate able to appeal to a broad enough portion of the electorate to win the presidency.”110 McGovern’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had less time for post-materialists: Young notes Carter’s opposition to their stances on both abortion and gay rights and states that “the commitments [in the 1976 platform] were less extensive and less specific than in 1972”111 (Young 2000, 97).

Despite the Carter campaign’s less enthusiastic stance towards new politics issues, the traditional gender vote gap did in fact reverse itself during the 1980 presidential election, with women

109 Who prior to advising Reagan’s 1980 campaign and ultimately joining his cabinet as Ambassador to the UN, was in fact an active Democrat and member of the 1976 Platform Committee (Kirkpatrick 1976).
110 However Young also adds that party regulars appreciated the reforms’ democratic legitimacy: “The reforms also represented a significant erosion of the role of state parties and a concomitant increase in the national party’s strength. Despite this, all but the most extreme of the party’s more traditional elements were willing to acknowledge the basic legitimacy of the procedural reforms. This at least partially explains why the party did not entirely abandon the reforms after 1972” (Young 200, 95-96).
111 However, Carter finally agreed to include a plank that said they did not support a constitutional amendment to overturn Roe v. Wade (Young 2000, 97).
voting Democratic in greater proportion than men by approximately six to eight percentage points (Costain 1992, 2). The emergence of the new modern ‘gender gap’ in the 1980 election results armed feminists with a new tactic for pressuring the Democratic Party to advance their demands, with particular respect to the ERA and abortion. Whereas the “Nylon Revolution” garnered little attention beyond McGovern strategists in 1972, by the early 1980s feminists groups such as NWPC and NOW regularly released polling data that emphasised the political importance of the gap to both the media and to the Democratic Party. In fact, the term “gender gap” was invented by NOW leaders in a document that featured polling data presented to delegates at the DNC general meeting in 1981. The term’s popularity increased: the Washington Post began to use it by October of that year and, as Wolbrecht states, “the phenomenon began to attract intense press coverage” (Young 2000, 101; Wolbrecht 2000, 48-49) From May 1982 NOW sent a monthly “Gender Gap Update” to the media, whereas by 1983, both Abzug and former NOW President Smeal each wrote books on the gap – the intention being “to convince politicians of the electoral consequences of opposing women’s rights” (Wolbrecht 2000, 49). The frequent use of the ‘gender gap strategy,’ both to convince the DNC to focus on women’s issues and to encourage Democratic legislators to take up key pieces of feminist legislation even in the context of a conservative Republican President, was such that Costain claims “Only the political presence of an electoral gender gap replaced the leverage that a more conservative Congress and White House had taken away” (Costain 1992, 104).

Beyond the electoral incentives, which were not as clearly delineated until after the 1980 election, Costain writes that the gradual churning of legislators and new breed of post-New Deal era politicians created a specific opportunity structure through which feminists could persuade policymakers on issues they held important. Though Mondale is not mentioned specifically, this idea is very much in keeping with his work on the CDA and his Presidential campaign 12 years after: “By the late 1960s, a less ideological group of politicians, holding ambitions for higher office began to view equal rights for women as an innovative issue with the potential to further their presidential aspirations” (Costain 1992, 133). In other words, although the party may not have employed gender-gap based research as means to develop an election strategy as early as the late 1960s, the idea that embracing progressive social policy and work/family issues of interest to women voters was grasped by the increasing ranks of post-materialist, new politics Democrats entering the party’s ranks.
c. Whose interest? Unions, the childcare ‘lobby’ and the Democratic elite

This research is primarily concerned with the extent to which either trade unions, being a key ally of the Democratic Party, or electoral imperative drove legislators to address the childcare issue. However, it is worth briefly considering the role of other possible childcare policy demanders, such as pre-existing childcare advocacy organisations, feminist groups and civil rights organisations. The US childcare lobby of the 1970s was quite diverse and somewhat fragmented: it included labour unions, civil rights activists, childcare and early learning advocacy groups and, to a lesser extent, feminist organisations. Interestingly, during the development of the CDA, the Day Care and Child Development Council of America, arguably the largest childcare advocacy organisation (it was an umbrella group) lobbied for increased legislative attention to the issue but as Cohen notes, “did not take a leadership role” (Cohen 2001, 30). In fact, the leading role seemed to lay with both civil rights and labour organisations. Although the women’s movement identified childcare as a matter of concern (for example, NOW highlighted childcare as a policy priority as early as 1966), it was not at the forefront of their agenda: as Cohen notes, “most feminists in the 1960s and early 1970s were not involved with childcare legislation. This was mainly because there were other issues such as abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). By the 1970s, the ERA took precedence over every other item on the women’s agenda” (Cohen 2001, 29).

By contrast to the somewhat muddled impact of childcare specific-advocacy groups and feminist organisations, Figure 1.15 shows a strong correlation, across all three countries in this study, between female labour mobilisation – the interaction of trade union density with female trade union membership – and childcare policy adoption. Whilst on the one hand it would seem intuitive that trade unions, in the midst of rising female membership, would lobby for a policy that enabled female employment, on the other hand there also appeared to be a tension between the prevailing tenor of large trade union leaders and policies that would facilitate women’s rights, and in particular equal female employment opportunities. This tension is best displayed in the battle for the Equal Rights Amendment, which the UAW opposed until 1970 and the AFL-CIO until 1974. In fact, the UAW offered the National Organization for Women office space in 1966 but ejected them in 1967 when they placed the ERA on their ‘bill of rights’ (Wolbrecht 2000, 154). Moreover, there was conflict between the unions and emerging Democratic activist groups, such as feminists and black civil rights leaders as outlined in the McGovern-Fraser discussion above.

However, despite broader concerns of a power struggle for influence within the Democratic Party, unions ceased lobbying against female equal employment policies in the wake of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and were themselves in the midst of becoming increasingly feminised. For example, Wolbrecht (2002) shows that during 1972 Democratic convention delegates identified as “labor activists”\footnote{It is unclear how this term is defined (i.e. whether it refers specifically to union delegates, delegates who self-report as labour activists or delegates who hold warm feelings to the labour movement).} expressed on average a ‘cooler’ reception towards the women’s movement relative to all other Democratic delegates (a difference of 10 per cent), according to the Convention Delegate Study’s “women’s movement feeling thermometer,” but that the differences decreased by 1980 as labour activists warmed to women’s issues\footnote{It is also unclear whether the labor activists who identified a warmer feeling thermometer reading in 1980 were the same labor activists surveyed in 1972 (in other words, the extent to which replacement amongst labor activists fostered their average position change is unclear).} (Wolbrecht 2002, 255-256). The AFL-CIO even promoted the 1969 Taft-Hartley reforms, which enabled trust funds for employee childcare centres (Cohen 2001, 28). They were also part of the ad hoc child care coalition that wrote, and lobbied for, the Child Development Act: though the coalition was led and to a certain extent dominated by Marian Wright Edelman, who had her roots with the civil rights movement, the US’s largest trade union confederation – the AFL-CIO – alongside its largest union, the National Education Association (the public school teachers union) and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) were all powerful players in the coalition.

The uniqueness of the ad hoc child care coalition is that it was able to bring together such a diverse array of organised interests; the group had 24 different associations represented, including the National Association for the Education of Young Children, the League of Women Voters, the National Organization for Women (NOW), the AFL-CIO, Day Care and Child Development Council of America, the National Council of Negro Women, the National League of Cities–U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Welfare Rights Organization (Morgan 2001, 225). This might suggest that during 1971 the ad hoc coalition had the representative diversity to secure the commitment of Democratic legislators who were both traditional social conservatives (and in particular linked to industrial unions) and those who were more socially progressive (aligned to civil rights, new left groups and perhaps more white collar/public sector unions). Such a diverse coalition is of course, open to the possibility of internal fracture and indeed, during this first attempt to legislate a landmark childcare bill a class-based divide did emerge, yet it was not between labour and feminists but instead was formed between the feminist and civil rights organisations. Morgan states:

“In a tense negotiating meeting between staffers and the child-care lobby, Edelman accused the House legislators of caring only about the middle class. ‘Edelman did not care about middle class kids at all,’ said one staffer who was present at the meeting, ‘[she] wanted to use the program as a political organizing base.’ Edelman herself recalls
that in drafting sessions, ‘We fought fiercely over priorities. Welfare mothers almost came to blows with some of the middle class liberationists who thought they should have access to day care if they wanted time to go to an art gallery . . . But welfare mothers who have no choice but to work wanted their kids’ needs to come first’” (Morgan 2001, 226).

Despite internal disagreement, the final Mondale-Brademas legislation of 1971 was endorsed by the wide array of groups within the childcare coalition, reflecting the possibility for shared goals amongst the Democrats’ newly diverse and perhaps unwieldy electoral coalition. Yet just as post-McGovern-Fraser, the Democrats would begin to lose certain elements of their traditional electoral coalition, by the time that the next major piece of childcare legislation (the 1975 Child and Family Services Act) was introduced into Congress, an even larger fracture occurred within the childcare coalition, thus dooming the possibility for a united Democratic push for childcare: during the 1975 hearings an insurmountable divide emerged between the American Federation of Teachers, who wanted the public schools to become the sole proprietor of any new early years programme and the rest of the coalition, who wanted to maintain the original prime sponsorship operating basis, wherein any non-profit organisation or municipality would be eligible to run an early years programme.

On September 8, 1974 the President of the AFT, Albert Shanker, took out a full page in the New York Times that was headlined “Early Childhood Education Is a Job for the Public Schools.” As Karch notes, Shanker “argued that the Comprehensive Child Development Act and the Child and Family Services Act would lead to conflicting responsibilities, duplication and overlap, gaps and unevenness of access, and wide variation in service quality, because they allowed a broad range of sponsors” (Karch 2013, 120). The AFT threatened to block all labour support from the bill, suggesting, in Karch’s words that “organized labor writ large would take on the legislation, unless it were revised to mandate that public schools take responsibility for new ECEC programmes” (Karch 2013, 120). And indeed the legislative representative of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, who did not have a direct interest in the AFT’s proposals “explained to her coalition colleagues that the public schools are not such a bad place and that a compromise with Shanker seems to represent the most likely path to legislative success.” The AFT’s position also received backing by the International Ladies’ Garment Association and the assistant director of the AFL-CIO’s legislation department (Steiner 1976, 246-47).

This split seems to reflect the larger, more encompassing split amongst the Democratic Party to such an extent that Karch quotes a former staffer on the House Subcommittee on Select Education as saying, “[i]f we want blue-collar support we must assess the power of Al Shanker”
(Karch 2013, 120). Such statements help to illustrate how the struggle for childcare policy adoption was part and parcel of the emerging fault lines between the Democrats’ competing constituencies and illustrates the difficulties managing them.

3.4 Driving the Democrats’ position change: union pressure or electoral imperative

The sections above display a party that was a) adjusting to a shift in traditional party-voter linkages and reaching out to new constituencies as well as b) experiencing a significant reform process that undermined the power of union confederations whilst apportioning an increased amount of control to party leaders and post-materialists. This union movement seemed itself torn between two positions: on the one hand it engaged in efforts to develop the landmark Child Development Act. On the other hand, confederation leaders expressed distaste for the internal party reforms that empowered the new politics Democrats who took a lead role in pushing childcare policy. What was the relative influence of electoral imperative and union pressure upon the Democrats’ decision to adopt childcare policy as a legislative issue during the late 1960s and early 1970s?

The following section employs quantitative analyses in order to determine whether the Democrats’ party position change was mechanised by legislator replacement and driven electoral imperative or whether it was mechanised by conversion and driven by trade union pressure. Whereas the former scenario reflect Karol’s (2009) model of coalition group incorporation the latter typifies coalition group maintenance. First, a series of descriptive statistics are provided in order to a) contextualise the composition of House Democrats from the late 1960s to the early 1990s and b) elaborate on the rate of turnover throughout the time period under examination. Next, Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) formula for disaggregating the components of political change is employed in order to determine the relative proportion of party position change (i.e. the increase in childcare bill co-sponsorship rates) that can be explained by replacement, conversion and mobilisation. Then, as a corroboration of Rapoport and Stone and a test of the relative importance of post-materialist and unionist characteristics on childcare policy adoption, a series of descriptive statistics on the co-sponsorship rates of different groups (e.g. men, women, university educated and non) are provided. A number of OLS regressions are also run. These regressions test for an association between co-sponsoring childcare legislation and having characteristics associated with either a unionist or a post-materialist orientation. In light of the

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114 Party elites responded to shifts in traditional party-voter linkages by making strategic appeals to a new set of voters. This change would be gradual on a party-wide scale, given that the party as a whole would need to replace its traditional, blue-collar and union oriented legislators and members with a new set of party elites who were not allied to traditional party-linked groups, such as unions. This new set of elites perhaps represented the types of voters that the party sought to attract (post-materialists of both genders and in particular, female voters) (Karol 2009, 19).

115 Congressional Democrats responded to their traditional party link interest group’s (i.e. the unions) newfound interest in childcare policy by adopting the issue.
emphasis on legislator replacement, this section will then examine whether legislator replacement did in fact produce a significant demographic shift amongst House Democrats in the lead-up to their adoption of childcare policy.

a. Co-sponsoring childcare and the mechanics of conversion or replacement: did legislators become converted to the childcare issue or was policy adoption driven by the entrance of post-materialist party modernisers?

In order to provide context to the discussion about legislator conversion, replacement and sociodemographic change, Table 3.2, below, introduces some descriptive statistics that illustrate how the composition of House Democrats changed between the 91st (1969-1971) and 101st (1989-1991) Congresses. This table focuses on the total number of House Democrats who served during each Congress; it includes their rate of turnover, the percentage of Democratic Representatives who were university educated, the percentage who were female and their median ADA and COPE scores throughout the period. An ADA score is an annual interest group rating computed by the left-liberal interest group, Americans for Democratic Action. It is based off of a legislators’s voting record on social and economic issues in a given year. A COPE score is an annual interest group rating issued by the AFL-CIO’s political arm. It is based off of a legislator’s voting record on labor issues during a given year.

116 Two separate Rapoport and Stone models are run, one in which T1 is the 90th Congress and one in which T1 is the 91st, in order to introduce the reader to the concept of Rapoport and Stone and illustrate the general mechanisms producing change between the 1960s and the early 1990s. However the second model (where T1 is the 91st) is preferable, given the low number of bills introduced during the 90th Congress and the few Representatives who stayed on between the 90th and 101st. For that reason, descriptive statistics as well the OLS regressions focus specifically on the 91st and 101st Congresses, leaving the 90th Congress aside.

117 ADA scores are a “liberal quotient” assigned to each Congressional representative published by Americans for Democratic Action, which according to the organisation covers “a gamut of judicial, social, economic, foreign, and military policy” issues. As Sharp (2000) explains, the selected votes “display sharp liberal/conservative divisions unblurred by extraneous matters.” COPE scores emanate from the Committee on Political Education of the AFL-CIO and are published in “labor’s report card” on Congress. As Sharp explains, scores are tabulated according to whether a legislator “voted ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ basing its decision on ‘the position the AFL-CIO took on the legislation’” (Sharp 2000, ix-xi).

118 As will be discussed at the end of this chapter, time-adjusted ADA and COPE scores are preferable because of the way these scores are calculated: each year the ADA and AFL-CIO’s COPE compute their scores based off of a specific set of votes that reached the House floor in that particular year. Since the underlying base of measurement (i.e. the specific set of votes) changes each year it is difficult to compare scores over time. Time-adjusted ADA scores do exist, and are shown in Figure 3.8 but similarly adjusted COPE scores do not exist. For the sake of within year, between score comparison, non-adjusted ADA and COPE scores are listed here in Table 3.2 but these are less reliable when compared over time.
Table 3.2 House Democratic composition, 91st –101st Congresses (Source: Sharp 2000, Anderson and Habel 2009)

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<td>University, %</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, %</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median ADA</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median COPE</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover: %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>first Congress</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover: %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>last Congress</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The makeup of House Democrats shifted little between the 91st (1969-1971) and 101st (1989-1991) Congresses: the total number of House Democrats ranged from a low of 250 in the 91st Congress to a high of 307 in the 94th (1974-1976); the proportion of female Democratic Representatives increased by just four percentage points, from two to six per cent in the 31 years under examination. The proportion of university-educated Democrats began at 93% during the 91st Congress and increased to 99% by the 101st. Turnover, as calculated by the proportion of newcomer House Democrats in a single Congress ranged from a low of four per cent (90th Congress) to 27% in the 94th Congress.\(^\text{119}\) Turnover, as calculated by the proportion of outgoing House Democrats in a single Congress ranged from six per cent in the 101st to 18 in the 96th Congress.\(^\text{120}\)

39 ‘stayers’ remained in office between the 91st and 101st Congresses. In the 91st Congress these stayers comprised 16% of all House Democrats and in the 101st they comprised 14%, meaning that by T2, 86% of House Democrats were ‘new.’ 26% of stayers co-sponsored a childcare-related bill during the 91st Congress and 28% did so during the 101st.

The section below will first analyse House Democrats’ childcare bill co-sponsorship rates with the Rapoport and Stone model, in order to find whether conversion or replacement was the dominant mechanism that produced their position change on the issue (i.e. the increase in the proportion of legislators who co-sponsored non means-tested childcare bills that occurred between T1 and T2). It will then provide descriptive statistics on co-sponsorship rates, comparing for example the percentage of men versus women who co-sponsored a childcare bill and indicating whether these differences were statistically significant. Next, it will apply OLS regressions that test for an association between the number of childcare bills a legislator co-

\(^{119}\) An average of 11% with a standard deviation of six.  
\(^{120}\) An average of 13% with a standard deviation of four.
sponsored and a variety of characteristics (i.e. gender, education, interest group ratings and controls for sitting on the House Education and Labor Committee and representing a Southern state). Both the second set of descriptive statistics and the regressions are useful because even if Rapoport and Stone find replacement to be the dominant driver, we would still not be sure that these new legislators were more post-materialist than their predecessors. And on the other hand, if Rapoport and Stone find that conversion was the dominant driver, it would still be unclear whether those who converted had strong links to trade unions.

However as Section 3.2 shows, there were just two universal childcare bills introduced into Congress before the Child Development Act started gaining traction in 1970 and 1971 (Rep. Mink’s 1967 and 1969 Supplementary Pre-school Education bills). Whilst there were a small number of ‘workfare’-centred childcare bills introduced and even passed during the 1960s,121 this type of legislation appealed to a more conservative coalition who were focused upon moving poor women from welfare to work, as opposed to the more socially liberal coalition of the early 1970s, who aimed for a universal policy that would foster female employment and female equal opportunity in general (Morgan 2001). The non-existence of middle-class childcare legislation prior to 1967 would skew the analysis towards a conversion-heavy result if T1 was any earlier than 1967. As such, the analysis first designates the 90th Congress (1967-1969) as T1 and also, due to the paucity of childcare bills in the 90th (just one: Mink’s 1967 Pre-School Supplementary bill), it runs a second model using the 91st Congress (1969-1971) as T1. Given the increased number of childcare bills introduced during the 91st Congress (six), and the fact that it immediately predated the McGovern-Fraser reforms, employing the 91st as T1 is preferable to the 90th. Measurement is another concern: of the various universal childcare bills introduced from the late 1960s, only a handful ever reached the House or Senate floor for a full vote. Therefore in order to effectively track legislators’ positions over time, this analysis focuses on co-sponsorship, as opposed to roll call votes, thus further enlarging the amount of data.

Since the analysis begins at a time period so close to the CDA’s passage (which occurred during the 92nd Congress), it leaves little opportunity to examine the effect of conversion versus replacement immediately prior to the CDA. However, it continues until the 101st Congress, which culminated in the 1990 passage of the Act for Better Childcare, the next landmark piece of childcare legislation to pass through the United States Congress (see footnote 97). It focuses specifically on the pieces of middle-income friendly childcare legislation discussed in 3.2, beginning with Mink’s 1967 bill in the 90th and ending with the Act for Better Childcare during

---

121 The 1962 (limited reintroduction of means-tested funding) and 1967 (Amendments to the Social Security Act) bills noted in Section 3.1.
the 101st. This longitudinal analysis, whilst not starting at the ideal time point, at least displays the trend that began in the late 1960s and indicates the extent to which the Democrats’ overall embrace of childcare policy – an issue that by the 1980s was firmly in their court rather than the Republicans’ – was driven by either trade union oriented Democrats or by younger, more progressive Democrats aligned with the new politics movement.

Rapoport and Stone (1994) developed a model that identifies the extent to which conversion, replacement and mobilisation effects explain position/opinion shifts over time. The ‘conversion’ effect refers to the proportion of change between Time 1 and Time 2 that can be explained by respondents who remained in the panel over the entire time period under consideration (‘stayers’) and changed their position during that time. The ‘replacement’ effect is the proportion of total change between Time 1 and Time 2 that can be accounted for by the entry of newcomers whose views differed from their predecessors who had dropped out. Finally, ‘mobilisation’ refers to the proportion of change that can be explained by the entry of newcomers in excess of the number that had dropped out, in other words the proportion of change that goes beyond simple replacement (Rapoport and Stone, 1994). The value for co-sponsoring a bill is ‘1’ and for not co-sponsoring is ‘0.’

The formula for disaggregating change is:

\[ T_2 - T_1 = (\beta \alpha)(S_2 - S_1) + \beta(1 - \alpha)(N_2 - D_1) + (1 - \beta)(N_2 - T_1) \]

Where:
- \( T_1 \) and \( T_2 \) are mean values of the variable under observation at the first and second time periods under observation
- \( S \) is the average value for ‘stayers,’ i.e. those present at both \( T_1 \) and \( T_2 \)
- \( \beta \) is the ratio of the size of the group at \( T_1 \) relative to the size at \( T_2 \)
- \( \alpha \) is the proportion of the group at \( T_1 \) which is comprised, of ‘stayers’
- \( D_1 \) is the mean value for ‘dropouts,’ i.e. those who were present at \( T_1 \) but not \( T_2 \)
- \( N_2 \) is the mean value for ‘newcomers,’ i.e. those who were present at \( T_2 \) but not \( T_1 \)

The first part of the equation reflects the conversion effect, the second replacement and the third, mobilisation.

122 Childcare bills that are focused entirely on means-tested assistance (e.g. welfare to work programmes) that do not include benefits for middle-income families, (for example an increase in the Child Care Development Block Grant or increases in the Dependent Care Tax Credit) are excluded.
i. 90th to 101st Congress

This first analysis starts in the 90th Congress (1967-1969) and completes in the 101st Congress. At T1, 25 out of 252 (10%) House Democrats co-sponsored at least one childcare bill; that figure became 119 out of 271, or 44%, by T2, yielding a 34% increase in co-sponsorship rates. Of the 32 House Democratic ‘stayers’ who remained in office throughout the time period, five (or 16%) co-sponsored in the 90th. That figure slightly more than doubled to 11 (34%) in the 101st. The House Democrat co-sponsorship values are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
T1 &= 0.099 \\
T2 &= 0.439 \\
S1 &= 0.156 \\
S2 &= 0.344 \\
B &= 0.93 \\
\alpha &= 0.127 \\
D1 &= 0.091 \\
N2 &= 0.452
\end{align*}
\]

Despite the doubling of stayers who co-sponsored in the 101st, when these values are applied to the Rapoport and Stone model, total party position change appears to be mechanised largely by replacement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total change:</th>
<th>Conversion</th>
<th>Replacement</th>
<th>Mobilisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34% comprised of:</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>7.26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 Rapoport and Stone: US 90th Congress – 101st Congress (Source: Congressional Record, Thomas 2014)

The large number of incoming Democrats who co-sponsored outweighs the effects of conversion. The newcomers co-sponsored at higher rate (45%) at T2 than did the stayers (34%) and even more so than the dropouts at T1 (9.1% of whom co-sponsored).

ii. 91st to 101st:

As previously noted, a second analysis starting at the 91st Congress is also employed in order to guard against the possibility that the relatively small number childcare bills introduced during the 90th Congress skewed the results. In contrast to the 90th, where one childcare bill was introduced (Rep. Mink’s HR9720), there were six childcare related bills introduced during the 91st Congress: HR 4190 and HR 4191, two versions of the Pre-school Centers Supplementary Education Act (1969); HR4314, which amended the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act so as to let employers and trade unions set up contribution funds for childcare centres (1969); and HR 13520 (1969),

123 In contrast to the 90th, where one childcare bill was introduced (Rep. Mink’s HR9720), there were six childcare related bills introduced during the 91st Congress: HR 4190 and HR 4191, two versions of the Pre-school Centers Supplementary Education Act (1969); HR4314, which amended the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act so as to let employers and trade unions set up contribution funds for childcare centres (1969); and HR 13520 (1969),
than the 90th for several reasons: it was the first Congress during which any bill promoting universal access to affordable childcare was introduced into the Chamber\textsuperscript{124} and it was the last Congress before the impact of the McGovern-Fraser reforms would have been felt. As the commission ran from 1969-1972, we might expect that after the 91st, its reforms would have begun to make an impact on the social and political preferences, and socioeconomic backgrounds, of incoming legislators (Stricherz 2003).

During the 91st Congress, 19\% of House Democrats co-sponsored at least one of the childcare bills introduced into the chamber; that figure was 44\% during the 101st Congress. To what extent was that 25\% increase driven by conversion amongst stayers, replacement or mobilisation? Of the 39 House Democrats who stayed in office between T1 and T2, 10 (26\%) co-sponsored a piece of universal childcare legislation during the 91st Congress. 11 (28\%) co-sponsored childcare legislation during the 101st. Immediately, this suggests that the relative amount of change accorded to conversion would be quite low: only one additional stayer co-sponsored a universal childcare bill at T2 than had done so at T1.

The House Democrat co-sponsorship values are as follows:

\begin{align*}
T1 &= .192 \\
T2 &= .439 \\
S1 &= .256 \\
S2 &= .282 \\
B &= .992 \\
\alpha &= .156 \\
D1 &= .18 \\
N2 &= .47
\end{align*}

And as expected, applying these values to the Rapoport and Stone formula yields replacement-heavy findings: of the 25\% total change in House Democrat childcare co-sponsorship between the 91st and 101st Congresses, just 1.55\% can be attributed to legislator conversion, 0.8\% to legislator mobilisation and 98.3\% to legislator replacement.

\textsuperscript{124} Whereas Mink’s bills, first introduced during the 90th, would have provided capital funding to build centres, they were not as comprehensive as the CDA (and its precursors, three of which were introduced during the 91st), which included capital and operational funding as well as guidelines on eligibility and fees.
This result is not entirely surprising: in contrast to the one stayer who converted, the newcomers to the House (i.e. those who arrived after the 91st Congress) had higher co-sponsorship rates than their stayer counterparts at T2 (47% versus 28%) just as they had higher co-sponsorship rates at T2 than the House Democrat dropouts had at T1 (47% versus 18%, respectively).

The Rapoport and Stone equations indicate that replacement was the dominant mechanism behind childcare policy adoption yet, as previously noted, it does necessarily confirm that the new Democrats who churned into the House of Representatives had backgrounds typically associated with post-materialist, left-liberal values, nor that those who co-sponsored – be they newcomers or stayers – had such backgrounds. Table 3.5, below, includes descriptive statistics that show the proportion of men, women, university and non-university educated House Democrats who co-sponsored at points T1 and T2. It also shows the proportion of Democratic Representatives with a COPE score higher than their ADA score who co-sponsored (and vice-versa). T-tests are applied to indicate whether differences in the per cent of men/women, university educated/non and those with positive/negative COPE-ADA scores who co-sponsored are statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-sponsor characteristics</th>
<th>91st Congress</th>
<th>101st Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women, %</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men, %</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University educated, %</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-university educated</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive COPE-ADA score&lt;sup&gt;125&lt;/sup&gt;, %</td>
<td>19+</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative COPE-ADA score, %</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern, %</td>
<td>3***</td>
<td>34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Southern, %</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Ed and Labor, %</td>
<td>86**</td>
<td>76**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-House Ed and Labour, %</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>125</sup> Where the difference in scores is zero, it is counted as being a negative COPE-ADA score.

Table 3.5 Democratic Co-sponsor characteristics (Source: Sharp 2000, Anderson and Habel 2009)
In the 91st Congress there was no statistically significant difference between the proportions of men and women who co-sponsored childcare legislation, nor was there a statistically significant difference between the proportion of university and non-university educated House Democrats who co-sponsored. There was a statistically significant difference between the proportion of Representatives with positive and negative COPE-ADA scores who co-sponsored, however not in the direction hypothesised: a greater proportion of House Democrats with a COPE score that exceeded their ADA score co-sponsored, relative to House Democrats with an ADA score that was higher than their COPE score.\(^{126}\)

A control variable for a legislator representing a state in the Southern US is also included because as discussed in 3.3, they were associated with social conservatism and often allied with Republicans on social policy issues. Another control variable is added for Education and Labor Committee members, since one might expect them to be the first and most likely to introduce and/or co-sponsor bills that pass through their committee. Differences between these control variables – Southern/non-Southern and whether or not a Representative sat on the House Education and Labor Committee – are both statistically significant at the 99.9% and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Indeed, just three per cent of Southerners co-sponsored a childcare-related bill during the 91st, relative to 27% of non-Southerners.\(^{127}\) 86% of those sitting on the House Education and Labour Committee did so, relative to just 16% of those not on the committee.\(^{128}\)

By the 101st Congress, female Democrats co-sponsored in slightly greater proportion than did male Democrats, just as university educated Democrats co-sponsored at a somewhat higher rate than did their non-university educated counterparts, however neither of these differences is statistically significant. Representatives with lower COPE scores than ADA scores did co-sponsor in greater proportion than their counterparts with the opposite pairing (a higher COPE to ADA) but the difference is not statistically significant. The control variables for being Southern and sitting on the House Education and Labor Committee again show up as significant: 34% of Southerners co-sponsored relative to 62% of non-Southerners, a difference that is statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level.\(^{129}\) 76% of House Education and Labor Committee

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126 However, it should be noted that there were just ten House Democrats in the 91st who had an ADA score that was higher than their COPE, relative to 225 who had a higher COPE than ADA score (there are no available 91st Congress COPE and/or ADA scores for 15 remaining House Democrats).

127 There were 91 House Democrats who hailed from the South during the 91st Congress.

128 There were seven Democrats on the House Education and Labor Committee during the 91st Congress.

129 There were 86 Southern House Democrats during the 101st Congress.
members co-sponsored relative to 51% of House Democrats who did not sit on that committee, a difference statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.\textsuperscript{130}

Both Rapoport and Stone and the descriptive statistics above treat House Democrats’ co-sponsorship of childcare bills as a binary variable (i.e. a legislator did or did not co-sponsor) and as such, they do not indicate what might drive some legislators to co-sponsor more than once – which may prove to be a more informative measure of the extent to which legislators embraced the issue. In order to test whether the Rapoport and Stone-based findings hold when we consider co-sponsorship along a continuous scale (for example, from zero to five in the 91\textsuperscript{st} Congress) and to test whether or not that the ‘replacement’ effect implies an association between co-sponsoring and post-materialism, multiple linear (OLS) regressions are run. Without attempting to provide a comprehensive model of the all the factors that drove a legislator to co-sponsor a childcare bill, these models serve to test the relative partial effects of our main variables of interest: gender, education (university-educated or non) and, as a proxy for loyalty to socially-left causes and/or labour unions, two interest group ratings: Americans for Democratic Action and COPE.\textsuperscript{131} Control variables for representing a Southern state and sitting on the House Education and Labor Committee are also included.

Although the OLS regressions as shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are intended to highlight associations between legislator characteristics and the strength of their commitment to childcare, (i.e. how many times they co-sponsored/debated the issue) there is not, across the three cases at hand, a normal distribution of childcare co-sponsorship and/or debate mentions. This is particularly concerning in the ALP and Labour Party cases, where debate mentions rather than bill co-sponsorship form the dependent variable: an individual MP’s number of debate mentions can range from zero to as high as 34 (as in the UK’s 52nd Parliament). Moreover, all three cases include a large quantity of zeros (i.e. legislators who did not co-sponsor/debate childcare).

In order to guard against the weaknesses of the OLS model in handling such non-normal distributions, binary logistic regressions are also run. In these, the independent variables remain identical to those in the OLS models however the dependent variable is not the number of bills co-sponsored or the number of debate mentions but rather, it is whether or not a legislator co-sponsored/debated. Because the differences between the two sets of results are not striking in any of the three cases (under the binary logistic regressions, nearly all of the independent

\textsuperscript{130} There were 21 Democrats on the House Education and Labor Committee during the 101\textsuperscript{st} Congress.

\textsuperscript{131} Interest group ratings are employed instead of measures of career long voting records on different types of social and economic issues as for example captured in DW nominate scores (Caroll et. al. 2013) because this study is interested in legislators feeling beholden to a particular constituency (i.e. labour unions or the new left, etc.) and the extent to which that drives their proclivity to co-sponsor particular types of legislation.
variables have a similar direction and significance level as in the OLS), footnotes 133 and 134, attached to the discussion of the OLS findings, compare results between the two different types of regression analysis. The binary logistic tables themselves are included under Appendix D whereas the OLS results and corresponding discussion appear below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.119 (.161)</td>
<td>.122 (.156)</td>
<td>.226* (.135)</td>
<td>.204 (.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.245 (.259)</td>
<td>.246 (.258)</td>
<td>.135 (.229)</td>
<td>.205 (.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score, 91st</td>
<td>.005* (.002)</td>
<td>.005** (.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE Score, 91st</td>
<td>.000 (.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA - COPE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.001(.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE - ADA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.003 (.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-.094 (.123)</td>
<td>-.088 (.113)</td>
<td>-.289*** (.071)</td>
<td>-.335*** (.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed and Labor Cmte</td>
<td>2.19***(.221)</td>
<td>2.189*** (.219)</td>
<td>2.31*** (.211)</td>
<td>2.26*** (.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.098 (.210)</td>
<td>-.097 (.163)</td>
<td>.101 (.135)</td>
<td>.225 (.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>.402</td>
<td>.394</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>.385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
Table 3.6 OLS regression results, US 91st Congress (Source: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000)

Table 3.6, Model 1 for the 91st Congress finds that whilst controlling for all other variables, education, gender and being southern yield no statistically significant effects on the number of bills a House Democrat co-sponsored; the partial association between ADA score and bills co-sponsored is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level, albeit with a small coefficient (a one unit increase in ADA score, on average, yields a .005 increase in the number of bills a legislator co-sponsors). However, one concern is the strong correlation between the ADA and COPE ratings (Pearson’s correlation coefficient of .854 at the 99.9% confidence level). Removing the COPE score yields a positive and more significant relationship for the ADA score (as shown in Model 2) whilst removing the ADA score (not shown) yields a positive though not significant relationship between COPE score and co-sponsorship (b=.004, p=.06).
In order to address any possible complications from the correlation issue, Model 3 calculates the difference between ADA and COPE scores, wherein respondents with a higher ADA than COPE score have a positive numerical score and in Model 4 the reverse is done (ADA score subtracted from COPE score).\textsuperscript{132} Controlling for all other variables, a higher ADA-COPE score is associated with a greater number of bills co-sponsored, whilst as shown in Model 4, a higher COPE relative to ADA score has a negative association with co-sponsoring. However, neither coefficient is statistically significant at the 90\% confidence level. Finally, Model 4 shows that the control variable – Education and Labour Committee membership – is positively associated and significant at the 99.9\% confidence level; indicating that controlling for all other variables, a Democratic member on the committee would, on average, co-sponsor 2.26 more childcare-related bills than would a non-committee member. Controlling for all other variables, being Southern has a negative and significant association with co-sponsorship, indicating that, holding all else constant, Southern House Democrats co-sponsored, on average, 3.35 fewer bills than their non-Southern counterparts.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{132} As they are based on different votes, the scales on which they are calculated are somewhat different. However COPE scores for House Democrats run on average higher than do ADA scores (in the 91\textsuperscript{st}, the average COPE score was 73, ADA was 49; in the 101\textsuperscript{st} those figures were 81 and 71, respectively), suggesting that any association between having a positive ADA-COPE score and co-sponsorship has met a very conservative test, particularly in the 91\textsuperscript{st} Congress. Given the large difference in averages one can be confident that a legislator who scores higher on the ADA score than the COPE score is most likely located in the left-liberal quadrant, as opposed to left-authoritarian quadrant, of party competition.

\textsuperscript{133} The binary logistic regressions replicating the OLS models used in the 91\textsuperscript{st} produce results quite similar to those shown in Table 3.6. Controlling for all other variables, both university education and gender remain insignificant across the models. Whilst still insignificant, the direction of association between being female and co-sponsoring is, in contrast to the OLS results, negative across all four models, holding all else constant. ADA and COPE scores also have a similar association with co-sponsorship in both types of regression, however the significance of ADA in Model 2 declined from 99\% in the OLS regression to 95\% in the logistic. In both regressions, ADA-COPE scores (Model 3) are positive and insignificant. The COPE-ADA score (Model 4) is negative and insignificant in the OLS but negative and significant at the 99\% confidence level in the logistic, holding all else constant. This indicates a negative association between having being scored higher by a unionist than a socially liberal interest group and the log odds of co-sponsoring. The control variable for sitting on the Education and Labor Committee is, as with the OLS results, positive and significant in Model 3 (in the OLS results it is significant at the 99.9\% confidence level and in the binary logistic it is significant at the 99\% level), however it is no longer significant in the logistic Model 4. The other control variable, Southern, remains negative and significant at the 99.9\% confidence level, controlling for all other variables, in Models 3 and 4. For the full output see Appendix D.
Twenty years later, in the 101st Congress, gender and university education both remain insignificantly associated with co-sponsorship, holding all else constant. ADA and COPE scores remain heavily correlated with one and other (Pearson’s correlation coefficient of .814, at the 99.9% confidence level), however as Model 3 indicates, House Democrats with ADA scores that are higher than their COPE scores are positively and significantly associated with co-sponsorship at the 95% confidence level. Similarly, Model 4 shows that controlling for all other variables, having a COPE score higher than an ADA score yields a negative association with co-sponsoring childcare bills. While both ADA-COPE and COPE-ADA variables are significant at the 95% confidence level, their coefficients are quite small (.006 and -.011, respectively). The control for representing a Southern state is now both negatively and significantly associated at the 99.9% confidence level: Model 4 shows that a Southerner is, on average, likely to co-sponsor .566 fewer bills than a non-Southerner, holding all else constant. Controlling for all other variables, sitting on the Education and Labor Committee is again positive and significantly associated at

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>-.338 (.472)</td>
<td>-.316 (.470)</td>
<td>-.241 (.522)</td>
<td>-.190 (.506)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.115 (.136)</td>
<td>.333 (.229)</td>
<td>.247 (.238)</td>
<td>.397 (.247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score, 101st</td>
<td>.017***(.004)</td>
<td>.018*** (.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE Score, 101st</td>
<td>.001 (.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA - COPE</td>
<td></td>
<td>.006* (.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE - ADA</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.011* (.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>.344 (.230)</td>
<td>-.098 (.133)</td>
<td>-.555***(.117)</td>
<td>-.566*** (.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed and Labor Cmte</td>
<td>.269 (.188)</td>
<td>.257 (.187)</td>
<td>.412* (.201)</td>
<td>.446* (.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.080 (.526)</td>
<td>-.080 (.513)</td>
<td>1.267* (.526)</td>
<td>1.294* (.509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

Table 3.7 OLS regression results, US 101st Congress (Source: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000)
the 95% confidence level (a House Democrat on the committee would, on average, sponsor .446 more childcare bills than non-committee members).  

These findings indicate that whilst on average both socially liberal and trade union-oriented backgrounds were significant in childcare co-sponsorship patterns during the 91st and 101st Congresses, those who were rated higher by the ADA than they were the AFL-CIO’s COPE, were positively and significantly associated with co-sponsorship. Those who were rated higher by COPE than they were the ADA had in the 101st, a negative and significant association with co-sponsorship, indicating that by the early 1990s, post-materialism was relatively more important than unionism in fostering childcare policy adoption in the legislative sense. This new politics argument is further supported by the fact that during the 91st and 101st Congresses Southern Democrats, a group who on average eschewed new politics, also had a negative and significant association with bill co-sponsorship. This, in combination with the ADA-COPE findings, does seem to suggest that the Democrats’ embrace of childcare was pushed along by the arrival of new politics legislators. However, the coefficients for university education and being female – two factors associated with new politics – are statistically insignificant. This apparent contradiction could in fact reflect the difficulty of measuring new politics orientation: a large majority of Congress is university-educated; given that 93% of all House Democrats in the 91st Congress had been to university, there was not much room for variation based simply upon education. In addition, the proportion of female House Democrats remained quite low throughout the period of study (they ranged from just 2.3 to 5.3%). The act of co-sponsoring (as opposed to debating) may indeed require a level of networking and committee placement that is challenging for minority Representatives to take part in.

The Rapoport and Stone findings, that legislator replacement mechanised the party’s embrace of childcare more so than legislator conversion, seem upheld. Characteristics associated with new

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134 The binary logistic regression replicating the OLS models for the 101st displays largely similar results in terms of direction of association and significance to those that appear in Table 3.7. While the direction of association between university and gender varies across all four models, they remain consistently insignificant, controlling for all other variables, as in the OLS findings. ADA scores, in both Models 1 and 2, are positive and significant at the 99.9% confidence level in both the OLS and logistic regressions. ADA-COPE scores (in Model 3) are, holding all else constant, positively and significantly associated with co-sponsorship in both regressions, however the confidence level is 95% in the OLS model and 99% in the logistic. COPE-ADA scores (Model 4) are, in both the OLS and logistic results, negatively associated however, unlike the OLS findings, the variable is no longer significant in the binary logistic model. The control for being Southern has the same negative and significant association (at the 99.9% confidence level) in Models 3 and 4 in both the OLS and logistic regressions. The control for sitting on the Education and Labor Committee is also largely similar between the two regression analyses: under the OLS it has a positive and significant association with co-sponsorship in Models 3 and 4, whereas in the logistic regression it remains positive but is only significant (at the 99% confidence level) in Model 4. For the full model see Appendix D.

135 During the 48th UK Parliament (1979-83) 57% of Labour MPs were university educated; in Australia’s 28th Parliament (1972-74) 37% of ALP MPs were university educated. This compares to 93% of all House Democrats during the 91st Congress (1969-71).
politics Democrats (mainly a higher ADA relative to COPE score) is significantly associated with higher rates of bill co-sponsorship just as being Southern Democrat or at T2, a high COPE-ADA scorer, is negatively and significantly associated, controlling for all other variables.

b. What did legislator ‘replacement’ look like?
While there has been large amount of explanatory power attributed to legislator replacement and the influence of legislators with characteristics more akin to new politics than unionism, to what extent did legislator replacement occur, and were the new legislators really very different from their predecessors?

Figure 3.7 displays the percentage point terms difference in House Democrats’ characteristics between the 91st and 101st Congresses. The increase in average Democratic ADA score (23 percentage points) relative to COPE score (eight percentage points) suggests that even accounting for shifts in standards in interest group ratings over time, the intake of House Democrats between 1969 and 1991 must have advanced more socially progressive pieces of legislation than did their predecessors. Time adjusted interest group ratings would be preferable in this case because the set of votes used to calculate these scores each year is not constant and thus the underlying scales can be different from year to year (Groseclose et al. 1999). However, the interest group scores here are not adjusted because there are no data for adjusted COPE scores over time. Figure 3.8 which displays over-time change does include adjusted ADA scores (Anderson and Habel 2009). The extent to which this new intake was more or less ‘pro-labour’ than their predecessors in absolute terms is unclear, however the strength of post-materialism (as measured by ADA scores) has increased relative to unionism, as the Rapoport and Stone and OLS findings would suggest. There were less significant, but positive, increases in university educated and female legislators and a decline in Southern Democrats.137

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136 As previously noted, the reason for the modest increase in university educated legislators is simply the higher starting point (relative to what will be shown in the Australian and British cases): in the 91st Congress 93% of all House Democrats already had a university education – so there was not much scope for a large increase.

137 See Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010) for a discussion on the low level of female political representation in the US.
c. Approximating the forces and mechanics of change

The Rapoport and Stone results indicate that replacement was by far the dominant mechanism behind the Democrats’ increased embrace of childcare and the OLS regressions largely confirmed a strong association between childcare co-sponsorship rate and legislators with characteristics that we would expect from ‘post-materialists’ (e.g. higher ADA score relative to COPE, non-Southern). Who did not co-sponsor? The typical House Democrat stayer who did not co-sponsor a single childcare bill between the 90th and 101st Congresses was Southern and socially conservative: more than half of the non-sponsoring stayers represented Southern states and their average ADA rating in 1990 was 56%, against a mean House Democrat rating of 71%. These findings are reflected by just glancing at the 1971 roll call vote on the CDA: 47 (90%) of the 52 House Democrats who voted against passing the Child Development Act conference
report (which cleared the measure for the President) were Southerners. However, what does this say about unions? The OLS regressions do indeed indicate that having a higher COPE relative to ADA score (which as previously noted is a conservative test) was, in the 91st Congress, negatively but not significantly associated with co-sponsorship; by the 101st this association remained negative and was significant at the 95% confidence level. Whilst, overall, Southern Democrats provided an even greater hurdle to childcare policy adoption than did unionists, this research question is centred upon the relative importance of replacement versus trade union pressure in driving change. At least according to the quantitative results displayed here, replacement outweighed conversion and post-materialists outweighed unionists in driving childcare policy adoption.

3.5 Conclusions: a new electoral agenda emboldened by reform

This chapter’s qualitative analysis, which emphasises significant shifts in both Democrats’ and Republicans’ longstanding electoral coalitions, suggests that the Democrats’ childcare policy adoption, in both legislative and in electoral terms, was largely driven by electoral imperative and mechanised by the influx of more socially liberal and to a lesser extent, higher-educated and female legislators. However, it does not find that unions were absent from the childcare policy adoption process; despite disagreement over the ERA and the AFL-CIO’s opposition to modernising reforms in the Democratic Party, it has been shown that unions did play active roles in Congressional childcare policy development. Quantitative findings uphold the relative power of replacement and the rise of post-materialist legislators as the driver behind childcare policy adoption (i.e. party position change) but are more negative on the impact of unions. Conversion, for example, played little role in mechanising party position change whereas regressions showed negative and mostly non-significant associations between a legislator having a high COPE score (or higher COPE than ADA score) and their co-sponsoring childcare legislation.

This is not to suggest that unions provided a significant hurdle to the party adopting childcare policy. In fact out of the quantitative variables analysed here, that title would surely go to one of the control variables, Representatives from Southern states. Although social conservatives, such as AFL-CIO President George Meany, lambasted the power accrued by social liberals’ within the Democratic Party, this chapter also explains that union representatives sat alongside left-liberals and civil rights activists on the original ad hoc childcare committee in the early 1970s and again in its 1975 reformation. Whilst the Rapoport and Stone model suggests little to no evidence of legislator conversion, the OLS findings indicate that ADA and COPE scores are

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138 The Southern Democrats were a part of the ‘conservative coalition’ of conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats (Congressional Quarterly, 1971).
correlated: one need to be either ‘pro-labour’ or ‘left-liberal’; indeed many of the legislators with high ADA scores also have high COPE scores. However, as it stands, the influence of unions at both T1 a and T2 on childcare policy adoption, in legislative terms, is weak relative to that of replacement and post-materialism, the variables this research associates with electoral imperative. As unions became increasingly feminised and the overarching power of the Meany challenged, childcare could have indeed comprised a larger place on their agenda and perhaps they could have played a stronger role in pushing the Democrats on the issue. This, however, speaks to the importance of timing and party internal organisation: just as unions were becoming increasingly feminised, their power within the Democratic Party was already being reduced.

Section 3.3 indicates that change in class and gender-based party-voter linkages predated strategic appeals to new middle class male and females voters: for example the influx of middle-income childcare assistance bills and the amount of attention devoted to universal childcare in the Democratic Party Platform occurred late 1960s and early 1970s. However, class and gender declined from the early 1960s (see Figures 1.16-17 and 1.20). Whilst this gap in time between electoral change and childcare policy adoption does not appear as stark as those what will be discussed in the Australian and British chapters (and in Chapter Six), it does beg the question of whether internal party reforms mediated the speed in which parties were able to make strategic appeals to post-materialist voters, either in the legislature or during election campaigns, and hence promise specific work/family policies, either by writing legislation or placing them on the Party Platform.

On the one hand, the Childcare Development Act was written and had received popular support at the same time the McGovern-Fraser reforms were being developed and implemented, therefore suggesting that party reform had no mediating impact on childcare policy adoption in the legislative sense. However, party reform could indeed have had a mediating impact on childcare policy adoption in the electoral sense: the direct impact of McGovern-Fraser included a 27 percentage point increase in the number of female conference delegates between 1968 and 1972 (from 13% to 40%) as well as the fact that the platform committee, in 1972, became 44% female with 46% its drafting subcommittee female and all of its four vice-chairs female (NY Times 1972). The resultant platform was the first to promise a specific programme of universal childcare just as it was the first to include a section focused exclusively on the ‘rights of women.’ Moreover, the quotas for youths and minorities alongside women, as well as the de-facto mandate for primaries that occurred as a result of McGovern-Fraser, are argued to have allowed the rise of new left candidates and the influx of new left party members at the expense of union power brokers (see for example Rae 1994, 21-23). So whilst the internal organisational
reforms occurred too late to have directly spurred the development of childcare legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they did foster an increased proportion of women sitting on the committee that wrote what was then the most feminist party platform in Democratic Party history. Moreover, the reforms were representative of the left-liberal inertia within the party that ensured that both candidate selection procedures (and internal party decision making structures) would be increasingly won (and increasingly influenced by) the party’s rising ranks of left-liberal, post-materialist members. These same members and legislators, who joined and were elected in the wake of McGovern-Fraser, would take the leading role in advancing childcare policy from the 1972 election up until this study’s endpoint, the 101st Congress.
Chapter Four: Two steps forward… The Australian Labor Party and universal childcare

4.1 Introduction
The following chapter analyses the Australian Labor Party’s embrace of childcare as an electoral issue and as a legislative priority both in the run up to the 1983 and 1984 federal elections. It will first briefly trace childcare policy development in Australia before placing the issue in the context of two separate, albeit related, events: Australian parties’ shifting electoral coalitions and the ALP’s response to it, which included changes in both electoral strategy and party organisation. It will then qualitatively analyse the trade unions’ stance on childcare. Next, using data derived from Parliamentary debate and legislator demographics, it attempts to determine whether the ALP’s embrace of childcare was mechanised by legislator conversion and driven by trade union pressure or mechanised by legislator replacement and driven by electoral strategy. This analysis is conducted with two techniques: Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model for disaggregating political change and OLS regressions that further test for an association between a legislator raising the issue in parliamentary debate and characteristics associated with either unionism or post-materialism. It will conclude on the relative strength of trade union pressure versus electoral imperative on driving party position change and also discuss the importance of party reform as a factor that mediated the speed in which electoral imperative was able to drive childcare policy adoption.

4.2 This time, a real promise: childcare from World War II until the late 1980s
Pre-war Australian childcare could be characterised as ‘philanthropic’; the few childcare centres that existed in the pre-war era were essentially centres for the study of ‘best practice’ on child health and care for children whose mothers were forced to work. Dubbed “Lady Gowrie Centres” after their founder, these facilities were not in fact services to provide full-day care in aid of female employment but rather charitable units staffed by middle class female volunteers. In fact, Suffragettes founded the organisation that ran the centres, the Kindergarten Union, in 1895 (Brennan 1994, 40-41). The exigencies of the World War II effort saw married women’s employment rise from 11% in 1933 to 25% in 1943. However the Labour-led Commonwealth Government’s childcare response was somewhat muted: a conference on the issue of wartime childcare was held in Sydney during 1942 and minimal funds were appropriated for an experimental childcare programme. Whereas the UK and the US central/federal governments had developed specific administrative structures to provide wartime care, the Australian Commonwealth government simply offered additional funding to pre-existing voluntary preschool organisations, in the hopes they could expand services enough to meet rising demand. The results were limited: only 14 new centres across three states were developed. According to Brennan, the hesitancy to involve state structures was in part due to concerns about the party’s
key constituencies: they did not want to offend the Catholic Church, with its focus on the preservation of maternal care nor did they want to anger unions, who resisted policies that would compromise the male breadwinner model (Brennan 1994, 47-48).

Despite a continual rise in women’s employment, the issue remained largely off the political agenda during the 1950s. Increased demand for pre-school education did not translate into a public debate over childcare. Brennan states that “there was some response from the market” in the form of child-minders but that “most women appear to have coped with the lack of childcare services by calling upon friends, neighbours and members of their extended family to provide help” (Brennan 1994, 53-55). Popularity for compensatory pre-school programmes, elicited by the influential “Plowden Report” in the UK and, in particular, the US’s Head Start programme increased from the 1960s, albeit public assistance was state rather than federal based and provision varied heavily from state to state, with Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania integrating pre-school into their primary schools. Voluntary pre-school provision dominated in Victoria and New South Wales (NSW), with NSW influenced particularly by both Catholic church and trade union objections to interventions with the under-fives (Brennan 1994, 53-57).

Moreover these services, varied as they were, focused on sessional pre-school education rather than the full-day programmes that would allow a second earner to take up full-time employment.

In 1972 the Liberal-Country governing Coalition passed the Commonwealth Child Care Act (CCA), the first federal-level intervention into the Australian childcare market. The Act stipulated that the Commonwealth government would appropriate capital grants and operational subsidies directly to community groups and local-government sponsored bodies in order for them to develop early years and, in particular, long day childcare programmes. Emphasis – though no formal guidelines for monitoring – was placed upon directing funds towards children “in need.” The legislation stated that, over three years, the Commonwealth would appropriate $23 million to community-groups and local governments who completed funding submissions. Passed on 2 November 1972, the McMahon Liberal-Country Coalition was voted out of Government before appropriating any funds. Contextually, the timing seemed appropriate: GDP growth throughout the 1960s averaged 5.3% whilst unemployment remained under 4%. The country had also experienced a significant jump in women’s employment, particularly located in the lower-wage tiers of the economy: by 1968, married women comprised 17.2% of the workforce, leading Liberal ministers to fear that thousands of pre-school aged children were left in unsatisfactory caring conditions. With a labour shortage unfolding, employer organisations began calling for a government action to foster female labour force participation, complaining
that females “on the birth of their first child, would be lost to industry for at least five years” (Brennan 1998, 63).

Opposition to the bill was largely fractured: debate surrounding women’s employment and childcare displayed a split between the traditionally conservative, Catholic members of the ALP, just as it did between male and female trade unionists. Whilst ALP Senator Arthur Giezeitelt castigated the Coalition for not moving sooner – nor stronger – on childcare provision in aid of a woman’s freedom to choose between work and care, the ALP’s industrial relations spokesman, Clyde Cameron, argued that an increase in the family wage would negate the need for women to work in the first place (Brennan 1998, 64; Commonwealth Senate Hansard 30 October 1972).

Although female trade unionists held meetings with then Australian Congress of Trade Unions (ACTU)\textsuperscript{139} President, and future Labor Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, in which they endorsed childcare, the ACTU officially prioritised the idea of a family wage – in lieu of childcare – until 1977 (Brennan 1994, 141).

Considering the pertinent context in which childcare policy entered the political arena (low unemployment, rising female labour force participation) and the fractured if not limited opposition to the policy, one might have expected childcare facilities to expand dramatically and for the policy in and of itself to take off as a vote winning issue. However, subsequent Governments – Labor under Gough Whitlam from 1972-1976 and the Liberal Coalition led by Malcolm Fraser from 1976-1983 – did not make substantive progress on the issue. In fact after two years of commissions and intra-party struggle, the ruling ALP could still not agree whether the policy was meant to be employed for educational (i.e. pre-school, half day) or daycare (full-day care whilst parents work) purposes. Under Whitman, the details of the submission-based model were finalised. The outcome of this however, was that organised, established pre-school associations were able to out-compete nascent and as yet non-existent childcare services for operational subsidies from the federal government. Although Fraser’s subsequent Coalition Government in 1976 attempted to limit pre-school funding – arguing that it fell under the remit of state-level education departments – and redirect subsidies towards child daycare centres, overall funding and the total growth in places remained quite stagnant (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2)\textsuperscript{140}. Moreover, the issue of childcare – and broader family policy issues – remained largely

\textsuperscript{139} The ACTU is the predominant peak-level union in Australia.

\textsuperscript{140} The steep rise in federal outlays from 1991, as seen in Figure 4.1, was not the result of increased spending commitments but instead the unintended consequence of policy change wherein the government began to subsidise thousands of families already using private, for-profit childcare. This made the government liable for over AU $40m extra payments per year (Brennan 1994, 203).

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off either party’s radar in subsequent federal elections, as indicated by Figures 1.7 and 1.8\(^{141}\) (Brennan 1998, 101; 124, 176-77).

The ALP had in the mid 1970s under Gough Whitlam begun to ‘modernise’ its image by campaigning on issues of interest to middle class families and in particular middle-income women: for example Brennan recalls Whitlam’s discussion of childcare during the 1974 campaign:

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\(^{141}\) Australian Federal elections are held every at least every three years; the House serves a maximum of three year terms and the Senate typically serves a fixed six-year term except in the instance of a ‘double dissolution.’
“At the Lane Cove Town Hall, on Sydney’s North Shore, the heart of middle class suburbia, Whitlam promised a child care program, the key features of which were free pre-school education, subsidised child care with parents contributing according to their means, and the encouragement of the creation of child care centres and holiday programs by industry” (Brennan 1998, 89).

Whitlam later stated that he had “no doubt that this commitment had much to do with our return to power” (Brennan 1998, 89). Though it was not until 1983 that, under the leadership of Bob Hawke, the ALP placed childcare within the key element of its election strategy: in the run up to the campaign the ALP signed a Prices and Incomes Accord with the ACTU which formalised an agreement for wage restraint in return for an increase in the “social wage” – childcare being denoted as key component of said wage – and the Accord being a central component of the ALP’s campaign (Brennan 1994, 165-66). During the 1984 election campaign the party prioritised the issue of childcare access and specific funding commitments. According to Deborah Brennan, childcare was “in expenditure terms, the biggest promise made by the government during the campaign” (Brennan 1998, 176). The Liberal-National Coalition engaged the issue but promised less: whilst the ALP offered to create an additional 20,000 new subsidised places available to children from families of all incomes, at a total cost of AU $100 million, the Liberal-National coalition campaigned on limited childcare tax rebates and floated the idea of providing fee assistance to families who registered their children in commercial childcare centres (Brennan 1998, 176-77). The ALP won in 1983 and were returned to power in 1984, and they did indeed follow through with their campaign promises: in addition to extending fee relief for families earning up to $30,000 (it had been $20,000 under the Coalition Government), the number of universally available Commonwealth-funded childcare places increased by over 60% in their first two years of rule (Brennan 1994, 174, 203).

Once in office, Hawke’s emphasis on consensual policy-making within the Labor Party, dubbed “quasi-corporatism,” meant that pressures for reduced expenditure on childcare which stemmed from neoliberal elements of the Party (i.e. the Treasury and Finance Minister) were moderated by a system in which, for the most part, economic policy was the remit of the right and centre-left factions, whilst social and welfare policy was handled by the leftist faction (Bray and Neilson 1996; Castles and Shirley 1996; Brennan 1998).\footnote{Furthermore Treasury demands to cut childcare expenditure were often rebuffed by Ministers at the highest level, who argued that cuts to childcare expenditure would lose middle class and women’s votes, which would be a particularly stinging loss seeing as the ALP had only just closed the gender vote gap (which traditionally favoured the Liberals) in 1983 (Brennan 1998; Curtin 1997; Curtin and Sawer 1996).} Since the 1983 and 1984 elections, federal support for childcare has not only remained a feasible but also a popular and hotly
contested political issue in Australian national politics. The necessity of maintaining federal support for childcare remains fairly uncontroversial in mainstream Australian politics, rather the debate continues about the level of and most appropriate mechanisms (supply-side versus demand-led) by which the government should deliver said assistance (Brennan 2007). During the early 1990s Labour Treasury ministers were successful in shifting funding mechanisms from a supply-side towards a decidedly demand-led approach. This resulted in rising parental costs as well as rising public expenditure (as will be discussed in Chapter Seven). However, childcare’s political popularity remained strong.

4.3 The ALP and childcare in context: balancing coalitions and interests

a. The ALP’s new electoral coalition: childcare in the electoral context

i) Shifts in patterns of gender and education-based party identification

The decline of manual labour as a result of deindustrialisation would, as class dealignment theory goes, suggest the Labor Party’s traditional male, working-class support would begin to decrease from the mid 1960s. This would require the party to shore up their electoral support by attracting a new group to their electoral coalition. Women, who had traditionally favoured the Liberal party regardless of class or income level, are said to have been Labor’s target: the ALP needed to reduce the traditional gender vote gap and, in particular, gain support in the growing outer-suburbs which were increasingly dominated by professional middle-income families (i.e. new middle class) (Sawer 1990). These trends are both displayed in Figures 1.16-1.17, which indicate a slow but steady decrease in class voting from the period 1945-1960 to 1981-1990 and a steady reversal of the traditional gender vote gap from 1967 to 1987. According to McAllister, another area of dislocation was strength of party identification: the percentage of “very strong” party identifiers dropped 13 percentage points, to twenty per cent, between 1967 and 1987 (McAllister 2002, 387-388).

This study’s analysis is based on Australia’s key political behaviour studies: the Australian National Political Attitudes Surveys of 1967, 1969, and 1979, as well as their successor, the Australian Election Study of 1987. As with the Chapter Three, it examines trends in party identification according to gender and education level. Here, higher-educated males tend to

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143 See for example Woodley 2013.
144 The 1967 edition of the Australian National Political Attitudes (ANAP) survey was the first major voting behavior study in Australia; it was thereafter completed according to a somewhat erratic schedule: 1969, then 1979, with no surveys in between those ten years. The ANAP was discontinued and its replacement, the Australian Election Study, which is largely similar in many of its questions surrounding political orientation and demographic information, was first completed in 1987.
145 Educational categories are collapsed from four into two: post-secondary (technical or university education) and secondary (primary and secondary). This is done in order to avoid making judgments from categories with low
reflect Inglehart (1977) and Inglehart and Rabier’s (1986) theory on rising post-materialism: between 1969 and 1987 the proportion of highly educated men who identified as Labor began to outstrip those who identified as Liberals, yielding an increase of nine percentage points between 1969 and 1987. There was little scope for reversal amongst lesser-educated men, who although they became slightly more likely to identify as independent, remained consistently more Labor then Liberal in terms of partisan identification between 1967 and 1987. This suggests that although total class voting may have been on the decline, at least among men, that process was not driven purely by blue-collar dealignment from the left.

Figure 4.3 Australian party identification: male, tech – university 1967-1987 (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 1987)

Figure 4.4 Australian party identification: male, primary – secondary 1967-1987 (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 1987)

bases – in particular this is relevant to university educated females, whose numbers were as low as 21 during the 1960s. As such, the categories have been combined.
How did female respondents compare? From 1967, the proportion of higher-educated females who identified as Liberal and Labor reversed themselves: by 1987 higher-educated women identified as Labor 16 percentage points more than they did Liberal. Correlated with this trend is a smaller increase in independent/other identification between during the 1970s, although this steadies off as Labor’s popularity continued to rise during the 1980s.

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
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<td><img src="image" alt="Graph showing party identification trends for females with higher education" /></td>
</tr>
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Figure 4.5 Australian party identification: female, tech-university (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 1987)

During the 1970s the Liberal-Labor party identification gap amongst lesser-educated women also narrowed to Labor’s advantage. However, Labor’s upward trajectory with this group appeared to stall from 1979 as, unlike their higher-educated counterparts, lesser-educated women identified in equal proportions Labor and Liberal during the 1980s. In fact, their identification with both groups dropped approximately three percentage points (42% to 39%) between 1979 and 1987, whilst their independent identification increased by seven percentage points.

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<tr>
<th>Party identification: Female, primary - secondary</th>
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<td><img src="image" alt="Graph showing party identification trends for females with primary-secondary education" /></td>
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Figure 4.6 Australian party identification: female, primary-secondary (Source ANAP 1967, 1969, 1979; AES 1987)

Analysing the different groups’ identification with Labor overtime yields an interesting picture: women, as a whole, increased the proportion in which they identified with the Labor Party.
Figure 4.7 below, which displays the total change in party identification for all groups between 1967 and 1987, could be accused of portraying a particular snapshot in time, wherein the mirrored effect of Liberal losses in all groups versus Labor gains in all groups indicates not a realignment on the part of the ‘post-materialists’ but instead the results of a popular political party that came to power in 1983 following almost ten years of Coalition rule.

Yet the gender vote gap as displayed in Figure 1.18 coupled with the high rates of electoral volatility on the part of both lesser and higher-educated women (as seen in Figure 4.8, below) suggests that from an ALP perspective, it would have been clear, at least from the late 1970s that the decline in Liberal identification on the part of women, and to a lesser extent, higher-educated men offered an opportunity to attract new types of voters, such as the new middle classes and in particular, new middle class women.
ii) Shifts in Party Membership

Disruptions in the party’s electoral base were paralleled by disruptions in their membership base: although ALP membership figures from this period are quite unreliable, due to the fact that all membership data was collected at the state level, Ian Ward notes National Secretary Bob McMullan’s claim that ‘everywhere’ in the 1980s has experienced an annual membership turnover of ‘about 20 to 30 per cent,’” leading Ward to claim that “Membership of the ALP now is extraordinarily fluid. Despite optimal political circumstances, the ALP has had difficulty attracting and retaining members” (Ward 1989, p.166).

Ward explains this by suggesting that the fluidity or indeed turnover of members, at least in the Victorian branch of the ALP, is a result not simply due to declining membership but a sharp change in the type of members joining:

“[B]y the early 1980s the party rank-and-file no longer chiefly comprised blue-collar, working class members drawn from Labor’s traditional constituency. Instead it had recruited a significant bloc of middle class members. By this I do not mean to suggest that Labor has attracted graziers, proprietors, professionals in private practice and others of the established (old) middle class who have long been stalwarts of the anti-labor parties. Rather it has attracted salaried, tertiary educated professionals, notably teachers, administrators and others of what King and Raynor (1981: 43) describe as the new established middle class. Their growing numbers have noticeably changed the ALP’s social character” (Ward 1989, 167).
Whereas Ward shows that “Professional, Technical and Related Workers” made up just 8.4% of the ALP’s Victoria branch membership in 1961, they comprised 38.4% of its membership in 1981 (Ward 1989, p.167). Indeed, the influx of these Australian ‘middle class’ members correlates with national-level strategies to make the party more electorally appealing to the new middle classes via an array of policies that catered to the modern middle-income family, despite irritation with the party’s newfound direction on the part of the rank-and-file, ‘blue-collar’ members (Ward 1989, 172). As the following sections will show, it was the tension between these groups that helped prompt the federal intervention in state parties, resulting in top-down reform.

b. Developing an electoral and organisational response

i) Targeting female voters

The loosening of traditional class and gender-based party-voter linkages, as outlined both above and in Chapter One suggests that by the 1970s the ALP had an opportunity to garner support from female and higher-educated male voters, and that they needed to shore up declining membership numbers with female members who, in a rather circuitous fashion, would attract female votes. Responding to electoral failure, the party in 1978 set up a series of research exercises and discussion papers under the title, “Committee of Inquiry.” One of these discussion papers specifically addressed gender and ALP membership. It stated at the outset, “The fact that only about 25% of the membership of the ALP is made up of women indicates that the Party as a forum for meaningful political participation is less attractive to women than to men” (ALP 1978, 2). The authors suggested that, in addition to broad representative numbers, the party’s female employment policies (or lack thereof) tended to discourage women from joining (or perhaps even voting for) the party:

“Industrial policies necessary to improve the position of many women in the workforce have been ignored or actively opposed by the Party, particularly where they have been opposed by largely male controlled unions. Policies on part-time employment, job sharing, adult apprenticeship, child care, both at or near the workplace and in residential locations, job reclassifications to avoid equal pay provisions, recognition of maternity as a service to the nation and many other matters are only now being considered. In some significant areas, they are still being resisted” (ALP 1978, 4).

Beyond industrial policies, the paper displayed frustration with the party’s social conservatism:

As classified by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
“The Party permits M.P.’s a conscience vote on abortion, an issue generally seen as having particular relevance to women. This is interpreted by many women as a refusal by the Party to accept political responsibility for an issue which does not directly affect the majority of members” (ALP 1978, 4).

The paper also identified the party’s links with unions as a potential deterrent to female ALP candidates: “Women are unable to build up the necessary power connections and thus lack sponsorship. This is not unrelated to the overlapping of the power structures of the ALP and the ACTU and TLCs [Trades and Labour Councils]. Women are not commonly found in positions of influence in those 10% (approximately) of unions which are affiliated to the ALP” (ALP 1978, 4). In fact the paper also went on to propose several different affirmative action measures for amending the party’s gender imbalance, such as requiring each state-level party branch to send at least one female delegate to the National Conference, or instituting women-only shortlists in particular safe seats, and quotas on women’s representation on the Branch-level and National-level executive boards (ALP 1978, 7). These proposals would not be approved at the National Conference in 1978.

However, electoral success required more than female party members’ increased representation; the party also needed an electoral strategy for reducing the vote gap. Marian Sawer points out that in the 1980 federal election, “the ALP became the first Australian political party to use the family theme extensively in a campaign” (Sawer 1990a, 49). Labour’s approach to the ‘family’ or indeed towards ‘women’ as an electoral issue appeared to have developed in fits and starts. Whilst Whitlam in the mid 1970s discussed and indeed developed childcare policy, albeit with limited attention and a funding mechanism that ultimately benefited part-time pre-school provision rather than full day care, Sawer notes that although “[e]arlier qualitative research had already shown that the family would be a popular campaign theme…Whitlam had refused to stoop to this in the 1977 federal election” (Sawer 1990a, 49). Yet according to Sawer the “increased targeting of the marginal outer suburban electorates which were the key to victory in four states and nationally” seems to have “partly influenced” “the stress on the family in ALP campaigns in the 1980s.” As Sawer states, “It is these outer suburban electorates which have the highest level of 'familialism' in Australia — meaning the degree to which people live in conventional husband/wife/dependent children households. And indeed, in the 1980 federal election, the ALP became the first Australian political party to employ the family theme extensively in a campaign.” Sawer quotes from a leading Australian National Opinion Poll (ANOP) pollster’s account of a dinner with then-Labor leader Bill Hayden, which without specifically citing childcare as an electoral issue, indicates a broader inclination to test the electoral benefits of campaigning on issues of interest to women and families:
“We had dinner one night and he said: ‘Look, I’ve been wrestling with an idea. I want to turn the family into Labor Party territory. It really does belong to the Labor Party and we’ve been seen to be distant from it. Go out and develop me a marketing program around that’” (Sawer 1990a, 49).

Susan Ryan, the ALP’s first female Senator, spearheaded a great deal of the polling behind the ALP’s campaign for women voters and on work/family policies, urging her colleagues that a targeted effort would finally bring them back to power. According to Rebecca Huntley:

“In order to persuade Party leaders that women voters were worth targeting, Labor feminists like Susan Ryan had to show that women could be convinced to vote Labor and that this in turn would give the Party a significant electoral advantage over its opponents. Ryan and many other Labor feminists have argued that generating numbers was the crucial first step towards breaking down some of the myths about women voters described above. New kinds of statistics, polling data and market research, interpreted by Labor feminists, would make women voters visible to the Party leadership, to the public and to the media. Numbers of this kind were, as Ryan puts it, ‘better than gold.’ With this new powerful tool,’ Ryan asserts that she ‘convinced the male leadership that with the right policies the gender gap could be closed’” (Huntley 2003, 151).

At the first ever Labor Women’s Conference in 1981, Ryan pointed out, first that “[i]f the same percentage of women as men voted ALP at the 1977 election, the ALP would be in Government today” and second, that the gender vote gap between men and women voting Labour was “closing”: whilst in 1974 federal election the gap was eight per cent, in 1975 it was seven per cent, it was six per cent in the 1977 federal election and finally, 4.5% in 1980” (Ryan 1981, 5). She also made a clear electoral case for fielding women members and candidates: “Insofar as we have available detailed surveys on voters’ attitudes to women candidates, the results are positive and suggest that other things being equal, as far as the gender of a candidate is relevant, women gain votes overall” (Ryan 1981, 4).

This type of research suited Ryan’s aims (to persuade Labor to campaign for women’s votes by running work/family policies) and, at the 1982 National Conference, it seemed to pay off: for the first time the party included a section on women in their platform whilst Ryan was appointed to the party’s National Campaign Committee, from which she led a gender gap research project that

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147 This argument was nearly identical to the one British Labour’s Patricia Hewitt and Shadow Communication Agency representative Deborah Mattinson would employ in “Women’s Votes: The Key to Winning” (1989). In fact, Hewitt and Mattinson cited the ALP’s success with middle-income women in their directive to the Labour Party on making strategic appeals to female voters.
was quantitative (i.e. polling on women’s political behaviour) and qualitative – small group discussions that better analysed political opinions, preferred policies, etc. (Huntley 2003, 153-54). And indeed Huntley notes that “The Labor Party’s attempt to close the gender gap in the 1983 election was seen to be a success, with exit polls showing that ‘women and men at last voted Labor in similar proportions.’ Labor women were eager to claim that it was ‘partly through [their] efforts’ that the gender gap was closed”148 (Huntley 2003, 172).

\**ii) Reforming internal party organisation**

Whilst the above paints the picture of a leadership dominated party attempting to modernise its public image and reformulate its electoral strategies, leaders such as Whitlam, Hayden and Hawke would have been unable to execute any of the aforementioned strategies only a decade earlier, before the party had begun its arduous process of modernisation and internal reorganisation. Upon becoming the ALP’s federal leader in 1967, Gough Whitlam found himself trying to steer a hugely decentralised, organisationally conservative and electorally disastrous party, which had not won an election since 1946. His chances of reforming the party were grim, considering that as federal party leader he was not even allowed to attend its national conference. That was because neither Whitlam, nor any of his fellow parliamentarians were delegates: from its inception in 1891, the ALP had been a fully federal political party, where state-level branches had their own rules for candidate selection, such as electing delegations to the national conference and choosing which trade unions to affiliate with149 (Jupp 1982, 105). The national conference was until Whitlam’s leadership, composed of 36 indirectly selected delegates from the states and territories (six from each), wherein each state was allowed to formulate their delegation’s ratio of union to party members, and in which unions had tremendous power – on average over 75% of total votes cast (McAllister 2002, 390). The federal leader was excluded from the conference whilst federal parliamentarians were rarely selected by their state delegations to attend – should they have wanted to attend they would have had to compete against both local union affiliates and rank-and-file members. This was entirely in keeping with party’s historical assertion that the parliamentary party was controlled by and responsible to the extra parliamentary party (Jupp 1982).

\[148\] The campaign for women’s votes was so specific that Huntley notes: “These years of intense activism on the part of Labor feminists ensured that the 1983 federal election campaign was ‘aimed specifically at women.’ The Party’s campaign to win the women’s vote was conducted on two levels. On a national level, women’s policy was developed and launched in both metropolitan and regional centres (Sawer & Simms, 1993: 209). At a local level, support and advice was given to candidates on winning the women’s vote. In terms of increased representation of women, the Party presented a record number of women candidates to the electorate, although most of them in unwinnable seats” (Huntley 2003, 176).

\[149\] In fact all trade union affiliations were cemented at the state-level, there were no Federal ALP-trade union affiliations.
In 1963 Whitlam, at the time deputy leader, was photographed standing with then-ALP leader Arthur Calwell outside the Canberra hotel where the federal ALP conference was being held, the two leaders waiting for the delegates to emerge and instruct them on what political issues they would have to run their upcoming election campaign on. When a conservative journalist published the photo, noting that Labor was run by 36 “faceless men,” then-Liberal Prime Minister Robert Menzies leapt at the issue, sending out pamphlets with the photo and emphasizing the fact that these faceless men “not elected to parliament nor responsible to the people were laying down policy and giving orders on critical conditions of defence and foreign relations which could affect every man and woman in this country” (McAllister 2002, 390; Jupp 105). Labor lost the election to the Liberals, losing ten seats against the ten gained by the Liberal-Country Coalition (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 22).

1966 saw the first ALP inquiry on organisational reform, written by former UK Labour advisor and ALP National Secretary, Cyril Wyndham in response to the party’s repeated election defeats. Coghlan and Dalton state that the Wyndham inquiry was “about changing two specific perceptions about the ALP. The first was that Labor was too much of a trade union party and, because of that, failed to appeal to a broader constituency. The second was that the Labor Party was too slow adapting to a rapidly changing society.” Wyndham, who was with Whitlam on the day of the infamous ‘faceless men’ photo, made 29 recommendations. A large theme was ‘centralisation’: as Coghlan and Denton (2012) note, “Wyndham was the most senior Labor Party figure to call for genuine direct representation of Party members and the consolidation of a federal structure capable of unifying the dysfunctional state branches.” His recommendations “aimed to completely re-organise the Labor Party from top to bottom ensuring direct representation of party members at state and federal conferences.” For example, there was no centralised federal campaign mechanism – states took on federal campaigns as they saw fit; Wyndham wanted to overhaul federal control over elections, mandate media training for all candidates and encourage female candidates to run (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21-22).

On a more institutional level, Wyndham recommended that the federal leader and shadow cabinet attend the federal Labour conference and that state delegations to the conference include federal parliamentarians. Wyndham also cited the “importance of the women’s vote as a decisive factor” and called for delegate rights for the President and Secretary of the Federal Labor Women’s' Organising Committee. He additionally called for the federal executive to intervene in any state disputes (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21). Whilst Coghlan and Denton assert that little actual change was ever made as a result of the recommendations they do note that Whitlam in

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150 The inquiry was titled “Party Re-Organisation: Recommendations of the General Secretary.”
his 1967 campaign for the federal party leadership “used the issue of wholesale Party reform to challenge Arthur Calwell for the leadership” (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21). Embarrassed by the ‘faceless men’ photograph, Whitlam understood the importance of a representative decision making body and upon taking national leadership of the party in 1967, insisted that in addition to the leader, at least two federal Senators and Representatives, along with each states’ parliamentary leader would be included as full voting delegates, which according to Jupp, made elected officials “a minimum of ten out of forty-nine entitled to attend” the conference (Jupp 1982, 105).

However, Whitlam was well aware that the all-powerful state executives in Victoria and Queensland would easily halt any substantive reorganisation of the party’s federal structure. Moreover, much of the party’s electoral failure stemmed not just from perceptions about the party conference’s legitimacy but also from the type of candidates being selected at the state and municipal branch levels: since the federal party could make no ruling on state or municipal selection procedures, these varied across the country. For example, in Victoria and Queensland, the union-dominated state executive selected candidates for local branch constituencies (i.e. municipalities) and quite often chose candidates who were widely opposed by/unrepresentative of their respective local branch, which often was increasingly composed of white-collar professionals. Thus Jupp states that in the case of Victoria, “the impact of migrant and professional movement into the inner suburbs was largely cancelled out by the preference shown by the [state’s] central executive, which was union-dominated for Australian-born, working-class candidates” (Jupp 1982, 98).

Whitlam used the Wyndham review to justify interventions into state party executives, such as in Victoria and Queensland. Jupp notes that in both states “the party machine was dominated by trade union officials, with politicians reduced to secondary roles and local branches becoming increasingly frustrated and powerless” and that “[i]n both cases the organised opposition from within the state came from groups of professional middle class members who had little in common with the state officials either socially, intellectually or ideologically” (Jupp 1982, 94). Following a series of exogenous shocks that began to weaken the Victorian ALP leadership (1964 split in the Communist Party, election losses in 1966, split of the Melbourne Trades Council, which left many unionists in opposition to their counterparts on the Victorian Labor Party’s central executive) the organisation was in such a state disarray that by 1970 the federal leaders had won support from a sufficient number of ‘blocs’ within the Victorian ALP to justify intervention. They based their intervention on the grounds that, in Jupp’s words, “the branch
executive was chosen by an organised faction, the Trade Unionists Defence Committee” (Jupp 1982, 96-97).

And indeed at the 1970 federal conference the South Australia branch broke the deadlock amongst the Federal Executive and “moved against” the Victorian branch, which was duly suspended. Its executive was overthrown and it was rebuilt according to a new internal structure: ideologically based factions (e.g. Socialist Left, Centre Unity) were formalised, greater local branch participation was required, trade union dominance of conference delegations was lessened (delegates had to be 60% from the unions, 40% from local branches) and finally, its “newly elected officers were drawn largely from the Centre Unity faction.”151 A similar 60:40 union/branches policy was adopted in New South Wales that same year (Jupp 1982, 96-97). Jupp states of post-reform Victoria: “The results were gratifying, including the winning of several suburban electorates for the ALP in 1972, an increase in branch membership and the first glimmerings of hope, so far unrealised, that Labor could win a state election” (Jupp 1982, 97). That said, they were not without controversy: a motion to expel Whitlam was brought to the federal conference, which Whitlam barely survived (a margin of 7-5) (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21).

Subsequent federal interventions followed in the similarly problematic Queensland branch in 1980; there too the 60:40 conference delegation rules were imposed. Whilst the New South Wales state executive was more moderate and electorally successful than the aforementioned state executives it was troubled by several Sydney branches, where allegations of corruption and violent resistance towards accepting increasingly professional/middle class party members came to a head in 1980 (Jupp 1982, 197-1999). Jupp explains:

“Following an organised beating by local party members on an ALP reformer, Peter Baldwin, who had sought to expose organised criminal behaviour, branch-stacking152 and refusal to accept new members in the select Sydney branches in July 1980, the NSW state branch intervened and the last major bastion of local working-class control was thus finally attacked because it had become corrupt and dysfunctional for the overall electoral image of the party. As in Melbourne, essentially working-class branches remained in newer western industrial suburbs. The old city machines no longer had much utility when most of their electorate were migrants, pensioners or professionals, whose notions of

151 Although Jupp notes the “Socialist Left reasserted its power towards the end of the 1970s” (Jupp 1982, 96).
152 Where new recruits are entered into the party so as to influence candidate pre-selection or when membership numbers are inflated for this same purpose.
what the ALP should be like were quite different from those which had shaped the party in the big cities for several generations” (Jupp 1982, 99).

The overall impact of the three interventions was to change Labor’s image. Jupp states that the ALP “came to lose its unique character as a union-dominated and predominantly working-class party whose politicians mirrored the social composition of their electorate,” adding that “the professional and well-educated component of the party became more important in all states, regardless of the ideological context of state ALP politics” (Jupp 1982, 100).

Still, the party’s Committee of Inquiry, which in 1978 released a report on “The Unions and the ALP” found two key electoral problems – both of which stemmed from the party’s trade union link: affiliated trade union members, let alone the non-affiliated, were not significantly more likely to vote for the ALP: only 50% of those affiliated did, as compare to Sweden where 65% voted for the Social Democratic Party (ALP 1978, 8). Second, the voting public – including ALP members – felt that the unions had too much power: the Committee’s 1978 report found that in 1976, 69% of “all people,” 57% of union members and 48% of ALP voters felt that Australian trade unions had “too much power” (ALP 1978a, 6).

Whilst on the one hand, the party sought to reduce the unions’ power by, in 1980, limiting the total amount of union votes cast at the national conference to 75% (later revised down to 60%), on the other hand, the Inquiry report stated that perceptions of trade union power were lower in South Australia, “where the Labor Premier and Government has for a long time enjoyed a very close working relationship with the unions in terms of consultation, participation of union members, and decision-asking.” This seemingly positive finding led them to state: “Although political style is an important factor, the poll referred to in fact indicates the need for more, rather than less, consultation with the trade union movement” [emphasis added]. According to the 1978 report, part of the problem lay with the highly decentralised nature of trade union affiliation in the ALP, where unlike UK Labour, unions only affiliated at the state, and not the national level (ALP 1978a, 8-10).

As a result, the party called for increased consultation and a clearer channel of communications with the unions on the national level. The party leader, Bill Hayden’s 1980 report on the ALP-Union relationship called for “a National Conference involving representatives of Unions, Government and Employers to discuss in an open and honest way the economic and social

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153 Another inquiry into electoral failure - this time after losses in the 1975 and 1977 federal elections.
154 Hayden followed Whitlam. He was leader until February 1983 when Bob Hawke took over, and successfully led the ALP to victory in the 1983 federal election campaign.
problems of our society” whilst perhaps more importantly, during the 1979 conference the ALP promised that when elected they would implement an accord surrounding prices, wages, taxation and wealth distribution “supporting the maintenance of real wages by quarterly adjustment and the passing on of the of increases in productivity” (ALP 1978a, 2-3).

In contrast to the similarly arduous modernisation process of UK Labour, where female activists in both the unions and the parties had, from the beginning of the process, been able to wedge themselves between the unions and party leadership so as to achieve gendered quotas on a variety of party bodies and in candidate selection processes, the ALP’s internal reform process did not from the early stages have an impact on, let alone consider the issues of gender or ethnic minority representation: indeed Jupp notes that whilst by 1980 the leaders in the party “were less likely to have a trade union background, more likely to have been university educated, less likely to have been manual workers and more likely to be professionals,” still the party “was white, Anglo-Irish and male, as it had been since its foundation nearly a century before” (Jupp 1982, 113). The 1981 federal conference finally passed a motion requiring that women constitute at least 25% of all state delegations to future national conferences, that “all national policy committees should include at least one woman to be responsible for ensuring that ALP policy includes women's interest” (ALP 1981, 28).

Interestingly, it was not until the 1994 conference that the ALP – at the federal level – instituted affirmative action rules that bore a resemblance to the gender quota motions which had passed Britain’s Labour Party conference almost a decade before – despite the fact that the ALP’s ‘modernisation’ efforts pre-dated those of UK Labour by a decade. Whilst Broad and Kirner concede that the first of the gendered measures passed by the ALP national conference in 1994 had in fact been adopted by most ALP state executives over nearly ten years prior (at least one-third of all non-public official party positions which are up for election should be filled by women) the second two – that women should comprise a minimum one-third of trade union delegations to the state and national ALP conferences, provided women comprise at least one-third of said trade union’s membership, and that by 2002 pre-selections for public office at the state and federal levels should be produce a minimum of 35% women – were largely novel to the party at both the state and federal levels (Broad and Kirner 1996, 80-81).

The effect of the party’s organisational reform process, begun by Whitlam and instituted across a variety of arenas – such as the state level branches, trade union linkages and gender representation – was largely to centralise power in the hands of the federal leader and the parliamentary party. Whilst interventions into the Victoria and Queensland state branches are prime examples of this, as were gender quotas on states’ conference delegations, the party’s call for increased national-level consultation with the trade unions is not so much an indication that
the national party leaders were willing to submit themselves to greater union domination but that
they intended to reduce the power that the states branches had with respect to union consultation
and negotiations and come to more inclusive, national-level agreements such as the 1983 Accord
without state-level intervention. In other words, their federal-level association with unions was
yet another example of party centralising reform at the states’ expense. In stark contrast to 1963,
when the parliamentary leaders waited outside of the conference whilst unelected insiders
decided the party’s campaign platform, Manning notes that throughout the 1980s and 90s, “even
Labor’s National Office has itself lost power to Hawke and Keating’s ‘Presidential’ style
campaigning.” Indeed, in 1988, former ALP Prime Minister Paul Keating discussed the
rebalancing of party power:

“Whitlam wanted a bigger conference. There are now 99 delegates. He wanted Labor’s
Parliamentary Leaders to be ex-officio delegates to it and to the national executive. That
happened in 1967. He wanted the conference open to the news media and he wanted
Labor to abandon the ‘archaic’ federal basis on which the conference was constituted.
Those things have happened too. Just about every structural change Whitlam advocated
is in place. The machine is under the thumb of the parliamentary party” (Oakes 2010, p.
58-59).

c. Unions, childcare and the ALP elite
Whereas this research’s focus on interests is primarily centred upon that of trade unions, given
that they were the ALP’s leading party-linked interest group, it is worth considering here the
impact of other organised interests that one would expect to be linked to the childcare issue.
Childcare interest organisations were from the aftermath of World War II somewhat fragmented:
as previously noted, the Australian Pre-school Association (APA), was one of the most
longstanding advocacy groups, with its roots in the Suffragette-formed Kindergarten Union.
However, as late as the 1960s, it deemed childcare, in Brennan’s words, “a necessary evil” for
the increased number of women who needed to enter the workforce (Brennan 1994, 60). Whilst
the APA’s influence may have helped assuage conservatives’ concerns with the childcare issue,
their influence on the childcare sector during the early to mid 1970s was somewhat detrimental
in the sense that they had the experience necessary to win grants from the Commonwealth Child
Care Act\footnote{155} in order to provide pre-school services, outbidding the nascent and politically
inexperienced non-profit, full-day childcare start-ups (Brennan 1994, 115-116).

\footnote{155} As it operated until 1976 on a submission based model.
The feminist influence was similarly mixed: the middle class oriented Women’s Electoral Lobby formed in Victoria during the early 1970s as a means of pressuring legislators into addressing issues of concern to women and women’s families but their middle class orientation (and indeed many of their Liberal Party sympathies) kept them at a distance from the Whitlam Government’s social policy debates during the early-mid 1970s (Brennan 1994, 74-76). Whereas, according to Brennan, several feminist organisations had demanded free, 24 hour childcare, the organised demand for such policies was weak and specificities of them largely unarticulated. By contrast, stronger pressure for a response to childcare issues of the 1970s emanated from feminists in the Labor Party bureaucracy (Brennan 1994, 79-83) as well as those within the white-collar unions such as the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations and finally, those who throughout the 1970s battled (and eventually succeeded) in convincing the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) to drop their family wage ideal and become more proactive on childcare issues (Brennan 1994, 143).

The cooperative link between women and the trade unions as displayed in the 1983 Accord represented a break in what had been an uneasy, or at least inconsistent, association. On the one hand, during the mid 1970s individual unions and union federations had made claims for childcare assistance on behalf of the workers, for example the Victoria Builders Association and the Clothing Trades, Food Preservers, Metal Workers and Vehicle Builders, in addition to a white-collar peak association, the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Organisations (Brennan 1998, 142-143). On the other hand, the union movement at large maintained policies aimed at discouraging women from the workforce: it was not until 1977 that the ACTU abolished support for a ‘family wage,’ which in Deborah Brennan’s words, “sought to discourage the necessity for families to have two incomes.” Brennan explains: “In keeping with this, the ACTU’s child care policy called for services to support the needs of ‘women who under present economic circumstances have to work’” (Brennan 1998, 141), rather than promoting the concept of universal childcare so that women could work.

A group of female trade union activists, the Women’s Action Committee, picketed the ACTU’s General Conference in 1970, “demanding support for equal pay, child care, abortion, contraception and maternity leave”; at the Alternative Trade Union’s Congress in 1973 they requested ACTU to draw up a charter for women. The reply seemed somewhat antagonistic: Brennan notes: “The ACTU responded with a document which omitted a number of the women’s claims and demanded an allowance for mothers to stay at home!” (Brennan 1998, 142). When sensing the need to modernise in 1973, a subcommittee at the ALP national conference “recommended that other elements within the party, such as women’s and youth groups…have
greater representation.” However, the unions soundly defeated the proposal (McAllister 2002, 390). In fact, it was not until 1977 when the ACTU finally dropped the family wage and set up a ‘Working Women’s Charter’ that included calls for “acceptable child care facilities and for support by government and local government bodies” stating that “trade unions should participate in the establishment of such centres which should be at low cost to the parent” (Brennan 1998, 143). Seven years later ACTU and the ALP agreed on the Accord (Brennan 1994, 165-166).

The ACTU, itself allied to state-level branches of the ALP, had until the 1970s been largely dominated by blue-collar unions. However, in a move towards centralisation and cross-class coalition building, the white-collar, private-sector employee dominated Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations (ACSPA) dissolved itself in 1979 and most of affiliates joined the ACTU. Two years later the leading public sector union, Council of Australian Government Employee Associations (CAGEO) followed suit and in 1985 a more decentralised state-based federation of white collar public sector employees, the Australian Public Service Federation (APSF) also joined ACTU. Interestingly, the ACTU President who coordinated the first two mergers was the same ALP Prime Minister who in just a few years would negotiate the ACTU-Labor Accord and run a campaign focusing on issues of interest to middle income families, such as childcare: Bob Hawke (Griffin 2009, 15). White-collar union federations such as the ACSPA were indeed interested and perhaps were stronger advocates of progressive and progressive work-family policies than ACTU had traditionally been. For example, in 1975 the ACSPA helped set up a ‘Working Women’s Centre,’ a policy and information resource for issues related to female employment. From 1977 it solicited federal government funds to set up union-sponsored childcare centres (Brennan 1994, 142, 147) and from 1978 took on the issue of 12 months maternity and paternity leave, antidiscrimination efforts for gay unionists and related progressive issues (Marlow 1978, 1).

4.4 Driving ALP position change: union pressure or electoral imperative

The following section analyses both parliamentary debate on childcare and legislator characteristics in order to determine the extent to which the ALP’s adoption of childcare as a legislative issue was mechanised by conversion and spurred by trade union pressure versus the extent to which it was mechanised by replacement and driven by electoral imperative. The former would reflect Karol’s (2009) model of coalition group maintenance: where Labor MPs embraced the issue of childcare in order to appease their longstanding party-linked interest group, trade unions. The latter would reflect Karol’s coalition group incorporation, wherein autonomous party elites responded to changing electoral conditions by making strategic appeals...
to a new set of voters. First, it will provide a series of descriptive statistics illustrating the rate of turnover amongst and the sociodemographic background of ALP MPs between the 28th and 34th Parliaments. Next, Rapoport and Stone’s 1994 model for disaggregating political change will be applied; this will indicate the extent to which the party’s position change on childcare was mechanised by legislator replacement, conversion or mobilisation. Another set of descriptive statistics will identify associations between our key independent variables (education, gender and unionism) and debating childcare, specifically pointing out for example, whether men or women debated childcare in greater proportion and whether these differences are statistically significant. Then OLS regressions are run: these will test for an association between the number of times a legislator debated childcare and their having characteristics associated with either a union or post-materialist orientation. The last section will analyse the demographic change underlying legislator replacement, noting whether the new crop of legislators emerging ahead of the ALP’s childcare policy adoption were in fact more post-materialist than their predecessors.

a. Mechanising and driving policy adoption: conversion or replacement

In order to contextualise the analysis of legislator conversion versus replacement, Table 4.1, below, provides descriptive statistics that illustrate the scale of change amongst ALP MPs between T1, the 28th Parliament (1972-1974), and T2, the 34th (1984-1987). Specifically, it looks at the composition of ALP MPs in each parliament: their absolute number, the percentage of whom were female, university educated and had a unionist background, as well the scale of their turnover (measured here as the percentage of MPs who were either in their first or last parliament).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>28th</th>
<th>29th</th>
<th>30th</th>
<th>31st</th>
<th>32nd</th>
<th>33rd</th>
<th>34th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total ALP MPs</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University educated, %</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, %</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union, %</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover: % first parliament</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover: % last parliament</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Composition of ALP MPs, 28th to 34th Parliaments (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard)

The total number of ALP MPs who served in a given parliament ranged between a low of 40 (in the 31st) and a high of 83 in the 34th (T2). ALP MPs had lower rates of university education than their US counterparts, though they did experience a 21 percentage point increase – from 37% to
58% between T1 and T2. There were zero women in Parliament at T1 and seven (eight per cent) at T2. Mirroring the rise in university educated ALP MPs was a decline in those with a unionist background: the figure nearly halved, from 31% in the 28th Parliament to 16% in the 34th.

Turnover, as measured by incoming MPs, ranged from as low as five per cent in the 30th to as high as 38% in the 33rd, after the ALP won their first federal election in a decade. Turnover when measured by the proportion of MPs in their last parliament ranged from a high of 37% in the 29th to a low of seven per cent in the 34th. There were 17 ALP ‘stayers’ who remained in the House of Representatives between the 28th and 34th Parliaments. These stayers comprised 25% of ALP MPs in the 28th and 20% in the 34th, meaning that by T2 80% of ALP MPs were ‘new.’ Whereas 18% of stayers debated childcare at T1, 35% of them did so at T2.

The next part of this section’s analysis employs Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model for disaggregating the different components of political change. Here, party position change is measured as the proportion of ALP members in the Federal House of Representatives who discussed childcare in the 34th Parliament (1984-1987), less the proportion of ALP MPs who did so in the 28th Parliament (1972-1974). The 28th is chosen at the starting point because it preceded the broader onset of internal organisational reforms and the 34th is designated T2 because it was the Parliament that followed Bob Hawke and the ALP’s 1984 electoral victory, during which childcare received increased attention as a legislative and a campaign issue. The analysis counts any instance in which a legislator discusses or asks a question related to childcare. It does not, however count instances in which a legislator, usually a minister, is providing a perfunctory answer to a parliamentary question on childcare (e.g. if they are a minister and when asked about a the number of places/level of spending they provide a simple answer). Negative statements on childcare are not counted nor are mentions of childcare in

---

156 An average of 21% with a standard deviation of 12.
157 An average of 16% with a standard deviation of 10.
158 The figures are derived from an examination of of the Australian Federal Parliament’s Hansard system which compiled every instance that an ALP MP discussed childcare in the House of Representatives between the 28th and the 34th Parliaments (1972-74 to 1983-87). References limited to part-time sessional pre-school are excluded as the focus is on full-day childcare that fosters female employment. Search terms include “childcare,” “child care,” “child care,” “child care,” “day care,” “daycare” and “nursery.”
159 Ideally, the starting point would have predated even the 1970 federal intervention into the Queensland branch but the ALP’s unpopularity during the 1960s and early 1970s meant that there were comparatively few ALP MPs in the House of Representatives. As such, if the analysis began before the 28th Parliament there would be very few ‘stayers’ left in the 34th Parliament. Stayers are crucial to the Rapoport and Stone model as their position change indicates whether or not large proportions of the party ‘converted’ to a particular issue.
160 This is largely due to the difficulty in assessing why a particular statement is negative: a legislator/party may indeed be supportive of state support for childcare costs but, for example, may not agree with a particular programme or a particular funding mechanism. For the sake of consistency, only positive mentions of childcare are counted.
which the context refers specifically to a tightly means-tested or lone parents only programme.\footnote{This also excludes references to programmes exclusively for aboriginal communities or questions that relate to the development of a childcare centre in a specific community, as it is less telling of the legislators’ interest in the issue as a national public policy concern.}

Whereas 20\% of ALP MPs mentioned childcare during the 28\textsuperscript{th}, 62\% did so during the 34\textsuperscript{th} – yielding a measure of party position change equal to 42\%.

As with the US case, Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) formula is used to determine the amounts of change attributed to conversion, replacement and mobilisation. The formula is as follows:

\[
T2 - T1 = (\beta \alpha)(S2 - S1) + \beta(1- \alpha)(D1 - N1) + (1- \beta)(N2 - T1)
\]

Where:

- $T1$ and $T2$ are mean values of the variable under observation at the first and second time periods under observation.
- $S$ is the average value for ‘stayers,’ i.e. those present at both $T1$ and $T2$.
- $\beta$ is the ratio of the size of the group at $T1$ relative to the size at $T2$.
- $\alpha$ is the proportion of the group at $T1$ which is comprised of ‘stayers’.
- $D1$ is the mean value for ‘dropouts,’ i.e. those who were present at $T1$ but not $T2$.
- $N2$ is the mean value for ‘newcomers,’ i.e. those who were present at $T2$ but not $T1$.

The first part of the equation reflects conversion, the second replacement and the third, mobilisation.

- $T1 = .197$
- $T2 = .621$
- $S1 = .176$
- $S2 = .353$
- $\beta = .805$
- $\alpha = .258$
- $D1 = .204$
- $N2 = .692$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total change:</th>
<th>Conversion</th>
<th>Replacement</th>
<th>Mobilisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td>.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.4% comprised of:</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 4.2 Rapoport and Stone, 28\textsuperscript{th} – 34\textsuperscript{th} Australian Parliament (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard 2013)}
The equation yields a largely replacement and mobilisation-heavy effect: whilst nine per cent of the 42% increase in ALP MP’s attention to childcare between 1972 and 1987 is attributed to conversion, we can see that the dominant force (91%) lies with the entry of new members, via both replacement and mobilisation.\textsuperscript{162} As such, the Rapoport and Stone equation suggests the mechanism behind policy change was not pressure on legislators that forced individuals to change their position on the issue but rather the replacement of older legislators with new ones.

However, Rapoport and Stone focus solely on legislators’ entry status, i.e. whether they were stayers, newcomers or dropouts. It tells us little about whether legislators’ backgrounds, as they relate to gender, education or unionism, are associated with debating childcare. Table 4.3, below, provides some descriptive statistics that show the proportions of MPs under each category that debated the issue. T-tests are applied to indicate whether group-based differences in debating childcare (e.g. between women and men) are statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>28th Parliament</th>
<th>34th Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University educated, %</td>
<td>40**</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-university educated, %</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women, %</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>85.7+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men, %</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-trade union, %</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union, %</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister\textsuperscript{163}, %</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-minister, %</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{**p<0.001, *p<0.01, +p<0.05, +p<0.1}

Table 4.3 Characteristics of ALP MPs who debated (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard 2013)

During the 28\textsuperscript{th} Parliament, university educated ALP MPs debated the issue in greater proportion than their non-university educated respondents, a margin of 40% to seven per cent, the difference being statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. It is impossible to compare the proportions of women and men who debated, given that there were no female ALP MPs sitting in the 28\textsuperscript{th} Parliament. A greater percentage of MPs with a non-union background debated the issue than their unionist counterparts (23% to 10%), though this difference is not statistically

\textsuperscript{162} As previously noted, mobilisation is the increase in total MP numbers above and beyond the proportion of those MPs that dropped out, this new group being, on average, more attuned to the issue than their predecessors.

\textsuperscript{163} During the 28\textsuperscript{th}, two out of four relevant ministers debated the issue; during the 52\textsuperscript{nd} all apart from one of the relevant ministers were located in the Senate. The single minister in the House did not debate childcare.
significant. A control variable, relevant ministerial/shadow ministerial posting, is included but it has no significant association with debating childcare at either T1 or T2.\textsuperscript{164}

During the 34\textsuperscript{th} Parliament, university educated Labour MPs continued to debate the issue in greater proportion than their non-university educated counterparts but the difference was no longer statistically significant. Women, who by the 34\textsuperscript{th} comprised eight per cent of Labour MPs, debated the issue in greater proportion than men: 86\% of women debated the issue as compared to 53\% of men, a difference statistically significant at the 90\% confidence level. 59\% of MPs who did not have a union background debated the issue as compared to 38\% of those with a union background, however the difference is not statistically significant.

In order to test whether a) these ‘replacing’ legislators who debated childcare were associated with post-materialism and b) the Rapoport and Stone-based findings hold when we treat debating childcare as a continuous, rather than a binary variable,\textsuperscript{165} a series of multiple linear (OLS) regressions are run for the number of times individual ALP MPs debated childcare during the 28\textsuperscript{th} and 34\textsuperscript{th} Parliaments. The aim is not to provide an overarching explanation for all of the drivers behind a legislators’ decision to raise the issue of childcare, but rather the regressions are employed in order to examine the relative strengths of the variables of interest and note whether they shifted throughout the course of electoral change and internal party reform that occurred between the late 1960s and early-mid 1980s. (The results for the binary logistic regressions, under which the dependent variable is whether or not a legislator debated childcare, appear in footnotes 167 and 168.)

The main variables of interest are gender, university education and having worked for a trade union\textsuperscript{166} whilst the control variable is relevant ministerial/shadow ministerial position, operating under the assumption that MPs with a women’s, childcare, or education-based post would be more likely to discuss the issue regardless of demographic/education characteristics. A strong, positive partial effect of trade union background could lend some credence to the hypothesis that

\textsuperscript{164}For the 28\textsuperscript{th} Parliament relevant ministerial posts are: Shadow Minister for Social Security, Shadow Minister for Labour, Shadow Minister for Education and Shadow Minister for Health. For the 34\textsuperscript{th} Parliament relevant posts are: Minister for Employment, Education and Training, Minister for Social Security, Minister for Community Services and Health, Minister assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women, Minister for Employment Services and Youth Affairs. However, just one of these positions, Minister for Employment, Education and Training, was allocated to an MP during the 34th (the rest were taken up by Senators). For a particular parliament, any MP who held one of these ministerial posts is denoted as having a relevant ministerial position, even if they did not hold the post throughout the entirety of the parliament.

\textsuperscript{165}For example, 55\% of all ALP MPs discussed childcare during the 34\textsuperscript{th} Parliament, though the number of times MPs spoke ranges from zero to four.

\textsuperscript{166}There are no interest group ratings akin to that of the ADA or COPE in Australia. As such, having worked for a trade union is employed as a proxy for being close to the movement, as one would expect that current and/or previous trade union staff would score highly in a union legislative ratings scheme.
the unions drove MPs to increasingly discuss the issue whilst the same effect for female and/or university educated MPs could suggest that MPs who raised the issue were of a more new politics/post-materialist orientation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.299* (.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>-.099 (.130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/Women’s Ministerial Post</td>
<td>.737** (.247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*University</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.113 (.086)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .229 \]
\[ N = 68 \]

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

Table 4.4 OLS regression results 28th Parliament, Australia, (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard)

The model for the 28th Parliament excludes the partial effect of women, given that there were no female ALP members in the House of Representatives during that parliament. Controlling for all other variables, the association between university education and debating childcare is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level: legislators with a university degree on average discussed childcare .299 times more than those without. The other independent variable, trade union background, has a negative relationship with debating, although not a significant one. Finally, the control variable, ministerial post, is significantly and positively associated at the 99% confidence level: those with a relevant post, on average, discussed childcare .74 more times than those without a similar post, controlling for all other variables. This indicates that holding all else constant, during the early-mid 1970s, legislators who were either highly educated and/or held a post that required them to address the issue adopted childcare policy more so than their unionist counterparts (who were negatively but not significantly associated with childcare debate).167

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167 In the binary logistic regression replicating the OLS results shown in Table 4.4 (the 28th Parliament), university remains positive and significantly associated with debating childcare at the 95% confidence level, holding all else constant. Trade union background remains negative but not significant whereas ministerial post remains positive but loses the significance accorded to it in the OLS output: the OLS regression found it to be significant at the 99% confidence level however it is not significant in the logistic results, controlling for all other variables. This is likely explained by the fact that out of the four ministers, just two debated childcare during the 28th. The variable’s increased significance under the OLS model is likely driven by the fact that these two ministers who debated the
These underlying fundamentals changed – but were not reversed – by the 34th Parliament: in Model 1, the partial effect of having a university education on the number of times a Labor MP raised childcare is still positive, though only significant at the 90% confidence level. Controlling for all other variables, a university educated MP is associated with raising the issue .473 times more than a non-university educated MP. Whilst the partial effect of union background, controlling for all other variables, is still insignificant, its coefficient is no longer negative. The third variable of interest, being female, is positively and significantly associated with raising the issue of childcare during parliamentary debates: controlling for all other variables, being a female MP increases the average number of times an MP debated by 1.4, which is significant at the 99% confidence level. The control variable, ministerial post, is no longer significantly associated with debating childcare and is indeed negatively related; this is unsurprising given that during the 34th Parliament all, bar one, of the relevant ministerial postings were held by ALP Senators, rather than MPs. And indeed the only ALP MP with a relevant ministerial post did not debate the issue.

Model 2 for the 34th Parliament includes the same independent variables as Model 1 but adds an interaction variable, female x university, in order to examine whether university educated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.473* (.268)</td>
<td>.454 (.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.418** (.478)</td>
<td>1.324* (.643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>.055 (.886)</td>
<td>.051 (.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/Women’s Ministerial Post</td>
<td>-1.192 (1.253)</td>
<td>-1.182 (1.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*University</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.212 (.960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.665** (.221)</td>
<td>.676** (.228)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .131
N = 84

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

Table 4.5 OLS regression results 34th Parliament, Australia (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard)
women were more likely than women on average to raise the issue of childcare, suggesting a degree of class-based interest in the issue. The partial effect, however, is insignificant.  

These findings indicate that controlling for all other variables, whilst university educated MPs - all of whom were male - were associated with the limited discussion of childcare during the early to mid 1970s (in contrast to trade unionists, who were negatively but not significantly associated with it), by the mid-to-late 1980s, females – regardless of university education – were positively and significantly associated with speaking on childcare, controlling for all other variables. Union background, whilst negative and insignificant in the 28th Parliament models. These combined findings tend to suggest that, of the variables we are concerned with, the impetus behind the ALP’s increased discussion of childcare in parliament was driven largely by MPs associated with the new politics movement, in particular female and university educated MPs. Relative to these groups, unionists appear to have had very little association with childcare policy adoption. This is in keeping with the Rapoport and Stone results, which indicated that the increase in ALP MPs’ discussion of the issue was largely driven by new entrants to the party as opposed to the conversion of MPs.

b. Legislator replacement: the ALP’s new brand

The previous section found that replacement – and not conversion – was the mechanism that produced party position change and that MPs who were female and/or higher-educated had a stronger association with debating childcare than did those without a university education and/or those who had previously worked for a trade union. So whilst there has been a great deal of explanatory power attributed to legislator replacement and the implied influence of legislators with characteristics suggesting a new politics approach to policy development, to what extent did legislator replacement occur, and were the new legislators very different from their predecessors? Figure 4.9 shows a near reversal in the proportion of Federal ALP MPs who had a university education and those who had previously worked for a trade union: whilst in 1966 45% of all ALP MPs had previously worked for a union, that figure was 15% by 1987. In 1966 just 20% had a university education whereas by 1987, 59% did. The increase in women MPs is less

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168 Under the binary logistic regression that replicates Model 1 of the 34th Parliament, university education remains positive and significant at the 90% confidence level, holding all other variables constant. Being female remains positively associated with debating childcare but while the association was significant at the 99.9% confidence level under the OLS regression it is just beyond significance at the 90% confidence here (p = .117). Having previously worked for a union remains negatively but not significantly associated with debate. Finally, ministerial post becomes negatively associated and features a large standard error. This variable appears problematic as there was only one ALP MP with a ministerial post during the 34th Parliament, and this MP did not debate childcare. (Unlike during the 28th, the four other relevant child and women’s ministers were all in the Senate.) The logistic models appear in Appendix D.

169 Of course the intent is not to construct an overarching model for childcare policy adoption but rather to test the strength of the theoretically relevant independent variables: gender, education and trade unionism.
dramatic and it reflects the overall low level of females represented in the ALP House: whereas there were no female ALP MPs between 1966-72, by 1987 they comprised eight per cent of all ALP MPs.

Figure 4.9 Percentage change in ALP MP demographics, 1966-1987 (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard)

4.5 Conclusions: a new electoral agenda but first, reform

When coupled with OLS regression results, the Rapoport and Stone findings would suggest that the Australian Labor Party adopted childcare because it sought to make strategic appeals to new middle class male and female voters. This driving force, according to the results, is stronger than that of union pressure. However, as set out both in this chapter and in Chapter One, traditional class and gender-based party-voter linkages had been on the decline in the Australian party system throughout the 1970s – well before the 1983 election and its focus on expanding childcare places. Moreover, the traditional pattern in which a greater proportion of Labor MPs had a trade union background than a university background had eroded from as early as 1971; indeed the dominance of the two characteristics would be in flux until 1977 when university educated Labour MPs began to eclipse those with a trade union background, ultimately by a difference of nearly 45% during the mid 1980s.

So, given the shifts both within the electorate and even within Labor’s own ranks, why did it take them until 1983 to make a cohesive attempt at appealing to the votes of middle-income families and in particular, women? On the one hand, Figures 1.6 – 1.8 show that attention to the issue did increase during the 1970s, when measured either in terms of words in a party manifesto or parliamentary debate mentions. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the number of debate mentions more than doubled between the 32nd and 33rd parliaments (1977-80 versus 1980-83), so
too did the number of childcare commitments in leader’s speeches. The number of words related to childcare in ALP manifestos nearly doubled over the same period of time. Indeed, there is something that allowed the attention to childcare to increase so steeply in the three years to 1983. The decentralised nature of the ALP and, as a consequence, the manner in which that inhibited party centralising and gender-based reforms may have played a role in mediating the speed at which the ALP’s electoral imperative allowed for strategic appeals on work/family policies such as childcare.

Whereas Whitlam demanded federal parliamentary representation at the national ALP conference as early as 1967 (Jupp 1982, 105), conference votes and candidate selection were largely union dominated until the 1970 intervention into the Victorian branch and rule change in NSW, and ten years later, the 1980 interventions into Queensland and Sydney branches (Coghlan and Denton 2012, 21-22). Federal intervention into the Victorian Branch during 1970 imposed reforms that rebalanced state delegations to a 60:40 union-rank-and-file ratio improved the state party’s electoral results and gradually won over middle class voters at the state level (Jupp 1982, 96-97). Indeed, the 1980 federal conference saw through yet another reduction in union voting power whilst, perhaps in response to the Committee of Inquiry findings and Sen. Susan Ryan’s research on the imperative of winning over female votes, the 1981 conference finally instituted gender-based reforms, requiring that women make up at least 25% of state delegations to the federal conference and that all national policy committees include at least one woman “responsible for ensuring that ALP policy includes women's interest” (ALP 1981, 28). The extent to which these reforms generated the party’s enhanced interest in women’s votes and hence work/family issues cannot be quantitatively measured but it does seem possible that an increase in female representation on policy-making boards is associated with an increase in attention to work/family issues in political campaigns and particularly on the national platform. Specifically, it seems plausible that party leaders would not have had the resources to appeal to new voters and campaign on such issues were it not for their ability to a) centralise decision making and public relations from the states and into the federal executive and b) develop structures that enhance the diversity of voices on party policy so as foster policy proposals more appealing to the new middle class and advertise to voters that ALP policy was no longer written by ‘36 faceless men.’

This is not to suggest, however, that unions were opposed to the ALP’s stance on childcare and work/family policies during the early 1980s; if anything it was the ACTU along with Labor who included childcare in the 1983 Accord as a part of the national social wage and as pointed out, the ACTU had by the late 1970s dropped their call for a family wage and by 1981 integrated
white collar unions such as those previously affiliated with CAGEO and ACSPA, both of which had made demands for public childcare assistance and the latter, improved maternity rights (Marlowe 1978). However, this era of union ‘modernisation’ also occurred during the same time that the ALP was attempting to ‘modernise itself,’ in part by limiting trade union influence at the state and federal levels. Therefore, the assertion that the ALP acted purely as a tool of the unions on childcare is doubtful. Had the ACTU been able to modernise themselves and take seriously demands stemming from its growing ranks of female members before the onset of ALP reform process then we may indeed have seen greater evidence of ‘legislator conversion,’ driven by trade union pressure. Since, however, that did not occur ahead of the ALP’s internal party reform it appears that the childcare policy adoption here was more a consequence of electoral imperative than traditional interest group pressure.
Chapter Five: Better late than never. New Labour and childcare policy adoption

5.1 Introduction
The following chapter will outline the UK Labour Party’s adoption of childcare policy as both a legislative and an electoral issue in the run up to the mid 1990s, when it became a centrepiece of the party’s 1997 general election campaign and a subsequent legislative priority. It will first provide a brief outline of the history and key interests surrounding British childcare policy, before going on to analyse the extent and shape of electoral change surrounding the Labour Party’s adoption of childcare. It will then qualitatively examine two strands of the Labour Party’s response to said change: targeting female voters and undergoing internal organisational reforms. It will qualitatively assess the link between unions, childcare and the Labour Party and then, in order to quantitatively test for the relative strength of union pressure versus electoral imperative in driving reform, it will employ Rapoport and Stone’s 1994 model of political change to disaggregate the proportions of party position change that were mechanised by conversion and replacement. Next it will run OLS regressions that test for an association between legislators debating childcare and having characteristics associated with either unionism or post-materialism. This will indicate, quantitatively, whether childcare policy adoption in the legislative sense was mechanised by conversion and driven by union pressure or mechanised by replacement and driven by electoral imperative, or perhaps another combination of the two. It will conclude by discussing the link between electoral imperative, legislator replacement and childcare policy adoption with a focus on the extent to which the party’s arduous organisational reform process mediated the speed in which it could adopt childcare policy, even more so in the electoral than in the legislative sense.

5.2 From zero to sixty: an outline of childcare policy in the UK
For much of the twentieth century, childcare remained off the British political agenda. World War II of course served as the key exception: like the United States, the UK government oversaw a rapid increase in provision as part of its ‘war effort’ as both industry and Trades Union Congress (TUC), in need of female employees, lobbied an accommodating government on the need for public childcare provision. By 1944 the state had developed 1,450 publicly funded “war nurseries” serving children aged 2-5 on both part and full-time bases (Randall 2000, 37-38). The nurseries were shut after the war’s end, despite the London Women’s Parliament’s formation of a “National Nursery Campaign.” Although there was a Parliamentary debate on their closure in 1945 that featured delegates from the National Council of Maternity and Child Welfare, child welfare organisations and nursery training challenges, etc., Randall notes that “it was only an adjournment debate and its timing on a Friday afternoon meant that very few members were present” (Randall 2000, 59). Westminster’s lack of attention to the prospect of
1,450 nurseries shutting reflected the little deliberation that would occur on the subject for the next forty years.

Indeed nearly dormant until New Labour’s ascension to power in 1997, British childcare policy – from the end of World War II until the 1990s – was means-tested, heavily decentralised, poorly regulated and quite minimally funded (Randall 2000). By the early 1990s, childcare provision in both the public and private sector was scant: 94% of mothers requiring childcare relied on their family for help (Hakim et al, 2008, 14) as there was only one childcare place per nine children\(^\text{170}\) (Waldfogel and Garnham 2008, 7). Despite a continual rise in maternal employment and repeated calls for a comprehensive policy on childcare from trade unions, employer organisations and early year’s pressure groups, consecutive Conservative Governments were unmoved\(^\text{171}\) (Randall 1996). In fact, during 1984 – when the Australian government ramped up childcare expenditure to record levels and the US Congress oversaw a rise in childcare tax credits – Margaret Thatcher’s Government landed parents who utilised workplace childcare centres with a tax bill, classifying it as a ‘perk’ (Policy Studies Institute 1989, 57; Randall 1996, 183).

In 1988 the Department of Employment warned of a “demographic time bomb,” predicting a labor shortage that mothers of young children would be needed to fill. Business interests, such as the typically Conservative Party-favouring Confederation of Business Interests (CBI) began to demand action on the issue: in 1993, the CBI, along with several major corporations such as Shell, TSB, Kingfisher and British Gas went so far as to form an association, “Employers for Childcare,” which released reports calling on the government to take action to increase childcare accessibility and affordability (Randall 2000, 89). According to Fleckenstein, the (Conservative) Major Government “cautiously acknowledged that work/family conflicts existed,” but rather than address the issue as a need for cross-class active labour market policy, it took a leaf out of the book of their conservative colleagues in the US and “considered a solution to the perceived welfare dependency of low-income families and lone mothers.” As such they added a minimal childcare component to the heavily means-tested “Family Credit” benefit and appropriated “limited” start-up funds for after-school care (Fleckenstein 2010, 799). Finally in 1997, the Labour Party, long considered a bastion male trade unionism, developed an election strategy that targeted middle-income women, concentrating on issues the strategists deemed key: parental leave, childcare, health and education (Mattinson 2010). Their manifesto touted a “National Childcare Strategy” which would “plan provision to match the requirements of the modern labor

\(^{170}\) For each child under the age of 8.

\(^{171}\) Apart from 1990 when John Major, acting as Chancellor, repealed the Thatcher-Government instituted workplace nursery tax.
market and help parents, especially women, to balance family and working life” (Labour Party 1997).

And indeed, once in office the party pushed through its five-year plan: a large, if slightly jumbled series of initiatives with an aim to ensure “good quality, affordable childcare for children aged 0 to 14 in every neighbourhood” (DFEE 1998, 7). Specifics included childcare tax credits for low-income working families, an increase in the universal child benefit, start-up funds for public-private childcare centres, integrated health, nursery and educational centres available to all but built in low-income neighbourhoods, 12.5 hours per week of free pre-school for all three and four year olds, and public-private partnerships that provided capital grants to new childcare centres, etc. (Lewis and Campbell 2007; Lloyd 2008; Seely 2011). Between 1997-1998 and 2007-2008, New Labour tripled spending on early years education and care, from £2 billion to over £7 billion making it “probably the fastest-growing major area of public spending” (Sefton 2009, 3).

5.3 Labour and childcare in context: electoral coalitions and policy demanders

a. Shifting voters, unclear coalitions

i) Shifts in patterns of gender and class party identification

Like its fellow centre-left parties in Australia and the United States, Labour had since the 1960s experienced a shift in the socio-economic profile of its electoral coalition, whereby according to Perrigo its “traditional working class membership” was slowly joined and partly replaced by better educated professionals employed in the public sector, often referred to as the “new middle class” or “new urban left” (Perrigo 1996, 119-120). Indeed Britain’s Alford index, at just above 40 in 1966, dropped steeply to under 30 by 1977 and whilst it increased slightly in the 1979 election, it never again rose above 30 (Clarke et. al. 2004, 43-44). Moreover, the traditional gender identification gap – which had favoured the Conservatives – began a gradual decline from the 1970 general election, although it was not completely eclipsed until 1997, as seen in Figure 1.19.

Classifying gender according education level provides a finer view of electoral coalitional change between the mid 1970s and the 1997 election, where Labour’s childcare appeals came to a head. It appears that from 1992 to 2001, the proportion of higher-educated female voters who identified as Conservative declined by 26 percentage points, as shown in Figure 5.1. This was a rather sharp drop that did not occur at any other point during the 1974-2001 timeline. This was in concert with a gradual increase in the proportion of higher-educated female voters who identified
as Liberal-SDP/Liberal Democrat (between 1987 and 1997, six percentage points) and an increase in Labour identification that occurred between 1987 and 2001 (26 percentage points), suggesting a somewhat gradual, increase in Labour identification on the part of higher-educated women, but one that was partially offset by the Liberals.

![Figure 5.1 UK party identification: female, post secondary – university (Source: British Election Study, 1974-2001)](image)

Shifts in party identification among women with lower levels of education were smaller than those of higher-educated women (see Figure 5.2: a nine percentage point increase in Labour Party identification between 1987 and 2001 versus a 17 percentage point decrease in Conservative Party identification between 1992 and 2001). Moreover, the shift seems less historically significant: whereas since 1974, higher-educated women identified as Conservative in greater proportion than they did Labour, there was greater degree of variance amongst lesser-educated women, who identified as either more Labour or more Tory from election to election.
There was an 18 percentage point increase in the proportion of higher-educated men (Figure 5.3) who identified as Labour between 1992 and 1997, concurrent with an eight percentage point decrease in Conservative and a two percentage point increase in Liberal/Liberal Democrat identification. Apart from the quite noticeable increase in Labour identification between 1992 and 1997, two trends become apparent: first, the increase in higher-educated male Labour identification was greater than that of lesser-educated women but second, the trend was much less predictable: Conservative identification had been steadily increasing since 1983 whilst Labour identification was decreasing; from 1979 this was coupled with a more gradual increase in the proportion of higher-educated men identifying as Liberal/Liberal Democrat (seven percentage point between 1987 and 1997). Again, this suggests that Labour did not reap the full rewards of middle class Conservative realignment.
Lesser-educated men (Figure 5.4) also displayed an increase in Labour Party identification between 1992 and 1997 of 13 percentage points, and of 16 percentage points between 1992 and 2001. However since at least 1974\textsuperscript{172} this group has traditionally identified as Labour in somewhat higher proportion (between two and five percentage points) than Conservative, so there was no stark reversal in identification trends as seen with both higher-educated men and women. The increase in Liberal identification as outlined above was minimal.

\textsuperscript{172} 1979 being the exception.
Figure 5.5 notes the total overall change in partisanship levels between 1974 and 2001: Labour are clearly a winner whilst the Conservatives, and to a much lesser extent, the Liberals lost out. This is indeed a snapshot in time and not indicative of long-term electoral trends, though it is interesting to note that Labour identification increased most among both highly-educated men and women, the two groups it had, during the 1970s, struggled the most to make inroads with. Though of course the presence of the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance/Liberal Democrats meant that Labour were not operating in a zero-sum game with the Tories and hence, would not reap all the rewards from middle class Conservative dealignment. The figures above suggest that lesser-educated men did not necessarily abandon the Labour Party from the late 1970s\textsuperscript{173} but that Labour’s purported advantage with them became very small until their popularity increased across all groups in 1997. The increase in support from higher-educated men does not appear to have been a gradual response to Labour’s slow evolution on social issues and party modernisation, as it appeared largely out of nowhere in 1997. There are, however, hints at some form of dealignment in this group, when one considers the rise in Liberal/Liberal Democrat identification which rose steadily from 1987\textsuperscript{174}, which perhaps suggests that higher-educated men were becoming increasingly attracted to the type of ‘left-liberal’ appeals that ‘New Labour’ under Tony Blair would begin to make.

While female voters of both educational groups increased their identification with Labour, higher-educated females seemed the group who changed the most, given their higher overall rate of identification change between 1987 and 2001 (15 percentage points) and the gradual manner in which this change occurred (i.e. the speed in which their rate of Conservative identification declined and their Labour identification increased), which suggests that their increasing preference for Labour was perhaps based on either a longer-term response to the party’s modernising electoral appeals (or on the other hand, their disaffection from the Conservatives), rather than the impact of a single election, as seen with higher-educated men. Their much higher than average electoral volatility score (see Figure 5.6 below) provides further evidence that the erosion of the traditional gender identification gap offered the Labour Party opportunities to forge a new electoral coalition, if only they would be able to institute reforms that would help modernise the party’s image and allow work-family policy proposals to be included in the strategic appeal process.

\textsuperscript{173} Although there does indeed appear to be a drop in Labour identification on their behalf between 1974 and 1979.\textsuperscript{174} Albeit starting from a lower base (from 11\% in 1987 to 18\% in 1997).
b. The party’s responds: new targets and organisational reform

i) Targeting female voters

Elected Labour Party Leader in 1983, Neil Kinnock found a party that was internally divided and poorly received by women of all backgrounds and the middle classes in general. What is worse, its traditional party-voter link with blue-collar males was also giving way. Kinnock aspired to modernise the party through two related strands: a communications overhaul and a series of reforms to the party’s internal organisational structure. The first strand will be discussed in this section and the second discussed in the next. In response to the party’s poor public reception (to be discussed below), Kinnock recruited a media friendly press secretary (future Labour Minister Patricia Hewitt) and communications director (Peter Mandelson) along with a team of pro-bono advertising professionals, dubbed the “Shadow Communications Agency” (SCA), all of which caused detractors to argue that “policy was increasingly subordinated to strategic considerations” (Bashevkin 2000, 410-411). Reviewing the factors behind Labour’s 1987 loss, the SCA indicated that the party’s old-fashioned male image remained an electoral obstacle. Moreover, a 1989 strategy document written by Patricia Hewitt and Deborah Mattison, the latter a co-founder of the SCA, which was entitled, “Women’s Votes: the Key to Winning” emphasised Labour’s need to campaign on work-family issues such as childcare. The strategy document also noted that in the 1987 general election Labour improved its overall standing amongst women by nine percentage points - a factor their polling attributed to women’s increasing concern over social policy issues - but that Labour’s newfound advantage amongst women was limited to a demographic with the lowest voter turnout: 18-24 year old women labelled as ‘working class.’ In short, Labour needed to widen its appeal.
Citing the Australian Labor Party’s success with closing the gender gap in 1983 as “the most important factor” in their electoral victory, Hewitt and Mattinson emphasised the ALP’s success in targeting middle-income voters, not strictly aligned to the feminist agenda but rather family concerns: “[b]ased on that research, the ALP in 1979 and 1980 campaigned as ‘the Party of the family,’ building up support amongst ‘middle Australia’ which served them well in the 1983 election itself.” Extrapolating from the ALP’s success with ‘middle-Australia’ the authors underlined the importance of attracting younger, middle-income women operating on a post-materialist vision of politics, as opposed to the traditional left-right distributive divide. Claiming, “the 25-50 age group must be Labour’s first priority,” they went on to argue: “A key target audience for Labour is women in their 30s and 40s, the ‘post-war baby boom’ teenagers of the 1960s. For them, combining employment and family is an urgent priority, which Labour’s policies must address” (Hewitt and Mattinson 1989).

But Kinnock’s Shadow Cabinet, let alone rank-and-file party members, were not easily convinced: Deborah Mattinson notes that when presenting the Shadow Cabinet with the findings from “Women’s Votes” at an away day in 1989:

“Patricia [Hewitt] and I had struggled to convey this [the fact that to women, Labour’s image ‘as male, old fashioned, and somewhat aggressive was profoundly off-putting’] to our male colleagues. Once again it was an all-male audience, with the exception of Jo Richardson, the women’s minister. The men were not noisy but some read papers as we spoke. We had expected this and decided that an appeal to self-interest was the only thing that would work. We had to persuade politicians that their own futures depended on persuading women voters” (Mattinson 2010).

Labour Party feminists continued to advocate for publicly funded childcare policy. The first report introduced by the progressive think tank loosely affiliated with Labor, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), in 1990 was “The Family Way,” which focused heavily on work/family balance. Its authors were Hewitt, Labour MP Harriet Harman and social policy analyst and advocate, Anna Coote (Randall 1996, 491; Coote et. al, 1990). Whilst Labour’s 1992 campaign did eventually increase its focus on policies that would appeal to middle-income women, the traditional gender-vote gap that had begun to close in 1987 re-opened slightly in the 1992 election. The political imperative for gender equality issues was, according to Fleckenstein, “reinforced” as “[s]ubsequently, childcare remained on the agenda of the Labour Party” (Fleckenstein 2010, 802). This was bolstered by the fact that the Shadow

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175 For example the 1992 manifesto committed £50m towards creating new childcare places (Randall 1996, 491).
Communications Agency data revealed Labour would have won the 1992 General election had women voted Labour in the same proportion as men (Perrigo 1996, 126).

Taking over as Labour leader following the death of John Smith in 1994, Tony Blair continued with his predecessors’ strategies on both the organisational and image fronts (Bashevkin 2000, 413). Hayes and McAllister note that under Blair, the party closely monitored the policy preferences of “Worcester woman” a straw woman invented by polling firms to represent a typical working woman from Middle England. Moreover, Mattinson notes that seven years after she and Patricia Hewitt received a cool response to ‘Women’s Votes’ at a Kinnock Shadow Cabinet away day in 1989, the response to their presentation on ‘Winning Words’ for women’s’ votes at a Blair Shadow Cabinet away day in 1996 was quite different: “The reaction to our presentation this time was much warmer, and we came away feeling that they really had ‘got it’” (Mattinson 2010).

Indeed, Labour’s 1997 platform was heavily reliant on social issues like health and education, with childcare playing a fairly significant role. Whilst the Conservative’s manifesto was absent of any childcare-related policies bar a proposal to “assist [lone parents] with childcare in work” (Conservative Party Manifesto, 1997), Labour announced a national childcare strategy that “will plan provision to match the requirements of the modern labor market and help parents, especially women, to balance family and working life” (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997). The increase in female support that Labour received in the 1997 general election was regarded as critical to their “landslide victory” (Peake 1997), and not only did Labour come close to eclipsing the traditional gender identification gap (see Figure 1.19), but also, for the first time Labour added higher-educated women to their electoral coalition (see Figure 5.1).

### ii) Reforming internal party organisation: gender-based and party-centralising changes

The Labour Party of the early 1980s would likely be unrecognisable to those only familiar with the orderly conferences and centrist, largely leadership-derived policy positions that defined Tony Blair’s New Labour. But in fact, when Kinnock was elected leader in the wake of Labour’s poor 1983 election performance, he found a party largely at war with itself, fissured between the hard-left, the unionist right and the often more centrist parliamentary party. The party’s internal chaos was in part the result of changing social-structural conditions within the country at large: on the one hand deindustrialisation since the 1960s had by the mid 1970s helped foster, in Perrigo’s words, “a marked decline in the traditional working-class [Labour Party] membership” which corresponded with, pace Inglehart and the rise of post-materialism, an “increase in members who were better educated, predominantly professionals employed in the public sector, often referred to as the 'new middle class' or the 'new urban left’” as well as the rise of unions.
with a predominantly female membership (Perrigo 1996, 119-120).

But while this educated, middle class ‘new left’ included centrist, would-be modernisers such as future leaders Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and future Deputy Leader and women’s minister, Harriet Harman, the new politics entrants also formed into ‘hard-left’ factions, such as the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD), associated with veteran MP and socialist, Tony Benn, just as they also filtered into an ‘ultra-left’ faction which, dominated by Trotskyist radicals, was collectively referred to as “Militant” (Shaw 1988, 218-220; Russell 2005, 18). The party experienced discord amongst its left-of-centre members but there was also a faction on the right, dominated by traditionalists who sought to restore relations with trade unions. And then of course there were the trade unions themselves, whose relationship with Labour declined along with the economy and which became particularly fragile during the 1979 ‘winter of discontent.’ According to Russell, the series of strikes “severely damaged perceptions of Labour’s ability to govern, ultimately contributing to its fall from power” (Russell 2005, 21-26). Moreover, the Labour leadership’s relationship with the CLPD was further inflamed in 1979, when then-Prime Minister James Callaghan refused to include on the 1979 manifesto a policy which passed through the National Executive Committee (NEC) (the party’s executive decision making body), calling for the abolishment of the House of Lords (Russell 2005, 169).

Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party trounced Labour in the 1979 elections, an event which threw the party into further internal disarray. Both the CLPD, whose sole reason of being was to exert extra-parliamentary party power over the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and the unions were able to combine and secure mutually beneficial, decentralising internal party reforms by 1981. The first, mandatory re-selection of all MPs opened up moderate seats to challenges from both the hard-left and the right. The second reform benefited unionists: the conference voted to replace the PLP’s sole decision making authority over leadership selection with an electoral college that appropriated 40% of votes to the party’s union affiliates. This was a somewhat unsurprising outcome given that the union bloc totalled 90% of all votes at the party conference. The outcome stirred moderate, right and in particular PLP members, and even went so far as to further push left-liberal party members into forming the breakaway Social Democratic Party (Russell 2005, 40). The hard-left who had continued to gain seats on the NEC and were thus able to exert control over the party’s manifesto, such that by the 1983 election it called for

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176 Harman being associated with the then-called ‘soft-left’ Labour Coordinating Committee (LCC).

177 The CLPD was founded in protest to then-Prime Minister Howard Wilson’s refusal in 1974 to endorse an NEC policy statement calling for the nationalisation of 25 large national firms. Wilson stated that he would refuse to endorse the reforms even if they were agreed to by the party conference. Thus the CLPD was formed as an organisational challenge to the party leadership – its aim was to gain power on the NEC and exert extra-parliamentary party dominance over the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) (Russell 2005, 16).

178 The introduction of the electoral college is cited as a key reason for the breakaway Social Democratic Party (SDP) (Russell 2005, 288).
widespread nationalisation and unilateral nuclear disarmament (Russell 2000, 130-13), Labour MP Gerald Kaufman famously dubbed the manifesto “the longest suicide note in history” 179 (Kaufman 2009). And indeed, despite the Thatcher Government’s unpopularity, Labour performed disastrously; they polled three million less votes than they had in 1979, making it the party’s worst performance since 1918. (Perrigo 1996, 116-17).

From 1983 onwards, centrist Labour Party officers began to attribute the repeated losses at the polls to their image as one embattled between the old-fashioned, blue-collar, male dominated party and a new left-wing “militant” factions, in addition to the public’s perception of Labour priorities as being centred upon unilateral nuclear disarmament and wide-scale nationalisation (Gould 1998, 66). Labour’s chief pollster, Bob Worcester described the party in the late 1970’s/early1980s as “organisational madness,” noting, “[i]n my experience I have had conflicting instructions from the head of press and publicity, the Prime Minister [Jim Callaghan] and the General Secretary, all of whom told me to do something different. There are no clear lines of authority and responsibility” (Gould 1998, 45). Kinnock responded to the organisational dysfunction by attempting to rebrand the party’s image (as discussed above) and internally reorganise the party, for example by exerting power over disobedient factions through tactics such as containment and sidelining (disavowing militant factions, i.e. those the tabloids labelled “the loony left”), as well as by attempting to reduce the power of the unions’ bloc vote, which will be discussed further below (Perrigo 1996, Lovenduski and Randall 1993, Bashevkin 2000).

The transition on both the public relations and internal organisational fronts, although here discussed separately, were not mutually exclusive. Labour strategist Philip Gould recalled a not so veiled threat from the assistant to the party’s then General Secretary, Larry Whitty: if Larry was ‘against’ Kinnock’s proposal for a new communications wing, it was going to be “extremely hard” for Kinnock to make any progress on it (Gould 1998, 49). Kinnock’s other major battlegrounds included shares of union versus constituency party influence in both candidate and party leadership selection procedures, in conference voting rights and on policy-making boards. This was in addition to a separate – but frequently entangled – movement on the part of Labour feminists who sought greater representation on decision making bodies such as the National Executive Committee, greater representation at the party’s annual conference and on trade unions’ delegations to said conference, as well as gender-based quotas in candidate selection procedures, such as having at least one woman on a shortlist (OWOS) or indeed all-women shortlists (AWS) (Lovecy 2007, Russell 2005, Alderman and Carter 1994). These gender-based and party centralising reforms, in reference to candidate and leadership elections as well as

179 Kaufman later recalled of his statement: “I was drawing attention to the party’s apparently irreversible meltdown as an electoral force… the strategy, if there was one, seemed to be to lose as many votes as possible” (Kaufman 2009)
quotas on decision making bodies were attempted throughout the 1980s. Even if supported by similar moderates (such as those on the LCC), they were often entangled with one and other. For example, some factions supported gender-based reforms as means of side-lining other factions (which will be discussed below).

In 1982 the first OWOS motion (wherein each constituency candidate selection procedure was to include at least one woman) reached the conference floor but was opposed by the NEC – its representative on the issue being Gladys Dunwoody, a female NEC member supported by the trade unions. The motion itself only received 20% of the votes. As Russell argues, the vote was an issue of women’s representation on its surface but was co-opted by factional interests in pursuit of their own gains, unrelated to gender-based representation. The following year, the NEC approved OWOS in principle but the measure was rejected by the full conference, only to be approved in 1986 and put into place – in constituencies where there was no sitting Labour MP – by 1987 (Russell 2005, 288).

In 1984 Kinnock attempted to reform local candidate selection procedures by removing the trade unions’ bloc-vote and introducing a one member-one vote (OMOV) system - though this was narrowly defeated in the conference vote. Finally, after another lost election in 1987, Kinnock managed to push through what Philip Gould termed an “unsatisfactory hybrid,” wherein unions held up to 40% of the local constituency vote, contingent upon the number of branches affiliated to the local constituency party (Gould 1998, 189; Alderman and Carter 1994, 325). The issue of women’s representation was bolstered at the 1989 conference when, after initially failing in 1986, the female-dominated union GMB APEX, working in concert with Labour Party feminists, was able to push through resolutions that called for increased representation of women on all Labour Party bodies, including the NEC, and demanded that trade unions send enough female delegates to Labour Party conferences so as to represent the proportion of their membership that is female. The rule change mandated that by 1990, four out of the trade unions’ 12 NEC seats were to be held by women and that by 2001 50% of the Parliamentary Labour Party (i.e. 50% of Labour MPs) would be female (Russell 2005, 102-108).

The 1991 conference provided another success for women’s representation, as it approved a phase-in of NEC and constituency-level changes to be enacted by 1995: four out of 12 trade union seats on the NEC and three out of seven constituency seats on the NEC were required to be held by women; in local parties two out of four elected officers and three out of seven constituency officers were required to be women; 50% of constituency delegations were also to

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180 The CLPD saw the proposal as a mechanism to “help protect the opportunity to deselect right-wing MPs” before each general election (Russell 2005, 100).
be reserved for females, and trade union delegations to the annual Labour Party conference were required to include women in “at least the proportions in which they were represented in the trade unions’ membership. The outcomes were reasonably stark: whilst only five out of 29 NEC members were women in 1991, 18 out of 32 executives were female by 1998. Russell argues “this was rapid change for a body where by 1990 there had still never been as single women elected in the trade union section, and only four women had ever been elected in the constituency section” (Russell 2005, 108). By the 1992 conference, the same group of women from the trade unions who had worked with female Labour Party leadership on internal party quotas now sat on the reformed NEC women's committee; in turn, the same group of women worked alongside Labour Women's officer Vicky Phillips and committee chair Clare Short to develop a compromise proposal on all-women shortlists (Russell 2005, 112). The timing was fortuitous in the sense that recently elected Labour Leader John Smith was more amenable to the concept than his predecessor, Neil Kinnock. In June 1993 the NEC agreed - in principle - that women shortlists were to be required in a) 50 per cent of the seats where a Labour MP retired and b) 50 per cent of seats that Labour expected to win, with room to take account of local conditions, such as popular male MPs – although this needed conference approval (Russell 2005, 113).

Yet the positive gains for women’s representation in 1992 and 1993 were counterbalanced by uncertainty on the party centralisation front: the 1992 conference was also the venue for the party’s next leadership election, a process singled out for ridicule by then-Conservative leader Michael Howard, who proclaimed that “the new Labour leadership would be 'tainted at source' by the manner of its election,” given the unions’ 40% stake in the electoral college (Alderman and Carter 323). According to Alderman and Carter, the unions were on the back foot over Kinnock’s moves to impart OMOV on constituencies’ candidate selection processes and were alarmed “at what was seen as 'a race to sever links with the unions.’” In what the authors deem “a haphazard and piecemeal manner” the NEC established a Review Group to examine the whole gamut of party-union links,” which “effectively precluded any change in the leadership selection procedures during the 1993 conference.” A large majority of the 15-member Trade Union Links Review Group were either unionists or thought to be supportive of the current arrangements (Alderman and Carter 1994, 324). In fear of another public spectacle, a compromise was reached where the unions retained their separate status in the electoral college, albeit with their share of the votes reduced from 40% to 33%, putting them on equal footing with the PLP and the Constituency Labour Parties (CLP) (Alderman and Carter 324-25).

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181 Indeed, although battles were framed as a move towards party “democratisation,” they have often been characterised as party-elite led moves towards “emasculating” of union/blue-collar influence and/or party centralisation (see for example Hopkin 2001, Russell 2005).
Finally, at the 1993 conference, significant headway was made on the feminists’ and party centralisers’ two long term-goals: OMOV at constituency-level candidate selection and all-women shortlists. As Russell explains, the conference had an increased feminist tilt - largely because of the 1991 rule change on internal quotas. According to Russell, "all the major trade unions expressed ‘formal support’ for all-women shortlists, due to female trade unionists’ efforts within their own organisations. (Russell 2005,113). The all-women's shortlist motion was tied to one mandating one member one vote (OMOV) in constituency-level and Labour leadership elections (thus depleting the trade union bloc vote). Whilst the constituencies favoured OMOV (since it put individual constituency level party members and activists a fairer level with the unions), they opposed all-women shortlists, since they viewed it as central party interference in local party affairs (Russell 2005, 113). The unions, by contrast opposed OMOV and, due to their female trade union officers, favoured all-women shortlists. Both measures, tied to the same resolution, narrowly passed through the conference vote: 47.5% to 44.4%, a fact that Alderman and Carter partially attribute to a last-minute position change by the Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF) union as well as a “a rousing closing speech by [then-Shadow Cabinet member John] Prescott” (Alderman and Carter 1994, 327).

But what about centralising reforms that would directly impact party policy? Policy such as manifesto commitments had traditionally been the remit of the NEC, who produced policy proposals that would then be submitted to the full conference. Prior to the era of discord the party leader would pass reforms through the NEC and as Russell states, “when the trade union majority in the conference and NEC was amenable, the leadership could thus comfortable secure its policy positions” (Russell 2005, 129). However, as outlined above, the rise of factions and increased tension between the unions and PLP resulted in a breakdown of consensus, to the extent that leaders such as Wilson and Callaghan would wilfully disavow policy that had passed through the party’s various internal decision making structures which resulted in the sort of left-wing backlash displayed by the 1983 manifesto. The NEC had two policy committees, international and home, the latter having been controlled by the CLPD’s Tony Benn since 1974. As Russell notes, the “political control of the NEC and its committees resulted in many decisions that were unwelcome by the party’s leaders” (Russell 2005, 131). Yet the party’s right gained enough seats during the 1981 NEC election that they ousted Benn by 1982. Benn’s removal and the entrance of the right allowed Kinnock an opportunity to pressure the NEC into reforming its policy-making process: instead of a single NEC-only domestic policy committee, Kinnock united the PLP and the extra parliamentary party by forming a joint Policy Coordinating Committee comprised of seven policy review groups, in which PLP and NEC members were to be represented in equal numbers. But despite being advertised as a ‘joint’ venture, the reforms
essentially subverted power from the extra parliamentary party to the PLP: the fact that there had been an increase in MPs on the NEC meant that MPs were a minority in only two out of the seven groups (Russell 2005, 131).

Although the policy output was more in keeping with the PLP’s objectives, Russell notes party-wide complaints about the exclusivity of the process and the conference’s inability to amend (they could only vote up or down) proposals (Russell 2005, 132-133). After the party’s loss in the 1987 election\(^{182}\), the joint Policy Coordinating Committee was formalised into the “Policy Review”\(^{183}\): like its predecessor the review groups were comprised of PLP and NEC members but were also “topped up” with trade unionists which, according to Shaw was a “format designed to lock in co-operation from the three main institutional units constituting the party.” The addition of unionists, however, does not appear to have detracted much power from the leadership in the sense that the entire review was overseen by the Campaign Management Team, which was comprised of senior politicians and party executives (Shaw 1993, 113). Moreover, the operation was increasingly focused on public perceptions: it consulted Institute for Public Policy Research just as each of the groups were regularly provided with quantitative public opinion data from the party’s Political Intelligence Officer and also, briefed by the Shadow Communications Agency (Shaw 1993, 112-114). Perhaps most relevant, however, was the concern with how the Review’s policy output would be received by women. Shaw states:

“For a mixture of internal party and electoral reasons, Labour was keen 'to ensure that the women's perspective (was) fully covered.' A Women's Monitoring Group (containing all the women members of the PRGs [Policy Review Groups]) was established (and later upgraded after opinion research in 1989 indicated that Labour was failing to attract women supporters) and was authorised to check that women's needs were taken fully into account by all PRGs” (Shaw 1993, 113).

Shaw’s assessment reflects the impact not just of the party’s newfound media strategy to win over female voters but also points to the increased representation of women on these decision making bodies, the result of the gender-based organisational reforms outlined above. In fact, Russell notes that Harriet Harman’s own election to the NEC in 1993, which helped bring work/family issues to the party executive’s attention, was made possible in the first place

\(^{182}\) Whilst the 1987 manifesto was introduced to the public without receiving such damning condemnation by centrists, the party only received 30% of all votes, as compared to the Tories’ more comfortable 42%.

\(^{183}\) Policy-making became more streamlined with an Interim National Policy Forum, proposed in 1990 which finally met in 1993 that “contained representatives of MPs, MEPs, local councillors, women's organisations, black members and youth organisations.” As Alderman and Carter point out, union representation was lessened as “Union representatives constituted about one-quarter of its membership” (Alderman and Carter 1994, 328-329).
because of rule change that required OMOV on constituencies’ NEC elections. These OMOV-induced results clearly favoured the ‘modernisers’: in 1992 left-winger Dennis Skinner lost his position whilst Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were elected in, with Harman the following year. Through a series of arduous battles over selection, representation and policy it was clear that the party modernisers finally gained the upper-hand over both the hard-left and the unions, and as the Policy Review and discussion over Labour’s 1997 manifesto suggests, this did have an impact on party policy and specifically, its newfound attention to work/family issues such as childcare.

c. Who wants childcare? Unions, Labour and policy adoption

i) Broader (non-union) childcare interests: fragmented and often divided advocacy

Beyond unions and Labour Party activists, who comprised the UK’s ‘childcare lobby’? Randall argues that from the 1960s and 1970s an “embryonic” under-fives lobby was formed which was “diverse, organizationally fragmented and lacking in political clout” (Randall 2000, 67-68). In fact, Randall argues that the group was not even in agreement on the “question of working mothers” (Randall 2000, 74). Organisations included broad under-fives welfare groups, charities such as the Salvation Army, a branch of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) and pre-school only (i.e. non-full day) groups like the National Campaign for Nursery Education. Feminist organisations did not immediately rush to the issue: the first feminist oriented childcare organisation, the National Childcare Campaign (NCC) only arrived on the scene in 1989 (Randall 2000, 69) and according to Randall, it originally “campaigned from an uncompromisingly socialist feminist position: women had the right to full-time, free and collective childcare” (Randall 2000, 84).

Public expenditure cuts in the 1970s and 1980s stifled the nascent movement, and indeed there was a split within the NCC with half its membership forming the Daycare Trust in 1986. It seemed most of the attention was derived through individual efforts of particular unions as well as the ‘municipal feminism’ so popular in the leftist-run Greater London Council and its local Labour Party at the time (Randall 2000, 84). The gap, aggravated by public expenditure cuts fostered a private childcare market. The growth of private-sector nurseries had an impact on industry coordination: by the mid 1990s, two private oriented groups, the Childcare Association and the National Private Day Nurseries Association, arose. These groups were also in competition with the Playgroups Association, who although they could not provide full day care,
had existed in the 1960s. With attendance rates stagnating by the 1990s the Playgroups Association felt increasingly threatened by the Major Government’s flirtation with pre-school services and in particular their proposal for a nursery school voucher scheme (Randall 2000, 104-105). By the mid 1990s even the NCC stepped away from its demand for free, publicly funded services and recognised that, in Randall’s words, “it may be necessary to have fees” (Randall 2000, 104). In a sense the non-union, non-Labour childcare interests were largely divided: at first by normative issues (e.g. childcare as a necessary evil versus childcare as a public good) and later by class and economic issues (e.g. public childcare as a right for all versus private childcare for middle class families). The union movement, as will be shown below, featured similarly diverse if not divided stances on the issue.

**ii) Peak-level trade unions and the response to work/family policies**

Even the Labour Party’s name bares tribute to the historical ties between itself and the trade unions: the party was founded, largely financed, and according to David Marquand, “controlled by a highly decentralised trade union movement” which “in a sense is not true of its social democratic counterparts on mainland Europe” (Gould 1998, 25). Apart from the fact that during the 1980s fees from affiliated trade union members accounted for 90% of total Labour Party income\(^1\) (Terry 2001), affiliated unions also historically had bloc votes in constituency candidate selections, for the Labour Party leaders and, crucially, had reserved more than half the seats on the Party’s chief administrative body, the National Executive Committee, which until Blair’s tenure had a decisive role in policy-making, acting as a “counterweight to the power of the parliamentary party” (Garner and Kelly 1998, 134). Coalition maintenance theory would predict that, had the affiliated unions put forth a strong call for action on childcare policy, the PLP would have quickly heeded their demands both during election campaigns and in Parliament.

Whether the unions put forth such a claim is unclear: from 1963 the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) had adopted the position that the government should provide childcare for working mothers; in 1978 it issued a “Charter for Under 5’s,” calling for flexible working hours and comprehensive childcare, and in 1979, a “Charter for Equality,” calling for mandatory female presence on key decision making boards, in addition to full-time childcare (Randall 2000, 70-71; Gelb 1989, 40-41, 76). Small pieces of anecdotal evidence taken from Hansard suggest that trade unions were linked to the advocacy of childcare since the 1980s. For example, during debate on Day Care Review legislation in 1989, Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn, noted:

\(^1\) This figure dropped to 50% by 1995.
“I am sponsored in the House by the National Union of Public Employees. We have a particular interest in the debate as our members provide a large proportion of the pre-school facilities in this country.

[…] We are also debating the range of child care facilities that should be on offer. The Labour party strongly believes that there should be statutory provision of pre-school facilities for parents who want to use them” (Hansard Millbank, 2013).

Moreover, Conservative MP Teresa Gorman, who wrote a clause to allow tax-exempt childcare vouchers (which did not pass), stated on the Commons floor:

“Labour Members knew from my discussions with them that my ten-minute Bill attracted enormous attention, not least from trade unions, which wrote to congratulate me on the forward-looking views of the Conservative party in making such a point to the House” (Hansard Millbank 2013).

However, British labor unions had a lengthy history of promoting the concept of a ‘family wage’ 186 and were more than hesitant to embrace the idea of female trade union leadership or even key feminist issues such as maternity/parental leave until the late 1980s and, in some cases, the 1990s (Gelb 1989). Measures of feminist agency within labor unions remain unclear: Kirton and Healy (2010), note that female trade union leadership was quite low up until the late 1990s and that even still, women are under-represented in trade union leadership positions. 187 Deborah Mattinson notes that when making a presentation to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) General Council in 1988 that used demographic data, polling and focus group work in order to highlight “how crucial women would be to the movement in the future”:

“The council members at the meeting, all men bar one, sat back in their chairs in the oak-panelled board room and guffawed noisily at each other’s jokes as I ran through the data. At the end, the TUC President moved the agenda on, dismissing me with a wave of his hand. There was no discussion about what I had presented at all, no action points, no follow-up” (Mattinson 2010).

iii) **Trade unions at the micro-level: coordination between female union and Labour Party officials**

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186 The concept of which was antithetical to married women working as it implied the male breadwinner should earn enough money for his entire family.

187 For example, women comprised 79% of COHSE membership but just 39% of its national executive; in the GMB women were 34% of membership, 29% of its executive; in NUPE: 75% membership, 46% executive (Brookes, Eagle and Short, 1989).
The behaviour of peak-level trade union officers and even the information gleaned from female union leadership statistics may, to a certain extent, mask wide variance amongst unions in terms of both their demographics and their inclination to lobby for work/family policies such as childcare; it also may downplay the impact of micro-level coordination between female trade union officers and female Labour Party officials. This coordination between female trade union officers and senior female Labour Party officers – what Russell calls a “progressive bureaucracy” (Russell 2005, 124) – pushed forward the previously discussed internal Labour party quotas, which sought to ensure that women were better represented on constituency General Committees, in the Shadow Cabinet, amongst conference delegates and on the NEC (Russell 2005, 104-05).

The party’s factional disputes created an opportunity structure for the progressive bureaucracy to play one group against and other, in order to shore up both union and party support for their measures.188 Meg Russell writes that the progressive bureaucracy “at times acted covertly to avoid opposition from senior men” and would then go to persuade unions and the party leadership at a broader level by framing their demands in the electoral context: ‘winning women’s votes’ and attracting new union members. The proposals, Russell concludes, were “radical in their effects” (Russell 2005, 124). The ‘progressive bureaucracy’s’ specific policy successes included OWOS and eventually, all women shortlists, which took hold before the 1997 election. They were aided by female-dominated unions: at the 1986 and 1989 GMB APEX sponsored resolutions that called for increased representation of women on all Labour Party bodies, including the NEC, and demanded that trade unions send enough female delegates to Labour Party conferences so as to represent the proportion of their membership that is female, that by 1990 four out of the trade unions’ twelve NEC seats were held by women and that by 2001 50% of the Parliamentary Labour Party (i.e. 50% of Labour MPs) were female (Russell 2005, 102-108).

Indeed both Russell (2005) and Lovecy (2007) suggest that the ‘progressive bureaucracy’ was able to make inroads with both the Labour Party and the unions by framing their demands in an electoral context: ‘winning women’s votes.’ However Lovecy notes that it would be inaccurate

188 For example at the 1993 conference, the motion on all-women’s shortlists was tied to another motion that mandated one member one vote (OMOV) in constituency-level and in Labour leadership elections (thus invalidating the trade union bloc vote). Whilst the constituencies favoured this (since it put individual constituency level party members and activists a fairer level with the unions), they opposed all-women shortlists, since they viewed it as an incidence of central party interference in local party affairs. The unions, by contrast naturally opposed OMOV and, due to the persuasion of female members (in addition to a number of heavily unions that were predominantly female) and perhaps more so their battle with the constituency leaders, favoured all-women shortlists. Both measures, tied to the same resolution, narrowly passed (Russell 2005, 112-115).
to suggest that the Labour and union leadership would have progressed on said issues were it not for prodding by the network of female party and union leaders:

“If the internal quotas proposals were thus strategically framed to appeal to the party leadership, and the case for them often presented as part of an electoral-driven strategy, it is nevertheless true that the issue was not developed nor initially taken forward by Kinnock or the NEC, but rather as Russell argues, the NEC, union leaders and Kinnock were essentially left in a reactive role, ‘bounced’ into supporting change by an active, feminist network in the unions supported by key party head office staff. The longer-term outcome would be a radically changed gender composition for executive bodies, for the Annual Conference and for the NEC were the number of women expanded from five out of 29 in 1991 to 18 out of 32 in 1988…This resulted in Clare Short’s assessment, in ‘an important and unremarked change in the ethos and the balance of power of the party’” (Lovecy, 2007, 81).

It appears that the level of close coordination between the trade unions and the Labour Party resulted in an increasingly feminised Party leadership and indeed, many of the senior Labour Party politicians went on to take up seats on the NEC, one in particular, Angela Eagle, became a leading Labour MP (Russell 2005, 127).

5.4 New votes or old interests: the drivers of policy adoption

The following section attempts to explain whether the Labour Party’s relatively slow embrace of childcare policy as a legislative issue was a response to the changing interests of trade unions and mechanised by legislators ‘converting’ to the issue, and the extent to which it was driven by electoral imperative and mechanised by the replacement of blue-collar, union-oriented MPs with post-materialist, new politics MPs. Whereas the former cause would reflect Karol’s (2009) ‘coalition group maintenance’ theory, the latter reflects his ‘coalition group incorporation’ theory.

First, it will provide a series of descriptive statistics in order to illustrate the composition of and rate of turnover amongst Labour MPs between T1 (the 48th Parliament, 1979-1983) and T2 (the 52nd Parliament, 1997-2001). It will then run the Rapoport and Stone (1994) model for

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189 Among the female trade union officers working within their parties - and alongside Labour - for quotas were Angela Eagle (COHSE), Maureen Rooney (AEEU), Bernadette Hillon (USDAW), Maureen O’Mara (NUPE), Anne Gibson (MSF) and Margaret Prosser (TGWU). These women went on to achieve increasingly powerful positions in the Labour Party: as Russell explains, ”when the NEC women's committee was reformed in 1989 to include six trade union women elected at the women's conference, these women took up the seats” (Russell 2005, 127).

190 As compared to the US Democrats and Australian Labor Party.
disaggregating political change, which as previously noted, identifies the proportion of party position change (i.e. the increase in the percentage of Labour MPs who debated childcare between T1 and T2) that is attributed to replacement, conversion or mobilisation. Next, it will provide another series of descriptive statistics, here listing the percentage of MPs who, according to gender, education and union background, debated childcare, noting whether the differences between said groups (e.g. men versus women) are statistically significant. A series of of OLS regressions then test for a relationship between the number of times an MP debated childcare and characteristics associated with post-materialism or characteristics associated with trade unionism. The last section will examine the amount of replacement that took place in each party from T1 to T2 and specifically, identify the characteristics of those replacing and those replaced: were the newcomers the type of post-materialist oriented legislators hypothesised here?

a. **The mechanics and forces of party position change: conversion or replacement, unionists or post-materialists?**

In order to illustrate the scale of legislator turnover as well as the general composition of Labour MPs between T1 and T2, Table 5.1 provides a series of descriptive statistics. It focuses on the delegation of Labour MPs in each Parliament: what proportion of them were female, university educated and had a union background? It also identifies the proportion of MPs who, in each Parliament, were either in the first of last terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>48(^{th})</th>
<th>49(^{th})</th>
<th>50(^{th})</th>
<th>51(^{st})</th>
<th>52(^{nd})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Labour MPs</strong></td>
<td>283</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>University educated, %</strong></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female, %</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade union, %</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnover: % first Parliament</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnover: % last Parliament</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 Labour MP characteristics, 1970-2001 (Source: Hansard Milbank)

The composition of Labour Party MPs shifted considerably between T1 and T2, the 48\(^{th}\) and 52\(^{nd}\) Parliaments (1979-2001). Table 5.1, above, shows that there was an increase of 136 Labour MPs during that time period. Whereas university educated MPs comprised just over half the Labour Party delegation during the 48\(^{th}\) Parliament, this would rise to nearly 80% by the 52\(^{nd}\). Similarly, the percentage of women Labour MPs more than quadrupled, from five to 23%. The percentage
of former unionist MPs declined by 13 percentage points, from 42% to 29%. Turnover, as calculated by the proportion of newcomer Labour MPs in a single parliament ranged from 15% in the 48th to as high as 45%, following Labour’s 1997 election victory. Turnover, when calculated as the proportion of outgoing Labour MPs in a single parliament ranged from a high of 34%, in the 48th Parliament, to a low of 14%, during the 52nd.

63 ‘stayers’ remained in Parliament between 1979 and 2001. They comprised 22% of all Labour Party MPs during the 48th Parliament and 15% during the 52nd, meaning that by T2 85% of Labour MPs were ‘new’. 11% of stayers debated childcare during T1 and 27% of them did so at T2.

This research employs Hansard’s Millbank system of parliamentary debates in order to capture the proportion of Labour MPs who debated childcare at T1 and T2. For each Parliament between 1979 and 2001, it notes every instance in which a Labour MP mentioned the issue of childcare, either in the form of a parliamentary question or during a debate. Rapoport and Stone’s (1994) model for disaggregating the components of party change is applied.

The 48th Parliament (1979-1983) is T1 because that was the point during which the party was mired by internal chaos and it was, arguably, the last parliament before the battle for internal Labour Party reform and modernisation commenced. The 52nd Parliament (1997-2001) is

191 An average of 27 with a standard deviation of 12.
192 An average of 22 with a standard deviation of eight.
194 It does not count instances in which the mention of childcare refers exclusively to narrowly means-tested or lone-parents only programme as they do not illustrate a general interest in childcare assistance for middle-income families, what this research is interested in.
195 It does count instances in which a legislator discussed childcare as part of a debate and also note each time a written question was submitted to the Government on childcare. It does not count each written response the Government in power gives, since the minister involved is required to answer such queries and is not choosing raise the issue on their own accord. If, however, a question is asked to a minister in a Commons sitting and the minister responds with a party-positional statement then that response is counted. However, it does not count negative responses or negative statements on childcare. While they are few and far between it is too ‘fuzzy’ to try and measure the extent to which a negative response is driven by for example financial reasons, by the fact that the speaker is endorsing another form of childcare assistance or indeed opposes the concept of non-maternal care for children at a cultural level. As such only positive debate mentions (i.e. discussing its importance, advocating an increase in spending and/or places) and/or parliamentary questions related to Government plans for childcare, the number of available childcare places and levels of childcare funding are counted.
196 As discussed in Chapter One, this method is less straightforward than that used by Karol (who uses roll-call data to draw a distinction between the two processes) because the traditional prevalence of party discipline in parliamentary systems (relative to that of presidential systems) masks legislators’ true intentions. Thus the traditional party line vote in the UK parliament yields little information as to whether a party changed its overall stance on an issue because legislators were convinced by longstanding interest group allies to do so (and thus reversed/converted their previous positions), or because legislators within that party were ousted and eventually retired, allowing new legislators with different alliances to come to the floor. Moreover, because, as this chapter shows, childcare was a relatively dormant issue during this timeframe (apart from the Thatcher Government’s removal of workplace nursery tax exemptions in 1984) votes on the issue are too few and far between to glean definitive insight.
designated T2 because it follows the 1997 election, where childcare received an increased amount of attention and it was the Parliament during which the party’s first set of non-means tested childcare policies were devised and (to some extent) implemented. T1 saw just nine per cent of Labour MPs raise the issue of childcare in the Commons. By contrast, during T2, 42% of Labour MPs raised the issue.

Rapoport and Stone will find the proportion of overall party position change that can be accounted for by change amongst the stayers or indeed replacement of dropouts with newcomers. The model is as follows:

\[ T2 - T1 = (\beta \alpha)(S2 - S1) + \beta(1 - \alpha)(N2 - D1) + (1 - \beta)(N2 - T1) \]

Where:
- \( T1 \) and \( T2 \) are mean values of the variable under observation at the first and second time periods under observation.
- \( S \) is the average value for ‘stayers,’ i.e. those present at both \( T1 \) and \( T2 \).
- \( B \) is the ratio of the size of the group at \( T1 \) relative to the size at \( T2 \).
- \( \alpha \) is the proportion of the group at \( T1 \) which is comprised, of ‘stayers’.
- \( D1 \) is the mean value for ‘dropouts,’ i.e. those who were present at \( T1 \) but not \( T2 \).
- \( N2 \) is the mean value for ‘newcomers,’ i.e. those who were present at \( T2 \) but not \( T1 \).

\[
\begin{align*}
T1 &= .085 \\
T2 &= .424 \\
S1 &= .111 \\
S2 &= .270 \\
D1 &= .078 \\
N2 &= .451 \\
B &= .671 \\
\alpha &= .223
\end{align*}
\]

Applying these values to the Rapoport and Stone formula yields a result that is dominated by replacement and mobilisation: of the 34 percentage point increase in the number of Labour MPs who raised the childcare issue during Commons debates between the 48th and the 52nd Parliaments, just seven per cent is attributed to legislator conversion, as opposed to 57% and 36% to legislator replacement and mobilisation, respectively. This suggests that Labour MPs
‘converting’ to the issue only account for seven per cent of change, whilst legislator replacement and mobilisation (the entry of newcomers in excess of the number that have dropped out) together account for 93% of the total increase in MPs debating childcare.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total change:</th>
<th>Conversion</th>
<th>Replacement</th>
<th>Mobilisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.194</td>
<td>.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34% comprised of:</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 Rapoport and Stone: 48th to 52nd UK Parliament (Source: Hansard Milbank, 2013)

The Rapoport and Stone equation finds that party position change amongst Labour MPs was indeed mechanised by replacement and mobilisation, rather than existing MPs changing their position. However, since the model only disaggregates between legislators according to when they entered office, it provides less insight into whether there is an association between debating and independent variables such as gender, education and unionism. Before testing these variables in a full OLS regression, Table 5.3, below, shows the proportion of Labour MPs at T1 and T2 that debated childcare who were female, university educated and had previously worked for a trade union. It also includes a control variable for relevant ministerial/shadow ministerial posting. T-tests are applied to indicate whether group-based differences in debating childcare (i.e. between women and men, etc.) are statistically significant.

\[197\] For the 48th Parliament this is: Shadow Secretary of State for Social Services, Shadow Secretary of State for Employment and Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Science. For the 52nd Parliament this is: Children’s Minister, any ministerial post in Department of Education and Employment (i.e. both junior minister and Minister of State), Secretary of State for Social Security and Minister for Women.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>48th Parliament</th>
<th>52nd Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University educated, %</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-university educated, %</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women, %</td>
<td>38*</td>
<td>71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men, %</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-trade union, %</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union, %</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister, %</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-minister, %</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

Table 5.3 Characteristics of Labour MPs who debated (Source: Hansard Milbank, 2013)

In the 48th Parliament, university and non-university educated Labour MPs debated childcare in roughly similar proportions, nine and seven per cent, respectively. However, women debated in greater proportion than men: whereas seven per cent of male Labour MPs debated childcare during the 48th, 38% of female Labour MPs did so, a difference that is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. MPs without a union background also debated in greater proportion than their counterparts with a union background, 12% to four per cent, respectively, a difference that is significant at the 95% confidence level. None of the three relevant shadow ministerial posts debated childcare during the 48th.

During the 52nd Parliament, university educated Labour MPs debated childcare in greater proportion than their non-university educated counterparts by a margin of 45% to 34%, a difference significant at the 90% confidence level. As with the 48th Parliament, a larger proportion of women than men debated, though the difference is now greater: 71% of female Labour MPs debated the issue as compared to 34% of men, a difference that is statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence level. Finally, non-trade unionists continued to debate the issue in greater proportion than their unionist counterparts, 46% to 33%, a difference that is significant at the 99% confidence level. 83% (five out six) relevant ministers debated childcare during the 52nd, the difference between relevant ministers and non is significant at the 90% confidence level.

As with the US and Australian cases, both the descriptive statistics set out in this chapter and Rapoport and Stone’s model treat speaking about childcare in Commons debates as binary.

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198 There were only three relevant ministers during the 48th Parliament, none of whom spoke on childcare. There were six ministers during the 52nd, five of whom spoke at least once on childcare.
variable (i.e. a legislator did or did not do so) which in a sense does not explain why some MPs who debated childcare were more or less committed than others, given for example, that in the 52nd Parliament the number of times an MP spoke on the issue ranged from zero to 34, with 42% of all MP speaking on it. Therefore OLS regressions are again used to both assess the driving factors behind the number of times an MP discussed the issue and test whether the Rapoport and Stone-based findings (that Labour’s embrace of childcare was predominantly mechanised by legislator turnover as opposed to conversion) holds when we treat speaking about childcare as continuous rather than categorical variable. The results for the binary logistic regressions, under which the dependent variable is whether or not a legislator debated childcare, appear in footnotes 201 and 202.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>-.031 (.090)</td>
<td>-.024 (.089)</td>
<td>-.032 (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.067*** (.194)</td>
<td>1.34*** (.210)</td>
<td>1.161** (.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>-.160* (.091)</td>
<td>-.123 (.091)</td>
<td>-.126 (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/Women’s Ministerial Post</td>
<td>.136 (.142)</td>
<td>.134 (.388)</td>
<td>.134 (.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*Union</td>
<td>-1.337* (.523)</td>
<td>-1.298* (.533)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*University</td>
<td>.209* (.087)</td>
<td>.189* (.087)</td>
<td>.195 (.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.209* (.087)</td>
<td>.189* (.087)</td>
<td>.195 (.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

Table 5.4 OLS regression results 48th Parliament, UK (Source: Hansard Milbank)

Like the Australian case, the main variables of interest are university education, gender and having previously worked at a trade union\(^{199}\), whilst the control variable is relevant ministerial post. Regressions are run for the 48th Parliament, which preceded the Labour Party’s decade of internal strife and reorganisation, and for the 52nd parliament, which was the result of Blair’s 1997 electoral victory, during which campaign childcare was embraced as an electoral issue. The National Childcare Strategy was also first devised during the 52nd. Model 1 for the 48th explains just 12% of the total variation in the number of times MPs spoke on the issue, however, it points to a strong and significant partial association between being female and speaking on the issue: controlling for education, trade union background and ministerial post, female MPs spoke on the

\(^{199}\) In Britain there are no interest group ratings similar to the US’s COPE or ADA scores, so having previously worked for a trade union is employed as a proxy. The assumption is that union staff, even after they entered Parliament would remain loyal to the demands of the labour movement.
issue 1.1 more times than their male counterparts, which is significant at the 99.9% confidence level. Controlling for all other variables, having a university education is negatively but not significantly associated with the number of times an MP spoke on the issue. The association between trade unionism and the number of times an MP spoke on childcare is negative and significant at the 90% confidence level. The control variable, relevant ministerial post, is not significant, therefore suggesting that childcare was of limited interest even to those whose portfolios may have included it, an indication of how far off the radar childcare was at the time.

Model 2 includes the interaction variable female x union, in order to assess whether female MPs with a union background were more likely to discuss the issue than their male-union counterparts. Interestingly, the result is negative, suggesting women with a union background were associated with 1.46 fewer childcare mentions than their male union background members, an association significant at the 95% confidence level. However, this seems driven by the fact that of the 11 female MPs, only one – who did not debate childcare – had previously worked at a union. Model 3 includes all of the aforementioned variables but adds another interaction, for female MPs with a university education: controlling for all other variables: the effect is positive but insignificant.

This is in spite of Joan Lestor’s disproportionate number of childcare mentions (five): being female continues to be positively and significantly associated with debating childcare, at the 99% confidence level, in the binary logistic models shown in Appendix D.

The direction and significance of relationships in the OLS regressions and the binary logistic regressions that appear in Appendix D are similar. Under the binary logistic counterpart to OLS Model 1, Table 5.4 (48th Parliament), university and ministerial posts remain insignificant, holding all other variables constant. Trade union remains negative and significant at the 90% confidence level, controlling for all other variables. Gender remains positive and significant, though whereas the OLS regressions found it significant at the 99.9% level, the binary logistic model finds it significant at the 99% level, holding all other variables constant. The direction and significance of association between debating and all independent variables are the same across Models 2 and 3 in the OLS and the binary logistic models. The only exception is the interaction female x union variable: holding all else constant, it is negative and significant at the 95% confidence level in the OLS results but is not significant in the logistic results.
As Table 5.5 shows, by the 52\textsuperscript{nd} Parliament, having a university education becomes positively – but still not significantly – associated with the number of times an MP spoke on childcare, controlling for all other variables. Being female remains positively and significantly – at the 99.9% confidence level – associated with the number of times an MP spoke on the issue: controlling for all other variables, the partial effect of being female is to increase the average number of times an MP spoke on the issue by 1.4. The final independent variable, trade union background, remains negative but not significant, whilst the control variable, ministerial post, is perhaps unsurprisingly positive and significant (being a minister is associated with speaking 6.5 more times on the issue than not being a minister), given that during this Parliament ministers developed and partially implemented the National Childcare Strategy (Lewis 2011, 76). Models 2 and 3 add interaction variables: Model 2 shows that the addition of a female x trade union background yields a positive but not significant association, and Model 3 finds the same for a female x university background.\footnote{The binary logistic models shown in Appendix D produce largely similar results to those of the OLS regressions shown in Table 5.5 (52\textsuperscript{nd} Parliament): with specific regard to OLS Model 1, under the binary logistic regression university remains insignificant as does trade unionism. Gender, the strongest result obtained in Model 1 of the OLS regressions for the 52\textsuperscript{nd} Parliament, did remain positive and significant at the 99.9% confidence level under the binary logistic regression. Whereas the OLS regression found that being female was associated with 1.4 more childcare mentions than being male, the binary logistic model found that by being female, the odds of a Labour MP debating childcare increased by 60% relative to the odds of a male Labour MP debating childcare. Whereas the OLS regression found ministerial positions to be positive and significant at the 99.9% confidence level, the binary logistic model finds the variable insignificant; this reduction in significance is likely due to the fact that three out of the six ministers (David Blunkett, Margaret Hodge and Harriet Harman) raised the issue between 13-14 times each, against a Labour MP average of 1.2 mentions, thus skewing the OLS model. In Models 2 and 3, the partial effect of the interaction variables (female x union and female x university) on debating remain positive but insignificant.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.351 (.336)</td>
<td>.271 (.339)</td>
<td>.079 (.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.400*** (.316)</td>
<td>1.149** (.355)</td>
<td>-.039 (.922)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>-.004 (.301)</td>
<td>-.233 (.335)</td>
<td>-.287 (.337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/Women’s Ministerial Post</td>
<td>6.493*** (1.11)</td>
<td>6.565*** (1.11)</td>
<td>6.512*** (1.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*Union</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.185 (.767)</td>
<td>1.164 (.766)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.354 (.969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.457 (.328)</td>
<td>.589+ (.339)</td>
<td>.752* (.358)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**\textsuperscript{p}<0.001, **\textsuperscript{p}<0.01, *\textsuperscript{p}<0.05, +\textsuperscript{p}<0.1

|**Table 5.5 OLS regression results 52nd Parliament, UK (Source: Hansard Milbank)|
These models illustrate that during the 48th Parliament, neither university nor trade unionism had positive partial effects, controlling for all other variables, on the number of times an MP spoke on childcare. Being a female is indeed positively and significantly associated, even when the same models are run employing a binary dependent variable according to whether they did or do not debate childcare (see Tables A.D.7 and A.D.8). By the 52nd Parliament, it becomes clear that female MPs were indeed a driving force behind the issue; university educated MPs, also a key contingent of the new politics group were not significantly, but now at least positively associated with speaking, whilst those with a union background remained negatively, though not significantly associated. These results, although found in models with quite low R²’s, do at least seem to indicate that of the variables we are interested in, the driving force behind MPs’ adoption of the childcare issue seems to lie more within the new politics movement (i.e. feminism and to a lesser extent, the entry of university educated Labor MPs), than it does with trade unionists coming to embrace the issue as a united movement. This finding gels with the Rapoport and Stone results that suggest the party’s increased attention to the issue was mechanised by replacement and the addition of more childcare friendly MPs than it was by the conversion of pre-existing parliamentarians.

b. Replacing whom? What was the extent of legislator ‘replacement’?

The debate analyses above suggest that Karol’s (2009) coalition group incorporation theory better explains the Labour Party’s embrace of childcare than does his coalition group maintenance theory (where legislators are converted by party-linked interest groups, i.e. trade unions). This is indicated by both the Rapoport and Stone results (which attribute 93% of position change to both replacement and mobilisation) and by the fact that OLS regressions indicate that union background has a negative and insignificant association with childcare debate, whilst having a university education and being female are both positively associated, with the latter also being significantly associated. The coalition group incorporation thesis is built on two premises: first that a party will have an electoral incentive to adopt a particular position and second that the process will be commenced by enterprising, autonomous elites and mechanised by the replacement of older legislators and party elites with ties to old interests groups, with new legislators and MPs who may resemble the voters they are trying to attract more so than their predecessors did.

What other components of coalition group incorporation does the British case display? As section 5.3 noted, the Labour Party adopted childcare policy in the wake of significant electoral coalitional change, and in the face of opportunities to gain votes with both higher-educated men
and women. Moreover, section 5.4 just noted the strong evidence pointing to legislator replacement and mobilisation as the driving mechanisms behind party position change. But who were these new legislators: were they in fact dominated by post-materialist modernisers? If so, we would expect to see socially conservative, influential men in Labour leadership positions replaced with progressive, educated and middle-income men and women. Comparing NEC election ballots (in which candidates write a short manifesto) with NEC election outcomes would be an excellent measure of replacement. Unfortunately, NEC ballots prior 1994 are not publicly available and 1994 is too late to be able to track processes of party elite replacement.

A proxy for this (social characteristics and social policy leanings of Labour officials) might be to compare the characteristics of Shadow Cabinet members over time, since these members have been, from 1981 to 2011, elected by the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). Key variables include a member’s gender and their level of education (i.e. whether or not they attended university). Figure 5.7 summarises the change in characteristics between each Shadow Cabinet, displaying quite an apparent shift by the time John Smith became Labour Leader in 1992:

![Demographic change in Shadow Cabinet/Cabinet background, 1974-2001, %](image)

**Figure 5.7 Demographic change in Shadow Cabinet/Cabinet, UK, 1974-2005 (Source: Hansard Milbank)**

For the sake of comparison, Wilson and Callaghan’s Cabinet have been included, as well as Blair’s two Cabinets, which are largely similar to his Shadow Cabinet.203

Although the average age of entry into the Cabinet was largely stable (minimum of 50, maximum 53), gender and education reverse themselves: under Wilson (1974-1976) there were just two (eight per cent) females in the Shadow Cabinet; that figure jumped to seven (23%) in

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203 In contrast to the Shadow Cabinet, Cabinet positions are not up for election in the PLP, one might assume that the party as a whole would not be opposed to the Cabinet choices of a Leader that they voted for.
Smith’s Shadow Cabinet and finally to nine (29%) in Blair’s second Government. In fact there has been an almost inversely proportional shift between female and non-university educated members: Kinnock’s Shadow Cabinets included just two (five per cent) female member and 15 (38%) non-university educated members. Yet the proportion of non-university educated males continued to decline, just as the proportion of female members continued to rise: the proportions were equal in Smith’s Shadow Cabinet but by the time of Blair’s first Government there were seven (21%) female members and just two (six per cent) non-university educated members. By 2001 there were over four times as many female members as there were non-university educated members. The proportion of former trade union employees exhibits a decline as well: from 32% in 1974 to 15% by the time of Blair’s shadow cabinet in 1994. Whilst there was an increase during Blair’s cabinet it’s worth noting that two of his five cabinet members with a trade union background were women. Moreover, the changes in Shadow Cabinet and Cabinet demographics are mirrored across the entire Parliamentary Labour Party (see Figure 5.8), with a rise of both university educated and female MPs occurring in near concert with a decline of MPs who had previously worked for a trade union. This group, operating with a much larger base number than the Shadow Cabinet/Cabinet members, displays a clear shift in party demographics commencing in 1983, the year in which the battles for both centralising and gender-based intra-party reforms commenced.

![Change in Labour MP demographics, 1970-2001, %](image)

**Figure 5.8 Change in Labour MP demographics, UK, 1970-2001 (Source: Hansard Milbank)**

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204 It may seem curious that Neil Kinnock, the apparent ‘moderniser’ of New Labour presided over a series of shadow Cabinets that was less well educated and less feminine than Harold Wilson’s Cabinet almost twenty years earlier. One point worth noting is that Kinnock’s tenure was so long that he had 39 members in and out of his Shadow Cabinet, moreover, many of those Shadow Cabinet members were elected during the early years of his tenure as leader and thus were chosen in an era of factional battles, when Kinnock had not yet passed through a series of institutional reforms that would have restrained ‘militant’ and the trade union influence in favour of a more middle class, feminine and university-educated cohort. And indeed from 1980, the shadow cabinet was no longer elected by the PLP but by the party conference, from which point there occurs an increase in female members and decline in non-university educated members.

205 Margaret Beckett and Mo Mowlam.
5.5 Conclusion: Reform now, votes later

The findings here suggest that electoral imperative was the force driving Labour’s adoption of childcare policy, whilst legislator replacement was the mechanism through which it occurred. This does not suggest however, that there is a linear, causal relationship between electoral change, shift in MP/Cabinet characteristics and policy adoption: for example, shifts in British class voting and in the UK’s gender vote gap (as seen in Figures 1.16-1.17) commenced as early as 1970 and 1966 respectively, whereas the shift in background and demographics amongst MPs and Shadow Cabinet members lagged behind, by approximately 13 years (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8). The intake of female, university educated MPs does increase in tandem with the number of childcare mentions during Parliamentary debate (compare Figures 5.7 with 1.11), however both of these factors are not clearly correlated with manifesto promises (a far more jagged trend) and in particular, spending commitments on childcare, which did not increase until the mid 1990s (see Figure 1.9 and 1.10).

This suggests that internal party reforms played an important role in the process: Labour MPs could frequently advance the issue in Parliamentary debate, however the increase in debate mentions moved in tandem with the speed in which both higher-educated and female MPs were first selected by local constituency parties and then elected into Parliament. These same selection procedures were a key battleground between Labour Party modernisers, right-wing unionists and left-wing ‘Militant’ party members throughout the 1980s. It was not until 1987 that Kinnock was first able to reduce the power of the union bloc vote in local constituency party selections and 1993 when OMOV was passed, putting local constituency members’ votes on a more even level with union votes. Moreover, the principle of one woman on a shortlist (OWOS) was not put in place until 1987, and only in seats where there was not a sitting Labour MP. Additional battles over reform included the selection of a leader willing to advance the issue, influence over election campaigns which can promote the issue and in particular, control over the party manifesto and over the spending commitments made in Leaders’ speeches. Yet these reforms took, in some cases, over a decade to achieve: it was not until 1992 that the union share in the electoral college for leadership selection was reduced from 40 to 33%; Kinnock’s Shadow Communications Agency was introduced in 1987 and continually battled for influence over everything from campaign slogans to party symbols²⁰⁶; reforms mandating women be represented on the NEC in proportion to their share in local constituency parties and in trade unions were not passed until 1991 and finally, the National Policy Forum, which replaced the conference’s role in voting on policy and instead is comprised of “representatives of MPs,

MEPs, local councillors, women's organisations, black members and youth organisations” was not set up until 1992 and did not meet until 1993 (Alderman and Carter 1994, 328-329).

This suggests that while electoral imperative may have been the driving force behind childcare policy adoption, the actual speed in which said adoption happened (measured both in terms of discussion in parliamentary debate and in campaign commitments) was mediated by the speed of internal party organisational reforms. Labour – arguably once an 'activist-dominated party' in the terms used by Schumacher et. al. (2013) – became a more leadership-dominated party in part by the work of both male and female modernisers. Interestingly, Schumacher et. al. (2013) would code Labour as an activist-dominated party because their data (Laver and Hunt surveys), comes from 1992 - the point at which Labour was only beginning to emerge from a period of stark transition, and seemingly moving from a mass party to an electoral professional one (Katz and Mair, 1995; Panebianco, 1988).
Chapter Six: Comparing the cases: policy adoption as a function of electoral imperative and party reform

6.1 Introduction
This chapter will compare both the variables analysed and the conclusions gleaned from the US, Australian and UK cases. Section 6.2 will provide a brief comparison of the childcare policy background in each country, noting the broader history of childcare provision, the strength of and cooperation between childcare advocates when the issue first entered the legislative arena, initial legislative attempts to address the issue and the outcome in each country. Section 6.3 compares the role of trade unions in addressing childcare policy across each country whilst Section 6.4, noting the broad correlation between childcare policy adoption and electoral change, compares shifting party-voter linkages in each country. Section 6.5 compares the quantitative results laid out in each chapter, assessing the extent to which replacement versus conversion effects mechanised, and union versus new politics characteristics drove, party position change within the three legislatures. It concludes that across the three countries, replacement did in fact mechanise change while the influence of post-materialist legislators207 drove said change. Finally, Section 6.6 highlights the fact that the gap in time between electoral change and policy adoption varies from country to country; it argues that these different gaps in time may be attributable to the different processes of organisational reform that were ongoing in each of the three parties near to the time they adopted childcare policy. It compares the content of organisational reforms which occurred in each party and highlights differences in the speed in which these were enacted. It finds that whilst party position change is driven by the rise of middle class, post-materialist members and legislators (and their attempt to attract like-minded voters to the party’s new electoral coalition), the time at which that policy adoption took place (in both the legislative and in electoral terms) was mediated by the speed in which party reformers were able to enact significant internal organisational change.

6.2 Childcare policy history: comparing the US, Australia and the UK
Although each country adopted emergency measures to provide childcare as part of the broader ‘war effort’ during World War II,208 Chapters Three, Four and Five note that these were temporary structures, largely retrenched at the commencement of the post-war, male-breadwinner era (Karch 2013, Brennan 1994, Randall 2000). Despite similar rates of female employment, legislative and electoral attention to the childcare issue arose amongst the Democratic Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Australian Labor Party during the early 1980s and the British Labour Party in the mid-to-late 1990s. The Democrats’ attempt to

207 Relative to those with union backgrounds.
208 Although the Australian response was less robust in comparison to that of the UK and the US (Brennan 1994, 48).
implement a universal, federally funded childcare programme was stymied in the early 1970s by a Republican president and the complications of multiple veto points. Childcare policy subsequent to that had been split between means-tested, welfare-to-work type assistance and largely regressive childcare-related tax expenditure on middle-income families (Karch 2013, Cohen 2001). By contrast, in 1980s Australia the ALP were able to increase operational funding for non-profit childcare centres, wherein fees were paid on an income-sliding scale. In fact, by the mid 1980s the Australian policy reflected the Child Development Act as passed in 1971 by the Democratic-led Congress (Brennan 1994). British Labour, by contrast, placed childcare on its agenda during the mid-to-late 1990s and once in Government enacted a mixed system of supply and demand-led childcare policy proposals: Sure Start centres that provided care and parental training, tax-free employer childcare vouchers and, eventually, 12.5 weekly hours of free early education and care for 3 and 4 year olds (Lewis and Campbell 2007; Lloyd 2008; Seely 2011).

But outside of political parties, what sort of coalitions lobbied for childcare? In the run up to policy adoption, childcare lobby groups in each country were largely fragmented: in no country was feminist attention to the issue paramount, since their concerns were often centred upon equal pay, equal rights and reproductive issues (Brennan 1994, Cohen 2001). Moreover, there were divides between pre-school and long day childcare advocates (UK and Australia) (Brennan 1994), socialist calls for free 24 hour childcare versus middle class oriented demands for increased childcare places, with an acceptance of fees (UK and to a limited extent Australia) (Randall 2000, Brennan 1994), divisions between unions and childcare advocacy groups over who would provide publicly funded services (US) (Karch 2013) and class-based arguments over what ultimate ends childcare should service (US) (Morgan 2001). Interestingly, in each country neither feminists nor childcare-specific advocacy groups have been identified as the key lobbyists (see for example Karch 2013 and Cohen 2001, Brennan 1994 and Randall 2000). Instead, the active interests – outside of political parties – include in the US, civil rights activists and female-dominated unions (Cohen 2001, Karch 2013), whereas in Australia, Brennan (1994) noted white-collar unions and increasingly feminised-blue collar unions, and in the UK, Randall (2000) pointed to female union activists and, to a limited extent, business interests such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) (Randall 2000, 89).

6.3 Trade unions and childcare policy: addressing work/family balance in the US, Australia and the UK

Is there evidence of a relationship between unions’ stance on childcare and broader work/family balance policies, and parties’ childcare policy adoption? This research has noted a quite neat
correlation between the peak of organised female labour mobilisation (the interaction effect between trade union density and female trade union membership) and each party’s adoption of childcare as an electoral issue (see Figure 1.15). Given the fact that much of the gendered Varieties of Capitalism literature suggests trade unions, at least in CMEs, would be resistant towards policies that facilitate female employment\(^{209}\) (Estevez-Abe 2009), is there any qualitative evidence to corroborate the correlation between organised female labour mobilisation and childcare policy adoption?

Chapters Four and Five observed that the largest trade union confederations in Australia and the UK had a history of promoting the family wage,\(^{210}\) a policy antithetical to those that advocate female employment, with the ACTU only dropping this as official policy in 1977 (Brennan 1998, 143) and the TUC during 1978 (Gelb 1989, 74). Both the ACTU but particularly the TUC opposed gender-based party reforms (Russell 2005, Coghlan and Denton 2012). The AFL-CIO opposed the ERA until as late as 1974 (Wolbrecht 2000, 154), whilst AFL-CIO executives such as president George Meany and COPE director Alex Barkan opposed reforms to the Democratic Party including those that would improve women’s representation (Dark 2001, 85).

On the other hand, unions in the US and Australia were directly involved with efforts that promoted childcare: as discussed at length in Chapter Three, although they were not in the lead of the ad hoc child care coalition, representatives from the AFL-CIO, the National Education Association and American Federation of Teachers were all active, participating members (Cohen 2001). Moreover, the ACTU negotiated the 1983 Accord with the ALP, which specifically designated childcare part of the national social wage. The ALP then went on to give childcare its most dominant place in a federal election campaign yet; once in office, the ALP more than doubled the number of available childcare places within their first two years in office (Brennan 1994, 165-66, 1974). The UK’s TUC, when it dropped its advocacy of the family wage in 1978, also issued “Charter for the Under 5’s” that called for flexible working hours and comprehensive childcare,” though it is unclear how strongly it was lobbied (Gelb 1989, 74).

Part of the incongruity surrounding this qualitative evidence\(^{211}\) might speak to the differences between trade unions, specifically regarding demographics: some unions had a higher proportion of female members and indeed were more progressive on issues ranging from gender-based

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\(^{209}\) For fear that career breaks and part-time employment could depress wages.

\(^{210}\) See for example Charles 1983.

\(^{211}\) That trade unions have on the one hand issued statements, or as in the US, have been part of a coalition behind childcare whilst, on the other hand, have also supported anti-feminist policies such as the family wage or opposed measures promoting greater female representation within their own ranks.
quotas in political parties to work/family balance policies. These distinctions may not have been reflected by broader trade union confederation stances, as seen for example in differences between US unions over the McGovern-Fraser reforms. Similarly, Australian white-collar union confederations, such as the APSCA, promoted work/family issues including maternity leave and childcare during the mid 1970s - prior to ACTU even dropping their demands for a family wage (Brennan 1994, 143). Before the TUC endorsed gender-based quotas within the Labour Party, specific unions such as GMB APEX had endorsed them (Russell 2005, 102-108).

The question remains, even in light of said cross-union variation: to what extent did the unions have influence over party policymakers in terms of childcare? And specifically, might union influence have been as strong as, or indeed stronger than electoral imperative?

6.4 Electoral trends: shifting voter-party linkages in the US, Australia and the UK

Chapter One showed that each party adopted the issue within the broader context of a loosening gender identification gap (i.e. where women/men as a singular category identify in greater proportion for one party of does the other gender) and within the context of a reduction in traditional class voting, as measured by both the Alford and Thomsen indices (see again Figures 1.16 and 1.17). Such trends represented both challenges and opportunities for centre-left parties: dealignment from traditional allies such as blue-collar males threatened their electoral viability. However, they had a chance to shore up votes from the drop in centre-right identification amongst female and higher-educated males.

The several charts in Chapters Three to Five that tracked party identification according to both gender and education found that between the 1960s and the late 1980s to early 2000s there was a drop off in centre-right support amongst female voters, and in particular the higher-educated female voters whom Kriesi identifies as being drawn towards left-liberal political value orientations (Kriesi 1999, 403). Whilst for the most part, the centre-right’s loss was the centre-left’s gain, as Chapter Five pointed out, the British Labour Party was not able to fully capitalise on higher-educated women’s declining Conservative identity during the late 1980s and early 1990s, since this group increased their Liberal-SDP/Liberal Democrat identity in tandem with

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212 See for example Russell on the “progressive bureaucracy” between female-dominated unions and Labour Party women (Russell 2005, 124) and and Dark on the fallout between progressive and female dominated unions and the AFL-CIO surrounding McGovern-Fraser (Dark 2001, 85).

213 As discussed in Chapter Three, the AFL-CIO leadership opposed McGovern-Fraser whereas many of its affiliates, including the UAW, AFSCME and CWA supported them (Dark 2001, 85).

214 As noted in Chapter Four, the white-collar unions of the APSCA affiliated with ACTU after the APSCA dissolved in 1979 (Griffin 2009, 15).

215 In the US the gender gap began to loosen during the mid 1960s, immediately prior to the number of pieces of childcare legislation put forth by Democratic legislators and the appearance of universal childcare on Democratic Party Platforms. Unlike the UK and Australia, however, the gender identification gap did not just loosen over time but instead, from the 1980s it entirely reversed, wherein women now favour the Democratic Party in greater proportion than do men.
that of Labour until 2001. Lesser-educated females also increased their centre-left identification but while this was a (positive) reversal of fortunes’ for the centre-left in the UK and Australia, it did not buck any pre-existing trends in the US.

Figure 6.1 collates each country’s Pedersen index of electoral volatility and finds that higher-educated women displayed the highest average volatility rate in the roughly twenty years leading up to each parties’ adoption of the childcare issue\textsuperscript{216}; whereas the average rate of volatility for all groups ranged from five (US) to seven per cent (UK), that of higher-educated females ranged from seven (US) to 11% (UK). The next highest rate of volatility was amongst lesser-educated females, ranging from five (US) to seven per cent (UK). Both higher and less-educated males displayed lower than average rates of volatility in each country. Average volatility, for all groups, was lowest in the US (5.3), followed closely by Australia (5.7) and lastly the UK was most volatile (7.2).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{electoral_coalitional_volatility.png}
\end{figure}

Given females’ higher than average volatility, what cross-country trends underlie the gender identification gap? Chapter One displayed a reversal of the traditional gender identification gap across all three countries between the 1960s and the 1980s-1990s, though the extent of this varied across the three countries. Figure 6.2 below displays the amount of change in the traditional (conservative favouring) and modern (left favouring) identification gap between the approximate onset of each country’s gender-based dealignment and the time at which its centre-left party adopted childcare as an electoral issue. To what extent were parties able to capitalise

\textsuperscript{216} Start and end points are US (1954-1972); Australia (1967-1987); UK (1974-2001).
on the decline of the traditional gender identification gap by the time they adopted childcare as either an electoral or a legislative issue? Both the Democrats and the ALP were able to take advantage of shifting voter-party linkages to such an extent that their modern gender identification gaps increased more than their countries’ traditional gaps declined. By contrast in the UK, women as of 1997 identified as Conservative in lower proportion than men but Labour still were not able to fully capitalise on this: the modern gender identification gap lagged behind the decline in the traditional gap; indeed the traditional gap had to decline further than it had in the other two countries before Labour embraced childcare. Where the mismatch between the gaps suggests that some disaffected centre-right identifiers gravitated to smaller parties/independent identification as opposed to Labour, the timing issue suggests an inability to respond to changing electoral conditions, or what Kitchschelt (1994) would call a lack of “strategic flexibility.”

The cross-country Alford and Thomsen indices (Figures 1.16 and 1.17) which detail trends in class dealignment between 1945 and 1990 suggest that the initial post-war declines in class-party alignment occurred first in the US and Australia, with the UK lagging behind the two by approximately 10 years. Whilst this broadly fits the order in which each country’s centre-left party adopted the issue of childcare policy, the drop in the UK between 1970 and 1980 was far steeper than that which occurred in either the US or Australia, suggesting that by 1980 UK Labour would have had as much incentive to develop strategic new policies like childcare as did the Democrats and ALP at that same point in time. Figure 6.3 displays the amount of change in class voting that occurred before Labour’s childcare policy adoption: it indicates that, as with

Figure 6.2 Change in gender identification gap at time of policy adoption (Sources: AES 1987, ANAP 1969, 1979, American Election Studies 1966-1992, British Election Studies, 1966-2001)
gender-based electoral change, before adopting the issue Labour experienced more than twice as much class-based electoral change than had the other parties.

The combined effect of shifts in class and gender party identification does seem to indicate that the parties’ electoral bases were in a state of flux throughout the years leading up to childcare policy adoption and, as a corollary, suggests that these shifts would cause parties to respond to such electoral change by reassessing the contents of their electoral constituencies and/or undertaking a process of party modernisation/internal reorganisation (Kitschelt 1994). Their greatest opportunities seemed to lie with female and in particular, higher-educated female voters. This factor, considered alongside the steady increase in female employment that has occurred in each of these three countries over the past forty years (see Figure 1.12) would indicate that parties not only had functional reasons to advance childcare policy (e.g. a response to increased rates of female employment) but that they also had an electoral incentive to do so: the class and gender-based electoral dealignment that has occurred over the previous 30-40 years offered an opportunity for parties to develop new policies that would appeal to increasingly adrift voters.

Although the shifts in each country’s traditional gender and class-party alignments surrounded centre-left parties’ decision to adopt childcare policy as both an electoral and a legislative issue, the cross-country, temporal variation in which these shifts occurred does not correlate as neatly with each party’s policy adoption as one might have expected, if electoral change was indeed the sole variable behind party policy adoption. This mismatch raises two questions: 1) to what extent might policy adoption be explained by the other hypothesised independent variable, trade union
influence and 2) to what extent was the impact of electoral change mediated by the hypothesised intervening variable, internal party reform?

6.5 Quantifying the mechanisms and forces that fostered childcare policy adoption

This research positions the issue of childcare policy adoption into the context of two shifting political relationships: on the one hand, policy adoption occurred during a time when trade unions, the centre-left’s traditional ally, saw an increase of female membership in its ranks and, as a consequence, began to consider the promotion of policies that foster work/family balance, such as flexible working and childcare (Cohen 2001, Karch 2013, Gelb 1989, Brennan 1994). On the other hand, the centre-left parties considered in this research adopted the issue (in both legislative and in electoral terms) during the broader context of shifting electoral conditions and an erosion of traditional party-voter linkages, which saw higher-educated male voters and female votes increasingly dealigned from their longstanding party family, the centre-right (Kitschelt 1994, Häusermann 2010, 14).

This research employed Rapoport and Stone’s model of party change in order to determine whether a party’s policy adoption (here measured in the legislative sense, meaning the proportion of Labour/ALP MPs who debated childcare/ the proportion of House Democrats who co-sponsored childcare bills) was mechanised by legislator conversion or legislator replacement. Conversion indicates that change in the party’s position on childcare was mechanised by legislators who shifted their position, and thus change may be have been driven by pressure on legislators to reverse previous stances/move from ambivalence to decisiveness on the issue. Replacement indicates that change was mechanised by new legislators coming into the party and replacing old legislators who had different positions on the issue and, presumably different background characteristics. An influx of new legislators may suggest a broader strategy to change the face of the party and as a consequence, the types of voters it appeals to.

Once the mechanism, conversion or replacement, is found OLS regressions are then run in order to test whether a) an association exists between legislators debating/co-sponsoring childcare and having a particular background (e.g. blue-collar, union-oriented versus higher-educated, post-materialist) and b) that the association runs in the same direction that the Rapoport and Stone results would lead us to expect. For example, if the Rapoport and Stone model found that childcare policy adoption was predominantly mechanised by conversion, we may assume that an outside force lobbied/pressured legislators into making that change. However, we would not know who exactly lobbied them. If the OLS regression then found a positive and significant association between having a union background and speaking on childcare/co-sponsoring
childcare legislation, then we may interpret that the two findings, in combination, suggest union pressure (more so than legislator replacement and electoral imperative) was a driving force in the parties’ adoption of childcare policy.\textsuperscript{217} If, on the other hand, the Rapoport and Stone model found replacement to dominate the process of party position change, the OLS regressions will tell us whether those new legislators supporting childcare did indeed have a background associated with post-materialism and new politics orientation. These two findings, in combination, would then suggest that party modernisation and perhaps, parties’ strategies to attract higher-educated, middle-income voters were the driving forces behind party position change.

a. Change mechanised by legislator replacement or conversion: comparing Rapoport and Stone results

Table 6.1 indicates that replacement effects far outweighed conversion as the force mechanising party position change in each of three parties under examination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Change, %</th>
<th>Conversion, %</th>
<th>Replacement, %</th>
<th>Mobilisation, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House Democrats, 1969-1990\textsuperscript{218}</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House ALP, 1972-1987</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour, 1979-2001</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 Rapoport and Stone comparison (Sources: Congressional Record 1965-74, Thomas 2014; Commonwealth of Australia Hansard 2013; House of Commons Hansard, 2013)

The size of party position change, in the legislative sense, is measured as the change in the proportion of legislators who either co-sponsored childcare legislation or debated it on the legislature floor between points T1 and T2. As Table 6.1 shows, the largest amount of change

\textsuperscript{217} This does not suggest that there were no other factors driving position change, however, the purpose of these analyses is to test the relevant importance of a particular set of factors.

\textsuperscript{218} Two Rapoport and Stone models were run for the US Democrats: the first model identified T1 at the 90\textsuperscript{th} Congress (T2 remained the same). Here change was 34\% and conversion higher, at seven per cent. However, the 90\textsuperscript{th} Congress featured fiver fewer bills than did the 91\textsuperscript{st}, so to avoid the risk of the model being skewed (this is particularly a concern for the OLS regressions), T1 in this comparison chart, as well as with the OLS regression models refers to the 91\textsuperscript{st} Congress. As explained in Chapter Three, T1 occurs far later into the adoption process in the US than in Australia or the UK, because there was no concerted effort to develop childcare legislation before 1967 and thus nothing to measure.
occurred amongst the ALP, followed by Labour and finally the Democrats: between T1 and T2 co-sponsorship rates increased by 24% amongst the US Democrats whereas the proportion of MPs who debated childcare increased 34% amongst UK Labour and by 42% amongst the ALP.

Conversion accounted for less than 10% of change in all parties; although it is the highest amongst the ALP where perhaps it should be recalled, the main trade union confederation, ACTU, jointly with the ALP, formulated the 1983 ‘Accord,’ which designated childcare costs “part of the national social wage” (Brennan 1994, 165-66). Replacement and mobilisation by contrast, accounted for 91-99% of change within all parties. The mobilisation effect is similar to replacement in that it indicates the proportion of change mechanised by newcomers but accounts for the fact that in each party, there were more newcomers at T2 than there were dropouts at T1. Each of the three parties had more seats at T2 than T1, though Labour experienced the greatest increase: the mobilisation effect was lower amongst the Democrats (1%) than either the ALP (23%) or Labour (36%).

b. Change associated with union background or new politics characteristics: comparing OLS regressions

Whereas the Rapoport and Stone equations helped identify the mechanism behind party position change, regression analyses tested for associations between co-sponsoring/debating childcare and several socio-demographic characteristics, in attempt to determine the relative importance of the two hypothesised drivers behind policy adoption, union pressure and electoral imperative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.205 (.262)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.067*** (.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.204 (.159)</td>
<td>.299*. (1.24)</td>
<td>-.031 (.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union/COPE-ADA</td>
<td>-.003 (.002)</td>
<td>-.099 (.130)</td>
<td>-.160+ (.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial/Cmte</td>
<td>2.26*** (.221)</td>
<td>.737** (.247)</td>
<td>.136 (.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-.335*** (.079)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.225 (.169)</td>
<td>.113 (.086)</td>
<td>.209 (.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

Table 6.2 OLS regressions, T1 comparison (Sources: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000; Commonwealth of Australia Hansard; Hansard Milbank)
As Tables 6.2 and 6.3 indicate, gender has a mixed but, in the case of Labour and the ALP, a very positive, association with childcare policy debate/co-sponsorship at both T1 and T2: for example, the relationship is positive but not significant in the US at both points in time, whereas controlling for all other variables, it is positive and significant at the 99.9% confidence level amongst Labour MPs at both T1 and T2 and ALP MPs at T2. The reasons for the lack of a significant association in the US are multi-causal and perhaps beyond the scope of this research. However, one avenue for inspection would be numbers in Congress: at T1 women made up just 2.5% of House Democrats and at T2, 5.3%. Moreover the difference could be attributable to the different dependent variables, co-sponsorship versus debating. Co-sponsorship, in the US, may require a greater degree of networking and particular committee placements, than would simply debating the issue in either the UK or Australian parliaments.

University education poses similarly mixed results: controlling for all other variables at T1 (when childcare was not yet adopted in either the Labour Party or the ALP), university education was positively and significantly associated (at the 95th confidence level in Australia) but not significant amongst the Democrats or British Labour. The pattern prevails at T2, with university still being positively and significantly associated with debate amongst ALP MPs (but not amongst Democrats or British Labour), controlling for all other variables. Part of the reason for university education’s null association with co-sponsorship in the US could relate to the

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**Table 6.3 OLS regressions, T2 comparison (Sources: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000; Commonwealth of Australia Hansard; Hansard Milbank)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.397 (.247)</td>
<td>1.418**(.478)</td>
<td>1.400***(.316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>-0.190 (.506)</td>
<td>0.473* (.268)</td>
<td>0.351 (.336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union/COPE-ADA</td>
<td>-0.011* (.004)</td>
<td>0.055 (.886)</td>
<td>-0.004 (.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial/Cmte</td>
<td>0.446* (.119)</td>
<td>-1.192 (1.25)</td>
<td>6.493*** (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-0.566*** (.122)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.294* (.509)</td>
<td>0.665** (.221)</td>
<td>0.457 (.328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

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219 There were no female ALP MPs during T1.
proportion of House Democrats who already by T1 had a university education: 93%. University education was the norm amongst House Democrats to such an extent that it would be unlikely to differentiate a post-materialist-oriented from a traditionalist-oriented legislator. In fact, legislators without university education were not associated with higher COPE scores.\(^{220}\)

What is negatively associated with childcare debate/co-sponsorship? The evidence broadly suggests variables related to blue-collar and/or socially conservative backgrounds. For example, controlling for all other variables at T1, there is a negative association with having a union background\(^{221}\) and debating/co-sponsoring childcare in all three parties; though the association is only significant in the UK. By T2, the relationship remains negative and is indeed significant in the US, remains negative but not significant in the UK and finally, positive but insignificant in Australia. A further control for the Democrats, which tests for the effects of representing a Southern state is negative and significant at the 99.9% confidence level at both T1 and T2, suggesting further the negative association between traditional, socially conservative party stalwarts and childcare policy co-sponsorship.

Possible (though by no means concrete) characteristics associated post-materialism, such as gender and higher-education are, for the most part, associated with childcare debate amongst ALP and Labour MPs at both T1 and T2. Controlling for all other variables, these associations are not significant in the US at either T1 or T2, however this could be related to the number of female House Democrats, as discussed above. By contrast, other proxies for post-materialist orientation in the US context include a legislator’s ADA score and, as shown immediately above, their COPE score relative to ADA score. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that a legislator’s ADA score at both T1 and T2 is indeed positively and significantly associated with co-sponsorship\(^{222}\), and here we see that COPE-ADA scores have a negative relationship with co-sponsorship, controlling for all other variables, at both T1 and T2 and that this association is significant at T2. This implies that legislators whose COPE score (union orientation) is higher than their ADA (left-liberal orientation) are negatively associated with co-sponsorship. The hypothesised association between unionism and childcare is further weakened when one considers the negative association is significant in the UK at T1 but insignificant in both the UK and Australia at T2. Overall, it seems that, across all three parties, the relative influence of new politics, post materialist characteristics are stronger and more positive than are traditional blue-collar unionist characteristics. Similar summary tables for both T1 and T2 with the results from the binary

\(^{220}\) For T1: Pearson’s correlation coefficient of .125 with p value of .057; for T2: .082 and .196, respectively.

\(^{221}\) For the ALP and Labour, ‘union background’ denotes having previously worked for a trade union. For the Democrats it implies having a higher COPE score relative to ADA score.

\(^{222}\) At the 95% confidence level at T1 and the 99.9% confidence level at T2.
logistic regressions appear in Appendix D. With small variation, they are in accordance with the results presented above.

c. Characteristics of legislator replacement within the Democrats, ALP and Labour

The Rapoport and Stone model indicated that party change was mechanised by replacement and the OLS regressions suggested that those legislators who co-sponsored/debated were associated more with a post-materialistic background/new politics orientation than trade-unionist/blue collar history. But to what extent did legislator replacement actually occur? And was there in fact an increase in legislators with post-materialistic characteristics coupled with a decrease in those with traditional blue-collar union-oriented characteristics?

As indicated by Figures 3.9, 4.9 and 5.8 the largest increases in female and university-educated legislators occurred in Australia and the UK, where for example between T1 and T2 there was an eight percentage point increase in the number of female ALP MPs and a 30 percentage point increase in the number of university educated MPs; between T1 and T2 there was a 17 percentage point increase in the number of female Labour Party MPs and a 21 percentage point increase in the number of university educated MPs. Legislators with a trade union background dropped 30 percentage points in the ALP and 13 percentage points in Labour. Whereas the shifts in university educated MPs in the US were noticeably smaller (three percentage points), the average nominal ADA score rose by 23 percentage points relative to COPE increase of eight percentage points, suggesting an influx of more new politics oriented MPs, albeit on just one of the dimensions analysed here.\textsuperscript{223}

d. Childcare policy adoption: the post-materialists’ natural policy response or a demonstration of strategic electoral appeals?

The three previous sections found that a) each party’s policy adoption was mechanised by legislator replacement, b) driven by legislators with characteristics normally associated with a post-materialist background and that c) the process of legislator replacement that occurred in each of the three parties was for the most part dominated by the entrance of higher-educated, more female and more socially liberal legislators. They replaced a large proportion of the male, lesser-educated and somewhat unionist old-guard. But to what extent can one argue that these parties adopted childcare due to electoral imperative, in other words to attract fellow higher-educated, middle-income men and women to the party’s fold? Or can one convincingly argue that childcare policy adoption was simply new legislators exerting their own personal policy

\textsuperscript{223} However, as noted in Chapter Three, the lack of time-adjusted COPE scores makes over time COPE score comparison difficult.
desires onto their party’s policy agenda? Or that they were not attempting to attract a new constituency but rather catering to a group of voters they had already won over?

On the one hand it seems unrealistic to suggest that parties are controlled by a handful of inter-generational puppet masters who from the early 1960s noticed gradual shifts in their country’s traditional party-voter linkages and set into place a long-term strategy to attract post-materialist legislators who would adopt similarly post-materialist strategic appeals and, within the course of up to thirty-plus years, decidedly win over higher-educated, middle-income (i.e. post-materialist) voters. On the other hand, it seems naïve to expect that these post-materialist legislators, be they Blair’s New Labour or “Watergate babies,” were purely motivated by their own personal policy goals and had no electoral foresight when they pushed childcare onto their legislative agendas or, in the case of party members, awarded the issue a dominant space on their party’s manifestos. The natural response thesis, which argues that childcare policy adoption was not a product of electoral imperative, would implicitly suggest that party members and legislators needed to reach a critical mass of ‘post-materialism’ before the party as a whole could in fact adopt the issue. Moreover, if childcare policy were not an electoral appeal we might expect its adoption to have occurred well into the process of class dealignment, and in particular, after the traditional gender identification/vote gap had been eclipsed: this would suggest parties viewed the policy as an ideal that catered to their large, post-materialist electoral constituency, rather than one that would attract an as yet unproven electoral bloc.

Yet this does not appear to be the case in the US. Here, in both legislative and in electoral (i.e. party platform) terms, the Democrats’ adopted childcare policy after the traditional gender identification gap had begun to decline but before the modern gender identification gap took shape: the modern gap was 4.3 in 1972, just smaller than it had been in 1968 and much smaller than it would eventually become (it would reach 14 by 1996). Moreover, the Child Development bill, although drawn up by two ‘left-liberals’ (Mondale and Brademas), passed the Democratic-led Congress before the party experienced a significant shift in the background of its Representatives: at the time of passage the proportion of female and university educated House Democrats as well as their average adjusted ADA score were all below their mean and median figures for the period of the 90th to 101st Congresses (see Figure 3.9).

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224 If they did not have the requisite power within the party to do so, they would need to provide their fellow party members, such as legislative committee heads and national executives, with a convincing reason for adopting the policy. Arguably, their convincing reason would be couched in electoral terms and, as such, policy adoption would be an electoral appeal and not a natural response to the entry of new politics oriented legislators.
In Australia, the shift in legislator characteristics seemed to move in tandem with shifts in electoral behavior: Figure 4.9 shows that after 1975 there was a precipitous decrease in the trade unionist MPs (concurrent with a proportionate increase in university-educated MPs). It was during the 1970s that class voting dropped 30% however by 1983-1984, when childcare was placed so prominently within the ALP manifestos as well as the 32nd Parliament (1980-83), when ALP members produced such a stark uptick in their discussion of the issue, the traditional gender vote gap had yet to be eclipsed. Moreover, as Chapter Four discussed, the ALP undertook a series of polls in market research on the issue, with Sen. Susan Ryan stating in 1981 that “if the same percentage of women as men voted ALP at the 1977 election, the ALP would be in Government today” (ALP 1981, 5).

Amongst UK Labour, post-materialists, as measured by the proportion of university, female and non-trade union MPs in Parliament appeared to gain a foothold between 1983 and 1987. However, unlike their ALP counterparts, shifts in legislator characteristics did not move in tandem with electoral behaviour: although the traditional gender vote gap had been in a process of decline, Figure 1.19 shows that the decreased traditional gender vote gap was not mirrored by an increase in the modern gender vote gap until the 1990s. In other words Labour was not necessarily rewarded for the Conservatives’ loss, in part due to the rising popularity of left-liberal parties such as the Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance relative to Labour (see for example Figures 5.1 and 5.3). In fact, Labour did not begin to make steady gains with higher-educated women until after the 1987 election and with lower-educated women until after the 1992 election.

Whereas Figure 1.11 displays a steady increase in the number of UK Labour’s childcare-related debate mentions from 1983 and in particular 1987, which progressed steadily until 2001 (the end of the time period under examination), the number of manifesto words and Leader’s speech commitments to the issue did not take off until the 1992 and 1997 campaigns. Chapter Five discussed how party strategists sold the issue of work-family policies to the Labour party elite as female vote winning issues. As discussed in Chapter Five and shown in the increase of

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225 As explained in Chapter Four there was only one Australian Election Survey during the 1970s.
226 By 56% since the prior parliament.
227 This argument was nearly identical to the one British Labour’s Patricia Hewitt and Shadow Communication Agency representative Deborah Mattinson would employ in “Women’s Votes: The Key to Winning” (1989). In fact, Hewitt and Mattinson cited the ALP’s success with middle-income women in their directive to the Labour Party on making strategic appeals to female voters.
228 This is when their median figure for the period of 1970-2001 was eclipsed.
229 The Liberals’ gender identification gap was positive (i.e. more females than males identification with them) throughout the BES time series under examination (from six per cent in 1964 to 27 per cent in 2001).
230 It also pointed to party strategy documents from the late 1980s which emphasised the importance of developing work-family policies as a strategic appeal and even pointed to the Democrats’ and the ALP’s success with closing
manifesto and leadership speech attention, they were ultimately successful by the 1992 and 1997 elections, despite a long journey to that point. That disjuncture between legislators’ emphasis on the issue, which increased starkly from 1983, and that of the party manifesto’s commitment to the issue may point to the importance of internal organisational reform and in particular, the balance of leadership/parliamentary party power versus rank-and-file power in setting party policy and managing electoral campaigns.

6.6 Mediating policy change: the importance of parties’ internal organisational reforms

a. The speed and content of reforms

This research suggests that childcare policy is one measure of a centre-left party’s willingness to respond to electoral change, in the sense that adopting childcare policy, in either legislative or campaign terms is a means of reaching out to new electoral constituencies. However, there was stark variation in the speed in which these three parties adopted childcare policy that may be due to differences between each party’s internal organisations. More specifically, the different gaps in time between the onset of class and gender-based electoral change and a party’s adoption of childcare policy may be explained by differences in the speed and depth of each party’s organisational reform process.

As discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Five, the Democrats, ALP and Labour all underwent significant internal party reforms that sought to 1) increase the representation of females and minorities within internal party decision making bodies (and in the UK, parliamentary candidates), 2) reduce the internal party power of extreme factions and affiliated interest groups, predominantly trade unions, and relatedly, 3) centralise a greater degree of power around the party leadership and parliamentary party. For clarity, the concept of ‘party modernisation’ or ‘party reform’ is here broken down into two separate categories: modernisation via media and public relations strategy (e.g. sophisticated polling, use of media strategists, such as Labour’s Shadow Communications Agency) and modernisation via internal organisational reforms of decision making structures (e.g. quotas on conference delegations, changes to candidate and leadership selection rules, changes to the process of party policy development).231 ALP and Labour Party leaders approved a shift in media strategies (targeting middle-income families and work-life balance issues) from the late 1970s232 and the mid 1980s233, respectively. This was

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231 This is not to argue that the two are mutually exclusive; for example, Chapter Five notes that Neil Kinnock and his Shadow Communications Agency faced pushback from the Labour Party bureaucracy, but for purposes of clarity the two types of party reform are treated here as distinct.

232 For example Chapter Four discussed Whitlam campaigning on childcare in middle class, Sydney suburbs as well as Hayden’s decision to go further in campaigning on family issues than Whitlam was willing to do.
approximately 10 years after traditional gender identification gaps began to erode in Australia and 20 years after they began to erode in the UK. Assessing a specific shift in the Democrats’ media strategy is somewhat more difficult given the fragmentation of campaigns for the presidency, different chambers of Congress and state and local-level campaigns.

The gender-based and party centralising reforms, which comprise the second category of party modernisation outlined above, occurred fastest in the already more leadership-oriented structure of the US Democrats, next in the ALP, where the federal party was able to intervene in state-level parties under a series of extreme, exogenous circumstances, and finally occurred last in UK Labour, where any reforms had to make their way through 1) a battling contingent of factions within the party and 2) a decision making structure with multiple veto points, wherein any rule changes needed to pass through at least two forums before making it to the conference floor, where voting was largely dominated by trade unions. These distinctions are set out in Table 6.4 below.

As Table 6.4 shows, if one were to assess the amount of time elapsed between the first decline in the Alford Index (identified at 1965 in the US and Australia, 1975 in the UK) and the first attempt at securing a substantive party-centralising organisational change (i.e. in candidate selection procedures, conference voting) we would see a timeframe of just six years in the US, as opposed to five to nine years in Australia and nine years in the UK. If, on the other hand, we were to measure the amount of time between the first decline in the Alford index and the first successful centralising reform, then we would see time elapse six years in the US, five to nine years in Australia and twelve to fifteen years in the UK. When analysing organisational reform within the context of shifts in the traditional gender identification gap and gender-based reforms, this ordered pattern remains: the amount of time elapsed between the first decline in the traditional gender identification gap (identified at 1966 in both the US and the UK, 1969 in Australia) and the first attempt at securing gender-based organisational reforms (e.g. quotas on decision making bodies, institutions that promote female candidate selection) was five years in

233 Kinnock brought in advertising executives Peter Mandelson, Deborah Mattinson and Philip Gould to run the Shadow Communications Agency in 1986 (Mattinson 2010).
234 For example the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) has different offices, staff and leadership from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC).
235 As outlined in Chapter Three, the head of McGovern-Fraser commission controlled the processes’ entire agenda and prevented state-level or union-based complaints from reaching the floor.
236 Such as Whitlam’s 1970 intervention into the Victoria state-ALP as well as subsequent (1980) interventions into Queensland and Sydney local branches.
237 Any proposal would have to be drawn up a particular Labour Party Committee, put before the NEC (which during the 1980s was union-dominated and had few female representatives) and upon passage by the NEC would have to be agreed to by a full conference vote (Russell 2005, 105-107).
238 Unions held 90% of conference votes before the conference voting reform of 1990 (Russell 2005, 40).
239 Specifically when the Alford index became lower than the median for the entire time period examined in Figure 1.15 (1945-90).
the US, nine to twelve years in Australia and sixteen years in the UK. The amount of time between that first decline in the traditional gender identification gap and the first *successful* attempt at securing gender-based reforms would again, see five years elapse in the US, twelve in Australia and twenty in the UK.
<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>UK</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Decline in class voting until party centralising reforms proposed</strong></td>
<td>6 (McGovern-Fraser in 1971 – baseline 1965&lt;sup&gt;240&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>5 (federal intervention into state party delegations’ composition in 1970) to 9 (Committee of Inquiry and its union findings in 1978) (baseline 1965)</td>
<td>9 (OMOV proposals rejected in 1984) (baseline 1975)&lt;sup&gt;241&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Decline in class voting until party centralising reforms enacted</strong></td>
<td>6 (McGovern-Fraser in 1971 – baseline 1965)</td>
<td>5 (federal intervention into state party delegations’ composition in 1970) to 9 (Committee of Inquiry and its union findings in 1978) (baseline 1965)</td>
<td>12 (electoral college compromise in 1987) to 15 (conference voting reform in 1990) (baseline 1975)</td>
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Table 6.4 Impact of party reform: space between electoral change and childcare policy adoption

<sup>240</sup> A baseline of 1965 is applied to the US and Australia because the Alford and Thomsen index data only measure class voting in ten-year intervals; it is clear that the decline commenced during 1960-1970 interval, so its mid-point is employed.

<sup>241</sup> A baseline of 1975 is applied the UK because the Alford and Thomsen index data only measure class voting in ten year intervals; it is clear that the decline commenced during 1970-1980 interval, so its mid-point is employed.
b. Explaining variation in time elapsed

Why did these reforms take so much longer for Labour than for the Democrats? Why were the ALP in the middle? Labour’s delayed response may be partly attributable to factional battles within the party and quite simply, the refusal of traditional hard-liners on both the right and the left to come to terms with the party’s electoral failures and negative public image. When hard-leftists such as the CLPD took key positions within the decision making bodies such as in local constituency parties, but in particular on the NEC during the mid-to-late 1970s, it was difficult for moderates (such as the LCC) and Kinnock to take back control and centralise power into the hands of the leadership. Moreover, the then-dominant power of the trade unions that permeated through local constituency parties up to the NEC meant that for the most part, any attempt to centralise power in the leadership’s hands or apportion a fixed level of decision making power to women was met with fierce resistance at every level. In other words, the multiple veto points that were inherent in the Labour Party’s structure reinforced a struggle between union dominance and leftist power that came at the expense of centrists.

At the start of the ALP’s modernisation process federal leader Gough Whitlam was perhaps at even more of a disadvantage than his UK Labour counterparts: as set out in Chapter Four, extra-parliamentary dominance over the parliamentary party was so great that the federal parliamentary leader was, in 1966, barred from attending the national conference. The extremely decentralised nature of the party precluded national standards over conference delegation, candidate selection and campaign management. But it was also this decentralised, disorganised structure, in combination with electoral imperative and exogenous factors that allowed Whitlam an opportunity for overhaul: when in 1970 the Victoria branch’s increasingly dominant middle class membership deemed the state party’s leadership illegitimate and accused it of being co-opted by a left-wing union organisation, Whitlam was keen to draw on the Wyndham recommendations and intervene. When at the 1970 federal conference the more moderate South Australia branch co-opted the Victorian executive by siding with Whitlam, the federal branch was able to suspend the Victoria branch, place moderates into its leadership, mandate that conference delegations feature a 60:40 union-constituency ratio and encourage more local branch participation in policy-making. By 1972 the Victoria ALP had turned around its electoral fortunes and won several middle class suburban seats (Jupp 1982, 94-97). This set a precedent for similar interventions into the electorally unsuccessful Queensland state branch and local Sydney branch in 1980. Moreover, the enforced replacement of hard-line unionists and left-wingers with the party’s increasingly moderate, higher-educated membership arguably paved the way for an easier adoption of the gender-based reforms which passed the national conference in
The Democrats’ McGovern-Fraser reforms sped along the quickest in part because of fewer veto points: for example, rule changes such as those related to McGovern-Fraser did not need to be put up for a conference vote. Furthermore, AFL-CIO executives could have tried to pressure DNC members to vote against the reforms but trade unions (unlike in the UK and Australia) are not able to officially affiliate to the Democrats at either the state or national level, and as such they had no direct representatives on the Democratic National Committee to veto the reforms. The absence of those two significant veto points were bolstered by personal and procedural factors related to the reform process: the Chairman, Larry O’Brien, was received as a compromise candidate between the traditional base and new politics members whilst O’Brien’s direct control over the reform processes’ agenda enabled him to separate the DNC executive from the full committee and earn the executives’ approval before presenting the reforms to the full committee. Both committees also felt pressure to reform given the fact they met twice a year (and Congressional elections are held more frequently, for example, than UK general elections).

However, the depth of the reforms did vary from country to country, with the Democrats arguably undertaking the narrowest gender-based reforms (loosely-defined gender-based quotas to conference delegations as set out in McGovern-Fraser242), followed by the ALP (gender-based quotas in conference delegations and on decision making bodies in the 1980s. Quotas on trade union delegations were not set until 1994 and pre-selections until 2002) and lastly UK Labour, where, after a slow start, the party ensured female representation on intra-party decision making bodies, in constituency and trade union delegations to the national conference, secured OWOS in non-Labour incumbent seats and finally, in 1993, secured all-women shortlists.

From the lens of party centralisation, a comparison of depth is not as simple: whereas in the US, 35 states’ candidate selections occur through open primaries and are thus less accountable to the smoke-filled room of party insiders that would have controlled nominations pre-McGovern-Fraser, it is now argued that a candidate’s ability to win a nomination is conditioned by party-linked interest groups and activists (see for example Masket 2011, Bawn et. al. 2012, Cohen et al 2008). Candidate selection procedures in both Australia and the UK have become increasingly less beholden to trade unions and in particular trade union bloc votes – thus ostensibly promoting a vision of party ‘democracy,’ though here elements of centralisation are more apparent: for example the Labour Party leadership have intervened in candidate selection procedures and

242 McGovern-Fraser also fostered the development of primaries, which helped remove broker power status from the unions. However this did not directly engender a higher level of female political representation.
vetoed particular candidates (see for example Hopkin 2001).^^243

c. **Party transformation**

Chapter Two noted Katz and Mair’s (1995) and Panebianco’s (1988) arguments on party change, and the extent to which they state traditional mass-based, bottom-up party organisations have transformed into either ‘catch-all’ or ‘electoral-professional’ parties, largely characterised by “de-ideologisation, weak electoral links, and centralisation of power around the party leadership” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, 308). To what extent did the Democrats, ALP and Labour meet this requirement, before and after their reform processes? Although the leadership of the pre-McGovern-Fraser era Democrats was more empowered than for example, their Labour Party counterparts,^^244 Chapter Three does outline a party which before 1972 was influenced by labour unions disproportionate to their size in the overall apparatus, and especially considering their lack of official affiliation with the party. Frustrations over Humphrey’s ability to swing the 1968 nomination despite his not fighting a single primary allowed the commencement of reform: whereas the primary elections that resulted out of McGovern-Fraser were characterised as ‘democratising’ they, in effect, removed power from traditional unionist brokers and placed it into the hands of an increasingly post-materialist party base.

The Australian Labor Party, electorally unsuccessfully and perceived as a male, union dominated ‘black box’ (see Chapter Four on the ‘faceless men’) at both the state and federal levels had a large membership base. However it is not clear this base was still the homogenous group who fostered bottom-up policy-making by the 1960s. In fact, the party was becoming an increasingly heterogeneous group of members who were nonetheless overpowered by hard-line factions that had managed to secure leadership positions. Whitlam’s interventions into the state-level parties centralised power into the hands of the federal leadership by mandating particular delegation and selection processes, as well as requiring that power be distributed to a more heterogeneous political base (Jupp 1982). Subsequent leaders turned to targeted polling (Huntley 2003) and employed more strategic media campaigns (Sawer 1990) and indeed a greater degree of control over election campaigns (Keating 2010).

Like Australia, Labour had historically maintained a large, direct and homogenous membership base typical of the post-war mass-member party structure. However by the time Kinnock came to power, there had already been a decline in traditional members concurrent with an influx of

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^^243 The differentiating depth of reforms is not posited to be the explanatory variable behind each country’s different childcare policy trajectories, but rather make the simple point that although Labour started behind its counterparts in terms of both campaigning for and indeed promoting women within its own organisation, it eventually eclipsed both the ALP and the Democrats on the promotion aspect.

^^244 As indicated by the relative ease in which the transformational reforms of McGovern-Fraser were passed.
middle class, hard-leftists who were able to take over several local constituency parties and make significant gains into internal party decision making bodies. Superficially the party have appeared to be a ‘bottom-up’ organisation but in fact it was becoming one where the bottom was increasingly fractured and at odds with one and other. Reforms starting with the Kinnock-era allowed the hard-left to be pushed out of key positions and also, dampened the unions’ power over internal decision making on issues ranging from leadership selection to policy-making. The party’s Shadow Communications Agency brought forth an era of targeting polling, focus groups and media training whilst its new policy-making structures reasserted PLP control over campaign issues (Perrigo 1996, Russell 2005, Shaw 1993), all of which led to traditionalists’ complaints that “policy was increasingly subordinated to strategic considerations” (Bashevkin 2000, 410-411).

d. Linking organisational change to policy adoption

Whilst this chapter has outlined the imperative behind each party’s organisational change and in this section, discussed variance in both the speed and depth of reforms that passed through each party, and the extent to which parties have ‘changed,’ the question remains: what is the explicit link between a party’s organisational change and their adoption of childcare policy? This depends on how the dependent variable – childcare policy adoption – is measured.

In the US attention to childcare in the legislative arena increased from the late 1960s to early 1970s, starting with Mink’s 1967 legislation and followed by the series of universal childcare bills proposed in the run up to 1971’s Child Development Act. To what extent did the McGovern-Fraser reforms promote this? The evidence at first seems less than clear when childcare policy adoption is measured by legislative attention: Patsy Mink was already in office prior to the reforms as were the chief architects of the CDA, John Brademas and Walter Mondale. On the other hand, the reforms sparked off greater representation of post-materialists (including post-materialist women) in the party, and in the long run fostered the entry of legislators who would in the future develop significant pieces of childcare legislation, such as Rep. Geraldine Ferraro (D-NY), and become the legislatures’ leading early years advocates, such as Rep. George Miller (D-CA) or Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT).

Concurrent with the uptick in childcare legislation was an increase in attention to the issue in terms of election campaigns, or more specifically, on the party’s platforms: whilst the 1968 Democratic Party Platform committed the party to means-tested programmes such as Head Start and offered “expanded” access to early education and childcare, the 1972 campaign promised a federally-funded universal childcare programme (similar to that of the CDA) and dedicated an
entire section to the rights of women. When measured as the number of words dedicated to the issue, Figure 1.4 displays the first major spate of attention to the issue occurring in 1972, with the number of sentences dedicated to the issue more than tripling from the 1968 platform. Did party reforms promote this? Chapter Three noted that women comprised just 14% of all delegates in the 1968 convention. By 1972, McGovern-Fraser reforms had transformed delegations to such an extent that women made up 40% of delegates. The 1972 platform – the first to propose universal federally funded childcare as well as the first to dedicate a section to the rights of women – was drawn up by a 150-member committee of which 44% of its members were female. Moreover, all four of the committee’s vice-chairs were female and seven of the 15 drafting committee members were women, including Rep. Bella Abzug (D-NY) (Herbers, 1972). Newspaper reports at the time mentioned disgruntled delegates complaining about the attention given to health and childcare issues without a parallel discussion of funding (NY Times 1972).

Figure 1.8 displays a peak in the ALP’s legislative attention to childcare during the late 1970s and in particular early 1980s. To what extent was this measure of policy adoption linked to party reform? The reorganisation of state-level parties and the empowerment of their increasingly middle class and female membership base may have directly impacted the type of ALP MPs elected to the House of Representatives: the interventions occurred through the 1970s – early 1980s and in that same time period the proportion of unionist MPs dropped roughly 15 percentage points, against the proportion of female and university educated MPs, both of which rose eight percentage points (see Figure 4.9). The change in legislator characteristics is associated with the party’s increased parliamentary attention childcare: controlling for all other variables, the OLS regressions for 1984-1987 found a positive and significant association (albeit at the 90% confidence level) between university education and childcare debate, a positive and significant association (at the 99.9% confidence level) between being female and debating childcare and finally, an insignificant association between having a union background and debating childcare (see Table 4.5).

What of the link between party reform and the electoral (i.e. platform) measure of childcare policy adoption? Figure 1.7 shows that a sharp increase in manifesto attention towards the issue occurred within the 1983 platform (58 percentage point difference from the 1979 manifesto in terms of the number of words devoted to childcare). Moreover, as Chapter Four sets out, that manifesto was the first of the ALP’s to include a specific section on the rights of women. This correlates with the 1981 federal rule requiring 25% female representation on both party policy committees (which would have influence over the manifesto) and on conference delegations (which would vote on the manifesto), as set out above. In fact, at conferences, during the early
1980s women members such as Sen. Susan Ryan spearheaded efforts to use sophisticated polling in order to track female political preferences (Ryan 1981). At the 1982 conference Ryan was appointed to the party’s National Campaign Committee, from which she led a gender gap research project. Efforts by Labor women sought to ensure that the 1983 campaign was, in Sawer’s words, “aimed specifically at women” (Huntley 2003, 154, 176).

When childcare in the UK Labour Party is measured in legislative terms (i.e. the proportion of Labour MPs who debated on the issue) one sees a steady, but steep, increase from 1987. For example, Figure 1.11 shows that the number of childcare debate mentions on behalf of Labour MPs nearly quadrupled between 49th and 50th Parliament (1983-1987; 1987-1992) and that figure doubling again between the 50th and the 52nd (1997-2001) parliaments, such that it reached over 500 mentions between 1997 and 2001. The increase in debate mentions commenced whilst the party reforms outlined above were moving ahead: for example in 1987 Labour feminists had secured limited approval of one-woman on a shortlist (OWOS) just as Kinnock at the same conference was able to reduce the size of the union bloc vote (but not implement OMOV) in constituency candidate selection procedures. However they had not reached their full potential (one woman on a shortlist or all-women shortlists) by the time the increase in childcare debate mentions had commenced.

Figures 1.9 and 1.10 shows the dependent variable, childcare policy adoption measured in electoral (i.e. manifesto) terms. Here, the number of words dedicated to childcare in UK Labour manifestos more than doubled between 1987 and the 1997 manifesto. The increased manifesto attention correlates with the reforms on female representation that commenced from 1987, which had an influence on conference delegations (from both local constituency parties and trade unions) as well as places on decision making bodies such as policy review committees and the NEC. For example, in 1991 just five out of 29 NEC seats were held by women, by 1998 this figure was 18 out of 32 (Russell 2005, 108). The steady gains made by women into party decision making bodies as well as into the PLP ensured that women would be well represented in the Policy Review process which, after the party’s loss in 1987, sought to develop an innovative manifesto in which output was subject to the approval of a women’s monitoring group in order to check that, in Shaw’s words, “women’s needs were taken fully into account by all [policy review groups]” (Shaw 1993, 113). Moreover, 1991 reforms ensured women were proportionately represented on what would in 1992 become the National Policy Forum, the body that finalises the set of policy proposals to be placed before the party conference and, eventually, on the manifesto (Alderman and Carter 1994, 328-329).

245 OWOS would only be required in constituencies where there was no sitting Labour MP.
If one were to conceptualise a timeline commencing with electoral change, which produced MP change and following on from that, the onset of childcare policy adoption as measured in both legislative and electoral terms, it might resemble Table 6.5 below. Here it becomes apparent that in the US, electoral change predated (very subtle) changes in legislator characteristics (measured here by an increase in ADA scored that commenced from the 93rd Congress). This shift in legislator characteristics was concurrent with policy adoption in both electoral and legislative terms. In Australia, it took roughly three years longer for the impact of electoral change to manifest itself into a shift in MP demographics (measured here in education/unionism and gender terms). However, once the shift in MPs commenced, it took two years until there was at least a 25% increase in childcare debate mentions and four to eight years before there was an increase in attention to the issue on the party platform.

The different lags between MP change and policy adoption in the legislative versus electoral senses repeats itself in the UK case. Here, there were eight-18 years between electoral change (measured in both education and gender terms) and a shift in MP demographics (measured in education and gender-based terms). Following the shift of MP demographics, it was only four years until Labour MPs displayed an increase of at least 25% in legislative attention to the issue. Yet electoral (i.e. manifesto) attention lagged further behind: it would not be until 1992 that the number childcare-related words in the manifesto would increase by at least 25% and indeed 1997 until a strong universal commitment to childcare was included in the manifesto.

The different gaps between MP change and childcare policy adoption in the legislative versus electoral senses suggest that whilst MPs were, once in office, able to draw attention to the issue, their power was limited in terms of electoral campaigns and party manifestos. Here, the complexities of internal party politics in the ALP and Labour, both of which were still battling over leadership centralising reforms, prevented childcare from becoming holding a more dominant place on the manifesto, further illustrating the impact of party reform on strategic flexibility.
### Table 6.5 Party reform and the space between the two measures of childcare policy adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of time between</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>UK</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral change and change in MP characteristics</td>
<td>7-8 years&lt;sup&gt;248&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10-11 years&lt;sup&gt;249&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>8-18 years&lt;sup&gt;250&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP change and adoption of childcare in legislative terms&lt;sup&gt;251&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0-1 years&lt;sup&gt;252&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2 years&lt;sup&gt;253&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4 years&lt;sup&gt;254&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP change and adoption of childcare in electoral terms&lt;sup&gt;255&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0-1 years&lt;sup&gt;256&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4–0 years/8-3 years&lt;sup&gt;257&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9-12 years&lt;sup&gt;258&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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### 6.7 Conclusion: electoral imperative, party reform and the importance of timing

This chapter provided a comparative analysis of the three case studies already outlined: it found variation with regard to specific factors such as the opportunity for centre-left parties to gain votes amongst higher-educated male (higher in the ALP and Labour than Democrats) or the increase in female legislators between T1 and T2 (15 percentage points in Labour as opposed to...

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<sup>246</sup> Onset of class (Alford/Thomsen) and gender-based electoral change.
<sup>247</sup> MP change according to gender, university, union background: minimum baseline for change is 10% (in a sustained direction) for any of the aforementioned characteristics.
<sup>248</sup> Baseline electoral change years are class: 1965 and gender 1966 against legislator change (of which there was little) according to increase in ADA scores which commenced in the 93<sup>rd</sup> Congress (from 1973).
<sup>249</sup> Baseline electoral change years are class: 1965 and gender 1969 against changes in MP characteristics based upon class: 1975 and gender 1980.
<sup>250</sup> Baseline electoral change years are class: 1975 and gender: 1966 against MP change (in terms of university/union and gender) of 1983.
<sup>251</sup> Measured by increase in childcare debate/co-sponsorship. Minimum baseline for change is a 25% increase (in a sustained direction).
<sup>252</sup> Predated/concurrent with 1973 legislator change.
<sup>253</sup> Using 1977 as year of legislative increase yields a result of 2 years according to MP’s class/educated based change. 0 years when MP change is based upon gender.
<sup>254</sup> One parliament.
<sup>255</sup> Measured by rise in platform mentions, policy commitments. Minimum baseline for change is a 25% increase (in a sustained direction).
<sup>256</sup> Predated/concurrent with MP change.
<sup>257</sup> Increase in manifesto words apparent in 1979, four years after class-based change in MPs, one year before gender based change in MPs. If using a more qualitative measure (i.e. strength of manifesto commitments) then 1983 (with the Accord) is a more appropriate and the gaps of time are 8 years (class) and 3 years (gender).
<sup>258</sup> Nine years in terms of number of words in speeches and manifesto, 12 when qualitatively assessing policy commitments (i.e. 1997 election promised childcare for all).
just eight in the ALP and four amongst the Democrats). However, it broadly concluded that parties had an opportunity to take advantage of the decline in class voting by making appeals to female voters. But whilst the qualitative evidence on the potential for positive trade union influence upon parties’ childcare policy adoption was mixed, the quantitative evidence presented in section 6.5 largely quashed the possibility, across all three cases, that union influence relative to electoral imperative drove the timing of parties’ childcare policy adoption in either the legislative or the electoral senses. The Rapoport and Stone results found replacement – rather than conversion – to be the dominant mechanism producing party position change in each party and the OLS regressions found that, for the most part, characteristics associated with post-materialism/new politics orientation were more strongly and significantly associated with a legislators debating/co-sponsoring childcare than were having a trade union background (which on some occasions was found to have a negative association). The combined quantitative analyses therefore suggest that since party change (measured in the legislative sense) was mechanised by replacement and driven\textsuperscript{259} by largely post-materialist legislators, that childcare policy adoption was, for all three parties, part of a broader electoral strategy to attract new and often, middle-income, higher-educated voters to their electoral constituencies.

However, the quantitative findings compared in this Chapter do not entirely dismiss the possibility that unions had a role in pushing for childcare policy: the US and Australian chapters noted that unions were involved in drafting childcare legislation and setting party policy. They rather indicate that unions’ relative influence in producing position change was far smaller than that of replacement and post-materialist orientations. Nor do these findings dismiss the possibility that unions have not in fact become increasingly concerned with the issue over time. Just as replacement effects shifted the make-up of Democratic, ALP and Labour legislators and, arguably, led to more progressive policy stances, the increased number of female members could have changed the organisations’ aggregate stance on the issue. However, even if unions are by now the leading childcare policy lobbyists in each country, their power within the three centre-left parties under examination has been significantly reduced through the series of internal reforms outlined in 6.6.

Both factional and traditional blue-collar unionist power was seen at T1 to be an impediment to politicians’ strategic flexibility to appeal to new voters, in this case middle-income and female voters. The ease (and attendant speed) in which party elites were able to restructure their internal organisation by apportioning more decision making control to women and moderates as well as centralising power into the leaderships’ hands helped determine when the party would adopt

\textsuperscript{259} At least according to the variables tested here.
childcare policy, adoption here being measured in both legislative and in electoral terms. Therefore the Democratic Party structure, which had the fewest veto points and no direct trade union representation on the executive was able to increase female and minority representation as well as reduce de-facto union power quicker than were the ALP, where extreme extra-parliamentary control over the parliamentary party and union domination of the federal conference held ‘modernising’ politicians back. Still, a combination of party decentralisation and exogenous factors from 1970 allowed ALP parliamentary leaders to step in, suspend and re-organise state branches from the top-down state, thus changing the demographics of the federal party conference. These options were not available to Labour Leaders, who found themselves in a centralised structure with multiple veto points, warring factions and entrenched union power. The implementation of rules on gender-based representation and reforms that apportioned power back to the PLP would take well over a decade.

The length of time taken to implement both these gender-based and centralising reforms explains why the Democrats were able to respond to large-scale changes in class and gender-based electoral behaviour earlier than were the ALP who in turn, surpassed British Labour. Once implemented these reforms helped spur party policy adoption on both electoral and legislative terms due to increased representation on party decision making bodies and, in particular on party policy and platform committees, just as they fostered the intake of more post-materialist, higher-educated (and in the case of UK Labour, female) legislators, relative to unionist, lower-educated legislators. In other words, the hypothesis as set out in Table 1.1 has been affirmed. Party reform centralised power into the hands of post-materialists, who adopted childcare policy as a strategic appeal to new middle class voters. It was these post-materialists, rather than unionists, who brought childcare policy onto the party’s agenda even if, as the next chapter will discuss, their long-term commitment to the issue would vary from party to party.
Chapter Seven: Discussion and Further Research

7.1 Where is party policy now?

Chapter Six concluded that all three parties’ childcare adoption processes were driven by electoral imperative rather than union pressure, however it did not address how stable those commitments to childcare remained. Did the three parties continue to advocate the issue and if so, did the policy shape that they promoted remain similar over time? The answer is somewhat mixed: since the mid 1980s the ALP has continuously advocated childcare and kept it as a centrepiece on their party platform in nearly every election.\textsuperscript{260} Labour, who adopted the issue during the late 1990s, continues to publicly advocate for affordable childcare and has given the issue increased attention in their party manifestos\textsuperscript{261} as well as in Government. The Democrats’ commitment to childcare has remained strong relative to the Republicans, who dropped childcare from their party platform during the 1970s. Yet universal policy proposals and specific spending commitments from the Democrats have been thin on the ground\textsuperscript{262} (Woolley and Peters 2013).

If parties have remained, at least in their campaign promises, committed to childcare, how strong are the policies they promote? In other words, have they continued to advocate policies similar to their original proposals, such as the ALP and Democrats’ 1970s and 80s commitments to universal, supply-side childcare funding? In the US and Australia, and to a certain extent, Britain the answer seems to be no, centre-left parties do not or have not been able to make such strong commitments to non means-tested childcare. Without attempting to provide a comprehensive explanation for the various paths each party’s childcare policy has taken, it does appear that the different times at which each party adopted the issue gave rise to different challenges to their original model of provision, at times quite drastically changing each party’s policy shape. For example, the 1980s onset of neoliberal ideas placed pressure on both the ALP and the Democrats’ universal, supply-side childcare policies and as such, neither party continues to promote this form of childcare assistance. UK Labour, arriving at the issue later than its American and Australian counterparts, has shifted slightly with regard to entitlements but it has not experienced an ideological change as large as moving from supply-side to demand-led policy shape, given that its original policies were designed for a mixed economy of childcare provision (Lloyd and Penn 2012).

\textsuperscript{260} For example the ALP’s 2013 platform heavily emphasised the fact that they increased the childcare rebate to cover up to 50% of ‘out of pocket’ child care costs (ALP 2013, 117).

\textsuperscript{261} For example, Labour’s 2010 manifesto committed to increased spending on Sure Start centres, promised an expansion of the free entitlement to all 2 year-olds as well as an expansion of hours for threes and fours and promising to retain childcare vouchers (Labour Party 2013, 3.3)

\textsuperscript{262} The Democrats’ 2008 platform committed to expanding pre-kindergarten early education but their specific promise on childcare was vague (“We will help pay for child care”); the 2012 platform committed to reform and expansion of Head Start but did not mention childcare (Wooley and Peters 2013).
Chapter Three noted that Democratic momentum behind universal childcare stalled after the early 1970s: subsequent policies may have included elements that benefited middle-income families, such as increased generosity of the Dependent Care Tax Credit, but since the mid-1970s, Democratic childcare bills have mostly centred upon means-tested benefits. Democrats were discouraged from actively addressing the issue after Nixon’s veto in 1971; the childcare coalition’s crumbling in 1975 did little to reinvigorate them. Nor have Democratic Presidents actively sought to revive the issue: President Carter, who lacked the post-materialist credentials of a George McGovern or Walter Mondale,264 discouraged universal childcare programmes, particularly in the context of a weakening economy.265 Bill Clinton, in the context of a growing economy, hinged his largest childcare policy proposal not upon helping middle-income families with rising costs and poor quality care but instead as part of a broader ‘welfare-to-work’ agenda (Levy and Michel 2002, 246). The Obama administration’s main policy proposal for the under-fives is focused upon universal pre-school, an unmet and important need in and of itself, but not one that would assist working families with the cost of full-day care266 (Gable 2014, 5).

More so than in the US, childcare remains a conventional Australian election issue that even the centre-right Liberals purport to champion267 (Liberal Party 2013). However, the shape of childcare funding has been transformed from supply-side to demand-led, with significant cost implications for both parents and the Treasury. The Labor Party, in office from 1983 to 1996, continued to advance childcare throughout the 1980s and 1990s, although they eventually submitted to a shift in policy, where funding went from being supply-side, quality rewarding and universal in the 1980s and early 1990s to demand-led, quality neutral and increasingly means-tested by the mid to late 1990s.268 These latter policies, whilst couched in the neoliberal canons

263 See for example Geraldine Ferraro’s HR 1603 and the Act for Better Childcare as discussed in Chapter Three, footnotes 96 and 97.
264 Who succeeded and preceded Carter as Democratic Presidential candidates. Mondale, of the Child Development Act was the Democratic Presidential candidate in 1984 where McGovern, as noted, was the left-liberal candidate in 1972.
265 For example Carter Administration official Arabella Martinez from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare testified before Congress during the deliberations over Sen. Alan Cranston’s Child Care Act of 1979, telling legislators that the administration did not believe all families needed or supported the idea of centre-based childcare assistance, stating that most were happy with informal arrangements. Cranston withdrew the bill (Zigler and Lang 1991, 44). See also footnote 95 in Chapter Three.
266 The Obama administration did implement stricter regulations on childcare providers (Cohn 2013)
267 For example the Liberal Party, ahead of the 2013 federal election, released a ten page document on their childcare strategy, which promised to prioritise “flexible, affordable and accessible” childcare for all (Coalition 2013, 2).
268 By the 1980s, Australian childcare policy was based off operational subsidies for non-profit, income-sliding scale fees for parents and a top-up fee relief (paid directly to non-profit providers) for low-income families. However, in 1987 neoliberal oriented Treasury minister Sen. Pete Walsh and Minister of Social Security, Don Grimes, floated the possibility of a complete shift towards a market-based, demand-led policy: a means-tested voucher system which would remove the government from direct involvement in childcare, including all operational and capital grant subsidies. However, Bob Hawke and Deputy Prime Minister Paul Keating rebuked the ministers citing internal polling that showed tampering with the childcare system would lose the ALP women’s votes.
of efficiency and choice, replaced operational subsidies with tax credits and cash payments to for-profit providers without mandating a fee cap. Although Labor’s then-Treasury Minister expected the shift to reduce government outlays, the demand-led policies in fact prompted fee inflation, and the government were locked into footing 50 per cent of the bill. Net costs to parents rose by over 100% between 1996 and 2007 (compared to 27% general inflation) and pushed public expenditure up from AU$ 500 million in 1996 to 3.3 billion in 2008.\(^{269}\)

Public childcare spending predominantly benefited large, for-profit childcare chains, such as Australian-based ABC Learning, who with over 1,100 centres in Australia and 2,000 across the UK, New Zealand and US, received more than AU$ 1 million a day in subsidies via Australian fee relief programmes. The company, which at one point was valued at more than AU$ 3.5 billion, collapsed in 2008 as a result of financial mismanagement (Hoy 2008). This forced the Australian federal government to commit at least AU$ 475 million in order to temporarily support the 120,000 children using its facilities and the 16,000 staff members who would be displaced (Brennan and Oloman 2009, 117-118). In power at the time, the ALP under Julia Gillard attempted to reign in regulations and quality controls on private centres but were unable to make headway on reshaping the overall demand-led funding mechanism and/or reducing either government expenditure or parental costs by implementing a fee cap. In 2011 total federal government childcare subsidies were estimated to reach AU$4 billion, despite continually rising parental net costs (Kruger 2011).

In the UK, Labour continued to implement its National Childcare Strategy throughout the 52nd to 54th Parliaments (1997-2010). As described in Chapter Five, this included a generous but somewhat awkward mix of supply and demand-led policies that ranged from universal Sure Start Centres (universal but primarily located in low-income neighbourhoods), Children’s Centres (which had a similar remit), introduced 12.5 weekly hours of free early education and care for all three and four year-olds (with 4’s being able to use their entitlement at primary school reception

\(^{269}\) In 1991, under pressure to prompt an increase places, the ALP (under Prime Minister Paul Keating) expanded the generously means-tested fee relief programme so that parents could use it at private, for-profit institutions. The Government expected that the move would yield an increase of 28,000 places in the first year, yet places in the commercial childcare sector – which was unencumbered by the planning principles non-profit centres had to abide by in order to receive operational subsidies – grew by 89,600 between 1991 and 1997, versus 4,300 for the non-profit sector. The increased costs, according to Brennan, “exceeded the Treasury’s worst fears” as they were forced to double their spending on Child Care Assistance between 1991 and 1996. Indeed, reports suggested that 70-75% of private operators’ income stemmed from government fee relief, which is accorded to centres before parents paid their fees (Brennan 1998, 200-04). In 1996, the newly elected Coalition Government under Liberal PM John Howard finally removed operational subsidies from non-profit centres, and in former Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s words, “let the market rip,” Howard’s Coalition Government completed the path towards a commercially led, demand-side childcare policy that was largely initiated by the ALP’s 1991 decision to allow childcare assistance funding for commercial centres.
classes), working tax credits for low-income families that at one point would cover up to 85% of parents’ childcare fees, tax-free, employer-provided childcare vouchers, and a ramp up of the universal cash payment, Child Benefit. Total spending on under 5’s tripled under New Labour (Sefton 2009, 3).

The 12.5 free hours was eventually increased to 15 and the current Coalition Government has followed through with Labour plans to expand the free early education and care entitlement to disadvantaged two year-olds (currently the lowest-income 40% are entitled), just as Labour have announced plans that they would consider universalising the 2 year old free entitlement if elected in 2015 (Grice 2014). Of course, Labour’s childcare policy proposals have not been a portrait of continual generosity: Gordon Brown in 2009 threatened to do away with tax-free childcare vouchers. Whilst public debate on UK childcare currently centres upon the untenable nature of net costs to parents (estimated at 28% of family net income in 2011), Labour leader Ed Miliband launching a report at the IPPR think tank in June of 2014 cautiously dismissed programmatic policy expansion such as the report’s proposal to increase the number of free hours provided to 3 and 4 year-olds, or provide a smaller entitlement for 1 year-olds. Instead, Miliband emphasised overall a party set on reducing public expenditure and specifically, cutting benefits270 (Wintour 2014).

7.2 Why are they here?

So although parties’ public commitments to the concept of affordable childcare have remained broadly stable, the strength of policies that they either proposed or passed in aim of that goal seems to have weakened. An explanation for why that happened would naturally be beyond the scope of this research, however it is worth asking how the story of childcare policy adoption and its eventual outcome fits into the broader discussion of party politics and the welfare state. The following section will focus on the tension between the two theoretical approaches that underlie the study’s guiding question (power resources and party competition) and consider the implications of this research for both these approaches, highlighting the importance of social democratic party transformation and organisational reform. In light of parties’ decreased ability or perhaps, decreased inclination, to propose childcare policies that are as strong and inclusive as their original ideas, the third section suggests avenues for future research.

The question guiding this research specifically implies a test on the relevance of the power resources versus party competition approach – do the findings presented in this study suggest

270 For example a key element of Miliband’s speech revolved around removing Jobseeker’s allowance for all under 25s without a Level 3 qualification. They may receive it if they enter training but it will be means-tested according to parental income.
that the power resources theory was irrelevant? It depends, partly, on how the ‘power resources’ are measured. Left-party power is somewhat irrelevant to the question at hand, whilst union density cannot explain temporal variation. Indeed, as repeatedly noted, union influence was weak relative to electoral imperative in driving policy adoption. But if one considers briefly again the argument of this thesis – that a party’s proclivity to adopt childcare policy was driven by electoral imperative and mediated by party organisational changes that instituted gender-based and centralising reforms – they will notice the suggestion that the number of women in parliament or in the party elite matter. This type of ‘critical mass’ theory is essentially a gendered measure of resource mobilisation and would suggest that without women in either the legislature or in the party elite, childcare policy adoption would not have happened in either the legislative or in the electoral senses.

In reality, the relationship is probably more complex: women comprised between two and three per cent of House Democrats in the immediate years before and after McGovern-Fraser, and in fact there were few women in Congress, apart from Patsy Mink, who played a role in the development of childcare policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, there were no women ALP MPs during the late 1970s, as the party’s attention to childcare (in legislative terms) began to noticeably increase.271 Yet, women ALP MPs were positively and significant associated, for controlling all other variables, with childcare debate at T2. Women were also positively and significantly associated with debating childcare in the UK at both T1 and T2, controlling for all other variables. In fact, the Labour Party’s gender-based candidate selection reforms brought an increased number of women into parliament, which did coincide with a steady increase in childcare debate in the run up to T2. On the one hand, this suggests that critical mass thesis can at least some of the time explain increased attention to childcare in the legislature (specifically in the Australian and UK cases). On the other hand, Fleckenstein notes that under New Labour, women MPs had the agency to influence the agenda and pressure the Blair government but they lacked the agency to actually exercise power in terms of childcare policy272 (Fleckenstein 2010, 801). When policy adoption is measured in electoral terms we do see evidence from all three countries that where party platforms and policy committees experienced an increase in female representation the resultant platforms/manifestos include a greater level of attention to work/family issues like childcare. Once again, however, this highlights the need to draw a distinction between discussing and debating (or indeed campaigning on) an issue versus having the political and (perhaps) financial capital to implement policy goals as formidable as universal childcare.

271 The 1980 election saw five female ALP MPs into the House of Representatives.
272 Given the lack of a women’s minister during Blair’s first Government and the cut of lone parent benefit (Fleckenstein 2010, 801).
The distinction between discussing and campaigning versus successfully legislating points to different gradations in the strength of the party competition approach: can parties afford to implement costly policies that cater to one constituency (for example middle-income families) at the expense of others (for example low-income families on benefits or indeed elite financial interests)? In other words, is party competition an independent variable that drives party position change or is it an intervening variable that structures policymakers’ choices? This research has argued that the aim of acquiring new voters ultimately drove parties to adopt childcare policy. However, this is not to argue that parties were free to do so without strategic constraints: Rosenbluth, et. al. 2006 asserted that “both social democratic and liberal parties are somewhat constrained by their core constituencies from issuing pure policy-based appeals to working women” (Rosenbluth et al., 2006, 167). Ultimately, the three parties at hand did not entirely abandon their traditional social constituencies during their hunt for middle class voters: the ALP, Democrats and Labour all promoted select labour and low-income issues: the Obama administration is currently pressing for an increase in the federal minimum wage; if elected in 2015, Labour’s Ed Miliband has promised to do the same, just as current Federal ALP leader Bill Shorten has pushed back against business demands to defer statutory minimum wage increases. However, the strength in which they continued to pursue left-materialist policies was, in light of their broader acceptance of neoliberal ideology, weak: for example President Clinton, in addition to implementing welfare-to-work policies, signed into law the repeal of the Glass-Steagall regulations, which among other rules, separated commercial from investment banking (Sanati 2009); New Labour engaged in ‘light touch’ financial sector regulation and implemented reforms such as de-indexing the public pension system from inflation (Hopkin and Blyth 2012, 22); the ALP underwent a series of neoliberal-oriented financial sector reforms during the 1980s and 1990s that by extension impacted wage distribution, such as floating the dollar, allowing the entrance of international banks and selling the Commonwealth bank (Martin 1999).

In this regard, the inconsistencies between social democratic ideals and neoliberal policy tend to resemble the strong public but wavering financial and political commitment to universal childcare outlined above. Picot’s 2009 framework, in a ‘purer’ gradation of the party competition

273 The Obama administration wants to increase the federal minimum from its current $7.25 an hour to a ‘living wage’ of $10.10 per hour. In January 2014, President Obama signed an executive order mandating federal government contractors to be paid $10.10 per hour by 2015 (Goldfarb 2014).

274 As part of Miliband’s focus on ‘pre-distribution,’ he promised to set a statutory minimum wage linked to national average earnings (BBC 2014).

275 In Australia, the independent Fair Work Commission implements minimum wage increases. Following the panel’s decision to increase wages to AU$15.80 in June 2013, industry leaders called for the implementation to be delayed. Shorten pushed back, stating, “Labor does not support a working poor as we see in the United States” (Australian, 2014).
approach would suggest that researchers focus their analysis on 1) public demand for policy change and 2) the spatial pattern of party competition: where all three of the parties here were motivated by electoral gains and aware of public opinion in favour of the issue, they had an incentive to employ policies like childcare so as to mobilise new middle class voters on non-materialist issues. However, neither the ALP nor the Democrats have a viable party to the left of them on the liberal-authoritarian axis of competition that could challenge them into committing to stronger childcare policy, wherein ‘strength’ here implies large-scale financial and/or administrative commitment (such as reorienting the funding model from demand to supply-side and/or ramping up expenditure). Though the Liberal Democrats are located to Labour’s ‘liberal-left’ (and indeed ahead of the 2015 election committed to a wider expansion of the childcare entitlement than Labour have, at the time of writing) the party’s current popularity and the overall mobilising capacity of childcare in general may not be powerful enough to motivate Labour to make a stronger commitment on the issue. This raises the possibility that whilst these parties have not entirely abandoned their traditional working class and low-income constituencies, they have also not pursued middle class childcare policies as strong as one might have expected them to because of the absence of a viable left-liberal competitor, as Picot (2009) would predict.

However, this research has argued that there is more to the story of childcare policy adoption than structured electoral imperative: just as inter-party politics condition the extent to which parties can make strong policy commitments and remain electorally viable, parties also have their own internal political and organisational constraints on the type of strategic electoral appeals they are able to put forth (Kitschelt 1994). Where, for example, the Democrats were hesitant to adopt the ERA during the 1960s, Wolbrecht suggest this was due to unions’ then-powerful influence in the party (Wolbrecht 2002, 254-273). It seems likely that had female Labour Party members fought to include a large manifesto plank that committed the party to universal, state-funded childcare during the early 1980s they would have received pushback from the union representation at both the policy committee, NEC and conference level. Whilst this explains previous constraints that were largely removed during the parties’ organisational reform processes, how then does the idea of internal organisational structure link up to the ALP, Democrats’ and Labour’s current stance on childcare?

By reducing the power of party affiliates, specifically unions, parties are now less anchored to a core constituency and more impervious to the types of policies that organised labour were once able to push through party forums, conferences and ultimately, onto their legislative agendas. In

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276 This includes universalising the 2-year old offer of 15 free hours early education and care per week, as well as offering 1 year-olds 10 hours per week (Brewer et. al, 2014, 185).
the immediate post-war era this would have resulted in policies such as wage arbitration, generous pensions, healthcare and survivors’ benefits. Had the internal party power of unions been replaced with the internal party power of a well-organised constituency on work-family issues then the parties may have continued to issue (and act upon) strong childcare policy commitments. Of course, that is not what happened: unlike in the electorate, the reduction of union power within parties’ internal organisations was not replaced by the growing internal power of another organised, new middle class group interest group. Instead, the reduction of unions’ internal party power was a consequence of centralising reforms that handed increased autonomy to the party leadership.

When parties adopted childcare as both an electoral and legislative issue they directed a strategic appeal to this new middle class and, to some extent, became electorally beholden to them. But because this new middle class is not an organised entity it would have had a more difficult time than did the organised union movement in for example, brokering candidate selection deals or issuing an organised response to potentially disappointing policy commitments. As such, the three parties at hand have not been anchored to the new middle classes in such a way that they prioritise long-term policy seeking goals on behalf of this constituency over the shorter-term benefits of office.

It thus seems expedient to lay the missed opportunity for universal childcare entirely at parties’ feet. Though, to what extent are parties’ strategic, office-seeking and sometimes empty appeals an indication of their rapacity for political power? And to what extent are they merely responding to the social and economic consequences of deindustrialisation which, arguably, has fostered demobilisation of working and middle class political interests and pushed parties into an arena where shifting, short-term valence issues determine votes? Whereas this study has argued that the power resources approach, relative to the party competition approach, cannot explain why parties adopted the issue of childcare in both legislative and electoral terms, it is here that the importance of power resources becomes apparent: perhaps it is the lack of an organised, middle class interest group affiliated to political parties that can explain why the childcare policies these three parties have taken on have not been able to produce a system of affordable, quality, universal childcare.

If, perhaps, this discussion includes an optimistic conclusion it might be that parties, free from powerful, internal affiliates are now less beholden to outside interests or, to use Bawn et. al’s term, “policy demanders” (Bawn et. al 2012). Whereas Bawn et. al. develop a convincing albeit disconcerting group-centric of theory of parties, in which their policy output is determined by the
preferences of party-linked interests/activists (and indeed the authors argue that both US parties are of this type), this research has found that childcare policy adoption was driven by parties’ electoral aims and that the party elite were able, post-reform, to do so autonomously from their traditional party-linked interest groups. Any nascent optimism, however, should be tempered: the findings here also speak to the ease in which parties can compete for votes on policies that have a diffuse array of interests without having to make a credible commitment or indeed transforming said policy once in office. Had this research examined party position change on a policy with a better-organised constituency, such as financial sector reform or perhaps in the US, gun control, we may indeed have seen greater influence of both legislator conversion and continued, strong policy commitments to the issue.

7.3 What way forward?

In light of the discussion on organisational power, research related to parties’ childcare policies would benefit from an examination into the way both organised and diffuse interests filter their policy preferences through today’s centre-left parties: have the organisational reforms that sought to ‘democratise’ candidate selection supplanted particularistic working class interests with particularistic elite interests? To what extent can ‘new middle class’ party members pressure parties to act on middle-income social policy needs, given the constraints of both autonomous party elites and the seemingly inelastic presence of neoliberal ideology? Until those issues are addressed the question remains: how might significant expansion and reform of childcare policy in each of these three countries take place? Short of a full-blown crisis in costs or provision, the answer seems to lie with the unnavigable task of organising and mobilising the new middle class: until that occurs, Schattschneider’s (1964) much discussed bias will prevail.
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Appendix A: ALP MPs’ childcare debate mentions, by parliament
Debates extracted from Parliament of Australia Hansard. Full transcripts available upon request.

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34th
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Michael Duffy 1
Michael Maher 1
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Nick Bolkus 1
Peter Baldwin 1
Peter Cleeland 1
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Ralph Jacobi 1
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Ron Elstob 1
Ronald Edwards 1
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Appendix B
British Labour MPs debating childcare in parliament, by parliament

Debates extracted from the House of Commons Hansard Millbank systems. Full transcript available upon request.

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Jack Straw 1
Bill Michie 1
Gordon Brown 1
Harry Cohen 1
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Roland Boyes 1
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Ian McCartney 1
Joan Walley 1
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Gordon McMaster 1
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Andrew Miller 1
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David Hanson 1
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Tessa Jowell 29
Barbara Roche 32

2nd (1997-2001)

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Margaret Beckett 1
Peter Snape 1
Clive Soley 1
Ernie Ross 1
Frank Dobson 1
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Mark Fisher 1
Norman Godman 1
Stuart Bell 1
Llin Golding 1
David Hinchliffe 1
Hilary Armstrong 1
Ian McCartney 1
James Wray 1
John McAllion 1
Keith Vaz 1
Paul Boateng 1
Paul Murphy 1
Sam Galbraith 1
Tony Worthington 1
Win Griffiths 1
Ashok Kumar 1
Huw Edwards 1
Alan Milburn 1
Ann Coffey 1
Bridget Prentice 1
Glenda Jackson 1
Gordon Prentice 1
Hugh Bayley 1
Jean Corston 1
John Heppell 1
Michael Connarty 1
Mike Gapes 1
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Paddy Tipping 1
Piara Khabra 1
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Gareth Thomas  2
Gisela Stuart  2
Ian Gibson  2
Ivan Lewis  2
Jacqui Smith  2
James Plaskitt  2
Joan Ryan  2
John Healey  2
Martin Linton  2
Martin Salter  2
Michael Wills  2
Patricia Hewitt  2
Paul Marsden  2
Peter Bradley  2
Phyllis Starkey  2
Russell Brown  2
Shona McIsaac  2
Syd Rapson  2
Tony Clarke  2
Valerie Davey  2
Angela Smith  2
Robert Sheldon  3
Audrey Wise  3
Andrew Smith  3
Maria Fyfe  3
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Barbara Roche  3
Estelle Morris  3
John Denham  3
John Hutton  3
Malcolm Wicks  3
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Beverly Hughes  3
Brian Iddon  3
Chris Pond  3
Debra Shipley  3
Jim Fitzpatrick  3
Jeremy Corbyn  4
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Fiona Mactaggart 4
Lorna Fitzsimmons 4
Louise Ellman 4
Paul Goggins 4
Tony Colman 4
Yvette Cooper 4
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Judy Mallaber 5
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Keith Bradley 7
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Margaret Hodge 13
Harriet Harman 14
Tony Blair 14
Julie Morgan 14
Gordon Brown 15
Harry Barnes 18
Steve Webb 21
Caroline Flint 34
Appendix C

1) Childcare legislation co-sponsors, 90th – 101st Congresses

(Pre-1973 co-sponsorship data from Congressional Record 90th -93rd Congresses, Sessions 1 and 2. Post-1973 data from the Library of Congress’s Thomas bill search. Full details available on request.)

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Johnson, Harold
Koch, Edward
Leggett, Robert
Matsunaga, Spark
Meads, Lloyd
Mikva, Abner
Miller, George Paul
Mink, Patsy
Moorhead, William
Moss, John
O'Neill, Tip
Perkins, Carl
Powell, Adam
Pucinski, Roman
Rooney, Frederick
Ryan, William
Scheuer, James
Thompson, Frank
Wilson, Charles H.
Wolff, Lester
Zablocki, Clement

92nd
(1971-1973)

Brademas, John
Burton, Phil
Clay, Bill
Dent, John
Dulski, Thaddeus
Edwards, Don
Eilberg, Joshua
Ford, William
Gibbons, Sam
Kastenmeier, Robert
Koch, Edward
Leggett, Robert
Matsunaga, Spark
Meads, Lloyd
Mikva, Abner
Mink, Patsy
Moss, John
Nix, Robert
Pepper, Claude
Podell, Bertram
Powell, Adam
Rostenkowski, Daniel
Roybal, Edward
Scheuer, James
St. Germain, Fernand
Stokes, Louis
Wilson, Charles H.
Wolff, Lester

94th
(1975-1977)

Abzug, Bella
Addabbo, Joseph
Anderson, Glenn
AuCoin, Les
Badillo, Herman
Beard, Edward
Benitez, Jamie
Biaggi, Mario
Bingham, Jonathan
Boggs, Lindy
Boland, Edward
Bonker, Don
Bradem, John
Brown, George
Burke, Yvonne
Carney, Charles
Carr, Bob
Clay, Bill
Collins, Cardiss
Conyers, John
Corman, James
Cornell, Robert
Daniels, Dominick
Dellums, Ronald
Dent, John
Drinan, Robert
Edwards, Don
Eilberg, Joshua
Fascell, Dante
Flood, Daniel
Florio, James
Ford, Harold
Fraser, Donald
Gibbons, Sam
96th (1979-1981)

Bingham, Jonathan
Dixon, Julian
Ferraro, Geraldine
Flood, Daniel
Garcia, Robert
Guarini, Frank
Hawkins, Gus
Lehman, William
Mikulski, Barbara
Ottinger, Richard
Roybal, Edward
Solarz, Stephen
Stark, Pete
Stokes, Louis

98th (1983-1985)

Ackerman, Gary
Albosta, Donald
Barnes, Michael
Berman, Howard
Boner, William
Bonior, David
Boxer, Barbara
Brooks, Jack
Carr, Bob
Coelho, Anthony
Conyers, John
Crockett, George
Dixon, Julian
Donnelly, Brian
Dwyer, Bernard
Edgar, Robert
Fazio, Victor
Ferraro, Geraldine
Ford, Harold
Frank, Barney
Gejdenson, Sam
Gray, William
Guarini, Frank
Hawkins, Gus
Howard, James
Kaptur, Marcy
Kastenmeier, Robert
Kennelly, Barbara
Kildee, Dale
LaFalce, John
Lantos, Tom
Lehman, Richard
Lehman, William
Leland, George
Levine, Meldon
Long, Clarence
Matsui, Robert
Mikulski, Barbara
Mineta, Norman
Moody, Jim
Morrison, Bruce
Neal, Stephen
Nowak, Henry
Oakar, Mary
Oberstar, James
Ottinger, Richard
Richardson, William
Rose, Charles
Sabo, Martin
Schroeder, Patricia
Schumer, Charles
Shannon, James
Smith, Lawrence
Solarz, Stephen
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Stokes, Louis
Studds, Gerry
Torricelli, Robert
Weiss, Theodore
Wheat, Alan
Wolpe, Howard
Yates, Sidney

101st
(1989-1990)

Akaka, Daniel
Atkins, Chester
Bates, Jim
Berman, Howard
Boggs, Lindy
Bonior, David
Borski, Robert
Bosco, Douglas
Boxer, Barbara
Brennan, Joseph
Bryant, John
Bustamante, Albert
Campbell, Ben
Cardin, Benjamin
Carper, Thomas
Clay, Bill
Coleman, Ronald
Collins, Cardiss
Conyers, John
Crockett, George
Dixon, Julian
Dwyer, Bernard
Dymally, Mervyn
Edwards, Don
Engel, Eliot
Espy, Albert
Evans, Lane
Fascell, Dante
Fazio, Victor
Flake, Floyd
Florio, James
Foglietta, Thomas
Ford, William
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Garcia, Robert
Gejdenson, Sam
González, Henry
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Hawkins, Gus
Hayes, Philip
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Unsoeld, Jolene
Vento, Bruce
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Walgren, Douglas
Weiss, Theodore
Wheat, Alan
Wolpe, Howard
Yates, Sidney

90th (1967-1969)
- HR 9720: Pre-school Supplementary Education Act

91st (1969-1971)
- HR 4190: Pre-school Supplementary Education Act
- HR 4191: Pre-school Supplementary Education Act
- HR 4314: To amend the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
- HR 13520: To provide comprehensive pre-school education programs in the ---
- Department of Health, Education and Welfare
- HR 19362: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW
- HR 15776: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW

92nd (1971-1973)
- HR 6719: Comprehensive child development program in the Department of HEW
- HR 6748: comprehensive child development program in the Department of HEW
- HR 7333: Comprehensive child development program in the Department of HEW
- HR 7750: Comprehensive child development program in the HEW:
- HR 10952: Comprehensive child development program in the Department of HEW
- HR 7397
- HR 7349: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW
- HR 7353: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW:
- HR 7336: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW
- HR 7355: Compressive child development program in the Department HEW

93rd (1973-1975)
- H.R. 2967: Child and Family Services Act
- H.R. 2970: Child and Family Services Act
- H.R. 2966: Child and Family Services Act
- H.R. 2968: Child and Family Services Act
- H.R. 2969: Child and Family Services Act
- H.R. 3624: Child and Family Services Act
- H.R. 8179: Child and Family Services Act
94th (1975-1977)
   - H.R.1121: Child Care Act of 1979

98th (1983-1985)
   - H.R.1603: A bill to provide an effective and cost-effective program for children in the areas of child welfare, child care, health care, education…Amends the Internal Revenue Code to increase the income tax credit for household and dependent care expenses from 20 percent to a maximum of 50 percent of such expenses. Reduces such percentage by one percent for each full $1,000 by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $10,000.

   H.R.3: Act for Better Child Care Services of 1990
### Appendix D: Binary Logistic Regression Tables

1) US Democrats, 91st and 101st Congresses

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<td>.721 (.971)</td>
<td>1.300 (.946)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
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<td>-1.648* (.768)</td>
<td>-2.541*** (.663)</td>
<td>-1.110*** (.291)</td>
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<td>Ed and Labor Cmte</td>
<td>3.579** (1.259)</td>
<td>3.175** (1.263)</td>
<td>4.019** (1.271)</td>
<td>.808 (.549)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.795*** (2.330)</td>
<td>-.303 (1.011)**</td>
<td>-.272 (.960)*</td>
<td>1.554 (1.360)</td>
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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

Table A.D.1, Binary logistic regression, 91st Congress, US Democrats (Source: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000)
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>-1.534 (1.514)</td>
<td>-1.533 (1.533)</td>
<td>-8.50 (1.350)</td>
<td>1.294 (.947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.265 (.652)</td>
<td>.223 (.651)</td>
<td>-.129 (.558)</td>
<td>-1.900 (1.649)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA Score, 101st</td>
<td>.046 (.012)***</td>
<td>.045*** (.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE Score, 101st</td>
<td>-.004 (.013)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA - COPE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.029** (.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE - ADA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.002 (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-1.75 (.378)</td>
<td>-0.81 (.370)</td>
<td>-1.110*** (.291)</td>
<td>-2.533*** (.663)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed and Labor Cmte</td>
<td>.615 (.611)</td>
<td>.554 (.608)</td>
<td>.808 (.549)</td>
<td>4.020** (1.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-1.327 (1.641)</td>
<td>-1.569 (1.625)</td>
<td>1.554 (1.360)</td>
<td>-2.285 (.960)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.273</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td>.267</td>
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<tr>
<td>N = 275</td>
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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1

Table A.D.2, Binary logistic regression, 101st Congress, US Democrats (Source: Congressional Record, Sharp 2000)
2) Australian Labor Party, 28th and 34th Parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1.905*</td>
<td>(.747)</td>
<td>1.717</td>
<td>(.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>-1.379</td>
<td>(1.132)</td>
<td>-1.601</td>
<td>(.929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/Women’s Ministerial Post</td>
<td>1.855</td>
<td>(1.453)</td>
<td>-21.6</td>
<td>(4.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-2.289***</td>
<td>(.628)</td>
<td>-2.215</td>
<td>(.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td></td>
<td>.132</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 68</td>
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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
Table A.D.3, Binary logistic regression, 28th Parliament, Australian Labor Party (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.809+</td>
<td>(.475)</td>
<td>.717</td>
<td>(.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.772</td>
<td>(1.129)</td>
<td>1.744</td>
<td>(1.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+.122)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+.122)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>-.414</td>
<td>(.655)</td>
<td>-.701</td>
<td>(.929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/Women’s Ministerial Post</td>
<td>-21.3</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
<td>-21.6</td>
<td>(4.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.271</td>
<td>(.387)</td>
<td>-.215</td>
<td>(.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td></td>
<td>.132</td>
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<tr>
<td>N = 83</td>
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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
Table A.D.4, Binary logistic regression, 34th Parliament, Australian Labor Party (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard)
### 3) British Labour Party, 48th and 52nd Parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>-.112 (.492)</td>
<td>-.093 (.497)</td>
<td>.016 (.537)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.961** (.631)</td>
<td>2.514** (.670)</td>
<td>2.541* (1.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>-.985+ (.566)</td>
<td>-.850 (.578)</td>
<td>-.954+ (.570)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/Women’s Ministerial Post</td>
<td>1.858 (1.278)</td>
<td>1.863 (1.273)</td>
<td>1.891 (1.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*Union</td>
<td>-20.1 (28.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*University</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.852 (.527)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-2.221 (.451)**</td>
<td>-2.268*** (.461)</td>
<td>-2.309*** (.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 282</td>
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</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
Table A.D.5, Binary logistic regression, 48th Parliament, British Labour Party (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.137 (.267)</td>
<td>.099 (.270)</td>
<td>.069 (.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.300*** (.250)</td>
<td>1.176*** (.280)</td>
<td>1.001 (.707)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>-.325 (.240)</td>
<td>-.445 (.274)</td>
<td>-.453 (.276)+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/Women’s Ministerial Post</td>
<td>1.658 (1.131)</td>
<td>1.670 (1.127)</td>
<td>1.667 (1.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*Union</td>
<td>.582 (.617)</td>
<td>.578 (.617)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*University</td>
<td></td>
<td>.201 (.748)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.697** (.259)</td>
<td>-.634 (.266)+</td>
<td>-.608* (.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 419</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
Table A.D.6, Binary logistic regression, 52nd Parliament, British Labour Party (Source: Commonwealth of Australia Hansard)
4) Cross-national comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-1.29 (.558)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.961** (.631)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>-.850 (1.350)</td>
<td>1.905* (.747)</td>
<td>-.112 (.492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union/COPE-ADA</td>
<td>-.029** (.09)</td>
<td>-1.379 (1.132)</td>
<td>-.985+ (.566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial/Cmte</td>
<td>.808 (.549)</td>
<td>1.855 (1.453)</td>
<td>1.858 (1.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-1.110*** (.291)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.554 (1.360)</td>
<td>-2.289*** (.628)</td>
<td>-2.221 (.451)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
Table A.D.7, Binary logistic regressions, T1 comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-1.900 (1.649)</td>
<td>1.772 (1.129)</td>
<td>1.300*** (.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1.294 (.947)</td>
<td>.809+ (.475)</td>
<td>.137 (.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union/COPE-ADA</td>
<td>-.002 (.009)</td>
<td>-.414 (.655)</td>
<td>-.325 (.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial/Cmte</td>
<td>4.020** (1.269)</td>
<td>-21.3 (4.1)</td>
<td>1.658 (1.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-2.533*** (.663)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-2.285 (.960)*</td>
<td>-.271 (.387)</td>
<td>-.697** (.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.267</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
Table A.D.8, Binary logistic regressions, T2 comparison