The London School of Economics and Political Science

Ethics, aid, and organisational characteristics: Are multilateral aid organisations more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts?

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December, 2014
Declaration of authorship

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Abstract

The role of ethics in international politics is highly contested. Despite this contestation, there is a widespread assertion that multilateral aid organisations (MLOs) are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than bilateral aid organisations (BLOs). However, this claim has not been systematically established or examined. To address this gap, this thesis first develops a framework for analysing the importance of ethical considerations, and, second, applies it to the introduction of a ‘new’ norm – Women/Gender and Development (WID/GAD) – into three organisations with different organisational characteristics: UNDP, EC/EU and ODA/DFID, using the method of comparative heuristic case studies. The analysis aims to establish the extent to which norm integration was driven by ethical considerations, and if this was influenced by organisational characteristics. The thesis finds that ethical considerations played a minor role in all organisations, suggesting that organisations as such are generally not likely to be driven by ethical considerations. However, the analysis also finds that people within the organisations seemed likely to be driven by ethical considerations, and, when given the freedom, power, and resources to act, they could drive norm integration and have their ethical commitments reflected at organisational-level. The level of freedom, power, and resources of these individuals was significantly influenced by organisational characteristics. Specifically, characteristics typical of MLOs are found to provide a restrictive environment, while characteristics typical of BLOs, if combined with a committed decision-maker, provide an enabling environment for committed actors to drive norm integration. However, BLOs are volatile and, without a committed decision-maker, are likely to take no action at all on a new norm. MLOs, due to their high susceptibility to scrutiny, are more likely to always take some action on a new norm – just not action driven by ethical considerations. These findings question MLOs’ claim to substantive moral legitimacy and provide a potential explanation for weak integration of WID/GAD in many development organisations.
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Acknowledgements

I would have never been able to start, let alone complete, this thesis without the support, encouragement, and seemingly limitless patience of my husband, Adam. (Thank you for believing in me, especially in moments when I did not!). A special “thank you” also goes to my supervisors, Prof. Kimberly Hutchings and Dr. Kirsten Ainley for being the best supervisors anyone could ever dream of!! Their responsiveness, continuous support, and relentless encouragement for me to think, think, and think again made this journey a true pleasure.

Last, but not least, I would like thank my parents Barbara and Hans for always being up for a Skype chat when I needed a break but also for understanding when I needed to be left in peace to think and write. Without our daily ‘elevenes’ the last three years would have been so much more lonely! Very last, these acknowledgements would not be complete without a special thanks to my little dog, Schnitzel, who stuck by me through this entire process, mostly sleeping at my feet. His gentle snores were – while, admittedly, not inspiring – a true comfort.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The role of ethics and morality in international politics is widely contested in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Indeed, some IR theorists suggest that “morality is mostly a myth…a cover for self-interest” and “a product of power” (Jack Donnelly quoted in Lumsdaine 1993, p. 8), while others claim that “moral convictions can have real effects, even in international politics” (Pogge 2008, p. 217). Some scholars, especially those rooted in international political theory, go deeper and question the dichotomous relationship between ethics and morality on the one hand, and self-interest on the other, extending the debate to the foundations and meaning of ethics.

This thesis is not an attempt to engage in the complex debate on the foundations and meanings of ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ – this is being done elsewhere. Instead, the aim here is a different one: using Hutchings’s ‘common sense’ definition of ‘ethics’ as referring to “codes of behaviours or sets of values that set out what is right or wrong to do within a particular context” (Hutchings 2010, p. 5), this thesis aims to examine the extent to which ethical considerations – considerations of ‘doing the right thing’ – matter in international politics. In other words, this thesis makes no judgement on whether particular ethical considerations are right or wrong in any absolute sense, but rather aims to examine the extent to which claims about rightness or wrongness matter in international politics. Such an endeavour, it is proposed and substantiated in Chapter Two, does not require a substantive definition of what ‘doing the right thing’ is, and thus, does not necessitate a detailed engagement with the foundations and substantive meaning of ‘ethics’, while still allowing for an examination of the role of ethical considerations.

Having said that, this thesis does take one substantive normative stance. Following Alexander Wendt, pure self-interest considerations are seen as opposed to ethical considerations, because they are defined “without regard to the other – who will

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1 Hutchings notes that it is contested within the literature whether a distinction should be made between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ (Hutchings 2010, p. 8). For the purpose of this thesis there is no reason to distinguish between the two terms and, for simplicity, I will mostly refer to ‘ethics’ unless quoting someone else’s work.

2 See for example (Hutchings 1999); (Hutchings 2010); (Pogge and Moellendorf 2008).
instead be viewed as an object to be manipulated for the gratification of the self” (Wendt 1995, p. 52).

Understood as such, various scholars have made an additional specific claim regarding the role of ethics in international politics. They have argued that, while states may be driven by strategic or self-interest considerations, International Organisations (IOs) are more likely to be guided by ethical considerations3 (Sikkink and Finnemore 2001; Kickbusch 2000; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2001; Park 2006; Grigorescu 2002; Finnemore 1996; True and Mintrom 2001). Others, in contrast, are adamant that IOs are purely driven by self-interest considerations, strategic calculation, or do not, in fact, have any independent agency vis-à-vis states at all (Mearsheimer 1994; Abott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984/2005; Pierson 1996).

Thus, both types of claims – general claims about the role of ethics in international politics, and specific claims about the way ethics impacts on the behaviour of IOs – are highly contested (see section 1.2 below). Moreover, both remain under-researched in IR. It is the aim of this thesis to tackle these shortcomings by engaging in-depth with the question of whether ethical considerations – considerations of doing the ‘right thing’ – matter in international politics, and if the extent to which they matter is different in international organisations as opposed to bilateral organisations. To address these general questions, the thesis focuses on one specific issue area: international development aid. It, thus, poses the following research question: Are multilateral development aid organisations more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts?

The reason for the focus on international development aid is three-fold. First, the role of ethics in aid has been particularly contested across different academic disciplines and yet, it has proven to be a particularly hard case that even sceptics of ethics have been struggling with. While the idealist scholar Lumsdaine insists that development

3 This thesis employs a formal definition of International Organisations (Snidal and Thompson 2000) and uses the following definition used by the OECD that understands International Organizations to be “entities established by formal political agreements between their members that have the status of international treaties; their existence is recognised by law in their member countries; they are not treated as resident institutional units of the countries in which they are located” (OECD 2014b).
aid cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of ethics (Lumsdaine 1993) even Hans Morgenthau concedes that “of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid” (Morgenthau 1962, p. 301). Thus, if ethics matters at all in the international politics in general and in the behaviour of IOs specifically, it should matter in the area of development aid, as this is widely acknowledged, even by realist scholars, to be difficult to explain by reference only to the national interest of states. And, as the aim of this thesis is not to examine whether ethics matters to a great extent in many contexts in international politics, but, rather more modestly, to explore whether it does matter to some extent in some contexts, and, if so, which circumstances are particularly conducive to this, the issue area of development aid seems particularly appropriate for this endeavour.

Second, the issue of development aid has not yet been widely explored by IR scholars although it might provide critical insights into the nature of international politics. This potential is rooted in the fact that, despite numerous attempts at studying motivations for aid, to date, no empirical model of aid allocation has managed to sufficiently explain all aid allocations (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Hattori 2001; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Trumbull and Wall 1994). Leading development aid scholar, Carol Lancaster, notably admits that she does not “have a model (to explain development aid)…There are too many interacting variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and insightful” (Lancaster 2007, p. 210). This sentiment has been echoed by Bauer (Bauer 1984) and, most recently, by Van der Veen (Van der Veen 2011) who states that development aid “presents a uniquely interesting issue area for testing competing IR theories. In other areas…the scope for different beliefs about the goals of a particular policy is often narrower” (Van der Veen 2011, p. 13).

Third, as will be seen below, the assertion that international organisations present a particularly good context for ethical considerations to matter is even more strongly pronounced in the literature on international development. Yet this claim has also not been systematically established or analysed.
This Chapter first substantiates the key claims made above in detail, thereby illustrating the relevance of this thesis. It establishes that (1) the role of ethics is a highly contested issue in IR; (2) that some scholars have taken the role of ethics seriously and claim to have established that it is an important force in IR; and (3) that many of these claims suggest that IOs provide particularly conducive environments for moral norms to emerge and diffuse. The Chapter further shows that none of these claims have been systematically, or with sufficient depth, substantiated. Second, the Chapter narrows the literature review to the issue area of international development aid, while expanding the scholarly focus to the fields of political economy and development studies. It shows that, indeed, the same assertions are equally widespread and under-researched in these contexts.

Last, the Chapter outlines the thesis structure to show how the research question will be answered and summarises its key findings, which show that the thesis finds no support for the simplistic assertion that multilateral organisations provide a better enabling environment for ethical considerations to matter than bilateral organisations. Indeed, the cases suggest that organisations per se are generally unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations – it is people within them that may be. If committed people in organisations are given the freedom and power to act on their ethical commitments, norm integration is likely to be driven by these individuals’ ethical beliefs and is likely to be reflected as such at the organisational-level. Specific characteristics most typical of bilateral aid organisations – cultural homogeneity, few decision-makers, and open mandates – if combined with a committed top-level decision-maker, make bilateral organisations more likely to provide such freedom and power; while characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations – cultural diversity and multi-member decision-making – are likely to reduce the freedom and power of committed staff.

However, bilateral organisations are also very volatile with frequently changing priorities and top-leadership, and if they do not include a committed decision-maker or have a closed mandate they are likely to take highly limited or no action at all on a norm, while multilateral organisations – because of the same organisational characteristics that reduce the freedom and power of committed actors, and if
combined with an open mandate and high-levels of susceptibility to scrutiny – are likely to always take some kind of action on a new norm.

In short, bilateral organisations either feature strong norm integration driven by ethical considerations or next-to-no norm integration at all, while multilateral organisations are likely to take some kind of action on a norm but this action is likely not to be coherent or comprehensive and will most probably be driven by reputational concerns rather than ethical considerations.

1.1 The contested role of ethics in International Relations

Some scholars, particularly those rooted in the realist tradition, assert that ethics or morality is always trumped by power or self-interest in international politics (Donnelly 2008). As mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, Donnelly claims that “morality is mostly a myth…a cover for self-interest” (Jack Donnelly quoted in Lumsdaine 1993, p. 8) and E.H. Carr has famously stated that, “in the international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less” (Carr 1964, p. 8). Even if moral discourse or ethical arguments feature to some extent in international politics, these are seen as instruments used purely for the attainment of power: “The search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to facilitate the attainment of power” (Spykman 1942, p. 18).

Others allow for a, albeit highly limited, role of ethics in international politics; one that constitutes “the outer limits of permissible behaviour but little else” (Hutchings 1999, p. 16). Yet despite this nuance, there is an underlying doubt about “the notion that moral principle has the power to control politics over time…political realism focuses attention on the principles or forces which underlie non-moral motivation” (Hutchings 1999, p. 17). Thus, in short, in the words of Jack Donnelly ‘Realism entails an “exclusion of morality from politics”’ (Jack Donnelly quoted in Lumsdaine 1993, p. 8).
Apart from realism, also other IR theories are highly sceptical about whether or not ethics can play an independent role in international politics. Notably, Andrew Hurrell concludes in his book *On Global Order* that,

> While the density of international society has undoubtedly increased, the elements of deformity have remained all too prominent…It is so say that this (international) society remains deeply contaminated by power and that the political theorists can only ignore the persistence of this structural contamination at the cost of idealisation. (Hurrell 2007, p. 305)

Radmila Nakarada concurs when she states that,

> Exposing the inconsistencies between the normative, rhetorical and practical performance of global capitalism has no preventative or transformative capacity. The forces of power have proven to be immune to such exposure; revelations have had no serious political consequences; moral indignation has had very limited reach…expecting effects from revealing the inconsistencies between the rhetorical and practical would imply that the global structures of power are erected on different principles than they really are; that paradoxes, pain, unnecessary deaths of men, women, and children mean something; and that the system can be shocked or shamed into generosity and solidarity. It would mean that one is appealing to a sense of justice that does not rule our word. (Nakaranda 2000, p. 68)

Yet on the other end of the spectrum scholars, such as Charles Beitz, have “challenged the realist paradigm by arguing that there are substantive moral principles that meaningfully address questions of international affairs, and that the formulation of foreign policy is intrinsically a domain of moral choice” (Charsles Beitz quoted in McElroy 1992, p. 4). Others, like Thomas Pogge have gone even further and claimed that “…moral convictions can have real effects even in international politics” (Pogge 2008, p. 217). Thus, the role of ethics is indeed highly contested in IR.
1.2 Constructivist claims on the role of ethics in norm emergence and diffusion

One approach to IR that has paid most rigorous attention to the role of ideas and ideational factors, including ethics or ‘norms’ in international politics is social constructivism.

Although norms are not necessarily bound up with moral or ethical ideas, as they are frequently defined as, “standard(s) of appropriate behaviour of actors with a given identity” some definitions do include a distinct sense of ‘oughtness’ or explicit reference to moral standards (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 892). James Fearon for instance argues that “social norms take the generic form of “Good people do (or do not do) X in situations A, B, C” because “we typically do not consider a rule of conduct to be a social norm unless a shared moral assessment is attached to its observance or non-observance” (Quoted in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 892).

Moreover, a lot of empirical work on norms by constructivist scholars deals with norms that are considered ‘good’ or ‘progressive’ and much research focuses on complex ethical questions such as human rights, humanitarian intervention, migration, sanctions, and – albeit to a limited extent – international development aid (Price 2008b; Crawford 2002; Park and Vetterlein 2010a; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Reus-Smit 1999, 2011). Thus, although this work mostly does not engage in detailed theorising on the “ethical desirability” of the norms in question or provide any sufficiently sound attempt to establish that ethical considerations about the value of the norm drive norm integration processes (Price 2008a, p. 317), as will be discussed later, there is a strong assumption underlying this work that the norms under discussion are in fact, distinctly based on “propositions about what is good and right” and that norm integration is driven by these considerations (Crawford 2002, p. 89).

This is so much so that it has been claimed that, “as a research programme, constructivism has established that moral norms – and thus ethics – matter in international relations” (Price 2008a, p. 317). Indeed, much work that focuses on the ‘life cycle’ of norms, in other words the emergence and spread of norms in the international sphere, suggests that the ‘moral’ quality of norms plays an important
role in these processes. Notably, Finnemore and Sikking argue that the first step in their “Cascade Model”, *norm emergence* – the point at which an idea is taken up by a sufficient number of actors to quality as being based on a ‘shared moral assessment’ – is driven by norm entrepreneurs who are motivated by “altruism, empathy, ideational commitment” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 898).

Others, such as Neta Crawford’s work in *Argument and Change in World Politics* go further and claim that the moral quality of norms is a critical factor that facilitates their spread across the international sphere, a process frequently referred to as ‘norm diffusion’, and that, working through normative persuasion, norms can affect outcomes in international politics (Crawford 2002). Similarly, Richard Price asserts in *Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Lands Mines* that “the role of moral persuasion…(is) particularly crucial” (Price 1998, p. 616) in explaining the adoption of a norm to prohibit land mines in international law. Martha Finnemore also dedicates a chapter of her book *National Interest in International Society* to analysing how the anti-poverty norm, as an addition to the norm on international development aid, emerged and spread (Finnemore 1996, chapter 4). She finds that this process was to a significant extent driven by ethical considerations as she points to the instrumental role played by the, then, President of the World Bank McNamara who, according to her, “…believed that aid was a moral obligation of rich nations and that it could and did work. He was an internationalist driven by internationalist morality and optimism” (Finnemore 1996, p. 104). This lead to the norm to become a “defining feature of development” as, at the end of the process described by her, “everyone involved in development was talking, writing, and structuring policies about poverty issues” (Finnemore 1996, p. 97).

Similarly, Risse, Roppe, and Sikkink conclude in their in-depth study of norm integration in *The Power of Human Rights* that “…moral consciousness-raising is necessary to ensure enduring human rights change” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, p. 256). Hulme and Fukudu-Parr’s study on *International Norm Dynamics and the End of Poverty*, argues that moral convictions significantly contributed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) being widely taken up as the leading framework for development aid (Hulme and Fukudu-Parr 2009). Donnelly, in his contribution to Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, *Restructuring World Politics* states that
his analysis of a global debt cancellation campaign carried out by Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANS) shows that NGO’s persistent lobby efforts framed in terms of “moral demands” helped to “…account for…verbal commitments to the need for multilateral debt reduction in mid-1994” (Donnelly 2001, p. 175). Susan Burgerman contends that “moral conviction” and “moral outrage” have significantly contributed to states cooperating to promote human rights (Burgerman 2001, p. 6) and Ann Marie Clark emphasises the importance of “moral leverage” used by NSA to strengthen legal human rights norms (Clark 2001, p. 30).

The above shows that much constructivist work asserts that norms, understood as having an ethical dimension, play a significant role in international politics precisely because of this ethical dimension. This finding is also echoed by Barnett and Sikkink who states that, “Constructivist investigations of states policies and of international society argue that they are shaped by deep beliefs, including ethical or moral beliefs about the purpose of the state, humanitarianism, and justice” (Barnett and Sikkink 2008, p. 69). Does this mean that Richard Price’s claim – that constructivism has shown that ‘ethics matters’ in international politics – is justified? If so, might constructivism have also shown that ethics matters more or less in specific organisational contexts, making my thesis superfluous? The next section turns to this.

The promise and limits of current constructivist work on ethics in norm emergence and diffusion

Despite the fact that much of constructivist work claims to have established the importance of ethical considerations in international politics, some scholars have questioned these attempts due to their lack of ‘normative theorising to establish the ethical desirability of the norms in question. Reus-Smit makes this point very clearly when he states that constructivist scholars “must take seriously the need to match the rigor of their empirical analysis of normative politics with an equally rigorous defence of their implicit normative agenda…” (Reus-Smit 2002, p. 504).

This critique certainly limits the constructivist contribution to the study of moral progress in international politics. However, as already stated in the introduction, this
is not the aim of this thesis. The aim here is to study whether ethical considerations – considerations of ‘doing the right thing’ – have any weight at all in international politics, and whether this is more or less likely in certain organisational contexts. No judgement is made on whether particular ethical considerations are right or wrong in any absolute sense. Understood as such, I propose that constructivist approaches, despite their lack of normative theorising, lend themselves very well to the study of ethical considerations. This is so for the following two reasons:

First, constructivism takes ideas and ideational factors seriously, allowing for the study of ethics and ethical considerations. Second, constructivist scholars frequently study processes of norm integration. Both factors make constructivist approaches apt for the endeavour in this thesis because (as its explained in detail in Chapter Two and Three) a careful study of norm integration processes, allows for an examination of the importance of ethical considerations.

In other words, it is suggested that an examination of norm integration processes enables an analysis of which drivers – ethical considerations or others – drive these processes without requiring a solid normative defence of the absolute ‘rightness’ of a certain value. All that is examined is whether or not ethical considerations dominantly drive the integration of the norm - not the ‘ethicality’ of the norm itself. Thus, constructivist approaches, due to their focus on norm integration, lend themselves very well to the study of ethical considerations.

However, despite this potential to shed light on the role of ethical considerations, constructivist work on norms has one critical limitation: most work pays insufficient attention to different drivers of norm integration (see Chapter Two for detail). This seriously limits the plausibility of existing constructivist claims on the role of ethics in norm integration. The work frequently refers to ‘persuasion’ as a key process in norm integration but does not sufficiently distinguish between different drivers of persuasion such as shaming, practical and scientific arguments, or ethical arguments and ethical considerations. This lack of distinction makes the work inapt to actually establish whether or not ethical considerations mattered in a particular instance. Thus, although offering the conceptual potential for the study of ethics, constructivist scholarship has not done enough to be able to claim that it has established that ethics
matters. This means that the aim of my research – to understand whether or not ethical considerations drive behaviour in international politics and whether or not this is more likely in certain organisational contexts – is not superfluous. On the contrary, it is relevant and has the potential to significantly contribute to current theorising on the role of ethical considerations in norm integration.

**International Organisations as norm facilitators**

The role and nature of IOs is highly contested in IR. Notably, a number of prominent theories, such as neorealist and neoliberal approaches question whether IOs have any independent agency at all. Based on a state-centric ontology of IR and a “definition of the problem as one of getting exogenously given egoists to cooperate” they are highly sceptical about international organisations as actors in their own right (Wendt 1994, p. 1). Neorealists tend to view international organisations as not “worthy of explanation…. (and) have no place for IOs in their model…international outcomes are determined by state power and interest alone…IOs are not important arenas within which states interact, and IOs are certainly not autonomous actors in their own right” (Nielson and Tierney 2003, p. 244). Hutchings concurs when she states that,

Realism is highly sceptical of the virtues and efficacy of international institutions and even more so of political cosmopolitanism. Not only is there no basis for political authority above and beyond that agreement of states in the international sphere, but also international institutions based on internationalist or cosmopolitan legitimations are regarded suspiciously as an idealistic coating of the real pursuit of underlying state interests. (Hutchings 1999, p. 23)

For neoliberalists, on the other hand, “IOs do matter, but they matter only as structural constraints on state behaviour, not as autonomous actors.” (Nielson and Tierney 2003, p. 244)

This limited view of international organisations has been seriously challenged,
particular by constructivist scholars. Notably, Barnett and Finnemore have argued that IOs,

...have authority, autonomy, and agency, and are political creatures that have effects similar to the effects of other authority-bearing actors, including states. The impact of IOs is not limited to the functions assigned to them by states and the regulation of already existing state interests. (Barnett and Sikkink 2008, p. 71)

Referring to a number of other constructivist IR scholars Park strongly reinforces this point when she states that research has shown that,

IOs operate within and across all aspects of international relations and act not only as forums for states’ interests but also as instigators of change in areas as diverse as development...IOs formulate and implement policies that cannot be described as the simple product of interstate bargaining. (Park 2006, pp. 111-112)

In fact some research suggests that IOs may actually “operate in ways not intended by the states that establish them” (Park 2004, p. 80).

In addition to general claims about the role and nature of IOs, constructivist scholars also frequently make another assertion: they suggest that norms are particularly likely to emerge and diffuse in IOs. Most notably, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that “international organizations ‘teach’ states new norms of behaviour” (Sikkink and Finnemore 2001, p. 401). This claim has been echoed by other scholars such as Boli and Thomas and Adler and Barnett. (Boli and Thomas 1999; Barnett and Adler 1998). Indeed, Kickbusch explicitly asserts that, “States were ‘taught’ by the WHO that a national health policy was part and parcel of modernization and that the organization would advise countries on how to go about establishing such a policy” (Kickbusch 2000, p. 981). In a review article of constructivist research, Finnemore and Sikkink establish that a lot of work suggests that “International Organizations are effective agents of social construction...” (Sikkink and Finnemore 2001, p. 401).

Others argue that IOs provide opportunity structures for norm emergence and diffusion. Grigorescu notably asserts that “One of the main mechanisms through which IOs contribute to domestic change is through the transmission of norms” (Grigorescu 2002, p. 467) and Khagram, Riker and Sikkink state that, “Most often
states work together to make norms in the context of international organizations” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2001, p. 14). Indeed, Park, in her overview of constructivist work on norm emergences finds that, in this literature IOs play the role of “norms diffusers or transmitters within the international realm” (Park 2006, p. 343).

Some scholars further suggest that IOs, due to their structural set-up as multilateral agencies, provide space for more honest policy deliberation, and are more readily believed to be driven by moral motives. Risse makes this point in “Lets Argue!” He states that “International institutions create a normative framework structuring interaction in a given issue-area. They often serve as arenas in which international policy deliberation can take place” (Risse 2000, p. 15). Similarly, Martha Finnemore alludes to a special property of multilateral organisations, in National Interests in International Society, as she states that “..the fact that the Bank was a multilateral entity created less suspicion about its moral and humanitarian motives than might have been applied to similar actions by a single powerful state” (Finnemore 1996, p. 125). Fukudu Parr, and True and Mintrom make similar claims in their work on poverty-focused development, and gender equality promotion (Hulme and Fukudu-Parr 2009; True and Mintrom 2001). Thus, there is indeed a widespread assertion that IOs provide a particularly fertile ground for norm emergence and diffusion.

The above has established that, although the role and nature of IOs in IR is highly contested, some scholars persistently claim that IOs have independent agency and, indeed, provide a particularly fertile ground for norm emergence and diffusions. It is these claims that I am interested in. How strong are they? The next section shows that there are significant limitations in these claims, further illustrating the relevance of this thesis and pointing to an additional key contribution that this research can make to IR theorising.
The limits of claims about the impact of organisational characteristics on ethical considerations

Many scholars referred to above do not further substantiate or attempt to explain their claims that norm emergence and integration are more likely in IOs. For instance, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink state that, “…states work together to make norms in the context of international organizations” without further elaborating on this claim (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2001, p. 14). Kickbusch and Fukudu Parr similarly do not theorise about why IOs might be ‘better’ at moral norm emergence and diffusion (Kickbusch 2000; Hulme and Fukudu-Parr 2009).

Other studies present international organisations as wedged between transnational advocacy networks, where norms are said to be first taken-up, and states, who are the end-target for norm advocacy (Park 2011; Nelson 2001; Khagram 2001). While this work describes in some detail why Transnational Advocacy Networks are well-placed to act as norm promoters – ranging from their expertise, their domestic political constituency to their frequent representation of southern views – the work only hints on reasons for why international organisations are seen to play a particular role, including material resources, expertise, and international standing of (certain) international organisations (Nelson 2001, p. 9).

Having said that, some accounts do provide some suggestions as to which particular characteristics may make international organisations particularly apt for moral norm integration. For example, Leon, in his study on the establishment of international structures to combat HIV/AIDS, states that it was UNAIDS’s outreach, expertise, access to policy-makers, resources, and open membership that made it well-placed for norm promotion. This argument is echoed by True and Mintrom who stress the UN’s outreach and expertise as important factors in making it an important player in the promotion of gender equality (True and Mintrom 2001). Risse in “Let’s Argue” suggests that international institutions, including IOs, are most apt to facilitate policy deliberation if they are “non-hierarchical and network-like international institutions characterized by a high density of mostly informal interactions should provide the structural conditions in international relations to allow for discursive and argumentative processes” (Risse 2000, p. 15). Yet, none of these claims are
elaborated on, let alone examined in any way, and therefore remain under-researched and un-substantiated.

Four accounts that come closest to developing a theory on organisational characteristics and norm integration are Martha Finnemore’s, Antje Vetterlein’s, Miller’s, and Hafner and Pollack’s work (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000; Finnemore 1996; Miller 1998; Vetterlein 2010). Notably, Martha Finnemore claims in *National Interests in International Society* that the World Bank was effective at norm creation, promotion, and integration due to its organisational structure. Notably, she states that,

Under Robert McNamara, the Bank’s influence, its visibility, and its credibility among development experts made it an effective proselytizer for poverty concerns. Its organisational structure was particularly important in this case. (Finnemore 1996, pp. 90-91)…The Bank’s ability to do this stemmed from a combination of prestige and power. In addition, the fact that the Bank was a multilateral entity created less suspicion about its moral and humanitarian motives than might have been applied to similar actions by a single powerful state. (Finnemore 1996, p. 125)

In short, Finnemore argues that it was the Bank’s high levels of expertise, it being perceived as impartial and autonomous by other global actors, and its ample financial resources that made it effective at norm development, promotion, and integration.

Vetterlein argues in her study on the IMF that what determines an organisation’s likelihood of integrating a norm are five organisational features: the organisation’s original mandate; its organisational structure with its set of rules, regulations, operational procedures, and departments; informal regulations that emerge through daily interactions of staff; the professional profile of staff; and the organisation’s autonomy from its member states. Out of the five, staff profile, in particular the congruence between a new norm and already existing beliefs among staff, is highlighted as especially important. Notably, she finds that “staff who consist of economists trained in conservative economic theory were not interested in pursuing social issues” (Vetterlein 2010, p. 95). McNeil and St. Clair concur with this claim (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 811).
The third noteworthy attempt at developing a theory on organisational characteristics and norm integration developed by Miller is based on insights developed by Kardam. Miller’s framework suggests that three factors influence how organisations integrate, in her case, the norm of gender equality in development cooperation. She suggests that the three most important factors are (1) vulnerability to external pressure; (2) proximity of the organisation’s mandate to gender equality; (3) presence and capacity of gender advocates within the organisation (Miller 1998). These factors are subsequently applied to in-depth case studies of the integration of gender equality into the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. The study finds, indeed, that all three factors influenced if, how, and to what extent gender equality was taken up by the organisations.

Along the same lines, Hafner and Pollack suggest in their work on *Mainstreaming Gender in Global Governance* that the timing and the extent to which the norm of gender mainstreaming is taken up by IOs is influenced by three factors: (1) the organisation’s political opportunity structure; (2) the fit of the organisation’s mandate with the norm; and (3) the organisation’s capacity for implementation (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000). This framework is applied to the integration of gender mainstreaming into UNDP and the World Bank. While the first two characteristics are discussed in detail and the work claims to show, as does Miller’s, that both played a role in influencing how gender mainstreaming was integrated into the organisations, the last characteristics is not described in sufficient detail, let alone examined in the case studies.

Thus, overall, the frameworks suggest that the organisational characteristics that make IOs ‘good’ at norm development and integration are high levels of expertise, perceived impartiality, financial resources, staff profile, open opportunity structures, and congruence between the organisation’s profile and a specific norm.

However, none of the work provides a comparison between IOs and state-based organisations and, indeed, most of these characteristics listed as critical are not limited to international organisations. The only characteristics mentioned above that are more typical of IOs than state-based organisations – impartiality and autonomy –
are not examined in any systematic way by either scholar. Indeed, they are merely stated as important. Thus, the work does not provide arguments that substantiate or refute the asserted facilitating role for ethical considerations of IOs per se. Moreover, a number of suggested factors that influence organisation’s likelihood of taking up a norm, such as the organisation’s mandate fit or an organisation’s capacity for norm integration, are, in my view, indicators of norm uptake rather than influential causal factors. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Ten.

The available work, therefore, does not provide a coherent or well-specified theory on what characteristics might make IOs better at moral norm emergence and diffusion than bilateral organisations. Combined with the limitations relating to the work’s ability to measure the extent to which ethical considerations actually drive norm integration, it seems fair to conclude that constructivist scholars have not provided a satisfactory answer as to whether ethics matters in international politics and, if so, whether it matters more in IOs than in bilateral organisations.

1.3 Narrowing the focus: The claimed ‘ethicality’ of multilateral development organisations

This section shows that the issue area of development aid is particularly well suited to the study of ethics in general and the role of IOs within it because motives for aid giving, although highly disputed, frequently include ethical considerations. Moreover, some scholarly work on development aid includes strong claims that multilateral development organisations (MDOs) are more guided by ethical motives than their bilateral counterparts. These claims, however, have not been sufficiently examined.

Although there are numerous explanations for why countries give development aid most scholarly accounts of aid engage in a debate of whether or not – and if so, to what extent – aid is driven by ethical considerations (Lumsdaine 1993; Lancaster 2007; McNeill and St. Clair 2009; Singer 1984; Morgenthau 1962; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Hattori 2001; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003; Akonor 2007; Hout 1991; Frey and Schneider 1986; Rowe 1978). Usually posited against aid driven by self-interest, much of this work
suggests that at least some aid – albeit, often a very small proportion – is driven by ethical considerations. Yet, the picture that emerges is highly complex, and indeed, many theorists suggest that motivations for aid are continuously changing, calling this the “pendulum of aid” (Riddell 2007, p. 92). Notably Pratt talks about a “continued battle between development, political and commercial interests with different interests gaining or losing ground in different time periods” (Pratt quoted in Riddell 2007, p. 97). Those that suggest that aid is largely motivated by ethical considerations do, in Akonor’s words, “when pushed, generally admit that their calls for intervention are self-serving and not purely altruistic” (Akonor 2007, p. 1073), while others insist that strategic interests similarly fail to explain all aid (Lumsdaine 1993). The most convincing accounts suggest that aid motivations vary from country to country and across time depending on the dominant perception, or “frames” of what the purpose of aid should be at any given time in any given country (Van der Veen 2011). In any case, the above suffices to show that the role of ethical considerations in aid is an important component of debates on aid, is highly contested, and very much on-going, making this issue area an interesting focus for the study of the role of ethical considerations in organisational decision-making.

In addition, the claim suggesting that IOs present a particularly good context for ethical considerations to matter is even more strongly pronounced in the issue area of international development. Many scholars suggest that multilateral aid is more likely to be guided by a focus on recipient needs, poverty alleviation, and overall more “humanitarian”, “moral” or “ethical” concerns than bilateral aid. Importantly, this is not to say that this point is undisputed, as various scholars, particularly those rooted post-colonialism, are highly critical of the possibility of ‘ethical aid’ in general, and the ethicality of (certain) multilateral organisations in particular (McEwan 2009; Chossudovsky 2003). However, the claim is remarkably widespread across various other types of literature, as illustrated by the quotations below,

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4 According to the OECD, multilateral ODA is a contribution made to a recipient institution that: conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development; is an international agency, institution, or organisation whose members are governments, or a fund managed autonomously by such an agency; pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets. Multilateral ODA includes both assessed and voluntary un-earmarked contributions. See DAC Statistical Reporting Directives in (OECD 2011, p. 21).
...aid channelled through the UN and other multilateral organizations is likely to have a stronger moral element than bilateral aid. (Singer 1984, p. 15)

International development organizations share a moral purpose: the reduction of poverty. (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 47)

Most authors seem to agree that multilateral giving will be different than bilateral aid. They suggest that multilateral aid will in itself be…more humanitarian in orientation. (Hawkins et al. 2006, p. 114)

It (multilateral aid) has long been favoured over bilateral aid because it is widely viewed as…more likely to be channelled to recipients on the basis of need, and with fewer conditions attached.” (Riddell 2007, p. 77)

…preferential allocations in favour of African countries by the multilateral aid agencies are more likely to reflect concern for the development needs of the poorest developing countries. (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, p. 886)

The bilateral donor’s emphasis on its own security needs, while doubtless ensuring some aid, may well not serve the developmental priorities of the recipient…By contrast, multilaterals are…more exclusively concerned with development. (Cassen 1994, p. 216)

The limits of current work on ethics, aid, and organisational structure

Despite the widespread assertion that ethical considerations matter more in MDOs than in BDOs, this claim has not been systematically analysed or substantiated. This is so for the same reasons noted above that limit constructivist work on norms in general. These are (1) aid driven by ethical considerations is measured by employing substantive measurements (eg. aid given to countries with low GDP/capita) without sufficient theoretical engagement with how appropriate these measurements are and (2) under-researched claims regarding organisational structure.
i. Limited theoretical engagement with appropriate measurements of aid driven by ‘ethical considerations’

Quantitative research on aid motivations usually employs substantive measurements of ‘ethical aid’ without any theoretical engagement with the concept of ‘ethics’ or ‘ethical considerations’, and even without any discussion, let alone, defence of the specific measurements employed. Notably, Schraeder, Hook and Taylor measure aid motivated by ethical considerations as aid that aims to “alleviate the suffering of those in distress” (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, p. 303). The extent to which these considerations drive aid is assessed by analysing the amount of aid allocated based on “humanitarian need”, which, in turn, is simply measured by looking at average life expectancy and a caloric intake of the target population (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, p. 298). The authors do not offer any discussion or defence of employing such a simplistic substantive measurement to establish ‘humanitarian need’.

Similarly, another prominent scholar, Neumayer, uses McKinlay and Little’s distinction between the ‘foreign policy view’ and the ‘humanitarian view’ of aid where the ‘humanitarian view’ of aid is defined as aid motivated by ethical considerations and assessed by an examination of aid allocation based on ‘recipient need’ (McKinlay 1977). ‘Recipient need’ is measured by looking at GDP per capita and ratings on the Physical Quality of Life Index (Neumayer 2003, p. 52). The appropriateness of this measurement is not discussed, let alone defended. Alesina and Dollar look at aid as either motivated by “strategic interest” or by a “moral vision”. The latter is understood as “recipient poverty” and measured by examining the amount of aid allocated to countries with low real per capita income (Alesina and Dollar 2000, p. 35). Trumbull and Wall define aid driven by “recipient well being”, as aid allocated to countries with low per capita income and high infant mortality rates (Trumbull and Wall 1994, p. 879). By doing so, these contributions make two implicit assertions that are not defended and, most frequently, not even acknowledged as potential points for contestation. First, they implicitly assert that aid can only be said to be motivated by ethical considerations if it is allocated based on the absolute needs of the target population. Second, they assume that these needs
can be measured by looking at broad and highly contested measurements, such as per capita income or average life expectancy.

Others, such as Easterly and Williamson use more sophisticated definitions of aid driven by ‘good’ or ‘ethical’ considerations, including an examination of the level of aid agency transparency, overhead costs, effective delivery, and allocation to less corrupt and more democratic countries (Easterly 2011, p. 1930). However, none of the measurements are discussed and certainly not defended as appropriate measurements for aid driven by ethical considerations. Easterly and Williamson simply state that their measurements are “derived from what practices the donors themselves, outside aid monitors, and the academic literature suggest agencies should follow” (Easterly 2011, p. 1930).

These simplistic accounts and lack of conceptual engagement with, and justification for, measurements of aid driven by ethical considerations are problematic. This is particularly so, as it is, in fact, highly contested what aid driven by ethical considerations should ‘look like’. This issue has been subject to very sophisticated debates in political philosophy, frequently framed around questions of ‘global justice’ (Pogge 2008b). These complex debates strongly suggest that simply using a substantive measurement of ‘ethical aid’, such as aid allocated to countries with low GDP per capita without defending it, or even without any kind of conceptual engagement with it, as is done by much quantitative work reviewed above, is problematic and insufficient to establish the actual extent to which ethical considerations drive aid organisations.

ii. Unjustified claims on the impact of organisational characteristics in the literature

Similarly to the constructivist work reviewed above, quantitative work comparing multilateral and bilateral aid also does not sufficiently assess what specific organisational characteristics of IOs might make them more likely to be driven by ethical considerations. Indeed, the majority of work does not provide any explanations for this asserted ‘ethicality’. Those that do, base their explanations largely on the simple fact that multilateral organisations are composed of more than one state, but do not examine or test this assertion in any way. Hattori notably states
that, “as a collective practice, multilateral aid obscures the identity of the donors, thus undermining the presumption of...strategic intent” (Hattori 2001, p. 644). Henry Cabot Lodge similarly asserts that aid given through the United Nations is “obviously insulated against political manipulation” (Cabot Lodge 1960, p. 525). The flip side to this argument – that aid given by one state individually is more likely to be influenced by non-development strategic state interests – is also frequently mentioned in the literature. Notably, Dengbol-Martinussen states that bilateral aid allocations are “heavily influenced by commercial and political interests” (Dengbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 1999, p. 120). Milner re-affirms this by stating that “a good deal of research suggests, however, that bilateral aid is more tied to donor interests than multilateral aid” (Milner 2006, p. 110). Yet, these statements are not sufficiently explored or assessed.

In addition, the literature mentions two other characteristics that are said to make MDOs more driven by ethical considerations than BDOs. First, the distinct nature of multilateral aid has been linked to the fact that some multilateral agencies are governed by the collective decisions of both donors and recipients (Riddell 2007, p. 77). This suggests that in addition to ‘lateralism’, the composition of the decision-making body, in particular the presence and decision-making power of both donors and recipients, could be an important characteristic that might make development aid more likely to be driven by ethical considerations. However, some research suggests the opposite. Notably, McNeill and St. Clair strongly argue that the presence of developing states, some of which are authoritarian, or at least fairly un-democratic, might drastically reduce the extent to which an organisation can exercise moral authority and act accordingly. They state that,

Multilateral organisations are created by, and answerable to, governments – many of which are authoritarian and/or corrupt. It is difficult for a multilateral organisation to seriously address the ethical challenge of poverty while also cooperating with a government, which manifestly does not promote the well-being of its people. (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 37)

Thus, there is no agreement on the impact of the composition of an organisation’s decision-making body. In addition, none of the work systematically assesses the impact of this organisational feature on the role of ethical considerations.
Second, some of the literature suggests that multilateral development agencies are more driven by ethical considerations or at least have the potential of being so because their mandates focus on promoting the common good and poverty reduction. McNeill and St. Clair for example, state that “International development organisations share a moral purpose: the reduction of poverty” and that “international organisations derive moral authority from their claim to act for the common good” (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 29). This ‘moral purpose’ is derived from their global mandates. Importantly, McNeill and St. Clair do not claim that organisations’ mandates necessarily make them more able to act ‘ethically’. In fact, one of the key arguments advanced in their book is that other organisational characteristics such as democratic governance structures; limited independent financial resources; and expertise that might not sit comfortably with moral arguments can drastically reduce the extent to which an organisation can exercise moral authority. However, they do seem to suggest that if these factors are controlled or overcome, multilateral aid organisations will act according to their mandates and, since the mandates are ‘moral’, their actions will be so, too. Yet, again, these assertions are not ‘tested’ or even substantiated in any way, but merely assumed to be true.

In summary, the above has shown that there is indeed a widespread assertion in IR and Development Studies that ethical considerations do carry some weight in international politics, particularly so in the issue area of development aid, and that multilateral organisations provide a particularly conducive context for this to happen. Yet, these assertions are highly disputed and have not been satisfactorily established or examined due to (1) a failure to engage with sufficient theoretical depth in how to measure whether or not ethical considerations drive processes and (2) a lack of any systematic examination of the impact of specific organisational characteristics on the role of ethical considerations in these processes. It is the aim of this thesis to address these shortcomings. Doing so, it is hoped, will contribute to the on-going debate on what forces do indeed “rule our world” (Nakaranda 2000, p. 39) and add some insights into existing work on the role of ethics in international politics in general, and in development aid in particular, work on norms, and theories on the role and nature of IOs. The next section outlines how this will be done.
1.4 Structure of the thesis

An analysis of the importance of ethical considerations in development organisations, and the impact of organisational structure on this, first requires the establishment of a framework for assessing the extent to which ethical considerations matter. This is done in Chapter Two. First, attempts within different literatures to establish the importance of ethical considerations in international development organisations in general, and in the context of norm integration processes in particular, are examined, with the hope of finding a suitable framework for application in this thesis. The Chapter concludes, however, that existing efforts in this regard are incomplete and, ultimately, do not allow for an identification of which considerations – ethical or otherwise – drive processes. Even the more detailed and sophisticated frameworks do not allow for a distinction of whether intrinsic or instrumental ethical considerations – considerations about the ‘moral rightness’ of an issue itself or considerations relating to the utility perception of the issue to achieve another, ‘morally right’, end – matter. To address this shortcoming, an alternative framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’ is proposed. The framework distinguishes between three different ‘drivers’ of processes, including norm integration processes, in organisations: intrinsic ethical considerations, instrumental ethical considerations, and social influence consideration. This differentiation allows for an analysis of the extent and nature of ethical considerations in norm integration processes.

Subsequently, Chapter Three presents the method applied in this thesis: heuristic comparative case studies of the integration of a ‘new’ norm in three organisations with very different organisational characteristics. The process of ‘norm integration’ is understood to encompass both the inclusion of the norm into (1) policies and strategies as well as (2) operational procedures and budgets. The choice of the organisations is based on characteristics hypothesised to facilitate ethical considerations driving norm emergence and integration in the literature: (1) overall composition of the organisation (bilateral/multilateral; global/regional; donors/donors & recipient countries); (2) the nature and substance of the mandate; (3) the organisations main source of authority; (4) its decision-making structure; and (5) its funding sources. The Chapter explains the choice of method as most
appropriate for the research objective, while recognising its limitations, and describes in detail how the different norm integration drivers can be identified by introducing a list of proxy indicators. It outlines the data collection process, which involved 36 semi-structured interviews with key informants as well as a thorough document analysis of published and unpublished policies, strategies, guidelines and other relevant materials such as training guides, as well as official and unofficial records of decision-making processes, covering the period from 1970 – 2000 from all three organisations studied (UNDP, EC/EU, ODA/DFID).

Chapter Four introduces the case studies of the first introduction and subsequent integration of the Women in Development/Gender And Development (WID/GAD) norm into UNDP, the EC/EU and ODA/DFID. First, a detailed introduction to the three organisations examined in this thesis is provided, giving a solid rational for their selection and showing how the selection of the three organisations aims to minimise selection bias. Second, Chapter Four introduces the norm - women/gender in development - by providing a brief overview of the norm’s origins and global evolution prior and throughout the period of analysis.

Chapters Five to Seven present the findings of the case study analysis and establish a theory of the impact of organisational structure on the importance of ethical considerations in norm integration in development organisations. This is done by first examining the first ‘key moment’ in norm integration in each organisation - the first high-level recognition of the norm - to establish which norm integration driver dominated, and if the dominance of this particular driver was influenced by specific organisational characteristics. This is done in Chapter Five.

The Chapter finds that the first high-level recognition of the norm in all three organisations was driven by social influence considerations, and not ethical considerations, be they intrinsic or instrumental. The dominance of social influence was largely due to a lack of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm in each organisation’s top-level decision-making body. This meant that norm integration involved debate and required negotiation, justification and compromise, which lead to weak and incoherent policies that favoured instrumental or non-conceptual approaches to the norm. Lack of agreement also meant that there was
insufficient political and financial support for coherent and comprehensive norm integration. In some cases, lack of agreement and appreciation of the norm in fact restricted the *freedom* of actors in the organisation who seemed committed to the norm to promote the norm as they saw fit, further contributing to weak and incoherent policies and weak operationalisation.

The Chapter shows that the likelihood of an agreement on the value of the norm under investigation was influenced by specific organisational characteristics. Specifically, three organisational characteristics most typical of multilateral aid organisations - namely *multi-membership* and *cultural diversity* in the organisations’ respective decision-making fora and *consensus-based decision-making processes* - made an agreement on the value of the norm less likely. However, as much as these characteristics made coherent policies featuring intrinsic arguments and comprehensive norm integration less likely, the first two characteristics, when combined with an *open mandate* and *strong susceptibility* to diverse *scrutinisers*, also significantly facilitated some kind of quick action on the norm.

Characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations – *relative culture homogeneity* and *few members involved in decision-making* – were found to decrease the likelihood of the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker and, especially if combined with weak susceptibility to scrutiny, were found to make any action at all on a new norm highly unlikely.

Thus, Chapter Five suggests that multilateral organisations might be quicker at initial norm uptake than their bilateral counterparts. However, it also clearly shows that this was more related to these organisations’ heightened reputational concerns than greater openness to ethical considerations as norm integration in neither organisation was driven by ethical considerations. This suggests two things. First, it suggests that neither multilateral nor bilateral organisations provide a particularly conducive context for ethical considerations to drive norm integration, thereby certainly calling into question the claim that IOs provide spaces particularly favourable for ethical considerations to matter. Second, it suggests that ethical considerations did not play any significant role at all in the cases analysed, potentially calling into question theories that claim that ethics matters in international development organisations.
Since the analysis presented in Chapter Five is limited to one policy it only provides very tentative insights into whether, and if so, which, organisational characteristics influence the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration in these three organisations. To expand the analysis, Chapter Six moves beyond the first high-level recognition to the second ‘key moment’ in norm integration: the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD policy or strategy in each organisation. The Chapter conducts the same analysis as Chapter Five and first establishes which norm integration driver dominated and subsequently examines the impact of organisational structure on the dominance of this particular driver.

The Chapter supports the tentative findings of Chapter Five. It finds that this second step towards norm integration in each organisation was also dominantly driven by social influence. As in the previous Chapter, the simple and overarching reason for this was the continued lack of agreement on, or appreciation of, the importance and value of the norm by the organisations’ top-level decisions makers. The same organisational characteristics noted in Chapter Five – multi-membership and culturally diverse decision-making bodies and consensus-based decision-making processes – are found to have made such an agreement difficult. Yet, as in Chapter Five, Chapter Six finds that the same characteristics were also instrumental in facilitating some action on the norm, as they increased the likelihood of the presence of committed and vocal decision-makers who put the issue on the organisations’ agendas. Cultural homogeneity, few decision-makers, and weak susceptibility to scrutiny, on the other hand, decreased the likelihood of a presence of a committed actor among decision-makers, and made the organisation less likely to take any action at all on the norm.

The one remarkable difference between this Chapter and the previous one is that in this second step towards norm uptake there was a visible presence of pockets of ethical commitment that drove parts of the norm integration process in all three organisations resulting in more coherent policies and strategies. In each case, this was largely enabled by the presence of committed individuals at various levels in each organisation who were, albeit to different extents, enabled to act on their personal ethical commitment due to increasing operational freedom. Yet, in all three
organisations, these individuals did not have significant decision-making power or resources and, therefore, did not manage to influence the overall process that drove norm integration across their organisations.

Crucially, the *presence, and level of freedom, power*\(^5\), and *resources* of committed decision-makers and operational staff – and thus, their ability to influence norm integration – was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. Notably, in the case of UNDP and the EU the Administrator and some member states respectively seemed very committed to the norm but certain organisational characteristics of UNDP’s and the EU’s decision-making bodies, especially their diversity and multi-membership (which made agreement on the value of the norm less likely), reduced the freedom of these decision-makers, and even more so, committed operational staff to act on their beliefs. In other words, organisational characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations (diversity and multi-membership) provided a form of ‘straight jacket’ for committed decision-makers and operational staffs to have their ethical commitments to the norm drive norm integration at organisational-level.

Yet the example of ODA found that even the reverse (homogeneity and few members in decision-making) can provide a constraining environment for ethical considerations to drive norm integration because these characteristics make the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker less likely. This absence of a committed decision-maker, in the case of ODA during the second key moment, coupled with low susceptibility to scrutiny, meant that committed operational staff – when present – were not given the freedom, power, and resources to have their ethical beliefs on the norm drive norm integration.

However, do these characteristics typical of bilateral organisations (homogeneity and few members in decision-making), if combined with a committed top-level decision-maker, provide a better enabling environment for ethical considerations to drive norm integration?

\(^5\) “Power” in this context refers to ‘decision-making power’, such as the inclusion in certain decision-making fora, throughout the thesis.
Chapter Seven turns to this question. Drawing on additional empirical evidence from the ODA/DFID case study, the Chapter considers the evolution of WID/GAD in ODA/DFID under two different leaders with different levels of personal commitment to the norm: Lynda Chalker and Clare Short. It shows that, indeed, with top-level commitment present, committed actors in ODA/DFID were given the freedom and resources to promote the norm, making norm integration comprehensive and framed around the intrinsic value of the norm. Indeed, norm integration during this period is the strongest and most strongly framed around intrinsic arguments observed in this thesis. Yet, when top-level commitment shifted – a function of the volatility of bilateral organisations – freedom and resources for WID/GAD integration reduced drastically. The Chapter, thus, shows that the characteristics of homogeneity and few-member decision-making can either provide a strongly enabling or highly restrictive environment for WID/GAD norm integration, depending on the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker. It also points to another significant characteristic most typical of bilateral organisations – their volatility.

Chapter Eight summarises the overall findings of this thesis, which are as follows:

1. Organisations per se are unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations, while people within may be.

2. If people within organisations who are committed to a particular norm are given the freedom, power and resources to act on their ethical beliefs and drive norm integration, then norm integration at the level of the organisation is likely to be driven by their ethical considerations.

3. Certain organisational characteristics make it more or less likely that committed people are present, especially at decision-making level, and are given the necessary freedom, power, and resources to act on their beliefs.

4. Characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations – cultural diversity and multi-membership – make it more likely that a decision-maker committed to the norm is present but provide a restraining environment for committed actors to act on their beliefs. Characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations – cultural homogeneity and few decision-makers – while making the presence of committed decision-maker unlikely, if combined with such a committed top-level decision-maker, provide an
enabling environment for committed actors to act on their beliefs, making it more likely for norm integration to be driven by ethical considerations.

5. The same characteristics that are likely to reduce the freedom and resources of committed actors to act on their personal beliefs (those most typical of multilateral organisations), if combined with high-level susceptibility to scrutiny and an open mandate, make organisations more likely to take some kind of action on a new norm, particularly if the norm has reached a certain level of international recognition. Yet, this is most likely driven by reputational concerns (which this thesis refers to as social influence), not ethical considerations.

6. On the flipside, the characteristics that are likely to enable freedom and resources for committed actors (those most typical of bilateral organisations) if not combined with a committed top-level decision-maker, make an organisation less likely to take any action on a new norm at all.

7. Thus, norm integration in bilateral organisations is likely to be either very comprehensive and driven by ethical considerations, or weak or non-existent; while multilateral organisations are likely to take some kind of action on a new norm, but this is likely to be weak and dominantly driven by social influence considerations.

Chapter Nine critically engages with these findings by first discussing three alternative explanations that could be put forward for what has been observed: (1) the role of global discourse; (2) the role of specific actors; and (3) the specific nature of the norm. All three are discussed in turn, and it is shown that, although important, how, and to what extent all three factors influenced norm integration was significantly conditioned by the organisational characteristics noted above. Second, the Chapter asks how generalisable the findings of this thesis are. This is done by extending the proposed theory to (1) different organisations and (2) a different norm (human rights mainstreaming/the human rights-based approach to programming). The Chapter shows that in both cases the findings of this thesis hold. Having said that, the expansion exercise does further refine the theory by suggesting that some – albeit very few – bilateral organisations in fact tend to be the ones that kick-start action on new norms and subsequently promote the norm at multilateral-level. Thus,
the findings of the thesis do indeed contribute to theorising on ethics, norm integration, and IOs.

The final Chapter, Chapter Ten, turns to the implications of the findings. Do they matter and what, if anything, do they contribute to current theorising on WID/GAD, norms, ethics, and IOs? The Chapter shows that these findings matter for three reasons. First, they matter because they add to existing theories on WID/GAD and organisational characteristics. By re-visiting two theories introduced in the introduction of this thesis by Miller and Hafner and Pollack, the Chapter shows that the theory suggested here supports, but also helps to further refine, both theories, thereby contributing to theorising on gender and organisations. Second, the Chapter shows that the key insight of this thesis matters: ethical considerations, especially intrinsic ethical considerations, seem generally unlikely to drive international development organisations and this is even less likely in multilateral organisations. It matters because, first, broadly speaking, many multilateral organisations base their authority on substantive moral legitimacy – in other words, a claim that they are driven by ‘doing the right thing’. By showing that multilateral organisations are not, as such, likely to be driven by ethical considerations, the findings of this thesis seriously call into question any kind of generic claim of multilateral organisations to substantive moral legitimacy, thereby casting doubt on a fundamental basis of their authority. Second, the findings are significant because norm integration driven by social influence and instrumental reasoning is likely to weaken the sustainability and comprehensiveness of norm uptake, pointing to a possible explanation for the frequently observed patchy integration of norms.

Last, the Chapter notes that this last claim – that norm integration driven by social influence and instrumental arguments leads to less comprehensive and sustainable norm integration – has only been tentatively established and concludes by suggesting that further examining this tentative assertion would provide a promising and critical area for further research. Such an endeavour would not only help to shed more light on the question whether ethical considerations have any weight in international politics, but also on whether it actually matters if the do.
Chapter 2: Towards a framework for an ‘ethical considerations’ analysis

Introduction

The previous Chapter has established that, although the role of ethics in IR is highly contested, some theorists, particularly those rooted in social constructivism, claim to have shown that ethical considerations matter and can affect outcomes in international politics. Yet, the previous Chapter has also pointed to a number of significant limitations in this work, illustrating that these claims have not been sufficiently substantiated.

Despite these shortfalls, it was argued that social constructivism offers conceptual possibilities for the study of ethical considerations. This, it was suggested, is so because the work takes ideas and ideational factors seriously and frequently engages in examinations of norm integration processes. This, in turn, offers the opportunity to study what kind of considerations - ethical or others - drive these norm integration processes. In short, the Chapter has suggested that constructivist approaches offer a conceptual opening to study the importance of ethical considerations without necessitating an engagement in substantive normative theorising or making simplistic claims about the normative desirability of certain values. This insight is fundamental for my quest in this thesis, as it provides me with a good starting point for the identification of an appropriate framework for measuring the importance of ethical considerations in development organisations. However, how exactly should such a framework look like? This Chapter turns to this and proposes a framework for an ethical considerations analysis.

The Chapter first revisits and carefully examines current constructivist work on norm integration process already touched-upon in the introduction in order to identify a suitable framework for the quest in this thesis. However, the assessment finds that overall, the work does not sufficiently engage with the specific processes – and especially the drivers – of norm integration to be useful for this thesis. Indeed, the Chapter shows that frequent reference to ‘persuasion’ as a key process in norm integration disguises a number of different drivers behind persuasion, ranging from
reputational concerns to practical, scientific arguments, as well as ethical considerations. This failure to distinguish ethical from other considerations makes the work inapt for the quest in this thesis, which is to understand whether or not multilateral aid organisations are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts. Thus, an alternative framework for an ethical considerations analysis is proposed that distinguishes between three norm integration drivers: (1) intrinsic ethical considerations; (2) instrumental ethical considerations; and (3) social influence.

2.1 Ethical considerations in theories on persuasion and norm socialisation

As already stated in Chapter One, this thesis does not aim to investigate the grounds and nature of ethical principles and values underlying development aid; this is being done elsewhere. Rather, it attempts to examine the impact of organisational characteristics on the importance of ‘ethical considerations’ – considerations of ‘what is right or wrong to do in a particular context’ – and whether this is influenced by organisational characteristics. No judgement about the absolute ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of a particular value is made.

The only substantive stance this thesis takes is that, following Alexander Wendt, pure self-interest considerations are seen as opposed to ethical considerations as they are defined “without regard to the other – who will instead be viewed as an object to be manipulated for the gratification of the self” (Wendt 1995, p. 52). In short, by asking whether ‘ethical considerations’ matter, the thesis essentially examines whether considerations about ‘what is right or wrong to do in a particular context’ matter – with the ‘right or wrong’ being defined with ‘regard to the other’ and not pure self-interest – and whether the importance of this is influenced by organisational structure.

Understood as such, Chapter One has shown that the approach that has taken the role of ethics in general, and in the context of norm integration and uptake specifically, most seriously in IR is social constructivism. Thus, it is seems like an appropriate

6See for example (Pogge 2008); (Miller 2007); (Opeskin 1996); (Nagel 2005); (Gasper 1999); (O'Neill 1975); (Singer 1984); (Singer 1984)
starting point for the identification of a framework to measure the nature and importance of ethical considerations.

Indeed, as noted in the previous Chapter, much constructivist work engages with processes of norm integration, such as socialisation and internalisation. Yet scholars have also noted a lack of theoretical engagement with the processes as such. Notably, Johnston states that “For much of the constructivist literature, socialization processes are unclear” and that, “A fair amount of empirical work has focused on macro-historical diffusion of values and practices, measured by correlations between the presence of a global norm and the presence of corresponding local practice” (Johnston 2001, p. 492). He further notes that, “when constructivists do begin to look at these micro-processes of socialization, the focus is almost exclusively on persuasion.” He further suggests, however, that the term is used in many different ways across the broader constructivist literature and scholars often do not study the process of persuasion in sufficient detail to understand its precise nature (Johnston 2001; Crawford 2002; Payne 2001). The next section examines this allegation in more detail.

**Different kinds of persuasion**

Echoing Johnston’s concerns, Payne finds that much constructivist work that refers to persuasion does not distinguish between persuasion based on “normative levers” or “material levers” such as the threat of sanctions or withdrawal of financial resources (Payne 2001). He finds that that, in fact, in much constructivist research on norms, “..factors like the resources or relative power of advocates might well influence the results of a frame contest” (Payne 2001, p. 37). Indeed, according to Payne, “constructivist empirical literature illustrates the central importance of material levers in achieving normative change” (Payne 2001, p. 37).

Johnston takes the critique of constructivism further and points to a failure of much of the work to distinguish between different kinds of ‘normative levers’, notably
non-coercive and coercive persuasion. He states that,

For some [constructivists] the term is something akin to non-coercive communication of new normative understandings that are internalized by actors such that a new course of action is viewed as entirely reasonable and appropriate…For others, persuasion can mean both something akin to communicative action and something more normatively coercive, entailing shaming or opprobrium. Here, compliance with a norm need not be a function of internalization but is, rather, a function of state elites’ aversion to public criticism. (Johnston 2001, p. 493)

A careful analysis of constructivist work on norm integration sustains this critique. For example, in their contribution, *The Power of Human Rights* Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink do indeed stress the importance of persuasion in their norm socialisation model (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Persuasion is not explicitly defined, but the authors describe how they perceive the way in which persuasion works and what its outcome is. A closer look at this strongly suggests that they include many different micro-processes as part of ‘persuasion’.

For instance, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink present different techniques used for persuasion, “including appeals to emotion, evoking symbols, as well as the use and extension of logical arguments” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, p. 14). They further state that, “In the area of human rights, persuasion and socialisation often involve processes such as shaming and denunciations, not aimed at producing changing minds with logic, but on changing minds by isolating or embarrassing the target” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, p. 14). The authors specifically argue that “shaming…implies a process of persuasion, since it convinces leaders that their behaviour is inconsistent with an identity to which they aspire” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, p. 15). Thus, the authors use the term persuasion very broadly as encompassing many different micro-processes - shaming, denunciations, appeals to emotion, evoking symbols, and logical argument. By doing so, their account does not, as alleged by Johnston and Payne, distinguish between different micro-processes involved in persuasion.

This is a significant limitation of this approach for my thesis, as the various micro-processes differ regarding the level and nature of ethical considerations they involve.
Notably, shaming does not involve any kind of ethical consideration, particularly not regarding the specific norm in question. Actors change their behaviour because of a realisation that, in order to avoid social punishment or to attract a social reward they have to appear to be acting in line with certain norm. This involves cost-benefit considerations rather than considerations about the value, including the ethical value, of the norm as such. Moreover, as seen in more detail below, appeals to logical and practical arguments are also unlikely to involve ethical considerations relating to the norm in question, but rather considerations of a practical nature. Thus, failure to distinguish between these different micro-processes makes this framework unsuitable for the quest to understand the importance of ethical considerations per se. This matters as it calls into question the validity of conclusions drawn from this work on the importance of ethical considerations. It also matters, as will be discussed throughout the thesis and, in particular in the Chapter Ten, because norm integration driven by ethical considerations, especially intrinsic ethical considerations, is most likely to lead to comprehensive and sustained norm integration.

The various different drivers encompassed (and not distinguished) by Risse, Roppe and Sikkink’s framework are summarised in the diagram below.

Diagram 1: Different drivers of persuasions in constructivist frameworks on norm integration

An analysis of other constructivist work explicitly focused on norms further illustrates the alleged limited engagement with norm integration processes. For example, a closer look at Richard Price’s work in *Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Lands Mines* shows that, although he explicitly refers to ‘moral persuasion’ as a key process in his analysis, he does not define ‘moral persuasion’ and the way in which persuasion is described suggests, yet again,
a broad conceptualisation of the term (Price 1998). Notably, Price uses ‘moral persuasion’ alongside references to social pressure, but does not explicitly distinguish between the two, precluding any insights into their respective roles and effects. For instance, he refers to “persuaded decision makers and social pressure of international reputation” as having been the “catalysts for change” in his case study but does not clearly distinguish the two processes (Price 1998, p. 617).

Moreover, the description of the norm integration process suggests that different arguments, including scientific and not just ethical arguments, were used to promote the norm under discussion in the article (the ban of anti-personal landmines) but they are not differentiated and we do not learn which argument was most persuasive. For example, when discussing an important symposium in the anti-personal landmine campaign, Prices states that the participants included, “military strategists, mines specialists and manufactures, experts in international humanitarian law and disarmament, surgeons and orthopaedists, representatives of demining organizations, NGOs, and the media” (Price 1998, p. 618). Whose arguments were most powerful is not discussed. In addition, Price describes in some detail the practical arguments advanced during the campaign, questioning the military utility of landmines rather than their amoral effects: “…many ban proponents…have sought to take on the military establishment of the world by emphasizing the common ground of assessments of military utility and necessity” (Price 1998, p. 632). Yet, Price does not discuss the effectiveness of these types of arguments versus ethical arguments.

Despite this, Price insists that he is not describing “epistemic communities” who are making “authoritative claims of scientific knowledge”. Instead, Price claims that their “influence derives …from their ability to successfully engage in policy process and engage in moral proselytizing through persuasion” (Price 1998, p. 618). However, this assertion is not substantiated and no detailed analysis showing that – and if so how – moral persuasion as opposed to practical persuasion or reputational concerns was key in these processes is provided. Lastly, when Price summarises the norm integration process described in his article, he does not actually seem to refer to moral persuasion as such. In fact, he emphasises the role of shaming and, subsequently, emulation, both of which are based on practical utility considerations.
rather than on ethical considerations relating to the value of the norm such \( (Price\ 1998,\ p.\ 640)\).

To complement the above, let me turn to some specific work on norms in international development. Notably, Martha Finnemore’s study of the promotion of social development in the World Bank describes the overall process of norm introduction, promotion, and (asserted) internalisation. However, the specific processes and mechanisms leading to norm integration are not described in much detail. Apart from the prominent role assigned to the World Bank President as a ‘norm entrepreneur’, the chapter merely refers to “a mixture of persuasion and coercion” that was used by the Bank to promote the anti-poverty norm \( (Finnemore\ 1996,\ p.\ 91)\). However, the terms are not defined, or even distinguished, and no detailed description on how exactly they worked is provided. In addition, the Chapter suggests that both practical and ethical arguments were used, without disentangling the two. For example, Finnemore states that the Bank aimed to persuade development experts, “as to the viability and moral necessity of a poverty focus” and that, “By helping the poor, rich nations could answer the moral imperative and serve their own interests at the same time” \( (Finnemore\ 1996,\ p.\ 104)\). This ‘broad brush’ with which the norm integration process is described does not enable judgement of the extent to which ethical considerations versus other considerations resulted in norm uptake.

Last, let me turn to two studies that have developed specific frameworks for studying norm integration: Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink \( Restructuring\ World\ Politics\ (Khagram,\ Riker,\ and\ Sikkink\ 2001)\) and Park and Vetterlein \( Owning\ Development\ (Park\ and\ Vetterlein\ 2010b)\). At the outset of their book, Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink present a specific framework for studying norm integration, which lists different processes through which norms are promoted by transnational advocacy networks (TANS). These include information, persuasion, moral pressure, and other forms of pressure. However, the framework does not distinguish between these micro-processes and the fact that they are driven by different considerations, such as reputational, practical, and ethical \( (Khagram,\ Riker,\ and\ Sikkink\ 2001,\ p.\ 16)\).
A closer look at the case studies presented in the book reveals that the majority of cases presented also does not distinguish between different micro-processes. The studies frequently refer to *dialogue, lobbying, convincing, education, pressure,* and *reputational concerns* as part of one and the same process. Notably, Donnelly states that “NGO efforts were…limited to the staging of protests at the joint IMF/World Bank meeting, visits to congressional offices to elicit support, and popular education” and that “Campaigners in some debtor countries, most notably Uganda, have engaged in dialogue and lobbying efforts with their own government” (Donnelly 2001, p. 162).

Some case studies seem to largely refer to reputational and instrumental pressure when they describe the processes at work in their cases, yet this is not acknowledged simply because the frameworks do not distinguish between the different micro-processes. For example Riker states that “INFID placed collective pressure on the Suharto government and international donor agencies for public accountability” (Riker 2001, p. 187) and Khagram notes that “Motivated by the continued criticism internationally, worried about growing evidence from its own monitoring efforts and aware of broadening opposition domestically within India, the World Bank sent its largest ever resettlement mission to the Narmada Valley in April 1987” (Khagram 2001, p. 216). Thus, the processes described by Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink include a variety of specific processes some of which are driven by ethical considerations, while others, such as those appealing to instrumental reasoning and reputation, are not. As these processes are not distinguished, we do not learn if the changes in behaviour were due to ethical or other considerations, making also this framework inappropriate to answer the research question in this thesis.

Next, let me turn to Park and Vetterlein’s contribution. In their book they develop a model of the norm integration process, which they call the ‘norm cycle’. The process comprises (1) norm emergence; (2) norm stabilisation; and (3) norm contestation. According to the authors, norm emergences involves the use of “argument, persuasion, and negotiation” to get organisations to “adopt a much broader approach to development” (Park and Vetterlein 2010a, p. 21). However, neither, persuasion, nor argument or negotiation are defined and persuasion seems to be used in a variety of different ways. At one point, persuasion seems to be perceived as being different
from shaming and social pressure, as the authors suggest that, “Norm advocates try to persuade and/or shame the IMF and the World Bank to adopt new policy norms” (Park and Vetterlein 2010a, p. 21). Yet, at a different point in the book, persuasion seems to be seen as synonymous with social pressure and shaming, as it is seen in contrast to ‘social recognition ‘ and ‘stabilisation’: “…the Fund has been persuaded to engage with the policy norm on social development, yet internally the norm has not been stabilized. It exists formally but…has not be socially recognised by IMF staff” (Vetterlein 2010, p. 14). These imprecisions leave the reader unclear about the exact meaning of persuasion, and indeed the other norm emergence processes (argument and negotiation) in the study.

Moreover, the framework does not explicitly distinguish between different ‘drivers’ of persuasion, mixing reputational, practical and ethical considerations. For this reason, the case studies presented in the book, although providing detailed process tracing and argument analysis and describing a variety of different arguments used for norm integration ranging from effectiveness, identity, and scientific to ethical arguments, do not provide strong and explicit insights into the extent to which ethical considerations – as opposed to other considerations – drive norm integration.

In summary, none of the work reviewed explicitly engages with the role of ethical considerations in the norm integration processes outlined. Some processes and mechanisms described stress the importance of persuasion, but persuasion is hardly ever defined and a closer look at its use suggests that it incorporates a variety of different mechanisms, some of which are likely to be driven by ethical considerations about the norm in question, such as dialogue, education and moral persuasion, while others, such as reputational pressure, threat of denunciation or shaming, are not. Most work does not engage in detailed argument analysis, discuss the use of ethical argument in norm integration and promotion, or attempt to study whether ethical considerations – or others – drove action on the norm. Thus, we do not learn if norm integration was driven by ethical considerations of the rightness of the norm or if other material or non-material reasons have lead to norm-compliant policies and behaviour.
The lack of engagement with the various drivers involved in norm integration limits the aptness of most constructivist frameworks for my quest. Since the aim of this thesis is to understand whether ethical considerations drive norm integration in development organisations and whether specific organisational structures make this more or less likely, tackling the first part of the question – whether ethical considerations matter – requires a theoretical framework that goes beyond the broad process of ‘persuasion’ and takes ethical considerations per se seriously.

Thus, let me, lastly, turn to one framework that comes closest to doing so: Neta Crawford’s approach in *Argument and Change in World Politics* (Crawford 2002). Her exploration of what causes change in world politics engages in a careful analysis of different types of arguments used to justify colonialism and slavery and asserts that convincing ethical arguments have lead to changes in ethical beliefs about these practices, resulting in the practices becoming de-legitimised and, ultimately, changing. Notably, Crawford, in contrast to many mainstream constructivists, insists on a distinction between behavioural norms and normative beliefs. According to her, “normative beliefs are beliefs about what is right to do” while behavioural norms are “typical or model behaviour or the dominant practice in a certain context” (Crawford 2002, p. 90 and p. 86). In addition Crawford bases her argument analyses on a four-fold distinction between different kinds of arguments: (1) scientific; (2) practical; (3) identity; and (4) ethical. According to her, ethical arguments are arguments on “how to act in a particular situation so as to be seen to be doing good, assuming that the good has been defined through cultural consensus or meta-argument” (Crawford 2002, p. 24). These distinctions are a crucial basis for teasing out the importance of ethical considerations, in contrast to other kinds of considerations.

In order to conduct her analysis of the extent to which ethical argument has impacted on practice in world politics, Crawford suggests a method she calls “informal argument analysis of ethical arguments”. This informal argument analysis provides a solid framework to identify first, the extent to which ethical arguments were present in a certain instance, and second, the extent to which behaviour changed in line with normative beliefs promoted through ethical arguments.
Although the framework engages in a convincing plausibility test to examine whether ideational or material considerations resulted in the observed change in behaviour, the framework presents one crucial limitation: it does not shed sufficient light on the specific process through which ethical argument is said to work to justify conclusions about the importance of ethical considerations per se. In her narrative, Crawford asserts that ethical argument impacts on practice through ethical persuasion that leads to people changing their minds about the ‘rightness’ of a particular issue per se (Crawford 2002, p. 99 and p. 117). However, despite seemingly arguing that the mechanism through which ethical argument works is ethical persuasion, which, in turn, impacts on behaviour, Crawford’s model does not look for evidence of whether ethical persuasion actually takes place. Rather, she looks for the presence of ethical argument, on the one hand, and the subsequent occurrence of norm-compliant behaviour, on the other. By doing so, Crawford looks to the outcome (changed behaviour) as proof that a ‘change of mind’ has taken place, while simultaneously claiming that the ‘change of mind’ explains the outcome. As Dessler and Owen critique, “Crawford writes that after an argument wins the day, behaviour should conform to it; but she supplies no way for us to know that an argument “won” without referring the very behaviour it is supposed to explain. Nor is it clear why Crawford does not offer stronger tests of whether arguments really do change minds” (Dessler and Owen 2005, p. 602). This critique also ties in with Payne’s statement that, “looking at state practice is a poor way of evaluating the persuasiveness of normative ideas” because “persuasion occurs when actors preferences change in response to communicative acts and cannot be revealed merely by examining behaviour” (Payne 2001, p. 42).

This limitation is particularly damming in the issue are of development, which is saturated with ethical arguments and provides ample examples of instances of behaviour aligned with such arguments.

The reason for this limitation in Crawford’s framework might be related to the methodological difficulties involved in measuring actual attitude change (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001). While fully appreciating this difficulty, this thesis proposes that the specific mechanisms through which ethical arguments work can be studied in more detail without having to measure ‘changes of mind’ as such. Indeed, the thesis
suggests that this can be done by taking seriously the different micro-processes that drive persuasion noted above. How exactly this can be done is detailed below.

2.2 A proposal for a an ‘ethical considerations’ analysis framework

The basis for my framework is the proposition that persuasion, even if dominated by ethical argument, and in the absence of overt material coercion and other kinds of dominating arguments, and even if leading to some form of subsequent norm-compliant behaviour, can be driven by different distinguishable process drivers, only some of which are driven by the ethical desirability of the norm per se, while others are not (see diagram 2 below).

Diagram 2: Possible drivers through which ethical argument can work

What, then, are these other drivers? As already hinted on, I suggest that dominant ethical argument can essentially work through persuasion driven by any of the three drivers identified above. First, I propose that ethical arguments, can work through reputational concerns, shaming and social pressure, rather than ethical considerations. I will refer to this driver as ‘social influence’. Coined by Johnston, the term ‘social influence’ refers to “a class of micro-processes that elicit pro-norm behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments” (Johnston 2001, p. 498). Crucially, the rewards and punishments are social. This means that “only groups can provide them, and only those groups whose approval an actor values will have this influence” (Johnston 2001, p. 498). This concept is similar to Schimmelfennig’s concept of “rhetorical action” by “weakly socialised actors” (Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 63). According to Schimmelfennig, these are actors who, “do not take the standard of legitimacy either for granted or as a moral imperative
that directly motivates their goals and behaviours” (Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 63). Instead, “They confront the standard of legitimacy as an external institutional resource and constraint” (Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 63).

In short, social influence is driven by reputational considerations such as a desire to “maximize status, honour, prestige, and the desire to avoid a loss of status, shaming, or humiliation and other social sanctions” (Johnston 2001, p. 500). It involves “public conformity without private acceptance” (Johnston 2001, p. 499). Thus, social influence is likely to involve ethical argument and might result in some level of norm compliant behaviour but is not driven by ethical considerations relating to the norm, let alone by considerations about the ethical desirability of the norm per se.

This concept can be seen in contrast to processes that are driven by considerations relating to the value of the norm. Yet, even processes that are driven by considerations relating to the value of the norm need to be differentiated as they can involve two distinct types of considerations both of which involve ethical argument, but which differ in one key respects: they differ on how they view the ethical value of the norm. The norm can either be seen as intrinsically valuable – as an ethically desirable ‘end’ in and of itself – or as an effective means towards another intrinsically valuable, pre-defined ‘end.’ In the latter, ethical justifications focus on the pre-defined end and not on the norm in question, which, instead, is justified using practical arguments linked to the norm’s utility to achieve these ends. In other words, the norm is not justified on ethical grounds but on instrumental ones and the ethically valued ‘ends’ remain unchanged by the norm. This process is similar to persuasion simply driven by practical arguments but differs regarding the extent to which it involves ethical arguments to justify the ends that the norm is said to achieve. I will refer to these two kinds of ethical considerations as ‘intrinsic ethical considerations’ and ‘instrumental ethical considerations’ respectively. The three drivers of norm integration are summarised in diagram 3.
Let me illustrate the difference between the three drivers through an example closely related to the work discussed above and further examined in this thesis: the introduction of the norm on ‘women/gender in development’ (WID/GAD) into an organisation that has as its main aim (end) the reduction of poverty. Arguments used in this context are likely to be predominantly ethical, whether they relate to the overall aim of the organisation (poverty eradication) or the norm itself. Yet, the introduction of gender equality can be driven by a number of different mechanisms.

First, gender equality could be introduced as an issue that has reached a certain level of international recognition and is considered something that global development organisations should be ‘seen to be doing’. In this case, the organisation is likely to take few steps towards norm integration, as it wants to be seen to be doing something on the norm in order to avoid social punishment or attract social rewards. Norm integration is driven by reputational considerations. In fact, the ethical or practical substance of the norm does not matter much – the norm could be anything – what matters is the recognition by the organisation that it is expected to look like it is integrating that particular norm. Such a process would be an example of ‘social influence’.

Second, norm integration could be driven by recognition of the instrumental value of gender equality to achieve the already pre-defined aim of poverty eradication. Gender equality is seen as important because women are viewed as vital ‘production
units’ and their active participation in development contributes to economic growth and poverty reduction. In this case, the ends of the organisation remain the same (poverty eradication) and the norm is merely seen as a means to an already given, yet ethically valued, end. In other words, the norm is integrated based on its utility perception not its intrinsic value. In this case, norm integration would be driven by instrumental ethical considerations. The considerations are still ‘ethical’ as they relate to the ethical value of the pre-defined goal of the organisation (poverty eradication), but are not based on the intrinsic value of the norm itself.

Third, the process of norm integration could be driven by a recognition of the intrinsic value of gender equality itself. In this case, the aim would be to change the organisation’s ‘ends’. Gender equality would either become part of the organisation’s overall aim or become an integral part of the given ‘end’ of poverty reduction. The table below summarises this example.
Importantly, the three proposed processes are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are highly interlinked and are likely to feature simultaneously in any process of norm integration. Yet I suggest it is very likely that one specific norm integration driver dominates norm integration at any given time across an organisation and that it is possible to identify which one. Indeed, I propose that analysing these three micro-processes is methodologically more feasible than aiming to measure ‘changes in mindset’ as such, while providing better insights into the extent to which – and what kind of – ethical considerations actually matter in norm integration than is currently allowed by existing models. How exactly this will be done is described in the next Chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drivers of norm integration</th>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Ethical value of the norm considered?</th>
<th>Intrinsic value of the norm as an end in itself considered?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intrinsic ethical considerations</strong></td>
<td>Integrating norm x is right because norm x is an important value <em>per se</em>. End: Norm x Means: Not specified</td>
<td>Integrating gender equality issues in development aid is desirable because gender equality is an important value <em>per se</em> and an intrinsic part of development. End: Integration of gender equality in development aid Means: Not specified</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental ethical considerations</strong></td>
<td>Integrating norm x is right because it will lead to y. Y is ethically desirable <em>per se</em>. End: Y Means: Norm x</td>
<td>Integrating gender equality issues in development aid is desirable because gender equality is an important means to achieve poverty reduction. Poverty reduction is ethically desirable <em>per se</em>. End: Poverty reduction Means: Integration of gender equality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social influence considerations</strong></td>
<td>Being perceived to comply with norm x is necessary to avoid social punishment or attract social rewards because norm x is highly regarded by the community social rewards are sought/punishment is feared from. End: Attract social reward / avoid social punishment Means: Appearance of norm compliance</td>
<td>Being perceived to be integrating gender equality in one’s policies and operations is necessary to avoid social punishment or attract social rewards from the global development community. End: Attract social rewards / avoid social punishment from the global development community Means: Appearance of integration of gender equality in one’s operations.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Drivers of norm integration likely to involve ethical argument
Conclusion

This Chapter has argued that the importance of ethical considerations in organisations can be assessed without engaging in normative theorising on what constitutes ethical aid. Specifically, it was suggested that such an examination can be conducted by analysing various drivers – ethical or others – of norm integration processes into organisations. Available frameworks on norm integration, however, are not apt for this task, as they do not sufficiently distinguish between different drivers of norm integration. Thus, the Chapter has proposed a framework for an ethical considerations analysis that distinguishes between three different drivers: intrinsic ethical considerations, instrumental ethical considerations, and social influence. Yet how can these drivers be identified? And, how will this be linked to the main explanatory variable of this analysis – organisational characteristics? The next Chapter addresses these questions in turn.
Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction

This thesis asks whether multilateral organisations are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts. In other words, the thesis investigates if specific organisational characteristics, especially those typical of multilateral or bilateral aid organisations, influence the extent and nature of ethical considerations in norm integration processes in these organisations. To answer this question, the previous Chapter has proposed a framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’. This Chapter outlines in detail how the framework will be applied and how the impact of the key explanatory factors – organisational characteristics – will be assessed. This is done by, first, specifying the research objective of the thesis. Second, the method employed by the thesis – structured and focused comparison of heuristic case studies of the integration of a new norm in three development organisations – is described and justified as appropriate to meet the research objective. Third, the logic of case study selection is presented and it is shown that the selection of organisations is based on maximum variance of organisational characteristics that are hypothesised in the literature to impact on the role of ethical considerations in norm integration in organisations, and is, thus, theoretically informed and deductive. The selection of the norm is guided by the aim to reduce the plausibility of alternative explanations. Fourth, the Chapter outlines in detail how the three norm integration drivers will be identified. A number of proxy indicators are presented and it is described how data will be collected and analysed. Last, some overall limitations of the methodological choices are noted and set against the benefits offered by the same.

3.1 Research objective – theory development

As stated above, the aim of this thesis is to engage with the assertion that multilateral aid organisations are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts. The previous Chapters have established that, despite the widespread nature of the asserted ‘ethicality’ of MDOs, it has not been well specified in the literature. Thus, the aim of this thesis is not to test this ‘theory’ as, I submit, its
underspecified nature does not allow for meaningful testing. Rather, the thesis aims to further develop a theory around the potential impact of organisational characteristics, especially those typical of multilateral and bilateral aid organisations, on the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration into international development organisations.

3.2 Method – structured and focused comparison of heuristic case studies

Introduction to the method

The method employed by this thesis is a structured and focused comparison of heuristic case studies (George and Bennett 2005, p. 73). Harry Eckstein describes the heuristic case study method as follows,

One studies a case in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct. That construct, based on a single case, is unlikely to constitute more than a slim clue to a valid general model. One therefore confronts it with another case that may suggest ways of amending and improving the construct to achieve better case interpretation; and this process is continued until the construct seems sufficiently refined to require no further major amendments or at least to warrant testing by large-scale comparative study. (Eckstein 2000, p. 146)

Justification of the method

The technique of heuristic case studies was chosen as it is considered particularly appropriate for theory development because it allows the research to “inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms and causal paths” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 146). The method is based on the insight that “theories do not come from a vacuum, or fully and directly from data. In the final analysis they come from the theorist’s imagination, logical ability to discern general problems and patterns in particular observations” (Eckstein 2000, p. 146). Heuristic case studies are seen as particularly conducive to empirically informed, yet imaginative and inclusive, theory development because they “do not commit the researcher to a highly limited set of variables, and thus increase the probability that critical variables and relations will be found” (Eckstein 2000, p. 146).
Requirements of the method

George and Bennett and Harry Eckstein outline a number of specific requirements of this method. The method requires a research design that includes (1) the clear definition of a research objective; (2) the specification of variables; (3) careful case selection; (4) a description of variance in variables; and (5) the formulation of data requirements (George and Bennett 2005, pp. 73 - 86). Point (1) and (2), the definition of the research objective and the specification of variables, have already been addressed; point (3) is addressed in section 2.2.3; and point (4) and (5) are dealt with in section 2.3 below. Let me begin with point (3), the selection of case studies.

Logic of case study selection

Since the aim of this thesis is to further develop an existing – yet underspecified – theory on the impact of organisational structure on the importance and nature of ethical considerations in norm integration into international development organisations, the selection of case studies requires (1) the selection of a norm; (2) the selection of appropriate organisations.

The logic of case study selection is of critical importance, especially in the context of the specific method of comparative heuristic case studies that is mostly inductive. The selection of case studies should aim to delineate this inductive approach. Harry Eckstein notably states that “the brief for heuristic case study is strong only to the extent that cases especially instructive for theory, and subject to rigorous inquiry, can be identified” (Eckstein 2000, p. 139). For this reason the thesis employs an inductive approach that is informed – but not determined – by available theory and hypothesis. Specifically, the thesis engages in theory-driven deduction in order to select appropriate case studies and subsequently conducts what George and Bennett call, “analytical, theory-driven induction” to carry out heuristic case studies in order to assess if, and if so which, organisational characteristics may influence the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration (George and Bennett 2005, p. 240). This, it is hoped, will allow for the inclusion of as many potentially relevant variables as possible.
i. Selection the norm

The criteria: The selection of the norm is guided by the criteria that the cases should indeed be “instructive for theory development.” Specifically, the aim of this thesis is not to show that ethical considerations matter to a large extent in most cases. On the contrary, the goal is much more modest, aiming to carefully analyse if, and if so, what kind of, ethical considerations matter more than other considerations in some cases and whether or not this is influenced by organisational characteristics. Thus, the choice of the norm is first guided by the aim of choosing a ‘most likely scenario’ for ethical considerations to matter and for the processes outlined in the theoretical framework to be empirically identifiable. In other words, the norm should have been promoted in ways sufficiently aligned with the different norm integration drivers identified in the theoretical framework (e.g. based on its instrumental value, its intrinsic value, and be well enough recognised to allow for social influence considerations to have played a role).

Second, the choice of the norm aims to limit the plausibility of alternative explanations to explain the variance in norm integration processes, such as material interest explanations or lack of know-how of how to integrate the norm for most development organisations, which would limit and bias the selection of organisations that can be studied in this thesis. Thus, the norm needed to be widely and internationally recognised, offer low-cost implementation options and a multitude of guidance on how to operationalise it in development organisations must be available.

The norm selected: The norm selected for analysis in this thesis is the ‘Women in Development/Gender in Development’ (WID/GAD) norm. WID/GAD is a suitable norm as it meets all these criteria. First, as outlined in Chapter Four, the promotion of WID/GAD has always been closely entangled with ethical arguments. However, the norm has also been promoted using other types of considerations, including instrumental and reputational ones. Thus, the norm provides a ‘most-likely’ case for ethical consideration to matter without being deterministic and, therefore, meaningless. Thus, as shown in Chapter Four, the different frames used for its promotion align well with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two,
making it likely that the analysis will produce relevant findings that will indeed be ‘instructive for theory development’.

Second, a focus on the WID/GAD norm limits material interest explanations for action or inaction on the norm, helping to narrow the focus on ideational ‘levers’ (see Chapter Two, section 2.1 on levers). Importantly, organisations have not been threatened with material punishment or enticed with material rewards if they do or do not take action on WID/GAD. Although some donors have attached some conditionalities relating to the norm to their funding for certain organisations, this has been very limited, mostly used to directly fund work on WID/GAD, and has, therefore, not been employed to exert significant overt pressure on the organisation to take or avoid action on the norm. Indeed, no donor has to date attached strong conditions on WID/GAD to their general funding for development (Khan 2009; Dubel 2007). Moreover, WID/AD is relatively inexpensive, especially as measured by this thesis, which strongly focuses on examining low-cost measures such as the extent to which the norm has been integrated into policies and operational tools (see indicators in Chapter Three). This considerably weakens the plausibility of arguments claiming that lack of financial resources explains limited norm uptake.

Third, as Chapter Four shows in detail, WID/GAD emerged in the 1970s and reached the status of being an internationally recognised global norm by the late 1970s/early 1980s and most development organisations had taken some kind of action on the norm by then OECD 1988). This allows for a broad choice of organisations that can be studied, reducing selection bias.

Last, the high-level recognition and momentum around WID/GAD also meant that, since the 1970s, numerous tools for norm integration have been developed and are widely available, weakening the plausibility of an alternative explanation relating to a lack of ‘know-how’ (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 14).

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7 See for example NORAD’s and SIDA’s funding of WID/GAD training and WID/GAD officials in EC development cooperation.
What about gender-bias? Despite all the above, choosing WID/GAD adds a layer of complexity to this analysis, as the issue of gender equality is complex, disputed, and in many ways highly personal. Notably, a large volume of literature exists on the role of ‘gender bias’ in development cooperation in general, and various types of organisations, including development organisations and large bureaucracies, specifically (Goetz 1992, 1994; Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007). It is not the aim of this thesis to downplay the importance of this work and the crucial insights drawn from these perspectives. Indeed, the thesis pays particular attention to evidence of gender-bias and, rather than undermine this work, aims to contribute to it as much as possible. However, in order to ensure that these specific characteristics of the norm do not bias the findings of this thesis, one criteria for the choice of organisations is that they are all large bureaucracies with mandates and cultures similarly aligned with WID/GAD, as will be shown below. Thus, the case study analysis will pay particular attention to the role of gender-bias as an important factor, while at the same time doing its utmost to ensure that this factor does not bias the findings of the thesis relating to organisational characteristics.

ii. Selection of the organisations

The criteria: To counter-balance the inductive approach of heuristic case studies, the selection of organisations follows a theory-driven and deductive logic based on the various organisational characteristics hypothesised by the literature that might matter in this context. This, it is hoped, provides an adequate balance to the inductive and open heuristic case study method employed to study the selected cases. The guiding criterion for selecting the organisations to be studied is maximum variance on organisational characteristics that might influence the extent to which ethical considerations matter as hypothesised in the literature.

The section below briefly re-visits and summarises the key factors that the literature suggests influence the importance of ethical considerations in international organisations, as outlined in Chapter One of this thesis. The aim is to provide a solid and theoretically informed basis for case study selection.
Existing theories on organisational characteristics and ethical considerations from development studies: As outlined in the introduction, much literature drawn from development studies and political economy suggests that the simple fact that multilateral organisations are composed of more than one state makes them more likely to provide a facilitating environment for ethical considerations to matter (Hattori 2001; Dengbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 1999; Milner 2006). In addition some scholars mention the composition of the decision-making body, especially whether it is composed of developing and developed countries or not, as important, although opinions differ whether multi-membership and cultural diversity hinder or facilitate ethical considerations to matter (McNeill and St. Clair 2009; Riddell 2007). Last, some of the literature suggests that multilateral development agencies are more ‘ethical’ or at least have the potential of being so because their mandates focus on promoting the common good and poverty reduction (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 29).

Thus, literature drawn from development studies and political economy suggests that the characteristics summarised in table 2 might influence the extent to which ethical considerations drive organisations.

Table 2: Organisational characteristics suggested by development studies and political economy literature to influence the importance of ethical considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational characteristics drawn from development studies and political economy literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall composition: one states / multiple states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of decision-making body: multi-membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of decision-making body: cultural diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of decision-making body: donors/recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate: focused on promoting the common good and poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Existing theories on organisational characteristics and ethical considerations from IR: To further complement and refine some of these characteristics, let me re-visit and expand on some of the constructivist arguments on organisational characteristics that facilitate norm integration outlined in Chapter One. First, some scholars such as Leon and True and Mintrom claim that multilateral organisations’ outreach and expertise make them apt for moral norm integration (True and Mintrom 2001). This, especially the point on outreach, is similar to Pollack and Hafner-Burton’s emphasis on the importance of open opportunity structures (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000).
Others, such as Risse have suggested that international institutions are most apt to facilitate policy deliberation if they are “non-hierarchical and network-like international institutions characterized by a high density of mostly informal interactions should provide the structural conditions in international relations to allow for discursive and argumentative processes” (Risse 2000, p. 15). In addition, Finnemore and others stress the proximity of the organisation’s mandate to the norm, its financial autonomy, measured through the organisation’s funding sources, its level of earmarking and the length of its funding cycles, as well as the professional profile of staff and their level of expertise.

Before summarising the hypothesised characteristics, I would like to supplement the already outlined characteristics with some suggested Barnett and Finnemore in their book Rules for the World (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Notably, they mention a number of structural characteristics that influence an organisations’ behaviour such as particular voting systems, including voting rights and voting mechanisms, and NGO representation (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 46 and p. 167). Barnett and Finnemore also emphasise a final characteristic as being of critical importance: an organisation’s source of authority. They identify three sources (1) delegated; (2) expertise; and (3) moral. ‘Delegated authority’ is derived from the perception that international organisations “represent the collective will of their members, who themselves have the authority to delegate tasks to IOs” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 22). ‘Expert authority’ is derived from technical expertise in a specific subject matter and ‘moral authority’ is based on the understanding that IOs “embody, serve, or protect widely shared set of principle and defend those principles against “self-serving claims of states” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 23).

Summary: Thus, in summary, the literature suggests that the following organisational characteristics might influence the extent to which ethical considerations drive development policy-making and implementation:
Table 3: Organisational characteristics suggested by constructivist literature to influence the importance of ethical considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational characteristics draw from constructivist literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall composition of the organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One state / multiple states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors / recipients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs / no NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of decision-making body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural diversity of decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors / recipients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting rights (One-member-one-vote / Voting power linked to financial contribution, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting mechanism (consensus / simple majority / qualified majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal / formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of focus on promoting ‘the common good’ and poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resonance of norm with mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial autonomy / funding mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of funding cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of earmarking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation / expertise / moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing based on expertise or nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous/heterogeneous professional backgrounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority specific technical experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority broader development experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political opportunity structures / outreach / susceptibility to scrutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of susceptibility to scrutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of scrutinisers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To analyse whether any of these characteristics directly or indirectly impact on the extent and nature of ethical considerations in norm integration into organisations, the organisations for study in this thesis are selected based on maximum variance on these characteristics, as described in detail in Chapter Four. The selected organisations are: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Community/European Union (EC/EU), and the Overseas Development Administration/Department for International Development (ODA/DFID).

**Period of analysis**

The period of analysis covers the first two key moments in WID/GAD introduction in all three organisations: the first high-level recognition of the norm (first key moment) and the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD policy or strategy (second key moment), as well as the three years following each key moment. The key moments took place in 1975, 1982, and 1986; and in 1986, 1995, and 1988 in UNDP, the EU/EC and ODA/DFID respectively. In order to allow for the further analysis of one tentative finding from the cases studies, the period is extended in the case of ODA/DFID until 2000.

**Level and unit of analysis**

The level and main units of analysis in this thesis are organisations, not individuals. In other words, the thesis does not systematically investigate what considerations motivated specific individuals in various organisations to act or not act on the norm in specific ways. The reasons for this are twofold. First, measuring individuals’ motivations is methodologically very complex, especially if one aims to understand the reasons why individuals are motivated by specific considerations (Checkel 2005). Second, a focus on individual motivations is not, in fact, necessary or even most appropriate for the quest in this thesis, which aims to analyse dominant norm drivers at a broader, organisational, level. While less deep than a measure of individual persuasion, this approach provides a broader, less subjective, and relatively more consistent measure of the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration processes across the organisation.
Having said that, while individual motivations are not systematically assessed, the role of committed individuals whose commitment is tentatively established through anecdotal evidence and analysis of their behaviour, and interview data, is indeed considered throughout the analysis.

**The analysis step by step**

The analysis conducted in this thesis followed Harry Eckstein’s interpretation of the heuristic case study method as quoted above. Specifically, the following concrete steps were undertaken:

- **First**, a chronology of the integration of the new norm in the selected organisations, which is understood to encompass both the inclusion of the norm into (1) policies and strategies as well as (2) operational procedures and budgets, was established through a period of “soaking and poking” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 92). The outcome of this process is summarised in Annexes One to Three. Attention is paid to whether the different kinds of norm integration processes proposed in the theoretical framework were identifiable and whether they could be tentatively linked to specific organisational characteristics.

- **Second**, the first and second key-moment of norm integration, the first high-level recognition of the norm and the first comprehensive policy or strategy on the norm, were identified and their specific timing and the process leading up to them as well as norm operationalisation in the subsequent three years were examined in order to establish (1) the dominant norm integration driver and (2) assess the impact of organisational characteristics on which norm integration driver dominated. The dominant norm integration driver was identified by assessing proxy indicators (see section 3.1 below) relating to the following criteria:
  
  o  Language used in official documents (policies, strategies, etc)
  o  Number and status of human resources allocated to the norm;
  o  Training courses (frequency, status, and substance) on the norm;
  o  Staff incentives regarding the norm;
  o  Programming tools on the norm & integration of the norm in mainstreaming programming tools;
o Financial resources allocated to promoting the norm (if measured at all);

o Performance on the norm as judged by external evaluations.

• Third, a number of findings on the impact of organisational characteristics on the importance of ethical considerations were drawn from the above and further examined with additional empirical evidence gathered from the case studies.

• Fourth, possible alternative explanations were considered and the generalisability of the findings was assessed by expanding the analysis to other organisations as well as to one other norm

• Fifth, the implications of the findings were considered and avenues for future research identified.

3.3 Data collection

After having outlined what this thesis analyses, this section describes in more detail how the necessary data for the analysis was collected.

Challenge of observability & proxy indicators

Before outlining the process of data collection, it is necessary to discuss one challenge in social science research in general, and in research dealing with abstract issues such as ‘ethics’, in particular: the issue of ‘observability’. This is highly controversial, dividing methodological approaches to IR (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 109; Jackson 2011). Indeed, some scholars strongly advice that “we should choose observable, rather than unobservable concepts wherever possible. Abstract, unobserved concepts …can play a useful role in theory formulation; but they can be a hindrance to empirical evaluation of theories and hypothesis” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

I concede that the three different norm integration drivers identified in the theoretical framework, which constitute the key dependent variables in this thesis, are not directly observable. However, I submit that they are detectable through (1) the examination of proxy indicators relating to two observables: arguments (e.g. policies
and strategies) and institutional behaviour (e.g. operationalisation) and (2) by engaging in careful analysis of the processes leading up to decisions on key policies and steps towards operationalisation.

Broadly speaking, norm integration driven by ethical considerations is expected to manifest itself through (1) coherent and comprehensive policies and strategies that conceptually engage with the norm and (2) comprehensive norm operationalisation. Intrinsic and instrumental ethical considerations are distinguished by the nature of ethical arguments and reasoning involved in norm integration in organisations. Annex Four specifies a number of detailed proxy indicators for the detection of the three norm integration drivers. Admittedly, such an analysis does not allow me to ‘prove’ that a certain driver dominated but, nevertheless, provides a solid and plausible indication of which considerations dominated the norm integration process in the organisation.

**Data collection and data analysis method**

Data collection was based on three sources: first, publicly available documents (policies, strategies, budgets, meeting records, training manuals) including archival searches and external sources (NGO reports, etc); second, internal documents accessed through personal contacts with staff in the respective organisations; and third, interviews with key actors.

Interviewees were selected based on two different processes. First, a number of key actors were purposefully selected due to their position and role in the respective organisation and, using the snowball method, other key actors were identified. Second, additional interviewees were randomly selected by sending requests for interviewees to the organisations’ alumni groups. Efforts were made to interview representatives from as many different parts of the organisation and thematic fields as possible. In total 36 interviews were conducted for the thesis.

Interviews were semi-structured following a similar structure across all interviews, to the extent appropriate, which is attached in Annex Five. Document analysis was conducted using the same proxy indicators as outlined above. All the above, it is
hoped, makes the method applied sufficiently “reliable, transparent, and replicable” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 26).

3.4 Methodological limitations

After presenting the overall methodology, describing the specific methods and outlining the logic of case selection, this Chapter highlights a number of issues that this thesis does not aim to tackle, outlines some general limitations of the methodological choices made in this thesis, and describes how their negative impact will be mitigated.

What this thesis does not attempt

First, as noted in the introduction, this thesis does not engage in a debate on the foundations of ethics or on the complex relationship between ethics and self-interest. Instead, the thesis employs a common-sense usage definition of ethics as proposed by Hutchings as referring to “codes of behaviour or sets of values that set out what is right or wrong to do within a particular context” (Hutchings 2010, p. 8) and follows Wendt in distinguishing ethics from self-interest (Wendt 1995, p. 52). Based on this, the thesis proposes a framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’ that allows for an examination of the importance and nature of ethical considerations without requiring a substantive definition of ethical aid.

Second, the analysis does not aim to measure whether persuasion has, in fact, taken place. It merely aims to examine what considerations drove processes of norm integration in organisations and why. This means, as already recognised above, that the proposed framework does not entirely overcome the shortcomings of Crawford’s work as measuring levels of persuasion presents serious methodological challenges that, if at all, cannot be overcome in a research project of a limited time span, such as this one (Checkel 2005). However, the framework still offers a deeper analysis of the processes of norm integration and, specifically, a focused analysis of what kind of considerations drove these processes, thereby providing better insights into the extent to which ethical considerations actually matter than is currently allowed by existing models.
Third, as stated above, the level of analysis is not set at an individual level but rather at organisational-level. Fourth, the analysis is not an attempt to establish a causal link between arguments and behaviour. The examination of norm operationalisation is merely used as an aid to help the identification of the different drivers of norm integration, as it provides a better indication of the importance of ethical considerations than argument analysis alone.

General limitation of case studies

i. Selection bias

Case studies present a number of methodological limitations. Most notably, case study research is said to be “particularly prone to versions of ‘selection bias’” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 28). To avoid selection bias, it is generally recommended to choose cases based on the independent variable, which in my case is ‘organisational characteristics’. As the organisations have been selected based on criterion of maximum variance on this independent variable, it is hoped that the thesis avoids such bias. In addition, the concluding Chapter of this thesis tentatively applies the findings of the case studies to a number of other organisations, thereby further limiting the risk of selection bias regarding the choice of the organisations contaminating my findings.

Regarding the choice of the norm, it has been explicitly noted above that the aim is to choose a most-likely case in which ethical considerations might matter. Thus, had a different norm been chosen, the findings might be different. This limitation impacts on the applicability of the theory generated and is noted in the section on ‘applicability’ below. However, the impact of this limitation is to some extent mitigated as the concluding Chapter of this thesis also tentatively applies the findings of the case studies to another norm.
ii. Representativeness

In addition to the risk of selection bias, case studies concentrate on a very limited number of specific cases and therefore lack ‘representativeness’ of a broader ‘population’ (George and Bennett 2005, p. 30). This, in turn, limits the applicability or generalisability of findings. Moreover, the in-depth nature of case studies and the resulting level of causal complexity often result in case studies attaining less theoretical parsimony than other types of research. The in-depth nature of case studies, however, also brings with it a number of advantages that might outweigh the necessary trade-offs. Notably George and Bennett state that while case studies may have “less explanatory power across other types of cases”, they exhibit “greater explanatory richness within a type of case” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 31). They conclude that, “case study researchers generally sacrifice the parsimony and broad applicability of their theories to develop cumulatively contingent generalizations that apply to well-defined types or subtypes of cases with a high degree of explanatory richness” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 31). This focus on context-specific causal complexes may not lead to generalisable findings, but hopes to uncover causal processes that other approaches might not detect. Moreover, the negative effects of limited ‘representativeness’ are mitigated by the expansion of the findings to additional organisations and another norm in Chapter Nine.

Bounds of applicability of theory

Since the subject matter of the thesis - ‘ethical considerations’ - is a highly abstract concept, there is a need to rely on proxy indicators to study it. As outlined above, the thesis aims to study the extent to which ‘ethical considerations’ matter by applying a framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’ developed in Chapter Two to the introduction of a norm into three organisations with different organisational characteristics. The norm chosen is WID/GAD. Thus, strictly speaking, the findings of this thesis only comprehensively apply to the introduction of this particular norm in the three organisations during the period under analysis. However, a strong focus on alternative explanations that particularly looks at explanations relating to the specific nature of the norm, as well as the tentative expansion of the findings to other organisations and another norm may allow for a contingent extension of the
applicability of the theory (George and Bennett 2005, p. 30). Having said that, the overall aim of this thesis is to uncover rich, context-specific causal complexes, which comes at the necessary expense of reduced generalisability.

**The challenge of indeterminacy**

Especially in statistical methods, research designs are required to exhibit positive degrees of freedom. Some authors apply the same standards to qualitative work (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 171). However, others, such as George and Bennett vehemently disagree with this standard. They state that, especially for the case study researcher, “the exclusion of potentially relevant variables can be a greater threat to valid inferences than the inclusion of additional variables that may or may not be spurious” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 247). In the case of George and Bennett, researchers are advised to let the “number of independent observations, not the number of cases set the upper limit on the number of independent variables that can be tested”, and, therefore, to “start with a broad range of variables that are potentially relevant to the phenomenon under study” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 247). The research design for this thesis follows George and Bennett’s view and commences with a broad set of possible explanatory variables (i.e. different organisational characteristics that might matter).

**The challenges of unit heterogeneity and equifinality**

The case studies in this thesis are complex and span over a considerable period of time. The organisations chosen are different in many respects, thus exhibiting a relatively low level of unit homogeneity. Although criticised by some as posing a methodological weakness, many scholars agree that a certain level of unit heterogeneity is unavoidable in social science and, thus, must be tolerated (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). However, research should attempt to be as explicit about the level of unit hetero/homogeneity as possible. This thesis will take due account of the similarities and differences of the case studies by providing an in-depth contextualisation of each – a luxury which only a limited number of cases allows for. Moreover, a certain level of homogeneity is hoped to be achieved by choosing examples for in-depth study from similar time periods across all cases.
The complexity of the research question and the organisations under study makes a certain degree of equifinality very likely. In fact, it is highly possible that rather than one organisational characteristic, a number of characteristics interplay to produce a certain effect (dominant norm integration process). This possibility will be kept in mind with particular attention to causal priority of the various factors.

Conclusion

This Chapter has described how this thesis attempts to achieve its aim of developing a more specified theory on whether and, if so, which, organisational characteristics influence the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration in development aid organisations. First, the specific method applied was outlined and justified and, second, a number of limitations associated with the study of abstract concepts such as ‘ethical considerations’ and the application of the case study method, were noted. Steps taken to limit certain potential shortcomings such as selection bias and the challenge of observability were outlined while other limitations, such as the limited applicability of findings, were acknowledged but set against advantages brought about by in-depth case studies, such as a high degree of explanatory richness.
Chapter 4: Introduction to the case studies

Introduction

The preceding Chapter has described how the thesis will engage with the research question. It has outlined the method of heuristic, comparative case studies of the introduction of a ‘new’ norm into development aid organisations and has described the logic of case study selection. Further, the Chapter has briefly described the selected norm – WID/GAD – and listed the selected organisations: UNDP, the EC/EU, and ODA/DFID. However, the suitability of the selected cases for the purpose of the thesis has not yet been established. The present Chapter turns to this by introducing both, the organisations, as well as the norm, in detail. This provides the necessary context for the case study analysis that follows in Chapters Five to Seven and substantiates the claim that the case study selection is, indeed, suitable for the purpose of this thesis.

4.1 The norm

This section substantiates the claims made in the previous Chapter that the norm is appropriate for this thesis because it is likely to lead to findings instructive for theory development, which is the overall research aim. This is done by sketching out the origins and global developments of the norm in order to show first, that the norm was indeed a global norm during the period of analysis. Second, this section illustrates that the norm has been promoted using different rationales or ‘frames’ over the years and third, shows that this makes the norm particularly well aligned to the theoretical framework established by this thesis.
Origins of the Women in Development (WID) norm and its international recognition

The norm on Women in Development (WID) has its origins in the international recognition of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, first formally enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Prominently placed in article 1, the Charter declares that the purpose of the UN is, amongst others, to,

…achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character…for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. (United Nations 1945, article 1)

The first international institution set-up to deal with women-specific issues was the UN Commission on the Status of Women, set-up in 1946. In 1967 the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women was adopted, framing discrimination against women as “fundamentally unjust” in an of itself, but also viewing the issue as essential to the “welfare of the family and of society” (United Nations 1967, preamble and article 1). This Declaration is also the first formal document that explicitly refers to the role of women in development. Specifically, it presents women’s participation in development as an important means to achieve development, as it states that, “…the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women as well as men in all fields” (United Nations 1967, preamble). Following this Declaration, the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, adopted in 1970, includes amongst its objectives the encouragement of the “full integration of women in the total development effort” (United Nations 1970a, para. 18(h)).

In 1972 the UN proclaimed 1975 as ‘International Women’s Year’ (Tinker and Jaquette 1987, p. 419). This was done in a General Assembly Resolution, which stressed, above all, women’s roles and responsibilities in development, rather than their right to equality and non-discrimination (United Nations 1972, article 2(b)).
The next key development in the emergence of the norm was the first formal legal recognition of WID in the US Foreign Assistance Act through the Percy Amendment. The Amendment stated that “Assistance granted by the United States was required to help integrate women into the national economies of foreign countries, thus improving their status and assisting the total development effort” (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 3). Although the Percy Amendment did not directly influence development at the international level, it certainly further elevated the status of WID (Jaquette and Summeriffed 2006, p. 37).

The ‘International Women’s Year’ was marked by the First World Conference on Women, held in Mexico in the summer of 1975. The conference had three key objectives identified by the UN General Assembly one of which was the “full integration and full participation of women in development” (United Nations 1975a). The Conference resulted in the adoption of the 1975 Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace. In line with previous international statements, the Declaration stressed the importance of women’s participation in order to achieve development and peace. However, the Declaration also strongly emphasised the values of equality and justice and distinguishes itself in two important aspects from previous statements. First, it presents women’s participation as a means to development – but also views development as a fundamental pre-condition for women’s rights. Notably, the Declaration states “The attainment of economic and social goals” is “basic to the realization of the rights of women…” This is even more strongly re-iterated in the World Plan of Action resulting from the conference, which states that “…development should be seen not only as a desirable goal in itself but also as the most important means of furthering equality of the sexes…” (United Nations 1975a, para. 21) It was also further re-iterated in the UN General Assembly Resolution on the World Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women adopted in 1980, which recognises in its preamble, “the need for the integration of women into the development process so that the equality of men and women may be reaffirmed and their situation improved” (United Nations 1980, preamble).

Second, and most importantly, the Declaration states that women’s participation is an intrinsic part of development: “Full participation of women in the various economic,
social, political, and cultural sectors is an important *indication* of the dynamic progress of peoples and their development (emphasis added)” and points towards a broader conception of development when it states that “The ultimate end of development is to achieve a better quality of life for all, which means not only the development of economic and other material resources but also the physical, moral and cultural growth of the human person” (United Nations 1980, Para. 16).

The overall momentum created in the 1970s was followed by the Second and the Third World Conference on Women held in 1980 in Copenhagen, and 1985 in Nairobi, respectively. By the late 1980s most development donors had included WID into their mandates and created offices specifically dedicated to the promotion of women in development (OECD 1988).

The uptake of WID in policies and – to some extent – in organisational structures does by no means mean that the norm influenced actual development practice, a point that will be touched upon below and tackled in detail in Chapters Five to Seven. In fact, even at the time of writing, many commentators point to the ‘implementation gap’ between gender equality policies and institutions on the one hand, and budgets, projects, and monitoring and evaluation frameworks on the other that still exists today. However, this brief overview does suggest that by the mid-1980s, the norm of WID/GAD had been formally recognised in global aid discourse. Thus, it seems justified to classify it as an internationally recognised norm.

**The different frames: From WID to GAD and from equality to efficiency**

Although originally framed as Women in Development (WID), the norm changed in name and, partly, in substance in the 1980s and 90s resulting in the emergence of the Gender and Development (GAD) norm. As hinted at above, the rationales and justifications used for its promotion have been varied and manifold since its first appearance on the international stage (Moser 1993, p. 55). This section turns to this issue and highlights some implications of these changes in rationales, justifications, and concepts for the thesis.
One of the most frequently referred to classifications of different approaches to WID/GAD was developed by Moser (Moser 1993; Interview with Colombo). Moser suggests a five-fold distinction between the (1) welfare approach; (2) the equity approach; (3) the efficiency approach; (4) the anti-poverty approach; and the (5) empowerment approach. Although Moser’s account is roughly chronologically organised, it is critical to note that, also as shown by this thesis, the different classifications continued to exist simultaneously throughout the research period with only slight tendencies towards one or the other.

According to Moser, the first overall approach to WID/GAD was the welfare approach. The approach is based on three assumptions,

First, that women are passive recipients of development, rather than participants in the development process. Secondly, that motherhood is the most important role for women in society. Thirdly, that child-rearing is the most effective role for women in all aspects of economic development. (Moser 1993, p. 61)

This approach was – and still is at the time of writing – popular with many donors mainly because it is, as Moser suggests, “politically safe, not questioning or changing the traditionally accepted role of women within the gender division of labour” (Moser 1993, p. 61). However, as much as it may be popular, it is also limited in its effectiveness as it does not view equality as its aim, presents women almost exclusively in their reproductive roles and, thus, reinforces gender stereotypes that may be detrimental to gender equality.

Largely in reaction to critiques of the welfare approach, additional approaches to WID/GAD emerged. As suggested by the document overview above, and also suggested by Moser, the first such approach was the equity approach. Moser notably states that, “Equity is the original WID approach, introduced within the 1976-85 UN Women’s Decade. Its purpose is to gain equity for women in the development process. Women are seen as active participants in development…It challenges women’s subordinate position” (Moser 1993, p. 63). In addition, this approach, while acknowledging women’s important role in development, also views development as
a means to achieve gender equality and views gender equality as an integral component of development.

In direct opposition to the welfare approach, the equity approach aims to transform power relations and sees, as the name suggests, equity between the sexes as the ultimate goal. However, the approach was criticized by developing countries for promoting a Western view of feminism that does not apply to non-western societies and was, according to Moser, not very popular with donors due to its political and controversial nature (Moser 1993, p. 27). She states that, “Politically, the majority of development agencies were hostile to equity programmes precisely because of their intentions to meet not only practical gender needs but also strategic gender needs, whose very success depended on an implicit redistribution of power” and that “From the perspective of the aid agencies, equity programmes necessitated unacceptable interferences with the country’s traditions” (Moser 1993, p. 65).

Again, in reaction to this politically charged approach, as well as the welfare approach, the anti-poverty and the efficiency approach emerged. The anti-poverty approach stresses the importance of women’s productive roles in the economic development of the countries (Moser 1993, p. 67). Based on ground-breaking work by Boserup on women’s economic role in development, shifting the aim from equity to WID/GAD as an important means to poverty reduction (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 3). This is very similar to the efficiency approach, which states that “development is more efficient and effective through women’s economic contribution” (Moser 1993, p. 69). Women were presented as “the missing link in development, a hitherto undervalued economic resource in the development process” (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 5). Importantly, in this approach the value of WID/GAD is purely instrumental and assumes that “the costs of investing in women’s productivity are justifiable in terms of economic and social returns” (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 5). As Razavi and Miller state, “…women as a social group are targeted by planners as a means through which prioritized development goals can be realized, which may or may not be in the direct interest of women” (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 7). Thus, equity or equality is not promoted as intrinsically valuable per se, but as a means to development, a critique that was already voiced at the time, notably by Huntington. One serious problem associated with this approach is that it is likely to limit the
implementation of the WID/GAD norm to instances where the economic case is strong (Tinker and Jaquette 1987, p. 64). This was particularly limiting in the 80s and 90s when there was limited “rigorous or convincing” evidence to show that investing in women leads to increased economic growth (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 163).

Lastly, Moser presents the empowerment approach, which aims to “empower women through greater self-reliance” (Moser 1993). According to her, this approach emerged from third world women’s movements, stresses the importance of acknowledging multiple discrimination faced by many women, and highlighted that women are not a homogeneous group.

During this period, the official discourse on Women in Development, gave way to Women and Development – an attempt to move away from the ‘added-on’ character of the norm –and finally to Gender and Development (GAD). The move from ‘women’ to ‘gender’ that came about in the 80s and 90s was significant in two ways. First, gender refers to both women and men and the relationship between them, allowing for a greater focus on power relations in the family and society at large – an issue that was previously largely absent from discussions on WID. Second, GAD is based on a distinction between ‘sex’ – referring to biological differences between women and men – and ‘gender’, which describes the socially constructed roles associated with being male and female. Importantly, gender roles are seen as constructed and, therefore, amenable to change. However, the extent to which the concept of gender has really been taken up by development organisations or has simply become a replacement term for ‘women’ is highly questionable. Indeed, many scholarly accounts and interviews with gender advocates conducted for this thesis suggest that the term gender has not been sufficiently understood by development practitioners and that it is still often taken to mean ‘women’ (Miller and Razavi 1995; Interview with Okondo). To capture this ambiguity, this thesis refers to the norm as WID/GAD throughout the period of analysis.

The above has shown that the WID/GAD norm has been internationally recognised, briefly described its substance and evolution over time, and provided an overview of
the different global approaches for its promotion. However, in addition to being widely recognized, is the norm well suited to the purpose of this thesis?

**Applicability of the theoretical framework to WID/GAD**

This section shows that the various approaches used for the promotion of WID/GAD align well with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two. In line with the principle of ‘most likely case’ this suggests that the various norm integration processes identified in the theoretical framework might indeed be identifiable in the introduction of WID/GAD in the selected case studies.

Recall that Chapter Two suggests a framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’. The suggested framework distinguishes between three norm integration drivers: social influence, instrumental ethical considerations and intrinsic ethical considerations, as summarised in the table below.

Table 4: Framework for an ethical consideration analysis - suggested norm integration processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process:</th>
<th>Intrinsic considerations</th>
<th>Ethical considerations</th>
<th>Social influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End</td>
<td>Norm ‘x’</td>
<td>Pre-defined goal ‘y’</td>
<td>Attract social reward / avoid social punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Norm ‘x’</td>
<td>Appearance of norm compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Integrating norm ‘x’ is right because norm ‘x’ is an important value per se.</td>
<td>Integrating norm ‘x’ is right because it will lead to ‘y’. ‘Y’ is ethically desirable per se.</td>
<td>Being perceived to comply with norm ‘x’ is necessary to avoid social punishment or attract social rewards because norm ‘x’ is highly regarded by the community social rewards are sought/punishment is feared from.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the same distinctions between ends, means, and justifications, the table below shows how the five approaches to WID/GAD suggested by Moser align with the theoretical framework.
Table 5: Alignment of WID/GAD approaches to the theoretical framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach:</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>Anti-poverty</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Supporting women in their reproductive and care roles.</td>
<td>Development of specific measures to support equity; gender mainstreaming.</td>
<td>Supporting women in their productive roles.</td>
<td>Promoting WID/GAD in areas that are seen to benefit most from including the norm, such as education, health and participation in the labour market.</td>
<td>Development of specific measures to empower women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women play important reproductive and care roles in society, which are important to achieve development. Women need to be supported in these roles.</td>
<td>Equity between women and men is a fundamental human right and a question of social justice and therefore an important end in itself.</td>
<td>Women constitute approximately 50 percent of the labour force and ensuring their productivity is important to achieve economic development and poverty reduction.</td>
<td>Promoting WID/GAD makes development more efficient and effective.</td>
<td>Empowerment and increased independence of women are important ends themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equivalent norm</td>
<td>Instrumental ethical considerations</td>
<td>Intrinsic ethical considerations</td>
<td>Instrumental ethical considerations</td>
<td>Instrumental ethical considerations</td>
<td>Intrinsic ethical considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration driver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since all approaches have aims that are justified on largely ethical grounds – development, poverty reduction, empowerment, and equity – they are all likely to involve ethical considerations and ethical arguments of some kind. However, the welfare, anti-poverty, and efficiency approach view the WID/GAD norm as a means towards achieving a given interest (welfare, development, poverty reduction). Thus, they are unlikely to lead to a re-definition of how actors’ perceive their ‘ends’. On the contrary, they reinforce given ends and aim to adapt the norm to align with them. Since all three approaches use instrumental reasoning, they are driven by instrumental ethical considerations. Equity and empowerment, on the other hand, view the WID/GAD norm as having intrinsic value and, thus, as an end in itself. Norm integration in these two approaches depends on the appreciation of the intrinsic value of the norm as part of the organisational ends. Thus, the equity and the empowerment approach are driven by intrinsic ethical considerations.

Moreover, as already established, WID/GAD had already achieved wide international recognition during the period of analysis as an issue that development actors should be seen to be doing, making it equally plausible that norm integration could be driven by social influence considerations.

In short, the various approaches used for the promotion of WID/GAD align well with the three norm integration drivers outlined in my theoretical framework, making a study of this norm likely to allow for findings ‘instructive for theory development’ and, thus, highly suitable for the quest in this thesis.
4.2 The three organisations

As stated in the previous Chapter, the selection of organisations is deductive and guided by maximum variance on key characteristics that the literature asserts might influence the extent and nature of ethical considerations in organisations. These are: (1) overall composition and mandate; (2) composition of decision-making bodies and decision-making processes; (3) financial autonomy/funding mechanisms; (4) sources of authority; (5) staff profile; and (6) susceptibility to scrutiny. This section introduces the three organisations selected for this thesis and substantiates the claim that they, indeed, exhibit maximum variance with regard to these characteristics, making them highly suitable for the analysis in this thesis, as summarised in table 6 below.
Table 6: Key organisational characteristics of ODA/DFID, EC/EU, UNDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ODA/DFID</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall composition</strong></td>
<td>One state / multiple states</td>
<td>Multiple states</td>
<td>Multiple states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor/recipient</td>
<td>One donor</td>
<td>Donors only</td>
<td>Donors and recipients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs/no NGOs</td>
<td>No NGOs</td>
<td>No NGOs</td>
<td>No NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition of decision-making body</strong></td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of cultural diversity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors/recipient</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Donors and recipients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-making process (especially in relation to WID/GAD)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting rights</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>One-member-one-vote</td>
<td>One-member-one-vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting mechanisms</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Consensus culture (although formally decision by qualified-majority)</td>
<td>Consensus-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical/non-hierarchical</td>
<td>Non-hierarchical pre-1997</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical post-1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandate</strong></td>
<td>Pre-1997: broad; Post-1997: development / poverty reduction</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Development / Human development + Neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial autonomy/funding mechanisms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>UK government</td>
<td>Member states</td>
<td>Member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of funding cycle</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of earmarking</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of authority</strong></td>
<td>Delegated</td>
<td>Delegated</td>
<td>Delegated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary source of authority</td>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of ‘delegators’</td>
<td>Delegators: UK government, parliament, CSO</td>
<td>Delegators: Member states, European Parliament</td>
<td>Delegators: Member states, UN system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff profile</strong></td>
<td>Career civil servants</td>
<td>Career civil servants</td>
<td>Broad development experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialised technical experts/broad development experts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Susceptibility to scrutiny and nature of scrutinisers</strong></td>
<td>High susceptibility to scrutiny only from few and homogenous, national, scrutinisers</td>
<td>High susceptibility to scrutiny from mildly diverse scrutinisers</td>
<td>High susceptibility to scrutiny from multiple and diverse scrutinisers including global scrutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak susceptibility to global scrutiny (particularly prior to 1997)</td>
<td>Weak susceptibility to global scrutiny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key organisational characteristics of UNDP

i. History, composition, and mandate

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was established in 1966. It was set-up to combine the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) and the United Nations Special Fund (Murphy 2006, p. 5). UNDP is composed of all UN member states and is, thus, global, comprising a majority of developing countries. When it was first established, UNDP’s principle aim was to “co-ordinate and administer United Nations resources for technical cooperation...” and to “promote self-determination and self-reliance of all countries, specifically recipients of development aid” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 9). The strong focus on national ownership was carried forward from the mandate of the EPTA, which firmly enshrined this principle in its founding policies that stated that,

United Nations’ help to developing countries would: (1) be rendered only in agreement with the governments concerned and on their request; (2) not be a means of foreign economic interference nor be accompanied by any considerations of a political nature; (3) be designed to meet the specific needs of the country, be decided by the government and be provided as far as possible in the form it desires. (UNDP 1985b, p. 13)

Born out of the context of de-colonisation, this focus on national ownership and neutrality meant that until the mid-1980s UNDP’s mandate was largely procedural, lacking any specific substantive content. This has lead some commentators to suggest that UNDP had a “no-strategy approach” and that “one of the principle unwritten laws of UNDP seems to be “Don’t have a strategy” (Klingebiel 1998, p. 13). However, this changed to some extent with the arrival of a new Administrator, Bill Draper in 1986, and the end of the Cold War, which made it easier for UNDP to take a stand on certain issues relating to its work (Interview with Eide). Notably, UNDP’s annual report for 1985, written in 1986, first introduced the concept of Human Development as UNDP’s substantive mandate, setting it apart from other aid agencies. In the foreword, Bill Draper states that, “Uniquely among multilateral funding agencies, UNDP is concerned with Human Development, with the release, enrichment and management of human resources as the driving forces in economic
and social progress” (UNDP 1985a, p. 2). This did not only set UNDP apart from other dominant multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF with their focus on structural adjustment, it also gave the UNDP an, although limited, advocacy role.

Over the following years, the Human Development paradigm became increasingly recognised as UNDP’s core mandate and the programme’s advocacy role seemed to increase (Klingebiel 1998, p. 386). In Murphy’s words, the processes of writing the Human Development Reports, which started in the late 1980s,

…were one part of what was once considered a somewhat revolutionary programme of ‘advocacy’ that UNDP first took on explicitly in 1986…Advocacy was ‘revolutionary’ only because in the first forty years of the UN’s development network under different names, UNDP had become the development programme of the developing countries, the intergovernmental organization most trusted by governments in the developing world because it was most responsive to them. (Murphy 2006, p. 7)

Yet, despite this growing push for advocacy, UNDP continued to firmly promote its image as a neutral actor working on behalf of its member states. Notably, in his report for 1989, the Administrator stressed that, in the context of growing diversity among developing countries, “…there can be no general blueprints for development” (UNDP 1989b, para. 38). He further describes UNDP’s assistance as being “responsive to the Government’s own policy priorities and strategies, its flexibility, multilateralism, neutrality and universality…” (UNDP 1989b, para. 38). Lastly, he states that “We see UNDP in the 1990s as a facilitator and catalyst for member countries, enabling them to mobilize the system’s technical resources to help developing countries improve the quality of life of their citizens” (UNDP 1989b, para. 137).

This dual mandate of neutrality and Human Development remained throughout the period of analysis, although it shifted somewhat with the arrival of the new Administrator Gus Speth who added a strong environmental dimension, thereby
altering the concept to Sustainable Human Development. This duality caused a certain level of friction and conceptual confusion in UNDP’s work. For some UNDP officials it is UNDP’s neutrality that is its most important characteristic and asset, as one senior staff member states that: “If I had to single out the most powerful tool, it is our convening power, based on our perceived neutrality.” Yet others state that “Advocacy is very important. A comparative advantage of UNDP is to be a good advocate. (There are) some basic issues on which we can’t be neutral; for example abject poverty” (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 71).

Thus, in summary, UNDP is global in its composition and comprises donors as well recipients. UNDP’s mandate has developed from being exclusively focused on neutrality, with very little substantive focus, to include an increasingly strong substantive focus on Human Development, although tensions between the two remain. Despite this tension, UNDP’s mandate has, throughout the period of analysis, been strongly focused on promoting global development on behalf of the international community. This sets the organisation apart from the other two case studies.

ii. Decision-making: composition and process

UNDP is governed by an Executive Board, which is composed of 36 member states selected from five regional groupings who serve on a rotating basis and includes donors as well as recipients of aid. Prior to 1992 the Board was known as the Governing Council and composed of 48 member states. Although the composition of the regional groups is slightly in favour of Western European states (with a membership of 12 as opposed to 8 for Africa and 7 for Asia), UNDP’s decision-making structure is still one of the most open, diverse, and egalitarian compared to other international organisations, as all members of the Executive Board have equal voting power, regardless of their financial contributions to the organisation. This

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8 For the purpose of this thesis the ‘new’ mandate will be referred to as Human Development throughout the research period as the inclusion of the sustainability dimension did not have a very significant impact on how WID/GAD was framed or operationalised.

9 The EC was founded with the aim of promoting economic and political integration among European countries with global development as a very minor additional responsibility, while ODA/DFID had the promotion of UK national interest as one its objectives for a number of years during the period of analysis.
means that the programme is highly unlikely to be an instrument of any donor’s foreign policy. As Murphy states, “The United States, for example, could veto World Bank loans to Allende’s government, but could not change UNDP’s commitment to serve Chile” (Murphy 2006, p. 21). Moreover, the composition of the Board means that it is highly likely to have a decision-making majority of developing countries, although UNDP has a long tradition of taking decisions by consensus (Kaufmann 1980, p. 77).

iii. Funding sources

UNDP is largely funded through voluntary contributions of its member states decided on a biannual basis. OECD states provide more than 90 percent of core funds to UNDP’s budget (Bissell 1985, p. 8). Contributors have the right to earmark parts of their specific contributions to particular themes, sectors, or programmes. The proportion of earmarked versus non-earmarked funds has increased drastically throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with earmarked funds significantly surpassing non-earmarked funds in the 1990s (Klingebiel 1998, p. 121).

All these characteristics - the high proportion of earmarking, the short funding cycles and the voluntary nature of funding - have serious implications for the workings of UNDP as they all limit the organisation’s autonomy. Notably, earmarking allows donors to push for specific issues their consider important. For some, this type of funding is in fact a “bilateralisation of multilateral aid” (Interview with Kaul). Less overt, but similarly powerful, the voluntary nature of UNDP’s funding is also restricting UNDP’s autonomy, as explained by Bissell: “As it became increasingly difficult to persuade governments to raise their voluntary contributions by an amount sufficient to meet UNDP’s lofty targets, special theme targets were established to catch potential donors’ eyes” (Bissell 1985, p. 8).

Overall, UNDP’s funding mechanisms are strongly “donor-driven” and severely restrict the organisation’s autonomy (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 354).
iv. Source of authority

The debate on UNDP’s mandate outlined above has already illustrated that the organisation’s source of authority was originally rooted in delegation from the UN system. In other words, it was the UN system that first made UNDP responsible for global development, thereby delegating authority for this task from the system to the organisation. Yet, very quickly, and largely due to its global membership with a majority developing countries and the political context of the time (decolonisation), UNDP was seen as the development programme of the developing countries, shifting its source of authority somewhat from being delegated by the UN system to being delegated by its member states.

Thus, UNDP’s source of authority was delegated by the UN system and the member states. Although this source of authority could also be seen as ‘moral’, as UNDP’s neutrality and the space and power it gave to developing countries to decide on policies and resource allocations that affected them can, and was, seen as ‘morally right’, in my view this merely amounted to a form of ‘procedural morality’ that gave the delegated source of authority a certain amount of legitimacy. In other words, it was the fact that the organisation’s source of authority was delegated combined with the nature of the ‘delegators’, and the form of delegation that gave the organisation a certain kind of moral clout. This moral clout was, therefore, a function of the organisation’s nature of delegation, thus, secondary to it, and meant that UNDP’s overall source of authority was ‘delegation’.

However, as described above, UNDP’s weak substantive mandate was increasingly replaced by its mandate to promote global Human Development. This shift represented a move from this ‘delegated’ source of authority to an increasingly substantive ‘moral’ authority. Human Development, a concept developed by UNDP itself (thus, not delegated), is presented as a morally ‘right’ view of development. The quote above, suggesting that abject poverty is an issue that UNDP cannot be neutral towards, illustrates this point very well. McNeill and St. Clair concur when they state that, “Through the promotion of the concept of Human Development, it (UNDP) has gained some moral authority” (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 5).
However, as with its mandate in the mid 1980s, the shift in source of authority has not been complete or linear and continues to move between ‘delegation’ and ‘moral’. McNeill and St. Clair suggest as much when they state that UNDP’s moral authority is “constrained by its need to work so closely with national governments” (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 22).

v. Staff profile

The staff profile of UNDP is highly diverse with many staff having general backgrounds in various social sciences. Staff are usually appointed based on their expertise, although national quota regulations, especially in more senior posts, also play an important role in staffing decisions. The impact of this profile on staff competence and attitudes is difficult to ascertain.

Notably, Miller and Razavi argue that UNDP’s staff profile is largely determined by the overwhelmingly administrative tasks that it carries out. They state that,

…as a central administrative agency of the United Nations, high priority is placed on good management rather than on substantive issues…Although UNDP staff may be trained as social scientists they are known as ‘managers’ and performance is based on good administrative skills. (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 10)

However, most other commentators as well as interviews carried out for this thesis come to a different conclusion. For example, Geisler suggests that the multitude of staff backgrounds “enables appreciation for and support of the multi-dimensional focus of UNDP work” (Geisler 1999). Similarly Murphy states that “the overwhelming majority of UNDP staff have been people who passionately believe in the goals of the organization” (Murphy 2006, p. ix). Indeed, he asserts that UNDP staff are so passionate about their work that they work for Human Development not because they have been delegated to do so by the Governing Council, but rather, because of their own convictions (Murphy 2006, p. ix). Interviews with former high-level UNDP staff suggest the same. Notably, one interviewee stated that in staff meetings she was frequently “surprised by the commitment (to development) in the room” (Interview with Reid).
vi. Susceptibility to scrutiny

Due to UNDP’s main source of authority being ‘delegated’, the organisation is highly susceptible to scrutiny from its ‘delegators’. Since, as established above, UNDP has two very different ‘delegators’ – the UN system on the one hand and the member states on the other – UNDP is susceptible to scrutiny from multiple and diverse scrutinisers. The extent of its susceptibility to scrutiny from these scrutinisers is further reinforced by the fact that UNDP’s funding relies entirely on the member states, giving them considerable power, while its mandate makes UNDP the development programme of the UN, thereby making it also highly responsive to demands from the UN system. Moreover, UNDP’s shift towards moral authority from the late 1980s onwards has further increased the organisation’s susceptibility to scrutiny from the UN system and the global development community in relation to promoting Human Development.

Key organisational characteristics of the EC

i. History, mandate, and composition

The European Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘EC’), established as the European Economic Community (EEC) with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, has as its overarching mandate the economic integration, development, and stability of its member states (European Economic Community 1957, article 1). Development cooperation, although explicitly included in the Treaty of Rome, is very much positioned as a minor issue for the organisation. Notably it is listed last amongst the activities of the Community (as point ‘k’) and is only very briefly elaborated on in Article 131 and 132 (European Economic Community 1957, article 3).

The formulation of the articles on development, as well as an analysis of its drafting process, show that developmental aims were, at best, secondary to historical ties and

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10 The European Economic Community was re-named European Union in 1993, making the European Community one of three pillars of the EU, alongside the ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ and the ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’. In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon, merged all three pillars under the European Union. Since the period of analysis of this thesis does not reach to 2009 and is only concerned with matters falling under the first pillar (European Community), the thesis will refer to the organisation as EC throughout, unless quoting other work.
political motives for cooperation with third countries. Notably, the treaty states that “The Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom” (European Economic Community 1957). Thus, the level of need was not considered in the selection of partner countries. This conclusion is supported by Holland and Doidge who, in their history of EU development cooperation, show that article 131 was only included due to the insistence of France who, “in the wake of the Second World War, with its increasing inability to fund the heavy cost of its colonial possessions …saw the new European architecture as a solution to its problems” (Holland and Doidge 2012, p. 22). Thus, it was “…historical ties rather than need had been the driving rationale behind preferential treatment” (Holland and Doidge 2012, p. 49). This close linkage between historical ties and EC aid continued throughout the period of analysis. Notably, as new member states joined, such as the UK in 1973, EC aid expanded to countries these new member states had historical ties with (Holland and Doidge 2012).

Although the aim of EC development cooperation has changed over the years and is now officially focused on ‘poverty eradication’ the overall mandate of the EC remains internally-focused, with development cooperation only playing a minor role (European Economic Community 1992) (European Union 2005). In addition, EC aid has, since its establishment, struggled with a clear ‘added value’ vis-à-vis member states bilateral policies. This has been especially so since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, in which the EC introduced the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity in its operations. These principles essentially mean that the aim of the EC is to ‘complement’ actions by its member states and act only when it is better placed than its member states to do so. The Treaty of Maastricht explicitly states that, “Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States.” However, what exactly this entails remains unclear and contested to this day. Notably, Holland observes that,
…what clear advantages can the EU route offer? Historically, what has been lacking is a coherent and accepted yardstick to determine those aspects of development cooperation that are best done bilaterally by member states, and those that are better done collectively at the EU level. (Holland 2002, p. 11)

Thus, the above suggests that the EC has a fairly weak, vague, and ever-evolving mandate on development cooperation and its role as a development actor is, at best, secondary to its role to integrate EU member states’ policies.

Overall composition: The membership of the EC is qualified by geographic scope, as only European states are eligible for membership. Its membership has increased from six in 1957 to 28 at the time of writing. As a donor, the EC has been referred to as a hybrid between a multilateral and a bilateral donor (Holland 2002, p. 49). Notably, the OECD/DAC states that “The European Union is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a DAC member in its own right and an individual donor, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications.” Thus, the OECD/DAC sees the EC as a donor that embodies a certain duality viewing the EC both as a “multilateral organisation and as a bilateral donor contributing to other multilateral organisations” (OECD 2011, p. 26).

Regarding its multilateral character, the EC exhibits a further rare quality amongst multilateral donors: it is entirely composed of donor countries rooted in similar historical and cultural backgrounds. This distinguishes the EC starkly from the first case study, the United Nations Development Programme, and means that the EC exhibits a moderate level of cultural diversity in its overall composition.

ii. Decision-making: composition and process

The EC’s decision-making structures on development have changed considerably over the years and are different for different parts of the developing world. Due to this complexity and for the purpose of clarity, the following analysis focuses on the structures in place for most of the period of analysis, excluding the changes that took place with the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. Moreover,
since the EC has a different institutional set-up for its relations with different parts of the developing world, the analysis only deals with the EC’s relation with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), although some policies referred to below are global in their reach.

The EC’s relations with the ACP are managed by a number of different EC institutions. The central administrative body of EC aid is the European Commission. However, in the case of the EC, the European Council (now the EU Council) also plays an important role in decision-making on development cooperation policy and implementation, especially in relation to the ACP. For this reason, the following analysis focuses on both, the Commission as well as the Council. The European Parliament’s role in development cooperation was mainly oversight until the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, although it did play an important role in some budgetary decisions and is, therefore, also taken into account below.

The Council & the ACP-EU Council of Ministers: The Council of the European Union is the most important decision-making body of the EC. Its role is to pass laws together with the European Parliament, approve the overall budget and replenish the European Development Fund. The Council meets in different configurations depending on the subject matter and is composed of the respective ministers of all EU member states. Development cooperation issues in general are discussed in the framework of the Working Group on Development and decided on by the General Affairs and External Relations Council, which is composed of ministers of foreign affairs or development cooperation. Thus, the Council exhibits a moderate level of cultural diversity.

Decisions on development cooperation used to be based on unanimity until the Treaty of Maastricht, which officially introduced qualified majority voting for the issue area of development (European Economic Community 1957, article 136 and 198(c)). However, despite this formal shift, even post-Maastricht Council practice has been to aim for consensus whenever possible.

Lastly, it should be noted that issues pertaining specifically to the ACP are decided by the European Development Fund Committee, which is composed of all EU
member states and – in contrast to other Council bodies – operates a weighted voting system. However, thematic issues such as WID/GAD fall within general development cooperation not the EDF.

The European Parliament & the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly: The European Parliament (EP) is responsible for passing legislation together with the Council, approves the overall budget of the EC together with the Council, can take up issues on its own initiative, and plays an important democratic oversight role as it has the right to raise questions to the Commission and the Council or set-up official hearings. It is composed of representatives of all major political parties from all member states and is, therefore, moderately diverse. However, a lot of its business is conducted in thematic Committees, including a Committee on Development and Cooperation and a Women’s Committee. The Committees meet once or twice per month and draw-up, amend, or adopt legislative proposals and own-initiative reports. They are generally characterised by a high level of homogeneity, as members of parliament usually choose to join Committees on issues they are interested in and supportive of.

The European Commission: The European Commission is the main executive arm of the EC. During the majority of the period of analysis, the European Commission’s department on development, DGVIII, later know as DG Development and now merged with DG AIDCO into DG DEVCO, is responsible for the day-to-day running of EC development cooperation operations with the ACP, including budget management and proposing policies and laws relating to development to the Council. In addition, DGI (external economic relations) also plays a role, albeit it is much more focused on Asia and Latin America (Holland 2002, pp. 85 - 87). Both departments are composed of civil servants who were employed by and, thus act on behalf of, the European Commission and the Community as a whole.

The different DGs of the Commission are headed by a Director General who is responsible for the day-to-day running of the department and a Commissioner who has overall political responsibility for the subject areas the department works on. The Director General reports directly to the Commissioner. Decisions inside the DGs are taken in different and frequently changing ways and are not formally enshrined in
any document (Interview with Marchetti). Interviews with Commission officials suggest that most decisions in DGVIII including on WID/GAD, are taken in a fairly informal and centralised way by the various heads of unit and the Director General (Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg).

iii. Funding sources

The general budgetary process is initiated by the Commission, who draws up a draft budget. This draft is subsequently modified by the Council and finally adopted by the European Parliament. Thematic issues, such as WID/GAD fall under this procedure, giving both Parliament and Council co-decision power on allocations to WID/GAD since the establishment of the first WID/GAD budget line in 1989. Importantly, decisions on the budget in the Council are taken by unanimity and earmarking of budget allocations for specific issues by member states is not permitted. This differentiates the EC strongly from UNDP, where earmarking is common, as will be seen in the Chapters Five and Six. Thus, due to the equal power of Council and Parliament, as well as the need for unanimity in the Council and the restrictions on earmarking, the EC budget is relatively autonomous. This, however, only applies to issues that are explicitly mentioned in the budget as stand-alone budget lines. Since the budget line for WID/GAD was only established in 1989, the decision of how much to allocate to WID/GAD prior to 1989 was entirely up to the Commission, giving it considerable financial autonomy on this issue.

In addition to annual budgets, the EC decides on multi-annual spending frameworks covering a period of five years in which allocations to budget lines are forecast. This makes the allocation of financial resources fairly predictable, slightly increasing the EC’s financial autonomy. Moreover, detailed decisions on allocations within the overall budget line ceiling, as well as the day-to-day administration of the budget are carried out by the Commission, providing it with considerable amount of freedom in this regard.

Lastly, it should be noted that the bulk of EC aid to the ACP is channelled through the EDF, which is not part of the EC budget and the procedure outlined above. However, thematic issues, such as WID/GAD do not fall under the EDF but are part
of the overall EC budget. Thus, regarding WID/GAD, the EC has medium level of financial autonomy from its member states.

iv. Sources of authority

As stated above, although the EC has been active in development cooperation since it was set-up, it was not founded with development cooperation as its main goal (Holland 2002; Grilli 1993). The EC was originally set up with a broad aim of bringing stability and development to European states and has, especially since the Treaty of Maastricht, stressed the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity in its operations. This suggests that the EC does not have a very strong, substantive, or independent identity as a development donor and the precise nature of the EC’s ‘source of authority’ as a development actor is contested (Holland 2002, p. 24). Although, as with many issue areas, the EC has been aiming to increase its autonomy in development cooperation, the above indicates that the EC’s source of authority in development cooperation is largely based on ‘delegation’ from the member states. This suggests that the EC is not directly very susceptible to external pressure or global development trends, but rather to internal pressure exercised by its member states.

Having said that, the EC is also increasingly rooting its authority for development cooperation in being particularly well placed to promote ‘good values’ and fulfil a kind of moral obligation of poverty eradication. Notably, its recent development policy, the European Consensus on Development, states that the EU aims to “reduce poverty in the world, to ensure sustainable economic, social and environmental development and to promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance and the respect of human rights” and that doing so is a “moral obligation” for the EU (European Commission 2012) (European Union 2005). This suggests that the EU is also increasingly rooting its authority for development cooperation in ‘morality’.

In addition, members of the European Parliament also root their authority in both ‘delegation’ and ‘morality’. Although formally drawing their source of authority largely from their constituencies and their political party, interviews with MEPs also suggest that they have a high level of freedom to engage in issues they personally
feel strongly about as long as they do not contradict the wishes of their constituency (Interview with Turner). Thus, their source of authority is partly ‘delegation’ by their constituencies and partly based on their sheer presence in the European Parliament and their personal convictions, possibly coming, at times, close to a claiming ‘moral authority’. This seems especially so for members of the Women’s Committee many of whom, according to interviews, identify strongly with a global women’s movement and frequently referred to ‘solidarity’ among women’s rights advocates, stressing their responsibility as representatives of this movement in the European Parliament (Interview with Rodano; Interview with Hemeldonck; Interview with Gaiotti).

v. Staff profile

Commission officials, the main operational staff, are employed based on having passed the ‘concours’, an EC entrance exam testing general knowledge, rather than specific areas of expertise, and are frequently moved across departments with very different areas of focus (Interview with Marchetti; Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). In addition to officials, the Commission also employs contract agents and ‘Detached National Experts’. The former are employed for a limited period of time and are usually hired for a specific task while the latter are seconded to Brussels from member states for a determined period of time.

Council officials are usually career civil servants who are employed by their respective governments and are mandated to represent their country’s position. Most frequently they do not have particular technical expertise in the issue area they are working in. Similarly, members of parliament are usually career politicians who might have a specific interest in certain issues, but are hardly ever trained technical experts in the fields.

vi. Susceptibility to scrutiny

Since the EC’s source of authority is largely delegated by the member states, and its entire revenue comes directly from the member states, the organisation is highly susceptible to scrutiny from them. In addition, with an increased focus on the
EC/EU’s democratic nature vis-à-vis the citizens of Europe, the European Parliament has become increasingly important as a powerful source of scrutiny, particularly in the area of international development. Yet, the EC’s relatively weak mandate on global development makes it only very mildly susceptible to global and external pressure, such as pressure emanating from the UN system. This may increase with a move towards rooting the EC’s authority increasingly in ‘morality’, but has not manifested itself as significant during the period of analysis.

**Key organisational characteristics of the UK aid administration**

i. History, composition, and mandate

The UK government’s development administration was established in 1961 and has since undergone numerous and significant structural changes. Most notably, the administration frequently shifted from being an independent ministry to being a wing of the Foreign Office, also during the period of analysis. In 1986 aid was administered by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), a wing of the Foreign Office. ODA was active until 1997 when it was replaced by the independent Department for International Development (DFID), lead by a Cabinet Minister.

Despite these structural changes, ODA/DFID’s overall composition generally remained the same. As Conlin states, “Whether the agency is an Administration or a Ministry, the general structure has been fairly consistent…” ODA/DFID is, as a bilateral donor, composed of one donor country with an administrative centre in London and various “mostly scientific” units outside (Conlin 1985, p. 74).

Yet the administration’s mandate has changed considerably over the years. Notably, prior to 1997, ODA’s mandate as a global development actor was fairly weak. Indeed, the administration was largely perceived as acting on behalf of the Foreign Office and promoting UK national interests, rather than development cooperation. This was particularly so in the 1970s and 80s, when even official rhetoric clearly stressed the importance of national interest promotion. Notably, in a speech, the, then Secretary of State for development stated in 1985 that the,
...objectives (of development aid) are not confined to promoting economic development of the poorest countries...Aid is also an arm of foreign policy...It serves the diplomatic purpose of promoting better relations. It promotes commercial interests. (Conlin 1985, p. 75)

Thus, national interest promotion played a significant role. Even when poverty reduction objectives where increasingly included in ODA policy language in the early 1990s, the organisation was still widely considered as “middle-of-the-pack development agency” (Barde, p. 2). Additionally, ODA was only responsible for aid and was, therefore, not included in negotiations relating to other issue areas that impact on development, such as matters of trade and security.

When DFID was set-up the mandate of the administration significantly increased to cover development policy more broadly, allowing the Minister to sit on several interdepartmental committees such as the committee on the environment, drug abuse, women’s issues, health, and arms sales (Barde, p. 9). The rise in status significantly boosted the ministry’s decision-making autonomy and political clout and made the department’s mandate more focused on promoting global development. Indeed, a study conducted for the Canadian government found that “Today (2005) DFID is generally considered to be the best (development agency) in the world” (Barde, p. 2).

ii. Decision-making

The overall ODA/DFID policy framework is decided in the ‘Multi-Annual Spending Review’, which is drafted by the Treasury in consultation with ODA/DFID and presented to Parliament for approval. However, more detailed policy decisions and decisions pertaining to implementation are taken by ODA/DFID in consultation with other government departments, such as the Department for Industry and Trade. The level of consultation and involvement in other government departments has changed over time and, while the impact of, for example the Foreign Office, was much greater during ODA’s times, the breath of involvement of other government departments has significantly increased with the setting-up of DFID (Barde, p. 15).
Having said that, many detailed decisions, especially in relation to issues of limited relevance to other government departments, such as WID/GAD, are either taken by officials working on the issue in the administration, the Permanent Secretary, or the Minister or Secretary of State for International Development him or herself. The precise level of involvement of the Minister or Secretary of State in specific decisions has varied with the different individuals holding the post. While some were fairly hands-off and delegated a lot of decision-making to operational staff, such as Lynda Chalker, others, such as Clare Short were much more involved (see Chapter Seven for detail). Overall, however, decisions on specific themes, such as WID/GAD, are taken in a largely informal and homogeneous setting by only few decision-makers inside ODA/DFID.

iii. Funding sources

Even before DFID was set-up, ODA had its own allocated budget line in the official budget issued annually by the Treasury. The overall budget available for development is proposed by the Treasury after negotiations with ODA/DFID and approval by the Prime Minister. This is done on a four-year basis through the ‘Multi-Annual Spending Review’, and it is subject to annual review. However, once approved by Parliament, ODA/DFID has considerable autonomy in allocating money to specific activities, albeit in line with the overall policy priorities agreed in the Spending Review. Thus, ODA/DFID’s finances are entirely autonomous from external sources, yet significantly dependent on government, in particular the Treasury and the Prime Minister’s Office, except for detailed funding decisions.

iv. Source of authority

ODA/DFID’s main source of authority has been, and remains to this day, rooted in ‘delegation’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, pp. 20 - 29). As a government department, or sub-department, it has been delegated the function of development cooperation by the government. Since its funding is also approved by Parliament, Parliament is also an important ‘delegator’ of authority. In addition, being part of democratically elected government, ODA/DFID’s authority is also rooted in delegation from UK citizens or UK civil society organisations.
However, to legitimise this delegation, DFID is also increasingly basing its authority on ‘doing good’. Notably, DFID states that it is acting out of “moral responsibility towards the poor” and sees its main task as “lead(ing) the UK’s work to end extreme poverty” (DFID 2014) Thus, DFID’s authority is also to a certain extent, and particularly recently, rooted in ‘morality’.

v. Staff

At operational level ODA/DFID is largely staffed with civil servants of British nationality with educational backgrounds in economics or social science although the ration of economists versus other social scientists has changed drastically over the years, with economists largely outweighing other specialisations up until the late 1980s. Leadership positions are usually held by career civil servants, while the post of Minister and Secretary of States is occupied by an individual with a party-political background.

vi. Susceptibility to scrutiny

ODA/DFID is largely susceptible to scrutiny from the government as well as Parliament, as it derives most of its authority as well as its funding from them. In addition, as a government department of a democratic state, the organisation is also mildly susceptible to scrutiny from non-state-actors, however, mostly those relatively aligned with the political ideology of the ruling party. Thus, ODA/DFID’s susceptibility to scrutiny is limited to relatively few and homogenous scrutinisers. This was particularly so when ODA was part of the Foreign Office and changed somewhat with the establishment of DFID and the arrival of Clare Short, both of which raised DFID’s status as a global development player, making its authority increasingly rooted in ‘morality’ and, therefore, more susceptible to external and global scrutiny.
Conclusion

This Chapter has introduced the norm as well as the three organisations selected for examination in this thesis. It has established that both are highly appropriate for the purpose of this thesis. First it was established that the norm has been widely recognised, is, therefore, a global norm, and has been framed in many different ways closely aligned to the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter Two, making the case studies likely to yield results instructive for theory development. Second, the Chapter has introduced the organisations chosen for case study analysis and has established that they do, indeed, differ considerably on a number of factors that are hypothesised by the literature to influence the extent to which ethical considerations matter in organisations.

The remainder of this thesis now turns to a detailed analysis of the introduction of WID/GAD into these three organisations in order to establish, first, which norm integration driver – social influence, intrinsic ethical considerations, instrumental ethical considerations – dominantly drove WID/GAD integration in the organisations, and second, whether the dominance of a particular driver was the result of specific organisational characteristics. The following Chapter focuses on the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in each organisation.
Chapter 5: First high-level recognition of WID/GAD

Introduction

The previous Chapter has established that by the mid-1970s the WID/GAD norm had achieved considerable international recognition and many donors were starting to take some action on it. Does this mean that gender equality was being increasingly accepted by international development organisations as an important value and, indeed, that it was a desire to promote gender equality *per se* and to ‘do the right thing’ that drove the observed norm integration? In other words, are we seeing ‘ethical considerations’ about the value of gender equality driving this norm integration process? And, if so, was the importance and nature of ethical considerations in these processes influenced by specific organisational characteristics typical of multilateral aid organisations, making these types of organisations more likely to be driven by such considerations and take action on the norm?

To answer these questions, this Chapter considers the first key moment in norm integration in the three organisations chosen for this thesis - the first high-level recognition of the norm - and examines in detail what kind of considerations drove this first step. Was it considerations relating to the value of women’s rights and gender equality as ethically desirable goals in and of themselves (intrinsic ethical considerations); a concern about the need to integrate women as necessary ‘production units’ to achieve other ethically desirable ends (instrumental ethical considerations) or; indeed, was it not about the norm at all and simply driven by reputational concerns (social influence)? This is done by applying the framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’ development in Chapter Two to a careful examination of the processes that lead up to the decisions and analysing their content as well as norm operationalisation during the three subsequent years. Second, the Chapter asks whether the dominance of the different drivers – intrinsic ethical considerations, instrumental ethical considerations, or social influence – was influenced by particular organisational characteristics.

The Chapter finds that the first high-level recognition of the norm, which happened in 1975 in UNDP, in 1982 in the EC, and in 1986 in ODA was in each case driven by
social influence considerations, and not ethical considerations, be they intrinsic or instrumental. The dominance of social influence was largely due to a lack of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm in each organisation’s top-level decision-making body. This meant that norm integration involved debate and required negotiation, justification and compromise, which lead to weak and incoherent policies that favoured instrumental or non-conceptual approaches to the norm. Lack of agreement also meant that there was insufficient political and financial backing for coherent and comprehensive norm integration. In some cases, lack of agreement and appreciation of the norm in fact restricted the freedom of actors who seemed committed to the norm to promote the norm as they saw fit, further contributing to weak and incoherent policies and weak operationalisation.

The Chapter shows that the likelihood of an agreement on the value of the norm under investigation was influenced by three specific organisational characteristics, namely multi-membership and cultural diversity in the organisations’ respective decision-making fora and consensus-based decision-making processes, all of which made an agreement on the value of the norm less likely. However, as much as these characteristics made coherent policies featuring intrinsic arguments and comprehensive norm integration less likely, the first two characteristics, when combined with an open mandate and strong susceptibility to diverse scrutinisers, also significantly facilitated some kind of quick action on the norm.

Thus, the Chapter suggests that multilateral organisations might be better at initial norm uptake than their bilateral counterparts. However, it also clearly shows that this was more related to their heightened reputational concerns than greater openness to ethical considerations as norm integration in neither organisation was driven by ethical considerations. This suggests two things. First, it suggests that organisational characteristics specific to multilateral or bilateral organisations do not significantly influence the importance or nature of ethical considerations in norm integration, thereby calling into question the claim that IOs as such are more likely to provide spaces particularly conducive for ethical considerations to matter. Second, it also suggests that ethical considerations did not play any significant role at all in the cases analysed, potentially calling into question theories that claim that ethical considerations have any weight at all in international development organisations.
5.1 The first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in UNDP

Of the three organisations analysed in this thesis UNDP was the first to officially endorse WID/GAD in January 1975, although efforts to promote gender balance in the organisation’s internal human resource policy had commenced considerably earlier (Interview with Miller). The endorsement took the form of a decision by the Governing Council, UNDP’s highest decision-making body. The following section analysis which considerations drove this first formal recognition.

Which norm integration driver dominated?

i. Process and timing

As outlined in Chapter Four, the UN system had already taken on WID in the 1950s and 1960s and UNDP was, since its establishment, under mild, yet explicit, external pressure to take up WID. This pressure took the initial form of an explicit ECOSOC recommendations in 1966 in which it “addressed a request to bodies in the United Nations system...including UNDP to assist in developing a unified long-term programme for the advancement of women” (United Nations 1995, p. 8). The pressure further increased when, in 1970, the United Nations General Assembly included WID as a consideration in the Second Development Decade. Specifically, the Assembly asked that “the full integration of women should be encouraged” (United Nations 1970a, para. 16(h)).

Yet despite the increasing recognition of WID/GAD by the UN system and explicit calls on UNDP to integrate the issue, no action was taken by UNDP prior to 1975. Indeed, a detailed analysis of Governing Council decisions and debates prior to 1975 reveals that neither the Governing Council nor the Administration itself exercised any pressure, be it normative or material, on UNDP to take any action on WID/GAD. Indeed, WID was only mentioned once in passing in 1972, when the Director of the Office of Technical Co-operation mentioned a project “in the Central African Republic where the promotion of participation of women in development was the main feature” (UNDP 1972, para. 335). WID/GAD was not mentioned by any
UND P Administrator report nor did any of the Administrator’s or other UNDP staff’s contributions to Governing Council debates mention the issue prior to 1975. In 1975 UN-system pressure on UNDP increased significantly when the UN decided to declare 1975 – 1985 the Women’s Decade and commemorate it with a World Conference on Women to be held in 1975 in Mexico. Indeed, one purpose of the conference was to publically hold UNDP and others to account for their actions, or lack thereof, on WID/GAD. The General Assembly Resolution on the conference explicitly states that one of its aims was to,

examine to what extent the organizations of the United Nations system have implemented the recommendations for the elimination of discrimination against women made by the Commission on the Status of Women… (United Nations General Assembly 1974, preamble)

In follow up to this, the General Assembly made a further explicit call for action to UN Agencies. It, …calls upon the United Nations system to provide increased assistance to those programmes…which will encourage and promote the full integration of women into national, regional and interregional economic development activities. 2. Recommends to all organizations concerned within the United Nations system to review their work and personal programmes in order to assess their impact on the further participation of women in development…” (United Nations General Assembly 1974, para. 1 and 2)

Thus, by the mid-1970s there was very strong and increasing pressure by the UN system on UNDP to take action on WID/GAD. This was especially so as UNDP was going to be formally and publically held accountable for its action/inaction on the norm in the processes around the first World Conference on Women in 1975.

The lack of internal calls for action and the mounting UN system pressure strongly suggests that it was external pressure linked to reputational concerns that drove the first high-level recognition of the norm. Interviews conducted for this thesis concur with this assessment (Interview with Anstee; Interview with Hamadeh; Interview with Reid). Notably, one senior official stated that WID/GAD was first taken up by UNDP “in reaction to the first Women’s Conference” (Interview with Leitner) and a
former director of the WID Division stated that “You have to remember that there was a UN Decade for Women…and since this (the UN Decade for Women) was a UN Resolution the multilateral system as a whole was also much concerned” (Interview with Eide). Indeed two senior UNDP officials suggested that it was indeed reputational considerations that drove UNDP to take this first step. One stated that after the first Women’s Conference in Mexico in 1975 it became “absolutely the fashion of the day. Everybody wanted to be *seen to be* [my emphasis] doing something” (Interview with Anstee). A former WID/GAD officer concurred when she stated that, indeed, UNDP took action on the norm because “the *pride* [my emphasis] of the organisation was at stake” (Interview with Miller).

ii. The policy approach

The actual decision by the Governing Council that first officially recognised WID as an issue relevant for UNDP is very short and does not include anything about UNDP’s rational or reason for integrating WID, apart from strongly stating that it was acting in response to requests from the UN system. The decision opens as follows,

Recalling that in its resolution 3010 (XVII) and 3275 (XXIX), the General Assembly proclaimed the goals of International Women’s Year 1975…(b) to ensure the full integration of women in the total development effort…Noting that in its resolution 3342 (XXIX), the General Assembly called upon the United Nations system to provide increased assistance to those programmes…which will encourage and promote the further integration of women into national, regional and interregional economic development activities…(UNDP 1975, pp. 39 - 40)

The actual commitment to WID is fairly weak and stresses the importance of taking into account member states’ views,

Considering that the concept of development…should in general give more importance to the needs, competence and aspirations of women; Bearing in mind the comments made by members of the Governing Council during the discussion… (UNDP 1975, Preamble)
The decision does make a clear *request* to UNDP but only *invites* governments to take action,

Requests that the integration of women in development should be a continuing consideration in the formulation, design and implementation of UNDP projects and programmes; 2. Invites Governments to take the appropriate decisions in order to ensure the participation of women in the planning process, in decision-making, and in the implementation of development projects… (UNDP 1975, para. 1 and 2)

Thus, the approach is strongly framed in responding to UN system demands, is extremely vague regarding what needs to be done to integrate WID/GAD, and does not involve any substantive rational or conceptual engagement with the norm.

iii. Operationalisation 1975 - 1978

After the adoption of the Governing Council Decision some steps towards institutionalising WID were taken. Notably, in 1975 a new UNDP Policies and Procedures Manual and accompanying Guidelines on Project Formulation “concerning the formulation, design, implementation and evaluation of projects with a view to integrating women as participants and beneficiaries in all relevant areas of development work” were developed (UNDP 1975a, para. 27). In addition, training kits were prepared in the same year and some staff training was undertaken in 1976 United Nations Development Programme 1975 (Razavi and Miller 1995a). A WID focal point was appointed in 1976, whose main responsibility was to sensitise UNDP staff members and make available research on WID. The focal point was supported by four additional focal points in the regional bureaux (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 14).

Despite these steps, a more detailed look at them suggests that operationalisation remained at a very superficial, if not tokenistic, level. For example, an analysis of the status of the WID focal point shows that the focal point was not included in UNDP decision making procedures and the additional focal points did not even have terms of reference for their work on WID, let alone sufficient expertise in the area. The training was ad-hoc, not compulsory, and no agency-wide training was introduced.
during this period (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 16). Moreover, the WID guidelines were weak. First, they were voluntary and second, they were included in the UNDP Programming Manual under “Special Considerations” indicating an ‘added – on’ status” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 14). Third, regarding their actual content, the guidelines were very vague, hardly justifying to be called ‘guidelines’. Notably, after a general discussion of WID, the document states that, “more specific advice concerning the diverse problems of how to better integrate women in the development process has been given in the form of an annotated list of references” (Kardam 1991, p. 19). The list of references merely provides a bibliography of a number of texts on WID/GAD and does not even include any annotation to the texts. This lack of detail has lead one prominent commentator to suggest that “the vague nature of the UNDP’s directions to staff is an indication that no particular procedural or programmatic changes were planned to deal with gender issues in the agency’s development assistance activities” (Kardam 1991, p. 19). Last, UNDP’s reporting system on project implementation, an important source of information on actual UNDP activities, was not amended to include WID during this period (United Nations Development Programme 1986c).

Regarding financial resources, UNDP did start to record financial resources allocated to WID/GAD in 1974 and available data suggests that the allocation to WID/GAD to technical cooperation was on average 0.9% of UNDP’s budget from 1975 – 1980 (United Nations Development Programme 1982). Even UNDP itself admitted that this allocation was very low, as a Report of the Administrator stated that, “it is abundantly clear that…financial resources allocated for this purpose (WID), are very small” (UNDP 1982a, para. 14). In addition, the accuracy of the recording system left a lot to be desired. Notably, an evaluation of the integration of WID/GAD into UNDP’s systems found that “A review of the existing financial management system shows that the current UNDP classification framework does not allow to track resource allocation to gender mainstreaming within its present structure” (UNDP 1998b, p. 11).
The above strongly indicates that operationalisation in the three years after the first high-level recognition of WID seemed to have been superficial, if not tokenistic. This finding is further supported by other evaluations as well as member states’ own assessments. In the Governing Council debate in 1978,

...several members express the view that the paper (on WID) appeared incomplete, both in terms of analysis and the data presented. They felt that UNDP should be playing a much more active role... (UNDP 1978, para. 279)

Indeed, one member’s impression was that “UNDP’s emphasis in this area had been somewhat haphazard” (UNDP 1978). In addition, an evaluation undertaken in 1978 found “limited progress in promoting women’s participation in development projects and programmes”, a conclusion echoed in other evaluations, including UNDP’s own assessment (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 14). Interviews conducted for this thesis concur with this conclusion. Notably, one senior UNDP official interviewed for this thesis stated that “…in the 1970s UNDP paid mostly lip service to the issue..” while another mentioned that in the 1970s, “everybody paid lip service to the idea but they were not quite so good at translating it into practice” (Interview with Hamadeh; Interview with Miller; Interview with Anstee).

<table>
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<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Level of operationalisation - UNDP</th>
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| Number of human resources allocated to WID | Weak  
• 1 focal point for WID appointed in 1976, focal point system expanded in 1977.             |
| Status of HR on WID                    | Weak  
• Not included in any decision-making fora.                                                     |
| Training on WID                        | Weak  
• Existed but voluntary and underfunded.                                                        |
| Programming tools for WID              | Weak  
• WID guidelines included in UNDP Programming Manual as “Special Considerations.”             |
| Integration of WID in other programming tools and policies | Weak  
• None.                                                                                   |
| Financial resources allocated to WID   | Medium  
• Weak recording mechanism;  
• On average 0.9% of technical cooperation budget spent on WID/GAD;  
• WID focal point severely underfunded.                                                          |
| Performance incentive on WID           | Weak  
• None.                                                                                   |
iv. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated?

The above account strongly suggests that it was social influence in response to pressure from the UN system that drove the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in UNDP. First, there was no evidence of any calls for action on WID/GAD from inside the organisation, yet strong evidence of considerable and increasing pressure from the UN system and testimonials of officials indicating that it was reputational concerns rooted in pressure from the UN system that drove the first official high-level recognition of the norm in the organisation. Second, the policy itself is explicitly framed as a response to this pressure and, in fact, does not mention any other justification or rational for the integration of WID/GAD. Third, operationalisation was very weak and largely viewed as ‘lip-service’ by observers in and outside of UNDP, suggesting that there was no genuine appreciation of the value of the norm across the organisation. This is especially so as a number of steps towards operationalisation would have been low-cost or no-cost, such as the amendment of UNDP’s reporting system on project implementation, a stronger and more comprehensive integration of WID/GAD into the Programming Manual, and the recording of expenditures on WID/GAD. Moreover, considerable know-how on how to integration WID/GAD in development operations already existed at that time (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 14). This strongly indicates that it could not have been a lack of resources or know-how that resulted in the weak operationalisation of the norm, leaving a lack of appreciation of the value of the norm as the most plausible explanation.

A combination of these observations strongly suggests that the first high-level recognition of the norm was indeed driven by social influence considerations. Ethical considerations relating to the value of the norm – whether intrinsic or instrumental – did not seem to have played a significant role in WID/GAD integration during this period in UNDP.
Why did this norm integration driver dominate?

i. Explaining the timing

The timing of the first high-level recognition of WID by UNDP was strongly influenced by the decision to declare 1975 – 1985 the UN Women’s Decade and by the announcement of the first World Conference on Women. Why did these developments have an impact on UNDP while they did not influence developments in the EU or ODA who only took action in 1982 and 1986 respectively? Moreover, why did this only lead to superficial norm integration driven by social influence considerations?

The reasons for this can be found first, in UNDP’s split source of delegated authority in the 1970s. UNDP was established by, and part of, the UN family, and its main function was to coordinate UN development efforts. The Programme, therefore, felt a certain obligation to respond to direct requests by the UN system, as it was this system that provided it with part of its authority. However, UNDP’s source of authority was also to a significant extent rooted in delegation from the member states on which it also depended for its funding. Thus, UNDP was strongly susceptible to multiple scrutinisers - the UN system and its member states. It was this organisational characteristic that explains why UNDP took action when it did – as it responded to pressure from one of its scrutinisers: the UN system – and why the response was half-hearted – as there was no noteworthy pressure from the other scrutinisers: the member states on WID/GAD prior to 1975.

This lack of push by UNDP member states can be partly explained by the fact that the norm had not reached very widespread international recognition at that point and not many member states had explicit and strong bilateral WID/GAD policies. In addition, however, the reason for why no state pushed for action on the norm was rooted in the Governing Council’s high level of cultural diversity and multi-membership resulting in a lack of agreement on the value of the norm, as illustrated below. Combined with a weak substantive mandate that did not provide an easy ‘hook’ for the norm, a strong procedural mandate that called for member state ownership and an identity perception as the ‘development programme of the
developing countries’, did not provide Governing Council members with sufficient freedom to push for the norm, which helps to explain why even the states that had already adopted bilateral policies, such as the US, did not push for action on WID/GAD in UNDP.

Last, UNDP’s delegated source of authority focused on the UN system and the member states, combined with a weak substantive yet strong procedural mandate and a very hierarchical set-up also meant that the Administration, although diverse and with expertise on WID/GAD, had very little freedom to promote issues on its own volition.

Thus, UNDP’s split source of delegated authority and its susceptibility to multiple scrutinisers – member states on the one hand and the UN system on the other – explains why it responded to pressure from the UN system at all, as opposed to the EC/EU and ODA/DFID. Its source of authority, combined with the high-level of cultural diversity and multi-membership of the Governing Council and its strong procedural mandate and the resulting limited freedom for member states and Administration staff to promote WID/GAD also explains why there was no pressure from inside the Governing Council or the Administration. This, in turn, explains why UNDP’s response was slow and meagre and only once UN pressure was very strong with the onset of the UN’s International Women’s Year, the beginning of the UN Decade for Women, and the first World Conference on Women, that UNDP finally took some action to integrate WID/GAD.

ii. Explaining the approach

The weak and hands-off approach to WID/GAD in UNDP was a direct result of the specific characteristics of its key-decision making body, the Governing Council. The Governing Council is characterised by a high level of cultural diversity amongst its membership, a relatively large number of principals with equal voting power, and a consensus-culture. This organisational set-up meant that reaching an agreement on many things, including the value of WID/GAD in the Council, was very difficult. Notably, an examination of the report of the Governing Council session describing the proceedings that led to the Governing Council Decision points to significant
differences of opinion between and among UN staff and UNDP member states about the importance and justification of WID.

For example, a consideration of opinions expressed by the member states during a Governing Council debate illustrates the diverse opinions on WID/GAD in the Council. Notably, a number of members stressed the importance of preserving different cultural approaches to the issue of integrating women in development. Some very clearly stated their preference for a non-transformative approach to WID, emphasising the importance that WID does not “prejudge either the family as a social unit or the existing ways of life...emphasising that the role of women was the giver of life” (UNDP 1975, para. 137). Representing the other end of the spectrum, some members criticised UNDP’s approach for being too non-transformative, stating that UNDP’s approach “contained practically no account of the social factor and added that the social structure of a society was the deciding factor in the status of women in it” (UNDP 1975, para. 143). This exchange does indeed indicate that there was no agreement on the importance of the value of gender equality amongst the members of the Governing Council. This conclusion is further supported by a statement by the Assistant Administrator in a subsequent Governing Council debate in which he states that “…even the definition of the concept of integration of women in development left much to be desired: a range of opinions exists on the issue…” (UNDP 1982b, para. 38).

Combined with (1) the political context of the time, which lead to a strong ‘hands-off’ approach to development from former colonial powers and a particular reluctance to impose specific issues or values on developing countries and (2) an only just emerging norm on WID/GAD, this explains why UNDP’s policy was weak and non-conceptual, clearly avoiding any engagement with the value of the norm itself.

iii. Explaining the level operationalisation

As established above, due to UNDP’s specific organisational characteristics such as its source of authority, its strong procedural mandate emphasising neutrality and country ownership, any impetus for norm operationalisation would have had to come
from the Governing Council. This was especially so as there was no pressure by the UN system as a whole on UNDP to take specific internal actions on the norm and decisions on steps towards operationalisation would have also required formal approval by the Council (United Nations 1970a). Moreover, the 1975 Decision did not provide any detail on how WID/GAD should be taken up. Recall that it merely requests that “the integration of women in development should be a continuing consideration in the formulation, design and implementation of UNDP projects and programmes” (UNDP 1975b, para. 151). Therefore, the Administration was not provided with a mandate, and thus had very little freedom, to take specific action on the norm, relying on a push from the Governing Council to take action.

However, the Governing Council’s high-level of cultural diversity, its multi-membership and its consensus culture, coupled with only just emerging international recognition of WID/GAD, and a strong procedural mandate as the development programme of the developing countries, meant that there was no agreement on the value of WID/GAD and, therefore, no push for action on the norm. Notably, in a Governing Council session in 1976 several member states, when discussing UNDP’s actions on WID/GAD “referred specifically to the frank and realistic appraisal of limited unanimity among members participating in the discussion as to the importance of the subject…” (UNDP 1976a, para. 132). The Administrator endorsed this hands-off approach as he “… expressed agreement with the idea that the Programme’s major responsibility at that point was largely to develop a preparedness to respond when national authorities and executing agencies defined the opportunities” (UNDP 1976a, para. 137). Thus, the lack of agreement on the importance of WID/GAD in the Governing Council, a function of its specific organisational characteristics, meant there was no strong push for norm operationalisation, resulting in very little action on the norm.
5.2 The first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in the EC

The EC first formally recognised WID in November 1982 in the Council Conclusions Concerning Community Development Aid in Relation to the Situation of Women in Developing Countries (Council of the European Communities 1982a).

**Which norm integration driver dominated?**

i. Process and timing

Although the adoption of the 1982 Council Conclusions was the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD, it was preceded by a number of developments on WID/GAD in the European Parliament and the Commission that help to explain the decision to formally recognise WID/GAD in 1982. Notably, the first significant steps towards the integration of women’s issues in the EC in general were taken by the European Parliament in 1979 when an ad-hoc Committee on Women’s Rights was set up. In October 1980 the Committee organised a discussion on WID/GAD and invited the Commissioner for Development, Mr. Cheyson, to give a presentation on ‘Women in Development’ (European Parliament 1980). Following this meeting, the Committee issued a detailed report in January 1981 on The Position of Women in the European Community, which included an extensive section on WID/GAD (European Parliament 1981). The rapporteur for the report, and also one of the most vocal members of the Committee on issues relating to development cooperation was a Dutch Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Hanja Maij-Weggen (Interview with Turner).

The section of the report on WID/GAD is remarkable as it strongly blames gender inequality in developing countries on colonialism and development actors, suggesting that the position of women was much stronger in traditional African societies. Notably, the report states that “Under the influence of colonial policy…the role of women was gradually reduced” and that “women, who during the colonial era were forced into the unpaid employment sector, are frequently ignored by modern development experts” (European Parliament 1981, para. 14.2.1).
Despite this glorification of traditional African societies, the report takes a very strong stand against harmful traditional practices, and strongly presents the aim of WID/GAD as improving the position of women in developing countries, without a strong emphasise on effective development (European Parliament 1981, para. 1.14.1). In addition, the report is very detailed, covering a number of different issues such as education, health, and work, and is very coherent.

The approach taken by the report, while different from most other donor or global accounts of WID/GAD at the time, including the Declarations of the First and Second World Conferences on Women in Mexico and Copenhagen, is very similar to the Dutch WID/GAD policy of 1980 (United Nations 1975a, 1980). Notably, the Dutch policy states that “The literature shows that the penetration of Western economic influence in developing countries has had a preponderantly negative effect, particularly on the economic independence of women in those countries” (Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1980, para. 2.2). This suggests strong and direct influence on the content of the report by the Dutch rapporteur, Hanja Maij-Weggen.

The report was followed by a Resolution of the European Parliament On the position of women in the European Community, which equally included a substantive section on WID/GAD, and strongly puts the aim of the Resolution as combating “women’s subordination”, another term that is not included in global documents but in the 1980 Dutch WID/GAD policy (Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1980; Parliament 1981).

The developments in the European Parliament, largely originating from the Women’s Committee, in particular from Maij-Weggen, a Dutch member, were followed by an intervention of the Dutch representatives in the Council at a meeting of Development Ministers in May 1981. In this meeting the Dutch representatives formally requested the EC to take up the issue of WID/GAD (Council of the European Communities 1981). It was this request from the Council that lead to the European Commission to draw up its first statement on WID/GAD in October 1982. Notably, the document entitled Women and Development in Community Practice – Impact of Women on Community Action explicitly states that it was written in
response to a “request by the Dutch delegation to take up the issue of Women in Development” (Commission of the European Communities 1982a, para. 1). The document presents a very weak account of WID/GAD, putting forward the opinion that focusing on one part of the population, such as women, poses the risk of creating “tensions in families”, and strongly stressed that development should aim to benefit all (Commission of the European Communities 1982a, p. 1). In line with this, the document states that respect for national cultures – or, indeed, the view expressed by national authorities – must guide any actions on WID/GAD, which are only to be undertaken if the partner country explicitly demands it.

The Commission report does not refer to the importance of equality or rights, does not present WID/GAD as important for effective development, and does not provide any information on how the issue will be integrated in EC cooperation. Overall, the report does not provide a clear stand on WID/GAD and reflects a very cautious, even reluctant, attitude towards the issue. Thus, it embodies a very different approach to the one taken in the European Parliament Report and Resolution.

Following the Commission document, the Council adopted its Conclusions in November 1982. Thus, it seems to have been the cumulative pressure from the European Parliament’s Women’s Committee, spearheaded by a Dutch MEP, as well as the Dutch representatives in the Council that resulted in the Commission document, which ultimately lead to the first high-level endorsement of WID/GAD by the Council in 1982. The impact of explicit Dutch pressure on the adoption of the Conclusions is further supported by the fact that the Dutch policy on Women in Development of 1980 explicitly states that the Dutch government

…will promote the adoption of an emancipatory development policy by the Common Market, a policy devoting attention to the advancement of women... (Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1980, para. 4.2.3)

Thus, the adoption of the 1982 Conclusions seems to be, at least in part, a result of a Dutch policy priority and pushed for by the Women’s Committee of the European Parliament. A prominent member of the European Parliament concurs with this
assessment as she stated in an interview for this thesis that “It all began in the Women’s Committee” (Interview with Rodano).

A brief look at actions undertaken by other Committees of the European Parliament and by the Commission further supports this conclusion, as neither seemed to allocate any importance to WID/GAD in 1981/82, suggesting that it was not them that put pressure on the Council to adopt the Conclusions. First, the Development Committee of the European Parliament did not engage with WID/GAD until much later and then, seemingly, reluctantly. Notably, it did not appoint a rapporteur to react to the Resolution on women in the EC in 1981, and rejected a Motion for a Resolution on WID/GAD tabled by one of its members in 1982, giving the reason that this issue is better dealt with by the ACP-EEC institutions (European Parliament Committee for Development Cooperation 1983). In fact, it was not until 1986 that the Development Committee issued its first report on WID/GAD, and only did so after it was explicitly asked to do so by my Parliament following the Nairobi conference.

Similarly the Commission did not include WID/GAD in its memorandum on the “Community’s development policy” of October 1982 nor is WID/GAD mentioned in its Plan of Action to Combat World Hunger or its Action Programme on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Women (Commission of the European Communities 1982b, 1982a, 1981c). This strongly indicates that neither the Commission nor the Development Committee of the Parliament put any pressure on the Council to take up WID/GAD and further supports my conclusion that it was indeed the pressure from the Dutch through the Parliament’s Women’s Committee and the Council that significantly contributed to the first formal recognition of WID/GAD in EC development cooperation.

ii. Policy approach

Overall, and in contrast to UNDP, the first EC Council Conclusions on WID/GAD deal with conceptual issues relating to WID/GAD but are conceptually very incoherent. For instance, the document strongly stresses that the aim of WID/GAD is not to benefit women specifically, but rather to “contribute to harmonious
development of the entire population” (Council of the European Communities 1982a, preamble). In order to achieve this, the Council “is prepared to take full account of the role of women in development…” (Council of the European Communities 1982a, preamble). Yet, the substantive part of the Conclusions present the aim of the policy as increasing the status of women. Notably, the document states that,

The creation of income for women which contributes to the subsistence of the family will strengthen the position of women in the local community and increase their participation in the economic development process…Training is especially needed…with the aim of increasing women’s capability to manage their productive resources…(Access to credit) should enable women to obtain the production elements necessary for them to benefit fully from the opportunities opened up by the creation and increase of income. (Council of the European Communities 1982a, para. 2(c))

No other justifications related to efficiency are given for these suggested interventions. This strongly indicates that the overall reason for integrating WID/GAD is not solely increasing the effectiveness of development, but also improving the status of women as an aim in its own right. However, the way it is presented – the efficiency argument being stressed in the preamble while the others being stressed in the substantive part of the conclusions – illustrates a considerable level of conceptual incoherence in the document.

The level of incoherence is even stronger when the treatment of culture is considered. While the preamble explicitly states that “development aid projects in favour of women must be carried out in conformity with the development objectives of the recipient country”, the substantive section of the conclusions calls on the EC to take action on “cultural, religious, social and economic factors, which determine the status and low level of participation of women in development” (Council of the European Communities 1982a, preamble and para. 1(c)).

iii. Level of operationalisation 1982 - 1985

The first step towards norm operationalisation was taken in 1982 when the first WID desk in DG Development was set up. However, the WID desk was only staffed by one part time and one temporary post, which seemed highly inadequate considering
that the desk was responsible for “staff sensitisation and training, internal networking, provision of technical advice concerning WID/GAD, provision of information and preparation of studies and project and programme evaluations” (Commission of the European Communities 1994 p. 29). In addition, the desk was located in the Human Resources division in the DG giving it very little influence over policy-making or implementation procedures and falsely framing WID/GAD as a human resource issue (Colombo 1994a).

Apart from the creation of the first WID desk in DG Development, there were hardly any other steps taken to operationalise WID/GAD in EC development cooperation. No training sessions on WID/GAD were held until 1985, there were no staff incentives for the integration of WID/GAD, no programming tools for the integration of WID/GAD, and no financial resources allocated to its promotion. In addition, WID/GAD was not taken up by other policies, whether they related to development or the promotion of women’s rights. Notably, the Commission’s Memorandum on Development Policy does not mention WID/GAD, which is not noted by any of the European Parliament or Council reactions to it (Commission of the European Communities 1982b). Also, the Action Programme on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men 1982-85 does not mention development or external relations, an oversight again not picked-up by any of the other EC institutions at the time (Commission of the European Communities 1981b).

WID/GAD was to some extent integrated in general programming tools, such as the “Manual for project preparation and appraisal” and the “Handbook on project evaluation and assessment” (OECD 1988; European Parliament 1986a). However, these tools were hardly used and were overall considered ineffective. Notably, their use was not compulsory leading only to the “occasional existence of gender assessment in project design” and to some evaluations looking at WID/GAD, depending on the personal interest of the consultant (Commission of the European Communities 1985a). Thus, it seems fair to conclude that in the three years after the first high-level recognition, WID/GAD had not been integrated in any significant way in EC aid operations.
Table 8: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in EC aid 1982 - 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Level of operationalisation - EC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of human resources allocated to WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 part time officer, 1 temporary post.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of HR on WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Located in the human resource division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training on WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming tools for WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of WID in other programming tools and policies</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some but tools not used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources allocated to WID</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No WID budget line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integration of WID in other activities not recorded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance incentive on WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iv. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated?

The above analysis of the process leading up to the Conclusions, its content, and the level of operationalisation show that also in the case of the EC, this first step towards norm integration in the Council was driven by social influence considerations. First, the process analysis showed that it was explicit and prolonged pressure for action on WID/GAD from the European Parliament that significantly contributed to the first high-level recognition. This suggests that the decision to adopt the Conclusions was overall driven by reputational concerns rooted in the need to respond to calls from Parliament, especially as Parliament had only just begun to be directly elected, giving it a particular status as representing the voice of the people of Europe. The decision was further facilitated by the fact that Parliamentary pressure was echoed by one member state in the Council, and, coupled with increased international recognition of the norm, which meant that most member states accepted some action on norm integration, as they agreed that the EC should be seen to be doing something on WID/GAD. Further, the policy itself is very incoherent and hardly any steps towards operationalisation were taken in the three years following the adoption of the conclusions, suggesting that this first high-level recognition was indeed dominantly driven by social influence considerations, rather than ethical considerations of the value of the norm across the organisation.
**Why did this norm integration driver dominate?**

i. Explaining the timing

As with UNDP, also the timing of the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in the EC can be explained by reference to its organisational structure, notably its source of authority. The EC’s source of authority on development was, like UNDP’s, split between delegation by the member states and delegation by the European Community as a whole. This source of authority partly rooted in delegation by the European Community meant that the Council was to some extent susceptible to pressure from the European Parliament. This was especially from 1979 onwards, as members were now directly elected by citizens of Europe and Parliament could more genuinely claim that it represented the interests of the people of the Community.

The particular set-up of Parliament, in turn, facilitated that the pressure exercised was strong indeed. First, Parliament exhibited a medium level of diversity with members representing a variety of different nations and political parties. Diversity was only ‘medium’ as members are exclusively European. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) also had a high amount of freedom, as apart from representing their constituencies, they are relatively free to promote their views on matters they consider important, provided they are in line with the EC’s mandate and their overall party group (Interview with Turner; Interview with Sichrovsky). The open mandate of the EC in relation to development aid further increased the level of freedom of MEPs, providing opportunities for the inclusion of many different issues using a variety of different frames (Interview with Fransen).

This diversity of Parliament increased the likelihood of the presence of members who felt strongly about WID/GAD, such as some Dutch members, and the high level of freedom allowed them to act on their believes and strongly push for the advancement of the norm in the way they saw fit. In addition, the setting-up of the Women’s Committee allowed for the aggregation of these MEPs, creating a highly homogenous group strongly committed to the intrinsic importance of equality, again, with a large amount of freedom to make their voices heard. It seems to have been this homogeneity coupled with the level of intrinsic persuasion on the issue, allowed
for by the medium level of diversity in the European Parliament as a whole, and the
level of freedom to act on this persuasion, that explains the relatively early timing
and the coherent approach focused on the intrinsic value of the norm of the Women’s
Committee Report.

Apart from the susceptibility to pressure from Parliament, the timing of this first
high-level decision was facilitated by the medium level of diversity in the top-level
decision-making body itself. This is illustrated by the fact that the next and most
decisive step towards the adoption of the 1982 Conclusions was the call by the Dutch
representative for development cooperation in the Council, and the subsequent
Commission document. Thus, it was the presence of an intrinsically persuaded actor,
made more likely by a medium-diverse decision-making forum, that was crucial in
this context. This was further aided by the relatively open mandate of EC
development cooperation, which provide considerable freedom for delegations to
raise issues and allowed for the Dutch representative to make the case that
WID/GAD fits squarely within the EC’s mandate. In contrast to UNDP, this freedom
was not curtailed by a strong procedural mandate that could have discouraged the
promotion of specific issues by donor states.

ii. Explaining the approach

The reason for the incoherent approach to WID/GAD was, as with UNDP, largely
due to the composition of the EC’s top-level decision-making body, the Council.
First, the Council is composed of all EC member states and operates on a consensus-
basis. This means that decisions are taken by a large number of principals from
diverse cultural backgrounds (albeit less diverse than UNDP). The diversity and
multi-membership meant that there was no agreement on the value of the norm and
the consensus culture as well as the weak substantive mandate for development
meant that the content of the policy had to be based on a compromise between actors
with different views on WID/GAD.

A case in point was France’s position on WID/GAD in the negotiations leading up to
the Conclusions. France, at that time, did not want to be perceived to be interfering
with recipient states regarding their ‘cultures and traditions’, especially in relation to
WID/GAD and strongly advocated for a hands-off approach to the issue (Interview with Maij-Weggen). The first draft of the Conclusions did not include an opening paragraph that stressed the primacy of national culture. In reaction to this ‘absence’, the French permanent representative proposed an amendment to the draft conclusions, suggesting the addition of the following opening paragraph, which was the only amendment proposed in the entire negotiation process,

Desirous that its co-operation action should contribute towards the harmonious development of the entire population in the beneficiary countries the Community is prepared to begin talks with these countries on the question of the role of women in development. The Community is ready to examine with the authorities of the States concerned with due respect for their sovereignty and for their economics cultural and social organizations measures which could be taken to ensure that the aid is more closely integrated with the local situation and is therefore more effective due allowance being made for the traditional role and particular problems of women. (Council of the European Communities 1982d, p. 5)

To satisfy France and solicit her agreement the Council Working group drafted the following paragraph, which was subsequently adopted in the final Conclusions,

In adopting these conclusions, the Council, anxious that its co-operation measures should contribute to the harmonious development of the entire population in the countries assisted, is prepared to take full account of the role of women. The Community is aware that development aid projects or operations in favor of women must be carried out in conformity with the development objectives of the recipient country (Council of the European Communities 1982b, preamble).

The paragraph captures the essence of the French proposal but the actual wording is less evasive and less insistent on protecting the sovereignty of recipients with regard to WID/GAD. Still, the addition of this issue significantly contributes to the overall incoherence of the document.

Moreover, to appease France, the Council of Ministers for Development meeting on 8 September 1981, also agreed that the integration of WID/GAD had to “avoid anything that could be interpreted as interference with partner countries’ internal affairs as well as any philosophical or sociological discussions.” Focus was to be
given to “concrete examples of development projects that benefit women” (Commission of the European Communities 1982a, para. 2).

Thus, this need for negotiation, justification, and compromise resulting from the multitude of views and the need for consensus reduced the freedom of committed actors and certainly helps to explain why the Conclusions are not strongly framed in intrinsic language of equality, do not aim for social transformation, do not mention empowerment or do not take a stronger stand on culture, and are overall incoherent—all of which is done, for example, by the Dutch WID/GAD policy of 1980 and the European Parliament Report and Resolution. However, in contrast to UNDP, the EC’s open mandate and less culturally diverse composition, meant that some member states were less concerned with promoting specific values in its development cooperation. In addition, in the early 1980s the WID/GAD norm had achieved greater international recognition which meant (1) that some member states, such as the Netherlands, had taken significant steps towards norm integration in their bilateral work and (2) that there was an emerging perception that, as a responsible development actor, one should be seen to be doing something on WID/GAD. This meant that member states pushed for stronger conceptual engagement, which resulted in a policy that, in contrast to UNDP, did address conceptual issues, albeit incoherently.

iii. Explaining the level of operationalisation

The reason for weak norm operationalisation was essentially twofold. First, there was no consistent pressure or follow-up from the Council on the level of implementation of the decision by the Commission and the Council had not allocated specific funds for this purpose. Second, weak operationalisation was related to the particular characteristics of the Commission. As outlined in Chapter Four, the Commission is characterised by relatively homogenous staff and centralised top-level decision-making lead by the Commissioner and the Director General as well as an identity conception focused on delegation. The former meant that the likelihood of a strongly persuaded top-level decision-maker was lower than in the Council while the latter meant that (1) action in the Commission was dependent on a strong and explicit push from the Council to implement specific actions and that (2) the
freedom of staff to pursue their own personal beliefs was highly limited. Yet, as seen above, no strong and explicit push towards specific actions on WID/GAD was exercised by the Council after the adoption of the Conclusions.

However, as the Conclusions had given the Commission a mandate to take action, norm operationalisation could have also resulted from a strong push from the Commissioner or the Director General, which, however, would have required them to be strongly persuaded of WID/GAD, the likelihood of which was reduced as explained above. Indeed, interviews suggest that the then Commissioner for Development, Chyson, as well as the Director General did not seem particularly committed to the issue and did not push for action on WID/GAD inside the Commission (Interview with Rodano; Interview with Maij-Weggen; Interview with Hemeldonck). Such an absence of individuals strongly committed to the norm, coupled with the limited amount of freedom of operational staff, meant that hardly any action on operationalising WID/GAD was taken inside the Commission.

Despite the limiting effect of diversity on comprehensive norm operationalization, it was the same structural characteristic, combined with an increasingly strong international momentum on the norm and the ability of member states to earmark funding for WID/GAD that allowed for the few steps towards operationalization to take place. Notably, the establishment of the WID/GAD desk was a result of direct pressure from a member state in the Council of Ministers and the WID/GAD posts were directly funded by a number of specific member states (Commission of the European Communities 1984b, p. 22).

Thus, in short, the mild diversity of the Council allowed for some steps of operationalisation to take place, while at the same time providing an obstacle for strong and consistent pressure for action on WID/GAD that would have facilitated comprehensive norm operationalisation. The homogeneity of decision-making in the Commission facilitated the absence of persuaded decision-makers and, coupled with a lack of freedom for action of operational staff, and no strong push from the Council, made operationalisation of WID/GAD weak.
5.3 The first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in ODA

The UK aid administration adopted its first official WID/GAD policy in 1986. Until then the administration had not taken WID/GAD up in its official discourse or operations despite the global trend and momentum created by the three International Women Conferences and the adoption of specific OECD/DAC WID guidelines in 1983 (OECD 1983; Cassen 1982; Eyben 2003; Ryrie 1984; Conlin 1985; ODA 1982). ODA’s lack of action on WID during this early period was such that the OECD/DAC considered the UK “…as one of the major obstacles to mainstreaming WID issues in the work of the DAC” (Eyben 2003, p. 883).

Which norm integration driver dominated?

i. Process and timing

ODA’s decision to publish its first WID strategy was not preceded by any preparatory action inside the department or any pressure exerted by government or Parliament. Notably, an analysis of parliamentary debates in the years and months prior to the drafting of the policy show that the issue of WID was only very scarcely mentioned. Even though the Third World Conference on Women brought a number of issues on women to the forefront, these were largely related to the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Hansard, 19 June 1985, 20 February 1986). In addition, an agenda item called “Advancement of Women” appeared frequently across many different issues areas after the conference. However, the specific issue of women in development was only raised three times during 1985 and 1986. All three contributions essentially requested more information on what ODA was doing to promote women in development and asked how ODA assessed the extent to which its interventions were effective (Hansard, 01 July 1985). Having said that, the questions were posed with considerable time lapses between them and no specific questions or requests were made regarding the drafting of a WID policy in the two years prior to its adoption. This hardly seems to amount to significant pressure on ODA from Parliament.
What, then, lead to the adoption of this policy? Interviews with former ODA officials and women’s advocates, as well as written accounts by observers, strongly indicate that it was specific pressure exercised by a group called the ‘WID lobby’ that resulted in the adoption of the first WID/GAD policy. This ‘WID lobby’ consisted of “a loose network of women academics working in the field of gender and development studies, joined by some women in development NGOs and the British Council” (Eyben 2007, p. 68). According to Rosalind Eyben, ODA/DFID Social Development Advisor from 1986 – 2000 it was this group that created a “push” and that “the booklet was produced for this reason” (Interview with Eyben). A number of other commentators interviewed for this thesis concur with this assessment (Interview with Holden; Interview with Beall). Interestingly, although it seems to have been efforts by a national WID lobby, the lobby did use the momentum of the global 1985 Nairobi conference to organise itself and to commence its direct lobby efforts. This was done through a meeting between the lobby and a Junior Foreign Office Minster present at the Nairobi conference (Interview with Eyben). This lobby meeting was followed by a subsequent meeting in London with senior staff in ODA, which became the first in a series of regular meetings between the Lobby and ODA officials that lasted well into the 1990s (Interview with Eyben; Interview with Moser). Thus, the available accounts of the time leading up to the 1986 booklet and interviews with key actors do indeed suggest that the pressures of the national lobby, that gained momentum through the global Nairobi conference, was a decisive factor that lead to the drafting of ODA’s first WID policy.

However, why was it this particular conference and this particular lobby group that lead to the adoption of a WID policy? A tentative answer to these questions is that the WID lobby did, indeed, only get increasingly organised around the Nairobi conference, and, thus, managed to exercised more effective pressure on ODA than before (Interview with Moser). This was further aided by the momentum created by the Nairobi conference, which increased the pressure on ODA to take action on WID more so than the previous two conferences. In addition, the WID lobby, although including a broad range of actors, was relatively aligned with government priorities. This was so especially in contrast to a British women’s network that had lobbied on the inclusion of WID into ODA prior to the mid-1980s. This group, called the “Subordination of Women Group” (SOW) was very active in the 1970s on a broad
range of issues, including WID. Politically rooted in socialism, this group had a very transformative vision aiming for significant changes in the way in which development agencies – and governments in general – approached issues of gender, power, and social relations (Interview with Beall; Interview with Young). It seems that the lobby’s strong ‘transformative’ approach, as well as its focus on training, research, and capacity building of women’s groups in developing countries as opposed to focused lobbying of ODA meant that SOW did not have any significant impact on the uptake of WID/GAD by ODA (Interview with Young). This suggests that a combination of concerted lobby efforts, increased access to decision-makers, and increased global momentum on WID – all of which were facilitated by the World Conferences – combined with a lobby group fairly aligned with government priorities, contributed to the drafting of the first WID policy by ODA.

ODA’s decision to publish its first WID strategy in 1986 is, thus, significant in three regards. First, it suggests that ODA was not significantly susceptible to external pressures – be they at global (UN) or regional (OECD/DAC) level. Interestingly, even the need to report on its implementation on the OECD/DAC’s WID guidelines in 1983/84 did not seem to have resulted in any kind of significant action inside the organisation. This indicates that externally generated pressure did not lead to any kind of norm integration process – not even one driven by social influence. Second, the timing of the first policy suggests that there was no strong internal commitment to promote the agenda at top-level in government or ODA. Had such an internal push existed, action on WID/GAD would have, most likely, been taken significantly earlier (Interview with Eyben). Third, the timing suggests that ODA was susceptible to certain kinds of national pressures, albeit only those closely aligned with its political ideology and identity perception.
The policy approach

The policy shows a high level of conceptual incoherence and indicates an overall very weak commitment to WID/GAD, compared to other donors and the global discourse at the time (Andersen and Baud 1987, p. 230). Notably, it does not mention equality between men and women. It merely recognises women’s contribution to development and states that the aid programme has aimed to meet their specific needs and interests. The overall aim of British aid is clearly stated as helping the “economic and social development of the world’s poorest countries” and women are presented as an important “resource” to this end (ODA 1986, p. 1).

Further, the policy presents WID issues as only relevant in specific areas and not across the entire aid programme and takes a strong view against influencing recipient government’s stance on WID (ODA 1986, p. 6). Lastly, the policy includes a strange division of projects regarding WID. Notably, it is suggested to divide projects into,

…those which have an impact on society in general – but for which it would be impossible to ascertain the impact on women in particular; those which can be expected to have an impact on women, but whose benefits do not depend on women being agents…; and those where benefits will accrue to women and where women’s role is crucial in implementing the project. (ODA 1986, p. 6)

This formulation did not reflect the global or regional discourse at the time (Andersen and Baud 1987, p. 230), which suggests that the drafters did not aim to please an external audience or had much expertise in this field.

Thus, overall, the approach to WID taken by the policy is incoherent and no meaningful discussion of the types of challenges women face, or what ODA will do to address them, is provided, suggesting weak commitment to the norm. This conclusion is further supported by findings from a number of NGO reports on the policy published at the time. Notably, a War on Want report published in 1988 finds that, “Policies in this area are a low cost public relations exercise to satisfy the Development Assistance Committee, lobbyists on the UN Decade for Women and public opinion” (Mazza 1988, p. 29).
iii. Level of operationalisation 1986 – 1987

In contrast to many development actors, ODA did not establish a post specifically dedicated to WID/GAD, as the issue was formally placed under the responsibility of two Social Development Advisors. This set-up was considered grossly unsatisfactory and reflected a very limited commitment to actual norm uptake by senior management (Eyben 2003, p. 881). There were no staff incentives for including WID in other official’s work and WID was not part of staff performance reviews (Jensen 2006, p. 25).

Programming tools specifically for WID were scarce, consisting of the 1988 strategy, which will be analysed in the next Chapter, and a checklist developed in the mid-1970s that was very limited in its utility and actual use (Mazza 1988, p. 21 and p. 39). The use of the programming tools on WID was not compulsory.

An analysis of a number of general programming tools strongly suggests that they had not adequately taken up WID. Notably, the guidelines Planning Development Projects issued in 1987 do not mention WID at all, even though they include a list of social issues (education, health, housing, water, wastewater and sewage) (O.D.A. 1987). Moreover, the guidelines include key questions for each issue to help guide programming. None of the questions include sex-disaggregation and reference is only made to generic groups such as “student” and “people”.

The 1988 document on Appraisals of Projects in Developing Countries explicitly refers to gender but merely states that it is ‘obvious’ and does not require special consideration as it will be taken into account if appropriate (ODA 1988a). This suggests, yet again, a weak approach to WID/GAD reflecting limited understanding and/or engagement with the concept. No budget was allocated to the implementation of the WID policies and no systematic staff training on WID/GAD was put in place.
Table 9: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in ODA 1986 - 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None specifically allocated to WID/GAD;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 3 allocated to social development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of human resources working on WID/GAD</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reported to Chief Economist;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Grade 6 and 7 – no direct meetings with Chief Economist;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not part of the projects and evaluations committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training courses (frequency, status, and substance)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compulsory training introduced in 1988;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited actual reach of training and short duration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming tools for WID/GAD</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• WID checklist (developed in 1970s);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1988 WID strategy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use not compulsory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of WID/GAD in general programming tools</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Very weak, incoherent, or none at all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not recorded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance incentives on WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above strongly suggests that the norm was only weakly operationalised in the three years following the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD. A report published by War on Want report comes to the same conclusion:

The few women and development policies that do exist are ineffective….the checklist and guidelines are not used…There are few safeguards of women’s interests. Project planners and evaluators do not have to prove that they have taken women into account…Above all, policy on women and development is just not taken seriously.” (Mazza 1988, p. 39)
iv. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated?

The above analysis strongly suggests that also ODA’s first step towards norm integration was driven by social influence. Importantly, prior to the adoption of the policy, there was no pressure to take action on WID/GAD from inside ODA or from government or parliament. Yet, there was emerging pressure from a group of CSOs ideologically aligned with government, which started to call for action on the norm. This, together with testimonials of ODA officials who worked there at the time, suggests that it was this reputational pressure that lead to the adoption of the first ODA WID/GAD policy. Moreover, the analysis of the policy itself and the level of operationalisation, both of which are very weak, further suggest that norm integration was indeed driven by social influence considerations rather than ethical considerations relating to the intrinsic or instrumental value of the norm.

**Why did this norm integration driver dominate?**

i. Explaining the timing

The timing of the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD by ODA can be explained by reference to its particular organisational structure. First, being bilateral and part of the Foreign Office, ODA had a source of authority ‘delegated’ by the British government and a mandate dominated by a desire to act in the UK’s national, particularly commercial, interest (Ryrie 1984). Combined with financial autonomy from external sources, this meant that ODA was not overly concerned with looking like it was acting in line with global development trends, making it virtually immune to external global pressure and scrutiny, at least in relation to WID/GAD. Yet, its structural set-up meant that it was susceptible to pressure from national CSOs more or less in line with the current government’s political ideology. Thus, the ‘nature of scrutinisers’ was fairly homogenous and aligned with government ideology. This meant that any action on WID/GAD would need to be triggered by either internal pressure or pressure from specific national CSOs.

The presence of internal pressure was made less likely due to the relatively homogenous top-level decision making involving only very few actors and helps to
explain why no pressure for action on WID/GAD from inside ODA was exercised. Thus, action on WID/GAD relied on pressure from specific national CSOs who got organised and got access to decision-makers around the Third World Conference on Women.

ii. Explaining the approach

The ease at which the decision to draft the first WID policy was taken, and its incoherent content, was closely linked to the homogeneity and informal decision-making in the organisation and its limited exposure to scrutiny, all of which meant that norm uptake depended largely on the interest of a few individuals inside the organisation. Indeed, this was the case with the 1986 WID policy. The policy was drafted by the, then, Chief Social Development Advisor, Sean Conlin in cooperation with the information office (Interview with Eyben). There was no consultation within or outside ODA and the policy was never discussed and approved in any formal setting (Interview with Eyben). Thus, the drafting process was low-profile and non-participatory and can be characterised as homogeneous, centralised, and informal, providing operational staff with considerable freedom and almost no scrutiny. This meant that staff’s personal conviction and knowledge regarding the norm could be fairly directly included in the policy, resulting in a strong reliance on the level and nature of operational staff’s personal commitment to the norm to determine the dominant norm integration process. This, coupled with a lack of strongly intrinsically committed individuals in the drafting process, lead to a weak and incoherent policy (Interview with Eyben).

iii. Explaining the level of operationalisation

The reasons for the very limited steps towards norm operationalisation taken by ODA around the adoption of the first policy are rooted in the same structural characteristics that explained the late timing and weak policy approach. As a bilateral agency, ODA was only susceptible to scrutiny from particular groups that were fairly homogenous and did not call for action on WID/GAD (government, parliament and certain CSOs). Without such pressure, ODA relied on an internal push to take action on the norm. Yet, its homogenous decision-making structure that was dominated by
only very few actors made the presence of a decision-maker willing to call for action on the norm unlikely. This was especially so as ODA had a weak mandate on development and WID/GAD would not have easily fit as a priority issues for the department.

Having said that, the large amount of freedom for operational staff – a result of ODA’s open mandate and its informal decision-making structure – would have made it possible for staff to take action, especially low-cost action, on the norm (as will be seen later). Yet, this move would have required operational staff who were personally driven to take action on WID/GAD, as there was no pressure to do so from senior management. As outlined above, this was not the case in ODA at that time, explaining the weak level of norm operationalisation.

5.4 The explanatory power of organisational characteristics summarised

The analysis above has established that the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD happened at very different times in the three organisations and that in each case, this development was driven by social influence considerations rather than instrumental ethical or intrinsic ethical considerations. It was also shown that, despite a common dominance of social influence, the strength of norm uptake differed considerably between the three organisations with ODA exhibiting the weakest norm uptake, while both UNDP and the EC showing signs of stronger norm uptake.

It has further been argued that both, the different timings of the first high-level recognition, as well as the dominance of social influence and the variance in norm uptake were in each case influenced by specific organisational characteristics. This section briefly summarises these arguments in preparation for an expansion of the analysis in the next Chapter.

Explaining the timing

The difference in timing of the first high-level recognition of the norm was largely due to the organisations’ different (1) sources of authority leading to susceptibility to
scrutiny from different kinds of ‘scrutinisers’; (2) their substantive mandate; and (3) the composition of their decision-making bodies.

Both the EC and the UNDP had a split source of delegated authority, with UNDP’s authority being partly rooted in delegation from the UN system and partly from its member states, and the EC looking to its member states on the one hand, and the European Parliament, on the other. This meant that both organisations were susceptible to scrutiny from a variety of different groups, making the nature of their ‘scrutinisers’ multiple and diverse, thereby increasing the likelihood of the presence of a scrutiniser that speaks out on behalf of the norm. In the case of the EC it was the Women’s Committee of the European Parliament that played this role, while in the case of UNDP it was ECOSOC.

In addition, UNDP’s substantive mandate, although fairly weak at the time, was still relatively strongly focused on promoting global development, especially compared to the EC whose main task was to promote European integration. This further increased UNDP’s susceptibility to pressure from global development trends, helping to explain why it was the first to take action on WID/GAD.

ODA, due to its bilateral nature and its resulting source of authority being delegated by the UK government and its very weak mandate on global development, in contrast, was almost ‘immune’ to external, global pressure and only susceptible to scrutiny from a fairly homogenous and small group of scrutinisers (NGOs of similar political ideology, members of parliament of same political party), which is why it took much longer for the ‘scrutinisers’ to get organised and put pressure on ODA to take action on WID/GAD.

Viewing the organisations in this light explains why they took action on WID/GAD at such different times, as they were all susceptible to different kinds of pressure. Out of the three, only UNDP was significantly susceptible to global pressure, while it required pressure from the European Parliament and British NGOs respectively to push the EC and ODA to act.
Moreover, the timing of WID/GAD uptake was influenced by the composition of the decision-making forum of the organisations, particularly the number of principals and their cultural diversity. This was especially so once the norm had become increasingly internationally recognised in the early 1980s. Notably, in the case of the EC it was explicit pressure from one vocal member state – the presence of which was facilitated by its multi-member and diverse decision-making body – that led to the adoption of the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD. Yet, in contrast to UNDP, cultural diversity was only mild and the EC’s mandate was not strongly focused on neutrality and ownership of developing countries. Combined with an increased international recognition, this decreased the reluctance of members to speak out for WID/GAD in the Council and decreased the opposition from others to take some action on the norm.

The flipside of the argument can also be illustrated by reference to ODA. In this case it was the homogenous and small number of principals that decreased the likelihood of the presence of a vocal protagonist who could have instigated action on the norm. None were present, making any action on the norm entirely reliant on external pressure, to which ODA was hardly susceptible, explaining the late adoption of its WID/GAD policy.

Explaining the policy approach

Overall, the approaches to WID/GAD dominant in the reviewed policies were to a significant extent influenced by the (1) composition of the decision-making bodies; (2) the decision-making process; (3) the strength of the mandate and (4) the resulting level of freedom of actors to promote the norm as they saw fit.

UNDP’s approach was largely determined by the high-level of diversity and multi-membership of the Governing Council, which meant that there was no agreement on the value of the norm, and its consensus-based decision-making. Combined with its weak substantive, yet strong procedural mandate focused on neutrality and developing country ownership, this meant that there was no freedom for vocal actors to push the norm as they saw fit, especially in an international context in the mid-
1970s when the norm was only just emerging. This resulted in a weak and non-conceptual approach to WID/GAD.

Similarly, the EC’s approach was strongly influenced by the medium level diversity and multi-membership of the Council and its consensus-based decision-making, which meant that there was no agreement on the value of the norm. However, in contrast to UNDP, the EC’s mandate, which allowed for the promotion of European values, and less culturally diverse composition meant that some member states had a greater degree of freedom as they were less concerned with promoting specific values through development cooperation. In addition, by the 1980s the norm had achieved greater international recognition. This explains the weak and incoherent, although more conceptually engaged, approach taken by the EC.

In the case of ODA, which was the weakest of the three in terms of policy coherence and operationalisation, social influence considerations drove norm integration precisely due to the homogeneity and informal decision-making in the organisation, its weak mandate and its resulting limited exposure to scrutiny, all of which meant that norm uptake depended largely on the interest of a few individuals inside the organisation. As the case study showed, the few individuals involved in WID/GAD in ODA in the mid 1980s were not particularly interested in the norm, explaining the overall dominance of social influence and the fact that ODA was the last to take up WID/GAD and did so in the weakest way.

**Explaining the level of operationalisation**

The above account has shown that two structural characteristics - diversity and multi-membership - made comprehensive operationalisation difficult, especially in a consensus-based decision-making forum, as there was no agreement on the value of the norm. The cases of the EC and UNDP illustrated this point very well. However, it was the same diversity and multi-membership that also facilitated earlier steps towards norm operationalisation in both UNDP and the EC. ODA, with a homogenous and limited membership decision-making structure and only weak susceptibility to scrutiny saw no steps towards operationalisation during the 1970s and early 1980s. Similarly, the Commission, being very homogenous, centralised and
only mildly susceptible to scrutiny, did not take significant action on WID/GAD either. This suggests that diversity and multi-membership, two features characteristic of multilateral aid agencies, are a double-edged sword for norm integration. While they facilitate some action on the norm – potentially more so than homogeneity and limited number of principals in decision-making – also seem to be obstacles to comprehensive norm uptake.

**Conclusion**

The Chapter has shown that in all three cases norm integration was driven by social influence rather than ethical considerations. The only instance in which ethical considerations seemed to dominate was in the Women’s Committee of the European Parliament. This was due to the fact that there was no agreement on, or appreciation of, the value of the norm among top-level decisions makers in either organisation – a factor, which was strongly influenced by organisational characteristics. In UNDP and the EC/EU this lack of agreement was a result of the high and medium level of cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making, coupled with consensus-based decision-making, which meant that action on the norm required negotiation, justification, and compromise, thereby reducing the freedom and power of committed actors at different levels to take action on the norm as they saw fit. In the case of ODA/DFID, the homogenous decision-making structure on WID/GAD and the few decision-makers involved meant that staff would have had ample freedom to promote the norm as they saw fit. Yet, the absence of committed decision-makers and staff – again a function of the homogeneity and limited number of decision-makers – made the presence of committed actors less likely. Indeed, no committed actors were present and, coupled with ODA/DFID’s low susceptibility to scrutiny, this meant that ODA/DFID was the slowest to take action on WID/GAD and, when it did, took very weak action indeed.

Importantly, the Chapter has also found that the same characteristics that made UNDP and the EC less likely to have norm integration driven by ethical considerations – multi-membership and cultural diversity of decision-making structures – if combined with an open mandate and strong susceptibility to scrutiny to multiple and diverse ‘scrutinisers’ (in the case of UNDP), helped to kick-start
some kind of action on the norm. Yet, to repeat, it was also the same diversity and multi-membership in the case of UNDP and the EC that lead to an incoherent policy approach and patchy operationalisation.

Multilateral organisations might, therefore, be better (faster and slightly more comprehensive) at initial norm uptake than their bilateral counterparts. However, the Chapter also clearly shows that this was more related to their heightened reputational concerns than greater sensitivity to ethical considerations as norm integration in neither organisation was driven by ethical considerations.

In summary, the Chapter suggests that certain characteristics typical of multilateral organisations – multi-membership and cultural diversity in decision-making – if combined with an open mandate and, especially if combined with strong susceptible to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers, make organisations more likely to take some kind of quick action on a new norm. Yet, the same characteristics reduce the likelihood of agreement on and appreciating of the norm, leading to negotiation, justification and compromise, all of which reduce the freedom and resources of committed actors, if present, to have their beliefs on the norm drive norm integration. Characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations, on the other hand – few members and homogenous decision-making and weak susceptibility to scrutiny – if not combined with a committed top-level decision-maker, make these organisations slow to take any action on the norm, and when they do, make the action likely to be very weak indeed.

The above indicates that, although organisational characteristics specific to multilateral or bilateral organisations influence when and how a norm may be taken up by an organisation, the importance of ethical considerations in norm integration seems to be minimal in all cases. This insight certainly calls into question simplistic assertions on the importance of ethics in norm integration and especially, any kind of generic claims that multilateral organisations, due to their structural set-up, are more likely to be guided by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts.

However, so far, the analysis has only focused on one key moment very early in the norm integration process in each organisation, making the above findings highly
tentative. In order to expand the analysis and test the above findings, the following Chapter considers the second key moment in norm integration: the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy.
Chapter 6: First comprehensive WID/GAD strategy or policy

Introduction

The previous Chapter has analysed the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in UNDP, the EC, and ODA and has put forward two arguments. First, it has made the case that in all three organisations the first formal step towards norm integration was dominantly driven by social influence considerations rather than considerations relating to the value of the norm as such. Second, the Chapter has argued that the dominance of this particular norm integration driver was significantly influenced by the organisations’ specific organisational characteristics. In particular, it was suggested that certain characteristics most typical of multilateral aid organisations – cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making bodies, and consensus-based decision-making – make strong norm integration, comprehensive and coherent policies, and the dominance of intrinsic ethical arguments for norm integration, all of which are indicative of norm integration overall driven by ethical considerations, unlikely. This is so because these characteristics make an agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm among decision-makers less probable, thereby leading to negotiation, justification and compromise. These, in turn, make coherent policies and comprehensive norm operationalisation less likely. Yet, it was also shown that the same characteristics, if combined with strong susceptibility to scrutiny from diverse scrutinisers, made the organisations quick at taking some kind of action on an emerging norm.

Moreover, and critically, the Chapter also suggested that characteristics most typical of bilateral aid organisations – cultural homogeneity and few members in decision-making – equally provide a constraining environment for ethical considerations to drive norm integration, as they make the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker less likely. The absence of such top-level commitment, combined with low levels of susceptibility to scrutiny, made ODA even less likely to take any kind of action on WID/GAD than UNDP and the EU.

Thus, the Chapter provides a first set of arguments suggesting that ethical considerations did not matter much at all in the norm integration processes analysed
in all three organisations. In other words, the findings provide little support for the claim that ethical considerations matter at all. More specifically, although multilateral organisations may be quicker at new norm uptake, the findings provide no support for the claim that they provide a more conducive environment for ethical considerations to matter.

This Chapter expands the analysis to the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy adopted by each organisation. It proceeds like the previous Chapter by first establishing which norm integration driver dominated the process and subsequently examines if this dominance was influenced by organisational characteristics.

The Chapter finds that the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy and norm integration in the subsequent three years was also overall driven by social influence considerations in each organisation. As in the previous Chapter, the simple and overarching reason for this was the continued lack of agreement on, and appreciation of, the importance and value of the norm by the organisations’ top-level decisions makers. The same organisational characteristics noted in Chapter Five – multi-membership and culturally diverse decision-making bodies, and consensus-based decision-making processes – are found to have made such an agreement more difficult; while homogeneity and few decision-makers made any kind of appreciation of the value unlikely.

Yet as Chapter Five, this Chapter finds that characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations – cultural diversity, multi-membership and high levels of susceptibility to scrutiny – were also instrumental in facilitating action on the norm, as they increased the likelihood of the presence of committed and vocal decision-makers who put the issue on the organisations’ agenda, making norm operationalisation in UNDP and the EC slightly more comprehensive than in ODA.

The one remarkable difference between this Chapter and the previous one is that in this second step towards norm uptake there was a visible presence of ‘pockets of ethical commitment’ that drove parts of the norm integration process in all three organisations reflected in more coherent policies and strategies. In each case, this was largely enabled by the presence of committed individuals at decision-making
and/or operational level in each organisation who were – albeit to different levels – enabled to act on their personal ethical commitment due to increasing operational freedom. Yet, in all three organisations, these individuals did not have significant decision-making power or resources and, therefore, did not manage to influence the overall process that drove norm integration across their organisations.

Crucially, the presence, and level of freedom, power\textsuperscript{11}, and resources of committed decision-makers and operational staff – and thus, their ability to influence norm integration – was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. Notably, in the case of UNDP and the EU the Administrator and some member states respectively seemed very committed to the norm but certain organisational characteristics of UNDP’s and the EU’s decision-making bodies, especially their diversity and multi-membership, which made agreement on the value of the norm less likely, reduced the freedom of these decision-makers and committed operational staff, where present, to act on their beliefs. In other words, organisational characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations (diversity and multi-membership) provided some kind of ‘straight jacket’ for committed decision-makers and, even more so, operational staff, to have their ethical commitments to the norm drive norm integration at organisational-level.

Yet, the example of ODA shows that also the reverse characteristics – homogeneity and few members in decision-making – can provide a constraining environment because they make the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker less likely. This absence of a committed decision-maker, in the case of ODA during the second key moment, coupled with low susceptibility to scrutiny, meant that committed operational staff, when present, were also not given the freedom, power, or resources to have their ethical beliefs on the norm drive norm integration. This explains why norm integration in all three cases was dominantly driven by social influence at the level of the organisation.

\textsuperscript{11} “Power” in this context refers to “decision-making power”, such as the inclusion in certain decision-making fora.
6.1 The first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy or policy in UNDP

Which norm integration driver dominated?

i. Process and timing

UNDP adopted its first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy in 1986. This section shows that the decision to adopt this strategy was a result of (1) specific pressure from certain vocal member states, combined with highly critical findings of UNDP’s norm integration efforts by an inter-organisational assessment, (2) the increased global momentum on the norm around the Third World Conference on Women, and (3) personal commitment by the new UNDP Administrator, Bill Draper. Each point is illustrated below.

Pressure from vocal member states and global momentum: Since the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in 1975 there was increasing pressure for action emerging from specific member states in the Governing Council, particularly the Nordics, Canada, and the United States. These countries started to regularly ask for updates on UNDP action on norm integration and frequently expressed concern that not enough was being done. Notably, the Nordics stated in a debate on a WID/GAD evaluation carried out in 1982 that “the report gave reasons for serious concerns” and that “the Nordic countries believed that action to ensure that women become both participants and beneficiaries of technical co-operation activities should be continued and intensified...” (UNDP 1982b, para. 20 and 21).

In response to these concerns and with a view to the Third World Conference on Women to be held in 1985 the Governing Council decided in 1982 to undertake an inter-organisational assessment of the integration of WID/GAD into a number UN agencies, including UNDP. The decision clearly states that,

…suitable evaluation studies should be prepared …for presentation to, and use by, the World Conference that will be convened in 1985 to review and appraise the achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. (UNDP 1982a, para. 49(d))
The findings of this assessment, published in March 1985, were highly critical and strongly called on UNDP, as well as the other UN agencies, to take more systematic action on the norm (UNDP 1985c, para. 89). Notably, the assessment stated that, there was a “neglect of women’s interests” in many projects reviewed and that this was most likely because “existing guidelines and instructions are not being adhered to” (UNDP 1985c, para. 87). It explicitly concludes that “A call for action needs to focus on how to surmount the obstacles rather than dwell on accomplishments” (UNDP 1985c, para. 98). The critical findings of this evaluation were put forward as one key rational for the adoption of the strategy. Notably, the Administrator explicitly states in his report of 1985 that, “…based on the recommendations of the study brought forth, UNDP is launching a major strategy to encourage greater involvement of women in all UNDP supported projects and programmes” (UNDP 1985c, para. 16).

In addition, strong and explicit calls from the Nordics and a few other supportive countries for more action on the norm continued and intensified. For instance in June 1985, the Nordics explicitly stated that they, “…strongly favoured improving the situation of women and bringing them into the mainstream of the development process” (UNDP 1985e, para. 23). They were strongly supported by the Netherlands, Canada and the US (UNDP 1985e, para. 30 and 37). Indeed, it was Canada that put forward a proposal to develop a strategy for WID/GAD implementation with “verifiable objectives and a time-frame for implementation” (UNDP 1985d, para. 30). This call for a strategy was explicitly endorsed by the United States delegation (UNDP 1985d, para. 33).

Following this pressure from Canada, the US and the Nordics, and the negative findings of the inter-organisational assessment, the Governing Council officially requested the Administrator in 1985 “to develop…an internal implementation strategy to strengthen the capacity of the Programme to deal with issues of women in development….” (UNDP 1985d, para. 3).

**Commitment by the UNDP Administrator Bill Draper:** In addition to pressure by specific countries and the negative findings of the assessment, accounts from WID/GAD officials who worked in UNDP at the time suggest that the new
Administration played an important role in the adoption of the strategy. Notably, one WID/GAD specialist interviewed for this thesis stated that, “He (Draper) wanted to make this a landmark for himself and his position. He wanted this to be his…He pushed the issue strongly” (Interview with Eide). This view is further supported by a number of senior UNDP officials interviewed for this thesis. (Interview with Eide; Interview with Hamadeh; Interview with Leitner; Interview with Reid). Indeed, when asked why the first WID/GAD strategy was adopted, another former WID/GAD official simply and firmly proclaimed “Draper – it was Draper!” (Interview with Hamadeh). Murphy further endorses the personal commitment of Draper in his detailed account of UNDP when he states that “Bill Draper put attention to women and advocacy for women at the centre of the Programme’s work” (Murphy 2006, p. 205). Draper himself made a strong statement to the Governing Council to this effect. He stated that “Rather than rhetoric, a genuine commitment was required on the part of the United Nations agencies, and donor and recipient countries. As far as UNDP was concerned, he had already made that commitment…” (UNDP 1986c, para. 46).

Yet, interestingly, UNDP staff who worked with Draper also strongly assert that Draper’s commitment was to a significant extent based on the fact that there was a increasing international momentum and strong pressure by some member states on UNDP to take action on WID/GAD, not a strong belief in the value of gender equality as such (Geisler 1999). According to a former Head of the WID Division, “..he (Draper) he was extremely conservative…he was a practical and very successful capitalist and he was committed to the issue but not with an intellectual understanding of it” (Interview with Eide). Another high-level UNDP official sated that WID/GAD was simply a “fashion” and that this “fashion had a constituency so “he (Draper) went along with it (WID/GAD) like they (Heads of Agency) go along with other topics” (Interview with Kaul) Yet, “personally, he was as favourable of women’s issues as he was of other issues” (Interview with Kaul). In other words, these accounts suggest that Draper’s commitment to WID/GAD was less motivated by a strong personal belief in the value of gender equality and more motivated by his susceptibility to political pressure on WID/GAD and a recognition that the promotion of the issue was a political opportunity for himself and UNDP. Thus, although Draper’s personal commitment seems to have been very important in these
developments, the analysis suggests that his commitment was considerably driven by political and reputational consideration relating to UNDP as well as himself, not considerations about the value of the norm as such.

ii. Policy approach

The approach taken in the strategy is remarkably different from the 1975 Governing Council decision. Although the strategy is still very limited in its conceptual deliberations it is more conceptually explicit than the first high-level recognition and strongly framed in instrumental arguments. Notably, the strategy states that its general objective is “to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of development programmes supported by UNDP through the active involvement of women as participants and/or beneficiaries” (UNDP 1986d, para. 253). Equity, equality, or rights are not mentioned at all in the entire document.

Despite the inclusion of instrumental arguments, the approach in the strategy continues to be conceptually very thin and strongly focused on procedural issues. For instance, the strategy’s stated aim, rather than being the integrating of women in development or the promotion of gender equality, is framed in exclusively procedural terms as “the creation, within UNDP of an institutionalized process…(so) that women’s interests are furthered and safeguarded” (UNDP 1986d, para. 1). A detailed analysis of the content shows, that indeed, the strategy calls for the development of further guidelines and databases for sex-disaggregated data and women’s profiles, extensive staff training, the integration of WID in country programming, and makes solid suggestions for systematic evaluations and reviews of the integration of WID.

The strategy is quite bold in explicitly pointing the finger at the Governing Council for not providing sufficient resources for the integration of WID and makes it very clear that the strategy can only be meaningfully implemented if sufficient resources are granted (UNDP 1986d, para. 27). Last, the strategy describes clear lines of responsibility and calls for more accountability of senior staff in the promotion of WID (UNDP 1986d, para. 6). Thus, overall, the strategy shows an, albeit limited,
explicit uptake of instrumental arguments for the promotion of WID, and a continued strong focus on procedural issues that include strong calls for adequate funding.

### iii. Operationalisation

The section below shows that the level of norm operationalisation in UNDP from 1986 to 1990 increased but, overall, remained weak and underfunded and in some cases, such as human resources, seemed to decrease within the same period.

**Human resources:** The number of staff dedicated to the promotion of WID/GAD in UNDP increased steadily over the period of analysis. After a slow start in the 1970s, the mid-1980s saw the setting up of the first UNDP division for Women in Development (WID division) in 1986. The division was staffed with two policy advisors and one director at D2 level and placed in the Bureau of Programme, Policy and Evaluation. This strategic position meant that the director of the division was part of senior management, part of the Personnel Committee and part of the Action Committee, which approved large projects over 500,000 USD (Interview with Eide). According to a statement of the director to the Governing Council, the setting up and status of the WID division was “not tokenism…the location of the division in UNDP’s organization also testifies to the sincerity of this initiative…we have access to each and every corner of the organization” (Eide 1987). In an interview for the thesis, the director further stressed the empowered position she and her colleagues in the division occupied in the organisation, especially through their participation in the Action Committee,

> We had a weekly, so called, Action Committee – which was extremely valuable because in this committee I met all other senior managers and those responsible for programmes and projects – they had to come and present anything that was over 500,000 USD –…I could propose as amendments to these projects…I was a full member of the Committee. (Interview with Eide)

Despite this overall positive assessment, Miller and Razavi find that the division had “no authority to ensure that its suggests were followed” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 17). The director concurs as she stated that “They (members of the Action Committee) all very politely listened but I never had the opportunity to follow up
what they really did” (Interview with Eide). Moreover, the budget allocations to the division were highly insufficient, as discussed below and the division was, even officially, considered severely understaffed” (UNDP 1990b, para. 44).

In addition to the WID division, UNDP set-up a WID/GAD focal point system. (UNDP 1989a; Kardam 1991). The focal point system continued and expanded throughout the entire research period. However, numerous evaluations have found that the system did not function well, mainly because the mandate of the focal points was too broad and their status too junior (Geisler 1999, para. 4.2). Indeed, it was UNDP’s official strategy to appoint UN volunteers – not professional staff – as gender focal points in country offices (UNDP 1997, para. 170).

In 1992 the WID division was renamed ‘Gender in Development Programme’ and became part of the Social Development and Poverty Elimination Division and subsequently the Poverty Practice Area (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 366). Although one additional policy advisor was recruited, the Division was overall downgraded, the director was moved from being at D2 to D1 level (lower) and, as a result, the division had less strategic access to decision-making in the organisation, such as management meetings (Interview with Hamadeh). Moreover, the move of the unit to be part of a large division focused on social development and poverty, send a signal that WID/GAD was not considered as a priority in itself, but part of UNDP’s efforts to achieve other overarching goals, such as poverty reduction (UNDP 2006).

Overall, a number of external assessments concur with my assessment above as they find that the WID division/GIDP was severely under-staffed and under-funded throughout the research period and that its position in the organisation did not give it adequate authority (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 366). Mondesire notably states that,

No matter how it is rationalized, the current status of the gender planning function in UNDP cannot serve the gender equality goals, which the organization so ardently articulates...GIDP is severely limited in the reach of its actions by not having access to certain important management arenas. (Mondesire 1999, p. 99)
Training: Training on WID essentially commenced with the setting-up of the WID division in 1987, although some ad-hoc WID training sessions were held even prior to that as noted in the section above. Since staff training was one of the official roles of the division, efforts were significantly stepped-up in the late 1980s. The number of training sessions for staff increased and training was further expanded to cover all levels of staff as well as government counterparts (United Nations Development Programme 1989a). In addition WID/GAD was mainstreamed into regular training programmes of UNDP (United Nations Development Programme 1989a). During this period UNDP had a full-time staff member exclusively dedicated to training and during the early 1990s and the norm was included as a compulsory element in the staff induction course for all UNDP professional staff. Importantly, WID/GAD was treated at the same level as all other thematic issues, such as poverty reduction (Interview with Leitner). Yet, only 15% of staff had attended specific WID/GAD training courses by 1990 (UNDP 1990b, para. 27).

Although the content of training changed over the research period, it was largely focused on practical and technical aspects of the norm, and did not stress the importance of gender equality per se or the need for social transformation to achieve it (UNDP 1986d; Interview with Mondesire). Indeed, according to Kabeer, the approach promoted in UNDP training – the ‘Harvard framework’ - contains “little that would challenge existing gender roles or the allocation of power between men and women” (Naila Kabeer quoted in Porter 1999, p. 9).

Programming tools: The development of programming tools for the operationalisation of WID/GAD increased considerably in the second half of the 1980s. Most notably, the already existing WID guidelines were updated and made more specific and a UNDP Programme Advisory Note (PAN) – Women in Development – was issued in 1986 (Kardam 1991, p. 20). This is a detailed, coherent and comprehensive document (Kardam 1991, p. 20).

Shortly after the adoption of the PAN, a strong and comprehensive operational WID strategy was published in 1987. The strategy clearly puts the responsibility for WID/GAD at the highest level and calls for a comprehensive inclusion of WID in all projects and programmes (UNDP 1987, para. 5). This contrasts UNDP’s approach
strongly with ODA’s and the EC’s approach of limiting WID to specific areas in which women were considered relevant. The strategy is further remarkable as it allows UNDP a considerable advocacy role on WID vis-à-vis partner governments (UNDP 1987, para. 7). The strategy also provides mechanisms to help to ensure that WID/GAD is taken up at every stage of the project cycle, especially the approval and evaluation stages.

Last, the strategy introduces a WID Project Review Form. This form was intended to be used in all projects and includes questions on the “pertinence of women’s issues to the project in order to generate proposals that specify how the project will integrate women” (UNDP 1988, para. 48(a)). Importantly, from 1988 onwards the use of the form was mandatory (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 366). In addition, to enable meaningful monitoring and evaluation, a WID questionnaire was sent to all field offices in 1989 to establish baseline data on the inclusion of WID at country level (Eide 1987).

The trend to produce very comprehensive programming tools for the operationalisation of WID continued in the 1990s (UNDP 1993). This was so much so that Hafner and Pollack judged the quality of some of UNDP’s programming tools as “one of the best” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 366). Thus, overall, this assessment suggests that from the mid-1980s onwards, UNDP has consistently produced comprehensive, coherent, and mandatory programming tools for the integration of WID/GAD.

However, despite the existence of these very strong tools, their effectiveness was not systematically monitored or assessed and available evidence suggests that they were not very effective or widely used (Geisler 1999, p. 42). One evaluation that was carried out regarding the use of the Project Review Form finds that “In many field offices, the only activity undertaken related to women in development is the filling in of the women-in-development project review form…it is a pro-forma activity rather than, as intended, an aide-memoire...” (UNDP 1990b, para. 33). Another UNDP document stats that “By and large...gender was superficially added to the project background to pass the screening process, but rarely integrated into the operating assumptions of the development sectors” (UNDP 1996, p. 2).
This trend of weak implementation continued throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. One large-scale evaluation finds that although “Planning instruments to address women and gender concerns have been around since the late 1980s but from all indications were never widely used” (Mondesire 1999, p. 23). This conclusion is further supported by data from interviews with high-level UNDP officials conducted for this thesis. Notably, one top-level official stated that, “…they (UNDP) are very good at it in theory but the practice is not always so good” (Interview with Anstee). An external consultant who has worked on WID in UNDP concurs when she states that, there was only “lip service paid” to the issue, particularly by senior management (Interview with Mondesire).

Integration in overall policies: The level of integration of WID/GAD in overall policies and reports increased somewhat from the mid-1980s onwards. For example, WID was consistently mentioned in the Administrator’s reports to the Governing Council, starting in 1985. In line with the largely non-conceptual, yet slightly instrumental, approach in the 1986 strategy, the reports almost exclusive focus on procedural issues and do not engage in any justification and conceptual detail regarding WID/GAD. A case in point is the Administrator’s report on ‘Women in Development’, which does not provide any conceptualisation or justification of the norm but provides over 13 pages of procedural detail (UNDP 1990b). Having said that, this analysis also shows that, when mentioned, the underlying rational was almost exclusively focused on instrumental reasoning with a strong focus on national ownership and respect for culture and tradition. Notably, the Administrator’s report clearly states that, “A sensitivity to gender issues is a means of improving development efficiency” (UNDP 1990b, para. 34). Equality, empowerment and rights are not mentioned at all.

The integration of WID/GAD into overall policies and programming tools intensified with the increasing reference to Human Development, and subsequently Sustainable Human Development from the late 1980s onwards. WID was presented at times as one component – and at times as an important means towards – Human Development. Either way, this inclusion meant that many general documents, tools and policies include specific references to WID (United Nations Development Programme 1994).
Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD: As mentioned above, UNDP was the first organisation out of the three that put it place efforts to record how much of UNDP’s technical cooperation budget was spent on WID/GAD in 1974 (UNDP 1982a). However, the accuracy of this system, especially when gender mainstreaming became the preferred strategy for the advancement of WID/GAD, left a lot to be desired. Notably, Miller and Razavi find that “the mainstreaming strategy makes it difficult for the UNDP to calculate the total resources being spent on women” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 27). Another evaluation also finds that “A review of the existing financial management system shows that the current UNDP classification framework does not allow to track resource allocation to gender mainstreaming within its present structure” (UNDP 1998b, p. 11). Despite the weak system to measure budgetary allocations to WID/GAD, there is some available data on resource allocations to WID/GAD throughout the period of analysis. This strongly suggests that throughout the period of analysis the budget allocated to promoting WID/GAD through technical cooperation as well as financial resources allocated to the WID division/GIDP were very low and considered grossly inadequate, even by some member states themselves (United Nations Development Programme 1982; United Nations Development Programme 1986c).

The limited resource allocation to WID/GAD continued in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with an average allocation of 0.7% (Mondesire 1999, p. 7). In 1990 the Nordic countries bluntly stated in a Governing Council debate that it “…considered that it was obvious that, if the division was not given sufficient resources, there would be a danger that the whole issue would be marginalized in UNDP” (UNDP 1990c, para. 144).

Performance incentives: UNDP seems to have made the greatest efforts at introducing performance incentives on WID/GAD in staff management among the three organisations assessed. Indeed, in the late 1980s accountability for the recruitment of women was included in UNDP staff performance evaluations. According to a senior UNDP official, UNDP staff had to report on the extent to which they had promoted the recruitment and professional advancement of women in UNDP (Interview with Leitner). In addition, in 1990, a report to the Governing Council stated that “Gender sensitivity is listed as a dimension of the new
performance appraisal system currently being introduced” (UNDP 1990b, para. 22) and Miller and Razavi talk about “GIDP’s strategy for pushing for clearer incentive structures” to encourage staff to integrate WID/GAD in their work (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 21). However, no formal or comprehensive system to include WID/GAD in performance appraisal systems for staff was introduced during the period of analysis (UNDP 2006).

Table 10: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in UNDP 1986 - 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of human resources allocated to WID</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2 policy advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 director at D2 level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Focal point system further expanded and ToR developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of HR on WID</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training on WID</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Systematically conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Staff member dedicated to training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Practically focused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming tools for WID</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• WID Programme Advisory Note; WID strategy; Project Review Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compulsory use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of WID in other programming tools and policies</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Frequently referenced in administrator reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1990 recognised as one of UNDP’s six priority areas in Governing Council decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources allocated to WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inadequately recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Average 0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance incentive on WID</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Performance evaluation include questions on efforts made to support the professional advancement of women in UNDP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iv. Summary: What norm integration driver dominated?

The evidence strongly suggests that the first WID/GAD strategy was a result of strong and increasing pressure from specific members states, negative findings of a large-scale WID evaluation, and the increased global momentum around WID/GAD. All three aspects also encouraged the newly appointed Administrator to push for action on the norm from the inside, further contributing to the adoption of the strategy in 1986. This already suggests that, despite increased commitment to WID/GAD by some member states, and arguably by the Administrator himself, the decision to adopt this first detailed strategy was largely driven by social influence considerations. This conclusion seems especially plausible when accounts of
WID/GAD officials are considered that suggest that the Administrator’s push for action on WID/GAD was indeed less due to his personal commitment to the value of gender equality, but rather driven by pressure from the UN system and vocal member states.

The approach to WID/GAD taken in the strategy is largely non-conceptual, although some instrumental arguments are included in the justification of the strategy. The strategy is coherent and comprehensive. Moreover, considerable steps towards norm integration, especially regarding the programming tools, the integration of WID in broader policies and tools and attempts to include WID/GAD into performance incentives were taken. This indicates increased genuine commitment – or freedom to express commitment – to the norm by some member states as well as by operational staff inside the Administration. Without such commitment, there would not have been any noteworthy pressure form inside the Governing Council and the Administration would not have produced a strong strategy and very comprehensive programming tools for norm integration.

However, the implementation of the strategy was severely underfunded, the programming tools developed were hardly used, there was no accountability for their use, and the suggested performance incentives on WID/GAD never materialised. In addition, numerous evaluations of WID/GAD in UNDP during that time find that, overall, there was a widespread lack of commitment to WID/GAD (UNDP 1982a, para 75(a); 1980).

Taken together, the above observations strongly suggest that, despite pockets of genuine commitment to the norm in the Administration and among member states, overall norm integration across the organisation was still dominantly driven by social influence considerations rather than instrumental or intrinsic ethical considerations.
**Why did this norm integration driver dominate?**

i. Explaining the timing

The timing of the first comprehensive strategy was a result of three interrelated factors: (1) increasing pressure from member states in the Governing Council; (2) increased international momentum and pressure on UNDP to better integrate WID/GAD; (3) a supportive incoming Administrator.

The first two factors are strongly intertwined with UNDP’s specific organisational characteristics. First, the presence of very vocal principals who exercised consistent pressure in UNDP’s decision-making forum was a function of its cultural diversity and multi-membership, which increased the likelihood of the presence of principals willing to speak out on behalf of the norm. This was particularly so (and in contrast to 1975) as the global momentum on WID/GAD had significantly increased and more member states had strong bilateral policies on the norm.

Second, the fact that the global developments and the resulting pressure for action on WID/GAD had a relatively strong impact on UNDP – at least compared to the other two case studies – was certainly also linked to UNDP’s source of authority being partly delegated from the UN system, but also increasing ‘moral’ and linked to the promotion of human development, making UNDP much more susceptible to pressure from the UN system. Indeed, UNDP’s ‘moral authority’ gained prominence in the mid-to late 1980s with the incoming Administrator, shifting UNDP’s main focus from procedural aspects of developing country membership to substantive issues relating to human development (as described in Chapter four). It was this shift that allowed UNDP to engage in more advocacy and speak out on behalf of the norm. Indeed, Murphy’s account of UNDP clearly observes that this shift in mandate lead to UNDP to take on an explicit advocacy role, including on WID/GAD (Murphy 2006, p. 7).

This shift in mandate, together with vocal member states and mounting UN system pressure rooted in the third World Conference on Women and the negative findings of the inter-organisational assessment, further help to explain why the Administrator,
motivated by reputational concerns, personally pushed for the adoption of the WID/Gad strategy, further contributing to its adoption in 1986.

ii. Explaining the policy approach

Why did UNDP’s policy approach remain largely non-conceptual, yet increasingly focused on instrumental (rather than intrinsic) arguments for norm integration? First, direct pressure from certain member states inside the Governing Council, a function of the organisation’s culturally diverse and multi-member decision-making body, albeit now coupled with an increased global momentum of the norm and stronger bilateral policies on WID/GAD in certain countries that encouraged member states to speak out on behalf of the issue, lead to an increased inclusion of instrumental arguments. In addition, the overall lack of agreement, especially from developing countries, combined with a consensus-culture, meant that even intrinsically committed staff promoted a largely instrumental and non-conceptual approach to WID/GAD.

Let me first illustrate my argument that strong pressure by certain states – the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Canada – influenced the approach taken by UNDP. Notably, the Nordics issued a joint statement to the Governing Council in 1985 “arguing that the focus on women’s reproductive roles ignored the important productive roles of women.” And that WID “was not just an issue of justice and equality, but a question of growth and efficiency, a means to accelerate substantially the development process” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 14). The Netherlands explicitly supported this approach. Notably, the Dutch delegation stated in a Governing Council debate in 1986 that “Denial to women of their right to act as agents and beneficiaries of development meant the wastage of one of the world’s most valuable human resources” (UNDP 1986b, para. 62). Canada, possibly the most vocal on this issue, stated in a debate in 1985 that “It believed that only when it was fully understood that development must involve both women and men in order to be effective would women in development be incorporated systematically into all project and programme planning” (UNDP 1985e, para. 31). In addition, and discussed in the section on operationalisation, the above countries also explicitly
pushed for the adoption of procedural measures to institutionalise WID United Nations Development Programme 1985d).

This push towards instrumentalism by the Nordics, the Netherlands and Canada was taken up by the Administrator who “…whole-heartedly endorsed the views of the Nordic and other delegations…Women represented a resource [my emphasise]…” (UNDP 1986b, para. 13). This view was promoted as it enabled the Administrator to present WID as fitting squarely within UNDP’s existing mandate. Notably, he states that “To fulfil its mandate to support the efforts of the developing countries to accelerate their economic and social development, the United Nations development system should above all take full cognizance of women as a development resource in need of the same attention as the male half of the population” (UNDP 1985c, para. 112).

Further, the instrumental approach to WID and the focus on procedural issues was also strongly promoted inside the administration by the head of the newly established WID Division, Ingrid Eide. For Eide, as for many WID/GAD officials, this approach was a strategic decision based on the political climate of the period and the specific mandate of UNDP and not a reflection of their personal convictions that were strongly feminist. In an interview for this thesis she stated that,

I think it is important that, yes, of course we know about the suffering and the humanitarian needs, etc, but our focus in UNDP is on development. Equality is the issue for CSW…our mandate is development. So I tried to narrow the focus. ..It (WID) had to be a question of professionalism – you could say that I was promoting the issues of WID as an independent variable for development…I tried to be realistic and pragmatic – more reformist than revolutionary…I had to professionalise and de-emotionalise the issue in order to intrigue the professionals that you had in UNDP. (Interview with Eide)

This pragmatic approach was consciously continued by the WID Division director that followed Eide, Elizabeth Reid. Notably, Reid stated that during her time in UNDP she made a conscious effort not to be seen as “constantly having a neon light above (her) head saying ‘Women!’” as, according to her, this would not have been conducive to carry out effective work on WID/GAD (Interview with Reid). Another
high-level UNDP staff member concurred when she stated that “We in UNDP are always very balanced and pragmatic…we were careful not to use arguments that were too feminist” (Interview with Leitner). The view that the instrumental and procedural approach was a conscious decision by WID/GAD advocates is further supported by an analysis of Geisler who finds that “advocacy by the director and other WID entrepreneurs was not aggressive or strident…commentators remember this period very well and confirmed that the “style” of advocacy had been non-threatening and helped to create a climate of acceptance for WID” (Geisler 1999).

However, as much as the approach was a decision taken by key individuals, it was strongly influenced by UNDP’s organisational set-up. First, this choice of approach was a result of the fact that, even in the decades following the first official recognition of WID, there was no conceptual agreement on the importance and relevance on WID in UNDP’s highly diverse decision-making body. Notably, in a debate in 1990 Sri Lanka framed women strongly as wives and mothers when its representative stated that, “To improve the quality of life of women, their tasks as housewives and mothers must be made less burdensome” (UNDP 1990c, para. 128). In contrast the Pakistan delegation stated that “In Pakistan, the old concept that a woman’s sphere of activities was confined to her home had undergone revolutionary changes since independence” (UNDP 1990c, para. 128). In addition, most other vocal countries, such as the Nordics, strongly pushed for the full integration of women in all spheres. The only thing that seemed to be a common threat over the years and across the various countries’ and the administration’s contributions on WID/Gender was the stress on procedural issues and the framing of the issue in instrumental terms. One Governing Council report, for instance, explicitly states that “all members agreed that the attainment of national development goals depended in large measure on the participation of both men and women in the development process” (UNDP 1990c, para. 128).

This lack of agreement on a conceptual approach to WID/GAD strongly influenced the strategies chosen by WID/GAD advocates inside the organisation. Notably, one former head of the WID Division stated in an interview for this thesis that, due to this lack of agreement in the Executive Board one “would not take an issue to the Board if you cared about it” as it would not be accepted. Rather, one would work
quietly and frame issues in such a way that they were easily acceptable. For instance
the instrumental approach to WID/GAD was a “deliberately chosen strategy” as
UNDP’s governance structure was “highly politicised” and represented a “straight
jacket” for the promotion of certain issues such as WID/GAD. Another UNDP staff
member noted that “Radical work on gender is not possible. Sad, but it was also an
education for me to realize the limitations of an institution like this. From the
outside, it’s quite impressive and overwhelming. It’s only when working on the
inside that you recognize the constraints” (Menon Sen quoted in Murphy 2006, p.
210).

Second, the decision by WID/GAD advocates to focus on an instrumental and almost
non-conceptual approach was strongly influenced by the organisation’s mandate.
Both dominant mandates, ‘neutrality’ and ‘developing country ownership’ until the
mid-1980s and subsequently Human Development with a strong focus on poverty
eradication, lent themselves much more to norm integration along instrumental and
procedural lines as they did not require a shift in mandate, but rather a re-framing of
the norm to fit within the overall mandates. Excerpts of the interview with Ingrid
Eide quoted above show that these considerations indeed played an important role.
Murphy concurs when he states that,

Rather than embracing feminist theory as the core to understanding
development, most analysts took the easier pat of adopting a non-
paradigmatic approach that asked whether the conditions of women
within society had an impact on a variety of development indicators
including income per capita, technological innovation, and
sustainable levels of population growth. (Murphy 2006, p. 204)

Thus, the largely non-conceptual approach and the increasing focus on instrumental
arguments was a result of the explicit pressure from some member states as well as a
strategic decision by internal WID advocates. Importantly, however, this strategic
decision by WID advocates to focus on instrumentalism did not seem to be a
reflection of their personal conviction, as outlined earlier. Instead, it was a strategic
decision based on their perception of UNDP’s mandate, its organisational culture, the
diversity of, and large number of principals in its decision-making structure
combined with consensus-based decision-making, and the resulting lack of
agreement on a conceptual approach to WID.
iii. Explaining the level of operationalisation

The reason for the specific level of operationalisation of WID/GAD can also be linked back to UNDP’s organisational structure. First, the few steps that were taken were the result of consistent pressure and earmarked funding from certain committed member states, which was facilitated by the organisation’s high-level of cultural diversity and large number of principals in its decision-making body and, controversially, its limited financial autonomy that enabled earmarking. A case in point was the decision to set-up a WID division in 1986. Although the decision was not formally discussed in the Governing Council, as the analysis of Governing Council debates and decisions reveals. However, protagonists such as the director of the WID Division at that time, as well as observers of this process suggest that it was pressure from specific countries – the Nordics and Canada – that pushed UNDP to set-up this division. In an interview for this thesis, a former director stated that the WID division “was set-up due to pressure from the Nordics, especially Norway, and Canada (Interview with Hamadeh). Hafner and Pollack come to the same assessment in their analysis of WID/GAD in UNDP as they state that “Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, for example, the governments of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland took leading roles, both unilaterally and as members of the Governing Council, to integrate women into the development process and to hold the UNDP accountable for the implementation of gender policy” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 355).

In addition, the observed increase in WID/GAD training in the late 1980s was enabled by the provision of specifically earmarked funding for this purpose from Norway (Geisler 1999). This indicates that it was cultural diversity and a large number of principals, which increased the likelihood of the presences of at least one committed actor in the decision-making forum willing to fund a specific activity, and the ability to earmark funding that allowed for certain steps towards norm operationalisation to take place.

Moreover, the personal commitment of key individuals, such as the Administrator, should not be overlooked, especially regarding the setting-up of the WID Division. This view is supported by a number of senior UNDP officials interviewed for this
thesis (Interview with Eide; Interview with Hamadeh; Interview with Leitner; Interview with Reid) and further endorsed by Murphy who states that “Bill Draper put attention to women and advocacy for women at the centre of the Programme’s work. He created the Women in Development Division...” (Murphy 2006, p. 205). He further finds that senior management came to view the meetings of the Action Committee, set up by Draper, as a space that “obliged us to take into consideration issues of gender...” (Murphy 2006, p. 238). Geisler concurs when she states that “As a result of external pressure, combined with a new support senior management at UNDP, the Division of Women in Development was created in 1987” (Geisler 1999).

Since, as established above, Draper did not seem to have a specific interest or understanding of WID/GAD he was open to action on WID/GAD and, thus, increased the freedom in the Administration to promote initiatives to operationalise the norm. Notably, former senior UNDP staff stated in interviews for this thesis that Draper “did not have a political agenda” regarding WID, which meant that “…he listened...he gave me voice” (Interview with Reid). According to former UNDP officials working on WID/GAD, it was this space and freedom to act that facilitated a number of concrete steps towards norm operationalisation, such as the increase in training and the introduction of performance incentives as the Administrator, “…supported everything we did” (Interview with Eide; Interview with Miller; Interview with Reid).

In addition, many of the specific steps towards operationalisation did not have to be discussed or approved by the Governing Council, further increasing the level of freedom of operational staff. Murphy concurs as he states that, “Such creative results came about because UNDP has attracted people who not only believe in what they do, but who have been able to be creative in times of crisis, and been willing to put themselves on the line and had the freedom [my emphasis] to do so” (Murphy 2006, p. ix).

However, the overall lack of funding for WID/GAD and the lack of accountability mechanisms for the use of WID/GAD tools significantly limited the power of
WID/GAD staff to promote the norm as they saw fit and reduced the level of norm operationalisation. Hafner and Pollack concur as they find that,

While the UNDP has undergone a fundamental transformation of organizational procedure in the last three decades, making the incorporation of gender equality a legitimate goal, it is far from clear that these policies have brought about the institutional changes in structure and culture that are necessary for a mainstreaming approach. (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 358).

Indeed, it was the same diversity that enabled some operationalisation to happen, that proved to be an obstacle for comprehensive and wide-reaching training funded through core funds, as it made overall agreement of allocating core funding to WID/GAD training difficult. Indeed, in debates by the budgetary committee on fund allocation for the strategy “Several members expressed their support for the Administrator’s proposal” and even “expressed concern that the implementation phase had not been planned to start until 1988 and asked whether this phase could not begin earlier” (UNDP 1986a, para. 5), while others expressed concern that “...the financial proposals were being made on an issue on which general agreement had not yet been reached by the Council, and that the strategy proposed could involve, in the long term, an encroachment on the prerogatives of recipient countries” (UNDP 1986a, para. 6). The final decision reached allocated highly insufficient resources to the implementation of the strategy (UNDP 1986d, para. 29).

6.2 The first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy or policy in the EC

Although the EC had adopted a number of Council Conclusions on WID/GAD since the first high-level recognition of the norm in 1982, it was not until December 1995 that the Council adopted its first Resolution on WID/GAD entitled Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation (Council of the European Union 1995). This Resolution is widely considered to be the first EC policy on WID/GAD as it is by far the most detailed statement on WID/GAD since 1982 and, as Resolution, has a higher standing than the previously adopted Conclusions (OECD 1998, p. 34).
**Which norm integration driver dominated?**

i. Process and timing

As mentioned above, in the decade preceding the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD policy, the Council adopted a number of Conclusions on WID/GAD. All Conclusions are very short and do not provide any concrete guidance on next steps to further integrate WID/GAD in EC development cooperation. Moreover, the Conclusions are overall strongly framed in efficiency terms (Council of the European Communities 1985; Council of the European Communities 1987, para. 2). In 1989 the legally binding Lomé IV convention was adopted, which regulated the EC’s relations with all African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The revised Convention includes more extensive references to WID/GAD, although on the whole the issue is still framed in similar terms and no additional specific requirements for integration of the issue are made. After the turn of the decade, the discussion of WID/GAD in the Council decreased and did not substantially flair up until preparations for the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 commenced. It is in this context that the 1995 Resolution was adopted.

The decision to adopt a Council Resolution on WID/GAD was taken at the Development Council meeting in May 1993 (Council of the European Communities 1993b). In contrast to the first high-level recognition, the European Parliament did not seem to have played a role in this decision. Notably, none of the Reports or Resolutions from the Development Committee in the years prior to the decision in 1993 called for the adoption of a Resolution or a more detailed WID/GAD policy (European Parliament 1992a, 1992b). Also, one of the protagonists involved in the drafting of the Commission Communication and the Resolution stated in an interview for this thesis that “Parliament did not play a significant role…it came very late in this” (Interview with Colombo). If it was not pressure from Parliament, what then lead to the decision to adopt the policy?

The reason for this decision seems to have been two-fold. First, the Conclusions themselves and commentators suggest that it was the upcoming Fourth World Conference on Women that lead to the decision to develop a detailed policy on
WID/GAD. Notably, the Conclusions are clearly framed in the context of the upcoming Fourth World Conference on Women. They state the intention to adopt a Resolution in paragraph five and paragraph six makes a strong commitment for the Community and the Member States to participate fully in the upcoming conference (Council of the European Communities 1993). Elgstroem concurs with this assessment as he notes that there was an “emerging perception among high-level DG officials that the Union had to have a gender policy to present at the forthcoming Women’s Conference in Beijing” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 463). There was desire amongst Commission and Council officials to “look good” in Beijing (Elgstroem 2011, p. 464). An external gender expert who was part of the drafting team of the Resolution concurs, as she explicitly stated in an interview for this thesis that the Resolution was adopted as it was “very fashionable” at the time, particularly with the upcoming conference in Beijing (Interview with Colombo).

Second, it has been suggested that it was explicit pressure from Denmark, a country with a very strong bilateral WID/GAD policy as well as pressure from European NGOs, that finally lead to the adoption of the decision to adopt a Resolution in 1993 (Elgstroem 2011). Thus, indeed, it seems to have been pressure rooted in the upcoming World Conference on Women and the explicit push by committed member state that resulted in the decision to adopt the EC first WID/GAD policy.

Following the Council Conclusions of 1993, and as a basis for the envisaged Resolution, the Commission set out to draft a Communication on Gender Issues in Development Cooperation. The Communication followed an in-depth assessment of WID/GAD policies of the EC and its member states, which was conducted by an external consultant under the supervision of the gender desk in DGVIII (Colombo 1994). It was the same consultant who was subsequently asked to draft the text of the actual Communication (Interview with Colombo). Following instructions set-out in the Council Conclusions, the drafting process was supported by the EC gender expert group, which was composed of representatives of all member states as well as the Commission. Notably, the expert group met to discuss various approaches to WID/GAD best suited to the Communication and Resolution and reviewed a draft of the Communication at its meeting in May 1995 (Elgstroem 2011, p. 466).
The actual Commission Communication is strongly framed in efficiency terms. Notably, the summary of the document states that “This paper…details the impact of existing disparities for sustainable development, and explains how neglecting these disparities can jeopardise the effectiveness of development actions” (Commission of the European Communities 1995a, summary). The substantive section of the paper continues this trend. Article 10 for example states that,

Improving women’s control over natural resources and benefiting from their experience…are important steps for avoiding mismanagement of the ecosystem….If the direct effect of mothers’ education on their children’s health and education is taken into account, it clearly appears that women’s education yields a high return on investment…Spending on improved health care for adult women offers the largest return from health care spending than for any other demographic group of adults. (Commission of the European Communities 1995a, para. 10)

Despite this strong instrumental focus, the issue of gender is dealt with in a detailed way stressing the socially constructed nature of it and couching the document in strong and transformative language (UNDP 1986d, para. 27). In addition, the Communication comprehensively outlines what needs to be done to integrate gender into EC development cooperation. This is done in much more detail than in the Resolution (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 3). Overall, the document is strong on procedure but weak on its overall objective. When it mentions its objective, it is strongly framed in efficiency terms and not at all in terms of rights or achieving equality between women and men.

The actual Resolution was discussed and refined by a working group of the Development Council at three meetings in November and December 1995 (Elgstroem 2011, p. 467). Ole Elgstroem’s detailed analysis of debates in these meetings shows that in the course of the discussions a few issues were dropped while others were included. This will be further discussed in the section that explains the approach taken in the policy. The final Council Resolution was formally adopted by the European Council on 20 December 1995.
Overall, the Resolution is fairly incoherent, exhibiting very limited conceptual clarity or engagement with WID/GAD. Notably, neither the overall aim of the Resolution nor the approach taken is clearly stated. First, paragraph one suggests that the objective of the policy is to facilitate “women’s participation in development” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 1) while paragraph two indicates that the Resolution’s aim is to “redress gender disparities” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 2), an objective quite different from promoting women’s participation in development. This difference is not recognised or explained. Regarding the approach to WID/GAD, the Resolution is equally unclear. Although social justice is mentioned once, the reference seems rather tokenistic, suggesting that the dominant approach taken by the Resolution is rooted in efficiency. Specifically, the reference states that “the Council recognizes that redressing existing gender disparities is a critical issue in development in terms of aid effectiveness and social justice, as women are as indispensable partners as men in achieving the objectives for development cooperation…” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 2). Thus, although social justice is mentioned, it is linked back to ‘achieving the objectives for development cooperation.’ The document also states that “gender has crucial implications for the achievement of all development objectives” further suggesting an overall focus on efficiency. Equality is only mentioned once in relation to NGOs, as the Resolution states that “the importance of the dialogue between NGOs and national machineries and NGOs’ positive role in promoting gender equality are recognised” but is clearly not seen as an objective of the Resolution (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 8).

The overall incoherence is further illustrated by the fact that the bulk of the Resolution outlines, what the document calls “general principles for gender-sensitive development cooperation” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 2). Despite this title, most of the issues listed are not actual principles but rather strategies on how to integrate gender. For instance, the first ‘principle’ is that “gender analysis at macro-, meso- and micro-level must be mainstreamed in the conception, design and implementation of all development policies and interventions, as well as in monitoring and evaluation” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 2). Another
‘principle’ is that an “analysis of differences and disparities between women and men must be a key criterion for assessing the goals and results of development policies and interventions” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 2). Not only are both strategies rather than principles, they are also essentially saying the same.

Apart from this incoherence, the Resolution strongly calls for the inclusion of gender equality issues in policy dialogue, includes a comprehensive definition of gender in line with global discourse, and includes a fairly specific and comprehensive list of strategies for the further integration of gender in EC aid (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 4).

iii. Level of operationalisation

**Human resources:** The level of human resources dedicated to WID/GAD was reduced in the early 1990s and, importantly, the one remaining post was filled by a seconded ‘detached national expert’ and funded directly by a member state. The countries seconding and funding this post were the Netherlands and Denmark and with the accession of Sweden in 1995, predominately Sweden (Interview with Varnai). The fact that staffing of the WID desk was done on temporary contracts, staffing was overall very inconsistent, lead to frequent staffing gaps and highly limited continuity or institutional memory on the issue (Braithwaite 2003, p. iii; Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). Overall, during this period as well as beyond, numerous evaluations, including by the OECD/DAC, have found the level of staffing for WID/GAD in the EC to be insufficient.

The position of the WID desk in DG VII in the organisational hierarchy improved slightly in the early 1990s when it was renamed ‘GAD’ desk and moved to the Human and Social Development Unit. However, according to a former WID desk officer and other commentators this was still a highly marginalised position, with no direct influence on the policies and actions of the DG (Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg; Interview with Turner).

Although an informal network of gender focal points was set-up in the mid-1990s, this network was considered fairly disorganised and ineffective (Pollack and Hafner-
Notably, an evaluation conducted in 2003 found that “Some gender focal points exist but it is not clear where and how many….most spend very little working time on gender issues, have no ToR for their gender work and are not trained or provided with support” (Braithwaite 2003, p. iv).

Overall, human resources allocated to WID/GAD in the EC were too few, placed in a marginalised position and not included in many decision-making or advisory groups.

Training: Staff training on WID/GAD in DG VIII commenced in 1991 with a set of three training sessions over a period of three years. The training sessions were not far reaching and approximately only 30 staff were trained per year (Interview with Colombo, pp. 35 - 43). Indeed, records suggest that in 1993 only seven staff members attended WID/GAD training (Interview with Colombo, p. 35). Different sets of trainings on WID/GAD continued, but training was never compulsory for DG VIII staff (it was for staff in DGI) despite efforts by WID/GAD desk office (Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). This suggests that WID/GAD training was weak. An in-depth evaluation of WID/GAD in EU development cooperation concurs as it finds that training was “insufficient to produce a sustained improvement in knowledge and skills of staff and partners” (Braithwaite 2003, p. 1).

Programming tools: In the early 1990s the WID desk in DGVIII produced guidelines for the integration of WID/GAD in EC development cooperation with ACP countries, which were still in force post 1995 (Commission of the European Communities 1991). The guidelines are extremely strongly framed in efficiency terms. A case in point is the headings in the section on “Why WID” which are “Cost-Effectiveness; Development Impact; and Development Sustainability”. The entire ‘why’ section essentially makes detailed cases for why women’s roles are important in relation to key development goals such as food security, population growth and the environment (Commission of the European Communities 1991b, pp. 9-10). The section concludes that “In short: investments in women as part of the human capital have a high pay-off…by increasing economic efficiency and impact of our development operations, and (by leading) to more effective use of natural resources and lower population growth rates” (Commission of the European Communities 1991b, p. 10). Even enhancing the status of women is justified as it, in turn, is a
determining factor in reducing birth rates. The issue of “equity concerns” is merely mentioned once in passing (Commission of the European Communities 1991b, p. 9).

Regarding the technical guidance in the ‘how’ section, the document is very good and practical. However, the language used in the actual guidelines is fairly weak stating that implementing the suggested measures is “advisable…desirable…should be considered” (Commission of the European Communities 1991b, p. 27 and 33).

In addition, a number of other tools, such as Gender Impact Assessments, and a Gender Marker Fiche were developed and gender was included in the mandate of the Quality Support Group in DG VIII which reviewed all financial proposals over two million Euros (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 446). However, the use of these tools was not obligatory, with the exception of the Gender Impact Assessment form, and a comprehensive evaluation found that most tools were rarely used.12

Overall, throughout the period under investigation the use of programming tools seems to have been low and actually regressed. One evaluation finds that,

…some of the previous mechanisms for supporting the integration of gender fell into misuse during the period 1995 – 1999, indicating regression rather than progress in some key areas….the once obligatory Gender Impact Assessment Form…was not revised to take into account the new DAC requirements post 1995 and has fallen out of systematic use. (Braithwaite 2003, p. iv).

Integration in overall policies and programming tools: An analysis of general programming tools for development shows that WID/GAD has not been comprehensively integrated. Notably, the basic formats for project documents in the manual “Project Cycle Management – Integrated Approach and Logical Framework” do not include WID/GAD and the overall document only includes a single reference to women in development equating WID/GAD with socio-cultural aspects of development (Commission of the European Communities 1993b, p. 55). Other

12 Notably, one evaluation finds that “within the Commission the manual has not been used very much; some desk officers confess that they have given it away to a ‘woman expert’, others have it on their shelves but it is clear that they have never opened it.”(Colombo 1995, p. 3). Also, another report comments on the fact that due to the inclusion of WID/GAD in the mandate of the Quality Support Group, “ it is theoretically possible for a project to be rejected on grounds of gender-blindness…but this has not happened yet”(Turner 1997, p. 18).
general guidelines “most notably for countries strategies – make references to gender as a cross-cutting principle but provide no practical guidance on how to take gender issues into account” (Braithwaite 2003, p. iv). Indeed, a number of evaluations of actual EC country strategies or other financing proposals under the EDF found that the vast majority did not integrate WID/GAD (Turner 1997, p. 27). Moreover, WID/GAD was not integrated in monitoring and evaluation systems nor was WID/GAD considered at all in the mid-term review and revision of Lomé IV or the financial review of EC-ACP cooperation carried out in 1996 (ACP-EEC 1995). Also, none of the Commission Annual Work Programmes over the entire decade refer to WID/GAD.

Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD: Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD also decreased by the end of the decade. Although in 1998 a financial regulation on Integrating Gender in Development was adopted, financial allocations to the gender budget line remained extremely low totalling about 0.016% of the EC’s total budget for ACP countries under the Lome convention (Turner 1997) and actually decreased by 50% from 1998 onwards (Braithwaite 2003, p. iv; Turner 1997; Council of the European Communities 1998).

Performance incentives: Throughout the entire period of analysis gender was never included in staff performance assessments.
iv. Summary: Which driver dominated?

The decision to adopt the EU’s first WID/GAD policy was to a significant extent influenced by the upcoming Fourth World Conference on Women and a desire by Commission Officials and member states to ‘look good’ in this international forum. This was clearly illustrated by the way in which the decision to adopt the Resolution and the Resolution itself was framed and re-affirmed by primary interview data and secondary sources.

This external impetus was complemented by pockets of internal pressure from a vocal member states in the Council. This strongly suggests that the decision to adopt the policy was largely driven by reputational and social influence considerations. This conclusion is further supported by the very incoherent approach taken by the policy and the findings on norm operationalisation that show that hardly any steps towards norm operationalisation were taken around the adoption of the policy. Indeed, certain crucial aspects, such as financial resources, decreased in the late 1990s. Both suggest that norm integration was not driven by a genuine appreciation of the value of norm – thus, ethical considerations about the norm – across the organisation, but rather by social influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>EC/EU 1995 - 1998</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of human resources allocated to WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 but inconsistent staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not funded by the core budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of HR on WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training on WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming tools for WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use not compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reported as not widely used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of WID in other programming tools and policies</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some but weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources allocated to WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender budget line in place since 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Allocation: 0.016% of total ACP budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Overall budget decreased by 50% in late 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance incentive on WID</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None</td>
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However, despite the overall dominance of social influence, instances of norm integration driven by ethical considerations were observed. This was most notably so in the Commission Communication that preceded the Resolution. The document was coherent and comprehensive and strongly framed in instrumental ethical considerations. The drafting process of the document also suggests that it was indeed carried out by individuals personally persuaded of the importance of the norm. However, these ‘pockets of commitment’ were largely at operational level, did not have decision-making powers and, thus, did not influence the approach taken by the organisation as a whole.

**Why did this driver dominate?**

i. Explaining the timing of the policy

The above account showed that two factors led to the adoption of the first comprehensive EC WID/GAD policy: (1) reputational concerns relating to the upcoming World Conference on Women in Beijing and (2) pressure from some vocal member states within the Council, notably Denmark. Both factors and how they influenced norm integration are functions of the EC’s organisational structure.

First, the reason that the EC was the last of the three case studies to adopt a WID/GAD policy is related to its level of susceptibility to scrutiny and the nature of its scrutinisers, both of which are a function of its mandate and source of authority. Notably, the reason for why the EC did not seem to feel any pressure around the Third World Conference on Women in 1985, while it reacted to the Fourth World Conference, was due to the EC’s weak global mandate on development and its internally focused source of authority that is not in any significant way related to global or UN-wide trends and developments. This meant that the EC was only mildly susceptible to global, external scrutiny but much more susceptible to internal scrutiny from Parliament and the Member States.

These ‘scrutinisers’ did not exercise any pressure around the Nairobi conference and only did so, albeit still limited, in the run up to the 1995 conference. Indeed, an analysis of Council documents shows that the Third World Conference of Women
was only mentioned in passing by the Council once in Conclusions adopted in 1985 (Council of the European Communities 1985). This was indeed so rudimentary that the European Parliament criticised the Council for failing to endorse the agreement reached at the Nairobi conference (European Parliament 1986b, para. 34).

This lack of pressure from the Council was again facilitated by organisational structure. Notably, the only mild diversity of the Council with fewer principals than UNDP meant that there was less likelihood of strong and consistent pressure on action on WID/GAD from inside the Council. Specifically, countries such as Norway, Canada, Sweden and the United States, that were very vocal in UNDP and pushed it to act in 1986 were not present in the European Council. This helps to explain while no pressure to adopt a comprehensive policy or strategy was exercised by member states in the Council prior to 1995, not even around the Nairobi conference. It was not until Denmark pushed the issue that action was taken.

In addition to the member states, also the European Parliament did not exercise any pressure on the Council for action on WID/GAD after the first high-level recognition and prior to 1995, as an analysis of Parliamentary Reports and Resolutions, and interviews with protagonists reveal (Interview with Colombo; European Parliament 1992a, 1992b). This was partly due to the fact that the issue of WID/GAD was increasingly seen as an issue to be promoted by the Development Committee, not the Women’s Committee that had been instrumental in achieving the first high-level recognition of the norm in 1982. However, the Development Committee took a very hands-off approach to the issue and viewed it as something best dealt with by another body: the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Joint Parliamentary Assembly. For instance, a Motion for a Resolution on Improving the Living Conditions of Women in the Third World proposed in the Committee in 1983 was never adopted. The official reason for this, outlined in a letter from the Development Committee to the President of the Parliament, was that the “issue should be discussed by our partners in the ACP-JPA” (European Parliament Committee for Development Cooperation 1983).

The few actions that were taken by the Development Committee on WID/GAD took a very reserved approach. Notably, the Parliament stated in a Resolution that it “[w]ould not attempt to impose its views on the governments of non-Community
countries….but will endeavour to secure full equality of men and women based on respect for each one’s culture and traditions” (European Parliament 1986b, para. 33). The accompanying report by the Development Committee also strongly stressed that “[w]omen in the Third World or the integration of women into the development process is not an emancipation issue” (European Parliament 1986b, para. 5).

Thus, none of the EC’s source of authority ‘delegators’ or ‘scrutinisers’ pushed for action prior to 1995, which resulted in no action on the norm. With global pressure mounting significantly and with member states in the EC becoming increasingly vocal on the issue this changed. Pressure was exercised by some key ‘delegators’, notably Denmark, partly encouraged by the increased global momentum, and others were less reluctant to agree, due to this same momentum and a feeling that the EC ‘ought to be seen to be doing something’, leading to the adoption of the Resolution in 1995. This explains the timing of the action and further supports the argument that it was indeed social influence considerations, not considerations relating to the value of the norm, be they intrinsic or instrumental, that drove this second key moment of WID/GAD integration.

In short, it was the EC/EU’s limited susceptibility to scrutiny, a function of its weak mandate as a development actor and its delegated source of authority, combined with only mild diversity in its decision-making body, that led to the late adoption of the first WID/GAD strategy.

ii. Explaining the approach

The reason for the policy’s strong conceptual incoherence can be found in the diversity and multi-membership in the Council with a consensus-based decision-making structure. The resulting need for agreement among diverse actors lead to a shying away from ‘controversial’ language that was too transformative or rights or value-based and a focus on practical and efficiency-based arguments (Interview with O'Neill). Yet in contrast to UNDP, there was no strong procedural mandate that would have limited the promotion of any values or engagement in conceptual issues. Both points are very well illustrated by an analysis of deliberations of the gender expert group. This shows that the main areas of disagreement amongst the group
were the role of NGOs, the place of positive action alongside mainstreaming and, very importantly, whether the main approach should be ‘women in development’ or ‘gender in development’. According to Ole Elgstroem who has studied this process in detail, the meetings clearly show that “Defining common standpoints in the EC context has required norm negotiations between these ideational camps” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 465).

The text of the Resolution and – albeit to a lesser extent – the Communication reflect this need for compromise and consensus to some extent. Members of the expert group considered it “good but too general” as “its formulations were deliberately kept uncontroversial…in some cases, where members of the group had conflicting opinions, comprises were sought that resulted in imprecise and lofty language” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 466). This need for compromise further explains the strong focus on efficiency, as this type of language was considered less offensive and non-controversial, and, thus, easier to push through a decision-making process that involves diverse members and requires consensus.

The impact of diversity and the resulting need for compromise on the dominant approach to WID/GAD is further illustrated by a quick look at the European Parliament’s approach to WID/GAD during that same period. An analysis of the European Parliament Resolution on the Fourth World Conference on Women shows a very different approach to WID/GAD. On the whole the Resolution is strongly couched in language promoted in Beijing, thus much more focused on rights, equality and transformation rather than development effectiveness. Notably, the Resolution calls on all national constitutions to “include women’s rights” and stresses the need to “teach the idea of equality and calls on the governments to organize campaigns to enhance awareness on equality issues” (European Parliament 1995, para. 10). Regarding development, strong emphasis is put on rights, including sexual and reproductive rights (European Parliament 1995, para. 3) and the Resolution even takes a pro-abortion stand (European Parliament 1995, para. 40).

The reason for this difference in approach can be linked to the different organisational set-up of the Parliament. First, the Resolution originated in the Women’s Committee, which is a strongly homogenous group of intrinsically
persuaded actors – thus, providing a lot of freedom and not requiring much compromise or ‘watering-down’ in order to reach agreement. Second, the adoption process of the actual Resolution did not require consensus but merely a majority, even the formal adoption process did not require the level of compromise that the adoption of the Council Resolution required. In short, it was medium diversity and multi-membership in decision-making that facilitated the drafting of the Resolution but also the same diversity, coupled with a formal decision-making process and the need for consensus that made the actual approach taken in the Council Resolution incoherent, vague, and overall focused on efficiency arguments rather than intrinsic, value-based arguments.

Lastly, also the example of the Commission Communication confirms my argument. Notably, the Commission Communication’s more coherent and overall stronger approach was an outcome of the overall informal and homogenous decision-making structure inside the Commission, yet this time combined with enhanced freedom for WID/GAD officials to take action enabled by the increased global momentum on gender in the run-up to Beijing and the resulting increased interest and openness of EC member states towards this issue. This gave WID/GAD officials a lot of freedom and allowed them, including the consultant who drafted the Communication, to include issues, which they personally considered important, such as positive action on WID/GAD in the Communication (Interview with Colombo). However, overall, the approach in the Communication is still very cautious and efficiency-based. According to interviews with official working on WID/GAD during this decade, this was a result of strategic considerations as they were “keen to produce a document that was likely to be accepted by the Council” (Interview with Colombo). Indeed, interviews with officials working on WID/GAD during this decade strongly suggest efficiency arguments were favoured as they were thought to be more effective in changing colleagues’ behaviour (Interview with Marchetti; Interview with Fransen). This observed self-censorship that was also present in UNDP seems to suggest a certain underlying organisational gender bias and will be further discussed in Chapter Nine.
iii. Explaining the level of operationalisation

The reason for why overall operationalisation was low in this second decade of analysis is linked to two factors. First, overall budgetary allocations were decided on by the Council and second, most specific decisions on implementation were taken at the level of the Commission.

As discussed above, the Council, due to its composition, did not agree on the value or importance of WID/GAD and, thus, did not allocate sufficient funds to its integration. This certainly hindered a number of steps, which, although relatively inexpensive, would have required some financial resources. Cases in point are the hiring of an adequate number of WID/GAD officers from the core budget and the rolling out of WID/GAD training for staff.

In addition, however, many decisions regarding specific steps towards norm operationalisation, such as the development and use of programming tools and the including of WID/GAD in performance incentives were taken at the level of the Commission. Coupled with a ‘delegated’ source of authority, which made the Commission only weakly susceptible to global trends, meant that it relied heavily on a strong internal push or an explicit push for by the Council to take any action on WID/GAD. As seen above, the Council did not exercise such a strong push for action. The set-up of the Commission, due to its homogeneity of top decision-makers, also made the presence of a vocal top-level decision-maker less likely. Indeed, according to interviews, no such commitment seems to have existed around 1995 (Interview with Fransen). According to one former official working on WID/GAD, there was “no management back-up” on the issue (Interview with Fransen).

However, in contrast to the previous period, WID/GAD officials’ freedom for action had increased slightly due to the growing global momentum around Beijing and a resulting increased interest by member states, explaining the slightly more coherent and specific approach in the 1995 Commission Communication. Despite this, the lack of top-level commitment meant that WID/GAD officials remained very few in numbers, highly marginalised in the organisational hierarchy and severely under-
funded. Coupled with an overall dominant source of authority and identity perception as ‘delegated’, this severely limited the power of WID/GAD officials to operationalise the norm and helps to explain the observed weak norm operationalisation.

6.3 The first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy or policy in ODA


Which driver dominated norm integration?

i. Process and timing

An analysis of debates in the House of Commons shows that there was no pressure from Parliament on ODA to take further action on WID/GAD after the adoption of the 1986 policy (UK Parliament 1988, 1987) and no formal records on how the decision to adopt the strategy in ODA was taken exist (Interview with Eyben; Interview with O'Neill). Yet, interviews with officials who worked in ODA during the time, including with the draftsperson of the strategy herself, strongly suggest that the decision to draft a strategy was the result of bargaining between a committed Social Development Advisers (SDAs) and senior management in ODA. The SDA, who was also the main contact person with the WID lobby that had been actively pushing for the adoption of the first policy in 1986, approached senior management with the specific request from the WID lobby to establish a quota for women to take up scholarships funded by ODA. Senior management refused the quota but granted permission to draft a WID strategy, in order to, at least, be seen to be somewhat responding to the lobby. As the SDA recalls,

So I had a meeting with more senior staff about whether we could agree to this request for a quota and they said ‘no’ and I looked disappointed…so I said, when they were feeling sympathetic, if we can’t have a quota can we have a strategy for WID. And that sounded to them as an easier thing than a quota so they said ‘yes, go away and draft a strategy’. (Interview with Eyben)
Thus, the decision to draft a strategy was taken without formal deliberation or wider consultation and seemed the result of bargaining and, ultimately, pressure from a national lobby group that had been effectively channelled into the organisation through a committed WID/GAD advocate inside the organisation. This strongly suggests that the decision to adopt a strategy does not reflect a long-term strategy or overall increased institutional commitment to WID and but was, instead, driven by social influence considerations.

ii. Policy approach

Although following a similar drafting process as the 1986 policy – informal and centralised – the approach taken by the 1988 strategy is remarkably different from the first policy. Notably, it presents WID as “an important component of its (ODA’s) policy on poverty alleviation” and recognises that “there are compelling equity arguments for giving special attention to promoting women’s opportunities” (ODA 1988, p. 1). Recall that equity was not mentioned in the first policy and integrating WID/GAD was certainly not presented as an important component of ODA’s work. Yet also in the 1988 strategy, equity arguments, although mentioned are not discussed and the sentence recognising them is immediately followed by a strong instrumental arguments for promoting WID. It states that, “The calculation that women account for two-thirds of the world’s work-hours, receive ten per cent of its income and own one per cent of its assets…indicates the economic benefit to be secured from (the) promotion of women’s interests” (ODA 1988, p. 1).

Further, and again in contrast to the 1986 policy, the strategy takes a bold approach to culture. It states that,

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Consistent consideration of both aspects (seeing women as agents of development and consumers of the output of development) is necessary everywhere and particularly in those countries where the cultural tradition attributes inferior status to women. (ODA 1988, p. 2)
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The strategy also provides a brief but comprehensive outline of a range of obstacles “to the full participation of women in the development process”, covering issues
from women’s legal status, to their cultural status and access to a wide variety of services. Most importantly, the strategy outlines detailed and concrete guidelines on how the norm should be integrated across ODA. Notably, it calls for the inclusion of WID/GAD in policy dialogue with partner countries and suggests concrete entry points in this regard; it provides guidance on how the norm should be integrated in project design; calls for staff training and the inclusion of WID/GAD expertise in terms of reference for consultants; and makes concrete requests to specific ODA divisions, such as the statistics division, the information department, and the international division, to integrate WID/GAD in their work (ODA 1988, p. 4).

Overall, the strategy is coherent, comprehensive and framed in both instrumental and intrinsic terms, with an underlying preference for the former.


**Human resources:** The number of human resources allocated to social development, which included WID, increased from two to three in 1988 and seven in 1991. A number, which, although representing an increase, was still judged to be grossly unsatisfactory, considering that SDA were responsible for all aspects of social development, not just WID/GAD (Eyben 2003, p. 881).

In addition to this increase in numbers, also the status of SDAs remained low. SDAs were employed at grades 6 or 7, which meant that they were not included in regular meetings with their superior, the Chief Economist (Interview Eyben) and did not have their own department or division. Due to their low status SDAs were also not part of the Projects and Evaluation Committee (PEC), whose role it was to review draft projects and programmes above a certain budget to ensure that they meet certain requirements. The PEC had the power to request amendments and advises the Minister on whether or not to approve a project or programme. Not being part of this committee significantly reduced SDAs’ power for quality insurance regarding matters of social development, including WID/GAD.

**Training:** Specific staff training on WID was introduced in the late 1988s. The training methodology included practical as well as strategic gender needs, which was
significant since the inclusion of strategic gender needs implied a move towards an inclusion of the concept of power and empowerment. Crucially, a top-level directive issued by the Minister Chris Patten made training compulsory for all staff (Interview with Moser). An internal evaluation of the training found that it was highly successful in increasing staff understanding of the importance of WID/GAD and when to ask for expert input (Sheelagh 1998).

However, due to its short duration (1 day) and the resulting lack of focus on practical skills, the training did not enable staff to fully integrate WID/GAD into their work themselves. Another evaluation found that training had only reached 30% of staff in the early 1990s and most staff trained were junior as senior managers were found to be only “poorly represented on the course” (Trumbull and Wall 1994, p. 38; Sheelagh 1998; Interview with Iredale). This actual limited reach of the training was also confirmed by interviews undertaken for this thesis, as the majority of those interviewed who worked in ODA during that time had not been trained on WID/GAD; and those that led departments were not aware whether their team members had been trained, even in departments such as education (Interview with Iredale; Interview with Symons; Interview with Weaver; Interview with Glenworth).

**Programming tools:** Programming tools specifically for WID were scarce, consisting of the 1988 strategy, which was not very specific or practical, and a checklist developed in the mid-1970s, which was very limited in its utility and actual use. The use of the both tools on WID was not compulsory (Mazza 1988, p. 21 and 39).

**Financial resources:** No budget was specifically allocated to the implementation of the WID policies or strategy and the amount of general funds spent on the promotion of WID/GAD was not tracked.

**Performance incentives:** There were no staff incentives for including WID in their work and WID was not part of staff performance reviews (Jensen 2006, p. 25).
iv. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated?

The decision to develop the first comprehensive strategy in ODA in 1988 was taken in response to pressure from a national lobby group. Although channelled through a committed official inside ODA, the overall driver of the actual decision to draft the strategy was a response to pressure from a national lobby group, thus, related to reputational concerns, suggesting a dominance of social influence. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the level of operationalisation, which remained very weak in the three years following the adoption of the strategy.

Only the approach taken by the strategy, which is coherent and comprehensive, points to the presence of pockets of genuine commitment to the norm and moments of norm integration driven by ethical – mostly instrumental – considerations.
However, as with UNDP and the EC above, these ‘pockets of commitment’ were positioned at operational level and did not have sufficient freedom or power to have their commitment reflected at organisational level.

Why did this driver dominate?

i. Explaining the process and timing

Like the first policy in 1986, also this strategy seems to be a direct result of the organisation’s mild susceptibility to pressure from national CSOs who got organised around the 1985 Nairobi Conference – a function of its ‘delegated source of authority’ – yet, this time channelled through an ODA staff member personally committed to the norm, who arrived in late 1986 (Interview with Holden; Interview with Eyben). Although the actions of this individual were very important, they were strongly facilitated by ODA’s organisational structure, particularly its homogeneous, centralised, and informal decision-making structure on matters relating to WID. This gave operational staff some freedom to take action on the norm as they saw fit, as it did not require formal approval from multiple and/or diverse actors, like the other two case studies did. Notably, the SDA responsible for WID/GAD at the time stated in an interview for this thesis that, “In ODA there was an enormous freedom” (Interview with Eyben).

The key difference to 1986, however, was that this time the process involved operational staff strongly committed to the norm, who arrived in late 1986 (Interview with Holden; Interview with Eyben).

ii. Explaining the approach

The observed change in policy approach reflected in the strategy seems to have been largely a reflection of key staff members’ personal convictions. Notably, Rosalind Eyben, the SDA in charge of drafting the policy, was knowledgeable on WID and strongly committed to a ‘social development approach’ to gender equality (Interview with Eyben). This approach, which views WID as an important part of, and tool to, achieve social development, is clearly reflected in the strategy.
However, despite the important role played by individual staff, as above, their views could only be so directly reflected in the policy due to the decision-making structures involved being homogeneous, centralised, and informal giving WID/GAD staff ample freedom to promote the norm as they saw fit. In this regard the policy is similar to the Commission Communication analysed above, which exhibits similar characteristics and was also drafted in a homogenous, centralised and informal way.

Having said that, although WID advocates managed to fairly freely decide on which approach to include, the dominant approach to WID/GAD promotion in this and subsequent policies was largely focused on instrumental arguments aligned with ODA’s already existing priority of economic and social development, again similar to the other cases. This approach, although not necessarily reflecting WID/GAD officials’ personal convictions (Interview with Holden), was chosen as a strategy that was thought to be most effective for norm integration in the organisation (Interview with Holden; Interview with Eyben).

iii. Explaining operationalisation

The reason for why the operationalisation of WID was overall weak was, yet again, linked to the administration’s decision-making structure, albeit this time at high-level. Its relatively homogeneous decision-making structure composed of fairly few actors and its limited susceptibility to external pressure resulting from its ‘delegated’ source of authority and its financial autonomy from external funding sources made it heavily reliant on a high-level ‘push’ either from government, Parliament or from inside ODA to take comprehensive action on WID/GAD. There was no push from government and Parliament and ODA’s structure made it relatively unlikely for such a push to exist inside the Administration. Its delegated source of authority, making it hardly susceptible to external scrutiny or pressures, and its homogenous decision-making body made the presence of a committed individual unlikely. The absence of such a push at high-level meant that the status of WID/GAD still remained low in the organisation. Although this provided freedom for WID/GAD advocates, it did not provide institutional backing, in other words status or resources for WID/GAD advocates, necessary for comprehensive norm operationalisation and overall norm integration process driven by ethical considerations at the level of the organisation.
6.4 The explanatory power of organisational characteristics summarised

Explaining the timing

The specific timing of the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy in each organisation was strongly influenced by (1) the organisations’ different level of susceptibility to scrutiny from more or less diverse scrutinisers, which was in turn influenced by the organisations’ mandate and source of authority, and (2) by the composition of its decision-making bodies.

The reason why UNDP was the first of the three organisations to undertake this second key step towards norm integration was largely a result of its strong susceptibility to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers, including the UN system, which was a function of UNDP’s split source of delegated authority (UN system and member states), its increasing moral authority and its overall mandate as a global development organisation. This, in turn, meant that UN system pressure had considerable impact on UNDP, particularly in contrast to the other two organisations. ODA only took action once some of the ‘scrutinisers’ it was most susceptible to – national CSOs – publically called for action on the norm, while the EC only acted fairly late in response to internal pressure from Commission officials and member states.

In addition, the level of multi-membership and cultural diversity also significantly influenced the timing of the adoption of the strategies, albeit coupled with the organisation’s substantive mandate. Notably, the adoption of the first WID/GAD strategy in UNDP was to a significant extent a result of explicit pressure from a number of vocal member states, the presence of which was facilitated by the multi-membership and cultural diversity of the Governing Council. In addition, the likelihood of a decision-maker to call for action on the norm was further facilitated by increased international recognition of WID/GAD (compared to the 1970s) and UNDP’s substantive mandate as a global development organisation. The EC Council’s multi-membership, yet only mild cultural diversity and weaker mandate as a ‘global’ development organisation, meant that there was no vocal decision-maker calling for action on the norm, resulting in no strong political push from the Council.
to the Commission to take any significant action on the norm prior to 1995. Thus, it was not until global pressure rose significantly in the run up to the Beijing Conference, that the EC felt the need to take action.

ODA’s homogenous, centralised, and informal decision-making relating to issues of WID/GAD meant that only few top-decisions makers were involved in high-level decisions on the norm, reducing the likelihood of the presence of a vocal principal willing to push for action on the norm. Yet, the informal nature of decision-making also meant that operational staff had a lot of freedom to take action on the norm as they saw fit. It was this freedom, together with pressure from a national lobby group, and strong personal commitment from the WID officer, that lead to the adoption of the strategy.

**Explaining the approach**

The approach to WID/GAD in all three strategies was significantly influenced by the composition of the organisations’ decision-making structure regarding the norm. Notably, UNDP’s multi-membership, high-level of cultural diversity, and consensus-based decision-making and the resulting lack of agreement on the importance of WID/GAD meant that norm integration involved debate and required negotiation, justification, and compromise, which lead to the continuation of an almost non-conceptual and instrumentally-focused policy approach to the norm. Similarly, the multitude of views on WID/GAD in the Council and the need for agreement meant that the overall policy approach favoured instrumental arguments, as reaching an agreement required negotiation and justification, and this was more readily done using instrumental arguments and relying on reputational pressure. In contrast to UNDP, there was no strong procedural mandate that might have lead to an overall non-conceptual approach.

Interestingly, however, in both cases there was also a noticeable shift towards a more comprehensive and coherent policy approach to the norm, which was a result of the presence of committed operational staff and a context that offered slightly more freedom for action on WID/GAD due to the ever-increasing international recognition of the norm. Yet, in both cases, the level of freedom was curtailed by the need for
negotiation, justification and compromise, as well as a considerably amount of self-censorship by WID/GAD advocates.

Due to its centralised and homogenous decision-making, especially on WID/GAD related matters, operational staff in ODA were not restricted to the same level and, thus, had considerably more freedom to take action on the norm as they saw fit. It was this freedom, and the fact that the strategy was not formally debated, that explains its comprehensive form. However, also ODA operational staff exercised a high-level of self-censorship, which explains the overall preference for instrumental arguments over intrinsic ones also in ODA’s approach.

**Explaining the level of operationalisation**

The overall weak level of operationalisation in all three organisations was a result of a lack of agreement on, and appreciation of, the importance of WID/GAD in the organisations’ top decision-making bodies. In the case of UNDP and the EC the lack of agreement was a result of their decision-making bodies’ multi-membership and culturally highly diverse decision-making body coupled with a consensus culture. This lack of agreement meant that there was no strong political backing or, even remotely, sufficient funding for WID/GAD staff to operationalise the norm.

However, the same structural characteristics, coupled with the ability of member states to earmark funding, also contributed to the decision to adopt the strategy in the first place and also directly lead to some of the few steps towards operationalisation that were actually taken by UNDP and the EC during the periods under investigation. Indeed, in both organisations, it was one or a few vocal member states, the presence of whom was facilitated by the organisations’ multi-membership and cultural diversity, that significantly influenced the decision to adopt the WID/GAD strategies and lead to a number of steps towards operationalisation.

The reverse of this argument has also been illustrated through the example of ODA. In ODA, due to its homogenous decision-making forum that only involved very few decision-makers, the likelihood of the presence of a committed and vocal decision-maker was reduced. This was further compounded by the fact that ODA’s
‘delegated’ source of authority meant that it was only mildly susceptible to scrutiny from very few scrutinisers (government, parliament, national CSOs), only some of which (nation CSOs) were vocal on the issue. In addition, the organisation’s substantive mandate was very weak and did not provide an ‘easy hook’ or incentive for the integration of WID/GAD. All of this gave top-level decisions-makers freedom to pursue issues they deemed important. The absence of such commitment amongst top-level decision-makers in ODA during this period of study meant that the norm was not considered important, resulting in very few steps towards norm operationalisation.

**Conclusion**

As the previous Chapter, this analysis has shown that also the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy in all three organisations was largely driven by social influence considerations rather than ethical considerations, be they instrumental or intrinsic. The simple, overarching, reason for this is the same as in Chapter Five: For norm integration to be overall driven by ethical considerations across an organisation would require agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm by the organisation’s top decision-makers, especially if decisions are taken by consensus.

The lack of agreement on the value and importance of WID/GAD reduced the freedom, power, and resources of actors committed to the norm in each organisation, leading to weak operationalisation as well as to incoherent and a strongly instrumentally focused or largely non-conceptual policies.

Also in agreement with Chapter Five, this Chapter has shown that the likelihood of such an agreement was significantly influenced by organisational structure suggesting that organisations with characteristics more typical of multilateral organisations – multi-membership, a high-level of cultural diversity and consensus-based decision-making – are less likely to agree on the importance or most appropriate approach to a norm. The divergence of views in the cases analysed was exacerbated, as the norm did not fit squarely within the organisation’s existing mandates, thus, not providing an easy hook or blueprint for norm uptake.
ODA’s homogenous and centralised decision-making on WID/GAD, on the other hand, made agreement on the norm more likely. However, the same characteristics made the presence of committed and vocal decision-maker less likely, making an appreciation of the value of the norm among top decision-makers less likely. Without such appreciation, and coupled with ODA’s highly limited susceptibility to external scrutinisers, ODA was less likely to take any action on the norm. When ODA did take action, in response to national CSO pressure – one pressure source that the organisation was susceptible to – this was limited to policy changes.

The policy was coherent and comprehensive as it was developed by committed actors within the organisation. Yet the lack of commitment at top-level meant that these individuals were not given the power or resources to comprehensively integrate WID/GAD across ODA.

In short, the Chapter concurs with the previous one in its finding that ethical considerations did not drive norm integration in the three cases analysed but showed that certain organisational characteristics mostly typical of multilateral organisations facilitated some kind of action on the norm. Yet, this was due to these organisations’ greater susceptible to reputational – not ethical – concerns. Indeed, the Chapter suggests that norm integration in multilateral organisations seem generally unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations as their structural set-up leads to a constant struggle to reach agreement, making the organisations less likely to reach comprehensive norm integration, especially integration driven by intrinsic ethical considerations.

Characteristics typical of bilateral organisations, especially few and homogenous decision-makers, seem to make organisations less likely to take any action on a new norm at all, as they make it less likely for a committed decision-maker to be present. If such top-level commitment is not present, and combined with low susceptibility to only very few and homogenous scrutinisers, bilateral organisations may not only be less likely to take action at all on a new norm, but when they do, this tends to lead to weak norm integration.
Can it, therefore, be concluded that ethical considerations are generally unlikely to drive norm integration in development organisations – and more broadly, that the cases indicate that ethical considerations do not carry much weight at all in international development organisations? This is not necessarily the case as one finding from the case studies might offer a potential context in which ethical considerations could drive norm integration: If multi-membership and diversity seem an obstacle for ethical considerations to dominate, then the reverse – homogeneity and limited membership, if combined with the presence of a committed decision-maker – might offer a more promising context. However, due to the absence of such a committed decision-maker in ODA during the first two key moment this assertion has only been hinted at by the example of the Women’s Committee in the European Parliament in Chapter Five, and the example of the Commission Communication in this Chapter, but has not yet been fully explored. The next Chapter turns to this.
Chapter 7: Towards a theory on the impact of organisational characteristics on ethical considerations: Additional empirical evidence to complete the findings

Introduction

The previous Chapters have argued that, both, the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD as well as the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy were driven by social influence rather than intrinsic or instrumental ethical considerations in all three organisations. Although some steps towards norm integration were taken in each case, these were largely due to external pressure, albeit the origins of the pressure and the level of susceptibility to it varied considerably between the organisations. Policies were incoherent and operationalisation weak in each case. The Chapters have argued that the reason for this was that in no organisation was there agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of WID/GAD among top-level decision-makers. As a result, operational staff committed to the norm, where and when present, had insufficient political backing, resources, and freedom to significantly influence norm integration and have their convictions regarding the norm reflected at organisational-level.

The lack of agreement or appreciation of the norm, in turn, was the result of particular organisational characteristics in each case. Specifically, the Chapters found that in the case of UNDP and the EC agreement on the norm was made less likely due to the organisations’ multi-member and culturally diverse decision-making fora that operated on consensus. Yet it was also found that the same characteristics, coupled with strong susceptibility to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers and a mandate as a global development organisation, made UNDP quicker at taking some action on the norm than the other two. This was so because multi-membership and cultural diversity increased the likelihood of the presence of vocal decision-makers who called for action on the norm, particularly once the norm was widely internationally recognised; and susceptibility to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers, a function of the organisation’s source of authority and global mandate, also made the organisation more likely to respond to global trends, including on WID/GAD.
On the flipside, homogeneity and centralised decision-making involving only few individuals, as was the case in ODA, made agreement on the norm among top-level decision-makers easier to achieve. However, the same characteristics made the presence of a decision-maker committed to the norm less likely, reducing the likelihood that the value of the norm would, in fact, be appreciated. Coupled with weak and inward-looking susceptibility to scrutiny and a weak mandate on global development, this made ODA less likely to take any action on the norm at all.

Does the above suggest that ethical considerations are, thus, highly unlikely to drive norm integration in any kind of development aid organisation? I propose that this may not be the case as the analysis so far has provided some tentative findings that suggest that homogeneity and more centralised decision-making – if combined with the presence of committed and vocal actors – can lead to strong agreement on, and appreciation of, the norm and, thus, lead to more comprehensive, coherent, and intrinsically-focused policies and strategies. Notably, during the periods analysed so far such a presence was observed in the European Parliament Women’s Committee, at the operational level in the Commission in the 1990s, and in ODA from the late 1980s onwards. In each case policies emerging from these fora were coherent, comprehensive, and framed around the intrinsic value of WID/GAD. However, in none of the cases was a committed actor present in top-decision making, thereby limiting the freedom, power, and resources of individuals in these fora to have their approaches reflected at organisational-level or operationalised. Thus, so far the analysis has not yet been able to explore the full extent of this tentative suggestions: Are homogeneity and few decision-makers, if combined with top-level support for the norm, possibly more likely to lead to more comprehensive norm uptake indicative of norm integration overall driven by ethical considerations?

In this Chapter I turn to this point and explore it in more detail by considering additional empirical evidence drawn from the entire research period from the organisation that exhibits these characteristics (homogeneity and few decision-makers) in its top-level decision-making: ODA/DFID. Specifically, the leadership of Lynda Chalker (1989-1997), and subsequently, Clare Short (1997 – 2000) are analysed.
The Chapter shows that, indeed, the presence of top-level commitment, or at least openness, in a homogenous decision-making body with a limited number of principals, can enable more comprehensive and coherent policies and strategies and strong norm operationalisation, indicative of norm integration driven by ethical considerations. Yet, the findings do not suggest that the organisation itself, or even the majority of staff, had become convinced of the ethical desirability of WID/GAD at any point. Indeed, the dominance of ethical considerations at organisational-level in the cases analysed was largely due to the fact that committed individuals were given the freedom and power to act on their ethical beliefs and, thereby, managed to have these beliefs reflected at organisational-level.

Thus, the Chapter supports the finding of the previous two Chapters, which suggest that organisations per se seem generally unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations – but that individuals inside them may be. Critically, however, organisational structure can significantly hinder or enable such individuals to act on their ethical beliefs and have them reflected at organisational-level, by providing (or not providing) them with sufficient freedom, power, and resources to act on their personal commitments to the norm. This, in turn, influences the extent to which norm integration may be driven by ethical considerations at the level of the organisation.

7.1 The arrival of a supportive top-level decision-maker in ODA: Lynda Chalker

This section expands the analysis of WID/GAD integration into ODA/DFID beyond 1988 to examine if norm integration changed with shifts in ODA/DFID leadership in 1988. First, available evidence on the new Minister of State for Overseas Development, Lynda Chalker’s, attitude to WID/GAD is considered and second, the impact of her commitment to the norm is examined.

Lynda Chalker’s growing openness to WID/GAD

Lynda Chalker took over from Chris Patten as Minister of State for Overseas Development in 1989 and held the post until 1997 when she was replaced by Clare Short. Interviews with a number of ODA staff who directly worked with her strongly
suggest that during her first few years in office Lynda Chalker, although not opposing action on WID/GAD, was, like Chris Patten, not particularly supportive of the issue. Notably, one SDA stated in an interview for this thesis that, “There was no resistance form the top (under Chalker). But there was no difference between Patten and Chalker. In the early years, Chalker was referred to as a ‘closet feminist’ () and not very knowledgeable or outspoken on WID/GAD (Interview with Holden).

However, interviewees and secondary sources also concur that in the early 1990s Chalker’s understanding of, and support for, WID/GAD shifted due to persistent internal advocacy by some Social Development Advisors (SDAs) in ODA. One former SDA stated that, “Lynda Chalker was a bit different [from Patten]. Strangely enough towards the end of her time she got more interested in it…She got much more into it.” (Interview with Holden) Another SDA who joined ODA in the mid-1990s stated that “I met Lady Chalker in Beijing in 1995. I think she was interested from a WID point of view and I think that she did get the point about WID….” (Interview with Keeling). This view was endorsed by an official who implemented projects for ODA on WID in Kenya and met Lynda Chalker on a number of occasions. Notably, she stated that “I found Lynda Chalker easy to work with on gender…she had more clarity (than Patten and Short).” (Interview with Okondo).

Other observers of WID/GAD in ODA concur with the observation that Chalker was indeed open and supportive of WID/GAD. Notably, Jo Beall states that Lady Chalker showed great “interest in women’s issues…” (Beall 1998, p. 237), which facilitated much action on WID/GAD in ODA in the early 1990s. Another account notes that ODA’s work on “…women in development was benefiting from…Lynda Chalker…being supportive.” (Eyben 2003, p. 886) Indeed, in 1995, Chalker agreed to “make a break-through speech in which she spoke of gender equality as a human right.” (Eyben 2003, p. 886) Eyben notes that “Her speech emphasized that women as well as men have rights. Top civil servants strongly disliked this rights language and instructed the Chief Economist to control its use.” (Eyben 2007, p. 74) All the above strongly suggests that Lynda Chalker was, indeed, open towards, and supportive of, WID/GAD and became increasingly vocal on the issue during her time in office.
What impact, if any, did this increased top-level openness to WID/GAD, combined with the continued presence of strongly committed operational staff, have on the dominant norm integration process in ODA? The next section turns to this by looking at (1) the policy approach and (2) operationalisation under Chalker.

**Which norm integration driver dominated?**

i. Impact on policy

In 1992 ODA adopted a new WID/GAD policy (ODA 1992b). The policy represents a further step towards a more coherent and comprehensive approach to WID/GAD and is framed in much less instrumental language than the previous ones. Notably, the entire foreword focuses on the importance of meeting women’s needs, taking into account their interests, and giving them a voice in the development process without tying these issues to effective development or economic growth. In addition, women’s triple roles are recognised and a much more comprehensive appreciation of the various challenges women face in developing countries is presented. For example, the policy starts with an explicit section entitled “The Challenge” which specifies a number of obstacles faced by women. Importantly, these include “legal rights” and “social status” in addition to previously recognised issues such as education. In particular, the policy takes a much stronger stance on cultural and calls for including WID in policy dialogue. (ODA 1992b, p. 1) Notably, the policy quite boldly states that “These restrictions (in social status) stem from a cultural atmosphere that accords women a lower status than men,” and that ODA’s “highest priority is to change attitudes in developing countries” (ODA 1992b, p.1).

The 1992 policy was replaced by a new policy in 1995 (ODA 1995). This policy represents a further, and very significant, departure in approach from previous ODA WID policies as it is strongly framed in explicit transformative language of rights and empowerment. The title alone is a case in point: *Making Aid Work for Women*. This title was a conscious and explicit move away from an instrumentalist view of WID/GAD making it clear that it is aid that should work for women, not women who should work for aid (Interview with Eyben). The policy itself puts strong emphasis on transformation and power relations. Notably, it states that “Our goal is to
transform the partnership between men and women” and opens with an account of an ODA project in India where “for the first time anyone can remember, women from villages…are having a say in the decisions which most affect their lives” (ODA 1995, p. 1). Culture and recipient government-led development are not mentioned as reasons for different approaches to WID. On the contrary, it states that “women everywhere do have the right to choose what they want in all areas of life…” and that it is “women and men in the South” – as opposed to their governments – that should “inform and influence” ODA’s approach. (ODA 1995, p. 1) Lastly, the policy also includes concrete strategies on how it should be implemented, making it a comprehensive document.

ii. Impact on operationalisation

Human resources: Human resources allocated to social development, including WID/GAD, grew from seven in 1991 to 25 in 1996. (Watkins 2004, p. 13.) In 1992 Social Development, the section responsible for promoting WID/GAD, became its own department, which increased its political clout as well as its financial autonomy of the Social Development Advisors (SDAs) as the department had its own allocation of funds. In 1995 the head of the Social Development Department was promoted to Chief Social Development Advisor. This was particularly significant, as it gave SDAs a seat on the Project Evaluation Committee (PEC). The PEC’s role was to review draft projects and programmes above a certain budget to ensure that they met certain requirements. The PEC had the power to request amendments and advise the Minister on whether or not to approve a project or programme. Having a seat on this committee significantly increased the SDA’s power to ensure that issues of social development, including WID/GAD, were included in ODA’s larger projects and programmes. The SDAs’ inclusion in the PEC was followed by them being given a seat on the Project Evaluation Team in 1996, marking a second important development towards operationalising WID/GAD.

Training: In the early 1990s a new training methodology for WID/GAD was introduced in ODA/DFID. The method included the concept of ‘strategic gender needs’ (Moser 1993) (Molnyeux 1985), which shifted the focus of WID/GAD from welfare towards empowerment and social transformation. Training on WID/GAD
further intensified during the mid-1990s and remained compulsory. An evaluation of the training found that it was highly successful in increasing staff understanding of the importance of WID/GAD and when to ask for expert input. (Sheelagh 1998) Due to its short duration (1 day) and the resulting lack of focus on practical skills, an evaluation of the training found that it did not enable staff to fully integrate WID/GAD into their work themselves. However, awareness-raising goals seemed to have been achieved (Sheelagh 1998, p. 27).

**Programming tools:** In 1993 ODA produced a guide to programming called the *Social Development Handbook* (ODA 1993). The document comprehensively includes gender equality and women and also contains a specific section on “Women in Development”. Thus, the handbook is framed in line with the ‘two-pronged approach’ to gender equality promotion – gender mainstreaming alongside a women-specific focus – an approach that was quite avant-garde in the early 1990s and only became wide-spread at global level with the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.

Moreover, the handbook explicitly includes and explains the concept of ‘gender’ in addition to ‘women’. The definition of gender is detailed and strongly refers to its ‘transformational’ potential (ODA 1993, p. 90). The handbook also includes strategic alongside practical gender needs. Thus, the handbook takes a very strong approach to WID/GAD and features elements of both intrinsic and instrumental ethical arguments to justify the norm.

**Broader policies:** A consideration of broader policy statements and tools suggests, in contrast, that WID/GAD had not been comprehensively integrated across the organisation. Although some reference to WID/GAD seem to be made as a matter of course, this is done in a very haphazard way suggesting the uncritical and shallow acceptance of a certain rhetoric regarding the norm, not actual norm integration. A case in point is a Technical Note on ‘Aid and Poverty Reduction’ (ODA 1991) that enshrined ODA’s overall policy aims, in the absence of a White Paper (the last White Paper was adopted in 1975). The Note does include WID, however in a weak way and not in line with ODA’s WID policy. Notably, the note recognises that one “of the underlying social processes (contributing to poverty) are rooted in class,
gender, regional and economic relations” (ODA 1991, p. 39) and calls on staff to “…identify geographical, ethnic, sectoral and gender issues in poverty” when conducting a poverty assessment. Further, it states that ODA will address “cultural attitudes which constraint activities of certain groups, eg. women and low-status casts” (ODA 1991, p. 39). Also, the note requires staff to engage in some sex-disaggregation when target groups are identified. However, sex-disaggregation is only required regarding life expectancy; illiteracy; and primary education enrolment. It is not required for nutritional measures; asset ownership; and access to public goods and services. (ODA 1991, p. 39) This reflects a very traditional conception of WID, which is not in line with the more progressive ODA WID documents published at that time. Another example is the education policy Power of Change published in 1992, which does not mention WID/GAD at all and, although it included a thematic annex which covered issues such as the environment (ODA 1992a).

An analysis of ODA’s mission statement issued in 1996 further supports this conclusion. The mission statement does include WID/GAD but merely states that “…ODA will aim…to help people achieve better education and health and to widen opportunities, particularly for women” (ODA 1996, p. 8). Also, a programming tool published in 1995, entitled Guide to Social Analysis for Projects in Developing Countries does not comprehensively mainstream gender equality. Although it includes an annex on a “Guide to the participation of women in development projects” (ODA 1993), gender equality or women are not included in the bulk of the guide. Notably, none of the other checklists provided, including those on education and health, including any mention of women or gender equality.

Budget: The creation of separate division for Social Development increased resources for WID/GAD as it effectively meant that Social Development had increased operational autonomy but also its own financial resources (Interview with Eyben). Although this did not represent a specific budget for WID, it increased the likelihood for resources being specifically dedicated to its promotion (Interview with Eyben). In addition to the establishment of a Social Development Division, ODA introduced a Policy Information Marker System (PIMS) which aimed to “track expenditure against priority policy objectives of the aid programme in order to
improve accountability and inform policy debate, monitoring and aid management” in 1993 (Jensen 2006, p. 75).

Staff incentives on WID/GAD: WID/GAD was not included in ODA staff performance reviews and no incentives for undertaking work on the issue were put in place.

Table 13: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in ODA 1992 - 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxy indicator</th>
<th>Findings 1992 - 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None specifically allocated to WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 40 allocated to social development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of human resources working on WID/GAD</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High - Post of “Chief Social Development Advisor” created;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Part of the projects and evaluation committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training courses (frequency, status, and</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>substance)</td>
<td>• Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Focus on strategic and practical gender needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Training not attended by senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming tools for WID/GAD</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1993 Handbook on Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender Equality Strategy Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Detailed, practical, including a gender approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use not compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of WID/GAD in general</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programming tools</td>
<td>• Done to a highly limited extent, not coherent with approach in WID policy and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• not comprehensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No specific budget for WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• PIMS marker introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff incentives on gender equality promotion</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ii. Summary: Which approach dominated?

The above analysis shows that both the policy approach as well as the operationalisation of the WID/GAD norm became significantly more comprehensive in the mid-1990s. In addition, the approach in policies, strategies, and training materials was becoming increasingly focused on intrinsic arguments, strongly promoting social transformation. Despite these indications of ethical considerations increasingly driving norm integration, the analysis also found that the norm was not well integrated into overall policies or programming tools.

The observed suggests that norm integration was driven by more than just social influence – it was driven by significantly widespread considerations of the instrumental and intrinsic ethical value of WID/GAD among WID/GAD officials. Importantly, however, I am not suggesting that this means that the organisation itself, or indeed the majority of staff working for ODA, were at this point persuaded of the intrinsic importance of the WID/GAD, as this is not the aim of this thesis and methodologically difficult, if not impossible to establish, as outlined in Chapter Three. Moreover, the limited inclusion of WID/GAD in general policies and programming tools would cast serious doubt on such a conclusion. All I am suggesting is that the above shows that some individuals in the organisation were driven by ethical considerations and were able to have their beliefs drive norm integration to a significant extent, thereby shifting the dominant norm integration driver from social influence towards instrumental and intrinsic considerations.

Why did this approach dominate?

The shift in the kind of considerations that drove WID/GAD integration in ODA was most likely to some extent influenced by shifts in global discourse, particularly around the Forth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, as will be further discussed below. However, the extent to which these particular global development were reflected in ODA – as opposed to previous global developments on gender – and the fact that changes did not remain at policy level but also affected operationalisation, was significantly facilitated by ODA’s homogenous and centralised decision-making structure on WID/GAD, yet this time combined with an
open and supportive top-level decision-maker. This structural constellation provided operational staff with a great deal of freedom as well as necessary top-management support (providing sufficient power and resources) for action on WID/GAD. In other words, committed SDAs who had arrived in the organisation in the late 1980s were given the chance to quietly and relentlessly push their agenda. They could fairly liberally – almost invisibly – promote WID/GAD (Interview with Eyben; Interview with Holden). Indeed, one gender expert specifically noted that under Chalker, they “had a lot of freedom” to promote WID/GAD as they saw fit without scrutiny or interference from above (Interview with Glenworth). In the words of another SDA, Chalker’s open but non-interfering approach enabled them to “not really tell (the people above you) what you are doing, just doing it” (Interview with Glenworth).

Indeed, both the 1992 and 1995 policy were drafted by the Social Development Division in consultation with NGOs (Interview with Eyben) but were never debated in ODA or in any other forum. Moreover, the training materials that introduced the concept of strategic alongside practical gender needs, was developed by a consultant in cooperation with the SDAs and also were never discussed, scrutinised, or had to be defended in any way (Interview with Eyben). The rolling out of the training as well as the upgrading of the SDAs to have their own department with increased funds and financial autonomy and, subsequently gain a seat on the PEC and the Evaluation Committee, was, according to one SDA, the result of “five years investment in relationships” (Interview with Holden) that was ultimately successful due to support from top-management.

This, therefore, strongly suggests that it was the considerable level of freedom of committed operational staff, coupled with the necessary funding and political backing, all of which were enabled by the homogenous and centralised decision-making structure and top-level support, that contributed to this shift in policy language and level of operationalisation.
7.2 Reverting back to limited support for WID/GAD in ODA/DFID: Clare Short

To further examine this finding, let me expand the analysis to cover the first years of DFID under the leadership of Clare Short. In 1997 the incoming labour government set-up an independent department for international development – DFID – and appointed Clare Short as Secretary of State for International Development. Although Clare Short had a reputation as a strong and vocal feminist in her previous career (Interview with Holden), there was almost unanimity amongst staff who were interviewed for this thesis and had closely worked with her that she was not supportive of the promotion of WID/GAD.

The reason for Clare Short’s lack of support for WID/GAD was, as suggested by interviewees and secondary sources, that Short wanted to raise the profile of the organisation by strongly aligning it with the, then, prominent global development agenda: poverty eradication, the International Development Targets (IDTs) and subsequently the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Interview with Colley). Notably John Vereker, Permanent Secretary of ODA/DFID from 1994 – 2002 stated that,

The Secretary of State (Clare Short) and I agreed on day one (after the setting up of DFID) that the mission of the Department was the reduction, and eventual elimination, of world poverty; and that our immediate objective was to harness the global effort to the International Development Target for 2015. (Vereker 2002, p. 37)

Other SDAs interviewed for this thesis concur. Notably, one stated that “Clare Short changed everything. Most importantly she pushed for a strong poverty focus” (Interview with Levesque) while another SDA noted that, “She (Clare Short) had her agenda – the poverty route. She said that aid is all about poverty – like nobody else before. That was probably the most important thing she did” (Interview with Holden).

Indeed, already during the Short’s first years in office, everything the Department did had to be aligned to ‘poverty eradication’ and Clare Short was known for micro-
managing and checking every policy statement to ensure that it reflected her vision. Notably, one senior ODA official stated that there was “a lot more scrutiny from her. She would rewrite texts. She was very assertive and did not trust civil servants” (Interview with Glenworth). Another interviewee who had worked with Clare Short stated that for Short it was “My way or the high way” (Interview with Okondo).

The shift to poverty eradication was so strong that staff across the organisation felt that they had their “wings clipped” after 1997 (Interview with Glenworth) in many different areas such as education (Interview with Levesque), natural resource management (Interview with Hellin), and gender equality. Indeed, there was evident pressure on ODA staff to align DFID’s gender work to ‘international development jargon’. For instance, Rose Eyben noted a strong pressure to include, what she calls “gender myths” (Eyben 2007, p. 75) into DFID gender policies post-1997 in order to align WID/GAD to the dominating global development discourse.

The shift to an exclusive focus on global development trends was considered detrimental to meaningful work on gender (Interview with Moser). Specifically, one SDA noted that,

Clare Short was a complete maverick to work with. Very, very strong on parts of the development agenda…but actually completely blind to certain aspects of development and gender was certainly one. It was very, very difficult to dialogue with her on gender issues…it was difficult being a SDA at that point. (Interview with Keeling)

Another similarly noted that,

All I know that it sort of became more difficult (under Clare Short)…The people who were left behind in London had quite a tough time. They thought that Labour was going to be great, all the values were going to be there and we are going to have great gender policies. But I think they had to actually lie low a bit. It was a strange dynamic. Short did not want to be seen to be only talking about gender. She had other more import things she wanted to talk about like globalisation…She did not want to be one of the girls. She wanted to be one of the men. (Interview with Holden)
The above accounts strongly suggest that Clare Short was not particularly open to, or supportive of, action on WID/GAD and, by strongly pushing the IDTs, the MDGs and poverty reduction, she significantly reduced the freedom and room for manoeuvre of WID/GAD advocates inside the organisation. Did this change in top-level support for WID/GAD and the resulting reduction in freedom of WID/GAD operational staff impact on the dominant norm integration driver? The section below turns to this point.

Which approach dominated?

i. Impact on policy

In 1998 DFID published an ‘Issue Paper’ entitled *Breaking the Barriers: Women and the Elimination of World Poverty* (DFID 1998). The document is very strongly framed in instrumental terms, linking WID/GAD to poverty eradication, the new thematic focus area of DFID. Notably, it states that “Gender inequality is preventing us from eliminating poverty. It is in all our interests to remove it” (DFID 1998, p. 11). Interestingly, a rather defensive approach seems to be taken as references is made to the observation that “The empowerment of women does not need to be at the cost to men, but creates benefits for society as a whole” (DFID 1998, p. 11). Although the document does not mention rights, it refers to ‘empowerment’ and also claims to be taking a gender approach: “Our policy recognises that unlike biological roles, which are determined by sex, gender roles are determined by society and can be changed” (DFID 1998, p. 15). However, the document itself largely mentions ‘women’, and does not propose any specific strategies on how ‘gender’ should be, or is being, addressed.

The attempts to show what DFID has done to promote WID/GAD are very vague, uncritical, and provide hardly any information on what has actually been done, let alone, achieved. For instance, the document only provides the following information on projects in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania,
In Uganda, where the rural poor find it difficult to benefit from conventional banking services, a village banking project allows both women and men to save and obtain credit...New urban programmes in Kenya and Tanzania will promote an active role of women in decision making, improving basic services, and creating opportunities for economic, social, and human development. (DFID 1998, p. 6; p. 10)

Although reference to strategic gender needs is included in the document, this seems to be done very vaguely suggesting nothing more than ‘lip-service’ to the concept,

The Western and Eastern India Rainfed Farming Projects support women’s practical needs, with tools, income generating, credit, and savings schemes. The strategic role of women in village institutions and the management of farming systems is increasingly being promoted. (DFID 1998, p. 5)

The document provides no further information on what the organisation intends to do to address strategic needs.

Lastly, the section on ‘Future work’ is very short and provides hardly any concrete information on what DFID is planning to do to promote WID/GAD (DFID 1998, p. 18). The vague nature of the document and failure to provide future objectives or strategies suggests limited appreciation of the importance of WID/GAD. However, the fact that DFID, since its 1997 White Paper, had taken on a strong poverty focus seems to have provided a ‘hook’ for WID/GAD. This document is the first in a long list of strategies and policies on gender that explicitly aim to link the aim of gender equality to poverty eradication, the International Development Targets, and later the Millennium Development Goals (DFID 2000b).

In 2000 DFID adopted a Target Strategy Paper on Poverty Elimination and the Empowerment of Women (DFID 2000b). The strategy is strongly framed in efficiency arguments. First, the overall aim of the strategy is stated in explicit efficiency terms. Notably it states that “The aim of the UK international development policy is to contribute to the elimination of world poverty...The struggle for gender equality is a key instrument for lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty” (DFID 2000b, p. 10). In contrast to previous policies, there is a strong emphasis on
‘evidence’ backing up these efficiency arguments, largely relying on data generated by the World Bank. Notably, the strategy specifically states that,

…there is a growing and compelling body of evidence that shows that not only do women bear the brunt of poverty, but also that women’s empowerment is a central precondition for its elimination….In the past, all of these (other donors) have been weak in their approach to gender concerns. This situation is rapidly changing, however, as new knowledge is emerging of the constraints imposed by inequality on economic development. (DFID 2000b, p. 24)

This represents a further shift away from a focus on the value of gender equality towards a strong preference for evidence-based instrumental arguments.

The strategy paper is also tightly linked to the International Development Targets (IDT), as is illustrated by a strong focus on gender equality in education – a key theme in the IDTs and subsequently in their successor, the Millennium Development Targets. “The headline target for gender equality relates to education…” (DFID 2000b, p. 8). Notably, and in line with approach taken in the ITD, education is not referred to as a ‘right’ and is strongly framed in efficiency terms: “In sub-Saharan Africa it has been argued that the cost to countries which have failed to give girls a fair chance of getting education has been a reduction in economic growth of 0.7% every year for the last 30 years. As a consequence, those countries now have GNPs roughly 25% lower than if they had given girls a better chance.” (DFID 2000b, p. 16)

ii. Impact on operationalisation

**Human resources:** Despite a general increase in staff human resources dedicated to WID/GAD saw a number of set-backs, especially after 2000 (Jensen 2006, p. 31). Notably, in 2001, the restructuring of the Policy Division resulted in the loss of the post for Chief Social Development Adviser. The Project Approval Committee composed of Chief Advisers vetting all major funding proposals in relation to DFID’s policies was also disbanded in 2001, further reducing the status and influence of social development, including WID/GAD. To add to this negative trend, Jensen’s in-depth evaluation of DFID’s WID/GAD promotion suggests that “the group (SDAs) has also grown less in comparison with other professional advisory
groups such as those for economics and governance and conflict. As a consequence, staff providing lead expertise and drive for gender equality have diminished” (Jensen 2006, p. 31).

Table 14: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in DFID 1997 - 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxy indicator</th>
<th>Findings 1997 - 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• None specifically allocated to WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 75 allocated to social development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of human resources working on WID/GAD</td>
<td>Weak / Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Decreased – abolishment of Chief Social Development Post; abolition of projects and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>evaluation committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training courses (frequency, status,</td>
<td>Weak / Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and substance)</td>
<td>• Compulsory gender training ended in 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mainstreaming of gender into existing training not reinforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender training virtually came to a halt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff incentives on gender equality</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>promotion</td>
<td>• None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming tools for WID/GAD</td>
<td>Weak / Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender equality information resources launched in 1998 but given to external body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1998 and 2000 gender strategies published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender equality resource: detailed, practical but externally developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other strategies: incoherent, vague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use not compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of WID/GAD in general</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programming tools</td>
<td>• Gender included in PSA targets but only linked to education and health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No specific budget for WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No reliable data available on level of mainstreaming.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iii. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated?

The above showed that there was remarkable shift in policy language to efficiency-based arguments, a decrease in operationalisation, and a strong alignment of WID/GAD to global development trends. These trends, most notably the IDTs and the MDG included WID/GAD to some extend, yet in a highly limited way linking gender equality strongly to education and health. DFID did exactly the same at policy level, while decreasing the integration of the norm in its operations. This, in particular the limited conceptualisation of WID/GAD and the weak commitment to
operationlisation, is strongly suggestive of norm integration driven by social influence – a desire to act as a global development actor and fit in with other development leaders – not ethical considerations relating to the instrumental or intrinsic value of WID/GAD per se.

Why did this approach dominate?

As previously, DFID’s shift in discourse and operationalisation of WID/GAD from 1997 onwards was certainly influenced by a general shift in global development discourse, including on gender, reflected in the IDTs and the MDGs. However, the above account also strongly suggests that how the global discourse impacted on DFID was to a significant extent influenced by the reduced top-level support for WID/GAD, coupled with Clare Short’s strong agenda to make DFID a leading global development actor by aligning it with certain global development trends. The structural set-up of the department, especially after DFID was set up as an independent government ministry headed by a Cabinet Minister, gave Short considerable power to shape DFID. In the words of one senior DFID staff, DFID’s independence “gave Clare Short a lot of leeway to push her agenda” (Interview with Jones). Thus, highly centralised and homogenous decision-making, combined with lack of openness or support for the norm, led to significantly reduced freedom of committed operational level staff to promote the norm as they saw fit and led to an overall dominance of social influence driving WID/GAD integration in the organisation.

Conclusion

The Chapter has explored the claim, which has tentatively emerged from the previous Chapters, that two characteristics typical of bilateral aid agencies – relative cultural homogeneity and limited number of decision-makers – if combined with a supportive top-level decision-maker, are likely to lead to norm integration being driven by ethical, especially intrinsic ethical, considerations. By including additional empirical evidence from ODA until 2001, the Chapter has shown that, indeed, it seems that the change in top-leadership from Chris Patten to Lynda Chalker and subsequently to Clare Short, all of whom had different levels of support for
WID/GAD, made a significant difference to how WID/GAD was integrated. Importantly, under Lynda Chalker, the minister who was most open and supportive to action on WID/GAD, the analysis shows that there was a shift towards norm integration driven by instrumental and subsequently intrinsic ethical considerations at the level of ODA. Yet, this shift was reversed back to social influence under Clare Short.

Thus, the findings suggest that bilateral agencies, although less likely than multilaterals to take any significant action on a global norm, if they include a supportive top-level decision-maker, are more likely to allow for norm integration to be driven by ethical consideration, than their multilateral counterparts. Importantly, however, this is not to say that the organisations as such are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations. Rather, the analysis suggests that organisational characteristics specific to bilateral agencies – cultural homogeneity and few members in decision-making – can allow for more freedom and power for committed individuals inside these organisations to act on their beliefs and have them reflected at organisational-level. This last point strongly emphasises the role of individuals in decision-making, as well as at operational level, in determining which norm integration driver dominated. Does this mean that actors matter more than organisational characteristics in explaining the observed processes? Before turning to this point, and others, as potential alternative explanations in Chapter Nine, the following Chapter, summarises and consolidates the findings of this thesis.
Chapter 8: A theory on the impact of organisational characteristics on ethical considerations: Summary of findings

Introduction

The previous Chapters have provided detailed empirical evidence on the impact of organisational characteristics on the extent and nature of ethical considerations in the integration of the WID/GAD norm in UNDP, the EC/EU, and ODA/DFID. This Chapter summarises and consolidates these findings. It shows that, essentially, the empirical data presented in the previous Chapters strongly points to two significant overall findings:

First, the case study findings strongly suggest that norm integration, when it took place, was largely driven by social influence rather than ethical considerations in all three organisations throughout the period of analysis. In fact, and critically, the findings indicate that the organisations per se were not driven by ethical considerations at all. Yet, in some instances, the people within them were. And when these individuals were given the freedom, power, and resources to act on their personal ethical beliefs, these beliefs were reflected at the level of the organisation.

Critically, it was found that the level of freedom, power, and resources of committed actors was significantly influenced by organisational characteristics. In other words, organisational characteristics were found to make it more or less likely for actors inside an organisations to be able to act on their ethical beliefs, thereby significantly influencing the extent to which their beliefs were reflected at the level of the organisation, manifested through policies and levels of operationalisation.

Specifically, the case studies found that characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations – cultural homogeneity and a limited number of actors in decision-makers, and a flexible mandate on development cooperation – if combined with a committed decision-maker, make these organisations more likely to provide such freedom, thereby facilitating actors’ ethical beliefs on the norm to be reflected at the level of the organisation. Importantly, to repeat, this is not to say that the findings suggest that bilateral organisations per se, or even the majority of staff in these
organisations are more likely to hold certain beliefs. It merely means that some actors in the organisation hold such beliefs and are more likely to be enabled to push their beliefs up to the level of the organisation.

Moreover, the case studies found that, although certain characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations may provide an enabling environment for committed staff to act on their beliefs, bilateral organisations are also highly volatile. Their leadership and, often, also their overall mandate is prone to frequent changes in line with electoral cycles. Thus, the level of ‘openness’ of the mandate as well as the level of commitment among top-management is likely to change frequently, making bilateral organisations likely to swing from strong norm integration driven by ethical considerations to weak norm integration driven by social influence or no action on the norm at all.

This insight leads to the second finding of this thesis: The WID/GAD norm did not always matter. If, when, and to what extent, it mattered was conditioned by organisational characteristics. Specifically, the finding suggests that bilateral organisations, if they do not include a committed decision-maker, are more likely to take no action at all on a new norm, largely due to their limited susceptibility to scrutiny. The likelihood of the presence of a committed decision maker is also decreased because of the homogeneity and limited number of decision-makers, typical of bilateral development organisations. Indeed, the case studies found that characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations – cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making – if combined with an open mandate and a high level of susceptibility to scrutiny to multiple scrutinisers, make these organisations significantly more likely to take some, usually quick, action on a new norm, than bilateral organisations.

Yet, the same characteristics typical of multilateral organisations that facilitate quick action on a new norm also make agreement and appreciation of the norm less likely, leading to negotiation, justification and compromise, thereby reducing the freedom and resources of committed actors to promote the norm as they see fit. Norm integration is, thus, most likely not driven by committed actors’ ethical considerations but rather by a general agreement by decision-makers that the
organisation should be seen to be doing something on the particular norm – a process referred to as social influence by this thesis.

In short, certain organisational characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations make norm integration either very likely to be driven by ethical considerations or may lead to next-to-no norm integration at all depending on the presence of a committed top-manager and the openness of the mandate. Both, the openness of the mandate and the presence of a committed to-manager, in turn, are likely to be subject to frequent changes due to bilateral organisations’ volatility. Characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations, on the other hand, are more stable and are most likely to lead to some kind of norm integration, yet not driven by ethical considerations but by social influence.

This Chapter summarises these findings and re-visits some of the key empirical data in order to further support and consolidate the insights gained from the detailed case studies. The first section discusses the overall finding that ethical considerations did not matter much in the norm integration processes studied and when they did, they mattered to people, not to organisations. When, and to what extent, people could act on their beliefs was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. The specific characteristics that matter in this context are discussed in detail and empirical evidence in support of their importance is re-visitted.

The second section consolidates the second finding of the thesis that suggests that if and when norms matter in organisations is significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics, making multilateral organisations more likely to quickly respond to new norms than their bilateral counterparts.
8.1 Overall finding 1: Ethical considerations do not matter much in organisations

As mentioned in the introduction, the case studies showed that, when norm integration did take place in the three organisations, it was largely driven by social influence rather than ethical considerations in all three organisations throughout the period of analysis. In fact, and critically, the findings indicate that the organisations per se were not driven by ethical considerations at all – but some people within the organisations were. And when these individuals were given the freedom, power, and resources to act on their personal ethical beliefs, these beliefs were reflected at the level of the organisation.

Critically, however, the case studies clearly found that organisational characteristics did matter. They mattered because specific organisational characteristics were found to make organisations more or less likely to provide freedom, power, and resources to individuals to act on their beliefs and have them reflected at organisational-level. In other words, organisational characteristics were found to make it more or less likely for people to be able to act on their beliefs, thereby significantly conditioning the extent to which their ethical commitments manifested themselves at the level of the organisation and drove processes at the level of the organisation.

Specifically, the cases found that one factor was particularly critical in conditioning the level of freedom and power of committed actors: the level of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm among top-level decision-makers. Simply put: the higher the level of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm among top-level decision-makers, the greater the freedom, power, and resources of committed actors to promote the norm as they see fit. This, in turn, impacts on the coherence, comprehensiveness, and dominant frames of policies and the level of norm operationalisation. The level of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm is influenced by a number of specific organisational characteristics, with agreement and appreciation particularly facilitated by:

1. Cultural homogeneity in decision-making body
2. Few members in decision-making body
3. Open mandate
4. Presence of committed actor in decision-making body

Since the first three of these characteristics are more typical of bilateral aid organisations than multilaterals, this finding suggests that bilateral organisations are more likely to have norm integration driven by ethical considerations than their multilateral counterparts. The next section outlines these findings in detail and revisits some of the key empirical evidence that underpins them. First, the overarching finding - the impact of agreement and appreciation of the norm – is outlined and a number of sub-findings are presented that explain how and why this factor impacts on the level of freedom of resources of committed actors and, thus, on the likelihood of ethical considerations driving norm integration. Second, the section shows how the said organisational characteristics make agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm more or less likely.

**Overall finding 1: Agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm among top-level decision-makers in an organisation increases the freedom of committed actors inside the organisation, including operational staff, to promote the norm as they see fit. This is highly likely to result in coherent and comprehensive policies that include arguments framed around the intrinsic value of the norm and comprehensive norm operationalisation, indicative of norm integration driven by ethical considerations.**

![Diagram 4: Overall finding 1](image-url)
The reverse has also been found:

**The reverse to overall finding 1**: No agreement on, or appreciation of, the value of the norm among top-level decision makers reduces the freedom and resources available to committed actors and leads to either no action on the norm or to incoherent and weak policies strongly based on procedural and instrumental arguments and weak norm operationalisation. Both are indicative of norm integration driven by social influence.

Diagram 5: The reverse of overall finding 1

Importantly, the overarching finding includes one specific detail that is of critical importance: It makes a deliberate distinction between agreement on the value of the norm and appreciation of the value of the norm. Agreement on the value of the norm simply means that opinions on the norm converge, regardless of whether the opinions are for or against the norm. Appreciation, on the other hand, implies a positive view of the norm – the norm is considered good or appropriate.

To explain and contextualise these overarching finding, the analysis has offered a number of sub-findings. These first outline how agreement and appreciation among top-level decision-makers matter (specific findings 1.1 – 1.4) and second, show how and which organisational characteristics significantly condition the level of agreement and appreciation of the norm (specific finding 1.5).
Summary of specific findings and consolidated empirical evidence

Specific finding 1.1: No agreement on, and appreciation of, the norm it is likely to lead to debate and, especially in consensus-based decision-making, require compromise. Debate will likely involve negotiation and justification, and compromise necessitates the accommodation of different views, both of which restrict the freedom of committed actors to promote the norm as they see fit. The result is likely to be incoherent and weak policies as well as a preference for efficiency and procedural arguments.

Diagram 6: Specific finding 1.1

The case of both the EC Council Conclusions of 1982 and the Resolution of 1995 have clearly illustrated the impact of lack of agreement, and the resulting debate and need for compromise, on the level of freedom of the drafting team, and ultimately on policy coherence. Notably, the analysis of the drafting process of the Conclusions has clearly shown that one of the reasons for the high-level of incoherence in the document caused by the way in which national culture was treated and the overall very cautious language was a result of diverse views on this matter, especially expressed by France who was not in favour of the inclusion of WID/GAD, the resulting debate, and ultimately, the compromise suggested by the drafting team (see Chapter Five).

Also the analysis of deliberations of the Gender Expert Group leading up to the 1995 Council Resolution showed that there was considerable disagreement in the Group relating to, for example, the place of positive action alongside mainstreaming and,
very importantly, whether the main approach in the document should be ‘women in development’ or ‘gender in development’. These disagreements were certainly partly due to diverging expert opinions of equally committed gender advocates, and thus, not exclusively related to the lack of appreciation of WID/GAD in the Council. However, interviews conducted for this thesis also strongly suggest that the disagreements observed were to a significant extent rooted in different ‘briefs’ given by committed, and not so committed, member states and an acute awareness by the expert group that the text would have to be agreeable to all members of the Council. (Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg; Interview with Colombo). This led to debate and resulted in a conceptually fairly incoherent document strongly framed in instrumental terms (see Chapter Six). Indeed, one EC gender official stressed that the policy was “thin” because “nobody dared to take a stand, making it (the policy) a bit of everything” (Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). The same verdict was expressed by members of the expert group themselves, who, as stated in Chapter Six, considered the Resolution “good but too general” as “its formulations were deliberately kept uncontroversial…in some cases, where members of the group had conflicting opinions, comprises were sought that resulted in imprecise and lofty language” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 466).

Last, also the case of UNDP illustrates this finding. Specifically, as outlined in Chapter Five and Six, the lack of agreement on a conceptual approach to WID/GAD strongly influenced the strategies chosen by WID/GAD advocates inside the organisation, limited their freedom, and made conceptual engagement in general, especially intrinsic arguments, almost invisible. Recall that, one former head of the WID Division stated in an interview for this thesis that, due to this lack of agreement in the Executive Board her Division would frame issues on WID/GAD in such a way that they were easy to justify based on UNDP’s accepted mandate. For instance the instrumental approach to WID/GAD was a “deliberately chosen strategy” as UNDP’s governance structure was “highly politicised” and represented a “straight jacket” for the promotion of certain issues such as WID/GAD, especially as an important value in itself (Interview with Reid). Indeed, recall that another UNDP staff member also noted that “Radical work on gender is not possible. Sad, but it was also an education for me to realize the limitations of an institution like this” (Menon Sen quoted in Murphy 2006, p. 210).
Specific finding 1.2: No agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm, especially in a consensus-based decision-making culture, makes sufficient funding and strong political backing for norm integration less probable. As a result, committed actors, including operational staff, have only very limited freedom or resources to integrate the norm as they see fit. This, in turn, is likely to lead to weak norm operationalisation.

Diagram 7: Specific finding 1.2

The case of UNDP has strongly illustrated that a lack of agreement on the norm lead to insufficient funding and political support, which reduced the freedom and power of committed staff, especially operational staff, to promote the norm and ultimately resulted in norm operationalisation remaining weak and incomprehensive. A case in point was the fact that, despite efforts by the Administrator and operational staff, and regardless of the fact that staff training was enshrined in the 1986 strategy, widespread training was not possible as the Governing Council did not agree on its importance and did, therefore, not allocate sufficient funding for this purpose. Recall that in a Governing Council debate on the training some member states expressed concern that “…the financial proposals were being made on an issue on which general agreement had not yet been reached by the Council, and that the strategy proposed could involve, in the long term, an encroachment on the prerogatives of recipient countries” (UNDP 1986a, para. 6). This meant that operational staff did not have the power, resources, or freedom to effectively operationalise WID/GAD.

Similarly, the cases of the EC Council and ODA showed that throughout the period of analysis, the lack of agreement on the importance of WID/GAD lead to the allocation of highly insufficient financial resources, which resulted in weak human resources and highly limited staff training. Moreover, the weak agreement in the case of the EC meant that the Council did not exercise any political pressure on senior
Commission officials to allow operational staff to put in place better programming tools or set-up accountability systems for staff’s actions or inactions on WID/GAD.

**Specific finding 1.3:** Agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of a norm means that norm integration *does not require compromise* or involve much *debate* on the norm. This is likely to increase the freedom of committed actors to promote the norm as they see fit. This is likely result in more coherent and comprehensive policies and an inclusion of arguments framed around the intrinsic value of the norm.

![Diagram 8: Specific finding 1.3](image)

The example of the European Parliament in the early 1980s, the European Commission in the mid-1990s, and ODA in 1988 illustrate that agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm facilitated a more coherent and comprehensive policy approach framed around the intrinsic value of the norm. Notably, the analysis of the European Parliament Resolution on the Fourth World Conference on Women showed that the document was very coherent and strongly framed in intrinsic terms. It stands out as strongly focused on rights, equality, and transformation; includes an explicit reference to sexual and productive rights; and even calls for the legalisation of abortion (European Parliament 1995, para. 40). This approach was only possible because the Resolution originated in the Women’s Committee, which was a strongly homogenous group of committed actors with a considerable amount of freedom – thus, not requiring much debate, negotiation, justification or compromise in order to reach agreement. Moreover, the adoption process of the actual Resolution did not require consensus but merely a majority (see Chapter Six).
Similarly, the 1995 Commission Communication’s coherent and overall stronger approach was an outcome of the overall agreement of the importance of WID/GAD amongst the few individuals tasked with drafting the document. The informal decision-making structure inside the Commission, the global momentum around the Beijing conference, and the lack of interest among top-level management meant that these individuals had a lot of freedom to draft the Communication as they saw fit, with next to no debate, negotiation, justification or need for compromise (see Chapter Six).

Last, the coherent and comprehensive policy approach in ODA’s 1988 strategy and the 1992 and 1995 policies, which also stand out as they included some intrinsic arguments for WID/GAD, were an outcome of a homogenous and centralised decision-making process on matters related to WID/GAD that did not require debate, which gave key staff members a lot of freedom and, thus, made it possible for them to promote the norm as they saw fit (see Chapter Six).

Specific finding 1.4: Agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of a norm makes sufficient funding and strong political backing for norm integration more probable and, thus provides committed actors, including operational staff with the freedom and the resources to comprehensively integrate the norm in the organisation’s operations, thereby making comprehensive norm operationalisation more likely.

The example of ODA under Lynda Chalker in Chapter Seven illustrated this point very well. Through continuous internal lobby efforts, SDAs in ODA increasingly convinced the Minister in the early to mid-1990s of the importance of WID/GAD and, as indicated by interview data and secondary sources, Chalker became, indeed, significantly committed to WID/GAD. It was this commitment, combined with the fact that she operated in a largely homogenous decision-making system with only few decision-makers, especially regarding WID/GAD that allowed her to politically
as well as financially support WID/GAD integration. This, in turn, provided operational staff with ample freedom and resources to promote the norm as they saw fit, resulting in significant steps towards comprehensive norm operationalisation in the early to mid-1990s, such as the expansion of staff training and the upgrading of ODA’s unit responsible for WID/GAD promotion.

**Specific finding 1.5:** Certain organisational characteristics make such agreement and appreciation more or less probable, thereby influencing the likelihood of coherent and comprehensive policies and strong operationalisation indicative of norm integration dominated by ethical considerations.

**Sub-finding 1.5.1:** A high-level of cultural diversity and multi-membership make an agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of a new norm less probable.

Both the cases of UNDP and the EC have illustrated this point very well. Notably, the examination of reports of UNDP Governing Council session, describing the proceedings that lead to the 1975 as well as the 1985 decisions showed that countries from different cultural and religious backgrounds indeed expressed a range of diverging views on WID/GAD. As explained in detail in Chapter Five, in Governing Council debates in 1975 some UNDP member states very clearly stated their preference for a non-transformative approach to WID, emphasising the importance that WID does not “prejudice either the family as a social unit or the existing ways of life…emphasising that the role of women was the giver of life” while others, such as the Nordics, criticised UNDP’s approach for being too non-transformative and radical (UNDP 1975, para. 137).

The level of disagreement continued throughout the 1990s as the analysis of a Governing Council debate in 1990 outlined. Recall that Sri Lanka framed women strongly as wives and mothers when its representative stated that, “To improve the
quality of life of women, their tasks as housewives and mothers must be made less burdensome” (UNDP 1990a, para. 128). In contrast the Pakistan delegation stated that “In Pakistan, the old concept that a woman’s sphere of activities was confined to her home had undergone revolutionary changes since independence.” (UNDP 1990a, para. 154) Most other vocal countries, such as the Nordics, strongly pushed for the full integration of women in all spheres. Last, a statement by the Assistant Administrator illustrates the level of disagreement very well when she stated that “…even the definition of the concept of integration of women in development left much to be desired: a range of opinions exists on the issue…” (UNDP 1982b, para. 38)

This lack of agreement on the most appropriate approach to WID/GAD did not, as such, necessarily mean that member states were not equally committed to the norm; that they lacked appreciation for the norm. However, statements exclusively focusing on women’s roles as wives and mothers do suggest a certain reluctance to embrace the value of gender equality. In addition, and most importantly, the case also shows that the diversity in UNDP’s Governing Council also meant that there were, in fact, diverging views on the importance of the norm – thus, different levels of appreciation of the norm. Notably, in a Governing Council session in 1976 several member states, “referred specifically to the frank and realistic appraisal of limited unanimity among members participating in the discussion as to the importance of the subject…” (UNDP 1976b, para. 132) In addition, debates leading up to the 1982 EC Council Conclusion and the example of France’s insistence on a very cautious approach to culture, further illustrated the different levels of appreciation of WID/GAD.
**Sub-finding 1.5.2:** Homogeneity and few decision-makers make an agreement on the value of the norm more probable.

This finding is drawn from the analysis of the drafting process of ODA’s 1986 policy and 1988 strategy. The first case showed that the policy was drafted by one Social Development Advisor in cooperation with the information office (Interview with Eyben). There was no consultation within or outside ODA and the policy was never discussed and approved in any formal setting (Interview with Eyben). This meant that there was no debate on the issue, and therefore, no scope for disagreement. The approach simply reflected the SDA’s personal conviction and knowledge regarding the norm.

In addition, the processes in the European Parliament’s Women Committee in the early 1980s and the European Commission in the mid-1990s further supported this hypothesis. In both cases, decision-making on WID was done in an informal way by few decision makers who, although coming from different national backgrounds, were homogeneous as, in the case of the Women’s Committee, they had grouped together (in the case of the Women’s Committee) or were working on WID/GAD (in the case of the Commission) because of their appreciation of the importance of WID/GAD. In both cases there was little debate or disagreement on the value of WID/GAD.
**Sub-finding 1.5.3:** Homogeneity and few decision makers, combined with the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker, make an agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm more probable.

The case of ODA under Lynda Chalker outlined in Chapter Seven, especially in contrast to ODA under Patten, DFID under Clare Short and UNDP under Bill Draper illustrates this point very well. Only when Chalker was Minister for International Development all three factors were present, and, indeed, lead to an agreement and – crucially – an appreciation of the value of the norm at top-level. In the case of ODA under Patten and DFID under Clare Short, the lack of a committed top-level decision-maker meant that the value of the norm was not fully appreciated at that level, while in UNDP, despite the presence of a committed top-level decision maker, the diversity and multi-membership of the decision-making forum made agreement and appreciation of the value of the norm overall difficult.

**Sub-finding 1.5.4:** An open mandate on development cooperation makes an inclusion of different arguments for norm promotion more likely.

The examples of the EU and of ODA/DFID illustrate this finding very well. As established in Chapter Four, neither ODA/DFID nor the EU had a rigid or closed mandate on development cooperation. Indeed, ODA/DFID, as is typical of bilateral organisations, gave considerable leeway to its leadership to define the organisation’s priorities, as was particularly apparent when Clare Short came into power and drastically changed the direction of the organisation. This, in turn, changed the
overall mandate of the organisation and, with it, the arguments used for the promotion of WID/GAD.

Also in the case of the EU, the organisation’s mandate on development cooperation was very general, and, thus, open and allowed WID/GAD advocates to use different arguments to promote the norm.

**Sub-finding 1.5.5:** An open mandate on development cooperation, combined with the presence of a committed decision-maker, makes the inclusion of intrinsic arguments more likely.

Both the cases of the EU and of ODA under Chalker have shown that an open mandate on development cooperation provides committed actors in decision-making – provided they are present – with the freedom to promote the norm using different types of arguments, including intrinsic ones. The examples of the EC Conclusion and Resolution, as well as ODA’s 1986 policy described in Chapter Five and Six are cases in point.

**Sub-finding 1.5.6:** A closed and rigid mandate makes an inclusion of instrumental arguments for the norm most likely.

The case of UNDP illustrates this finding particularly well. While UNDP’s substantive mandate was rather weak until the late 1980s and the uptake of Human Development, it was procedurally very strong and focused on impartiality and neutrality. This meant that WID/GAD had to be framed in line with these priorities.
and provide WID/GAD advocates little freedom to do otherwise. This lack of freedom intensified with the mandate shift to human development, requiring WID/GAD advocates to link the norm strongly to the achievement of human development.

The case of DFID under Clare Short is another case in point. DFID’s strong focus on the International Development Targets and poverty eradication under Short meant that all of DFID’s actions had to be justified in relation to their contribution to effective poverty eradication, including WID/GAD. Thus, instrumental arguments for the promotion of the norm took centre stage during this period.

**Specific finding 1.6:** In summary, cultural homogeneity, few decision-makers, a committed decision-maker at top-level, and an open mandate make agreement on, and appreciation of, the norm at top-level highly likely, thereby reducing the need for debate, negotiation, justification, and compromise and increase political and financial support for the norm. This, in turn increases the freedom, power, and resources of committed actors, including operational staff, to promote the norm as they see fit. This makes the inclusion of intrinsic ethical arguments, coherent and comprehensive policies, and strong operationalisation more likely, all of which are indicative of norm integration driven by ethical, especially intrinsic ethical, considerations.

Diagram 16: Specific finding 1.6
Again, the example of ODA under Lynda Chalker outlined in Chapter Seven illustrated this finding very well. Out of all organisations and across the entire research period, the data strongly suggests that only when all four factors were present, there was agreement and appreciation of the value of the norm among top-level decision-makers, which, in turn, allowed for intrinsic arguments to feature, enabled the adoption of coherent and comprehensive policies and comprehensive norm operationalisation, all of which indicate norm integration driven by ethical considerations.

8.2 Overall finding 2: Norms do not always matter – and if and when they matter is conditioned by organisational characteristics

Somewhat contrary to much literature on norms and to the initial expectations of this thesis, the findings of the case studies show that in certain instances the norm did not have any impact at all on some of the organisations studied – not even on organisational rhetoric. If and when the norm impacted on organisations at all was found to be significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. The characteristics that have been identified as facilitating action are:

- High-level of cultural diversity in decision-making
- Multi-membership in decision-making
- High-level of susceptibility of scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers

As these characteristics are mostly typical of multilateral organisations, the findings suggest that multilaterals are generally likely to take quick action on a new norm than their bilateral counterparts.\(^\text{13}\)

The following section illustrates how exactly these characteristics make an organisation more or less likely to take some action on a norm and summarises the empirical evidence that underpins the findings.

\(^{13}\) This finding will be further refined in the conclusion when insights from other donors are added. This shows that bilateral organizations, if they included a committed top-level actor, are likely to lead norm integration efforts, subsequently promote the norm at multilateral level, which, in turn, results in many other bilateral organisations to take some action on the norm.
**Consolidated empirical evidence underpinning the findings**

**Specific finding 2.1:** Cultural diversity and multi-membership increase the likelihood of the presence of a vocal actor willing to push for action on the norm in an organisation’s decision-making forum, making any action on the norm more probable, especially if the norm has wide international recognition, thereby reducing the reluctance of other members to agree to the proposed action.

Diagram 17: Specific finding 2.1

This finding emerged most clearly from the example of both, the first high-level recognition and the first WID/GAD strategy in the EU/EC. Both developments were to a significant extent a result of specific pressure from a few member states – notably Denmark and the Netherlands – that were committed to the norm, as illustrated by their bilateral policies. The presence of such committed actors in decision-making was made more likely due to the cultural diversity and multi-membership of the EU’s decision-making body, the Council.

In addition, the few steps that were taken to operationalisation WID/GAD in EU development cooperation after the first high-level recognition, such as the establishment of the WID/GAD desk and the funding of WID/GAD officers (Commission of the European Communities 1984b, p. 22) all happened in responses to concrete pressure and specifically earmarked funding from the same member states in the Council.

Moreover, also the example of the adoption of UNDP’s first WID/GAD strategy strongly supports this finding. In this case, it was the presence of very vocal member states, Canada and Norway, who exercised consistent pressure in UNDP’s decision-
making forum to take action on the norm. As above, their presence was facilitated by the decision-making forum’s high level of cultural diversity and multi-membership. Importantly, the pressure of the committed actors was given more credit and weight once the WID/GAD norm had achieved wide international recognition.

Moreover, as was the case in the EC, the few steps that were taken to operationalise the norm after the adoption of the strategy were the result of consistent pressure and earmarked funding from certain committed member states. A case in point was the decision to set-up a WID division in 1986, which was set-up in response to explicit pressure from the Nordics and Canada, and the increase in WID/GAD training in the late 1980s, which was directly funded by Norway.

Sub-finding 2.2: Cultural homogeneity and few decision-makers decrease the likelihood of the presence of a vocal actor willing to push for action on the norm. This reduces the likelihood of any action on the norm.

The case of ODA up until the early 1990s illustrated this point very well. ODA took no steps on WID/GAD until 1986 partly because its homogenous decision-making structure, that was dominated by only very few actors made the presence of a decision-maker willing to call for action on the norm unlikely. Indeed, no such committed decision-maker was present, helping to explain the late and overall weak uptake of the norm.

Yet, if, when, and to what extent the organisations took action on WID/GAD was also significantly influenced by their level of susceptibility to scrutiny and the nature of the ‘scrutinisers’, as summarised in sub-finding 2.3:
Sub-finding 2.3: The more susceptible to scrutiny and the more diverse the scrutinisers, the more likely it is that an organisation takes action on a new norm.

Diagram 19: Sub-finding 2.3

\[ \text{Low susceptibility to scrutiny} + \text{Homogeneous scrutinisers} = \text{Action on the norm less likely} \]

\[ \text{High susceptibility to scrutiny} + \text{Diverse scrutinisers} = \text{Action on the norm more likely} \]

The processes observed in UNDP illustrate this point very well, as it was the fact that UNDP was strongly susceptible to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers, including the UN system, that lead to the adoption of the first WID/GAD high-level recognition and was also instrumental in the adoption of the first strategy in 1986. The EC, on the other hand, was mainly susceptible to scrutiny from its member states and parliament, and only took action once pressure from these sources increased in the late 1970s/early 1980s. It was the absence of such pressure until the mid-1990s, which helps to explain why the EC took no action on WID/GAD during that time and only did so, once pressure from a specific member states, once again, increased.

ODA was the last to recognise the norm in 1986 as it was virtually immune to global pressure and only susceptible to fairly homogenous and few scrutinisers – government, parliament and, albeit only very mildly – national CSOs. It only took action once the national CSOs aligned to the then government's dominant ideology got sufficiently organised around the Nairobi Conference and called on ODA to take action on WID/GAD.
Sub-finding 2.4: The level of susceptibility to scrutiny and the nature of the scrutinisers is a function of organisation’s source of authority, including its funding source, and its mandate.

UNDP was strongly susceptible to multiple scrutinisers because it had a split source of delegated authority – making it susceptible to pressure from the UN system and its member states. It was also strongly susceptible to scrutiny, especially from its member states, because its funding depended on support from the member states and its mandate made it a global development actor as well as the ‘development programme of the developing countries’

The EC, due to its mandate as acting on behalf of its member states and as being held accountable by Parliament and exclusively funded by the member states, was strongly susceptible to scrutiny from these - medium-diverse scrutinisers. This, however, did not include global bodies, making it not very responsive to global trends.
ODA, being bilateral and part of the Foreign Office, had a source of authority ‘delegated’ by the British government and a mandate dominated by a desire to act in the UK’s national, particularly commercial, interest. Combined with funding coming exclusively from the UK government, this meant that ODA was not overly concerned with looking like it was acting in line with external standards of ‘good development’, making it virtually immune to external global pressure and scrutiny, only susceptible to few and fairly homogenous scrutinisers, and only very mildly susceptible to scrutiny from outside government or parliament.

In summary, all the above findings strongly suggest that organisations with culturally diverse and multi-member decision-making bodies and high-levels of susceptibility to scrutiny from diverse scrutinisers are more likely to take some action on a new norm, especially once the norm has reached significantly wide international recognition. As these characteristics are mostly found in multilateral organisations, the findings suggest that these types of organisations are, indeed, more likely to take quick action on a new norm than their bilateral counterparts.

**Conclusion**

This Chapter has summarised the findings drawn from the empirical case studies. It has drawn-out two overarching findings and a number of sub-findings that emerged from the case studies and consolidated the empirical evidence in their support. First, it was shown that the case studies strongly suggest that overall, norm integration was mostly driven by social influence, not ethical, considerations in all three organisations. When ethical considerations played a role, this was mostly driven by individual actors who were given the space and resources to act on their beliefs, enabling them to have their beliefs reflected at the level of the organisation.

The findings showed that certain characteristics – relative cultural homogeneity, a limited number of decision-makers, and the presence of a supportive top-level decision-maker – made it more probable for committed actors in an organisation to have this freedom, resulting in norm integration being driven by these actors’ ethical beliefs on the norm. Since these characteristics are mostly found in bilateral aid agencies as opposed to multilaterals, the findings suggest that it is these types of
organisations that are more likely to feature norm integration driven by ethical considerations. Importantly, however, this does not mean that the organisations per se are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations about the norm, or even that the majority of their staff are. It merely means that these organisations are more likely to offer the freedom and resources for committed actors to integrate the norm as they see fit.

Second, the Chapter discussed the second overall finding of the case studies that indicates that in some cases, norms do not have any impact on organisations at all and that, if and when they do is significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. Indeed, evidence was consolidated that indicates that the same characteristics that make norm integration in bilateral organisations more likely to be driven by ethical considerations, in fact, decrease the likelihood of such organisations to take any action on the norm in the first place. Specifically, homogeneity and a limited number of decision-makers, combined with a low level of susceptibility to scrutiny from few and homogenous scrutinisers – in the case of ODA a function of its weak mandate on development and its position as a bilateral agency and a wing of the Foreign Office for most of the period of analysis – can lead to very delayed and extremely weak action on a norm. This is because the impact of global pressure on the organisations is very low, making the organisations reliant on an internal push for norm uptake. This, in turn, is made less probable in a homogenous decision-making forum with a limited number of decision-makers, simply because the likelihood of the presence of a decision maker who is committed and willing to push for action on the norm is reduced. On the contrary, multilateral organisations, largely due to the diversity and multi-membership of their decision-making bodies, and their high level of susceptibility to scrutiny from diverse scrutinisers, a function of their mandate and source of authority, are faster at taking some action on new norms.

In short, multilateral organisations tend to be faster at norm uptake of new norms, but are more likely driven by social influence, not ethical considerations. Bilateral organisations, on the other hand, are less likely to take any quick action on a new norm at all. Yet, when they do act, norm integration is more likely to be driven by
ethical considerations than in multilateral organisations. This overall finding is summarised in diagram 21 below.

Diagram 21: Impact of specific organisational characteristics on the importance of ethical considerations in norm integration in development organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MULTILATERAL</th>
<th>BILATERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Important characteristics:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Important characteristics:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Culturally highly diverse decision-making body</td>
<td>• Culturally homogenous decision-making body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multi-member decision-making body</td>
<td>• Decision-making body with few members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Open &amp; stable mandate</td>
<td>• Open &amp; volatile mandate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If:</th>
<th>If:</th>
<th>If:</th>
<th>If:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committed decision-maker <strong>not present</strong></td>
<td>Committed decision-maker <strong>present</strong></td>
<td>Committed decision-maker <strong>not present</strong></td>
<td>Committed decision-maker <strong>present</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Then:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Then:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Then:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Then:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ SOME ACTION on the norm likely</td>
<td>➢ SOME ACTION on the norm likely</td>
<td>➢ NO ACTION on the norm likely</td>
<td>➢ COMPREHENSIVE ACTION on the norm likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ SOCIAL INFLUENCE likely to dominate norm integration</td>
<td>➢ SOCIAL INFLUENCE likely to dominate norm integration</td>
<td>➢ ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS likely to dominate norm integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Importantly, however, and at the risk of repeating, the findings do not show that bilateral organisations with a committed decision-maker are *as such* are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations. Rather, the analysis suggests that organisational characteristics specific to bilateral agencies can allow for more space and power for committed individuals to act on their beliefs and have them reflected at organisational-level.

This last point strongly emphasises the role of individuals in decision-making, as well as at operational level, in determining which norm integration driver dominated. This leads to a further question: Do actors matter more than structure in explaining the observed processes tying in with extensive literature on the role of ‘policy’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Sustein 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; True and Mintrom 2001; Elgstrom 2011; Park 2011; Caglar, Pruegl, and Zwingel 2013)? Or could the findings be better explained by focusing on global discourse rather than on organisational characteristics? Last, this and the previous Chapters observed that
throughout much of the period of analysis there was a particular reluctance among many individuals at all levels towards the specific issue of gender equality and it was noted that often WID/GAD advocates chose to promote the norm through instrumental-ethical and not intrinsic-ethical arguments despite their personal convictions to the contrary. Might this be suggestive of an underlying gender bias in large bureaucracies in general that may offer a better explanation for the observed processes? The next Chapter turns to the power of these alternative explanations for the findings of this thesis.
Chapter 9: Alternative explanations and the generalisability of the findings

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to critically engage with the assertion that multilateral aid organisations are, as such, more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts and, more broadly, to examine if ethical considerations have any weight at all in international development organisations. To do so, comparative heuristic case studies of the introduction of WID/GAD into three international development organisations with very different organisational characteristics have been conducted. Based on the findings of these case studies, the thesis has established a number of findings that cast significant doubt on the simplistic assertion that multilateral organisations are, as such, more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts. Indeed, the thesis has suggested that organisations per se seem generally unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations – yet people within them might be. If these committed individuals are given the freedom and power to act on their personal ethical beliefs on a norm, they can drive norm integration, and have their commitment reflected at organisational-level. This manifests itself through coherent policies that include strong intrinsic arguments and comprehensive norm operationalisation.

Thus, the analysis certainly points to the importance of specific actors in determining the role that ethical considerations play in norm integration, tying in with extensive existing literature on the role of ‘policy’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Sustein 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; True and Mintrom 2001; Elgstroem 2011; Park 2011; Caglar, Pruegl, and Zwingel 2013). Second, shifts in global discourse on the norm have featured as having influenced what approach to WID/GAD dominated in the three organisations. Notably, the thesis clearly outlines that global approaches to WID/GAD have moved, for example, from the ‘welfare approach’ to the ‘economic efficiency approach’ to the ‘rights approach’ and, thus, the observed shifts in WID/GAD ‘frames’ in the three organisations might simply be reflections of this discourse. Third, the cases have also suggested that the specific nature of the norm may have significantly influenced how it was integrated into the organisations.
Attitudes to gender equality as such, seemed, at times, hostile and operational staff responsible for promoting the norm consciously shied away from promoting the norm based on its intrinsic value. Might any of these three factors provide better explanations than the ‘organisational characteristics’ theory put forward by this thesis?

Moreover, the analysis has only focused on one norm and three organisations. Might this restricted research focus not mean that the findings are only applicable to these particular instances and, thus, no general conclusions can be drawn?

This Chapter turns to these critical questions. First, the three alternative explanations are examined. It is shown that, although important, how, and to what extent all three factors influenced norm integration was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. Thus, the following shows that my theory does indeed help to refine current theories on norm integration in particular, and the role of ethical considerations more generally, by outlining how organisational characteristics (1) impact on what kind of, and to what extent, global discourse influences organisations; (2) limit or enable actors to act on their personal ethical beliefs and empower or restrain them to makes their beliefs and action influence outcomes in international politics; and (3) conditions how bureaucratic gender-bias affects the integration of WID/GAD.

Second, the Chapter turns to the question of generalisability, starting with a consideration of the extension of the theory to other organisations. This is done by taking a brief look at the integration of WID/GAD into four other multilateral and bilateral organisations to broadly gauge if the theory developed by this thesis might be applicable to other organisations. It is found that the theory seems plausible also in the context of other organisations. However, this expansion exercise further refines my findings. Notably, it suggests that, although generally less likely to respond quickly, some – albeit very few – bilateral organisations with committed top-level decision-makers also seem to be the first to facilitate the emergence of international norms. These organisations, together with other actors, subsequently promote the norm at the multilateral-level. Once taken up by multilaterals, there
seems to be a knock-on effect on other bilateral organisations, possibly due to the increased international status that multilateral uptake represents.

Last, the theory proposed by this thesis is briefly applied to another norm – ‘human rights mainstreaming/human rights-based approach to development’ (HRM/HRBA) to provide some tentative thoughts on the extent to which the theory is applicable to other norms.

It is found that, indeed, the suggestion that bilateral organisations either comprehensively and coherently integrate norms (when a committed decision-maker is present) or take highly restrictive or no action at all on a norm (when no committed decision-maker is present); while multilateral organisations are more likely to be in the ‘middle of the road’ and largely driven by social influence, holds in the face of HRBA.

9.1 Alternative Explanations

Global discourse

Alternative Explanation 1: ‘The language used to introduce and institutionalise the norm simply reflects the dominant discourse on development in general, and on the norm specifically, at the time. It is, therefore, not influenced by specific organisational characteristics, and does not reveal anything particular about the extent to which ethical considerations matter in an organisation.’

Throughout the analysis frequent references have been made to shifts in global discourse on gender specifically, and development aid in general. However, do these shifts in global discourse provide a better explanation for the way in which WID/GAD was promoted in the three organisations than organisational characteristics?

I submit that this is not the case for three reasons. First, global discourse does not explain why the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD and the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD policy took place at very different times in each of
the three organisations. Recall that the first high-level recognition happened in 1975 in UNDP, in 1982 in the EC, and in 1986 in ODA, while the first comprehensive policies were adopted in 1986, 1995, and 1988 respectively. While developments in UNDP were most closely aligned to global trends and discourse, an explanation referring exclusively to global discourse does not shed sufficient light on developments in ODA or the EC and on why the organisations reacted at such different times and to such different extents.

Second, the three organisations, as well as sub-institutions, such as the European Parliament, employed very different approaches during the exact same period. A case in point is the year 1995 when ODA adopted its fourth, and the EC its first comprehensive WID/GAD policy. While ODA’s policy is strongly framed in terms of rights and empowerment, the EC’s approach is strongly efficiency-based. Moreover, in both the first high-level recognition and the first policy, the EC Council took a very different approach to WID/GAD than the Parliament and the Commission. Simple reference to global discourse alone does not help to explain these differences.

Third, the case suggests that reference to global discourse is an unsatisfactory explanation for why certain approaches to WID/GAD dominated in the three organisations simply because there was never only one global discourse on gender equality. Notably, in 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, which framed WID/GAD strongly in terms of rights and empowerment and introduced the concept of gender mainstreaming. Yet, other, very influential, voices in international development employed a very different discourse on WID/GAD at exactly the same time. A case in point is the OECD, which took an extremely strong instrumental approach in its DAC High-Level Meeting Statement on Gender Equality. The statement opens with the following lines,
There is strong emerging consensus that to achieve sustainable, people-centred development, progress towards equality in the roles of women is essential. This consensus is based on ample evidence: investment in the education of girls quite possibly yields a higher rate of return than any other investment;...as economic actors they are clearly also key to reducing poverty and to improving the effectiveness of structural adjustment programmes... (OECD 1995, p. 1)

Similarly, although the International Development Targets and the Millennium Development Goals brought a general shift to strong instrumental arguments relating WID/GAD to poverty eradication and an almost exclusive focus on WID/GAD in relation to in education and health in the late 1990/early 2000s, UNIFEM took a very different approach at exactly the same time. Notably it focused on ‘gender justice’ and ‘social transformation’ and aimed to incorporate gender equality as an integral part of human development – not as a means towards it (UNIFEM 2000, p. 20-21).

Thus, reference to global discourse alone does not explain the difference in timing of development on WID/GAD in the three organisations, does not help to explain the difference in approach during the same period, and seems overall weak since there was never only one dominant global discourse on gender equality at any given point during the period of analysis.

This is not to undermine the importance of global discourse altogether, as the account above certainly suggests some role for it. However, I suggest that the level of influence of global discourse as well as the kind of discourse that influenced the organisations was conditioned by their organisational characteristics. What mattered most in this context was the organisations level of susceptibility to scrutiny and the nature of the scrutinisers, both of which were a function of the organisations’ source of authority and mandate.

Both the EC and ODA, with a delegated source of authority and a weak mandate on global development did not appear to be very susceptible to global discourse of any kind. This was particularly pronounced in the case of ODA which did not rely on external approval for either its reputation or its funding, especially in the years before Clare Short took over and introduced a greater focus on DFID’s international
reputation. Notably, ODA did not respond to shifts in discourse around the first and second World Conference on Women or to calls from the OECD/DAC. When it did take some action in 1986, the approach taken was, in fact, not in line with global discourse.

Also the EC did not at all react to the first two World Conferences on Women or the UN Decade on Women and certainly did not adopt its first conclusions in 1982 due to global pressure emanating from these conferences. This is illustrated by (1) the timing of the conclusions, as they do not closely enough follow any of the conferences, and (2), the fact that neither the Conferences nor the World Decade on Women are even mentioned in the 1982 Conclusions. Although it is likely that the pressure exercised by the Netherlands, which ultimately lead to the adoption of the Conclusions, was influenced by the global momentum, this influence was only indirect and only felt due the EC’s medium-level of diversity. The limited influence of global discourse can further be illustrated by the 1985 conclusions, which only make one passing reference to the Nairobi Conference and were indeed criticised by the European Parliament for failing to endorse the agreement reached at the Nairobi Conference (European Parliament 1985).

UNDP, on the other hand, with a split source of identity partly rooted in the UN system and a mandate as a global development actor was the first to follow global discourse on WID/GAD. However, due to its second source of authority – its member states – UNDP’s approach was throughout quite unique as it was strongly non-conceptual and remained instrumentally focused, even during discursive shifts around Beijing (Mondesire 1998).

All the above strongly suggests that a simple reference to ‘global discourse’ does not provide a better explanation for the observed approaches to WID/GAD in the three organisations over the period analysed. Although various global discourses influenced the three organisations’ approach to WID/GAD, the kind of discourse, as well as the extent to which it mattered, was significantly conditioned by two organisational characteristics: the organisations’ source of authority and their mandate strength on development.
**Actors**

*Alternative explanation 2: ‘Organisational characteristics are secondary to agents. What ultimately matters are agents and their actions.’*

The account above is frequently linked to personal convictions and specific actions taken by top-level decision makers and operational staff in all three organisations. Indeed, one key finding of the thesis – that organisations per se are unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations while people within them may be – strongly pointing to the importance of actors. This finding ties in with extensive work on the role of ‘policy’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in norm emergence, change, and integration processes (Sustein 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; True and Mintrom 2001; Elgstroem 2011; Park 2011; Caglar, Pruegl, and Zwingel 2013).

However, does exclusive reference to actors provide a better explanation to the observed norm integration processes than the theory on organisational characteristics advanced by this thesis? I argue that this is not the case because, as already mentioned in previous Chapters, the case studies have shown that the presence, freedom, and power of committed actors is significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. Thus, while not downplaying the importance of actors, I argue that actors are significantly *enabled* or *restrained* in their actions by the characteristics of the organisation they work in. This is so much so that the same actor is likely to act differently in different organisational settings. Let me illustrate this point below.

First, all cases illustrated that the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker in an organisation’s decision-making forum, who is willing to push for action on the norm, is made significantly more or less probable depending on the number of members and the level of cultural diversity of the decision-making body, coupled with the level of international recognition of the norm and the openness of the organisation’s mandate. The higher the diversity, the large the number of members, and the more recognised the norm and the more open the organisation’s mandate, the more likely it is that an actor willing to push for action on the norm will be present in
decision-making. This, as was shown, can significantly influence the extent to which the organisation takes action on a new norm.

Second, all cases have shown that the freedom and power of committed actors was significantly influenced by organisational characteristics. This was so at decision-making, as well as operational, level. Taking the former first, recall that, particularly in the case of ODA/DFID, the role of decision-makers in influencing WID/GAD integration was significantly conditioned by the particular structure they were operating in. Mostly notably, both Chalker and Short could only directly influence the organisational approach to WID/GAD to the extent they did as they were operating in a homogenous and centralised decision-making system, particularly in relation to WID/GAD, where they could take decisions without debate or approval from any body. It was indeed more or less ‘their way or the highway’ regarding WID/GAD, as suggested by one interviewee (Interview with Okondo). This meant that their approach to WID/GAD could be fairly directly reflected at organisational level. In the case of Lynda Chalker, this meant an open but largely hands-off approach that gave knowledgeable and committed SDAs the freedom and power to take action on the norm as they saw fit. This was further facilitated by the fact that ODA did not have, or aim to play, a strong role as a leading development donor, therefore not needing to promote a particular agenda or talk a specific talk. This was partly due to Lynda Chalker’s personality (Interview with Eyben) but also a result of the position of ODA as wing of the Foreign Office, making its susceptibility to external scrutiny weak and inward looking.

The latter changed when Clare Short took office. Her desire to elevate DFID’s status, coupled with her power to shift the organisation in the direction she saw fit due to the homogenous and centralised decision-making process and the increased political clout that came with DFID’s independent status, meant that DFID became increasingly concerned with its general external reputation as a donor and a desire to be increasingly viewed as global leader in development. Space for WID/GAD advocates shrunk and all work on the norm had to be aligned to the global anti-poverty agenda. Thus, although in both cases, Chalker’s and Short’s personalities played a significant role, their actions were to a significant extent conditioned by ODA’s/DFID’s specific organisational set-up.
The example of UNDP illustrates the flipside of the argument. Although Bill Draper was widely viewed as committed to WID/GAD his leverage for action was severely restricted by UNDP’s highly diverse and multi-member decision-making body and its source of authority partly rooted in delegation form the member states. In the words of one interviewee, he was confined by the “organisational straightjacket” of UNDP (Interview with Reid). Similarly, Gus Speth, who took over from Bill Draper in 1993, although not particularly committed to WID/GA, did not drastically change UNDP’s work on WID/GAD, due to the same “organisational straightjacket”.

In addition to the importance of committed individuals in decision-making, the thesis has also very strongly pointed to the role of operational staff. Yet again, their freedom and power was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. Let me illustrate this claim first by reference to ODA/DFID. Notably, although the SDA in charge of WID/GAD remained the same from 1986 until 2000, the organisation’s approach to the norm changed considerably. Interview data as well as personal reflections published by her strongly suggest that, although her commitment to WID/GAD did not change throughout this period, her room for manoeuvre and the strategies chosen for norm integration varied depending on the organisational space she had at any given time. Notably, the SDA stated in an interview for this thesis that under Chalker,

…there was enormous freedom…we were working in a very enabling environment. That changed (under Clare Short)...we were too creative and having too much fun. They could not control us…just see what happened to people working on gender and social development issues now in DFID. It is really pathetic. Their hands are so tied – they have not got the same freedom at all. I could never do now what I did then. (Interview with Eyben)

Thus, the organisation’s volatility and the resulting frequent changes in top-management, combined with the fairly homogenous and limited number of decision-makers and the open mandate that gave top-management ample freedom and power to set new priorities for the organisation, significantly influenced the freedom and power of committed operational staff. Yet, the homogeneity, few decision-makers,

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14 The mere presence of operational staff working on WID/GAD was not so much conditioned by organisational structure, as most donors employed someone in this capacity already during the early 1980s. Their status and resources – in other words, their power – and freedom differed considerably.
and open mandate also meant that, when top-level commitment existed, committed actors had a lot of freedom and power to act on their beliefs.

On the contrary, operational staff in UNDP were, throughout the research period, significantly limited by the organisation’s specific characteristics, especially the multi-membership and cultural diversity of its decision-making body. Recall that one former WID/GAD staff noted that,

> UNDP lives in terror of saying or doing something that will annoy the government, so they dumb down the language grossly simplifying what feminist research has proven at the start. Radical work on gender is not possible. Sad, but it was also an education for me to realize the limitations of an institution like this. From the outside it’s quite impressive and overwhelming. It’s only when working on the inside that you recognize the constraints. (Menon Sen quoted in Murphy 2006, p. 210)

Another WID/GAD staff mentioned in an interview for this thesis that in UNDP they “could not work transformationally” (Interview with Reid) and another noted that “certain arguments could just not be used” (Interview with Leitner).

Combined with the finding that UNDP’s multi-membership and cultural diversity also reduced funding for WID/GAD, this strongly suggests that UNDP’s organisational set-up significantly restrained the freedom and power of operational staff committed to WID/GAD to act on their personal beliefs.

In short, this thesis has shown that, while actors significantly influenced the kind of norm integration driver that dominated in each organisations, the extent to which they could influence these processes was significantly conditioned by the characteristics of the organisation they worked in.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{15}\) The account in this thesis focuses largely on the impact of organisational characteristics on norm integration and, admittedly does not pay explicit attention to the complex interrelation between organisational characteristics and agents or actors. This is done due to the nature of the research question and in the interest of focus and clarity. However, this thesis does not intend to downplay the importance of this aspect, particularly because in all cases, while agents were conditioned by organisational characteristics, they also significantly influenced these characteristics. This is recognised in the narrative above, but no deep engagement with this point is possible due to the research focus and in the interest of clarity.
**Bureaucratic gender bias**

*Alternative explanation 3:* ‘All bureaucracies are “gendered and engendering process(es), such that (their) outcomes, internal organization, and culture reflect and promote the interest of men.” According to this argument gender is “constitutive of, not contingent to, administration” and is “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between sexes” (Joan Scott quoted in Goetz 1992, p. 9).

According to this line of reasoning, the findings of the thesis are essentially not about organisational characteristics, agents, or global discourse, but are best explained by reference to a widespread bureaucratic gender bias that affects all bureaucracies, including multilateral and bilateral development agencies. Indeed, ample and very insightful literature on gender in development bureaucracies argues that gender-biased power structures in such bureaucracies are the key factors that determine how these organisations operate. Notably, Goetz finds that “...women’s experiences of change in developing economies has tended to be distilled through the development process in ways which strongly reflect the gender politics and gendered interests of the users of information” (Goetz 1994, p. 28). Referring to what Adele Mueller calls “the bureaucratization of feminist knowledge”, Goetz further suggests that “bureaucratic procedures for information generation...has the effect of stripping away its political content” (Goetz 1994, p. 28). Cornwall et all agree: “The institutional and organisational forms of international development, as bureaucracies...produce pressures for simplification, sloganizing and lowest common denominator consensus” (Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007, p. 16). They refer to these processes of simplification as manifestations of a “politics of influence” and of “power relations within development” which “ensure that feminist through remains thoroughly marginal” (Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007, p. 16).

Seeing ‘gender bias’ as a form of power, potentially very subtle and possibly disguised as ‘appropriate behaviour’, the findings of the case study do indeed suggest that it was present in all three organisations and that it substantially conditioned the kind of norm integration processes that gender advocates deemed appropriate in all
three organisations analysed. Notably, external evaluations, academic accounts, as well as interviews conducted for this thesis with staff in all three organisations across the entire research period noted a widespread apprehension among staff and management towards the issue of gender equality. For instance, an external evaluation of WID/GAD in the EC found,

…a certain degree of resistance to integrating the concept of gender, with several officers viewing it as a gimmick or passing phase, and others mentioning that if gender is included everywhere, it will annoy people. One expert even suggested that gender might be a possible ‘virus’.” (Colombo 1994a, p. 37)

Elgstroem, also referring to the EC, states that, “One of my informants called DG VIII a ‘male organization’, another claimed that most officials there ‘couldn’t care less’ about gender issues. ‘There is no understanding and little sympathy’ is yet another typical quote” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 470). A comprehensive review of WID/GAD in the EC similarly finds that, “There has been a lack of encouraging statements from top management on the importance of the integration of gender. Staff members believe that gender is very low on the list of priorities of the institution” (Jensen 2006, p. iv).

Evaluations carried out on UNDP reach similar conclusions. One noted explicit reluctance by staff to take action on gender as, “...questionnaire responses indicate that, to address gender issues, explicit instructions have been ignored by missions and, at times, by Governments” (UNDP 1990b). Another evaluation found that, “Some women staff members indicated that WID issues are not taken seriously by male colleagues and that the response has often been laughter when women in development was mentioned” (Kardam 1991). Mondesire also clearly finds in her 1999 evaluation that there was no senior management support for action on WID/GAD (Mondesire 1999). An evaluation of WID/GAD training in ODA/DFID equally found reluctance towards the issue among many staff. Some senior members of staff stated that “you can never get away from gender, its always there.” (Sheelagh 1998, p. 20) and that “..it (gender) is not appropriate to what my department does and fortunately we’re exempt from the usual DFID rules so we don’t have to do it…” (Sheelagh 1998, p. 21).
Interviews conducted for this thesis strongly support these findings. For instance, one interviewee stated that, the reason why he got involved in WID/GAD work was to “limit the damage the bra burning feminists [in the organisation] were causing” as they were, according to him, “suggesting a lot of nonsense” (Interview with Pearce). Moreover, a number of high-level officials interviewed explicitly stated that they did not want to be associated with women’s issues as this was considered bad for their career. One official, who had turned down the position as head of the Gender in Development Programme in UNDP said that she did so because: “I did not want to be totally associated with women’s issues. It is different when you are in a technical field but gender was not like that…it was not considered a technical field, it was (considered) soft and limiting your personal growth and influence…” (Interview with Miller). Another interviewee noted that, “I was very proud of the fact that I had never dealt with women’s affairs…” Individuals who had worked closely with Clare Short, similarly stated that Short, “came from quite a strong feminist background but she did not want to be seen as the great feminist around DFID… She did not want to be one of the girls. She wanted to be one of the men” (Interview with Holden). This strongly suggests that there was certainly a strong sense amongst officials in the three organisations that gender issues were viewed with a certain apprehension, particularly if framed in terms of ‘feminist language’.

WID/GAD advocates seemed to be very much aware of such a gender-bias and adjusted their strategies accordingly. Specifically, this seems to have lead to, what I refer to in the thesis, significant ‘self-censorship’ of WID/GAD advocates that resulted in the overall preference for instrumental arguments in all cases throughout most of the examined period. Notably, one former head of the WID division in UNDP stated that,

I tried to represent myself not as a narrow minded women-only feminist and instead as concerned with development in a broader perspective –when they realised that I was married and had three sons – I became a normal person and with my professional and political background…I was accepted as one of their kind. (Interview with Eide)
Another WID/GAD official in DFID noted that, “…feminist arguments just did not work” and another stated that talking about values or rights was seen to make one at best unpopular and ineffective and at worst being “laughed at” (Interview with Hay).

The particular aversion to gender equality across different levels in all three organisations found by the evaluations cited above, although not independently assessed by this thesis, very likely also influenced the level of operationalisation of WID/GAD, as it lead to weak political support for WID/GAD officials and limited, or even negative, pressure on general staff to promote the issue. This may have had particularly large impact in hierarchical bureaucracies, such as the three case studies, as one interviewee noted, “civil servants do what they are told” (Interview with Hay) and since there was “little serious commitment from the management” (Interview with Hay) this negatively impacted on the level of norm operationalisation. Indeed, the interviewee stated that, “if performance was affected, they would do something. This is bureaucracy and people do what they are told” (Interview with Hay).

However, and taking into account the constitutive effect of gender-bias on structure, the case studies have also shown that the way in which gender-bias constrained action on norm integration, especially action by WID/GAD staff, was also significantly conditioned by specific organisational characteristics. Notably, the cases show that the extent to which WID/GAD staff felt constrained by gender-bias depended to a significant extent on the openness of the mandate of the organisation. UNDP, having a strong mandate focused on ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’ made staff particularly keen to avoid value-based arguments and focused on the “professionalisation” of the issue instead. Both the EC and ODA/DFID pre-1997 had much weaker and broader mandates on development, which meant that WID/GAD staff were less constraint in how they could frame the issue and, indeed, both organisations’ approach to WID/GAD includes both intrinsic and instrumental arguments as well as a much higher level of conceptual engagement than in UNDP. When DFID’s mandate became more restrictive in 1997, WID/GAD staff were certainly more constraint in how they could address the underlying gender-bias in DFID and promote WID/GAD across DFID.
In addition, the organisation’s source of authority and the composition of its decision-making body further influenced how gender-bias in the organisation affected the action of WID/GAD staff, because it impacted on their level of freedom and power to promote the norm as they saw fit as outlined in the previous section. Notably, UNDP’s source of authority partly rooted in ‘delegation from the member states’ combined with the multi-member and highly diverse decision-making forum that did not agree on the value of WID/GAD meant that WID/GAD staff were strongly constrained in their actions. This limited them in how they could approach WID/GAD in general, including how they could aim to address the organisation’s underlying gender bias. ODA staff, in the years prior to 1997, on the other hand, were most free to promote the issue as they saw fit. Although still constrained by a gender-biased culture, which helps to explain the still strong focus on instrumental arguments in ODA (‘self-censorship’), the constraint was less than in the other two organisations, particularly UNDP. In other words, certain organisational characteristics influenced to what extent WID/GAD staff had strategic entry points to overcome or even address the underlying gender-bias and promote the issue according to their beliefs.

**Summary**

The section has established that, although global discourse, actors, and gender-bias, have impacted on how WID/GAD was integrated in all three organisations, the way in which all factors influenced norm integration was significantly conditioned by specific organisational characteristics. This further illustrates the added value my theory brings to attempts at understanding the role of ethical considerations in different types of development organisations in general, and in norm integration, and specifically the integration of WID/GAD, in particular.

**9.2 The question of generalisability: Other organisations and another norm**

As recognised in Chapter Three, the method chosen for this thesis, comparative heuristic case studies, brings with it a number of strengths and weaknesses. While the detailed and in-depth qualitative work allowed for by this method enables in-depth findings with “explanatory richness”, this comes at a certain cost of
generalisability (George and Bennett 2005, p. 30). This thesis has almost exclusively focused on one norm and three organisations. To what extent are the findings that have emerged from this study generalisable to other norms or other organisations?

This section turns to this question and discusses the extent to which the findings of this thesis are generalisable, or at least, contingently applicable to “types or subtypes of cases” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 31). Since the findings of the thesis are based on the selection of (1) specific organisations and (2) a specific norm, the following section will discuss the implications of each in turn, beginning with the former.

**Generalisability: Other organisations**

The case studies have, broadly speaking, pointed to the following two overall findings on the impact of organisational characteristics on the importance of ethical considerations in, and the timing of, WID/GAD uptake:

1. **Importance of ethical considerations**: Organisations with cultural homogeneity and few members in decision-making, if coupled with the presence of a committed decision-maker, are likely to provide ample freedom, power, and resources to actors committed to a norm to have their commitments reflected at the level of the organisation – likely to lead to coherent and intrinsically-focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation. On the other hand, organisations with culturally diverse and multi-member decision-making bodies and consensus-based decision-making, are less likely to provide such freedom, likely to lead to less coherent and instrumentally-focused policies and patchy operationalisation.
2. Timing of norm uptake: Organisations with high-levels of cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making, coupled with a high level of susceptibility to scrutiny (multiple and/or active scrutinisers) and an open mandate, are quicker to react to new norms than organisations with low-levels of cultural diversity, few members in decision-making, low levels of susceptibility to scrutiny, and a closed mandate.

This section takes both findings in turn to establish the extent to which it is plausible to suggest broader applicability to different organisations.

i. Importance of ethical considerations

Organisations with cultural homogeneity and few members in decision-making, if coupled with the presence of a committed decision-maker, are likely to provide ample freedom, power, and resources to actors committed to a norm to have their commitments reflected at the level of the organisation – likely to lead to coherent and intrinsically-focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation. On the other hand, organisations with culturally diverse and multi-member decision-making bodies and consensus-based decision-making, are less likely to provide such freedom, power, and resources likely to lead to less coherent, instrumentally-focused policies and patchy operationalisation.

As the characteristics likely to reduce freedom and power of committed actors to act on their beliefs - cultural diversity and multi-member decision-making - are most commonly found in multilateral organisations, this finding suggests that multilateral organisations may be less likely to have norm integration driven by ethical, especially intrinsic ethical considerations. Bilateral organisations with homogenous and few decision-makers, if combined with a committed decision-maker, on the other hand, are more likely to provide such freedom and are, thus, more likely to have norm integration driven by ethical considerations.

Crucially, the claim examined here is not that all, or even most, bilateral aid organisations are likely to have WID/GAD integration dominated by ethical considerations. Much more modestly, the claim advanced and assessed here is that
ethical considerations are more likely to dominate norm integration in a bilateral organisation than a multilateral organisation. Using the indicators applied in this thesis to measure the different norm integration drivers, one would therefore expected multilateral organisations to be more likely to have weak WID/GAD policies either framed in procedural (non-conceptual) or instrumental terms and weak operationalisation, while bilateral organisations are more likely to feature comprehensive and intrinsically focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation.

To examine the extent to which this theory applies to other organisations, the section below provides a brief overview of the integration of WID/GAD into the World Bank and the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and then turns to the integration of the norm into two bilateral organisations: the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD. Due to space constraints, this section does not engage in process analysis and only looks at policies and secondary data on levels of WID/GAD operationalisation to gauge how WID/GAD has been taken up by these organisations. The findings are, thus, highly tentative but provide an indication of the extent to which the theory proposed here might be applicable beyond the three organisations studied.

**Multilateral organisations**

**World Bank**: The World Bank first substantively included WID/GAD in its 1984 Operational Manual. This inclusion was non-conceptual and, overall, weak. Notably, WID was included under ‘Sociological Aspects of Project Appraisal’. It was framed largely in non-conceptual terms, aiming for the greater participation of women in relevant areas. The manual was not accompanied by concrete strategies of how this should be done or by any incentives or enforcement mechanisms (Razavi and Miller 1995a). Subsequent evaluations judged that the manual “failed to make responsiveness to WID a routine concern in operations” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 34).
The first comprehensive WID/GAD policy was adopted in 1994. It is strongly framed in efficiency terms. Notably the strategy opens with the following paragraph,

Women produce half the food in some parts of the developing worlds, bear most of the responsibility for household food security, and make up a quarter of the work force in industry...Improving women’s productivity can contribute to growth, efficiency, and poverty reduction. (World Bank 1994, p. 9)

This strong focus on efficiency continues throughout the strategy and paragraphs such as the following are frequently found in the document: “Investing in women is critical for poverty reduction. It speeds economic development…it produces significant social returns” (World Bank 1994, p. 22).

Despite lengthy discussions for making the efficiency case for WID/GAD the document is weak on strategy. No concrete strategies of how the policy should be implemented are outlined and no concrete commitments to implementation are made in the document. Thus, in addition to being strongly framed in efficiency terms, the document is not very comprehensive.

The strong focus on efficiency continued into the 2000s. Notably, the World Bank’s 2002 gender policy opens with the following paragraph:

Several major World Bank reports provide strong empirical evidence that the gender-based division of labour…tend to slow development, economic growth and poverty reduction.. (World Bank 2002, p. 1)

This exclusive focus on efficiency is carried forward throughout the document, with statements such as “Gender inequality retards economic growth and poverty reduction” commonly used. All thematic issues mentioned, such as education, health, and access to agricultural inputs, are also exclusively framed in efficiency terms (World Bank 2002)

The policy is also remarkable in its ‘hands-off’ approach regarding entrenched
gender inequalities and only allows for World Bank intervention if the ‘opportunity costs’ are considered high enough,

Because the religious or cultural traditions that define and justify the distinct roles and expected behavior of males and females are strongly cherished and socially reinforced, change in gender systems is often contested... Especially where the CGA suggest that opportunity costs of ignoring gender issues are high, Bank staff will be proactive in bringing gender issues to the attention of their country counterparts. (World Bank 2002, p. 2)

Regarding operationalisation, numerous evaluations conducted of the integration of WID/GAD into World Bank policy and operations concur that, overall, “gender concerns have not been systematically integrated into World Bank operations” (World Bank 2005; Razavi and Miller 1995a; World Bank 2010). One evaluation, for instance, found that, “lack of training” and limited “focus” of policies and strategies have “proved detrimental to the effective implementation of policy.” Regarding impact on gender equality outcomes, the evaluation found that “The Bank’s efforts have been marginal and have only had negligible impact as a result” (World Bank 2005, p. xiii).

Food and Agricultural Organisation: The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) adopted its first WID/GAD strategy in 1989. The strategy is entitled Plan of Action for the Integration of Women in Development and aims to ensure that “in the organisation’s sphere of responsibility, women are accorded equal rights and opportunities” and that “their potential contribution is put to good use by their societies” (FAO 1989a, p. 1). Thus, although conceptually quite vague, the approach taken is mostly instrumental. The stress on efficiency arguments is further supported by a brief examination of discussions in the FAO Council around the adoption of the Plan of Action in which it was noted that “The issue of women in development is basically an issue of hard development economics - making the best use of economic potentials in order to obtain growth and development” (FAO 1989b, p. 181).

The Plan provides some detail on implementation, with priority given to staff training and the strengthening of technical divisions to incorporate WID into their
programme of work, but does not include a comprehensive or wide-ranging strategy for the integration of WID/GAD.

The Plan was revised in 1995. The new Gender Action Plan is even more strongly framed in efficiency terms. Notably, women’s lack of access to land and other agricultural inputs is exclusively presented as a major obstacle to productivity. The strategy opens by stating that,

Agricultural and rural development that is equitable, effective and sustainable cannot be pursued without an explicit recognition of the tremendous contribution of rural women…women’s empowerment will be central to achieving initiatives aimed at raising levels of nutrition, improving production and distribution of food and agricultural products, and enhancing the living conditions of rural populations. (FAO 1995, para. 1)

The focus on instrumental-ethical arguments has continued and to some extent intensified to this day, for instance in the recently adopted new FAO gender policy (FAO 2013, p. 1).

Overall, evaluations carried out on FAO’s work on gender are highly critical of the organisation’s achievements. One evaluation found that FAO’s gender action plans have “left little mark on the organization” (FAO 2011b, p. 10) and a gender audit noted that there are “major impediments to gender mainstreaming at FAO” and that FAO is “far behind many of its peers and nowhere near where it ought to be” (FAO 2011a, p. 2).

Summary on multilateral organisations: Although very brief, the above overview does suggest that gender policies of both, FAO and the World Bank, seem to be largely based on instrumental arguments and, at least in the 1980s and 1990s, were not very coherent or comprehensive. Moreover, operationalisation of WID/GAD has left much to be desired across the board. In order for the above to support my findings, this would need to be significantly different in some bilateral aid organisations. The next section turns to this question.
Bilateral organisations

Crucially, the claim examined here is not that all, or even most, bilateral aid organisations have more coherent and intrinsically focused WID/GAD policies or have more comprehensively integrated the norm in their operations. Much more modestly, the claim advanced and assessed here is that coherent policies based on the intrinsic value of the norm and comprehensive operationalisation are most likely to be found in bilateral aid organisations. In other words, if one observes intrinsically focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation it is most likely to be in a bilateral organisation. Instrumentally focused policies and weak operationalisation are found in both, multilateral as well as bilateral organisations.

The following section analyses the integration of WID/GAD into policy language and operationalisation of three bilateral donors.

**Netherlands:** As already mentioned in the previous Chapters, the Netherlands adopted its first WID policy in 1980. The document is remarkable in its level of detail, coherence, and strong intrinsic approach to gender equality. Most notably, it puts the improvement of women’s living and working conditions as a core goal of development aid (para 1) and explicitly states that it aims to transform social – and power – relations. For instance, the policy states that,

> Women will not be in a position to influence their lives until they have achieved some degree of economic independence... This implies that men...will bear their share of responsibility in three realms of activity: domestic duties, bringing up children and caring for the sick and elderly...development programmes and projects...should be designed to bring about social change that will alter the traditional attitudes. (Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1980, para. 3.1)

Moreover, the policy specifically states that it aims to support the “fight against women’s subordination” (Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1980, para. 3.1.4) and strongly critiques other donors including the UN that frame the issue as a “social problem”
The policy also includes a detailed and comprehensive checklist for the inclusion of WID/GAD into development cooperation. This checklist further underlines the strong and almost confrontational approach taken by the policy as it states that,

...it must be realized that the participation of women in the development process necessarily involves major changes in the institutionalised power relationship between the sexes... Obviously this process will encounter strong opposition. Development programmes aimed at improving the position of women and enabling them to participate in the development process must allow for such resistance. (Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1980, annex, p. 1)

Following the adoption of this policy the Netherlands put in place a number of concrete steps to operationalise WID/GAD, such as gender training, and was considered “ahead of the game” in its efforts in this regard (Jackson 1992, p. 92).

The first WID/GAD policy was replaced in 1992 with a policy entitled, “Women in Development: Advancing towards Autonomy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992). As the title suggests, the policy focuses on women’s autonomy as the basis for the integration of women into development. It notably states that, “.development policies have to be oriented explicitly to women in development. This can best be done on the basis of the concept of autonomy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 11). Autonomy is understood broadly as including the following three aspects (1) physical, (2) economic; (3) socio-cultural (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 15)

This is a very comprehensive understanding of the different spheres that require attention to achieve women’s empowerment and gender equality and includes controversial issues such as sexual and reproductive rights.

The policy is further remarkable as it explicitly addresses issues of power and social transformation. For instance it states that, “..women are fighting, and have fought, for
economic and political rights and for control over their own bodies and lives in all places throughout history,” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 11) The policy also recognises that women suffer specific human rights abuses due to their sex (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 11).

In addition to this detailed conceptual engagement with WID/GAD, the policy also outlines a very comprehensive and ambitious implementation strategy, including instrument for operationalisation and specific targets (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 18 - 22). Comprehensive operationalisation of WID/GAD that commenced after the adoption of the first policy continued throughout the 1990s. Tools for gender mainstreaming developed by the Dutch during this period were considered as “the best-developed gender analysis instrument so far” (Roggeband and Verloo 2006, p. 616). Moreover, an evaluation carried out in 1998 found that “In the 1990s the processes accelerated…the amount of human and other resources made available increased substantially” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1998, p. 1) and that WID/GAD has become well integrated in projects and programmes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1998, p. 2).

Last, also a recent DAC Peer Review 2010 the Netherlands is referred to as “an internationally recognised leader on gender equality and women’s empowerment in development and has a long and established track record in mainstreaming these issues in its development co-operation. This impressive performance should be maintained…” (OECD 2011, p. 30). Gender equality is considered to have a “high profile and strong leadership from teams and individuals in the Hague and most Dutch embassies” (OECD 2011, p. 29) and “spending on gender equality reflects its prioritisation of this issue. The Netherlands spent a higher proportion of ODA on gender equality and women’s empowerment activities in 2008 than most other DAC members” (OECD 2011, p. 47).

**NORAD:** In 1985, the Ministry adopted its first WID policy, which strongly recognised women’s productive roles alongside their reproductive roles. The policy is comprehensive and coherent. Indeed, one evaluation of the integration of WID/GAD in Norwegian aid finds that NORAD was “one of the first national
development agencies to present a coherent policy document on the integration of WID into development aid.” (Geisler 1999, p. 12)

Following the first policy, NORAD published a *Strategy for Assistance to Women in Development* in 1986. The strategy aimed to: (1) improve women’s living conditions; and (2) provide opportunities for women to participate in economic, cultural, and political activities with a view to change the mainstream of development to make it benefit women. According to some commentators, this strategy “espoused a very radical, ‘agenda-setting’ approach” (Geisler 1999, p. 12). Further, the strategy included an explicit mandate for NORAD to push for increased action on WID/GAD in multilateral organisations. It stated that Norway’s active participation in the multilateral organisations is “an opportunity to work towards a wider understanding of women’s role in development and thereby influence both the member countries and the organisations in relationship to WID” (Geisler 1999, p. 13).

Thus, it seems that already in the early decades, NORAD stood out as an aid agency with coherent and comprehensive policies that included a significant focus on gender equality as an important value and of itself. This trend continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. A case in point is the 2007 – 2009 Action Plan. The Plan is remarkable as it strongly – almost confrontationally – puts the issue of women’s rights – at the heart of Norway’s development cooperation. Notably, the Plan states that, “The Government wants Norway to be a fearless champion of women’s rights and gender equality.” The Plan puts the “rights, participation and influence of women will be at the core of Norway’s development cooperation efforts” and aims to “ensure the realisation of the rights of women that are set out in international human rights conventions” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 6).

The substantive part of the plan lives up to these promises as it focuses on four thematic issues: women’s political empowerment, women’s economic empowerment, sexual and reproductive health and rights, violence against women. The latter two stand out as critical for women’s empowerment but often overlooked by many development agencies. Indeed, the Plan particularly strong on these two issues. It states that,
Norway will be a fearless champion of women’s sexual and reproductive rights...Establishing the right to safe abortion on demand was a milestone in the fight of Norwegian women for economic and political participation on the same terms as men. Far too many women die each year because they lack access to safe abortion on demand. We will also fight all forms of discrimination and stigmatisation on the grounds of sexual orientation. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 7)

The Plan is also strongly transformative as it calls for,”…the redistribution of power, resources and care responsibilities between men and women…. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 6).

Regarding implementation, NORAD seems to have made comprehensive efforts. Although the organisation was criticised for weak translation of policies into actual practice in the late 1990s and early 2000s (NORAD 2005), more recent assessments suggest comprehensive integration of the norm in NORADs operations. Notably, the 2013 DAC Peer Review states that NORAD,

…is among the more progressive voices in the global development landscape, committed to critical and challenging development issues. For example, „ Norway…plays a leading role in promoting gender equality and women’s rights internationally and in following up on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. (OECD 2013, p. 25)

It further finds that, “Norway has incorporated gender equality and women’s empowerment across its programmes” (OECD 2013, p. 38). Specifically, the review states that, “Norway has institutionalised and has allocated sufficient resources, under a team of four advisers on gender in the Ministry and another six in Norad, to provide an additional boost to ensuring that gender equality is incorporated across its programmes” (OECD 2013, p. 7).

Thus, compared to other aid agencies, Norway’s policies and, although to a lesser extent, its implementation, stand out as being strong, coherent, and framed in intrinsic arguments. Commentators on aid and gender concur. For instance, Slebervick and Ostebo find that “Norway is often seen as a “world champion” in gender equality. Norwegian aid policies on gender often emphasise how lessons can
be learned from “the Norwegian model” and experiences.” (Selbervik and Ostebo 2013, p. 250) while an evaluation of Norwegian aid find that “Over the years the Norwegian Government has distinguished itself as a champion of women’s rights and gender equality both in Norway itself and also in its development aid strategies” (Geisler 1999, p. 12).

Summary on bilateral organisations: In summary, the integration of WID/GAD into Dutch and Norwegian aid administrations was overall more comprehensive and policies were more focused on intrinsic arguments than the multilateral agencies examined above. This does indeed suggest that the theory developed by this thesis might be applicable beyond the three detailed case studies. In addition, a recent OECD/DAC report also supports my tentative assertion that bilateral organisations may be more likely to comprehensively operationalise WID/GAD, as it has found,

...unprecedented political and policy commitment from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors to accelerating progress towards gender equality, women’s empowerment and women’s rights...DAC members have become more active and strategic in their efforts to influence multilateral institutions’ performance on gender equality [emphasis added]; and have stepped up their engagement in global processes to protect and advance women’s rights. (OECD 2014a, p. 4)
ii Timing of norm uptake

Organisations with high-levels of cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making, coupled with a high level of susceptibility to scrutiny (multiple and/or active scrutinisers) and an open mandate, are quicker to react to new norms than organisations with low-levels of cultural diversity, few members in decision-making, low levels of susceptibility to scrutiny and a closed mandate.

Since some of the characteristics that were found to make organisations quicker to react to new norms – high-levels of cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision making – are most typical of multilateral organisations, the finding suggests that, overall, multilateral organisations might be quicker to react to new norms than their bilateral counterparts. Likely exceptions are multilateral organisations with limited susceptibility to scrutiny, mostly expected in organisations that generate their own resources and have closed mandates such as international development banks, including the World Bank.

The table below provides an overview of a number of multilateral and bilateral aid organisations and shows when they first recognised WID/GAD in their mandates. Without going into detail, as this would go beyond the scope of this thesis, the table indicates that multilateral organisations did indeed, react considerably earlier to WID/GAD than their bilateral counterparts.
Table: 18 Overview of first formal recognition of WID/GAD in key development organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of first formal recognition of WID/GAD</th>
<th>Agency</th>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>USAID</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>ILO</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>EC</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>CIDA</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>SIDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>DFID</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>FAO</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>WFP</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>NZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Swiss</td>
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The table highlights one particularly notable exception to the observed trend: the United States, and the Netherlands. The United States was, in fact, the first aid donor (multilateral or bilateral) to recognise WID/GAD in its official mandate in 1973. Does this challenge my findings?

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16 “First formal recognition” refers to either the first inclusion of WID/GAD into the organisations’ mandates or the adoption of a first WID/GAD policy. The establishment of working groups or other, more informal measures, are not taken into account.
17 (International Labour Conference 1975)
18 The first WID/GAD policies of CIDA, SIDA, DFID, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany and USAID are referenced in (OECD 1988)
19 (Peebles 2007)
20 (Dodhia and Johnson 2005)
21 (Inter-American Development Bank 2010)
22 (UNHCR Executive Committee 1989)
23 (Cammack 1999)
24 (JICA 2007)
25 (Womenwatch 2004)
26 (Austrian Development Agency 2006)
27 (Bennett 2013)
28 (Aleyly 2004)
29 (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2013)
A closer look at both cases shows, that neither undermine the theory put forward in this thesis. Recall, that the thesis has found that organisations tended to take some action on the norm when the scrutinisers they were susceptible to pushed for action on the norm. The reason for why multilateral organisations are generally quicker at responding to new and global trends is that they are more susceptible to multiple scrutinisers. This, in turn, means that there is a higher probability that one of the scrutinisers they are susceptible to will push for action on the norm. Importantly, the finding does not preclude the presence of committed and powerful scrutinisers in a bilateral setting, as the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in ODA was indeed triggered by such pressure, it simply suggests that it is less likely.

As already discussed above, there was strong internal pressure among Dutch politician also reflected at the level of the EC that helps to explain the early recognition of WID/GAD in the Netherlands. Also the first formal legal recognition of WID/GAD in the US Foreign Assistance Act, also known as the Percy Amendment, was the result of consistent lobbying of US Congressional hearings by domestic “women’s circles” (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 3). Specifically, it was decisive action by mainstream women’s organisations, spearheaded by two high-ranking women in the US political establishment – Mildred May, Head of the US Information Agency Women’s Programme, and Virginia Allen, Deputation Assistance of State for Public Affairs – that put pressure on Congress to take action and, ultimately, lead to the adoption of the amendment (Fraser and Tinker 2004). Thus, the early recognition of WID/GAD in the US can be explained by the presence of powerful domestic ‘scrutinisers’ whose voices mattered to decision-makers in the US in the early 1970s. It was not a reaction to a global trend or global pressure and, therefore, does not undermine the theory put forward here that multilateral organisations are more susceptible to these types of trends and pressures.

Yet, this insight does point to a potential refinement of the theory put forward here, as it might suggest that, although generally slower, one or a few bilateral organisations might also be the first to take action on a new norm. This point is further considered in the section on HRM/HRBA below.
Summary: This section has provided a brief overview of the integration of WID/GAD into a number of additional multilateral and bilateral donors. The findings of this section have tentatively indicated the viability of my suggested theory. First, an analysis of a number of other multilateral and bilateral aid organisations has further supported the suggestions that coherent and intrinsically-focused policies as well as comprehensive operationalisation are most likely found in bilateral agencies. Second, a look at when WID/GAD was first taken up by various development organisations suggests that, overall, multilateral organisations took action earlier than the majority of bilateral donors.

Generalisability: Another norm

This section briefly considers the integration of another norm - human rights mainstreaming/the human rights-based approach to development (HRM/HRBA) – into a number of multilateral and bilateral development organisations in order to gauge the extent to which the theory proposed in this thesis holds when confronted with a different norm. This section first introduces the norm and subsequently discusses the applicability of the two key findings to its introduction into UNDP, ODA/DFID, and the EU.

i. The origins and definitions of HRM/HRBA

Official attempts at linking the promotion and protection of human rights and development date back to the first World Conference on Human Rights that was held in Teheran in 1968. The conference recognised that “the achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies of economic and social development” (Alston and Robinson 2005, p. 1). In 1977 the UN Commission on Human Rights “proclaimed the existence of a human right to development”, yet it was not until the mid-1990s that “the human rights community began to engage more directly and constructively with their counterparts working on development issues” (Alston and Robinson 2005, p. 2 - 3). In 1996 some donors started to adopt explicit policies recognising human rights and development and in 1997 Kofi Annan “directed all UN
agencies to contribute to the mainstreaming of human rights” (Alston and Robinson 2005, p. 2; OECD 2006).

Although no formal definition of human rights mainstreaming exists, it is usually understood as aiming for a “systematic integration of human rights in development. Beyond the use of conditionalities and direct support, this ‘transversal integration’ implies that human rights are accounted for in all sectors of development cooperation” (Holland and Doidge 2012, p. 9). HRBA, in contrast, is even more ‘far reaching’. Holland, for example, notes that, “Unlike mainstreaming policies, a HRBA refines development in terms of ‘rights-holders’ and ‘duty-bearers’. Fostering processes of citizen-state accountability, within the limits set by the human rights framework, becomes a central preoccupation in development cooperation policy” (Holland and Doidge 2012, p. 9 - 10).

In 2003 the United Nations Development Group adopted a Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development, which defines HRBA as encompassing the following three principles,

1. All programmes of development co-operation…should further the realisation of human rights...;
2. Human rights standards contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…guide all development cooperation and programming;
3. Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of ‘duty-bearers’ to meet their obligations and/or of ‘rights-holders’ to claim their rights. (UNDP 2014a)

At its core, therefore, HRBA is a,

…radical affair…demanding profound changes in choices of partners, the range of activities undertaken and the rationale for them, internal management systems and funding procedures, and the type of relationships established with partners in the public and non-governmental sectors. (Uvin 2004, p. 166)

Similar to WID/GAD, HRM/HRBA has also been promoted using two different ‘frames’: the instrumental and the intrinsic frame. Notably Alston and Robinson note that, “Human rights work is seen as both an objective in its own right and as
contributing to improving the quality and effectiveness of development assistance” (Alston and Robinson 2005, p. 1).

A recent OECD/World Bank publications elaborates on this further,

The intrinsic reasons for integrating human rights in development relate to moral and ethical imperatives connected with human dignity and freedom...Donors also focus on human rights for instrumental purposes – as a means to an end – to improve development outcomes in relation to governance, poverty reduction, and aid effectiveness. (OECD and World Bank 2013, p. xxxi)

The publication further notes that, “…some donors continue to question the added value of human rights to their development work and the link between human rights and development effectiveness” (OECD and World Bank 2013, p. xxxi) and Alston and Robinson note that the instrumental frame for HRM/HRBA is on the rise as they state that, “Donors are increasingly convinced that human rights are not merely ‘moral considerations’ but are in fact instrumental in making development cooperation and poverty reduction more efficient…” (Alston and Robinson 2005, p. 3).

ii. Importance of ethical considerations:

Organisations with cultural homogeneity and few members in decision-making, if coupled with the presence of a committed decision-maker, are likely to provide ample freedom, power, and resources to actors committed to a norm to have their commitments reflected at the level of the organisation – likely to lead to coherent and intrinsically-focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation. On the other hand, organisations with culturally diverse and multi-member decision-making bodies and consensus-based decision-making, are less likely to provide such freedom, power, an resources likely to lead to less coherent, instrumentally-focused policies and patchy operationalisation.

UNDP: HRM/HRBA was first adopted by UNDP in 1998. The concept was strongly framed in terms of the ‘right to development’ and linked to sustainable development, which was UNDP’s overall mandate at that time, to human dignity. Notably, the
document states that “UNDP works for the full realization of the right to development” and that “Sustainable human development is directed towards the promotion of human dignity – and the realization of all human rights, economic, social, cultural, civil and political” (UNDP 1998a, p. iv). Issues of ‘citizen-state accountability’ noted by Holland as being critical to HRM/HRBA are not mentioned at all, and human rights are certainly not embraced as a cornerstone of UNDP’s work. Thus, while not framed in instrumental terms as such, UNDP’s first HR policy is very general and vague.

Although UNDP has increasingly and explicitly taken on HRBA as such since then and produced a comprehensive HRBA policy in 2005 that recognised human rights and development as “interrelated, inter-dependent and indivisible”, these statements do not seem to have had any impact on the way the organisation operates. Indeed, Jack Donnelly has argued that UNDP has simply “redefine(d) human rights, along with democracy, peace, and justice, as subsets of development.” According to him, “…such a definition fails to address the relationship between economic development and human rights. Tensions between these objectives cannot be evaded by stipulative definitions” (Jack Donnelly quoted in Uvin 2002).

Indeed, a brief consideration of discussions in UNDP’s main decision-making body, the Executive Board, shows that UNDP’s approach to HR/HRBA is remarkably hands-off and a-political. Notably, in a speech to the Executive Board in 2007 the Administrator stated that,

It is important to be clear about what we mean when we are talking about a human rights-based approach to programming. UNDP’s stance on human rights is not one of political conditionality, but rather one of collaboration and cooperation…The policy, promulgated in 1998, specifies that UNDP should work to promote human rights, primarily through support for the development of national capacities. (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 88)

A brief analysis of debates in the Executive Board strongly indicate that this weak approach was largely a result of lack of agreement on the value and relevance of HRBA. A case in point is the discussion on the 2008 – 2011 Strategic Plan. The draft Strategic Plan proposed by the Administration included human rights as a “core
operational principle” for UNDP’s work as it states that “UNDP relies on a human-rights based approach…as (a) core principle for all operational work” (UNDP 2007, para. 126).

This explicit inclusion of HRBA in the Strategic Plan was strongly contested by some Executive Board members. Notably, the official report on the Executive Board’s discussion on the Strategy Plan states that, “Several – not all [emphasis added] – delegations reminded the organization that it should work towards a human rights-based approach in its programmatic work” (UNDP 2007, para. 3). It added that,

Some delegation…reiterated their contention that a human rights-based approach is not within the UNDP mandate, nor does UNDP have normative, operational or monitoring competence in the area of human rights….They reaffirmed the view that development funding should be neutral, grounded in multilateralism and free of conditionalities, reflecting the universal, voluntary and grant nature of United Nations development activities as guided by national priorities…some delegations encouraged UNDP to remain sensitive to divergent viewpoints and cultural differences… (UNDP 2007, para. 24)

Based on this strong reaction from some member states, the Administrator decided that, “The draft that we put before you is not sufficiently balanced…UNDP staff is very committed and indeed directed by the deeply rooted understanding that ‘development’ as a concept and as a practice will fail if imported or imposed and that building capacity to sustain ownership is the single most decisive contribution that can make a difference…all of our policies are driven by governments.” He further concedes that,

The section on ‘operational principles’ should be rewritten entirely…the explicit recognition that UNDP’s contribution to gender equality, human rights and civic engagement is all about capacity development support and not, I repeat, not, about political conditionality. (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 88)

The final version of the Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011 does indeed not include any explicit references to HRBA as an operational principle.
Moreover, over recent years UNDP’s approach to HRBA has narrowed even further and has become more focused on HRBA’s instrumental value for sustainable development. Notably, a policy document published in 2012 explicitly presents the following as the sole rational for HRBA: “HRBA helps to achieve sustainable development outcomes…mainstreaming human rights contributes to human development” (UNDP 2012).

This brief discussion indicates that, as with the case of WID/GAD, also in the case of HR/HRBA in UNDP, the organisation’s high-level of cultural diversity and multi-membership in its decision-making forum and its formal decision-making, resulted in a lack of agreement on, and appreciation of, the norm, which in turn reduced the freedom of committed actors in the Administration who had included HRBA as an operational principle for UNDP’s work, to have their commitment reflected at the level of the organisation. Thus, as with gender, UNDP’s organisational characteristics, while allowing for an early reaction to HRBA, seem to be a straight jacket for comprehensive policies and action on the norm. Peter Uvin, concurs when he concludes that “HRBAs will probably be taken forward by NGOs and bilateral agencies, as multilateral agencies with their global state membership and bureaucratic weight seem unable to do so” (Uvin 2004, p. 122).

**DFID:** DFID first recognised the relevance of human rights to development in its 1997 White Paper. The policy strongly reiterates the UK government’s commitment to “human rights and a more ethical foreign policy” and states that DFID will “give particular attention to human rights, transparent and accountable government and core labour standards, building on the Government’s ethical approach to international relations” (DFID 1997, p. 16, p. 50). More specifically, the paper states that in its work on sustainable livelihoods DFID will work to “promote human rights” and will employ a “human-rights based approach to labour issues” (DFID 1997, p. 19, p. 65).

Importantly, the policy takes a strong stand against certain governments, as it states that, “Where poor countries are ruled by governments with no commitment to helping the poor realise their human rights, we will help – where we can – through
alternative channels.” (DFID 1997, p. 39 - 40) This puts DFID’s approach to human rights promotion in stark contrast to UNDP’s approach.

The 1997 policy commitment is further elaborated on in a Target Strategy Paper on *Realising the Human Rights of the Poor* adopted in 2000 (DFID 2000c). The paper states that it aims to provide a strategy for the “achievement of human rights and fundamental freedoms of poor people” (DFID 2000c, p. 1). It notes that human rights are an integral part, as well as a means to, development and that human rights violations perpetuate poverty. The strategy is comprehensive and provides detailed suggestions on how HRBA should be operationalised. Thus, DFID was one of the first donor agencies to take up HR/HRBA and approached it in a comprehensive way stressing the importance of the value of human rights *per se*.

Despite these strong early developments, more recent HRBA policies no longer explicitly refer to HRBA. Notably, DFID’s Business Plan 2012 only refers to some of the “underlying principles of HRBA” (DFID 2012). Indeed, d’Hollander et al. suggest that there is now a “absence of a clear human rights-based approach” in DFID’s overall policy (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 200). No specific policy on HRBA has been adopted by DFID since 2000.

This change seem to be partly due to, according to Hollander, “a change of management in DFID” (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 200). Indeed, it seems to have been Clare Short’s personal commitment to human rights that facilitated DFID’s comprehensive initial integration of the norm. Notably, Short had been the chair of the International Socialist Group on Human Rights and, before and during her time as Secretary of State of International Development was considered a “strong defender of human rights” (Piron 2003, p. 8). Importantly, Short’s interest in human rights “coincided with that of the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, who introduced an “ethical foreign policy” to provide direction for the work of FCO” (Piron 2003, p. 8). This commitment seemed to drop with changes in leadership in 2003 (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014).

Thus, this example suggests that, indeed, as with WID/GAD, DFID is, as a bilateral agency first and foremost *volatile* in its approach and operationalisation of
HR/HRBA. Frequent changes in leadership in line with election cycles and centralised power with the Secretary of State mean that priorities frequently change. Yet, the example of DFID, particularly compared to UNDP, also indicates that bilateral organisations are, indeed, more likely to have comprehensive and intrinsically focused approaches to new norms if a committed decision-maker is present.  

EU: The European Union has a relatively long history of integration human rights and democracy in its external relations, including its development cooperation. For example the EU has included a ‘human rights clause’ in all its partnership agreements with third countries since 1989 and has also established an instrument especially dedicated to the promotion of democracy and human rights (EIDHR) in third countries (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 6). However, these approaches are institutionally separate from mainstream EU development cooperation activities and commentators refer to the “ghettoisation” of human rights in EU development cooperation (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 12).

In 2001 the EU first recognised the concept of mainstreaming of human rights across all its external relations in a Commission Communication (Commission of the European Communities 2001a). The document is very general and only mentions development cooperation as one of many areas of the EU’s external relations. HRBA as such is not mentioned in any EU policy document until 2012 when the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights was adopted. In it a commitment is made that “in the area of development cooperation, a human rights-based approach will be used to ensure that the EU strengthens its efforts to assist partner countries in implementing their international human rights obligations”(Council of the European Union 2012). The strategy also envisages the development of an HRBA toolkit. However, this toolkit has not yet been finalised at the time of writing (June 2014) and HRBA is only mentioned once in the Action Plan. Commentators concur that by 2014, “…the Commission had not formally adopted such a far-reaching approach (as HRBA)” (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 9).

30 A brief look at other bilateral and multilateral agencies does indeed further support this finding, as some bilateral organisations seem to have taken up HRBA more comprehensively and focused on its intrinsic value than multilaterals. Cases in point are recently adopted policies by Germany and Denmark (Denmark 2013; Germany 2011).
There is, thus, highly limited engagement with the concept and no concrete commitment on implementing HRBA in EU development cooperation.

Although an analysis of the reasons for this goes beyond the scope of this Chapter, a brief look at examinations of debates on the strengthening of human rights conditionality for development aid among member states strongly suggests that there is no agreement on HRM/HRBA among EU member states (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 6). Notably, some member states have “elaborated policies which tie the provision of budget support more explicitly to human rights” (Hollander 2014 p. 6) while others fundamentally disagree with such an approach. This has lead to “fragmented frameworks” and “inconsistent responses” by the EU (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 6). Thus, the multi-membership and diversity of decision-makers seems to have significantly contributed to the EU’s weak response to HRBA.

Another factor that seems to have contributed to the EU’s slow and weak response to HRBA is the fact that the most powerful ‘scrutiniser’ of EU action, the European Parliament, has not taken any notable action to push for HRBA. Notably, it was not until 2012 that Parliament called on the Commission to take up HRBA (European Parliament 2012). This call is re-stated in a Resolution in 2013, albeit in a very weak manner. The Resolution does not ask the EU to take-up HRBA in its development cooperation and merely “Calls on the Commission to…ensure that EU development efforts do not contribute to further marginalisation of groups suffering discrimination and that EU funds are distributed fairly among different regions within a country…” (European Parliament 2012, para. 32). This finding further supports the theory put forward by this thesis, that suggests that the nature of scrutinisers is critical in facilitating action on a new norm, especially in a multi-member and diverse setting.

Last, the reason for why the EU has finally adopted HRBA in its official policy also supports the findings of this thesis – most notably the suggestion that multi-membership and diversity can also lead to some action on a new norm if a committed actor who is willing to push for action on it is present and if the norm has reached wide international recognition. The EU adopted HRBA largely in response to explicit pressure and lobbying from Denmark who, since 2012 has taken on an active role in
further promoting HRBA in the context of EU development cooperation. Notably, Denmark has sponsored an EU seminar on HRBA in 2014 and explicitly includes as a priority issue to “work to ensure that human rights and democracy are included as key priorities in the EU’s development cooperation” (DANIDA). This suggests that it was pressure from this committed actor, supported by increasing international recognition of HRBA resulting in a broad acceptance that the EU should be seen to be doing something on it, that lead to the adoption of the first HRBA policy.

Summary: Overall, this brief overview suggests that the most coherent and comprehensive integration of HRBA framed in intrinsic terms seems to have taken place by DFID under Clare Short. Yet, when DFID’s top-management changed, HRBA was de-prioritised. This is very much in line with the findings on WID/GAD that indicated that bilateral organisations have the greatest potential of comprehensively and coherently integrate a new norm and frame it in intrinsic terms if a committed decision-maker is present. Yet, without such a presence, bilateral organisations, due to the limited number of decision-makers and their weak susceptibility to only a few and homogenous scrutinisers, bilateral organisations can easily take next-to-no action on a norm.

The case of UNDP also supports the theory suggested by this thesis as it clearly shows that, while multilateral organisations with open mandates and high-levels of susceptibility to scrutiny are likely to take quick action on a new norm, the likely lack of agreement on the norm in their decision-making fora makes coherent and intrinsically-focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation generally less probable. This finding is further supported by the brief overview of HRBA integration into EU development cooperation and is also in line with the observation in a recent study that bilateral agencies have mostly adopted the HRBA, which, “On the spectrum of incorporating human rights in development…are the strongest articulation of donor and partner commitment while multilaterals have mostly opted for human rights mainstreaming policies ” (OECD and World Bank 2013, p. 25).

Thus, the extension of the proposed theory to the HR/HRBA norm tentatively indicates the wider applicability of my findings. Bilateral organisations seem to integrate new norms either very quickly, comprehensively and framed in intrinsic
terms, thus indicative of norm integration driven by ethical considerations, or take next to no action on the norm at all, while multilateral organisations with high susceptibility to scrutiny and open mandates are likely to take some action, albeit weak and farmed in incoherent or instrumental terms – all of which points to norm integration driven by social influence consideration.

Last, let me recognise one caveat. Although HRM/HRBA and WID/GAD are different norms, one could argue that they form part of a particular category of norms as they both touch upon power relations (either between the state and the citizen in the case of HRM/HRBA or between men and women in the case of WID/GAD), are frequently associated with ‘western culture’ and are thus, considered ‘political’ and ‘controversial’. It is plausible that these particular qualities of the two norms studied influenced the findings of the thesis, as they are likely to make it more difficult to reach agreement on and appreciation of the value of the norm in a diverse and multi-member setting. It may, therefore, be the case that less disputed norms may display different trends. Investigating this could be an interesting avenue for further research.

ii. Timing of norm uptake

Organisations with high-levels of cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making, coupled with a high level of susceptibility to scrutiny (multiple and/or active scrutinisers) and an open mandate, are quicker to react to new norms than organisations with low-levels of cultural diversity, few members in decision-making, low levels of susceptibility to scrutiny and a closed mandate.

According to this theory, and as established in the section on WID/GAD above, one would expect multilateral organisations, apart from those with a closed mandate and low susceptibility to scrutiny, such as international development banks, to have reacted quicker to HRM/HRBA than bilateral development organisations.

Starting with the three organisations studied in this thesis – UNDP, the EU, and DFID – one would therefore expect UNDP to take quick action, and the EU and DFID to lag behind due to the latter two’s more limited susceptibility to scrutiny and DFID’s increasingly closed mandate from 1997 onwards. However, as shown in the
table below, DFID was the first of the three organisations to recognise the importance of human rights for development cooperation in 1997. UNDP followed-suit in 1998 and the EU adopted an, albeit very weak, commitment to human rights mainstreaming in 2001 and only endorsed HRBA in 2012.

This observation further supports the suggestion made in the context of WID/GAD and the Percy Amendment in the previous section, that the findings of this thesis hold, but need to be refined. Indeed, the observation strongly suggests that bilateral organisations – if there is a committed, or open, top-level decision-maker – are likely to be the first to push for a new norm.

Indeed, a consideration of the timing of HR/HRBA uptake of other donor agencies (see table below) seems to further confirm this suggestion as it was two additional bilateral agencies, alongside DFID, that were the first to take action on HR/HRBA: CIDA and SIDA. With this refinement in mind, the table below does confirm the overall theory established by this thesis: that multilateral organisations with open mandates and high-levels of susceptibility to scrutiny quickly follow normative trends. The majority of bilateral organisations eventually (but quite late) followed suite, while some bilateral organisations, as well as multilateral agencies that have very closed mandates and/or are hardly susceptible to scrutiny, such as international development banks, have not taken any action on the norm at all.
This confirms my overall finding that, on the whole, organisations with multi-
membership, cultural diversity, high susceptibility to scrutiny and open mandates are
more likely to take some action on a new norm, while organisations with
homogenous and few decision-makers, closed mandates or low levels of
susceptibility to scrutiny or homogenous scrutinisers are less likely to do so. To
recap, what this analysis draws out more clearly, however, is that new norms are also
seem more likely to first emerge in a homogenous setting with few decision-makers
– thus a bilateral setting. These agencies, together with other actors, seem to
subsequently promoted the norm in multilateral organisations, which increases
international recognition of the norm and finally leads to many (not all) bilateral
organisations to take action on it. The case of the US in the context of WID/GAD
and SIDA and CIDA with regards to HR/HRBA suggest as much.
Conclusion

This Chapter has first considered three explanations that could be put forward as alternatives to my theory on the impact of organisational structure on the role of ethics in development aid organisations. It was recognised that all three – global discourse, the role of actors, and gender-bias of bureaucracies – play an important role in determining dominant norm integration drivers. However, it was shown that how and to what extent they matter is significantly conditioned by organisational structure. Thus, although the nature of the norm integration drivers that dominate norm integration processes is a result of a complex interplay between different factors, organisational structure is one critical element without which theories on norm integration, and the role of ethics within it, are incomplete.

Second, the Chapter has tentatively extended the findings of this thesis to different organisations and to a different norm. This exercise has shown that even if extended beyond these three case studies, the theory suggested seems plausible. Having said that, extending the theory to other organisations and another norm has further suggested an additional insight: Bilateral organisations, are also likely to be the first to take action on a new norm – quicker than multilaterals – and it is these bilateral organisations, together with other pressure groups, that seem to facilitate norm uptake at multilateral level. In short, bilateral organisations seem to integrate new norms either very quickly, comprehensively and driven by ethical considerations or take next to no action on the norm at all, while multilateral organisations with high susceptibility to scrutiny and open mandates take some action are likely to take some action, albeit weak and most driven by social influence consideration. Yet, as this finding only emerged through the extension to other organisations and norms, it requires further examination.

After having further consolidated the findings of the thesis, it is now necessary to ask: What are the implications of my findings? Do they matter? The next and final Chapter turns to this.
Chapter 10: Conclusion – Implications of findings and suggestions for further research

Introduction

The aim of this thesis has been to critically engage with the assertion that multilateral aid organisations are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts and, more broadly, to shed some light on the question of whether ethical considerations have any weight at all in international politics. To do so, comparative heuristic case studies of the integration of the WID/GAD norm into three organisations with very different organisational characteristics have been conducted. It was assessed which considerations – intrinsic ethical, instrumental ethical, or social influence considerations – dominantly drove the integration of this norm in the three organisations, and whether the kind of driver that dominated was influenced by specific organisational characteristics typical of bilateral or multilateral organisations. In other words, it was examined whether norm integration was at all driven by ethical considerations in any of the cases and, if so, whether this was facilitated by organisational characteristics most typical of multilateral or bilateral organisations.

Based on this analysis the thesis has established a number of findings that cast significant doubt on the simplistic assertion that multilateral aid organisations are, as such, more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts. Indeed, the thesis has suggested that aid organisations per se are generally unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations. Yet people within them may be and, if given sufficient freedom, power, and resources to act on their ethical beliefs, these individuals can drive norm integration and have their ethical beliefs reflected at the level of the organisation, manifested through coherent policies and comprehensive operationalisation.

Crucially, however, this does not mean that organisational characteristics do not matter in this context. On the contrary, the thesis shows that they matter significantly because specific characteristics were found to influence the likelihood of individuals having the necessary freedom and resources to act on their personal beliefs. In other
words, it was found that organisations provide a critical enabling or restraining environment for people to act on their ethical beliefs. Whether the environment is enabling or restraining is significantly influenced by particular organisational characteristics.

Specifically, the thesis has found that characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations – cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making – especially in consensus-based decision-making, reduced the freedom, power, and resources of committed actors to promote the WID/GAD norm as they saw fit as it led to a lack of agreement on, or appreciation of, the value of the norm in the decision-making body and, thus, required negotiation, justification, and compromise. This resulted in norm integration overall driven by social influence – not intrinsic or instrumental ethical considerations – at the level of the organisation. This, in turn, manifested itself through weak policies often focused on the instrumental value of the norm, and weak operationalisation.

On the flipside, characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations - cultural homogeneity, few decision-makers, and an open or flexible mandate - if combined with the presence of a committed decision-maker, increased the likelihood of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm and, thus, allowed for ample freedom, power, and resources for committed staff within the organisations to drive the norm integration process based on their personal ethical believes. This, in turn, led to coherent and comprehensive policies that included intrinsic arguments, and comprehensive operationalisation.

Importantly, however, the same characteristics that made organisations more likely to allow for committed actors to drive norm integration – cultural homogeneity and few decision-makers – if combined with low susceptibility to scrutiny, homogenous scrutinisers, and without a committed decision-maker, made the organisations studied slow to take any action on the WID/GAD norm at all. On the contrary, cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making – characteristics typical of multilateral aid organisations that are likely to reduce the freedom and power of committed staff – especially if combined with high susceptibility to multiple
scrutinisers and an open mandate, made the organisations studied quicker to take
some kind of action on WID/GAD.

In other words, characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations, cultural
homogeneity and few decision-makers, either provide a highly restrictive or highly
enabling environment for norm integration, especially integration driven by ethical
considerations, depending on the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker.
Characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations on the other hand – cultural
diversity and multiple decision-makers – are likely to lead to one or a few actors to
call for some action on the norm, and, if the norm is internationally recognised, are
likely to lead to some norm integration. However, due to the set-up of such a
decision-making body, norm integration is, overall, likely to be weak and driven by
social influence rather than ethical considerations.

The aim of this Chapter is to take a step back from these specific findings and ask
one key question: so what? Do the findings matter? What, if anything, do they add to
current theorising on the integration of gender into organisations specifically, or
norm integration and the role of ethics within it more broadly? This is done first, by
re-visiting two prominent frameworks on factors that are said to influence how
organisations have taken up WID/GAD suggested by Miller and Hafner and Pollack,
and already touched upon in the introduction of this thesis. It is shown that my theory
supports, but also further refines, some of their suggestions by exposing some
explanatory factors suggested by these frameworks as indicators rather than
explanations of a certain level of WID/GAD integration. This shows that my theory
does indeed add to current thinking on organisations and gender equality.

Second, the Chapter asks: does it matter that multilateral organisations do not seem
more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than bilateral organisations? It is
shown that this finding does matter because, broadly speaking, many multilateral
organisations base their authority on substantive moral legitimacy – in other words, a
claim that they are driven by ‘doing the right thing’. By showing that multilateral
organisations are not, as such, likely to be driven by ethical considerations, the
findings of this thesis seriously casts doubt on these organisations’ claims to
substantive moral legitimacy, and, thus, call into question one of their fundamental basis of authority.

Third, the Chapter asks more broadly whether it matters that ethical considerations, especially intrinsic ethical considerations, seem generally unlikely to drive international development organisations, and that social influence and instrumental reasoning tend to have more weight? It is argued that also this finding is significant as a dominance of social influence likely weakens the sustainability and comprehensiveness of norm uptake.

Specifically, it is shown that, in contrast to theories that suggest that social influence concerns can fairly easily transform into sustainable and comprehensive norm uptake through processes of “argumentative self-entrapment” (Risse 2000) and “cognitive dissonance” (Checkel 2005) the cases analysed in this thesis suggest that social influence and instrumental-ethical reasoning did not lead to sustainable and comprehensive norm uptake. It is argued that this indicates that social influence and instrumental reasoning are, due to their nature, indeed highly unlikely to lead to such outcomes. This is so first, because social influence leads to shallow norm uptake following largely a logic of ‘appropriate rhetoric’ rather than ‘appropriate behaviour’. Second, instrumental-ethical reasoning for norm integration is highly volatile as it relies on (1) strong scientific means-ends relationships, and (2) on the ‘ends’ staying the same. Both are often highly unstable, especially in the sphere of international development. Moreover, (3) instrumental reasoning is likely to lead to limited norm integration that only goes as far as to ensure that the norm performs well as an effective means; and (4) is unlikely to lead to deep changes in beliefs about the rightness of the norm, as such changes are not aimed for and the focus on the norm’s instrumental value risks ‘hollowing out’ the intrinsic essence of the norm. In short, the thesis suggests that ethical considerations are unlikely to matter much in aid organisations, and this seems to matter.
10.1 Refinement of other prominent frameworks on organisational characteristics and WID/GAD

At the outset of this thesis it was noted that a number of scholars have developed frameworks that suggest that certain organisational characteristics influence if, when, and how organisations take up specific norms. It was shown that none of the frameworks focused on characteristics specific to multilateral or bilateral organisations, making them unsuited to the overall quest of this thesis. However, in conclusion, I would like to re-visit two of these frameworks as they focus specifically on WID/GAD and are frequently cited in general literature on gender and organisations, in order to examine whether or not my theory adds to general theorising on gender and organisations.

**Miller’s framework**

In her contribution to *Missionaries and Mandarines: Feminist Engagement with Development Institutions* (Miller 1998), Miller introduces a framework for analysing why and how different development organisations have reacted to the WID/GAD norm. As described in the introduction to this thesis, the framework is based on insights developed by Kardam (Kardam 1993) and suggests that three factors influence how international organisation’s respond to WID/GAD. These are:

1. Openness to external influence;
2. Proximity of the organisation’s mandate to gender equality;

The following takes each factor in turn and discusses it in light of the theory proposed by this thesis.
i. Openness to external influence

The theory proposed by this thesis takes due account of an organisation’s ‘openness to external influence’. Referred to as ‘susceptibility to scrutiny’ the thesis indeed shows that this factor is critical in influencing when an organisation takes some kind of action on a new norm.

However, my findings add a certain ‘cautionary note’ regarding norm integration prompted by external influence, as the findings suggest that such integration is likely to be highly limited. Specifically, norm integration driven by a desire to ‘please the scrutinisers’ is expected to be taken up in highly visible areas to satisfy the ‘scrutinisers’ but is relatively unlikely to be coherently comprehensively taken up by the organisation’s policies and operations, unless the process is also driven by internal advocates, as further discussed below. This point is not recognised by Miller’s framework.

In addition, my theory adds to Miller’s framework in two more respects. First, it adds to the framework by drawing attention to the nature of the ‘scrutinisers’ or ‘influencers’. The thesis suggests that it matters whether the scrutinisers are homogenous or diverse – with diverse scrutinisers more likely to include some that are vocal on a new norm. The example of UNDP and the EC, both organisations with fairly diverse scrutinisers (the member states and the UN system in the case of UNDP and the member states and the very diverse European Parliament in the case of the EC) on the one hand, and ODA with relatively homogenous scrutinisers on the other, have illustrated this point in detail.

Second, the theory proposed by this thesis points to a number of organisational characteristics that influence an organisation’s openness to external influence, such as the organisation’s source of authority, its source of funding, and the strength of its mandate as a global development organisation, making ‘openness to external influence’ causally secondary to other characteristics. Recall that Chapter Eight illustrates that an organisation with a ‘delegated’ source of authority is likely to be highly susceptible to scrutiny from the delegators. If the delegators are diverse and vocal, the organisation will be susceptible to strong and diverse scrutiny. If, on the
other hand, the delegators are homogenous and/or weak, scrutiny will be less. Similarly, an organisation is susceptible to scrutiny from its funders – and will be much less so if it generates its own revenue. Last, an organisation with a mandate as a global organisation is likely to be more susceptible to any kind of external scrutiny or influence than an organisation with an inward-looking mandate. These intricacies are not recognised by Miller’s framework.

ii. Proximity of gender equality to mandate

The factor of proximity of an organisation’s mandate is certainly important, but, as already discussed in Chapter Three and Four of this thesis, it is a weak explanation for differences in norm take-up overall, as organisations’ mandates evolve over time. One possible exception to this are organisations that were set-up with the sole purpose of promoting a specific norm, such as UNIFEM, now UN Women, with regards to gender equality. However, most organisations, and certainly those studied in this thesis, have broader mandates that have evolved considerably over time.

Thus, rather than being an explanatory factor, this thesis suggests that the proximity of gender equality to the organisation’s mandate is an indicator of the extent to which the norm has been integrated.

Having said that, the thesis does suggest that the speed at which a norm is taken up by an organisation’s mandate is important and is influenced by organisational characteristics, including the general level of openness and volatility of the mandate. Notably, it is suggested that an organisation with a fairly open mandate on development cooperation, such as the EC and ODA under Chalker, is more likely to narrow the proximity between a new norm and the organisation’s mandate. Moreover, certain organisations, in particular bilateral organisations, have a more volatile (potentially frequently changing) mandate and are, thus, more likely to change their mandate, thereby affecting the proximity of the norm. This was clearly seen in the example of ODA under Chalker and DFID under Short.

Thus, the substantive proximity on an organisation’s mandate to gender equality – although important for short-term analysis – is more of an indicator of how an
organisation has integrated the norm in the longer-run rather than an explanation for it.

iii. Presence and capacity of gender advocates within an organisation

The role of gender advocates has been discussed in detail in Chapter Nine. The Chapter illustrates that the thesis very much acknowledges the role of individuals in influencing how organisations have integrated WID/GAD. However, Chapter Nine also shows that how and to what extent gender advocates can make their voices heard – in other words, their presence and capacity – is significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. Thus, organisational characteristics take causal priority over the position of WID/GAD advocates. Moreover, as in the point above, the presence and capacity of WID/GAD advocates in an organisation is more of an indicator of the extent to which organisations have integrated WID/GAD rather than an explanation for it.

Thus, overall, this brief discussion suggests that, rather than undermining Miller’s framework or being undermined by it, my theory adds to it.

**Hafner and Pollack’s framework**

In *Mainstreaming Gender in Global Governance* Hafner and Pollack argue that the timing and extent to which gender mainstreaming was taken up by two international organisations, UNDP and the World Bank, was influenced by three factors:

1. The organisations’ political opportunity structure;
2. Fit of organisation’s mandate with the norm;
3. The organisations’ capacity for implementation. (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 339)

Political opportunity structures are understood as “points of institutional access” for external actors and the level of “sensitivity to pressure from the international political environment” and, therefore, similar to Miller’s factor of “openness to external influence” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 341). The third factor, the organisation’s capacity for implementation, is not defined or described in any detail.
i. Political opportunity structures

As in the discussion of Miller’s framework above, the importance of political opportunity structures is very closely related to the level of susceptibility to scrutiny, which is recognised as playing a key role in influencing when and how a norm is taken up. Indeed, the specific findings of Hafner and Pollack mostly relate this factor to explaining the timing of norm uptake, rather than the depth of norm integration, and therefore strongly support the findings of this thesis on the impact of ‘susceptibility to scrutiny’ on the speed at which organisations are likely to respond to new ideas. Hafner and Pollack notably find that,

The UNDP is characterized as a relatively open organization with a weak capacity for implementation and has been a leader in the international development community in the early adoption of gender mainstreaming procedures…. The World Bank, in comparison, was for most of its history a relatively closed organization with a dominant frame less receptive to gender issues. Not surprisingly, the Bank has only recently incorporated the gender mainstreaming policy frame, largely in response to strong pressure from internal policy entrepreneurs. (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 341)

This suggestion is in line with the findings of this thesis and strongly supports the importance of the ‘level of susceptibility to scrutiny’ and the ‘nature of scrutinisers’ in influencing when WID/GAD was taken up by various organisations.

ii. Mandate fit

As discussed above, the extent to which an organisation’s mandate is aligned with the norm being promoted should be more seen as an indicator of the extent to which WID/GAD has been integrated into an organisation, rather than as an explanatory factor for it. This is especially so in the two case studies chosen by Hafner and Pollack – UNDP and the World Bank, as both organisations had an original mandate with similar distance to WID/GAD.
iii. Capacity for implementation

Hafner and Pollack’s theory also claims to explain the difference in norm implementation in the two organisations. Indeed, the scholars suggest that what influenced the level of actual gender mainstreaming in the organisations was their “capacity for implementation.” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 341) This is only further elaborated in the example of UNDP, where it is stated that, “donor-driven resources and the lack of political will on the part of many host governments that must work to nationalise and sustain UNDP programs present substantial obstacles to the implementation of policy” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 354).

These factors, although not further elaborated on by Hafner and Pollack, also strongly support the findings of this thesis that cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making – referred to in Hafner and Pollack’s work as a “lack of political will on the part of many host countries” – and “varying views and priorities of different donors”, can proof an obstacle to norm implementation (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 354).

Yet, in the case of the World Bank’s level of WID/GAD implementation, Hafner and Pollack’s framework significantly lacks theoretical and analytical depth. First, Hafner and Pollack assert that the World Bank has comprehensively implemented gender mainstreaming without substantiating this assertion (Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002, p. 362). This is highly problematic, as the suggestion that the World Bank has successfully mainstreamed gender is far from undisputed (World Bank 2010, 2005; Weaver 2010; Razavi and Miller 1995a). Second, the reasons for the alleged strong implementation of gender mainstreaming are not at all discussed. The authors merely state that, “The Bank’s record of implementation, however, has been more successful, reflecting its greater implementation capacity and resources” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 341).

This dubious case study as well as the lack of theorising strongly suggests that the attempts in this thesis go beyond what is offered by Hafner and Pollack. By pointing to the impact of composition of an organisation’s decision-making body, particularly its cultural diversity and number of members, on the freedom and resources of
committed actors in the organisation to promote the norm, and, ultimately, on the level of operationalisation, the theory proposed by this thesis significantly contributes to theorising on when, why, and how organisations take up gender issues in their rhetoric and operations.

iv. Summary

Overall, the above strongly suggests that findings of this thesis significantly contribute to theorising on when, why, and how organisations have taken up WID/GAD. This is particularly so as my findings do not contradict other prominent theories but rather further support and refine them, thereby offering a constructive contribution to theorising on gender equality in development aid organisations.

Yet, what, if any, are the wider implications of the case study findings and the proposed theory? Do the findings matter beyond specific theorising on gender? The next section turns to this.

10.2 Ethics does not matter more in MDOs than in BDOs: Calling into question MDO’s claim to substantive moral legitimacy

This thesis has established that ethical considerations, although overall unlikely to feature prominently in development aid organisations, are more likely to do so in bilateral, rather than multilateral, agencies. It was found that this was the case, not because bilateral organisations per se were more driven by ethical considerations, but because these types of organisations, due to their homogeneous decision-making bodies with relatively few members, if combined with a committed top-level decision-maker, are more likely to provide freedom and power to committed individuals within the organisations to drive norm integration and have their ethical beliefs reflected at the level of the organisation. Certain characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations - multi-membership and cultural diversity in decision-making – on the other hand, were found to make organisations less likely to provide such freedom, and power, thereby reducing the likelihood of norm integration driven by ethical, especially intrinsic, considerations at organisational-level. Yet, apart from debunking simplistic theories that suggest the contrary and offering some insights
into norm integration in organisations, does this finding matter? Does it matter that multilateral organisations are less likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts?

In my view, it is important, even crucial, because it is inextricably linked to one factor that enables international organisations to exist and act in the international sphere: their authority. Authority here is understood as “the ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference from others.” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 5) Importantly, one critical basis of this authority, particularly in the absence of coercion is the organisation’s legitimacy. Notably Bodansky states that, “Legitimacy concerns the justification of authority; it provides grounds for deferring to another’s decision, even in the absence of coercion…” (Bodansky 1999, p. 603).

Buchanan and Keohane concur but add that legitimacy is a particularly crucial foundation of authority for global governance institutions. They state that, “If they (global governance institutions) lack legitimacy, then their claims to authority are unfounded and they are not entitled to our support.” (Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 407) This point is also put forward by Barnett and Finnemore who argue that, “to be authoritative, ergo powerful, they (international organisations) must be seen to serve some valued and legitimate social purpose…”(Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 21).

So, legitimacy is an important foundation of authority of international organisations. But, what exactly is legitimacy and is it relevant to international development organisations? The concept of legitimacy has been used in various and “often nebulous” ways in different kinds of literature and is, therefore, considered a “slippery concept” (Bodansky 1999, p. 601). Although there are numerous definitions of ‘legitimacy’, some suggesting that the concept only applies to relationships between “the ruler and the ruled” (Zaum 2013, p. 4), making it non-applicable to much of development aid, there is an increasing amount of literature on the legitimacy of development organisations, indicating that the concept is very
much relevant in this sphere. Indeed, the OECD/DAC has found that one key reason for bilateral donors support to multilateral development organisation is their “legitimacy” (OECD 2011, p. 84).

Legitimacy in these debates refers to debates on these organisations right to exist, receive funding, and act on behalf of others in the issue area of development. This understanding of legitimacy is in line with Edward’s conceptualisation of the concept as he states that “legitimacy is generally understood as the right to be and do something in society – a sense that an organisation is lawful, admissible, and justified in its chosen course of action” (Edwards 2000, p. 7). Suchman concurs when he states legitimacy, in this view, is based on “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 573).

Legitimacy, understood in this way, is fundamental for most development organisations, as being considered legitimate makes them less vulnerable to claims that they are “negligent” or “unnecessary” (Suchman 1995, p. 575). Most fundamentally, being considered legitimate by whoever is likely to financially support the organisation is crucial to secure funding, without which most development organisations, including the three analysed in this thesis, would cease to exist. In short, development organisations’ ability to exist and act in the international sphere depends on their legitimacy, making it a critical concern for them (Suchman 1995, p. 574).

**Different bases for legitimacy**

Legitimacy can be based on a variety of different standards and a number of different basis for legitimacy have been identified in the literature. (Suchman 1995; Zaum 2013; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Bodansky 1999). Due to space constraints and in the interest of focus, the following will only discuss one particular basis for

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31 As Kuchl states, “Development assistance organizations need to defend their legitimacy against the governmental apparatus (on which they depend for their funding), against the critical mass media, and against a growing number of lobby organizations.” (Kuehl 2009, p. 575).
legitimacy most relevant to this thesis – ‘moral legitimacy’. According to Suchman, “moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative evaluation of the organization and its activities…it rests on judgments about whether the activity is the ‘right thing to do’” (Suchman 1995, p. 579).

Moral legitimacy can be based on different considerations: consequential, procedural, and structural (Suchman 1995, p. 580). Either “organizations should be judged by what they accomplish”, “they can garner moral legitimacy by embracing socially accepted techniques and procedures”, or “institutionally prescribed structures convey the message than an organization is acting on collectively valued purposes…” (Suchman 1995, p. 581). In my view the first and last can be grouped together as constituting a substantive basis of moral legitimacy – the former referring to substantive moral output legitimacy and the latter to substantive moral input legitimacy – while the remaining basis relates to procedural moral legitimacy. This distinction, omitting the differentiation between output and input legitimacy, has also been suggested by Bodansky (Bodansky 1999, p. 612) and Barnett and Finnemore who argue that international organisations “must be seen to serve some valued and legitimate social purpose (substantive), and, further, they must be seen to serve that purpose in an impartial and technocratic way by using impersonal rules (procedural)…” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 21).

i. Procedural and substantive moral legitimacy:

There has been some debate in the literature on whether procedural or substantive moral legitimacy is more important. Notably, much quantitative work on development aid refers to multilateral organisations’ neutrality and impartiality – thus, procedural legitimacy – as most important. Coicaud and Heisekanen, on the other hand, has argued that it is substantive moral legitimacy that has become most important for IOs. He states that,
States saw in international organizations vital instruments to bring about a culture of mutually recognized values and rules, of common appeal and welfare, able to rise above states’ narrow and self-interest outlook. The imperative of delivering public goods at the global level assigned by states to international organizations...emerged as the more important of the two criteria of legitimacy. International organizations derive their social and political meaning and validity from this criterion.” (Coicaud and Heiskanen 2001, p. 523)

On yet another note, some have argued that procedural and substantive legitimacy are mutually reinforcing. For instance, Barnett and Finnemore suggest that improving procedural legitimacy can simultaneously lead to improved substantive legitimacy. They state that,

In response to concerns that opaque procedures give voice to the powerful but silence the weak, many IOs have attempted to increase transparency, democratic deliberation, and local participation and representation. Open decision-making processes can do more than increase procedural legitimacy though. It is also intended to produce policies that will better serve those previously excluded and so be more substantively legitimate. (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 169)

This suggests that the more democratic, inclusive, and open an organisation is, the more justified are its claims to, not just procedural, but also substantive moral legitimacy. In other words, the organisation will be better at promoting common values and, adding Suchman’s understanding, more driven by “doing the right thing.” (Suchman 1995, p. 579)

ii. MDO’s questionable claim to substantive moral legitimacy

All three organisations studied in this paper proudly stress their open and democratic decision-making structures but also make explicit claims that they are working to promote internationally recognised principles and values – thereby making claims to both, substantive and procedural moral legitimacy. Notably DFID claims to “lead the UK’s work to end extreme poverty” (DFID 2014), “UNDP...help(s) build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone” (UNDP 2014b), and the EC works “in order to reduce poverty in the world, to ensure sustainable economic, social and
environmental development and to promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance and the respect of human rights” (Council of the European Union 2012). Moreover, many development organisations, including the three focused on in this thesis, claim that they “occupy the high moral ground” (Uvin 2002). For instance DFID claims that it is acting out of a “moral responsibility” towards the poor (UK Conservative Party 2014) while UNDP declares that it is acting on “moral imperatives” (UNDP 2014b), and the EU states that its development cooperation is guided by “moral obligations” (European Union 2005, para. 1). Thus, both, procedural and substantive moral legitimacy – in other words, ‘doing things right’ and ‘doing the right thing’ – are important basis for the authority of international organisations, especially development organisations.

While not specifically analysing procedural moral legitimacy, the findings of this thesis throw considerable doubt on these organisations’ claims to substantive moral legitimacy. Notably, the finding that aid organisations in general, and multilateral organisations in particular, are unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations – or an aim of ‘doing the right thing’ but rather by reputational concerns and social influence certainly calls into question any generic claim of development aid organisations, especially multilaterals, to substantive moral legitimacy. This, in itself, is an interesting finding and throws considerable doubt on these organisations basis of authority.

Moreover, and critically, the findings of the case studies strongly indicate that the assertion that procedural and substantive moral legitimacy are mutually reinforcing is flawed and that the opposite may, in fact, be more plausible. In other words, it is suggested that procedural moral legitimacy can undermine substantive moral legitimacy. Recall that the cases have shown that strong procedural legitimacy can – and in the cases analysed did – undermine the ability to promote values and for ethical considerations to matter. Multi-member, inclusive and consensus-based decision-making required a high level of debate, negotiation and justification on the most appropriate course of action. This made it more difficult for organisations to promote values simply because values are difficult to justify and negotiate on and, as Barnett and Finnemore readily admit, there is a “lack of consensus on what goals or values are universally desired or welfare-promoting…” (Barnett and Finnemore
2004, p. 169). With few and thin agreed global values and a general reluctance to use value-based arguments in negotiations and justifications, organisations that pride themselves for their ‘good procedures’, in other words, for being ‘neutral’ and ‘impartial’ in their decision-making may, in fact, not be very strong at promoting substantive values.

Thus, the thesis suggests that there may be a fundamental trade off between procedural and substantive moral legitimacy. Justified claims to procedural moral legitimacy by organisations with global membership and consensus-based decision-making may, in fact, undermine claims to substantive moral legitimacy. This insight does not only throw doubt on theoretical claims by IR scholars, such as Barnett and Finnemore, on the mutually reinforcing nature of both types of moral legitimacy, it also further exposes generic claims of multilateral organisations to moral legitimacy as simplistic and in further need of critical engagement.

10.3 Ethical considerations do not matter much at all in norm integration processes: Explaining shallow norm uptake

The case study findings strongly suggest that ethical considerations were largely overshadowed by social influence considerations in all three organisations throughout the period of analysis. This indicates a highly limited impact of ethical considerations in the cases analysed. Apart from calling into question organisations’ claims to moral legitimacy, does this finding matter? Does it matter that ethical considerations do not really seem to drive norm integration in international development aid organisations?

Some IR theorists suggest that it might not. Indeed, it has been argued that regardless of whether norm integration is kick-started by social influence or by a few individuals’ personal ethical beliefs, these processes can lead to ‘norm socialisation’ and ‘deep norm internalisation’ by which the norm is taken up by individuals’ or organisations’ interests and identities (Park 2011; Grigorescu 2002; Finnemore 1996; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Risse 2000), or may even lead to a changes in actors’ beliefs about the ethical rightness of the norm in question (Crawford 2002). Risse notably argues that such an outcome can happen through a process that he refers to
as “argumentative self-entrapment” (Risse 2000, p. 23). According to Risse, this process “starts as rhetorical action and strategic adaptation to external pressure but ends with argumentative behaviour” (Risse 2000, p. 32). Applied to the issue area of human rights, Risse, together with Ropp and Sikkink argue that, “Even instrumental adoption of human rights norms, if it leads to domestic structural changes such as redemocratization, sets into motion a process of identity transformation, so that norms initially adopted for instrumental reasons, are later maintained for reasons of belief and identity” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, p. 15).

Along the same lines, Wendt refers to such an outcome as “Third Degree internalisation” in which actors follow norms “because they think the norms are legitimate and therefore want to follow them” (Wendt 1999, p. 272). The norm is accepted as legitimate due to its intrinsic qualities – not for instrumental reasons or coercion – and complying with the norm is not a strategy towards an exogenously given interest, but rather constitutes the actor’s interest and identity. The norm becomes a “preference over an outcome, not just a preference over a strategy” (Wendt 1999, p. 304). Similar to Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, Wendt suggests that the there is a “tendency for actors to internalize it (the norm) more deeply over time, to move inevitably from First Degree internalization (strategic calculation) to Third...” (Wendt 1999, p. 311).

Checkel’s work on norm internalisation makes similar claims. Referring to ‘deep internalisation’ as “type II internalisation” or “normative suasion” Checkels suggests that, “When normative suasion takes place, agents actively and reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness…(this) implies that agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are part” (Checkel 2005, p. 804). As Wendt and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink above, Checkel suggests that such an outcome can be the result of behaviour originally driven by
social influence, because,

…at some point, they (people driven by strategic calculation) will likely need to justify these acts to themselves and others. As a result, a cognitive dissonance may arise between what is justified and argued for, and what is (secretly, privately) believed…(and) they internalize the justification. (Checkel 2005, p. 814)

Indeed, Ole Elgstroem suggests that such ‘deep norm internalisation’ has in fact taken place in the EU regarding WID/GAD with the adoption of the 1995 Resolution. He states that, “Interests were from now on constructed to include a strong concern for gender in development processes.” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 458) Such an outcome implies deep changes and should lead to sustainable and comprehensive changes in behaviour that outlive the presence of the original norm entrepreneurs. This, together with the theoretical accounts of Wendt, Checkel, and Risse et all would mean that the processes described in my thesis, although not driven by ethical considerations as such at the level of the organisation, can have broad and long lasting impact on behaviour in international politics. In other words, in might not really matter whether norm integration is indeed broadly driven by intrinsic or instrumental ethical considerations or social influence – as the effects on long-term behaviour may be very similar.

However, evidence drawn from recent, comprehensive, and large-scale evaluations on WID/GAD suggest that, at least in the case of this specific norm and the three organisations examined, such deep norm internalisation has not taken place. Notably, all evaluations find that WID/GAD has not been well integrated in either the operations of the organisations, or the attitudes of staff or management in either of the three organisations. In the cases of DFID and UNDP, the evaluations even found that norm integration had regressed since the late 1990s. Notably, the DFID evaluation finds that the number of staff dedicated to WID/GAD are still insufficient; WID/GAD training is no longer compulsory and not widely attended, particularly not by senior management; the budget allocated to WID/GAD is still not reliably tracked; most programming tools are not gender specific and those that are, are not sufficiently disseminated or used; and WID/GAD is still not systematically included in staff performance appraisals. (Jensen 2006, p. 25 - 33)
Echoing these findings, the evaluation of WID/GAD in EC development cooperation notes insufficient and inconsistent staffing of the WID/GAD desk (p. iii); a regression of the availability and use of programming tools on gender over recent years (iv) haphazard and insufficient training; and grossly inadequate financial resources for the promotion of WID/GAD (iv). Overall it concludes that “In general…gender has been treated in a formalistic and limited way…” (UNDP 2006, p. v)

UNDP’s last evaluation similarly finds that staff working on gender are insufficient in number and have limited authority financial resources allocated to gender are grossly inadequate; gender has become ‘less visible’ in overall policies and programming tools over recent years; and performance assessment also do not include gender. It concludes that “UNDP lacks both the capacity and the institutional framework for a systematic and effective gender mainstreaming approach” and therefore, “has not met the standards expected of a leader in development practice and promoter of international norms.” (UNDP 2006, p. iv - x)

Indeed, looking at the WID/GAD movement in general, Razavi notes that “Comparative studies of institutional responses to gender have highlighted the need for sustained external pressure from an organized women’s movement if institutional change is to come about.” (Razavi 1998, p. 30) This certainly suggests that the norm had not been fully internalized or taken up in the ‘interests and identities’ of the three organizations over the three decades analysed in this thesis, strongly weakening statements, as those by Elgstroem and throwing doubt on the validity of the theoretical accounts of Wendt, Checkel, and Risse et al.

While the reasons for this lack of ‘deep norm internalisation’ are certainly manifold, I suggest below that the dominance of social influence and instrumental arguments in the promotion of WID/GAD significantly contributed to this shallow and volatile norm uptake for two reasons: (1) the shallow impact of social influence and (2) the volatility of instrumental arguments.
The shallow impact of social influence: the logic of ‘appropriate rhetoric’

Although I am not denying that norm integration largely driven by social influence considerations can lead to strong norm integration, sustainable changes in behaviour and even changes in peoples beliefs as suggested by Risse, Roppe and Sikkink, Wendt, and Checkel, the findings of my thesis give reason to believe that such an outcome is highly unlikely. Indeed, norm integration driven by social influence was shown to tend to involve some steps towards norm uptake that are mostly high in visibility and low in cost. Changes in rhetoric were widespread and fairly sustainable, while operationalisation was patchy and highly volatile. Thus, it seems that norm integration driven by social influence did lead to changes in rhetoric and certain changes in what was considered ‘appropriate’.

Yet changes in rhetoric did not lead to argumentative self-entrapment or any other of the suggested processes over the long, or even, medium-term. Rather, they largely remained just that: rhetoric. Thus, the shift in logic of appropriateness also remained at the level of rhetoric, making the observed less a change in what was considered ‘appropriate behaviour’ but merely lead to a shift in the ‘logic of appropriate rhetoric’. Numerous interviews conducted for this thesis strongly support this suggestion (Interview with Turner; Interview with Sichrovsky; Interview with Pearce; Interview with Iredale). Notably, interviewees stated that reference to WID/GAD in policy documents was mainly “automatic” and even “die-hards” who did not agree with WID/GAD talked the talk as “it was not in their interest to voice their opinion” (Interview with Miller). Yet, the same logic did not apply to actual staff behaviour, as reflected in the low levels of operationalisation.

The next section turns to possible reasons for this.
The volatility of instrumental-ethical arguments for norm integration

As discussed above, instrumental-ethical arguments were widely used in all three cases and were often chosen by WID/GAD advocates as most effective given the institutional context they were working in. Indeed, advocates and feminist scholars alike have argued that,

...instrumental arguments are not aberrations; they are part of everyday reality that constitutes feminist politics worldwide. In other words, instrumentalism – as opposed to advocacy around a staunchly feminist agenda – becomes inevitable when advocates seek to bring a feminist agenda within institutions and bureaucracies... (Razavi 1998, p. 38)

Cornwall, Harrison and Whitehead suggest that “feminist engagement with development...has required the embrace of simplifications, in order to make strategic alliances and some inroads in the intensely political arena of policy-making” (Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007, p. 15) and that these “Trojan Horses (managed to) lever open debates and mobilize support...” (Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007, p. 4). They explicitly argue that “Feminist engagement has required the embrace of simplifications, in order to make strategic alliances and some inroads in the intensely political arena of policy-making” (Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007, p. 15). Some gender advocates interviewed for this thesis agree with the above stance. One senior EC official noted that framing gender in instrumental terms “is very important to get things done – to persuade technical people to do something” (Interview with Fransen). Other interviewees noted that using instrumental arguments is “just a matter of reality...we live in market based word” (Interview with Mondesire) and that “it was probably bad (to use instrumental arguments) but necessary” (Interview with Young).
Indeed, there are examples where instrumental arguments have led to positive outcomes for women. Razavi, notably, refers to work by Naciri who argues that,

…Moroccan women have seized the opportunities offered to them through formal education in ways that have truly transformed their lives…Thus even though Moroccan nationalist may have promoted female education for instrumental reasons, the women who have had access to education have pursued their own agenda in ways that were not necessarily expected or desired by policymakers. (Razavi 1998, p. 38)

While I am not denying that norm integration based on instrumental arguments can, at times, lead to norm uptake, and that instrumentalism was chosen for strategic reasons, I submit that the strategy may have had ultimately negative consequences for the promotion of the norm, helping to explain the weak and volatile uptake of the norm by all three organisations. This is so for four reasons.

First, a focus on instrumental arguments and a strong means-ends relationship to justify a norm is based on scientific arguments that establish the means-ends relationship. If scientific evidence is inconclusive or new and contradictory evidence emerges, the justification is weakened. Indeed, Jensen finds in her large-scale evaluation of WID/GAD in DFID that,

Despite the existence and availability of many internal and external policy and strategy documents explaining the relevance of gender equality to poverty reduction and demonstrating how gender inequalities hinder development…the extent to which the concept of gender equality is perceived as significant and essential to DFID’s mandate and core poverty reduction work remains unclear and unevenly understood amongst DFID staff. (Jensen 2006, p. 21)

A number of detailed empirical studies further support this argument. Most notably, Jackson’s findings in her essay *The Poverty Trap* strongly concur with the above. She argues that “The instrumental interest in women as the means to achieve development objectives such as poverty reduction may ultimately undermine GAD. Gender appears to have collapsed into a poverty trap.” (Jackson 1998, p. 39) She
states that,

The entrapment of GAD by poverty reduction presents analogous problems, for the view that it is the concentration of women amongst the poor and vulnerable, which justifies gender and development activity has some policy implications. Does this mean that where poverty is not feminised then there is no justification for GAD? (Jackson 1998, p. 50)

This danger is not just theoretical, as indeed, some empirical studies have found a positive correlation between gender inequality and economic growth. Notably, Braunstein finds that, “when gender discrimination is manifested in ways that do not compromise the overall quality of the labour force but merely lower the cost of labour for employers, systematically discriminating against women can have positive effects on growth” (Braunstein 2012, p. 15). In another study by Seguino also finds that, “the gender gap in manufacturing earning was also positively associated with economic growth, largely via its positive impact on investments and exports” (Seguino quoted in Kabeer and Natali 2013, p. 16). Along similar lines, Goetz and Sandler have noted “The looming presence of India and China on the development scene as power-houses of investment for growth raises new questions about the prospects of gender equality when it does not serve the purpose of keeping labour cheap for manufacturing megaliths” (Goetz and Sandler 2007, p. 170). Thus, basing a justification for gender equality solely on its instrumental value to achieve economic growth or poverty reduction is unlikely to lead to sustainable and comprehensive norm internalisation.

Second, if the ‘ends’ change, the justification for the norm collapses and has to be re-thought. Indeed, many WID/GAD officials interviewed for this thesis mentioned that the biggest challenges with promoting WID/GAD was the fact that they had to constantly “re-package” the issue to make it relevant to colleagues working on different issues (Interview with Marchetti). The reason for this was the fact that WID/GAD was not framed as an intrinsically valuable issue, but had to be justified based on its instrumental value to achieve whatever the current ‘ends’ were. This required constant gathering of empirical data to ‘proof’ the relevance of the issue, and was especially challenging in important and heavily-funded issue areas such as infrastructure or energy. In contrast, interviewees, most of whom were also working
on children’s rights as the two were frequently combined in one post, did not experience the same problem with this issue, as “nobody questioned the relevance and importance of children’s rights” and the issue could simply be promoted as “important and of itself” (Interview with Marchetti).

Third, an instrumental view of a norm is likely to lead to limited norm integration that only goes as far as to ensure that the norm performs as an effective means, not that the norm itself is taken up. Notably, the evaluation of DFID states that,

With regard to the conceptual limitation of gender equality, the compromises made in the course of policy development have largely contributed to the narrowing down and the limiting of gender equality concepts. Although the process of consensus building is important and should not be undermined, it has particular implications for concepts such as gender equality. Indeed, it is the interpretation of gender equality that will determine the scope of its application. The narrower the interpretation, the more limited its application will be as a result. (Jensen 2006, p. 23)

In line with this finding, one gender advocate who worked for ODA and UNDP noted that:

Instrumenatlism has backfired in the end. It is easier language but we do not want to see women as production units in the post-2015 dialogue because then you do not address the social justice issue, you are not transforming. If you see women as production units it means that you are condoning parents pulling their girls out of school to do farm work... (Interview with Okondo)

Fourth, instrumental reasoning is unlikely to lead to deep changes in peoples believes about the norm as it does not even aim for such a change. In other words, instrumental norm integration is likely to lead to a ‘hollowing out’ of the norm, an abandonment of its ‘essence’, – that is likely to have negative implications on the depth and sustainability of norm integration. This view is widely reflected in feminist discourse on development. Molnyeux has notably stated that the “concern is that the transformative agenda has been captured by power, coopted and instrumentalized, and its political vision has been neutralized” (Molnyeux 2007, p. 234). Turquet et all concur as they state that “There has been an increasing sense among many involved in the feminist struggle to put ‘gender’ on the agenda in development institutions that
the term itself has been effectively eviscerated of any of its original political intent” (Eyben and Turquet 2013, p. 5). In other words “development institutions undermine feminist intent” (Eyben and Turquet 2013, p. 2). Kerr suggests that this is because gender equality has become “technical rather than political and ultimately fails to address the systematic nature of gender and social injustice” (Kerr 1999, p. 197). Echoing this, Goetz and Sandler argue that “We (feminists) have been assimilated when we were aiming for infiltration and influence” (Goetz and Sandler 2007, p. 167).

Razavi illustrates this point very clearly when she explains how a focus on poverty can undermine the achievement of gender equality because,

...poverty policies are not necessarily a response to gender inequalities because gender discrimination is not caused by poverty...the social forces that create scarcity on the one hand, and discrimination on the other, are ‘analytically distinct but empirically seamless. (Razavi 1998, p. 30)

Mukhopadhyay concurs. Based on a detailed study of the integration of gender equality in selected ministries in Ethiopia and development projects in Yemen, she concludes that “integrating gender concerns within policy agendas whose main objective is not necessarily the promotion of equal rights is a near impossible task and one that reinforces the powerlessness of gender advocates and the gender quality agenda” (in Cornwall et al. p. 144).

In addition, Weaver, in her detailed study of the WID/GAD integration into the World Bank comes to the same conclusion. She suggested that a focus on instrumental arguments may backfire as it leads to “shallow” internalisation of WID/GAD. In her study of WID/GAD in the World Bank she states that,

My interviews confirmed that GAD advocates are leery of the “shallow internalization effect of unfunded mandates and aware of the necessity of inciting something deeper than instrumental rationality to produced more sustainable and self-enforcing behavioural change. (Weaver 2010, p. 84)
Referring to instrumentalism as a “Faustian bargain” she finds that,

Gender advocates in the Bank revel that over time the framing tactics employed here have sometimes entailed uncomfortable compromise. In order to gain intellectual and operational entry, they consciously chose a narrowed approach that validated gender ideas through technocratic projects that could provide quick, quantifiable results and were focused on the impact on national economics. The effect was more or less a ‘watering down’ of the policy norm’s scope. Many of the deeper issues, impeding women’s empowerment, security and development, particularly those embedded in social relations and cultures, are neglected or overshadowed. (Weaver 2010, p. 84)

All the above suggests that norm integration driven by instrumental arguments, even if the arguments themselves are strongly related to ethical considerations of other ‘moral’ ends (i.e. poverty eradication) or driven by intrinsic ethical beliefs of norm promoters themselves, are likely to lead to volatile and unsustainable norm integration. Indeed, it is probable that such norms remain, in Inge Kaul’s words, “fashions” and “only survive if they have a constituency” (Interview with Kaul). While long-term shifts in rhetoric – an acceptance of the norm as part of a certain logic of appropriate rhetoric – seem easier to achieve, sustainable shifts in behaviour and especially the willingness to allocate sufficient resources to norm integration, are very difficult to reach and, in the absence of actual changes in beliefs on the intrinsic value of the norm, heavily rely on continuous pressure from committed individuals.
Conclusion

This Chapter has turned to the wider implications of the findings of this thesis. Do they matter? This question was addressed by, first, considering the extent to which the theory proposed here adds to, or is refuted by, other prominent theories on how organisational characteristics influence the uptake of WID/GAD. By looking at Millers’ and Hafner and Pollack’s frameworks, it was shown that in many respects the theory proposed here reinforces, but also further refines, these frameworks, thereby adding to current theorising on development organisations and the uptake of WID/GAD in their policies and operations.

Second, the Chapter has examined the significance of the finding that multilateral organisations are indeed less likely to be driven by ethical considerations and it is shown that this insight significantly undermines these organisations’ claims to substantive moral legitimacy, which provides an importance basis for their authority. In addition, the finding casts doubt on the widespread assertion that procedural and substantive moral legitimacy are mutually reinforcing and suggests instead that there might be a trade-off between them.

Third, the Chapter has considered the implications of the broader finding that ethical considerations did not, overall, matter much and were overshadowed by social influence considerations. It was shown that social influence can lead to some action on the norm, but is likely to lead to incoherent and incomprehensive norm integration, mostly focused on highly-visible and low-costs areas such as the development of policies and strategies, thereby largely following a logic of appropriate rhetoric rather than appropriate behaviour. However, certain individuals hold strong ethical beliefs and, if given the freedom and power, can have these beliefs reflected at the level of the organisation. Yet, critically, such shifts are likely to be contingent on the continuous pressure of these individuals, and, thus, short-lived. This maybe especially so if norm integration is strongly focused on instrumental arguments, making norm uptake shallow and the justifications for the norm volatile by basing them on, often disputed and ever-changing, empirical evidence, and on certain specific ‘ends’.
Having said that, the last claim is merely tentative, as the scope of this thesis has not allowed for more in-depth engagement with this point. Yet it may be critical, as the examples of both WID/GAD and HRM/HRBA have suggested that there seems to be a widespread and increasing trend towards instrumentalisation of both norms. Indeed, the thesis suggests that, based on these two examples, norms may emerge framed in intrinsic terms but once they get taken up by broader development discourse, they tend to become ‘instrumentalised’ and lose their political and transformative edge. Norms seem to become means towards existing and non-controversial organisational ends, leaving existing power structures and organisational goals untouched. What is the impact of such instrumentalism? Does it really have negative consequences on the level of norm integration and obstruct actual change to take place as suggested in this Chapter? Or is such instrumentalism a ‘necessary evil’ – a phase in norm integration – that will lead to gradual change and eventually result in ‘deep norm internalisation’? The fact that WID/GAD still does not seem to be effectively integrated in most donors’ development operations suggests the former, but only rigorous investigation could turn this assertion into more than what it is right now: a tentative claim. Such an endeavour, while beyond the scope of this thesis, would certainly be worthwhile and would shed more light, not only on whether ethical considerations carry any weight at all in international politics, but also on whether it actually matters if they do.
List of Annexes

Annex 1: Chronology of introduction of WID/GAD into UNDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Governing Council Decision, 462nd meeting, adopted on 28 January 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>First WID focal points appointed in head quarters and regional bureaus</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Revisied programming manual including guidelines on the integration of WID produced</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>First WID evaluation published</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Inter-organizational Assessment of Women’s Participation in Development published</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Women in Development: Implementation Strategy adopted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>UNDP Programme Advisory Note – <em>Women in Development</em> drafted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Policy <em>Women in Development: Policy and Procedures</em> adopted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>WID Division set-up</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Systematic WID/GAD training commences</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>WID adopted as one priority area for UNDP (Organizational meeting 37ths session p. 1119, para. 7.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>WID Division changed to Gender in Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Strategy <em>Integrating Gender Concerns in Programming</em> drafted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Policy <em>Agenda for Change</em> adopted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Policy <em>Gender and Sustainable Human Development: Policy Perspectives</em> adopted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Policy <em>Direct Line 11 on Gender Equality and the Advancement of Women</em> adopted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td><em>Global Cooperation Framework</em> adopted</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td><em>Guidance Note on Gender Mainstreaming</em> adopted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Policy on <em>Narrowing the Focus</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Evaluation <em>Tracking Mainstreaming in MDGD Activities</em> carried out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 2: Chronology of introduction of WID/GAD into EC/EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>First mention on WID in European Parliament Resolution on <em>Hunger in the World</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Meeting on WID by Ad-hoc Women’s Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Ad-hoc Women’s Committee Report <em>The Position of Women in the Community</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>European Parliament Resolution <em>The Position of Women in the Community</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>First WID advisor employed in DG VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Report from the Commission to the Council <em>Women and Development in Community Practice – Impact of Women on Community Action</em> produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Council Conclusions <em>Concerning Community Development Aid in Relation to the Situation of Women in Developing Countries</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly Report <em>Cultural Cooperation between ACP States and the EEC</em> adopted (draftpersons: Raymond Chasle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Ad-hoc Working Party on WID was set up by the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Lomé III Convention adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Report from the Commission to the Council <em>Women and Development</em> produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Council Conclusion <em>Development Aid and the Situation of Women in developing Countries</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Council Conclusion <em>The Role of Women in Development</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>ACP-EEC Joint Assembly Resolution <em>Women and Population</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Council Conclusion <em>Women in Development</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Evaluation of seven EDF rural development projects conducted (Colombo 1994a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>ACP-EEC Joint Assembly Resolution <em>The Situation of Women in the ACP States</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Lomé IV Convention adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Commission Work Programme for the Implementation of the Women and Development Aspect in the Lomé IV Convention produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>DG VIII WID/GAD manual <em>When, Where, How to Incorporate Gender into Lomé IV Projects and Programmes</em> developed (Colombo 1994 p. 29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>EP resolution <em>The Situation of Women and Children in Developing Countries</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Commission Guidelines on WID developed which included a checklist for gender sensitivity and a gender impact assessment form (Colombo 1994 p. 32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Impact assessment of WID/GAD in EC development cooperation carried out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Commission Communication <em>Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Council Resolution on <em>Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>OECD/DAC <em>Gender Marker Fiche and Gender Country Profiles, and the Standard Project Cycle Management for Development Projects</em> modified to integrate WID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Lomé IV Convention revised by the Agreement on Mauritius on 4th November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Council Resolution <em>Integration Gender Issues in Development Cooperation</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on <em>Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation</em> produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Council Regulation <em>Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 3: Chronology of introduction of WID/GAD into ODA/DFID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>First WID policy published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Additional 2 Social Development Advisors hired, making the total 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>First WID Strategy adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Document <em>Appraisal of Projects in Developing Countries</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Compulsory WID training introduced, including both practical and strategic gender needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Second WID policy published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Third WID policy published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Social Development becomes its own division with its own budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td><em>Social Development Handbook</em> published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Post of Chief Social Development Advisor established with a seat on “Project Approval Committee”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Fourth WID policy adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>SDA represented on project evaluation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40 Social Development Advisors working in ODA/DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>White Paper on Development adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Fifth WID policy <em>Breaking the Barriers</em> adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Gender training no longer compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Gender training stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Target Strategy Paper on Gender adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>White Paper on Development adopted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4: Proxy indicators for the three norm integration drivers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norm integration driver 1</th>
<th>Proxy indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic ethical considerations</td>
<td>Language used in official documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ethical argument paramount in the process of norm promotion; framed as more important than practical arguments;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High consistency of arguments in different contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Number and location of internal norm advocates: sufficient and in central/decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Role: provision of awareness raising; oversight of organisational norm promotion; provision of technical advice on the integration of the norm into the organisation’s policies and operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training courses (frequency, status, and substance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compulsory;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Frequent;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Targeting all staff;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Training focused on awareness raising not only practical/technical aspects and allowing for open discussion on the norm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some level of accountability towards integration the norm into one’s work (more focus on rewards than on punishment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programming tools for WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Comprehensive tools for the integration of WID/GAD for each step of the programming process with an approach that includes arguments about the intrinsic value of the norm;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compulsory use of these tools;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Clear accountability structures for use of these tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integration of WID/GAD in general programming tools and policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integration of WID/GAD in existing general programming tools using an approach that includes arguments focused on the intrinsic value of the norm;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integration of WID/GAD in M&amp;E framework with focus on measuring outcomes on gender equality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Specific budget for WID/GAD in place;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Financial resources spent on WID/GAD measured;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sufficient financial resources allocated and spent on WID/GAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm integration driver 2</td>
<td>Proxy indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental ethical considerations</td>
<td>Language used in official documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intrinsic ethical argument present in norm promotion process;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Instrumental ethical argument dominant in norm promotion process;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High consistency of argument in different contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Number and location of internal norm advocates:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sufficient and in technical branches of the organisation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Role: provision of technical advice on the integration of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WID/GAD in the organisation’s policies and operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training courses (frequency, status, and substance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compulsory;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Frequent;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Training targeted at technical personnel;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Training focused on practical application of WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and not on awareness raising of its importance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Little space for debate, except on technical aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Certain level of accountability towards integration of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>norm into one’s work (equal focus on rewards and on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>punishment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programming tools for WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of comprehensive tools for the integration of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WID/GAD for each step of the programming process with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>an approach that focuses on the instrumental value of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>norm;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compulsory use of these tools;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Clear accountability structures for use of these tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integration of WID/GAD in general programming tools and policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integration of WID/GAD in existing general programming tools;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integration of WID/GAD in M&amp;E framework with focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on measuring outcomes on gender equality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Specific budget for WID/GAD in place;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Financial resources spent on WID/GAD measured;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sufficient financial resources allocated and spent on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WID/GAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm integration driver 3</td>
<td>Proxy indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Social influence considerations | Language used in official documents  
|                           | • Instrumental and intrinsic ethical argument present in  
|                           | • High level of conceptual inconsistency within the same  
|                           | • Formulaic integration of WID/GAD disjointed from main  
|                           | body of the document.  
|                          | Human resources allocated to WID/GAD  
|                          | • Number: very limited;  
|                          | • Location: not in decision-making fora;  
|                          | • Role: general advisory role.  
|                          | Training courses (frequency, status, and substance)  
|                          | • None or infrequent;  
|                          | • Low status / targeting primarily junior staff.  
|                          | Staff incentives  
|                          | • None.  
|                          | Programming tools for WID/GAD  
|                          | • Very limited in number;  
|                          | • Not compulsory to use;  
|                          | • No accountability for their use.  
|                          | Integration of WID/GAD in general programming tools and  
|                          | policies  
|                          | • Very limited integration in general programming tools,  
|                          | especially in M&E.  
|                          | Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD  
|                          | • No/limited budget allocated to WID/GAD;  
|                          | • Expenditures of WID/GAD not adequately tracked;  
|                          | • Budget allocation fluctuates highly in line with  
|                          | international conferences and pledges on WID/GAD.  

Annex 5:  Interview questions

5.1 Interview questions for ODA/DFID officials

Name of interviewee:

Dates and position in ODA/DFID:

Date of interview:

Policies and their drafting process

• When, in your view, was the issue of women in development first recognised in ODA? What or who drove this process?
• Where you already in ODA when the 1986 booklet and the 1988 strategy was drafted?
• If yes, could you tell me a bit about the drafting process of the 1988 strategy and the 1989 booklet?
• If not, could you tell me a bit about the drafting process of the 1989 booklet?
• Who was involved? Inside and outside ODA?
• Why was the first strategy drafted in 1988 and a booklet so shortly afterwards, considering that the first booklet was drafted in 1986? (only shortly before)
• What was the drafting process? Different from subsequent booklets?
• There were quite a few follow-up booklets published in relatively quick succession. Why do you think this was the case?
• Did the drafting process change with the different ministers or when DfID was set-up (for the last booklet)?
• What was the drafting process of the 1997 White Paper?
• What was the process for getting GAD included? Do you think it was successful?

Discourse

• What, in your opinion, was the dominant discourse in the late 80s/90s for the promotion of WID/GAD in ODA/DfID?
• Was the discourse inside ODA similar to the more public discourse in the booklets? If yes, how so? In particular, was the discourse promoted by SDA different from the mainstream discourse in the organisation?
• Did the discourse change over the 15 years? If so, how?
• If yes, what influenced change in discourse? (global changes, changes in minister, external pressure – lobby groups, other structural changes – such as those in 2003?)
• Did ODA/DfID’s susceptibility to external or internal pressure change when DfID became independent?
• Did the ‘freedom’ social development advisors had on steering the discourse on WID/GAD change when DfID was set-up?

Operationalisation

• What was the dominant strategy to promote the norm inside DfID, for example training? (focused on efficiency or intrinsic / focused on training, persuasion, and awareness raising or on penalising)
• What were the milestones in the operationalisation of WID/GAD in ODA/DfID? (same as Eyben that things worked well in early 1990s but after Beijing there was a fatigue)
• How much financial autonomy did the SDA have? Budget for WID/GAD?
• In particular, what kind of trainings were provided? What approach was promoted? Did this change?
• What made the milestones possible? (chance, structural issues, minister support?)
• Overall, do you think this strategy was successful? In other words, by 2000 had WID/GAD been taken up in DfID’s operations?
• Do you think that the discourse focusing on efficiency / linking WID/GAD to other overarching aims ultimately weakened the uptake – as the overall aims changed? (from social development, to MGS, to aid effectiveness to value for money?)
• (If not already answered)
• In your opinion, has WID/GAD been taken up today?
• Is there anyone else I should talk to?

5.2 Interview questions for UNDP officials

Name of interviewee:
Dates and position in UNDP:
Date of interview:

Policies/strategies/discourse
• When, in your view, was the issue of Women in Development first recognised by the UN in general and UNDP specifically? What or who drove this process (especially in UNDP)?
• How was the issue perceived in the administration as well as the Governing Council? Was it considered controversial/was there reluctance or was there general agreement that this is an issue important to UNDP?
• The issue of Women in Development has been framed in different ways: as a question of human rights and social justice with a strong intrinsic value attached to equality and as an issue necessary for effective development/economic growth. Which frame do dominated in UNDP and why? Do you think this has changed?

Specific regarding the WID division
• How was the decision to set-up a Women’s Division taken? Who drove this/pushed for it?
• 1986 strategy: decision to allocate no extra-budgetary resources: was this decision taken as a sign of support for having WID recognised as a core issue for UNDP or as a sign of lack of commitment?
• In your view, was the way in which the WID division was set-up strategic enough (human and financial resources; positioning in the hierarchy of the organisation) – was it set up to make a difference or more to appease/window-dress?
• Was Bill Draper particularly supportive of women’s issues?

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Zooming out

- Do you think UNDP’s multilateral character made it better or worse at taking up and spreading an issue like WID?
- Overall: do you think gender equality has been accepted as an important value in the hearts and minds of UNDP officials – or is it mainly something that one knows one should be seen to be acting in line with. (Has the efficiency argument backfired?)
- Any one else I should talk to?

5.3 Interview questions for Members of the European Parliament who were members of the Women’s’ Committee and the Development Committee

Name of interviewee:
Dates and position in the EC/EU:
Date of interview:

- What made you join both the Women’s Committee and the Development Committee? (personal interest, political opportunities?)
- What was the status of the two different committees?
- Was it easy for a man working in the Women’s Committee?
- Which, out of the two committees was more concerned with WID?
- Was there a sense in the Development Committee that the issue of women was the responsibility of the Women’s Committee?
- Discussions on Lome III 84/85 and and Lome IV 89/90: What were the key issue? Was the issue of Women in Development discussed?
- What was the role of the Commission and the Council in this? Who was seen to be pushing the issue?
- Who else do you think might be in a position to share some insights into these issues?

5.4 Interview questions for European Commission officials not specifically working on gender

Name of interviewee:
Dates and position in the EC/EU:
Date of interview:

- Is gender equality promotion part of your performance appraisals?
- Were you trained on gender? Were your colleagues/team trained on gender?
- Were there any programming tools on integrating gender in your work?
- Where these programming tools used (practical and/or compulsory?)
- How was the issue framed? (equality as an important value, or an important issue to have effective development?)
- Which frame, do you think, would have been more effective?
- Were did you think the greatest push on gender came from and where the greatest resistance? (Inside the DG, the Commission, EC Institutions?)
- Overall, what was the predominant attitude towards gender equality?
(Understood? Embraced? Resisted? Seen as good but only the gender expert’s responsibility?)

- What do you think the greatest obstacle to operationalising gender in EU development cooperation was/is?
- Overall, has it worked? Has gender been successfully taken up by EU development cooperation?
- Who else could I speak to?

5.5 Interview questions for EC/EU officials working gender

Name of interviewee:
Dates and position in the EC/EU:
Date of interview:

Push and pull factors
- During your time as gender desk officer, where did the greatest push on gender equality and where the greatest resistance come from?
  - Within the DG,
  - the Commission,
  - the EC Institutions, etc?
- In your view, was the European Parliament particularly vocal in promoting gender in development issues?
- If so, was it mainly the Women’s Committee or the Development Committee?
- What was the role of the ACP-EEC JPA in promoting gender in development?
- What was the role of the Council: overall help or hindrance?
- Do you think it was easier to promote gender in development in the context of the EU than in a national context?

Discourse & attitude
- During your time in DG Development, was gender in development promoted using ‘efficiency arguments’ (gender equality is important for effective development) or ‘rights/intrinsic arguments’ (e.g. gender equality is a right, it is an important value in itself)?
- From your experience in the Commission, which types of arguments would be most effective to persuade colleagues of the importance of gender in development?
- During your time in DG Development, did you feel that the issue of gender was widely understood and/or accepted by your colleagues or not?

Operationalisation:
- Was gender part of staffs performance appraisals?
- What were the key programming tools developed during your time?
- Were any of them compulsory? If not, why not?
- Overall, what do you think the greatest obstacle to integrating gender in EU development cooperation was?
- From your perspective now, do you think gender in development has become firmly integrated in the EU’s operations and EU officials’ attitudes?

European Institute for Gender Equality
• Does the Institute deal with gender in external relations?
• If not, was this ever a controversial issue?
• During your time as desk officer, was DG Development represented in the numerous high-level structures for gender mainstreaming/equal opportunities such as the High-level group for gender mainstreaming and the Group of Commissioners for Equal Opportunities?
• What was your relationship, if any, with other gender equality officials in other DGs (eg Employment)?

Others to interview? Particular programming tools I should look at?
Bibliography


development-cooperation/a-common-agenda/the-eu-as-a-global-force-for-human-rights/.


———. 1986b. Resolution on the results of the UN Conference concluding the Decade for Women held in Nairobi Brussels.


Interview with Anstee, M. Former UN Under-Secretary General and former UNDP Resident Representative in various countries, telephone interview on 04/11/2013.

Interview with Beall, J. WID/GAD specialist following developments on WID/GAD in the British aid administration, interviewed on 15/11/2012.

Interview with Colley, J. Former ODA/DFID Official (1967 - 2002) and WID Focal Point (1992 - 1993), telephone interview on 06/02/2013


Interview with Eide, I. Former Director of UNDP WID Division (1987 - 1989), telephone interview on 07/11/2013.


Interview with Fransen, L. Head of Unit of Social and Human Development, DG Development Cooperation (1993 – 2007), telephone interview on 28/05/2013.

Interview with Gaiotti, P. Member of the European Parliament (1979 – 1984), written answers to interview questions and email exchange on 06/16/2013.


Interview with Hamadeh, L. Various positions in UNDP (1978 - 2005) including Programme Officer in WID Division, telephone interview on 10/01/2014.

Interview with Hay, S. Deputy Head of ECHO Unit 4, European Commission, telephone interview on 20/06/2013.


Interview with Hemeldonck, M. Member of the European Parliament (1984 – 1994), written answers to interview questions and email exchange on 28/05/2013.


Interview with Iredale, R. Education Advisor / Chief Education Advisor, ODA (1979-93), telephone interview on 08/02/2012.

Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg, E. Gender Desk Officer (2001-2005), DG Development Cooperation, European Commission, telephone interview on 18/06/2013.

Interview with Jones. Former ODA/DFID Energy Adviser (1984 - 2006), telephone interview on 06/02/2013.

Interview with Keeling, A. Former ODA/DFID Social Development Advisor (1996 - 2004), telephone interview on 09/01/2013.
Interview with Levesque, D. Former ODA/DFID Official and Education Advisor (1971 - 2012), telephone interview on 06/02/2013.
Interview with Maij-Weggen, H. Member of the European Parliament (1979 – 2003), written answers to interview questions and email exchange on 06/16/2013.
Interview with Marchetti, M. Head of Sector Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination, DG Development Cooperation, European Commission, telephone interview on 03/07/2013.
Interview with Moser, C. WID/GAD expert, Emeritus Professor, University of Manchester, interviewed on 28/11/2013.
Interview with O'Neill, P. OECD/DAC Gendernet Coordinator, telephone interview on 26/06/2013.
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