The Evolution of an Urban Political Machine:
Republican Philadelphia, 1867-1933

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Abstract

The persistence of the classic duel between reform and bossism as the dominant theme in the literature on American urban politics has been subject to increasing criticism in recent years. This conflict, it is now argued, provides an inadequate framework in helping us to understand the complexity of American municipal development. While accepting that initiatives suggesting alternative ways of viewing urban politics are long overdue, such efforts, in my view, can only achieve their purpose if they are based on an accurate understanding of the role that the political machine has played in the American city. Unfortunately the consensus that prevails in the abundant literature on this political institution fails to provide just such an understanding. In particular the existing literature fails to furnish satisfactory answers to such key questions as, How do we account for the emergence of the political machine? What functions did it fulfill in the American city? To what extent did so-called "bosses" control party organisations and city governments? Which sections of the urban population supported the machine and why?

The aim of this thesis is to address these questions using the Republican political machine (or "Organisation") in Philadelphia as the model for inquiry. The thesis is divided into two parts, the first of which shows that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, an over-riding
cleavage between well-organised machine and reform forces
did not dominate party politics in Philadelphia in the
period prior to 1887. The second half argues that, contrary
to received wisdom, a fully fledged political machine did
not emerge as the dominant force in the government and
politics of the city until the turn of the century. This
development is attributed not to the influx of poor
immigrants to the city, but to changes in the organisation
and structure of Philadelphia's political and economic
system, and the ability of the new (internally) consolidated
political machine to overwhelm its (external) electoral
opponents including its principal opposition the nonpartisan
reform movement. It is also argued that the machine, rather
than being the natural functional substitute for government
that its apologists have traditionally maintained, did in
fact function as a blight on the system of government in
Philadelphia.
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Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to address a number of issues with regard to the urban political machine which, in my view, have not been satisfactorily resolved in the existing literature on the subject. These include such key questions as, How do we account for the emergence of this political institution? What role did it play in the American city? Who supported the machine and why? To what extent did so-called "bosses" actually boss political parties and city governments?

This thesis tackles these questions using as its model of inquiry an urban political machine which up to now has not been subject to critical examination, that is, the Republican machine (or "Organisation" as it was popularly known) in Philadelphia. Philadelphia provides a particularly appropriate setting for such an inquiry not just because of its inherent importance as one of the nation's largest cities, but also because it achieved national notoriety at the turn of the century when the muckraker Lincoln Steffens, in his famous investigation of municipal corruption, declared the city to be not only "the most corrupt and the most contented" but also "the worst governed in the country." \(^1\)\(^2\)

The intention of this inquiry is not to chronicle the history of party politics in Philadelphia but rather to
explain how and when the Republican machine emerged as the dominant institution in the city's politics; to ascertain what distinctions can be made between the various so-called "bosses" who, it is alleged, ruled the city between the 1850's and the 1930's; to determine which sections of the local population supported the "Organisation" and why; and finally to critically examine the functions that the "Organisation" fulfilled in Philadelphia.

This thesis argues that, contrary to received wisdom, a fully-fledged political machine did not in fact emerge as the central force in the government and politics of Philadelphia until the turn of the century. As this development was contingent upon the establishment of a reliable system of discipline within the Republican party organisation and the ability of the latter to control votes, the thesis seeks to explain how power was consolidated within the Republican party and how the "Organisation" was able to command the support of the electorate on such a regular basis.

The Republican "Organisation", it is argued, did not emerge as sociologist Robert Merton contends, as a response to "needs" and demands which other institutions failed to satisfy, nor was it the creation of the immigrant masses. Its establishment in fact, this thesis suggests, came about as a result of a series of innovations initiated by state and local party leaders which transformed the way in which the Republican party organisation functioned at both the state and the city level by the turn of the century. Its
creation, it is also argued, was in the interest of, and apparently supported by, a major segment of the Philadelphia business community, namely, a clique of utility entrepreneurs keen to reap the benefits that the centralisation of local political power would bring to their own efforts to consolidate control of the city's public utilities industry.

The thesis shows that the "Organisation's" ability to command the support of the electorate was attributable to the "personal service" it rendered to the individual voter (in particular to "new" immigrants who faced the problem of adjusting to a new social and economic environment), the control it exercised over the election machinery, and its successful exploitation of the divisions between, and weaknesses, of its electoral opponents the Democratic party and the nonpartisan reform movement. Finally it argues that the Republican "Organisation" exploited the urban immigrant poor as much as it helped them, and that rather than being the natural functional substitute for government that Merton's theoretical model suggests, the machine's role was, if anything, of a dysfunctional nature; that is, it was destructive of functioning government for the vast majority of immigrants and poor people who needed such government the most. Consequently, it is suggested that bosses no longer deserve their current "good guy" reputation in the literature on urban politics.

With reference to the structure of the thesis, in Chapter 1
I review the existing literature on the urban political machine illustrating in what ways the received wisdom on the subject is deficient in terms of its ability to provide a fully satisfactory explanation for certain key issues concerning machine politics. The remainder of the thesis is split into two parts, corresponding with the two periods in which, I maintain, it is possible to divide the history of party politics in Philadelphia during the second half of the nineteenth century. The division is based on the number and structure of political formations that competed for power in the city and the characteristic processes through which the struggle among them took place.

Part A begins in 1867 with Simon Cameron's successful nomination and election as U.S. Senator for Pennsylvania. This victory is generally regarded as the turning point in Cameron's efforts to establish a Republican dynasty of party bosses, which included his son Donald J. Cameron, Matthew S. Quay and Boies Penrose, who were to rule Pennsylvania until the latter's death in 1921. In Philadelphia, local politics in the immediate post-war years was characterised by the exodus of the city's men of wealth from public office and their replacement by professional politicians. The section ends in 1887 with the fall of James McManes and the "Gas Ring", when the Bullitt Bill was adopted as Philadelphia's new city charter.

Part A attempts to show, that in spite of appearances to the contrary, an over-riding cleavage between well-organised machine and reform forces did not dominate party politics in
Philadelphia. Chapter 2 traces the emergence of the career politician in ante-bellum Philadelphia. It also offers an explanation why, although the style of boss politics flourished in the city from the 1840's onwards (such as for example, in the exchange of patronage and favours for votes), a well-disciplined and cohesive city-wide political machine did not emerge at this time. A description of how James McManes and William Stokley were able to establish city-wide organisations, as a consequence of their respective power bases in the Gas Trust and the Public Buildings Commission, is provided in Chapter 3. It is also argued in this chapter that, by failing to distinguish between the structure and organisation of the Republican party and the way that it functioned in the immediate post-war period, contemporary observers and later historians have attributed power and influence to McManes and Stokley that they did not possess. Neither party leader, the analysis in this chapter suggests, can be categorised as a genuine party boss.

Chapter 4 shows that just as there was no cohesive city-wide political machine in Philadelphia prior to 1887, nor was there a well-organised reform movement. It is argued that, contrary to received wisdom, the city's men of wealth continued to participate in local affairs, but that since political reform was limited to groups that were few in number, short-lived and poorly organised, they did not enjoy the degree of success against bossism that contemporary publicists maintained.
Part B of the thesis offers an explanation for the gradual emergence (or "institutionalisation") of the Republican machine as the central force in the government and politics of Philadelphia by the turn of the century. This entails an analysis along two different lines, on the one hand to account for the increased (internal) discipline within the Republican party organisation and, on the other, to explain the machine's ability to overwhelm its (external) electoral opponents to such an extent that a one party system emerged in Philadelphia as the Democratic party was reduced to the role of a "kept minority"; a subservient auxiliary of the dominant Republican "Organisation".

That a reliable system of discipline was indeed gradually established within the Republican party organisation is demonstrated in Chapter 5 where it is also argued that, as a result of this development, successive party leaders David Martin, Israel W. Durham, James P. McNichol and the Vare brothers can (unlike their predecessors McManes and Stokley) be considered to have been genuine city bosses. An explanation of how the party leadership consolidated power within the Republican party organisation is provided in Chapter 6.

The "Organisation's" ability to control votes is examined in Chapter 7. A quantitative electoral analysis reveals that it was environmental rather than cultural factors which induced "new" immigrants, in addition to the city's poor and black population, to support the "Organisation" in return
for the "personal service" that it provided. This finding, it contends, should not lead us to conclude, as Merton and most other scholars have done, that the bosses were "good guys" who served the needs of the urban poor. On the contrary, it is suggested that the "Organisation" exploited its supporters as much as it helped them. The final section of this chapter focuses on the Republican machine's extraordinary degree of electoral success between 1887 and the re-emergence of a competitive two-party system in 1933; a feature of local politics which, it is argued, was attributable not so much to public apathy, but to the demise of the Democratic party, the local strength of Republican partisanship, and the control the "Organisation" exercised over the election machinery.

Those who benefitted from, and supported, the establishment of a fully fledged political machine, and those who were opposed to it, are the subject of the final two chapters. Chapter 8 demonstrates that, while the party boss was not subservient to business interests as is traditionally alleged, one of the main beneficiaries, and apparently supporters, of the creation of a centralised political structure in Philadelphia, was a significant section of the local business community. The relationship between the centralisation of political power and the consolidation of the public utilities industry at the turn of the century, it is suggested, was not just one of coincidence.

Finally, Chapter 9 shows in what ways reform groups after 1886 differed from their predecessors and offers an
explanation for the emergence of the nonpartisan reform movement as the most serious threat to the "Organisation's" hegemony in local affairs. It also examines why the nonpartisans were not more successful in challenging the "Organisation's" grip on the city's government and its politics. Indeed the failure of the reformers to remain faithful to the principle of nonpartisanship, it is suggested, was yet another factor which not only underpinned the "Organisation's" hegemony in local politics but also explains why "good city government" proved to be such an elusive goal in Philadelphia in the early part of this century.
1. A Literature Review of the Urban Political Machine

There has been a growing reaction among scholars in recent years against the persistence of the classic duel between reform and bossism as the dominant theme in urban politics. As Michael Frisch has written this debate, one of the oldest arguments in American historiography, "has come to seem to so many readers a rather tired circular discussion that somehow has never gotten very far away from the original dichotomy of Plunkett v. Steffens."¹ In a recent historiographical review, Jon Teaford has shown that up until the 1980's, this dichotomy provided the framework of the leading historical accounts of municipal government in America.

Whether the approach was quantitative or traditional, urban government of the period 1850 to 1940 was seen as a clash between upper middle class reformers seeking centralised efficient moral rule and the political machines dedicated to rewarding party loyalists and securing the mass of immigrant votes through favours and services.²

David Thelen has also noted the distinction between the analyses of national politics and government and that of the city by scholars.

While a wide variety of concerns has informed analyses of national politics and government the city has simply remained the scene for such increasingly sophisticated variations on the theme of the perpetual struggle between bosses and reformers as the dichotomy between local ("bosses") and centralised ("reformers") outlooks.³

These historians have argued that this scenario is an
inadequate one to describe the complexity of municipal development in the United States because it has ignored vital elements in the story of urban rule and diverted scholars' attention for far too long from other actors in municipal government and other problems vital to urban politics. Thelen, for example, reminds us that power in American cities meant not just the apportionment of votes and offices but also the apportionment of money and profits; that the city was the land of opportunity for contractors, landlords, bankers, manufacturers and utility companies, and their survival and profits depended on their relationship to city government.4

It is now opportune then, according to these scholars, to recast the central issue of urban politics. As Teaford puts it,

during the 1980's it seems possible to rewrite the history of urban politics and government along new lines that do not neglect the diversity of decisionmakers, nor the significance of such areas of public policy as sanitation, recreation, public safety and public works.5

Thelen is in favour of any model which would "restore rats, fires, taxes, diseases, schools, jobs, crime, transportation and utilities to their rightful places as the central realities of urban life."6

While accepting there is considerable merit in the claims of these historians and that alternative ways of viewing urban politics are long overdue, it is my contention that even though there is a consensus among scholars in the abundant literature on the political machine, certain key issues have
not been satisfactorily resolved. The first issue concerns the role that the political machine has played in the American city, that is, the functions fulfilled by the urban political machine.

Until the mid-1950's historical research into the study of corruption tended to take its stimulus from a basic commitment to reform and most of it was undertaken during times when a general concern with reform was fairly high. These periods were very productive, yielding rich materials in the form of journalism, memoirs of reformers, and treatises on "good government" which in their very devotion to the overthrow of the "machine" could hardly help producing in the course of things a number of insights into the nature of this political institution. However, as much of the literature was heavily pejorative, concerned more with excoriation than explanation, this one-eyed view quite naturally emphasised the worst features of "machine" politics - its wastefulness, corruption and illegality. In general, the political machine was presented as a sinister and somewhat secret association of men who ran politics, lived by graft, and were headed by "bosses" who came up from the slums and were necessarily evil creatures. Even the terms boss, bossism, machine, ring and organisation which have been in common use for over a century are morally "loaded" so that today they have little precise meaning. Essentially the differences between a boss and a leader and between a machine and an organisation are normative, and exist primarily in the mind of the speaker.
The last quarter-century however has witnessed a fundamental shift in this historical research pattern, so much so that today, according to David Thelen,

we have come close to simply inverting the prejudices of the Progressive Era. Steffens and company argued that bosses at their worst were arrogant amateurs who repeatedly sold out their constituents, while reformers at their best gave urban residents the chance to control their lives by injecting a responsive professionalism into city government. Now however, many historians believe that bosses were the true professionals who understood and served the needs of most city dwellers, while reformers were arrogant amateur politicians who imposed their centralised programmes of efficiency on unwilling majorities.9

One of the reasons for this dramatic reversal may well be due to the fact that the old-style Boss and his machine have been in considerable decline and so have begun to acquire some of the fascination of other elements of Americana once they were perceived to be vanishing. Whalers and whalemen, cattle-towns and cowboys underwent the same process. In this age of mass communication media and alleged homogenisation of culture, the Boss's rugged individuality - and he was an individual no matter what else he may also have been - made him an appealing and challenging figure for a new generation of historians, social scientists and writers. In Edwin O'Connor's, The Last Hurrah, Mayor Frank Skeffington tries to persuade his nephew to join him. He tells him that all the others like himself are gone. "When I join them," he adds, "the old campaign will vanish like the Noble Red Man."10

O'Connor's novel, along with Robert Merton's, Social Theory
and Social Structure, were instrumental in establishing a new stereotype of the boss at a popular and scholarly level.\textsuperscript{11} O'Connor's story, based on the life and career of James M. Curley of Boston, presents a sentimental view, depicting Boss Frank Skeffington as a shrewd, very Irish and eminently human benefactor. His organised machine was very much oriented to serving the needs of the people as individuals, reflective of the ethnic make-up of the city (although almost tribally Irish overall), and kindly if inefficient. Skeffington's political strength came almost entirely from the ethnic population, the poor and the elderly. O'Connor's insights were incorporated in the theoretical model developed by Robert Merton to account for the success of the political machine. Merton argued that immigrants, the poor, and businessmen in an expanding city were likely to support the machine because it served functions that were "at the time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns and structures."	extsuperscript{12}

Since the 1950's Merton's functionalist theory has taken root and there has been an increasing tendency to see machine politics from a new perspective. Elmer Cornwell for example has argued that the machine operated as virtually the only agency which facilitated the political and economic integration of immigrants into the community. Cornwell suggests this was done by soliciting votes with the familiar array of machine "services" - food, jobs, intercession with the law and so forth - bringing their representatives into the organisation, offering a career ladder to some
individuals and giving general recognition to them as a

Seymour Mandelbaum also has suggested that in the fragmented
metropolis of the Tweed era, the "big pay off" was an
essential if not the most efficient way of getting things
done, considering the problems of New York at the time. He argues that in view of the role and aspirations of the
city boss, the influence of entrenched special interest
groups and the rapid urbanisation of the American city,
corruption was almost, if not completely, inevitable. In a
similar vein, Alexander Callow has argued that the boss
exploited the inability of government to supply the demands
of the emerging city:

The machine was not the only mechanism as reformers
would insist; it was not the most honest or most
efficient; yet as a response to urban needs it was
to put it in its simplest terms - a way of getting
things done.

Again Zane Lee Miller, in examining the rise and fall of
George B. Cox in Cincinnati, is much less concerned with Cox
the grafter than with Cox the politician and reformer.

Miller fleshes out the so-called Periphery theory initiated
by Richard Wade, in which it is argued that by the outset of
the Progressive period the classic conflict of the city
against the country was replaced by the struggle within the
city itself. Accordingly, Miller traces the demographic
spread of Cincinnati into three outlying ("Hilltop")
sections occupied by the upper and middle class, with the
poor and newly arrived confined to the central city (the
"Basin"). The contest was between the inner city and the

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peripheries, and no longer a matter of conquering the inner city. If the boss was to sustain his power, as Cox realised, he must woo the periphery neighbourhoods, and in so doing Cox achieved several reforms. Miller views Boss Cox as emerging from a "decade of disorder," and imposing a "new order" on the city's politics and government. He was able to satisfy not only his party followers and the poor of the inner city with patronage and favours, but also reformers in the business community and suburbs by supporting the secret ballot, changes in voter registration and a crackdown on vice and minor graft. On his record of reforms he helped to modernise city government, professionalise the police and fire departments, and build a large and expensive waterworks. Thus Cox was no free-booting graft monger like Tweed, exploiting the chaos of rapid urbanisation, but rather helped to soothe the cultural and racial antagonisms in this mushrooming metropolis.

More recently still John M. Allswang, in attempting to demonstrate the "symbiotic" relationship between bosses and urban voters, vigorously insisted that the former better served the economic and cultural needs of the "dependent" and "semi-dependent" peoples who inhabited cities, than did reformers.¹⁷

The product of all these recent works has been to establish an unusually rosy picture of bossism. Indeed a more striking revision of a historical image is difficult to imagine. Ironically, while the boss's reputation has been
rising that of the reformers has been sinking, due to the pioneering work of Richard Hofstadter and Samuel Hays which began to strip reformers of their noble rhetoric to reveal their ulterior motives.¹⁸ Thus the former good guys and bad guys of the urban drama have switched roles in the current debate on bosses and reformers. Reformers are now seen less as paragons of virtue and more as proponents of middle class social control, while Tweed and company are now regarded as having been a social necessity. The chief factor responsible for this fundamental shift in interpretation, and which still underpins the prevailing picture of the urban boss in the contemporary literature is, as I have identified, Robert Merton's seminal work written over thirty years ago. Yet, surprisingly, Merton's theoretical model has not been subjected to critical examination; perhaps because logically immigrants, the poor and businessmen must have benefitted from the machine otherwise they would not have continued to vote for it. Nonetheless the question still remains, How valid is Merton's analysis of the relationship between the machine and its supporters? What have been the manifest (as opposed to latent) functions of the machine?

The second issue not satisfactorily resolved concerns the emergence of the political machine in the American city. As machine politics emerged as the characteristic form of city government in late nineteenth century America, scholars have sought the origins of the machine in the peculiarities of American culture and politics. They have focused in
particular on massive immigration and the close association of the machine and ethnic politics and have suggested that the machine was created by immigrants, a product of immigrant culture and ethnic conflict. The most familiar of these arguments, for example, appeared in *City Politics* where Edward Banfield and James Wilson, following Hofstadter, argued that nineteenth century politics was grounded in an immigrant political ethos at variance with middle class white Anglo-Saxon Protestant values. They suggested that the "individualist" or "private-regarding" values of immigrant voters led them to accept patronage, corruption and "friendship", while the "unitarist" or "public-regarding" values of middle class native Protestant voters induced them to insist on honesty and the advancement of the public interest.¹⁹

Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan similarly suggest that the attachment of immigrants to the machine was an expression of primordial ethnic loyalties.²⁰ They argue that social norms of deference and personal dependence were Irish peasant values of lasting vigour that were essential to machine building and facilitated Irish political success. In contrast, Richard Wade, Oscar Handlin, William Whyte and Robert Merton focus upon the post-migration experiences of the immigrant and have suggested that the machine can be viewed as a political expression of living conditions in inner city districts, as a defensive reaction against discrimination, and as an outgrowth of the social structure of these communities.²¹
Despite differences of opinion over why immigrants were attached to political machines, there is general agreement in the literature on what constitutes such an institution. Most scholars now agree that political machines had two distinguishing characteristics. On the one hand, in terms of "structure", they were well-disciplined and cohesive city-wide political institutions; party organisations which functioned as their centralised and hierarchical structure suggested they should, with the party leader (or boss) capable of exercising control over subordinates both in party office and public office. On the other, in terms of "style", they were characterised by what James Scott has called the peculiar "organisational cement" (or linkages, such as the exchange of patronage and favours for votes), which bound machine politicians and their supporters together.22

The problem with the examples above however is, as Martin Shefter has also argued, that the explanation they offer for the emergence of the political machine can account only for the "style" of machine politics and not its "structure" and organisation.23 That is, although they suggest plausible (though not necessarily accurate) reasons for the attachment of immigrants to the political machine (and the opposition of certain social groups to such an institution) they do not fully explain how, in Edward Banfield's terminology, this form of party organisation was able to "centralise influence" within its jurisdiction.24 Put another way, conventional wisdom may help us to account for the machine's
ability to attract (external) electoral support (and opposition) but it fails to provide an adequate explanation for its (internal) structural cohesiveness.

The inadequacy of conventional theories of the political machine is highlighted by their failure to bring about a clearer understanding of the terms boss, machine, ring and organisation. Early scholars of urban politics such as John T. Salter and Harold Zink failed to define the clout of party leaders or draw meaningful distinctions between the various so-called "bosses". For example, with reference to Philadelphia, Salter, writing in the 1930's, referred to William Mann, Robert Mackey, James McManes, David Martin, Israel Durham, James P. McNichol, Boies Penrose and Edwin Vare as the "eight feudal barons" who ruled the city for eighty-four years.25 Similarly, Zink, in his rather superficial, impressionistic, collective biography of bosses, continued to refer to them as "feudal barons", labelling James McManes "King" and Edwin Vare "Duke" of Philadelphia.26

Surprisingly in more recent years while Samuel Hays and Melvin G. Holli dissected the reform cause into structural and social reformers, and other historians such as Gabriel Kolko, James Weinstein, John D. Buenker, J. Joseph Huthmacher, Robert H. Wiebe and David Thelen have added their own increasingly sophisticated analyses of the movement, the urban boss has received far less attention.27 Instead, historians have continued to lump various party
leaders neatly together under the category "boss". For example, the term "boss" has been loosely applied to such figures as Bill Tweed, Richard Croker, James McManes and Israel Durham, but we do not know what differences, if any, existed between the Tammany Hall of 1870 and 1900, and the Republican party in Philadelphia of 1870 and 1900.

A brief elaboration is sufficient to establish how poorly conventional theories help us to explain the emergence of the political machine, or enable us to draw significant distinctions between various bosses. In Philadelphia, for example, the "organisational cement" peculiar to machine politics was a feature of political life both in the mid-nineteenth century and also the early twentieth century. In describing the emergence of the career politician in antebellum Philadelphia, for instance, Sam Bass Warner Jr. suggests that Joel Barlow Sutherland became the city's first "boss" when he built a Democratic machine in South Philadelphia. Warner draws attention to Sutherland's friendship to the workingman, his distribution of patronage and favours, and his support for the basic economic interests of the district.

That the exchange of patronage and favours for votes was still a crucial aspect of machine politics at the turn of the century, can be deduced from David H. Lane's address to division (precinct) leaders in his twentieth ward during the 1901 election campaign. The veteran ward leader explained that jobs were not only the "backbone of the Organisation" but the heart that kept it going:
The cohesive power of the Organisation is offices. We have 10,000 officeholders and they are all ours. The officeholders are the backbone of the Organisation. We have all of the officeholders and we want to keep them. Poles, Hungarians, Italians and other foreigners when they come here, vote for the Republican ticket. Why? Because we have the offices and they expect favours from officeholders.

In New York, they vote Tammany for the same reason. Our organisation bears the same relation that Tammany does to New York. If we would keep these votes we must retain control of the offices. Foreigners know that they cannot get favours except through our organisation.

......The ownership of the offices means the power for distributing patronage and for conferring favours upon citizens generally, who in return will support the Organisation. It is through this far-reaching power that the great Republican party is given its majority in this city and state. Without the offices this great organisation would crumble and fall.

Thus both Warner's analysis and Lane's statement fit the generally accepted definition of machine politics very well. However, although the exchange of patronage and favours for votes was a distinguishing feature of machine politics in antebellum Philadelphia and at the turn of the century, it does not necessarily follow that the structure and organisation of machine politics remained constant over this period.

For example, it is clear from Warner's own account that Sutherland's influence never extended beyond the first Pennsylvania Congressional District and that his only source of power was the various public offices he himself personally occupied. Warner's use of the term "boss" then is misleading in the sense that Sutherland never headed a
city-wide organisation, nor could he reliably control his nominal followers. On the other hand, we know that when Lane made his election speech in 1901, the Republican machine (as will be shown in Part B) had established itself as the central force in the government and politics of Philadelphia. It was a well-disciplined, city-wide party organisation in which control was centralised under "boss" Israel W. Durham.

If we are to adequately explain then, when and how the city's politics came to be dominated by a political machine, it will be necessary to account more for the changes that took place in the organisation and structure of local politics over this period than in the style of political competition. In particular, the following questions will need to be addressed, with regard to the various so-called "bosses" who, it is alleged, ruled the city between the 1850's and 1930's: To what extent is the term "boss" actually appropriate to them; that is, to what degree did they actually boss? To what extent did they control their followers in party office; the distribution of patronage; the membership and decisions of the party organisation's local units; the party nominations for public office; the behaviour of elected officials nominally affiliated to them; the passage of legislation through City Council; city government?

A final objection to these conventional theories stems from the fact that even though these scholars are interested in who supported the machine - and indeed disagree over which
immigrants were likely to vote for the machine, and why - they have not made any attempt to test empirically the validity of the various hypotheses that have been put forward to explain the distribution of electoral support for the political machine. It is only recently that any researchers have attempted to do this, and their work has produced some provocative findings.

Kenneth Wald, for example, has shown that the electoral base of Boss Ed Crump's machine in Memphis consisted of a coalition of blacks and white ethnics. This may not seem surprising since both groups normally occupy the lower rungs of the social ladder. However, in Memphis, white ethnics had achieved considerable economic success before Crump built his machine, and in 1900 they were more likely than white natives to fall into non-manual and skilled manual occupational groups, while blacks were firmly rooted at the base of the economic pyramid. Wald then goes on to suggest that the common denominator between blacks and white ethnics was certainly not economic, but rather social marginality. From this perspective, Crump's machine appealed most strongly to voters belonging to groups on the margins of the dominant culture - the "outsiders" or "strangers".

Again in New York, Martin Shefter has attempted to explain how Tammany Hall moved from a position of relative weakness on the political scene to a hegemony over the city's politics, based on the persistent and overwhelming support of a large and disciplined army of voters. The bonds of
ethnic, cultural and parochial loyalties of the kind upon which the machine fed, existed among New York voters, but remained fragmented among a number of competing organisations. In a short time, however, Tammany came to dominate the city's politics as these loyalties became centred in it.

Although this happened very quickly, Shefter points out that Tammany's hegemony over the voters did not develop automatically. Apparently habits and attitudes ready for immediate mobilisation may have been brought across from the Old World, but they did not begin operating mechanistically in the new political environment of New York city. It was second generation immigrant voters who were more likely to support the machine than more recent arrivals, because it took some time to be socialised into politics. Tammany's emergence as a dominant force depended upon an organisational innovation; the extension throughout the city of a network of political clubs that served as continuous sources for support, loyalty, and recruitment to the machine. Only then, according to Shefter, was Tammany able to mobilise in effective and permanent fashion the mass of ethnic voters in the city. Shefter confirms therefore, that voting choice is a two stage affair, the propensity of certain groups to vote one way, and the need to get them to do so through an essentially political process of organisation and network building.

To sum up then, I have suggested that a number of different issues have not been dealt with very satisfactorily in the
existing literature on the urban political machine. These issues include such fundamental questions as, How can we account for the emergence of this political institution? What functions did it fulfill in the American city? Which sections of the urban population supported the machine, and why? What valid distinctions can we draw between various "bosses"? The aim of this investigation, as stated earlier, is to address these questions using the city of Philadelphia as the model for inquiry. In the first instance however, it is necessary to identify precisely when the city's politics can be said to have been dominated by a political machine. It is this issue which is the subject of the following section of the thesis.
PART A

THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM AND RING RULE IN THE PRE-MACHINE ERA, 1867-1887

It is my contention that, contrary to received wisdom, a political machine did not dominate Philadelphia politics until the turn of this century. The basis for this opinion rests not on conventional theories of the political machine, but on an examination of the number and structure of political formations that contended for power in the city during the second half of the nineteenth century, and the characteristic processes through which the struggle among them took place. Such an analysis reveals, as demonstrated in Part B, that it was not until after 1887 that a political machine gradually emerged as the dominant institution in the city's politics.

Prior to this development, as the first section of this thesis will show, the distinguishing feature of Philadelphia party politics was the weakness of political organisations and the fluidity of political alignments. Political competition was characterised by the multiplicity of formations (such as volunteer fire companies, street gangs, and committees of notables) and individual actors (such as saloon-keepers, lawyers, publishers and entrepreneurs) that contended for power in the city. Major politicians operated largely independent of political parties, their influence
being essentially a function of the size and strength (both physical and financial) of their personal followings. Consequently, political competition in Philadelphia during this period was also quite violent and corrupt.\(^1\)

As my view concerning exactly when Philadelphia politics was dominated by a political machine is contrary to that held by both contemporary observers and later historians, the aim of this first section is to demonstrate that a well-disciplined and cohesive political machine did not emerge in Philadelphia prior to the introduction of the Bullitt Bill as the city's new charter in 1887. Put another way, Part A will show that party politics in Philadelphia was not organised or centralised before 1887 and that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, local political life was not dominated by an over-riding cleavage between well-disciplined machine and reform forces.

Chapter 2 traces the exodus of the city's men of wealth from public office by the late 1860's, and their replacement by professional politicians. It also offers an explanation why, although the style of machine politics was a prominent feature of local political life from the 1840's onwards, an organised and centralised city-wide political structure did not emerge in ante-bellum Philadelphia.

Chapter 3 also demonstrates that while Republican politicians James McManes and William Stokley were able to exercise power and influence city-wide as a consequence of their respective power bases in the Gas Trust and Public
Buildings Commission, neither can be considered to have been, in spite of the claims of contemporary observers and later historians to the contrary, a genuine city "boss". This judgement is based on an examination of the Republican party organisation in the immediate post-bellum period which reveals that it did not function as its centralised and hierarchical structure suggested it should, that is with the party leader capable of exercising control over subordinates both in party office and public office. As McManes and Stokley's power was confined to the public rather than party offices which they personally occupied, it would be more appropriate, it is suggested, to describe them as having been leaders of "Rings" (that is, an intra-governmental operation which tied a loose coalition of politicians together in the quest for specific material benefits) rather than ambiguously as party bosses.

An analysis of reform politics during this period is provided in Chapter 4. This shows that while the city's "best men" did not abandon local affairs and politics as historians have traditionally alleged, neither were they responsible for bringing about the "fall of bossism" as contemporary publicists maintained. It also suggests furthermore that just as there was no well-disciplined city-wide political machine in Philadelphia prior to 1887 nor was there a well-organised reform movement.
2. The Emergence of the Career Politician

Pre-industrial Philadelphia was a small, geographically compact and socially integrated community. It was, as Edgar P. Richardson put it

the most successful example in North America of the seaport city, a kind of city that the eighteenth century had brought to perfection. It was a community of merchants, mariners and mechanics. It was urban but pre-industrial, a tree-lined checkerboard of red-brick houses trimmed in white.

Work and residence were often combined at the same address, rich and poor lived next to one another, and there was no residential segregation among racial, ethnic and socio-economic groups. It was a "pedestrian community" in which human relationships were established by personal contact over limited areas. A community that, as Michael Frisch has said, was experienced directly and informally, for individuals could not live free from the view of others, from their approval or disapproval.

In such a social situation, those who became dominant in economic, social and religious life established and maintained acceptable patterns for the entire community. As Sam Bass Warner Jr. has written,

the real secret of the peace and order of the eighteenth century town lay not in its government, but in the informal structure of its community. Unlike later Philadelphia, the eighteenth century town was a community. Graded by wealth and divided by distinctions of class though it was, it functioned as a single community. The community had been created out of a remarkably inclusive network of business and economic relationships, and
it was maintained by the daily interactions of trade and sociability......the eighteenth century pattern of settlement guaranteed every citizen a knowledge of town life. At such density and small-scale, no generation could be raised ignorant of the other side of town, of the ways of life of the working class, or of the manners of the haut bourgeois.²

The absence of residential segregation meant that differences in values which might have led to differences in public demands were not readily revealed in political affairs. Urban political leadership reflected the integrated community. The close corporation created by Penn's Proprietary Charter of 1701 was a club of the wealthy Quaker elite that fell with the Revolution in 1776. Philadelphia's second charter passed in 1789 placed legislative power in a Select and Common Council, and executive power in the Mayor, who was initially appointed by the State Governor but subsequently chosen by Councils.⁵ Since Councilmen were elected at large and the franchise was restricted to local taxpayers (both important elements of a political culture in the Federal era that Ronald Formisano has characterised as "deferential-participant"),⁶ the City Councils were invariably composed of men dominant in the community's social and economic life - bankers, merchants and lawyers.

Public office was the preserve of men of wealth and leisure such as the lawyer Michael Keppele (1811-12) and the merchant John Inskeep (1800-1;1804-6) who served one and two terms respectively as Mayor in the early nineteenth century. The most successful officeholder however (and to whom officeholding seemed natural and proper) was Robert Wharton
who came from a merchant family and in 1798 was elected Mayor for the first of fifteen times (1798-1800; 1806-8; 1810-11; 1814-19; 1820-24). A wealthy merchant and sportsman and the most popular member of the city's local aristocracy, he was President of the Gloucester Fox-Hunting Club, sixteen times Governor of the Schuylkill Fishing Company, the oldest gourmet club in America today, and Captain of the First City Troop between 1803 and 1810.7

The city's merchant class provided public commissions, and elective office with a variety of talent, experience and expertise. For example, shipping merchant and banker Stephen Girard, merchant and ironmaster Henry Drinker Jr., shipping magnate Thomas P. Cope, salt merchant Joseph Lewis, drug manufacturer John P. Wetherill and the sculptor William Rush, dominated the Watering Committee of the City Councils. They were responsible for pioneering the building of America's first municipal waterworks in 1801 - the Fairmount Water Works on the Schuylkill river, which was also to provide the basis of what was to become the first large urban park in the country.8 In a similar vein, merchant and philanthropist Roberts Vaux and Samuel Breck successfully spearheaded the drive for legislative action to establish a system of free public education in the 1830's. The Free School Act of 1836 also authorised the establishment of Philadelphia's Central High School, the first in the country.9

The political leadership of the city's merchants, as already
suggested, followed from their economic and social leadership, a tribute, from their viewpoint, of their leading role in the economy. Mechanics, artisans and manufacturers were inclined to give their votes to merchants, in part, on the basis of shared interests. In the pre-industrial setting, it was merchants who organised growth and prosperity, finding markets for mechanics' products, lending funds for artisan production and organising the pursuit of commerce. Mechanics, with merchants, supported the Constitution and its promise of a thriving commercial republic.¹⁰

Deference also followed from merchants' social leadership. Politics and the obligations of the rich to the poor, worked hand in hand. As Sam Bass Warner noted, the lines dividing the social, economic and political leadership of wealthy merchants were only lightly sketched. In a variety of ways, the division between public and private pursuits, public and private leadership, and public and private generosity, was an indistinct one. That is why Warner regards the city's wealthy merchants - such as for example the philanthropist and shipping merchant Thomas P. Cope, (1768-1854) - as "old-style generalists in business and politics."¹¹ Warner suggests Cope,

regarded the city as the foreground of a man's loyalty and public concern. Public life for him was participation in the management of the city and he drew no sharp distinctions among public office, municipal committees, and private philanthropic groups.¹²

Cope promoted the economic well-being of the city. He established a regular packet service between Philadelphia
and Liverpool, founded the local Board of Trade, and for twenty-two years served as its President and "like all Philadelphia businessmen pressed for internal improvements to expand the city's region of cheap, inland transportation." A patrician who was the "poor man's friend", he served as the manager of the Almshouse, one of the Guardians of the Poor, and even carried food to the houses of the sick. He also gave $40,000 to the Institute for Coloured Youth to found a technical school for Negroes.¹³

As well as demonstrating generosity and concern, wealthy men also provided leadership in the volunteer fire department. The fire company provided an arena in which wealthy men could demonstrate their courage and their capacity for leading other men, in this case, usually those of the middling social strata.¹⁴ As officeholders, men of substance could control mobs. The traditional form of riot control, in fact, involved less a show of physical force than the use of "respect". Politics, as Formisano reminds us, was still very much influenced by the fact that this was a culture in which a gentleman could be recognised by dress and manners.¹⁵ For example, this was how Mayor Wharton was described by one who knew him:

This Mr. Wharton was Mayor of the City in 1798 and for many years after. He was bold, intrepid and very active, ready at a moment's notice to quell a riot. His appearance at such gatherings with staff in hand, and hat tipped a little on one side of his head with firm step and independent authority, would scatter the ire, and quell the fire of the most ferocious mob. Philadelphia never had a more efficient and popular municipal officer.¹⁶
Like other forms of civic leadership, governance was founded on respect for courage and benevolence. This merchant style of political leadership and urban governance however began to be eroded in the 1830's and 40's. The volunteer fire companies, for example, no longer qualified as genteel dinner clubs which met in rented inns or halls. In terms of composition, "respectable elements" were replaced by the "less prestigious social classes." By the 1840's the companies contained only a sprinkling of middle-class occupational groups, namely master craftsmen, small shopkeepers and clerks. Most of the officers and nearly all of the firefighters were skilled journeymen who owned no real property.  

The social authority of wealthy men was also in decline. Major anti-black riots in the 1830's and the devastating nativist riots of 1844 testified to the inability of men of substance to control mobs. In politics too, wealthy men had been pressed to give way in the wake of the Workingmen's Party, trade union and labour political activism, and ultimately the career politician in the person of the "boss". Political leadership once based on a more general deference came to be based on party organisation and mass partisan loyalty. Elections were increasingly characterised by violence. In these circumstances it was hardly surprising that "by 1850," according to Warner, "the old style generalists in business and politics...... were as antique as the handloom weavers."
How can we account for these developments - the exodus of the wealthy from politics and the emergence of the career politician in the person of the "boss"? Sam Bass Warner has provided us with one explanation. He regards the emergence of the career politician in Philadelphia as a part of a more general process of specialisation and the division of labour.

The new habits of business taught the mid-nineteenth century businessman that the city was not important to their daily lives and in response these business leaders became ignorant of their city and abandoned its politics.22

As businessmen "abandoned the city's affairs" and turned their attention to national and regional matters because the larger economic environment became more relevant to profit-making, "new specialists assumed their former tasks."23

It is perhaps worth noting first of all that Warner's assertion about businessmen abandoning the city's affairs in the mid-nineteenth century, is inaccurate in two senses. In the first instance, the exodus of the wealthy from political office was a post-Civil War and not an ante-bellum phenomenon. Prior to the Civil War, the city's merchant class continued to provide leaders who combined a deep concern for promoting the city's political and economic health (regardless of party). For example, the drug manufacturer John P. Wetherill, woollen trader George Morrison Coates, and Theodore Cuyler, general counsel for the Pennsylvania Railroad, each served as President of Councils in the 1850's and 60's. The first four mayors of Philadelphia after the political consolidation of the city
and county in 1854 (see Figure 2.1) - Robert Conrad (1854-56), Richard Vaux (1856-58), Alexander Henry (1858-66) and Morton McMichael (1866-69) - were all life long local residents who had pursued successful careers either in trade, law or publishing.  

Furthermore, a contemporary survey of the first Common Council after consolidation observed that Philadelphia was "represented by those whose business, wealth and position impels them to guard her treasury and her credit." The new Councilmen included John H. Diehl, merchant and President of Independent Mutual Fire Insurance Company; Stilwell Shaw Bishop, senior partner of the shipping house Bishops, Simons and Company; Conrad S. Grove, a manufacturer of linseed oil; William W. Watt, a textile manufacturer who employed over two hundred workers; A. M. Eastwick, a locomotive manufacturer who built a railroad line from St. Petersburg to Moscow under contract from the Tsar, and Alpheas W. Green, owner of a gentlemen's furnishing store. In addition, there was also an owner of an iron foundry, a coal merchant, a drug manufacturer, publisher, silversmith, a clock and watch manufacturer, and a stageline owner. In sum, the new council was composed of "an assortment of practical, self-made businessmen, possessing great business talent," all of whom had clearly not "abandoned the city's affairs and its politics."  

The retreat of the city's merchant class and businessmen from political office did not become marked until after the Civil War when Councils were inundated with an influx of
Figure 2.1. Map of the City and County of Philadelphia, 1854 to the present. In 1854 the "old city" was merged with twenty-seven other political subdivisions within Philadelphia County and grew from two square miles to 130: the same area that it covers today. [Source: Theodore Hershberg (ed.), Philadelphia: Work, Space, Family and Group Experience in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1981), p. 127]
"fourth rate political ward jobbers who go (there) not for the honour but for the plunder." ^7 The changing composition of Councils was also reflected in the make-up of the Republican party organisation. Not one of the original members of the Republican City Executive Committee in 1857 survived to the post-Civil War years. By 1869 the majority of committee members owed their livelihood to politics. The Republican Party had become dominated by career politicians (see Table 2.1). ^8 This transformation in local politics occurred because according to James Bryce, "during the Civil War, the (city's) best citizens" had been

busily absorbed in its great issues and both then and for some time after, welcomed all the help that could be given to their party by any man who knew how to organise the voters and bring them up to the polls; while at the same time their keen interest in national questions made them inattentive to municipal affairs. Accordingly the local control and management of the party fell into hands of obscure citizens, men who had their own ends to serve, their own fortunes to make but who were valuable to their party because they kept it in power through their assiduous work among the lower class of voters. ^9

Another contemporary observer, the reform publicist George Vickers, described this process in rather more colourful and dramatic fashion:

During the war years there came to the front of the party organisation, a baser element.....the rag-tag and bob-tail in politics. They were the moths of humanity drawn from the four quarters of the earth to the staid Quaker City by the glare of opportunity. One party to them was as good as another so far as principles were concerned. The main consideration that influenced their actions was opportunity for self-advancement. With the Democratic party labouring under reverses, and the Republican party successful in city and state their lot was, of course, cast with the latter. These political Ishmaelites worked darkly and noiselessly.....At a time when every vote in the Republican party was...
Table 2.1. Union Republican City Executive Committee, 1869-1870

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers and Members</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Public office/Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>John L. Hill</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Collector of Delinquent Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Presidents</td>
<td>John W. Donnelly</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John H. Seltzer</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>assessor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries</td>
<td>John McCullough</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>customs clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert T. Gill</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>liquor-dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>George Boyer</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Samuel Lutz</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>alderman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Kelly</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Butler</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles W. Ridgway</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>customs clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John V. Creely</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>lawyer /Congressman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles A. Porter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>county clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jacob Albright</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Albright &amp; Sheeler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Andress</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William H. Johnson</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Fowler &amp; Huhn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Henry Huhn</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>highways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Ash</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George W. Painter</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>county registrar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph S. Allen</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Allen &amp; Stites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gideon Clark</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Register of Wills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John F. Preston</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Dutton</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>inspector</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A. L. Dungan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James Newell</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>assessor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John C. Sees</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>deputy coroner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morton A. Everly</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>collector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harry Hancock</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>bricklayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hiram Miller</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>lumber dealer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Union Republican City Executive Committee, 1869-70, (Philadelphia, 1869), Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Gopsill's Philadelphia City Directory for 1870 (Philadelphia, 1870).
needed, they were accepted without question. They at once made themselves useful, showed a practical disposition to look after the welfare of the party in the city, and thus in a measure relieve the real leaders of the party, some of whom were at the front....Carefully and with great system did they lay their plans and push their fortunes.

So successful was the "baser element" that, according to Vickers, the Republican party no longer qualified as a "political party......public freebooters was a more appropriate title."30

The other sense in which Warner's assertion about the exodus of the wealthy is misleading, is the inference that this was a voluntary gesture on their part, that is they chose to abandon the city's affairs and its politics. E. Digby Baltzell in a similar vein also talks about "the gradual withdrawal of the Philadelphia gentlemen away from public service and into the counting house."31 However the evidence, I suggest, would seem to indicate there was an element of compulsion. That is, men of substance appear to have been forced to abandon the city's politics as much as they chose to leave of their own accord. The explanations suggested by Bryce and Vickers above would seem to imply this, plus the latter also complained that "men of character (like himself) were driven away" from Councils. Similarly Morton McMichael's North American argued that rising partisan criticism in local politics had the effect to "drive out of Councils, many high-toned gentlemen of stirring integrity." Furthermore, in May 1868, the Union League, a social club composed of members of the local business elite who had been loyal to the Union during the
Civil War, launched an effort to secure the election of their own candidates to office, that is of men "whom office seeks, rather than those who seek office." The reaction of the Union League to local political conditions and the subsequent reactions of men of substance in organising reform groups to clean up City Hall, simply does not square with the notion that "business leaders became ignorant of their city and abandoned its politics."32

Warner's claim that the emergence of the career politician was a part of a more general process of specialisation and the division of labour is more persuasive, though by no means the only reason for this development.

Industrialisation, and with it population growth and immigration, had by the mid-nineteenth century, as Warner points out, begun to transform Philadelphia's economic and social order.33 The artisan and merchant gave way to the worker, industrialist and financier.34 More profoundly, the consensus and community of the eighteenth century town, as depicted by Warner, were shattered, and in their place was a diverse and rather contentious aggregation of interests. Preconsolidation Philadelphia was in essence a divided city for the residents of the mercantile core of the old city and those in the adjacent suburbs were separated along social class, ethnic, religious, occupational and political lines.35

The most important element in this political environment was, according to Formisano, the establishment of political parties. The national two-party system established the
institutional continuity around which organisations formed to help carry elections at the county, state and federal levels. It did not make its presence felt in city politics however until the new Whig and Democratic parties contended for power between 1834 and 1850. Increasingly, from the late 1830's onwards, city elections in Philadelphia, like state and federal contests (and like most places nationwide), were contested along strictly party lines.\textsuperscript{36}

In addition, the introduction of universal white manhood suffrage in 1838 and the proliferation of egalitarian appeals as the common rhetoric of mass political party organisations also meant that deference virtually disappeared as a factor in urban politics. Indeed, the local counterpart of the Jacksonian Revolution was that small, paternalist, elite-dominated city government was increasingly challenged by career politicians and mass political parties.\textsuperscript{37} It would appear then that the emergence of the career politician was probably due to a unique combination of circumstances; that is, industrialisation, the extension of the franchise, and the appearance of the national two-party system in city politics for the first time.

The emergence of the career politician and the exodus of the wealthy from politics is a familiar theme in the literature on urban political development. Not so well publicised however, as Amy Bridges points out, is the notion that the career politicians' style of political leadership closely
resembled the patrician style. Career politicians and patricians were alike, according to Bridges, in the sense that they each stressed personal generosity and benevolence towards their supporters and communities, and proved their courage and leadership capacity in the volunteer fire department. Career politicians actually modified the patrician style to suit their own personal ends in the new political environment, for what distinguished them from patricians was their reliance on partisanship, rather than personality (or deference), for political victory, and their dependence on municipal funds and patronage, rather than personal wealth, to provide for their constituents and supporters. For example, when Warner cites Joel Barlow Sutherland as a representative career politician and the city's first "boss", he draws particular attention to Sutherland's friendship to the workingman, his distribution of patronage and favours, and his support for the basic economic interests of his district. Thus, the exchange of patronage and favours for votes, which Banfield and Wilson and others regard as the distinguishing characteristic of machine politics, was part of the career politician from the outset.

However, although the style of boss politics emerged in ante-bellum Philadelphia, a well-disciplined and cohesive citywide political machine headed by a single party leader did not. Why? There are a number of reasons why this system of party politics was not organised or centralised at this time. They all pertain, to some degree, to the
structure and organisation of city government and political parties in mid-nineteenth century Philadelphia.

Firstly, the simultaneous expansion and fragmentation of city government not only exacerbated the diffusion of political power, but provided opportunities for enterprising politicians to create their own personal organisations. As noted earlier, Philadelphia's second charter, passed in 1789, vested legislative power in a bi-cameral City Council, while executive duties were concentrated in a Board of City Commissioners who were appointed by the Mayor with the approval of Councils. It was not long, however, before the radical fears of strong executives, inherited from the Revolution and Jackson, prevented the Mayor and Commissioners from exercising much independence of action. When new municipal functions were added, as in the case of water, sewage and gas, the Councils created independent committees which did not report to the Mayor but to the Councils themselves. The Mayor was "gradually shorn of his various powers and duties as Executive" and "relegated.... to being simply chief of police and the figure-head of the corporation, not holding even the check of the veto power."41

Political consolidation in 1854 did nothing to arrest the dissipation of government responsibility and accountability for, as Edward P. Allinson and Boies Penrose noted in their history of Philadelphia government, "the organic law remains unchanged and consolidated Philadelphia is the ripened fruit of the system of the old city. No radical departure marks
its event."

Until the adoption of the Bullitt Bill as the new city charter in 1887 then, responsibility for city services was fragmented among up to thirty-two separate boards and departments all actively competing for their share of city revenue.

Indeed consolidation intensified the problems of city government because it left a number of county officers outside city authority. The City Treasurer, District Attorney, Recorder of Deeds, Register of Wills, and Sheriff were among Philadelphia's most important officers, yet they maintained independent offices on State House Row, aptly named because they remained responsible only to the state, though they performed vital city services. These elected county officers were not paid a fixed salary but received lucrative commissions on the fees they collected often amounting up to $100,000 a year. Financial returns of this magnitude proved a considerable temptation that career politicians found difficult to resist, for as local reformers noted,

> these vast pecuniary prizes with their princely revenues have proved the most potent source of corruption in our local politics, stimulating unprincipled men to obtain nominations by all the disgraceful arts known to Ring politicians and moreover furnishing the means through which every fibre of our local political system is vitiated. It is not too much to compute that a million of dollars a year is levied upon the people by the officials of "the Row", the greater portion of which is illegally exacted and much of which is expended in manipulating precinct politics and perpetrating election frauds.

Thus the fee system attached to "Row" offices enabled enterprising politicians such as District Attorney William
B. Mann and Sheriff William R. Leeds to build up a strong personal following and in doing so make themselves relatively independent of political parties.

The "triumph of localism," a consequence of the extension of electoral democracy, constitutes a further reason why a well-disciplined and centralised political machine failed to emerge in mid-nineteenth century Philadelphia. The expansion in the size of the electorate referred to earlier was accompanied by an increase in the number of elected offices. After 1839, the mayor was elected by the people rather than by Councils, while state judges ceased to be appointed officials. Political consolidation made the City Treasurer an elected rather than appointed official and created two new elected positions that of City Controller and Receiver of Taxes.47

Howard Gillette and William Cutler have recently argued that consolidation, "effected a dramatic shift of power from local to central authority" and "concentrated power and decision-making.....perhaps more than any other event in the city's history."48 Although they are correct to stress that consolidation brought unity of management to the functions of government they exaggerate the centralising aspects of consolidation for the latter fostered extreme localism in politics. For example, it extended electoral democracy by making ward officers such as school directors, tax collectors and assessors, guardians of the poor, and representatives on the Board of Health elective rather than
appointive offices, for the first time. It also left the petty judicial position of Alderman unaltered as an elective office. In addition, consolidation provided that Select and Common Councilmen were to be elected from wards and not at large, as formerly.\textsuperscript{49}

Consolidation then, by making these local offices elective, enhanced their political importance and made wards the new focus of politics. As wards served as the local basis for representation on city councils and as administrative districts for many of the municipal services, they now became the basic unit of political life. Wards were turned into the city's fundamental entities for political organisation providing aspiring politicians a base around which to build personal followings. In essence, consolidation paved the way for the emergence of the independent ward "boss".

The nature of political parties themselves provides the final reason why a political machine failed to emerge in ante-bellum Philadelphia. It needs to be stressed that political parties at this time were loosely structured, poorly organised, ill-disciplined and not subject to legal controls.\textsuperscript{50} Accordingly they could be treated as just what they were - private organisations designed to operate openly on the basis of personal favours and rewards in the spirit that is of Plunkitt who "seen his financial opportunities and took 'em."\textsuperscript{51} In these circumstances party leaders could not control the behaviour of local party officers nor of party workers in public office. Indeed, the party apparatus
was so weak that career politicians relied on, and were often products of, organisations whose primary purpose was not the delivery of the vote. Consequently it was groups such as the volunteer fire companies, gangs, social clubs, coteries of saloon frequenters, and other structures of status and prestige within neighbourhoods, that dominated the electoral process, and not party organisations.

It seems that in Philadelphia fire companies were the most significant group, for as Frank Willing Leach, secretary to the State Republican party leader Matt Quay, recalled in 1905:

> In those days [1856] local political battles at the polls were not fought by Executive Committeemen, by division workers and the like, as is the case nowadays. The chief factor then and for many years afterward were the active members of the volunteer fire company.52

Indeed, in 1856 Philadelphia was considered to have an excess of fire companies, as seventy of them functioned within the city. These provided an arena in which a man who wanted to be a political leader could demonstrate his courage and leadership capacity, for their colourful uniforms, exciting dashes to fires and competition for community recognition made them very attractive to young men in the city. Those who wished to exercise political leadership attempted to gain executive office by demonstrating their ability to the satisfaction of their peers. Directors were elected from and by the members, and bestowed with the considerable honour of supervising the fighting of fires.53 Company members created each company's
distinct identity. Some company names like Franklin, Washington, Lafayette and Americus suggested patriotism; some like Schuylkill, Southwark and Moyamensing, neighbourhood; and some like Harmony and Good Will, a sense of duty; while others such as Shiffler and Hibernia indicated nativism and national origin respectively.\textsuperscript{54}

The circumstances surrounding fire-fighting (such as the race to arrive first at a fire, and the honour of extinguishing it), community loyalty, and political and religious differences, provided the basis for trouble between these rival companies. Indeed, "the conflicts between these rival associations became the major source of organised violence before the Civil War."\textsuperscript{55} For example, in Moyamensing the Irish Protestants of the Franklin Hose Company fought savage contests against the Irish Catholics of the Moyamensing Hose Company, while in Southwark arson and fighting accompanied the uncompromising hostility between the Weccacoe Engine Company a temperance, nativist outfit, and the Weccacoe Hose Company, an Irish and non-temperance organisation.\textsuperscript{56} It was in the bitter competition with rival companies that men were able to prove loyalty, courage and leadership capacity to the satisfaction of their fellows, thereby proving themselves worthy of support and loyalty. Such local city politicians as Mayor William Stokley (Harmony Engine Company); Sheriff William R. Leeds (Goodwill Engine Company); Councilmen William E. Rowan (Columbia Engine Company) and William McMullen (Moyamensing Hose Company); Congressman Charles O'Neill (Franklin Hose
Company); State Representative Lewis Cassidy (Hibernia Hose Company); Chief of Police Samuel Ruggles (Columbia Hose Company) and future "bosses" of the city in the 1890's, Dave Martin (Taylor Hose Company) and Charles Porter (Schuylkill Hose Company), all began their political careers in the ranks of the volunteer fire companies.57

Street gangs were another significant source of support for the career politician. Although we do not know how many of these bands existed one survey uncovered fifty-two street gangs in the city during the period 1836 to 1878.58 They tended to be concentrated in poorer working class districts such as Southwark, Moyamensing, Northern Liberties and Spring Garden, on the edge of the old city (see Figure 2.1). The vast majority of these groups had very short lives of three years or less, though some such as the Snakers (seven years), Buffers (ten years) and Schuylkill Rangers (twenty-six years) persisted for much longer periods. Headquartered at a saloon, club-house, abandoned building or simply a streetcorner, these gangs had distinctive dress, fashioning clothing styles that became their hallmark. Their names were also assertions of their distinct identity. The Schuylkill Rangers and Kensington Black Hawks were named for their turf; Killers, Rats, Bouncers, Spitfires, Tormentors, Smashers and Flayers drew on slang, while Shifflers, American Guards, Orangemen and Kerryonians expressed ethnicity or nativism.59 Sometimes the turf and neighbourhood loyalties of the gangs coincided with those of the fire companies. For example, the Weccacoe Hose Company
ran to and from fires escorted by the Bouncers, while the Killers and Moyamensing Hose Company, and the Shifflers and Shiffler Hose Company had established alliances. Often there was little distinction between the two institutions.

Gangs complemented the role of fire companies in the electoral process, by promoting the political fortunes of those whom they supported. They were particularly useful in guarding ballot-boxes and keeping opponents away from the polls. In return they were courted with donations, patronage and freedom from arrest. Gangs, fire companies and the like, thus provided the bases then for grass roots political organisation in ante-bellum Philadelphia. This development had important consequences for political parties and the nature of political competition. From the partisan and party leaders' point of view, as these groups were not primarily political, they were a poor substitute for ward organisation or for a permanent presence in the wards. Collectively they served to give the parties popular ties and a popular base but individually most of them were unreliable for they were tied more to individuals than to parties, and therefore capable of changing partisan affiliation. Even when they remained faithful to their partisan allegiance however, these organisations maintained their own self-direction and autonomy. There was thus no compelling incentive for them to accept centralised control or to follow the wishes of the party leadership. The independence of these groups had significant implications for political competition. Their size and strength (often
literally their physical strength) were regarded as a measure of the influence of the individual politicians they promoted, for the latter relied upon them to secure party nominations and subsequent election. The electoral arena then became increasingly violent and corrupt, as brawlers, cash payments and patronage were variously used to achieve victory.\textsuperscript{61}

William "Squire" McMullen's career as Democratic "boss" of the fourth ward throughout the second half of the nineteenth century provides an excellent illustration of the style and structure of boss politics that I have been discussing.\textsuperscript{62}

Born in Moyamensing in 1824, the son of an Irish Catholic grocer, McMullen held a variety of jobs before he settled into politics. He served as an apprentice printer and carpenter, worked in his father's store and finally decided to join the navy. It was on his return to Philadelphia in the mid-1840's, after his enlistment expired, that he established his reputation as a street fighter with the Moyamensing Hose Company, earning the epithet "Bull" because of his brute strength. When the Mexican War broke out, the Company enlisted, and McMullen the loyal Democrat went with them. He was ultimately placed in command of the "Moya" troops and returned to the city a genuine war hero. He was a conspicuous leader of the Moyamensing Hose company and considered a protector of the local Irish Catholic community against the attacks of nativists, Protestants and a police force drawn exclusively from the native-born population. In 1850, McMullen was elected President of the Keystone Club,
an association of Democratic party workers and established an alliance with the "Killers" streetgang. A few years later he became a saloonkeeper. He was elected Alderman in 1856, and was simultaneously made a prison inspector in the wake of the Democratic victory in the Mayorality election. He ruled paternalistically over his "subjects" and earned the title "Squire" for the way he helped his neighbours gain parole and other considerations from the legal system.^3

McMullen enjoyed a successful political career because he controlled votes in this poor section of the city "through favours, patronage and outright cash payments to voters."^4 His "political style was based on rowdyism," as Harry Silcox puts it. "His reputation as a street-fighter, a scoundrel and a lawless thug marked McMullen's youth. Later these same traits would characterise his election day behaviour."^5 Indeed, in the local election of October 1871, Octavius V. Catto, president of the fourth ward black political club, was shot dead by one of McMullen's associates. McMullen managed to survive the public outcry following this incident. He also survived the abolition of the volunteer fire department in 1871 and that of the position of Alderman in 1873, as well as the demise of the local Democratic party. He was able to do this because he had been a loyal Democrat, made deals with Republicans like James McManes and William Stokley whenever politically expedient, and increasingly relied on his saloon as a focus for his supporters. McMullen's strategy was so successful that he was able to serve an uninterrupted tenure as Select
Councilman for the fourth ward from 1874 until his death in 1901.66

Ward "bosses" like McMullen yielded little strength beyond their respective ward boundaries, but they were crucial to those who sought election to city office or one of the "Row" offices. As these positions were elected at large, those who aspired to such an office had to draw up alliances with career politicians at grass roots level. For example, in 1856 "gentleman-Democrat" Richard Vaux was elected Mayor largely through his alliance with local "bosses" and firehouse gangs, notably Irish Catholic politicians Lewis C. Cassidy and William McMullen.67 A lawyer, Quaker, and son of merchant and philanthropist Roberts Vaux, Richard connected himself with working class interests and organisations such as the Columbia Hose Company and posed as the champion of the common man. The price for the latter's support was evident after Vaux's victory when "lines of his supporters seeking jobs with the city filled the Chestnut Street sidewalks."68 McMullen for example, rejected a lieutenancy in the police force in favour of a position on the Board of Prison Inspectors, but he did secure the appointment of at least six volunteer firemen from Moyamensing Hose Company to the police force.69

The most successful aspirant for city office at this time was William B. Mann who was elected District Attorney in 1856 and served until 1874 with just one interruption, the three year term 1868 to 1871. Born in 1816, the son of a clergyman and teacher, Mann practised as a lawyer in the
Northern Liberties district. He stood as the Whig, Know
Nothing and Republican candidate in 1856 and defeated
Democrat, Lewis Cassidy. Like Vaux and Cassidy, Mann
courted the support of local "bosses" and fire companies,
and was himself a member of the Pennsylvania Hose Company.
The election result was contested in the courts by both
candidates, and it seems that Mann prevailed as victor
because the ballot frauds perpetrated in the "uptown"
district of Northern Liberties were of less magnitude than
those carried out by McMullen in the "downtown" areas of
Moyamensing and Southwark.70

As a "Row" officer, Mann enjoyed an income of between
$75,000 and $100,000 a year in fees, which he used to cement
a personal following with various local "bosses" and fire
companies throughout the city. Consequently, Mann was a
major influence within the local Republican party and
depicted as its first great leader and "Boss" by his
enemies.71 Mann's position within the Republican party was
soon contested, however, by two career politicians who,
unlike Mann, did not have to suffer the insecurities
attendant upon constant public re-election, but owed their
influence to the unusual positions they occupied in
Philadelphia city government. These were James McManes and
William S. Stokley.
3. Ring Rule

While the power of city and county office-holders, such as William Mann, rested on a shaky organisational base, and ward "bosses" like William McMullen rarely exercised influence beyond ward level, James McManes and William Stokley were able to establish city wide organisations as a consequence of their respective power bases in the Gas Trust and Public Buildings Commission, which occupied unique positions in Philadelphia city government.

JAMES McMANES AND THE "GAS RING"

An Irish immigrant of Ulster Presbyterian stock, McManes was only eight years old when his family emigrated to Philadelphia in 1830. After a brief education he went to work as a bobbin-boy in a Southwark cotton mill and later became an apprentice weaver. At twenty-six years of age McManes had saved sufficient money to set up his own modest spinning business but this was destroyed by fire, so he reverted to being a supervisory foreman for Thomas Harkness, a manufacturer of cotton goods. In 1855, he joined with Edward C. Quinn, a conveyancer, in setting up a real estate business which allowed him to pay off his old creditors, lay the foundations of his future fortune and boost his political career which had begun half-heartedly twelve years earlier.
Naturalised in 1844, McManes joined the Whigs and was a prominent campaigner for Winfield Scott, their Presidential candidate in 1852. After Scott's defeat McManes switched parties and organised a People's Republican Club in the Seventeenth Ward. He also joined forces with other individual political operators such as William H. Kern, William Kemble, Henry Bumm, Alfred C. Homer and H. C. Howell in a "log-rolling" venture, whereby they all agreed to help one another to achieve political success. As a result, McManes was elected school director in 1858, a position he held until 1866 when he joined the city Board of Education. In 1860, McManes helped nominate Andrew G. Curtin for Governor at the state Republican convention and supported Lincoln when he was a delegate to the national convention. As a reward for loyalty, Curtin appointed him Bank Inspector of Philadelphia.

In 1865, McManes was elected to the Board of Gas Trustees by Common Council and remained a member, except for one interrupted break in 1883 to 1884, until the Trust's abolition in 1887. McManes quickly emerged as the dominant figure on the Board because, by the admission of his enemies, he possessed "the personal qualities - courage, resolution, foresight, personal capacity (and) the judicious preference of the substance of power to its display," needed for political leadership. With his "centre of power" in the Gas Trust, he became all-powerful in the city's politics, because according to James Bryce, McManes, by his superior activity and intelligence, secured
the command of the whole [Republican] party machinery and reached the high position of recognised Boss of Philadelphia.\(^3\)

Why, and how, did the Gas Trust become the "centre of power" with McManes as the "Boss of Philadelphia"? In 1835, the City Council enacted an ordinance which provided for the establishment of a gas works with a capital outlay of $100,000 to be secured by an issue of stock. The city reserved the right to purchase the plant at any time by converting the stock into a twenty year loan. In addition, the administration of the plant was placed in the hands of a Board of twelve members elected by Councils, who constituted the trustees of the loans issued for the construction and enlargement of the gas works. By an ordinance of June 17, 1841, the city exercised its right to become the owner of the gas works. The ordinance also provided that the trustee system should be continued until the loans on the gas works account had been paid off. As thirty year loans under these conditions were issued until 1855 (after 1855, subsequent loans required by the Gas Trustees were made payable by the City Treasurer) the Board of Trustees had an assured lease of life until 1885.\(^4\)

It was soon apparent that the Gas Trust had been unwittingly invested with autocratic power for as Henry C. Lea pointed out:

When the Gas Trust was organised in a shape that rendered it impervious to political influences, it seems to have been the fond belief that it would always be kept in the hands of such men as Alexander Dallas Bache, Samuel V. Merrick, Frederick Brown, Joseph S. Lavering, M. W. Baldwin and others of similar high character whose names
figure in the early lists of Trustees. With the gradual deterioration of our municipal administration such names as these disappear and are replaced by working politicians whose earnest efforts to obtain admission to unsalaried position, entailing no little labour can scarcely be expected to arise from disinterested self-sacrifice. The inevitable result is that the Gas Trust becomes a vast political machine, wielding the influence derivable from hundreds of appointments and millions of expenditure. 5

As Dr. Frederick W. Spiers of the Municipal League later recalled:

The unique opportunities for spoliation offered by this irresponsible administrative board were speedily recognised and during the Civil War period, a body of political bandits succeeded in capturing the Trust. From this vantage ground, they proceeded to corrupt the whole municipal administration, and the Philadelphia Gas Ring speedily created a political machine which rivalled that of its contemporary - the Tweed Ring - in the neatness and dispatch with which it transferred the money of the people from the public treasury to the pockets of the politicians. 6

The Trust was able to achieve this because although the Select and Common Council each elected six trustees who served for a period of three years, they did not control the Board. As Henry C. Lea explained to Bryce:

It might be thought that the power of election vested in the Councils would enable the latter to control the trustees, but when "politics" invaded the trust, a vicious circle speedily established itself and the trust controlled the councils. Its enormous pay-roll enabled it to employ numerous "workers" in each of the 600 or 700 election divisions [precincts] of the city, and aspirants for seats in the councils found it almost impossible to obtain either nomination or election without the favour of the Trust. Thus the Councils became filled with its henchmen or "heelers", submissive to its bidding, not only in the selection of trustees to fill the four yearly vacancies, but in every detail of city government with which the leaders of the trust desired to interfere. It is easy to understand the enormous possibilities of power created by such a position. 7
McManes' clout depended on the resources of the Gas Trust, which were considerable. The Board spent over four million dollars a year, half of which took the form of large contracts for purchasing supplies. It also employed a workforce which fluctuated from eight hundred to two thousand men. Henry C. Lea, in his report for the Citizens Municipal Reform Association, claimed that the gas works were grossly over-manned, produced gas of an inferior quality, had excess leakage, and made too little profit for the city. One reason for the low profit was that the Trustees paid approximately $1 per ton over the current market price for coal. This "drawback" amounted to a total "wastage" of one million dollars a year, much of which the Gas Trustees probably received back, it was alleged, in the form of a rebate or "kickback".

Several attempts were made by reformers and Councils to improve the accountability of the Gas Trust but all these efforts in 1854, 1858, and 1868 failed in the Courts, which ruled that the trustees had a secure lease of life until the final loan matured in 1885. Henry C. Lea pointed out the "anomalous position" occupied by the Gas Trust as a result of these judgements:

"Its property is in reality the property of the city which holds the title to all its real estate: if ably managed, its profits would enure to the benefit of the public; if recklessly or corruptly conducted, the loss falls upon the city. The city is liable for the loans which are administered by the Trust. The Trustees are elected by Councils, and yet when once elected, they are practically independent of the power creating them, which is responsible for their acts, and for whose profit or loss they are acting......"
...The Gas Trust is thus a close corporation, permitting no intrusion or investigation, holding its sessions in secret, giving out contracts at its pleasure, without public competition, submitting its accounts to no auditor, presenting to the public such information, and no more, of its acts and doings as it pleases, spending annually more than four million of public money and practically admitting no accountability to anyone. That it should become a political engine of vast influence was inevitable and that its management should share in the general degradation of municipal politics is a necessary consequence.\footnote{11}

Thus the Gas Trust "became the centre of power" as the Public Ledger put it. Its authority became absolute. Political caucuses were held in the Board Room. Appointments to the local, state and national offices emanated from its walls and aspiring young politicians looked to its sacred precincts for inspiration.\footnote{12}

Bryce explained that such a consequence was not so remarkable for,

\begin{quote}
...it must be remembered that when a number of small factions combine to rule a party, that faction which is a little larger or better organised, or better provided with funds than the others, obtains the first place among them and may keep it so long as it gives to the rest a fair share of the booty, and directs the policy of the confederates with firmness and skill.\ldots\end{quote}

The merit of the system was that it perpetuated itself, and in fact grew stronger the longer it stood. Whenever an election was in prospect, the ward primaries of the Republican party were thronged by the officers and workpeople of the Gas Trust and other city departments who secured the choice of such delegates as the Ring had previously selected in secret conclave.\footnote{13}

McManes' influence was particularly strong in the Tax Department, for example, which he controlled between 1873 and 1882, as the office of Receiver of Taxes was occupied successively by his close associates and fellow gas trustees, Thomas J. Smith (1873-76) and Albert C. Roberts
Indeed, Independent Republican, Joseph Caven, called the Tax Office, "a graduating place for gas trustees." The position was very attractive in the 1870's because a new office, that of Collector of Delinquent Taxes, had been created to recover the ten million dollars of outstanding tax arrears that had accumulated in the city. The Collector, appointed by the Receiver, was paid a five per cent commission on the taxes he recovered. This office yielded fees of between $150,000 and $200,000 a year between 1873 and 1881, making it "one of the richest prizes of the political spoilsman." The material benefits that McManes gained from the Gas Trust and the Tax Office meant that "his power in city politics equalled and ordinarily exceeded that of any other person." According to Harold Zink, McManes "had become sufficiently powerful to deserve the appellation 'King'." Similarly, the North American in its obituary on McManes suggested he was "one of the most powerful dictators whoever ruled this city. His rule was absolute, as that of a Czar, and his word was law."

WILLIAM S. STOKLEY AND THE "BUILDINGS RING"

William S. Stokley was the other leading politician who emerged in the immediate post-war years and he was to challenge McManes for the title of "city boss" from his centre of power on the Public Buildings Commission, and as Mayor of the City from 1871-81. Stokley epitomised the
self-made man. Born in Philadelphia in 1823, the eldest child of three, he was only in his youth when his father died, leaving him with the responsibility of caring for the family. He established a successful confectionery business, and entered politics through the Franklin Hose Company. An active fireman for sixteen years, he served as the Company's treasurer and its representative on the City's Fire Association. In 1860 Stokley was elected as a Republican to the Common Council from the ninth ward, and after being successively re-elected for four terms, gained the Presidency in 1865. By 1867, Stokley had moved on to the upper chamber and in 1868 was elected President of the Select Council.18

While President of the Select Council Stokley established a modest reputation as a "law and order man" and "reformer". This was based on two controversial ordinances he introduced, one calling for the abolition of the volunteer fire companies in favour of a professional fire department; and the other advocating the transfer of the gas works from the Gas Trust to a Department of Gas. Both ordinances successfully passed Councils, though the gas works remained under the Trust after McManes' appeal to the state Supreme Court was upheld. The 1867 measure advocating the establishment of a paid fire department by 1871 seems to have been successful for a number of reasons. Firstly, public opinion had become increasingly hostile towards the volunteer system, as fire companies had a long record of street-fighting, arson, shooting and murder. Secondly, new
technology in the form of the steam-powered fire engine drove a wedge into the volunteers' ranks. The new engines were not only very costly but also heavy, requiring horses rather than men to pull them. Consequently the city argued that it was now opportune to rationalise operations. Finally, professional politicians who, like Stokley himself, were often former firemen believed there was a need for change. They recognised that the volunteer fire companies were too unruly and unpredictable and too much inclined to adopt independent lines of action to fit comfortably into Republican party organisation's efforts to unify political control of the city. Stokley's reform of the fire service and his efforts to transfer the gas works to the city won general support throughout the city and formed the basis of his successful bid for the Mayoralty in 1871.19

As President of Select Council Stokley was also involved in the dispute over the erection of new public buildings. The controversy over their location and over who was to build them and control the expenditures was to leave Stokley in an unprecedented position of power in Philadelphia. What was not disputed was that Philadelphia desperately needed public buildings to house its growing government and court systems. As early as 1838, rapid population growth, commercial developments and the expansion of government services and bureaucracy, had led civic leaders to advocate the need of concentrating these services in a single forum. The failure to agree on how this should be done meant that the problem had considerably intensified when Councils again revived the
issue after the Civil War. In February 1867 an ordinance was drafted making building commissioners of the Councils' Committee on City Property and suggesting that the new buildings be erected on Penn Square in the ninth ward. A Special Joint Committee of Councils set up to consider the issue reported back with two amendments designed to satisfy the city's commercial interests. It suggested that a number of prominent businessmen replace the Committee on City Property as Building Commissioners and proposed that the site be changed to Independence Square in the fifth ward commercial area. Stokley, as Select Councilman for the ninth ward, opposed the change of site and along with A. Wilson Henszey (tenth ward), his ally in the Common Council, successfully led the effort to reject the ordinance and postpone the issue indefinitely. 20

In 1868, William Bumm, an associate of McManes and chairman of the City Property Committee, introduced a new bill for public buildings keeping the Independence Square site but replacing the businessmen commissioners with men who were more politically oriented, such as the chief engineer, and surveyor, the highways commissioner and the Committee on City Property all of whom were appointed by Councils, plus some other Councilmen and contractors who could sell their services to the city. The bill passed both Councils and was approved by the Mayor in January 1869. The Commission brought together jobbers and contractors belonging to the Mann wing of the Republican party. As a sop to Stokley who joined the Commission by right of his position as President
of Select Council, the Commissioners elected him President of the body.\textsuperscript{21} Unable to gain support for the Penn Square site, Stokley turned to newly elected State Senator Wilson Henszey for help. He supported Henszey's successful efforts in guiding bills through the state legislature that made Independence Square "a public green forever," submitted the issue of the site for the buildings to a popular vote and established a new commission. The new Buildings Commission set up on August 5, 1870 did not include any members of the original commission established the previous year. Instead it was composed of the Mayor, Presidents of Councils, and Councilmen John Rice, Henry Phillips and Stokley, as well as Theodore Cuyler and John P. Wetherill, who were two former Councilmen with close ties to the business community. This development represented a considerable coup on the part of Stokley and Henszey for they had entirely changed the complexion of the Commission.\textsuperscript{22} However the new Commission "aroused general indignation" because of its unlimited power. Councils were denied supervisory powers and were directed to accept any contracts the Commission entered into and to raise money through an annual tax on property.\textsuperscript{23} As lawyer and reformer Horace Binney put it, the state legislature have appointed for us a Building Commission, empowered to tax us without limit, and to spend our money without supervision, to hold office without restriction of time and to fill all vacancies in their own body......inflicting on us all the evils of taxation without representation.\textsuperscript{24} Although the Commission "was so subversive of the principles
of self-government" reform efforts to abolish it failed, and it remained intact until 1901, when the task of building a new city hall was complete.25

The referendum on the site of the city hall gave a narrow majority in favour of Penn Square over Washington Square, even though many business leaders argued that the former was too isolated from the city's commercial district.26 The Commission then entered a new controversy by proposing to build a single mammoth city hall at the intersection of the city's major thoroughfares, Broad and Market streets, instead of having separate offices on each of the four blocks constituting Penn Square. The intersection scheme was vehemently opposed by the city's business community and Stokley voted against the proposal when it was raised in June 1871. Stokley also suggested that all the contracts awarded by the Commission should be subject to the approval of the City Council. These actions enabled Stokley to deflect public criticism against himself in the crucial period prior to his nomination and election as Mayor in November, 1871.

According to Howard Gillette however, Stokley's behaviour subsequent to his proposal advocating Council supervision "reveals calculated deceit," because far from seeking to dilute the Commission's powers, he worked hard to fill it with allies.27 For example, when Henry Phillips, Theodore Cuyler, John P. Wetherill and John Rice resigned from the Commission over a six month period between October 1871 and

77
April 1872, Stokley secured the election of associates such as Mahlon Dickenson, former Receiver of Taxes Richard Peltz, and the latter's brother-in-law, marble-cutter John Hill, all of whom had known him since his days as a fireman. Moreover, except for Hill who served until 1894, they all remained Commissioners for thirty years, until the body was abolished in 1901. In the process, they spent $24 million, well over double the original $10 million estimate for the construction of city hall. Over 20 percent of this amount was attributable to a single contract, the largest ever awarded in the city's history. In October 1872, the Commission, without advertising for bids, gave a $5,300,000 contract to William Struthers & Son, to provide marble as the foundation material for the new building. Critics were quick to point out that Struthers would provide marble from the Lee Quarry in Massachusetts, which was owned by ex-Commissioner John Rice, and was where John Hill had served his apprenticeship. Soon afterwards both Stokley and Hill moved into $20,000 brownstone houses on Filbert Street, provided, it was alleged by the press, by city building contractors.

Stokley's position on the Buildings Commission paved the way for further political alliances. District Attorney William Mann, for example, was made one of the sureties for the Struther's contract. In addition, as the intersection scheme disrupted street railway traffic, Stokley used his influence to help the Union Railway Company break the West Philadelphia Railway's Company exclusive privilege of laying
tracks on Market Street. Stokley bestowed a number of favours on Union Directors and major stockholders. For example, in 1873 Stokley's friends in Councils secured authorisation to deposit city money in Union Directors' William Kemble and James McManes' People's Bank. The Commission also named city treasurer, and Union stockholder, Peter Widener as its own treasurer. Another Union stockholder, Sheriff William Leeds, secured from the Commission brick contracts worth over $50,000 in 1873 alone. Another contract, worth over $200,000 over five years from 1874 to 1879, was awarded to the Excelsior Brick Company which listed among its directors Widener's business colleague, William Elkins.31

The links between these individuals were cemented still further through the practice of what George Washington Plunkitt has termed "honest graft".32 Under Mayor Stokley and Highways Commissioner John Hill, highway expenditures mushroomed into a one million dollar a year business. The bulk of this money was appropriated for city improvements in Philadelphia's growing suburban districts (see Table 3.1).33 Hill, along with close associates such as Leeds, Henszey, Dickenson, Widener, Elkins, as well as Councilman George Dorlon, Prothonotary John Loughridge, Registrar of Water James Wark, and contractor Charles Porter, bought land in west and north central Philadelphia, and then made sure the city provided the improvements necessary to enhance the value of the property.34 The "highway ring's" success was guaranteed because Stokley had secured Henszey's election as
Table 3.1. The Distribution of Population in Philadelphia, 1850, 1880

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Old City</th>
<th>Adjacent to Old City</th>
<th>Outlying Districts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>121,376</td>
<td>218,669</td>
<td>68,717</td>
<td>408,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.7)%</td>
<td>(53.5)</td>
<td>(16.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>112,846</td>
<td>361,024</td>
<td>373,300</td>
<td>847,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-7%)</td>
<td>(+65.1%)</td>
<td>(+443%)</td>
<td>(+207.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.3)</td>
<td>(42.6)</td>
<td>(44.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a Figures in parentheses represent the proportion of the total population in Philadelphia county.

b Spring Garden, Northern Liberties, Kensington, Moyamensing and Southwark districts.

President of Common Council (1873-76) who in turn had appointed William Ellwood Rowan (27th ward) as Chairman of the Committee on Highways and John Bardsley (28th ward) as head of the Finance Committee. Both Councilmen were keen to provide municipal services for their own districts and approved every highway appropriation requested.35

The Philadelphia Times in March 1875, suggested that the control of city services allowed Stokley, Hill and Leeds to rule the city:

The secret of the great influence exercised by the
Table 3.2. The Society of Mysterious Pilgrims, 1872-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Public Office</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John E. Addicks</td>
<td>Health Officer</td>
<td>Stokley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James B. Alexander</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph R. Ash</td>
<td>State Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Baldwin</td>
<td>Councilman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas J. Barger</td>
<td>Buildings Commissioner</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Beitler I</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry H. Bingham</td>
<td>Clerk of Quarter Sessions</td>
<td>Cameron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph A. Bonham</td>
<td>Solicitor, Register of Wills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Brearly</td>
<td>Chief Clerk, Register of Wills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William M. Bunn</td>
<td>Guardian of the Poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William C. Calhoun</td>
<td>Sealer of Weights &amp; Measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis C. Cassidy</td>
<td>Buildings Commissioner</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gideon Clark I</td>
<td>Register of Wills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Cochrane</td>
<td>Councilman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles C. Cochrane</td>
<td>Cashier, City Treasurer</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.H.T. Collis</td>
<td>City Solicitor</td>
<td>Stokley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Coward</td>
<td>Highways contractor</td>
<td>Stokley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. W. Davis</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob B. De Haven I</td>
<td>Tax Collector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William A. Delaney I</td>
<td>Book-keeper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Disston I</td>
<td>Fire Commissioner</td>
<td>Indep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Dorlan</td>
<td>Councilman</td>
<td>Stokley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph H. Edwards I</td>
<td>deputy Sheriff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William L. Elkins</td>
<td>Councilman</td>
<td>Cameron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Elliott O</td>
<td>Sheriff</td>
<td>Cameron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. F. English</td>
<td>Flour Inspector</td>
<td>McManes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George D. Glenn</td>
<td>Caterer, Quarter Sessions McManes</td>
<td>McManes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. W. C. Greene</td>
<td>Pension Agent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Wilson Henszey</td>
<td>President, Common Council Stokley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John L. Hill</td>
<td>Highways Commissioner Stokely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall C. Hong</td>
<td>deputy Sheriff Stokley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Hunter</td>
<td>State Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiram Hunter</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel P. Jones</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Josephs</td>
<td>State Senator Democrat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James N. Kerns</td>
<td>U.S. Marshall Cameron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William King</td>
<td>Chief Clerk, City Controller</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lamon</td>
<td>State Senator McManes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David H. Lane</td>
<td>deputy Recorder of Deeds Cameron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Lane</td>
<td>Clerk, City Treasurer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William R. Leeds</td>
<td>ex-Sheriff Stokley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Loughlin</td>
<td>Councilman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Loughridge</td>
<td>ex-Prothonotary Stokley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mackey</td>
<td>State Treasurer Cameron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Mann</td>
<td>Prothonotary Cameron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John McCall</td>
<td>Councilman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John McCullough</td>
<td>Councilman</td>
<td>McManes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander McCuen</td>
<td>Fire Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George H. Moore</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Morris</td>
<td>Mercantile Appraiser</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Peltz</td>
<td>Buildings Commissioner Stokley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles A. Porter</td>
<td>Highways contractor Stokley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William A. Porter</td>
<td>Fire Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

82
Erastus Poulson Solicitor, Receiver of Taxes
William E. Rowan Councilman McManes
Harry C. Selby Registrar of Water Stokley
William Siner Councilman
William L. Smith City Commissioner
William S. Stokley\* Mayor Stokley
William H. Taggart\* Coal Inspector
William A. Thorpe\* Police Magistrate
Joseph Tittermary\* Mercantile Appraiser
R. C. Tittermary\* Mercantile Appraiser
Isaac W. Van Houten\* Superintendent
Frederick J. Walter\* Clerk
John Welsh\* Port Warden Democrat
Peter A. B. Widener\* City Treasurer Cameron


Cameron: indicates those members whose chief loyalty was to the state Republican party leader, Simon Cameron.

I original incorporator
O Officer

triumvirate is that they usually work together and being the dispenser of almost unlimited patronage, and to the extent of millions of dollars annually, they wield immense power in local politics and whenever they undertake a thing, they are bound to put it through.\[36\]

Stokley's new politics found social expression in the Society of Mysterious Pilgrims established in 1872. In

83
addition, to prominent Republicans such as the Mayor and his chief supporters Hill, Leeds and Peltz, it included Democrats like Public Buildings Commissioners Lewis Cassidy and Thomas Barger, as well as the city's most active ward politicians who made their living through a variety of elective and appointive offices (see Table 3.2). In 1875, a watchdog sub-committee of the Union League publicly condemned the Pilgrims as

> that dictatorial band of men, nominally of both parties, but without true allegiance to either, which now rules and oppresses our city and is disgracing and destroying the Republican organisation.

At the head of this "dictatorial band" who now ruled the city were Stokley, Hill and Leeds who were likened by journalists to Rome's first triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus.

THE LIMITS OF BOSS POWER

Both contemporary observers and later historians have depicted McManes and Stokley as "bosses" who wielded enormous power and influence city wide. McManes has been described variously as "James I", "King James", and "Boss of Philadelphia". With Stokley "as a powerful auxiliary" he became "one of the most powerful dictators who ever ruled this city." To what extent are these characterisations accurate? How far do McManes and Stokley qualify as genuine "city bosses"? That is, to what extent did they control their followers in party office; the distribution of
patronage; the membership and decisions of the party organisation's local units; the party's nominations for public office; the behaviour of elected officials nominally affiliated to them; city government? In short, did they head a well-disciplined and centralised party organisation that was capable not only of distributing patronage but also of routinely centralising power in the city?

The observations of contemporaries and later historians would seem to suggest they did. As we we saw earlier, Henry C. Lea explained to James Bryce that although the Councils elected Gas Trustees, it was the Gas Trust that controlled the Councils. This was because the Trust had secured control of Republican party nominations due to the judicious distribution of patronage at its disposal, which allowed it to employ numerous party "workers" in the city's 700 divisions. Bryce reiterates that "nearly all the municipal offices were held by their nominees. They commanded a majority in the Select and Common Councils." Lea's biographer, Edward S. Bradley, confirms that McManes "secured command of the whole party machinery."

Other contemporaries agreed with Lea's assessment. Quaker reformer and manufacturer, Philip C. Garrett, for example, noted how "Seventh Street", where the office of the Gas Trust was situated, had become a "synonym" for "the Ring" in Republican party circles. More dramatically George Vickers claimed that,

James McManes held sway as an imperious and exacting taskmaster. Artful in politics as a Machiavelli, his name was synonymous with all that
an autocratic and unscrupulous control of political machinery and methods could imply........Entrenched in a political position which he had converted into a veritable fortress for purposes, offensive and defensive, he had gathered about him as his aides and lieutenants, men who were apt and skilful in executing his orders and prompt in sharing his spoils..............

To enter public service whether as a Councilman, a member of the legislature or as an officer of a public department, was to first give satisfactory proof of allegiance to these men to their claims and methods, with no reference whatever to personal scruples or to convictions of personal duty. The ease with which these combined spoilsmen made and unmade public offices.... was performed with the facility of a simple wave of the hand. Under their rule although elections still went on with their accustomed regularity.......every material outcome of such elections was in the interest of the self-constituted dictators and against the interests of the people. To the cause of the former, Stokley with his twelve hundred police officers was a powerful auxiliary.45

The Public Ledger and North American repeated these claims in their obituaries of McManes, as did historian Harold Zink, writing in the 1930's, who suggested that,

Republican nomination conventions followed the "King's" orders because he controlled the organisation or machine which sent the delegates to the conventions.

McManes was able to control Councils in turn, because "in Republican Philadelphia, nominations as a rule carried with it election to office."46 More recently, Howard Gillette has argued that Stokley built a new political machine by turning the "machinery of government into a vast patronage system" and that Philadelphia's city hall now stands as a "monument" to it.47

It is my contention that contemporary observers and later historians have exaggerated the power and influence exercised by McManes and Stokley, and that neither qualifies
as a genuine city boss. In the first place, there is the nature of their relationship to consider. Stokley was not always McManes' "powerful auxiliary," as Vickers claimed him to be, for he contended for power in his own right and not as an adjunct to McManes. Their relationship oscillated between mutual co-operation and outright hostility. Put briefly, McManes resented Stokley's periodic interference in the running of the Gas works. In 1868, it was Stokley who introduced the ordinance which attempted to abolish the Trust, and transfer the works to a Department of Gas. Again in 1875, Stokley attempted to bring the gas works with all its patronage under his control as Mayor. This effort also failed. Nevertheless Stokley's hostility to the Gas Trust did not prevent McManes from endorsing him for the Mayoralty in 1874, and again in 1877. This was because Stokley had secured a number of favours for the Union Railway Company, of which McManes was a major stockholder, and in 1877 had agreed to support Albert C. Roberts, McManes' candidate for Receiver of Taxes (thereby guaranteeing McManes control of the Collectorship of Delinquent Taxes).

Thereafter, however, a serious rift developed between the two, as they bitterly fought to gain the upper hand within the Republican party. In May 1878, at the state gubernatorial convention, the division of the city's delegates into factions was apparent when McManes' supporters donned "Black Hats" and Stokley's "White Hats". Relations worsened in 1880 after Rufus Shapley, one of Stokley's closest allies and friends, published an
anonymous political satire entitled *Solid for Mulhooly* which gave a very unflattering account of McManes' career. It traced Michael Mulhooly's (McManes) rise to fame from his ancestral roots or "Paddy-Gree", "among the bogs of County Tyrone" to "Boss of the Ring", by way of the saloon "in which his first lessons of life were learned," to his "apprenticeship as a repeater at the polls" following his fraudulent naturalisation, and then as a corrupt and perjured member of the municipal Legislature, always to be hired or bought by the highest bidder, and always an uneducated, vulgar, flashily-dressed, obscene creature of the Ring which made him what he is, and of which he is a worthy representative.\(^5\)

Mulhooly is portrayed as a bull-necked, beefy thug chomping on a cigar, decked out in a gaudy vest and patterned pantaloons, complete with derby hat and cane; the familiar image which the public have associated with the boss for generations (see Figure 3.1). Though published anonymously, the authorship of the satire was speedily traced to Shapley and in the subsequent Mayoral election in February 1881, Stokley lost his bid for a fourth term of office partially as a result of McManes' supporters cutting the Republican ticket in a number of key wards.\(^5\)

Secondly, neither Stokley or McManes satisfactorily controlled the city Council. The Presidency of Councils was a very important position because the occupant appointed Councilmen to the Council Committees that considered and discussed prospective legislation and appropriations and made recommendations to the legislature. As the President
Figure 3.1. Michael Mulhooly (James McManes): His Ancestry, Education and Portrait. [Source: Solid for Mulhooly. A Political Satire by Rufus E. Shapley (Philadelphia, 1881). pp.1, 16, 20. Illustrations are by Thomas Nast]
was elected each year at the start of the Council session, the office provides us with a gauge of the factional superiority of the various groups contending for power. An examination of the affiliations of the various Presidents between the Civil War and 1884, suggests that McManes and Stokley exercised at best only intermittent control over Councils (see Table 3.3). Stokley was at the height of his power between 1873 and 1876 when his close associate, A. Wilson Henszey, was President of Common Council. In January 1876, Henszey was defeated by Independent Republican Joseph L. Caven, from the fifteenth ward (a district renowned for its "independence" in politics) and he held the office for five years before retiring to private life. McManes' strength rested largely in the Select Council but his control was so insecure that he himself was defeated as a candidate for re-election to the Gas Trust in 1882.

The reason why they failed to control the city council lies in the fact that they did not control the Republican party either. Let us take, for example, the Republican party's nominations for public office. The Republican party rules provided for a party organisation and a nominating system. The organisation of the Republican party paralleled the city's governmental structure. It included bodies representing the electoral division (precinct), the ward, and the city at large. Division associations organised annually, and were designed to be popular assemblies of the resident Republican voters. At the regular annual primary, Republican citizens met at their respective Club Rooms to
Table 3.3. Presidents of Councils and their Political Affiliation, 1865-1884

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Years of Office</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Council</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William S. Stokley</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1865-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph F. Marcer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1867-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Wagner</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1869-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Huhn</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1871-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Wagner</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1872-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Wilson Henszey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1873-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph L. Caven</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1876-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Lex</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1881-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Select Council</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William S. Stokley</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1868-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. W. Cattell</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1870-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. E. Littleton</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1872-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. W. Downing</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1874-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. W. Burnell</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1875-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George A. Smith</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1876-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George W. Bumm</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1878-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William B. Smith</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1882-84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


IR Independent Republican
elect three (and from 1877, two) members from each division to the ward executive committee. In turn each of the ward committees elected a member to the City Executive Committee. 55

With reference to the nominating system, the candidates for all offices were nominated by either a ward or city convention. Initially, all public offices at large were nominated at one city convention but the opportunities this had created for log-rolling led to a "growing indignation (among) the people," and by 1868 separate conventions for each public office had been instituted, "in order to render less easy the purchase or dictation of nominations by the managers of rings," as local reformers put it. 56 Each division elected one delegate to each City Convention, and two representatives to the Ward Convention. The only alteration in these arrangements, prior to the introduction of the direct primary in 1906, occurred between 1877 and 1881, when the number of delegates each ward was entitled to send to a City Convention was made dependent on the number of Republican votes that were polled in the particular ward in the preceding general election. That is, each ward was entitled to one representative for every 500 Republican votes, or majority thereof, although every ward was to be represented by at least three delegates. 57 This meant that the average size of City Conventions, prior to 1887, was 688 delegates, though only 160 between 1877 and 1881.

With such large numbers of delegates at City conventions
held at the same time on the same day, it would have been extremely difficult to exercise central control even under circumstances of party harmony. As it was however, the Republican party was rent by factionalism, particularly during the period 1877 to 1881. As well as the triumvirate of Stokley, Hill and Leeds, and the supporters of McManes, such as Councilman William E. Rowan and City committeeman Christian Kneass, it is possible to distinguish a third faction that contended for power within the Republican party. This was led by Hamilton Disston and included State Treasurer, Robert Mackey, and nineteenth ward leader, David Martin. Disston was a man of considerable independent wealth. In 1878, at the age of thirty-four, he inherited his father's saw manufacturing works which employed over 2,000 men and was reputed to be the largest of its kind in the country. Disston, like Mackey and Martin, was as interested in the state political arena as well as the local one.58

Consequently, there was no single "boss" dictating party nominations, rather the various factions fought it out (sometimes, literally) in the convention hall. As a successful nomination depended on factions securing the largest number of delegates, conventions occasionally became rowdy and violent as disputes arose, particularly over the admission of delegates when seats were contested by rival factions.59 Sometimes the factions were able to compromise on a slate, but when such negotiations failed, and if the differences were strong enough, the struggles between them
spilled over into the electoral arena. For example, in November 1876, William E. Rowan, McManes' candidate for Sheriff, was defeated by almost 7,000 votes, while other city wide Republican candidates gained a majority of between 14,000 and 15,000 votes. Rowan's defeat was attributed to Disston and Stokley supporters refusing to vote for him. A similar explanation was offered a year later when the Democrat, Robert E. Pattison, defeated James Sayre, another McManes' candidate, to become City Controller. Finally, as noted earlier, Stokley himself was defeated for the Mayoralty in 1881, when McManes' supporters cut the Republican ticket.

Furthermore, these three broad factions did not exercise a monopoly on the candidate selection process for it was still possible, given the number and size of city conventions, for an individual politician to secure a nomination by making an independent and direct appeal to party workers. Success in such a venture usually depended on how well their campaign was organised, the personal popularity of the individual concerned, and their record of party service. Frank W. Leach, a Republican party worker in the eighth ward in the 1870's, recalled in 1905 that:

The methods resorted to thirty years ago to secure a nomination for an important city or county office were so unlike those employed nowadays that the lack of resemblance almost suggests another nationality and a different form of city government. Then the ward and precinct workers who possessed minds, souls, individualities much as they were of their own were duly sought after and consulted. Candidates went from ward to ward and almost from house to house.

By 1905, division representation had become an "abstract
principle" according to Leach, but a quarter of a century earlier it "meant division representation pure and simple."64

In these circumstances, John O'Donnell was able to secure the nomination for Recorder of Deeds in 1881, and George de B. Keim that of Sheriff in 1882, entirely independent of the various party factions. Moreover William B. Smith secured the Mayoralty nomination in January 1884, despite a position of open defiance towards McManes.65 Thus it would seem that contrary to the claims of reformers, and later historians, Republican nominating conventions did not follow McManes, or anybody else's, orders. As Leach put it rather wistfully:

In these days [1905] of enormous majorities, when Philadelphia's wonderful "Organisation" glides upon the even tenor of its way, seemingly unmoved and undisturbed by criticism or opposition, it is difficult to comprehend the conditions as they existed a quarter of a century ago.

Whereas placidity prevails today in the inner councils of the party managers, then all was turbulence and strife. First the factions fought among themselves. Then the people combined to overthrow the factions. Encounter succeeded encounter, as the night the day; charge followed charge along the entire line of battle. The militant host slept upon their guns, or slept not at all.

Surely these were strident, stringent, strenuous days!66

It is not surprising then that since these factions struggled to gain control over party nominations for city offices, they exercised even less influence over ward public offices. The party appeared to be somewhat centralised since it was governed by a City Committee, but this
appearance was illusory. That is, the party organisation did not function as its centralised and hierarchical structure suggested. So, even if McManes was the sole boss, and party factionalism was absent, he would still have had no formal control over the membership and decisions of the party's local units. This was because the wards were the prime units of the organisational structure. For example, representatives on the party's City Committee were selected at the ward level and could only be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of the ward committee. Moreover, as we have seen, each ward elected candidates to Councils, and as that body became increasingly involved in the decisions that allocated the city's tangible resources, the ward caucuses acquired even greater political importance. In practice, what evolved was a bottom-heavy structure in which candidate selection and voter mobilisation depended on action at the ward level. The City Committee did not function as a centralised and powerful institution that was capable of extinguishing dissent and controlling the candidate selection process. It had no institutionalised means to control the selection process for the increasingly important seats on the Councils. The City Committee could not slate or deslate nominees for public office made by Republican ward conventions. In sum, it had no monopoly over the recruitment of candidates to public office.

Consequently, neither McManes or Stokley was able to ensure the renomination of followers nominally affiliated to them, nor the failure of renomination of those who opposed them.
For example, when Stokley's ally, Wilson Henszey, was defeated for the Presidency of Common Council by Joseph Caven in January 1876, the terms of seventeen of the twenty-eight Councilmen who voted for the former were about to expire. Only six of these sixteen faithful Stokley supporters who sought renomination were successful, and just four were re-elected in February 1876. By contrast, ten out of eleven of the thirty-two Councilmen who voted for the Independent Republican were successfully renominated and elected, including Caven himself despite "organised hostility on the part of a considerable number of office-holders" in the fifteenth ward. Stokley and McManes also failed to prevent Caven's re-election in 1879, and were similarly unsuccessful in their efforts to dislodge the Committee Chairmen, appointed by Caven, either at the ward nominating conventions or subsequent elections.

Furthermore, they could not prevent Republican politicians not endorsed by the party organisation from being elected. For example, John Hunter, Caven's Finance Committee Chairman, was successfully elected as an Independent Republican from the 24th ward in 1877, and re-elected in 1880, even though he was denied the Republican party's nomination on both occasions. Even more damaging for McManes, his closest associates were vulnerable to electoral defeat. For example, in February 1881 Nathan Spering was defeated for re-election to the Select Council when dissident Republican "regulars", organised by Samuel Houseman and Israel W. Durham, split the party vote in the
seventh ward when they opted to support the Democratic candidate George R. Snowden. Again, in February 1882, in the elections to the Select Council in the eighth, thirteenth, twenty-eighth and thirty-first wards, four Independent Republicans (A. Haller Gross, J.P. Woolverton, William B. Smith, and James Whitaker) defeated four McManes stalwarts (Don Blair, James Miles, James Dobson, and Frances Martin) even though they failed to secure the Republican party nomination in their respective wards.

The methods of distribution of patronage and the nature of party organisation, enhanced the "independence" of wards and weakened prospective centralised control still further. As noted earlier, the mayor had been gradually shorn of his powers as Executive and the responsibility for city services had become fragmented among over thirty separate boards and departments. As the bulk of these departments reported to Councils and not the Mayor, the patronage associated with the new city services fell to the Councillors (see Table 3.4). Since each ward nominated and elected its own representative the ward leaders had direct control over the increasing number of municipal jobs. Excluding the gas works and the police department, as well as the "Row" offices, there were more than 4,000 municipal jobs available in 1879, worth a total value of over two and a half million dollars. An examination of the patronage appointment books for the Water Department reveals that the party successful in Councils in electing its nominee as head of department, secured the spoils. In this case the
Table 3.4. The Jurisdiction of Political Appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Councils</th>
<th>City Officers</th>
<th>County (&quot;Row&quot;) Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Chief of Police</td>
<td>Clerks &amp; Messengers of Councils</td>
<td>City Controller</td>
<td>City Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Boiler Inspector</td>
<td>Highways Commissioner</td>
<td>City Coroner</td>
<td>District Attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioner of Markets &amp; City Property</td>
<td>*City Solicitor</td>
<td>Recorder of Deeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Engineer Water Dept</td>
<td>*Receiver of Taxes</td>
<td>Register of Wills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions held by virtue of Mayoral Office:</td>
<td>Chief Surveyor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sheriff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinking Fund Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Board of City Trusts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, House of Refuge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustee, Penn Museum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ appointments subject to confirmation by Select Council
* The Pennsylvania Railroad and Philadelphia and Erie Railroad Companies.
Republicans successfully elected William H. McFadden as Chief Engineer of the Water Department (1873-1882) and patronage appointments were distributed among Republican Councilmen regardless of their affiliation with which faction. The City Committee did not control the distribution of patronage and nor did any single individual. McManes' chief source of power lay in the Gas Trust, while Stokley's, as Mayor, lay in the 1200 privates and 98 officers of the police department.

Contrary to Gillette's claims, Stokley did not build a new political machine by turning the "machinery of government into a vast patronage system." Indeed, the Republican party organisation at this time seems to have resembled a feudal hierarchy since local officials, in return for their partisan support, exercised control over a significant proportion of the material rewards available to the party. This control not only enhanced their influence within their petty domains, but also increased their bargaining power against those wishing to centralise power within the party organisation.

Furthermore, although the abolition of the volunteer fire department in 1871 paved the way for a more disciplined party organisation, the Republican party apparatus still remained weak in the 1870's. For example, over two-thirds of the divisions (23 out of 33) in the nineteenth ward had no year-round organisation as late as October 1877, even though this had been made mandatory rather than permissible in the party rules since 1871.
Thus, the absence of an effective party apparatus and the lack of control over the distribution of rewards combined with a set of party practices (ward level nominations and elections), effectively precluded the City Committee or any individual "boss" from exerting firm discipline over party workers. Consequently, party leaders such as McManes and Stokley also had difficulty in controlling the behaviour of their nominal followers in public office. For example, when Stokley received the news that Caven had been elected President of Common Council against both his and McManes' wishes, the *Sunday Times* reported "his fat cheeks became flushed with excitement and rage." At once, he announced his intention to suspend and revoke the police appointments previously made for the nineteen Republicans who voted for Caven. This incident underlines the weakness of Stokley's position, namely that patronage by itself, without a strong party organisation, was not a sufficient guarantee that subordinates would always follow orders.

In sum then, it seems reasonable to conclude that neither Stokley or McManes were genuine city bosses. That they have been portrayed as such is due in large measure to the contemporary assessment of their powers by observers such as Lea, Bryce and Vickers. Lea and Bryce accurately describe the Republican party structure and organisation, but not how it functioned. In their defence it can be argued that they are not the only ones that have overlooked this crucial distinction. Historians and social scientists, such as
Robert Merton for instance, have also subsequently mistaken the hierarchical structure of party organisations for their actual functioning. However Lea and Bryce also assumed that all office-holders were beholden to McManes, and they failed to distinguish the various factions and contenders for power within the party. Consequently, one is left with the colourful picture, drawn by Vickers, which depicts a Republican political machine as a monolithic mob with McManes as the supreme nabob, dictating every act and every crime (see Figure 3.2). Historians like Zink perpetuated the traditional myth of the dictatorial sway of the boss, because their research was based on the reform-inspired apocrypha of the times.\(^79\)

This is plainly no longer adequate. It is perhaps more accurate to describe McManes and Stokley as leaders of "Rings"; that is, an intra-governmental operation that tied a loose coalition of politicians together in the quest for specific material benefits. Unlike ward "bosses", they were able to exercise power and influence city-wide because of the public, rather than party offices, they personally occupied. Ironically their respective power bases, although unusual features of Philadelphia city government in the second half of the nineteenth century, actually resembled the close corporation of the eighteenth century colonial town. The Public Buildings Commission and the Gas Trust were secret bodies, not accountable to city Councils; the former created by the state legislature, the latter unwittingly invested with autocratic power. Gillette's
"THE GREAT SUPREME."—p. 70.

Figure 3.2. Michael Mulhooly (James McManes): The Supreme Nabob. [Sources: Solid for Mulhooly. A Political Satire by Rufus E. Shapley (Philadelphia, 1881), pp. 70, 185. Illustrations are by Thomas Nast. See also George Vickers. The Fall of Bossism: A History of the Committee of One Hundred and the Reform Movement in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1883), pp. iii, vi-vii, 3-5, 20, 219.]
claim that city hall now stands as a "monument to a new political machine" is misleading, because it was the Republican political machine that emerged in the late nineteenth century, that actually canvassed for the abolition of the Buildings Commission. Indeed when the Commission was finally abolished in 1901, U.S. Senator Boies Penrose, Quay's's heir as state Republican party leader, telegraphed his congratulations from Washington to his faithful lieutenant in Harrisburg, State Senator James P. McNichol, who along with Israel Durham controlled the new Republican machine in Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{80}

A final limitation on "boss" power at this time (and indeed right up until 1951 when Philadelphia finally achieved home rule) was the fact that the city was not a self contained arena of political activity. The city government was a creature of the state legislature and the boundaries of the urban polity were highly permeable. The dependence and permeability of the urban polity meant that things happened not only in Philadelphia but also to Philadelphia. For example, in the absence of a general incorporation law before 1874, the state legislature exercised its constitutional right to enact special and local legislation. Street railway companies, for instance, were granted access to the streets of Philadelphia on such terms as the legislature saw fit. In 1868, the legislative jurisdiction of the city was by-passed completely, when the state legislature passed the so-called "Railway Boss Act" which prohibited the city from regulating street railroads without
specific authorisation from the Assembly.\textsuperscript{81} The creation of the Public Buildings Commission in 1870 was, as we have seen, another example of the legislature undermining the principle of self-government.\textsuperscript{82}

Indeed, Henry C. Lea blamed the lack of self-government as the main reason for the failure of Philadelphia's municipal administration, as he explained to fellow-reformer John P. Wetherill in October 1872:

\begin{quote}
The source of much of the evil which we suffer is to be found in the exaggerated powers exercised by our legislature. We boast that we are a free people and yet there is not a municipality in the state that is not subject to a despotism as arbitrary and as irresponsible as that which vexes the inhabitants of Moscow or Constantinople........ the theory of absolute and indefeasible sovereignty residing in the State, supreme in all things not specially reserved to the Federal authority, places every fragment of the people under a domination as autocratic and irresponsible as that of an Eastern despot.

...........Every detail of municipal government.... is regulated for us by those who cannot possibly know anything about it and in exchange for this we acquire the wretched privilege of similarly interfering with the self-government of our fellow citizens. The absurdity of such a system is so self-evident that the mere statement of it would seem to be sufficient to insure its removal.... our very municipality is merely the creature of the legislature which may abolish it altogether at any moment or interfere in the minutest detail of its organisation.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

Patronage provided another way in which Philadelphia's political system was penetrated by external authorities. The state appointed port wardens, physicians, prison and bank inspectors, public notaries and the City Recorder, as well as county inspectors to regulate trade, weighers of merchandise, measurers of grain and so forth. In total the
governor controlled over 660 appointments in Philadelphia in 1876. The national government had even larger patronage resources at its disposal. In addition to the Customs House, the Federal Mint, the Schuylkill and Frankford Arsenals, and the Southwark Navy Yard, there were the jobs controlled by the U.S. Marshall in the city, the subtreasurer and postmaster, all of whom were federal appointees.

The limited capacity of city government and the potential interventions of state and national government meant that local politicians were forced to go outside the city itself to achieve their aims. Working for local goals at the state or national level required them to seek allies outside the city. Conversely, the size and importance of Philadelphia led those political actors in the state arena to ally with politicians from the city. Although Philadelphia was the smallest of the sixty-three counties in Pennsylvania in terms of size, its population of 674,022 in 1870 was well over double that of its nearest rival, Allegheny County, which numbered only 262,204 inhabitants. As the state's second largest city, Pittsburgh's population was only 53,000 in 1870. Philadelphia's political importance can be adjudged from the fact that in 1870 it accounted for approximately one-quarter of the state's electorate, and provided six of Pennsylvania's twenty-seven Congressmen, four of its thirty-one state senators and eighteen of its one hundred state representatives. It also provided sixteen members of the Republican State Central Committee formed in
1868, while every other county in the state was restricted to just one representative. Philadelphia was so powerful politically that the New York Times claimed that "it was the state." Similarly, the Harrisburg Patriot called the state capitol "Philadelphia's thirtieth ward." While these claims are exaggerated, they do testify to the crucial significance of Philadelphia in state and national politics. State and federal political actors therefore needed to accommodate the city's politicians if they were to increase their power in the state and federal arena. In the process of jostling for supremacy they were to change fundamentally the configuration of political forces in the city.
4. The Politics of Protest and Reform

This investigation of party politics in Philadelphia has so far concentrated solely on the political "boss" and his organisation. I have suggested that although the style of political competition associated with machine politics played a central role in the city's political life, the system of party politics was not organised or centralised. Put another way, in spite of appearances to the contrary, Philadelphia, in the period prior to 1887, was not governed by a single overall "boss" at the head of a well-disciplined and centralised party organisation.

What I want to consider now in this chapter is the nature of political reform in Philadelphia during this period. Any assessment of reform politics at this time must take into account two conflicting interpretations of the political activities of the city's men of wealth in the post-bellum city. On the one hand, sociologist E. Digby Baltzell and historians Sam Bass Warner Jr. and Russell Weigley, have argued that the city's men of wealth (in particular the new business and banking elite which displaced the old colonial gentry at the top of the city's social structure at the time of the Civil War) abandoned local affairs and politics. On the other hand, contemporary observers such as George Vickers, Alexander McClure, James Bryce, E. V. Smalley and subsequently Henry Lea's biographer, Edward S. Bradley, have claimed that reform groups organised by the city's "best
men" scored a series of stunning reform victories against "bossism" in the 1870's, culminating in Stokley's defeat in 1881.¹

It is my contention that neither interpretation is accurate, for, as I will show, the city's businessmen did participate in local affairs, but since reform politics was limited to groups that were few in number, short-lived, poorly organised and unrepresentative, they did not enjoy the degree of success that contemporary publicists maintained. Indeed, the reform groups organised by the city's businessmen played only a peripheral role in the electoral and governmental arena. I would suggest that they resemble those early reform groups which Kenneth Fox has categorised as "indigenous" responses to local conditions. That is, those reform groups which, in the absence of a national social scientific approach to the theory and practice of urban government, drew entirely from resources and values already in place, and addressed the municipal condition as purely a local one.² The intention of this chapter is to show that just as there was no cohesive city-wide political machine in Philadelphia at this time, nor was there a well-organised reform movement.

THE "BEST MEN" IN RETREAT?

Although the exodus of the wealthy from political life is a familiar theme in the literature on nineteenth century urban politics, I suggested earlier, in Chapter 2, that Warner's
assertion that Philadelphia businessmen "abandoned the
city's affairs and its politics" was misleading, in the
sense that their retreat from political office was a post-
bellum rather than ante-bellum phenomenon, and that it was
as much a change forced upon them as it was a voluntary
gesture on their part.\(^3\) It is necessary, however, to
qualify Warner's claim still further for as it stands it
bears little relation to historical reality. That
businessmen had not become "ignorant of their city and
abandoned its politics" in the post-bellum period can be
demonstrated in a number of ways. If we take the city's
post-war social elite as drawn up by Baltzell for instance,
an analysis of the thirty-nine men in the city whose income
exceeded $25,000 in 1864 reveals that ten, far from
"abandoning the city's affairs," were actively engaged in
local reform politics (see Table 4.1). It is worth noting
that these men of wealth were not just members of reform
groups but prominent activists who occupied important posts
of responsibility. Indeed they were often the prime movers
in their formation. For instance, it was Henry C. Lea, ably
supported by Wheeler, Baird, Drexel and Lippincott, who was
largely responsible for the organisation of the Citizens'
Municipal Reform Association (C.M.R.A.) in June 1871, and
the Reform Club in Spring 1872.\(^4\)

The C.M.R.A. was set up in response to the establishment of
the Public Buildings Commission by the state legislature in
the summer of 1870. Reform publicist George Vickers
pinpointed the act creating the Commission,
Table 4.1. Elite Philadelphians and their Political Activities, 1871-1886*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>C.M.R.A. Reform Club</th>
<th>Comm. of 100</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Baird (2nd)*</td>
<td>Locomotive Manufacturer</td>
<td>Central Council</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Wheeler (5th)</td>
<td>Ironmaster</td>
<td>Tr.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward W. Clark (14th)</td>
<td>Banker</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C.M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Vaughan Merrick (17th)</td>
<td>Ironmaster</td>
<td>Central Council</td>
<td>C.M.A.</td>
<td>C.S.R.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua B. Lippincott (18th)</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>Central Council</td>
<td>Vice Pres.</td>
<td>U.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarence H. Clark (21st)</td>
<td>Banker</td>
<td></td>
<td>C.M.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry C. Lea (27th)</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>Vice Pres.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C.M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Wanamaker (33rd)</td>
<td>Dry Goods Merchant</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C.S.R.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement Biddle (39th)</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One elite Philadelphian actively engaged in politics though not included in this table is Thomas Dolan (11th), on the grounds that as chairman of the state Republican party in 1882, he was an associate of Matthew Quay and the state Republican machine, and not a participant in reform activities. See ch.8 of this thesis.

The figure in parentheses indicates the position of the elite member in Baltzell's table of the wealthiest individuals in the city in 1864.

C.M.A. Citizens' Municipal Association

C.S.R.A. Civil Service Reform Association

M Member

MC 1871 Democratic party candidate in the 1871 mayoral election

Tr. Treasurer

U.L. Union League

as the origin of the reform movement in Philadelphia. By creating a body with unlimited tenure of office, with power to fill all vacancies, with authority to tax the community and to spend the public money without restriction or supervision this act was so subversive of all the principles of self-government that when its provisions came to be fully understood it aroused general indignation.5

Those citizens indignant enough to join the reform effort included the city's most prominent bankers, lawyers, manufacturers and merchants. Of the seventy-five C.M.R.A. activists listed in Appendix 1, for example, one-third were manufacturers, seventeen were lawyers, sixteen, merchants, and four, bankers. Four publishers, two stockbrokers, two physicians, a railroad president, newspaper publisher, hotel proprietor and a painter, made up the remainder. These reformers varied in background as well as in occupation. For example, some such as the "gentlemen-lawyers" Clement
Biddle, Theodore Cuyler and William Rawle, were descendants of the city's "First Families" of the Revolutionary period, while others, like Irish immigrant and locomotive manufacturer Matthew Baird, ironmaster Charles Wheeler and publisher Joshua Lippincott had worked themselves up out of poverty to establish million dollar businesses. Still others, such as the publisher Henry C. Lea, ironmaster J. Vaughan Merrick, and bankers Anthony J. Drexel and Edward W. Clark, had inherited their respective family businesses. The reformers also differed in their political allegiance, for while the majority of them were strongly Republican, the group did include conspicuous Democrats such as Lehman Ashmead, James Dougherty, William Massey and Colonel James Page.

The reform group as a whole then included an impressive cross-section of the city's best citizens, whose unity (given the differences between them) would have seemed quite remarkable were it not for the fact that they had been accustomed to joint intervention in local politics in the past; such as for example, in sponsoring measures like the political consolidation of Philadelphia and the chartering of the Pennsylvania Railroad, on the basis that it would be for the general good of the business community, and the city as a whole. Howard Gillette has argued that it was this "tradition by which government and business formed a partnership for the public good (that) provided the common ground for businessmen reformers."

Unity among businessmen was also fostered by organisations
like the Commercial Exchange and the Board of Trade. Founded in 1854 by merchant reformer George L. Buzby, precisely for the purpose of bringing businessmen of all types together, the Commercial Exchange listed among its membership in 1871 manufacturers from the reform groups such as William Massey (brewer), Barton Jenks (textiles) and Israel P. Morris (iron), and merchants Henry Winsor (shipping), John Wetherill and Amos R. Little (dry goods). Links between merchants and manufacturers were strengthened still further through exclusive social clubs such as the Union League of which at least thirty of the seventy-five C.M.R.A. activits were members. What brought businessmen together in the immediate post-war period was not a scheme for internal improvements or such like, but a common threat to the security of their wealth, in this case the career politician who, as we saw in Chapter 2, had taken control of the local Republican party organisation and city government.

The sense of grievance men of wealth felt at the loss of their social and political leadership was aggravated by the economic consequences of the influx of "fourth rate political ward jobbers into Councils who go there not for the honour but for the plunder." Businessmen reformers were particularly alarmed on two counts. On the one hand they believed that the city's finances were out of control and that escalating levels of taxation, expenditure and indebtedness had to be arrested or else the "inevitable result (will) be the destruction of our credit and a crushing burden of taxation that will destroy the sources of
On the other hand, they also felt aggrieved that in spite of "the vast sums which have been levied upon us," basic city services were still poor and inadequate. The C.M.R.A. maintained that,

the sums so recklessly squandered during the past ten or twelve years should have given us the best ordered, cleanest, best-paved, best-lighted city in Christendom, with exhaustless supplies of pure water, a model police force and a school system unapproachable in its excellence and completeness. Yet there is not a third-rate city in Europe that is not our superior in most of these necessary adjuncts to modern civilisation. Our streets never were filthier nor so constantly in need of repair, breeding pestilence and wearing out horses and vehicles. Our gas never was so poor or so dear; our water supply so indifferent in quality and insufficient in quantity; our school system manifesting so alarming a tendency to extravagance and corruption; our police force so passive in maintaining order and so active in perpetrating election frauds.

The reason why "we are so deficient in nearly all the comforts and adornments which befit a great metropolis" is due to "the culpable neglect of the authorities," in particular, "fraud and extravagance" on the part of a few hundred idle and worthless politicians [who] grow rich, while the people are plundered and receive comparatively nothing, either in good government or necessary improvements.

The reformers identified the two "sources of evil from which we suffer" as being on the one hand, "the fact that the people of our large cities really do not govern themselves," and on the other,

the heated partisanship which has led our citizens to sacrifice their better judgement and independence to the dictates of party discipline, and to support the "regular nominees" of their political faith irrespective of the character and qualifications of candidates....
Corruption, incapacity and self-seeking have become recommendations for office, and our municipal government has thus necessarily passed into the hands of the corrupt and incapable.

The remedy to the city's problems then, the reformers believed,

lies in emancipating ourselves from the bonds of party discipline...........It lies in recognising the difference between the business of supplying our community with water, gas, cleaning, paving, schooling, and justice, and the great questions of statesmanship which divide the country at large into political parties.

Between these there is no necessary connection and the object of the Reform Association has been to form an organisation through which men of the most opposite political convictions could unite in the work of securing an honest, efficient and economical transaction of municipal business without thereby proving false to their political allegiance or endangering the success of their respective parties throughout the nation."18

The reformers set themselves a simple general objective: "to reform, if possible existing abuses and to prevent their reoccurrence by causing honest men to be elected to legislative and municipal office."19 They set about achieving this objective, in the first instance, by attempting to secure additional support from the rest of the business community. At Henry Lea's instigation, they organised a Reform Club designed so as to counteract the feeling among businessmen that independent voting in local elections would aid Democratic attempts to lower tariffs. The Reform Club's constitution, like the C.M.R.A.'s charter, prevented it from participating in state or national politics, and consequently the reformers confined their activities to municipal affairs which they regarded "as simply a matter of business and not of politics."20
In order to secure the election of capable, honest men, irrespective of party, the reformers reasoned that it would be necessary initially "to arouse public indignation." Accordingly, they sought to demonstrate to the electorate, by way of pamphlets, tracts, addresses and public meetings, that "we were being most frightfully robbed and misgoverned." For example, they issued tracts purporting to show the prevalence of ballot fraud under the existing registration and election laws; the reckless extravagance of the "Row offices" and the fee system; how funds were misappropriated by the city treasurer, and how levels of taxation and expenditure were outstripping the growth of population and the value of property. In a similar vein, Henry Lea published a political satire in September 1872 entitled Songs for the Politicians. They included "The Respectable Man" and "The Educated Hog" which ridiculed those respectable middle-class citizens who, driven by conformity or self-interest, always voted for the "regular" ticket. The hired thug who intimidated the voter at the polls was the subject of "The Battle Song of the Rounder", while "The Lament of the Taxpayer" was devoted to the citizens who always ended up the loser.

For all their propaganda, however, the reformers failed miserably in the electoral arena. The maximum number of votes they collected when they presented their own ticket for county officers, for example, was in 1872 when they received just 13,000 votes out of the 90,000 cast. The reformers blamed national issues, ballot fraud and the
Although frustrated in their electoral efforts, they were more successful in their attempt to curb state legislative interference in local affairs. In this respect they were beneficiaries of (as well as being participants in) the successful campaign for constitutional revision that was launched in the early 1870's, following the widespread publicity given to allegations of political corruption in the state government. In presenting the reformers' proposals in January 1873 to the state convention that was given the task of drawing up a new constitution, Lea argued that responsible local self-government in Philadelphia could be realised only if the practice by which the state legislature enacted special and local legislation was ended; the voter registration and election laws changed; the system of administering justice in petty cases reformed; the fee system abolished and provision made for the punishment of bribery of public officials.

By stripping the (Republican dominated) Board of Aldermen of supervisory control of the voter registration system; forbidding special and local legislation, replacing fees with a salaried system and making bribery punishable, the convention accepted every one of the reformers suggestions except for the proposal that elected Aldermen be replaced by magistrates appointed by the Governor. With the adoption of a new state constitution in 1874 reform activity subsided as the city's "best men", confident that
the foundations for responsible local government had been laid, turned their attention to the effort to bring the nation's Centennial celebration to Philadelphia. A new era in Philadelphia politics failed to materialise however, and when the opportunity arose to exploit the factional rivalry within the Republican party, the city's businessmen, inspired by paper manufacturer E. Dunbar Lockwood and dry goods merchant Amos Little, mobilised in November 1880 "to give the Gas Trust its death blow." The Committee of One Hundred closely resembled earlier reform groups both in its membership and objectives. Indeed, thirteen former members of the C.M.R.A. such as Lea, Drexel and Wheeler were members of the original Committee set up on November 26 (see Appendix 2). Of the 137 members who participated between 1880 and 1883, a substantial majority listed their occupations within the business community as merchants(45), manufacturers(30) or professional men(13). Like their predecessors Committee members also pursued their business interests in civic and social organisations for fifty-six of them belonged to the Board of Trade, and seventy to the Union League. The Committee's high social status can be adjudged from the fact that two-thirds of its members (90) were listed in Boyd's Blue Book which described itself as a "society directory containing a list of the names and addresses of the elite of the city of Philadelphia." In a subsequent review of early reform groups, the Municipal League of Philadelphia depicted the Committee of One Hundred as being "a select
body of men" that represented "in its personnel many of the city's commercial and professional interests."^34

Initially conceived as an Independent Republican body "seeking to reform the management of the Republican party," the Committee quickly abandoned the notion of "reform within the party," in favour of an "effort on behalf of the whole people."^35 "Believing in the principle that party interests must be subordinate to those of the whole city," the Committee sought to "restore the honest administration of the early days of the municipality" and thereby make "the government of the city... a model of efficiency and economy."^36 The reformers (like their predecessors) believed this could be achieved by securing "the nomination and election of a better class of candidate for office," maintaining "the purity of the ballot," prosecuting those "guilty of election frauds, maladministration of office and misappropriation of public funds," and promoting "a public service based upon character and capability only."^37 In pursuit of the latter sixty-three (41 percent) members of the Committee also enrolled in the local civil service reform association.^38

The reformers met with instant success in the first election they contested, for the joint ticket they presented with the Democrats defeated the regular Republican one headed by Stokley. The election of Samuel G. King as Mayor and John Hunter as Receiver of Taxes, in February 1881, marked the beginning of the Committee's five year involvement in local politics.^39 The reform group confined itself largely to
endorsing candidates for public office who "at the very
least (were) law-abiding citizens, known for their sobriety,
morality, trustworthiness and general fitness." To ensure
that only the most suitable candidates for Councils and ward
offices were selected, a sub-committee on ward organisation
was instructed to set up "auxiliary committees of citizens
in every ward" made up of "all persons desirous of co-
operating with the Committee of One Hundred." The
reformers commitment to non-partisanship in local affairs
meant that they endorsed candidates irrespective of party,
and sometimes of neither party.

A further sub-committee, on legislation, was set up "to
promote such measures as are necessary in the interest of
reform." It reported in favour of civil service reform
and structural changes in the system of city government, and
when these proposals were incorporated in the Bullitt Bill,
the reformers sent a delegation to Harrisburg to support the
measure. Indeed, with the adoption of the Bullitt Bill as
the new city charter, the Committee of One Hundred formally
disbanded in January, 1886.

Enough has been said to establish that, contrary to Warner's
claims, the city was still important to local businessmen in
their daily lives, and that the latter had not abandoned its
affairs or its politics in the post-bellum period. Indeed,
a little reflection argues that the idea that the wealthy
could abandon local politics solely for profits does not
square with common sense. For instance, businessmen as
local residents were the wealthiest city dwellers, and therefore had a vested interest because of taxation in city politics and government. Besides, city government was charged with important housekeeping functions that determined everything from the value of real estate to the use of police as strikebreakers; and men of wealth, like citizens in general, also cared deeply about the provision of basic city services such as water, gas, street lighting, parks, and police and fire protection, particularly at a time of rapid urban growth.

Indeed, as we have seen, it was a mixture of resentment at the deterioration of municipal services amid fears that the rapid growth of the city budget was endangering the security of wealth against taxation, that prompted men of substance to organise the first of a series of reform groups aimed at improving local government. In December 1869, for example, a number of local businessmen set up the Citizens' Association for the Improvement of Streets and Roads of Philadelphia, to act as a clearing house for passing on complaints about the city's streets to the appropriate authorities.45 Again in June 1871, the C.M.R.A. was organised in response to the creation of the Public Buildings Commission, for as the reformers pointed out, the latter was,

empowered to tax us without limit, and to spend our money without supervision, to hold office without restriction of time, and to fill all vacancies in their own body, [thus] inflicting on us all the evils of taxation without representation.46

Warner's argument only makes sense if by "the city's affairs
and its politics" he means "public office", for in this respect, as noted earlier, the retreat of the wealthy is marked. Even such a committed reformer as Henry C. Lea could not be persuaded to enter formal politics. For example, in November 1878, when Joseph Caven suggested that he put his proposals for the reform of the gas works into effect by running for the office of trustee, Lea replied:

Mr. Henry assures me that I could be of substantial service, owing to the factions within the trust and that it would enable you to overthrow the "Gas Ring" which has so long exercised a baneful influence over our politics....[but]....I long ago determined never to accept public office of any kind and the one in question would be especially distasteful to me as a proper performance of its' duties would involve labour incompatible with my other engagements...47

Furthermore, the Committee of One Hundred prided itself that "not a single member was a politician or an aspirant for office."48 Anxious to avoid the fate of its predecessor the C.M.R.A., which was dismissed as a "mere party of office seekers (who) have no right to reproach others on the same account" when it placed its own members on an election ticket, the Committee of One Hundred's Articles of Association provided,

that no person holding any important office under the national, state or city government shall be eligible for membership; and that any member becoming a candidate for office shall cease to take an active part in the affairs of the Committee; and if elected shall cease to become a member.49

Although unwilling to run for public office themselves, the reformers were still committed to bringing about political change through the election of men "whom office seeks, rather than those who seek office."50 How successful were they?
THE "FORWARD MARCH OF REFORM"?

According to contemporary observers such as Alexander McClure, James Bryce, George Vickers, newspaper reporter E. V. Smalley, and subsequently Lea's biographer Edward S. Bradley, a well-organised reform movement was not only pre-eminent in local party politics in the period prior to 1887, but it also scored a series of remarkable victories against "bossism". Beginning with the "practical political coup" by which the C.M.R.A. succeeded in defeating gas trustee William E. Rowan's election bid for the office of Sheriff in 1876, the reformers made a "break in Bossism's Wall" by electing, and re-electing, the Democrat Robert E. Pattison to the post of City Controller in 1877 and 1880.51

"This evidence of Independent strength so encouraged the remnant of the old Reform Association," Bradley suggests, that E. Dunbar Lockwood convened a Committee of One Hundred leading citizens of Independent sympathies to put in nomination at coming elections [February 1881] a slate of local officers who should have at heart the best interests of the city. Thus began a movement which continued with increasing success until 1886 when the passage of the Bullitt Bill assured the end of the Gas Trust.52

Contemporary journalist, E. V. Smalley, noted in the wake of Stokley's defeat in February 1881 that,

A great change has recently been brought about by the sincere, courageous, and persistent efforts of a few businessmen acting in the field of politics but outside of party lines. These men successfully appealed to the conscience, self-interest and public spirit of the best classes of their fellow citizens.53
Similarly, Alexander McClure in his autobiography subsequently claimed that:

The Committee of One Hundred came into power and found it possible to enforce something approaching honest elections, and they thoroughly revolutionised the city. It was the best-directed reform movement of modern times. It was made up of practical businessmen who understood that idealism in politics was good in theory, but utterly valueless in practice, and they not only defeated the notoriously corrupt machine men of the city, but they defeated men of the highest standing who adhered to and sustained the organisation, thereby giving it the benefit of their reputations......For a full decade, the Republican leaders were under fair notice that Machine candidates would be made to bite the dust.54

These claims about the reformers' achievement neatly complement the standard history of the Committee of One Hundred written by George Vickers in 1883, in which Vickers gives a passionate account of how the city's businessmen brought about The Fall of Bossism in Philadelphia. The impression that bossism was dead and that the city's businessmen were responsible for it, was also conveyed in James Bryce's analysis of "The Philadelphia Gas Ring" which relied heavily on Vickers "little book" for information on local politics and reiterated Vickers' claims.55

It is my contention that just as contemporary observers overstated the power and influence exercised by "bosses" such as McManes and Stokley, they have also exaggerated the role that early reform groups played in local party politics. Indeed, a closer examination of their claims suggests that the reformers were not responsible for the successes that have been attributed to them.
In the first instance, it is difficult to see how Rowan's defeat in 1876 and Pattison's victories in 1877 and 1880 can be attributed to the efforts of the C.M.R.A., since there was no organised reform activity in the city at this time. Although Vickers and Bradley both argued that the C.M.R.A.'s work did not come to an end until 1878, there is reason to believe that the group suffered a lingering death and had ceased to be an influential force in local politics since the adoption of the new state constitution in 1874. It is also worth noting that by Vickers own admission "the C.M.R.A. although not disbanded ceased to act politically as an organisation after February 1877," that is, nine months before Pattison's victory later that year.56

It seems that the only work carried out under the auspices of the C.M.R.A., after the constitutional reforms it had advocated had been adopted, were Lea's three exhaustive reports on the operation of the gas works under the Gas Trust, published in 1874.57 Lea appears to have been an isolated crusader for as Howard Gillette has pointed out,

his continued activity in the name of reform, publicised as it was after 1875, simply did not represent the existence of any organised reform effort.58

This is also suggested by Bradley who attributes the demise of the C.M.R.A. to Lea's enforced absence from the city on the grounds of ill-health.59 In retrospect Lea himself suggested to Frank W. Leach, in March 1905, that the main reason why the reform group went into decline was because the task was endless......the essential weakness of all such [reform] efforts is that the powers of
evil are untiring and always at work, for they make their living by it, while the volunteers for good have something else to do, in time their energies are spent, they disband and the enemy reoccupies the field. Then came the end not abruptly, sensationally as the result of some great catastrophe, which disrupted the organisation and ground it into powder. But the simple silent processes of nature were at work. One by one those who laboured dropped out and there were none to take their places, and the association quietly went out of existence having opened the path for those who might come to take up the burden when a recrudescence of misrule might call for new effort.

As well as having to attend to their respective businesses, the challenge of organising the forthcoming Centennial Exposition provided the reform volunteers with "something else to do." C.M.R.A. member John Welsh, for example, quit his position as the first President of the Reform Club to become chairman of the Centennial Board of Finance. Joseph Patterson, John Wetherill, Nathan Parker Shortridge, Henry Winsor and Amos Little, of the reform group, also joined the Board. Other reformers such as Henry Lea, Clement Biddle, Barton Jenks, Henry Lewis, and William Massey, recognising the financial boom that America's first world fair would bring to the city, led fund-raising efforts and "mobilised the financial community with the same spirit as they devoted to the Union League in the Civil War."

Another important factor in accounting for the demise of organised reform activity in the mid-seventies, was the serious division that reformers suffered within their ranks over the question of partisanship. This was particularly notable in the case of the Reform Club and the Union League. Problems arose over the Reform Club's role in local politics
because of the contradiction inherent in its constitution. On the one hand, the club's constitution declared that its "fundamental object...is to advance its principles by mutual intercourse and discussion and not as a political or partisan body," but on the other hand it was also committed to associate...for the purpose of aiding in the reform and improvement of the municipal government of the city of Philadelphia, in the election of honest and capable men to fill its offices and represent it in the State legislature, irrespective of their views on national and State politics; in the punishment and prevention of fraud and corruption in municipal officers; and in guarding the rights and privileges of the city of Philadelphia from legislative encroachment. Consequently friction developed between those reformers who were committed to active intervention in local politics, and those who sought political change only through "mutual intercourse and discussion." Indeed, at the very time when the reformers were supposed to have scored their first notable victory over "bossism", the Reform Club had "irreparably split" over the issue of partisanship.

In November 1876, for example, while Rowan failed in his bid to become Sheriff, J. V. Ingham filed a suit against the Reform Club in the Court of Common Pleas. The court upheld Ingham's claim that the resolution passed at the club's annual general meeting calling for a "political" assessment of three dollars to be levied on every member for the year 1876-77, to form a special fund to aid municipal reform, was an infringement of the first article of the club's constitution. By the time of Pattison's victory, those members who wanted the club to be "a purely social organisation" were in the majority, but the acrimony between
the two factions persisted to such an extent that the Reform Club was ultimately forced to disband in May 1880.66

The split in reform ranks, over the degree to which they should participate in local affairs, emerged even earlier in the case of the Union League. In April 1875 internal dissension erupted among the League's membership when the watchdog Committee, that had been appointed by the Board of Governors to oversee local elections, refused to endorse the Republican party ticket for the forthcoming county election.67 Since the League was pledged to using its influence to secure the nomination of men who placed the welfare of the people above party interests, the Committee of Sixty-Two reasoned that as Henry Bingham and David Lane were members of the Society of Mysterious Pilgrims, they were unfit to hold public office. Furthermore, the Committee publicly condemned the Pilgrims as,

that dictatorial band of men, nominally of both parties, but without true allegiance to either, which now rules and oppresses our city and is disgracing and destroying the Republican organisation.68

Some members were outraged by the Committee's stand, particularly since Bingham was a director of the Union League, while others felt that by making its conclusions public knowledge, the watchdog group had exceeded the responsibility invested in it. At the subsequent annual general meeting, a majority of the League's members voted in favour of an amendment to the By-Laws which declared that "the League as a body should not hereafter take part in municipal politics unless otherwise directed by members in
General Meeting." By 1876 then, the League had effectively withdrawn from municipal politics, and in future would concentrate only on national affairs.

If Rowan's defeat and Pattison's success did not mark "the beginning of the forward march of reform" how then can we account for these election results? In short, it was a combination of party factionalism and independent voting, rather than the efforts of a well-organised reform movement, that was responsible for Rowan's failure and Pattison's victory. As noted earlier in the last chapter, the Republican party was rent by factionalism in the 1870's, as three loose coalitions of politicians led by McManes, Stokley, and Disston respectively, contended for power within the party. That Rowan's defeat was due to party factionalism is suggested by the fact that he was the only city-wide Republican candidate who failed to be elected in November 1876. While city treasurer Delos Southworth and President Rutherford Hayes obtained majorities of 14,720 and 15,427 votes respectively, Rowan lost to the Democratic candidate William Wright by 6,227 votes. Since he polled consistently less votes than Southworth in the election returns for Disston's twenty-ninth (10.6%) ward, Leed's tenth (13.0%) ward, Stokley's ninth (8.3%) ward and Martin's nineteenth (6.6%) ward, it seems likely that Rowan was cut by the supporters of McManes' factional rivals within the party (see Figure 4.1). Suspicion of party treachery is also suggested by the fact that Disston was the nephew of the Democratic candidate, and that Wright's chief supporters
were Lewis Cassidy and Thomas Barger who where both Pilgrims and allies of Stokley on the Buildings Commission. 70

It seems that Rowan's close association with McManes and his reputation as a "jobbing politician" also cost him the support of many traditional Republican voters, for as E. V. Smalley reported prior to the election:

The Republicans of Philadelphia are loaded with a candidate for Sheriff in the person of the regular nominee Mr. Rowan, whom many thousands of them are refusing to carry. For many years he has been a prominent spoilsman in the corrupt councils ring and his reputation is so bad that before the County Convention met, every decent Republican paper in the city attacked him. 71

The returns of traditional Republican suburban wards such as the twenty-second (Germantown) and Caven's fifteenth ward, where Rowan polled 14 percent and 11.3 percent less votes than Southworth respectively, indicates that Smalley's assessment may well have been accurate. 72

Party factionalism also seems to have been responsible for Pattison's victory in 1877, even though reform publicists insisted that it was another step in "the forward march of reform." By failing to stress that the C.M.R.A., the Reform Club and the Union League did not take any part in the election campaign, and that the whole Democratic ticket was elected and not just Pattison, the accounts of these contemporary observers give a misleading impression of Pattison's election victory. Pattison himself suggested to the Democratic convention that nominated him that "the signs of the times" such as "the dissensions of the Republicans, and their maladministration in office while in power...point
Leach concluded that "the rampant factional strife within the ranks of the "regular" Republican politicians" was the "determining" factor in the election. The election returns also indicate that James Sayre, Russell Thayer and Andrew J. Knorr suffered the same fate as Rowan had the previous year, for the Republican ticket was cut again by a combination of Disston and Stokley supporters.

As Pattison was the only candidate on the Democratic ticket to be elected in November 1880, and since this year was also a Presidential election year when party lines were traditionally more tightly drawn, it is Pattison's re-election, rather than initial election, that is remarkable. On this occasion it appears that independent voting, rather than party factionalism, was the main factor responsible for his election victory. Pattison, a young lawyer and son of a Methodist preacher, had so impressed Independent Councilmen and many of the city's "best men", in his role as guardian of the city treasury, that Joseph L. Caven organised a rally at which fifty of Philadelphia's leading businessmen who were "Republican in national politics" but "independent in local affairs" endorsed Pattison for re-election.

The President of the Common Council explained that:

As a Republican I propose on next Tuesday to vote for Garfield because the best interests of the country demand that no change be made in the national administration; as a Republican I propose at the same time to vote for Robert Pattison for Controller because the best interests of Philadelphia demand that no change be made in the administration of that office.

Thousands of Philadelphians seem to have followed Caven's
line on election day, for while Garfield and three local Republican candidates carried the city by over 20,000 votes, Pattison defeated Harper Jeffries by 13,593 votes. That Pattison's victory was not due to the efforts of an organised reform movement was acknowledged by both Bradley and Vickers. Bradley suggests that "Independent strength" in the form of a "public protest against corruption overwhelmed the bosses," while Vickers notes that the "spontaneous bolt against the Republican candidate was "by the people unorganised, by popular sentiment crystallised into tangible opposition." Similarly the North American regarded Pattison's victory as "unmistakably the result of independent personal effort by citizens of character, property, education and responsibility." 

An examination of the election returns reported in Table 4.2 also suggests that Stokley's defeat in the mayoral election of February 1881 was due to a combination of the independent voting and party factionalism that had characterised local elections over the previous five years. A comparison of the percentage of votes polled by Stokley in 1881 with those received by W. Nelson West, the successful Republican candidate who was supported by both McManes and the Committee of One Hundred, indicates that there was a repetition of the spontaneous independent bolt in the traditional Republican suburban wards (15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29) that had brought about Pattison's victory, the previous year, while the ward returns from North Philadelphia (13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 31), where
Table 4.2. The Republican Party vote in selected city elections, by ward, 1877, 1881

(as percent of total vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Office</th>
<th>W. S. Stokley (Mayor) 1877</th>
<th>W. S. Stokley (Mayor) 1881</th>
<th>W. N. West (City Solicitor) 1881</th>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Diff. (b)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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a The figures in this column represent the percentage difference between the votes cast for Stokley in the 1877 election, when he was supported by James McManes, and those he received in the 1881 election, when he was opposed by both the Committee of One Hundred and the Gas Trust leader.

b The figures in this column represent the percentage difference between the votes cast for Stokley in the 1881 election and those received by Nelson West, a party candidate who was supported by both McManes and the Committee of One Hundred.

McManes' support was particularly strong, also suggests that Stokley was a victim of party factionalism (see Figure 4.1).

That Stokley's defeat was in part attributable to a suburban protest against the misuse of city funds, is also suggested by the fact that ring wards (15, 20, 22, 24, 28 and 29) which consistently provided Republican majorities in mayoral
elections between 1865 and 1884 failed to do so in 1881 (see Table 4.3).\textsuperscript{81} The idea that Stokley's defeat was also due to McManes supporters "cutting" his candidacy, is not too surprising when we recall that the Mayor had used similar tactics in previous years to prevent the election of party nominees endorsed by the gas trust faction. Moreover, the publication of the political satire \textit{Solid for Mulhooly} by one of Stokley's close associates, along with the Mayor's campaign pledge to abolish the gas trust, would suggest the "ticket-cutting" was probably an important feature of the election, as the \textit{Times} maintained.\textsuperscript{82}

If the above analysis of the 1881 election is accurate, then it would appear that reform publicists were wrong to attribute Stokley's defeat to the intervention of the Committee of One Hundred. It is my contention that just as these contemporary observers failed to distinguish the difference between the structure of the Republican party organisation and its actual functioning, they also committed the error of assuming that because the Committee of One Hundred endorsed the Democratic candidate Samuel G. King for the mayoralty, then the reform group must have been responsible for his victory. That is, they wrongly credited this "reform success" to the Committee when in fact, by their own admission, the "strength of the city's Independent voters" to which they referred to, was an "unorganised" phenomenon that had emerged as a significant factor in local elections before the reform group had even been set up.\textsuperscript{83}
Table 4.3. City wards returning a majority for Republican Mayoral Candidates, 1865-1884

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>50-55%</th>
<th>55-60%</th>
<th>60% +</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>McMichael</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 19</td>
<td>13 15</td>
<td>10 14 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 23 24</td>
<td>21 22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>Tyndale</td>
<td>1 7 8 9</td>
<td>14 15 18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 19</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 24 27</td>
<td>21 22 23 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Stokley</td>
<td>8 9</td>
<td>13 14 15 16 19</td>
<td>10 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20 27 28 29</td>
<td>21 22 23 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>Stokley</td>
<td>9 12 13</td>
<td>14 16 18 19</td>
<td>10 15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 21 24 25 28</td>
<td>26 29</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Stokley</td>
<td>4 9</td>
<td>1 8</td>
<td>5 7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 14 18</td>
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<td>21 22 23 28 29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Stokley</td>
<td>5 4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7 8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 21 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 31</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>9 5</td>
<td>1 8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 14 15 19</td>
<td>10 18</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 22 24</td>
<td>21 23 28 29</td>
<td>26 27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figure in brackets represents the total number of wards in the city at the time each mayoral election was held. Ward 27 was subdivided from ward 24 in 1866; 28 from 21 in 1867; 29 from 20 in 1871 and 30 from 26 and 31 from 19 in 1875. See John Daly and Allen Weinberg, Genealogy of Philadelphia County Subdivisions 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 69-72.
I would further suggest that the notion that the Committee of One Hundred was even capable of (let alone solely responsible for) dealing bossism a stunning blow in February 1881, is difficult to sustain. In the first place it is questionable whether the Committee had sufficient time to mobilise the "Independent strength" of the electorate since it was only actually organised on November 26, 1880, and did not finally agree on a mayoral candidate until just two weeks before the election day. Since "not a single member" of the Committee "was a politician or an aspirant for office," as E. V. Smalley emphasised, it is also debatable whether these businessmen had the necessary expertise to organise a great political movement. Even more serious however, was the division that the reformers suffered within their ranks over what tactics should be employed to secure a reform victory. In short, the Committee was badly split over whether to seek reform "within the (Republican) party" or outside of party lines.

Given the failure of past non-partisan reform groups such as the C.M.R.A. and the Reform Club, the Committee was initially set up purely as an Independent Republican body "seeking to reform the management of the Republican party." However, the group's Executive Committee "caused consternation" at the general meeting of December 20, 1880, when after "considering the subject of the nomination of proper candidates for municipal offices to be chosen at the February election," it recommended that the Committee should actually endorse Stokley for the mayoralty. The "general
uproar" subsided only after executive member, James A. Wright, explained to the meeting that Stokley's nomination was recommended on the grounds that the Mayor had promised the committee that he would support certain reform measures such as transferring the gas works to the city and establishing a police force free of political influence. 88 The general meeting eventually voted in favour of Stokley's nomination by fifty-two votes to thirty. 89 (That forty members of the Committee, or one-third of the entire body, were absent from the meeting also calls into question how genuinely committed the businessmen were to political reform).

Convinced that the group had made a fatal error in endorsing Stokley, Rudolph Blankenburg and John Verree resigned and organised a rival Businessmen's Committee to promote the nomination of manufacturer Edward T. Steel for Mayor. 90 That Blankenburg and Verree were correct in their assessment was soon confirmed, for when Stokley secured the Republican nomination for Mayor on January 13, 1881, he reneged on his promises to the reformers, and ignored their request for him to endorse the Committee's Declaration of Principles. 91 Consequently, the Committee withdrew its nomination of Stokley and recognising that it had been "deluded" by the notion of "reform within the party," amended its Declaration of Principles to permit "a union of all the elements of opposition to the Ring, irrespective of party." 92 The Committee's about-turn on how best to achieve political reform in local politics was sufficient to woo Blankenburg
and Verree back to the group, but its subsequent endorsement of Select Councilman Samuel G. King, the Democratic nominee, for the mayoralty, on January 30, 1881, led several prominent members such as Anthony J. Drexel, Henry Winsor, William Sellers, Benjamin Comegys, Oliver Evans, Frederick Loeble, James Dobson and R. H. Griffith, to resign from the Committee in protest at its betrayal of the Republican party.93

The division between reformers over the question of partisanship continued to undermine the Committee's effectiveness in local elections however. For example, in the 1884 mayoral campaign, twenty-three members, led by Edward R. Wood, John P. Wetherill and Lemuel Coffin, resigned from the Committee when the group voted to endorse Samuel G. King for re-election, in preference to the Republican nominee Independent Republican Councilman, William B. Smith.94

Apart from the "internal weakness manifested in the ranks of the organisation itself," the Municipal League later attributed the Committee's lack of "vigour and success" to the fact that the group was not "thoroughly representative," nor "well-organised in every ward of the city."95 With reference to the former, we have already noted that the members of the Committee of One Hundred, like their predecessors in the C.M.R.A. and the Reform Club, were a socially exclusive group, but it is also worth pointing out that since almost half (forty-two) of them lived in fashionable neighbourhoods such as Rittenhouse Square

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(eighth ward) in centre city, or prestigious suburban districts like Chestnut Hill and Germantown (twenty-second ward), they were also residentially segregated from the bulk of the city's population. Moreover, as one-third of the city's wards (ten out of thirty-one) were not represented on the Committee at all, the group's geographical isolation was accentuated even further (see Appendix 2). 96

Since the Committee was also a self-constituted body that conducted political affairs in an autocratic manner, there is reason to believe that the efforts of the city's "best men" made little impact on the city's electorate. 97 As the Times suggested, the Committee of One Hundred, like its predecessor the C.M.R.A., was composed of men who sat in their cosy parlours and cooked up tickets for others to vote and issued flaming manifestos to the public but like the Pope's bull against the comet, these paper bulletins amounted to little or nothing because the masses of people were not taken into account. 98

Similarly, Committee member George H. Earle Jr. later conceded to Frank W. Leach that the reform group had "perished" because it "was essentially aristocratic in temperament," while former C.M.R.A. executive officer, John J. Ridgway, even suggested that the Committee's "entire course (had) alienated the public." 99

The reformers' influence in local elections was also hampered by their poor organisation and their dislike of political activism. Indeed, the Committee's participation in local elections was limited merely to endorsing candidates on the recommendation of the group's Executive
Committee for city-wide offices, or on behalf of its "auxiliary committees of citizens in every ward" for district offices.\textsuperscript{100} It was on this basis that contemporary newspapers judged the Committee's success or failure in local politics. For example, in February 1882 they heralded a "reform victory" since three-quarters of those elected to Councils had been endorsed by the Committee, whereas in February 1884 they deemed the successful election of all regular Republican nominees to be a "Reform Waterloo".\textsuperscript{101} Consequently, the impression that the reader picks up from these accounts is that the Committee played a dominant role in local elections. They impart the belief, for example, that the Committee was solely responsible for the election of forty-two of the fifty-four Councilman elected in February 1882, and therefore fully deserved its reputation as being the "conqueror of the bosses".\textsuperscript{102} While we cannot be certain about the extent to which the Committee influenced local elections, it is clear that opposition to boss rule was never matched by comparable political organisation.

Historian Philip S. Benjamin attributes the "gentlemen reformers" reluctance to build an effective political organisation to the strong Quaker influence on the Committee for, as he points out, although the Quaker proportion of the city's population was less than one percent, almost one-fifth of the group's members were prominent Friends.\textsuperscript{103} Even though "the operations of boss rule clearly violated standards basic to the Quaker ethos," Benjamin argues that "the Quakers proved hesitant and ineffectual as political
reformers" because they were unable to resolve the dilemmas posed by the Friends' tradition of avoiding active participation in politics and of their [usual] attachment to the Republican party.\textsuperscript{104}

The Committee's dislike of political activism and organisation was such that they refused to endorse William B. Smith for the mayoralty in February 1884, even though they had supported his election to Select Council in two earlier campaigns and had applauded his stand against McManes, as President of the upper chamber, from 1882 to 1884. This was because the reformers believed that Smith's method of campaigning was "undignified" and "unethical" since it involved him conducting a personal canvass of the city and making a direct appeal to the party's division workers.\textsuperscript{105}

Even if the reformers could have overcome their "distaste for organisation on the ward and precinct level," however, they would still have had difficulties establishing a "viable base to launch their challenge to the machine" because as vehement opponents of the spoils system they had no way of rewarding reform volunteers.\textsuperscript{106} As McClure pointed out,

\begin{quote}
the labour of the reformers is a thankless task. It is all work and no pay beyond the gratification of having performed a duty to the public.\textsuperscript{107}
\end{quote}

In sum then, it seems reasonable to conclude that since the reformers not only lacked experience but were weakened by divisions over partisanship, and formed groups that were
poorly organised and unrepresentative, they were not capable of achieving the electoral victories which has traditionally been accorded them.\textsuperscript{107}

Finally, reform publicists misrepresented the real significance of the new city charter when they depicted it as the culmination of the reformers' achievement, for it was in fact the leaders of the state Republican party, Simon Cameron and his chief lieutenant Matt Quay, who were responsible for the passage of the Bullitt bill.\textsuperscript{108} Their motivation however was not to bring about better urban government but rather to extend their influence over Philadelphia City Council and the local Republican party organisation.\textsuperscript{109}

Philadelphia, as I suggested at the end of the last chapter, was because of the size of its population, extremely powerful politically, particularly in terms of its electoral and representational strength. Indeed the city's politicians had played a key role in the factional struggle between Cameron and Andrew Curtin for control of the state Republican party organisation. It was only after allying with "Ring" leader James McManes and Sheriff William Elliott, for instance, that Cameron was able to pressurise William Mann, one of Curtin's most faithful allies, into accepting his leadership of the party.\textsuperscript{110} The alliance with McManes, Elliott, Mann, and ultimately Stokley, combined with the deployment of superior patronage resources and the successful conversion of key leaders (such as Quay and Wayne MacVeagh) away from the opposition camp, enabled the
resourceful Cameron to not only establish himself as the undisputed leader of the state Republican party, but also, by attracting Philadelphia's full electoral strength, withstand the Liberal Republican revolt of 1872.\textsuperscript{111}

Cameron's efforts to control the state legislature were soon handicapped however, and the electoral success of the Republican party placed at risk, when some of the Philadelphia politicians he had accommodated, namely Stokley and McManes, began to publicly question his authority.\textsuperscript{112} He was therefore forced to take steps to curb their power. His uncompromising insistence, as a senatorial oligarch, on complete loyalty from his personal following, placed him in the position anyway of having to eliminate those who stood in his path.\textsuperscript{113}

What the passage of the Bullitt Bill in 1885 represented in essence, I would suggest, was the culmination not of the reformers' achievements, but of Cameron and Quay's efforts to eliminate Stokley and McManes as significant political actors in the city's political arena. This process they had initiated almost a decade earlier, when in the wake of the defeat of the Mayor's ally Wilson Henszey for the Presidency of Common Council in January 1876, they had supported, through loyal subordinates led by twentieth ward leader and Councilman David H. Lane, the adoption of a tight spending policy by new President Joseph L. Caven and his Independent associates.\textsuperscript{114}

This economy drive, combined with the "Pay-As-You-Go" Act of
1879 (a state legislative bill which, sponsored by Caven and again supported by Cameron Republicans, restricted Philadelphia's debt limit and required each city department to make requests for funds within limits set in advance by the tax rate) had the desired effect not only from the reform perspective of bringing an "end to profligacy" in the administration of city finances, but also from Cameron's viewpoint in the sense that Stokley was seriously weakened as resources for local patronage and opportunities for "honest graft" declined. The policy of retrenchment returned Cameron a handsome dividend for those who suffered most from the misuse of city funds, that is, suburban residents in the city's fastest growing wards, expressed their displeasure, as we have seen, by switching from their usual Republican allegiance and voting in favour of Stokley's Democratic opponent, Samuel G. King in the 1881 mayoral election. The strength of the suburban protest vote ultimately cost Stokley the election and with this defeat he ceased to be a significant factor in the city's politics.

Collaboration with Independent Councilmen also played a part in Cameron and Quay's efforts to undermine McManes' position in the city's politics. Joint action in Councils to secure the election of Gas trustees who would be hostile to the "Ring" leader, and also the appointment of a Committee to investigate alleged mismanagement of the Gas Works met, on this occasion, with only partial success however. What provided Cameron and Quay with the decisive breakthrough in curbing McManes' power were not the efforts to challenge
his leadership of the Gas Trust or to improve the Trust's accountability, but rather the initiatives they made aimed at diminishing his influence within the local Republican party, and also city government.

With regard to the former, the state leaders in May 1883 attempted to lure Independent Republicans back to the ranks of the regular party by organising a new political club, the United Republican Association of Pennsylvania. Headquartered in the Betz Building on the north-west corner of Broad and Chestnut Streets, adjacent to the new city hall building, the U.R.A. was "brought into being to attract" as Leach put it "all local elements thought to be in antagonism to the McManes dynasty." That the state leaders were successful in their goal is suggested by the fact that the U.R.A. managed to woo not just local party activists who were opposed to McManes but also prominent businessmen such as Edward C. Knight, George A. Boker and Colonel A. Louden Snowden; men who were "staunch Republicans in national affairs but not necessarily conspicuous in municipal politics." Independent Republicans such as Joseph L. Caven and John J. Ridgway, and members of the Committee of One Hundred reform group like Francis B. Reeves, George D. McCreary, Thomas Learning, H. W. Bartol, Nathaniel E. Janney and Thomas W. Barlow, also joined the new organisation. The North American commented that the members of the U.R.A. included,

many active young men thoroughly acquainted with political affairs but who have never been attached to the cliques whose power brought the party
organisation into contempt; and considering the condition of the party at present, it will not be long before the association will exert a powerful influence in shaping the political affairs of the city.¹²⁰

The paper's prediction proved accurate for by the end of the year, the U.R.A., led by Ridgway and supported by Lane, had secured the nomination of "a vigorous opponent of McManes" for the mayoralty, namely Independent Republican and President of Select Council, William B. Smith.¹²¹ Smith's subsequent victory in the election in February 1884 meant that, for the first time since Cameron's senatorial triumph in 1867, the mayoralty of Philadelphia lay with entirely loyal interests. Henceforth, the Times suggested that the local Republican party would be controlled by Quay, Smith and Lane "who turn in with the Cameron element."¹²²

Cameron and Quay attempted to attract Independent Republicans back to the party organisation, not just through the creation of a new political club, but also by supporting reformers' efforts to establish a new system of government in Philadelphia. This initiative "startled Independents everywhere" not least because businessmen reformers regarded the provisions of the Bullitt Bill (such as the application of civil service rules to all city employees; the reduction of city departments from thirty-two to nine and the granting to the Mayor the power of appointment and removal of department heads) as the key to combating "bossism" in local politics, and yet here, ironically, were in their view, two of its most conspicuous practitioners supporting the same reform principle as them.¹²³
Why Cameron and Quay supported the same goals as businessmen reformers however was not, as I have suggested, because of any sincere commitment to reform, but because it was politically expedient for them to do so. On the one hand, for example, it placed them in a positive light in the eyes of reformers and Independents (as they intended) and on the other the Bullitt Bill, if implemented, would (by placing the Gas Trust under the new Department of Public Works, whose Director would be held responsible by appointment to the Mayor) abolish McManes' "centre of power". Cameron and Quay also favoured the centralisation of power and responsibility under a strong Mayor, because it would strike a decisive blow against Councilmen and ward "bosses", since the practice of having executive departments controlled and administered by Committees of Councils would be eliminated. Philadelphia state representative Boies Penrose, for example, advised Quay that "the ward and district leaders" who were fighting the Bullitt Bill were losing influence. They're moss covered and sawdust stuffed. They're years behind the times. Younger men who will be more vigorous and harder to control will take their place unless the independent power of those local bosses is taken away and concentrated in a single head. You can control one man, particularly if you've been careful to select a tame and respectable one, but a dozen ignorant saloon-keepers can raise hell.

The irony of Cameron Republicans supporting the same legislation as reform groups such as the Committee of One Hundred and the Civil Service Reform Association, did not escape the attention of some contemporaries who recognised the political advantages that the former could gain from the
bill. In an editorial entitled "Boss Rule in Reform Disguise", McClure's Times argued that "the sweeping absolutism of the Bullitt Charter" would produce "an absolute Boss Restoration." The paper claimed that:

Every facility is given for the Bosses to organise the whole city government under their dependents, and when thus organised there will be no power of removal or possibility of reform except by another appeal to a future legislature. With all the audacious villainry of Tweed no such reckless violence to public rights was ever dreamed of.

In a similar vein, George H. Earle of the Committee of One Hundred, predicted that the Bullitt Bill would "create the worst ring which ever ruled the city." Other "highly reputable and well-known citizens" such as John Wanamaker, John W. Patton, A. Louden Snowden, Louis Wagner, and George S. Graham also had doubts about the proposed new charter. They were wary of "the danger of sudden and sweeping change" that would occur if the Bill was implemented. Since "the Mayor has almost despotic powers" they were also concerned about "the difficulty of electing a good Mayor and the risk of electing a bad or unfit one."

Despite the reservations of some of the city's men of substance, and the bitter opposition of the "Gas Ring" and Councils, the Bullitt Bill was passed by the state legislature in May 1885, and brought into effect in April 1887. As it transpired the fears of the minority of the city's best citizens were well-founded for the structural changes in local government implemented under the new city charter did not bring about "the fall of bossism" as
reformers had anticipated. James Bryce, for instance, subsequently acknowledged that the Bullitt Charter, has worked for good...[in that]...it extinguished the separate Gas Trust and therewith quenched the light of Mr. McManes who ceased to be formidable when his patronage departed and had now become a "back number"...[but]...in the stead of Mr. McManes the State Boss now reigns.\[130\]

In the process of curbing McManes' power and extending his influence over Philadelphia City Council and the local Republican party, Quay by "turning reformer", also managed it should be noted, to undermine the bonds that held the reformers together. As Lucretia L. Blankenburg later recalled:

Senator Cameron stood back of Quay; together they worked to defeat all reform movements in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania. They enmeshed different members of the Committee of One Hundred until they ceased to be reformers and finally were largely the cause of the Committee's dissolution.\[131\]

Thus political expediency on Quay's part yielded a handsome return; the abolition of McManes' "centre of power" and the demise of organised reform activity in the city.

Contrary to the opinion of reform publicists the new city charter then, I would suggest, represented more a triumph for Cameron and Quay, than it did for genuine political reform. Indeed, by consolidating power and responsibility in local government, the new charter paved the way "for the worst ring which ever ruled this city" as some men of substance had forecast. A "ring" moreover, that was to be controlled not by city politicians, as in the past, but by state Republican party leader, Matthew S. Quay.
In the late nineteenth century, party politics in Philadelphia became dominated by an over-riding cleavage between well-organised machine and reform forces. In particular, the Republican political machine (or "Organisation") emerged as the central force in the government and politics of the city. Put another way political power in Philadelphia was consolidated by the turn of the century; that is, power within the Republican party was centralised and the control it, in turn, exercised over the city government expanded to such an extent that the "Organisation" emerged as the dominant institution in the local polity.¹

The intention of this section is to explain how this change in the organisation and structure of the city's party politics came about; that is, to account for the (internal) consolidation of power within the Republican party and its ability to overwhelm its (external) electoral opponents, as well as to examine how the non-partisan reform movement emerged as the only serious threat to the "Organisation's" hegemony during this period.

That a reliable system of control and discipline was indeed established within the Republican party organisation is
demonstrated in Chapter 5 where, it is also argued that, as a result of this development, successive party leaders David Martin, Israel W. Durham, James P. McNichol and the Vare brothers, can unlike their predecessors James McManes and William Stokley, be considered to have been (in the literal sense) genuine city bosses.

Chapter 6 offers an explanation for the consolidation of power within the Republican party organisation. The centralisation of the "Organisation", it is argued, was attributable not just to the monopolisation by the political boss of the distribution of patronage (itself a consequence of the administrative consolidation and centralisation of power and authority under the new city charter of 1887) as conventional wisdom suggests, but also to turn-of-the-century changes in party rules, methods, recruitment and finance which transformed the way in which the Republican party organisation functioned and enabled the party leadership to exercise reliable control over subordinates both in party office and in public office.

Since the establishment of a system of discipline was contingent upon the "Organisation" being able to control the electorate Chapter 7 examines the electoral foundations of the Republican machine. A quantitative analysis reveals that the "Organisation's" ability to control votes successfully was based on the "social services" it provided to the "new" immigrant, poor, and black population of the inner city. Although this analysis indicates that proponents of the post-migration theory, such as Robert
Merton, Richard Wade, William F. Whyte and Oscar Handlin provide us with the most likely explanation for the attachment of voters to the "Organisation", it does not necessarily follow, it is argued, that the various Republican party leaders were "good guys" who served the needs of the urban poor. On the contrary, it is suggested that the "Organisation" exploited its firmest supporters, as much as it helped them, and that rather than being the natural functional substitute for government that Merton's theoretical model suggests, the machine's role in Philadelphia was, if anything, dysfunctional. That is, it was destructive of functioning government for the vast majority of its supporters who in fact needed such government the most.

The final section of Chapter 7 examines the remarkable degree of electoral success that the Republican machine enjoyed between 1887 and the re-emergence of a competitive two party system in 1933. The "Organisation's" electoral supremacy, it is suggested, was attributable not so much to public indifference, but to the control it exercised over the election machinery, the local strength of Republican partisanship, and the reduction of the Democratic party to the status of a "kept minority."

Those who benefitted from and supported the "Organisation's" hegemony in local affairs, and those who were opposed to it are the subject of the final two chapters. Chapter 8 focuses on the relationship between consolidation in the
urban polity and in the local economy. It describes how Republican party leaders helped a clique of plutocrats to establish monopoly control over the city's street railway, gas and electricity supply systems; a development, it is suggested, which, like the centralisation of local political power, was to the mutual benefit of both the party boss and the group of utility entrepreneurs. It is also argued that since the party boss and his machine were independent of, and not subservient to, business interests economic man, contrary to received wisdom, did not triumph over political man in turn of the century Philadelphia.

Chapter 9 demonstrates in what ways reform groups, organised after 1886, differed from their predecessors, and also offers an explanation for the emergence (as well as failure) of the non-partisan reform movement as the principal opposition to the "Organisation's" hegemony in local affairs.
5. The Salient Characteristics of Republican Boss Rule in Philadelphia

The purpose of this introductory chapter to Part B is to show that, unlike James McManes and William S. Stokley, successive party leaders David Martin (and his ally, Charles A. Porter), Israel W. Durham, James P. McNichol and the Vare brothers can be categorised as genuine city "bosses". My contention that it was only after 1887 that the city was governed by an overall "boss" for the first time, can be demonstrated by specifying those characteristics which Martin and his successors had in common but which distinguished them from their predecessors.¹

The first distinguishing feature of the "boss rule", that accompanied the institutionalisation of the Republican "Organisation", is that Martin and his successors were chosen to run the city Republican party organisation by the state party leader (or "boss"), Matthew S. Quay. Put another way, Quay and his successor Boies Penrose exercised a firm grip over the Republican party organisation in Philadelphia, or as James Bryce observed, "in the stead of Mr. McManes, the State Boss now reigns supreme through his lieutenants."² Muckraker Lincoln Steffens even suggested that Quay was "the proprietor of Pennsylvania and the real ruler of Philadelphia, just as William Penn, the Great Proprietor was."³ Indeed, this characteristic led Steffens to conclude that:

157
The Philadelphia Organisation is upside down. It has its roots in the air, or rather like the banyon tree, it send its roots from the centre out both up and down and all around and there lies its peculiar strength....the Organisation that rules Philadelphia is not a mere municipal machine, but a city, state and national organisation.

A second distinguishing feature of Republican "boss rule", after 1887, is that Martin and his successors did not occupy any public office in city government when they held the position of city "boss". Indeed, apart from McNichol's six year spell as Select Councilman, and Bill Vare's four year term in the upper chamber, local party leaders avoided city government office altogether. Instead they opted for public positions in county or state government (see Table 5.1). This preference may well have been a reflection of the close links that existed between the city and the state boss, or was perhaps recognition of where power really lay, since the city of Philadelphia was merely a legislative agency of the state and not an independent sovereignty. However, what is particularly significant is that, unlike McManes and Stokley, the power of Martin and his successors did not just stem from the public offices they personally occupied. That is, local party leaders after 1887 were able to subject their followers to a system of control and discipline regardless of whatever public office they themselves occupied.

In the case of party office, the city "boss" exercised a firm grip over the internal affairs of the Republican party organisation. For example, in 1905, when ward leaders Charles F. Kindred, Theodore B. Stulb and Alexander Crow...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth and Death</th>
<th>Political Base</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Public Office</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Martin</td>
<td>1845-1920</td>
<td>19th ward N.E.Phila.</td>
<td>Garbage Collector</td>
<td>1889 - 91 Collector of Internal Revenue for 1st district of Penn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles A. Porter</td>
<td>1839 - 1907</td>
<td>8th ward Downtown</td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>1862 - 66 Supervisor of Streets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel W. Durham</td>
<td>1856-1909</td>
<td>7th ward Downtown</td>
<td>Flour Dealer</td>
<td>1885 - 1985 Police Magistrate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James P. McNichol</td>
<td>1864-1917</td>
<td>10th ward Downtown</td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>1898 - 1904 Select Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Vare</td>
<td>1859-1908</td>
<td>1st ward South Phila.</td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>1890 - 96 State Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Vare</td>
<td>1862-1922</td>
<td>1st ward South Phila.</td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>1897 State Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William S. Vare</td>
<td>1867-1934</td>
<td>1st/26th ward South Phila.</td>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>1898 - 1902 President, Board of Mercantile Appraisers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1898 - 1902 Select Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1902-1912 Recorder of Deeds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1912-1926 U.S. House of Representatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1926-1929 U.S. Senator-elect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jr., questioned Durham and McNichol's authority during a period of reform insurgency, they were automatically replaced on the Republican City Committee by Peter E. Smith, John Klang and Charles L. Brown. Reform leader, Rudolph Blankenburg, wryly observed that

\[\text{disobedience to the orders of the "Organisation" whether from the rank and file or those higher up is meted with instant punishment....it cannot and does not brook insubordination, which in fact is about the only "crime" it is unwilling to tolerate.}\]

Bill Vare was also able to dictate his choice of ward leaders, for as contemporary political scientist Professor John T. Salter noted, "when Vare says 'There is your leader - elect him,' the Ward Committee follows orders." This kind of obedience prompted the Sunday Dispatch to remark that, "The Republican Organisation is a good deal like an army. It obeys the wishes of the general staff."

Local elections provide a good example not only of the smooth efficiency of the machine, but also illustrate the tendency of party workers, throughout the city, to carry out the boss's orders. The September primary election of 1925, or the "Shoyer Stickers election" as it became known, provides perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the boss's ability to subject party subordinates to a reliable system of control. John M. Patterson, the "Organisation" candidate for the Republican nomination for District Attorney, fell ill just before the primary, and on election day was believed to be dying. At 3 p.m. the Vare leaders went into conference at Republican party headquarters and decided to defeat their own candidate.
This decision was quite remarkable given that voters had been going to the polls since 7 a.m. to vote for Patterson, and there were only four hours left before they closed. Ward leaders were summoned by telephone to party headquarters and given bundles of stickers, which had been printed on the eve of election day and held in readiness, in the event of Patterson's death. The stickers, bearing the name of former City Treasurer, Frederick J. Shoyer, were distributed by car to polling places throughout the city, where they were placed by election officials over Patterson's name or in a blank space on the ballot paper. Soon after the polls closed, Patterson died, but the Vares' were unable to rob him of victory as he received 168,795 votes. Yet in an incredible feat of organisation, the Vare machine had managed to cast 124,895 votes for a man not previously discussed as a candidate for District Attorney, and whose name had not even been printed on the ballot paper.\(^{10}\)

The system of control which the city boss exercised over subordinates in party office also extended to those followers who occupied public office. From the 1890's onwards, one-third to one-half of the members of Select Council also sat on the Republican party's City Committee, while the lower chamber was packed with party workers who had served the "Organisation" loyally in their respective wards.\(^{11}\)

That the "Organisation's" leadership could control the
behaviour of their supporters in elected public office was demonstrated in 1901, when state "boss" Quay punished an ungrateful Peter B. Widener for his lack of support during a political crisis. Quay supervised the passage of legislation, creating a new category of street railway company, which was specifically directed towards destroying Widener's monopoly of the transit industry in Philadelphia. While Widener set sail for a European holiday, two of Quay's supporters introduced the necessary bills, without notice, in the state legislature on May 28, 1901. They were whisked through the House and Senate by June 5, and passed by Governor Stone on June 7, when charters were issued for roads in Scranton and Pittsburgh, and for thirteen companies in Philadelphia.

The machine in Philadelphia was equally effective. Under instructions from "Iz" Durham, James L. Miles, President of Select Council and Chairman of the Republican City Committee, called a special session of Council for Monday, June 10, to consider the thirteen franchise ordinances. The forty-member Council included nineteen ward leaders, and it quickly referred the bills to the Street Railroads Committee chaired by Watson D. Upperman, the thirty-first ward representative on the Republican City Committee. Significantly, Charles Seger, the machine's "whip" appointed by Durham, also sat on the Railroads Committee, and it took just one hour to approve these ordinances which affected nearly two hundred miles of the city's streets, as well as the rights and interests of existing transit companies. The
bills were then passed by Councils on June 12, sent to Mayor Ashbridge the following day, and initialled shortly after midnight on June 14, but not before the Mayor had publicly refused to veto or accept an offer to the city of two and a half million dollars for the same franchises, from store merchant John Wanamaker.\textsuperscript{12}

The street railway franchise "grab" was widely condemned by the forces of good government, but what is remarkable about this incident from the perspective of political organisation, is the speed by which the conspiracy was executed. Since this legislation was passed by the state legislature and city council in just over two weeks, I would suggest that this "macing" exercise provides an excellent illustration of the superb way in which Quay and Durham were able to marshall their "troops" in the respective legislatures.\textsuperscript{13}

Local party leaders managed to maintain control of their followers in city council, even on occasions when they were starved of patronage resources. For example, the Vare and McNichol forces in Councils successfully combined to thwart Blankenburg's reform initiatives, by employing obstructionist tactics to undermine his mayoral administration (1912-16). Morris L. Cooke, Blankenburg's Director of Public Works, acknowledged that "the real stumbling block" to reform was

\begin{quote}
the openly antagonistic attitude of our City Councils....The whole body is organised so that a very few strong-willed and corrupt men at points of vantage, arrange everything. A bare half dozen absolutely dictate to twenty times
\end{quote}
The monotonous regularity with which successive party leaders secured public contract work suggests that the city "boss's" ability to control the behaviour of his followers was not confined to unusual or special occasions. On the contrary, the remarkable way in which firms that party leaders invested in, or associated themselves with, prospered, indicates that the city "boss" was able to subject subordinates in public office to a reliable system of control and discipline, on a consistent and regular basis.

For example, David Martin, Charles Porter and John Mack, were nicknamed the "Hog Combine", because "they hogged everything in sight and more!" \(^\text{15}\) Between 1887 and 1894 companies they controlled completed nearly five million dollars worth of business with the Department of Public Works (see Table 5.2). After 1894 Martin and Porter's Vulcanite Paving Company received a total of 736 contracts worth approximately four million dollars, while John Mack's businesses acquired over four thousand contracts, carrying out at least thirty-three million dollars worth of public work. \(^\text{16}\)

Similarly, McNichol and the Vare brothers were labelled "the Contractor Bosses". James P. McNichol, along with his brother Daniel, inherited the family building firm and completed over six million dollars worth of municipal work, in the form of street-paving and repair contracts, in the
Table 5.2. City Contracts for the Department of Public Works, Awarded to the "Hog Combine", 1887-1894

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau:</th>
<th>Highways $</th>
<th>Water $</th>
<th>Surveys $</th>
<th>Misc. $</th>
<th>Total $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>102,178</td>
<td>227,360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>329,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>141,461</td>
<td>252,145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>393,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>109,323</td>
<td>352,029</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>461,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>354,562</td>
<td>4,249</td>
<td>73,175</td>
<td></td>
<td>431,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>244,626</td>
<td>59,555</td>
<td>15,916</td>
<td></td>
<td>320,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>174,157</td>
<td>23,148</td>
<td>271,759</td>
<td></td>
<td>469,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>956,272</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>24,303</td>
<td></td>
<td>982,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>307,560</td>
<td>1,038,000</td>
<td>72,080</td>
<td>83,481</td>
<td>1,501,121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2,390,139 1,958,337 432,930 107,784 4,889,190

Vulcanite Filbert Charles
Paving Company & Porter A. Porter

Number of Contracts: 152 16 16

| 1887    | 102,176    | 227,360 |           |         | 329,536 |
| 1888    | 156,505    | 237,101 |           |         | 393,606 |
| 1889    | 126,024    | 328,199 | 7,128     |         | 461,351 |
| 1890    | 358,812    | 73,175  |           |         | 431,987 |
| 1891    | 304,182    | 15,916  |           |         | 320,098 |
| 1892    | 197,305    | 271,759 |           |         | 469,064 |
| 1893    | 982,427    |        |           |         | 982,427 |
| 1894    | 391,041    | 1,110,080 |         |         | 1,501,121 |

2,618,472 1,902,740 367,978 4,889,190

165
Major Items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paving Broad Street</td>
<td>$700,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lining East Park Reservoir</td>
<td>$792,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Pennsylvania Junction</td>
<td>$263,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen Lane Reservoir</td>
<td>$1,038,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mayor's Annual Register of Contracts, 1887-1894, Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia; City Contracts, Records Centre, City of Philadelphia; Anti-Combine Committee, For Good Government, (Philadelphia, 1895), pp.15-21.

The Mayor's Annual Register lists the number of contracts that was awarded to the above firms during this period, while the value of them has been calculated by tracing the individual contracts stored at the Records Centre, 410 N. Broad Street.

The Anti-Combine Committee was a local non-partisan reform group set up in 1895 with the aim of electing former Democratic governor Robert E. Pattison "as Mayor, to secure a business administration of city affairs."

1890's. Their company, in which Durham was made a secret partner, then undertook rather more ambitious projects. They built the twenty-five million dollar Torresdale water-filtration plant (1899-1907) and the Roosevelt Boulevard (1903-14) which opened up the north-eastern section of the city to automobile traffic and residential development, as well as the subway tunnel (1907-8) for the Market Street transit line, and the Ben Franklin Parkway (1918) which linked Fairmount Park to the city centre.18

"Sunny Jim's" other interests included the Pennsylvania Company, which controlled a half a million dollar garbage disposal business, and the Filbert Paving and Construction Company which netted 310 city contracts, worth in excess of three million dollars, between 1903 and 1911. He was also
the major stockholder in the Millard and Keystone Construction Companies which obtained a three million dollar contract for the construction of a new high pressure fire mains, the largest single contract awarded by the Department of Public Safety during the Reyburn administration of 1907 to 1911.\textsuperscript{19}

The Vare brothers, George, Edwin and Bill, initially set up a small contracting business in South Philadelphia, hauling ashes, and collecting and dumping the city's garbage. Their company, however, quickly developed into a major street-cleaning operation, and between 1888 and 1921 they collected eighteen million dollars from fifty-eight street-cleaning contracts, usually covering the first, second and third districts of the city. In 1905, and from 1909-11 inclusive, they managed to obtain the contract for cleaning the entire city, ranging in cost from $950,000 in 1905, to $1,372,000 in 1911. The Vares' also carried out ten million dollars worth of other public work, including sewer construction, bridge-building, resurfacing work and the development of League Island Park. In total Vare interests received 341 public contracts worth over twenty eight million dollars (see Table 5.3).\textsuperscript{20}

Private work was also important to "the Contractor Bosses". In public testimony Edwin Vare admitted that by 1911 he had undertaken fifty million dollars worth of work for the city, fifteen million from public contracts and thirty-five million from sub-contracting work for private parties. The Vares' largest private contract was with the Bell Telephone
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Contracts</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
<th>No. of Estimated Value/ Unknown</th>
<th>Estimated Value $</th>
<th>Grand Sum $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilson &amp; Vare</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>830,419</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>227,000</td>
<td>1,057,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1888-1895)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.S. Vare</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1891-3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Vare</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>816,149</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>326,452</td>
<td>1,142,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1894-1904)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Vare</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>21,324,120</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3,110,000</td>
<td>24,434,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1890-1922)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vare Construction Company</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,409,042</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,409,042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1923-1928)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3,668,452</td>
<td>28,048,182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mayor's Annual Register of Contracts, 1888-1928, Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia; City Contracts, Records Centre, City of Philadelphia.

* Because of theft or fire it is not possible to trace all of the individual contracts at the Records Centre. In such cases an estimated value has been calculated, based on the average value of contracts awarded to the firm in the particular year when the individual contract could not be found.
Company and involved the digging and laying of conduits throughout the city. McNichol enjoyed a similar deal with the United Gas Improvement Company. The "Contractor Bosses" could insist on a monopoly arrangement in private contract work, for these large utility companies could not complete any project without approval from the City Council and the Department of Public Works.  

A brief examination of the procedure by which city contracts were awarded is sufficient to show that the city "boss" was able to exercise control over subordinates in public office. First impressions suggest that public contracts were awarded on an impartial basis, since it was city councils that determined (except when the state legislature dictated otherwise) what work was to be carried on within the city, and either granted permission to utility companies to proceed, or appropriated the necessary funds to government departments. Heads of departments, appointed by the Mayor, were then responsible for awarding public contracts and overseeing the satisfactory completion of both private and public work on behalf of the city.

In practice, however, this procedure was so tightly controlled by the "Organisation" that fair and open competition amongst contractors was stifled, and only those firms favoured by the city "boss" prospered. For example, since the bulk of the council's work dealt with matters of business routine and not general public policy, and given that (prior to 1919) it was a large and unwieldy body, all bills, resolutions, and petitions were considered by
committees first, before open discussion in the chambers. If any of these committees did not favour bills they obstructed them by simply holding them back. In 1912, for instance, although 311 bills were reported out for action by Councils, 2,084 had actually been referred to Committees. Significantly, Committee recommendations were almost never changed by Councils. Of the 254 bills reported favourably by Committee in 1912, only four were rejected and two hundred passed unanimously.

The "Organisation" always controlled the most important of the twenty-seven Council Committees, namely the Finance, Highways and Surveys Committees, which dealt with 75 percent of all Council work. In 1910-11, for example, 22 of the 53 Councilmen who occupied the 72 positions on the three Committees, were members of the City Committee. Ward leaders, Frank H. Caven, Harry J. Trainer, Peter E. Costello, and John P. Connelly, sat on all three Committees, with the latter being Chairman of the Highways Committee. The Chairmanship of the Finance Committee was held by first ward leader Joseph R.C. McAllister who relied on an appointed postion as a real estate assessor for his livelihood, and owed his political career to the Vares'. Similarly, in 1911 when Vare received a contract to clean the entire city for $1,372,000, seven ward leaders sat on the Councils street-cleaning Committee that determined the size of the appropriation to the street-cleaning Bureau. They included Neil MacNeill, Ferdinand G. Zweig, Harry J. Trainer and Kennedy Crossan, who were all members of Vare's
mayoral campaign committee for the Republican primary election in 1911.\textsuperscript{26}

Over fifty percent of the appropriations allocated by the Councils went to the Departments of Public Works and Public Safety, the two largest departments in city government. In theory, the Mayor appointed the heads of departments but in practice, as he owed his election to the party, they were selected by the City Committee, because the "Organisation" had to be certain they would be willing to follow their instructions with regard to the awarding of contracts and the appointment or removal of subordinates.\textsuperscript{27} These positions were sometimes filled by Committee members. For example, David Smyth, James B. Sheehan, Joseph H. Klemmer, Henry Clay, Arthur R. H. Morrow and Peter Costello, all served as either Director or assistant Director of Supplies, Public Works or Public Safety, under the Weaver and Reyburn administrations of 1903-11.\textsuperscript{28} Ward leaders also occupied lucrative and influential offices within these departments. For example, when Morris L. Cooke took over as Director of Public Works in the Blankenburg reform administration (1912-16), he discovered that all the assistant Commissioners of the Bureau of Highways, drawing $2,500/year, were ward leaders who had no knowledge of highway engineering.\textsuperscript{29}

It was these party workers in public office that ensured that city contracts were placed with firms favoured by, or controlled by, party leaders. Vare, for example, was awarded a $950,000 contract in 1905 to clean the entire city, by forty-first ward leader Peter Costello, Director of
Public Works, on the recommendation of eighteenth ward leader Samuel Sutcliffe, Chief of the Street-Cleaning Bureau. Both these party workers had been elevated to the City Committee by McNichol in the 1890's. In addition, eighth ward leader Robert Scott, magistrate Dennis F. Fitzgerald, and State Representatives Joseph MacIvor and Henry S. Myers were employed as district inspectors to see that Vare carried out the work properly (see Figure 5.1).^30

A conspiracy to defraud the city in the construction of the smallpox wing of the new municipal hospital, which was uncovered in October 1905, shows just how much the awarding of contracts was a tightly knit "Organisation" affair. Those charged included Abraham L. English, the Director of Public Safety under Mayor Ashbridge (1899-1903), who awarded the one million dollar contract in 1903; City Architect Philip H. Johnson, who was Durham's brother-in-law; and two representatives of Henderson and Company, of which McNichol was a director. It was shown that they acted together to change the specifications of the contract after it was awarded and carried it out in their own way, with the aid of the building inspector, James D. Finley, a flour merchant who also happened to be Durham's cousin.^31

The construction of the Torresdale water filtration system, between 1899 and 1907, provides perhaps the best illustration of the methods which were used by successive administrations to stifle fair competition amongst contractors, as all but two of the major contracts for this twenty-five million dollar enterprise were awarded to D. J.
Figure 5.1. Philadelphia's Political Contractor System, 1919. This chart illustrating how the "Contractor Bosses" were able to maintain a tight grip on the awarding of contracts for public work, was used by the Philadelphia Charter Revision Committee in its publicity campaign to secure the passage of a new city charter in 1919. [Source: Neva R. Deardorff. "To Unshackle Philadelphia," The Survey (April 5, 1919), p.21]
In June 1905, Mayor John Weaver fell out with Durham over the "boss's" proposal to lease the city's gas works to the United Gas Improvement Company. Weaver "turned reformer" and appointed "two of the country's foremost engineers," John Donald Maclennan and Major Cassius E. Gillette of the War Department, to head an inquiry into the awarding of contracts for the construction of the filtration plant. The engineers reported back to the Mayor that the favoured contractors, in collusion with city officials, had robbed the treasury of six million dollars, out of the eighteen million, spent on the filtration scheme by 1905, even when allowing the contractors a 20 percent profit margin.32

Their investigation into this "graft operation" revealed that a variety of methods had been used to "guide the contracts into the "right" hands," as the Public Ledger put it.33 These included: the inadequate advertising for bids; the insistence on lump sum bids (rather than itemising bids so that competitors could have made intelligent bids upon the different classes of work at unit prices) and the withholding, by the Filtration Bureau, of the relevant information (except to the favoured contractor) that was needed in order to calculate such an estimate; the awarding of contracts to McNichol's company on the basis that it was the "best" or most "responsible" bidder, rather than the "lowest" bidder, and on the grounds that his firm would complete the work in the shortest time; the readvertisement of some contracts when other competitors were the lowest
bidders; and finally, the intimidation of competitors by contract specifications "which gave excessive and unnecessary power to city officials."³⁴

In the case of the latter, the filtration contracts contained a clause that gave the Director of Public Works authority to change the plans and specifications of contracts to an unlimited extent, and to fix the price of work as charged. The engineers claimed that the main purpose of this provision was to permit city officials to harass an unwelcome contractor without the latter being able to prevent it, or to secure legal redress.³⁵

The experience of George C. Dietrich, who managed to obtain one of the two large contracts that eluded McNichol, suggests that the engineers were correct in their assessment. Dietrich attempted to build Lardner's Point Station No.2 for $532,000, leaving himself a margin of $120,000 as protection against accidents and delays, and to provide a reasonable profit, but as he had successfully underbid the McNichol firm, he incurred the wrath of the "Organisation". Chief of the Filtration Bureau, John W. Hill, who had been specially imported from Boss Cox's Cincinnati, told his inspectors to "keep after that Dutchman (Dietrich) - you must nail him down to a hair." In fact sixty-two material changes were made to the specifications of his contract and eighty-nine supplementary sheets of drawings were issued after the contract was let. Dietrich was forced into bankruptcy and left Philadelphia for
Seattle, a ruined man. 36

In these circumstances it is perhaps not too surprising to find that there was no competition for the five largest contracts awarded for the construction of the filters, and the provision of sand and gravel to fill them. Contemporaries such as the reformer Rudolph Blankenburg however were still bewildered that city work totalling $9,400,000 could not attract other bidders:

It is an astonishing feature of the bidding for the sand contracts, which were the largest that had ever been awarded in Philadelphia or elsewhere in the U.S., that not a single firm of sand-dealers participated in the bidding, although there were a dozen or more reputable and thoroughly competent dealers in the article in the city. 37

It appears that the Vares obtained their street-cleaning contracts in a similar fashion to the way in which McNichol secured the filtration contracts. Street-cleaning contracts were awarded on a yearly basis only, which meant that prospective bidders had to take the risk of purchasing expensive vehicles and machinery, without any guarantee that their contract would be renewed. They were also not awarded until late November, which did not allow sufficient time for a new contractor to establish his own dumping stations throughout the city. 38 In addition, bidders were discouraged by two specifications which were never enforced when Vare was awarded the contract; that is, the contractor had to "employ an extra 195 men as 'block men' to clean each city square" in the downtown district, and make sure there was "a sufficient number of men maintained on all asphalt, brick and wood block streets to keep them clean at all
The wide interpretation that could be placed on the latter specification meant that officials of the Street-Cleaning Bureau could easily harass an unwanted contractor. This occurred in the case of Daniel Dooley, an independent contractor who suffered a similar fate as George C. Dietrich. In 1903 Dooley obtained the street-cleaning contract in the third district for $59,000, under bidding the Contracting Combine by $112,000. From the outset, he was harassed as numerous complaints were filed with the Bureau that he was not fulfilling the contract specifications. He was compelled to pay fines totalling $9,084.50 or 15 percent of the contract value. Dooley was again successful in bidding for the 1904 contract, but the strain of events took their toll however, for he died in March that year, a victim of what his widow and the North American called "gang persecution". After the Dooley episode, the Vares' picked up street-cleaning contracts on a regular basis and by 1911 they were the only bidders offering to clean the entire city for $1,340,000. The North American called the charade of awarding contracts "a Reyburnian Joke".

An important consequence of the ability of successive party leaders to subject subordinates, both in party and in public office, to a reliable system of control, was that the city "boss" was able to regulate the legislation that did (or did not) pass through the City Council. As George W. Norris,
Blankenburg's director of wharves, docks and ferries complained, "the legislation that the Mayor wanted, the (Councils) refused. The legislation that he did not want they passed over his veto."^2 For example, when reformers persuaded the state legislature to pass a new housing code in 1913 that regulated health and safety standards in Philadelphia, the city Councils, guided by Edwin Vare, voted insufficient funds to pay for the hundred sanitary inspectors that would have to be hired to ensure that the act was enforced.43

In a similar vein, a decade earlier, Israel Durham repeatedly blocked the efforts of utilities financier, John Mack, to secure a council ordinance that would have allowed him to break the Philadelphia Electric Company's local monopoly on electric lighting. Mack, a railroad financier and street-paving and garbage disposal contractor, had been a close associate of Durham's at the turn of the century. He was also President of the Keystone Telephone Company and interested in the idea of using the Company's extensive underground conduits to establish a new electric company.44 Fearful of a potential rival, Joseph McCall, President of Philadelphia Electric, attempted to take over the Keystone Company in 1904. Durham acted as an intermediary for Mack, and negotiated a deal with McCall whereby Philadelphia Electric would purchase the Keystone conduits for two and a half million dollars. In addition, Durham promised McCall that Councils would approve an ordinance prohibiting the further stringing of electric light wires within the
districts covered by the Keystone's conduits, thereby safeguarding the Company's future interests.

On returning from holiday Mack rejected the agreement and demanded that Philadelphia Electric pay three million dollars for the underground conduits. When McCall refused to increase his offer, Mack announced his intention to compete against Philadelphia Electric and promised prospective consumers a 20 percent reduction in electric rates. Meanwhile Durham, humiliated at the way Mack had cancelled his agreement, vowed that no ordinance giving Mack electric privileges would ever pass Councils. Mack attempted to secure an ordinance on several occasions but never succeeded. He was eventually forced to accept McCall's original offer, and worse still, his contract work for the city was substantially cut. Durham contemptuously dismissed him with the expression: "Why that man doesn't know what division he lives in and could not carry it with a million dollars."^5

As the boss's approval was necessary to pass legislation in Councils, communication and payment passed through him, rather than directly from private interests to subordinates. That is, when businessmen, or big corporations such as the Pennsylvania Railroad, sought legislative privileges, they channelled their requests and "contributions" (the "routine graft" or "oil" that kept the machine in running order) through the city boss's eleventh floor office in the Betz Building, which was situated adjacent to city hall. They rarely attempted to bribe councilmen on an individual basis
as they had done in the past; nor did they bother to lobby the Mayor, the official head of government. Instead, private interests found that their needs were more easily met by dealing with a single overall boss, a leader of unofficial executive status, who could guarantee results because of his ability to control city government.

For example, when the Mutual Automatic Telephone Company secured franchise privileges in July 1894, it was obliged to distribute $363,000 of its stock to the "Organisation". Seventy-five Common Councilmen were each allocated six, fifty dollar shares, and twenty-five Select Councilmen, twenty shares each. This share distribution guaranteed a three-fifths majority in each Council chamber, enough to secure passage of the franchise in the event of a mayoral veto. Almost half of the shares, however, went to David Martin, and his associate Charles A. Porter, who each received 1525 shares valued at $76,250. The local reform watchdog group, the Citizens' Municipal Association, acknowledged that as State Senators, Martin and Porter had "no official connection with Councils," but as leaders of the Republican party organisation "possessed notorious influence with members."

The "influence" which David Martin and his successors as party leaders exercised was, as we have seen, the ability to subject subordinates, in both party and public office, to a reliable system of control. It is this increased discipline within the (internal) party organisation which distinguishes genuine "boss" rule in turn-of-the-century Philadelphia from
the party factionalism and ring rivalry that prevailed in the 1870's, when McManes and Stokley struggled for supremacy within the Republican party. Under Martin and his successors, the "Organisation" exhibited the internal cohesiveness and discipline which was characteristic of the mature political machine; that is, the Republican party organisation functioned as its centralised and hierarchical pyramid structure suggested that it should. What we now need to explain, however, is how this system of control and discipline was instituted; that is, how was power internally consolidated within the Republican "Organisation". This issue will be the subject of the following chapter.
6. The Centralisation of the Republican "Organisation" of Philadelphia

In seeking to account for the centralisation of political machines James Scott, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson argue that if a political boss can monopolise the distribution of patronage within his domain, he will quickly be able to bring other politicians under his control because he will be able to reward those who are loyal to him and starve out those who are not.\footnote{Patronage it appears also seems to have been a key factor in accounting for the consolidation of power within the Philadelphia Republican "Organisation". Clinton R. Woodruff, Secretary of the National Municipal League, for example, regarded the threat of dismissal from public office as the lynch-pin of what he called "the Philadelphia system." He noted the completeness and thoroughness with which the Organisation took care of its workers and yet subjected each one of them to constant dependence upon it for support and maintenance.............Each ward leader with very few exceptions.....was given an appointive position so that at any time at which he might prove recalcitrant he could be brought to terms by threatening removal. Councilmen were controlled by receiving clerkships in the administrative departments, or by having their near relatives, sons, daughters or others dependent upon them for livelihood, given appointive places. In this way, or through subsidies to interests in which the ward leaders or councilmen were interested, the machine could depend at any moment upon the unquestioning fealty of its retainers. It did not have to discuss ways and means with them or secure their views. It knew that by the very simple process of threatening to cut off their bread and butter, they could bring them to support the most iniquitous or arbitrary measures.}

1  82
It is my contention, however, that the monopolisation of the distribution of patronage (itself a consequence of the administrative consolidation and centralisation of power and authority under the new city charter of 1887) provides only a partial explanation for the establishment of a reliable system of discipline within the "Organisation". The difficulties that McManes and Stokley faced in disciplining their subordinates, even when they did control substantial amounts of patronage in the city, indicates that the explanation for the centralisation of political machines favoured by Scott, Banfield and Wilson is not a fully satisfactory one.

We noted earlier in Chapter 3 that a critical source of McManes and Stokley's weakness was their inability to monopolise the recruitment of candidates to public office. It was pointed out that this weakness was attributable to the fact that the Republican party organisation did not function as its centralised and hierarchical structure implied that it should. Indeed it was argued that the party organisation more closely resembled a feudal hierarchy rather than the business corporation or modern bureaucracy to which Scott, Banfield and Wilson liken the political machine. It was also indicated in the last chapter that a key distinguishing feature of machine rule in Philadelphia was that the state party leader Matt Quay and his successor Boies Penrose exercised a firm grip over the city's Republican party organisation.
An adequate explanation for the centralisation of the Republican "Organisation" then must account, on the one hand, for Quay's ability to control party affairs in Philadelphia and, on the other, for the erosion of the power and influence of local party officials in their respective ward bailiwicks by the party leadership. It is my contention that the emergence of a fully fledged political machine in Philadelphia was due as much to a series of organisational innovations, initiated by the state and city party boss between the mid-1880's and the turn of the century, as it was to the monopolisation of the distribution of patronage.

In other words, the transformation in the functioning of the party organisation - that resulted from the the emergence of a centralised political structure in place of the feudal hierarchy - was not simply a natural and automatic consequence of the monopolisation of the distribution of patronage as the scholars listed above maintain. It was also due to a number of changes in party methods, rules, recruitment and finance implemented by the state and city party boss in a deliberate attempt to centralise power within the Republican party. How then did the party leadership manage to establish a reliable system of control and discipline?

QUAYISM AND PHILADELPHIA

In order to provide a satisfactory explanation it is
necessary in the first instance to focus on developments at
the state level, for Quay's ability to influence party
affairs in Philadelphia to his own advantage rested on his
success in consolidating power within the state Republican
party, a task which he undertook in the wake of James G.
Blaine's defeat in the Presidential election of 1884.
Quay's biographer, James Kehl identifies this election as a
key turning point in the development of the state Republican
party, because Blaine's defeat finally convinced Quay of the
inadequacy of the machine that Cameron, like other
Senatorial oligarchs, had operated since the Civil War. A
variety of factors, namely, the reluctance of President
Grant's successors to supply adequate amounts of federal
patronage to the Camerons; the implementation of the
Pendleton Civil Service Act in 1883; the party factionalism
(such as the twelve year rivalry between Stalwarts and Half
Breeds) which resulted from the reliance on patronage; and
the twin threat posed by the growing power of business and
the rapidly increasing size of urban constituencies, led
Quay to conclude that a power base in central government was
"too vulnerable for effective boss rule."

With Simon Cameron's approval Quay therefore decided,
not to repair the Cameron machine but to design a
new model that shifted the locus of power from
Washington to the individual states. In his
blueprint federal patronage became subordinate to
the power sources in the states that had been the
focal units of party power prior to the era of the
Stalwart bosses. Quay sought to return political
emphasis to its normal political channel. In the
process he revised the functions of his party
organisation and made it more responsive to the
demands of an expanding and increasingly
industrial economy. In Pennsylvania, Quay
personally became the connecting link between the "interests" and legislative approval of their growing demands. 6

In order to function as an efficient political broker however, it was necessary for Quay to control the flow of legislation and appropriations through the state legislature, and this in turn was contingent upon his ability to subject to his discipline party subordinates who staffed the state government.

What enabled Quay to establish a reliable system of discipline among his followers was not just the monopoly of federal and state patronage at his disposal (which he regarded as a curse as much as a blessing) but also that of a regular and independent (of business interests) supply of money. 7 This "income" derived from manipulating public funds in the state treasury enabled Quay to become in Kehl's words,

the new proprietor of Pennsylvania...........while Governors and legislators directed the affairs of Pennsylvania........Quay manipulated the affairs of governors and legislators. The power of the treasury often elected the officials who came to Harrisburg and just as often despatched them to their homes when they ceased to fulfill the purposes that Quay and his Harrisburg ring had designed for them. The treasury made and unmade men; by juggling the state's millions it could arrange personal successes or frame personal tragedies. 8

While treasury funds enabled Quay to influence the outcome of local elections to state office, it was the power to withdraw patronage and to reduce or withhold state appropriations (as well as the threat to make public any personal or political indiscretion which a legislator may

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have committed) which provided him with the means to ensure subordinates remained loyal to him during their term of office. Indeed so successful was Quay in inducing subordinates to accept his leadership that Independent Republican gubernatorial candidate John Wanamaker claimed in 1898,

\[\text{the Republican party of Pennsylvania has well nigh lost its identity. So completely has Quayism taken possession of it that we almost look in vain for any semblance to its former self.} \]

\[\text{The single aim of those who control its organisation has been to drive principle, conscience and righteousness out and to let Quayism in.} \]

\[\text{The party organisation has been thoroughly subjugated and is now officered and directed for the benefit of one man and not the Republican party.} \]

The internal consolidation of power within the state Republican party and the control it, in turn, exercised over Pennsylvania government had important consequences not just for reform insurgents but also for the structure and organisation of party politics in Philadelphia. We have already seen how Quay, through the creation of the U.R.A. and by securing the passage of the Bullitt Bill, managed, at McManes' expense, to increase his influence over the Philadelphia Republican party and city government. The establishment of a reliable system of discipline within the state Republican party, combined with the ability to control the flow of legislation and appropriations through the state legislature, enabled Quay to extend his influence over the city's political affairs still further, to the point of being able to impose his personal choice as leader of the local Republican organisation.
"From his seat in the U.S. Senate," as Steffens put it, Quay chose David Martin for boss..........he raised up his man and set him over the people......Boss Martin picked up and set down from above was accepted by Philadelphia, and the Philadelphia machine.  

Martin was "accepted" because Quay, by discriminating in granting or withholding support for appropriations to public agencies, and for legislation designed to meet the needs of corporate interests, made it clear to Philadelphia businessmen, financiers, social service agents and politicians, that the nineteenth ward leader was the correct local "political channel" they should use to ensure that their claims for government support would receive preferential treatment.  

Martin was not plucked from political obscurity by Quay as Steffens infers. He had held a variety of public offices such as County Commissioner, Mercantile Appraiser and sergeant-at-arms in the state and national House of Representatives as well as being a local Republican party ward leader when Quay "declared" him "to be the boss of Philadelphia." Martin was however a Quay-made man in the sense that his promotion to city boss was due to the state party leader who subsequently made the former garbage collector "a full-time member of his state organisation and even advanced him to the Republican National Committee in 1891." It was also through Quay's intervention that Martin was appointed to the prestigious federal office of Collector of Internal Revenue by President Harrison in May,
1889. Indeed, it was through the judicious distribution of federal and state patronage that Martin struck the final blow against McManes by establishing control over the Republican City Committee. In gratitude for his elevation, Martin, as local party leader, willingly took orders from state boss Quay, that is, until 1895 when he felt independent enough to turn against his benefactor and join (with "boss" Chris Magee of Pittsburgh) in an unsuccessful state-wide bid to wrest control of the Republican machine from the party leader.¹⁵

The way in which Quay responded to Martin's refusal to endorse Boies Penrose, his choice as Republican Mayoral candidate in 1895 ("one of the dirtiest and basest exhibitions of treachery in the history of the city's politics," according to the Times), illustrates very well the methods which the state boss could use to deal with potential rivals to his leadership and also at the same time influence political affairs in Philadelphia to his own advantage.¹⁶ Initially he attempted to embarrass and discredit his political opponents, firstly, by launching a scathing "personal attack" on the Philadelphia party leader "from the floor of the U.S. Senate" accusing him of being a tool of big business; and then, by persuading the state legislature to set up a Committee of Inquiry to investigate (and confirm) allegations of misgovernment in the Commonwealth's two largest cities.¹⁷

He then sought to undermine their political influence locally by redistributing federal and state patronage
positions in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in favour of those subordinates who had remained loyal to him and by attempting to revise the respective charters of these two cities in such a way as to benefit his embattled supporters.\textsuperscript{18} Finally he astonished his opponents (and supporters) by adopting yet again the role of reformer. On this occasion Quay committed himself to implementing (but ultimately not delivering) civil service reform in all branches of government in the state. The adoption of a reform strategy though was sufficient to boost his own personal popularity with the electorate at the expense of his opponents.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed this strategy, combined with the other initiatives, eventually enabled the "master of corrupt politics" to not only emerge triumphant in the struggle with "his recalcitrant pupils" but also to install seventh ward leader Israel W. Durham, Penrose's campaign manager, as the new Philadelphia Republican party leader in the process.\textsuperscript{20}

"IZ" DURHAM AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

Unlike Martin, Durham and his associate "Sunny Jim" McNichol, were quite content to reap the rewards that political control of a burgeoning metropolis like Philadelphia had to offer, while submitting to the dictates of Quay and Penrose in the state arena. Penrose's biographer maintains that "Iz" was the kind of subordinate with whom a state boss could feel comfortable. Unlike McManes and Martin, he had no ambitions to enlarge his kingdom but demonstrated an indefatigable dedication to success
at the local level.\textsuperscript{21}

Such was Durham's preoccupation with local politics that even though he attended every Republican National convention between 1896 and 1908 as a city delegate, he was often quoted as saying, "What do I care who is President, so long as I can carry my ward?"\textsuperscript{22}

It was also under Durham's regime that a number of innovations were implemented in the way that the Republican party conducted its affairs; changes which were to fundamentally transform the way in which the party organisation functioned. The first organisational change involved an alteration to the party rules which radically affected the membership of the Republican City Committee and made it, rather than the wards, the prime unit of the organisational structure. When Stokley and McManes were engaged in their struggle for factional superiority, Republican party rules provided that representatives on the City Committee were to be elected at the ward level, and that they could only be removed from office by a two-thirds majority vote of their respective ward executive committees.\textsuperscript{23} In the wake of Martin's demise at the turn of the century, Durham altered these rules in such a way as to permit him to dictate who should sit as ward representatives on the City Committee. This was achieved by dropping the requirement that ward representatives had to be existing members of their ward executive committees, and by extending the eligibility of those entitled to sit on the party's central body to all public officeholders and party workers.
The practical consequence of these amendments to the party rules, was that the party leadership was able to impose its own representatives on the City Committee by designating as ward leaders those party workers it favoured, rather than those who believed themselves to be the legitimate agents of Republican interests in the various wards.\textsuperscript{24} As the \textit{Press} pointed out:

Under the rule the City Committee is vested with power which stifles independence in ward politics. The City Committee has had power in fact to step in and dictate the affairs of any one or all of the 42 ward organisations. This power was finally extended so that the City Committee was able to say who should and who should not sit in its Councils as the representative of a ward.

The rules of the Organisation were drafted and amended from time to time, to fortify Durham against possible attack. He personally dictated the changes to the rules. It was the fountain-head of his system of making and unmaking ward leaders in a single night. Under his system, a ward leader was a ward leader only when the City Committee said so.

Old ward leaders of known strength in their respective wards were gradually crowded out at the direction of Durham and their successors seated in the City Committee by that body itself. Without the approval of the City Committee a ward was barred from naming its representative in that Committee. The City Committee was Durham: Durham was the City Committee.\textsuperscript{25}

Under the amended party rules then, Durham and McNichol purged recalcitrant politicians from the "Organisation". A comparison of the City Committee's membership for 1905 with that of 1895 (the year of the Martin-Magee revolt), reveals that only eleven of the thirty-seven ward representatives survived the leadership purge (see Table 6.1).\textsuperscript{26}

Independent "free wheeling types" such as Charles Kindred, Edward W. Patton and Theodore Stulb, were replaced on the
City Committee by new "organisation men" such as Peter E. Smith, George J. Van Houten and John Klang. Other examples of the new generation of politicians, hand-picked by the party leaders to sit on the City Committee, included John K, Myers, Elias Abrams, Samuel Sutcliffe, Charles T. Preston, William McKinley, Thomas S. Wiltbank, Frank H. Caven and Oscar Noll.27

In order to ensure that these new representatives remained loyal to the "Organisation" and would not resist dictation from the centre, Durham insisted that most of them be given appointive positions on the public payroll.28 An examination of the City Committee for 1905 shows that (besides Durham and McNichol), twenty-three ward representatives held appointive positions, while only fifteen had recognised occupations outside of politics (see Table 6.1).

The control that the party leadership exercised over the membership of the party's local units extended to the division level, since division leaders, even though elected by the party's registered voters, were in practice subservient to the selected ward leaders. This was because ward leaders, by the judicious distribution of minor patronage positions and campaign funds, and the exercise of careful discrimination in responding to requests for favours from voters, could usually ensure that their particular choices as committeemen were adopted as the party's divisional representatives.29
Table 6.1. The Republican City Committee, 1905

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Representative Name</th>
<th>Elective Office</th>
<th>Appointed Position</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>William S. Vare</td>
<td>Recorder of Deeds</td>
<td>President, Select Council Man</td>
<td>contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Harry C. Ransley</td>
<td>President, Select Council Man</td>
<td>Select Councilman</td>
<td>store merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Harry J. Trainer</td>
<td>Select Councilman</td>
<td>Mercantile Appraiser</td>
<td>horseshoer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Robert J. Moore*</td>
<td>Magistrate</td>
<td>clerk, &quot;Row&quot; office</td>
<td>clerk, City Controller's office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Samuel G. Maloney</td>
<td></td>
<td>Harbour Master</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Charles Getzinger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>clerk, City Controller's office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Israel W. Durham*</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
<td>State Insurance Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Edward A. Devlin*</td>
<td>ex-Magistrate</td>
<td>Mercantile Appraiser</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>John K. Myers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Chief, Highways Bureau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>James P. McNichol*</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
<td></td>
<td>contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Joseph H. Klemmer*</td>
<td>Register of Wills</td>
<td>ex-tax auditor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>John Klang</td>
<td>Select Councilman</td>
<td></td>
<td>saloon keeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>James L. Miles</td>
<td>Sheriff</td>
<td></td>
<td>attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Jacob Wildemore*</td>
<td>City Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Charles L. Brown</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
<td>Counsel, State Attorney</td>
<td>Dairy &amp; Food Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Elias Abrams</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Highway Inspector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

194
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>David S. Scott*</td>
<td>Magistrate clerk, City Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Samuel Sutcliffe*</td>
<td>Chief, Bureau of Street-Cleaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>David Martin*</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>David H. Lane*</td>
<td>Educational Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Charles T. Preston</td>
<td>Assistant Chief, Highways Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Jesse S. Shepard</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>William McKinley</td>
<td>Collector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Thomas S. Wiltbank</td>
<td>Select Councilman real estate broker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Wilbur-F. Short</td>
<td>Select Councilman hosiery m/fer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Arthur R. H. Morrow</td>
<td>Assistant journalist Director of Supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>George J. Van Houten</td>
<td>Common Councilman Court Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>George Sterr Jr.</td>
<td>Assistant Chief, Highways Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Peter E. Smith</td>
<td>Sergeant-at-arms, Select Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>John Smith*</td>
<td>Assistant Engineer, Bureau of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Horatio B. Hackett*</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>William H. Berkelbach</td>
<td>Inspector, Street-Cleaning Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>John B. Lukens*</td>
<td>Mercantile Appraiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Frank H. Caven</td>
<td>Select Councilman upholstrey m/fer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>George A. Castor</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Hugh Black</td>
<td>City Commissioner, teamster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Oscar E. Noll</td>
<td>Assistant Chief, Highways Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>James E. Walsh</td>
<td>Select Councilman, insurance agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>George A. Vare</td>
<td>State Senator, contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Harry D. Beaston</td>
<td>Receiver of Taxes, Supervisor of the Census, coal merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Peter E. Costello</td>
<td>Director of Public Works, contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Henry Homiller</td>
<td>Inspector, Water Bureau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: *Press*, Jan. 12, 1895; *Public Ledger*, June 18, 1905; *North American*, June 19, 1905; *Record*, June 20, 1905; *Gopsill's Philadelphia City Directory for 1905* (Philadelphia, 1905).

* indicates those who were members of the Republican City Committee in 1895.

The second of the party leadership's innovations resulted in party nominations for public office being subjected to strict control by the City Committee and the various ward committees. One of McManes and Stokley's main weaknesses, it will be recalled, was their inability to ensure that their particular followers would be nominated for public office. Nor were they able to prevent their opponents from securing the party's nominations. This weakness was due to the fact that the City Committee did not function as a centralised and powerful institution. It was not capable of extinguishing dissent, or of controlling the candidate
selection process, either city-wide or at the ward level.

Party conventions consequently were therefore arenas of intense rivalry as the various factions struggled to secure party nominations for public office. As a successful nomination depended on factions obtaining the largest number of delegates, conventions were occasionally rowdy and violent as disputes arose, particularly over the admission of delegates when seats were contested by the rival factions.\(^{30}\)

In order to resolve such disputes, the party rules provided for boards to try contests. These boards were comprised of the President and Secretary of the local party association and the other three divisional officers who had been responsible for compiling the register of those eligible to vote in the divisional primary elections.

It was often because these divisional boards failed to function as impartial tribunals for the settlement of contested seats, that party nomination conventions subsequently became rowdy and violent.\(^{31}\) As contemporary political scientist, Walter Branson, pointed out, these boards were "characterised by incompetence and venality" and tended to "create rather than decide contests."\(^{32}\)

Given "the notorious partiality of the contest boards," the party's rules were ultimately amended, in May 1898, in order to grant the City and ward committees the right to issue tickets of admission to the convention hall to the primary delegates whom they considered to be properly elected.\(^{33}\)
Although "this practice" was "apparently begun in good faith," according to Branson it opened the way for flagrant abuses. It has enabled the faction in control of the party organisation to make up the roll of a convention in an arbitrary manner giving itself a majority even when defeated at the primaries.  

Divisional representation at nomination conventions was thus rendered an "abstract principle," as Frank W. Leach put it.  

It was this alteration to the party rules that provided the party's leadership with the (institutionalised) means by which it could control the candidate selection process for public office. Since the party leadership exercised control over the membership of the City Committee and the various ward committees, the implementation of the new party rule meant that in practice, any Republican politician who desired public office in Philadelphia, could not secure it without the "boss's" endorsement. So long as a prospective candidate obtained an endorsement "from the proper source" (Durham), Leach suggested, then "the thing is done. His nomination is assured." He "can rusticate in Florida or luxuriate at the Hot Springs until the convention adjourns."  

Reformers, not surprisingly, protested that the Republican party organisation, under Durham and McNichol, had become "a system of absolute despotism, a menace to free government" that "totally destroys and makes subservient the popular will." The Municipal League of Philadelphia also
complained that:

Party primaries and nominating conventions have been made a farce. They are in no sense representative, they simply register the wishes of the "bosses" declared days and weeks beforehand. Deliberation has been abolished, as has consideration. Automationism has taken their place and independence of thought and action by party men has been almost unheard of, or where manifested has been speedily punished.38

It is important to stress that it was not just the party nominations that the party "bosses" could guarantee but also, since the "Organisation" (as we shall see in the next chapter) was able to control the electorate, almost certain victory in the general election to public office.

The "Organisation" was thus able to virtually guarantee that (unlike the 1870's and early 80's when a Republican politician could win office by running as an independent candidate) its endorsement alone was not only necessary but also sufficient for a party supporter to hold public office in Philadelphia. That is, not only did the "Organisation" control Republican party nominations for public office at city and ward level, but it also assured the successful nominee of winning a reliable majority in the general election. By the late nineteenth century then, the Republican party boss, unlike his predecessors, was able for the first time to enjoy a monopoly over the recruitment of candidates to public office.

A third organisational change, which stemmed directly from the first two, was the systematisation and centralisation of party revenues. For example, as we saw in the last chapter,
the city "boss", like Quay, became a political broker; the connecting link between corporate interests and legislative approval of their growing demands. When businessmen or corporations needed legislative privileges from city government, they channelled their requests and "contributions" (the "routine graft" or "oil" that kept the machine in running order) through the city "boss's" office in the Betz Building, situated adjacent to City Hall. Since the "boss" was able to control the flow of legislation and appropriations through the City Council, they no longer used lobbyists to bribe legislators or government officials on an individual basis as they had done in the past. This new arrangement represented an important shift towards party centralisation, for the money or company stock that private interests had formerly paid for favours or protection no longer went to party subordinates but directly into the pockets of the party "boss".

Also important in this respect, and again noted earlier, were the exorbitant profits that party leaders enjoyed as a result of the virtual monopoly which firms they controlled or invested in, exercised over public contract work. The consistent regularity with which these favoured firms obtained contract work was, like the ability of the "boss" to function as a political broker, a direct consequence of the establishment of a reliable system of discipline within the "Organisation".

The willingness of public officials to divide the perquisites of office with the "Organisation", and the
insistence of party leaders that they should do so, reflects this important shift towards central control of party revenues. For example, when the "Organisation" was hard pressed, as during the period of City Party insurgency (1905-7), public officeholders were obliged to raise a campaign "pot" amongst themselves. In 1906 William S. Vare and Joseph Klemmer donated their annual salaries of $10,000 and $5,000, as Recorder of Deeds and Register of Wills respectively, to the "Organisation's" coffers. State Senator Clarence Wolf and Insurance Commissioner David Martin both gave $5,000 each, and before the "pot" reached the twentieth contributor, over $100,000 had been collected for the election campaign. The significance of this gesture by these various public officeholders is that it indicates that party workers - unlike in the earlier period of "individualism and ring rule" - were more inclined to accept that their commitment and obligation to the party organisation was not exhausted once they were elected to office. In sharp contrast to those individuals who collected fees on State House Row in the 1870's, "Organisation" men at the turn of the century regarded public office not so much as their own personal property, but something they occupied on behalf of the party leadership. It was not just coincidence, I would suggest, that the Bardsley Treasury defalcation scandal of 1891 was the last occasion, under "Organisation" rule, that an elected official was removed from office for abusing his position for personal financial gain.
The systematic and comprehensive way in which the "Organisation" levied "political assessments" on patronage-holders was also indicative of the centralised control that was exercised over party revenues. It appears that, in the first decade of this century, approximately 94 percent of all city employees paid assessments to the Republican "Organisation", even though it was against the law to solicit these subscriptions. These "voluntary contributions" were either deducted at source from job-holders' wages or collected by way of the postal service. They ranged from $350,000 in 1903 to $500,000 in 1910, and totalled over three million dollars between 1903 and 1913. The "Organisation" employed a "progressive system of taxation" requiring the lowest paid job-holders on $900/year or less to contribute one percent, and the highest paid earning $6,000/year or more, four percent, of their salary to the City Committee, twice a year, before each election. Job-holders also gave an additional sum to their ward committees equivalent to half the amount they had donated to the City Committee.

Such was the rigour with which these extra-legal income taxes were collected, that reformers proclaimed them to be "one of the vicious features of machine control." City employees were subject no less, to "the galling yoke of the political gangster," as Rudolph Blankenburg put it. There is a certain irony about these comments, in the sense that they actually constitute an unintended compliment to the way in which the leadership of the "Organisation" financed party
operations. We should not find this too surprising however, for reformers apparently saw no contradiction in their condemnation of political machines not only for the grand inefficiencies of spoils, but also for the extraordinary efficiency with which they levied political assessments.

The fourth, and final, innovation of the party leadership's involved a shift in the methods by which the functionaries who staffed the party apparatus were compensated; changes which were intended, in effect, to maintain the "Organisation" in a healthy state of efficiency. In the case of patronage, for instance, it will be recalled that in the 1870's and 80's, when the majority of the thirty separate government agencies which were responsible for city services reported to Councils, political appointments were shared out by the majority party, regardless of faction, to all Councilmen on an individual basis. The introduction of the Bullitt city charter in 1887 however, had important consequences for the control and distribution of political appointments, for not only was the new system of government characterised by administrative consolidation and the centralisation of power and authority in the Mayor, it also made the chief executive, in conjunction with the other eight heads of department, responsible for formulating rules prescribing a uniform and systematic method governing the selection and promotion of city officials. In addition, the Mayor was also given the power to appoint the civil service examining board whose duty it was to implement these recruitment procedures. The Mayor's power of appointment
also extended to the key position of Secretary of the civil service examining board; the official who was responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the various sub-committees of the board, and for drawing up the eligible lists of those applicants who had achieved the required standard to be employed by the city.\textsuperscript{49}

So long as the Mayor remained faithful to the "Organisation" then, party leaders were in a position to exercise strict control over the appointment of city officials. That they invariably did so (apart from Weaver's temporary break with Durham in 1905), is reflected in the character of the appointments that they made to the civil service examining board itself. The key position of Secretary for instance, after 1887, was usually filled by a senior figure on the Republican City Committee, such as former Clerk of the Quarter Sessions Court, James W. Latta, twenty sixth ward leader Arthur H. Morrow, or Rolla Dance, a protege of McNichol's who had succeeded "Sunny Jim" as Select Councilman for the tenth ward.\textsuperscript{50} Such stalwarts of the City Committee as Harry C. Ransley and Walter T. Bradley were also appointed as civil service examiners and were responsible for interviewing prospective public employees such as policemen, park guards, prison officers, messengers, doorkeepers, janitors and watchmen.\textsuperscript{51} Given the enduring loyalty of successive Mayors to the "Organisation", local reformers could legitimately claim, as indeed they did, that the function of the civil service examining board was in fact not to insulate public office from party influence but
"to keep out those who were objectionable to the bosses."\textsuperscript{52}

The establishment of a virtual monopoly over public patronage meant that party leaders could now control the distribution of political appointments. Instead of sharing out these appointments in an equitable fashion among individual councilmen, the party leadership introduced a new criteria for their distribution; namely they were to be doled out on the basis of the number of "Organisation" votes that each ward leader could produce. In other words, the amount of patronage that a ward leader could receive was to be performance-related.\textsuperscript{53} This system of distribution was so rigidly adhered to that records were kept in government departments of the political residence of every city employee and the latter were not allowed to move from one division to another until permission was obtained from the Chief of the Bureau in which they worked. This was not granted until it had been approved by the Head of the Department, after he had taken the issue up with the ward leader where the employee happened to live.\textsuperscript{54} This method of distribution may not have produced the most suitable appointments for the city, but it maintained the "Organisation" in a constant and healthy state of efficiency, because its emphasis on productivity had a galvanising effect on ward leaders and committeemen.\textsuperscript{55}

Positions on the public payroll were not the only incentive used by the party leadership to encourage dedication to duty among the rank-and-file. Public office also seems to have
been used as a reward for those who laboured long and hard for the "Organisation". An examination of the Republican delegation to the State House of Representatives in 1920, for instance, reveals that one-third were lawyers, and that the majority had a long record of service to the "Organisation". They included Leopold Glass, counsel for the City Committee, ward leaders like Sigmund Gans, Matthew Patterson and John K. Scott, as well as John Drinkhouse and Richard Curry who had each served on their respective ward committees for over twenty years.\(^56\) A similar survey of the delegation in 1890 shows in sharp contrast that there were four school directors, six ward committee members and one former magistrate among the twenty-nine Republican representatives. The other eighteen were engaged in a wide cross-section of occupations and did not have any record of service to the party, though two did have distinguished war records.\(^57\) The monopoly, that the "Organisation" established in the 1890's, over the recruitment of candidates to public office, cannot by itself account for the differences in the length of party service between the two delegations. What also seems to have been significant is the reluctance of party "bosses" in Philadelphia to permit significant positions (except on occasions when political tickets required hasty "window-dressing" or the unusual lustre of some amateur's reputation) to go to men with less than a decade of party experience.

In addition to the incentives provided by political appointments and public office, members of the
"Organisation" were also compensated for their loyalty by the opportunity to participate in what George Washington Plunkitt termed "honest graft". The planning and development of the ten mile long NorthEast (Roosevelt) Boulevard through open farm lands to the isolated suburb of Torresdale provides a classic example of "honest graft" in practice. In 1902, the Philadelphia Land Company was incorporated and its representatives, employed by John Mack, began to buy up cheap land between Torresdale and the city centre. Meanwhile Peter Costello, forty-first ward leader and Chairman of the Councils Finance Committee, who owed his position to Durham and McNichol, introduced an ordinance for the construction of a boulevard from Broad and Cayuga Streets to Torresdale. This was in spite of the fact that there was no apparent need for such a thoroughfare, for although the thirty-fifth ward, the main beneficiary of the proposed boulevard, contained almost 25 percent of the city's land area, it had only 8,614 inhabitants of whom fewer than one in five lived or owned property close to the route. The route, however, cut through the farm property that had recently been acquired by the Philadelphia Land Company, and after the ordinance was passed the company's associates made a handsome profit through the sale of their land to the city. For example, in September 1903, the Company bought 105 acres from Mary J. Anderson for $23,550 and 212 acres from Henry C. Thompson for $99,700. These 317 acres were assessed in 1908 at $93,550 a rate of $300 per acre, yet the city paid $50,496 for 20 acres, a rate of $2,500 per acre.
In addition to the sale of land, damages totalling $1,380,000 were also awarded by road juries, often up to fifteen times in excess of the assessed value of property along the route. This was an outright gift in as much as the improvements, instead of damaging the property, actually increased its value. The *North American* was convinced that these land operations ..... have in fact, followed the lines of a definite system....a combination of land speculators and politicians operating through the scandalous road jury system dipped into the city treasury at a rate in excess of one million dollars a year.°

City Solicitor, James Alcorn, and his assistant, John Monaghan, legal counsel to the "Organisation", as well as City Committee members Harry J. Trainer, Harry C. Ransley, James B. Anderson, Charles F. Kindred, Kennedy Crossan and James Dorney, all received large awards.62

Indeed such was the "Organisation's" control over the venture it was possible to change the proposed route at will almost overnight. In 1903, for example, David Martin reconciled his differences with the "Organisation" at the same time as Mack fell out with Durham and McNichol.63 To mark the occasion, the original line of the Boulevard was changed by about one and a half miles so as to include some of Martin's property at the expense of John Mack's (see Figure 6.1). When land was taken by the city for the Pennypack Creek Park, which was part of the general N. E. Boulevard scheme, thirty acres on Martin's 202 acre property, which he had bought in 1895 for $65,374, was condemned. Martin received $77,980 in damages, and his
Figure 6.1. The “McNichol Boulevard” : As well as the change in the original line of the Boulevard to benefit Martin at Mack’s expense, the diagram also shows the lots owned by the Philadelphia Land Company. The numbers 4, 5, and 6 refer to the construction of the Boulevard. All of these contracts were ultimately awarded to D J McNichol and the McNichol Paving and Construction Company, even though the work was given out on a sectional basis, hence Blankenburg’s derisory nickname for the thoroughfare. [Source: The Bulletin, Oct. 11, 1911, Committee of Seventy Scrapbook, Urban Archives, Temple University. City Contracts, 20037, 20704 (1903), 21566 (1904), 25528 (1907), 26883 (1908), Records Centre, City of Philadelphia]
remaining property was assessed at $103,100. Not surprisingly these activities prompted Blankenburg to regard the N.E. Boulevard as

the culmination of "Organisation" effrontery and thievery...which...is open to curves as crooked as its projectors. Boulevards are generally supposed to run in a straight line but this scheme of the grafters is planned to run for ten miles at all kinds of angles in the direction of and past the lands acquired by the "Gang" increasing the value of their holdings immensely.

As McNichol received the $1.4 million contract for building the Boulevard by the same methods he obtained the water filtration contracts, Blankenburg dubbed the enterprise the "McNichol Boulevard" and concluded that:

The Torresdale Boulevard was conceived for graft purposes solely and when completed will be one of the most striking as well as costly monuments of the phenomenal graft administration of Samuel H. Ashbridge.

Opportunities to participate in "honest graft", and the prospect of public office or positions on the public payroll as rewards for hard work on behalf of the party, provided not only incentives that kept the "Organisation" in a healthy state of efficiency, but also encouraged a terrific sense of loyalty among the rank and file. This is not surprising since party workers were far more likely to support a political structure that rewarded its members in a "democratic fashion" on the basis of their performance, rather than one which elevated politicians because they possessed personal resources (such as wealth, social standing or popularity) which could be utilised in election campaigns.
Indeed the disbursement of rewards by the "Organisation" on a productivity basis, led over time to the recruitment and promotion of leaders of a different stamp than those who had played a dominant role in Republican politics during the factional era. With the monopolisation of the recruitment of candidates to public office (and also the "Organisation's" ability to control the electorate) a prospective career in local politics was converted from a high risk one into a low risk one in the sense that the "Organisation" could guarantee favoured candidates virtually an unlimited tenure of office. This fundamental change in the condition of local politics had important consequences for the character of the men who sought and were elevated into public office. Not least, independent "free-wheeling types" who chafed under any restraint, tended to be weeded out in favour of "Organisation men"; that is, party workers who accepted that political loyalty and regularity were primary virtues over and above their own individual feelings.

By the time William Vare acceded to the mantle of party leader in the 1920's, the politicians who staffed the Republican "Organisation" were of a new political generation; a generation, formed under Durham's reign, whose members did not find the notion of party discipline so novel and hence so chafing. A contemporary political scientist, John T. Salter, pointed out "the most striking single identifying quality" of Republican party division leaders was their
loyalty. These men are loyal to their leaders, just as their leaders are in turn loyal to their own leaders and the Organisation. It is personal rather than civic loyalty. This loyalty pattern is a habit of mind among the overwhelming majority of the members of any successful party organisation. It is so implicit in normal times, that one must turn in nature to a highly trained bird dog to find its counterpart, or to a young child's faith in its parent.

In a free moment, these men unhesitatingly describe themselves as "order men". They take orders and ask no questions.68

The establishment of a reliable system of control and discipline may have had important (internal) consequences on the character of men who staffed the party apparatus but it was also dependent as has already been suggested on the "Organisation's" ability to control votes.

Having explained how the centralisation of the "Organisation" was accomplished - through a series of organisational innovations (in addition to the monopolisation of the distribution of patronage) that enabled the Republican party organisation to function as its centralised and hierarchical structure suggested it should; thereby replacing a system of "individualism and ring rule" with one in which the party leadership was able to exercise reliable discipline over the city's Republican politicians - it is necessary now to consider who supported the Republican political machine and why.
7. The Electoral Foundations and Functions of the Republican Machine

In order to provide a fully satisfactory explanation for the increased (internal) discipline within the Republican party organisation it is also necessary to explain how the "Organisation" was able to overwhelm its (external) electoral opponents, for as Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson have pointed out, the former was dependent upon the latter. As they simply put it, "the existence of the machine depends upon its ability to control votes." ¹

The "Organisation's" ability to control the electorate was extremely impressive since, apart from the occasional defeat in 1905 and 1911 when reform elements were successful, the Republican party secured all city and county offices in Philadelphia (except where statute in the form of minority representation required otherwise) between 1887 and 1933.² Indeed it was not unusual for the "Organisation" to roll up enormous majorities in local elections. For example, mayoral candidates Ashbridge, Weaver, Moore and Kendrick in 1899, 1903, 1919 and 1923 respectively, all polled well over 80 percent of the votes cast (see Table 7.1).

The question, then, that presents itself is how was the "Organisation" able to command the support of the electorate so regularly? In the literature on urban politics, there is general agreement among scholars that political machines
Table 7.1. The Republican Party Vote in Philadelphia
Mayoral Elections, 1887-1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Vote</th>
<th>Total Vote in Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>Fitler</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>155,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>Stuart</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>178,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>215,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Ashbridge</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>167,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Weaver</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>201,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Reyburn</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>211,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Earle</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>265,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>265,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Moore</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>283,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Kendrick</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>330,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Mackey</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>444,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Moore</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>407,343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


were supported disproportionately by the poor and by voters of immigrant stock. There is some disagreement, however, over why immigrants supported the machine, and consequently which immigrants were particularly likely to vote for the machine.

For example, scholars such as Richard Hofstadter, Edward
Banfield and James Q. Wilson, and Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, have placed the concepts of "political culture" or "political ethos" at the centre of their analyses of machine politics. Banfield and Wilson, following Hofstadter, have argued that nineteenth century politics was grounded in a struggle between two different systems of political ethics; namely, an immigrant political ethos which was at odds with middle class white Anglo-Saxon Protestant values. They suggest that it was the "individualist" or "private-regarding" values of immigrant voters which led them to accept the patronage, favours and "friendship" offered by machine workers, while the "unitarist" or "public-regarding" values of middle class native Protestant voters induced them to insist on honesty and attention to the public weal. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan have similarly suggested that the attachment of voters to the machine was an expression of primordial ethnic loyalties. Thus Glazer and Moynihan, along with Hofstadter, Banfield and Wilson, subscribe to the view that it was the pre-migration heritage of the immigrant which explains why he supported the machine.

The experience of migration itself is central to James Scott's analysis of the social context within which political machines flourish. Scott argues that political machines found their strongest support among "disorientated new arrivals" to the American city. He suggests that recent immigrants were particularly likely to pursue individual interests in politics because they were experiencing
profound social disorganisation as a result of immigration, urbanisation and economic change.6

Richard Wade, Oscar Handlin, William Whyte and Robert Merton focus upon the post-migration experiences of the immigrant and have suggested that the machine should be viewed as an expression of the patterns of social life in the city's tenement districts, a natural product of the social structure of the inner city.7 In initiating the so-called Periphery Theory, Wade, for example, argued that by the outset of the Progressive period, the classic conflict of the city against the country had been replaced by the struggle within the city itself. "The boss system was simply the political expression of inner city life."8

In a similar vein, sociologist Robert Merton has claimed that the "needs" of immigrants, the poor, and of businessmen in an expanding city, accounted for the tendency of these groups to support the machine. Merton was primarily concerned with developing theory for social science and with directing attention to the basic human behavioural patterns which underlie all forms of social action including politics. From the standpoint of the "functional analysis" to which he was contributing, Merton argued that the machine was successful because it served functions that were "at the time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns and structures."9

Merton's analysis was both functional and structural. Initially a "structural context" is established: a general
setting or environment in which, for one reason or another, the "need" for such an establishment as the political machine has arisen. The principal element in the environment is the diffusion and fragmentation of power - and therefore of responsibility - which tends to be inherent in a transitory, non-authoritarian, elected, democratic officialdom. It is easy to see how this could emerge as a critical limitation in the mushrooming cities of the United States in the late nineteenth century, amid an urban life proliferating in complexity and tangled with a bewildering maze of conflicting needs and claims. Here an alternative, informal focus of responsibility was located in the "boss", a leader of unofficial executive status who had a freedom and flexibility made possible by his ability to work, as it were, in the back room.10

In this setting, Merton argues that the machine system performed a number of "latent functions" in relation to the various subgroups making up its constituency. The first of these functions included various kinds of welfare services for the immigrant, the poor, and the powerless; such services would include the widest range of things - food, jobs, intercession with the law in times of trouble, and so forth. The price for these services quite logically would be votes.

A second type of function which the political machine fulfilled was that it operated as a channel of social mobility. Merton suggests that for certain critical ethnic
groups, and for groups situated in lower social brackets generally, the machine provided avenues for personal advancement, which would doubtless otherwise be closed. For example, the availability of careers in politics served as a significant safety valve for the surplus social energies of the New York Irish from the 1870's on. Again, the price which these groups were asked to pay was, from their viewpoint, hardly excessive: unquestioning devotion and loyalty to the organisation. Thus the political machine operated as virtually the only agency which facilitated the political-economic integration of immigrants into the community. This conclusion reached by Merton ties in neatly with Banfield and Wilson's analysis, for they argue that the decline of political machines is explained by the movement of immigrant groups up the class scale and their consequent assimilation into the middle class political ethos.

Before considering the extent to which those various hypotheses are able to account for the distribution of electoral support for the Republican "Organisation", it is important to point out that the city experienced significant population changes during the period of the "Organisation's" institutionalisation. For example, as the city's population continued to grow up to the 1920's at approximately the same rate (20%) as was established in the early post-bellum period, its size almost doubled from just over one million in 1890 to almost two million by 1930 (see Table 7.2).

Immigrants made a significant contribution to the increase
Table 7.2. Population of Philadelphia, 1880-1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>847,170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1,046,964</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,293,697</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,549,008</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,823,779</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,950,961</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-1930</td>
<td>130.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


in numbers. One in two Philadelphians were either first or second generation immigrants in the period between 1880 and 1930, and the foreign-born population alone accounted for almost one-quarter of the city's total population between 1880 and 1920 (see Table 7.3). The composition of Philadelphia's ethnic population also changed markedly over the period 1880 to 1920. For example, the proportion of the city's foreign-born population that was either Irish or German fell from over three-quarters in 1880, to just over one-quarter by 1920. By this time Russian Jews were the largest foreign-born group in the city, and there were almost equal numbers of foreign-born Italians and Irish
Table 7.3. Ethnic Composition of Philadelphia: 1880-1930
(As Percent of Total Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>31,669</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>84,459</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>134,229</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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220
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Born</td>
<td>204,335 24.1 384,707 24.7 397,927 21.8 18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>255,721 30.2 496,785 32.1 591,471 32.4 31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock</td>
<td>460,056 54.3 881,492 56.8 989,398 54.2 50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>847,170 1,549,008 1,823,779 1,950,961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


living in Philadelphia (see Table 7.4).

It is worth noting, however, that when compared with other large northern cities, Philadelphia did not receive its proportionate share of new immigrants, despite its size and industrial importance. Philadelphia's percentage of foreign-born residents was the lowest of all large northern cities averaging one-quarter of the total population from 1870 to 1920, compared with one-third in Boston, 40% in New York and even higher percentages in newer cities like Cleveland, Detroit and Chicago. This characteristic feature of Philadelphia's population did not escape the attention of contemporary observers, for as Lincoln Steffens pointed out in July 1903, "Philadelphia with 47 per cent of the population native-born of native parents is the most American of our greater cities."

Although Philadelphia's foreign-born representation was small when compared to that of other cities, its black
Table 7.4. Ethnic Groups in Philadelphia, 1880-1920
(As Percent of Total Ethnic Population)

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<tr>
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<th>1890</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
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<td><strong>Foreign Born</strong></td>
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<td>12.9</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
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<td>27.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>11.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>25.9*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Generation</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The same as for Tables 7.2 and 7.3.

* The largest ethnic group in this residual category were the Poles who comprised 7.8 percent of the city's foreign-born population in 1920.

population was large: almost 5 percent of the city's total population in 1900, and over 10 percent by 1930 (see Table
7.3). In 1900 Philadelphia housed a larger black community than any other northern city, and by the 1920's had a greater percentage of blacks than any other large city in the country, except for St. Louis and Baltimore.¹⁵

Having noted the significant changes in Philadelphia's population over the period of the "Organisation's" institutionalisation, we can now turn to the data reported in Table 7.5. This data permits us to test the ability of the various hypotheses, outlined above, to account for the distribution of the "Organisation's" electoral support. The entries in the table are unstandardised partial regression coefficients (and the accompanying standard error) generated by a series of multiple regression equations for the Philadelphia mayoral elections 1865 to 1931.¹⁶ The dependent variable in each equation is the percentage of the ward's total mayoral vote in the general election that was cast for the Republican party's candidate. The independent variables in these equations measure the demographic characteristics of the ward. The variables German, Irish, Italian and Jewish, for instance, indicate the proportion of each ward's population whose mothers were born in Germany, Ireland, Italy and Russia - that is, the percentage of the ward's population that is first or second generation German, Irish, Italian or Jewish. The Other Foreign variable is a residual category which indicates the percentage of the ward's population whose mothers were born in some foreign country other than Germany, Ireland, Italy or Russia. (The All Foreign variable has been used in those equations where
Table 7.5. Ethnicity, Social Class and The Republican Party Vote, Philadelphia Mayoral Elections, 1865-1931

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Other Foreign</th>
<th>All Foreign</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>R²</th>
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<td>Jewish</td>
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<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N = the number in brackets; that is the total number of wards in the city at the time each mayoral election was held.

The figures in this table are regression coefficients; those in parentheses are standard errors.

a p < .001
b p < .01
c p < .05
the information provided by the decennial census permitted only a limited breakdown of the population based on colour and nativity). The final independent variable is a measure of the class composition of the ward's population.

These regression coefficients estimate the impact - controlling simultaneously for all other variables included in the equation - of a unit change in the variable in question upon a ward's voting behaviour. A coefficient of .63 on the Italian variable in the 1919 election, for example, indicates that, holding all other independent variables constant, as the first and second generation Italian proportion of a ward's population increased by 10 percent, the Republican share of the ward's mayoral vote increased by 6.3 percent. Conventional methodological wisdom suggests that unstandardised regression coefficients are the measures least likely to run the risk of the ecological fallacy. The table also reports the explained variance when all variables are entered in the equation.

What conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the coefficients? Firstly, the magnitude of the coefficients of determination ($R^2$) of these equations indicates that the various factors mentioned in the hypotheses discussed above are indeed relevant to explaining the distribution of support for the Republican "Organisation". A knowledge of the class and ethnic composition of the city's wards enables one to explain in the usual statistical sense ($R^2$) from 31 to as high as 83 percent of the variation among the city's neighbourhoods in the votes cast for the Republican party's
Secondly, the regression coefficients in these equations indicate a watershed at the turn of the century in the distribution of electoral support for the Republican party. The coefficients in the equations for 1865 to 1895, for instance, indicate that ethnicity is strongly negative and independently related to Republican party voting, while social class is not. The coefficients of the All Foreign variable in the equations for the elections held between 1865 and 1874 are all very large, negative and significant at the .01 level. Similarly the coefficients of the ethnicity variables in the equations for the elections held between 1877 and 1895 are again generally large, negative, and in almost two-thirds of the cases, significant at the .05 level.\(^\text{19}\) By contrast, in only one (1884) of the ten elections held between 1865 and 1895 does a regression coefficient of the social class variable pass this test. From these results I would infer that up to 1895 the Republican party was supported overwhelmingly by the native-born population, irrespective of social class, and vigorously opposed by the ethnic population which, during this period, was composed largely of Irish and German immigrants.\(^\text{20}\)

The regression coefficients in the equations for 1907 to 1931 reveal quite a marked change, however, in the distribution of electoral support for the Republican party. They indicate that social class is strongly negative, and...
independently related, to Republican party voting. They also show a clear distinction among the ethnicity variables between "new" immigrant and "old" immigrant groups. The coefficients of the social class variables in these equations are generally large, negative and, in three out of five elections, significant at the .05 level. By contrast, the coefficients of the Jewish, Italian, Other Foreign and All Foreign variables are moderate to large, positive and, in half of the cases, significant at the .05 level. None of the coefficients for the German and Irish variables, however, pass this test. Finally, the coefficients of the Black variables in the equations for 1907 to 1931 are generally large and positive, and all of them are significant at the .05 level. These results suggest then that it was at the turn of the century that the Republican party began to exhibit the characteristic electoral base that one would expect of the classic political machine, as portrayed by conventional wisdom. That is, the "Organisation" was supported by the poor, the black, and the "new" immigrant population, and was opposed by wealthy, native-born white Philadelphians.

How do we account though for the difference in the voting behaviour of the various ethnic groups, and what was it about the city's new foreign stock and poor voters that inclined them to vote for the "Organisation"? The strength of immigrant opposition to the Republican party in the immediate post-bellum period is not difficult to understand, for several reasons. Firstly, immigrants, and in particular
the Irish, were unlikely to support a party identified with
antislaveryism, for they were often in direct economic
competition for jobs with blacks. Secondly, they were
also likely to have been repelled by a party which, in order
to broaden its electoral appeal, advocated not just an
economic program of protectionism based on the tariff but
also nativist policies as well. Finally, as Dennis Clark
has pointed out, immigrant support for the Republicans was
unlikely, given the long-standing affinity that existed
between the immigrant population and the Democratic party in
ante-bellum Philadelphia.

Why "new" immigrants should abandon the voting habits of
their predecessors and offer their support to the
"Organisation" is a question which can be resolved by using
the data reported in Table 7.5 to assess the merits of the
various theories that scholars have proposed to explain why
immigrants were especially likely to vote for political
machines. The ethos theory of Banfield and Wilson does not
stand up very well under the tests to which the data permits
us to subject it. Philadelphia's Italians (the majority of
whom were young, unskilled labourers who came from Sicily
and Southern Italy) came from a culture in which, according
to Banfield, "amoral familism" is a dominant theme, and from
a social structure whose patterns of patronage and
particularist loyalties are similar to those that underpin
machine politics. The Jewish population of Philadelphia,
on the other hand, came from a culture that emphasises
community responsibility, an outlook, said by Banfield and
Wilson, to be quite the reverse of the one that provides the moral basis of the backward society of Southern Italy. Indeed, they suggest that this Jewish cultural attitude lies much closer to the WASP than to the immigrant ethos.

If Banfield and Wilson are correct we would expect there to be a close resemblance between the political behaviour of Jews and WASPs, or at least a significant difference between Jewish and Italian voting patterns. This expectation is not borne out by the data, for the patterns of Jewish and Italian voting behaviour are similar, rather than divergent. It would appear then that the differing political ethoses of the Jewish and Italian immigrants in the city were not the dominant force shaping their political behaviour.

It is not possible to reach any conclusive result with regard to the hypothesis that "disoriented new arrivals" were particularly prone to support the urban political machine, because unfortunately problems of co-linearity prevent one from entering, as distinct variables in the regression equations, the first and second generation segments of the "new" immigrant groups in the city. However, recent historical research on the migration process has cast serious doubts on the traditional social breakdown and assimilationist viewpoint which forms the basis of Scott's argument. Historians of immigration and ethnicity such as Rudolph Vecoli, William DeMarco and Caroline Golab, have shown that, rather than weakening under the strains of migration and modernisation, the ties of family, kinship and community among immigrants remained strong in the industrial
Their depiction of an urban nation with vibrant peasant cultures flourishing in the American city has seriously challenged the traditional view that newcomers suffered social disorganisation and the destruction of traditional culture before rapid assimilation into the American mainstream. In her study of Poles in Philadelphia, for example, Caroline Golab notes that "the Poles settlement and work patterns wherever they went strongly reflected their feudal past and peasant culture." In view of this recent scholarship, it does not seem likely that Scott's argument can provide us with a credible explanation for the attachment of ethnics to the Republican "Organisation".

In order to test the validity of the final hypothesis mentioned above - Wade and Merton's argument that the political machine should be viewed as an expression of the patterns of social life in the city's tenement districts - it is necessary to proceed rather differently than we have so far, because there are two strands to this post-migration theory. That is, Wade, Merton, Handlin and Whyte suggest not only that support for the political machine will be strongest in the congested inner city areas, but also that immigrants who reside in the urban core will vote for the machine in significantly greater proportions than their counterparts in outlying suburban districts.

The former claim can be evaluated by examining the geographical distribution of electoral support for the
Republican "Organisation" as reported in Table 7.6, which provides a breakdown, by city district, of the party's vote in Philadelphia mayoral elections between 1887 and 1931.

Indeed, an examination of the data indicates that from the mayoral election of 1903 onwards, support for the "Organisation" was consistently stronger in the city centre and South Philadelphia ("The Neck") - that is the area sandwiched between the Schuylkill and Delaware rivers (see Figure 7.1) - than in any other section of the city.

Confirmation that support for the "Organisation" was indeed strongest in the inner city is suggested by Table 7.7, which reveals that from the mayoral election of 1899 onwards, the Republican proportion of the total vote was consistently greater in the urban core than in the ring wards.

The hypothesis that the relationship between ethnicity and machine voting is not the same in all areas of the city can be tested by partitioning the wards of the city into two groups - the poorer half and the wealthier half - and by estimating a separate regression equation for each subset of wards. Unfortunately limitations of data prevent one from generating significant regression equations for each subset of wards; that is given the small sample size none of the equations generated passed the appropriate F test at the .05 level. However, Professor John L. Shover's recent research helps us to clarify this issue, for he used Philadelphia as a case study in his efforts to test empirically the influence of persistent ethnic loyalties on voting behaviour. In the process of his rigorous quantitative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1887</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1899</th>
<th>1903</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The same as for table 7.1. The five districts into which the city has been divided are the same as those used by John Daly and Allen Weinberg in their Genealogy of Philadelphia County Subdivisions, 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 98-100; that is, Centre City comprising of wards 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10; South Philadelphia (1, 2, 3, 4, 26, 30, 36, 39, 48); West Philadelphia (24, 27, 34, 40, 44, 46), and that area to the Northwest (13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 32, 37, 38, 42, 47) and Northeast (11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 25, 31, 33, 35, 41, 43, 45) of the downtown core.
Figure 7.1. Ward Map of the City of Philadelphia, 1914. [Source: John Daly and Allen Weinberg Genealogy of Philadelphia County Subdivisions 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 1966), p. 84.]
Table 7.7. The Republican Party Vote in Philadelphia
Mayoral Elections, by Ring and Core Wards, 1887-1931
(As Percent of the Total Vote cast in Ring or Core Wards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ring Total Vote</th>
<th>Ring Percent Repub.</th>
<th>Core Total Vote</th>
<th>Core Percent Repub.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>92,442</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>61,599</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>125,495</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>53,396</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>158,893</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>57,088</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>63,396</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>104,349</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>70,928</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>130,622</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>66,810</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>144,775</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>99,476</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>166,103</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>117,770</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>147,297</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>91,234</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>191,860</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>96,981</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>233,989</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>162,866</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>278,084</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>151,788</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>248,531</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: the same as for Table 7.1. For each mayoral election the city's individual wards were categorised as either ring or core wards by using John Daly and Allen Weinberg's Genealogy of Philadelphia County Subdivisions 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 1966), pp.73-84. For the 1891 election for example, the city's 33 wards were divided into 16 ring (1, 18-29, 31-33) wards and 17 core (2-17, 30) wards. In the case of the 1919 election the city's 48 wards were more unevenly divided into 11 ring (21, 22, 23, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 46, 48) wards and 37 core (1-20, 24-33, 36, 37, 43, 44, 45, 47) wards.

Analysis of local elections between 1924 and 1933, Shover notes that, each ethnic group reflects a similar pattern; the
lower the economic status, the higher the Republican vote: ethnic divisions in core wards voted more Republican than in ring and border wards.\textsuperscript{29}

In a subsequent article, Shover elaborates that,

this can be explained by the inevitable equation of machine control with the slum infested river and centre city wards...it is an index of the strength of the Philadelphia Republican machine.\textsuperscript{30}

But what was it about the social environment of the inner city that led "new" immigrants to support the "Organisation" so strongly? Why were "new" immigrants in inner city areas more inclined to vote for the political machine? "New" immigrant groups such as East European Jews, Italians and Poles constituted just over half of the city's foreign-born population in 1910, and almost two-thirds by 1920 (see Table 7.4). However, although they arrived in Philadelphia at approximately the same time, they had different reasons for settling in the city. As Caroline Golab has pointed out, each immigrant group possessed unique characteristics and these qualities were reflected in the nature of the particular group's emigration.

The East European Jews, for example, were quite literally forced from their homelands by poverty and pogroms and came to America with the intention of staying permanently. Their previous work experience in the cities of western Russia and Poland as either factory operatives, skilled artisans, or small merchants, equipped them to fill these occupations in American cities. Thus it was "the unique character" of the Jews immigration,

their fugitive status, their poverty, their
intention to leave Europe indefinitely, their urban orientation and their possession of skills and crafts...[which]...explains why the Jews were concentrated in the large cities of the East; why they were not geographically mobile, and why once landed in Philadelphia they tended to go no further.\(^\text{31}\)

By contrast, the Italians who settled in Philadelphia came initially with the intention of earning enough money to improve their status back home in the small village communities of Sicily and Southern Italy. These "birds of passage" regarded their visits to America as work junkets rather than a permanent commitment to a new life. They often arrived without their families and usually gained seasonal employment as unskilled general labourers in the construction industry.\(^\text{32}\)

Although Philadelphia's Jews and Italians came from very different backgrounds and had different reasons for emigrating, as well as having obvious cultural differences in terms of religion, language, dress and so forth, they also had a number of common features. For example, not only did both groups arrive in the city at the same time, they were also both economically disadvantaged, subject to discrimination, and when compared to "old" immigrant groups, rather more residentially segregated in the inner city.\(^\text{33}\)

With regard to the latter, Philadelphia's urban form at the turn of the century closely resembled Ernest Burgess's model of urban spatial structure in which the socio-economic status of the population increases with increasing distance from the centre of the city.\(^\text{34}\) "New" immigrants and blacks
congregated in the zone surrounding the manufacturing and retailing core. In 1910, two-thirds of the city's first and second generation Italian immigrant population lived in wards two, three, four, and twenty-six, situated in South Philadelphia (see Table 7.8). Together with Russian Jews, they made up between two-thirds and four-fifths of the total population of wards two, three, and four. Russian Jews also accounted for over half of the population in the city's first ward, though as a group they tended to be rather more dispersed than the city's Italian population. Even so, over two-thirds of Philadelphia's Russian Jewish population lived in South Philadelphia and the wards adjoining the Delaware river, in 1910.

The bulk of Philadelphia's black population lived in close proximity to the "new" immigrants, but unlike the latter, they were excluded from industrial work. The city's blacks continued to earn their living as they had done in the mid-nineteenth century, in menial domestic and largely unskilled low-paying jobs, usually in hotels, restaurants and white households. The heaviest concentration of blacks was in the seventh and thirtieth wards where they accounted for approximately half of the total population by 1920 (see Table 7.9). Other black clusters (significant for the present day) were discernible just to the north (wards 14, 15, 20 and 47) and west (wards 24 and 27) of the city centre by the turn of the century.

The "new" immigrant and black communities not only had a common residential pattern but also had similar needs.
Table 7.8. Geographical Distribution of New Immigrant Groups, 1910, 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of City</th>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>Percent of ward's population</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
<th>Percent of ward's population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,346</td>
<td>1,858</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6,623</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,527</td>
<td>8,064</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>9,334</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,538</td>
<td>4,149</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>4,782</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,732</td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>2,352</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7,274</td>
<td>5,083</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>13,863</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>31,417</td>
<td>21,729</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent of City's Italian Population</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of City</th>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>Percent of ward's population</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
<th>Percent of ward's population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16,398</td>
<td>7,596</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>9,918</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,427</td>
<td>3,668</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>3,590</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,093</td>
<td>2,543</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>2,084</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,269</td>
<td>3,095</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,149</td>
<td>2,535</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) 6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

239
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of City</th>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Russian Born</th>
<th>2nd of ward's population</th>
<th>Russian Born</th>
<th>Percent of ward's population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(NE) 11</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NE) 12</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>2,404</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NW) 13</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NE) 16</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 39</td>
<td>4,605</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>19,171</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62,026</td>
<td>30,097</td>
<td>47,772</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of City's Russian Population</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: the same as for Table 7.2.

Above all, these sub-groups needed the means of physical existence: jobs, loans, rent money, contributions of food or fuel, to tide them over and the like. They also needed a buffer against an unfamiliar state and its legal minions; help when they or their offspring were in trouble with the police; help in dealing with inspectors, in seeking pushcart licenses or in other relations with the public bureaucracy. Finally, they also needed the intangibles of friendship, sympathy and social exchange.

The urban political machine, as Merton, Wade, Handlin and Whyte have argued, was well equipped to satisfy these needs,
Table 7.9. Geographical Distribution of Black Population, 1880-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Ward of City</th>
<th>1890 No.</th>
<th>1890 %</th>
<th>1900 No.</th>
<th>1900 %</th>
<th>1910 No.</th>
<th>1910 %</th>
<th>1920 No.</th>
<th>1920 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(C) 4</td>
<td>2,592</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2,542</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>2,619</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) 5</td>
<td>2,368</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1,251</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) 7</td>
<td>9,002</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>10,462</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>11,553</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>12,241</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) 8</td>
<td>3,031</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NW) 14</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>3,085</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>4,946</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NW) 15</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2,423</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2,698</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3,766</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NW) 20</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2,821</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8,269</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W) 24</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2,193</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3,958</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8,152</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 26</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2,874</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5,191</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5,715</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(W) 27</td>
<td>2,193</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3,173</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>3,195</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2,927</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 30</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5,242</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>15,481</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) 36</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5,840</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>13,291</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NW) 47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>12.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28,959</td>
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<td>39,694</td>
<td></td>
<td>58,280</td>
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<td>88,197</td>
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<td>Percent of City's Black Population</td>
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<td></td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>65.7</td>
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Sources: The same as for Table 7.2.

and if the claims of contemporary "Organisation" politicians are to be believed, then it seems likely that the Republican "Organisation" in Philadelphia did in fact fulfill the role
that these scholars have ascribed to political machines in general. For example, David H. Lane, "Peerless Leader" of the twentieth ward, explained why the city's foreign-born population voted for the Republican ticket, in the course of an election address to division leaders in the 1901 campaign:

Poles, Hungarians, Italians and other foreigners when they come here, vote for the Republican ticket. Why? Because we have the offices and they expect favours from officeholders.

In New York, they vote for Tammany for the same reason. Our Organisation bears the same relation that Tammany does to New York.36

Similarly, a quarter of a century later, Mayor A. Mackey testified before a U.S. Senate Committee that "the genius of the success of the Republican Organisation in Philadelphia is personal service to the individual voter."37 In his autobiography William Vare also claimed that,

the Philadelphia Organisation is in fact one of the greatest welfare organisations in the United States. It must stand for something worthwhile, or otherwise how could it maintain its firm hold on the suffrages of the Philadelphia public through many decades and win repeated victories. The answer is this. The Philadelphia Organisation is successful because it serves the people.

......The Philadelphia Organisation gives a real social service, and one without red tape, without class, religious or colour distinction. It is natural that with the Organisation thus responsive - and undoubtedly more so than any other social agency in the entire community - the public should indicate its appreciation by supporting these political forces at the elections.38

In sum then, it seems reasonable to conclude that in the case of Philadelphia, those scholars who view the political machine as arising out of the patterns of social and economic life in the districts of the inner city, provide us
with the most likely explanation for the attachment of ethnics to the Republican "Organisation".

ROBERT K. MERTON AND THE LATENT FUNCTIONS OF THE POLITICAL MACHINE

Although this post-migration theory helps us to identify why immigrants supported the machine and which immigrants were especially likely to vote for the machine, the scholars who subscribe to this view are not just concerned with accounting for the distribution of electoral support for the urban political machine. Robert Merton, in particular, as I suggested earlier in Chapter 1, has been responsible for establishing a more positive image of the role played by the political machine. Scholars such as Oscar Handlin, Eric McKitrick, Elmer Cornwell, Alexander Callow, Seymour Mandelbaum, Zane Lee Miller and John Allswang have all incorporated Merton's functional model in their analysis of the political machine; so much so, in fact, that in the last thirty years bosses and reformers have undergone a role reversal in the literature on urban politics.

The urban bosses are now depicted as "good guys" who served the needs of the otherwise unorganised urban poor, while the reformers, it is alleged, were business and professional men intent on imposing economic and cultural control over the lower orders. But how valid is Merton's analysis of the relationship between the machine and its supporters; did the machine fulfill the functions that Merton suggests that it
did; how well does Merton's model fit the reality of Republican "Organisation" rule in Philadelphia?

The short answer is not very well at all. The current preference for bosses over reformers is rooted in the conviction that the reformers were unresponsive to the poor when they championed programmes from motives of efficiency, and bosses won the support of the poor whose lives they understood when they attacked reformers' programmes. The problems with this approach, however, are illustrated in John F. Baumann's study of the Philadelphia Housing Commission between 1911 and 1915. Baumann criticises the reformers for imposing efficiency on slum dwellers when they secured the Heidinger Housing Act of 1913 which created a hundred sanitary inspectors to regulate health and safety in Philadelphia's poor housing. Edwin Vare, popularly known as the "Apostle of the Poor" then served his constituents, Baumann appears to argue, by blocking funds to pay the inspectors and by emasculating the housing law in the next legislature. The reformers may have wanted to inspect housing because they were inspired by the need for efficiency, but it does not follow that poor slum dwellers opposed inspections that would improve the health and safety of their homes. Indeed, since the Housing and Sanitation Division of the city's Health Bureau was at this time receiving two hundred complaints a day concerning violations of existing laws, it seems more plausible that poor slum dwellers would have welcomed inspections as a way of improving housing conditions.
Baumann's argument, however, leaves us with having to accept the highly improbable assertion that the urban poor preferred the boss's system of regulation whereby slumlords and manufacturers could provide unsafe and unhealthy living and working conditions in exchange for buying off the machine's inspectors. If we were to extend Baumann's argument to other issues raised during Blankenburg's reform administration (1912-16), for example, the reformers' efforts to lower food and gas prices in the city, and to institute a public works programme during the depression of 1914 to 1915 - initiatives which were all thwarted by the "Organisation" - we would be left with the incongruous proposition that the urban poor preferred a system of boss rule which maintained high food and gas prices and unemployment.

What in fact Baumann's study demonstrates, I would suggest, is that bosses gave as much aid to slumlords and manufacturers who got rich off the urban poor, as they gave to the poor themselves. In the case of Philadelphia, the Republican "Organisation", at the same time as it was providing a "personal service" for the immigrant poor, was also aiding and abetting those interests - the saloon and gambling-house keepers, tenement-house owners, utility entrepreneurs, land developers and manufacturers - who were making large profits as a result of urban growth, often at the expense of the working classes.

It should also be emphasised that the "personal service"
provided by the "Organisation" was simply just that; favoured individuals received such benefits as buckets of coal, Christmas turkeys, summer trips to Atlantic City or jobs on the public payroll, but these favours constituted the sum total of the "Organisation's" welfare programme. In other words, the "Organisation's" petty welfare system only provided a social service on a sketchy, unsystematic and haphazard basis.

In fact, the "Organisation" did little to promote genuine social reforms that would have met the real needs of its constituents; for example, programmes which would have provided decent housing, good schools and hospitals, clean water, full employment, racial integration and so on. Instead it focused its energies on "giving the people something they could see." Essentially practical, the "Organisation" reasoned that the ordinary citizen judged a government by tangibles which he could view with his own eyes. It thus supported ambitious building projects - such as the Ben Franklin Parkway, the Roosevelt (North-east) Boulevard, the League Island Park and the Municipal Stadium - which were aimed at promoting civic improvement while at the same time beautifying the city. Such schemes provided the "Organisation" with new allies in the business community and led to more jobs, patronage and profit for the machine.

Some contemporaries were not beguiled by the "Organisation's" strategy. Political satirist Edmund Sage, for example, noted in his novel the Masters of the City,
published in 1909, that the products of "Organisation" rule

lay,

in driveways and distant parks, in Temples of
Justice and public buildings, in fanciful lamps
and freak decorations....but all of these things
do not reach the mass of the people. It does not
give seats in schools, take the dirt from off the
streets, give the tired man and woman a rest in
the trolley or train, keep down rents, abolish
crowded tenements, provide playgrounds, supply
drinking fountains and public lavatories for the
people.49

Most projects were downtown oriented to bring traffic to the
downtown, to beautify it, and to raise or maintain downtown
business property values. It left too little funds and too
little energy for other things.

The tradition of the "boss" from Vare down to Daley has been
that of "giving people what they wanted", but in practice
this has meant what the machine has perceived as what the
people wanted. The real question is whether the needs of a
large urban centre and its people would not have been better
met if more money had been spent on less glamorous
programmes such as proper police and fire protection, better
housing and sanitation.

In the 1960's, Sam Bass Warner Jr. conducted an examination
of Philadelphia's urban development in an attempt to
understand why contemporary America was facing an urban
crisis. His conclusion was that the long tradition of
excessive reliance on private institutions and private
wealth as the basic mode of social organisation in the city,
was responsible for the "ills" that afflicted contemporary
urban America. "Privatism" (which was, as Warner
subsequently explained, actually "capitalism" and the culture it spawned) was the enduring legacy which "each Philadelphia" had bequeathed its successor. As Warner put it, the industrial metropolis of the early twentieth century,

like the colonial town and big city which had preceded it was a private city and the public dimensions of urban life suffered accordingly. In 1930, Philadelphia like all large American cities stood as a monument to the traditions of the private city. Consequently, the Philadelphia of 1930 can be viewed as the typical inheritance of today's American cities.

Ultimately "in the end" though, according to Warner, "the failure of the industrial metropolis was political." Local and state professional political leaders, utterly avoided dealing with the mounting social welfare and economic and physical development issues which constituted both the disorders and the potential of the metropolis. The whole negative attitude toward government which characterised the Republican leadership encouraged a least-cost, low-quality orientation toward all public institutions and programs whether they were police departments, or schools, hospitals or highways.

Warner suggests that the most conscientious research would be required to arrive at a judicious estimate of which of these two groups of professional political leaders did the most damage to the city of Philadelphia.

It is difficult to disagree with Warner's assessment for the tradition of "privatism" dovetailed neatly with the self-serving instincts of the "Organisation". That is, the "Organisation" was unlikely to undermine the traditional reverence for private enterprise since, as we shall see later, it was ideally situated to cultivate and benefit from
quid pro quo arrangements with private interests.\textsuperscript{54}

Besides, bossism as a political situation was innately conservative and defensive, and by its very nature tended to avoid controversy and division. Thus ideological issues and the public interest were placed well behind the need for political organisation and self-preservation; a viewpoint nicely encapsulated in Durham's remark, "What do I care who is President, so long as I can carry my ward."\textsuperscript{55}

The North American's obituary of "Iz" Durham emphasises the self-serving nature of bossism and its failure to promote the public welfare:

of the qualities of statemanship he had none. He had no ideals. His ambitions were all selfish. He leaves no monument in the shape of a good statute or ordinance or any piece of constructive legislation.......no civic improvement or better­ment.\textsuperscript{56}

According to Warner, the Vare brothers too "after almost forty years of power and effort...could boast of very little constructive results for Philadelphia."\textsuperscript{57} Harold Zink credits the brothers for encouraging all sorts of public works measures that benefitted their South Philadelphia constituents, and for their support as state legislators of such progressive reforms as child labour laws, limitations on women's hours of work, workmen's compensation and mothers' assistance welfare payments. He also praises Edwin Vare for his personal generosity to various charitable institutions and to individuals seeking aid.\textsuperscript{58}

A closer examination of the Vare brothers activities, however, reveals that they only supported these social
reforms in the final stages of their passage; an astute political ploy on their part since not to have supported this legislation would have meant damaging their reputations with their local constituents. The brothers did not initiate any of these social reforms, probably for the quite logical reason that such legislation represented a direct threat to the "Organisation's" system of "personal service". With regard to their support for various local public works measures, Zink neglects to mention that it was the Vares' who benefitted from such schemes in the form of public contracts, and that they could well afford to be generous benefactors to the poor since they made exorbitant profits from such work.

If the biographers of the state political leaders are to be believed, then Matt Quay and Boies Penrose also proved no more useful to the city's welfare than Durham or the Vare brothers. Indeed, the former appear to be carbon-copies of their urban counterparts. For example, James A. Kehl concluded his assessment of Quay's career with the comment that although the state "boss" had been

bold and innovative in party methods, he did not apply his creativity to policy issues. If he had displayed the same vision toward the issues that he displayed toward party organisation, he might have become a statesman. Quay and his fellow politicians preferred to treat social and economic dysfunctions with verbal patches and legislative bandages, instead of forward-looking statesmanship.

By supplying superficial responses they permitted many of society's most crucial decisions to gravitate from the realm of party and government into the hands of the rising industrial complex. Thus the party system failed to function as an effective catalyst when the nation desperately needed solutions to basic problems.
Like Quay, Penrose appears to have devoted himself to the service of his party, and invested little energy in tackling the pressing social and economic problems of the day. As Walter Davenport has so colourfully put it,

You may scan the records of Pennsylvania's legislature until vertigo threatens and fail to find more than a meagre scattering of his personal contributions to the political or social fabric of his state.

As later in the U.S. Senate, Penrose originated little or nothing of importance. His whole energies went into the service of his party in its struggle to perpetuate itself; or to his faction of the Republican party; or to those great business interests which provided him and his following with the funds with which to smother opposition. Penrose as a legislator, a contributor to government, was as colourless and unappealing as a sleeping walrus. Potentially until dissipation, sloth, prejudice, and narrow partisanship crippled his fine mind he was a statesman. Actually he was a glorified district leader and he remained just that, even through all his years in the U.S. Senate.62

Few people will need convincing that bosses were self-serving and devoted to their party organisation, but what these assessments of the city and state's political leadership also point to, I would suggest, is that bossism was destructive of functioning government for the vast majority of immigrants and low-income people who needed government the most. While Merton argues that the machine was successful because it served functions that were "at the time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns and structures," I would maintain that its main contribution has been a dysfunctional one. That is, rather than being a natural functional substitute for government as Merton (and Max Weber) have claimed, the boss and his machine, I would
argue, have prevented political parties and governments from devising, initiating and implementing programmes that could have dealt with the critical social and economic "ills" that have so bedevilled the modern American city.

In Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, it was the Republican party organisation itself which was the subject of local and state election campaigns as questions of honesty and propriety in government took precedence over such difficult and important matters as economic development and social welfare.\textsuperscript{63} When in office, the "Organisation" concentrated on "giving the people something they could see," rather than attempting to fulfill the real needs of its supporters. It also prevented other groups from implementing programmes which attempted to meet those needs, as the Womens League for Good Government wearily pointed out in 1919:

> the "Organisation" is a sinister force that forms part of our "invisible government". If we attempt to analyse it, it seems to be more than anything else a tacit understanding of mutual helpfulness between men who make a business of using the machinery of popular government for the furtherance of their own personal ends. It is difficult to locate it. Like the hurricane we cannot always tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth, but we see the results clearly enough. It results in filling public offices with men who are at the best poorly fitted for the place, sometimes actually dishonest: in extravagance and misuse of public funds; in the passing of unnecessary laws that create "jobs"; in the quiet thwarting of measures urged by the public for the public good. As often in life, the innocent suffer for the guilty.\textsuperscript{64}

Indeed, while Merton has argued that the machine, centralised and disciplined, developed as an alternative to the confused, decentralised nature of formal government, it
is worth noting that in Philadelphia, the Republican "Organisation" rather than "bringing order" to the city, actually perpetuated the diffusion and fragmentation of power. This can be seen in the "Organisation's" reaction to structural reform. In 1919, for example, the Vare brothers unsuccessfully resisted the passage of a new city charter which set up a stream-lined unicameral system of government in place of the large and unwieldy bicameral version that had developed under the Bullitt Charter of 1887. What is surprising about the brothers' opposition, however, is that back in 1905 they had supported, for the city's education system, the very kinds of reforms they subsequently fought against in municipal government. The 1905 school law, for instance, created for the cities and towns of Pennsylvania a modern, centralised, bureaucratic management of schools. In Philadelphia, power was taken from the forty-two ward school boards and placed in the hands of a small central Board of Education and a strong Superintendent of Schools.

There is a simple explanation for the Vare brothers' apparent paradoxical behaviour in 1905 and 1919. In 1905, the brothers were faithful supporters of Durham and Penrose's campaign to maintain a centralised and city-wide Republican party organisation. Durham was a keen supporter of the 1905 school reform because, by abolishing ward school boards and with them the local public office of school director, the law helped the city "boss" centralise authority within the Republican party by breaking down the independent strength of the party's ward organisations. By 1919, however, the
Vares' were engaged in factional warfare with Penrose's supporters for control of the Republican City Committee, and indeed it was the state "boss" who was largely responsible for the passage of the new city charter. The brothers opposed the new charter because it broke down their power base in the oldest parts of the city (as Penrose intended it to) and fixed more rigidly, accountability and responsibility in local government.⁶⁸

The actions of the state and local party leaders in 1905 and 1919 suggests that these "bosses" had a pragmatic approach towards reform. Some scholars, notably J. Joseph Huthmacher and John D. Buenker, have argued that urban political machines made a significant contribution to the social and structural reforms that characterised the progressive era in the United States. Indeed, Buenker suggests that political bosses were partly responsible for the development of a new ideology which he terms "urban liberalism".⁶⁹

To label party "bosses" in Philadelphia "urban liberals" would, I suggest, be inappropriate and very misleading. Their behaviour would seem to indicate that they were power-brokers who were interested primarily in maintaining control over their affairs, and who were prepared to support (or oppose) reform measures when it was in their interest to do so. In other words, the selective approach adopted by Republican "bosses" towards social and structural reforms illustrates that they were not so much "for" or "against" reform, as they were concerned with their own self-interest.
and the life of their party machine. Calling these Republican "bosses", "urban liberals" would entirely miss the point of their activity. The same can be said of Merton's functional analysis, in the sense that it greatly exaggerates the importance of the boss's services to the immigrant poor, while failing to recognise that the political machine, in fact, functioned as a blight on the system of government.

Merton also suggests that one of the machine's latent functions was to operate as a channel of social mobility for the urban immigrant poor. Again, it seems that in Philadelphia, the Republican "Organisation" did not fulfill this role. For example, in his analysis of the relationship between ethnicity and voting behaviour in Philadelphia, John L. Shover conducted a survey of the recipients of political patronage positions in local government between 1916 and 1938. He discovered that county non-civil service jobs requiring no special skills were overwhelmingly allocated to persons with English, Scottish and German surnames. In 1916, only 5% of these positions were held by persons with Jewish or Italian names. By 1932, according to Shover, Jews and Italians still held only 8% of such jobs.  

The "representative sample" of division leaders published by "The Young Republicans" in 1926 also provides us with an insight on those who staffed the party organisation at the grass roots level, when the Republican machine was at the peak of its power and when the city's Jews and Italians were well established as the largest foreign-born groups in
Philadelphia. I found that 62% of these party committeemen were job-holders, and that, like Shover, less than 5% of them had Italian, Jewish or Polish names. These findings would seem to indicate that far from providing a career ladder for the immigrant poor, the Republican "Organisation" in Philadelphia slighted its strongest supporters - the city's Italian, Jewish and black population.

Finally, Merton's claim, and Banfield and Wilson's suggestion, that the political machine facilitated the integration of immigrants into the community (and thus their consequent assimilation into the middle class political ethos), is also not tenable in the case of Republican Philadelphia, for as Shover has demonstrated, ethno-religious political consciousness, far from diminishing, actually flourished in the city in the 1930's. He shows that by 1936, when the Philadelphia version of the New Deal coalition had taken shape, with only native whites remaining Republican, the city's ethnic and religious groups, although acculturated in terms of language, value systems and lifestyle, responded to vital political choices as blacks, Jews, Germans or Catholics, and not as Americans grouped cross-culturally by occupation, class, or neighbourhood.

Merton's functional analysis then, in my view, does not provide, at least in the case of Republican Philadelphia, an accurate interpretation of the relationship that existed between the political machine and its poor immigrant supporters. Moreover, his functional theory is
unsatisfactory in providing an explanation for the functions of the political machine, because it rests on a faulty premise; that is, the machine, according to Merton, originated as a response to "needs" and demands which other institutions failed to satisfy. We have already seen, however, that by the time the bulk of "new" immigrants were arriving in Philadelphia at the turn of the century, the "Organisation" was already a fully fledged political machine; a political institution in fact that dominated the government and politics of the city.

It follows then, that the Republican machine was not the creation of the "new" immigrant masses, or a product of immigrant culture and ethnic conflict. It emerged, in fact, as a consequence of changes in the organisation and structure of party politics in the city, and not as a result of responding to the "needs" of various social groups. From the functional viewpoint then, the "Organisation" operated as a centralised political structure which assimilated most of the city's sub-groups as they arrived in Philadelphia. In doing so, however, it exploited the urban immigrant poor as much as it helped them. Indeed, its role, if anything, was of a dysfunctional nature - depriving immigrants and low income groups of an effective local government that could cater to their real needs.

In arguing that the only "needs" the "Organisation" served were its own, however, I am not suggesting that historians should again embrace the contemporary reform caricature of the political boss. But what I am saying is that the
positive image of the boss that prevails, largely due to
Merton's seminal work, in the current literature on urban
politics, stands in need of revision. In my view,
recognition is long overdue of the fact that political bosses, rather than being cultural pluralists, were as
culturally narrow as the most nativist reformer.

ONE-PARTY POLITICS

This analysis so far has concentrated on examining the
"Organisation's" electoral base and discussing the validity of Merton's functional model in helping us to understand the role that the political machine has fulfilled in the American city. However, we have yet to explain fully why the Republican party enjoyed such an extraordinary degree of electoral success during the period between 1887 and 1933. The key to the "Organisation's" electoral supremacy did not just lie in the "personal service" it provided to the individual voter. It also rested on the "Organisation's" ability to nullify electoral opposition by exploiting the weaknesses of, and divisions between, the Democratic party and the nonpartisan reform movement.

With regard to the former, the minority party experienced a phenomenal decline between the 1880's and 1920's, in both leadership strength and grass roots support. The Republican "Organisation" benefitted from three major turning points in the fortunes of the Democratic party, two concerned with national party policy, and the other with a localised
factional struggle. Firstly, there was the nationwide shift towards the Republican party in 1894, for the Democrats, as the incumbent administration, were blamed for the severe economic depression affecting the country. In Philadelphia this was reflected in a major change in the voting pattern of the Third Congressional District, traditionally the bulwark of the Democratic party. In 1894, this normally Democratic stronghold returned a majority for the Republican gubernatorial nominee for the first time in the city's history.75

Secondly, the local consequences of the national party split over the free silver issue and Bryan's candidacy for the Presidency in 1896, stripped the city's Democratic leadership of many socially prominent families who could all trace their party lineage to before the Civil War. Local "blue-bloods" like John Cadwalader Jr., George W. Norris and John and William Bullitt as well as such men of substance as company director Henry D. Welsh, newspaper publisher William Singerly and lawyers Emmanuel Furth, George F. Baer and Henry M. Dechert, all participated in the "Jeffersonian bolt" from the party in 1896.76

Finally, Samuel Jackson Randall's death in 1890 precipitated a factional struggle for control of the (3rd) district he represented in Congress. The principal protagonists included Randall's staunch ally lawyer William F. Harrity, who was supported by the sixth ward leader, Thomas J. Ryan and Charles P. Donnelly, Chairman of the Democratic City
Committee, against the combination of State Senator William McAleer and Judge James Gay Gordon.\textsuperscript{77}

The "Organisation" skilfully exploited this rivalry by initially supporting the Gordon-McAleer faction, and then switching allegiance to the Harrity faction while making inroads on them both, and ultimately capturing the Third District for the Republican party.\textsuperscript{78} In the 1890's, David Martin successfully sponsored McAleer's bid for Congress against Harrity's nominees, and in return McAleer supported Republican candidates in local elections. The most infamous McAleer defections from the regular Democratic ticket occurred in the Mayoralty election of 1895, and the Shrievalty election of 1896, and as a reward McAleer was given the Republican nomination for Congress in 1898.\textsuperscript{79} This proved to be his undoing, however, for with his own party hopelessly fragmented, McAleer polled more Republican than Democratic votes in every ward in the district. The "Organisation" therefore decided to drop him from their ticket in 1900, as they no longer needed the support of a superannuated Democrat. In 1900 McAleer carried only the sixth and seventeenth wards, while Bryan gained a majority in the sixth in the Presidential election. By the turn of the century the old Randall Democratic stronghold had disintegrated.\textsuperscript{80}

Having dropped McAleer the "Organisation" negotiated a new arrangement with Tommy Ryan. Ryan agreed to aid the Republican "Organisation" in exchange for political immunity for his sixth ward and control of minority patronage
resources. The basis for this bi-partisan agreement lay in the section of the state constitution that guaranteed minority representation. Since the "Organisation" could control the distribution of appointive minority posts and had sufficient votes at its disposal to determine which of the minority candidates were to be elected, however, this type of bi-partisan arrangement weakened the Democratic party, ultimately destroying its independence. "Under the vicious system of 'minority representation', the Democratic party," reformer George W. Norris observed in 1915, "has become little more than a bi-partisan adjunct of the Republican Organisation, trading votes in return for a few salaried positions." Consequently "the straight Democratic vote has naturally shrunk to negligible proportions" from 39 percent of the total vote in the 1891 mayoral election to fewer than 4 percent in the 1915 election.

The party's "redemption" and the re-emergence of a competitive two party system did not occur in fact until the municipal election of 1933, and until then it continued to function as a "kept minority", or as reformer Thomas Raeburn White put it, as "a mere corrupt annex of the Republican 'Organisation'." When Ryan's successor Charlie Donnelly, for instance, proved wayward in his loyalty to the "Organisation", he was replaced in 1924 as Chairman of the Democratic City Committee by John O'Donnell, one of Bill Vare's closest friends and a fellow South Philadelphian. O'Donnell's response in 1932 to a fellow Democrat who suggested that he break with Vare, indicates the extent to
which the Democratic party was subservient to the Republican "Organisation" during his tenure of office. The Democratic party chairman refused on the grounds that he could not "do that to my old friend who has kept me on his payroll for so many years. Vare has been paying the rent on Democratic Headquarters. I can't bite the hand that feeds me."\(^8^6\) The provision of minority representation then, instead of strengthening the opposition party by guaranteeing that it would always have some patronage, fostered a system of politics that institutionalised the impotency of the Democratic party.

With the establishment in effect of one party rule in Philadelphia from the mid-1890's to the early 1930's, the initiative among the "Organisation's" opponents was seized by groups outside the party system, in particular by the non-partisan reform movement. Again though, the "Organisation" was usually triumphant in overcoming this new source of electoral opposition. It employed a number of different strategies to undermine the strength of the reform movement. One of the "Organisation's" favourite ploys was to emphasise the importance of national issues and national party policy, at the expense of local affairs. In particular, it exploited the fears of the city's business community over such matters as the tariff and the currency issue, by suggesting that voting any other way than for the Republican party in local elections would weaken the party nationally. A typical "Organisation" circular, for example, published during the 1901 campaign, addressed voters in the
following terms:

Dear friend, neighbour and businessman,

.............prosperity over the last five years has been due to Republican principles, both nationally and in the city.

Pennsylvania and Philadelphia are the greatest manufacturing state and city of a great country. Will you by your vote at the request and harangue of a few so-called reformers who have joined themselves together under various titles such as "the Municipal League", "Union Party", "Reform League" and other insidious and high-sounding titles be led astray into the camp of the enemy to give them aid and comfort in order to rejuvenate and encourage those who in the past have been most active in upholding Bryanism, free silverism, free tradeism and the other isms so strongly advocated by the Democratic party.

An examination of the names of the most prominent people who head the opposition to the regular Republican candidates in this city, will show that it is the same old political fleas who jump from one party to the other, one year supporting Lincoln and Grant, then Harrison and Cleveland, and finally the low estate of Bryanism.....

In addition to appealing to national partisan sympathies, ward leaders, such as David Lane, also suggested to party supporters that if they were dissatisfied with the leaders of the local Republican organisation then "the proper method of procedure" would be to seek "reform within the party" and not to support reform insurgency movements outside of traditional party lines.

This emphasis on party loyalty and national issues appears to have paid the "Organisation" handsome dividends for reformers, on a number of occasions, claimed that their defeats were attributable to the syndrome of "party regularity". Indeed, it seems that even the reformers
themselves could be "duped" by the cry of "party regularity" as the eminent publisher John C. Winston, chairman of the Committee of Seventy, admitted to a City Party public meeting in 1905:

I have tried by hard work in the Committee of Seventy, to atone for all my folly as a blind voter...Never again will I permit myself to be lulled into a political trance by the purring cry of "party regularity". No man shall ever again make me believe that it is high treason to vote for a good man on any municipal ticket. I have sat on a low bench in a practical political school...and I wish every hide-bound "regular" could see the light as I see it now.90

The "Organisation" also engaged in extra-legal practices to thwart well-intentioned reformers. These included the invasion of reform party ranks to secure nominations the "Organisation" could control, and ticket-splitting on election days to give enough votes to the Democratic party to keep it, rather than a reform third party as the official minority party.91 A good example of the latter practice occurred in February 1905, when fifteen magistrates, or more than half of the entire minor judiciary, were due to be elected. On this occasion, the "Organisation" not only elected its own candidates but deliberately and successfully transferred 55,000 votes, over one-quarter of those actually polled, to the Democratic ticket, thus ensuring its triumph as a minority over the City Party ticket. The election returns indicate that the "straight" ballot, based on the number of votes received by the Republican and Democratic candidates for the City Solicitorship, was 180,000 and 24,000 votes respectively. However, in the magistrates contest the ten machine Republicans polled between 30,000
and 50,000 votes less (131,000 to 151,000), and the five Democratic nominees over 50,000 votes more (74,000 to 80,000), than their respective party candidates in the City Solicitorship election. If a "straight" ballot had taken place in the magistrates contest, then the City Party's nominees (29,000 to 36,000) would have been elected as the minor judiciary, rather than the Democratic party's candidates. 92

The "Organisation" repeated this ticket-splitting exercise again in 1921 so as to ensure that its subservient auxiliary, rather than the Independent Republicans, occupied the minor judicial offices once more. 93 It also implemented similar ticket-splitting schemes in 1899, 1923 and 1927 in order to make certain that its own favoured candidate was elected to the minority County Commissionership, particularly since the bulk of the minority patronage available in the city was at the disposal of this official. 94 In 1923, for example, the "straight" ballot based on the number of votes polled by the Democratic party candidate in the mayoral election, was 37,000 votes. In the minority County Commissionership contest of that year, however, John O'Donnell outpolled Edgar Lank by 80,000 votes to 35,000, largely because the "Organisation" switched over 40,000 Republican votes to elect the "Vare Democrat" to the office, rather than Charlie Donnelly's associate (see Table 7.10). 95

Occasional ticket-splitting ventures and astute methods of
Table 7.10. Ticket Splitting in Selected Controlled Wards: A Comparison of the County Commissioner and Mayoral Elections of 1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Candidates</th>
<th>Wards and Vote Totals</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2  3  8  12  13  14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral Election (the &quot;straight vote&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendrick (R)</td>
<td>6,189 3,471 2,973 3,067 5,035 3,878 24,433</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raff (D)</td>
<td>110 70 101 73 89 186 629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Commissioner Election (the &quot;split vote&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Donnell (D)</td>
<td>2,256 1,448 2,250 1,169 1,025 1,594 9,742</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lank (D)</td>
<td>107 62 87 58 71 169 554</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuenzel (R)</td>
<td>6,132 3,449 2,769 2,182 4,079 2,472 21,083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmes (R)</td>
<td>4,036 1,992 651 2,860 4,979 3,871 18,389</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Donnell's lead over Lank</td>
<td>2,149 1,386 2,163 1,111 954 1,425 9,188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Votes &quot;dropped&quot; by Holmes</td>
<td>2,096 1,457 2,108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Votes &quot;dropped&quot; by Kuenzel</td>
<td>678 900 1,399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


campaigning provide only a partial explanation for the "Organisation's" electoral success. According to Clinton
Rogers Woodruff, Secretary of the National Municipal League, the real "secret of the machine's ability to continue itself in power" was the control it exercised over the entire election machinery.96

The "Organisation" exercised this control through a variety of extra-legal and illegal practices. The former included control over key public bodies that were meant to be impartial and were responsible for safeguarding the purity of the ballot; for example, the registration boards whose duty it was to draw up lists of qualified voters; the divisional election boards who were responsible for ensuring that proper procedures were adhered to on election day, and finally the County Commissioners who made all the preparations for the holding of elections, including the selection of polling places and the certification of watchers.97

With regard to illegal practices, this usually involved registration frauds such as the wrongful issue of poll tax receipts to qualify voters for registration, and the padding of assessors lists and registration books. In the period prior to the 1906 Personal Registration Act, local newspapers and reformers estimated that the number of fraudulently registered voters in the city varied from between 30,000 to 80,000.98 As late as 1926, however, the Reed Senate Committee investigating William Vare's election to the U.S. Senate, found almost 25,000 false entries in registration books across the city. The forged signatures included dead people, non-naturalised foreigners and
children. The Senate Inquiry also found evidence of election frauds such as the voting of phantoms (non-registered voters), multiple voting (repeating), the miscounting of votes, the altering of ballots and ballot-box stuffing in election divisions throughout the city. Such mal-practices the Committee concluded meant that the average chance of a Philadelphia voter having his vote for the U.S. Senatorship contest properly recorded was one in eight.

A final illegal practice was the coercion of voters as they entered polling places. Reform groups and contemporary observers, like political scientist Professor Maynard Kreuger, maintained that it was,

a notorious custom in Philadelphia for political workers to force voters who have no disability whatever to accept "assistance" with the result that many ballots are marked by the same person and the secrecy of the ballot becomes a mockery.

An inquiry conducted in the wake of the 1909 city election by the "watchdog" reform group Committee of Seventy, for example, revealed that 38,000 votes, or more than 15 percent of the total votes cast, were marked by persons other than the voters.

In addition to the control it exercised over the election machinery, the "Organisation" also benefitted from the problems that beset its opponents, one of which was public apathy. The Municipal League even claimed that "the criminally indifferent citizen" was a "more formidable" problem than that of "fraudulent voting." In its annual report for 1901-2, the League observed that,
the machine can always depend upon its vote; partly through the perfection of its organisation; partly through its almost absolute control of the election officers; but its great source of strength we might almost say its bulwark is the indifference and apathy of the independent voter.\textsuperscript{104} League secretary, Clinton R. Woodruff, also conceded that a "revival of interest on the part of the 'stay at home' voter" was a "greater need" than "protection from the fraudulent vote."\textsuperscript{105} Woodruff and the Municipal League drew this conclusion from the observations they made on the voting turnout figures in local elections. They noted, for example, that in the mayoral elections of 1899 (47.6\%) and 1903 (57.6\%) only approximately half of the electorate bothered to turn out to vote.\textsuperscript{106} More significant, however, had been the electoral survey they conducted in various selected wards of the city, which revealed that in "respectable divisions" in "independent wards", "less than 50 percent of the voters took the trouble to vote," while in the "machine divisions", "we find that the number of voters represent from 80 to 100 per cent of the assessment." "Throughout the city," the League concluded, "it will be found that the day labourer and man of moderate means is much more diligent in the exercise of his franchise."\textsuperscript{107} Leading civic reformers such as Rudolph Blankenburg and Herbert Welsh, and muchraking journalists like Lincoln Steffens and Theophilus Baker, all agreed with the League's assessment.\textsuperscript{108} Blankenburg, for example, writing in January 1905 suggested that
one of the crying evils of the hour is the lamentable indifference of the average citizen to his public duties and the easy-going spirit with which he permits his municipal or state servant to become his master and ruler.....

....we have in our midst a quarter of a million honest, well-disposed men who could rescue the city if they would cultivate and arouse the dormant public spirit within them, if they would once awaken from the political turpitude and moral lethargy, that has, almost continually for a generation, been their voluntary lot.109

Public indifference and lethargy was what struck Lincoln Steffens when he visited the city in July 1903 and this was reflected in his damning indictment of Philadelphia as being "corrupt and contented".110

At exactly the same time as Steffens was carrying out his investigation of municipal corruption, fellow journalist Theophilus Baker was also dissecting the "Philadelphia character" which he believed to be a patent contradiction of a high private and low public morality......there is what may be called, for want of a better name, a sort of moral locomoter ataxia, an inability to put into action the community's really high sense of right and wrong conduct. The citizens lack the virtue militant, that individually disagreeable, but socially valuable quality - pugnacity - the quality that leads an Englishman to spend £20 to avoid the illegal exaction of a shilling. They are law abiding, conservative to the point of allowing a rogue to rob them, if he only preserves the appearances and technicalities of legality.111

Such comments from outsiders helped to give Philadelphia a national reputation (that still endures) of being a city that was conservative, complacent and dull.

"Sinful contentment," as Blankenburg put it, proved to be short-lived, however, for the "better elements" were shaken out of their complacency partly as a result of Steffens'
stinging rebuke, but mainly because of Durham's proposal in April 1905 to lease the municipal gas works to his friend Thomas Dolan's United Gas Improvement company on a long term basis, and at generous terms to the private corporation. The so-called "gas steal" provoked such an outburst of public indignation against the "Organisation" that it sparked off a decade of insurgent reform activity in the city.

This popular protest was also reflected in the substantial increase in the number of voters who went to the polls. For example, the turnout of voters for the mayoral elections of 1907, 1911, 1915 and 1919 was 84.4, 71.6, 86.7, and 79.5 percent respectively. Yet in spite of "the revival of interest on the part of the 'stay at home' voter" the reformers had little to show for all the increased activity at the polls. Their only victories were in November 1905 when the City Party managed to elect its entire ticket in the election for county offices, and in November 1911 when, as a result of a temporary split within the "Organisation", Keystone Party candidate Rudolph Blankenburg was elected Mayor by the narrow majority of 3,333 votes.

The reformers lack of electoral success, it appears, was due to the fact that they faced a more formidable problem than that of public indifference, and that was the local strength of Republican partisanship. It was this obstacle which provided opponents of the "Organisation" with their greatest difficulty. The reformers themselves, even though they
claimed to be non-partisan, had problems in shaking off their Republican identity. For example, third parties like the City (1905-7), Keystone (1910-15), Washington (1912-16) and Franklin (1915-16) party, were all Republican in orientation at least in national politics. Moreover, although Thomas R. White claimed that non-partisanship was the key to the City Party's victory in 1905, he also noted that many City Party members had argued "that the candidates ought not to be named as City Party candidates but as Republican candidates, nominated by an independent wing of the party." Lincoln Steffens also described the Philadelphia reformers as loyal Republicans. He told Teddy Roosevelt that, "they are Republicans and they are friends of yours and their plan is to make the City or Lincoln Republicans the real Republicans of Philadelphia." Similarly in 1911, Blankenburg's election as Mayor, at the head of the Keystone Party ticket, was hailed as a victory for Republicanism as well for reform. The Public Ledger, an anti-"Organisation" journal that supported Blankenburg, argued that the success of the reformers, indicates the unalterable devotion of Philadelphia to the genuine principles of the national Republican party. It shows that the voters recognised in Mr. Blankenburg a better Republican .....than his opponent...and that they have finally reached the conclusion that the principles of Republicanism....are far safer in the hands of a Blankenburg, than in those of a candidate named by the McNichol machine. Again in 1915, the Evening Ledger, supporting the Franklin Party ticket, declared that George Porter's election as Mayor would "be a triumph for Philadelphia Republicanism of
the best type and an inspiration to Republicanism throughout the nation."¹²⁰

This recurring display of Republican partisanship, on the part of the local press and third parties, rankled many anti-"Organisation" Democrats who were potential supporters of reform groups. The Democratic Record complained that the prevailing view among Philadelphia reformers in regard to local politics was that,

> If the city is to be saved from the contractors, it must only be by Republicans....Evidently no help in municipal reform is desired from persons who do not care what happens to the Grand Old Party, and from those who are perfectly satisfied to have it indefinitely out of power.¹²¹

The short-lived Franklin party was, in fact, the last third party to claim that it was non-partisan in local affairs. By the 1920's all reform activity remained within party ranks. Independent Republicans in suburban wards battled with the "Organisation" only at party primaries and not in general elections. When a disagreeable candidate obtained the Republican nomination and was opposed by a Democrat in the general election, the Independents either maintained their party regularity by voting for the candidate named in the primary, or did not participate in the contest at all. And yet potentially, in combination with the estimated 30,000 "anti-Organisation" Democrats in the city, Independent Republicans in the ring wards could have provided William Vare with formidable opposition, but such an alliance never materialised. The Independents stubbornly refused to leave the Republican party even if it meant the continuation of the "Organisation's" ascendancy.¹²²
Indeed from 1919 onwards they actually fought against the Democrats in general elections when minority positions were at stake. Thus rather than seeking to "fuse" with the Democrats in opposition to "Organisation" (as they had done in the past, in 1911, 1913 and 1917), the Independent Republicans forced the Democratic party into a position of dependence on the Republican machine. By refusing to bolt party ranks and by attempting to secure minority representation, the Independent Republicans aided the "Organisation" in the sense that their actions prevented the formation of a substantial united opposition to machine rule. The behaviour of the Independent Republicans in the 1920's indicates that they were more Republican than Independent, a characteristic which did not escape the notice of the Record. In September 1923, the Record printed a lengthy editorial entitled "What's the matter with Philadelphia?" in which it asked why Philadelphians had continued to vote for the "same group of unscrupulous political bosses who had robbed them for so many years."

"The answer," it suggested,

is to be found in the childish unreasoning belief that obsesses the average Philadelphian, that all governmental virtue reposes in the Republican party. This belief is fostered from childhood, handed down from generation to generation, and unquestionably accepted as an article of faith in most households. Men who apply their well-developed reasoning faculties to all other problems of life blindly refuse to consider the truth or falsity of the creed that permeates the Philadelphia atmosphere.

In Philadelphia you must be a Republican, just as you must eat, sleep, keep your body clean, and be courteous to women. It matters not that the precepts of the Republican and Democratic parties
have no more to do with municipal government than have the tenets of Buddhism, and that a Democrat is fully as capable of satisfactorily filling a municipal office as a Republican without prejudice to the application of Republican policies in the execution of the nation's business; the belief is fixed in the typical Philadelphian mind that the election of a Democrat to any important city office would be reactionary, ruinous and in effect equivalent to a municipal disaster.

We diagnose the case as almost hopeless addiction to Republicanism; habitual overdosing with partisanship... The strength of the Republican party in Philadelphia is the cause that blights our city, imposes upon it unnecessary burdens of taxation, hampers its development and enables venal politicians to fritter away its substance to their own personal enrichment. That's what's the matter with Philadelphia.24

"Hopeless addiction to Republicanism" then was a key feature, though not the only one, of the "Organisation's" success in controlling votes.

In sum, the "Organisation's" ability to overwhelm its electoral opponents rested on a number of factors, namely: public apathy; the demise of the Democratic party; the control it exercised over the election machinery; its astute methods of campaigning, and the "personal service" it rendered to the individual voter; in addition to the local strength of Republican partisanship. Taken together, they account for the remarkable degree of electoral success that the "Organisation" enjoyed during the period of its "institutionalisation".

This ability to control the electorate was, as pointed out at the start of this chapter, a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a reliable system of discipline within the "Organisation"; a development which in fact was
explained in the last chapter. But what still remains to be considered, however, is who benefitted from, and supported, the creation of such a centralised political structure, and who opposed it. This will be the subject of the final two chapters.
8. The Utility Monopolists

One of the main beneficiaries and supporters of the creation of a centralised political structure in Philadelphia seems to have been a major segment of the local business community, for the emergence of a fully fledged political machine at the turn of the century coincided with the consolidation of the public utilities industry in the city. More specifically, just as power was consolidated in the local polity, the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company and the Philadelphia Electric Company both managed to establish monopoly control over the city's street railway and electricity supply systems respectively.¹ In addition, the United Gas Improvement Company established virtual control over the local gas supply system when it successfully managed to obtain a long term lease of the municipal gas works in 1897.²

Although the relationship between consolidation in the local economy and in the urban polity was apparently coincidental, it needs to be emphasised that the centralisation of political power on the one hand, and the consolidation of the public utilities industry on the other, was to the mutual benefit of both utility entrepreneurs and also the party "boss". In the case of the former, for instance, it was to their benefit to have political power highly centralised since their particular industry was heavily dependent upon, and vulnerable to, governmental action.
Indeed, so long as the polity remained fragmented, utilities companies (which had very substantial fixed assets) were subject to, and vulnerable to, extortionate demands, from legislators. The creation of a system of discipline over public officials was therefore very much in the interest of utility companies, since dealing with a single party leader who could control the flow of legislation that they were vitally interested in, was preferable to the chronic discord and legislative blackmail that prevailed under a system of rampant factionalism.¹

The consolidation of the public utilities industry was also in the interests of a prospective party "boss" since so long as it remained fragmented, entrepreneurs, in competing with one another for favours from government, would be driven to offer bribes to secure such legislative privileges. Bribery may (or may not) have produced the desired result as far as these entrepreneurs were concerned, but what it also invariably did, was to subvert the ability of the party "boss" to discipline his subordinates. What I would suggest then is that if an arrangement could be struck between utility entrepreneurs and the political "boss", then the interests of both would be served.

It seems in fact that such an arrangement between the two was indeed reached in Philadelphia in the late nineteenth century, for the state government under Quay, and the city government under Martin and Durham, displayed considerable favouritism towards those utility companies which were
controlled by such entrepreneurs as Peter A. B. Widener, William L. Elkins, William H. Kemble and Thomas Dolan. This group of capitalists were, according to E. Digby Baltzell, "the last of the great nineteenth century business Titans in Philadelphia." They also had several other things in common. Nearly all of them, for example, were born in the 1830's in poor circumstances. They were all educated to the high school level and all went to work in their 'teens in retail establishments; Widener in his elder brother's butcher's shop; Dolan and Kemble in general dry goods stores and Elkins as a grocery clerk. None of them, despite their eligibility, served in the Union Army during the Civil War. Instead they proceeded to pile up considerable fortunes in commerce, industry and banking.

Widener (1834-1915), for example, quickly acquired his own meatshop and during the Civil War received a lucrative contract, courtesy of Simon Cameron's War Department, to supply mutton to all troops within ten miles of Philadelphia. With the $50,000 profit from this contract, he opened a chain of meat stores throughout the city, bought several strategically located streetcar lines and began to invest in suburban real estate. Also actively involved in local politics as a member of the Republican twentieth ward executive committee, Widener was elected to several minor offices before being appointed City Treasurer in 1873. Failing to secure successive party nominations for the State Treasuryship and the Mayoralty of Philadelphia in 1877, however, Widener forsook his political ambitions in favour
of his business interests. \(^7\)

With Elkins and Kemble he worked out a strategy for combining, consolidating and mechanising all the streetcar lines in Philadelphia. After their Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company secured a local monopoly, the trio, in partnership with William C. Whitney and Thomas Fortune Ryan, proceeded to use the same strategy to monopolise control of street railway systems in New York, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Chicago and more than a hundred other cities across the country. \(^8\) In addition to his traction interests, Widener helped to organise both the United States Steel Company and the American Tobacco Company. He was also a large investor in the Pennsylvania Railroad, Standard Oil and the United Gas Improvement Company. When he died in 1915, Widener left an estate of approximately one hundred million dollars, the largest single fortune in the city. \(^9\)

Widener's closest friend and associate William L. Elkins (1832-1903) also enjoyed similar initial success in retailing, though as a grocer rather than as a butcher. However, after ten years running his own produce business in New York and Philadelphia he, like many others, was struck by the "Oil Fever" which broke out following the discovery of oil in western Pennsylvania in 1859. Over the next twenty years Elkins acquired many prosperous wells and pioneered the refining of crude oil for illuminating purposes and for gasoline. In 1880 he sold his business to the Standard Oil Company and thereafter, in partnership with Widener, concentrated on building up his interests in street
railways, gas, electric lighting and suburban real estate. At the time of his death in 1903, he was the director of twenty-four companies and his personal fortune was estimated to be twenty five million dollars.\footnote{10}

The eldest member of the group William Kemble (1824-1891) "accumulated a large fortune" by successfully combining a career in business with one in politics.\footnote{11} Kemble, like Widener, was an activist in local politics as a Republican committeeman. He served as an agent for federal revenue stamps during the Civil War and was subsequently elected state treasurer for the first of three successive terms in 1865. It was Kemble in fact who pioneered the "treasury system" which became such an important component of Quay's state organisation.\footnote{12} He also ensured that the largest recipient of state money was the "pet" institution he founded, the People's Bank of Philadelphia. Kemble's manipulation of public funds was such that he has acquired immortality in the annals of Pennsylvania history as the author of the famous political maxim: "Addition, division and silence."\footnote{13} As well as pocketing his share of the spoils, Kemble was also active in the Philadelphia street railway industry. He served as Secretary of the Union Passenger Railway Company, for instance, one of the largest streetcar lines in the city, before joining up with Widener and Elkins to consolidate Philadelphia's street railway system. A close associate of both Quay and Cameron, it was Kemble who acted as the "connecting link" between the utility financiers and the state Republican organisation.\footnote{14}
The final member of the group, Thomas Dolan (1834-1914), was like the others a self-made man; a sales assistant who became, according to Baltzell, "one of Philadelphia's greatest nineteenth century business tycoons." Dolan made his fortune as a manufacturer of men's wear, fancy-knit goods and hosiery. He began the manufacture of "Germantown Goods" in 1861, and speedily built up a prosperous trade until, at the close of the Civil War, although still only thirty years old, he was one of the wealthiest men in the city. By 1871 his Keystone Knitting Mills was doing one million dollars worth of business a year, an annual turnover that established Dolan as one of the largest producers of men's wear in America, and paved the way for his election to the Presidency of the National Association of Manufacturers.

As well as being a prosperous textile manufacturer, Dolan also played a major role in organising and directing gas and electric companies. Indeed, he became a national figure in the utility field when the company he organised along with Widener and Elkins in 1882, the United Gas Improvement Company, became within a decade America's largest public utility concern. It was also under Dolan's leadership that the "U.G.I." leased the city's gas works in 1897. Dolan, like Kemble, also had close links with Quay's state Republican machine. In 1882, for instance, supported by Quay, he was elected chairman of the State Republican party. Again, backed by Quay, he served as an adviser to the Republican National Committee in the 1890's. When he
eventually died in 1914, Dolan's personal wealth in the city was exceeded only by that of Widener's.\textsuperscript{18}

As a group - Dolan, Widener, Elkins and Kemble - constituted, according to contemporary journalist Burton J. Hendrick, "a federation of capital" that was mutually bound together by a maze of interlocking business interests.\textsuperscript{19}

Writing in 1907, Hendrick observed that

> in the last thirty years working separately or working together, they have entered city after city, State after State, acquired street railways, gas and electric lighting companies and developed them on an enormous scale. . . . upon them at least ten million people or one-eighth of the nation's population are dependent for such daily needs as electric transit, and gas and electric lighting.\textsuperscript{20}

These capitalists were in fact, as Baltzell points out, "men of America's first plutocratic generation," the great organisers who were creators of, and products of, the general "organisational revolution" that was taking place in late nineteenth century America.\textsuperscript{21} They were essentially financiers, though their financial activities were not great speculative ventures such as those of Jim Fiske and Jay Gould, but rather carefully orchestrated moves involving limited risk and yet yielding enormous return, as in the case of the phenomenal growth of the "U.G.I."

These utility financiers who founded newer and fabulously wealthy family lines were different from those families of earlier wealth in Philadelphia, not just in terms of their poor origins, limited education and the manner in which they accumulated their wealth, but also in the way in which they
behaved and the place where they chose to live. The city's "First Families" of the Revolutionary period, and the banking, business and industrial elite of the mid-nineteenth century, tended to reside in fashionable downtown neighbourhoods such as Independence and Rittenhouse Square, or in suburbs along the Main Line and in Chestnut Hill to the west of the city. The new plutocrats, in defiance of Proper Philadelphia's popular convention that "Nobody lives north of Market" (the main east-west thoroughfare connecting the Delaware and Schyilkil rivers), built tremendous Victorian mansions at the corner of Broad Street and Girard Avenue, a full twelve blocks, north of Market Street.22

Aesthetic differences between the plutocrats and the aristocrats further compounded the geographic split between the two. Whereas mansions in Rittenhouse Square, for instance, tended to be simple, restrained and conservative in their design, the ones that Widener and Elkins built were "an overwhelming confection" that gave "an architectural definition to Thorstein Veblen's famous phrase, 'conspicuous consumption'";23 a "pecuniary canon of taste" indeed that led Baltzell to conclude that the newly rich Philadelphians "were typical of America's Renaissance Princes of the 'Gilded Age'."24

A final difference, and from our viewpoint perhaps the most important one, between the plutocrats and the aristocrats, was in their attitude towards local affairs and politics. Put briefly, the utility financiers, unlike earlier men of substance, were simply not interested in governance.
Instead, they were primarily concerned in power as a means to personal wealth, and if that meant that Pennsylvania and Philadelphia were ruled by the likes of Quay, Martin, Durham, McNichol and the Vare brothers, then so be it. They were prepared to accept and support machine rule in Pennsylvania and Philadelphia because, like party workers, they secured material rewards under such a system.

In what ways were these utility entrepreneurs favoured by the various party "bosses"? How did they benefit from the creation of a centralised political structure in Philadelphia and (given that local affairs were subject to state interference) also Pennsylvania? That the utility entrepreneurs received legislative favours from the state government under Quay, and the city government under Martin and Durham, can be demonstrated by examining the way in which the companies they controlled were able to establish monopoly control over the city's street railway, gas and electricity supply systems.

In the case of street railways, Kemble, Widener and Elkins united, rationalised and mechanised Philadelphia's street car lines into an electric-powered system which eventually monopolised local transit. That they managed to establish such a monopoly was attributable not only to their skill, vision and ability as entrepreneurs, but also to the alliance they forged with the state and city Republican machines.

Kemble, as one of the original incorporators of the Union
Passenger Railway Company in 1864, had been the first member of the group to get involved in street railways. Headed by state treasurer William McGrath, and numbering politicians Jacob Ridgway and William Leeds among its directors, the Union quickly became one of the city's successful roads. With valuable north-south and east-west lines it connected northern suburbs with the developing central business district and the Delaware river front.

It was while serving as Secretary of the Union company that Kemble began to develop a strategy for combining the city's twenty-odd competing horse-car lines into one. He based his strategy on the model provided by the Pennsylvania Railroad. As a lobbyist for "The Pennsy" in the early 1870's, Kemble had observed how the railroads managers had assembled a self-sufficient regional system, by creating a trunk and branch network through merging other roads and then leasing them to its main line. He also noted how they had divided the railroads into divisions and developed a line and staff structure to administer them.26

Kemble sought to apply the same techniques to the city's street railway system. He envisaged that the Union would become the trunk line for a system which would run through the heart of the business district and branch into the northern and western suburbs of the city. When his associates on the Union Board balked at his scheme, Kemble teamed up with Widener and Elkins and formed a rival (Continental) company with the intention of capturing
control of the Union, and then implementing his strategy of combination. However, in order to protect themselves from political raids by their opponents, and to ensure the passage of appropriate legislation, the trio also needed to recruit the necessary political expertise. It was for this reason that Quay was added to the group. Together these four men formed "a combine that became the most powerful single force in the city's street railway industry."

At the time the "Combine" entered the transit field in 1873, some twenty-seven separate passenger railway companies had (in the absence of a general law for the incorporation of street railways and in the belief that competition was the best regulator of the public interest) been granted charter rights by the state legislature to operate horse-car lines in Philadelphia. In practice, the unco-ordinated and unsystematic development of street railways aroused considerable public opposition and hostility. Public criticism focused not just on the failure of company owners to co-operate over the provision of routes, schedules and new technology, but also on the process by which they secured charters in the first place. For example, Philadelphians were indignant about the fact that since local affairs were subject to state interference, they had no control, and nor were they consulted, over the conferring of charters that made a gift of the use of their city's streets for private profit. The passage of the so-called "Railway Boss Act" of 1868, which prohibited the city from regulating street railroads without specific authorisation
from the assembly, only added to their sense of injustice.\textsuperscript{31} Such resentment was aggravated even further by the discovery that prospective companies often secured their charters through bribes, stock-options and other favours, and that greedy legislators had willingly sacrificed the city's interests for such inducements.\textsuperscript{32}

Concerted public protest over inadequate local control and about special influence in charter grants brought limited reform. The new state constitution of 1874 attempted to reduce legislative corruption by prohibiting, among other things, special charters for railways. It also provided that any further street railway construction was to be subject to municipal approval.\textsuperscript{33}

This initiative to promote local regulation counted for little in practice, however, because reformers enacted no general law to permit the incorporation of additional lines. Indeed, since the Constitution did not affect existing companies, it did not take long for the traction magnates to realise that by preventing the passage of such a law they could consolidate their positions without having to worry about the appearance of additional competitors.\textsuperscript{34} In fact, because of their close relationship with Quay, they were able to delay the passage of a general incorporation law for fifteen years, by which "time, of course," as Harold E. Cox and John F. Meyers have pointed out, "it was too late to preserve competition - if indeed that was a purpose of the Act of 1889."\textsuperscript{35}
Cox and Meyers suggest that,

the rapidity with which [they] succeeded in .... consolidating their positions in Philadelphia, while at the same time exploiting their favoured position within the state legislature...commands even a cynic's respect. 36

Indeed, the way in which the "combine" turned "the new Constitution to their advantage," Cox and Meyers conclude, amounted to "the prostitution of an ideal." 37

Cox and Meyers formed this opinion on the basis of how the "Combine" established its traction monopoly; namely through "legislative manipulation." 38 That is, by way of the state legislature, under Quay's influence and direction, regularly "delivering" (or not) the necessary legislation that permitted the group to monopolise the city's street railway system 39

In 1883, for instance, the "Combine" was in an awkward dilemma. It had established a powerful system by capturing control of the Union company in 1880 and that of the West Philadelphia railway in 1881. However, since companies under their respective charters were restricted to horse traction and had limited capitalisation, the group could not meet the growing demand for transportation by substituting cable technology and mechanical power for horsepower, without the passage of a general incorporation law and the risk of additional competition. The state legislature, in order to,

get around [this] very obvious impasse...obligingly legalised the creation of a corporation that might in future be easily converted into a monopoly. 40

That is, the state assembly enacted a motive power law which
permitted the creation of an entirely new category of company: the traction motor company. Specifically, the bill provided for the formation of corporations,

for the construction and operation of motors and cables or other machinery for supplying motive power to passenger railways and the necessary apparatus for applying the same.

In addition these companies were,

permitted to motorise any existing railway company not previously covered by existing charters and franchises, to sell their services to existing companies, operate lines under contract, and lease lines.41

This bill, as Cox and Meyers point out, had "obvious advantages" for the "Combine", for not only did it permit the group to construct a cable line, it also did not interfere with the existing restriction against the establishment of new passenger railway companies in Philadelphia.42 Since the "Combine", at the time of the passage of the Act, was the only group in Philadelphia that had the financial capability to construct a cable line, Cox and Meyers argue that,

the law was made to order for this organisation; and it was no accident that the first company under the Act was the Philadelphia Traction Company, controlled by the syndicate. Using this new company as a base of operations, the syndicate unified the Union, West Philadelphia and Continental Companies into a single system to which they added other properties from time to time. Syndicate control was exercised through nine hundred and ninety-nine year leases - in effect, perpetual leases - under which the majority of the more lucrative and strategically located properties in Philadelphia were consolidated.43

By the time that a general incorporation law was finally passed in 1889, "it was too late to preserve competition" or
"significantly affect the march...toward total monopoly," because by then virtually all the main thoroughfares in downtown Philadelphia were occupied by rail lines, so "constructing new lines was neither feasible nor necessary." The "Combine" in fact, turned even this apparent defeat to their advantage. The group simply created companies which built additional trackage in Philadelphia under its control. The effect of this building was to widen the network of street railways and with it syndicate control of the street railway industry while at the same time discouraging competition by small isolated companies in Philadelphia.

By the mid-1890's only three important companies - the Philadelphia Traction (with 203 miles of track), the Electric Traction (130 miles), and People's Traction (73 miles), in addition to one small independent line, the Hestonville, Montana and Fairmount Railway Company (24 miles) - had survived the city's traction wars (see Table 8.1).

However, when following the conversion from cable to electric traction, renewed rivalry threatened to ruin all three companies, "the state legislature was once again called upon; and once again it delivered." In 1895, the State Assembly passed the legislation necessary to allow a consolidation to take place. The company heads quickly chartered a new organisation, the Union Traction Company, which assumed complete control of the assets and liabilities of the three competing traction companies. This merger virtually completed the combination of Philadelphia's street railways. Within two years, the "Combine" assumed direction
of the new company, and soon after the Union absorbed the remaining independent line, the Hestonville Company, thus uniting the city's street railways into an powerful monopoly (see Table 8.1).48

It could be construed from the discussion so far, as indeed contemporary observers such as Lincoln Steffens and Moisei Ostrogorski, and more recent scholars like Matthew Josephson, Richard Hofstadter, Robert Merton, E. Digby Baltzell, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson have argued, that the reason why the utility entrepreneurs were able to secure legislative favours from the state assembly was because they themselves controlled the legislature; that in fact the party "boss" and his machine were mere functionaries of the new plutocrats.49

An examination of the infamous "franchise grab" of 1901 (when the "Combine" had already consolidated its economic position) suggests, however, that this would be an erroneous judgement to make.50 The "franchise grab" was a direct consequence of the deterioration that followed Kemble's death, in the political (rather than economic) position of the "Combine". With the loss of the "chief connection" between the traction syndicate and the Republican machine, relations between Quay and the remainder of the group - Peter Widener, his son George, William Elkins and Thomas Dolan - declined sharply and temporarily ruptured when the elder Widener refused to support the state "boss" during a period of political crisis at the turn of the century.51
Table 8.1. The Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company and its subsidiaries*

Philadelphia
Rapid
Transit
Company
(1902)

Electric
Traction
Co. (1893)\textsuperscript{a}

Hestonville,
Mantua &
Fairmount
(1859)

Peoples
Traction
Co. (1893)

Philadelphia
Traction
Co. (1895)

Union
Traction
Co. (1895)


* The subsidiaries listed were all passenger railway companies unless otherwise stated.

\textsuperscript{a} The figure in parentheses indicates the date of the company's incorporation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street Name 1 (Year)</th>
<th>Street Name 2 (Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens' North End (1894)</td>
<td>Citizens' (1858)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankford &amp; Southwark (1854)</td>
<td>2nd &amp; 3rd Sts. (1858)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens' East End (1894)</td>
<td>Lombard &amp; South St. (1861)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown &amp; Parrish Sts. (1894)</td>
<td>Clearfield &amp; Cambria St. (1894)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street Name 1 (Year)</th>
<th>Street Name 2 (Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairmount &amp; Arch St. (1858)</td>
<td>East Aramingo Ave. (1894)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairmount (1858)</td>
<td>Green &amp; Coates Sts. (1858)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairmount Park &amp; Haddington (1892)</td>
<td>Germantown (1858)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern (1890)</td>
<td>Centennial (1889)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girard Ave. (1894)</td>
<td>Peoples (1873)---Cheltenham &amp; J'kintn (1892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillcrest Ave. (1896)</td>
<td>Aramingo Ave. (1894)</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street Name 1 (Year)</th>
<th>Street Name 2 (Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catherine &amp; Bainbridge Sts. (1889)</td>
<td>Western Suburban (1894)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Philadelphia (1857)</td>
<td>Phila. City (1859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union (1864)</td>
<td>Kessler St. (1892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental (1873)</td>
<td>Phila. &amp; Gray's Ferry (1858)---Schuylkill River (1866)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridge Avenue (1859)</td>
<td>Girard College (1858)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walnut St. Connecting R. Co. (1890)</td>
<td>Chelten Ave. (1889)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntingdon St. Conn. R. Co. (1894)</td>
<td>Frankford &amp; Fairmont (1894)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd St. &amp; Allegheny Ave. (1890)---Fishers Lane (1899)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern (1889)</td>
<td>G'town &amp; Fairmont Pk (1895)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall St. (1889)</td>
<td>Lindley Ave. (1899)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Following his re-election to the U.S. Senate and his acquittal on charges of misappropriating state funds, Quay determined to exact revenge on the ungrateful Widener by entering "a marriage of convenience" with paving contractor John Mack, and supervising the passage of legislation that would destroy the "Combine's" monopoly of the street railway business in Philadelphia.\(^5^2\)

Capitalising on public demands for rapid transit, and on Widener and Elkin's absence on a European holiday, Quay, in May 1901, sponsored two bills through the state legislature which provided for the creation of yet another category of street railway company. The rapid transit companies created under the provisions of the Focht-Emery bills were also granted the right to enter upon street railway lines already built and to have unlimited power to borrow money on bonds. In addition, their franchises were to be exclusive and perpetual.\(^5^3\)

The bills, as Clinton R. Woodruff observed, "came like a bolt of thunder out of a clear sky" and were "literally jammed through" the state legislature and Philadelphia City Council "with unprecedented and reckless speed."\(^5^4\) The "whole process" (the passage of the bills and the issuing of charters for thirteen companies in Philadelphia, all controlled by Mack) took just sixteen days, even though the legislation had far-reaching implications for every thoroughfare in the city and threatened the security of every existing transit franchise.\(^5^5\)
Wanamaker argued that these "ripper bills" were "little short of public plunder," while Woodruff claimed that they constituted,

a new and hitherto unparalleled record of franchise looting and defiance of public opinion. I doubt if ever in the history of a state or a city, public opinion has been more openly or impudently defied; if ever the machinery of government has been more brazenly prostituted to private ends and profit; if ever there has been a more conscienceless betrayal of public trust.

Since the Mack group had little capital and no plan for construction, local reformers were outraged by the "ripper bills", not so much because they sympathised with the "Combine's" Union Traction Company, which as Woodruff acknowledged "was getting a dose of its own medicine," but because "the public interest" was being sacrificed for the sake of "macing" (blackmailing) Widener, Elkins and Dolan. The "Combine", given the threat that the Mack group could sell its franchises to a potential rival, was thus reluctantly forced, and at considerable expense, to compromise with Quay's new associate.

What the "franchise grab" of 1901 demonstrates then, in my view, is not just a betrayal of "the public interest" or the ability of the "boss" to control the behaviour of his subordinates in public office, as was argued in Chapter 5. It also indicates that, contrary to received wisdom, the Republican political machines, at both the state and city level, were independent of, and not subservient to, utility interests; that in fact legislative concessions were the prerogative of the party "boss" for him to confer or withhold as he deemed appropriate.
Apart from occasional differences such as the one that precipitated the "franchise grab", relations between the utility entrepreneurs and Republican party "bosses" were generally smooth. The preferential treatment that their gas and electric companies received at the hands of city government, also suggests that the utility monopolists were favoured beneficiaries of Republican machine rule.

In 1897, for instance, the "Combine's" "U.G.I." company managed to secure, "in the face of great public hostility" and "at a time when the tide of American public opinion " was "setting strongly toward enlarging municipal activity," a thirty year lease of the municipal gas works, due to the efforts of "boss" Dave Martin, a close friend of Dolan's.61 Reform groups and local newspapers argued against the proposed lease because it constituted "a bad financial bargain" since it was "estimated upon a depreciated value (of the works) based upon the earning capacity of a plant that has been inefficiently managed."62 In addition, given the length of the lease and the fact that the gas works were a profitable thirty million dollar public asset, reformers claimed that local citizens would receive "inadequate compensation," whether in the form of annual rental payments to the city treasury or in lower gas prices to the consumer.63

Reformers were also concerned about "the far-reaching principles" that the issue raised, and not just the "material aspects" of the lease.64 For example, they argued
that the city's gas works should be run "for the benefit, not of the few stockholders of a private corporation but, of the citizens who live within its bounds." They were also worried that the creation a "a great private monopoly in gas supply" would increase the risk of "political corruption."

Finally, and most damaging of all, according to Henry C. Lea, the passage of the proposed lease would constitute,

an open admission that we are not competent to govern ourselves....we shall have renounced our right to self government and shall have placed ourselves under the tutelege of a syndicate of capitalists.

None of these arguments, however, failed to persuade sufficient Councilmen not to sacrifice the city's long-term interests for short-term gains, and the lease was duly passed in November 1897.

In 1905, Durham and Dolan negotiated a new agreement which was designed to benefit both the "Organisation" and the "U.G.I.". Put simply, in return for cancelling the existing lease in favour of a new seventy-five year one, the "U.G.I.", instead of paying rentals, was to contribute twenty-five million dollars to the city treasury over a period of three years. This arrangement suited both parties, since on the one hand it provided Durham with a "handsome kitty" with which to reward his faithful followers, and on the other allowed Dolan to secure long-term control of the gas works by "paying only a fraction of the real value of the lease."

Durham's plan back-fired, however, for he made a "serious
blunder" in attempting to "railroad" the ordinance through the City Council. That is, he "ignored the charged atmosphere" in the city that followed Steffens' indictment of Philadelphia as being "Corrupt and Contented", and by acting "in, such a high-handed manner, provoked public sentiment in opposition." "As the nature of the Gas Steal became evident, a wave of indignation swept throughout the city" and "caught the Organisation by complete surprise." Mayor John Weaver vetoed the new proposed gas lease, broke with Durham, and temporarily joined the ranks of the new independent party in the city. Such was the strength of reform fever and popular indignation that Durham was ultimately forced to concede defeat in the "gas war".

The significance of the so-called "gas steal" is that it is usually regarded as the incident which ignited "a decade of insurgent reform activity in both city and state," but what it also indicates (and this has tended to be overlooked) is the depth of the mutual interdependent interest that bound the "Organisation" and the utility entrepreneurs together.

The political favouritism that was displayed by the party "boss" towards the "Combine's" electric companies, provides a third and final example of the collusion that existed between the "Organisation" and the utility monopolists. For instance, when Dolan's Brush Electric Light Company (1881) consolidated with Widener, Kemble, Quay and Elkins' United States (originally Maxim) Electric Lighting Company (1881),
to form an "Electric Trust" in 1886, in order "to minimise competition, standardise rates and increase their earning power," these companies also entered into "a secret combination" with electric light companies controlled by David Martin and Charles Porter, so that they could farm out among themselves the work of lighting the city's streets with electricity.

At the same time the city's Edison Electric Light Company was effectively "frozen out of competition for city lighting because its ordinance prohibited the company from furnishing current for arc lights." Consequently, with the Edison company unable to compete, and the other "nine ostensibly separate companies furnishing arc lights" either under the control of the "Electric Trust" or Martin and Porter, the cost of public lighting, it was alleged, was "twice as much" as it should have been. This was because the nine companies formed "a public electric light monopoly" since they had "a tacit understanding and agreement not to compete in each other's territory" and were therefore able to "maintain excessive profits by avoiding competition."

In view of the growing unpopularity of the "Electric Trust", however, and the increasing demands for a municipal electric lighting system, Martin Maloney, one of Dolan's closest associates, reasoned that a fresh initiative was needed to overcome both public agitation and the other problems that faced the city's electric light companies, notably their diverse systems of light and power distribution, ruinous competition, and the confusion and waste attendant upon the
Table 8.2. The Philadelphia Electric Company of New Jersey and its subsidiaries*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsidiary</th>
<th>Year</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Heat, Light &amp; Power Co. (Pa. 1895)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Light &amp; Power Co. (N.J. 1898)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Electric Company (New Jersey, 1899)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Electric Co. (1896)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Electric Co. (1899)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kensington Electric Co. (1893)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware County Electric Co. (1909)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philadelphia Electric Company (Pennsylvania, 1902)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Edison (1886)
- Brush (1881)
- U.S. (1881)
- Phila. (1882)
- Columbia (1892)
- Northern (1885)
- Pa. (1887)
- West End
- Powelton (1890)
- M\fer's (1890)
- Suburban (1890)
- Diamond (1890)
- Wissahickon (1893)
- Germantown (1884)
- Keystone (1886)
- Bala & Merion (1891)
- Southern (1890)
- Beacon (1896)
- Overbrook (1893)
- Cheltenham (1890)
- Philadelphia Suburban
- Faraday
- Citizen's
- Media


* all the subsidiaries listed were either electric light or heat and power companies.

a the figure in parentheses represents the date when the company was incorporated.
duplication of service.\textsuperscript{84}

Maloney established a new corporation, the Pennsylvania Heat, Light and Power Company (1895) which he envisaged would use culm (waste coal) in a revolutionary way to generate cheap electricity. Martin and Porter, as a favour to Dolan, provided Maloney's company with the necessary franchise to allow it to compete in the city. The party "bosses" then sold off their companies to "Penn. Heat" which also acquired control of the Edison company.\textsuperscript{85} Maloney also reached agreement with the "Electric Trust" and within a few years established a monopoly of the city's electricity supply system under "The Philadelphia Electric Company" (1902), a Pennsylvania corporation that included Dolan, Widener, Elkins and Mack on its board of directors (see Table 8.2).\textsuperscript{86}

While acknowledging that the monopolisation of the city's electricity supply system, like the street railway system before it, was in large measure due to the skill, enterprise and foresight of entrepreneurs such as Maloney, Dolan, Widener and Elkins, and that the process of consolidation required a high degree of technical, financial and administrative expertise, it is also the case that it could not have been achieved without the necessary political support. Quay, Martin and Durham appear to have played the role of "political midwife" in assisting in the consolidation of the public utilities industry.

The relationship between consolidation in the economy and in
the polity was not one of coincidence. The politicos and the plutocrats were allied together because it was in their mutual interest to do so and, moreover, the former were not subservient to the latter. Not everyone welcomed this development in Philadelphia political affairs. Indeed, such an alliance prompted widespread opposition, and it is to the opponents of the "Organisation" that we turn next.
9. The Non-Partisan Reform Movement

Between the introduction of the Bullitt City Charter in 1887 and the re-emergence of a competitive two party system in 1933, the most serious threat to the "Organisation's" hegemony in Philadelphia politics was presented by the non-partisan reform movement. On the governmental level the "Organisation" was challenged by successive "public watchdog" committees such as the Citizens' Municipal Association (C.M.A., 1886-1906) and the Committee of Seventy (1904, to the present day), while in the electoral arena its supremacy was contested by a series of committees and third parties sponsored by non-partisan reformers. These included the Citizens' Committee of Fifty for a New Philadelphia (1890-92); the Citizens' Committee of 95 for Good City Government (1895); the Anti-Combine Committee (1895); the Municipal League (1891-1904); the Union Party (1901); the City Party (1905-7); and the Keystone Party (1910-15).

These reform groups differed from their predecessors, such as the C.M.R.A. and the Committee of One Hundred, in a number of respects which might be termed organisational breadth, depth, coherence and duration. That is, in short, they tended to be larger in size, far better organised, more representative and durable in that they usually persisted over the course of several elections and legislative sessions. They also differed from earlier reform
organisations, as we shall see later, in terms of their composition, their objectives and their solutions to municipal problems.

Citing the C.M.A. and the Municipal League of Philadelphia as examples, Kenneth Fox has recently suggested that these city reform organisations of the late nineteenth century, represented a new kind of elite activism. Unlike the committees of notables that often formed in the 1870's to fight specific campaigns against municipal corruption, the purpose of these new organisations was to lay foundations for major political movements of the future.

During the 1880's, ad hoc committees became less popular; reform effort went increasingly into founding permanent organisations.

The new clubs and leagues had large memberships, sound organisational structure and a dedication to achievement rather than to elite organising for its own sake.3

The Municipal League for example, conscious that "the trouble in the past has been that reform movements have been too sporadic and too spasmodic,"4 deliberately set out to imitate the Republican machine's organisational structure and to build up "a municipal party governed upon the same general principles as national parties."5 As the League's Board of Managers reasoned,

when we realise how thoroughly the regular politicians are entrenched; how completely they are organised; how well they are supplied with the "sinews of war", those interested in developing the city along the highest possible lines and evolving a higher standard must leave no stone unturned to advance their cause, and must be as compactly organised as the "regulars". Organisation then must be the "keynote" of the League and as this progresses the prospects of its ultimate success will grow brighter.6
In short, the "Organisation" was to "be overcome by organisation." Indeed, organisation became the League's "watchword" to such an extent that "at its tenth anniversary (in 1901) it recognised that to accomplish permanent results it must adopt as its guiding policy 'all at it and always at it'."9

The Municipal League's organisation, like that of the Republican party, paralleled the city's governmental structure. It included bodies representing the electoral division, the ward and the city at large. Overall authority rested in a Central Board of Managers which was composed of twenty-five members elected at large and one delegate elected from each of the city's wards.10 Within five years, the League built up a membership in excess of five thousand, a considerable feat given that, unlike the Republican machine, "we have nothing to offer our workers except the satisfaction that comes from labouring in a cause based upon fundamentally right principles." In its thirteen year life-span the League participated in twenty local elections with a varying degree of success.12 "The best and most fruitful of all its work" however, as the Board of Managers pointed out at the League's tenth anniversary celebration, was "not the mere election of candidates" but rather that it has organised the city for reform. It has made visible and effective a reform vote that without its aid, would have eddied hither and thither....[Unlike] the Committee of One Hundred...which should have been a permanent force for good [but instead] dissolved and left no organisation behind, the Municipal League in this city has struck its roots deep.13
The Committee of Seventy, the City Party and the Keystone
Party were the heirs and beneficiaries of the "local reform
tradition" established by the Municipal League. In November
1904, the Committee of Seventy for instance "took up the
League's work under a fresh name and with fresh blood, and
along somewhat broader and more general lines." Like the
League, the Committee was committed to the view that
the machine cannot be destroyed by one victory at
the polls....its influence can be held in check
only by organised effort conducted on intelligent
business principles. Accordingly, committee members contributed not only
sufficient funds to finance election campaigns but also to
establish a Bureau of Information which would "provide the
information the public needs to promote fair and efficient
governance in Philadelphia." In "keeping watch and ward
over public interests" with regard to election and
municipal laws and to the conduct of public officials, the
Committee of Seventy, over the last eighty years, has
faithfully fulfilled the aims of its founders who, back in
January 1905, had planned to establish "an organisation of a
permanent character whose purpose shall be to aid in
securing good government in Philadelphia."

In its early days the Committee of Seventy, by organising
the City Party, played a major role in directing the wave of
reform insurgency that swept the city in May 1905, following
Durham's proposal to lease the city's gas works to the
"U.G.I." The City Party itself inherited the Municipal
League's organisation in the wards and divisions throughout
the city and managed to defeat the regular "Organisation"
ticket in the county elections in November 1905. Six years later the nonpartisans celebrated an even more stunning victory over the "Organisation", when their Keystone Party candidate Rudolph Blankenburg defeated George H. Earle in the mayoral election. In both the 1905 and 1911 campaigns over 40,000 citizens participated in the primary elections for these two third parties, a level of support which easily outweighed the 24,000 "genuine" votes that the Democratic party could barely muster even in a general election.

In terms both of electoral strength and political organisation then, party politics in Philadelphia at the turn of the century was dominated by an over-riding cleavage between well organised machine and reform forces. We have already accounted for the centralisation of the Republican "Organisation" in Philadelphia, but it is still necessary for us to explain how the founders of the non-partisan reform movement were able to seize the initiative among those who opposed the machine and gain a substantial following. Or, put another way, how can we account for the emergence of the nonpartisan reformers as the main opposition to the Republican machine?

In the first instance, this development can be attributed to the institutionalisation of the "Organisation" under Durham's leadership. The establishment of a reliable system of discipline within the Republican machine, combined with the "Organisation's" ability to control the electorate,
enabled party leaders to exercise a virtual monopoly over the recruitment of candidates to public office. This internal consolidation of power, alongside the "Organisation's" emergence as the central force in the government and politics of Philadelphia, also had important consequences for the city's men of substance. In the first place they were not only driven out of the Republican party organisation, but were also (given that the Democrats were a "kept minority") forced into abandoning the alternative major party as well, and thereby compelled to seek reform outside of traditional party lines. These men of substance did not, as one might infer from Sam Bass Warner Jr., E. Digby Baltzell, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, withdraw of their own accord. In his reflections on the City Party's campaign of 1905, for instance, Franklin S. Edmonds, Chairman of the City Committee (and himself, a young lawyer and college professor) suggested that

the most serious error of the Organisation in its political history was [its] absolute neglect of...
...the young men of independence and spirit whose ideals of political life have been formed largely upon the models suggested by Theodore Roosevelt and Joseph W. Folk. [This] large group of young men [have] found all the doors to political activity closed by the Organisation and its agents.

Indeed for many years in Philadelphia, at the primary election only the officeholders have voted: the party machinery in divisions has been controlled by the officeholders; the nominating conventions have been attended by the officeholders and the independent has been told he must either "go along" or be impotent as a political factor.24

The consolidation of Quay and Durham's regime had another consequence which was shocking to men of substance in
Philadelphia. I suggested in the last chapter that the creation of a centralised and dominant party organisation served the interests of some very important elements of the city's business community. But if the existence of such a structure was a collective "good" for those such as the utility monopolists and local contractors allied to it, it was a collective "bad" - a menace - for those who were not. In its report "to formulate a plan of Organisation for the Promotion of Good Government in Philadelphia" for instance, the Committee of Seven, appointed by the Citizens' Meeting of December 19, 1904, identified precisely the consequences of "machine rule" and "the evil condition which it is sought to remedy."

The evil from which the city is suffering is not so much lack of ability in its employees as the existence, separate and apart from its government, of an unofficial organisation, sometimes called "The Machine", established ostensibly for political purposes, but really for private profit, and which depends for its power and influence on:

First.- Its absolute control of the appointment of all municipal officers and employees, and the fixing of their salaries.

Second.- Its control of the police, so that it may, in return for votes and money, protect criminals and allow citizens to evade the law in special instances.

Third.- Its control of election, so that its candidates may be elected at the polls.

Fourth.- Its control of contracts and of grants of public franchises.

This organisation tends to demoralise to a greater or less extent every branch of municipal work. It decreases the efficiency of every department, because in the case of conflict between the interest of the city and the interest of "The Machine", the latter must prevail. It multiplies offices. It makes loyalty and service to "The Machine", rather than ability and honesty, the
test of fitness. It enormously increases the cost of carrying on the business of the city, and it decreases the returns to the citizens from such cost.

It lowers the standards of public and private morality by bringing all classes of citizens into constant and familiar contact with "graft" as a mode of conducting business affairs.

Its effect upon the finances of the city is already becoming apparent. The annual tax on property, when the rate and the method of valuation are considered together, is high and there is every indication that it will be higher. Rents will of necessity advance and in the end the burden will fall most heavily on that large class of the community who are dependent upon their daily labour for their support, and whose comfort depends upon the relation between wages and the cost of living.25

"Conditions" were "fast becoming intolerable," particularly so to a segment of the business community that was becoming increasingly significant in the early twentieth century.26 That is, those dynamic elements of the new professional communities (such as scientific management, public health, public administration and political science) which had newly emerged in turn-of-the-century America, and which Samuel Hays has identified as being in the vanguard of the municipal reform movement.27 More recently, Kenneth Fox has unravelled the intricate tangle of changes in legal, governmental and political thought and practice which helped to produce a new national model of urban government in the early twentieth century.28 Fox identifies a national coalition of elite reform activists, made up of experts in municipal law, political scientists, progressive city officials and statisticians at the federal Bureau of Census, as being responsible for producing a new "functional mode"
of government, that is, a national social scientific approach to the theory and practice of urban government.  

In her examination of the early twentieth century non-partisan reform movement in Philadelphia however, Bonnie Fox concludes that "the so-called "Philadelphia progressives" resembled Richard Hofstadter's Mugwumps of the 1880's, conducting Samuel P. Hays' dispassionate type of campaign for municipal efficiency."  

Fox's conclusion is based on her analysis of Blankenburg's Mayoral Election Campaign Committee, whose composition suggests to her that "the Philadelphia reformers of 1911 in fact, were the civic leaders of an earlier era. They had previously participated in movements for municipal improvement."  

Bonnie Fox's assessment, however, stands in need of qualification. In my view she overstates the degree to which the Philadelphia progressives were "the civic leaders of an earlier era," and that it was "the younger members of the Committee of One Hundred" who became "the leaders of the (reform) groups that followed."  

A comparison of the membership register of the Committee of One Hundred with the membership rolls of the various reform "groups that followed" for instance, reveals that 60 percent (91) of the Committee's members were not affiliated to any future reform organisation, and that an additional 27 members' commitment to the non-partisan cause stretched only so far as enlisting to join the "public watchdog" committee, the C.M.A. (see Appendix 2). As far as can be ascertained it is possible to identify only 12 (8%) out of the 153 members as being active
participants in future non-partisan reform groups.

"Hofstadter's Mugwumps of the 1880's," constituted then, I would suggest, only one element of the non-partisan reform movement in turn-of-the-century Philadelphia. The problem with Bonnie Fox's study of the Philadelphia progressives is that it does not reveal the full range and depth of those committed to non-partisan reform. It seems that there were in fact two cosmopolitan "elites" simultaneously interacting and competing for power and prestige at this time; one comprising of Mugwumps and their descendants and the other consisting largely of young middle class professional men. As we saw earlier, it was Franklin S. Edmonds and "young (professional) men of independence and spirit" like himself who were in the forefront of the City Party's struggle against the "Organisation" in 1905. Clinton R. Woodruff also observed, that

it is an interesting fact to note that the leaders of the opposition to the recent [1905] proposed extension of the Gas Lease were mainly young men who had been actively identified with the Municipal League and who had received their training in public works while identified with it.

Woodruff suggested that this development was due to the fact that (unlike the Committee of One Hundred), the League had been "a persistent and not an intermittent factor in the fight for good government." Indeed the League was not only better organised but it differed "essentially from the (self-constituted) Committee of One Hundred in being thoroughly representative." "That element of representation in the American and republican sense" was
reflected in the membership of the League's Central Board of Managers.\textsuperscript{38} An examination of those who sat on the League's Board of Management between 1891 and 1904 reveals the true diversity of the Philadelphia non-partisan reform movement. The League's Managers included Mugwumps, like the retired Quaker businessman Charles Richardson, insurance broker Robert R. Corson and publisher Robert R. Dearden; descendants of Mugwumps, such as locomotive manufacturer George Burnham Jr., lawyer R. Francis Wood and reform pamphleteer Herbert Welsh; University of Pennsylvania academics like political scientists Walter J. Branson, Edmund J. James and Leo S. Rowe, and the Dean of the Law School, William Draper Lewis; young lawyers such as Clinton R. Woodruff, Samuel B. Scott, George D. Porter and Walter S. McInnes and engineers like James Christie and James Mapes Dodge as well as newspaper editor George E. Mapes and a sprinkling of financiers, physicians, clergymen, and small businessmen (see Table 9.1).

The Committee of Seventy was similarly eclectic in its composition, as its founders deliberately intended it to be.\textsuperscript{39} Its members included trade unionist Alfred D. Calvert, mechanical engineer Morris L. Cooke, drygoods merchant Frederic H. Strawbridge, soap manufacturer Samuel Fels, physician George Woodward, book publisher John C. Winston, banker George Norris and dye manufacturer J. Henry Scattergood, as well as former Mugwumps Joshua L. Bailey, William W. Justice, William H. Jenks, Lewis Madeira, Walter Wood and Francis B. Reeves, and descendants of Mugwumps like
Table 9.1. Members of the Board of Management of the Municipal League of Philadelphia, 1891-1904

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Other Political Affiliations*</th>
<th>Residence (Ward)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Finley Acker</td>
<td>grocer</td>
<td>C.M.A., C50</td>
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</tr>
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<td>John S. Adams</td>
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<td>C.M.A.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Charles A. Brinley</td>
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<td>C.M.A., C50</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>John Wanamaker's</td>
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<td>George Burnham Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>manufacturer</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>Robert R. Corson</td>
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<td>Robert R. Dearden</td>
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<td>U.P., C.P.</td>
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<td>Horace A. Doan</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Charles W. Dulles</td>
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<td>Theodore M. Etting</td>
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<td>Alexander Henry</td>
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<td>George E. Mapes</td>
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<tr>
<td>John B. Roberts</td>
<td>physician</td>
<td>C.M.A., C95</td>
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</table>
Leo S. Rowe: university professor
Samuel B. Scott: lawyer; C.P.
W. S. Stewart: physician; C95
William H. Tenbrook: manufacturer
David Wallerstein: lawyer; C70
Herbert Welsh: pamphleteer; C.S.R.A., C.M.A., C50, C95, A-CC
Theodore Wernwag: importer; C.M.A., C50, A-CC
William White Jr.: lawyer; 7
R. Francis Wood: lawyer; C.S.R.A., C.M.A.
Clinton R. Woodruff: lawyer; C.S.R.A., C95

Sources: the same as for Appendix 2.

* A-CC: Anti-Combine Committee
C50: Citizens' Committee of Fifty for a New Philadelphia
C95: Citizens' Committee of 95 for Good City Government
C.M.A.: Citizens' Municipal Association
C.M.R.A.: Citizens' Municipal Reform Association
C.P.: City Party
C.S.R.A.: Civil Service Reform Association
C100: Committee of One Hundred
C70: Committee of Seventy
U.P.: Union Party

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Francis R. Cope Jr., T. Morris Perot Jr., James Bateman Jr., and Coleman Sellers Jr., (see Table 9.2).

Representatives of the various elements that made up the local non-partisan reform movement in Philadelphia were also conspicuous in the national coalition of elite reform activists that Kenneth Fox identifies as being responsible for devising a new systematic approach to the problems of urban government. Philadelphia lawyer Clinton R. Woodruff, for example, acted as the secretary, treasurer and counsel for the local Municipal League, but also served as the first Secretary (1894-1920) of the national organisation as well. Similarly, Mugwump descendant and locomotive manufacturer George Burnham Jr., occupied simultaneously the Presidency of the Philadelphia Municipal League and the Treasuryship (1894-1919) of the National Municipal League. In addition both Woodruff and Burnham, along with university professor Leo S. Rowe and Mugwump businessman Charles Richardson, sat on the committee which drafted the National Municipal League's first model city charter, published in 1899.

Philadelphia engineer Morris L. Cooke also provides an excellent example of the progressive city official which Kenneth Fox has argued was so important in generating "innovations" in urban government. A close friend, neighbour and professional disciple of Frederick W. Taylor, Cooke, in his capacity as Mayor Blankenburg's Director of Public Works (1912-16), "brought scientific management into the mainstream of municipal progressivism."
Table 9.2. The Committee of Seventy, 1905-6

<table>
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<td>Palmyra</td>
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<td>C.M.A.</td>
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<td>William C. Bullitt</td>
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<td>U.P.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alfred D. Calvert</td>
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<td>C.P.</td>
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<td>Samuel Christian</td>
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<td>Henry H. Collins</td>
<td>cardboard manufacturer</td>
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<td>Bryn Mawr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morris L. Cooke</td>
<td>engineer</td>
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320
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<td>William H. Haines</td>
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<td>Walter P. Hall</td>
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<td>J. Gibson McIlvaine</td>
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<td>Henry F. Mitchell</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

East Downington
George W. Norris  investment banker
Harlan Page  cement manufacturer  C.P.  22
William H. Pfahler  heating manufacturer  C.P.
Francis B. Reeves  president, Girard National Bank  C.M.A., C.S.R.A.  C100, C50, C95  A-CC, C.P.  22
Charles Richardson  retired businessman  C.M.A., C.S.R.A.  C100, M.L., C50 C95, A-CC  10
James S. Rogers  lawyer  24
J. Henry Scattergood  dye manufacturer  C.P.  24
William H. Scott  printer  C.M.A.  22
Coleman Sellers Jr.  machine manufacturer
Theodore B. Stork  lawyer  22
Frederic H. Strawbridge  dry goods merchant  C.M.A.  22
Allen Sutherland  chairman, Erie National Bank  C.P.  38
Ellerslie Wallace  retired businessman
David Wallerstein  lawyer  M.L.  22
Thomas R. White  lawyer  22
Asa S. Wing  financier  C.S.R.A., C.P.  27
If it is accepted then that the "Philadelphia progressives" were rather more diverse than Bonnie Fox's depiction of them as "Hofstadter's Mugwumps of the 1880's," it is necessary to explain what drew these disparate elements into a reform coalition aligned against the "Organisation". What did Mugwumps, their descendants, and dynamic elements of the urban business and professional communities have in common? One factor that pulled these various groups into a reform coalition was the traditional and conventional one, that of political "outs" combining together in an attempt to replace the "ins". Another factor seems to have been a common aversion to urban democracy as expressed in party government, and conversely a strong commitment to purge local government of party politics and transform it into an institution run according to the social values of the middle and upper classes.

The pursuit of governmental efficiency, as a mutual
objective, was also an important area of co-operation among
the various reform elements. Mugwump reformers in
Philadelphia were not mainly motivated by status anxieties
as defined by Hofstadter and Mowry but by the threat that
political corruption posed to the security of their private
and business wealth. In contrast, young middle class
professional men were drawn to the reform cause, as Robert
H. Wiebe has shown, through the "inherent dynamics" of their
occupations rather than because of their class
connections. But whatever the motivation that inspired
these two elites, governmental efficiency was the common
goal that pulled them together. That is, both wanted to
apply the same principles (and hence the rule of the same
forces) in the political world as those that were
rationalising the economic order.

In tracing the changing meaning of "efficiency", Martin J.
Schiesl has recently shown that, by the turn of the century,
this concept no longer meant purifying local government by
replacing "bad" officials with "good" ones, but instead
encompassed three key objectives: the "businesslike"
management of municipal affairs (or non-partisanship); the
provision of a strong executive; and the separation of
politics from administration. These key objectives also
formed the basis of the recurring demands that were made by
Philadelphia reformers at this time, in their various
platforms, declarations of principles and programmes, which
were designed to thwart machine government. For example,
all the reform groups sought "the separation of municipal
affairs from state and national politics"; "honest and fair elections"; "the honest, open, economical and efficient administration of our municipal affairs by enlightened methods and upon business principles"; "the sincere and impartial enforcement of civil service provisions of the City Charter"; "the absolute divorce of officeholders from political control"; "the granting of franchises for limited periods only and after proper compensation"; "the impartial award of contracts after due publicity and open competition"; and finally, "a comprehensive system of public improvements."49 Some reform agencies were dedicated entirely to improving the technical aspects of city administration rather than the political. The Philadelphia Housing Commission and the Bureau of Municipal Research, for instance, were both committed to promoting the efficient and scientific management of municipal business.50 Prominent reformers and efficiency-minded businessmen such as Samuel Fels, George Burnham Jr., George W. Norris and Dr. George Woodward sat on the Board of Directors of both organisations.51

The pursuit of, and demand for, governmental efficiency not only drew young professionals, old Mugwumps and their descendants together, but also mobilised against the machine additional elements of the city's business community and of its native middle class, because such an objective well served the interests of these groups. The municipal reform movement was able to extend its appeal still further because it developed an ideology of compelling force. The
non-partisan reformers argued that the cleavages of national politics (on issues such as the tariff) were irrelevant to the concerns of municipal government, and should not be permitted to cloud the enormous commonality of interests among the propertied classes in urban politics.

Philadelphia progressive and political satirist Edmund Sage, for example, in his novel Masters of the City (1909), remonstrated with those who were taken in by the cry of "party regularity", in the following manner:

Because the machine here is called Republican - the same as in New York it is called Democratic - if you are not with the Machine, you are not with your party. That is the answer of the Machine to every demand for civic betterment. You demand reform and the answer is: "Vote for Smith, Jones, Brown, and the whole Republican ticket! Hurrah!"

Thousands of men do not take time to analyse this statement. Can high or low tariffs clean our streets: can silver or gold standards give us improved pavements; or transit; or schools; or poor little kids good playgrounds? What has Taft or Bryan or Debs to do with public bath houses or with well-lighted streets; the suppression of gambling; the proper regulation of recognised dangerous amusements? "Nothing", you say. Yet as soon as you start to talk that way, the whip is cracked and the cry goes out: "Vote for THE REPUBLICAN PARTY!" 52

The Municipal League also regarded its main role as being an "educational" one; that is, "to demonstrate to the public the advantages to be derived from the absolute separation of national and state politics from municipal politics."53 It sought to achieve this objective by publishing a series of tracts and addresses on municipal affairs which argued that not only should the business corporation be used as a model for reorganising local government but also that the city was itself in fact a corporation; "a joint-stock affair in which
One early League address, written by Theodore Etting in 1894, for instance, pleaded to local "shareholders" not to sacrifice the interests of the city for the sake of national party ties in the following way:

the prosperity of our cities..............can only be obtained by the entire separation of the conduct of city affairs from any connection with National or State politics.

We have from time to time had independent movements, which have sometimes resulted in the election of good men and the defeat of bad men.... But what I wish particularly to impress upon you is that no endeavour heretofore has been made to transact the affairs of the city upon a proper businesslike footing. If you or I, holding a few shares of the stock of any company can go to its annual meeting and vote for its directors without any inquiry in regard to them other than their fitness or capacity, why should not that be the principal inquiry which should be made with regard to the very much larger number of shares which we hold in this co-operative enterprise in which we are engaged, the government of this city?

Reform efforts to persuade upright citizens that they had a common interest in local politics were not just restricted to political arguments about the relevance of partisanship to city affairs. There was also a moral dimension to the reformers' campaign. Woodruff for instance, insisted that the question of municipal government was as much a moral one as it was a political or economic one, while the Committee of Seventy stated succinctly that the "Organisation" maintained "its control" over the city "through a combination of the police, the criminal classes, and the election officers." More sensationalistically, the city's Law and Order Society, at the turn of the century, exposed the
"corrupt alliance" that existed between the "Organisation" and the White Slave syndicate in Philadelphia. The Society's agents discovered that in return for bribes and illegally registered votes, the police, "unscrupulous officials", and "corrupt politicians" furnished aid and protection to white slave dens, gambling houses and speakeasies in the city's "Tenderloin District" (wards 11, 12 and 13). 58

By publicising the links between the "Organisation" and the city's criminal classes, reformers such as Rudolph Blankenburg and newspaper editor Louis Seaber, attempted to warn (and at the same time, recruit into the reform coalition) members of the native middle class, of the threat posed by the city's "idle and vicious classes" to the city's moral and political community. 59 Such propaganda seems to have worked for D. Clarence Gibboney, the Law and Order Society's secretary and "The Terror of Philadelphia's Evil-Doers", who was only narrowly defeated by 400 votes in the Republican primary election for District Attorney in 1909. 60 Again, two years later, Gibboney was to present the only serious challenge to Blankenburg in the Keystone Party's primary election for the Mayoralty. 61

In Philadelphia, as in other cities, moral and political reform converged and interwove to produce in electoral terms, as we saw in chapter 7, a substantial class-based core of opposition to the "Organisation"; a fitting tribute to the efforts of the non-partisans in convincing the propertied classes of their commonality of interest in local
politics. Having mobilised the city's wealthy native born white population into a reform coalition the non-partisans sought to challenge the "Organisation's" hegemony in local politics; how successful were they?

"CORRUPT AND CONTENTED"?

The short answer is that they were not very successful at all. We have seen already that in the elections to city and county office reformers were restricted to just two successes between 1887 and 1933, and even then it can be argued that the so-called "victories" of 1905 and 1911 were due more to errors of judgement made by the city "boss", and divisions within the "Organisation", than they were to a genuine commitment to reform on the part of the electorate.

In his analysis of reform insurgency in 1905, for instance, Lloyd Abernethy suggests that the City Party's victory was a direct consequence of a "serious blunder" made by the "Organisation". That is, if Durham had not "selected this time" to implement his plan to lease the city's gas works to the "U.G.I.", then "it is quite probable," Abernethy speculates, "that the movement, like many in the past would have gradually subsided." Abernethy bases his opinion partly on the fact that the City Party owed much of its victory to "Mayor Weaver's laudable, if not altruistic, decision to bolt the machine leadership (by vetoing the gas bill) at the crucial moment," for the Mayor's betrayal "gave
the movement not only more colour and respectability but the support of the vast city administration as well."\(^{65}\)

An analysis of the election returns in 1911 for the Republican mayoral nominee George Earle Jr., also suggests that Blankenburg's victory was due as much to a temporary split within the "Organisation", as it was to a popular upsurge in reform sentiment. For example, in the November general election which Blankenburg won by the slender majority of 3,333 votes, Earle polled only 131,123 votes which was almost 60,000 votes less than the total number of registered Republican voters who had participated in the party's primary election, the previous month.\(^{66}\) In that particular election, Earle, the Penrose-backed nominee, had narrowly outpolled William Vare by 105,455 votes to 82,256, in a bitterly fought contest.\(^{67}\)

Earle's subsequent poor performance in the contest against Blankenburg, it seems, was due to the fact that the Vare brothers were (contrary to William Vare's later claims) unable to bury their differences with Penrose, and therefore "cut" the Republican ticket in the general election.\(^{68}\) The brothers' lack of enthusiasm for Earle's candidacy is reflected in the ward returns made by their home base (South Philadelphia) in the two elections. For example, in the Republican primary election, Vare managed to secure 88.5 percent, 83.9 percent, and 92.6 percent of the vote in the first, twenty-sixth and thirty-ninth wards respectively, yet in the general election these three wards furnished Earle
with only 60.6 percent, 50.9 percent and 55.8 percent of their respective total votes - a reduction of over one-third for the Republican nominee. Overall Earle received just 60.8 percent of the total vote in South Philadelphia which was 10 percent less than Reyburn (70.9%) had achieved in 1907, and almost 20 percent less than Weaver (81.9%) and Smith (79.0%) managed in the 1903 and 1916 mayoral elections. Earle's reduced majority in South Philadelphia, combined with the increased pluralities that Blankenburg enjoyed in North and West Philadelphia, resulted in the "Old Dutch Cleanser" being elected to the Mayoralty by the narrowest of margins.

It can also be argued that the gains that the reform "victories" of 1905 and 1911 secured were not as great as contemporary reformers believed them to be. For instance, the most significant and "permanent result of the Philadelphia upheaval of 1905-6," from a reform viewpoint, resulted from the special session of the state legislature held in spring 1906, which enacted a series of reforms that Progressives had considered long overdue. In the wake of electoral defeats for the Republican party in November 1905, not only in Philadelphia but also statewide, party leader Boies Penrose had responded promptly to reform pressure for a special session of the legislature, in the hope that he would be able to woo the insurgents back to the G.O.P. The major measures passed by the thirty day special session provided for the personal registration of voters; a stricter civil service code (Shern Law) to prohibit political
activity by city employees; a civil service (Gable) bill to establish a *bona fide* merit system in Philadelphia; a corrupt practices act requiring candidates to file reports of campaign receipts and expenditures and a uniform system of primary elections for all candidates for city and county offices.73

This list of reforms, although impressive, did not result in a "revolution in Philadelphia politics" as Clinton R. Woodruff hoped, nor bring about "the end of the oligarchy" as George Woodward predicted because, unfortunately for the reformers, these new laws were not administered as they intended them to be.74 Under the Personal Registration Act of 1906, for instance, lists of qualified voters in each of the city's election divisions were to be drawn up by four registrars (two each from the majority and minority parties), selected by a Registration Commission, which was in turn appointed by the state Governor. This measure, by replacing the existing voter registration system conducted by "assessors" elected at party primary elections, was designed to curb the "Organisation's" extra-legal practice of registration fraud.75 "Organisation" control over the system did not wane however, for 90 percent of the persons recommended by the Republican machine to act as registrars were appointed by the Commission, and with the eclipse of the Democratic party, the "Organisation" soon exercised influence over minority registrars as well. Consequently registration abuse continued to flourish in the city.76

The attempt to establish a *bona fide* merit system in

333
Philadelphia, by placing the power of appointment to public office in the hands of a three member commission selected by the Mayor, was also unsuccessful. This was because the chief executive (apart from Weaver between 1905 and 1907) invariably remained loyal to the "Organisation". That the good intentions behind the Gable civil service reform bill of 1906 were not fulfilled is suggested by the report published in 1919, by the Women's League for Good Government (W.L.G.G.), during its campaign for a new city charter. In its **Facts About Philadelphia**, the W.L.G.G. argued in favour of transferring the power of appointment from the Mayor to the City Council, since under the existing system,

> the Mayor appoints the Civil Service Commission and can therefore control it politically. A Civil Service Commission to examine the Mayor's appointees which is itself appointed by the Mayor is a laughable absurdity and is merely a fiction to appease the public.  

Again, the effort to prohibit political activity by city employees, by forbidding them from soliciting political assessments and from "taking an active part in politics," proved to be an abject failure in practice. This was because under the new civil service code the provision for enforcing the Shern Law lay in the hands of the employee's superior officer, that is, the heads of each of the city's departments. In practice, these "Organisation" stalwarts simply either ignored the Shern Law or refused to enforce it. The Committee of Seventy, for instance, was frequently inundated with complaints about the political activity of officeholders, and in particular the actions of
police officers. In just one single election campaign alone, that of 1911, the Committee investigated over 1500 alleged violations of the Shern Act. The Committee, in turn, filed complaints against police officers and other city employees with the appropriate head of department "but no action was ever taken against the offenders." 80

Morris L. Cooke, Blankenburg's Director of Public Works, also discovered on taking office that approximately 94 percent of the city's employees paid political assessments to the Republican "Organisation" even though "it was, and is against the law to solicit these subscriptions." 81 Given that the Shern Law had "remained a dead letter until you (Blankenburg) came into office," Cooke and the other departmental heads of government set about eliminating the solicitation of "voluntary contributions" by city employees, and disciplining any officeholder found guilty of "taking an active part in politics." 82 Once Blankenburg left office, however, there was a gradual resumption of political activity by public officeholders 83, and also of the practice of levying political assessments from city employees. 84

Finally, the Corrupt Practices Act, like the Shern law, was also ignored or poorly enforced, while the Uniform Primary Act, which in theory placed the selection of party candidates for public office on a fairer and more competitive basis, did not in practice affect the ability of the city "boss" to control Republican party nominations. 85
These various reforms then, although welcomed by Woodruff, as "representing a very substantial measure of progress in the direction of protecting the fundamental liberties of the people and advancing the cause of decent and effective government," subsequently failed to "end the Oligarchy" because they were not effectively implemented.®^ Local interest in reform following the special session, moreover, noticeably and characteristically waned, as Penrose and Durham had hoped. Mayor Weaver defected back to the "Organisation" in November 1906, and the City party itself dissolved quickly thereafter.®^ Charles E. Carpenter, Chairman of the City Party's Campaign Committee when it won the election of November 1905, even endorsed Republican candidate John E. Reyburn for the Mayoralty in February, 1907, along with the rest of the "Organisation" ticket.®®

Again, with regard to the reform "victory" of 1911, Blankenburg's term of office was not the roaring success that contemporary reformers suggested it to be.®® Indeed the fact that Blankenburg kept his campaign promise, that his administration would be a non-partisan one committed to putting city operations on a business basis, alienated his supporters, as much as it did the "Organisation".®® For example, most reform advocates welcomed the inclusion in the Mayor's cabinet of such able and dedicated professional men as Morris L. Cooke (Public Works), George D. Porter (Public Safety), George W. Norris (Wharves, Docks and Ferries), Herman Loeb (Supplies) and A. Merrit Taylor (Transit), particularly since they were all committed to developing an
efficient program of public services. 91

Cooke for instance, finding that there was only one trained engineer among 1,000 employees in the Highways Bureau, replaced inept political appointees with technical experts. He also modernised office routine and initiated on-the-job training, paid vacations, loan schemes and other benefits designed to meet the needs of the department's 4,000 workers and their families. 92 Indeed Cooke confided to the Mayor (and Blankenburg subsequently agreed with him) that "without a doubt the biggest single change brought about in this department during your administration will be in the status of the individual employee." 93 Cooke also ended collusion between public officials and contractors (as did all Blankenburg's departmental heads), and drew up standard specifications and awarded city contracts to the "lowest and best" bidder, only after open bidding for public work. 94 It was also upon Cooke's insistence that municipal complaint books were made available in various locations across the city and all grievances promptly investigated. 95

Cooke's cabinet colleagues also matched his enthusiasm for efficiency in their respective departments. George D. Porter, for example, determined to insulate the police and fire departments from machine influence, set up a training school for recruits and abolished the political assessment of employees in both departments. 96 In total, it has been estimated that the Blankenburg administration saved the city $5,000,000. 97 Yet in spite of such public economy and improvements in city services like increased expenditure on
local schools, and the reconstruction of Philadelphia General Hospital; the increase in municipal wharves for ocean trade; the abolition of hazardous grade crossings, and a blueprint for the construction of the Broad Street subway; Blankenburg's administration failed to satisfy not only the electorate (which rejected the Mayor's protege George D. Porter when he ran for the Mayoralty in 1916), but also its supporters.98 Why?

Firstly, and ironically, it seems that Blankenburg's decision to honour his campaign pledge to respect the civil service system and prohibit political activity by municipal employees, alienated the Keystone party workers who had helped to elect him to office. Dismissing him as a "Benedict Arnold, an ingrate," these job hungry Keystoners deserted Blankenburg, thereby depriving his administration of the support of what had initially been his most committed followers.99 Blankenburg's reluctance to provide the Bull Moosers (or Washington Party, as the Roosevelt progressives were known in Pennsylvania) with patronage positions after 1912, also served to increase dissension within local reform ranks and diffuse still further the support for his administration.100

Secondly, and conversely, Blankenburg's failure to keep a campaign promise (that of, lowering gas prices) disappointed not only consumers but also disillusioned some of his staunchest supporters such as the reform newspaper, the North American.101 Thirdly, Blankenburg's ability to win
public support was constrained by the actions of the "Organisation"-controlled City Council which thwarted those mayoral proposals that required legislative action. For example, a new housing code was crippled by the councilmen's refusal to vote adequate funds to ensure its enforcement. Similarly, during the economic recession of 1914-15, the City Council also refused to vote funds for Blankenburg's modest public works program to help the unemployed. An attempt to lower food costs by initiating a system of trolley freights to bring cheaper Delaware Valley produce into the city was also blocked by the City Council. A final example of legislative obstruction is provided by Blankenburg's continual failure to persuade the Councils' Finance Committee to raise additional public revenue (and thereby permit a reduction in gas prices) through a combination of tax reform, new levies and an increase in the size of the city's debt limit.

If such measures had been implemented rather than blocked then Porter's prospects of election as Blankenburg's successor would have been more realistic. As it turned out, the essentially administrative achievements of Blankenburg's term of office held insufficient appeal to the city's voters to justify them electing the former Director of Public Safety to the Mayorality in November 1915. It should also be added that some of Blankenburg's reforms were only achievements of a short term nature. For example, open bidding for city contracts did not prevent the Vare and McNichol firms from continuing to receive most of the city's
business during Blankenburg's term of office, and under his successor, Mayor Thomas B. Smith, there was a return to "business as usual" (that is, collusion between city officials and contractors) for the "Contractor Bosses". Similarly, the "emancipation" of the individual employee "from the galling yoke of the political gangster," which Blankenburg regarded as "the greatest single change affected by my administration" was, as we have seen, only a reality for the length of his term of office.

Porter's defeat in the Mayoralty contest of 1915 precipitated the disbanding of the non-partisan (Franklin) party which he and his supporters had formed during the campaign, and the defection of the insurgents back to the Republican fold. The Franklin Party was in fact the last of the independent reform parties to challenge the "Organisation's" hegemony in local politics. Thereafter, as we saw in the last chapter, all reform activity remained within party ranks, even though this meant the continued ascendancy of the "Organisation" in Philadelphia political life. Indeed, the major advances towards political reform in the post-Blankenburg era - the introduction of a new city charter in 1919 and Bill Vare's downfall as city "boss" in June 1934 - were not the achievements of reformers, but more the result of internal dissension within the "Organisation".

The new city charter for Philadelphia approved by the state legislature in 1919, for example, was essentially a product of the occasional party factional warfare that broke out
between the Vare brothers and state Republican leader Boies Penrose. Penrose supported the charter proposal in the hope that by establishing more accountability and responsibility in Philadelphia's system of government, not least in the creation of a unicameral legislature, it would also threaten the Vares' power base in the "Neck" of the city. Indeed, reformer Clinton R. Woodruff identified "U.S. Senator Boies Penrose" as being "the greatest single factor in securing the passage of the bill." In a recent review of Philadelphia city government, the Committee of Seventy has also suggested that "the 1919 charter was more a victory of Penrose over Vare than of reformers over corruption." Similarly, although contemporary political scientist John T. Salter identified a number of factors: personal ill-health, errors of judgement, the onset of the Great Depression, and the re-emergence of a two party system in local politics in 1933, as being responsible for the downfall of William Vare as city "boss" in June 1934, he concluded that the "final destruction of Vare over the Republican Central Campaign Committee was brought about by a palace intrigue rather than a revolt from the people." The final question that presents itself then is: Why were "the people" so supine in the face of the "Organisation's" hegemony in local politics; Why were the non-partisan reformers not more successful in their efforts; Was Philadelphia as "corrupt and contented" as Steffens claimed it to be?

Leading reformer and contemporary political scientist
Professor Frank Goodnow certainly seemed to believe it was, for he suggested, after reviewing Steffens' writings, that Philadelphia appeared to be the prominent exception to the rule that bad city government resulted from undesirable social and economic conditions, rather than from failings of human nature.\textsuperscript{114} Other local contemporary reformers such as Rudolph Blankenburg, Theophilus Baker, Herbert Welsh and Clinton R. Woodruff would, as we saw in the last chapter, also have agreed with Goodnow's assessment that in Philadelphia "something in the moral character of the people militated against good city government."\textsuperscript{115} And yet, as we also noted earlier, public apathy and indifference was not only a short-lived phenomenon in the city but merely one of a number of factors: such as the demise of the Democratic party, the local strength of Republican partisanship, the "Organisation's" control of the election machinery, its astute campaign methods, and its provision of a "personal service" to the individual voter, that accounted for the Republican machine's electoral supremacy in Philadelphia between 1887 and 1933.\textsuperscript{116}

There is also I would suggest one other factor which contributed to the "Organisation's" electoral success and which should be added to the above list and that is, the reformers were themselves unfaithful to the principle of non-partisanship. Although in theory, the non-partisans were committed to separating municipal affairs from state and national politics, their behaviour in practice indicates that they were not all fully convinced of their own
Indeed the reformers seem to have been persistently divided (a weakness exploited by the "Organisation") over whether to pursue reform within the Republican party, or outside of traditional party lines. The Committee of Fifty and the Citizens' Committee of 95 for example, both split up during the mayoral election campaigns of 1891 and 1895 respectively, because they were "hopelessly divided" over which candidate they should support in the contest. In the 1895 election campaign, in fact, a splinter group from the Citizens' Committee formed "The Business Men's Republican Association" in order to endorse Martin and Porter's candidate for the Mayoralty, rather than support the Anti-Combine's nominee, the distinguished Democrat and ex-Governor, Robert E. Pattison.

Many City Party members, as noted earlier, also seem to have been insincere in their commitment to non-partisan reform, for once the measures guaranteeing "reform within the party" had been passed by the Special Session of the state legislature in 1906, the reform party virtually collapsed as the bulk of its members followed the example of the chairman of its Campaign Committee and defected back to the Republican party.

In 1911, the reformers were again divided between those who participated in the Keystone primary and were genuinely committed to the principle of non-partisanship in local affairs, and those who took "advantage of the (1906) primary act" and supported Dimner Beeber, "the only Republican candidate and Platform of Absolute Independence" in the
Republican primary election. Over one-third (35) of the hundred members of the Republican Nomination League that endorsed Beeber had been conspicuous non-partisan reformers prior to the 1911 campaign, in such groups as the Municipal League, City Party and Committee of Seventy. They included such familiar reform figures as George Burnham Jr., Dr. George Woodward, John C. Winston, Frederic H. Strawbridge, Thomas Raeburn White and Franklin S. Edmonds (see Table 9.3).

What this recurring division within the reform movement over the issue of partisanship in local affairs suggests, in my view, is that many reform activists found it as difficult as the "average Philadelphian" to overcome, as John C. Winston put it, the "political trance" induced "by the purring cry of party regularity;" that is, to resist their "natural" inclination to vote Republican, even when it came to municipal elections. Indeed in the post-Blankenburg era, as we have seen, all reform activity remained within party ranks. Independent Republicans tended to be more Republican than Independent, in that they battled with the "Organisation" only at party primaries and not in general elections.

"Good city government" proved elusive in turn-of-the-century Philadelphia then, I would suggest, not because of "sinful contentment" or failings of human nature, or because of undesirable social and economic conditions in the "City of Homes", but because of the city's "hopeless addiction to
Table 9.3. Non-Partisan Reformers who joined The Republican Nomination League, 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Municipal League</th>
<th>City Party</th>
<th>Committee of Seventy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard L. Austin</td>
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<td>Reynolds D. Brown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samuel J. Buck</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Burnham</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Burnham Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Frank Clapp</td>
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<td>James M. Dodge</td>
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<td>Franklin S. Edmonds</td>
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<td>V. Frank Gable</td>
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<td>Francis Goodhue</td>
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<td>Emil Guenther</td>
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<td>William H. Haines</td>
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<td>Clarence L. Harper</td>
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<td>Alexander Henry</td>
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<td>E. C. Irwin</td>
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<td>Arthur H. Lea</td>
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<td>Max Levy</td>
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<td>Francis A. Lewis</td>
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<td>William M. Longstreth</td>
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<tr>
<td>J. Gibson McIlvain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter S. McInnes</td>
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Sources: Republican Nomination League, Advantage of the Primary Act, 1911; Municipal League, Annual Report of the Board of Managers, 1891-2 to 1902-3; Committee of Seventy, Sixth Report of the Executive Board, May 8, 1906, pp.20-23; idem, Report of the Executive Board, March 20, 1912, pp.30-34; City Party, Hand-Book, 1905, pp.8-19; all these pamphlets were published in Philadelphia and are held at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

Republicanism", an affliction that affected reformers as much as the "average Philadelphian".124 Ironically, therefore, it was the partisanship of the non-partisans that not only underpinned the "Organisation's" hegemony in local politics, but was also responsible, as much as any of the factors listed above, for Philadelphia being what Steffens regarded as "the worst governed city in the country."125
Conclusion

The purpose of this study has been to examine, using the Republican "Organisation" in Philadelphia as the model for inquiry, certain issues concerning the urban political machine which in my view have not been satisfactorily resolved in the existing literature on the subject; namely, fundamental questions such as, How can we account for the emergence of the urban political machine? Can we draw valid distinctions between so-called "bosses"? Which sections of the urban population supported the machine, and why? What functions has the machine fulfilled in the American city?

What answers, then, have been provided, and what conclusions can be drawn, from this analysis of the development of party organisation in Philadelphia? In the first place, this study has demonstrated that, contrary to the claims of contemporary reform observers and later historians, a fully fledged political machine did not in fact emerge in Philadelphia until the turn of this century. This development in the city's politics, was not, in my view, a direct consequence of the influx of "new" immigrants into Philadelphia at this time even though, as the conventional wisdom points out, such newcomers were (along with the poor and black population of the inner city) especially susceptible to the inducements offered by machine politicians, and in spite of the fact that the Republican "Organisation" did indeed acquire the characteristic
electoral basis that one would expect of the classic political machine.

Although the conventional view of the political machine appears to be confirmed by the election data reported in Chapter 7, the appearance is, I suggest, illusory, for as this study has shown, the creation of a centralised political structure in Philadelphia came about as a result of a series of innovations initiated by state and local party leaders which transformed the way in which the Republican party organisation functioned at both the state and the city level by the turn of the century. Its establishment, it was also argued, was in the interest of, and apparently supported by, a major segment of the Philadelphia business community; namely, a clique of utility financiers anxious to reap the benefits that the centralisation of local political power would bring to their own efforts to consolidate control of the city's public utilities industry. By the time that "new" immigrants began arriving in Philadelphia in significant numbers the Republican "Organisation" was already established as the central force in the government and politics of the city. That the "Organisation" subsequently exhibited the characteristic electoral base of political machines, as portrayed by conventional wisdom, was because it operated as a political structure that assimilated most of the city's sub-groups as they arrived in Philadelphia.

The Republican political machine in Philadelphia, then, was
not the creation of the immigrant masses or a product of immigrant culture, nor the political expression of life in the inner city; it emerged as a consequence of changes, orchestrated by the party leadership, in the organisation and structure of the city's political life. Changes which met the interests of local political and economic elites, rather than the "needs" of the urban poor and the immigrant masses. In seeking to account for the emergence of the political machine then, this study suggests that one should focus not just as the traditional accounts do on the linkages at the base of the political system (between that is machine politicians and the members of their mass following), but also on those at the top. It also confirms the view that any explanation to be deemed sufficiently adequate must account not only for the "style" of machine politics (that is, the nature of political attachments) but also for changes in the "structure" and organisation of this system of politics.

Examining the actual functioning of the party organisation to determine whether it operated as its centralised and hierarchical structure suggests also helps us to overcome a major weakness of conventional theories of the political machine, and that is their collective failure to draw meaningful distinctions between various so-called "bosses". Rather than neatly lumping various party leaders together under the label "boss" this study, by identifying the differences in the degree of clout exercised by James McManes and Israel Durham, for instance, has illustrated the
wisdom of asking such questions as, to what extent did the "boss" control: his followers in party office; the distribution of patronage; the membership and decisions of the party organisation's local units; the party nominations for public office; the behaviour of elected officials nominally affiliated to him; the passage of legislation through City Council?

Only by finding the answers to such questions is it possible to determine to what extent "boss" is an appropriate term for a particular party leader. Indeed, it is only by defining the precise extent of the party leader's sphere of influence that we can avoid the distortion of historical reality inherent in the traditional accounts of machine politics, and in addition increase our understanding of the role played by the "boss", not only within the party organisation, but also in city government.

This study has also suggested that the received wisdom on machine politics is equally unsatisfactory in furnishing an explanation for the functions of the political machine, as it is for its emergence in the American city. In particular, I have argued that Robert Merton's functional model of the machine (the theory at the root of the current preference for bosses over reformers in the literature on urban politics) does not provide an accurate or adequate explanation for the functions performed by the "boss" and his machine.

While accepting that the machine did provide, as in the case
of the "Organisation", a "personal service" to some city inhabitants, this aspect of machine activity has, in my view, been exaggerated not only by Merton but also by scholars such as Oscar Handlin, Eric McKitrick, Elmer Cornwell, Alexander Callow, Seymour Mandelbaum, Zane L. Miller, and John Allswang. These apologists for machine politics have consistently failed to acknowledge that the petty welfare system operated by the party organisation does not offset the unpalatable truth (from their viewpoint) that the machine, by giving as much aid to those interests who got rich off the urban poor, was essentially exploitative of its firmest supporters. They have also failed to recognise that since political man was independent of, and not subservient to, economic man (at least in the case of turn of the century Philadelphia) these business interests were themselves in turn (potentially) subject to exploitation by the machine.

More importantly, these scholars have misled us from recognising that the self-serving machine, rather than being the natural functional substitute for government as they suggest, did in fact function as a blight on the system of government in American cities. That is, it was destructive of functioning government for the vast majority of immigrants and poor people who needed such government the most. Thus the machine's role in the city, this study suggests, has been of a dysfunctional nature.

Since this study argues that the only real "needs" that the machine served were those of its own and of its
plutocratic allies in the local business community, and not
those of the urban immigrant poor, it suggests that the
positive image of bossism that now prevails in the
literature on urban politics is unjustified. In suggesting
that the "boss" no longer deserves his "good guy"
reputation, however, I am not arguing for a return to the
prejudices of the progressive era, when reformers were
depicted as the "good guys" and "bosses" the "bad guys" in
urban politics. Rather it is my contention that the balance
needs to be redressed; that is, historians should recognise
that while reformers may not necessarily have been "bad
guys" in the urban drama, "bosses" invariably were, more
often than not.

In my view, then, those scholars who wish to abandon the
boss-reformer synthesis in order "to rewrite the history of
urban politics and government along new lines," will need to
reconsider the role that the "boss" has played in the
American city, because it is not possible to generate
alternative ways of viewing urban politics successfully
unless such initiatives are based on a clear and accurate
understanding of the emergence of the political machine and
the functions that it has fulfilled. Only on this basis, I
maintain, will it be possible to recast the central issue of
urban politics satisfactorily, and thereby "restore rats,
fires, taxes, diseases, schools, jobs, crime, transportation
and utilities to their rightful places as the central
realities of urban life."
### Appendix 1:

**The Citizens Municipal Reform Association: Membership, Residence, Occupation and other Affiliations**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>C.M.R.A.&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Reform Club</th>
<th>Union League&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Board of Trade (Ward)</th>
<th>Residence</th>
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The list of members of the C.M.R.A. has been restricted to those individuals who can be identified as having been prominent activists within the group, that is, generally, those men of substance who served as ward representatives or officers of the association.

The figure in this column refers to the year that the particular individual became a member of the Union League.

The figure in parentheses indicates the position of the member in the table of the wealthiest individuals in the city in 1864.

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Appendix 2:

The Committee of One Hundred: Membership, Residence, Occupation and other Affiliations

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<th>C.M.A.</th>
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<th>Residence (Ward)</th>
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| William H. Jenks   | cotton m/fer       | M        | M        | M      | C70                         | 9
| Joseph de F. Junker| lawyer             |          |          | 27     |                             |
| Theodore Justice   | wool merchant      | M        | M        | C95    | 22                          |
| William W. Justice | wool merchant      | M        | M        | CP, C70 | 22                         |
| Godfrey Keebler    | baker              | M        | M        |        | 10                          |
| Charles C. Knight  | iron m/fer         |          |          |        | 15                          |
| J. K. Knorr        | physician          |          |          |        |                             |
| Henry C. Lea       | publisher, V-P     |          | V-P      | M      | 24                          |
| Thomas Leaming     | lawyer             | O        | M        |        | 8                           |

363
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<td>M</td>
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<td>O</td>
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367
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<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
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Sources: Committee of One Hundred (undated leaflet listing members of the Committee and their residence); George Vickers, The Fall of Bossism: A History of the Committee of One Hundred and the Reform Movement in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania v. 1, (Philadelphia, 1883); Citizens' Municipal Reform Association, Committee and Membership, 1871-72; Civil Service Reform Association, Annual Report of the Executive Committee, 1882-1888; Citizens' Municipal Association, Constitution, By-Laws and List of Members, 1886, 1891, 1895; Citizens' Committee of Fifty, First Annual Report, 1892; The Citizens' Committee of 95 for Good City Government, 1895, Herbert Welsh Papers; Municipal League, Annual Report of the Board of Managers, 1891-2 to 1902-3; Anti-Combine Committee, For Good Government, 1895, p.1; North American, Aug. 31, 1901; Record, Sept. 21, 1901, Israel Durham Scrapbook (for details of the Union Party); Committee of Seventy, Sixth Report of the Executive Board, May 8, 1906, pp.20-23; City Party, Hand-Book, 1905, pp.8-19; Keystone Party, City Committee, Oct. 24, 1912; Gopsill's Philadelphia City Directory, 1882-1911; The North American, Philadelphia and Popular Philadelphians (Philadelphia, 1891); all the pamphlets listed above were published in Philadelphia and are held at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

* indicates that the individual was a member of the original committee that was set up in November 1880.

Reform Groups:

- A-CC: Anti-Combine Committee
- C95: Citizens' Committee of 95 for Good City Government
- C.M.A.: Citizens' Municipal Association
- C.M.R.A.: Citizens' Municipal Reform Association
- CP: City Party
- C.S.R.A.: Civil Service Reform Association
- C50: Committee of Fifty for a New Philadelphia
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<td>KP</td>
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**Position:**

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<td>FC</td>
<td>Finance Committee</td>
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<td>Officer</td>
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<td>Pr.</td>
<td>President</td>
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<td>Sec.</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
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<td>Tr.</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-P</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
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<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>Ward Representative</td>
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Notes

All the pamphlets and annual reports cited are held by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and were published in Philadelphia, unless otherwise stated.

Introduction


Indeed, except for Howard F. Gillette's Corrupt and Contented; Philadelphia's Political Machine, 1865-1887, (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1970) which provides a detailed analysis of the various formations that contested for political power in the city prior to the enactment of the Bullitt Bill as the new city charter in 1887, and two "participant observer" studies - John T. Salter, Boss Rule, Portraits in City Politics (New York, 1935); David H. Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1935) - conducted at the very time (1933) when the "organisation" lost control of the city, scholars have ignored the "institutionalisation" of machine politics in what was, then, the third largest city in the country.

Chapter 1. A Literature Review of the Urban Political Machine


4 Ibid., p. 409.


That the political machine is still of enduring interest to scholars see Scott Greer (ed), Ethnics, Machines and the American Urban Future (Cambridge, Mass., 1981); Harvey Boulay and Alan Di Gaetano, "Why Did Political Machines Disappear?" Journal of Urban History 12 (Nov. 1985), pp. 25-49.


12 Ibid., p. 71.

22 James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1972), p. 107; Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, pp. 115-121; Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York, 1961), ch. 11; Raymond Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974), pp. 99-106; Fred Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 353 (May 1964), p. 3. Banfield and Wilson have provided perhaps the most widely accepted definition of machine politics, characterising the machine as "a party organisation that depends crucially upon inducements that are both specific and material." It follows that the machine "is apolitical: it is interested only in making and distributing income......to those who run it and work for it. Political principle is foreign to it and represents a danger and a threat to it." Hence machine politics is associated with corruption and patronage. As specific material inducements are never plentiful enough however, machine politics is also associated with personalistic leadership and the friendship and loyalty of the clubhouse. Thus it is the artful combination of clubhouse solidarity and material rewards which creates a well disciplined and centralised political organisation reaching from city hall to the city's wards and precincts and claiming a majority of the city's electorate. (Banfield and Wilson, Ibid.).
23 Martin Shefter, "The Electoral Foundations of the

Banfield, Political Influence, p. 309.


Part A. The Politics of Individualism and Ring Rule in the Pre-Machine Era, 1867-1887

The nature of state party politics at the time of the Civil War, it should also be pointed out, bore a striking resemblance to the character of political life which prevailed in Philadelphia. That is, prior to Simon Cameron's emergence as the undisputed leader of the state Republican party in 1873, party politics in Pennsylvania, as in the urban polity, was not dominated by an over-riding cleavage between well-organised machine and reform forces.

William Gienapp and James Huston's analysis of the break-up of the Jacksonian-Whig party system in Pennsylvania for example reveals that personal
rivalries were responsible, as much as disputes over policy or different orientations to politics, for the cleavages between the individual political actors and formations who contended for power within the main parties. See William E. Gienapp, "Nebraska, Nativism and Rum: The Failure of Fusion in Pennsylvania, 1854," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography (hereafter, PMHB) 109 (Oct. 1985), pp. 426-7, 450-1, 469-70; James L. Huston, "The Demise of the Pennsylvania American Party, 1854-1858," PMHB 109 (Oct. 1985), pp. 482-3.


Chapter 2. The Emergence of the Career Politician

4 Warner, Private City, pp. 15-16.


Warner, Private City, p. 80.

Ibid.


Formisano and Burns (eds.), Boston, 1700-1980, p. 262; Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 87-8.


Warner, Private City, p.82.

Ibid., p. 85.

Ibid., pp. 85-6.

Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 45-8.

Daguerrotype Sketches of the Members of the First
Common Council after Consolidation for 1854 and 1855, 1855.

26 Ibid.

27 Inquirer, Nov. 18, 1874. For details of Councilmen who were jobbers and contractors and who abused their public office for personal profit, see Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 46, and Maxwell Whiteman, Gentlemen in Crisis: The First Century of the Union League of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 106-7.

28 A full list of the members of the Republican City Executive Committee in 1857 and also of officers of the individual ward associations is contained in The Republican Manual containing information in Relation to the Government of the Republican Party in the City of Philadelphia, 1857, pp. 31-33, 134-140.


The Republicans only attracted wide-scale support in the city when, in the wake of the Panic of 1857, the party joined with local Know-Nothings to form a new (People's Party) coalition, the lynch-pin of which was a programme advocating high protective tariffs, the protection of "American Labour" and popular sovereignty. By committing themselves to this broader programme Republicans were able to dispel not only their earlier image of single-minded devotion to anti-slaveryism, but also to elect (and subsequently re-elect in 1860, '62 and '64) one of their own leaders, abolitionist Alexander Henry, as mayor in 1858.
It seems in fact that it was protectionism (and in particular the argument that the interests of labour and capital and indeed of the city as a whole would be mutually advanced under the shield of a protective tariff), rather than concessions to nativism or anti-Catholicism, which had the most enduring appeal to the local electorate. In this respect, the Republicans were the beneficiaries of, and natural heirs to, the Whig tradition in the city, for it was the latter who, through their "American System", had initially advocated high tariff protection for American industries. (See Huston, "The Demise of the Pennsylvania American Party," pp. 478-81, 490-1; Bruce Collins, "The Democrats' Loss of Pennsylvania in 1858," PMHB 109 (Oct. 1985), pp. 499, 520-26, 535; Weigley, "The Border City," pp. 309-92; Amy Bridges, A City in the Republic: Ante-bellum New York and the origins of machine politics (New York, 1984), pp. 28-29, 67, 155).

As the party not only of protection, but also internal improvements and local services as well, the Republicans proved irresistible to the bulk of Philadelphians. So attractive were they indeed that the election of newspaper publisher, protectionist and Union loyalist Morton McMichael, as mayor in 1865 marked the beginning of almost a century (until the election of Democrat Joseph S. Clark Jr. in 1952) of virtually unbroken Republican rule in the city; apart from that is, the mayoral administrations of Daniel Fox (Democrat, 1868-71), Samuel King (Democrat, 1881-4) and Rudolph Blankenburg (Keystone, 1912-16), and even the latter was a Republican in national politics.

The Civil War period, it should be pointed out, also witnessed another significant change in local affairs namely, the displacement of the city's old upper class (who had been identified disproportionately with the discredited Constitutional - or Peace - Democratic faction during the war years), as civic and political leaders, by a new business and industrial elite. The members of this new ruling elite, unlike their predecessors, were also overwhelmingly drawn to the Republican party because it was the most appropriate vehicle for their commercial aspirations. See Whiteman, Ibid., pp. 15-18; Weigley, Ibid., pp. 412-3; Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 10, 16.

32 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p.v; North American, Jan. 9, 1868; Whiteman, Gentlemen in Crisis, pp. 106-7.
33 By this time, for instance, the city had almost shed its colonial reputation as a commercial port and distributor of European manufactures, and had emerged as an important centre of manufacturing in its own right. "A virtual emporium of commodity production" with a thriving commercial and financial sector, the city manufactured everything indeed from silk handkerchiefs to iron rails. See Bruce Laurie and Mark

This transition in the local economy was accompanied by rapid growth in the city's population; a remarkable sixfold increase in fact, from 67,811 in 1800 to 408,762 by 1850. Immigrants made a significant contribution to the increase in numbers. The Irish community, for example, grew from 5,000 in 1800 to 71,787 in 1850, or 17.6 percent of the city's population. The Germans, the second largest immigrant group in the city, made up 5.6 percent (22,788) of the total population in 1850, and together with the Irish accounted for 34 percent of the foreign-born population. By mid-century, foreign-born immigrants made up 29.6 percent (118,343) of Philadelphia's population; the highest proportion in the city's history and the largest of any city in the country, except for New York. See Hershberg (ed.), Philadelphia: Work, Space, Family and Group Experience, p. 465; Dennis Clark, The Irish in Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1973), pp. 17, 24.

By 1850, Philadelphia had the largest industrial workforce (57,958) and a bigger gross product (6 percent of the national total) than any other city in the country, except for New York (Laurie and Schmitz, "Manufacture and Productivity," pp. 44-5). For a detailed breakdown of the new business, industrial and banking elite that displaced the old colonial gentry at the top of the city's social structure by the end of the Civil War, see Baltzell, An American Business Aristocracy, pp. 129-130. See also Table 4.1 and Appendix 1 of this thesis.

So acute were the differences between the various social groups that the city witnessed episodic bursts of violence in the ante-bellum period, the most prominent of which were the famous Native American riots of 1844. The fighting reflected the cultural and religious conflict that bedevilled Philadelphia, and also highlighted its political disorganisation, particularly the weakness of its peace-keeping system. The response to the social turmoil was not just to professionalise the police force which had been thoroughly discredited by the riots, but also to lobby, ultimately successfully, for the political consolidation of the City and County of Philadelphia into one governmental unit. See Feldberg, The Philadelphia Riots of 1844, pp. 41-50; Clark, The Irish in Philadelphia, pp. 20-22; E. Digby Baltzell, The
38 Bridges, A City in the Republic, p. 74.
39 Ibid.
40 Warner, Private City, pp. 86-91; Laurie, "Fire Companies and Gangs," p. 73.
41 Allinson and Penrose, City Government, pp. 47, 33-38.
42 Ibid., p. 49.
43 Ibid., pp. 37, 47-48.
44 Ibid., p. 40.
46 CMRA, Address, May, 1872, pp. 6-7; see also Thomas H. Speakman, The People v. The Politicians: Where and How the Peoples Money Goes, and How Political Morals are Corrupted, 1878.
47 Allinson and Penrose, City Government, pp. 35, 49-51.
48 Cutler and Gillette (eds.), Divided Metropolis, pp. 12, 250.
51 Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, p. 55.
52 Frank Willing Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," North American, May 28, 1905. Subsequent to Quay's death in May 1904, the North American asked Leach to submit a personal review of the state party leader's political career for publication. Such was the interest shown by readers in Leach's article that the paper commissioned him to write a more detailed account of his time as Quay's secretary.

Leach's reminiscences, spread over forty-two highly descriptive and extensive articles, were published in the Sunday editions of the North American between July 3, 1904 and June 25, 1905. Given his intimate relationship with Quay, Leach was extremely well qualified to comment not only on state and national politics, but also on city affairs as well, particularly since he had begun his political career as a Republican party divisional worker in the eighth ward in downtown Philadelphia in the 1870's. Leach subsequently dabbled with Independent Republicanism and served as Secretary of the Independent Republican State Committee in the early 1880's, before finally accepting Quay's offer of employment as his personal secretary in 1884.
Since he additionally served as Chief Clerk in the City Controller's office (1881-84) and Real Estate Deputy in the Sheriff's Department (1891-95), Leach was also well placed to comment on public office and city government in Philadelphia. Leach's work was based on his personal files and recollections, and contemporary newspapers and correspondence he had with both party politicians and reformers between the 1870's and the turn of the century. Where appropriate his claims have been checked for accuracy with other sources; generally the Times and the Public Ledger. The Public Ledger was an orthodox conservative Republican newspaper that represented the views of downtown business interests, while Alexander McClure's Times was strongly committed to reform within the Republican party and considered itself to be the main "opposition" journal in the city.

54 Laurie, Ibid., pp. 75, 78, 80, 82; Clark, Ibid., pp. 109, 116.
56 Laurie, "Fire Companies and Gangs," pp. 77-8.
60 Laurie, Fire Companies and Gangs," pp. 78-80.
61 See note 18 above.
62 The fourth ward covered the same geographical area throughout this period; that is, from the Delaware River to Broad Street and from South Street to Fitzwater Street. Comprised largely of working class and immigrant neighbourhoods, it traversed Southwark and Moyamensing on the southern edge of the old city (see Figures 2.1 and 4.1): John Daly and Allen Weinberg, Genealogy of Philadelphia County Subdivisions 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 64, 83; Census Office, Vital Statistics of Boston and Philadelphia covering a Period of Six Years Ending May 31, 1890 (Washington, D.C., 1894), p. 90.
65 Ibid., p. 389.
66 Ibid., pp. 403, 408.
68 Warner, Private City, pp. 95-6.
Chapter 3. Ring Rule

1 Zink, City Bosses, pp. 196-9; see also McManes' obituary in the North American and Public Ledger, Nov. 24, 1899.
4 Zink, City Bosses, pp. 194-5; Bryce, American Commonwealth, v. II, p. 408; CMRA, The Gas Trust, April 20, 1874.
9 CMRA, The Gas Trust, pp. 3-16.
11 CMRA, The Gas Trust, pp. 2-3, 16.
12 Public Ledger, Nov. 24, 1899.
14 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 69.
15 Ibid., pp. 67, 156-7; Allinson and Penrose, City Government, pp. 55-7.
16 Zink, City Bosses, pp. 197-8.
17 North American, Nov. 24, 1899.
23 Allinson and Penrose, City Government, pp. 53-4.
24 CMRA, Address, Sept. 1871.
25 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 59.
28 Ibid.
32 Plunkitt explained what he meant by "honest graft" or "boodle" by example,

My party's in power in the city, and its going to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well, I'm tipped off, say, that they're going to lay out a new park at a certain place. I see my opportunity and I take it. I go to that place and I buy up all the land I can in the neighbourhood. Then the board of this or that makes its plan public, and there is a rush to get my land, which no-body cared particular for before.

Ain't it perfectly honest to charge a good price and make a profit on my investment and foresight? Of course it is. Well, that's honest graft. (Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, p. 55).
33 No longer the "walking city" of the mid-nineteenth century, Philadelphia's spatial area, like the size of its population, had doubled by the mid-1870's. This dramatic growth did not result in a duplication of the spatial arrangements that characterised the 1850 city, for the city did not merely expand; its basic spatial structure changed. It was turned inside out. That is, the significant changes in economic and social structure wrought by industrialisation were expressed physically in the spatial form of the city. Indeed spatial and socio-economic differentiation complemented one another to such an extent that by 1880 the city "had begun to assume the unmistakable dimensions of the modern metropolis." (Hershberg (ed.), Philadelphia: Work, Space, Family and Group Experience, pp. 472-3, and p. 122 for the quotation).
34 Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 153, 158-160.
36 Times, March 21, 1875, quoted in Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 162.
38 Whiteman, Gentlemen in Crisis, pp. 114-5.
39 Gustavus Myers, "The Most Corrupt City in the World,"
Simon Cameron, once he had established himself as the undisputed leader of the state Republican party in 1873, was similarly depicted as "master of the state" and "the new Proprietor of Pennsylvania." (Daniel Dougherty, "The Cameron Dynasty": Earnest Protest against its Continuance, Oct. 21, 1878, p. 28; Public Ledger, March 13, 1877).


Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 5; Popular Philadelphians, p. 19; The Report of a Committee of One, pp. 5-10; Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 165.

Gillette, ibid., pp. 141, 175.

Zink, City Bosses, p. 203; Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 44-5.

Rufus E. Shapley, Solid for Mulholy (Philadelphia, 1881), pp. 24-5, 137.

Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 246-8; Times, Public Ledger, Feb. 16, 1881; Leach "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 19, March 12, 1905.

Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 26, 1905.

Zink, City Bosses, p. 204; Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 278; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," March 12, April 2, 1905.

The Republican Manual, 1857, pp. 10-22; Rules of the Union Republican Party of Philadelphia, 1868, p. 3-4; 1871, p. 3; 1877, pp. 4-5.

CMRA, Address of the Executive Committee, March 18, 1872; Rules of the Union Republican Party, 1868, p. 6.


Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 19, 1905; Popular Philadelphians, p. 24. See also note 10 of Chapter 4.

For examples of rowdyism at conventions, which resulted in the suspension of proceedings and police intervention to restore order, see Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 19, March 19, May 7, 1905; and the Inquirer and Public Ledger, Sept. 15, 1877; Sept. 30, 1881; Jan. 10, 1884; Sept. 23, 1886; for reports of the Republican party's efforts to nominate a District Attorney and Coroner in 1877, two City Commissioners in 1881, a Receiver of Taxes in 1884, and a Judge for Common Pleas Court No. 3 in 1886.

Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 170; Leach, "Twenty
General Louis Wagner, a contestant for the Republican party nomination for Recorder of Deeds in 1881, also believed that a candidate needed to "have a silver mine at his back, a drinking capacity equal to the camel and be able to smoke like the stack of an iron furnace." Wagner subsequently withdrew from the contest on the grounds that "a personal canvass (of the wards and divisions) of the character indicated (was) absolutely needed," if one wanted to secure the party's nomination (Public Ledger, Sept. 19, 1881).

63 Ibid., Feb. 12, 1905.
64 Ibid., March 19, 1905.
65 Ibid., March 19, April 9, 1905; Public Ledger, Sept. 30, 1881; Sept. 21, 1882; Jan. 4, 9, 10, 1884.
66 Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," March 19, 1905.
67 The New Rules of the Union Republican Party, 1877, p. 5.
68 Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 12, 1905; Public Ledger, Jan. 4, Feb. 16, 1876.
69 Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 26, 1905; Public Ledger, Jan. 15, Feb. 19, 1879.
70 Ibid.; Public Ledger, Feb. 21, 1877, Feb. 26, 1880.
71 Ibid., March 12, 1905; Public Ledger, Feb. 16, 17, 1881; Zink, City Bosses, p. 207.
72 Ibid., March 26, 1905; Public Ledger, Feb. 22, 1882.
74 Patronage Appointment Book, Water Department, 1875, 1876, 1879, Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia.
76 Rules for the Government of the Union Republican Party, 1871, p. 3; Minutes Book, Nineteenth Ward Union Republican Executive Committee, 1875-1880, Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia.
77 Sunday Times, Jan. 9, 1876, quoted in Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 12, 1905.
78 For other examples of Stokley's inability to control the behaviour of his followers, see Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 146, 148, 163, 169.
79 Zink's uncritical acceptance of the source materials which he used for his chapter on McManes for instance (that is, Vickers' Fall of Bossism; Bryce's, American Commonwealth; Lea's investigation of the gas works, and the Gas Trust leader's obituary in the crusading reform journal, North American) meant that his City Bosses, pp. 194-205, reiterated the distorted views of contemporary reform observers and thereby perpetuated the notion of the all-powerful "boss", "King" James.
Neither, it should be noted, was Simon Cameron, contrary to received wisdom, the supreme nabob of the state Republican party. His power base in central government was "too vulnerable for effective boss rule" (Kehl, *Boss Rule*, p. 60) in the sense that federal patronage, even when it was readily available to him (which it sometimes was not, when he was faced with an unco-operative President like Rutherford B. Hayes or James Garfield) failed to provide him with the sufficient means necessary to establish a reliable system of discipline within his "organisation". For details of Cameron's inability to control the state legislature, and the behaviour of senior elected public officials (such as Governors Geary, 1867-73 and Hoyt, 1879-83) who owed their positions to him, see Kehl, *Boss Rule*, pp. 36-7, 44-5, 54-5, 142-3; Klein and Hoogenboom, *A History of Pennsylvania*, pp. 260, 324.


83 *Constitutional Reforms*. Letter from Henry C. Lea to John Price Wetherill, Oct. 31, 1872, pp. 4-5, HSP.

84 Gillette, *Corrupt and Contented*, p. 37; The Republican Manual, 1857, pp. 77-8. Details of public officials in Philadelphia who were appointed by the state Governor can be found in the annual Council manual.

85 The Republican Manual, 1857, pp. 75-77. Federal officers, like state officials in the city, were also listed in the annual Council manual; see, for example, the *Manual of Councils*, 1885-86, pp. 122-4.

86 Gillette, *Corrupt and Contented*, pp. 30-1.


Chapter 4. The Politics of Protest and Reform


2 Kenneth Fox, *Better City Government: Innovation in*
American Urban Politics, 1850-1937 (Philadelphia, 1977), p. 22. Fox’s assertion that the main significance of these early reform groups lay “in solidifying groups of gentlemen reformers” together “and elevating them to prominence” rather than in “the practical reform work (they) managed to accomplish,” also provides, in my view, an appropriate assessment of the contribution of the C.M.R.A. and Committee of One Hundred to political reform in post-bellum Philadelphia (Fox, Ibid., p. 46). Another subscriber to this viewpoint of the significance of early reform groups is Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency, p. 3.

4 Bradley, Lea, pp. 189-90; Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp, 60-4; Whiteman, Gentlemen in Crisis, p. 112.
5 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 59; see also Allinson and Penrose, City Government, pp. 61-2.
7 Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 52-3; Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 73.
8 Cutler and Gillette, Divided Metropolis, pp. 9-14, 32-33.
9 Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 57.
10 Ibid., pp. 55-7. These businessmen were also alike in that they formed their companies in partnership or individually, and not through incorporation (which required a special act of the state legislature until 1874). Big business was not yet dominant or very much in evidence in Philadelphia in the immediate post-bellum period. As late as 1880, for example, there were no corporations among the 849 textile firms in Philadelphia. (Philip Scranton, Proprietary Capitalism: The Textile Manufacture at Philadelphia, 1800-1885 (Cambridge, 1983), p. 3).

Firms such as Alfred Jenk’s machine works; the Baldwin locomotive works; Henry Disston and Sons, the largest saw and tool manufacturer in the country, and the Cramp Shipyards, all with nearly 3,000 workers apiece were exceptions to the usual scale of organisation. (Laurie and Schmitz, "Manufacture and Productivity," pp. 47-65).

11 Inquirer, Nov. 18, 1874.
12 CMRA, Address, May, 1872, p. 1. The reformers pessimistic forecast was based on the analysis they conducted of the city’s finances; an examination which revealed that although levels of taxation had risen dramatically since the ante-bellum period, city income had failed to keep pace with public expenditure. Public revenue raised by taxation for instance had more than quadrupled from $2,653,474 in 1860 to $11,640,571 in 1874, as a result of a 26 percent rise in the tax rate from $1.75 (on every $100 of taxable property) to $2.20 and the tripling of the assessed valuation of property from $155,697,669 to $548,243,585, while city
expenditures had also exhibited a similar pattern of growth rising from four to thirteen million dollars over the same period. Put another way, in terms of per head of population, taxation revenue had increased from $4.79 in 1860 to $16.03 in 1874, while city expenditures had risen from $7.10 to $18.09 over this period.

As a result of this imbalance, the annual deficit on the city's budget the reformers noted had doubled from an average of $271,749 between 1854 and 1861, to $593,896 during the Civil War (1861-67). By the post-war decade, city expenditures was exceeding income by, on average, in excess of one million dollars ($1,045,172) a year. These yearly deficiencies were reflected in the size of the city's floating debt which by the early 1870's exceeded four million dollars, having stood at under a half a million only a decade earlier. Even more disturbing, particularly from the reform viewpoint, had been the remorseless growth in the city's funded debt (money borrowed to provide "permanent improvements" such as schools, bridges, sewers, waterworks and so forth) which rose from $20,913,505 in 1860 to $58,165,516 in 1874. See CMRA, Reform Tracts No. 1 Municipal Taxation, Dec. 1871; CMRA, Facts for the People, March 4, 1874, pp. 1-3; Allinson and Penrose, City Government, pp. 44-6, 57-8.

It was then the city's increasing indebtedness along with "the progress of taxation and expenditure ever onward at a rate far exceeding that of the increasing population and the value of property," which so alarmed the reformers and formed the basis of their gloomy prediction for the future. (CMRA, Address, May, 1872, p. 1).

13 Ibid., p. 2.
14 Ibid., p. 1.
15 CMRA, Address, Sept. 1873, p. 3; idem, Facts for the People, March, 1874, p. 1.
18 CMRA, Address, May, 1872, p. 2.
22 Ibid.
23 See for example, CMRA, Reform Tracts No. 1: Municipal Taxation, Dec. 1871; Reform Tracts No. 2: The Registry and Election Laws (undated) and Facts for the People, Oct. 1873, March, 1874.
24 Bradley, Lea, pp. 188-9. Lea's Songs for the Politicians were reproduced in full by Leach, "Twenty
Years with Quay," Jan. 29, 1905.


26 Ibid. For further details of the nature of the local problems which faced the reformers see CMRA, Reform Tract No. 2, p. 4; idem, Address, Oct. 1871, p. 2; Bradley, Lea, pp. 183-4; Klein and Hoogenboom, A History of Pennsylvania, p. 318; Stewart, "The Deal for Philadelphia," p. 47.


28 CMRA, Memorial to the Constitutional Convention of Pennsylvania, 1873; Bradley, Lea, p. 190; Whiteman, Gentlemen in Crisis, pp. 111-3.


30 Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 228-9.

31 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 72.


33 Ibid., p. 239.


35 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp. 74-6, 139-40.

36 Ibid., pp. 111-2.

37 Ibid., pp. 113-5; Smalley, "The Philadelphia Committee of One Hundred," p. 398; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," March 5, 1905.

38 See Appendix 2.

39 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp. 230-3; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 19, 1905.


41 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 99; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," March 5, 12, 1905.

42 Ibid.

43 See the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of One Hundred on the Bullitt Bill, April, 1885.


45 Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 50; CMRA, Address, May, 1872, p. 1.

46 CMRA, Address, Sept. 1871, p. 2; Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 59.

47 Lea to Joseph Caven, Nov. 17, 1878, Lea Papers, University of Pennsylvania, quoted in Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 224.


At the ward level the most consistent Republican majorities in mayoral elections between 1865 and 1884 were provided by wards 7, 8, 9, and 10 just west of the old downtown core and wards 24 and 27 further to the west across the Schuylkill river as well as wards - 13, 14, 15, 20(29), 21(28), 22 - to the northwest of the old city (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3); that is, the new residential areas on the urban periphery to which those who benefitted most from industrialisation (the managers, supervisors and clerks) were relocating.

These suburban areas usually provided the Republicans with the firmest support because, according to Gillette, they were the main beneficiaries of the party's commitment to government taking a positive role (within the bounds of fiscal integrity) in the promotion of municipal improvements. (Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 16-17, 26).

73 Public Ledger, Sept. 13, 1877.
74 Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 19, 1905.
75 Unlike the elections of November 1876, when Rowan was the only Republican candidate to be defeated, all the Republican candidates for office in November 1877 were narrowly beaten by their Democratic opponents: James Sayre (52,626 votes) by Robert E. Pattison (majority, 1,620) in the City Controller election; Russell Thayer (53,859) by Hagert (majority, 773) in the District Attorney election, and Andrew J. Knorr (51,818) by Gilbert (majority, 1024) in the Coroner's election. For details of how party factionalism robbed these three Republican candidates of victory, see the Public Ledger, Nov. 7, 1877; Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 246-7; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 19, 1905.

76 Public Ledger, Nov. 1, 1880; Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp. 41-3, 46; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 26, 1905.
77 Public Ledger, Nov. 1, 1880.
78 Ibid., Nov. 3, 1880; Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 53.
79 Bradley, Lea, pp. 196-7; Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp. 65-6.
80 North American, Nov. 3, 1880.
81 The defeat of six "regular" Republican nominees by Independent candidates in ring wards 21, 22, 26 and 30 in council elections held on the same day as the mayoral contest also indicates that there was a repetition of the spontaneous bolt in suburban areas. See Public Ledger, Feb. 16, 1881; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," March 12, 1905.
82 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, p. 219; Times, Feb. 16, 1881.
83 Bradley, Lea, pp. 196-7; Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp. 65-6, 212-3.
84 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp. 184, 203.
86 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp. 73-4, 111.
87 Ibid., p. 76, 107-110.
88 Ibid., pp. 111-3.
89 Ibid., p. 114.
90 Ibid., p. 115; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," March 5, 1905.
91 Ibid., pp. 128, 131; Times, Jan. 17, 1881.
92 Ibid., pp. 138, 144-8.
93 Ibid., pp. 141-4.
94 Inquirer, Feb. 12, 1884.
While listing the election returns for Select Council for example, these newspapers point out that "Gas Trust nominees," Dan Blair (8th ward), Dave Mullen (9th), James Miles (13th), William S. Reyburn (15th), James Dobson (28th) and Frances Martin (31st) were all defeated by Independent Republican candidates who had been endorsed by the Committee of One Hundred. The implication that the reader picks up is that the Committee played an integral role in the defeat of the Gas Trust faction.

While not contesting that the election results constituted a victory for Independent Republicanism or "reform" as such, I would suggest however, that these newspapers give a misleading impression of the importance of the Committee in the "reform victory" of February 1882. Indeed by (wrongly) crediting the victory to the reform group, these newspaper accounts tended to reinforce the claims of reform publicists who argued that it was the Committee of One Hundred which was in fact responsible for bringing about "The Fall of Bossism".
securing pluralities of less than 5,000, but following Cameron's accommodation with key political leaders such as Mann and McManes the state party could anticipate a 20,000 majority in the city and certain victory in the state. See Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 100-2.

112 See Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 38-9, 44, 50, 54-5, 75; Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 68-9, 268-9; for details of how, first, Stokley in 1876, and then, McManes in 1880, successfully led a "bolt" of Philadelphia representatives against Cameron's leadership at the Republican National Convention of those years. In the latter case, McManes, much to Cameron's chagrin, was credited by many newspapers as being the individual most responsible for Ulysses S. Grant's failure to be nominated for a third term of office.

113 Kehl, Boss Rule, p. 53.

114 Times, Jan. 7, 1876; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Feb. 26, 1905.

115 Public Ledger, Jan. 31, 1878. Highways expenditure, for example, fell from $1,515,929 in 1876, to $589,419 in 1878, and $326,798 in 1880, under William Baldwin, John Hill's successor as Highways Commissioner. Overall the total expenditure by city departments fell by almost four million dollars between 1875 and 1880, from $10,105,919 to $6,370,578. See Ring Rule.....Report of a Committee of 80,000, pp. 20-21; Manual of Councils, 1885-86, p. 105; Allinson and Penrose, City Government, pp. 58-9.

116 Vickers, Fall of Bossism, pp. 72, 93-4; Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 271-2; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," March 12, 1905. Although embarrassed by the Investigating Committee's report for instance which was very critical of the management of the Gas Works McManes was able to fend its recommendations due to the strength of his support in the Select Council. (Gillette, Ibid., pp. 274-5; Leach, Ibid., April 12, 1905).

McManes' defeat for re-election to the Gas Trust in January 1883 was also only a temporary setback for he was again elected to the Board the following year. He did however face a hostile minority in the Trust since opponents such as David Lane, William H. Smith, Alfred Moore, James Work, and William W. Alcorn were all elected as Trustees between 1881 and 1883. (Leach, Ibid., April 2, 16, 1905; Zink, City Bosses, p. 204). Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," April 23, 1905. Put another way, the U.R.A. was formed to provide an alternative focus for those who previously had felt excluded from the party by those who contended for influence at the Central Union Republican Club at 11th and Chestnut Street, and at "Seventh Street," the "synonym for the Ring" that met at the offices of the Gas Trust. (Leach, Ibid.; see also Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, p. 279).
Businessmen reformers supported structural changes in city government because they anticipated that the concentration of power and responsibility incorporated in the new charter would not only improve accountability but also promote the efficient management of city services and ultimately bring about lower taxes. For further details of the reasons why reformers supported the passage of the Bullitt Bill, see Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of One Hundred on the Bullitt Bill, April, 1885; Civil Service Reform Association, Fourth Annual Report, 1885; The Bullitt Bill: What the Reform Charter is, and Why it Should become a Law, n.d., c. 1885; The Bullitt Bill: Who favour and who oppose its enactment, n.d., c. 1885.

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Similar changes also took place in the organisation and structure of state party politics in the late nineteenth century. The Republican machine of Cameron's successor, Matthew S. Quay (1833-1904) for example, emerged as the dominant institution in Pennsylvania's government and politics in the mid-1880's. Embracing 20,000 "regulars" and an annual payroll of $24,000,000, Quay's machine indeed, in the opinion of the party leader's critics, was "the most perfect and complete of all state (political) organisations" which emerged elsewhere across the country in the last two decades of the nineteenth century (Jesse Macy, Party Organisation and Machinery (New York, 1912), p. 111).

Chapter 5. The Salient Characteristics of Republican Boss Rule in Philadelphia

1 All the various party leaders including McManes and Stokley, it should be pointed out, did have something in common which has tended to be under-rated or overlooked in the past (and which, in my view, needs to be re-emphasised); and that was their ability and competence as professional politicians. For details of just how capable and talented these "bosses" were in the business of politics (whatever else they may have been) see the character sketches of McManes, Vare and Durham in Bryce, American Commonwealth, v. II, pp. 407-9; John T. Salter, "The End of Vare," Political Science Quarterly 50 (June 1935), p. 216; Steffens, Shame of the Cities, p. 216; Zink, City Bosses, p. 212; Pittsburgh Dispatch, May 19, 1902, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.

2 Bryce, American Commonwealth, v. II, p. 421. The party leaders at the state level, like their counterparts in Philadelphia, were also party professionals of the highest calibre. The only significant difference between the two groups seems to have been one of social background. Unlike the city "bosses" who were of humble origin, state leaders Quay and Penrose came from the upper echelons of society. Quay, for instance, was a classical scholar and son of a Presbyterian minister. He was also, in the opinion of Rudyard Kipling, the best literary critic in America. (Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. xii, 253, 283). Penrose (1860-1921), a Harvard law graduate, and descendant of the prominent colonial shipbuilder Bartholomew Penrose, was, according to Baltzell, "Proper Philadelphia's most interesting and gifted politician in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." (Baltzell, An American Business Aristocracy, pp. 163-4). For further details of Penrose's career see the two excellent and entertaining biographies that have been written about him, both of which contain a wealth of anecdotal material about this colourful political figure who, in Baltzell's opinion, "certainly measured up to Ernest Hemingway's ideal of the gentleman" (Baltzell, Ibid.); Walter Davenport, Power and Glory: The Life of Boies Penrose (New York,
1931), and Robert D. Bowden, Boies Penrose, Symbol of an Era (New York, 1937).
3 Steffens, Shame of the Cities, p. 203.
4 Ibid., p. 204.
5 Record, June 20, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
9 Those occasions (such as the local elections of 1899, 1905, 1921, 1923, and 1927) when the "Organisation" not only elected its own candidates but also deliberately transferred enough votes to the Democratic ticket (in order to ensure that minority party representation remained in the hands of its traditional partisan opponents rather than a reform third party), are also illustrative of the boss's ability to exercise control over his party subordinates, for the successful outcome of these intricate, extra-legal, ticket-splitting ventures was dependent on the full co-operation of party workers across the city. See pp. 264-266 of this thesis for details.
11 In 1894, 15 out of 37 Select Councilmen sat on the Republican City Committee; in 1899, 19 out of 40; in 1905, 19 out of 42; in 1910, 18 out of 47, and in 1916, 15 out of 48. In 1925, at least 13 of the 20 Councilmen (in the new uni-cameral body organised under the city charter of 1919) sat on the City Committee. These figures are based on the Manual of Councils for the respective years and lists of the Republican City Committee compiled from Press, Jan. 12, 1895; Public Ledger, June 18, 1905; North American, June 19, 1905; Record, June 20, 1905; Press, Sept. 3, 1911; and "The Young Republicans," Respect for Republicans, Feb. 1926.
Plain Talk, Report by Morris Llewellyn Cooke, Director of Public Works to the Mayor, 1914, p. 50, Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia. For examples of reform measures sponsored by Blankenburg which were thwarted by City Councils, see Donald W. Disbrow, "Reform in Philadelphia under Mayor Blankenburg, 1912-1916," Pennsylvania History 27 (Oct. 1960), pp. 386-88.


The figures for John Mack's businesses were arrived at by adding together the number of public contracts awarded to John M. Mack, The Mack Paving and Construction Company, the Barber Asphalt Paving Company, the Pennsylvania Asphalt Paving Company and the Union Paving Company, deduced from the Mayor's Annual Register of Contracts, 1887-1930, Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia. Arranged numerically, though indexed alphabetically by the name of the contractor, the Mayor's Annual Register contains details (date, nature of work, contractor, bureau and city department, and value of contract) of all authorised contracts for public work in the city carried out by private firms.

Between 1887 (when subsequent to the introduction of the Bullitt city charter the first register was compiled) and 1930, the City of Philadelphia negotiated almost 70,000 public contracts with private companies; however, prior to 1903, the annual register lists only the number of contracts awarded to each firm, but not their value. Such information can still be found though, since individual contracts have been stored, and can usually be traced, at the Records Centre, 410N Broad Street.

Press, July 8, 1901, Durham Scrapbook, HSP; Mayor's Annual Register of Contracts, 1887-1902.

Clark, The Irish in Philadelphia, pp. 141-2; idem, The Irish Relations, p. 86-96.


In 1912, for instance, 204 of the 311 bills passed by Councils were concerned with paving streets, changing

24 Ibid.
26 Mayor's Annual Register of Contracts, 1911; Manual of Councils, 1910-11, p. 29; Press, Sept. 3, 1911.
27 Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes, pp. 44-5.
28 Manual of Councils, 1905-6, pp. 78, 95, 126; 1910-11, pp. 93, 145; Record, June 20, 1905.
29 Morris L. Cooke, Business Methods in Municipal Works: An Informal Record of the Operation of the Department of Public Works, of the City of Philadelphia, under the Administration of Mayor Blankenburg, 1913, p. 8, 24, Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia.
30 Mayor's Annual Register of Contracts, 1904; Manual of Councils, 1905-6, pp. 95, 109; Record, June 20, 1905.
31 Press, Oct. 13, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
32 Public Ledger, Oct. 30, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. For further details of the methods that were used to favour McNichol's company in the awarding of contracts for the construction of the Torresdale filtration system, see also the Press, July 7, 1901, Durham Scrapbook, HSP; Public Ledger, July 7, 1906, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU; CMA, 15th AR, 1901, pp. 44-5; "How Philadelphia was Bled," Nation 81 (Aug. 17, 1905); Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," June, 1905, pp. 577-581.
35 Public Ledger, Oct. 30, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
36 "How Philadelphia was Bled," Aug. 17, 1905.
38 Public Ledger, Nov. 29, 1910, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU.
39 North American, Nov. 28, 1910, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU.
40 Ibid., Nov. 4, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
41 Ibid., Nov. 28, 1910, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU.
45 Wainwright, Philadelphia Electric Company, p. 86; Public Ledger, June 29, 1909.
47 Record, Public Ledger, Feb. 6, 1895; Times, Feb. 8, 1895; CMA, 9th AR, 1895, pp. 41-45.
48 CMA, 9th AR, 1895, p. 44.
Chapter 6. The Centralisation of the Republican
"Organisation" of Philadelphia

3 See pp. 90-98 of this thesis.
4 Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 57, 59-60.
5 Ibid., pp. 60, 61-2, 66-7, 70-1, 82-3.
6 Ibid., p. 62.
7 Ibid., pp. 63-4. Quay, in response to reform claims that the control of federal and state patronage (which provided him with an estimated annual payroll of $7,600,000; an amount sufficient to sustain 14,705 officeholders in 1898) had permitted him to become "the dictator of the State Republican party" (Bradley, Lea, p. 202), publicly asserted that it was "a positive disadvantage (because) everybody cannot be gratified. For every single appointment a dozen or more who have been disappointed become disgruntled and indifferent." (Kansas City Star, Nov. 11, 1889, quoted in Kehl, Boss Rule, p. 123). The fact that no fewer than twenty men expected his support when a vacancy arose in the state Supreme Court in 1901, suggests that Quay, on this occasion, was not attempting to deceive the public and that the allocation of patronage did provide him with a genuinely difficult problem. See Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 122-3, 137, 144, 235-7; Speeches of Wanamaker on Quayism, pp. 231-5.
8 Ibid., pp. 66-7. According to Quay's critics, in the late nineteenth century, treasury funds amounting to as much as five to six million dollars a year were held on deposit in private ("pet") banks throughout the state while school districts, hospitals and state charities languished because of unpaid public appropriations. These deposits yielded the Republican machine in excess of $150,000 a year in "substitute interest" and earned Quay the nickname of "Farmer General of the State Finance." (Isaac F. Marcosson, "The Fall of the House of Quay," World's Work 11 (1906), p. 7120; Speeches of Wanamaker on Quayism, pp. 19-23, 158; Kehl, Boss Rule, p. 67). For details of other ways how state funds were converted to political capital by Quay, and of the methods he used to disburse the money in the most effective manner to influence elections see Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 63-67, 144, 214-5; Davenport, Power and Glory, pp. 56, 58, 61; Marcosson, "Fall of the House of Quay," pp. 7120-3; Speeches of Wanamaker on Quayism, pp. 20, 41-2, 369.
9 Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 62-3, 83, 122-3, 137, 144, 237; Speeches of Wanamaker on Quayism, pp. 195, 197, 231-5. Details of personal and political indiscretions
committed by legislators were compiled by Quay's agents who relied on private detectives, municipal policemen, subsidised journalists and "shysters at law, medicine, banking and of the pulpit" to provide them with potentially damaging material. (Davenport, Power and Glory, pp. 70-1). They were recorded on card files (known as "Quay's coffins") which the state boss kept among his private papers. (Kehl, Ibid., pp. 63-4).

Speeches of Wanamaker on Quayism, p. 283. For an excellent illustration of the control that Quay exercised over the state Republican party see Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 241-2; Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," March, 1905, pp. 237-8; Edward J. Stackpole, Behind the Scenes with a Newspaperman: Fifty Years in the Life of an Editor (Philadelphia, 1927), pp. 81-2; for details of how the state boss made a successful eleventh hour switch in his choice of candidate for the gubernatorial nomination at the state Republican convention held in June 1902.

10 Steffens, Shame of the Cities, p. 204.
11 Ibid.; Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 62, 75-6; Zink, City Bosses, pp. 204-5.
12 Kehl, Boss Rule, p. 76; Morgan, City of Firsts, p. 284; Popular Philadelphians, 27-8.
13 Kehl, Boss Rule, p. 76.
14 Ibid.; Morgan, City of Firsts, p. 284; Popular Philadelphians, p. 28.
15 Times, Jan. 12, 1895.
19 Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 191; North American, June 29, 1909. For details of how Quay eventually overcame the challenge of the "Hog Combine" see also Kehl, Ibid., pp. 193-5, 209-13; Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," Nov. 27, 1904, June 25, 1905; Zink, City Bosses, pp. 208-10.

Charter revision, state investigating committees, federal and state patronage and the advocacy of reform (when politically expedient) were also the "weapons" used by Quay's successor, Boies Penrose to influence political affairs in Philadelphia for his own benefit. See Lloyd M. Abernethy, "Insurgency in Philadelphia, 1905," PMHB 87 (Jan. 1963), p. 12; C of 70, Second Report of the Executive Board, 1905, pp. 36-9; and pp. 340-1 of this thesis for example, for details of how Penrose used charter revision (that is, the passage of the 1905 "Ripper Bill" and the introduction of a new city charter in 1919) in the first instance to support
his loyal follower "Iz" Durham who was experiencing difficulties during a period of reform insurgency (1905-7) and in the other to punish the Vare brothers for their disobedience. See also Lloyd M. Abernethy, "Progressivism, 1905-1919," in Weigley (ed.), Philadelphia: A 300-Year History, p. 551; William S. Vare, My Forty Years in Politics (Philadelphia, 1933), pp. 114-118; "The Campaign in Philadelphia," Outlook (Sept. 16, 1911), pp. 97-8; for details of how Penrose managed to seal victory for his candidate, George H. Earle in the Republican mayoral primary election of 1911, by establishing a state Committee of Inquiry (into allegations of corruption in the Reyburn mayoral administration), which dealt a mortal blow to the campaign of his opponent, William Vare.

Penrose-inspired interventions in local affairs it should be noted tended to be of a punitive rather than supportive nature following "Iz" Durham's death in 1909. This was because the Vare brothers, Edwin and Bill, unlike Durham (and McNichol who continued to serve as Penrose's able lieutenant until his death in 1917) were not always prepared to acquiesce to the wishes of the state party leader. Consequently, Penrose's relationship with the Vares' was an uneasy one oscillating between compromise and harmony in certain campaigns and violence and murder in others. See Davenport, Power and Glory, pp. 138-145; Vare, Forty Years, pp. 124-137; William A. McGarry, "Government by Murder," Independent (Oct. 27, 1917), pp. 178-80; Abernethy, "Progressivism," pp. 561-2, for details.

21 Bowden, Boies Penrose, pp. 182, 203-4; Kehl, Boss Rule, p. 76; Steffens, Shame of the Cities, p. 216; Zink, City Bosses, pp. 206-21.
22 North American, June 29, 1909.
23 The New Rules of the Union Republican Party, 1877, p. 5.
25 Press, June 27, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
26 Lists of party committeemen and ward leaders for this period no longer exist, though it has been possible to compile the membership of the Republican City Committee for 1895 and 1905 using the following newspapers: Press, Jan. 12, 1895; Public Ledger, June 18, 1905; North American, June 19, 1905; Record, June 20, 1905.
27 Ibid.; Public Ledger, Oct. 30, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
30 See pp. 94-96, and note 59 for Chapter 3.
31 Ibid. The New Rules of the Union Republican Party, 1877, pp. 21-22; Walter J. Branson, "The Philadelphia


35 Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," March 19, 1905.

36 Ibid., Feb. 12, 1905.

37 Public Ledger, North American, July 10, 1901, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.

38 ML, AR, 1902-3, p. 4. For a good illustration of this "automationism" see Public Ledger, North American, Inquirer, July 10, 1901, Durham Scrapbook, HSP; William R. Stewart, "The Real John Weaver," October Cosmopolitan (1905), pp. 1-30; The True John Weaver, 1905, pp. 1-19; for details of how convention delegates, upon receiving last-minute instructions from Durham, adopted the relatively unknown John Weaver, instead of the current incumbent Peter F. Rothermel, as the party's nominee for the District Attorneyship in 1901.

39 See pp. 177-181.


41 North American, Aug. 17, 1909, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.

42 Bardsley, as city treasurer, personally and legitimately received over $200,000 in interest on the deposit of public funds. Failing to clear his debts by speculation with this money, however, led him to misappropriate a further $778,858.38 of public funds for his own ends. Bardsley's fraudulent manipulation of the city's money was uncovered following the failure of two banks which were key depositories for public funds: Report of the Sub-Committee of the Finance Committee of Councils of Philadelphia upon the Investigation of the City's Deposits in the Keystone, National and Other Banks, and the Transactions of John Bardsley, late City Treasurer in the Management of Public Funds, March 13, 1892; CMA, 6th AR, 1892, pp. 3, 11-14.

43 The Political Assessment of Office Holders: A Report on the System as Practised by the Republican Organisation in the City of Philadelphia, 1883-1913, 1913, p. 5. This investigation of the political assessment of public employees was carried out on behalf of reform Mayor Blankenburg, by his Director of Public Works, the gifted, progressive engineer, Morris Llewellyn Cooke. For further details of their reform efforts see Chapter 9.

44 Ibid., p. 12; Public Ledger, Feb. 6, 1895.


46 Ibid., p. 5; Address of Rudolph Blankenburg, Academy of Music, Sept. 27, 1917, pp. 2-3, Blankenburg Papers, HSP.


48 See pp. 98-100.

50 Manual of Councils, 1889-90, p. 56; 1899-1900, p. 44; 1905-6, p. 77; Popular Philadelphians, pp. 12-13; Public Ledger, June 18, 1905; Inquirer, Oct. 12, 1905.

51 Manual of Councils, 1899-1900, p. 44.


53 Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes, pp. 47, 66; Salter, Boss Rule, p. 30. In 1900 there were 4,502 positions available in the city government making up a total payroll of $4,535,450. By 1930 the number of jobs had almost tripled to 12,887 and the public payroll quadrupled to $18,840,900. See Manual of Councils, 1899-1900, 1930.


56 Ibid., 1890, pp. 662-686.

57 For a definition of what, in Plunkitt's view, constituted "honest graft" see note 32 of Chapter 3.


59 North American, Oct. 18, 1911, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU.

60 Ibid.

61 Bulletin, Oct. 18, 1911, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU.

62 For details of John Mack and his relationship with Durham see pp. 178-9, 208-9, 295-6, of this thesis. With regard to Martin's reconciliation with Durham see North American, Oct. 20, 1909, and Times, Oct. 25, 1911, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU.

63 Times, Oct. 25, 1911, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU.

64 Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," Aug. 1905, p. 129.

65 Ibid., June, 1905, p. 581.

66 Ward leader, Thomas W. Cunningham, for example, served six successive terms (1904-1928) as Clerk of the Quarter Sessions. Similarly, "Boss" William Vare (1902-1912) and James M. Hazlett (1912-1932), President of the Republican City Committee, occupied the Recorder of Deeds office for virtually the first third of this century. See Manual of Councils; Inquirer, Oct. 12,
Chapter 7. The Electoral Foundations and Functions of the Republican Machine

1 Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 116.
2 Manual of Councils, 1887-1933.
4 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 9; Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, ch. 9.
5 Glazer and Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, pp. 221-9.
9 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 71. Merton was not the first scholar to suggest that the success of the political machine was based on the functions it performed. Contemporary observers such as Mosei Ostrogorski and Lincoln Steffens, for example, both referred to the way the machine filled a void which no other agency seemed equipped for. See Mosei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties, v. II (London, 1902), part 4, and Steffens, The Autobiography, v. I, pp. 618-9.
10 Max Weber too, acutely aware of bureaucracy and its implications, was also very impressed by the responsibility of the political "boss", recognising that in him and in his organisation lay the natural functional substitute for bureaucracy in a growing democratic political culture. See Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, 1946), pp. 108-111.
11 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 71-81.
12 Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, ch. 9.
16 The mayoral elections of 1899, 1903, and 1916 have been omitted from Table 7.5 since the equations generated for these elections failed to pass the appropriate F
test at the .05 level.

The ward returns in the sixteen mayoral elections that have been included in this analysis were taken from the Inquirer, Oct. 11, 1865; Oct. 14, 1868; Feb. 18, 1874; Feb. 21, 1877; Feb. 16, 1887; Feb. 21, 1895; Feb. 20, 1907; Nov. 9, 1911; and the Manual of Councils, 1881, p. 111; 1920, pp. 274-5; 1927, pp. 285-6; 1931, pp. 297-8, as well as the Eighteenth Annual Report of the Registration Commission, 1923, pp. 18-19.


The indicator for social class used in this analysis is the number of taxable inhabitants in each ward (expressed as a proportion of the total population of the ward) taken from the yearly statements of Real and Personal Property in the city, drawn up by the Board of Revision of Taxes and contained in the annual reports of the Mayor. See the Annual Message of the Mayor of the City of Philadelphia, 1890-1930.

The t-statistics of the regression coefficients of the ethnicity variables in these equations test the null hypothesis that the difference in the estimated level of support for the Republican candidate in wards inhabited by the ethnic group in question and those populated by third generation Americans is not significantly greater than zero.

This inference is also consistent with what one would expect given the observations that were made earlier on the electoral foundations of the Republican party. See note 30 for Chapter 2 and note 74 for Chapter 4. For details of the city's ethnic population, prior to 1880, see note 33 for Chapter 2.

Clark, The Irish in Philadelphia, p.73; idem, The Irish Relations, ch. 10.

See note 30 for Chapter 2.

Clark, The Irish in Philadelphia, pp. 117-120.


Lawrence Fuchs, The Political Behaviour of American


29 Ibid., p. 509.


32 Ibid., pp. 210-5.


36 *Public Ledger*, Oct. 7, 1901.


39 See pp. 22-3, 25-6, of this thesis.

40 Ibid., pp. 24-6 and notes 13 to 17 for Chapter 1.


On Philadelphia's horizontal slums and the widespread violations of sanitary and housing laws by slumlords, see WLGG, Facts About Philadelphia, ch. 1; and John F. Sutherland, "Housing the Poor in the City of Homes: Philadelphia at the Turn of the Century," in Davis and Haller (eds.), The People's of Philadelphia, ch. 9.

For the relationship between the state and city "bosses" and the utility financiers, Widener, Elkins, Kemble and Dolan see Chapter 8 of this thesis. And finally for the aid given to land developers and manufacturers see Davenport, Power and Glory, pp. 132, 184; Klein and Hoogenboom, A History of Pennsylvania, pp. 321-3; Warner, Private City, pp. 219-221; Dan Rottenberg, "The Rise of Albert M. Greenfield," in Friedman (ed.), Jewish Life in Philadelphia, ch. 12; and pp. 207-10 of this thesis.

Zink, City Bosses, p. 225.

See for instance, Clinton R. Woodruff, "Philadelphia's Water: A Story of Municipal Procrastination," Forum 28 (1899-1900), pp. 305-314, in which Woodruff argues that the repeated delay in the city's water supply - which until the construction of the Torresdale filtration plant (1899-1907) was taken direct from the river - was due to a mixture of "procrastination, corporate greed and official indifference."


Warner, Private City, pp. 201-2, 223.


Ibid., p. 215.

See Chapter 8 and pp. 177-181 of this thesis.
A dramatic illustration of the exorbitant profit that the "Contractor Bosses" enjoyed is provided by the contract work they carried out, extending and developing League Island Park between 1901 and 1909. By using material dredged from the Delaware and Schuylkill rivers as "landfill" for the project, instead of "clean earth" as specified by the contract, City Surveyor John M. Nobre estimated that the Vares' made a net profit of as much as one million dollars out of the $1,355,462 in contracts that had been awarded by the city for the completion of the scheme: Inquirer, July 29, 1911; Record, Sept. 20, 1911; North American, Sept. 25, 30, 1911, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU; City Contracts 16829, 17457, 18537, 19840, 22107, Records Centre, City of Philadelphia. For details of the profits that street-cleaning contracts yielded to the Vares', see CMA, 8th AR, 1894, pp.45-6; CMA, 10th AR, 1896, p. 40; North American, Nov. 28, 1910, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU; Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," July, 1905, pp. 21-2.


See note 20 of Chapter 6 and pp. 340-1 of this thesis.

J. Joseph Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Urban Reform," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 49 (Sept. 1962), pp. 231-241; idem, Senator Robert F.


74 Since the party organisation emerged independent of (and was not subservient to) the business corporation in the late nineteenth century it also follows that the political machine was not the creation of business interests. That is, put another way, just as the machine did not originate as a response to the "needs" of poor immigrants neither was it created, contrary to Merton's claims, to satisfy the demands of businessmen. Indeed, the party boss, far from serving as the "business community's ambassador" as Merton suggests, was in fact his own master and as such extracted his pound of flesh from every enterprise expecting service from the Republican party organisation. (Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 74). See ch. 8 of this thesis and especially pp. 292-6 and note 60 for details of the relationship between the party boss and the big businessman. See also Speeches of Wanamaker on Quayism, pp. 23, 72-3, 195, 233-5; Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," April, 1905, pp. 353-4; Welsh, "The Degradation of Pennsylvania Politics," pp. 1, 6-8, 15-16; "The Growing Impudence of the Bosses," Century 52 (1896), p. 155; Henry Jones Ford, "Municipal Corruption: A Comment on Lincoln Steffens," Political Science Quarterly 19 (1904), p. 678; for examples of business interests being "compelled to stand and deliver" (Wanamaker, Ibid., p. 93) to the party boss and his organisation.


76 Quay, Philadelphia Democrats, 1880-1910, p. 100.

77 Ibid., pp. 78, 92, 123.

78 Ibid., ch. 8.

79 A Record of Thirteen Years Perfidy: Judge Gordon and Congressman McAleer Responsible for Democratic Losses in Philadelphia. An address from the Democratic City Committee to the Democratic State Convention, Aug. 12, 1901; Inquirer, Feb. 21, 1895.

The elected minority officers included one of the three County Commissioners, and one-third of the city's magistrates, while the appointed officers accounted for half of Philadelphia's real estate assessors, and two of the five-member Board of Registration Commissioners.


Durham Scrapbook, 1901, HSP.

Inquirer, July 10, 1901. See the Record, June 20, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP; Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," Aug. 1905, p. 141, and Abernethy, "Insurgency," p. 18, for other examples of "Organisation" politicians advocating a similar approach.


Public Ledger, Oct. 24, 1905, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.

Salter, Boss Rule, pp. 217-8. See the C of 70, Report of the Executive Board, Feb. 28, 1913, pp. 7-8; City Party, City Party Men of the Ninth Ward Do Not Be Deceived, 1908; for example, for details of how the "Organisation" managed to "capture" City Party and Democratic Party nominations in the 1908 and 1910 primary elections.


Drayer, J. Hampton Moore, pp. 158-172.


Kreuger, "Election Frauds," p. 295. For an explanation why the introduction of a system of personal registration in 1906 failed to seriously impair the "Organisation's" control over voter registration see Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes, pp. 117-120.


ML, AR, 1899-1901, pp. 5-7.

Ibid., 1901-2, p. 11.


Ibid.; ML, AR, 1899-1901, pp. 5-7; AR, 1901-2, p. 11.

ML, AR, 1899-1901, pp. 5-7.


Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," June, 1905, p. 572.

Abernethy, "Insurgency," p. 3.


For an assessment of these reform third parties, see Chapter 9 of this thesis.


Quoted in Greenberg, The Philadelphia Democratic Party,

Chapter 8. The Utility Monopolists


4 It should also be noted that this kind of arrangement was not unusual or unique to Philadelphia. For details of similar alliances between utility financiers and political machines in other American cities, see Frank M. Stewart, A Half-Century of Municipal Reform: A History of the National Municipal League (Berkeley, 1950), p. 9; Hendrick, "Great American Fortunes," p. 33.

5 Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, p. 124.


7 Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 124-5; Hendrick, "Great American Fortunes," p. 34; Popular
Philadelphians, p. 171.
11 Hendrick, "Great American Fortunes," p. 36.
12 Ibid., pp. 36-7; Klein and Hoogenboom, A History of Pennsylvania, p. 318.
15 Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, p. 96.
16 See Table 4.1.
20 Ibid.
24 Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, p. 126.
31 Speirs, The Street Railway System, pp. 73-5; Cox and

32 Same as for note 3 of this chapter.
36 Ibid., p. 410.
38 Ibid., p. 411.
39 Ibid., pp. 413, 415.


50 This particular incident involving the granting of thirteen franchises to rapid transit companies in Philadelphia for no apparent reason other than political expediency has been extensively reported. In addition to the sources listed below see also, Davenport, Power and Glory, pp. 152-4; Morgan, City of Firsts, p. 288; Wainwright, Philadelphia Electric Company, pp. 83-5; Stirling, "Inside Transit Facts," Feb. 22, 1930; Press, Inquirer, June 17, 1901, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
55 ML, AR, 1901-2, pp. 5-7; Cox and Meyers, "The Philadelphia Traction Monopoly," p. 418.
57 Ibid., p. 216.
59 For details of the compromise settlement, which involved the cash payment of $2,000,000 to Mack and the formation of a new company, the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, see Cox and Meyers, "The Philadelphia Traction Monopoly," p. 420.
60 Put another way, it shows that political man was not subject to the control of economic man in turn of the century Philadelphia. The conventional view which holds the opposite to be the case is indeed seriously flawed because it fails to take account of the fact that although the political machine and the business corporation both emerged as dominant national institutions in the late nineteenth century they did so independent of one another. Thus the assumption on which the conventional wisdom rests (that the party boss and his machine were created by business interests) is in fact a false one. See Jesse Macy, Party Organisation and Machinery (New York, 1912); Kenneth Boulding, The Organisational Revolution (New York, 1953); for a description of the political dimension of the organisational revolution that was taking place in late nineteenth century America, and Kehl, Boss Rule, pp. 26-30, 59-83; Speeches of Wanamaker on Quayism, pp. 23, 72-3, 93, 195, 230-5, 325-31; Welsh, "The Degradation of Pennsylvania Politics," pp. 1, 6-8, 15-16; for details of how Quay managed to establish a power base which rivalled that of industry, and not one which was subservient to it. Speirs, "Philadelphia Gas Lease," p. 718. On Martin's friendship with Dolan see Isaac F. Marcosson, "The Awakening of Philadelphia," World's Work 11 (Sept. 1905), pp. 6643-5; Public Ledger, Nov. 10, Inquirer, Nov. 9, 1897, Durham Scrapbook, HSP.
63 CMA, Communication: Citizens' Municipal Association to the Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee of Finance and Gas of Select and Common Councils of the City of Philadelphia, p. 414.
65 Ibid., pp. 2-3. The Municipal League also expressed a similar viewpoint see the ML, AR, 1897-98, pp. 29-35; Woodruff, "Municipal League," pp. 344-5.
67 CMA, Communication, 1897, pp. 11-12.
70 Abernethy, "Insurgency," p. 9.
71 Ibid.
72 Vare, Forty Years, p. 89.
73 Abernethy, "Insurgency," p. 10.
75 Abernethy, "Insurgency," p. 14; Vare, Forty Years, p. 93.
76 Abernethy, "Insurgency," p. 3.
79 CMA, 9th AR, 1895, p. 6.
80 CMA, 11th AR, 1897, p. 14; CMA, 9th AR, 1895, pp. 25-27.
81 CMA, 11th AR, 1897, p. 14.
82 ML, AR, 1894-5, p. 23.
83 CMA, 9th AR, 1894-5, p. 23. For further details of how this public electric lighting monopoly operated see the ML, AR, 1898-99, pp. 9-10; CMA, 7th AR, 1893, pp. 16-17; CMA, 8th AR, 1894, pp. 19-20; CMA, 9th AR, 1895, pp. 6-11; CMA, 11th AR, 1897, pp. 13-16.
85 Ibid., pp. 51, 55, 59; Patterson, A Financial History, p. 119.

Chapter 9. The Non-Partisan Reform Movement

1 Forbidden under its constitution from taking any "part in nominations to public office," the C.M.A's objectives were "to sustain the constituted authorities in a faithful administration of the public service; to secure a strict fulfilment by public officers,
employees and contractors of all their obligations to
the city and to the citizen"; and finally "to promote
such legislation as shall be most conducive to the
public welfare." (CMA, Constitution, By-Laws and List
of Members, 1886, p. 3.

Although initially involved in organising the City
Party and in directing the wave of reform insurgency
that swept the city following Durham's proposal to
extend the lease of the gas works to the "U.G.I." in
1905, the Committee of Seventy quickly abandoned its
involvement in the endorsement of candidates for public
office. Instead it concentrated on helping "in
securing good government in Philadelphia." More
specifically, the Committee sought to achieve this goal
through the "protection of the ballot" and by
"encouraging and aiding faithful officials in the
performance of their duties" as well as by "gathering
and disseminating reliable information regarding city
affairs and candidates." (C of 70, Report of the
Executive Board, 1905, pp. 8-10.) See also the Report
of the Executive Board, March 20, 1912, pp. 4-5;
Woodruff, "Municipal League," pp. 356-7; Abernethy,
"Insurgency," pp. 6-8; for details of the Committee's
formation and early development.

2 Lloyd M. Abernethy, "Progressivism, 1905-1919," in
539-557; Philip S. Benjamin, "Gentlemen Reformers in
the Quaker City, 1870-1912," Political Science
Quarterly 85 (March 1970), pp. 70-79; Bonnie R. Fox,
"The Philadelphia Progressives: A Test of the
Hofstadter-Hays Theses," Pennsylvania History 34
(1967), pp. 376-9;
4 ML, AR, 1896-7, p. 25.
6 ML, AR, 1894-5, pp. 5-6.
7 ML, AR, 1902-3, p. 25.
8 ML, AR, 1896-7, p. 25.
10 Ibid., p. 339.
11 ML, AR, 1899-1901, p. 3. With regard to membership the
League's roll increased from 3,693 local citizens in
1894-5, to 5,105 by 1895-6. See ML, AR, 1894-5, pp. 5-
6; AR, 1895-6, pp. 4-6.
12 The League's "vote varied from 5,000 to 58,000" in
these local elections, "according to the degree of
public interest", as Woodruff puts it. See "Municipal
League," p. 337.
15 C of 70, Report of the Executive Board, 1905, p. 5.
16 Ibid., p. 6; C of 70, The Charter, p. ix.
17 Press, March 24, 1907, C of 70 Scrapbook, TU.
19 Abernethy, "Insurgency," pp. 6-7; Benjamin, "Gentlemen
Reformers," p. 75; C of 70, Third Report of the
Executive Board, 1905, p. 7.


21 Disbrow, "Reform in Philadelphia," p. 381.


23 Warner, Private City, pp. 85-6; Baltzell, An American Business Aristocracy, pp. 20, 131; Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, pp. 139, 261.


26 Ibid., p. 4.


28 Fox, Better City Government.


31 Ibid., pp. 382, 386.

32 Ibid., pp. 392-3.

33 The twelve dedicated former Committee members who remained active in local politics and never wavered in their commitment to non-partisan reform, were: Joshua L. Bailey, Rudolph Blankenburg, Robert R. Corson, William Harkness Jr., William H. Jenks, Lewis C. Madeira, Morris Newberger, Francis B. Reeves, Charles Richardson, William Potter and Walter Wood. See Appendix 2 for details of their individual affiliations.


36 Ibid., p. 367.

37 ML, AR, 1897-8, p. 28.

38 ML, AR, 1894-5, pp. 3-4.


40 Stewart, History of the National Municipal League, pp. 176-7; Smull's Legislative Hand Book, 1899-1900, pp. 1184-5.


42 Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency, p. 164; Daniel

45 For an example of joint cooperative effort in the quest for efficiency, see Bauman, "The Philadelphia Housing Commission," pp. 118-120.
48 Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency, p. 3.
49 For a more detailed breakdown of the goals that the various non-partisan reform groups sought to achieve, see the CMA, Constitution, By-Laws, 1886, pp. 3-5; Citizens' Committee of Fifty, First Annual Report, 1892, pp. 1-2; Anti-Combine Committee, For Good Government, 1895 p. i; Woodruff, "Municipal League," p. 337; City, Party, Hand-Book, 1905 pp. 20-23; C of 70, Report of the Executive Board, 1905, pp. 8-10.
52 Sage, Masters of the City, p. 31.
55 Etting, The Proper Standard of Municipal Affairs, pp. 8, 11-12.
57 Stewart, History of the National Municipal League, pp. 156-7; C of 70, Report of the Executive Board, 1905, p. 5.
58 D.C. Gibboney, The White Slave Traffic, pp. 4-9; Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," Aug. 1905, p. 133.
59 Blankenburg, Ibid., pp. 130, 132-3; Seaber.
60 North American, March 5, 1905; Abernethy, "Progressivism," p. 544.
63 See pp. 213-4.
64 Abernethy, "Insurgency," p. 9.
65 Ibid., p. 19.
66 Public Ledger, Oct. 2, 1911; Inquirer, Nov. 9, 1911.
67 Public Ledger, Oct. 2, 1911; Vare, Forty Years, p. 116; Disbrow, "Reform in Philadelphia," p. 381.
68 William Vare subsequently claimed that he and his brothers were loyal to the Republican ticket in 1911, though both his biographer and Penrose's biographer suggest that the Vares' did in fact help Blankenburg to defeat Earle in the mayoral election. See Vare, Forty Years, p. 118; Salter, The People's Choice, p. 19; Davenport, Power and Glory, p. 189. My analysis indicates agreement with Salter and Davenport's opinion.
69 Public Ledger, Oct. 2, 1911; Inquirer, Nov. 9, 1911.
70 See Table 7.6.
71 Ibid.
72 Woodruff, "Permanent Results," p. 252.
75 Woodruff, "Election Methods," pp. 4-5.
76 Woodruff, "Permanent Results," pp. 259-60; Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes, p. 117.
78 WLGG, Facts About Philadelphia, p. 62. The W.L.G.G.'s recommendation was in fact incorporated into the new city charter introduced in 1919 but since Councilmen (like the Mayor) invariably remained loyal to the "Organisation", this reform initiative also failed to loosen the machine's grip on the control of public appointments. See Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes, pp. 55-6.
79 Ibid., pp. 60-1; Deardorff, "To Unshackle Philadelphia," p. 22.
The Political Assessment of Officeholders, p. 4.

Cooke, Business Methods, pp. 26-27. See also De Schweinitz, "Philadelphia Striking a Balance," p. 460; C of 70, Report of the Executive Board, Feb. 28, 1913, pp. 15-16; Plain Talk, pp. 28-30, for details of public employees who were disciplined for taking an active part in local elections.


Woodruff, "Permanent Results," pp. 270-1.


Charles E. Carpenter, Chairman of the City Party Campaign Committee when it won the Election of Nov. 1905, supports Reyburn and Black: Why?, 1907.


Plain Talk, pp. 28-30.


Plain Talk, pp. 4-6.


100 Disbrow, "Reform in Philadelphia," p. 389.
107 Jenkins, "The Blankenburg Administration," p. 213.
109 See pp. 273-6 of this thesis.
110 Woodruff, "Progress in Philadelphia," p. 323. Prior to 1919, the city legislature provided unequal representation with central city and river front wards (that is, the Vares' stronghold) being over-represented in Councils, and large residential wards in Germantown and West Philadelphia under-represented. By replacing the unwieldy bicameral, 146-member, City Council with a smaller (21 member) uni-cameral body, and by providing that Councilmen be elected from the eight state senatorial districts, the 1919 charter sought to make the new local legislature more representative than the one it replaced.
112 C of 70, The Charter, p. 3.
113 Salter, "The End of Vare," p. 214.
115 Ibid., p. 127. See also pp. 268-270 of this thesis.
116 See pp. 271, 275 of this thesis.
117 Times, Jan. 10, 1895; Public Ledger, Jan. 7, 1895; Press, Jan. 11, 1895, Durham Scrapbook, HSP; Letters from Joshua L. Bailey (Oct. 31, 1891), and William H. Rhawn (Oct. 22, 1891) to Herbert Welsh, Welsh Papers, Anti-Combine Committee Box, HSP.
118 Those reformers who organised "The Business Men's Republican Association," are listed on an election circular of February, 1895, Welsh Papers, Anti-Combine Committee Box, HSP.
119 Edmonds, "Significance of Recent Reform Movement," p. 185; Charles E. Carpenter, Chairman of the City Party Campaign Committee........supports Reyburn and Black: Why?; "The Cats Came Back": A Political History of Philadelphia from May 1905 to April 1907, By the Cat...
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