

REGIONALISM AND THE ALLIED DEBATE ON POSTWAR WORLD
AND EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION, 1940-1945

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A B S T R A C T

During World War II, regionalism was upheld by theorists and practitioners of international relations as a needed modification or alternative to the sovereign state and international system of political organization. Aspects of regionalism relating in particular to security matters were eventually incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 1945. This study draws together ideas and historical data on regionalism and the war-time search for postwar world and European order. Part One of the study identifies three theories, or proto-theories, of regionalism and postwar order -- interstate, hegemonial, and autochthonous -- based on the degree to which state sovereignty was subordinated to regional criteria. These theories help elucidate the allied debate on regionalism and postwar order. Part Two examines the debate on the future world organization by the three major powers -- the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union -- as well as, at the 1945 San Francisco United Nations Conference on International Organization, among the smaller allied countries. Part Three helps unravel the allied debate on regionalism and the future structure of Europe, including the attempt by eastern European governments-in-exile to form one or more regional federations in that part of Europe. It also discusses the role of nonstate actors. The study concludes with an assessment of regionalism as a concept and principle that alters the classical, state-centric understanding of international relations.

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INTRODUCTION

REGIONALISM AND POSTWAR ORDER: STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND APPROACH

Society is older, better, and ultimately stronger than the State.

Herder, late 18th c.

For when we plan a reconstruction of the life of Europe, we tend to think of ourselves as planners and architects, facing the rubble heap that was once an edifice; and in doing so we fail to see ourselves as part of the problem.

John Macmurray, 1943

Regionalism Can Mean More Efficient Sales Volume, if its Principles are Rightly Applied.

Western Advertising, December 1937

(CHAPTER I)

Unlike during "the war to end to all wars," World War II was marked by considerable allied activity in the cause of research and planning for the postwar peace. A second general war within a generation seemed to underline the precariousness of the established order. Theorists and practitioners of international relations were confronted with an international system in crisis for having again failed to maintain the peace. The paralysis of the League of Nations in the face of national imperialisms, external or internal, prompted a search for alternative forms of political organization. The crisis, when coupled with the mandate to uproot an Axis order that had redrawn the European and Asian political maps and the need for extensive postwar reconstruction, provided the allies with an opportunity and challenge to consider changes in the pre-war international system. Was the pre-war League of Nations model of sovereign states within a loose universal organization to be resurrected, reformed, or cast aside altogether for another postwar peace structure? What were the theoretical flaws of the prewar structure? On what principles should a new structure be based? In particular,

how was Europe, the crucible of both the international system of sovereign states and the two world wars, to be politically organized?

The Soviet proletarian experiment hypothetically represented a historical alternative to the pre-war "bourgeois" order. At a time during World War I when western statesmen were conceiving national states out of the fallen aristocratic empires in central and eastern Europe, Lenin and Trotsky were calling for a socialist "United States of Europe" and multinational world federation where the state itself would wither away. As it happened, the choice during World War II among the Big Three -- the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union -- between bourgeois and proletarian internationalism never became an issue. Soviet Russia had effectively returned to the international community of nations in 1933, the year Hitler came into power, and conducted its foreign relations on "liberal-bourgeois" terms. (That the Soviet postwar capture of the eastern European states and the subsequent Asian communist revolutions introduced an era of communist international relations is not of concern here.). Rather, this study seeks to demonstrate that the most serious and plausible allied alternative for restructuring Europe and the postwar world was regionalism. Together with the smaller allied countries, the three major powers sought or were obliged to grapple with various forms of regionalism as a promise and/or threat to a peaceable postwar settlement.

Regionalism in international political organization was largely perceived in terms of combining usually contiguous

states for limited or general purposes in political, military, economic, social, and/or cultural spheres. Whether in the form of a regional alliance, confederation, federation, or just mere cooperation, regionalism was viewed, significantly, as an intermediary level of organization between the sovereign state and a universal organization. Its advocates saw multistate regions as islands of peace that constituted building blocks for a general structure of peace. They argued that the region corresponded more closely than the sovereign state to the growing, interdependent security and economic needs of states and peoples living in propinquity. It was a more intelligible form of political organization than sovereign states pursuing autarchic and nationalistic ends. Critics viewed regional entities as potential power blocs or superstates that could be a greater threat to peace than the smaller states, which could be more easily contained within a general international organization.

Given the importance of regional organization in the postwar world on the one hand and the unsettled political structure of Europe on the other, a closer study of the formative wartime debate on regionalism and postwar order is of historical and theoretical interest to the student of international relations. A central question during the wartime debate was whether regional or universal principles should be adopted as the basis for world organization. Some more realistically questioned whether the two principles were mutually exclusive and asked how regional

groupings or arrangements could be represented in and relate to a general organization. These questions applied no less to the issue of how Germany, eastern Europe, and Europe itself would be organized after the war. The restoration of the pre-war system of sovereign states vied with principles favoring the regionalization and federalization of Europe, whether this involved grouping smaller states into a larger entity or breaking up a large state into regional components. The former received expression in the 1944 agreement between the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg to form the BENELUX custom's union and the latter in the federalization of Germany into regionally autonomous Länder governments after the war.

Regionalism was not an issue of note in international relations until the war-time debate. In 1919, the League of Nations was conceived as a universal organization of sovereign member states. The only reference in the League's Covenant to regionalism was Article 21, which acknowledged the "validity of regional understandings" such as the Monroe Doctrine, which was mentioned by name, "for securing the maintenance of peace." Though conceived as a world-wide body, the League in practice became a kind of European regional organization when the United States refused to join and when members found themselves resorting to regional measures to maintain the peace. Between 1925 and 1936, peace in Europe was maintained less through the universal principles of collective security and disarmament than by the nonaggression and arbitration treaties signed in Locarno in 1925 by several European states. In the mid-1930s,

attempts, led in no small part by the Soviet Union, were made to form an "eastern Locarno" in eastern Europe.

The main problem with regionalism during the war-time deliberations was that, as a relatively new and untried concept, there was little consensus on what it meant in both theory and practice. There were virtually no theoretical treatises on the subject much less practical applications that were understood as specific to regionalism. As a result, regionalism tended to be defined by its supporters and detractors in terms of a vocabulary already held about social and political reality and world politics. Perhaps no better insight into the intellectual climate of the period existed than E.H. Carr's singular contribution to international relations theory in The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939.¹

Published at the outbreak of the war and dedicated "to the makers of the coming peace," the book was the first perceptive articulation of the idealist-realist bifurcation in international relations theory. Carr argued that non-rational principles of power were replacing principles of modern scientific rationalism as the central concept in world politics. The rationally-inspired views of the idealists for an internationalist, Wilsonian world order were declared bankrupt and utopian by an emerging group of realists pointing to the disintegration of world order under those principles. For the latter, power and geopolitics were the real determinants of politics and world order.

The science of international politics was founded after

World War I by idealist writers mainly in the United States -- Philip Jessup, Nicholas Murray Butler, James T. Shotwell, and J.L. Brierly, an English international law authority, among others. The substance of Carr's argument was that they envisaged a rationally ordered world based partly on the 19th century (European) liberal-utilitarian belief in the harmony of competing interests and partly on the perceived need to transfer the order of nature discovered by modern science into human social and political organization. Like the discrete individual pursuing his self-interest, the sovereign state pursued its interests within an international (i.e., inter-state) system that tended, with help from the proverbial "invisible hand," toward equilibrium. Given the anomalies of politics, however, it was also necessary to intervene in this process by promoting the widespread acceptance, through knowledge applied by reason and a belief in progress, of international law and organization. After World War I, the budding science of international relations saw this tendency realized in its most advanced form in the League of Nations.²

Carr traced idealist theory to the optimistic late-18th and 19th century Enlightenment beliefs about man, nature, and social order. These beliefs were based on a new "secular 'law of nature' whose ultimate source was the individual human reason" (22). From the Encyclopaedists via Jean-Jeacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant to Hegel, Darwin, and Marx, "never was there an age which so unreservedly proclaimed the supremacy of the intellect" (25). They shared the view that just as the physical laws of nature as

established by science could be apprehended by reason, so too could the moral laws of nature be scientifically established. And if reason was able to establish what the universally valid moral laws were, then the "assumption was made that once these laws were determined, human beings would conform to them just as matter conformed to the physical laws of nature" (22-3). Applied to international relations and the problem of world order, these beliefs led to an intellectual self-fulfilling prophecy as perhaps first expressed by Abbé Saint Pierre (1737-1814), a historical patron of the league of nations idea. Saint Pierre was "so confident in the reasonableness of his projects that he always believed that, if they were fairly considered, the ruling powers could not fail to adopt them."³ In the same vein, J.L. Briery spoke for internationalists in the 1920s when he called the League of Nations, with "all its imperfections ... the best and perhaps the only hope of the eventual triumph of law and reason in international relations."⁴

The course of events in the 1930s prompted Carr, in 1939, to declare the bankruptcy of the idealist approach to world order. "The inner meaning of the modern international crisis," he declared, was "the collapse of the whole structure of utopianism based on the concept of the harmony of interests. The present generation will have to rebuild from the foundations" (62).

Realists rightly challenged, Carr maintained, the assumption that rational scientific principles could be

applied to the ordering of world society. Idealist assumptions about political reality were based more on aspiration than in the hard analysis of experience. "Like the alchemists," stated Carr, "they (the idealists) were content to advocate highly imaginative solutions whose relation to existing facts was one of flat negation" (6). Realists on the other hand claimed to base their assumptions about political reality on the facts of experience. In so doing, they declared that power, defined in military, economic, and geopolitical terms, was the central concept in international politics. It was illusory to think that an international peacekeeping authority existed or could be made to exist in international society because it appeared reasonable. Rather, experience had shown that power and interests as exercised by sovereign states were the main determinants in international politics.

Realist theory was anchored in a more pessimistic, pre-Enlightenment view of man and society reflected in the political writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Carr stated modern realists joined Francis Bacon (1561-1626), philosophical pioneer of the inductive method of modern experimental science, in praising Machiavelli for "'saying openly and without hypocrisy what men are in the habit of doing, not what they ought to do'" (64). Also, Carr approvingly quoted his contemporary Peter Drucker, who in his The End of Economic Man captured the signature of the time: "The European masses realised for the first time that existence in this society is governed not by rational and sensible, but by blind,

irrational and demonic forces" (224).

While identifying with the realist critique, Carr argued that realism was as untenable a principle for establishing and maintaining world order as idealism. He stated that "pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible" (93). He criticized the amoral if not immoral character of realism, which he attributed to the modern, in this case Hobbesian, view of nature. In point of fact, realism and idealism were birds of the same ideological feather. Carr traced the origins of realism to the same modern scientific assumptions (viz., the need to control nature through instrumental methods) embraced by the idealists. Carr thereby challenged the realists' premise that their views about social and political reality were based on "facts." Hobbes' theory of politics, for example, was a rational construct which assumed a state of nature determined by the principle of mechanical causation. This decidedly modern view of reality was reinforced by the mechanistic doctrine of nature conceived by physicist Isaac Newton (1642-1727), which opened "the possibility of a physical science of politics" (64). The consequence of this thinking was the positivist separation of ethics from politics that made "morality ... the product of power" (64).

The might-makes-right doctrine and its legal corollary of a positive law based on force or command were not in themselves peculiarly modern characteristics. They were evident in classical Greece. The modern element in the

realist premise, according to Carr, was its attachment to the Enlightenment idea of progress manifested in the 19th century in historical, and also economic, biological, and geographic determinism. Realists were not immune to the Hegelian belief in the unfolding of an omnipotent state according to rationally-determined "laws." Carr stated that "both utopianism and realism accepted and incorporated in their philosophies the eighteenth century belief in progress, with the curious and somewhat paradoxical result that realism became in appearance more 'progressive' than utopianism" (65).

In taking both the realists and idealists to task, Carr attempted to develop an integrative theory of world politics "based on elements of both utopia and reality" (93). He made a case, if a tentative one, for what may be described as moral realism in international politics. A sound political theory in international relations had to "explore the ruins of our international order and discover on what fresh foundations we may hope to rebuild it; and like other problems, this problem (had to) be considered from the standpoint both of power and morality" (226). Influenced in part by Protestant theologian and social philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr, he drew on the biblical injunction of rendering unto both God and Caesar to develop a theory of politics where power and morality coexisted in a necessarily uneasy balance. "'Politics,'" Carr quoted Niebuhr, "'will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy

compromises'" (100).⁵

Carr's outline for a "new international order" was at best sketchy in his final 15-page chapter. He looked in principle to society and social needs and not to the sovereign state and its needs for the source of a new morality and legitimate authority. Specifically, he saw the pursuit of "tolerant and unoppressive ... social ends" (employment, economic reconstruction) as the moral task of an ascendant power or powers. In this respect, the United States and Britain, or even an Anglo-American association, possessed the moral strength to overcome and replace the demonic German and Japanese ascendancy in the world.

As a political theorist, Carr did not sufficiently explore the premises of his political morality, which broached but did not articulate a more integrative view of social and political reality. While he pointed to the nihilistic consequences of a politics based on the sensate knowledge and reductionism of the idealist and realist theories, his own moral realism lacked a firm or convincing anchor. With Matthew Arnold, he seemed in this area to be a searcher "wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born" (Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse). For Carr's concept of "society" was unclear and undeveloped, as he failed to draw out the socio-cultural realities that moved and shaped politics at the societal level. Had he probed in this direction, he may have endorsed social thinker David Bidney's integrative view of reality expressed at war's end:

The monistic doctrines of both idealists (Platonic and Kantian) and realists (positivists and Marxian materialists) fail to provide an adequate interpretation of the cultural process simply because they tend to take exclusively either the ideational or the actual social and material forces into account. Both parties fail to consider the inherent interrelation of ideational, social, and material elements which give rise to unique cultural phenomena.⁶

Both idealists and realists confronted the issue of regionalism during the war by incorporating the concept into their respective assumptions about social and political reality and world order. Idealists, as world federalists or internationalists, espoused forms of what I call "interstate regionalism," which ranged from limited cooperation schemes among states in specific areas to regional federations of states within a full-fledged world federation. Realists advanced ideas of "hegemonial regionalism," where regionalism was viewed in big power spheres-of-influence terms. A third theory or school of thought, which loosely corresponds to Carr's adumbration of a third "social ends" way between idealism and realism, I refer to as "autochthonous regionalism." Here regionalism is based on indigenous sociocultural entities of peoples existing in more or less historically defined areas, or regions. It is a region-based, not state-based, theory of regionalism.

The three theories, or perhaps more accurately, proto-theories, of regionalism constitute chapters II, III, and IV, respectively, in Part One of this study. The remainder of the study applies these theories of regionalism to an empirical analysis of the allied war-time deliberations on postwar world and European organization. The allied debate on regionalism and the future world order are examined in

Part Two. The domestic debates of the three major powers on the question of regionalism and postwar world order planning are described in Chapter V, covering the period from 1940 (or late 1939) to mid-1943. How the contending positions unfolded in the rejection and then partial re-acceptance of regionalism in the inter-allied conferences held between mid-1943 and the spring of 1945 is discussed in chapters VI and VII.

In addition to the future world organization, the structure of postwar Europe in general and eastern Europe in particular was also hotly debated among the allies and is the subject, respectively, of Chapters VIII and IX in Part Three of the study. Europe was seen by regionalists of many colors as the most obvious and necessary area for the adoption of regional and federal principles of organization. Already in the interwar period, and particularly in the 1930s, the continent had been the subject of numerous still-born attempts -- from citizen manifestos to high-level diplomatic maneuvers -- for economic and political integration schemes ranging in scope from the pan-European to sub-regional. Perhaps the most notable attempt at a sub-regional interstate unit was the Little Entente formed between Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia in 1921 which, after the advent of Hitler in 1933, acquired more or less pro forma institutions in a Permanent Council of Foreign Ministers, Economic Council, and Secretariat headquartered in Geneva.

That the failed experiment of the Entente and numerous

other initiatives occurred in eastern Europe was no accident, for nowhere was the political turmoil and flux in Europe more apparent than in its eastern part. Before World War I, southeastern Europe had acquired a reputation as the "powderkeg of Europe," a distinction it lived up to in 1914. After the war, the ethnic "one-nation, one-state" principle of political organization was given its first historical application in the region as the basis of the 1919 Paris peace settlement. The belt of east European states established by the allies was in part motivated by the desire to create a regional buffer, or cordon sanitaire, between Bolshevik Russia and the rest of Europe. But the experiment in nation statehood in this ethnically inter-mixed region produced mixed results and was short-lived. The divisive external as well as domestic policies of the new nationalistic regimes produced, rather, a fragmented region whose political vacuum was progressively filled by German power in the 1930s and by Soviet power after 1944. During the World War II, regionalism as a war-time issue was to a great extent inspired by and directed toward the question of postwar order in the so-called "shatter zone" of Europe. Chapter IX examines the allied war-time efforts to establish regional federations as the basis for a postwar settlement there.

So much by way of an introduction to the nature and scope of the problem. With regard to method or approach, the question arises to what extent the field of international relations has the conceptual tools with which to use the

region as a unit of analysis comparable to that of the state. In other words, can a study on regionalism be approached by using a regional rather than a state-centric conception of world politics? Although this remains an open question, an underlying objective in this study is to address this problem. Also axiomatic to this study is the recognition that traditional positivist methodologies in the social sciences, derived from the so-called hard methods of the physical sciences, have at best been limited gateways to truth about social and political reality. This approach, marked by the practice of isolating and classifying quantifiable information, served to reduce and fragment knowledge in the name of methodological rigor and specialization. By contrast, integrative regional approaches have been developed by scholars largely outside the field of international relations. An integrative approach, such as suggested above by David Bidney, maintains a cognitive openness to all aspects of experiential reality, including to structures of consciousness as being integral parts of the structure of reality. Within political science, only contemporary political theorists have succeeded in bridging, or transcending, classical positivist separation between "values" and "facts," itself a consequence of the sharp subject-object dualism in classical western science.⁷

Political theory was once elegantly defined by Sheldon Wolin as reflection grounded in experience. Influenced by the post-modern existentialist and phenomenological currents of philosophy that emerged in turn of the century Europe, contemporary political theorists have taken the

existing human being in society or, in the language of phenomenology, the "life-world" as its central concept -- and not the state, power, or a logical or ideological construct.⁸ A rigorous and comprehensive view of reality entailed, according to Maurice Natanson, a "root agreement that any proper epistemology must be built on and through the disciplined investigation of phenomena taken in their essential givenness and elaborated in terms of a reflective consciousness" (emphasis in original).⁹

Students of international relations and organization remained largely untouched by this irruption in western thought (which was not without affinities to eastern thought). Rather, a regional approach that embraced the regnant positivist methodologies, enhanced by the schools of logical and analytical positivism based largely in the Anglo-Saxon societies, was developed by the so-called neofunctionalist school of integration theory between the mid-1950s and early 1970s. The postwar movement toward regional integration in western Europe and other parts of the world elicited a corpus of scholarship in integration theory among, in particular, American political scientists. The neo-functionalists owed intellectual debts to, but distinguished themselves from, the mainly European federalist writers and the functionalist theory of international organization developed by David Mitrany and his followers.¹⁰

The neofunctionalists were methodologically grounded in the prevailing social "scientism" and predictive claims

of the period. Most of them focussed research efforts on the problem of the political unification of states and came to hold, and share with some federalists, that the end product of the political unification process was "an entity similar to the modern nation-state... ."11 For Amatai Etzioni, for example, a multinational political community was considered integrated when it possessed effective control over the use of the means of violence. He defined integration as "the ability of a unit or system to maintain itself in the face of internal and external challenges."12

Neofunctionalists admitted their theory foundered when the experiences in Europe and elsewhere indicated by the early 1970s that regional integration had not in fact turn out to be examples of political unification. Hence, "using them to generate a theory about political unification proved impossible."13 But this acknowledged failure belied other theoretical limitations of the school. Its main flaw lay in its attempt to reduce integration phenomena to quantifiable variables. Thus, what it may have gained in scientific rigor and neatness was frequently lost in theoretical relevance, for, as Donald Puchala pointed out, the main questions of integration theory defied concepts of metric quantification. For Puchala, these questions included, "within what environment, under what conditions, and by what processes does a new transnational political unit peacefully emerge from two or more initially separate and different ones?"14 Additionally, he advised that in order "to understand international relations, ...it is essential to understand how peoples perceive and feel about one another, from whence

stem such perceptions and sentiments, how and why they change,"15

The value-free science to which the neofunctionalists aspired in the name of the fact/value distinction belied their for the most part unwitting attachment to the prevailing Anglo-American rationalist philosophies of utilitarianism and reductionist empiricism that shaped their vocabulary of politics. Politics was understood largely in terms of a rational pursuit and balance of "interests" and "demands." While this understanding of politics may have meaning for the middle classes in the modern industrial and commercially-based Anglo-Saxon societies (and perhaps post-1957 Brussels), it had less relevance in the vastly more numerous traditional political cultures of Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Africa. As Charles Pentland noted with a touch of irony, "no matter what his sentiments or actions, then, a French farmer who demonstrates in Brussels rather than Paris is acting in line with neofunctionalist assumptions of instrumental rationality."¹⁶

The positive aspect of the postwar integration theorizing was the change it initiated toward a regional conception of world politics. Regional integration theory created an alternative to the traditional Hobbesian vs. Grotian (viz., internationalist) paradigms in international relations theory which saw international political reality in terms of state sovereignty and its logical corollary, international anarchy on the one hand, and a universal

international system of states and law on the other. With the new integration paradigm, the first steps were taken toward recognizing 1) the region as a reality existing between the state and a universal organization and 2) the postwar state as neither as a unitary entity, "in full control of all territory, men, and resources," nor as the sole actor in international politics. The classical notion of state sovereignty as inviolable and indivisible had ceded in the postwar world to the more porous concept of an "interpenetration of different degrees of autonomy."¹⁷

The modern state has nonetheless demonstrated its capacity to endure in the postwar world as a viable political unit in the conduct and study of international relations. It is also true that its authority has been diluted by a complex of forces, human and material, acting within and across state boundaries. These include transnational factors such as communication, transportation, economic and environmental interdependence, and non-material, sociocultural factors such as movements for human rights and regional autonomy among others. Also, social and political theorists have continued to question the authority if not the legitimacy of the state. Paul Ricoeur, for example, viewed the state as "abstract institution which lacks the familiarity and intimacy of a community" and that because "relations between the citizen and the state are mediated by representation, ... the experiences of everyday life do not mesh neatly with those facing political leaders."¹⁸

In the 1970s, following the self-proclaimed demise of

the neofunctionalist regional integration theory, integration studies proliferated into cognate areas that focussed less on the political unification of states than on collaborative behavior "via transnational processes within settings of interdependence."¹⁹ Political studies shifted perceptively from "high-politics" to "low-politics" models of integration. Direct objective variables gave way to more indirect variables to describe the integration process. Charles Pentland distinguished between a state model and community model approach to the study of international integration wherein structures of consciousness played a not insignificant role. In his community model, for example, "more stress is placed on the character of the relationships between the peoples... (and) the emergence of political institutions is considered less important than the growth of certain common values, perceptions and habits."²⁰

The pluralization of integration studies helped to break the boundaries of academically acceptable research to include approaches and findings from disciplines outside the narrow prism of an American-dominated political science. It was at this point where regionalism began to regain recognition as an integrative and interdisciplinary approach in the study of international political integration. Intra-regional relationships were as much determinants of regional integration in a multistate area than state actors or the influence of outside powers. Moreover, the character of these relationships suggested that political integration could issue as much from a prior "psychological" integration

experienced by individuals and groups as by considerations of utility, power, or fear -- the mainsprings of modern political thought and behaviour. A new criterion for integration was the quality of the relations between the integrating units. According to Daniel Druckman, the study of regional politics at the beginning of 1980s existed at an "interdisciplinary juncture where the study of relationships among nations merges with the social psychology of interaction among persons and groups."²¹ Psychological processes, he argued, undergirded the political processes. They shaped the political attitudes and behaviors that "are pervasive in the creation of a 'community of action' that is so essential for regional integration or identification."²² These processes not only served a dynamic learning and communication function, but "also play a role in the creation of structures," Druckman stated, as the "interplay between structures and behavior is another way of addressing the nexus between political and social-psychological processes."²³

Using Druckman's thesis, it is possible to see how the relation of the psychological processes of individuals and groups in society to the problem of political organization is mediated by man's relationship to his natural and cultural landscape, or his experience or sense of "place." In the 1960s, Harold and Margaret Sprout had explored the phenomenon of non-deterministic "man-milieu relationships" in international relations theory.²⁴ Their psycho-ecological theory was based on hypotheses derived from observed regularities of psychological behavior of human undertakings

"formulated with reference to human persons, as individuals or in concrete groups," an approach which they said made no sense when applied to "political systems or other high-level abstractions."²⁵ Influenced by the French "Annales" school of human geography, they attached significance to the geographic quality of political community. They argued that

the distribution and arrangement of phenomena upon the earth's surface are always, or nearly always, related significantly to what people undertake and to what they accomplish. The ecological perspective and ecological theories bring the dimensions of location, distance, space, distribution, and configuration sharply into focus in many social contexts, not least in the context of politics in general and of international politics in particular.²⁶

Phenomenologically-oriented social scientists developed a similar concept by drawing on Edmund Husserl's notion of the Lebenswelt, or life-world, which Husserl developed in his last work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1938). Husserl defined such human societies as essentially preconceptual worlds of common or ordinary experience that constituted a universal set of concrete "regional" types.²⁷ The life-world was an ecumene, or inhabited world, experienced by man in a given eco-social environment over time. It was capable of being understood conceptually through its historical reconstitution. Husserl's Lebenswelt comprised, as summarized by David Bidney,

not only the naturally selected environment but also the social and cultural world of human society. The sociocultural life-world is a historic achievement of man in a given ecological environment and varies with time and place for different societies. Husserl is explicit on this point: 'Among the

objects of the life-world we also find human beings, with all their human action and concern, works and suffering, living in common in the world-horizon in their particular social interrelations and knowing themselves to be such.' He now recognizes that historians in particular are concerned with the reconstruction of the changing, surrounding life-worlds²⁸ of the peoples and periods with which they deal.

This spatio-temporal or "culture area" understanding of human societies, which has been developed in particular by anthropologists, approximates what is meant in this study by the autochthonous region. Husserl's allusion to its historical reconstitution may well refer to the "regionalist" historiography that emerged at the turn of the century in Europe (see below, p. 105f.). In any event, such a historical-cultural, organic understanding of regionalism as an approach to the study of world politics contrasts sharply with the state-based concepts of regionalism that have been dominant in international relations theory. Although there are points of contact between the two approaches, the latter projects a mechanical view of regions as, for example, "areas of the world which contain geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs, mutually interrelated units."²⁹ In the political application of systems theory, regions were analyzed as subsystems of the international system with little or no regard for the beliefs, sociocultural characteristics, or habits and desires of the people who lived in them. One political scientist who investigated a range of definitions stated that "geographical contiguity, interaction, and perception of belonging to a distinctive community (were) frequently offered" (emphasis in original).³⁰ For the most part, the

most common criteria for distinguishing one region from another were more or less abstract "'differences in the quality or frequency of communications and interactions.'"³¹

Disentangling the various conceptions and theories of the region and regionalism as they were expressed during World War II is the task of the next part of this study.

NOTES

- ¹ E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York, [1939] 2d ed. 1964).
- ² Carr, chapters 1-4. Carr noted that the harmony of interests doctrine was already in crisis before World War I, but was restored largely through American initiative after the war (p. 51). Subsequent page references cited in text.
- ³ J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (London, 1932), p. 131, quoted in Carr, p. 25.
- ⁴ J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (Oxford, 1928), p. 222.
- ⁵ The quote is from Reinhold Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York, [1932] 1942), p. 4.
- ⁶ David Bidney, "Culture Theory and the Problem of Cultural Crisis," in Symposium on Science, Religion, and Philosophy, vol.6 (New York, 1947), p. 571.
- ⁷ See Hwa K. Jung, The Crisis of Political Understanding: A Phenomenological Perspective in the Conduct of Political Inquiry (Pittsburgh, 1979). For a trenchant critique of positivism as a method and worldview, see Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago, 1952), chapters 1 and 2. For the role of political theory in the scientific study of politics, see Sheldon Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1969).
- ⁸ See Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory (Chicago, [1977] 1987).
- ⁹ Maurice Natanson, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," in Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, v.1, ed. M. Natanson (Evanston, 1973), p. 25. In an earlier work, Natanson accorded consciousness exaggerated importance when he held that the phenomenological approach designated "a general style of social science which takes human consciousness and its intended meanings as the proper locus for the understanding of social action." ("A Study in Philosophy and the Social Sciences," in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, ed. M. Natanson [New York, 1963], p. 283).
- ¹⁰ The main neofunctionalist writings include Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, 1958); Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (New York, 1963); Amatai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York, 1965); Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of

Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970); Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston, 1971). Among the federalists, see Raymond Aron and Alexandre Marc, Principes du fédéralisme (Paris, 1948); Arthur MacMahon, ed., Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York, 1955); Henri Brugmans and Pierre Duclos, Le fédéralisme contemporain (Leyden, 1963); Carl J. Friedrich, Federalism: Trends in Theory and Practice (New York, 1968); Guy Heraud, Le principes du fédéralisme et la fédération européenne (Paris, 1968). On functionalism, see David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, (London, 4th ed., 1946); and A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations (London, 1975).

¹¹ Donald J. Puchala, "Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations," in From National Development to Global Community, eds. Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett (London, 1981), pp. 145, 146.

¹² Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 330.

¹³ Puchala, p. 146. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, 1975).

¹⁴ Puchala, p. 146.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 151.

¹⁶ Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London, 1973), p. 125.

¹⁷ Ghita Ionescu, "Between Sovereignty and Integration: Introduction," Government and Opposition, 9/1(Winter 1974), p. 5. See Arend Lijphart, "Karl W. Deutsch and the New Paradigm in International Relations," in From National Development..., pp. 234 f.

¹⁸ Paul Riceour as paraphrased by William Connolly, ed., Legitimacy and the State (New York, 1984), p. 17.

¹⁹ Puchala, op.cit., p. 150.

²⁰ Pentland, op.cot., pp. 21-22.

²¹ Daniel Druckman, "Social-Psychological Factors in Regional Politics," in Comparative Regional Systems. eds. Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd (New York, 1980), p. 18. Druckman (p.42) approvingly quotes Glenda Rosenthal's assertion that "the capacity of individuals and small groups to influence decisions has been virtually ignored by students of regional integration." (in The Men Behind the Decisions [Lexington, 1975], p. 134).

²² Druckman, p. 23.

²³ Ibid., pp. 41-42.

24 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, With Special Reference to International Politics (Princeton, 1965).

25 Ibid., p. 42.

26 Ibid., p. 14.

27 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, ed. David Carr. (Evanston, 1970), p. 227.

28 David Bidney, "Phenomenological Method and the Anthropological Science of the Cultural Life-World," in M. Natanson, Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, pp 128-29.

29 Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, "The International Relations of Regions," in Regional Politics and World Order eds. Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (San Francisco, 1973), p. 335.

30 Bruce M. Russett, "International Regions and the International System," in Regional Politics..., p. 187.

31 F.K. Berrien, "Homeostasis in Groups," General Systems: Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Theory Research, 9(1964), p. 207, quoted in Russett, Ibid. See also William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory," International Studies Quarterly, 17(March 1973) and the neofunctionalist writings cited above, footnote 10.

PART ONE

THEORIES OF REGIONALISM AND POST-WAR ORDER

It has ... become increasingly apparent that formulas of peace and prosperity which were conceived abstractly and applied indiscriminately to the various cells of which make up the European body often failed to solve pressing regional problems. This experience may well justify a reversal of the process of political and economic pacification to the effect that a thorough examination of regional problems should precede, not follow, the elaboration of guiding principles.

Adda B. Bozeman, 1941

Introduction

During the war, regionalism was upheld by many students of international relations as a necessary alternative or reform for the international system of sovereign states. Yet no significant theoretical study or treatise was devoted to regionalism as a concept in international relations or principle of political organization. Academics and publicists nonetheless advanced regionalist ideas and proposals for postwar order that, when combined, formed corpuses of materials with which to formulate theories on the subject. Regionalism was for the most part seen as a groups-of-states concept by both realists and idealists in international relations theory, but they were challenged by regionalists who argued for a society-based, region-centric conception of political organization.

Idealists embraced a conception of regionalism which I refer to as the theory of interstate regionalism. Under this scheme, the sovereign state was retained as the unit of analysis and object of regional integration. Maximalist schemes devised by utopian federalists envisaged a world federation and government with states organized into regional units. More modest proposals by internationalists favored a strengthened world organization that provided room for regional arrangements and agencies designed for specific

security or economic cooperation purposes. Realists blurred distinctions between sovereign states with their conception of major power orbitry, where large and powerful states dominate or exercise suzerainty over smaller neighboring states. I have called this the theory of hegemonial regionalism. Realists considered the repartition of the world into equal and sovereign states as a legal fiction in a world that in reality was shaped by major powers. Large and powerful states exercising control over sub-continental, continental or even hemispheric regions were the important political units in global society.

In the margins of the theoretical debate were regionalists who downplayed or altogether obliterated the distinctions of sovereign states as political units. They considered cultural regions, or regional cultures, as more intelligible units of global society. The region was in general defined by a natural and cultural landscape that was a composite of pre-existing environmental, historical, socio-cultural, ethnic, and economic realities that existed within or across modern state boundaries. In politics, they favored the decentralization or break-up of existing states into autonomous self-governing regions (units) organized into larger federal units. I refer to this "low politics" theory of regionalism as autochthonous regionalism. This aspect of regionalism has received less attention as a concept in international relations than in disciplines such as sociology, geography, anthropology, and history. An objective of chapter IV in this study is to introduce

findings from some of these disciplines into the corpus of international relations theory on regionalism.

The contrast between a state-centric and society-based form of political organization is by no means a new or unfamiliar one. It suggests an opposition that can be traced in modern Europe to the weariness expressed by artists and intellectuals beginning in the 1880s with the impersonal, or contractually-based industrial state. Social historian Ferdinand Tönnies drew "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" typologies of societies in his 1887 treatise published, coincidentally, in the same year Nietzsche predicted the advent of nihilism in Europe in his Der Wille zur Macht (The Will to Power). Tönnies linked "Gesellschaft" with modern state culture rooted in so-called "rational will" and "Gemeinschaft" with community culture rooted in "natural will." The latter principle connoted an organic, ascriptive solidarity based on timeless affective relationships (friendship, neighborliness, kinship) that were still found among many peasants, artists, and common people of Europe. Historically, he found that a period of Gesellschaft as state civilization followed a folk culture period of Gemeinschaft. Tönnies saw the Gesellschaft principle in his time as synonymous with state, which had created a society that was a "coexistence of people independent of each other" and, as the realm of the calculating businessman, bureaucrat, and scientist, "a mechanical aggregate and artifact."¹

While neither type of society existed in reality inasmuch as individuals participated, willy-nilly, in both,

the dichotomy is heuristically useful in depicting the tension people experience between contending modes of existence. This tension found political expression in the opposition between "high politics," or the realm of central and diplomatic-strategic action by and on behalf of the state, and "low politics," which addressed the daily lives, concerns, and beliefs of individuals and groups in society. The modern European state formed a unity of purpose through a national culture that linked individuals directly to the central authority of the state. In so doing, it weakened or ruptured intermediary links such as church, family, guilds, ethnic roots, and other traditional organic solidarities between people. Autochthonous regionalism, which found some voice among political thinkers and writers during the war, was an attempt to restore a society-based, or low politics model of political organization.

The purpose in the following chapters on theories of regionalism and postwar order is not to construct theories as such. Rather, it is to provide some historical data and analysis that contributes to a more differentiated, experientially grounded understanding of regionalism in international relations. The interstate, hegemonial, and autochthonous theories, or proto-theories, of regionalism are distinguished according to the way theorists of international order experience the social and political reality in which they participate.

NOTE

¹Quoted in Theories of Society, vol.I, eds. Talcott Parsons, et.al. (New York, 1961), p. 192.

CHAPTER II

INTERSTATE REGIONALISM

The reality of a second world war in a generation forced idealists to confront, with international law theorist Wolfgang Friedmann, "the crisis of the national state."¹ Their reaction to the crisis and need to articulate a more viable postwar peace structure elicited a wide range of ideas and plans on how the international system could be reformed, altered, or even transformed. Most idealists still considered the sovereign state and international system as the most advanced form of political organization known to man. Known as internationalists, they believed the international system was the culmination of centuries of modern European development in law, economic progress, and political emancipation from feudal and absolutist structures. For them, the League Nations model could still work with proper reforms and improved procedures, including regional arrangements. For the most part Americans, they constituted the dominant school of postwar thought as a whole.

Idealists who were critical of the internationalist model were federalists of a utopian bent and, at the other

end of the idealist spectrum, functionalists who argued for a radical pragmatist approach to international organization. The federalists under review were a publically visible minority who argued for a world federal government built on statist principles that combined universal collective security and/or socialist planning with regional organization. Functionalists sought a gradual dilution of state sovereignty in the creation of transnational technical and socio-economic agencies, and saw some value in organizing these functional activities along regional lines. The regionalism articulated by these idealists constituted a corpus of theory which I refer to as interstate regionalism.

Utopian Federalism

The federalist writers concerned with world and European order tended to be publicists possessed with unshaken beliefs about science, progress, and reason as vehicles for implementing political change. Among their leading American proponents of a politically liberal persuasion were Clarence Streit, a former New York Times reporter, and Ely Culbertson, a Rumanian-born bridge expert. A less strident and more socially-based form of federalism inspired by social democratic values was promoted by Felix Gross and an entourage of collaborators organized around his New York-based journal, The New Europe. In Britain, federalists, among them G.D.H. Cole, W.B. Curry, R.W.G. Mackay, R.H. Tawney, H.G. Wells, and Barbara Wootton, were

for the most part identified with the Fabian socialist movement.²

Streit, who had covered the League of Nations as a journalist in the 1930s, first published his plan for a world "Federal Union" centered on an Anglo-American association before the outbreak of war in 1939. In a revised 1940 edition, he expanded his scheme to include all fifteen western democratic nations as the core and model for a universal organization. Modelling his scheme on the American federal experience, his union of states included a defense force, a custom's union with a common currency, and a postal and communications system. A five-member executive board ran a central government that shared sovereignty with the member states. States retained complete home rule and separate governmental powers to deal with domestic matters. His plan gained some notariety with the public in the early years of the war. Not unlike Abbé St. Pierre before him, Streit was convinced of the correctness of his plan. "If we will Union we can achieve Union," he assured the public, "and the time we take to do it depends only on ourselves."³

Ely Culbertson's Total Peace was a more original tract in terms of its regional component. He blended his Wilsonian ideals of a collective security system based on an international police force with global regionalism. His concept of interstate regionalism, while schematic, included aspects of hegemonial and autochthonous regionalism. His "World Federation" plan was not based around a North Atlantic regional core, but eleven "naturally divided" regional federations comprised of one or more sovereign

states.⁴ Culbertson delineated nine "sovereign" regions equipped with their own governmental organs: a Pan-American, British, Latin-European, Germanic, Middle European, Russian, Middle Eastern, Chinese, and Japanese. There were also two "autonomous" regions, the Malaysian and Indian, under temporary American and British trusteeships, in his scheme.

The largest and most populous state in each region served as the "initiating state," with each region forming a natural "economic, psychosocial, and space-political unit" (256). Economically, a region was large enough to be a self-contained unit with a balance between agriculture, industry, and raw materials.⁵ Some of the regions, namely the Japanese, Chinese, Indian, and Russian, already existed politically and the British Empire, while a "geographic absurdity," was none the less a political entity. Culbertson's "space-political" concept had an affinity with the geo-political ideas developed within the realist school. He defined "space-political" as the relation "between space and a state from the standpoint of power and strategic security" (183). He explained it in terms suggestive of geographic determinism: "...in the same way a man is largely a creature of his physical environment, a nation or state is largely shaped by the extent of and the kind of space it occupies" (Ibid.).

As a plan, Total Peace was an ideal prescription for world order, complete with a draft constitution on "how to organize peace." But Culbertson also recognized regions as more than material bundles of legal, economic, political,

and strategic factors. In a revealing if thin elaboration of "the regional principle" (256-58), he understood his "natural" division of the world into approximately eleven regions in essentially psychological, cultural, and historical terms. The countries which comprised each region had a common complex of "psycho-social" forces which, if not stronger than nationalism, extended beyond the frontiers of the states and distinguished them from other regions. These forces consisted of "a common heritage of history, tradition, culture, law, and often language" (257). Apart from the Pan-American and British regions, which were relatively recent historical constructions, the regions he delineated had previously existed for centuries as multinational empires and were now seeking to re-integrate in another form. While his regionalism was fundamentally of an interstate variety, he developed an argument for autochthonous regionalism in international relations by stressing the essential immutability of peoples and cultures as units of organization. He developed the argument in the following terms:

Whatever the political or even racial differences between states of the same Region, and however great their passing rivalries and hatreds may be, during many centuries they have been molded into the same characteristic way of life. Today those states are still held together by their common psychosocial patterns inherited from empires of old (257).

...From the standpoint of the philosophy of history, many wars of the past were but struggles of the 'ghosts' of ancient empires to reunite their dismembered states. Today, with easier communications, the same states seek to reassemble themselves within their common psychosocial, historical, and economic Regions in order to better resist oppression and aggression. The Regional structure of the World Federation Plan merely accelerates--and peacefully--

this inevitable reassembly of kindred nations into larger Regional units (258).

Culbertson saw such regional entities as a necessary "intermediate mechanism" between the national state and the World Federation, whose powers were limited to enforcing the peace. The world was "still too large for a central government to attend to its needs" (313). But the powers of his regional governments, invested with constitutions providing for an executive, legislature, and judiciary, were even more limited than that of the world government. In fact, he admitted there was very little the regional governments could "do without the consent of its member states" (315). Nonetheless, the structures and organs would be in place for this regionalism to advance with time to "a closer partnership between the member states" (Ibid.).⁶

Britain's Fabian federalists considered such blueprints for world federation as impracticable and a penchant of the legalistically-minded Americans. With the possible exception of H.G. Well's highly utopian idea for a world socialist state, they they tended to favor a building block approach to world peace that began in Europe. They criticized Streit's plan for not contributing to the unification of the continent and suggested building up regional structures in Europe based on ideas that combined federalism with socialist planning. Federalism was less a unity-in-diversity principle than a mechanism for central planning and control. As economist Barbara Wootton stated, the principal reason for socialist interest in federation was "the fact that social progress (was) contingent upon international order"

in which "conscious and planned direction of economic life over a wide area (was) essential... Only under the settled and ordered government of a Federation (was) it possible to create interstate public utilities that are operated for the common welfare."⁷

Wootton favored a European-wide socialist federation. Others in this school thought in terms of several smaller sub-regional federations. For G.D.H. Cole, it was not necessary or even desirable at this time for all of Europe to be covered by a single, unified economic plan. Rather, there was room for more than one plan and "for more than one group of countries committed to concerted economic and social planning on a common institutional basis." As a minimum, he envisaged separate plans for eastern and western Europe based on the principle that the planning groups should be "as large as could be effectively unified, either politically or economically, at the present stage of human development in the arts of government and administration."⁸ Economist R.H. Tawney also argued for federations built in stages, beginning with a union of Britain and France that was in the works in the months preceding the fall of France in June 1940 (see Chapter VIII). He believed that the reorganization along federal lines of state systems in both eastern and western Europe would serve as the "basis on which later to build a more comprehensive system."⁹

Between the neo-liberal and socialist tendencies among the federal idealists was a third cluster of social democratic thinkers who sought to base world and European reconstruction on social security needs. Not unlike Carr's

"social ends" idea, American economist Lewis Corey argued that the "political job of creating federations and a world organization cannot, in the final analysis, be separated from the job of social economic reconstruction to strengthen the attitudes and policies which are needed to insure world cooperation and peace."¹⁰

Perhaps the most thoughtful articulation of this approach was made by Polish-American labor economist Felix Gross in his ideas for regional federation in eastern Europe. Critical of internationalists seeking to base postwar order on improved (military) security mechanisms, Gross stressed the the need for comprehensive social security at both the national and international levels. Social reforms were necessary to attain the "freedom from fear" called for in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, for "fear born of insecurity has determined the behavior of the masses of common people."¹¹ The demise of the Nazi order would provide an opportunity to mold new social forms that may inaugurate a new era of stability and of peaceful evolution. Such changes could not be effected through the structure of small nationalistic states. Rather, only a socially progressive and democratic federalism offered an "opportunity to develop the potentialities of these nations" (36).

The future of eastern Europe was a recurrent theme in the literature on postwar order. Gross developed a concept of "integral federalism" as a principle extending federal and social democratic values to every aspect of political, economic, and social life in eastern Europe. Unlike the

British socialists, Gross defined federalism in terms of centralizing and decentralizing principles of organization between and within states. Externally, he envisaged an interstate regional federation that recognized the "functional interdependence" of the participating states. Internally, federalization meant state decentralization in favor of regional and local autonomies, including self-government particularly in cultural matters for national "minorities." This was tantamount to transforming the national states into an "inner federation of autonomous provinces" in which the provinces themselves would "not be organized in a centralistic way" (44). With decentralization and the transfer of state authority to larger federal institutions, the sovereignties of the national states would be substantially curtailed. Economically, federalization meant the abolition of tariff walls and the formation of a single economic unit of the member states. On the social level it implied a harmonization of social patterns within the union. Gross's "integral federalism" went farthest among the idealists in embracing autochthonous regionalism by empowering societal structures at the expense of centralized state power.

The main pitfall of federalist plans for union was their aspirational character. Federalists imputed a sense of community and stability among the units to be federated which was either unrealistic or simply not there. No amount of rational planning or constitution drafting of the postwar order that did not take into account the social and cultural habits of the people could be expected to work.

Gross's concept of "inner federation" was perhaps alone among the idealists in addressing, if not developing, this issue. For the others, internationalist Percy E. Corbett's remark seemed apt: "Federal union cannot be imposed simply because it is rationally indicated."¹²

Internationalism

If the federalists had expectations of major social and political changes following the war, then the internationalists waxed more sober and restrained. As for the most part American liberals, they were rooted in a western legal tradition whose international law and organization they sought to revitalize through reform. In general, they favored a world organization that was a stronger version of the League of Nations, or a league "with teeth."¹³ They were opposed to regionalism as a primary basis for world organization but explored ways of including or containing it within a universal organization.

English jurist J.L. Brierly reaffirmed the principal function of international law as marking out the "sphere within which each state may exercise its governmental powers without trespassing on the sphere of other states, and thus make it possible for a plurality of independent states to coexist in the same world without colliding with one another."¹⁴ This view was echoed by a gathering of prominent North American international law teachers and advocates which pledged "to aid in 'revitalizing and strengthening international law' and 'in laying the bases of a just and

enduring world peace securing order under law to all nations'." ¹⁵ This community of internationalists identified six premises for establishing and maintaining an effective legal order in a world of states. The premises illustrate vintage internationalist doctrine:

1. The States of the world form a community, and the protection and advancement of the common interests of their peoples require effective organization of the Community of States.

2. The law of the Community of States is international law. The development of an adequate system of international law depends upon continuous collaboration by States to promote the common welfare of all peoples and to maintain just and peaceful relations between all States.

3. The conduct of each State in its relations with other States and with the Community of States is subject to international law, and the sovereignty of a State is subject to the limitations of international law.

4. Any failure of a States to carry out its obligations under international law is a matter of concern to the Community of States.

5. Any use of force or any threat to use force by a State in its relations with another State is a matter of concern to the Community of States.

6. The maintenance of just and peaceful relations between States requires orderly procedures by which international situation can be readjusted as need arises. ¹⁶

The conference predictably proposed that the coming world organization be organized on a universal basis. It also suggested, if negatively, that a general organization "not preclude the organization of groups of states on the basis of regional propinquity, historical relationship, or mutuality of interest, for purposes not inconsistent with those of the universal organization." ¹⁷ This cautious acceptance of interstate regionalism reflected the wariness

and uncertainty with which regionalism was viewed.

Internationalists were more openly disdainful of the federalists who called for a world government. Positive law theorist Hans Kelsen considered it unrealistic to think that individual states would unite into a world organization whose authority "would be on par with the legal order of the states themselves."¹⁸ That effectively meant a world state, and such a centralized structure would mean the end of international law as it was known. A more realistic world order could be sought "only within the framework of international law, that is to say, by an organization which in the degree of its centralization does not exceed that compatible with the nature of international law."¹⁹ A legal conservative, Kelsen concluded that any scheme for postwar order

should involve no revolution of international relations but reform of their order by an improvement of the social technique prevailing in this field. The specific technique of the order regulating the relations between States is the Law of Nations. He who wishes to approach the aim of world peace in a realistic way must take this problem ... as one of a slow and steady perfection of the international legal order.²⁰

Kelsen argued with most internationalists that the main task of a world organization was to prevent wars, the greatest of all social evils. What the League of Nations accomplished in this respect was admittedly little; but, Kelsen stated, "the dream of a World State is certainly too much."²¹ In espousing a positive law which in the last resort was based on force or command, he and most internationalists recommended institutionalizing sanctions as means of

enforcement. Specifically, Kelsen favored the establishment of an international court with "compulsory jurisdiction," which in his view was "the indispensable prerequisite for the achievement of any further progress."²²

When probing beyond the generalities of conference declarations, one finds more substantial material on regionalism and functionalism in the individual writings of internationalists. Internationalists tended to agree on the value and need for functional cooperation. Percy Corbett and James T. Shotwell among others encouraged the formation of international agencies as vehicles that would foster greater "confidence in supranational institutions."²³ Regionalism, however, was a somewhat more problematical issue. Like the idea of a world state, regional political groupings potentially threatened the very nature of an international community of sovereign states. Shotwell warned that the "danger inherent in the growth of regional organizations (was) that they may weaken, instead of strengthen, the general system upon which the peace of the world finally depends."²⁴ Pittman Potter stated that regional groupings could become a new form of isolationism and separatism which may result in the "setting up of large blocks of nations against one another, or even of continents and hemispheres one against the other."²⁵ Percy Corbett cautioned that without an "overall co-ordination, the regional groups might become merely larger bases of attempted autarchy" and that "a balance of federations, if left to itself, would be as unstable as a balance of states has proved to be."²⁶

Most internationalists for these reasons opposed

regionalism as a primary basis for structuring postwar order. But they could hardly ignore it. For those not opposed to regionalism on principle, they sought ways of including or containing it in a world organization based on international law and organization. Corbett suggested that a balance of regional groupings of states within a universal "co-ordinating organization" in the form of a world commonwealth may be the best structure for world order. He called for a world organization that was

neither universal federation nor yet simply league. It combines the beginnings of a World Commonwealth with other, limited, groupings of states around regional or other special interests. ...We must contemplate a world order embracing associations of states varying all the way from close-knit federal unions in some parts of Europe to the something less than confederation of Pan America.²⁷

Brierly also saw room for incorporating regionalist as well as functionalist features into the international system. He admitted that rules devised for universal application assumed a uniformity among political units and their interests which often did not exist. It is more likely, he stated,

that the line of progress will be found to lie in the finding of particular solutions for particular problems; in the constitution, for example of special regimes for special regions of the world which are of concern to more nations than one..., or in the setting up of special functional organs with powers appropriate to the particular subject matter which they are charged to regulate.²⁸

Brierly shared the paramount concern of internationalists for security. He envisaged a system of interlocking regional arrangements within a wider world

organization whose principal mandate was coordinating global security. Security itself consisted of many problems where "different conditions, political, economic, or strategic, in different regions of the world make different arrangements necessary."²⁹ Wolfgang Friedmann went further and favored the development of a combination of general and regional collective security within the framework of a general organization, but in which "primary obligations (would) devolve on the regional group immediately concerned... ." ³⁰ Similarly, Shotwell admitted that "regional organizations might constitute a first line of defense against local wars arising out of the quarrels of neighboring nations... ." ³¹

Shotwell addressed the problem of the relationship between regional (and functional) organizations and the general organization. He advanced the formula of "varied responsibility" where, on the basis of "enlightened national interest," states would participate in the organization of the peace in multiple ways but always within the framework of a world organization.³² He suggested that functional agencies devoted to matters of health and welfare may "be more effectively administered from other centers than that of the political organization."³³ He acknowledged that this formula departed from the letter and spirit League of Nations' Covenant, which was based on the traditional theory of the equality of all states and the universal obligation. Citing the American federal system as a model, he envisaged a structure that was prefigured in the European inter-war cooperation initiatives in the form of the Little Entente and the Locarno treaty system.³⁴

Friedmann and, in particular, Quincy Wright gave more weight to the regional concept than other internationalists. Friedmann questioned the very basis of the "national State as the limit of political, military and economic sovereignty."³⁵ He saw regional units taking on not only security but also economic, cultural, and political responsibilities. Economically, they would develop otherwise unused energies and resources. Politically, they were a means with which to redress the imbalance between large and small states:

If regional groups are developed as more closely knit units, within a wider general organisation, they can do much more than offset the preponderance of Big Powers. They can play a vital part in widening the exclusively national horizon, in economic planning, cultural relations and political allegiance. Indeed, without this process of education and mental change, reform and change by institutions and constitutions will remain futile.³⁶

If Friedmann gave regional organization within a world-wide organization greater weight than most internationalists, then Quincy Wright pushed the interstate regional idea even further. In his magisterial A Study of War, which was published in 1942 after some sixteen years of research, he downplayed the significance of and was ambivalent towards regionalism.³⁷ In the work, he developed Woodrow Wilson's view that the balance of power system had become obsolete in the 20th century. Great Britain's capacity to act as a balancer had passed and the United States was not prepared, by dint of historical precedent, to assume that role. The rise of industrialism, nationalism, constitutionalism, democracy, and international organization in the 19th

century further impaired the assumptions upon which the balance theory rested. Also, military technology and warfare had now made all states vulnerable to attack. He concluded that it was therefore

unlikely that the problem of a just territorial distribution can be solved permanently or be assured a peaceful solution in the future under a balance-of-power system. Such a distribution can only be effected through invoking 'the organized opinion of mankind' [President Wilson] for the authoritative settlement of such issues as they arise, and such invocation is possible only through procedures functioning within an international organization which has superseded the balance of power as the basic guaranty of state security (772-73).

Wright saw regionalism as a method of collective security that sought to preserve the balance of power system. Regional groupings were potentially hostile continental blocs. At the same time, he also stated that the interwar regional groupings in Europe had sought ways to work within League of Nations in an arrangement that reinforced the functioning of both organizations.

The Locarno, Scandinavian, Baltic, Balkan, and Little Entente groupings and, in the opinion of some, the British Commonwealth of Nations were juridically dependent upon the League of Nations, whose functioning they sought to strengthen in the 1920s. With the collapse of the League, these groupings tended to disintegrate, each state holding itself free to take positions in crises as the exigencies of balance-of-power politics required, with the result that most of them were occupied (778).

Wright thought that the reduction in the number of states caused by regional groupings could make the international system more unstable. Yet he also saw that geographically separated regional "blocs" resembled buffer states "designed to keep the European great powers at arm's

length" (778). If regions depended solely on the balance of power formula, it would contribute to world instability. But if they organized themselves in the framework of a "world-confederation," they could succeed in reducing their dependence on a balance-of-power system (780, 1342-43).

Wright's contingent views on regionalism in The Study of War were stated with an undertone of uncertainty about its impact on international relations. During the war, he was less ambivalent on the subject in his recommendations to the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace, a public group of experts founded by Shotwell and Clark Eichelberger in the fall of 1939.³⁸ He still believed that an effective world organization was one which continued to give national (and local) governments "primary legal authority within the territory of the respective States" (462). But the present stage of world history also required regional and functional structures along with the universal. He favored the creation of world regions organized into confederations or federations of states.

The national security of states still required respect and confidence in international law. But this could be attained in an increasingly interdependent world only through a "better organization of the world community" (478). He criticized the equality-of-nations principle in international law as "dogma" that was either impracticable or undemocratic, as "it would greatly overweight the political influence of the citizens of small states" (489). A better balance between large and small states could be achieved international organization allowed "for variations

according to the traditions and needs of each region" (462). With consent from a world assembly, regional organizations could be formed by groups of states for purposes of security and welfare. Each region would develop its own institutions in its own way and have "primary responsibility for maintaining order and facilitating political changes in the region..."(464). Regional organization would be subject to the competence of the universal organization in matters covered by a universal covenant. Specifically, regional authorities should be "subject to at least juridical control" by the universal authority, citing Briand's European Union proposal as being within the framework of the League as an example (477). Wright envisaged a world organized into seven regions based on, "without violating reasonably democratic procedures, technical and geographic rather than political or ideological considerations..." (475). The regions were:

- 1) a European federation with a central police authority, possessing "adequate" power; legislature, representing both people and states; court, with the competence of declaring null and void any national laws "violating the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Union Constitution;" and powers extending to commerce and social reforms;

- 2) within Europe, a separate Danubian regional federation;³⁹

- 3) a Near Eastern region comprised mainly of the Muslim fragments of the Ottoman Empire but with "some representation" of

European great powers with territorial of historic interests in the region;

4) the Soviet Union, which constituted a region in itself;

5) the British Commonwealth of Nations, which constituted "not a region but an historic political grouping...;"

6) the American region organized along lines of the Pan-American treaties but also including Canada; and

7) a Far Eastern region organized according to the principles of a modified Washington Conference Treaty.

Wright also saw functional organizations supplementing regional organizations in his peace plan. Functional agencies were necessary in order to facilitate international cooperation in dealing with social problems and those of health and nutrition, commerce and raw materials, transit and communications, labor, and the colonies (466). His incorporation of regional, federal, and functional features within universal organization was a variant of Shotwell's principle of varied responsibility. In a study for the Commission dealing with the transition period to postwar peace, he went somewhat beyond Shotwell in calling for new political institutions that curtailed state sovereignties.⁴⁰ The institutions would be devoted to meeting the needs of people over the needs of the national victor governments. He argued his case for a European union "rest(ing) on a broad basis of European opinion rather than upon contract among national governments" (276). Incorporating and synthesizing arguments advanced by federalists and functionalists, Wright

the internationalist stated that postwar order should stress welfare over power through a democratic "regime of national governments, regional unions, and world institutions functioning with the consent of the governed..." (269).

Functionalism

The highest theoretical articulation of functionalism as a principle of international organization was provided by British political scientist David Mitrany in his A Working Peace System.⁴¹ The functional idea was traceable to the emergence in the 19th and early 20th centuries of international technical, economic, and social agencies such as the International Postal Union (IPU), Danube River Commission, and International Labor Organization (ILO). Mitrany attempted to shift the focus of attention in the debate on organization from formal or constitutional approaches and divisive "high politics" issues to the task of meeting practical social and economic needs. The growing complexity and interdependence of modern life mandated transnational cooperation that was essentially nonpolitical in nature. If problems were assigned to specialists separated from national political concerns, it would be possible to achieve international integration in a growing number of sectors. Mitrany argued against both "traditional legalistic ideas" and a "forcibly created world state" in favor of a "low politics" approach to world organization.⁴² Such an approach represented a "working" peace system to the extent it overlaid "political divisions with a spreading

web of international activities and agencies, in which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated."⁴³

Though conceived as a global process, functionalism did not exclude cooperation on a regional basis. During the war, Mitrany and a team of collaborators sought to apply the functional approach to eastern, or Danubian, Europe in particular. In late 1941, he helped establish an Economic Research Group for southeastern Europe within the London-based Political and Economic Planning (PEP). Its purpose was to study working models for "regional cooperation in practical matters ... bent on improving the social life of the peoples of the region."⁴⁴ One model project promoted by the functionalists was a Danubian Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). For Mitrany, the central idea of such a project was to isolate a field of activity and organize it under an autonomous functional authority that left existing state divisions and authorities intact except for the jurisdiction of that particular function. Regional functional cooperation thus allowed "established political units to follow new ways without doing violence to old sentiments."⁴⁵ Mitrany believed it was the "only method likely to take root and bear fruit in soil so churned up by centuries of political passion and conflict as the Danubian region." Based on the foundations of the earlier Danube Commissions to which the states in the lower Danube transferred authority and from which they derived mutual benefit, Mitrany envisaged a "multi-purpose" semi-public authority charged with regional

planning to improve navigation, flood control, irrigation, and the hydro-electric power supply.⁴⁶

Mitrany's functional theory of international issued from the liberal idealistic tradition, but its organizational principle was not state-based. The idea of functional collaboration on a regional basis constituted interstate regionalism only to the extent contiguous states were left intact and agreed between themselves to relinquish authority in a given technical or socio-economic domain. Functionalists accepted the reality of the sovereign state and international system if with the long-term view of effecting a shift from inter-state to trans-state (i.e., transnational) relations as functional organization developed in international society.

Interstate regionalism as a theory of postwar order was an attempt by idealists in international relations to enhance the pre-war machinery of the classical international system of sovereign states with forms of regional (including functional) organization. As a relatively new concept in international organization, regionalism was perceived by internationalists as a potential threat to the universal principles of law and organization underlying the international system. They opposed regionalism as a primary basis for world organization. But the idea of grouping states into regional units as a first line of defense against aggression and for welfare purposes came to be accepted by most internationalists as long as such groupings remained subordinate to a universal organization.

The sovereign state remained the point of reference if not central concern for internationalists, but they acknowledged with other idealists that security, economic, and even sociocultural concerns also interceded as a factor in support of regional organization. With the exception of the functionalists, idealists were caught on the horns of a dilemma—defending a crisis-ridden state system while acknowledging that societal needs were not met or necessarily conceived in terms of that system. Some idealists went a considerable distance toward reconciling that dilemma by recognizing regional organization within the community of states.

NOTES

¹Wolfgang Friedmann, The Crisis of the National State (London, 1943).

²Clarence Streit, Union Now (New York and London, 1939) and Union Now: The Proposal for Inter-democratic Federal Union (New York and London, 1940); Ely Culbertson, Total Peace (New York, 1943) and Summary of the World Federation Plan: An Outline of a Practical and Detailed Plan for World Settlement (London, [1942] 1944); Felix Gross, Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe (New York, 1945); Lewis Corey, ed., Unfinished Task: Economic Reconstruction for Democracy (New York, 1943); G.D.H. Cole, Europe, Russia, and the Future (London, 1941) and Great Britain in the Postwar World (London, 1942); W.B. Curry, The Case for Federal Union. A New International Order (Harmondsworth, 1939); R.W.G. Mackay, Federal Europe: Being the Case for European Federation Together with a Draft Constitution of a United States of Europe (London, 1940) and Peace Aims and the New World Order (London 1941); R.H. Tawney, Why Britain Fights (London, 1941); H.G. Wells, The New World Order (London, 1940); Barbara Wootton, Socialism and Federation (London, 1941) and Freedom Under Planning (London, 1945).

³Quoted in Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in American During World War II (New York, 1967), p. 39.

⁴Culbertson, Total Peace, p. 239f. Subsequent page references cited in text.

⁵The present Germanic and Japanese federations were excluded from the category of "reasonable" (256).

⁶For a bibliography of commentaries and critiques of the Streit and Culbertson plans, see Julia E. Johnson, comp., World Peace Plans (New York, 1943), pp. 270-72.

⁷Barbara Wootton, Socialism and Federation, pp. 20, 21-22. Wells, in The New World Order, p. 97, went further than Wootton in claiming that "'federation' means practically uniform socialism within the Federal limits, leading, as state after state is incorporated, to world socialism."

⁸Cole, Europe, Russia, and the Future, pp. 127-128.

⁹R.H. Tawney, Why Britain Fights, (London, 1941), pp. 31,32. For a similar view, ee also Mackay, Federal Europe..., pp. 93-94.

¹⁰Lewis Corey, ed., Democratic Postwar Reconstruction in Central Eastern Europe, (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1943), p. 65. See also his The Unfinished Task: Economic Reconstruction for Democracy, and Joseph S. Roucek, ed., A Challenge to

Peacemakers (Philadelphia, 1944).

¹¹ Gross, Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe, p. 35. Subsequent page references cited in text.

¹² Corbett, Postwar Worlds, p. 187.

¹³ Leading international tracts and treatises include J.L. Brierly, The Outlook for International Law (Oxford, 1944); Percy E. Corbett, Post-war Worlds (New York and Toronto, 1942); Wolfgang Friedmann, The Crisis of the National State (London, 1943); Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations (Cambridge, MA, 1942) and Peace Through Law (Chapel Hill, 1944); James T. Shotwell, The Great Decision (New York, 1944); Quincy Wright, International Law and the World Order (Chicago, 1940) and "Peace and Political Organization" and "Fundamental Problems of International Organization" in International Conciliation (New York), 369 (April, 1941); The International Law of the Future. Postulates, Principles and Proposals. A Statement of a Community of Views by North Americans, in International Conciliation, 399 (April 1944). See also Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York, 1967) and Harold Josephson, James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America (Rutherford, NJ, 1975).

¹⁴ J.L. Brierly, The Outlook for International Law, p. 12.

¹⁵ The International Law of the Future, p. 251. Among the 196 participants who devoted 62 working days and 30 conferences between February 1942 and the end of 1943 to produce six postulates, 10 principles, and 23 proposals, were Percy E. Corbett (Montreal), John Foster Dulles (New York), Carter Goodrich (Columbia; Chairman of the ILO governing body), Leland Goodrich (Brown; Director of the World Peace Foundation), Rudolf Holsti (Stanford), Philip C. Jessup (Columbia), Hans Kelsen (University of California), Pittman Potter (Oberlin), Roscoe Pound (Harvard), and Quincy Wright (Chicago).

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 267.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 270. See also pp. 317-18.

¹⁸ Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations, p. 27.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

²⁰ Hans Kelsen, Peace Through Law, ix.

²¹ Ibid., p. viii.

²² Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations, p. 169. In an interesting critique of legal positivism, Gerhart Niemeyer, Law Without Force: The Function of Politics in

International Law (Princeton, 1941), p. 400, argued that "no amount of institutions, agencies, technical devices and procedures can promote the real scope of the law governing interstate relations. Only by reorienting our attitude to the problem of order can progress be made. We have to learn that the rules of order are contained in the structure of social relationships and not in the command of authority. social relationships is to be found inside the structure of acting individuals, not above them or even in opposition to them" (emphasis added). It is this new orientation, with its "insistence on the laws of connectedness rather than separateness, which will open up the path toward further development of international law." Niemeyer, Gordon Craig, John B. Whitton and others were members of the Princeton Group for the Study of Post-War International Problems, which explored the question of power politics and moral obligation that Carr grappled with. See John Boardman Whitton, ed., Second Chance: America and the Peace (Princeton, 1944).

²³ Percy Corbett, "The Future of International Law," in Agenda for Peace ed. Ernest M. Patterson (Philadelphia, 1944), 100-01. See Charles DeBenedetti, "James T. Shotwell and the Science of International Politics," Political Science Quarterly, 89 (June 1974), 392-93.

²⁴ James Shotwell, The Great Decision, p. 216.

²⁵ Pittman B. Potter, "Universalism vs. Regionalism in International Organization," American Political Science Review, 37 (October 1943), 858.

²⁶ P.E. Corbett, Postwar Worlds, pp. 131, 188.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 131, 188.

²⁸ Brierly, The Outlook for International Law, p. 45.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 92.

³⁰ Friedmann, The Crisis of the National State, p. 186.

³¹ Shotwell, The Great Decision, p. 214. For other views, see Kelsen, Peace Through Law, pp. 55-57 and Brecht, "Regionalism Within World Organization," op.cit., pp. 23-26.

³² Shotwell, The Great Decision, p. 215.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 216.

³⁵ Friedmann, The Crisis of the National State, p. 187.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 188.

³⁷ Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1942).

Subsequent page references from volume 2 cited in text.

³⁸ Following page references are from Quincy Wright, "Peace and Political Organization" and "Fundamental Problems of International Organization," in International Conciliation, 369 (April 1941), 454-492.

³⁹ Wright, p. 464, justified a separate Danubian grouping in the following (geo-political) terms:

The disruption of the Hapsburg Empire as a result of the World War disorganized the economic life and security of the Danubian area, and made the States vulnerable to attack by their powerful neighbors, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union... . The reestablishment of a federation of the Danubian area within the general European federation may be desirable. While the limits of such a federation, both in area and in powers, would depend on the development of political circumstances, the inclusion of a restored Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria, as well as Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, might be desirable thus providing a great power ... contributing with Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain to the European union, and maintaining sympathetic connections with the Soviet and Near Eastern regions.

⁴⁰ Quincy Wright, "Political Conditions of the Transition Period," International Conciliation, 379 (April 1942).

⁴¹ Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (London, 1943). See James Avery Joyce, ed., World Organization: Federal or Functional? (London, 1945).

⁴² Ibid., p. 6.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁴ [David Mitrany, ed.], Economic Development of Southeast Europe (London, 1945), p. 12. Rumanian-born Mitrany had previously written on the economic dislocations caused by the break-up of the Habsburg Empire following World War I in The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe (New Haven, 1936). He suggested that the break-up of the empire "may have been an inevitable preliminary, a necessary equalization, a levelling of the ground for new foundations," for in "that region political and economic division ever was, and remains, as much a challenge for co-operation as an obstacle to it" (241).

⁴⁵ David Mitrany, "A T.V.A. for the Danube Valley," Nov. 1944 typescript in David Mitrany Collection, Manuscripts & Archives, The London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 2. The Collection contains a number of related materials on this subject, mainly in the form of lecture

notes, private memoranda, and letters, including a 4-page "Note on a Danubian Road Transport Authority." See also George Kiss, "TVA on the Danube?," The Geographical Review, 38 (1947).

⁴⁶Mitrany, "A T.V.A. for the Danube Valley," p. 13f. For other examples of proposed functional collaboration on a regional and continental basis, see A Canadian Economist, "Economic Reconstruction in Europe," International Affairs, 20 (1944).

CHAPTER III

HEGEMONIAL REGIONALISM

The second identifiable theory of regionalism during the war was associated with the "realist" school of power politics. As we have seen, realists claimed that power and not a rationally-willed order was the determinant of world politics. They saw the major powers as the architects and arbiters of the postwar peace whether or not a universal organization existed. In a world they claimed was moving toward larger economic and political configurations, realists saw smaller states tied in regional groupings as spheres of influence to major powers. Both national and world security were assured through such combinations of geo-strategic forces.

The realist school represented a mixed bag of modern ideas that drew both on the pre-Enlightenment thought of Machiavelli and Hobbes and the Enlightenment afterglow of 19th century historicism (principally through Hegel and his right-wing followers), positivism, and social Darwinism. But the most original theoretical articulation of realism during the war came from an independent political thinker, Hans Morgenthau, who essentially eshewed these ideologies while

affirming the non-rational structure of social and political reality. His Scientific Man vs. Power Politics was a brilliant if trenchant treatise in political thought based on lectures delivered during the war at the New School for Social Research on "Liberalism and Foreign Policy" and the University of Chicago on "The Scientific Delusion and the Problem of International Order."¹

Unlike nature, which was susceptible to laws of modern science, human society was not infinitely malleable. Society had a character that was contingent (i.e, unpredictable) because it was rooted in a trait essential to man, namely his non-rational nature and faculties. While not eschewing reason, Morgenthau argued that a rationalism that deified reason was itself inherently irrational. Reason, he argued,

far from following its own inherent impulses, is driven toward its goal by the irrational forces the ends of which it serves. ...Clamoring for reason to extend its dominion over all human affairs and expecting it to reach this goal by its own inner force is the most futile, yet most conspicuous, social practice of the age. ...The triumph of reason is, in truth, the triumph of irrational forces which succeed in using the processes of reason to satisfy themselves (154, 155).

Morgenthau held that while politics must be understood through reason, which was abstract, it was not in reason that it found its model. Politics had its model in social reality and the unpredictable character of social life. "The principles of reason are always simple, consistent, and abstract," he stated, while "the social world is always complicated, incongruous, and concrete" (10). The western liberal's belief in scientific rationalism as the ground of action in politics was the main source of the contemporary

crisis. Morgenthau's antidote to the crisis was the re-examination of social and political problems in light of the pre-rationalist western tradition. And this process would have to begin, he said, with "the assumption that power politics, rooted in the lust for power which is common to all men, is for this reason inseparable from social life itself" (9).

With Machiavelli, Morgenthau accepted the practice of politics as essentially amoral. "Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determined the technique of political action" (195). Yet Morgenthau was not insensitive to the tension between ethics and human action, "of the tragic presence of evil in all political action..." (202). With E.H. Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr, he held that political action could at best achieve an uneasy alliance between morality and power:

Whatever choice we make, we must do evil while we try to do good; for we must abandon one moral end in favor of another. While trying to render to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's, we will at best strike a precarious balance which will ever waver between both, never completely satisfying either. In the extreme, we will abandon one completely in order fully to satisfy the other. The typical solution, however, will be a compromise which puts the struggle at rest without putting conscience at ease (190).

When it came to a hard choice, however, the realist in Morgenthau instructed him that man had "no choice between power and the common good" and that to "act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, (was) political wisdom." For Morgenthau, moral courage meant

knowing "with despair that the political act (was) inevitably evil," but acting nevertheless, and that moral judgement was the ability to choose the least evil expedient action. It was in the combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and prudential judgement that man reconciled his political nature with his moral destiny. "That this conciliation," he concluded, "(was) nothing more than a modus vivendi, uneasy, precarious, and even paradoxical, can disappoint only those who prefer to gloss over and to distort the tragic contradictions of human existence with the soothing logic of a specious concord" (203).

Morgenthau's open-ended if also pessimistic view of life and politics equipped him with the ability^{to} grapple with, if not transcend, the charge of ethical nihilism that was leveled at the realist school by, among others, E.H. Carr. In contrast to Morgenthau, most realists during the war defined morality and power politics in less ambiguous terms of geography, raison d'état, and geopolitics. They owed an intellectual debt less to the Greco-Christian tradition or such post-modern social philosophers such as Reinhold Niebuhr who in part shaped Morgenthau's thinking than to Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the 19th century thinkers. In reasserting that "Machiavelli's method (was) the method of science applied to politics," positivist writer James Burnham heralded the elitist and proto-fascist theories of Wilfred Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Georges Sorel, and Robert Michels as exemplars of the new Machiavellianism.² Apart from the new Machiavellians, American realists were also the

intellectual progeny of late 19th and early 20th century theorists of environmental determinism.

Prominent among them were Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), German founder of anthropo-geography who coined the term Lebensraum (living space), and his more radical geopolitical successors, the Swedish Rudolph Kjellen (1864-1922) and Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), the servant of German national socialism.³ In brief, Ratzel saw the modern state in Hegelian-Darwinian terms as an organism that either prospered or died. The state either evolved in a Darwinian process to higher forms or else devolved into decadence. For a state to be in balance or equilibrium was seen as static and meant loss of character or vitality. Kjellen, in his Der Staat als Lebensform (1917), held up the state as an organism and whose principal attribute was power and categoric imperative expansion. Karl Haushofer assumed Kjellen's mantle in 1922 and became director of the Institut für Geopolitik at University of Munich in 1933. He was a principal drafter of geographic and historical arguments in the service of the rising Nazi state.⁴

A second branch of environmental determinism derived from Anglo-American writers such as British historian Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862), the American naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), British geographer Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), and American geographer and explorer Ellsworth Huntington (1876-1947).⁵ Buckle and Huntington emphasized the importance of climatic factors on political behavior. Mahan and Mackinder related geographical factors to world politics by emphasizing the

historical importance of, respectively, seafaring power and continental power. Mahan wrote on the naval history of Great Britain and the United States and identified six factors affecting the development and maintenance of sea power among states, namely, geographical position, the physical "conformation" of the state, extent of territory, population, national character, and governmental character.

Mackinder had perhaps the most direct influence on realist thought in general and east European organization in particular. Writing after the turn of the century, he stressed the increasing importance of landpower with the development of more effective transportation and communication. In 1904, he argued that history's "geographical pivot" was located in the landlocked Eurasian "heartland," whose restless, nomadic peoples had always placed pressure on the peoples settled in the rimlands or littorals. He expanded on this idea after World War I in his Democratic Ideals and Reality, whose thinking was rekindled by his students during World War II. Mackinder viewed the eastern part of Europe as a transition zone between between the Eurasian "heartland" and the "marginal crescent" of peninsular Europe. It also was also a divide between two cultures. He stated World War I was essentially a contest between German and Slav and a buffer zone was needed between the two. It was "a vital necessity that there should be a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia."⁶ The extent to which fear of Bolshevism also played a factor in his thinking at the time in conceiving of ^{the} region as a

"cordon sanitaire" against Soviet power is open to question. More fundamentally, he argued that in spite or because of the ethnic diversity of the region,

the peoples of the Middle Tier -- Poles, Bohemians, Hungarians, Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks -- are much too unlikely to federate for any purpose except defense, yet they are all too different from both Germans and Russians that they may be trusted to resist any new organization of either great neighbor making towards empire in eastern Europe.⁷

The German and Anglo-American branches of environmental determinism tended to divide the realist school into two camps during the war. Political geographers found themselves closer to Anglo-American theorists and were critical of the adherents of geopolitics, who were closer to the pre-Haushofer German school. Political geographer Isaiah Bowman, President of both the American Geographical Society and Johns Hopkins University and a key State Department advisor on postwar issues, criticized geopolitics for its essentially immoral character. Geopolitics presented a "distorted view of the historical, political, and geographical relations of the world and its parts" and contained a "poisonous self-destroying principle: when international interests conflict or overlap, might shall decide the issue. Against 'geopolitical needs' democracy opposes moral rights."⁸

In spite of Bowman's critique, geopolitical ideas dominated the realist school during the war if perhaps more by force of argument than in number of adherents. Its most prominent representative was Nicholas J. Spykman, founder and first director in 1935 of the Yale Institute of International Studies. A disillusioned supporter of the

League of Nations, Spykman found a new rationale for world politics in the combination of power and geography. He held that the power of a state was like a dynamic, organic force and that "other things being equal, all states (had) a tendency to expand."⁹

Spykman dismissed Haushofer's geopolitics as "geographical metaphysics."¹⁰ But the fact that certain writers had distorted the meaning of the term geopolitics was "no valid reason for condemning its method and material" (7). Geopolitical analysis dealt with changing, dynamic relationships and was preferable to a merely descriptive and static geographic approach. "Geographic position and physical power are facts to be reckoned with in the international world" and geopolitics was available as a "technique ... for the more effective understanding of these facts" (Ibid.). Geopolitics provided the possibility of considering a state's security problems "in geographic terms in such a way that the conclusions (could) be of direct and immediate use to the statesmen whose duty it is to formulate foreign policy" (5). It was in this context that the region acquired special geopolitical importance. Regions were "not geographic regions defined by a fixed and permanent topography but areas determined on the one hand by geography and on the other by dynamic shifts in the centers of power" (6).

In his principal war-time work, Spykman criticized both isolationists and internationalists in arguing for a policy based on renewed concepts of national interest and balance

of power.¹¹ The primary characteristic of international political society was the independence and sovereignty of states that had "no central authority to preserve law and order" (7). To assure their survival, states had to make "the preservation or improvement of their power position a principal objective of their foreign policy." (Ibid.). The postwar world would not substantially differ from the pre-war order, and international society would continue to operate in "a world of power politics" (Ibid.). For the United States, this meant formulating a geo-political "strategy for both war and peace based on the implications of its geographic location in the world" (8). Although Spykman evaluated power in terms of resources and strategy, he believed that "all civilized life rest(ed) in the last instance on power" (11). Considerations of morality or values of justice, fairness, and tolerance, were subservient to the power objective. For Spykman, "the search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values;" rather, "moral values are used to facilitate the achievement of power" (18).

This approach to political reality and the problem of postwar order was echoed, if less stridently, by Robert Strausz-Hupé, a leading realist theorist based at the University of Pennsylvania. His point of departure was Mackinder's thesis of modern technology revolutionizing our concept of space.¹² The world had become globalized by technology and its demands, which enhanced the value of strategic space, placing "an increasingly higher value on mere spaciousness" (190). Politically, this accounted for

and pointed to the further growth of state-based concentrations of global power. According to Strausz-Hupé,

productive capacity, self-sufficiency in raw materials, and defense in depth ... do not only call for large size but lure the large state on to further expansion at the expense of smaller nations whose forces of resistance are limited. ...The history of our times appears to reflect, with malignant fatality, the trend toward empires and super-states predicted by the Ratzels, Spenglers, and Mackinders (190-91).

This historical trend drove "men's thoughts about the world's political organization into yet untried channels" (193). The forms this organization assumed among realists in the context of their search for a structure of postwar order may be termed "hegemonial regionalism." It is a "great power orbit" theory of postwar order that tended to cluster small states into regional groupings under the suzerainty or control of a geographically proximate major power. The basic concept of larger states exercising power over smaller peripheral political units was hardly a new phenomenon. What was distinctive during the war-time theorizing on postwar order was its justification in terms of the regional concept. An affinity of interests was imputed between the smaller, geographically-related units that both tied and distinguished them as a group from a neighboring hegemonial power. Cooperation and voluntary integration around a benign power were implicit in the regional idea.

Mackinder first raised this concept in his thoughts on post-World War I order. He held that world order could be best maintained through one or more powers commissioned in various areas as a "trustee for humanity." He volunteered

the United States and the British Empire as world trustees "for the peace of the ocean and of the straits connecting the basins of the ocean," a step which he justified as a mere "regularization of existing facts."¹³ For Europe, Mackinder's proposal for a "belt of buffer states" in eastern Europe, gave birth to the concept of a region as a glacis, or cordon sanitaire, between power constellations. A contending example of hegemonial regionalism debated during World War I was the German-inspired "Mitteleuropa" plan. Spurred by the Allied blockade of the Axis powers, Friedrich Naumann, a German liberal politician inspired by economic rather than Pan-German interests, advanced a plan to integrate the German and Austrian empires into a German-centered economic and political union.¹⁴ Naumann contended that the creation of such a central European unit would lead to the renunciation of the idea of German nationalist expansion.¹⁵ An example and precedent for hegemonial regionalism in the Americas was the relationship between the United States and the smaller American republics. The idea and even urgency of "Pan-American union," which had a history extending to the 19th century, gained in currency during the 1930s and early 1940s.

Acknowledging the global trends toward economic integration and political consolidation, geopolitical realists maintained that regionalism as a principle in international relations was "the attempt to organize large areas of the world -- usually but not necessarily continental in extent -- in political, economic, and cultural units under the leadership of a dominant power."¹⁶

Within this framework, postwar order would result from a concert or balance of great power regional systems which, as building blocks, would serve to maintain the peace. Such a system was designed to thwart any aspirations of a single power for world hegemony. It would pool economic and military resources to reflect the strategic interdependence that can preserve the national independences of both the major and affiliated lesser powers. There was little or no need in such a scheme for a universal organization. At best, a general organization could consist of a forum or coalition of the major powers. As William T.R. Fox, an associate of Spykman's Yale institute, stated, "effective collaboration to check aggression must be built on the distribution of power in the world we will have to live in. In this world a self-contained coalition of first-rank powers must be the nucleus of a general security program."¹⁷

The idea of a western hemispheric regional alliance did not sit well with globally-minded realists, particularly after America's entry in the war. Spykman viewed pan-Americanism as a product of a new, larger scale isolationism. In an globalized world where the United States was militarily engaged in both Europe and the Pacific, "hemisphere defense through hemisphere isolation became the new streamlined version of the old isolationist position."¹⁸ In a similar vein, Eugene Staley argued that globalization of war and economic and technological change required a commensurate approach in meeting the problems. "On this basis, it is clear that continents, as such, have no very

great claim to be regarded as the natural building blocks of postwar order."¹⁹

Instead of casting the United States as a regional power, Spykman, Strausz-Hupé and other American realists saw the United States as the world's premier arbiter of the peace after the war. It was time for the United States to definitively shed its isolationism. As a power endowed with abundant resources, favorable geographic position, and a benign attitude towards the world, the United States was best suited to shape the postwar order. In the words of Strausz-Hupé, the United States had

a peremptory interest in enforcing the creation and maintenance of a universal order... Its great size, space deepness, and resources, its possession of all the geographical perquisites of land, air, and sea power make the United States a state capable of exerting that measure of international control needed to guard the community of nations against the ever-present minority of would-be aggressors... Space is power, and the space realities of the U.S. endow it with the attributes of beneficent leadership.²⁰

Spykman assumed ^{the} postwar world would still be comprised of independent sovereign states. At the same time, he questioned the viability of small states and prized the potential of an American-British hegemony within a wider balance of power system.²¹ The idea of an Anglo-American condominium was popularized in the early 1940s before the Soviet Union and United States became belligerent in the war. Unlike Streit's "Union Now" scheme, Spykman did not see an Anglo-American union as the nucleus of world order, federated or not, but as part of a wider system of global security. United States policy was to be guided by a strategy that demanded "the preservation of a balance of

power in Europe and Asia..." (465). This precluded a regionally united Europe. A postwar Europe federation would be against United States' interests in a balance system. "A federal Europe would constitute an agglomeration of force that would completely alter our significance as an Atlantic power and greatly weaken our position in the Western Hemisphere" (466).²² Nor did his system of balance mean the outright hegemony of Europe by one or two of the major powers. Rather, he argued for a relatively weak Europe in the form of a European "League of Nations" composed, however, of more or less equal political units. Creating equal units meant breaking up large powers such as Germany and the Soviet Union and combining the smaller states "into larger federations which will preserve the cultural autonomy of the component parts, but which will be strong enough to discourage thoughts of easy conquest" (466).

In the spirit of Mackinder, Spykman believed the main problem in Europe was balancing Germany and Russia. Ruling out a common frontier between them, Spykman revived Mackinder's idea of an east European buffer belt, only this time consisting not of separated states but a single political unit. He favored "a great eastern European federation from the Baltic to the Mediterranean" supplemented by "a British-Scandinavian group around the North Sea and the Baltic, and a Latin group around the Mediterranean" (467). Thus, while opposing a European-wide regional union, he favored sub-regional groupings within Europe as the way to achieve a power balance on the

continent. He was not sanguine, however, that such units of approximately equal size and strength could be realized. Barring this, he thought an enhanced balance of power regime for Europe could be created in the form of a regional League of Nations with the United States as an extra-regional member (468).

Spykman's regional concept did not extend beyond Europe. He did not develop it into a general structure for postwar order. In a world of independent states whose basic structure was unlikely to change in the postwar world, he inclined toward a system of collective security guaranteed by the major powers, preferably the United States and Britain. The major powers were regional powers by virtue of their strategic position, interests, and ability to extend "protective guarantees" to the smaller states.²³ But this was done less in the context of a regionalist structure of postwar order than "on the separate calculation by each of the great powers of its own national interest."²⁴

Hegemonial regionalism as a great power orbit theory of political organization was developed more fully by Strausz-Hupé and the journalist and public philosopher, Walter Lippmann. In 1918, Lippmann had been a member of President Wilson's so-called "group of experts" that helped prepare the Paris peace settlement, at which time he reportedly drafted eight of Wilson's "Fourteen Points." During the interwar period, he came to the realization that ^{the} universal League commitment to collective security was a mirage. "By preferring peace in general to a specific peace, President Wilson in effect forgot about Germany," he stated.

It was a mistake to have dissolved "the coalition which had won the war and could have alone perpetuated the settlement."²⁵ The next postwar settlement, he averred, had to be based on the combined power of the allies in the framework of a given state's realistic balance between power on the one hand and commitments on the other as both of these related to areas of vital interests.

In his widely-read U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Lippmann promoted a postwar order based both on a "nuclear alliance" between the three major powers -- the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union -- and a western hemisphere security zone.²⁶ Fearing that an Anglo-American vs. Soviet confrontation in Europe as well as Asia would lead to World War III, Lippmann held it essential to include Russia in a three-power pact that could serve as a core for a possible "wider association of nations" (168).²⁷ In order to avoid such a confrontation in Europe, he proposed, like Spykman and an array of postwar thinkers, a neutral border zone between the "Atlantic community" and Soviet power that extended from Finland to Turkey (157f.). Poland and the Danubian and Balkan states were unlikely to organize themselves independently of the Soviet Union and would most likely fall into the latter's sphere of influence. But this did not preclude their "neutralization" as a safeguard against both East-West conflict and their satellitization by the Soviets. This idea again reflected Mackinder's idea of an east European "buffer" while also serving realist opposition to a united and independent

Europe.

Lippmann developed a more sophisticated regional plan toward the end of the war. The emerging relationship of world political forces pointed toward two major and three minor power constellations that could serve as strategic nodal points or zones of global security. The United States was consolidating her strategic and diplomatic position not in the Western Hemisphere but Atlantic Community. The second major power constellation was emerging in a Soviet-led orbit that now included eastern Europe. Lippmann's secondary security zones were located in Asia and Near East, consisting of a Chinese orbit centered in east Asia, a Moslem constellation centered in the Near East, and an Indian-led Hinduized region in South Asia. In an apparent departure from realist orthodoxy, he saw the power components of these constellations not in terms of a state's material power attributes, but as nations and communities emerging dynamically into ever larger regional groupings. The process was not top-down but one of development upward. Lippmann doubted that some sixty-odd separate states could form a world-wide organization for the maintenance of peace. He contended that individual states had to first "combine in the their neighborhoods," followed by larger communities and constellations, which could then participate in a world society. In this building-block process, each state would recognize that it belonged to one larger security area.²⁸ Without elaboration, Lippmann considered not only states but "historic communities" as partners in the integration process, which itself was not defined. But in arguing

against a general organization as a starting point, he stated that:

we have to reverse the Wilsonian pattern of collective security. We cannot build a universal society from the top downwards. We must build up to it from the existing national states and historic communities. That, I think, is what we must learn from the great experiment at Geneva and from its failure. We have, I am convinced, to learn ^{it}₂₉ thoroughly. For we cannot afford to fail again.

Strausz-Hupé had also identified several "geographical nuclei of power" in his conception of postwar order. The American nucleus, however, was the first among equals, singularly capable of exercising the global "balancing and stabilizing control." This was no simplistic brief for world domination, he argued, but a recognition that the United States "had a preemptory interest in enforcing the creation and maintenance of a universal order ... (whose) security will ultimately depend on armed force, as does the security of any political system."³⁰ At the end of the war, he recognized that the world system would not be multipartite, but bipolar. This structure would work against the possibility of a future global integration of several power centers because it reduced the basis for compromise. Rather, military preparedness would become "the indispensable guarantee of security and hence peace" and there would be a disincentive "to dismantle a compact security arrangement fortified by a solid aggregation of client states."³¹

In response to the stalemate that would ensue from this postwar structure, Strausz-Hupé developed a regional concept that departed from the realists' "great power orbit" theory

and broached the third, or autochthonous, theory of regionalism. Dividing the world into orbital zones, he now argued, until no small power existed outside a great power's sphere of interest entailed a "loss of 'play,' without which not only engine parts but also parts of a state system are exposed to intolerable friction" (35). With the fate of eastern Europe perhaps on his mind, the Viennese-born scholar-strategist called for the integration of small states into independent supranational units outside the security spheres of the great powers. Regionalism was now viewed as a third alternative for small states faced with choices between being placed in a great power orbit vs. isolation on the one hand or collaborating within an international organization vs. submission to a single power on the other.

Strausz-Hupé probed regionalism as an idea that went beyond concepts of power and geopolitics. He now considered it a mistake to confuse a region with "orbit," "bloc," or "zone," which were euphemisms for domination. His focus shifted to view regions as multinational human societies existing in defined time and space. He observed that a region was defined by sets of "affinities" composed of a distinctive blend of geographical, economical, cultural, and historical characteristics. "The regional affinities of western Europe lie in its economic interdependence, Atlantic outlook, and cultural experience" (273), he affirmed. And in spite of

political antagonisms, the peoples of the Danubian basin and the Arab lands of the Middle East are each drawn together by a common or similar geo-

graphical and shared historical experience. The accent may lie on this or that unifying factor. The fact is that among these races the idea of regional unity has sturdily survived long periods of fragmentation and foreign domination (273-74).

The regional affinities were the lost "play" factor in politics. Not recognizing this factor would adversely affect the stability of the great powers. Although he did not develop this idea, Strausz-Hupé described regionalism as a "comparatively recent phenomenon" whose "unfolding" would be a slow process. In a bold claim, he stated that it was "the only truly new phenomenon which has appeared on an international stage which for more than a century has been dominated by nationalism" (273). Regionalism represented "a fundamental alternative in world-political strategy," the need for which was reinforced by the threat of revolutionary ideologies to Western civilization. He challenged the West to "evolve new political forms" such as regional and sub-regional federations "adapted to a new political situation and its power-political instruments" (275). With its own federalist tradition, an American foreign policy that nurtured a federalism of regional as well as global dimensions was consistent with American interests. In fact, "if the settlement of World War II (did) not afford scope for the formation of new autonomous units created by the voluntary association of small nations," he argued that it "would be the antithesis of a system of balanced power" (35).

As we have seen, regionalism in world organization remained a subject of some disagreement and shifting emphasis among realists. There seemed to be less confusion

among them with regard to the structure of postwar Europe. Realists saw Europe as a power vacuum that was not to be filled by a single European power, notably Germany. At the same time, they were skeptical of a united Europe, favoring a weak Europe under the sphere of one or more extra-European major powers. At the same time, they thought it made balance of power sense for the smaller states to be integrated in sub-regional groupings commensurate in size and strength to the larger European states. As with the idealists, their particular concern was directed at what political geographers referred to as the strategic "shatter zone" of Europe, namely its eastern half.

Emphasizing the region's inherent volatility and instability, most realists developed regional concepts that were variations on Mackinder's theme. Writing after the German invasion of Russia, geopolitical publicist Bruce Hopper declared that the key to understanding the present conflict had to "be sought in the forces of history which have perpetuated a disequilibrium in the No Man's Land of Eastern Europe... ." ³² Peace required a new, creative balance in eastern Europe, which was attainable

only through the creation of strong buffer states to prevent direct contact between the Germanic and the Russian zones of power and likewise to prevent the division of the area into small nationalistic states... Unless a constructive solution is achieved for the "Teufel's Gürtel" (devil's belt), it will continue as the cradle of wars and the graveyard of peace settlements. ³³

Political geographer Richard Hartshorne similarly argued that the belt of buffer states had proven inadequate to prevent great power penetration in the region. He observed

that "for a second time in a generation we are engaged in a war that originated in that belt" and that "the war has merely demonstrated a more obvious point, namely, that national sovereignty for these states provided no national security."³⁴

As Quincy Wright had considered on behalf of the internationalists, Hartshorne raised the question of restoring the lands and economic infrastructure of the Habsburg monarchy. He envisaged welding the disparate elements of Danubian region into a federated geopolitical unit capable of defending itself and playing the balancing role it had done in the past. Before the war, he had diagnosed the monarchy's disintegration in part to its inability to articulate supranational political concepts or institutions capable of containing the centrifugal force of nationalism.³⁵⁴ He now argued that "the territorial basis of the former empire in the mid-Danube realm could provide the basis for a federated state, bound in its economic geography and in its external geopolitical relations... ." ³⁶ Whatever the outcome, any realistic planning for east Europe had at least three factors to take into account. The first was the impossibility of creating "clear-cut national states comparable with the system of states in Western Europe." The second was that all national or ethnic groups were a "definite reality ... and no politico-geographic system can be expected to succeed that does not give expression to each... ." Finally, that the great powers possessed the means to "destroy whatever structure is set in East Europe

unless the structure is effectively designed to prevent that outcome" (211).

Hartshorne's second factor introduced autochthonous criteria as requisites for the reunification of the region. Just as Strausz-Hupé tentatively moved away from regionalism as a purely great power orbit theory at the end of the war to one based on historical, cultural, economic, and other "affinities," Hartshorne embraced the notion that only indigenous peoples and not states could provide the impetus for unity. "Stability in the shatter zone cannot be achieved from the outside, whether from west or from east, nor by the reestablishment of free but hopelessly small units, but only by integration into a free association of free peoples, capable of providing a major element of its own defense" (emphasis added) (214). Such an east European regional grouping, while empowered to address its own problems and fate, would also have to coexist within a larger European and world organization. He concluded his case for a regional unit in east Europe related to larger units by stating that such an organization within this area would not be

in conflict with plans for a larger-scale organization of the states of Europe, or of the world, but on the contrary would be supplementary to it. A world organization should not be called upon to solve the endless number of local problems involved in the community life of the many individual peoples living in this area. On the other hand, the addition to a European, or world, organization of an additional large federal state would give strength where the addition of a dozen small states would give only confusion (214).

Both Hartshorne and Strausz-Hupé remained realists with regard to eastern Europe to the extent they also emphasized the strategic factor in the region. Strausz-

Hupé, for example, took the statesmen who crafted the 1919 peace settlement to task for having neglected strategic considerations in their desire to satisfy ethnic demands:

If a great tier of buffer states -- as envisioned by Curzon and Mackinder -- was to have lastingly barred Germany and Russia from each other, and Russia from the sea, then the frontiers of each state should have been drawn with special regard to strategic requirements even when they conflicted with the principle of national self-determination. The strategic role of these states in the grand scheme of world policy should have been given precedence over their individual aspirations.³⁷

He also joined Hartshorne in criticizing the Paris Peace settlement after World War I for allowing the dissolution of the supranational Danubian monarchy, as the resulting strategic power vacuum bred antagonism and war. "World War II can appropriately be called the Second War of the Austrian Succession," he suggested, "for Germany's annexation of the succession states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, namely Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, presented the concrete issues on which the Great Powers lined up for war."³⁸

During the war, regionalism had become an accepted if also imprecise concept in theorizing on postwar world and European organization. Neither the idealists nor realists developed more than tentative and partial theories of regionalism and postwar order in writings that did not focus on regionalism as such. Both interstate and hegemonial regionalism were in essence state-based theories of reforming the international system. Regions were largely conceived in terms of groups-of-states tied either to an

universal organization or hegemonial power. With some exceptions, neither interstate or hegemonial regionalists went much beyond fitting regionalism into their idealist or realist conceptions of political reality. The concept of state sovereignty was, if frequently decried, rarely questioned to any degree or depth. Most theorists of groups-of-states regionalism did not venture to challenge the assumptions of the modern unitary state as such.

Realist theorists of hegemonial regionalism were more penetrating in their critique of the abstract foundations of the modern international system than were the theorists of interstate regionalism in defending the assumptions of that system. But their alternative for restructuring world society into regional imperiums led by a major power did not transcend the basic assumption of national self-interest that undergirded the international system. Yet some writers in both schools -- Culbertson, Shotwell, and Quincy among the idealists, Strausz-Hupé and Hartshorne among realists -- attempted to go beyond state-centered conceptions of regionalism by acknowledging historical, economic, and socio-cultural factors operating at the societal level as something that was inherent in the regional idea. This approached the autochthonous theory of regionalism covered in the next chapter. The primary contest, however, was waged between the state-centered idealist and realist conceptions of postwar organization. At war's end, the idealists, or more precisely, the internationalists among them, had bested the realists at least on paper when the United Nations Charter was adopted in 1945. But as the moderate realist

Frederick L. Shuman observed somewhat wryly at war's end,
this settlement did not

alter in any fundamental way the traditional concepts of international law and diplomacy or the established structure of the Western state system as a congeries of theoretically equal sovereignties. It reiterat(ed) the principles of international rectitude and self-denial which have long been praised by all right-thinking citizens pursuing international morality and long ignored by all realistic governments pursuing national interests.

NOTES

¹Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago, 1946). Page references cited in text.

²James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (New York, 1943).

³The following draws heavily on Edmund A. Walsh, "Geopolitics and International Morals," in Compass of the World: A Symposium on Political Geography, eds. H.W. Weigert and V. Stefansson (New York, 1944). Ratzel's most important disciple in the United States was Ellen Churchill Semple (1863-1932), who founded schools of geography at the University of Chicago and Clark University emphasizing environmental factors as the determinants of culture and politics.

⁴Walsh, p. 17. See Derwent Whittlesey, "Haushofer: The Geopoliticians," in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1941), pp. 388-411; and Andrew Gyorgy, Geopolitics: The New German Science (Berkeley, 1944).

⁵See Henry Thomas Buckle, History of Civilization in England (London, [1857-61] 1903); Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890); Ellsworth Huntington, Civilization and Climate (New Haven, 1924), and Mainsprings of Civilization (New York, 1945); Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographical Journal, XXIII (1904), and Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, (New York, [1919] 1942).

⁶Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 157.

⁷Ibid., p. 172.

⁸Isaiah Bownman, "Geography vs. Geopolitics," Geographical Review (1942), cited in Compass of the World, op.cit., pp.40-41. See also Joseph S. Roucek, "Political Geography and Geopolitics," in Twentieth Century Political Thought, ed. J.S. Roucek (New York, 1946).

⁹Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, 33 (1939), 392, 394. See also Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, 32 (February 1938), 28-50 and (April 1938), 213-36. See Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "The Contribution of Nicholas Spykman to the Study of International Politics," World Politics, IV (April 1952).

¹⁰Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York, 1944), p. 7. Subsequent page references cited in text.

¹¹Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics:

The United States and the Balance of Power (New York, 1942). Page references cited in text.

¹²Robert Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (New York, 1942). Page references cited in text.

¹³Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Political Reality, p. 172.

¹⁴Friedrich Naumann, Mitteleuropa (Berlin, 1915). The for reaction of Naumann's plan in Hungary, see Karoly Irinyi, A Naumann-felé 'Mitteleuropa'-tervezet és a magyar politikai közvélemény (Naumann's 'Mitteleuropa' project and Hungarian public opinion) (Budapest, 1963).

¹⁵Jacques Droz, L'Europe centrale. Évolution historique de l'idée de 'Mitteleuropa' (Paris, 1960), p. 213.

¹⁶Russell Hunt Fifield, Regionalism as a Principle in International Relations (Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University, 1942), p. i. Written at the beginning of the war, Fifield's thesis examined three great power constellations centered on the "new orders" of Germany and Japan on the one side, and the democratic Pan-American experiment led by the United States on the other. In his view, "the method of the Axis powers in Europe and Asia is force imposed by a 'superior' or a 'divine' race upon the unwilling peoples of their jurisdiction while the method of the United States in the New World is mutual cooperation voluntarily accepted by the members of the area." He stated that "many people in the democracies envision a world organized on a regional basis with substantial political, economic, and cultural relations among the units, subject to a general world organization" (Ibid.).

¹⁷William T.R. Fox, The Superpowers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union -- Their Responsibility for Peace, (New Haven, 1944), p. 155.

¹⁸Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics, p. 6.

¹⁹Eugene Staley, "The Myth of the Continents," in Compass of the World, Weigert and Stefansson, op.cit., p. 106. The article originally appeared in Foreign Affairs, April 1941.

²⁰Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics, pp. 193, 194. See also Lionel Gelber, Peace by Power (New York, 1942); John MacCormac, America and World Mastery (New York, 1942); and Edward Meade Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 1943). Like Streit's federation schemes, this view enjoyed public appeal in the United States, popularized by publisher Henry R. Luce's The American Century (New York, 1941) and the writings of Walter Lippmann (see below). Luce exhorted Americans to "accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for

such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit" (22-23).

²¹ Spykman, America's Strategy, pp. 461-65. Subsequent page references cited in text.

²² In opposing European unity, realist Arnold Wolfers argued that the states of Europe "would find the surest guarantee of political independence ... in a balance of power between their great neighbors in East and West." ("Anglo-American Postwar Cooperation and the Interests of Europe," American Political Science Review, 36 [August, 1942], p. 663). See Heinrich Bodensieck, Provozierte Teilung Europas? Die britisch-amerikanische Regionalismus-Diskussion und die Vorgeschichte des Kalten Krieges 1939-1945 (Opladen, 1970), pp. 41f.

²³ Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, p. 6.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁵ Walter Lippmann, U.S. War Aims (Boston, 1944), pp. 162, 162-63. See Divine, Second Chance, pp. 178-80; Bodensieck, Provozierte Teilung Europas, pp. 56-57.

²⁶ Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943). Page references cited in text.

²⁷ For the public impact of Lippmann's work, see Divine, op.cit., pp. 124-27; Bodensieck, op.cit., pp. 47-49.

²⁸ Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, p. 190.

²⁹ Ibid., 197.

³⁰ Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, pp. 194-95.

³¹ Strausz-Hupé, The Balance of Tomorrow, p. 37. Subsequent page references cited in text.

³² Bruce Hopper, "The War for Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, 20 (October, 1941), 18.

³³ Ibid., pp. 27, 29.

³⁴ Richard Hartshorne, "The United States and the 'Shatter Zone' of Europe," in Compass of the World, op.cit., pp. 204, 209. See also Joseph C. Roucek, East Central Europe: The Crucible of Wars, (New York, 1946). On the concept of the "shatter zone," see Gordon East, "The Concept and Political Status of the Shatter Zone," in Geographical Essays on Eastern Europe ed. George Hoffman (New York, 1960).

³⁵ Richard Hartshorne, "The Tragedy of Austria-Hungary: A Post-Mortem in Political Geography," (abstract) Annals of the Association of American Geographers, XXVIII (1938), 49.

³⁶Hartshorne, "The United States and the 'Shatter Zone' of Europe," p. 213.

³⁷Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, p. 213.

³⁸Ibid., p. 261.

³⁹Frederick L. Schuman, "Regionalism and Spheres of Influence," in Peace, Security and the United Nations, ed. H.J. Morgenthau (Chicago, 1946), pp. 93-4.

CHAPTER IV

AUTOCHTHONOUS REGIONALISM

On the eve of the war, sociologist F.W. Morgan identified three aspects of regionalism that had become part of the western consciousness since the latter part of the 19th century.¹ These were the rise of the socio-cultural and political movements known as "regionalism;" the development of regionalism as a concept in geography and other fields; and the emergence of the regional novel as a genre in literature. The latter expression, of which the Wessex novels of Thomas Hardy and Maurice Barres' Les Déracinés (1897) were perhaps the best exemplars, will not concern us here. But the parallel emergence of these phenomena in various parts of the West suggested a synchronicity. According to Morgan, the three expressions were "roughly contemporaneous and ha(d) enough characteristics in common to justify the assumption that they (bore) some relation to each other."² Before turning to the war-time theoretical discussion of regionalism as a phenomenon of autochthonous, or indigenous, criteria, it is appropriate to briefly review the development of regionalism as a historical movement and concept in the social sciences.

"Regionalism" as a Historical Movement and Concept

So-called "regionalist" movements sprang up in France and Spain in latter half of the 19th century followed by similar movements in other parts of Europe, east and west, and even the United States.³ While diverse in their expressions and goals, the movements proceeded, in Morgan's words, "from the reaction against the centralized government of the modern State, against the centralizing influence of the capital city upon all cultural activities, and against the standardizing effects of modern civilization."⁴ If the regions of the regionalist, geographer, and novelist rarely coincided, they were nonetheless "signs of a developing consciousness of the smaller units of the earth."

It was no accident that the regionalist movement was born and acquired its greatest momentum in France, home (if perhaps in competition with Prussia) of the modern unitary state. Political and administrative centralization in France had already begun during the early modern period of absolute monarchies. The road network of the ancien régime, for example, upon which the later rail system was built, basically led to and from Paris. But it was not until the French Revolution, with its invocation of "la nation française," and subsequent Napoleonic reforms that centralization acquired its modern form. In the 1931, historian Carlton Hayes described the transformation in the following terms:

[T]he inhabitants of France, shortly before the Revolution of 1789, were not a closely knit

nationality; they were a congeries of Gascons, Provençals, Artesians, Bretons, Normans, Alsatians, etc., whom their common king addressed as 'my peoples'; ...[T]hey learned to be 'the French people' ('la nation française') from middle-class instructors who had already outgrown the cramping bonds of provincial loyalty and who utilized the Revolution as a popular and even compulsory training school in French nationalism.⁵
(parens in original)

The logic of the new state required people to conform to a common national purpose that linked them directly to a central authority. This idea, Hans Kohn has argued, received its theoretical justification in the 17th and 18th century political thought of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Hobbes and Locke prepared the way by devising new political philosophies based on "a fervent rationalism ... (and) the theory of the state as an expediency."⁶ Locke as an Enlightenment precursor of idealism believed in the rule of reason and the fundamental goodness and perfectability of man. By contrast, Hobbes' pessimistic view of man and nature led him to believe that the "state was not an instrument for social good, but an essential brake upon man; (that) law was nothing but the command of the sovereign actually in power." While they differed on the ends of the state, Hobbes and Locke shared in common the idea of a new political order where the state was emptied of the traditional constraints of an transcendent, or independent morality.

The moral vacuum was filled by Rousseau who founded, as Kohn put it, "the state on a new basis, on a truly patriotic basis... ." ⁷ The process entailed transforming the medieval natio, an unselfconscious, ethno-cultural concept, into an

abstract political concept called the "general will." If during the medieval period there was no sovereignty as such with regard to political authority, the general will now became an expression of a people (peuple) endowed with sovereign power.⁸ Nationalism became the new communitarian morality which provided the glue that welded the people with the new state.⁹

The administratively centralized state became a historical reality in France on July 14, 1790 with the merger of local and regional defense groups into a single, self-conscious nation.¹⁰ The revolutionary Constituent Assembly agreed on that day to break up the old provinces, or pays d'état, into arbitrarily delineated administrative units, or départements. Napoleon completed this process with the law of Pluiose of the year VIII (February 17, 1800), which gave the first consul the power to appoint département prefects, arrondissement subprefects, and municipal mayors. The administrative centralization was accompanied by cultural centralization through the creation of a national system of education centered in Paris and extending from the village level to the highest institutions of learning. This policy atrophied independent intellectual and cultural life which had been flourishing at the time of the revolution. It was accomplished by eviscerating intermediary institutions (guilds, parishes, local assemblies, cultural associations) that stood between the individual and the state. The new arrangements worked toward making, as Octave Feuillet wrote to Napoleon III in 1867, all of France a suburb of Paris. Similar processes took place in London,

Berlin, and other major European capitals. Regional planner Lewis Mumford described the social impact of this transformation in the following somewhat sardonic terms:

[T]he living tissue of customs and traditions, the vernacular architecture, the folk-ways and the folk-tales, the vulgar languages and dialects which were spoken outside of Paris or London -- all these were looked upon by the intelligent eighteenth century gentleman as a mass of follies and barbarisms. Enlightenment and progress meant the spreading of London and Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg over wider and wider areas.¹¹

Although opposition to central control was never absent in France, the first significant protest movement arose in 1854 among a group of Provençal poets led by Frédéric Mistral. Highly romantic, they called themselves the félibristes in the tradition of the medieval troubadors. Toward the end of the century, the initial romantic strain of the movement became political. In 1892, the movement issued a declaration calling for "freedom of the communes" and "the liberation of the soul of the provinces from their departmental prison." They demanded what was to become the classic regionalist refrain of autonomy guaranteed by federalist principles and structures. In 1900, various regionalist currents united to form the Fédération Régionaliste Française (FRF), one of whose leaders, Jean Charles-Brun (1870-1930), drafted the magna charta of the regionalist movement in the following year.¹²

World War I proved to be a turning point in the history of regionalism in France. In the wake of external danger and a recrudescence of local and regional activity, the central government's authority collapsed.¹³ In August-September

1914, as Paris faced the danger of German occupation, the connection between the capital and the various parts of France had broken down. Left to their own devices, the regions spontaneously organized effective action on behalf of the war effort in such practical areas as humanitarian relief, land cultivation, transportation, and food and coal supply. These initiatives contrasted with the period between the French Revolution and the 1870-71 war, when mayors, prefects, and local assemblies dared not act without prior instructions from Paris. Through a 1915 decree, the central government attempted to coordinate these activities through the creation of regional economic advisory councils which, in 1919, evolved into recognized organs called régions économiques. "This reform in the classic land of administrative centralization," Hedwig Hintze suggested, "signalized a decisive victory for the regionalist idea."¹⁴

For Lewis Mumford, the regionalist movement in the early 20th century represented "an effort to create a new mould for life as a whole, in continuity with that which had continuously existed in Europe." He saw regionalism as a paradigm for a new, as yet undefinable, politics that was at once idealistic and practical, radical and commonplace, and cultural and technical. It carried the promise of a social cure for a body politic afflicted with the other-directed, mechanistic values of the industrial state:

In the slow, varied and partly involuntary growth of regionalism there is the promise ... of changes more subtle and profound than those that can be embodied in any definite political programme. What we are working for is a new attitude towards our political and industrial institutions... Our industrialism has been other-worldly... It is time

that we came to terms with the earth, and worked in partnership with the forces that promote life and the traditions that enhance it. Regionalism suggests a cure... .¹⁵

The regionalist movements at the turn of the century were accompanied by efforts among academics to develop a regional concept. Geographers in particular, but also anthropologists, sociologists, cultural historians, and political economists were developing new fields of social study that took man's relation to his natural and cultural landscape, and not the state, as their locus of concern. Influenced in part by the élan-vital, or life-philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941), who discarded both the positivist and idealist philosophies of the 19th century, and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Ferdinand Tönnies, and Max Weber (1864-1920) in Germany, these new social science disciplines, or Geisteswissenschaften, brought social and political reality "down to earth," as it were, without resorting to scientific reductionism. French sociologists Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939) studied the "morphology" of social groups in society and cultural anthropologists Franz Boas (1858-1946) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) were among the first to develop the concept of "culture area." In 1911, Boas held that each culture could be understood "only as an historical growth determined by the social and geographical environment in which each people is placed and by the way in which it develops the cultural material that comes into its possession from the outside through its own creativeness."¹⁶ Political economist Max Weber was in particular concerned with the mutual

relationship between economic, cultural, and political factors in the development of western society from "traditional" to "rational" principles of authority and legitimacy.

It was in the field of geography that the regional concept as such was developed at the turn of the century. According to regional geographer Robert Dickinson, "the regional concept was developed around 1900 with reference to the division of the world into systems of major entities."¹⁷ In England and in particular Germany, "regions" tended to be delimited in terms of physical nature and climate which affected if not determined culture. Others, notably Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845-1918) in France and the German-American Franz Boas in the United States rejected this environmental determinism and stressed environmental and cultural interaction as the differentiating factors between regions.

In 1891, the Languedocian Vidal de la Blache founded the Annales school of human geography which produced a generation of "genre de vie" (way, or mode, of life) monographs on the various regions, including trans-border regions, of France. He extended his basically descriptive regional human geography approach to the differentiation of world regions, asserting that the repartition of the world was "regionally organized."¹⁸ He distanced himself from the determinism initiated by Friedrich Ratzel and developed by his followers and was not content to link the concept of terrestrial unity with the modern state.¹⁹ Rather, in his Tableau de le géographie de la France (1903), Vidal de la

Blache defined a region as a composite of environmental and human factors, specifically as

a reservoir of energy whose origin lies in nature but whose development depends upon man. It is man, who, by molding the land to his own purposes, brings out its individuality. He establishes a connection between its separate features. He substitutes for the incoherent effect of local circumstances a systematic concourse of forces. It is thus that a region defines and differentiates itself and becomes as it were a medal struck off in the effigy of a people.²⁰

The above disciplinary innovations took place in the context of a more general reorientation in scientific, social, and political thought in fin-de-siècle Europe. The changing perceptions in society and politics were manifested, as H. Stuart Hughes suggests, in a revolt against the dominant naturalistic and positivistic assumptions about reality and in the (re)emergence of non-rational, subjective factors (intuition, consciousness, spontaneity) in understanding human behavior.²¹ German historian Karl-Georg Faber has argued that a "paradigm shift" in historical and political research began at the turn of the century when the concept of the historical region emerged as "a new object of historical science... ." ²² The region and regional consciousness were (re)discovered as constituent elements of Europe's social and political structure.²³ According to Faber, the change signaled a shift in focus in the study of politics away from "the state and politics as an étatist arrangement, or at least its relativization as a historical force, toward that of popular forces (in Germany), to society (in France), and to 'social forces' (in the USA)."²⁴ The regional concept

provided the means through which the region could begin to join the state as an intelligible unit of study.

In Germany, the phenomenon of popular forces, or *Volkskräften*, was tied to the concept of "Geschichtslandschaft," or historical landscape, an idea traceable to the thought of cultural historian Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and geographer Karl Ritter (1779-1859) but identified principally with Friedrich Ratzel in his Deutschland, Einführung in die Heimatkunde (Leipzig 1898) and the works of cultural historian Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915).²⁵ In France, "Région historique" referred to the "Annales" school founded by Paul Vidal de la Blache and developed by Jean Brunhes, Lucien Febvre, and others including Henri Berr and his journal, Revue du synthèse historique, founded in 1900. American "sectionalism" was developed by frontier historian Frederick Jackson Turner (1861-1932), whose article "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" (1894) and The Significance of the Section in American History (1926) helped sparked the American "New History" school that set itself apart from the dominant constitutional historians. Turner adopted philosopher Josiah Royce's 1902 definition of "section" as "any part of a national domain which is geographically and socially sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own ideals and customs and to possess a sense of its distinction from other parts of the country."

The emergence of the regionalist movement and the "region" as a concept in the social sciences provide a

basis with which to explore regionalism as an autochthonous force or the region as unit in international relations.

"Autochthonous" is synonymous with "indigenous" and derives from the Greek "autochthon" meaning "of the land itself." The war-time materials under review in this study point to the development of autochthonous regionalism as both a concept and principle of postwar political organization.

Autochthonous Regionalism as a Concept of Postwar Order

After reviewing the corpus of writings on regionalism and postwar reconstruction in 1943, sociologist James Watkins observed that "both the concepts and methodology of regionalism (were) conspicuously lacking. ...Without apparently being aware of the scientific reasoning which should have led them to do so, the authors have uniformly rejected the physiographic region in favor of the group-of-states region and have constructed their world schemes in conformity with the latter."²⁶ There was little to suggest that the "regions selected (had) been delimited in accordance with indices previously determined and investigated" and there was "plainly no conception of 'composite major societal region(s)' within a larger whole (which in this case is the world itself or one of the continents)... ." ²⁷

Watkins took part in a symposium of American sociologists led by Howard W. Odum (1884-1954), editor of Social Forces at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), who sought to develop and apply the regional concept

to the problem of postwar order. Odum had founded the Institute for Research in Social Science and the journal Social Forces in the early 1920s with support from his mentor Franklin Henry Giddings (1855-1931) at Columbia University. Giddings built on William Graham Sumner's pioneering study on Folkways (1906) to develop the concept of "sustentation area," designating an area capable of sustaining elemental social life. Analogous to Tönnies' Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft dichotomy, Giddings and in particular Odum contrasted "folkways", or natural and enduring features of social life, with "stateways" (or sometimes, "technicways"), which were the artificial and transient artefacts of civilization. The contrast between the permanent, continuous, and voluntaristic "folk culture" and a necessarily coercive "state civilization" was a central feature of Odum's folk society theory of regionalism.

Odum began his work in community studies of race and folk culture in the American South. In the 1930s, he turned to develop theoretical aspects of regionalism and folk sociology.²⁸ With Harry E. Moore in the late 1930s, he authored American Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical Approach to National Integration, which became a landmark study on regionalism in the United States.²⁹ Odum distanced himself from Turner's "sectionalism," which he interpreted as a "cultural inbreeding" that invariably led to political isolationism and national separatism. The danger inherent in sectionalism, a danger which Turner himself recognized in the war between North and South, was the idea of "separate

units with separate interests" akin to the exclusivist European nations. Odum stressed the integrative and synthetic character of regionalism, where regions were studied in relation to a larger whole, in this case, the United States. Regionalism implied a unifying function whose premise was not to "become a federation of conflicting sections but a homogeneity of varying regions" (39).

Odum and Moore defined a region as a social gestalt, or complex of interrelationships of natural and cultural forces that formed a unique regional pattern. The synthetic character of the region was in part determined by the

presence or absence of various elements of social organization, but in greater part by the pattern those elements which are present form through their interrelationships and through the peculiar interpretation given them by the folk occupying the particular region under study. The elements, therefore, can be understood only when conceived as parts of the whole social organization (413-14).

The region served as the frame of reference for the study of societal phenomena. The region was an object of study for the biologist, the geologist, the geographer, the anthropologist, the economist, the historian, the political scientist; but the sociologist's region was the nearest approximation to a synthesis of studies, methods, and concepts where regionalism could emerge as a "'gestalt' on the one hand and a comprehensive methodological approach on the other" (414-15).

Methodologically, a region's concrete existence was established in part by a statistical-cultural approach that determined "a relatively large degree of homogeneity measured by a relatively large number of indices available

for a relatively large number of purposes and classifications" (30). The limitations of such an approach were also recognized. A descriptive compilation of facts and comparative indices were necessary but not sufficient to establish the existence of a region. There were other contributing factors of a cultural nature, such as "personality, folkways, motivation, handicaps, (which were) not measurable in terms of our present objective methods" (448). Odum addressed the problem by adapting gestalt psychology to sociology. He applied the concept of gestalt to suggest a given "cultural determinism" inherent in the region:

The concept borrowed is that of the mutual dependence of the field and the figure, the insistence that form and relationship are as important as content, and give much of their meaning to the individual bits composing the whole; that the meaning of a line in a drawing, a note in a musical composition, or any other bit of sensory evidence depends in large part on associated sensory perceptions... This is tantamount to saying that all the factors are mutually conditioning, at once cause and effect. In still other words, regionalism points to cultural determinism in that the tools by which man has surrounded himself, both physical and mental, and by which he seeks his well-being, direct and affect his response to the physical area in which he finds himself (414).

Interrelated environmental and cultural factors are ingredients in a natural pattern of organization that gives a region its distinctive character. "For both the individual and the social group, the pre-existing culture is largely determinative of the present organization" and represented the customary, or "natural" order of society (Ibid.). Its nucleus consisted of "the valuable heritage of 'the folk'" (Ibid.).

Between 1942 and 1945, Odum devoted space in Social Forces for a symposium on the regional concept as it related in particular to the problem of postwar planning and order.³⁰ Open-ended in design and scope, this symposium of "regionalists" contributed substantially toward the development of regionalism as an autochthonous concept in political organization. The symposium was initiated by Odum's postulation of twelve axiomatic "assumptions" on the theory and practice of regionalism as a social analysis and planning tool.³¹ The sociologist was being asked to interpret the nature and role of regionalism in contemporary society in general and post-war reconstruction in particular. With the war, Odum's folk sociology differentiating folk "culture" and state "civilization" had taken on new meaning. The enduring human ecology values of folk culture in regional society were seen more than ever as a needed corrective balance to the ersatz character of state civilization "now so tragically destructive in contemporary society." As a comprehensive, or synthetic, science of the region, regionalism became an "extension of the postulates of human ecology into a broader framework of societal development and a frame of reference for societal planning."

If his regionalism in the 1930s was confined to the American experience, Odum now emphasized the generic value of the regional concept, which was applicable "to all societies and in particular to the world of war-regions." In his second series of assumptions, he distinguished between two levels of regionalism, the structural-organic and the functional-organizational, each of which shared two

features. The structural-organic corresponded to the world's geographic regions, "described and characterized in terms of nature's settings," and to the world-cultural regions, in which was understood the "organic character of the relation between men and resources, between physical areas and culture areas, between cultural environment and technological forces... ."

The functional-organizational level of regionalism corresponded to the eco-political repartition of the world into political units ("nations, federations, and empires") and the existing war-regions and coming postwar world, "in which the promise of a new regionalism in post-war reconstruction may set the stage for cooperative societies of regional balance" that transcended "economic nationalism and totalitarian militarism." Odum devoted the next ten series of assumptions to the application of American regionalism to an understanding "not only the world of culture of today and tomorrow, but in the understanding and planning of any realistic post-war world reconstruction." In brief, the American experiment was in no small way defined by a pioneering spirit that, for reasons of survival, was forced to continually make adjustments to frontier environments. Odum cited Frederick Jackson Turner's statement that "'American social development has been continually beginning over and over again on the frontier'." This condition now applied to a war-torn world and was needed to face the frontier challenge of rebuilding and restructuring the postwar world.

Odum's article, drafted in the form of a syllabus for future research, elicited a number of responses.³² George Lundberg ("Regionalism, Science, and the Peace Settlement") understood regionalism in terms of "social space." In human sociology, regionalism referred to the study of social behavior in a geographic area from a regional point of view, "because we think of all behavior taking place in space" (132). He discussed the integrative function of the concept and found a shared vocabulary with the Unity of Science movement recently established by physicists at the University of Chicago. The use of such terms as "organismic," "symbiotic," "gradient," "equilibrium," and "balance" were common to both fields (133). Lundberg doubted, however, that these concepts of regionalism and science would receive practical consideration in the organization of the postwar peace. The vocabulary of the international settlement was likely to remain in the realm of "'balance' of political power" and the "whole legalistic, moralistic frame of reference" (135).³³

Svend Riemer ("Theoretical Aspects of Regionalism"), described regionalism as an integrative disciplinary approach that had developed from a practical need for social orientation (275). He presented an operational definition of the region as both a functional unit and an "ideal type" (278-9). It was in this context that Odum's ideas of equilibrium and cultural harmony and organic growth "move into the center of theoretical discourse the problem of purposeful social action" (280). Rudolf Heberle ("Regionalism: Some Critical Reflections") distinguished

between regionalism as a political phenomenon -- "the popular sentiment of the inhabitants of a certain geographical region ... constitute a forceful factor in political life" (280-1) -- and regionalism in the social sciences, which aimed at the "thorough and at the same time comprehensive knowledge of a concrete society" (282).

Comprehensive meant going beyond the measurement of quantifiable regional indices to a consideration of the region as, quoting from Odum's syllabus, "'an area of which the inhabitants feel themselves a part'" (283). Heberle called for "analysis of the socio-psychological nature of this "'consciousness of kind'," stating that people of a region are likely to be bound less by common "interests" than "the imponderable factors of a common tradition and history" (283).

J.O. Hertzler ("Some Basic Queries Respecting World Regionalism") attempted with admittedly limited success to project the "principles of intra-national regionalism, especially as it has developed in the United States," into the world arena (373). He tried to integrate the autochthonous regionalism principle of the North Carolina school with the groups-of-states formulas that dominated the debate on regionalism and postwar organization. He envisaged regions as administrative units within a universal organization composed of states organized where possible into regional federations. But he found that trying to "establish subdivisions in which a consistent natural-cultural 'landscape' existed (would) not be appropriate for

most administrative purposes" (379). In spite of this assessment, the North Carolina school of regionalism represented the only concerted effort to open a theoretical discussion on a region qua region approach to postwar organization.

International relations theorists who developed regionalism along these or similar lines were few and far between next to the idealists and realists who dominated the academic and public debate on regionalism and postwar order. Perhaps singularly among them, George B. de Huszar of the University of Chicago strove to develop regionalism as an integrative concept in international relations and the problem of peacemaking.³⁴ Huszar took issue with the contending "geographical" and "legal" approaches for their static conceptions of peace. Both were concerned with formal structures -- boundaries, treaties, territory, armaments, laws, balance of power -- to the neglect of social, psychological, economic, anthropological and other related factors. "Habits of cooperation are more important than formal structures," he argued, "for no organization, no matter how perfect in structure, can succeed unless there is a will to work together."³⁵

International relations as a field was in Huszar's view limited in its study of law, institutions, diplomatic history, geography, and current events. As such, it was unable to "realistically appraise a social situation, take account of the interdependence of a variety of economic, social, and psychological factors..." (21). He regretted the near absence of sociologists, psychologists, and

anthropologists in the discussions on the postwar peace. A synthetic over an analytic approach was needed in international relations that took into account a variety of concrete social phenomena. It was necessary to integrate data from a number of social science disciplines to obtain a more functional view of the social reality that undergirded international politics:

...(O)nce we realize that the orthodox methods are not sufficient, we will pay less attention to legal formulas and maps and more to the relations between peoples. Sociological, economic, and psychological methods cannot hope to offer diagrams and blueprints for peace...; but by dealing with intangibles, with dynamic forces, we may grasp the realities of international politics. Such forces are not sideline issues, for nations are not merely legal units and pieces of land; they are made up of human beings (24).

Huszar drew in part on the anthropological concept of "culture area" to develop his regional approach to the study of postwar organization.³⁶ He defined a culture area as a "region having certain definite characteristics of culture, both material and non-material, which distinguish it from other areas." A regional approach counteracted both "the crude empiricism" implicit in overspecialized research and the dilettantism associated with the "vague theorizing" of universalists. The region, while it cut in to or crossed state boundaries, was nonetheless delimited in time and space and its successful study required multidisciplinary team research. The regional approach served an integrative function in drawing together various social and physical science disciplines for the study of a given region. In language that approached that of the North Carolina

school of regionalism, Huszar stated the objective of such an approach was to build a configurational "perspective" of a region by bringing data on that region together in a pattern. A regional approach treated a culture area as an organic unit that could only be understood if its individual traits were considered in relation to an integrated whole. The interdisciplinary scope of this approach meant studying "the physical characteristics, climate, resources, transportation system, economic structure, linguistic pattern, racial situation, political structure, social and religious pattern, and intellectual and artistic life of a region." From such a study of "uniformities and diversities the basic trends and problems of a region would emerge. By contrasting various areas a morphology of world regions would result." Interdisciplinary regional or area research, introduced in American universities in the 1930s, came to its own in the years following World War II.³⁷

Autochthonous Regionalism as a Principle of Postwar Organization

The idea of autochthonous regionalism as a principle of postwar organization was pursued among others by Alfred Cobban, a Reader of French History and writer in international affairs at the University of London.³⁸ With Europe as his focus of concern, Cobban advanced the principle "that administrative areas should wherever possible represent social realities."³⁹ This invariably meant recognizing political units that cut into or across pre-war state boundaries. Political units were not divisible

according to "mathematical or geometric criteris; local conditions are the only criteria, and these may sometimes dictate a large, sometimes a comparatively small area" (92). A political structure comprised of local or regional units representing real communal interests was a repudiation of the existing French system of administration that had spread throughout Europe in the 19th century. The system, a legacy of the French Revolution and Napoléon, had proven "a perfect instrument of centralized government, whether the ruling authority (was) an individual despot or a Parliament" (92). The French Revolution sought to establish liberty from the top downwards; for Cobban, "the only sound process is to build it from the bottom upwards" (93). He saw a need for both integration and decentralization in a postwar structure composed of supra-national and sub-national units organized along federal lines. He acknowledged that this effectively meant the end of the sovereign nation state:

The truth is that the sovereign nation state is no longer a possible, as it was never an adequate, political framework for the organisation of Europe, to say nothing of the rest of the world. Above the nations, vastly greater military and economic systems are required by the circumstances of the age. Below them the existence of lesser units is constantly demanding institutional recognition. Thus, over the nation there is an urgent need for some kind of federal or imperial structure, which shall unite without destroying the nations, and under the nation for some institutional system through which the political and cultural consciousness of the lesser communities may achieve satisfaction. ...The latter ... might possibly be met by reconstruction on a regional basis, in other words, by the establishment under the greater nations of a scheme of local autonomy throughout Europe (91).

The main obstacle in building such as structure was the

principle of national self-determination, which was regarded by the 1919 Paris peacemakers as the moral and political foundation of the post-World War I settlement. The theory of self-determination based on national sovereignty suffered from several flawed assumptions. For one, the western democracies believed they were fighting the Axis powers for the right of national independence which the latter were said to have quashed. Second, the belief was widespread that a nationality had a natural right to independent statehood. In a new era of universal suffrage, national self-determination was seen as a democratic principle based on the "one nation, one state" formula. Third, when applied in ethnically inter-mixed central and eastern Europe, where the principle in practice favored the largest and most dominant nationality, the new state invariably practiced "national determinism" over so-called "minority" peoples under its rule. In this process, the cultural idea of the nation "slip(ped) into the background, and the nation (became) a dominantly political concept, the embodiment of the power of the state."⁴⁰

As this was occurring in eastern Europe, the process in western Europe had moved in the opposite direction, namely, from the political to the cultural nation. The early modern dynasties of France, Spain, England, and Portugal, with their medieval origins, evolved into modern administrative states before the age of nationalism. Nationality was a subjective and psychological factor "in opposition to the objective and political fact of the state" (59). In the 1915 words of Sir Alfred Zimmern, "'I have come to believe in

nationality not as a political creed for oppressed peoples, but rather as an educational creed for the diverse national groups of which the industrialized and largely migratory democracies in our large modern States must be increasingly composed'" (Ibid.).

Cobban revised the concept of nationality by emphasizing its variable and porous as against its imputed exclusive character. Viewed beyond the nationalistic prism of the last century or so, ethnic sentiment has in fact differed in degree and kind from period to period, from country to country, and even from individual to individual. The theory of the nation state, however, was "built on the assumption that national loyalties (were) exclusive" (60-61).⁴¹ When applied in international relations, it imputed the erroneous "belief that the whole world (could) be divided agmonst separate homogeneous divisions of the human race..." (61).

Given the tragi-comic results of these assumptions about nationality since 1918, Cobban declared that "the idea of the nation-state as the one valid basis of political organization must be abandoned" (64). A first step required revising the principle of national sovereignty, which inauspiciously sanctioned the nation state as a "leviathan, fatal to the domestic liberties of individuals and groups," as well as a force for anarchy in international relations (67). National sovereignty had become "irreconcilable with any solution to the fundamental problems of the modern world" (71). Both national self-determination and national

sovereignty were no longer tenable as absolute rights. The right of self-determination could no longer mean an absolute right to national sovereignty, for the "true rights of man are his liberties -- political, economic, national, religious," which may or may not require some degree of separate statehood under circumstances that may or may not be objectively possible (74). As an alternative, Cobban saw the region as the true expression of self-determination within a federal political community. For beneath the veneer of modern industrialized states, European society remained more or less remained a mosaic of medieval fragments. In central and eastern Europe, "the facts of medieval politics (were) still the underlying realities" while the regional communities in western Europe "have awoken to a sense of their separate identity" (148, 149).⁴²

The task of a realistic international policy would begin by "construct(ing) a regional map of the world" that was also be cognizant of a number of mixed population areas such as Transylvania (149). The criterion for the existence of a region was the sentiment of its population. When self-determination is based not on separate statehood but the principle of local and regional self-government,

a new and entirely different vista of possibilities is opened up. The recognition of the right of local autonomy restores the alliance between democracy and national feeling, which centralization ha(d) done so much to break. ...The principle of building from below is both more democratic and more realistic than the nation-state theory of 1918. Where regions with a separate national consciousness exist, even if they are smaller than the communities we are accustomed to, they must be treated as the basic elements in the pattern of European society. This is the first principle of the new self-determination (151).⁴³

Cobban next considered within what limits regional autonomy was possible. What, for example, was an appropriate distribution of powers between a central and regional governments? He argued that a separation between culture and politics, as proposed by Austro-Marxist Karl Renner in his 1899 cultural autonomy plan to reform the Habsburg Empire, was untenable.⁴⁴ Autonomous cultural associations of persons would give no scope to the "territorial sentiment" implicit in the idea of the (autochthonous) region and regional autonomy. The problem self-determination was addressed only where there was a "recognizable area, however small, which the nation, or sub-nation, (could) consider its own on the basis of occupation; and any attempt to satisfy true national demands must in some sense be political, that is, it must deal with the rights of government" (152-53).

As a decentralized political structure was the sine qua non of regionalism, regional control over the functions of local government, following the American and British models of self-government, would in itself be a step toward enhancing the importance of regional government. The central authorities would perforce be unable to manipulate a regional administration as if it were an artificial unit of the central government. But Cobban did not outline what powers the regional governments should have beyond cultural control over religion, education, and language. It was also unclear what the nature of the state, denuded of national sovereignty, was. The state's role, in what appeared to be a Swiss-like confederative structure, was essentially a

functional one of providing for defense, preserving domestic law and order, and promoting economic well-being (154-55). His models for the larger federative community were not the dissolved multinational empires of the Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns, Romanovs, or Ottomans, who failed to contain national sentiments. Rather, ^{he}embraced a form of hegemonial regionalism in the international sphere. Experience warranted looking at the existing federative patterns in the "imperial boundaries or spheres of influence" of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union (156).⁴⁵

The strategic interests of the major powers were thus another limitation on smaller states organized on the basis of regional autonomy. But great power interests and regional autonomy were not in necessary conflict. Indeed, a consideration of military and economic factors suggested that "the survival of small states depends today, as in the past, on the policy the dominant great powers adopt" (171). With an eye fixed fixed more on the traditional balance of power principle than on a predatory power politics, Cobban suggested that the policies of the great powers -- strategic interests, prevention of war, domestic security, economic well-being -- were not "necessarily harmful to the independence or legitimate rights of the small states" (173). In this respect, autochthonous and hegemonial regionalism were not mutually exclusive propositions. But in Cobban's earlier (January 1943) article on the "regional reconstruction of Europe," he emphasized not great power hegemony but federalism as an organizing principle that would operate "throughout the social fabric." In a

reorganization of Europe based on regional autonomy and local government, "the unitary nation state would disappear" and be replaced by "a European order consisting of a number of greater or smaller federations... ."46

Cobban's re-interpretation of self-determination was partially echoed by E.H. Carr, who saw a need to place limits on self-determination as an absolute right. He argued along the line that

national self-determination became a standing invitation to secession. The movement which dismembered Austria-Hungary and created Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was bound to be succeeded by movements for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Given the premises of nationalism, the process was natural and legitimate, and no end could be set to it.⁴⁷

Carr discredited the 19th century idea of a necessary identity between the nation and state. "The existence of a more or less homogeneous racial or linguistic group bound together by a common tradition and the cultivation of a common culture must cease to provide a prima facie case for the setting up of an independent political unit."⁴⁸

His remedy accorded only partial recognition to autochthonous regionalism as a principle of political organization. Carr suggested a system of divided but not incompatible loyalties. He contended there was "every reason to suppose that considerable numbers of Welshmen, Catalans and Uzbeks have quite satisfactorily solved the problem of regarding themselves as good Welshmen, Catalans, and Uzbeks for some purposes and good British, Spanish and Soviet citizens for others" (66). Given the reality of greater concentrations of power and centralization particularly in

the military and economic fields, it was in the "interplay between centralisation and devolution, in this recognition that some human affairs require to be handled by larger, and others by smaller, groups than at present, that we must seek a solution to the baffling problem of self-determination" (Ibid.). If the 1919 peace settlement was planned in terms of national units, Carr believed planning in terms of a wider global framework was necessary in order to remove limitations on genuine self-determination. Only when an international order based on common military and economic power had been assured could "national aspirations for independence and self-government, for the development and maintainance of national institutions and national culture, receive their full and unrestricted expression" (279).

Autochthonous regionalism as a principle of political organization applied as much to the decentralization of large states as to the integration of smaller states into larger regional units. The postwar futures of Germany and the Danubian region were frequently cited as such examples by both theorists and practitioners of the postwar order. Political theorist Arnold Brecht's proposal to decentralize Germany into federal units was an application of autochthonous regionalism as a principle of power devolution in a large unitary state.⁴⁹ He favored restoring the rights of the larger German provinces and breaking up Prussia into its thirteen original provinces. The provinces, or Länder, would be self-governing units accountable to a Federal Council, the highest legislative authority. Brecht's scheme,

which was largely realized in the actual political structure of postwar Germany, underlined the proposition of Odum and others that (autochthonous) regionalism was not a provincial version of nationalism but a manifestation of a social reality-based unit cohering within a larger (viz., federal) unit. Brecht stated that "the marked regional stratification of political opinions in Germany (offered) a plausible argument for re-establishing some kind of federal system, and perfecting it by the elimination of oversized Prussia as a single state, in order to leave homogeneous regions the possibility of shaping their pattern of life differently in matters that can be locally differentiated."⁵¹

With regard to the ethnically intermixed Danubian region, British historian C.A. Macartney looked to the lapsed Habsburg monarchy for clues to a "constructive and synthetic" plan that was not based on a policy of power balance of national states.⁵² He stressed the need to consider "the wishes and needs of the east European peoples as a whole, not only a favoured part of them" (151). He stated that a restructured east-central Europe "would probably be something which the world has not yet seen." In the meantime, the Monarchy was a model of a multinational polity that provided a large degree of protection and national security to all its peoples and maintained an attitude towards them that was based not on nationality, but loyalty to the supranational symbol of the crown. Nationalist propaganda notwithstanding, the Habsburgs, Macartney argued

had no wish, and never tried, to change the national individualities, as such, of their subjects. These were regarded as natural and ineradicable characteristics, and were accepted as such... Nor did the dynasty ever favour, in a positive sense, the national aspirations of any one nation among the politically active classes. In the negative sense, one nation might receive harsher treatment than another if it proved more truculent or more disloyal. But the object was to reduce all national feeling to a common level, to extirpate from anywhere any feelings except that of attachment to the dynasty (42, 43).

The conditions for a new eastern Europe required choosing its external and internal natural limits, taking "separately each of the great needs of security, national freedom and economic welfare, in each case working with the appropriate limits and through the appropriate organization" (157).

Macartney was deliberately vague on the form of such organization -- he mentioned national and geographic units -- but outlined the grounds for a common defense "entailing a degree of common foreign policy" (153) and an economic organization that would disregard ethnic frontiers:

Just as the smaller nations need security from their over-powerful neighbors, and cannot possibly obtain it without combining, so the best protection for them against economic exploitation by Germany, and also the best means of raising their standard of living, would be the creation of an intermediary economic unit between Germany and the U.S.S.R., planned, as are the German and Russian economic units, primarily for the benefit of its own inhabitants, and sufficiently large, elastic and economically differentiated to preserve its economic independence (154).

Macartney emphasized the cultural diversity of the Danubian region. Yet he claimed that behind the region's "mutually irreconcilable ambitions and tedious quarrels" was a "certain underlying Danubian culture" that gave credence to a regionalism that was not only a sub-national but also

multinational principle of political organization.

Historically, the region's "different races and cultures have met not only to clash, but also to enrich and fructify each other. Its special history and conditions have produced something which does not easily fit into the pattern of the world, but the world would be immeasurably the poorer without it," Macartney concluded (157).⁵³

For all the Anglo-Saxon theorizing on regionalism as a principle of postwar political organization, what were the thoughts of those most directly affected by and opposed to the Nazi "New Order" in Europe, namely members of the European resistance? For a study concerned with indigenous forms of political organization, what were their ideas on how postwar Europe should be organized? German historian Walter Lipgens has maintained that the dominant postwar theme of resistance movements in Europe was "a voluntary federation of Europe."⁵⁴ Another writer has stated that the intellectual resistance forces regarded themselves as a forerunners of "a true federation founded on the shared recognition that Europe's nation-states could no longer afford the rivalries that had weakened their response to Hitler's aggression."⁵⁵

In 1941, imprisoned Italian resisters Altiero Spinelli and Ernest Rossi drafted the "Ventotene Manifesto," perhaps the first important Resistance declaration devoted to European unification. It was adopted as the program of the Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE), the first federalist association in Europe, at its founding congress in Milan on

August 27-28, 1943. The document was rooted in the humanistic premise that "man is not a mere instrument to be used by others but that every man must be an autonomous life centre." The manifesto also charged that the nation state had become a (Hegelian?) "divine entity" with an inherent proclivity to dominate:

The absolute sovereignty of national states has given each the desire to dominate, since each one feels threatened by the strength of the others, and considers as its living space an increasingly vast territory wherein it will have the right of freedom of movement... The desire to dominate cannot be placated except by the predominance of the strongest state.⁵⁶

The manifesto voiced the fear that the British and Americans, with their imperial and balance of power interests would "seek to exploit ... the restoration of the national state" in Europe by appealing to national sentiments. If this happened, it would be a matter of time before "national jealousies would again develop, and (each) state would again express its satisfaction at its own existence in its armed strength" (478). Accordingly, the first order of priority in planning the postwar settlement was "the abolition of the division of Europe into national, sovereign states" in favor of "a federal reorganization of Europe" (Ibid.).

The federal structure outlined by Spinelli in documents written in the months after the August 1941 manifesto affirmed interstate more than autochthonous regionalism. The units of the federal system were states whose sovereignty would be restricted by international law. Spinelli's loyalties, however, were directed toward Europe

and its "diversity." He hoped the catharsis of the war experience would reorient political loyalties from the nation state to Europe. The common suffering of the European people under the "German yoke" served as a "stimulus to all peoples to free themselves, not as a particular need of each nation but as a common European interest." The desire "to be spared future oppression" and to live in peace with one's neighbors meant shaking off "former idols." "The federal solution would satisfy these aspirations much better than the mere restoration of national sovereignty," he argued (487). The regional element in his thought was seen in his conception of the federal system as not being a "unitary European state" but rather, but as a protector of the diversity of Europe (488).

If the Ventotene federalists remained within the bounds of interstate regionalism, other groups and individuals ventured further afield by extending the federative principle within the existing states or advocating a federation of regions where the sovereign state as it was known disappeared altogether. Again, autochthonous regionalism and federalism join here as corollary or mutually inclusive ordering principles. Under such principles, political power both devolves into regional, or provincial, self-governing units and evolves into a supranational federal system that protects the regional autonomies. Quoting, respectively from Italian, French, German, Dutch, and Polish resistance documents, Lipgens stated that

the general theme was everywhere the same: to

put into practice the 'democratic principle of self-government from below' and to set up 'strong guarantees against the absolutist, centralizing and bureaucratic power of the sovereign nation state'. Only 'local autonomies (communal, regional etc.)' could provide, within a 'wider supranational federal system', 'the guarantee of a sufficient decentralization of national states' (17-18).

Former French socialist Premier Léon Blum, in his A l'échelle humaine (written in prison in 1941 and published in 1945), called for a federation along American or Swiss lines that maintained "the fires of local political life." Central authorities, no longer capable of dealing "adequately with all the aspects of life in a modern state," should only assume the tasks of functional coordination of "smaller satellite authorities with special fields of action, within which they have a limited independence" (279). Yet Blum sought to reform, not displace the modern state, which for him remained the basic unit of international relations. Decentralization in the name of locally-based social democracy and the limitation of sovereignty were the heart of his reform of the state system. Externally, he applied this approach to the expansion of functional authorities like the International Labor Organization. But the League of Nations remained for him "a noble and magnificent creation," a model for both European and world organization (281). As with functional organizations, the remedy lay in providing international institutions real authority. Unlike Spinelli, he appeared not to shrink from the idea of a super-state. Blum favored an international body "boldly and openly set up as a super-state on a level above national sovereignties..." (282).

Others came closer to espousing autochthonous regionalism in the international sphere by developing the idea of supranational federation and regional autonomy as a complementary whole. Inspired in part by their experiences in the resistance, their model was

a network of local voluntary associations, vehicles of direct democracy, united within a European federation. The old nation-states, bellicose and unresponsive to the needs of their citizens, were to be superceded at both a lower and a higher level by more responsible institutions.⁵⁷

In his thirteen "Theses for a Third Front," published anonymously in a Zürich newspaper in 1942, writer Ignazio Silone argued that "political unification should express the real unity of European society" and not be based on the "reactionary system of national sovereignty" (emphasis added).⁵⁸ Voluntaristic socialism through people-centered producers' associations coupled to a European-wide federation were the essential ingredients of his "third front" idea. Not dissimilar to the "third road" appeals of the inter-war populists in eastern Europe, Silone argued maintained that the new European federation should not be a "limited and perpetually weak union of sovereign states, but a grouping of free peoples, among whom associations directed by the producers will have reabsorbed a good part of the functions currently monopolized by big capital and by the state bureaucracy."⁵⁹

Giorgio Peyronel applied Silone's idea in the sphere of international relations.⁶⁰ Peyronnel was a member of the Partito d'Azione (Action Party) that included the Ventotene federalists prior to the 1943 MFE congress. He began with

the premise that the centralized modern state, born of the triumph of the bourgeoisie more than two centuries ago, had now become burdened with the excesses of nationalism and imperialism that have resulted in two world wars. The state was no longer an adequate means through which relations among peoples could be regulated. "The imperialist phase of nationalism, with its overt violation of the rights of nationalities, has destroyed the legal and historical foundation on which the nation state claimed to base itself," he declared. With the authority of the nation state in question, he argued the case for a double-edged, or "integral," federalism that effectively stripped the state of its role as an actor in international relations:

Now that the false creed of nationalism has shown its totalitarian face and become discredited, international life must be adapted to new standards, which should be multiples or sub-multiples of the nation as we know it. The idea of federalism is being mooted, and there are two forms of it which should be distinguished. There is supranational federalism, which is what people generally understand by the term, but there is also infranational federalism. This involves the effective internal decentralization of nation states, a reaffirmation of the cultural, political and administrative autonomy of regions and communes (regionalism and communalism), and protection of minorities which are distinct, racially or linguistically or for any historical reason, from the 'nation' to which they belong at the present day.

Peyronnel considered the danger of local oligarchies emerging in this decentralized federal structure. He claimed this eventuality would be averted by the system of graded federal linkages, whereby the administratively autonomous units would be politically responsible to a higher central power, which in turn would be "linked to a larger supranational federation." The source of power, however, for

a system of integral federalism lay not at the top but in the local autonomies upon which the structure depended. The regional and local autonomies were not merely administrative instrumentalities through which the states would be decentralized. They were also crucial components in a "freely differentiated unity" that would provide a more "elastic means of solving European problems" by "above all respect(ing) the values of life and culture that have characterized Europe through the ages."⁶¹

As a contrast to the state-based regionalisms of the idealists and realists, autochthonous regionalism was a society-based, "regionalist" theory of political organization. It sought as a rule to structure world and European organization from below through recognition of the social repartition of the world into historical-cultural individualities, or indigenous regional human settlements that existed within or across the modern states. Such a model of a political organization pointed to both the internal transformation of the modern state through the devolution of state power to self-governing regional units and the external transformation of the state through its integration into larger multinational, federal polities. Autochthonous regionalism as a principle of political organization thus combined regional autonomy with regional integration to adumbrate a new type of political community. It raised the possibility institutionalizing the principle of unity in diversity through a system that replaced national sovereignties with a federative system of shared sovereignty

along regional lines.

NOTES

¹F.W. Morgan, "Three Aspects of Regional Consciousness," Sociological Review, 31(1939).

²Ibid., p. 68.

³See Hedwig Hintze, "Regionalism," in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol.13 (New York, 1934); Karl Möckl, "Föderalismus und Regionalismus im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Eine Skizze," in Von der freien Gemeinde zum föderalistischen Europa, ed. Fried Esterbauer (Berlin, 1983); Solange Gras, La revolte des régions d'Europe occidentale de 1916 a nos jours (Paris, 1982).

⁴This and the following quote in Morgan, op.cit., p. 69.

⁵Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931), pp. 293-94. This revisionist interpretation of the French Revolution, linking nationalism and centralized state power, was taken up by several political historians during the war. See, e.g., Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York, 1944); Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics: A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character (London, 1944); E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London, 1945); Alfred Cobban, National Self-Determination (London, 1945).

⁶Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 180.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Kohn, p. 245f. In reality, it was the bourgeoisie in the name of the people that wrested sovereign power from the 17th and 18th century absolute monarchs. On the difference between the medieval and modern "nation," see Eugen Lemberg, Nationalismus, v.I (Hamburg, 1964), pp. 37, 40, 55f. On the differing conceptions of sovereignty, see George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 3d ed. (New York, [1937] 1961), pp. 207f., 247f.

⁹See also Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London, [1960] 1978), p. 12f.; Lemberg, op.cit., I, p 116; Eugene Kamenka, ed. Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea (Canberra, 1973), p. 4f.; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, [1983] 1985), p. 77-78 and passim.; William H. McNeill, Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History (Toronto, 1987), p. 50f.

¹⁰This and following paragraphs rely heavily on Hintze, op.cit.

¹¹Lewis Mumford, "The Theory and Practice of Regionalism," The Sociological Review, 20 (April 1928), 135.

¹² See Jean Charles-Brun, Le régionalisme (Paris, [1903] 1919).

¹³ Henri Hauser, Le problème du régionalisme (Paris, 1924), p. 9f.

¹⁴ Hintze, op.cit., p. 212.

¹⁵ Mumford, op.cit., p. 140.

¹⁶ Quoted in William W. Speth, "The Anthropogeographic Theory of Franz Boas," Anthropos, 73 (1978), p. 15.

¹⁷ Robert E. Dickinson, Regional Ecology: The Study of Man's Environment (New York, 1970), p.60. See Morgan, op.cit., pp. 76-78.

¹⁸ Paul Vidal de la Blache, Principes de géographie humaine ed. E. de Martonne (Paris, [1921] 5th ed. 1955), p. 195. See Anne Buttimer, Society and Milieu in the French Geographic Tradition (Chicago, 1971), pp. 43-58.

¹⁹ Geoffrey Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1985), pp. 13-14.

²⁰ Translation in Rupert B. Vance, "Region," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, v.13 (New York, 1968), p. 379. Vidalian geography was developed in France by Jean Brunhes (1860-1930) in his La géographie humaine (Paris, 1910), trans. Human Geography, An Attempt at a Positive Classification: Principles and Examples (Chicago, [1920] 1978), and historian Lucien Febvre (1878-1956), La terre et l'évolution humaine (Paris, [1922] 1949), trans. A Geographical Introduction to History (New York, 1925).

²¹ H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930 (New York, 1958), p. 33f. See also I.M. Bochenski, Contemporary European Philosophy: Philosophies of Matter, the Idea, Life, Essence, Existence, and Being tr. D. Nicholl and K. Aschenbrenner (Berkeley, [1947] 1961), chapter 1.

²² Karl-Georg Faber, "Geschichtslandschaft - Région historique - Section in History. Ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Wissenschaftsgeschichte," Saeculum, 30/1 (1979), p. 12.

²³ See Dietrich Gerhard, "Regionalismus und ständisches Wesen als ein Grundthema Europäischer Geschichte," in Alte und neue Welt in vergleichender Geschichtsbetrachtung ed. D. Gerhard (Göttingen, 1962); F. Prinz, "Geschichte und Regionalismus," in Bohemia. Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum, v.19 (1978).

²⁴ Faber, loc.cit.

²⁵ This paragraph draws on and quotes from Faber, Ibid., pp.

6-12. Faber challenges the view that Ratzel was a social Darwinist in "Zur Vorgeschichte der Geopolitik: Staat, Nation un Lebensraum im Denken deutscher Geographen vor 1914," in Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus, ed. H. Dollinger (Münster, 1982).

²⁶James T. Watkins, "Regionalism and Plans for Post-War Reconstruction: The First Three Years," Social Forces, 21 (May 1943), 384.

²⁷Ibid., p. 383.

²⁸Howard W. Odum, "From Community Studies to Regionalism," in In Search of the Regional Balance in America eds. H.W. Odum and K. Jocher (Chapel Hill, 1945).

²⁹Howard W. Odum and Harry E. Moore, American Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical Approach to National Integration, (Gloucester, MA, 1938U 1966). Page references cited in text.

³⁰Relevant contributions include Howard W. Odum, "A Sociological Approach to the Study and Practice of American Regionalism," 20 (May 1942); George A. Lundberg, "Regionalism, Science, and the Peace Settlement," 21 (December 1942); Nicholas Doman, "World Reconstruction and European Regionalism," 21 (March 1943); Charles E. Martin, "Regionalism as Illustrated by the Western Hemisphere: Solidarity of the Americas," 21 (March 1943); Svend Riemer, "Theoretical Aspects of Regionalism," 21 (March 1943); Rudolf Heberle, "Regionalism: Some Critical Observations," 21 (March 1943); Margaret Jarman Hagood, "Statistical Methods for Delineation of Regions Applied to Data on Agriculture and Population," 21 (March 1943); James T. Watkins, "Regionalism and Plans for Post-War Reconstruction: The First Three Years," 21 (May 1943); Howard W. Odum, "Sociology in the Contemporary World of Today and Tomorrow," 21 (May 1943); J.O Hertzler, "Some Basic Sociological Postulates Underlying World Organization and Peace," 22 (December 1943); J.O. Hertzler, "Some Basic Queries Respecting World Regionalism," 22 (May 1944); C. Herman Pritchett, "Organization for Regional Planning," 23 (March 1945); Elizabeth Green and Craighill Handy, "Regional Planning the Far East," 23 (March 1945).

³¹Odum, "A Sociological Approach to the Study and Practice of American Regionalism," pp. 425f. The following quotes are in pp. 426 and 427.

³²See note 30. Page references cited in text.

³³Julian S. Huxley, "Science, War and Reconstruction," Science, 91 (February 16, 1940), argued from the standpoint of human biology to suggest that man's social environment required alterations in his social and political organization. He considered world government "wholly premature" and favored regional forms of organization. Some functions were "sufficiently advanced to be put on a world

footing without dislocation, while for others the step can only be on to a regional basis" (154).

³⁴ George B. de Huszar, "The Problems in Perspective," in New Perspectives on Peace, ed. George B. de Huszar (Chicago, 1944); and "Regional Approach to the Study of the Contemporary World," in Approaches to World Unity: Fifth Symposium on Science, Philosophy and Religion, eds. Louis Finkelstein and Lyman Bryson (New York, 1945).

³⁵ Huszar, "The Problems in Persepctive," pp. 8-9. Subsequent page references cited in text. In Britain, social philosopher John Macmurray also expressed doubts that political or economic organization could be achieved without regard for he called he "unconscious force of social habit." He cautioned that deliberate planning could never be more than a minor element in deciding what will happen. Rather, it was the "massive complex of common life, expressing the inertia and the momentum of established social habit, moving through and along the channels of social institutions, which maintain the continuity of history, and determine what future is possible." He elaborated by stating that it was

the common life of the common people of the world that must carry any plan that we try to put into operation, and provide its motive force. Any plan which is incompatible with this unconscious pressure is stillborn. ...It may be inherently excellent, it may be scientifically elaborated and tested, yet it is futile if it runs counter to the habits of the common life of those whom it affects.

(John Macmurray, Through Chaos to Community? I. Reconstruction and World Revolution (London, 1943), pp. 12,14.).

³⁶ Huszar, "Regional Approach to the Study of the Contemporary World," p. 696. The following quotes are on pp. 696-97.

³⁷ See Robert B. Hall, Area Studies: with Special Reference to their Implication for Research in the Social Sciences (New York, 1947).

³⁸ Alfred Cobban, "The Regional Reconstruction of Europe," New Commonwealth Quarterly, VIII (January 1943); and National Self-Determination (London, 1945).

³⁹ Cobban, "The Regional Reconstruction of Europe," p. 92. Subsequent page references cited in text.

⁴⁰ Cobban, National Self-Determination, p. 57. Subsequent page references cited in text. For a similar argument, see Erich Hula, "National Self-Determination Reconsidered," Social Research, 10 (February 1943).

⁴¹ In illustrating this point, Cobban stated that "(i)n Macedonia, during the Balkan Wars, the local population appeared, to the best of its ability, as Bulgar or Serb, according as the fortunes of war favoured one side or the

other. In Upper Silesia, after 1918, many of the inhabitants seem to have remained for years uncertain whether they were Poles or Germans, and in no hurry to make up their minds" (61-62).

⁴²Cobban (p. 148) cited Otto von Gierke's formulation of the medieval federative system of thought as instructive: "'The properly medieval system of thought started from the idea of the whole and of unity, but to every lesser unit, down to and including the individual, it ascribed inherent life, a purpose of its own, and an intrinsic value within the harmoniously articulated organism of the world-whole filled with the Divine Spirit'" (in The Development of Political Theory, trans. B.Freyd, 1939, p. 257).

⁴³Erich Hula, "National Self-Determination Reconsidered," p. 19, argued along similar lines in distinguishing between the principle of "national" self-determination and "political" self-determination or self-determination as such. He stated that "the doctrine which puts the ideal of ethnic self-determination contrary to and above the ideal of political self-determination will sooner or later destroy the national coherence of any people united by a political belief, and break up any country where men of different ethnical origins have so far lived peacefully together... ."

⁴⁴See Karl Renner (speud. Rudolf Springer), Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie (Vienna/Leipzig, 1906) and Robert A. Kann. The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Hapsburg Monarchy, 2 vols. (New York, [1950] 1964), I, pp. 105-07.

⁴⁵In chapters 9 through 12 (pp. 78-138), Cobban examines "national autonomy in the British Commonwealth of Nations," "the policy of the United States in relation to the rights of small nations," "national self-determination in the theory and practice of the Soviet Union," and "the right of national autonomy for non-European peoples."

⁴⁶Cobban, "The Regional Reconstruction of Europe," p. 94.

⁴⁷E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London, 1945), p. 24

⁴⁸Edward Hallett Carr, Conditions of Peace (New York, 1942), p. 65. Subsequent page references cited in text.

⁵⁰Arnold Brecht, "On Germany's Postwar Structure," Social Research 11 (November 1944); "Regionalism and World Organization," in Regionalism and World Organization: Postwar Aspects of Europe's Global Relationship (Washington, D.C., 1944); and Federalism and Regionalism in Germany: The Division of Prussia (New York, 1945).

⁵¹Brecht, Federalism and Regionalism in Germany, p. 44. For this work, Brecht drew on material obtained from his tenure as the Director of the Division for Constitution and Administration in the German Ministry of Interior prior to

1933. During the war, he was a member the Institute of World Affairs at the New School for Social Research (New York).

⁵²C.A. Macartney, Problems of the Danubian Basin (London, 1942), p. 151. Subsequent page references cited in text. See also A.J.P Taylor, "National Independence and the 'Austrian' Idea," Political Quarterly 16 (1945).

⁵³See Hugh Seton-Watson, The 'Sick Heart' of Modern Europe: The Problem of the Danubian Lands (Seattle, 1976) and Jean Bérenger, L'exige historique de l'Europe danubienne (Paris, 1976).

⁵⁴Lipgens I, p. 17. See Walter Lipgens, Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940-1945 (Munich, 1968).

⁵⁵James D. Wilkinson, The Intellectual Resistance in Europe (Cambridge, MA, 1981), p. 173.

⁵⁶Quoted in Lipgens I, p. 474. Subsequent page references cited in the text.

⁵⁷Wilkinson, op.cit., p. 268.

⁵⁸Quoted in Wilkinson, p. 252.

⁵⁹Ibid. For a review of east European populism and the "third road" idea in eastern Europe, see Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, Populism, Its Meaning and National Characteristics (London, 1969), p. 97f.

⁶⁰L.R. (Giorgio Peyronel), "Federalismo, autonomie locali, autogoverno," L'Unita Europea (Milan), No.4, May-June 1944. Page references in text are to translation in Lipgens I, p. 535f.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 536. The idea of "integral federalism" was raised by Felix Gross (see above, pp. 46-47) but developed in the 1930s by a group of "personalist" writers -- Emmanuel Mounier, Denis de Rougement, Robert Aron, Alexandre Marc among them -- associated with the French journals Esprit and Ordre nouveau. See Lipgens II, p. 2 and Brugmans, L'idée européenne 1918-1966, pp. 60-65. According to de Rougement, the two intellectual movements which marked those intellectuals coming of age in the interwar generation was surrealism in the 1920s and personalism in the 1930s. The first, he stated, shaped "the sensibility of several generations, mine included. The second prepared the Resistance, which engendered the European federalism." (Journal d'une époque, 1926-1946 [Paris, 1968], p. 108.). During the Resistance, they and others frequently pointed to the Swiss model of local autonomy and federal rule. See, e.g., Denis de Rougement, Mission ou démission de la Suisse (Neuchatel, 1940) and Denis de Rougement and Charlotte Muret, "What Switzerland Teaches: Federalism and Regionalism for Man's Freedom," Commonweal, 34 (September 19, 1941).

PART TWO

REGIONALISM AND POSTWAR WORLD ORGANIZATION

Any genuine world order must be intercultural as well as international. It must recognize the existence of the five or six world cultures and base its organization upon them. But the world is not ripe for such an order. ...The internationalist assumes that once the pressure of European imperialism and economic exploitation is removed, the non-European peoples will spontaneously carry on the work of world organization according to the best traditions of Western democracy and humanitarianism.

Christopher Dawson, 1932

...this war, like the last war will produce nothing but destruction unless we prepare for the future now.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 5, 1941

Introduction

The theoretical debate on regionalism and postwar order did not take place in a vacuum. It was accompanied by a similar debate at the level of allied policy. This debate was again dominated by internationalists who were prepared to accept some forms of interstate regionalism and realists who thought in terms of hegemonial regionalism. Proponents of autochthonous regionalism found little hearing among the state actors involved in planning the postwar order. In practice, interstate, hegemonial, and autochthonous regionalisms did not fit into neat categories and at times merged or overlapped. At times, rationales for groups-of-states regionalism (interstate or hegemonial) were also expressed in terms of units that corresponded to culture areas. By war's end, however, the internationalists who favored a universal organization with limited regional features had won the upper hand in determining the structure of the postwar world organization.

The debate on the future world organization centered on the issue of whether regional or universal principles would inform the peacekeeping structure. Which kind of political organization could best maintain and promote the peace? In a world of legally equal and sovereign nation

states, how could the imbalance between major powers and smaller be redressed? Should regional organizations have the right and freedom to deal with and quell disputes in its area without involvement or interference from the general organization? Would regions be islands or building blocks of of peace or power "blocs" that would increase global insecurity?

Between 1940 and 1943, the deliberations on regionalism were largely waged within and between the postwar planning councils of the State Department in Washington, Foreign Office in London, and, to a limited degree, the Foreign Commissariat in Moscow. These deliberations, with reference to their domestic underpinnings, are the subject of Chapter V. From the summer of 1943 to the spring of 1945, the debate broadened to become a multilateral issue at the allied war-time conferences of the major powers -- the subject of Chapter VI. Of the three major powers, the United States, after hedging on the regionalist issue until August 1943, became the leading advocate of universalism in world organization and primary force in establishing the United Nations. Britain was the leading advocate among the Big Three for regionalist restructuring in world (and European) organization but invariably deferred to the American position. The Soviet Union, whose attitude toward regionalism was the most muted, belied an attachment to hegemonial regionalism in acquiescing to America's bid for a universal world organization.

The smaller allied and non-Axis states -- notably the Latin American nations, Arab states, the London-based

governments-in-exile of Europe, as well as the members of the British Commonwealth -- were seen but seldom heard in the debate on postwar issues in general and the question of regionalism in particular. They raised their voices in San Francisco in the spring of 1945, when some fifty non-Axis states were invited to approve and establish the United Nations organization. Many of the smaller states acted through regional groupings to press demands for greater inclusion of regionalist principles in the U.N. Charter. This culmination of the debate on regionalism and world organization is the subject of Chapter VII.

CHAPTER V

REGIONALISM AND POSTWAR WORLD ORDER PLANNING AMONG THE MAJOR POWERS, 1940-1943

In the early war years, both the United States and Great Britain had developed postwar proposals favoring a regionally-structured world organization. Foreign Office and, in particular, State Department research between 1940 and 1943 made cases for regionalism within a world organization guaranteed by the major powers as against a League-type universal organization. Inspired in part by the success of the inter-American system of states as a model of regional cooperation, President Roosevelt joined Prime Minister Churchill over the objections of their foreign ministers in favoring a major power-oriented regionalist approach to postwar organization. The basic structure which they envisaged was a "world council" led by the major powers -- the United States, Britain, Soviet Union, and (over British objections) China -- that partitioned the world into several regions of smaller and medium-sized states represented through "regional councils." The Soviet Union for its own geo-political reasons also favored a hegemonic regional over a strictly universal security framework.

Before examining the positions of the three major powers on the place and role of regionalism in postwar world organization, it is helpful to review the domestic institutional contexts in which the planning for the future peace was conducted.

Planning for the Peace: the Actors and Institutions

Of the three major powers, the United States was the best organized and least unsure of itself when it came to planning for the postwar peace. Even before America's entry into the war, President Roosevelt voiced the need to create a structure for lasting peace. His tenacious Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, became the architect of that peace due in no small part to his organizational abilities within the State Department and negotiating skills with Congress and the White House. Hull was an unabashed Wilsonian internationalist whose strength of conviction, when added to his administrative skills, made American proposals the ones considered and invariably adopted at the allied war-time conferences.

In December 1939, Secretary Hull initiated discussions in the Department on "problems of peace and reconstruction" in order to outline "the basic principles which should underlie a desirable world order."¹ The discussion group began work in January 1940 as the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations under the chairmanship of Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles. Welles, who enjoyed a personal relationship and access to President Roosevelt,

was an internationalist who became the administration's leading voice for interstate regionalism in world organization. In May 1940, on the heels of Germany's attack on the Low Countries and Winston Churchill's induction as Prime Minister, Hull broadened the Advisory Committee's Subcommittee on Economic Problems into a separate informal Inter-departmental Group to Consider Post-War International Economic Problems and Policies. The group's chairman was Leo Pasvolsky, an economist who had worked on the State Department staff between 1930 to 1937 and whom Hull brought back in September 1939 to be the Department's post-war planning czar. He served as Hull's speechwriter and was, with Hull, wary of regionalism as an approach to world political organization. In 1928, he published a study on the "economic nationalism of the Danubian states" in which he argued that the Danubian problem was part of a more general European problem and that a solution was to be sought on "a European, rather than regional, scale."²

In a departmental change in February 1941, Hull created the Division of Special Research for the task, as he declared in an April 24 speech, "of creating ultimate conditions of peace and justice."³ Pasvolsky was appointed as its chief. But it was not until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that postwar planning assumed an importance and momentum of its own in the Department. In December 1941, President Roosevelt approved the formation of a nonpartisan, presidential Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, which was to comprise of more than 300 prominent Americans inside and outside the government. Under Hull's chairmanship

and with Pasvolsky serving as executive officer and director of research, the work of the committee and its sub-committees constituted the bulk of the U.S. government's research on postwar planning.⁴ Key members of the committee included Sumner Welles, Vice Chairman, among eleven members of the State Department including Assistant Secretaries Dean Acheson and Adolf A. Berle; Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee among five Senators and three Representatives; and assorted members drawn from government departments and agencies, including the White House. Among those who were drawn from private life were Norman H. Davies, President of the Council on Foreign Relations; Myron C. Taylor, an industrialist and, later in the war, Personal Representative of the President to the Vatican; Ann O'Hare McCormick of the editorial staff of The New York Times; Isaiah Bowman, geographer and President of Johns Hopkins University; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs; and James T. Shotwell, historian and a Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Advisory Committee's seven working subcommittees -- Political Problems, Economic Policy and Reconstruction, Security Problems, Territorial Problems, Legal Problems, International Organization, and European Organization -- held more than three hundred meetings between February 1942 and July 1943. In January 1944, its work was taken over in a reorganization of the Department by a policy-making Committee on Postwar Programs, again under the leadership of Hull and Pasvolsky. The Division of International Security

and Organization, with Pasvolsky's aide Harley Notter as chief, was subsequently established to develop and implement plans for the United Nations organization.⁵

In Britain, postwar planning was conducted by the Foreign Office under the authority of the War Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Churchill. Churchill was the British government's strongest advocate of regional organization. The bulk of the British research effort was conducted by the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) located in Balliol College, Oxford. It was established prior to the outbreak of the war as a semi-public undertaking between the Foreign Office and Chatham House, or Royal Institute for International Affairs. Its chief was historian Arnold Toynbee, who tended to hire its members from academe. Among them were C.A.W. Manning, the Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and the historian on Hungary and eastern Europe, C.A. Macartney. The FRPS produced a sizeable collection of policy-oriented studies. By the end of 1941, it had prepared a plan for the production of twenty volumes of background materials for ministers and senior postwar policymakers. But the project was not brought to fruition with the dissolution of FRPS in April 1943 and its merger with the Foreign Office's political intelligence division to form the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD) in London.

In the meantime, the Foreign Office had established an Economic and Reconstruction Department in June 1942 under the chairmanship of Foreign Office Counsellor Gladwyn Jebb. Jebb was the Foreign Office's counterpart of Leo Pasvolsky

at the State Department. In 1940-41, he had served as Assistant Under Secretary in the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Postwar planning in Britain took a new turn after the Soviet victory in Stalingrad in early 1943. Differences between the War Cabinet and Foreign Office on the regionalist issue prompted Churchill, in July 1943, to set up a small War Cabinet committee on the postwar settlement that reported directly to him. Opposed by the Foreign Office, the committee proved short-lived (it held only four meetings) and gave way the next month to a War Cabinet Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration on terms recommended by the Foreign Office. The committee's mandate was broadened by the Prime Minister in April 1944 and its name changed to the Armistice and Post-War Committee. Its chairman was Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee with Gladwyn Jebb heading the Secretariat that coordinated all major postwar political questions.⁶

Of the three major powers, the Soviet Union devoted the least time and effort to postwar world order planning, preferring to react to American and British initiatives. It was not until early 1943, after their decisive military victory in the Caucasus, that the Soviets were able to diplomatically position themselves to consider questions of postwar order. In May 1943, Premier and Marshall Joseph Stalin ordered home ambassadors Ivan Maisky from London and Maxim Litvinov from Washington. Litvinov, a former Foreign Commissar fluent (as was Maisky) in the ways of western diplomacy, had in the mid-1930s promoted plans for regional

security pacts in Europe within the framework of the League of Nations. Stalin now appointed him Assistant Foreign Commissar under Vyacheslav Molotov, who replaced Litvinov as Foreign Commissar in 1939, with responsibility for postwar planning in general and the world security organization in particular.⁷ As if to pave the way for the coming negotiations on postwar issues, Stalin dissolved the Comintern, the arm of the international communist movement, following the ambassadors' recall to Moscow. It was a move which Secretary Hull welcomed as a sign of "a greater degree of trust ... for the winning of the war and for successful postwar undertakings."⁸ But it was not until September 1943, a month before the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Meeting, that the Soviet government established a commission on the peace treaties and postwar organization. Little is known of this commission other than that its membership was composed of Soviet "political figures and statesmen" whose task was "to work out concrete proposals for the postwar arrangement of the world, including the question of creating an international security organization."⁹

Regionalism and the Postwar Policy Debate in the U.S. Government

The Wilsonian internationalism that came to dominate postwar planning in the United States in the last years of the war must be seen against a historical background of American isolationism, "non-entanglement," and neutrality. The March 1920 U.S. Senate rejection of the League of Nations that President Wilson had been instrumental in

founding as part of 1919 Paris peace settlement proved a reminder of this fact. The rejection was followed by Wilson's landslide defeat in the elections later that year amidst the promise of Republican candidate Warren G. Harding to "return to normalcy."

After President Roosevelt's inauguration in 1933, his "good neighbor" policy found an echo among the twenty-two American republics in the western hemisphere. While maintaining a policy of neutrality, the United States promoted the idea of an inter-American system as a bulwark of cooperation against the rising power of Germany. When the Soviet Union signed the non-aggression pact with Germany in August 1939, Roosevelt and his supporters promoted closer collaboration with Britain. The idea of Anglo-American union became a source of academic and journalistic interest.¹⁰ Two months after the fall of France, Prime Minister Churchill stated in the House of Commons on August 20, 1940 that "the British Empire and the United States will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage."¹¹ The movement toward Anglo-American union was symbolically affirmed in the Atlantic Charter issued "at sea" in August 1941 by Roosevelt and Churchill in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Coming at the heels of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the eight-point declaration calling for cooperation among the free nations prefigured both the end of America's neutrality and isolation and its postwar attachment to the "Atlantic community." At the time, it provided the United States with

a "broader and more definite basis for comprehensive preparation of postwar policy within the United States Government than had existed heretofore... ."12

A reference to postwar organization in the Charter cited the need for "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security." This phrase replaced "an effective international organization" in the original British draft which Roosevelt believed, given the League experience, would not be supported by American public opinion.¹³ This caution reflected the "realist" strain in Roosevelt's thinking in the early 1940s that led him to support a postwar peace plan based in part on hegemonial regionalism. The change of wording suggested that Roosevelt "was again being haunted by the ghost of Woodrow Wilson. The extreme internationalists, he felt, were lacking in 'realism,' which meant they did not take into account the power of isolationist sentiment. He was afraid that even an implication of another League of Nations would fill the American people with memories of the First World War -- another A.E.F. [American Expeditionary Force], another false 'peace,' another age of disillusionment, of boom and bust, another opportunity for another Hitler."¹⁴

In these early war years, the President received advice on postwar issues principally from Under Secretary of State Welles, who as an authority on Latin America had assisted Roosevelt in implementing the "Good Neighbor" policy. Welles' theoretical objective in postwar organization was reconciling the tension between the sovereign equality of states and the security interests of the great powers. He

sought this reconciliation in a formula for world organization that was based on a regional groupings of states and the combined might of the major powers.

Welles' starting assumption was that the foreign policy of the United States, "like that of any other nation, should be based on enlightened selfishness."¹⁵ Given this, it was unlikely for a great power to join or cooperate with a world organization whose combined military power was greater than its own. A world organization needed a structure that recognized the security interests of the great powers while simultaneously "making it impossible for any one power to block the efforts of the organization to check aggression from whatever power."¹⁶ He envisaged regionally-organized systems of states in which one or more great powers were members. The regional systems would assume the "primary responsibility for maintaining peace in their respective parts of the world."¹⁷ Only when regions failed to contain conflict in their area would the universal organization be required to act. "In that manner each state in every region, no matter how weak it might be, would be required as well as enabled to contribute in proportion to its resources the assistance needed in maintaining regional, and world, peace."¹⁸

Welles saw interstate regional systems as primary peacekeeping mechanisms in a larger system of security protected by the major powers. As the major powers were also members in the regional groupings, thus enhancing their influence in the region, Welles' system had hegemonial as

well as interstate features. In addition, Welles saw residual intra-regional advantages in such regional systems, stating that they would also

greatly encourage the development of constructive economic and financial policies in each area. In Eastern Europe, in many parts of the Americas as well as Africa, Asia, and the more highly developed area of Western Europe, there is almost unlimited opportunity for co-operative measures to remove artificial and prejudicial trade barriers, to unify currencies, to distribute electric power... Over a period of years, regional systems would inevitably do away with the more restrictive forms of ultra-nationalism in the economic and financial field. In short, they are a device that in innumerable ways, would make it far easier to maintain the peace... .¹⁹

Secretary of State Hull was less sanguine about regionalism. He invoked President Woodrow Wilson's oft quoted warning and the rallying call for internationalists that "there must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace; all nations henceforth (must) avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power." Hull understood regionalism in terms of regional alliances of states. He argued that organizing the world into such regional "blocs" would be inherently unstable and lead to potential inter-regional conflicts. The conflicts would in turn engender power rivalries of a greater order and be more difficult to contain by a world organization than conflicts between smaller individual states. As regional groupings solidified, Hull stated,

it might be possible that conflicts would spring up, not between nations but between regions. ...The more advanced regional ideas of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill ... might lead to questions of balance of power, and regional organizations of the type they envisaged might deal arbitrarily with one another and in the internal affairs

of their members, whether by military force or economic pressure... This would open the door to abuses and the exercise of undue privileges by greedy, grasping nations possessing great military and economic strength.

Hull's views happened to be contrary to the direction of the State Department's research under Welles' leadership in 1942-43. Various sub-committees of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy -- in particular, the Political Committee and its Special Subcommittee on International Organization, both chaired by Welles; the Economic Committee presided over by Myron C. Taylor; the Territorial Committee chaired by Isaiah Bowman; and the European Organization Committee chaired by Hamilton Fish Armstrong -- confirmed that regionalism within a relatively weak universalist framework was favored for world (and European) organization prior to mid-1943.²¹

The actual preparatory work for the new world organization began with the establishment of a Special Subcommittee on International Organization suggested by Welles at a June 26, 1942 meeting of the Political Subcommittee. Chaired by Welles, the subcommittee met 45 times between July 17, 1942 and July 26, 1943. Its mandate according to Welles was to "put together in a preliminary draft its views on organization which would then be taken up by the Political Subcommittee for discussion."²² Welles set the tone for the subcommittee's work by suggesting the feasibility of combining world-wide and regional elements in a general security organization.²³ Universal jurisdiction would be assumed for security and policing matters while most other problems would be left to the disposition of the

regional organizations, who would be represented in the general organization. The plan was developed at a subsequent meeting, where "in viewing the total problem of postwar international organization, Mr. Welles envisaged a considerable devolution of function from a world-wide political authority to various regional bodies."²⁴ The meetings' minutes did not indicate to what extent Welles view was supported by other members of the subcommittee. As things unfolded, it appeared that a regional grouping was not a political unit possessed with legitimate authority and power in the international arena but an association of states whose members were also represented individually in the world organization. At the December 4 meeting, there was consensus that "'states' under the generally accepted concept of sovereignty" would be the members of the new world organization and that "the vitality of the national state was regarded ... as of primary importance in the postwar world."²⁵ At the same time, a consensus also existed on the need to create an organization that was not a revival of League of Nations.²⁶

On March 26, 1943, Welles sent a draft of the subcommittee's recommendations to Secretary Hull. The report recommended a general security system in which peacekeeping and policing powers were vested in an eleven member Executive Council represented by the four major powers (including China) and five regional groupings of smaller and middle sized states. The regional members consisted of two representatives from Europe (including one from eastern

Europe), two from the Americas, and one each from the Far East, the Near East and Africa, and the British Dominions.²⁷

In a final revised version of a "Draft Constitution of International Organization," completed on July 14, 1943, the subcommittee recommended five principal organs for the new world organization:²⁸

- an Executive Committee chaired by a General Secretary consisting of the four major powers and having "responsibility in matters of international security;"

- a Council chaired by the General Secretary consisting of the four major powers and seven regional representatives (as noted above) with "authority to supervise and coordinate" the work of the organization as well as "deal with any situation or condition which may threaten an impairment of the good relations among people;"

- a General Conference composed of all member states of the organization with "authority to act upon any matter of concern to the international community, and such special matters as may be referred to it by the Executive Committee or Council;"

- a General Security and Armaments Commission established by the Council as a "permanent advisory and administrative agency" composed of "military, naval, aviation, and civilian representatives of the states and groups of states represented on the Council";

- a permanent Secretariat established at the seat of the organization led by a General Secretary appointed by the Council with majority approval of the General Conference;

and

● a Judiciary or permanent court of international justice.

Welles' scheme at this time enjoyed the support of President Roosevelt, who still spoke in terms of a "realist" postwar peace maintained essentially by the major powers. A day after submitting the March 26 report, Welles met with the President and Hull for a meeting with visiting Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Coming less than a week after Churchill's March 1943 radio speech where he envisaged a "Council of Europe" as the lynchpin of a postwar peace structure, the Americans conveyed concern to Eden of a European-centered peace plan. Presidential aide Harry Hopkins, present at the meeting, described two points that were conveyed to Eden by the Americans:

1. The President and Welles were very emphatic that the United States could not be a member of any independent regional body such as a European Council; they felt that all the United Nations should be members of one body for the purposes of recommending policy; that this body should be world-wide in scope. 2. That there would be under this body regional councils with similar advisory powers made up of nations geographically located in the regions; but, finally, that the real decisions should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, who would be the powers for many years to come that would have to police the world.²⁹

Secretary Hull reportedly said little or nothing at the White House meeting. But he subsequently rejected Welles' March 26 report in the Department's Political Subcommittee because, as he put it, "I could not go along with the regional feature."³⁰ The rejection reflected a simmering rivalry and feud between Hull and Welles attributed as much to clashing personal styles as policy

differences. Hull, who chafed at Welles' access and familiarity with the President, had begun to undercut Welles' efforts and influence in late 1942-early 1943. In January 1943, he replaced Welles as chairman of the pivotal Political Subcommittee (while allowing him to continue to serve as acting chairman until March). At the same time, he weaned key members of the Special Subcommittee -- Myron C. Taylor, Isaiah Bowman, Norman Davis, and Green Hackworth -- into an "informal agenda group" that served as an adjunct to the Political Subcommittee and, in practice, as the general coordinating organ for the entire Advisory Committee.³¹

Upon rejecting Welles' March 26 report, Hull gave the Political Subcommittee and its so-called agenda group a new mandate for a "detailed consideration of international organization ... on the basis of the fundamental issues rather than on the special sub-committee's draft." According to Hull, the Political Subcommittee had by the summer, "after thorough discussion, expressed itself as being overwhelmingly in favor of a universal rather than a regional basis for international organization."³² In a memorandum sent to the President on August 10th, Myron C. Taylor summarized the new view of ^{the} subcommittee in the following terms:

We have questioned how long such regional groups might escape the greed, rivalries, and ambitions of their component parts, or their utilization for selfish purposes by more powerful members; and we have queried whether those dangers could be avoided only through a strong world order. We have reached a consensus that the universal organization must not be founded upon regional structures and that such regional relationships or organizations should be primarily concerned with local problems, though

they could perform some functions by delegation³³
from the general international organization.

This outcome was part of a successful effort during the summer by Hull and his agenda group to have Roosevelt "turn toward our point of view."³⁴ Hull organized several meetings at the White House with Welles usually absent. On July 23, Hull suspended the work of the Advisory Committee and charged the agenda group, under Leo Pasvolsky's coordination, to draft a United Nations Charter "based on the views of the Political Subcommittee that there should be a universal rather than regional basis for the world organization."³⁵

The issue of regionalism came to a head in August 1943 as the Department was preparing the draft of a Four-Power Declaration and other papers for presentation to Roosevelt and Churchill at the First Quebec Conference August 12-24. As Acting Secretary of State on August 11 (Hull was incapacitated by an illness), Welles submitted three papers to the President which revealed the split within the Department on the question of regionalism.³⁶ The proposed Four-Power Declaration prepared by the agenda group was decidedly internationalist in outlook. It had the major powers, in article four, "recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of peace and security" (emphasis added). The second enclosure was a draft protocol for a Provisional United Nations Council prepared

by Welles' Special Subcommittee on June 19 that was based on a stronger regional representation structure than outlined earlier. Members of the eleven member Council were now to "represent the general interest of the region from which they are designated rather than the particular interests of the states of which they are nationals."³⁷

The third enclosure, an August 11 memorandum by Pasvolsky to the President, revealed the rupture in the Department on regionalism issue. The memorandum summarized the work on that day of the final meeting of the Department's "Security Subcommittee," which had been asked to respond to a July 16 British proposal for a "United Nations Commission for Europe." In a passage to which Welles took open issue, Pasvolsky wrote what in effect was to become the U.S. policy:

The British Aide-Mémoire raises again the whole issue of regionalism in connection with international organization. ... The committee discussions have so far pointed to the following conclusions: (1) that the basis of international organization should be world-wide rather than regional; (2) that there are grave dangers involved in having the world organization rest upon the foundation of previously created, full-fledged regional organizations; and (3) that while there may be advantages in setting up regional arrangements for some purposes, such arrangements should be subsidiary to the world organization and should flow from it.³⁸

On August 20, Secretary Hull personally brought the documents to the President and Prime Minister Churchill meeting at the First Quebec Conference. The draft Four-Power Declaration prepared by the Informal Agenda Group was accepted as the basis for further negotiation while the Welles' committee documents, consisting of a slightly revised draft United Nations Protocol and papers relating to

dependent territories organized into regional commissions, were not acted upon.³⁹ In addition to the draft Four-Power Declaration, the Political Subcommittee's agenda group had on August 14 completed a draft "Charter of the United Nations" that became the basis for the Department's preparatory work for the Dumbarton Oaks conference a year later. Regionalism was reduced in the draft to a minor subordinate role within a general membership organization of states. The single reference to regionalism (in Article 12) stated that "nothing in this Charter shall affect regional arrangements, agreements, or associations, now existing or which may be entered into between Members, which are consistent with the obligations under this Charter."⁴⁰

The gods were no longer with Welles, who felt the weight of the Department and, subsequently, the President's own support going against him. Outflanked and overpowered by Hull on this and other issues, Welles resigned from the Department on August 21. Hull and his principled internationalism prevailed in the end over Welles and the interstate regionalism suggested by him and perhaps the bulk of the Department's own research between 1940 and 1943. But the war-time debate on regionalism and world organization was far from over.

The Regionalist Debate in the British Government

Next to the other major powers, Britain's commitment to regionalism in world organization was the least equivocal if also the most ineffectual. Less comfortable with the

legalistic approach of the preponderantly American internationalists than with the concept of balance, Britain sought a postwar peace that was based on "creating an effective European political unit which could hold a balance between Russian and American power."⁴¹ Britain directed world organization planning efforts to the two theatres of conflict, Europe and the Far East, of which the former was clearly the more important. "The British felt that no scheme for international peace could survive if it were not based on a foundation of European security, coupled with safeguards against further outbreaks of aggression in the Far East."⁴²

A second and not unrelated postwar policy goal was assuring United States participation in the postwar world. With Britain's position as a world power in decline next to ascendant American and Soviet powers, British policymakers were satisfied if they "could bind the United States to participate in world affairs as she had omitted to do in the years between the wars."⁴³ In the early war years, when the Soviet Union was aligned with Germany in the 1939 non-aggression pact, the idea of an Anglo-American condominium was favorably discussed among Foreign Office researchers. In a Foreign Research Press Service (FRPS) paper submitted to the Foreign Office on July 7, 1941, shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Arnold Toynbee argued for a peace settlement that integrated Europe with the rest of the world under the guarantee of Anglo-American power. The way toward a stable peaceful order, he argued, was

not to insulate the overseas world from the mainland of Europe either economically, politically, or strategically, but to try to bring the two regions into partnership under the auspices of Powers strong enough to guarantee peace and at the same time wise enough to use force underlying the guarantee with tact, justice and moderation. This is a partnership which Great Britain, as the bridge between Europe and the overseas countries, would be capable of bringing into being, and which the United Kingdom and the United States, acting in concert, would be capable⁴⁴ of protecting effectively by their joint guarantee.

The form of a British-American-led world order was outlined in a brief prepared by a FPRS subcommittee and submitted to the Foreign Office on the same date (July 7). The world order was to be shouldered by "the English-speaking peoples, who alone (would) possess the armed force needed for the purpose," and organized into "four or five great blocs" that included the British-American unit (with Latin America and presumably Canada) along with a pan-European, Far Eastern, and Soviet blocs.⁴⁵

Postwar order planning in Britain effectively began in October 1942, when the Foreign Office's Reconstruction Department headed by Gladwyn Jebb outlined a "Four Power Plan" for a regionally-organized world security organization.⁴⁶ Though viewed from the perspective of British interests, the plan was consonant with the regionalist American view at that time. Its basic idea was a major power-guaranteed peace through a "world council" comprised of "regional councils" that would "co-ordinate defence and economic arrangements" (7). On November 27, the War Cabinet approved a slightly revised version of such a plan. Four subsidiary regional councils -- for Europe, America, the Far East, and the British Commonwealth -- were

represented on the World Council, with the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union also participating as members of the European Council (12). Referring to a speech on postwar issues by Sumner Welles four days earlier, the War Cabinet "agreed that we should take advantage of this situation" and approved Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's motion to develop the Jebb proposal along lines suggested by Sir Stafford Cripps. Minister of Air and former Leader of the House of Commons, Cripps urged the government "to take the consideration of policy a stage further and to develop a programme of common action by the Four Powers" (12).

With assistance from Cripps, Eden completed and submitted on January 16, 1943 a "United Nations Plan" whose preamble referred to Britain's two-fold foreign policy aims as remaining a world power and preserving "the freedom of Europe as essential to our own" (14). The revised proposal again favored regional bodies provided the great powers acted in concert and with no single major power dominant in any given region:

Generally speaking, regional groupings should be encouraged, subject always to the principle that there must not be a kind of "limited liability" system, whereby one Power is solely responsible for keeping the peace in any given area. ...In discussing "regionalism" therefore, we must assume that all the Four Powers (with the exception of China) are in principle equally interested in maintaining the peace everywhere in the world... (17).

Eden outlined a structure that divided the world into eight regional systems subordinate politically to a World council representing the major powers including, pro forma, China and possibly France. The eight regional groupings were:

- the British Imperial Conference;
- a Pan-American Union;
- a European Council whose members included the U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., the European allies, and eventually neutrals and ex-enemy states;
- a Far Eastern Council with China playing the leading role but also including the U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., Canada, ?India, ?Australia, and eventually Japan;
- a Southeast Asia Council composed of France, Thailand, U.K., U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, China, The Netherlands, and ?India;
- a Middle East Council with the U.K., ?U.S., U.S.S.R., Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, ?Palestine;
- an sub-Saharan Africa Council of the major colonial powers and Ethiopia;
- and a Caribbean Commission with the U.K., U.S., Canada, Holland, France, ?Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, San Domingo, Venezuela (18-19). (interrogation points in original)

After the January 1943 Casablanca Conference talks between Roosevelt and Churchill, the two leaders agreed that Eden would soon follow with consultations in Washington on postwar issues. On his return leg via Cairo, where he met with Turkish President Ismet Inönü, Churchill addressed a paper entitled "Morning Thoughts: Note on Postwar Security" to the President February 2. He expressed the intention of the "leading Powers to prolong their honourable association" in order to create a world organization in which "governmental instruments" would be created in the two principal areas of conflict, Europe and the Far East.⁴⁷ Churchill publically outlined his views on postwar order in his March 21, 1943 radio address in which he called on the three great powers to begin conferring on the future world organisation. While not seeking to preempt those

discussions, he suggested that in the context of an organization composed of member states, "there should come into being a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia" distinct from, yet subsidiary to the world organization.⁴⁸ Europe had to take precedence over Asia, in part because the end of the war was within sight there and in part because "in Europe lie most of the causes which have led to these two world wars."

The general problem of Europe for Churchill was safeguarding the rights and interests of the small nations. The problems of the small states, now overpowered by Germany, could be redressed through their representation in regional groupings or councils which would exist as entities alongside the larger powers. He called for consideration of the proposition, "that side by side with the Great Powers there should be a number of groupings of states or confederations which would express themselves through their own chosen representatives, the whole making a council of great States and groups of States."⁴⁹

The speech was coolly received in Washington, where the visiting Eden found himself on the defensive.⁵⁰ In preparing for his March 12 to 30 Washington trip, Eden, perhaps aware of the rumblings in the State Department on the regionalism issue, decided not to put "much emphasis on the 'regional idea'."⁵¹ Regionalism had not only begun to lose favor in the State Department, but the Soviet Union had by this time begun to openly oppose Foreign Office-sponsored plans for regional federations in eastern Europe. In his memoirs, Eden

indicated that he had begun to hedge on his support for regionalism when in January 1943 he warned of the dangers of "a kind of 'limited liability' system, whereby one power would be responsible for keeping the peace in a given region." Failing a common world policy on the part of the great powers, Eden, echoing Hull's criticism of regionalism as an essentially crude form of hegemonial regionalism, said "we shall be confronted by the prospect of a world in precarious balance, with the great powers, each with its circle of client States, facing each other in a rivalry which will merge imperceptibly into hostility."⁵²

In Washington, Eden chose to play the role of a listener over that of an advocate on the postwar organization issue. On March 24, he heard Welles' demurrals on Churchill's plan for a Council of Europe as the apparent centerpiece a the world organization. In a March 27 meeting at the White House with the President, Hull, Welles, presidential aide Harry Hopkins, and U.S. ambassador to Britain John Winant, Eden distanced himself from Churchill's speech and, according to Hopkins' minute, "rather felt that Churchill spoke on the spur of the moment and that he, Eden, agreed that the United Nations should be organized on a global basis."⁵³ But Roosevelt, as he also learned, was still the "realist" advocating a major power-centered regionalism within a world-wide organization. In a March 28 cable to Churchill, he outlined Roosevelt's three-tier idea for a world organization that reflected Welles' regionalist thinking. On the top tier, an executive committee of the four major powers would be responsible for all important

security and policing decisions. An advisory council would occupy the middle and be composed of representatives of the four powers plus six to eight representatives elected on a regional basis, meeting to settle questions brought before it. At the bottom was a general assembly composed of all member nations which would meet annually to give the smaller states the opportunity, as Roosevelt put it, "to blow off steam."⁵⁴

Churchill had an opportunity to present his ideas directly to American leaders during his visit to Washington in May 1943.⁵⁵ In a May 22 luncheon meeting at the British embassy, he accepted a request by Vice President Wallace, Secretary of War Stimson, Interior Secretary Ickes, Sumner Welles, and Senator Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to hear out his views on postwar world organization. Churchill said he "attached great importance to the regional principle," for only countries whose interests were directly involved in a conflict could "be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion" (804).

Reacting perhaps to the American criticism of his European-centered proposal in March, he now outlined a plan for three autonomous "Regional Councils" -- in Europe, Asia, and the American hemisphere (including Canada as a member of the British Commonwealth) -- within a world organization

guaranteed by the major powers. Unlike Roosevelt's three-tier idea, he likened his postwar structure to a three-legged stool, with a Supreme World Council supported by the three Regional Councils. The regional councils were subordinate to the world council, which served as the highest court of appeals in settling disputes. The world council was based on an association of the three great powers (or four, if China had to be included), with regional council representation by election and on a rotating basis. The major powers would be members of regional councils in which they had interests. Churchill expressed hope that the United States would be represented in all three. As an enforcement mechanism in the world council, he suggested dividing the armed forces of each state into two contingents, one forming a national force, the other an international police force placed "at the disposal of the Regional Councils under the direction of the Supreme World Council" (805).

Churchill also revived the idea of an Anglo-American partnership, stating that a world organization could not exclude treaties of friendship "devoid of sinister purpose against others" (806). He doubted that a world security system could work unless the United States and the British Commonwealth joined forces in what he called "fraternal association." He not only favored free trade and movement, but looked forward to common military bases for a joint defense of common interests. Churchill even broached the idea of issuing common passports and "some common form of citizenship" (806).⁵⁶

Although Churchill pointed out in closing that he was "expressing only personal views" (807), he circulated the written account of his remarks to the War Cabinet upon his return in early June. And judging by the reaction of his American hosts, British and American views on postwar world organization seemed to be synchronous. On June 10, Welles outlined his idea of a world council represented by the four major powers and seven regional groupings of states to British Ambassador Lord Halifax and visiting Foreign Office Under-Secretary Richard Law.⁵⁷ From the Foreign Office's perspective, it "welcomed American assent to the idea of a Supreme World Council consisting of the four Powers and other members chosen on a regional basis."⁵⁸

Churchill's regional model was a seeming amalgam of interstate, hegemonial, and autochthonous forms (in that order of importance) that sought to weld smaller nations into larger entities which in turn were part of larger continental systems. The structure was to be held together by the major powers, including perhaps a partnership between the United States and Britain, in a world organization where states were represented individually and through regional groupings. Churchill remained committed to the regional idea but did not have the time to pursue its implementation into policy either with the Foreign Office, where the postwar planning effort was centered, or in the allied councils. The Foreign Office began to waver on the regionalism issue in 1943 as its policies were increasingly influenced by the thinking of the United States and Soviet

Union. As William McNeill has suggested, "the power of the two vast nation-states, America and Russia, each newly aware of its strength and full of self-confidence, clearly surpassed Britain's unaided strength; and the British Government saw their post-war problem primarily in terms of salvaging as much of Britain's influence, wealth, and power as circumstances would permit."⁵⁹ Neither Churchill nor Eden were in a position to oppose the internationalist direction in which Secretary of State Hull officially steered allied policy on postwar world organization after the mid-1943. This direction was assured by a Soviet Union that preferred to leave "the field of post-war planning on the grand scale to the Americans."⁶⁰

Outlines of a Soviet Perspective

The Soviet Union, as we noted above, devoted the least effort among the major powers to postwar world order planning. At the same time, it nurtured a hegemonial policy towards its western neighbors that first revealed itself in 1939-40 following the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression treaty. A Soviet attitude and policy on regionalism and postwar order did not emerge until 1943, and even then it remained sketchy and derivative. If regionalism was a new term in the western political lexicon, it was all the more so in the Soviet's. Their dilemma can in part be explained by understanding some basic distinctions between the theory and practice of Soviet international relations.

As we noted in Chapter I, the Soviet Union's Marxist-

Leninist metaphysic questioned the very legitimacy of the western capitalist/nationalist, or "bourgeois," states-system. Soviet theory countered "bourgeois internationalism" with a "proletarian internationalism" that recognized the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its center in Moscow as the fount of a revolutionary-socialist and, ultimately, stateless world order which alone could establish world peace. Based along class and not national lines, the new socialist world was seen as the "camp of peace" while the dying capitalist world of "encirclement" was the "camp of war" that would some day be overcome. In this framework, the modern state was considered an instrument of class rule that appeared, historically, with the division of society into classes. The state according to Marxist theorists was a coercive mechanism of the exploiting class whose development was tied to the period of capitalism and nationalism. "A nation is not merely a historical category," Stalin wrote in 1913, "but a historical category belonging to a definite period, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism was at the same time a process of amalgamation of people into nations."⁶¹ In western Europe, the formation of nations coincided with their conversion into independent national states. In eastern Europe, where feudal structures still largely prevailed, nations were organized into large multinational empires, but that the bourgeois-driven national movements in the region "were bound to respond in the same fashion."⁶²

Just as capitalism was ineluctably moving toward

socialism, the capitalist nation-states were destined by the same historical laws to disappear under the rule of the proletariat and be replaced by the higher, supranational political authority of the socialist world state. Thus, "since Stalin took it for granted that the bourgeoisie must be destroyed, the world of sovereign nation-states which it had created was likewise doomed to oblivion."⁶³ The state would expire ("wither away") with the construction of a classless society by a "dictatorship of the proletariat." The appointed agency for carrying out this change was the third Communist International, or Comintern, set up by Lenin in 1919. At the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, the Comintern Program still asserted that the state, "being the embodiment of class domination, dies out as classes die out."⁶⁴

This utopian vision, while it had theoretical merit in the eyes CPSU General-Secretary Stalin, took a back seat in the 1930s to the pragmatic needs of power and protecting "socialism in one country." In 1930, Stalin artfully "declared that the Communist state was to grow and reach the greatest strength ever obtained by any state in history, and only then would it begin to 'wither away'."⁶⁵ In 1939, at the 18th Congress of the CPSU, he declared that the Soviet state would continue to exist in the period of Communism as long as "capitalist encirclement" existed.⁶⁶

In the meantime, Premier Stalin led Soviet Russia back into the bourgeois community of nations. With Hitler's accession to power in January 1933, Germany as well as a

militaristic Japan in the Pacific became a threat to Soviet security. Using his able Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov, he succeeded in obtaining diplomatic recognition from the United States government in late 1933. This was followed by the Soviet Union's trumpeted "return to Europe" and its 1934 admission to the League of Nations. It was here that Litvinov, with uncanny ability, labored to create regional security pacts within the League framework in both Europe and the Pacific.⁶⁷ In crafty and eloquent speeches to the League between 1936 and 1938, he often criticized the League's universalist conception of collective security as an impediment to peace.⁶⁸ On September 28, 1936, he began a campaign to promote a regional as against a universal application of the collective security principle. He said the chief function of the League was to uphold peace, not "universalism at any price." He called on the League to act on his regional proposals, among them the creation of an "eastern Locarno," "without waiting for the advent of universalism." In fact, he called on the members of the League who wished to take part in regional, or, when this was impossible, in bilateral pacts of mutual assistance to "open diplomatic negotiations among themselves to achieve this aim."⁶⁹ The failure of these and other more lame attempts to stop Hitler prompted Stalin to drop Litvinov and opt for the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939, which remained in force until Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.⁷⁰

It was not until early 1943, when victory over the German army in the Caucasus seemed assured, that the Soviets

began to consider the question of postwar world order. A February 1943 despatch to the Foreign Office from British ambassador Clark Kerr in Moscow indicated that "the Soviet Government had not yet got beyond the merest preliminary study" in this area.⁷¹ It was at this time that Soviet ambassador to London Ivan Maisky began discussions with British officials, among them Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information and a confidant of Churchill. In an April 1943 exchange, Bracken outlined Churchill's revised scheme of a supreme world council of the three or four major powers and the three subordinate regional councils responsible for maintaining the peace in their regions. While Maisky voiced "no objections" to the regional structure, which nonetheless provided "for the representation of every country of that region in its central body," he questioned "the setting up of a three-member or four-member directorate which in the long run will give orders to the whole world. This undoubtedly will arouse serious and sufficiently justified objections by other States: what then?"⁷² Maisky's doubts were in fact not shared by Stalin, who, as we shall see in the following Chapter, had fewer qualms about a major power condominium policing the world. As early as June 1, 1942, Molotov had assured Roosevelt of Stalin's support for the President's concept of a peace structure based on the major powers acting as "world policemen."⁷³

When both Maisky and Litvinov were recalled to Moscow in May 1943, both were later appointed deputy Foreign Commissars under Molotov to assist with postwar issues.

Litvinov was given responsibilities for postwar planning with emphasis on the world security organization.⁷⁴ The Soviets were to express views on regionalism and postwar world organization during the wartime inter-allied conferences between the end of 1943 and the spring of 1945, the subject of the following chapter.

NOTES

¹Postwar, p. 20.

²Leo Pasvolsky, Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States," (New York, 1928), p. 576.

³The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948), v.2, p. 1630.

⁴Postwar, p. 63f.

⁵Ibid., p. 208f.

⁶Woodward, p. 62.

⁷Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism (New York, 1979), p. 218f.

⁸Quoted in Postwar, p. 163.

⁹Nikolai Lebedev, The USSR in World Politics (Moscow, [1980] 1982), p. 107.

¹⁰Heinrich Bodensieck, Provozierte Teilung Europas? Die british-nordamerikanische Regionalismus-Diskussion und die Vorgeschichte des Kalten Krieges 1939-1945 (Opladen, 1970), pp. 21-25; David J. Dallin, The Big Three: The United States, Britain, Russia (New Haven, 1945), chs. 2 and 3.

¹¹Quoted in P.E. Corbett, Post-war Worlds (New York, 1942), p. 97.

¹²Postwar, p. 51.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (New York, [1948] rev.ed. 1950), p. 360.

¹⁵Sumner Welles, A Time for Decision (New York/London, 1944), p. 401.

¹⁶Sumner Welles, Where are We Heading? (New York/London, 1946), p. 24; see also A Time for Decision, p. 374.

¹⁷Welles, Where are We Heading?, p. 23.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 23-24.

¹⁹Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 381.

²⁰Hull, v.2, pp. 1644, 1646.

²¹See NA, Lot File 60D-224: "The Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945," for the files on these and the other committees. For a Department summary of the postwar planning

effort through the fall of 1943 that somewhat underrepresents the volume of material in support of regionalism, see ISO-Und 7, October 7, 1944: "Work in the Field of International Organization in the Department of State Prior to October 1943" (19 p.). See also Postwar, passim, and FRUS, beginning with The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943 (Washington, 1970).

²²NA, 60D-224: Minutes PIO-1, 17 July 1942. In addition to Welles, the subcommittee's members were Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin V. Cohen, Green H. Hackworth (as acting chairman in Welles' absence), James T. Shotwell, Leo Pasvolsky, Harley Notter (Research Secretary), and, at the later meetings, Hamilton Fish Armstrong.

²³Ibid., Minutes PIO-4, 14 August 1942, p. 4.

²⁴Ibid., Minutes PIO-5, 21 August 1942, p. 1.

²⁵Postwar, p. 113.

²⁶Ibid., p. 112.

²⁷Postwar, p. 110. See Welles, The Time for Decision, pp. 374-387. Compare Hull, pp. 1639-40.

²⁸Postwar, Appendix 13, pp. 472-483.

²⁹Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (New York, [1948] rev.ed. 1950), p. 717.

³⁰Hull, v.2, p. 1640.

³¹Postwar, p. 171.

³²Hull, loc.cit

³³FRUS, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 688.

³⁴Hull, p. 1646.

³⁵Hull, p. 1647. See Postwar, pp. 146-148. As an exception, the subcommittee on Problems of European Organization, which was established in May 1943, continued to meet until March 1944.

³⁶FRUS, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp. 691-721.

³⁷Ibid., p. 694.

³⁸Ibid., p. 691. In a footnote to his memorandum (Ibid., p. 691), Pasvolsky recounted part of the chronology of the turbulent events of August 11th: "Welles is Acting Secretary, from eleven o'clock today, and is taking the position that he and not Pasvolsky will transmit the

[Pasvolsky] memorandum to the President. And furthermore, he opposes the statements in the memorandum which object to regional structure and organization, and consequently he is carrying through the sending to the President of the full draft as worked out by him and his committee of the United Nations protocol which embodies the whole regional principle."

³⁹Ibid., pp. 692, 706-21. See Postwar, pp. 188-89. The importance of the victory of internationalism in the Four-Power Declaration is revealed in the following December 1943 Department record: "The general idea of agreement among the four major nations for cooperation in regard to security matters and establishment of international organization grew out of a series of discussions in the Subcommittee on Political Problems and in the Special Subcommittee on International Organization, both led by Mr. Welles, during the Spring and Summer of 1942. ...The final wording of the document as the draft declaration recommended to the Secretary was particularly important, for it was decisive on the issue involved [i.e., the universal principle of article 4], and this constructive work was done by the informal agenda group which met in Mr. Pasvolsky's office in the early days of August this year." (NA, Lot 60D 224, Box 19: "Background and Development of the 4-Nation Declaration, In Light of Records in the Division of Political Studies," 13 Dec. 1943).

⁴⁰Postwar, p. 531 (Appendix 23).

⁴¹William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (London/New York/Toronto, [1953] 1970), p. 322.

⁴²John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, The Semblance of Peace: the Political Settlement after the Second World War (London, 1972), p. 89.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴PRO, W 9336, RRI/28/iii: "Why Great Britain Cannot Cut Herself Off from the Continent," p. 4. See also RRI/42/iii: "Oceanic vs. Continental Road to World Organization: The Two Roads and the History" (21 p.), which was submitted to the Foreign Office on the same date.

⁴⁵PRO FO 371, W 9336, RRI/3/iii: "British-American Order," pp. 22 and 6.

⁴⁶Woodward, p. 3f. Subsequent page references cited in text.

⁴⁷Churchill, v.4, p. 711. For the complete text, see FRUS, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, pp. 702-06.

⁴⁸This and the following quoted passages are from Winston S. Churchill, His Complete Speeches 1897-1963 ed. R.R. James (New York/London, 1974), pp. 6757-58.

⁴⁹For a summary of British views on the problem of small states, see G.N. Clark, "British War Aims and the Smaller European Allies," Agenda (London), I (October 1942) and II (August 1943).

⁵⁰Wheeler-Bennett, p. 90.

⁵¹Woodward, p. 24.

⁵²This and following quote in Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston, 1965), p. 424.

⁵³Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 718. In a March 16 meeting, they discussed the future of Germany in terms of partition. Eden favored the "dismemberment of Germany to take place as the result of spontaneous movements for such partition coming from within Germany herself..." (FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, v.III, p. 20).

⁵⁴Woodward, pp. 33-34. See Eden, The Reckoning, pp. 430-433 and F.B. King, The New Internationalism: Allied Policy and the European Peace, 1939-1945 (London, 1973), pp. 161-62.

⁵⁵Churchill, v.4, pp. 802-807. Subsequent page references cited in text. See also Woodward, pp. 38-40. Churchill's own account is a near-verbatim transcription of the British Embassy's "secret" May 28, 1943 "Memorandum" of the meeting, in NA, Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945, Box 19.

⁵⁶According to Sherwood (op.cit., p. 750), Churchill, who again raised the Anglo-American banner at a September 6, 1943 speech at Harvard University, "certainly talked to Roosevelt before suggesting even the remote possibility of 'common citizenship' and was assured by the President that the United States had advanced so far from its isolationist position that this would not outrage public opinion or provoke another Boston Tea Party."

⁵⁷Woodward, p. 41.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 42.

⁵⁹William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (London, [1953] 1970), p. 316.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (New York, 1942), p. 17.

⁶²Ibid., p. 18.

⁶³Elliot R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York, 1960), p. 26.

⁶⁴Quoted in Kermit E. McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine (New York, 1964), p. 227.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 269.

⁶⁷B. Ponomarev, A. Gromyko, and V. Khostov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1969), pp. 306-330; Nikolai Lebedev, The USSR in World Politics (Moscow, [1980] 1982), pp. 74-77; Maxim Litvinov, Against Agression: The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York, 1939), passim.

⁶⁸Litvinov, op.cit., p. 54.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 55.

⁷⁰Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union (New York, 1982), pp. 309 and 324, state that while Litvinov was pursuing his regional peace proposals in the League, Molotov, who was appointed as his successor in May 1939, had for some time led the negotiations with Berlin that led to the non-aggression pact.

⁷¹PRO, FO 371/35338. Clark Kerr to Eden, 21 February 1943. The despatch was in response to lengthy instructions by Eden (FO 371/35228/U 321/216/G, 4 February) for Kerr to explore Soviet views and encourage Soviet cooperation on postwar issues: "You should suggest that there seems to be general agreement that the 'Anglo-American-Soviet' coalition must be continued after the war if possible. In the maintenance of this coalition lies the main hope of securing a durable peace."

⁷²Ivan Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador: the War 1939-43 (London, 1967), p. 357.

⁷³FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1942, v.3, p. 580.

⁷⁴Vojtech Mastny, op.cit., p. 218.

CHAPTER VI

THE DEBATE AMONG THE MAJOR POWERS AT THE INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCES, 1943-1945

Between 1940 and 1943, the United States favored a postwar world organization with marked regionalist features. In August 1943, Secretary of State Hull succeeded in pulling American thinking on world organization back toward Wilsonian internationalism. He considered regionalism, which he interpreted as potentially hostile "blocs" of states, as a threat to the very nature of universal organization. But Hull's success in turning both the State Department and White House to his view did not foreclose debate on regionalism and world organization in the next phase of postwar planning, namely the inter-allied conferences of the major powers. In the 18 months between the first Quebec Conference August 12-24, 1943 and the Yalta conference February 4-12, 1945, the views and proposals on world organization advanced by the State Department carried the day, for the most part, with Britain and the Soviet Union. During this period, advocates of regionalism were on the largely on the defensive. But regionalism remained an issue on the postwar agendas. Like a jack-in-the-box, it kept

coming back in the allied deliberations leading to and including the San Francisco Conference on International Organization between April 25-June 26, 1945.

Regionalism on the Wane I: From Quebec to Teheran, August-December 1943

On August 21, 1943, Secretary of State Hull secured preliminary approval of the State Department's "informal agenda group" draft of a Four-Power Declaration on allied war aims from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill meeting at the First Quebec Conference. Article 4 of the Declaration devoted to the future world organization obliged the governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China to jointly declare that

they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹

The draft declaration, which was to be acted upon at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October, also stated that until a general system of security was in place, the four powers would act as the world's policemen. Article 5 mandated them during this interim period to "consult and act jointly in behalf of the community of nations."

Churchill's agreement in principle to the declaration contradicted his stated regionalist ideas on postwar order. "Despite his earlier views," as Hull noted in his memoirs, "Mr. Churchill did not object to the Four-Nation Declaration."² For a meeting devoted primarily to military

affairs, Churchill the supreme strategist may have attached little importance to the high-minded declaration (he did not mention it in his six-volume wartime memoirs). This view was reinforced by the Foreign Office, which regarded the declaration "as less valuable than a document which the Senate could have ratified at once."³ Churchill's acquiescence may have also been impelled by a realization that his idea for a Council of Europe was becoming a pipedream in face of American and Soviet opposition and that, under these circumstances, it was necessary to rely on the United States as a counterpoise to Soviet power. "From Churchill's point of view, there was much that seemed unrealistic in American attitudes, but acceptance of American leadership in post-war planning had the great advantage of committing the United States to an active part in post-war international affairs."⁴ Churchill assured the President on August 23 that there would be no serious differences of view on the text, but that he would nonetheless have to refer the document to the War Cabinet for consideration and approval.

With Churchill still in the United States, Eden presented the draft text to the War Cabinet on September 6. Members responded by taking exception to the "sovereign equality of nations" phrase and by seeking to give greater voice to the role of small nations. The Cabinet thought that the "sovereign equality of nations" might erroneously be taken "to mean that every nation should be given equal weight in the World Organisation." After consulting with the Dominion governments, they revised the wording of the draft

into a separate document presented to the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference. Article 4 was revised by adding to the "sovereign equality of nations" the phrase, "for the maintenance of international peace and security in which all peace-loving nations, great and small, may play their part." This wording left open the possibility of small nations playing their part as regional actors, and hence as more equal not only de jure, but also de facto to the larger states. Concern for the small nations was also cause for amending article 5 to read: "They [the four major powers] will consult with one another, and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations."

At the Moscow conference October 19-30, 1943, Secretary Hull succeeded in his main conference goal of securing adoption of the "Four-Nation Declaration." The original American text was approved with but minor changes on October 26. The only modification of article 4 was the substitution of "peace-loving states" for "nations." Foreign Secretary Eden did succeed, however, in amending article 5 with the British wording lest the original "be taken to imply a four-power dictatorship ... that the British Dominions, particularly Canada, objected to."⁵ The Soviet Union's only objection to the declaration was the inclusion of China as a signatory. Hull also circulated at this time but did not place other, including the Welles' committee, documents relating to world organization on the agenda.⁶

Through Hull's persistence and skill, and the power of

the United States, internationalism in general and a universal international organization in particular had now been formally adopted by the major powers as the guiding principle and structure of postwar world organization. The Moscow Declaration became the reference point for all subsequent postwar planning. Hull admitted to no inherent conflict between an internationalism recognizing the "sovereign equality of all nations" and the big power condominium that would guarantee if not impose peace on the rest of the world. On one hand, he could tell Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov (on October 19) that he was "convinced that our three countries would be engaged in close cooperative international action not only during the war but in the post-war period as well... ." ⁷ On the other, in his November 18 report on the Moscow conference to a joint session of Congress, he could lay "particular stress" on the Article 4 provision emphasizing that "the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a future system of general security, will be the foundation upon which the future international organization will be constructed." In characteristic language fraught with as much wishful thinking as his comment to Molotov, Hull stated that as the provisions of declaration were "carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interests." ⁸

The Moscow conference prepared the way for the first joint meeting of the three allied heads of state in Teheran November 28-December 1. In their first war-time encounter, President Roosevelt broached Marshall Stalin with the question of postwar world organization in a private conversation on November 29. He spoke of a need for a world-wide organization. But what he outlined to Stalin was his regionalist plan for a three-tiered world organization which he had also discussed with Churchill in early September.⁹ The organization would consist of a general assembly of some 40 nations which would discuss and make recommendations to a 10-member executive committee composed of the four major powers and six representatives from five world regions. The six regional representatives included "two additional European states, one South American, one Near East, a Far Eastern country, and one British Dominion."¹⁰ The executive committee would deal with all non-military questions. The third and highest organ consisted of the four major powers, or "Four Policemen," who "would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to peace and any emergency which requires this action."¹¹

Although Roosevelt had apparently rallied to Hull's internationalism, it is apparent that the six smaller states on the executive committee were representatives of regions, not their respective states. The structure he outlined corresponded to Welles' July 14, 1943 "Draft Constitution of International Organization," which provided for an "executive committee" of the four major powers; an eleven-

member "council" of the four powers and seven members representing five regions (two each from Europe and the American states group); and a "general conference."¹²

By contrast, Roosevelt's conception did not correspond to the draft "Charter of the United Nations" completed by Hull's Informal Agenda Group in the State Department on August 14, 1943, which provided for an organization based on universal membership in a "general conference" and a "council" comprised of the four major powers and three member states elected by the general conference.¹³

Roosevelt was not in his element in Teheran. When Stalin asked him whether the world body would have the right to make binding decisions on the nations of the world that may also require the sending of American troops to Europe, Roosevelt equivocated. He admitted that such an arrangement might be unacceptable to the U.S. Congress. Stalin then proceeded to challenge the idea of a world organization ruled by the "Four Policemen" by coming to the defense of the small nations of Europe and, while not stating so directly, endorsing Churchill's conception of postwar order. He imagined that the European nations would resent China's intervention in their affairs. Instead of a world organization based on the four major powers, Stalin envisaged an organization based on European and Far Eastern "commissions," with the three major powers as members of the European commission. Roosevelt replied that this idea was close to Churchill's idea of regional councils for Europe, the Far East, and the Americas. He also expressed doubts that Congress would agree to America's participation in an

exclusively European committee "which might be able to force the dispatch of American troops to Europe."¹⁴ When Stalin pointed out that a world organization run by the major powers might also require the use of American troops, Roosevelt again hedged, responding that he did not envisage the use of troops, but only American planes and ships.

In a follow-up conversation on December 1, Stalin, referring to the November 29 discussion, told Roosevelt that on further reflection, "he had come to agree with the President that it [the world organization] should be world-wide and not regional."¹⁵ But from what the President told Senator Tom Connally upon returning to the United States, Roosevelt still believed Stalin favored the regional plan. "Stalin, Roosevelt concluded, favored Churchill's regional plan," Connally wrote. "'I'll have to work on both of them,' Roosevelt told me."¹⁶ Churchill, who was not invited to take part in the discussions, suggested later that Roosevelt misrepresented his views. "He does not seem to have made it clear that I also contemplated a Supreme United Nations Council, of which the three regional committees would be the components. As I was not informed until much later of what had taken place, I was not able to correct this erroneous presentation."¹⁷ The Teheran discussions on postwar world organization proved inconclusive and premature, in large part because "Roosevelt seems to have become hesitant as between the various, vaguely formulated possibilities."¹⁸ Stalin, on the other hand, no doubt took note of Roosevelt's remarks about the unavailability of American troops for

postwar police duty in Europe in whatever hegemonial designs he may have entertained for the Soviet Union in postwar eastern Europe.

Regionalism Revived: the Road to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (August 21-October 7, 1944)

After a research and development phase between 1940 and 1943, the major powers, notably the United States and Great Britain, engaged in a second or preparatory phase of postwar world order planning in 1944. Armed with the Moscow Declaration and a "topical outline" prepared by the Informal Agenda Group, the three powers formulated separate proposals for the new world organization that were considered at a working conference in the Dumbarton Oaks estate near Washington D.C. between August 21-October 7.¹⁹ The "Topical Outline" issued to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China on February 17, 1944 essentially established the agenda and ensuing work.²⁰ It consisted of questions relating to the general character, structure, and function of an international organization consisting of a General Assembly, Executive Council, and Court of Justice. It also sought proposals specific to security arrangements, economic and social cooperation, territorial trusteeships, and procedures for establishing all of the above.

The attitudes and policy objectives of the three major powers prior to the conference revealed substantial differences of emphasis and view. The British, guided by principles of a traditional and benign Realpolitik, continued to speak up, if in more muted tones, for the

smaller states and their participation in world organization through regional groupings. Churchill hoped that a less "pulverized" Europe would enable Great Britain and European states to hold their own against the American and Soviet giants. The British continued to favor geographic "regional councils" as a key to world order. By contrast, the formally-minded Americans directed their energies to drafting a charter of the world organization based on a literal interpretation of Article 4 of the Moscow Declaration. In devising their legalistic blueprint for a universal organization, they accorded little room for regionalism. The Soviets, in a reversal of Stalin's negative view at Teheran of Roosevelt's "four policemen" idea and disguising power ambitions for hegemony in eastern Europe, outlined more or less hasty views for a world organization that was dependent on the major powers.

The Foreign Office coordinated the work and production of five memoranda on world organization that were submitted to the United States and Soviet Union in July 1944 as the British negotiating position for Dumbarton Oaks. Directed by Gladwyn Jebb, the memoranda were prepared by an interdepartmental committee chaired by Minister of State Richard Law and submitted to the Armistice and Post-War Committee and War Cabinet in April 1944. The memoranda, which were slightly revised between April and July, covered subjects relating to the scope and nature of the world organization (Memorandum A); settlement of disputes (Memorandum B); military aspects of a postwar security

organization (Memorandum C); coordination of political and economic mechanisms (Memorandum D); and the method and procedure for establishing the world organization (Memorandum E).²¹

Referring to the Moscow Declaration, the British proposals provided for a world-wide organization respecting the political independence and "sovereign equality" of its member states. On the surface, the memoranda and Law's April 16 cover note to the War Cabinet were internationalist in tone and supportive of a three or four-power-led world organization. Law stated in his cover note that power resided in a World Council composed of the four major powers "and a number of other States" (91). A closer reading of the texts revealed an underlying preference for regional structures as a basis for both small state representation and international security within world organization. The British proposals attempted clearly to go beyond the internationalism plus "four-policemen" formula.

In addition to a universal organization, Memorandum A envisaged functional, or specialised technical organizations "through which States will combine for various purposes," and regional associations when there was "obvious advantage to be obtained by limitation of the sphere of action" (95). Such advantages were seen in matters relating to "security, for economic co-operation, for the promotion of welfare for colonial territories or for other purposes" (Ibid.). A coordinating mechanism would tie the functional organizations to "an economic and social secretariat

attached to the World Council" and the regional organizations "should not (be in) conflict with the world-wide organisation but rather assist to carry out its purposes" (Ibid.).

The World Council had to remain small in order to ensure effective action, but it also had to be "of such character as to possess the confidence of all Members of the Organization" (96). As the power, size, and status of states varied greatly and were unevenly distributed over the continents, a means had to "be found to ensure that the various regions of the world (were) adequately represented" (Ibid.). The proposition was made conditionally: "Should Regional Associations of sufficient importance be formed they might furnish the basis for representation on the Council" (97). The matter needed "careful examination -- not only amongst the Four Powers themselves but with the other States whose wishes must be taken into account" (Ibid.).

Regionalism was also an issue in the proposals for a security system (Memorandum C). The suggestion was made in Memorandum B that regional political organizations, in consort with the World Council, could serve in a dispute as the peace settlement agency of first resort (104). Memorandum C, which was approved by the Chiefs of Staff, was based on the assumption than an international police force, which implied the existence of a world government, was premature (108). A regional approach to security would be more feasible as this would serve to limit the military commitments of the smaller powers while increasing their efficiency and ability to act. Such an arrangement would

"give the smaller nations a more direct concern in security problems, ...thus reducing the burden on the Four Powers" and facilitating cooperation in security matters between the states involved (Ibid.). A disadvantage lay in the military difficulty of dividing the world into more or less fixed geographical regions. But if a regional system were established, it was conceivable that the Military Staff Committee of the world organization could "coordinate the activities of the military staff attached to the regional organisations" (111).

In the final memorandum (E) relating to the actual establishment of the world organization, it was suggested that if regional organizations came into being, they be set up "in accordance with a general plan after the outline of the World Organisation has been determined" (113). In sum, the postwar structure that emerged from the texts was a great power-based international organization with a pointed concern if not emphasis for interstate regional (and functional) forms of organization subordinate to a world organization. The draft texts were careful not to advocate regionalism as the organizing principle. Rather, it was presented as a possibility if the right (i.e., political) conditions existed.

Irked by the equivocal character of the proposals and the Foreign Office's apparent backsliding on the regional principle, Churchill returned to his idea of regional councils for Europe, America, and Asia at the April 27, 1944 War Cabinet meeting that considered the memoranda's conclusions.

He expounded on his regional concept in a separate May 8 memorandum that accompanied the five Foreign Office memoranda to the Dominion Prime Ministers meeting in London. Each regional council was to consist of twelve to twenty representatives who would select a single member as representative to a seven-member World Peace Council consisting of the four major powers and three regional councils. The nationality of the regional representative could not be that of any of the four major powers permanently represented. It was also expected that one or more of the four permanent members of the council also be members of regional councils. The regional councils were charged with real security and functional economic and social welfare duties. The other institutions of the world organization were to be a consultative Assembly and World Court. The only contemplated derogations of national sovereignty lay in the area of war prevention.²²

The Dominion Prime Ministers, led by New Zealand's Peter Fraser, objected both to the idea of organizing the world into three continental hemispheric "blocs" and being represented in the World Council by the United Kingdom as part of the British Empire or Commonwealth. As Eden later noted of the May 11 meeting, the Dominion representatives "all took my line and not W.'s [Winston Churchill's] about the future world set-up. ...they were nervous about regional councils... ." ²³ Faced with this opposition, Churchill withdrew his memorandum from consideration. Following the conference, Eden "diplomatically concluded that regional councils ... should be de-emphasized as an integral part of

the international organization's structure."²⁴ Churchill, however, fought back and chose to put uncharacteristic pressure on Eden to "revise" the Foreign Office cover note to the Dominion Foreign Ministers along with certain passages in memorandas A and B "'in the sense of weighing the alternatives of regional organisations under the supreme body versus general mob.'"²⁵

The revised May 15 cover note contained ten new paragraphs that represented perhaps the strongest official major power language for regional organization that was to appear during war.²⁶ It also exposed the splits between the War Cabinet and Foreign Office on the one hand and British and American positions on the other. The note began by acknowledging articles 4 and 5 of the Moscow Declaration as laying down the principle for a world-wide organization that reserved a special position for the major powers during an interim period. It then asserted that world organization only made concrete sense if it was seen in terms of a combination of the great powers linked to "the continental organisations in which other States find their due place" (120). The advantages of a world organized into "three continental blocs of Europe, Asia and the Western Hemisphere each with its own special machinery adapted to its own needs" were four-fold (Ibid.). One, it would foster needed European unification. Two, continental representation on the World Council would make that body more representative of the whole world while remaining sufficiently small in membership to allow it act with promptness and efficiency. Three, it

would encourage smaller states to form contiguous groupings within the continental organizations to prevent absorption by stronger neighboring states. Finally, it would contribute to economic development and the solution of other including technical problems such as those of transport and power.

The revised note declared that a "fully developed regional system" would take time to build and cited the proposed "United Nations Commission for Europe" as a vehicle for the gradual establishment of regional and functional bodies within the framework of the world organization. Similar integration processes were foreseen for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific within a wider area sharing common institutions with China and in which the British Commonwealth would be represented. Such a framework already existed in the Western Hemisphere in the Pan-American Union. While great power involvement for the maintenance of peace could require military interventions in Europe or Asia, it would be done with the purpose of encouraging "the other States to cooperate together in the settlement of their own problems in such a manner as finally to reach the objectives of a 'United States of Europe' and its equivalents in the other continents" (121).

The cover note then acknowledged the writing on the political wall, namely the near certainty that the British proposals would not be acceptable to the United States of the Soviet Union. It instructed that the above objective "should be constantly in the mind of our delegation at Washington," but that it was "not possible to state it there explicitly or include it in the papers" to be exchanged

before the meeting with United States and Soviet Union. The reason was that "Mr. Hull has committed himself publically to a world organisation of a quite different kind" (121). If Britain forced the issue, it risked the consequence of the United States refusing "any permanent responsibility outside its own hemisphere" (Ibid.). Given this possibility, Britain's official approach at the Dumbarton Oaks conference "was to be able to report that the British proposal was similar to the American plan in all essentials."²⁷ As if to underscore the lack of British leverage on the issue, Churchill, in a May 24 speech to the House of Commons cited the need for a world structured into "great entities" not in conflict with a world organization. He qualified this by stating that "it would be presumption for any one Power to prescribe in detail exactly what solution will be found. Anyone can see how many alternatives there are. A mere attempt on our part to do so ... might prejudice us in gaining consideration for our arguments when the time comes... ."28

In the long months between the Moscow and Dumbarton Oaks conferences, the United States developed a draft charter for a universal world organization whose structure resembled a revised League of Nations. After returning from the Moscow conference in November, Hull and his advisors, organized into a somewhat more formalized "Informal Political Agenda Group," wasted little time in getting to work. On November 18, the Department sought concurrence from the three other signatories of the Moscow Declaration to

"welcome adherence by all peace-loving states to the statement in paragraph 4 of the Declaration... ."29 Only the Soviet government responded, in the affirmative. On December 23, the Department had completed a draft "Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security" which contained no provisions for regional arrangements.³⁰ Referred to as the "Possible Plan," it provided for an Executive Council with powers "to repress acts or threats of aggression" and was composed of the four major powers and at least three other members states chosen by a General Assembly. The third organ of the organization was an International Court of Justice. On December 29, Hull sent the plan to the President, who had returned from Teheran and Cairo a week before. Roosevelt initialled his approval of the plan on February 3, 1944. As Hull stated, "practically all the points contained in this draft were later embodied in the proposals we submitted to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference."³¹

Perhaps in anticipation of the British position, Hull and his advisors perceived a need to refute regionalism as principle and structure for world organization. A Department memo on regional organization written by the Political Studies Division chief Harley A. Notter, whose supervisor, Pasvolsky, was Hulls' special assistant for postwar planning, apparently filled this need.³² The succinct nine-paragraph memo indicated the extent to which regionalism was perceived by Hull and his advisors as a threat to the

international system as it was known. The memo began by rhetorically asking what role if any regional organization could play in the universal international organization that had been agreed upon as the basis for the postwar world organization. Notter cited several arguments in favor of regional organization:

Regional organization could satisfy the obvious need for the application of such principles as might be accepted in common by the peoples and states in each region. It could facilitate peaceful adjustments locally. It would provide between the states and universal organization a structure of political, economic, and legal buffers to absorb the shocks of many of the controversies which will arise, and would also free the universal organization for the performance of higher functions. And it would offer an intermediate type of international organization to fall back upon if the universal is crippled by the defection of a great power.

The remainder of the memo was devoted to a critique of these arguments. In a regionally organized world, a universal organization would be faced with the prospect of dealing less with individual states than with groups of states. Viable regional organizations would therefore run the risk of creating "a profound change in the relationship as well as the functions of universal organization." Second, well established regional groupings could weaken or strip the security functions of the universal organization. This could lead to inter-regional conflicts, which "might be beyond the competence of any universal organization to master." It was easier to deal with a single state alone than a state that was tied to a region. Third, regionalism and the relationship between great powers and small states in the area of economic relations may result in the

"development of closed trade areas or discriminatory systems which could defy universal organization and create grave inter-regional struggles." Major powers may not choose to exercise their economic power with the same restraint as the United States had done in the inter-American system. Fourth, although the above could be prevented by the representation of more than one major power in a given region, this in turn creates other risks. It could commit the United States to a role in the Europe or the Pacific which it may not otherwise have desired. The United States would "be held responsible for the local and world effects of decisions taken in those (regional) councils." Furthermore, in an American hemisphere council, the United States would be representing the other American republics without election by or instructions from them, a factor that may render existing inter-American relations more difficult. Fifth, if the relationship between a regional and universal organization is not appellate, that is, regional subordinate to universal, then the very nature of international organization is altered. It would increase the chances for domination by great powers in some regions. Sixth and last, the memo stated that it was doubtful whether the American people would approve U.S. participation in European, Far Eastern, and American regional councils as well as in a universal organization. "They might feel that the United States would be stronger in dealing with other major powers directly and only in a universal organization."

Apart from the last argument, which was based on domestic political considerations, Notter's objections to regionalism were at least as hypothetical as arguments in

its favor. What Hull and his advisors had in their favor was the tried and, in their view, true experience of the existing international system and body of law. Experimenting with a new structure meant taking unnecessary risks. A more realistic challenge lay in expanding the scope and reach of (western) international law in the framework of an evolving international organization. Hull stated in a major policy speech on April 9, 1944 that a universal organization

must be based upon firm and binding obligations that the member nations will not use force against each other and against any other nations except in accordance with the arrangements made. It must provide for the maintenance of adequate forces to preserve peace and it must provide the institutions and procedures for calling this force into action to preserve peace. ...It must provide for an international court for the development and application of law to the settlement of international controversies which fall within the realm of law, for the development of machinery for adjusting controversies to which the field of law has not yet been extended, and for other institutions for the development of new rules to keep abreast of a changing world with new problems and new interests.³³

Hull's speech coincided with a series of consultations which he initiated with members of Congress to ensure broad support for the Department's work. But it was in the course of these consultations that regionalism, which had received little or no mention, bounced back into the picture. An April 24, 1944 draft of the "Possible Plan" was presented by Hull on the following day to the consultative group of Senators appointed by the Foreign Relations Committee at Hull's request.³⁴ At a follow-up meeting on May 2, two of the four substantive queries raised by the Senators were regional in nature: "a) regional representation as a basis for council membership; b) the need to consult with South

American countries and to weight the effect of the proposed international organization in the inter-American system."³⁵

As if to preempt debate on these questions, Hull distributed a revised "Possible Plan" on April 29, which contained significant additions endorsing regional measures within universal organization. Chapter I, Section A, Article 4, devoted to the "Nature of the Organization," read:

The organization should be so constituted as to make possible the existence of regional organizations or other arrangements not inconsistent with its purposes, and to enable such organizations and arrangements to function on their own initiation or by reference from the general organization on matters of security and peace which are appropriate for regional adjustment. The general organization should at all times be informed of the activities in matters of security and peace undertaken by regional organizations or under regional or other arrangements.³⁶

Additionally, Chapter IV of the draft, devoted to the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," acknowledged the feasibility of using regional arrangements as a means of first resort in the settlement of local or regional disputes. Article 3 stated that, "where feasible regional or other arrangements should be employed to bring about adjustment or settlement of local or regional controversies." Article 4 stipulated that "if the parties fail to effect a settlement of such a dispute, by the means above indicated, they should be obligated to refer to the executive council for a just and equitable settlement."³⁷

Finally, with regard to the use of military forces and facilities in enforcing the peace, Chapter VI ("Determination of Threats to the Peace or Breaches of the Peace and Action with Respect Thereto"), Section D, Article

1 read: "In formulating plans for the agreement and in carrying out operations under the agreement, the council should take account of the geographical position of the member states, their regional or special obligations, their population, and their relative resources."³⁸

The draft plan went a long way to assuaging the Senators' desire to protect the inter-American regional system in the world organization. The scope and role of regional organization received wider acceptance, particularly in the area of regional settlement of disputes. But it stopped short of accepting the second concern, namely regional representation on the Executive Council. As indicated by the State Department memo cited above, this involved the risk of changing the very nature of international organization based on individual state membership and representation. This was a line which Hull and his advisors were not prepared to cross.

With minor changes in areas not affecting the three passages on regionalism, the April 29 draft was adopted as the "[United States] Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization" circulated by the United States on July 18, 1944 to Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. Resembling a League of Nations with regional features, the four principal institutions of the organization were a General Assembly of all member states, an 11-member Executive Council, an International Court of Justice, and Secretariat. The Executive Council was comprised of the four major powers and possibly France with permanent seats, with the remaining seats filled on a rotating basis by individual

states elected by the General Assembly.³⁹

Accepting the legitimacy of regional organizations and regional peacekeeping measures became a cause for concern within the State Department after the official American draft was issued. Officials were faced with the question, to what extent could or should the general organization maintain control over the regional groupings? An August 4 internal memorandum interpreting Chapter I, Section A, Article 4 declared that regional groupings "can be continued or created, provided they are not judged by the executive council to be inconsistent with the purposes of the general organization."⁴⁰ Also, could regional organizations undertake actions, including military, in their region without consultation or approval from the general organization? Here, the memorandum interpreted Chapter V, Article 3 as providing regional groupings freedom of action in the peaceful settlement of disputes in their area: "Each group or organization should be able act in such cases on the initiative of any member of the group or organization, on its own initiative, or by reference from the general international organization." But when it came to applying military enforcement measures, this could only be done "with the prior specific or general authorization of the general organization or at the council's request."⁴¹

The Department's acceptance in the spring of 1944 of limited forms of interstate regionalism within a general international organization was more than Hull and his advisors had hoped to bargain for. Their concessions were

the price of Senate support and cognizance of the British position. Lower-level consultations took place with Britain, who was more eager in this preparatory stage to exchange information on plans for world organization than the United States.⁴² According to the Department's official history, the earlier universalist drafts were "supplemented and modified in the light of congressional and other consultations then in progress and of the [Informal Political Agenda] Group's own re-examination of the major problems it believed likely to arise in the then imminent Dumbarton Oaks negotiations."⁴³

The Soviet Union did not openly address issue of postwar world organization until just prior to the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Assistant Foreign Commissar Litvinov only became intimately involved with the world organization project in the summer of 1944, perhaps upon receiving the British and American Dumbarton Oaks proposals.⁴⁴ In July 1944, he informed a U.S. Embassy official in Moscow of an article entitled "Regarding International Security Organization" in the Leningrad literary magazine Zvezda.⁴⁵ Written by Litvinov under the pseudonym "N.Malinin," the article departed from the theme of earlier statements by Maisky and Stalin on the need to safeguard the interests of small states. Rather, Litvinov stressed the need for a general security organization in which the major powers, who have proven themselves in the war, would share the burden of power in a directive body operating on the principle of unanimity. Smaller nations were in fact now obliged to

assist the great powers, as the responsibility for maintaining the peace was to be a league of the major powers and not shared among member states assembled in an "impersonal organization."⁴⁶ The issue of regionalism was not addressed in the article.

It was not until August 12, or nine days before the convening of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, that the Soviet Union despatched its outline for a world organization, "Memorandum on an International Security Organization," to Britain and the United States. The document adhered to the "topical outline" and was an abbreviated if not hastily prepared version of the main American (and British) proposals.⁴⁷ The aims, composition, and principal organs of the world organization were in basic harmony with the agenda established by the State Department. The document did not emphasize or seek to institutionalize the privileged "world policemen" role ascribed earlier to the great powers. It in fact conflicted with Stalin's statement on August 9, when he "praised the 'sword' about to be forged at Dumbarton Oaks..., alluding to a prospective concert of the giants rather than to any cacophony of the dwarfs filling the halls of the United Nations by virtue of their sheer numbers."⁴⁸ As if to confirm this, Radio Moscow's English-language service declared at the opening of the Dumbarton Oaks talks that it was "clear that the primary responsibility of ensuring lasting peace after the war rests with those countries whose power is securing victory."⁴⁹ The Soviet memorandum again withheld comment on the issue of regionalism, stating that the "question of regional organisation (was) subject to

further study."⁵⁰ The results of this study were to appear in a second revealing "Malinin" article two months after the Dumbarton Oaks discussions.

Regionalism on the Wane II: From Dumbarton Oaks to San Francisco

After seven working weeks at Georgetown's Dumbarton Oaks estate, representatives of the United States, Britain, Soviet Union, and China completed a joint proposal for a United Nations organization on October 7, 1944.⁵¹ Interstate regionalism emerged from this work with a profile considerably reduced from the original British and even American proposals. Provisions relating to regionalism were relegated to a section (C) called "Regional Arrangements" in Chapter VIII, "Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security Including Prevention and Suppression of Aggression." The three paragraphs in VIII (C) read:

1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security. (emphasis added)

A Formulation Group responsible for the drafting of the document was led by Leo Pasvolsky for the United States, Gladwyn Jebb for Great Britain, and Arkadi Sobolev for the Soviet Union. Sobolev was a Minister Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in London and the Deputy Chairman of the Soviet delegation to the conference. The Formulation Group was the highest expert-level group at the conference. A Joint Steering Committee, of which Pasvolsky, Jebb, and Sobolev were associate members, established the policy. But it was the Formulation Group "in which not only the precise drafting and most of the exacting process of weighing the meaning and effect of each word and phrase in all proposals were carried out, but in which, with the sole exception of the Joint Steering Committee, the most detailed and analytical consideration was systematically given to all the provisions advanced for the international organization during the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations."⁵²

As the Formulation Group by its own wishes kept no minutes, it is difficult to determine how and why the role of regionalism was reduced at Dumbarton Oaks. It has been established that Section C "was largely formulated by Pasvolsky on the basis of the U.S. document on Regional Arrangements (ISO 43)."⁵³ Instead of stating positively, as did Chapter I of the United States' July 18 proposal on the general character of the world organization, that the organization should "be so constituted as to make possible

the existence of regional organizations," the Dumbarton Oaks proposal stated negatively in a chapter dealing with international security arrangements, that "nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies." Whereas the British and American proposals for the conference favored actions initiated by regional authorities in the settlement of disputes and their enforcement in cooperation with the general organization, paragraph 2 of the Dumbarton proposal stipulated that "no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." It was indicated that both the British and Soviet representatives took exception before agreeing to this wording of paragraph 2 as they favored "military enforcement action to take place largely on a regional basis."⁵⁴

The next meeting of the major powers prior to San Francisco was the Yalta conference February 4-11, 1945. Substantive issues on international organization remained outside the scope of the talks, but the three powers agreed that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would serve as the basis for a United Nations Charter. They also agreed on plans to proceed with the establishment of the organization before the end of the war and that invitations be sent to all allied states. A principal issue at Yalta was agreement on a veto voting formula for the Security Council sought by the Soviet Union. According to this formula, the proposed 11-member Council could act by concurrence of at least seven

members but with unanimity among the major powers as permanent members. The difficulty of this voting method was that if a permanent member objected to any Council enforcement measure, a war could hypothetically run its full course without action by the general organization. The formula also made it practically possible for any permanent member to veto an enforcement action under a regional arrangement to which it was not a party. This aspect became the subject of heated debate at San Francisco.

The veto prerogative pointed to a new Soviet attitude favoring a "loose" general organization. As the likelihood of comity among the major powers was at best uncertain, it seemed unrealistic to harbor high expectations for strong general organization. A signal of a Soviet preference for a decentralized world organization was provided six weeks before the Yalta conference in the Soviet Union's first public statement on regionalism. It appeared in a "Malinin" article entitled "On the Establishment of an International Security Organization" in the December 15, 1944 issue of War and the Working Class, a time when eastern Europe was rapidly coming under Soviet military control. The article baldly endorsed forms of both hegemonial and interstate regionalism as the bases for world organization. While it declared regional "blocs" and "spheres of influence" as undesirable, so-called "security zones" entailing mutually beneficial military arrangements between great and small powers were a different matter. The article "advocated the creation of regional groupings within the framework of the

United Nations but under the aegis of the great powers that had paramount interests in the respective regions."⁵⁵ The article also made a case for interstate regionalism by proposing to divide of the General Assembly into four -- European, American, Asiatic-Pacific, African -- sections or regional assembly committees. States, territories, and possessions within the limits of the respective continents and ocean bases would be included in the sections. These regional subdivisions would exist under the roof of the general organization but would also have their own organization structure served by the Secretariat and other United Nations agencies.⁵⁶ The article was a trial balloon that seized on the regionalist literature and controversy to serve Soviet objectives. The sudden embrace of regionalism appeared designed to provide the Soviet Union with the justification for its hegemony over eastern Europe and a world organization that would be powerless to control its actions.

This Soviet trial balloon favoring a world organization structured into regional security zones and interstate assemblies did not fail to unsettle the State Department. On January 27, 1945, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew sent a despatch to Ambassador Averill Harriman in Moscow, with a summary transmitted to Seceretary of State Stettinus in Yalta (Hull had resigned as Secretary of State in November 1944). Grew declared that the Soviet proposals would be violation of "the intent of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals." He argued further that

the founding of general international organization

upon regional substructures would be of doubtful service to security. . . . The Department's primary concern is the creation of a strong and effective overall international organization. It is to be feared that the proposal of plans for a decentralization of the international organization or its organs along the lines advanced in the article under discussion would complicate the problem of achieving the establishment of the organization and would impair its effectiveness.

Secretary Grew's admonition for Moscow to "postpone any discussion of moves toward decentralization until after the international organization (was) firmly established" was apparently heeded in letter if not in spirit. But while the Soviets did not directly pursue the matter, dissatisfaction among the smaller allied states, helped by splits in major power unity on other issues, led to substantial revisions of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals on regional arrangements at the upcoming San Francisco conference.

NOTES

¹Postwar, p. 553.

²Hull, II, p. 1646.

³McNeill, American, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946, p. 323.

⁴This and quotes in following paragraph from Woodward, pp. 72-3.

⁵Herbert Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War They Fought and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957), pp. 208-09. For the final text of the Declaration, see Documents on American Foreign Relations eds. Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll (Boston, 1945), v.6, pp. 229-30.

⁶Postwar, p. 198. See Hull, op.cit., pp. 1238-39, 1279f.

⁷FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, I, p. 576.

⁸Quoted in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1943-1944, pp. 13 and 14. See Hull, pp. 1647-48. Following the Moscow conference, Hull was riding a crest of American enthusiasm for internationalism. On November 5, 1943, the U.S. Senate approved the Connally Resolution endorsing the Moscow Declaration provision for a general international organization by a margin of 85 to 5.

⁹Woodward, p. 73.

¹⁰FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 530. Quoted from the narrative minutes of Charles Bohlen, the President's interpreter.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²See Postwar, pp. 472-83, for entire text.

¹³See Ibid., pp. 526-32, for entire text; also McNeill, p. 356.

¹⁴FRUS, op.cit., p. 531. See Feis, p. 269f.; McNeill, p. 356.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 596.

¹⁶Tom Connally, My Name is Tom Connally (New York, 1954), p. 265. Cited in FRUS, op.cit., note 6, p. 596.

¹⁷Churchill, v.5, p. 363.

¹⁸Feis, p. 271. See McNeill, op.cit., p. 357.

¹⁹See Postwar, pp. 246-338; FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1944, I, pp. 614-913; Woodward, pp. 80-180.

- ²⁰The text of the outline is in Postwar, pp. 581-82.
- ²¹The original memoranda and Law's cover note are printed in Woodward, pp. 90-115. Hereafter, page references are cited in text. For the slightly revised versions of the memoranda received by the State Department on July 22, see FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1944, I, pp. 670-692.
- ²²Woodward, pp. 117-18.
- ²³Eden, The Reckoning, p. 514.
- ²⁴King, The New Internationalism, p. 168.
- ²⁵Woodward, p. 124. The principal change in Memorandum A incorporated more explicit language for a European organization. See below, Chapter VIII.
- ²⁶Woodward, pp. 119-121. Subsequent page references cited in text.
- ²⁷King, op.cit., p. 169.
- ²⁸Quoted in War and Peace Aims. Extracts from Statements of United Nations Leaders, Supplement 4, United Nations Review (New York), October 31, 1944, p. 100. Permanent Under Secretary of State Alexander Cadogan led the British delegation to Dumbarton Oaks with Gladwyn Jebb as Secretary General. In an August 4 War Cabinet meeting a day prior to his departure, Cadogan, who was said to have received no instructions, found the Churchill "cynically jocular" about the "Future World Organisation." "Neither he -- nor anyone else -- would take it seriously, and at 11:55 he said 'There now: in 25 mins. we've settled the future of the World. Who can say that we aren't efficient?'" (The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945 ed. David Dilks [New York, 1972], pp. 653-54).
- ²⁹Postwar, p. 247.
- ³⁰Postwar, pp. 577-81, for entire text.
- ³¹Hull, II, p. 1649.
- ³²NA, Lot 60 D224, PS:Notter, Box 85: "Possible Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Organization" (n.d. but late 1943 or early 1944). All quotations in the text are from this 3-page single-spaced typed document.
- ³³Postwar, p. 261.
- ³⁴Postwar, p. 259. Of the group of eight Senators, four had been members of the President's Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy: Tom Connally and Walter F. George, Democrats, and Wallace H. White Jr. and Warren Austin, Republicans. Of the remaining four, namely, Alben W. Barkley and Guy M. Gillette (Democrats), Arthur H.

Vandenberg, (Republican), and Robert M. LaFollette (Progressive), Vandenberg was the most regionally-oriented and played a major role in the regionalism debate at the 1945 San Francisco conference.

³⁵ Postwar, p. 264.

³⁶ Postwar, p. 583. Full text pp. 582-91.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 586.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 588.

³⁹ Postwar, pp. 595-606, for the entire text; See FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1944, I, pp. 653f.

⁴⁰ NA, 60D-224, ISO 56c, Box 169, 4 August 1944.

⁴¹ Ibid. A subsequent memorandum stated the general organization could assume jurisdiction in such a case either on its own initiative or upon appeal by any member state. (NA, ISO 43d, Box 169: "The Role of Local and Regional Agencies in the Maintenance of Security and Peace." August 17, 1944)

⁴² See Postwar, pp. 247, 255-57, 262.

⁴³ Postwar, p. 252.

⁴⁴ Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, p. 219.

⁴⁵ FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1944, I, pp. 694-96: "The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State," July 24, 1944.

⁴⁶ Charles Prince, "Current Views of the Soviet Union on the International Organization of Security, Economic Cooperation and International Law," The American Journal of International Law, 39 (July 1945), 452.

⁴⁷ FRUS, op.cit., pp. 706-711.

⁴⁸ Mastny, op.cit., p. 221.

⁴⁹ BBCMS, 1863B, 4B USSR Abroad, 22 August 1944. The broadcast added to the confusion on Soviet views. A reading of an editorial, "The Path from War to a Durable Peace," in The War and the Working Class, it returned to the earlier themes on the small states. It declared that all peace-loving states were "interested in creating a system of security, particularly the medium and small countries which, as the current war has sharply brought out, cannot successfully oppose the German aggressor."

⁵⁰ FRUS, op.cit., p. 707.

⁵¹ See the "[The Dumbarton Oaks] Proposals for the

Establishment of a General International Organization" in Postwar, pp. 611-19.

⁵²Postwar, p. 308. Through participation of the key Formulation Group members as associates on the Joint Steering Committee, the discussions in the Formulation Group "were inherently indistinguishable from those in the Steering Committee at its policy level except in one respect: the Steering Committee alone could conclude its discussions with decisions" (Ibid.).

⁵³FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1944, I, p. 912.

⁵⁴Ibid. Britain's Memorandum A stated that there was "considerable support for the suggestion that, for purposes of an international security system, the world should be divided into fixed regions, each containing forces which, under the supreme control of a World Council, would be responsible for preventing aggression in that region" (Ibid., p. 688).

⁵⁵Mastny, p. 231. See FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, pp. 34-5.

⁵⁶Prince, op.cit., p. 456.

⁵⁷FRUS, Ibid., p. 35.

CHAPTER VII

REGIONALISM AND THE SMALLER ALLIED STATES AT THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, SPRING 1945

The six months between the Dumbarton Oaks conference and the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco was a period of relative calm before the storm, at least as far as the major powers were concerned. For many of the smaller allied nations of Europe, the Near East, and, in particular, Latin America, the universalist and major power-centered Dumbarton Oaks proposals were a disappointment. Feeling ignored and under-represented in the movement to establish the world organization, they in part responded by intensifying efforts to form or develop regional associations. With major power unity under some stress, their concerted activities led to some changes in favor of regionalism at San Francisco. Before unravelling the debate on regionalism at the conference, an examination of their attitudes and policies will provide some background with which to understand the dynamic process that drove the debate. For next to displays of Soviet intransigence, the debate on regionalism constituted one of the dramatic high points of the conference.

Regionalism and the Small States Prior to San Francisco

Eastern, western, or all-European regional groupings of states were constant postwar themes, official and unofficial, during the war. Britain in particular promoted European unification in her postwar planning and regional integration efforts among allied governments-in-exile based for the most part in London. When the prospect for east European regional federations died in 1943 with voiced public opposition to them by the Soviet Union, efforts to unify west European states intensified. As if to capture the spirit of the times, General Charles de Gaulle, president of the French Committee of National Liberation declared at an April 21, 1944 press conference in Algiers, "I believe we live in a period of concentration of states."¹ He called for the formation of a west European "bloc" bounded by the Mediterranean, the English Channel, and the Rhine River.

Other, perhaps more consistent advocates of small state integration were members of the so-called "Oslo Group" representing the Scandinavian states and Low Countries. Its leading members, ministers of foreign affairs Trygve Lie of Norway, E.N. van Kleffens of The Netherlands, and Paul van Zeeland and, towards the end of the war, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, lobbied the American and British governments throughout the war for recognition of regional economic and security needs that safeguarded the interests of the smaller nations.² Commenting on Churchill's March 21, 1943 broadcast, van Kleffens wrote in a March 25 letter to The Times that if the democratic idea in international

affairs were to prevail, "we cannot proclaim democracy, and practice the rule of the few." He challenged the idea that "the views of the lesser states ... would carry less weight, the decisive criterion appearing to be size and power."³ In an earlier November 25, 1942 broadcast to The Netherlands, van Kleffens made a case for a world security organization not based on the universal League of Nations model. While not "neglecting the universal element of the indivisible peace," he believed that an "organisation based on regions" was "perhaps most to the purpose... ." ⁴ In 1944, Paul-Henri Spaak initiated discussions with the Foreign Office to create a west European bloc beginning with the Low Countries and France. ⁵ A concrete outcome of his and van Zeeland's efforts was the September 1944 customs agreement signed in London by the exiled governments of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. BENELUX became the forerunner of the postwar regional integration movement in western Europe.

The Arab states led by Egypt received similar encouragement, if not prodding, from the British government. In July 1943, they began high-level negotiations for a regional association of Arab states. In September 1944, the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen met in Alexandria to agree on a loose confederation, or League of Arab States. The pact of union known as the Alexandria Protocol, was signed by all the states on March 22, 1945 (excepting Yemen, which signed on May 5) and entered into force on May 10. ⁶ Though informed by western international law, the treaty was written in Arabic (dated the eighth day of Rabi' II, 1364) and

conceived in the spirit of Arab cultural unity. The treaty placed emphasis on regional cooperation in social, economic, and cultural affairs. Its main purpose, at least as far as the states were concerned, was to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the member states through a system of regional collective security. The League was a prime example of interstate regionalism. In anticipation of the San Francisco conference, the League's main organ, a Council composed of single representatives from each member state, was instructed "to decide upon the means by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future... ." ⁷ In San Francisco, the League sought recognition within the United Nations as a legitimate regional organization.

If the European and Arab regionalist initiatives rested more on will than a tradition of regional cooperation in the spring of 1945, then the American republics could lay some claim to what Sumner Welles submitted was "the most advanced regional system ever to have been evolved." ⁸ The Latin states could point to a pattern of relations that began with their emergence as independent political units in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The political idea of a "Western Hemisphere" representing a "New World" of peoples and nations distinct from the rest of the world, Europe in particular, can in part be traced to thinking that found political expression in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. In an 1811 letter, Thomas Jefferson distinguished the New World from Europe as "one hemisphere of the earth, separated from the

other by wide seas on both sides, having a different system of interests flowing from different climates, different soils, different productions, different modes of existence, and its own local relations and duties..."(emphasis added).⁹

But initiatives for a inter-American regional system more often than not came from the Latin states. Through much of the 19th century, the United States viewed the Western Hemisphere as a shield (or metaphor) for its own isolation and continental expansion. The United States chose not to participate in the first eleven Pan-American conferences held between 1826 and 1889. The 1826 congress convened by Simon Bolivar was the first international conference held in the Americas. Using western international and constitutional law language, the congress approved treaties for multilateral cooperation in defense and other matters and thereby "established at the outset the principle of the continuity of inter-American co-operation."¹⁰

A new phase in inter-American relations began in the late 1880's with the partial entry of the United States into world arena. For the next several decades, United States policy toward Latin America was guided by an undisguised form of hegemonial regionalism. The 1889-90 Pan-American conference, in which also Canada participated, was convened through bipartisan Congressional action in Washington, D.C. to press for a Zollverein, or custom's union, ostensibly to prevent European economic penetration of Latin America. Although the custom's project failed, the conference adopted an arbitration convention "which paved the way for the elaborate inter-American peace system of the present day."¹¹

A permanent organ, the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, was established and evolved in 1910 into the Pan American Union. The "pan" in the Pan-American movement was, however, more "identified with United States intervention and attempts to control the area than with genuine aspirations of cooperation."¹² At the 1890 and subsequent Pan-American conferences, which were held approximately every five years, the United States vetoed political questions that would have limited its freedom of action, or "civilizing mission," in the hemisphere. The 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which gave legal sanction for interventionism and "claimed for the United States a monopoly of the right to engage in it,"¹³ became the symbol of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

Inter-American relations improved in the late 1920's when the Hoover administration endorsed Pan-Americanism as a supranational concept. But the shift from hegemonial to interstate regionalism, or perhaps to a benign combination of the two, did not begin in earnest until, at his 1933 inauguration, Franklin Roosevelt announced his "good neighbor" policy. While intended as a global policy, it soon came to be practiced and identified in the inter-American context. For the next ten years, inter-American relations entered a period of growth toward the new administration's foreign policy goal of "hemispheric unity."¹⁴

An architect of that policy was Sumner Welles, who was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs in December 1933. Welles had served in diplomatic posts in the Caribbean and authored a voluminous study that denied hegemonic intentions in the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁵ The transition from interventionism to a period of interstate regional cooperation began at 7th Pan-American Conference in Montevideo in December 1933, when Secretary of State Cordell Hull agreed to a qualified ban on interventionism. In December 1936, President Roosevelt himself convened and attended an extraordinary Inter-American Conference on Peace and Security in Buenos Aires, where he announced an unqualified ban on all forms of intervention. The conference also embraced the principle of collective security and adopted a mechanism for consultation through periodic meetings of the hemisphere's foreign ministers. The meeting was interpreted by one observer as the "continentalization" or pan-Americanization of the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁶ With Europe, in this case Nazi Germany, once again threatening hemispheric security, "regional links which set the countries of the Western Hemisphere apart from the rest of the world were emphasized by both the United States and Latin America... ." ¹⁷ By 1940, "the underlying Western Hemisphere idea was more popular throughout the Americas and apparently closer to realization than at any previous period in history."¹⁸

The movement toward an inter-American regional system peaked, however, at a point in early 1943 as Under Secretary of State Welles was seeking to include Canada among the twenty-two independent democracies of the new world. In a February 1943 speech in Toronto, Welles provided a case

definition of interstate regionalism and American foreign policy objectives when he declared that:

The inter-American system, as it had now developed in the Americas, has its roots in the common recognition of the sovereign equality of all the American states, and in their joint belief that they find individual advantage in cooperation. The good neighbor policy had made it possible for this regional system to be developed. Continued participation by the United States in this system should become the permanent cornerstone of American foreign policy.¹⁹

Welles saw a distinct place for the inter-American system in the future world organization. He stated

that the regional system of the Americas must be an indispensable part of any international organization which may be established after the war. The ideals of the Western Hemisphere, our liberties, and our democratic institutions can all play a vitally important part in that new World Order.²⁰

As Welles was speaking, the pan-American idea was in eclipse. State Department policy under Secretary of State Hull was shifting to stress universal over regional preferences as a basis for world organization. Hull believed it unlikely that "the people of the United States would support this country's participation in a European council and a Pacific council, in addition to a Western Hemisphere council, and also in a universal organization."²¹ Apart from this shift in the Department's thinking, America's entry into the war brought her policy of neutrality and quasi-isolationism to a abrupt end and catapulted her from a regional to global power. Involved militarily in both Europe and the Pacific, the United States had perforce become a global actor. As if to reinforce this fact, foreign policy interventionists joined internationalists in attacking the

isolationist "Maginot mentality" of the western hemisphere idea.²² Finally, what perhaps sealed the fate of the Pan-American movement was the fissure in inter-American solidarity sparked by the Department's refusal to recognize a dictatorial Argentine government and its application of pressure on the other American governments to follow suit.²³

These developments threw the Latin republics back on themselves. Analogous to the period before the 1880s, the Latin states pursued their regional efforts with at best passive United States interest. No Pan-American conferences or consultative meetings of foreign ministers took place between the January 1942 meeting in Rio de Janeiro, where Argentina refused to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis nations, and the Mexico City, or Chapultepec Conference in February 1945. Unlike Britain, who consulted with her Dominion partners before and following the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the United States declined requests by the Latin American states for inter-American consultations. Rather, they were provided "clarifications" from low-ranking officials in the State Department on the issue of the future world organization.²⁴

Unsuccessful in convening an inter-American consultative meeting, the nineteen Latin allied countries (excluding Argentina) organized a special "Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace" in Chapultepec February 21-March 9, 1945. Its main purpose was to evaluate and take a position on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals before the San Francisco conference. With Argentina absent, the

United States somewhat grudgingly accepted the Mexican government's invitation to attend. Faced with a restive and determined Latin bloc, the United States sought to forestall discussions on regionalism and other major issues until the San Francisco conference.²⁵ The North Americans were appeared outmaneuvered and were obliged to accept resolutions in favor of: more power for the General Assembly of the world organization; Latin American representation in the Security Council; and recognition of the inter-American system as a regional system capable of settling its own disputes within the framework of a world organization.

The Act of Chapultepec, to which Argentina acceded on April 4 after its March 27 declaration of war on Germany, created an instrumentality in Chapter I, Article 3 that provided for mutual defense. It stated that "every attack of a State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an America State, shall...be considered as an act of aggression against the other States which sign this Act." Additionally, the parties were bound by Chapter I, Article 4 to consult among themselves "in order to agree upon the measures" needed, including the use of armed force, to meet threats or acts of aggression in their region.²⁶ At the conclusion of the conference, the United States agreed that a treaty to this effect would be concluded between the American states as soon as peace was restored. In the meantime, the dynamic of the Chapultepec encounter, which put the United States delegation on the defensive, carried over into the work that produced the final version of the

United Nations Charter in San Francisco.

Regionalism at San Francisco

Emboldened by their success at Chapultepec, the Latin states played an important if not pivotal role in strengthening the regional features of the world organization promulgated in San Francisco. This outcome was helped by a split in the United States delegation and at best cordial relations among the major powers. The United States was torn between a renewed commitment to the inter-American regional system and a universalism that it saw guaranteed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. This split the United States delegation in San Francisco into a State Department contingent led by Leo Pasvolksy seeking to implement the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and a smaller Congressional group led by Senator Vandenberg sympathetic to the Latin states and inter-American regional system.

Questions relating to regionalism "were among the most basic issues faced in the Conference."²⁷ Nearly all of the fifty participating states presented amendments that touched on regional issues. A special subcommittee of Committee III/4 devoted to "regional arrangements" was formed merely to assemble, classify, and analyze the proposals. The main issue raised by the proposed amendments was the autonomy of regional action within the world organization. Of particular concern was the question of a great power veto of regional action in the Security Council. At the time, Senator Vandenberg articulated the issue which was at stake as

follows:

It speedily developed that not only are the South Americans hot about protecting Chapultepec but the Australians are equally anxious not to be left unprotected in their far corner of the earth. They want liberty of regional action if some one of the Big Powers vetoes Organization action on the Council. Other potential groups are forming and they could be highly dangerous -- particularly the Arabian bloc and its impact on Palestine. Our great problem is to find a rule which protects legitimate existing groups (like Pan-Am) without opening up the opportunity for regional balance-of-power groups."²⁸

An initial set of amendments in Committee III/4 dealt with attempts to define the nature and status of regional organizations. Egypt sought to have the conference adopt a definition of regionalism that went beyond the narrow security terms expressed the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The Egyptian definition stressed the importance of indigenous cultural and socio-economic factors and came perhaps as close as any official position articulated by a state during the war to a statement of autochthonous regionalism. The definition, which did not even use the term "state," read:

There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a permanent nature, grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development²⁹ of their economic and cultural relations.

After considerable wrangling and debate, the conference decided not to adopt any specific definition of regionalism and retained the Dumbarton Oaks understanding of "regional arrangements" as pertaining to security measures taken by

two or more states for the peaceful settlement of disputes in their area. But this decision did not inhibit the Arab and, in particular, Latin American states from lobbying to have their regional organizations recognized by name in the United Nations Charter.³⁰ Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla sought in fact to include mention of the Act of Chapultepec in the Charter's preamble.

The early substantive debate at the conference centered on Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal on "Regional Arrangements," which forbade enforcement action by regional bodies without Security Council authorization. A number of European countries, France in particular, were joined by the Soviet Union in expressing concern about possible renewed threats from Germany or other enemy countries and sought the right to act against such threats without prior approval by the Council. The French argued for the need to safeguard the December 10, 1944 Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance directed against Germany as a regional arrangement capable of immediate action in the event of renewed aggression. France's amendment to Paragraph 2 called for the right to use regional enforcement measures until such time as the United Nations was strong enough to deal with aggression. French delegate and acting chairman of the French delegation Joseph Paul-Boncourt stressed the time delay factor if an act of aggression had to be referred to the Security Council before any action could be taken:

Whatever precautions may be taken...in order to assure swift and effective action by the Security Council, it is impossible to prevent delays

resulting from its meetings, its discussion, from the transport from countries often distant of material and men assigned to those who are attacked. And this, coupled with the lightening rapidity which aggression in modern war is capable of, ...may³¹ subject a country to the risk of death... .

France received support from the Soviet Union. And as if to up the ante, the Soviet Union sought to prevent the bilateral pacts it had concluded during the war not only with with France, but Britain, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia from becoming subject to a veto in the Council.³² Foreign Commissar Molotov, chairman of the Soviet delegation, argued on May 4 that his country and France "had twice been objects of German aggression" and that it was up to the parties of the treaties to decide when the United Nations was "strong enough to assume the responsibility for dealing with such aggression" and for the mutual pact treaties to lapse.³³ An amendment was drafted that provided regional agencies in the form of mutual assistance pacts with the right to act after informing, but not requiring the approval of, the Council.

On May 5, the four major powers, who were the sponsors of the conference, agreed to amend Paragraph 2 with an exemption which became Article 53 in a new, separate chapter on "Regional Arrangements" in the Charter. In wording drafted by Leo Pasvolsky, the article declared that no enforcement action by regional arrangements or agencies could be undertaken without authorization of the Security Council with the exception of measures directed against renewal of aggressive policies by an enemy state until such time as the world organization was capable of assuming

responsibility for preventing further aggression.³⁴

While the exemption in the amendment was restricted to actions against enemy states over a limited period, this concession to the European allies opened the gates for a similar, if bolder, exemption sought by the Latin American states under the Act of Chapultepec.³⁵ In the same May 6th message to President Harry Truman and former Secretary Hull (who, as senior advisor to the United States delegation, was incapacitated in a Washington hospital during most of the conference) announcing the above agreement, Secretary of State Edward Stettinus, chairman of the United States delegation, reported that it had become

evident that the other American Republics are insistent on greater freedom for the Inter-American system to act in matters of hemispheric concern. ...Strong sentiment exists for sharply restricting the scope of action of the general organization in this hemisphere and for permitting action under the Act of Chapultepec without authorization from the Council.³⁶

Senator Vandenberg served as the United States representative on Committee III/4 and spoke on behalf of the Latin American states. He noted in his diary on May 5th that

the Amendment opened up serious collateral considerations as we thought it over today. Europe would have freedom of action for her defensive regional arrangements (pending the time when the Peace League shall prove its dependability as a substitute policeman) but the Western Hemisphere would not have similar freedom of action under its Pan-American agreements which have a background of a century behind them and which were specifically implemented again by our 21 Republics a few weeks ago at Chapultepec. Therefore, in the event of trouble in the Americas, we could not act ourselves; we would have to depend exclusively on the Security Council; and any one permanent member of the Council could veto the latter action (putting us at the mercy of Britain, Russia or China).³⁷

With support from the Latin states, Vandenberg, in a letter that evening to the United States delegation, proposed attaching a second amendment to the future Article 53. He sought to add the words

and with the exception of measures which may be taken under ... the Act of Chapultepec of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of Peace and War, signed a Mexico City on March 8, 1945, until such time as the Organization may, by consent of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, be charged with this function.³⁸

As Vandenberg noted, "hell broke loose" in the American delegation when it met on May 7 to discuss his proposed amendment. Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, adviser to the United States delegation, questioned whether it would be possible to "avoid opening up the old question of the exclusion of all regional arrangements from the jurisdiction of the Organization."³⁹ But Leo Pasvolsky spoke up bluntly on behalf of the Department's viewpoint in the United States delegation. He argued that (hegemonial) regionalism would mean the end of a general, or universal organization:

If we open up the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to allow for regional enforcement action on a collective basis, the world organization is finished. ... We then move into a system in which we rely for our security on regional groups, large states with their spheres of influence surrounded by groups of smaller states. We will convert the world into armed camps and end up with a world war unlike any we have seen (634-35).

Vandenberg received support from other Congressional delegates, among them Representatives Sol Bloom, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey. He threatened a U.S. Senate floor fight on

the Charter if the issues of freedom of regional action under Chapultepec and the Security Council major power veto of regional action were not resolved. The Latin states in turn threatened to withhold their support for other aspects of the Charter if their regional demands were not met. Moreover, they were visibly losing faith in the entire United Nations project. At a May 8 meeting of the United States delegation, James C. Dunn reported that some Latin representatives "were saying there was no use for the international organization." Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Nelson A. Rockefeller, as an adviser to the U.S. delegation, said the Latin states had become fearful in particular of Soviet motives and given the uncertainty following Roosevelt's death (April 12), they "were coming around to the position that, until the world organization proved its effectiveness, the Western Hemisphere system should be free from the necessity of any authorization for action by the Security Council" (646).

The United States delegates were split between the desire to build a strong and effective global security system and to recognize the regional Act of Chapultepec in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and hemispheric solidarity. The impasse broke on May 11 when the principle was accepted that a state possessed an inherent right of self-defense without any necessary regard to regional arrangements. "The concept is that an attack against one state in any part of the world is an act against all," stated Harley A. Notter, an adviser to the United States delegation and to the State Department's Office of Special

Political Affairs. "This is the concept of world security, not of regional security" (667). But a state's inherent right of self-defense could not logically preclude the use of regional action in pursuit of that right. A draft amendment was thus attached not to the "regional arrangements" chapter but in a new, twelfth paragraph to Section B of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals dealing with threats to peace or acts of aggression. In a gesture to the Latin American states and in recognition of the existence of regional arrangements, the proposed amendment cited the Act of Chapultepec by name. The paragraph unanimously approved on May 12 for President Truman's approval read as follows:

Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression and should aggression occur by any state against any member state, such member state possesses the inherent right to take necessary measures of self-defense. The right to take such measures for self-defense against armed attack shall apply to understandings or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states agree to consider an attack against any one of them as an attack against all of them. The taking of such measures shall be reported immediately to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (685-86) (emphasis added).

The May 12 five-power (France had been added as the fifth major power sponsor) consultative meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the amendment produced a wide range of views that found the United States as the sponsor at one end and, uncharacteristically, the British in opposition at other. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who had during the

course of the war become increasingly disenchanted by the regional idea pushed on him by Prime Minister Churchill, attacked the draft as a Latin American inspired move "that would result in regionalism of the worst kind" (692). He stated that he did not come to San Francisco "for the purpose of signing a regional agreement" (693). Rather, he emphasized "that the entire concept which had been in prospect in calling this Conference was that of a world Organization. Did we want a world Organization, recognizing the existence of some treaties and agreements or did we want a concept of regional organization topped by a world Organization with very limited powers[?]" (695). Eden's view was shared by former Secretary Hull, who was reported by Secretary Stettinus on May 12 to have "felt that the proposed new wording on regional arrangements would impair the strength of the international organization" and "that the American position was veering away from a strong international organization" (677). It was also held by Eden and others that mention of the Act of Chapultepec would lead to efforts to mention other regional associations such as the Arab League.

The chairman of the French delegation, Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, disagreed with Eden and saw value in the "immediate reliance on group or regional agreements" barring the existence of an effective world organization. But he asked for more time to study the American text (694). The acting chairman of the Chinese delegation, Ambassador to the United Kingdom Wellington V.K. Koo, did not contribute in a substantive way to the discussion. The Soviet position was

presented by Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United States and acting chairman of the Soviet delegation.

Reserved and non-committal, he asked for clarifications and also requested time to study the draft. At the same time, he indirectly endorsed Eden's position. The Latin American states were asking for the right of independent action, which "might well result in a series of regional organizations acting independently of the Council; one for Latin America, one for Europe and others elsewhere" (695). He also pointed out that while the amendment safeguarding mutual aid treaty arrangements in Europe proposed for Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 was limited in scope and time, "in the United States draft there was no time limit to the exception proposed" (Ibid.).⁴⁰

After the consultative meeting, the American delegation met to discuss the admendment^{and} bridge divisions within its own ranks. Of the twelve members, led by Secretary Stettinius, that comprised the American delegation, Senators Connally and Vandenberg were joined by Commander Harold E. Stassen, U.S.N.R., a delegate, in leading the defense for the proposed amendment. Both Connally and Vandenberg began by arguing for reciprocity between the exception agreed upon for Europe and the similar need for special recognition to safeguard the security of the American republics. They cited the long history of the inter-American system and the principle of the inherent right to self-defense. Connally maintained that the exception sought in the American proposal was not at great variance from the exception agreed

upon for Europe in that the treaties in both cases were aimed at resistance to armed aggression. But it was Commander Stassen, a former governor of Minnesota, who untied the Gordian knot in outlining a three-tiered world security structure (and process) recognizing the intent of the American draft, namely that of the right of self-defense. The first tier dealt with the peaceful settlement of disputes, that is, in cases where no aggression had been committed, where "no one questioned the propriety of emphasis on regional action..." (693). The second tier concerned enforcement or the application of sanctions, where the "world Organization should have complete and exclusive jurisdiction..." (Ibid.). The third tier related to action in the event of the failure or absence of enforcement. He argued that "the right of self defense must be reserved to meet such a situation" and that recognition had to "be given to the right of joint action in self defense" (694). The compromise represented in the American amendment recognized the validity of both individual and collective self-defense measures.

The amendment found expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter under "Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Agression." Owing to British opposition, specific mention of the Act of Chapultepec was omitted in the article (or anywhere in Charter). The article's provision for the right of "collective self-defense" permitted groups of states, acting through regional arrangements, to act independently of the Security Council if a member of that

group was a victim of an armed attack. This represented the legal escape clause sought by the Latin states and other regional groupings to Article 53 which, except in the limited case of former enemy states, prohibited enforcement action by regional agencies without prior authorization of the Security Council. This sanction, now nullified by the right to collective self-defense clearly weakened the role of the Security Council as envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks plan. After the vote on the draft amendment, the Colombian delegate Alberto Lleras Camargo, who was chairman of the Committee III/4, took pains to interpret Act of Chapultepec's collective self-defense role as being compatible with the general organization:

The Act of Chapultepec provides for the collective self-defense of the hemisphere and establishes that if an American nation is attacked all the rest consider themselves attacked. Consequently such action as they may take to repel aggression, authorized by the article which was discussed in the subcommittee yesterday, is legitimate for all of them. Such action would be in accord with the Charter, by the approval of the article; and a regional arrangement may take action, provided it does not have improper purposes... From this, it may be deduced that the approval of this article implies that the Act of Chapultepec is not in contravention of the Charter.⁴¹

In deference to the Latin states, Secretary Stettinius informed their delegation chairmen as Secretary of State (and not as head of the United States delegation) in a May 15 consultative meeting of assurances received by phone that day from President Truman. He was instructed to say "there would be no change in the Good Neighbor policy" and that the United States was prepared, as informally requested by the Latin states, to implement the Act of Chapultepec in the

form of a treaty within the framework of the world organization which would be negotiated and signed "not later than autumn of this year (i.e., 1945)."42

While Britain now backed the draft amendment at the five-power consultative meeting on May 16, Soviet representative Gromyko stated he was still awaiting instructions from Moscow. On procedural grounds, he objected to its presentation as a United States amendment, arguing that formal amendments could only be presented after consultation among the major powers. On substantive grounds, he noted at the five-power consultative meeting on May 16 that there were "certain deviations in it from the principles agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks" (760). The Soviets appeared wary about extending their support for regional arrangements too far. It may legitimize other possible independent regional coalitions such as in eastern Europe. At the same time, they served to weaken the power of the general organization. After Gromyko received his Moscow instructions on May 19, he merely suggested insignificant wording changes for both future articles 53 and 51 (812-14). The Soviet accomodation to the regional amendments did not extend to other issues faced at the conference. The Soviets remained adamant in preventing the extension of the major power veto obtained at Yalta to even a mandatory "consideration" of a question brought to the Security Council. They also sought to limit the powers of the General Assembly. The Soviet support for the recognition of regional arrangements was re-confirmed at a June 19 five-power

consultative meeting discussing the denial of the right of enemy states to have recourse to the Security Council or General Assembly. It is interesting to note that Gromyko's attempt to include a phrase on "regional arrangements" was overruled by the other four powers, who did not wish to reopen the regional question.⁴³

Regionalism in the United Nations Charter

When the dust had settled in San Francisco, the United Nations Charter had been modified to recognize the growing reality of interstate regionalism in international relations and the need to institutionalize it in international organization. "The provisions in the Charter respecting both (individual and collective) self-defense in the event of armed attack and the role of regional arrangements in relation to the functioning of the world security organization were among the most basic issues faced in the Conference... ."44 In the compromises required to produce the final Charter, the three-paragraph section (C) on "Regional Arrangements" in Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was expanded into a separate chapter (VIII) of three articles (52-54) and seven paragraphs as well as a new article (51) added in Chapter VII relating to breaches of the peace. The phrase, "resort to regional agencies or arrangements," was also added to Article 33 of chapter VI relating to the pacific settlement of disputes.

The limited exemption to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals that became the revised Article 53 opened the lid for the inclusion of the

other regional measures which served to weaken the authority of the general organization. The original text and added exemption (underlined) read:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state ... or in regional arrangements directed against the renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on the request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for⁴⁵preventing further aggression by such a state.

The "regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy," based on bilateral mutual defense treaties between the Soviet Union and several European allied states (and the Republic of China), were to have functioned for a transitional period until the general organization could assume responsibility for preventing further aggression. While this stripped at least some short-term power from the Security Council, the Council's authority was further weakened by the provision that the responsibility for deciding whether these special arrangements could operate outside the control of the Council was placed on the governments themselves. The original amendment read "by consent of" in place of the adopted wording "on the request of" the governments concerned.⁴⁶

The revision of that article led to the adoption of an additional paragraph to Chapter VIII, Section B of the Dumbarton proposal that became Article 51 in the Charter:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way effect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The right of "collective self-defense" sanctioned enforcement action by a regional arrangement or agency without prior authorization from the Security Council. This helped to legitimize regional groupings as entities and provided "at least a partial basis for the continued application of ... the Monroe Doctrine."⁴⁷ This limited the Security Council's ability to maintain peace and security and made political obligation depend on the good faith of the organization's members.

The recognition of regional arrangements or agencies in the Charter raised questions about the relationship between regional organizations and the general organization. The first paragraph of Article 52, adopted virtually unchanged from the Dumbarton Oaks document, recognized regional arrangements and agencies as a reality and define their relationship to the universal organization as subsidiary:

Nothing in this present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The second paragraph was added in San Francisco to give

priority to the resort to regional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes affecting states that were parties to regional arrangements:

The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring to the Security Council.

Paragraph three, adopted almost verbatim from the second sentence of Paragraph 1, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal, obliged the Security Council to encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes through regional arrangements or agencies. The intent of this paragraph was reinforced in Chapter VI ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes"), Article 33, paragraph 1 of the Charter (Chapter VIII, Section A, paragraph 3 in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals), which encouraged parties to a dispute to resort in the first instance to regional and other means to settle disputes:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. (emphasis added)

To counter the regionalist offensive in San Francisco, advocates of universalism sought measures to retain the primacy of Security Council authority in the maintenance of peace and security. The 4th and final paragraph of Article 33, "This Article in no way impairs the application of the Article 34 and 35," was an attempt to safeguard the power of the Council to investigate a dispute on its own initiative

or on the initiative of a state to determine whether the dispute would endanger the maintenance of peace and security.⁴⁹ An attempt to affirm the supremacy of the Security Council was also made in Article 54, which was transferred with a single word change -- "should" to "shall" -- from Section C, Paragraph 3 of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal. It required that "[t]he Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or be regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security." But the article lacked provisions for implementation and was in fact weakened more by the right provided under Article 51 for parties to regional arrangements to report to the Council after regional action had been taken. The placidly worded universalism of Article 54 was reinforced, it was believed, by the stronger wording of Article 103:

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Here, the Charter invoked "the character of basic law of the international community" by applying the principle of international law which infers that "a later agreement between the same parties supersedes and earlier agreement."⁵⁰ But again, the article did not provide any implementation measures for the nullification of obligations that were deemed inconsistent with the Charter.

The United Nations Charter has been described as a

"theoretical reconciliation of universalism and regionalism."⁵² It would perhaps be more accurate to describe it with Inis Claude as a compromise between a "theoretical preference for universalism and political pressures for regionalism."⁵² The regionalist measures adopted in San Francisco provided states more freedom to act under regional arrangements without the prior sanction of the Security Council. In spite of these regional features, the United Nations Charter provided for an essentially universalist structure in world organization that left the relationship between regionalism and universalism unclear. Regionalism was never defined as a concept or organizing principle beyond that of a security arrangement between two or more states. Regionalism was understood in terms of interstate "arrangements and agencies" that ranged from treaties of alliance between two non-contiguous states to the inter-American regional system. Nonetheless, the regional measures recognized in the United Nations Charter were steps that introduced interstate regionalism as a principle in international relations and concept in international organization.

NOTES

¹ War and Peace Aims: Extracts from Statements of United Nations Leaders (New York), Supplement #4 of United Nations Review, October 31, 1944, p. 99. See Woodward, p. 181f.

² Sumner Welles stated that "many of the Governments of the smaller nations of Western Europe approached this Government from time to time with respect to postwar problems... The views advanced by the Netherlands and Norwegian governments were in the highest degree useful. It is necessary to say, however, that in most of these cases the views were regional rather than universal." (in Where are We Heading?, p. 26)

³ Quoted in G.N. Clark, "British War Aims and the Smaller European Allies," Agenda II,3 (August 1943), p. 283.

⁴ Ibid., p. 284.

⁵ Woodward, pp. 181-83.

⁶ See treaty text in Ruth C. Lawson, International Regional Organizations (New York, 1962), pp. 230-234. See also Hussein A. Hassouna, "The League of Arab States and the United Nations: Relations in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," in Regionalism and the United Nations, ed. B. Andemicael (New York and Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979); B.Y. Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League 1945-1955," International Conciliation, No. 498 (1954); and Sir Hamilton Gibb, "Towards Arab Unity," Foreign Affairs, XXIV, No.1 (1945).

⁷ Article 3, cited in Lawson, p. 231.

⁸ Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 368.

⁹ Quoted in Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, NY, 1954), p. 28.

¹⁰ Whitaker, p. 43. See also J.M. Yepes, Philosophie du pan-américanisme et la organisation de la paix (Neuchatel, 1945), pp. 61-65, 89-98. Yepes was a legal scholar and counsellor to the Colombia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as a Columbian delegate to the Pan-American and San Francisco conferences.

¹¹ Whitaker, p. 85. Compare Yepes, op.cit., pp. 169-70.

¹² Minerva M. Etzioni, The Majority of One: Towards a Theory of Regional Compatibility (Beverly Hills, CA, 1970), p. 9.

¹³ Whitaker, p. 100.

¹⁴ Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 192.

¹⁵ Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924 (New York, 1928).

¹⁶Whitaker, p. 149; Yepes, p. 111.

¹⁷Etzioni, p. 101.

¹⁸Whitaker, p. 132.

¹⁹Welles, A Time for Decision, p. 240.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Hull, II, p. 1645.

²²See above, pp. 78-80.

²³As Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles disagreed with this policy. He claimed that it broke "the unity of the hemisphere, maintained against all obstacles for more than ten years. It should be proof that the act of recognition should never again be employed in inter-American affairs for political purposes... "(The Time for Decision, p. 237). See Whitaker, pp. 169-70.

²⁴According to Laurence Duggan, the State Department's political advisor on Latin American affairs at that time,

the United States sat down with the British, the Russians and the Chinese at Dumbarton Oaks to plan a world security organization without even a gesture toward the Latin American countries... The United States' cavalier disregard of their opinion at this time probably irritated their [Latin America's] government circles more than any other factor. (in The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security [New York, 1949], p. 107).

Sumner Welles added, with a note of bitterness, that

it would have been of immense advantage to the United States had the rest of the world known that when the United States spoke at Dumbarton Oaks she interpreted the aspirations of 250 million citizens of the 21 nations of the New World. The opportunity was deliberately spurned. It was rejected because of timidity and because of the childish petulance of individual officers in the Department who were disgruntled by the failure of the Latin American governments to adopt without question the State Department's wishes concerning hemispheric affairs. (in Where are We Heading?, pp. 210-11).

²⁵At one point in the deliberations, an exasperated Senator Tom Connally of the U.S. delegation charged, "You fellows want the whole universe to come to you," whereupon the Colombian delegate, Foreign Minister Alberto Lleras Camargo, responded, "In America we have worked out a real international organization which, up to the present, is only theory

in the rest of the world" (quoted in Etzioni, p. 53).

²⁶ Both quotes in Postwar, p. 406. See also Yepes, pp. 145-54.

²⁷ Postwar, p. 448.

²⁸ Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), p. 190.

²⁹ Quoted in Charter, p. 184.

³⁰ FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, p. 356. See also Charter, pp. 36-38; Etzioni, p.63.

³¹ Quoted in Yalem, Theories of Regionalism, p. 52.

³² The Soviet Union's treaties consisted of a Treaty of Alliance signed in London with Britain on May 26, 1942; an Agreement of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow with Czechoslovakia on December 12, 1943; a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed in Moscow with France on December 10, 1944; and treaties of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Collaboration signed in Moscow with Yugoslavia on April 11, 1945 and the Polish National Council on April 21, 1945. See treaty texts in Documents on American Foreign Relations 1941-192, v.4, p. 254 (for Britain); v.5, (1943-1944), p. 642 (for Czechoslovakia), and v.7, (1944-1945), pp. 855f. (for Poland, Yugoslavia, France).

³³ FRUS, op.cit., p. 605. See also Woodward, pp. 305-10.

³⁴ Charter, p. 351. See FRUS, op.cit., p. 615.

³⁵ FRUS, p. 644.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 614.

³⁷ Vandenberg, p. 187.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 188.

³⁹ FRUS, op.cit., p. 634. Subsequent page references cited in text.

⁴⁰ The Izvestia correspondent in San Francisco provided an additional gauge on Soviet thinking and on the regionalist issue in general. In his May 11 (or 12) despatch to Moscow, he both criticized the Latin American demands and defended regional security measures. The Latin countries were, he wrote

trying to make their regional organization completely independent of the international security organization while wanting to take part in the solution of questions affecting European countries. This is tantamount to the destruction of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals... Some governments do not want the five powers including

the Soviet Union who hold permanent seats on the Council of the future organisation to have the right to agree among themselves on principles affecting the Western Hemisphere countries... Their aim is to weaken, if they cannot destroy, the Anglo-Soviet-US coalition. Some of the ferocious advocates of regional security claim that regional interests are incompatible with the powers of the Security Council. Actually, regional security measures in no way conflict with the larger security organization, which provides concrete measures to counteract the threat of a new aggression from Germany or any other quarter. These regional measures can only strengthen the general international organization. Newspaper circles expect that mediation by US delegates will result in a compromise formula which will meet Latin-American wishes and also permit a linking of the Pan-American regional organization -- provided for by the Chapultepec agreement -- with general principles and the machinery of the international security organization. (emphasis added) (quoted in BBCMS, 2127B, 4A (2) Soviet Eur and Overseas Service (i), May 12, 1945).

Similarly, in a May 15 "International Review by Comrade Lemin" on Radio Moscow, it was held that "amendments whose aim is reasonably to coordinate the principles of general security with regional arrangements or treaties of mutual aid" had a "constructive character," while "the suggestion of the complete independence of regional agreements from the International Security Organization" was among amendments of a "diametrically opposed character." The commentator stated not without some insight that "this suggestion obviously followed the line of ... breaking up the State sovereignty of the members of the International Organisation." (BBCMS, 2129B, 4A(1) Soviet Home Service (xii), May 15, 1945).

⁴¹Quoted in Etzioni, p. 80.

⁴²FRUS, op.cit., p. 731. Subsequent page references cited in text. See also FRUS, pp. 835-36; Vandenberg, pp. 192-193. Negotiations did not begin for the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or "Rio Treaty," until 1947. The treaty went into effect the following year, when the constitution for the Organization of American States (OAS) was also signed. Cold War interests probably outweighed any intrinsic United States' interest in regional association in the establishment of these organizations.

⁴³Gromyko sought to add the following to a draft statement of Committee III/3:

It is understood that the enemy states should not have the the right to appeal to the Security Council or the General Assembly under Chapter VII, Section A, paragraph 2, with respect to action

taken or authorized under Chapter XII, paragraph 2
[on transitional arrangements] and regional
arrangements directed against enemy states (1372-73).

⁴⁴Postwar, p. 448. See Charter, p. 183.

⁴⁵Charter, p. 351.

⁴⁶Charter, p. 188.

⁴⁷Charter, p. 179.

⁴⁸In the bargaining process, the phrase "resort to regional agencies or arrangements" was added by the United States as a "verbal concession" to the Latin states' agreeing not to have the Act of Chapultepec mentioned in the Charter (FRUS, Ibid., p. 835).

⁴⁹See Charter, pp. 182-186, and Etzioni, pp. 64-70.

⁵⁰Charter, pp. 281 and 280.

⁵¹Yalem, Theories of Regionalism, pp. 51

⁵²Quoted in Yalem, p. 54.

PART THREE

REGIONALISM AND POSTWAR EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION

In a matter of months or years -- and this is no prophecy but a statement of fact -- the whole of Europe will have to be reconstructed. By that I do not merely refer to boundaries, but to internal reconstruction as well, since the moral foundations and political structures of the whole of Europe have been shaken.

Karel Capek, 1938

Past attempts to organize this strife-torn continent have failed largely ... because they were not founded on a thorough knowledge of (regional) realities.

Adda B. Bozeman, 1941

Introduction

If the United States took the lead among the three major powers in establishing a world organization, then Britain assumed a similar if unsuccessful initiative with regard to Europe. Throughout the war, Prime Minister Churchill believed that a united Europe of more or less equal-size political units would be the best guarantee for a postwar settlement not only for Europe, but also the world. By contrast, President Roosevelt expressed America's historical fear of political and military involvement in European affairs and was less convinced of the wisdom of this path. He was supported by American realists who favored a weak if not splintered Europe and internationalists who feared that United States participation in a European council may require the stationing of American troops on the continent. The Soviet Union was in principle opposed to regional arrangements in Europe in which it did not have a controlling voice. Stalin played a low profile role on the question of European organization and urged the restoration of the sovereign nation states after the war. As with the issue of world organization, the Soviets preferred to react to Anglo-American proposals on Europe as they acquired regional hegemony over eastern Europe through military occupation in the last two years of the war.

The third and final part of this study examines the

allied debate on regionalism and the future structure of Europe. When the Soviet Union and United States became belligerents in the war in 1941, it became clear that the Big Three -- in particular, the two extra-European powers -- would be the main arbiters of the postwar peace in Europe. When the allied coalition was formed on January 1, 1942, the influence of the several London-based European governments-in-exile began to wane. With support from Britain, virtually all of these governments publically favored regional integration schemes ranging from cooperation to federation on an all-European or, in most cases, sub-regional basis. Chapter VIII unravels the positions of the three major powers on the question of an all-European settlement and the debate this issue engendered between them. In Chapter IX, the study focusses on what perhaps was, apart from the BENELUX agreement, the most historically significant integration attempt among the European governments-in-exile during the war, namely, the efforts between 1940 and 1943 by the Polish, Czechoslovak, and also Yugoslav and Greek governments to create interstate regional confederations in eastern Europe.

What precedents if any existed for a united Europe? Together with Japan's "co-prosperity sphere" in Asia, Nazi Germany's "new order" was a palpable if also crude example of hegemonial regionalism in war-time Europe. German propaganda did not refrain from invoking the symbol of "Europe" for its imperial design to unify the continent. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 was

heralded as a European crusade against Bolshevism and the "despotic" East. The propaganda, which was bought by significant segments of the European public at the time, hailed the invasion as an "all-European campaign against Bolshevism" led by Hitler, the "supreme commander in the battle for European civilization."¹ Minister of Propaganda Josef Goebbels made the case for an amoral hegemonial regionalism clear when, in a 1943 speech to a meeting of Gauleiters, he declared,

The Führer drew the conclusion that all the clutter of small nations (Kleinstaatengerümpel) still existing in Europe must be liquidated as soon as possible. The aim of our struggle must be to create a unified Europe. Only the Germans can really organize Europe. ...To dominate Europe will be to assume the leadership of the world. In this connection we naturally cannot accept questions of right and wrong even as a basis of discussion.²

The Nazi ideas on Europe are only historically significant in so far as they were also accompanied by more pragmatic statements by German economists of the need for economic integration. Reich Economic Minister Walther Funk's statement in a July 25, 1940 speech that a "stronger sense of economic community among European nations must be aroused by collaboration in all spheres of economic policy..." was argued in part on rational grounds not dissimilar to the Mitteleuropa ideas developed by Friedrich Naumann and others during World War I.³ In both cases, a vast central European economic and cultural area was conceived under German leadership. But if the spirit of Naumann's hegemonial regionalism remained within a beneficent liberal European tradition, the economists of the Third Reich were servants of a pathological national imperialism.

For so-called good Europeans, the idea of European unity had a history as long as the sovereign European states' system itself. While never political^{ly} unified, Europe was as much a state of mind as a geographical and cultural reality. The "European idea" has been traced by some contemporary Europeanists to the late medieval attempts, most notably Dante's On Monarchy, to revive a disintegrating "respublica Christiana," or western Christian empire.⁴ Denis Hay has pointed out that the term "Europe" only entered the vocabulary in adjectival form in the mid-15th century and was used interchangeably with "Western Christendom" until the beginning of the 18th century.⁵ The decline of the western medieval imperial and feudal order was thus addressed by a corresponding rise in the "idea of Europe." Between the 18th century and the turn of the 20th, the idea assumed the form of a modern, secular civilization known in contemporary history books as the European Age. As believers in science and industry as the path to Enlightenment, Europeans self-understood themselves and the world in Eurocentric terms. As John Lukacs has suggested, the idea of Europe was thus "the historical development of the idea of Europe."⁶

With the passing of the European Age after World War I, the idea of Europe as a condition of historical consciousness assumed another form. It now received expression as a European "movement" designed to rescue the continent from its own decline. The "Pan-European Union" was launched in 1923 by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi as a "non-party mass movement for the unification of Europe."

While it never attracted popular support, the initiative received political attention in May 1930, when French Foreign Minister Auguste Briand sent his European counterparts a plan for a European federal union of sovereign states that was inspired by the movement.⁷

During World War II, the non-communist European exile and resistance movements became the inheritors of the idea of Europe. As we have seen, members of the resistance tended to advocate forms of interstate and autochthonous regionalism within a federative framework.⁸ This part of the study deals in particular with diplomatic initiatives by state actors, led or encouraged by the British, to unify the continent or parts of it as the basis for a postwar European settlement.

NOTES

¹Quoted in Lipgens I, p. 11. That the appeal had some appeal in Europe was noted by Michael Salewski, ibid., p. 49: "If there was ever a genuine chance of integrating Europe during the Nazi period, it was certainly during the months between July and November 1941." For documents on "National Socialist and Fascist Ideas on Europe," see ibid., pp. 55-199.

²Ibid., p. 12.

³Ibid., p. 71. See above, p. 75.

⁴See Rolf Hellmut Foerster, Europa: Geschichte einer Politischen Idee. Mit einer Bibliographie von 182 Einigungsplänen aus den Jahren 1306 bis 1945 (Munich, 1967).

⁵Denis Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (New York, [1957] 1966).

⁶Lukacs, The Decline and Rise of Europe (New York, 1965), p. 257.

⁷Henri Brugmans, L'idée européenne 1918-1966 (2d ed., Bruges, 1966), pp. 49-60.

⁸See above, pp. 134f.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE QUESTION OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN REGIONAL SETTLEMENT

Differing historical-ideological perspectives and pragmatic political concerns marked the diverging approaches of the three major powers on the question of postwar European organization. As with the debate over world organization, the differences between the Big Three were a function of national interests as shaped by their respective worldviews. The domestic and inter-allied policy debates among the three powers on the question of regionalism and European organization are explored in this chapter. The main issue at stake was Britain's attempt to cast the planned allied post-armistice commission for Europe into a postwar European organization, a plan which foundered on American and Soviet opposition. An examination of how this unfolded is preceded by an analysis of the attitudes and policies of the three major powers on regionalism and postwar European political organization.

The British Initiatives

Prime Minister Churchill's idea for a postwar Council

of Europe was consonant with past British policy toward Europe. Since Philip of Spain's incursions in the 16th century, Britain opposed attempts by a single European power to acquire hegemony over the continent. After the turn of the 20th century, preserving the independence of the smaller nations of Europe became a cornerstone of that policy. In 1907, the policy was defined in the following terms:

"England, more than any other non-insular power, has a direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others and the natural protector of the weaker communities."¹

Churchill's concern and preoccupation with Europe was a mark of his loyalty to the British Empire which he sought against hope to preserve during his war-time tenure. His actions as a statesman were guided as much by cultural-historical considerations as by pragmatic strategic interests. His acute geo-political sense reminded him, particularly after 1941, that the relationship of world forces had changed. The British maritime-based Empire was ceding its pre-eminence in maintaining the global and European balance to the United States and Soviet Union. While clinging to the idea of the Empire, Churchill's complex nature led him to try to anchor Britain alternatively to the United States or a united Europe and even, if possible, to both.

One of his first preoccupations upon becoming Prime Minister on May 10, 1940 was pursuit of an Anglo-French association as a short-run attempt to save France from

German occupation and as a longer-term nucleus for a future united Europe. Britain and France, whose policies toward Germany had collided in the inter-war period, now collaborated through joint economic and military committees. A political union was first considered in March 1940, when Churchill, who was serving as the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Premier Paul Reynaud agreed that neither country would conclude a separate armistice or peace treaty. On June 13, the War Cabinet had Churchill send a formal message to a retreating French government under Reynaud in which he proclaimed an "indissoluble union of our two peoples and of our two Empires."² By June 16, a draft "Declaration of Union" was sent to Reynaud which provided for mutual citizenship and a political union with "a single War Cabinet" and "joint organs of defence, foreign, financial, and economic policies."³ When Reynaud's defeatist ministers balked, fearing among other things that it would relegate France to the position of a Dominion, Reynaud resigned, whereupon the government fell into German hands.⁴

After the fall of France, Churchill shifted his thoughts to the United States amidst growing public sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic for closer Anglo-American association. If the events in Europe pushed him in this direction, his shift was not a mere realpolitik calculation. Before the outbreak of the war, Churchill had completed a multi-volume manuscript on A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, which was not to be published until 1956. Aside from his American mother, it was the

common conceptions of English-speaking peoples to law, language, history, and literature drew Churchill to America. He spoke of a "common citizenship" in an Anglo-American association to U.S. leaders in Washington in May 1943. At his September 6, 1943 speech at Harvard University, he assured his audience that "throughout all this ordeal and struggle which is characteristic of our age, you will find in the British Commonwealth and Empire good comrades to whom you are united by other ties besides those of State policy and public need."⁵

But a union of Britain and North America never developed beyond extension of American aid and secret Anglo-American military staff talks and remained the subject of publicists. Churchill's draft of the August 1941 "Atlantic Charter" declaration contained only a vague, symbolic hint of unity between the two powers. He said the Charter's preamble sought "to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world."⁶ For all the affinities, Churchill's attitude towards America was tempered in part by disagreement with a United States policy that was committed to ending Britain's colonial rule. In an October 21, 1942 minute to Foreign Secretary Eden, Churchill confided that Roosevelt's desire to include China among the major powers represented "a faggot vote on the side of the United States in any attempt to liquidate the British overseas Empire."⁷

Churchill's attachments to America and the Empire were not overshadowed his by commitment to Europe and European

unity. In the fall of 1942, he feared Europe's demise in the face of both Prussian and a menacing Soviet power. In his October 1942 message to Eden, where he commented on the War Cabinet's "Four Power Plan," he stated that "my thoughts rest primarily in Europe -- the revival of the glory of Europe, the parent continent of the modern nations and of civilization. It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient States of Europe."⁸ He then proceeded to outline his thinking on the postwar structure of Europe:

Hard as it is to say now, I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe. I look forward to a United States of Europe in which barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole. I hope to see a Council consisting of perhaps ten units, including the former Great Powers, with several confederations -- Scandinavian, Danubian, Balkan, etc. -- which would possess an international police and be charged with keeping Prussia disarmed.

A. European-wide organization became the goal of Britain's wartime policy on postwar Europe. A supporting objective was solidarity with the smaller nations of Europe. Churchill envisaged their consolidation into larger regional groupings as a way of protecting their independence and maintaining the European balance. He believed the smaller powers should play a role alongside the great powers in the postwar world:

Of course we shall have to work with the Americans in many ways, and in the greatest ways, but Europe is our prime care, and we certainly do not wish to be shut up with the Russians and the Chinese when Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, Frenchman, Spaniards, Poles, Czechs, and Turks will have their burning questions, their desire

for our aid, and their very great power of making their voices heard.

In his "Morning Thoughts" memo of February 2, 1943 to President Roosevelt, in which he introduced his idea of regional councils for Europe and the Far East as constituent elements in a world organization, Churchill conceived of the European council as "an instrument of European government."⁹ He saw the old League without its weaknesses as a model, modified by integrating the smaller states into larger representative units that would be comparable in size and power and size to the larger states. The units of the European council would, he stated, be the "great nations of Europe and Asia Minor [i.e., Turkey] as long established" as well as "a number of Confederations formed among the smaller States, among which a Scandinavian Bloc, Danubian Bloc, and a Balkan Bloc appear obvious." Churchill also stressed in his message the importance of a continuing great power coalition that would guarantee a postwar arrangement in Europe.

Churchill aired his views on postwar European (and world) organization in his March 21, 1943 radio broadcast.¹⁰ He called on the allies, led by the three major powers, to begin conferring on the future world organization and to consider creating within that framework "a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia." With the end of the war in Europe in sight and in view of the fact that "in Europe lie most of the causes which have led to these two world wars," the task at hand was to build an "effective league" embracing the whole of Europe. Europe was to be an interstate unit

comprised of "great States and groups of States." Grouping the smaller states into larger interstate regions, or "confederations which would express themselves through their own chosen representatives," was advocated in order to safeguard "the rights and interests (of) the large number of small nations... ." Using a military analogy, he described the fate of small nations if they were not formed into larger units:

What is to happen to the large number of small nations whose rights and interests must be safeguarded? Here let me ask what would be thought of an army that consisted only of battalions and brigades, and which never formed any of the larger and higher organisations like army corps. It would soon get mopped up.

Churchill's larger goal was, as he put it, "to restore the true greatness of Europe," whose task he realized was contingent on great power cooperation. At the same time, he recognized the importance of preserving the historical-cultural diversity of Europe:

It is my earnest hope, though I can hardly expect to see it fulfilled in my lifetime, that we shall see achieve the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible without destroying the individual characteristics and traditions of its many ancient and historic races. All this will, I believe, be found to harmonise with the high permanent interests of Britain, the United States, and Russia. It certainly cannot be accomplished without their cordial and concerted agreement and participation. Thus, and only thus, will the glory of Europe rise again.

Churchill seemed to prefer casting Britain's lot with Europe to create a power between the United States and Soviet Union. In practice, however, his allegiances swung between Europe and the U.S. At his May 22, 1943 Washington discussion on the postwar issues with American leaders,

Churchill argued both for a United States of Europe and an Anglo-American association.¹¹ He spoke of Europe as an entity consisting of twelve units of states and groups of states that would appoint representatives to a common council. The older, established west European states would remain intact while the central, eastern, and northern European states would combine into confederations. It was important to create a strong French state that would act as a buffer between the Soviet Union and England. Spain and Italy would also remain as single states. Prussia was to be severed from the rest of Germany and constitute a separate state with some 40 million inhabitants. Catholic Bavaria would possibly join a Danubian federation "based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire." Turkey, he hoped, was to cooperate with Greece in a larger Balkan union, while he hoped Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose governments in exile had entered negotiations for a confederation "would stand together in friendly relations with Russia." The Scandinavian states and the Low Countries (including Denmark) were also seen as distinct regional units.

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's views on postwar order in Europe lacked Churchill's sense of resolve and principle. He shared the Prime Minister's position until the Americans and Soviets began to voice opposition to [~]regionally organized Europe. In the course of 1943, he gradually turned the Foreign Office away from regionalism as an approach to political organization until, at the San Francisco

conference in the spring of 1945, he was its uncompromising opponent.

Eden, as head of the Dominions Office at the outbreak of the war, first outlined his views on British war aims in Europe in a letter to Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax. It was not enough to accomplish the negative aim of destroying Nazi rule and returning to a status quo ante. A positive aim, he suggested, would be a solution "on the lines of some form of European federation. This would comprise a European defence scheme, a European customs union and common currency."¹² While such projects seemed "somewhat wild," they were in fact variations on the theme of "[French Prime Minister] Briand's conception of a European union." Eden did not propose that a united Europe be included in Britain's war aims, but he wished to underline the need to say in public that "we were fighting for something more than our own interests, 'or even the re-creation of the world as we knew it two months ago.'"¹³ In these early war years, he saw Britain playing a central role in deciding Europe's future as Britain was the most qualified and informed among the major powers on the subject. While appearing to be sensitive to Soviet views, he showed little patience with American opinion about the future of Europe. After a July 1942 unofficial visit from John Foster Dulles, of the World Council of Churches, where Dulles reported that the United States was favoring blocs resulting from a confederation of equals and not of smaller states concentrated around a big power, Eden minuted:

American views are of interest, but ours are even more important where Europe is concerned. ...[W]e should always consult U.S. Government, but our object should be to bring them along with us. They know very little of Europe and it would be unfortunate for the future of the world if U.S. uninstructed views were to decide the future of the European continent.¹⁴ Our diplomacy should be equal to the task... .

Unlike Churchill's European council idea, which was an example of interstate regionalism, the Foreign Office's "Four-Power Plan" drafted by Gladwyn Jebb in October 1942 outlined a peace structure that leaned toward hegemonial regionalism. Drafted in the months following the May 26, 1942 Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance, the proposal held that, "In many areas, one particular Power would be expected at the outset to provide the chief physical means of keeping the peace."¹⁵ Eden, who on his own initiative had proposed the alliance treaty to Foreign Commissar Molotov, toyed with the idea of a Europe divided into British and Soviet spheres, with the United States as the dominant power in the Far Eastern regional council. According to the British draft, "the greatest responsibility for the restoration of (the) western European area would rest with us" (7). Eden added in a November 8 memorandum that while a wider organization and United States participation was necessary for permanent stability in Europe, the latter was a commitment whose prospects were less than certain. Thus, he argued, "if we refused the leadership of Europe, the smaller powers would inevitably drift into the German orbit" (10).

The first reference in British postwar plans to a "council of Europe" came with War Cabinet member Sir Stafford Cripps' November 19 minute to the "Four-Power

Plan." In urging the War Cabinet to take bolder action, he regarded Europe as the focal point of such action. The greatest danger to peace was the "strong central position of Germany" in Europe (11). In place of an Anglo-Soviet condominium in Europe, he proposed reducing the economic power of Germany while strengthening the smaller neighboring states, which should be formed "into larger federal units" (12). Responding to Churchill's favorable comments on the plan, he raised the idea of a "Council of Europe to deal with political, economic and social issues (including minority issues) likely to disturb the peace" (Ibid.). Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union would be members of the Council, one of five similar world regional councils led by one or more of the great powers. A "Supreme World Council" would embody the councils of: Europe, the Americas, where the United States was dominant; the Far East, led by China; the British Commonwealth; and, "owing to its great size and multiplicity of republics," the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Ibid.).

On January 16, 1943, Eden, assisted by Cripps, combined the Jebb memorandum and Cripps minute into a new "United Nations Plan" that backed away from hegemonial regionalism in Europe and embraced the idea of an international organization maintained by a concert of the four major powers. In that framework, Britain was to continue to bear the responsibilities of a world power and to prevent Europe's domination by any single power, preserving "the freedom of Europe as essential to our own." The revised

memorandum admitted that Britain could not realize these objectives through her own unaided efforts. "We can only hope to play our part either as a European Power or as a World Power if we ourselves form part of a wider organization" (14).

In the planned transition period to a permanent European settlement, Eden proposed an inter-allied Armistice and Reconstruction Commission for Europe on which the smaller European allies would be represented along with the Big Three and the cooperation of any remaining neutral states. It would have wide powers, including police enforcement powers, to coordinate essential services both inside and outside Germany. The commission would also provide a "unifying political framework" for an eventual "'Council of Europe' on which all European States should be represented, including the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and, if possible the United States" (24). The Council of Europe would be part of a world-wide system of five interstate regional councils as envisaged by Cripps in addition to regional "commissions" for the colonial dependencies (17).

Shortly after these deliberations, Eden began to backpedal on his support for interstate regionalism in European (and world) organization. With the Soviet Union now on a westward march and voicing opposition to regional federations in eastern Europe and the State Department disputing the very idea of regionalism in postwar organization, Eden began to hedge on the issue. Believing at this time that "the key lay in Moscow," Eden underscored the

need to obtain the Soviet Union's agreement for a common postwar policy on Europe.¹⁶ In a February 4, 1943 despatch to the British ambassador to Moscow, he instructed the ambassador to emphasize

the desirability of the three major Allies pursuing an agreed policy in regard to Europe as a whole. His Majesty's Government would, in fact, propose that Three-Power consultations should in due course take place on post-war arrangements alike in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Only if this principle is accepted will there be any hope of getting some real European order established when Germany collapses, and it should be excluded that any one of the three Great Powers should run a policy of its own in opposition to, or behind the backs of, the others. Moreover, only if it is accepted will any joint planning be either possible or desirable. Some assurance from M. Molotov that the principle is accepted by the Soviet Union will accordingly be of great value as a¹⁷ first step towards real Three-Power collaboration.

In preparing for his March 12-30 United States trip for exploratory discussions on postwar issues with American leaders, Eden decided "not (to) put too much emphasis on the 'regional idea' (except to the extent to which it was implicit in the initial treatment of Europe...)" and a proposed declaration on colonial administration.¹⁸ Before leaving London, Eden was informed by Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky "that the Soviet Government was not enthusiastic about the proposal for a future federation of Europe" and was asked not to make any binding commitments with regard to Europe. Eden disagreed with Maisky's assertion that a federation combining the small European countries would have "negligible" political and military significance, "saying the very fact of the smallness of some of the countries made federation all the more desirable, politically and

militarily as well as economically."¹⁹ Although Maisky stated that he was speaking for himself and not with specific instructions from Moscow, his words were not taken lightly by Eden, who assured Maisky that his talks with the Americans would be exploratory.²⁰

Eden focussed his exploratory Washington discussions on postwar questions on problems of world security and the future of Germany. Much of his time was spent discussing technical issues relating to shipping and the postwar organization of civil aviation. When Churchill's March 21 radio broadcast advocating regional organization had, as presidential aide Harry Hopkins put it, "a very unfortunate effect over here," Eden disassociated himself from the Prime Minister's remarks.²¹ Apart from expressing a desire for United States participation in postwar Europe, Eden and his associates, William Strang and Gladwyn Jebb, did not push the British plan for a post-armistice "United Nations Commission for Europe" during their March 24-25 discussions at the State Department.²² Discussions on the future of Europe as a whole at both the White House on March 15 and with Welles at the State Department on the 16th was confined to questions of boundaries, geography, and strategy.²³ On March 29, at the conclusion of his visit, Eden reported to Hopkins that "he thought that he and Hull did see eye to eye on the major world problems."²⁴

Under Gladwyn Jebb's hand, Eden's "United Nations Plan" went through two further revisions before it was presented to the War Cabinet on July 7. The new "United Nations Plan for Organising Peace" still envisaged an all-European plan

guaranteed by the three major power. Including allied and neutral European states, Europe would be organized to contain a resurgent Germany and restore the continent to social and political health. The means lay in developing the armistice-related United Nations Commission for Europe into a Council for Europe. The revised plan emphasized that in order

[t]o provide a political framework for the various military and economic measures contemplated, it is to be hoped that the United Nations Commission for Europe ... may at some stage become a 'Council of Europe', on which all European States should be represented, including the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, with the addition, it is to be hoped, of the United States. ...A Council of Europe in which the [Big Three] did not play an active part might become in course of time an instrument through which Germany could recover peacefully that hegemony over Europe which she had momentarily²⁵ established by force of arms during the present war.

The plan still provided for the creation of sub-regional groupings of smaller states as units within the all-European organization. While seeking to guard against the "attempt to force European nations into unions against their will, ...it might be possible for the United Nations Commission for Europe, for instance, to encourage 'regional' tendencies by centralising certain services in certain specified areas" (57).

Eden presented the British views on the transition phase for Europe in the form of a ten-point "Aide Mémoire" to the Americans on July 16, 1943. In addition to armistice and control commissions for enemy states administered by an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission of the three major powers, the plan provided for a high-profile, supervisory European

organization. "There should be established a supervisory body entitled 'United Nations Commission for Europe,' composed of high ranking political representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., of France and other minor European Allies, and, if so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the policing of Europe" (46) (emphasis in original). The Commission, located at "some convenient point" on the continent, would be directed by a steering committee comprised of representatives of the three major powers (and possibly France) and operate under the rule of unanimity. The Commission would have several functions, acting as supreme allied authority in Europe to "direct and coordinate" the activities of the several armistice commissions, the allied commanders-in-chief, and any allied civilian authorities that may be established. It would also deal with current problems, "military, political and economic, connected with the maintenance of order" (47-8).²⁶

On the eve of great power deliberations on postwar organization, beginning with the October 1943 Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow, Britain was still poised to negotiate on behalf of an interstate regional settlement for Europe.

United States' Views

Eden's July 16, 1943 aide mémoire elicited an unenthusiastic reponse in the State Department. With the imminent departure from the Department of Under Secretary Welles, the tide had turned against regionalism as a basis

for postwar political organization. In an August 11 memorandum on the aide mémoire to the President, Leo Pasvoltsy, Secretary Hull's special assistant for postwar organization matters, questioned the desirability of combining armistice-related activities in individual states with postwar questions of a general and long-term character. Pasvoltsy cited comments of the Subcommittee on Security of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy:

It is the feeling of the Subcommittee that the decision to create an agency, which would essentially be a kind of super-government for Europe, should be made exclusively on its own merits... It is felt that the political reaction in this country would be unfavorable if the United States were to take such a major step involving general and long-run commitments, under the guise of making a settlement with the enemy. These policy issues should be determined separately.²⁷

The Pasvoltsy memorandum also informed the President that the discussions in the State Department on postwar organization had concluded that postwar organization was to have a universal and not a regional character.²⁸

Pasvoltsy invoked the traditional American fear of long-term commitments abroad, particularly in Europe, as an argument against a regional organization in Europe that would involve the United States. Although it seemed ironic that this otherwise isolationist argument was being advanced by an internationalist, this fear of "entangling alliances" was nonetheless a constant theme in the annals of American foreign relations. The United States, while itself a federation of states and a unification of (primarily European) nationalities, never presented itself as a model for the old world during the war. Europe's controversies

were, as George Washington pointed out in his Farewell Address, "essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships and enmities." This attitude was reinforced by generations of Europeans who migrated to the new world from lives in the old world which many wished to leave behind. In foreign affairs, the United States preferred as a matter of habit to rest behind the protective contours of the Monroe Doctrine.

American isolationism thawed at turn of the 20th century and in the wake of European colonial ventures and unrest. Apart from her own imperial adventures in the Caribbean and the Philippines, America's international involvement was highlighted by her 1917-18 military intervention in Europe. But three months after the Harding administration's inaugural in 1921, United States ambassador to London George Harvey announced to a stunned Europe that the United States government "could not, without the betrayal of its creators and masters, and will not, I assure you, have anything whatsoever to do with the League, or with any commission or committee appointed by it or responsible to it, directly or indirectly, openly or furtively."²⁹

America's return to "normalcy" ended in 1933 with President Roosevelt's inaugural pledge that "in the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor... ," thus opening a new phase of American foreign relations that had a particular echo in Latin

America. Although Roosevelt was knowledgeable in particular about the geography of Europe, he did not share Churchill's emotional ties to the continent. His non-involvement in European affairs was largely determined, however, by a neutrality-minded Congress. Roosevelt's efforts to avert war in Europe did not extend beyond effective rhetorical appeals and material assistance to Britain. At the outbreak of World War II, the isolationist lobby, which had more than residual support in the American public, obtained the President's signature to the Neutrality Act which he proclaimed on September 5, 1939. In assessing the decade of the 1930s, Sumner Welles wrote in 1944 that

many of us have gained the conviction that the United States might even then have changed the trend of events had public opinion in this country grasped more clearly how desperately serious the world situation had become, and that in its own interest alone this country should share actively and effectively in international affairs. ...During those years among the highest officials of this Government only the President himself clearly³⁰ and emphatically sounded the note of danger... .

America's official neutrality remained in effect until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. In the meantime, preliminary postwar planning had begun in January 1940 in the State Department with the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles was appointed chairman with Hugh R. Wilson, former ambassador to Germany, as vice-chairman. Though an internationalist, Welles had become an advocate of interstate regionalism in both world and European organization. Upon assuming the chairmanship of the Advisory Council, he emphasized "the necessity of basic

research as the foundation for policy recommendations,"³¹ and for the next three years, shaped the administration's policy debate on questions of postwar organization.

Soon after convening in January 1940, the Subcommittee on Political Problems which Welles also chaired raised questions with regard to the feasibility of regional organization in Europe:

Should the United States, apart from cooperation with Europe in matters of economic reconstruction, commit itself to any international cooperation on purely political matters? Perhaps in view of the failure of the League of Nations and the success of the inter-American system, a number of regional leagues -- each under an individual, rather than a representative of a government, as president and each having a direct relationship to the others -- should be favored. Still another possibility was that the League of Nations might be continued, with modifications, to represent primarily the states of Europe and Africa; a regional group might be formed for Asia; and a collaborating relationship established between these regional₃₂ arrangements and the inter-American organization.

Welles drew on his February-March 1940 fact-finding trip to Europe to devise a regionally-based proposal for a major power-sponsored postwar European settlement.³³ He outlined a Europe consisting of eight or nine regional sub-units represented in a single political unit. The executive of this body was a presidency that rotated annually in the manner of Switzerland's Federal Council. The plan favored "such derogation of the sovereignty of states as (would) make for quick and decisive action by the body" (458). Practical power would remain in the hands of the major powers except in the unlikely event of a federal union along the lines of a United States of Europe.

The nine blocs of the political unit, whose decisions

"for the purposes of European administration" would be based on either majority or two-thirds rule, retained Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy as political units (if France and Britain did not choose to form a single bloc, as was being considered at the time). The smaller states were to be grouped into five regional units consisting of Scandinavia; the Iberian peninsula; the eastern Baltic states and Poland; the Danubian states (Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia); and the Balkan states (Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece). In addition to the political body, the Welles proposal also outlined provisions for a permanent court of justice; an international force that was "regional in character"; a disarmament commission that was "primarily regional but with possible participation, for limited purposes, of states of the world"; a technical commission that was "worldwide in scope"; and a "Permanent Group" of non-governmental ombudsmen "recognized for their wisdom, character and experience" and who would monitor and report on actual or likely world trouble spots to the political body (459-60).

Riding on growing public support for internationalism in 1943, Secretary of State Hull rejected proposals for interstate regionalism in European organization that were not firmly subordinated to a general world organization. In August, at the time of Welles' resignation, the State Department had "reached a consensus" that international organization was to be structured on a universal, not regional, basis. Regional organizations, concerned primarily

with local problems, "could perform some function by delegation from the general international organization."³⁴

While not opposed on principle to European unification, the Department did not wish to see it guaranteed by the three major powers participating in a Council of Europe but by a world organization that would include the major powers. As Myron C. Taylor, a member of Secretary Hull's "informal agenda group" stated in an August 1943 memo to the President:

With respect to the proposed Council of Europe, we have questioned whether the United States should join Great Britain and Russia in guaranteeing the security of that group of states. We have examined this problem in light of Western Hemisphere relationships under the Monroe Doctrine and in terms of the more recent Good Neighbor policies. As an alternative to Mr. Churchill's proposal, we have discussed a union of all European states, excluding Great Britain and Russia, which would be placed under the protection of a world organization that would include Britain and Russia.³⁵

If the State Department opposed the British plan to develop transitional armistice and control machinery into a European organization, it did not preclude the possibility of some kind of European-wide organization after the war. Secretary Hull suspended the work of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy in July 1943, but he allowed the work of the Special Subcommittee on Problems of European Organization, formed in May, to continue its work. The committee was chaired by Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong and included Leo Pasvolksy, Isaiah Bowen, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Harley A. Notter, Cyril Black, and Philip E. Mosley among its twenty or so members. After some preliminary organizational meetings in May, it met at the

State Department sixteen times on a bimonthly basis between June 4, 1943 and March 31, 1944.³⁶

At its first formal meeting, the subcommittee agreed that it had been "formed to study the possibility of a unification of the European continent, as well as that of more limited regional arrangements."³⁷ It acknowledged various types of regional arrangements, ranging from bilateral agreements involving two states to an all-European confederation. Its primary stated objective was to assess the effects of European regional organization on United States interests. In this context, it set out to study a list of ten possible regional groups of states, noting that there was greater interest among European allied statesmen for sub-regional groupings than for an all-European organization.³⁸ The ten possible groupings were:

- the Continent as a whole;
- the Low Countries, w/ or w/o the Rhineland;
- the Low Countries and France;
- a Scandinavian federation;
- a Balkan federation;
- a Polish-Czechoslovak federation;
- an East European federation;
- a Danubian federation;
- a South Slav federation; and perhaps
- an Iberian bloc.³⁹

The results of the subcommittee's work by fall 1943 were summarized in an internal memorandum on the Department's work on postwar international organization.⁴⁰ While apprehensive about the potential economic and political impact of a united Europe, the Department gave conditional support to the idea of European unification. "It was found that a full European customs union would not necessarily be either advantageous or detrimental to the

long-run interests of the United States, but that its effects would depend on economic developments within the union and the external commercial policy pursued," the report stated.⁴¹ It held that closer economic and political rapprochement would carry potentialities both for peace and war. It nonetheless recommended that the United States tentatively favor regional groupings provided they were freely arrived at and its members remained state units capable of being diplomatically represented in a larger, world-wide organization. In the event Europe did not move toward greater economic and political regional integration, the report recommended that the United States support functional organization "for such unification of technical services as might be feasible."⁴²

The entry of Soviet troops into eastern Europe in the spring of 1944 changed the political variables favoring interstate regionalism in Europe. On Leo Pasvolsky's suggestion, Hamilton Fish Armstrong suspended the work of the subcommittee at its last meeting on March 31, 1944 on grounds that "some of the schemes studied by the subcommittee had been rendered academic" by the changed world situation.⁴³ At a February meeting, committee member Adolf A. Berle pointed to the likelihood of hegemonial regionalism in eastern Europe in stating that "as a working assumption, the Subcommittee might study the hypothetical case of a group of states extending as far west as the western frontier of Czechoslovakia, and to Trieste in the south, dominated by the Soviet Union."⁴⁴

Soviet Attitudes

Since the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet policy toward Europe fluctuated uneasily between engagement and withdrawal, internationalism and isolation. The very rules and methods of engagement and the meaning of internationalism added confusion to the picture. The existence of the new socialist regime and its universal claims for a world socialist revolution challenged the traditional (i.e., European) assumptions about the conduct of international relations based on a system of sovereign states. As noted above, the modern state for Marxist-Leninists was an instrument of bourgeois-national class rule. It was not in need of reform but replacement by a "dictatorship of the proletariat" that would usher in the Marxian realm of freedom (full communism) based on a classless society organized into a federation of nations. In the years prior to and immediately following the October 1917, Lenin and in particular, Leon Trotsky, advanced federalist slogans of the "union of the oppressed everywhere" in the form of a "United Soviet States of Europe" as a precursor for the "United States of the World."⁴⁵ In the constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, introduced in July 1918, it was proclaimed that the Russian socialist experiment augured a new future for the federal organization of Europe and the world:

Our Constitution is of world-wide significance. As the workers and peasants from different countries take advantage of favorable circum-

stances and follow the example of Soviet Russia ... the Russian Soviet Republic sooner or later will be surrounded by daughter and sister Republics, which uniting will lay the basis for a federation, first of Europe, and then of the entire world.⁴⁶

For tactical reasons, Lenin embraced the popular idea of "national self-determination" as a means of solving a festering nationality problem in eastern Europe. He declared independent nations as units of political organization. But Lenin and other left-wing socialists attached no intrinsic value to the nation, which they viewed with the state as a transitory category that would disappear with the advent of socialism. Socialism alone could reconcile the class and national differences that separated men. The real basis of national self-determination lay in the nation being "under the leadership of a cadre drawn from a class-conscious proletariat" in which the principal task of the party of the proletariat "was to further the self-determination of the proletariat in each national group rather than the self-determination of the entire national group itself."⁴⁷

Nations and not states were seen as the units of organization although it was not clear how the "nations" were constituted other than being soviet, or "council," republics. Lenin claimed that he wanted a "voluntary union of nations in fraternal unity."⁴⁸ At the founding congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919, the manifesto of the congress cited the inadequacy of the sovereign state as a form of political organization. The platform of the congress called for the proletariat to "wipe out boundaries between states, transform the whole world

into one cooperative commonwealth, and realize the freedom and brotherhood of nations."⁴⁹

When it became evident in 1920 that a European revolution was not imminent, the Soviet Union turned inward to survive a civil war and develop "socialism in one country." At the same time, the "two-camp" thesis was developed and the Comintern maintained as a world-wide party instrument to carry on the work of the revolution. Communist cadres in whatever nation or state were required to show loyalty to the Soviet Union. "The (proletarian) internationalist," as Stalin proclaimed in 1927, "is one who unreservedly, without hesitation, without conditions, is prepared to defend the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union is the base of the world revolutionary movement and it is impossible to defend or advance this movement without defending the Soviet Union."⁵⁰

Hitler's rise to power in 1933 and Germany's subsequent exit from the League of Nations disquieted the security conscious Soviet government. For the next five to six years, the Soviets pursued an unorthodox policy of attempting to contain Germany through regional security pacts within the League of Nations structure. Foreign Affairs Commissar Maxim Litvinov, as the cosmopolitan-minded architect of this policy, persuaded Stalin and the Central Committee Politburo in December 1933 for the Soviets to join the League in order to pursue this policy.⁵¹ The new direction was based on the assumption that security could best be assured through collective commitments undertaken on a regional basis. Both bilateral and multilateral mutual assistance pacts were seen

as the most reliable security guarantees. As a rule, the Soviet regime had on principle opposed regional arrangements in Europe in which it was not represented. In May 1933, Litvinov told the French that "anything done without us ... can only be something done against us."⁵² The Soviets viewed both Briand's plan for a United States of Europe and the Little Entente as cordons sanitaires hostile to the Soviet Union. The regional agreements which were now being proposed had, according to the Soviets, "nothing in common with blocs directed against definite states or groups of states and pursuing the purpose of encircling and isolating these states. The significance of such agreements was that they embraced all the states of a given geographical region and provided their members with identical guarantees of assistance in the event of aggression by any country."⁵³

With the Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations in September 1934, Litvinov emerged as a leading advocate of League action on a regional basis. In his inaugural speech to the League, he stated that while the Soviet Union represented "a new form of state" opposed by "old state formations," it had nonetheless "never excluded the possibility of some form or other of association with states having a different political or social system, so long as there is no mutual hostility and if it is for the attainment of common aims."⁵⁴ Regional security arrangements were seen as a means of strengthening the League's Covenant, in particular Article 16, which provided for the application of military sanctions against states that violated the

peace. Regional pacts were described as supplementary guarantees of security within the League system. In September 1935, Litvinov placed regional pacts within a broader a European union of states capable of inter-acting with other regional systems:

It seems to me sometimes that, with the universality of the League, ...the voices of European countries in the League may sometimes be drowned in the universal chorus, or not find an adequate expression corresponding to the specific weight of Europe in international life. Some remedy to this state of affairs would be the more justified as the possibility of interference of the League in the affairs of some of the other continents is in some cases limited beforehand, or even excluded. This question might be considered together with the question on the agenda regarding the relations between the League of Nations and the Pan-American Union. The creation of a European organisation with the League of Nations might in time lead to a wide European regional agreement embracing and linking up regional pacts of a more limited scope.⁵⁵

Surprising as it may seem, Litvinov advocated on behalf of an interstate regionalism where each member state would preserve its sovereignty in regional pacts within the League framework. At the League's 16th Assembly in July 1936, he asserted that it was necessary

that all continents, for a start, the continent of Europe, at least, (be) covered with a network of regional pacts, under which individual groups of states would be committed to the defence of definite regions against aggression, and the fulfillment of these regional commitments is regarded as fulfillment of the commitments under the pact [i.e., the League of Nations Covenant--Ed.] and has the full support of all the members of the League of Nations. Far from replacing the League Covenant these regional pacts⁵⁶ must complement it..." (brackets in original).

Stalin's main foreign policy concern was security along Soviet Russia's western frontier. While he approved or tolerated Litvinov's initiatives in the League, he also had

Deputy Foreign Affairs Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov play the German card in Berlin.⁵⁷ In the mid-1930s, Litvinov negotiated principally with the French, supporters of the Little Entente, for the creation of a Locarno-type "Eastern Pact." While he was unsuccessful in obtaining a trilateral pact between France and Czechoslovakia, he did succeed in concluding bilateral mutual assistance treaties with those states in May 1935. The pact with Czechoslovakia contained a fateful escape clause which obligated the Soviet Union to aid Czechoslovakia only if France also acted in fulfillment of its responsibility. Litvinov's inability by the spring of 1936 to conclude the requisite military conventions rendered the treaties ineffective even if they were still in force at the time of the capitulation and collapse of Czechoslovakia in 1938.⁵⁸ According to Anthony Eden, "had the Eastern Pact come into being, it would have ... influenced German policy towards Czechoslovakia, not in its intention but in its execution. It might even have averted Munich."⁵⁹ The failure of Litvinov's efforts was less the result of diplomatic posturing or naive assumptions than of a latent, if understandable, western mistrust of the Soviet Union that was fed by incredulous news of internal events in Russia (purges, famine, forced collectivization).⁶⁰ Hitler also succeeded in confusing western diplomats. The denouement of Litvinov's scheme was his replacement as Foreign Commissar by Vyacheslav Molotov, who three months later signed the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact whose secret protocol created a German-Soviet condominium in eastern Europe. The experiment in interstate regionalism under the

rules of bourgeois internationalism failed and gave way to hegemonial regionalism by two despotic powers who divided eastern Europe between them.

When the wartime allied coalition was formed on January 1, 1942, the Soviets were again obliged to deal with the West. In spite or because of Stalin's cynical and perhaps xenophobic attitude toward the West, the Soviet Union formally adhered to the Atlantic Charter at the September 1941 Inter-Allied Conference in London and in May 1942 signed a twenty-year treaty of alliance with Britain. In the early war years, and particularly when Soviet territory was under seize, the Soviets did not voice opposition to the British postwar ideas for regional reorganization in Europe. During Eden's December 1941 meeting with Stalin in Moscow, Stalin, while pressing for recognition of the Soviet territorial gains of 1939 and 1940, raised no objections "if some European countries wished to federate."⁶¹ In the fall of 1942, as the Red Army began to turn the tide against the Germans, the Soviets began to give mixed signals about the regional confederation plans for eastern Europe. Soviet Ambassador in London Maisky told Eden as late as March 1943 that the Soviet government may not oppose regional federations in northern and southeastern Europe if certain security guarantees were met.⁶² But the Soviet Union's London ambassador accredited to the European governments-in-exile, A.Y. Bogomolov, was particularly active in later 1942 and 1943 in cajoling the east Europeans to drop their plans for union. Themes of national self-determination and state

sovereignty were increasingly invoked as part of a campaign to restore the structure of the prewar system (excepting the Baltic states).⁶³ This attitude was to prevail at Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October 1943.

The Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference and Beyond

The die for the postwar structure of Europe was cast at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 18-31, 1943. British Foreign Secretary Eden placed four items on the conference agenda which would have substantially altered the organization of postwar Europe along interstate regional lines. But the Americans and Russians were not terribly interested and had their own "agendas" at the conference. Secretary of State Hull was concerned above all with allied adherence to the Four-Power Declaration assuring universalism in international political organization while Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov considered issues other than military ones of secondary importance.

Masking perhaps his own changing views or pessimism about the regional alternative favored by Churchill, Eden was unassertive in arguing the British case. Eden's hand was also weakened by the lack of Anglo-American cooperation at the conference. Secretary of State Hull's refusal to meet with him prior to the tripartite meeting was intended to show the host power that no special relationship existed between Britain and the United States. In spite of America's growing strength, the U.S. government had begun to play, as one observer put it, "the role of suitor to Stalin's coy

mistress. ...Churchill and Eden, thinking largely in terms of a balance of power, wanted to bargain with Stalin, whereas Roosevelt and Hull thought in terms of abstract principles to which they hoped Stalin could, if treated indulgently enough by his war-time allies, be committed."⁶⁴

The British proposals sought to introduce interstate regionalism in Europe as a means of preventing a large power's hegemony on the continent. Although directed officially against Germany, the British position also sought to forestall the division of postwar Europe into Soviet and possibly American spheres of influence. Toward this end, they sought to table a proposal concerning "The Question of Joint Responsibility for Europe as Against Separate Spheres of Influence." Although Hull and other internationalists shared an anathema for "spheres of influence," they asked the British before the conference to change the wording of "Spheres of Influence" to the less offensive "Areas of Responsibility."⁶⁵ The four-article proposal, after acknowledging the draft Four-Power Declaration, would have committed the three governments to accept:

2. That all States are accordingly free to associate themselves with other states in order to increase their mutual welfare by the establishment of institutions on a wider scale than each can separately maintain, provided that such associations shall not be directed against the the welfare or stability of other States and are approved by any general international organization that may be set up in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Four Power Declaration adopted at..... on..... .

3. That, subject to the considerations advanced in paragraph 2 above, they regard it as their duty and interest, so far as lies in their power, to assist other European States for form any associations designed to increase their mutual welfare and the

general prosperity of the Continent;

4. That for their own part they will not seek to create any separate areas of responsibility in Europe and will not recognize such for others, but rather affirm their common interest in the well-being of Europe as a whole.

Hull and Molotov responded to the proposal at the eighth tripartite negotiating session on October 26. Hull argued that the conference should first agree on general principles as a basis for agreement on particular issues. It was the U.S. government's view "that the first step was to agree upon and adopt a broad set of principles capable of world-wide application which would then guide our three countries in our consideration of separate and specific questions, of which the British proposal was one" (638). Foreign Commissar Molotov agreed with Hull, adding perhaps defensively that he "knew of no reason to believe that the Soviet Government would be interested in separate zones or spheres of influence." He "could guarantee that there was no disposition on the part of the Soviet Government to divide Europe into such separate zones" (638-39). Foreign Secretary Eden did not pursue the issue and, as a result, no action was taken on the document.

In a more concrete second measure, Eden presented a version of the Foreign Office's July 7 memorandum on "The United Nations Plan for Organising Peace." It had called for a "United Nations Commission for Europe" with wide political authority that would "at some stage become a 'Council of Europe'." In face of American opposition, Eden scaled down the proposal for the Moscow conference and merely called for a "form of clearing house ... with broad consultative powers

to deal with general questions arising out of the war" (607).⁶⁷ In the course of negotiations, both the Soviets and Americans further reduced the role and scope of what became formalized at the conference as the European Advisory Commission (EAC). The Commission was to be based in London with a rotating presidency of the three powers and a secretariat. Its mandate, in the end, was to "study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities which the three Governments may consider appropriate to refer to it."⁶⁸ Authorized merely to make studies and recommendations, the EAC was a far cry from what the British had originally bargained for. The EAC's authority was further reduced by Hull in the spring of 1944 and abolished altogether in July 1945 in favor an inter-governmental Council of Foreign Ministers.⁶⁹

The third and fourth British proposals on behalf of interstate regionalism were directed at central and eastern Europe. The issues concerned the future of Austria and sub-regional confederation(s) in eastern Europe. The latter proposal, which was also sidetracked by the Soviet Union and United States, is dealt with in the following chapter. The most Eden was able to salvage in Moscow was a "Declaration on Liberated Austria" calling for the restoration of Austrian independence after the war. The future of Austria was the subject of intense deliberation throughout 1943 in the Foreign Office and War Cabinet. On June 16, the War Cabinet approved a two-stage policy that combined

restoration of Austrian independence with "the fitting of Austria into some form of Central or Southeast European Confederation. ...The Cabinet considered that the larger grouping should be established soon after the war ended before there had been time for opinion to harden on other lines."⁷⁰ In Moscow, it was the United States revision of the British draft of the declaration, in which the word "association" with neighboring states was deleted, that was adopted as the official conference document on October 30.

The outcome of the Moscow conference opened the way for the division of Europe into American and Soviet spheres of influence. At the time, however, it was perceived as a success in the medias of the three powers, each of them in terms of their governments' main negotiating interests. While all three states hailed the results, "American newspapers generally seized upon the Four-Power Declaration as the most important decision of the Conference; British newspapers tended to emphasize the value of the European Advisory Council...; while the Russian newspapers put the greatest emphasis upon the military repercussions... ." ⁷¹

The setback in Moscow for Britain's proposals for postwar Europe, while not unexpected, forced the Foreign Office into further retreat on the issue of regional organization. This was reflected in the preparations for the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Churchill, preoccupied with war-time issues, including plans for the cross-Channel invasion, had not kept up with the Foreign Office's preparations for the meeting. He demurred, however, when he examined the draft memoranda for the conference in early May 1944. In a

May 21 minute, he demanded that Eden to "revise" the position taken on Europe, which had essentially ignored his concept of a European council. Churchill stated that "'the only thing I am pressing for is a United States of Europe in some form or other, with a Council of its own of which I trust Russia, Great Britain and the United States will be members.'"⁷² The redrafted paragraph 18 of the first memorandum (Memorandum A) of five memoranda submitted to the major powers emphasized the need for a European organization. The paragraph, of which the addition is underlined, read as follows:

Just as there are functional organisations, so there may be regional associations for various purposes when there is obvious advantage to be obtained by limitation of the sphere of action. In particular there should be some regional organisation for the Continent of Europe if only to prevent a repetition of the circumstances which have caused two World Wars to originate in that area. The condition of Europe at the close of this war will demand the special care and assistance of the three Great Powers and means must be found to prevent its becoming the centre of a third world tragedy. It is possible that out of some 'United Nations Commission for Europe'...there might grow a European organisation which under the guidance of the three major allies, might foster peaceful tendencies, heal the wounds of Europe, and at the same time prevent Germany from again dominating the Continent. Such regional associations might also come into existence for [...] economic co-operation, for the promotion of welfare in colonial territories, etc. It is, however, essential that they should not conflict with the world-wide organisation but rather assist it to carry out its purposes (125). (brackets contained the word "security" in the original draft)

Eden placated the Prime Minister but received support from the Dominion governments in de-emphasizing regional councils in general and a European organization in particular when it came to instructing the British

delegation to Dumbarton Oaks.⁷³ Eden prevented Churchill's regionalism from becoming an issue at Dumbarton Oaks as prospects for a European regional organization or organizations were vanishing under American reservations and the presence of Soviet troops in eastern Europe. The United States never felt comfortable with the idea of a European-wide organization. But the State Department did not in principle oppose intra-European regional groupings after 1943. In considering the "treatment of Austria" in June 1944, the Department's Committee on Postwar Programs acknowledged that Austria's viability as a political unit would best be served in a economic and political relationship with its Danubian neighbors.⁷⁴ Its memorandum, which was approved by Roosevelt and forwarded by Secretary Hull to the American ambassador to the European Advisory Commission in London, in effect agreed with the British position by stating that independent statehood for Austria was not enough. Independence, the memorandum stated, was

not a prescription against future economic and political relationships with Austria's neighbors which, presumably, might assume the character of special economic arrangements, political federation, or even a merger of sovereignties, provided any such arrangement was approved by the parties concerned and⁷⁵ was acceptable to the international organization.

As late as April 1945, when Soviet troops had completed the liberation of eastern Europe, a Department document of the committee on International Security Organization again considered the viability of such groupings. It stated that "in general, the Department of State has taken the position that the U.S. should favor the development of such regional

groupings as might seem to promote the economic welfare and political security of the peoples involved... ."76 In practice, however, the Department did little to foster and much to prevent European integration in general and the unification of smaller European states, notably the east European governments-in-exile, in particular. It is to the latter subject that we turn in the next chapter.

NOTES

¹British Documents on the Origins of the War, eds. Gooch and Temperley (London, 1928), v.3, p. 403.

²Churchill, v.2, p. 186.

³Ibid., p. 208.

⁴Ibid., p. 213; See Eleanor M. Gates, End of the Affair: The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1939-40 (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 234-244 and passim.

⁵Quoted in Winston Churchill on America and Britain, ed. Kay Halle (New York, 1970). p. 92.

⁶Churchill, v.3, p. 435.

⁷Churchill, v.4, p. 562. Churchill's mission civilisatrice attitude to colonialism was revealed in a riposte he delivered to Helen Ogden Mills Reid, Vice-President of the New York Herald Tribune and critic of British policy in India. At a September 1943 White House luncheon gathering, he retorted, "Are we talking about the brown Indians of India, who have multiplied alarmingly under the benevolent British rule? Or are we talking of the red Indians of America who, I understand, are almost extinct?" Cited in Wheeler-Bennett and Nichols, The Semblance of Peace, p. 98. Churchill was reportedly proud of his Iroquois Indian ancestry on his mother's side.

⁸This and following quotes in Churchill, v.4, p. 562.

⁹This and subsequent quotes from Churchill, v.4, p. 711.

¹⁰Winston S. Churchill, His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, ed. R.R. James (New York/London, 1974). Ensuing quotes from pp. 6757-59.

¹¹Churchill, v.4, p. 802-06 and FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, v.1, pp. 167-172. The text quoted is from a May 28 memorandum of the meeting that Churchill asked Ambassador Halifax to transmit to Roosevelt and which Churchill circulated to his War Cabinet upon his return. The occasion was a British Embassy luncheon attended by Vice President Wallace, Under Secretary Welles, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Connally. Compare Woodward, v. 5, pp. 39-40.

¹²This and following quotes in Anthony Eden, The Reckoning, pp. 85-86.

¹³Eden admitted in his memoirs that he had taken "no direct part" in developing these proposals until his return to the Foreign Office in the 1950s (Ibid., p. 86).

- ¹⁴Eden, The Reckoning, p. 395.
- ¹⁵Woodward, p. 7. Subsequent page references cited in text.
- ¹⁶Eden op.cit., p. 424.
- ¹⁷PRO, FO 371/35338/U 321/216/G: Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow). Molotov's response was non-committal while expressing vague interest in tripartite talks.
- ¹⁸Woodward, v.5, p. 24.
- ¹⁹As told to Roosevelt's presidential aide, Harry Hopkins, in Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948), p. 714. See Eden, The Reckoning, p. 430.
- ²⁰Eden, The Reckoning, p. 429.
- ²¹Hopkins in Sherwood, p. 718. Cp. Woodward, pp. 33-35.
- ²²Woodward, pp. 33, 36-38.
- ²³FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, III, pp. 13-24. The subject of eastern European federations was brought up with Welles. See Chapter IX.
- ²⁴Sherwood, p. 719. Cp. Eden, pp. 440-41.
- ²⁵Woodward, v.5, p. 57. Subsequent page references from this source cited in text.
- ²⁶See FRUS, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, pp. 700-02.
- ²⁷FRUS, Ibid., p. 699.
- ²⁸See above, pp. 161-3.
- ²⁹quoted in Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 42.
- ³⁰Ibid., p. 72.
- ³¹Postwar, p. 38.
- ³²Postwar, p. 25. Regional thinking permeated various postwar planning activities in the Department in the early 1940s. In the area of postwar international economic relations, for example, it is interesting to note the work of the Interdepartmental Group to Consider Post-War Economic Problems and Policies organized in May 1940. By December 1940, it had organized its work along regional and functional, not state, lines. In addition to sub-committees on commodity and subject studies (commercial, transportation, monetary and financial, and population), five sub-committees on regional studies were established. The purpose of these committees were to study the five

regions selected -- Germany and the continent of Europe; Japan and the Far East; Soviet Russia; the British Commonwealth; and the United States and the Western Hemisphere -- "from the viewpoint of the economic aims and current economic practices of the nations respectively predominant in each of the regions, as well as of the economic structure and possibilities of each region under various assumptions as to the outcome of the war. (Postwar, pp. 460-61; see also pp. 29-30 and 39-40).

³³"Memorandum [by Hugh R. Wilson] Arising From Conversations in Welles' Office, April 19 and 26," May 1, 1940 in Postwar, pp. 458-60. Subsequent page references cited in text.

³⁴FRUS, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 688.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Postwar, pp. 146-48. The committee was believed to have been established on the suggestion of Sumner Welles. At a preparatory organizational meeting on May 14, Hamilton Fish Armstrong referred to the group as the "Committee on European Regional Organization." The following day, Welles, who did not take formal part in the work of the committee, suggested to Armstrong that the name be changed to the "Subcommittee on Problems of European Organization" and that it not deal, as envisaged, with various "ideological and religious" groupings, such as a Vatican supported Habsburg bloc for the Danubian region (NA, Lot 60D-224, Notter Records, Box 84: May 17, 1943 letter from Hamilton J. Armstrong to Leo Pasvolksy).

³⁷NA, Lot 60D-224, Box 84: R Minutes 1, June 4, 1943, p. 2.

³⁸Ibid. A committee report written preparatory to the June 4 meeting contained an assessment of the support among European leaders for regional organization in Europe. The report concluded that there existed a "negative ... preponderance of opinion" among European statesmen for the unification of the continent. "A few leaders have expressed thorough-going approval for a single political and economic unit to embrace the whole continent," the report explained, "but most of the statesmen in exile maintain such extensive reservations that it would seem unwarranted to conclude that any considerable sentiment for such a project exists at the present time." On the other hand, the report observed "a keen interest manifested in various types of (sub-)regional organization," particularly in eastern and northern Europe. It cited two federations, the Polish-Czechoslovak and the Yugoslav-Greek, which "have already been agreed upon, at least in principle," and mentioned that discussion for a Nordic Union had "reached a semi-official stage" in Sweden and Denmark. It recognized the security concerns of the leaders of the smaller countries and the stress that was placed by those whose projects had been "developed in greater detail" of the "necessity for post-war planning at

various levels (national, regional, European)..." (NA, R-2, 2 June 1943: "How much of a desire for the unification of Europe has been expressed by European leaders and what plans have been proposed by them?," pp. 15, 16).

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰NA, 60D-224, ISO-Und 7, October 1, 1944: "Work in the Field of International Organization in the Department of States Prior to October 1943."

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 15-16.

⁴²Ibid., p. 16.

⁴³NA, op.cit., R Minutes 16, 31 March 1944.

⁴⁴NA, R Minutes 12, 4 February 1944, p. 21.

⁴⁵Klaus Törnudd, Soviet Attitudes Towards Non-Military Regional Co-operation (Helsinki, 1963), p. 71.

⁴⁶Quoted in Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State, p. 30.

⁴⁷Charles C. Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought (The Hague, 1976), p. 104. See also Hélène Carrère D'Encausse, "Unité prolétarienne et diversité nationale: Lénine et la théorie de l'autodétermination," Revue française de science politique 21 (April 1971), p. 230.

⁴⁸Quoted in Törnudd, p. 31

⁴⁹Goodman, op.cit., p. 31.

⁵⁰Quoted in Törnudd, p. 57.

⁵¹Soviet Foreign Policy, v.1, 1917-1945 eds. A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev (Moscow, 4th rev. ed, [1980] 1981), pp. 279-324. Point 1 of Litvinov's plan approved by the Politburo on December 20, 1933 gave consent for the USSR's adherence to the League of Nations. Further, "(2) The USSR had no objections to a regional treaty for mutual defence against German aggression, to be contracted with the League of Nations framework. (3) The USSR consents to Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland or several of the above, a cosignatories of such a treaty, provided Poland and France take part." (Ibid., p. 300)

⁵²Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-39 (New York, 1984), p. 20.

⁵³The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1945, eds. B. Ponomaryov, A. Gromyko, V. Khvostov (Moscow, 1969), pp. 306-07.

⁵⁴Quoted in Alvin Z. Rubenstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York, 2nd ed., 1966), pp. 137, 138.

⁵⁵Quoted in Törnudd, p. 85.

⁵⁶History of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 329.

⁵⁷Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present (New York, 1982), pp. 308, 324.

⁵⁸According to Soviet sources, the escape provision was inserted by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Eduard Benes. See Ibid., pp. 321-22. See also Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 (Ithaca and London, 1984), pp. 42-55; 97-98.

⁵⁹Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (London, 1962), p. 171.

⁶⁰Hochman, pp. 76, 142. See also Haslam, op.cit., pp. 230-2.

⁶¹Eden, The Reckoning, p. 335.

⁶²Eden, Ibid., p. 430. The guarantees included omitting Rumania from a Balkan confederation and Finland from a Scandanvian one (Ibid.). See Wheeler-Bennett, The Semblance of Peace, pp. 96-97.

⁶³See Nikolai Lebedev, The USSR in World Politics (Moscow, 1980), p. 107-08.

⁶⁴McNeill, pp. 327, 328. See also Woodward, pp. 42-43 and Wheeler-Bennett, p. 107.

⁶⁵Feis, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, p. 212.

⁶⁶FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, v.1, pp. 737. Subsequent page references cited in text. The quotes are based on minutes taken by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.

⁶⁷See Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 113-14 and Woodward, v.2, Chap. XXXIII, section v.

⁶⁸FRUS, op.cit., p. 757.

⁶⁹Woodward, pp. 252-54, 404. See Feis, op.cit., p. 213.

⁷⁰PRO FO 371/34464/C7012, June 20, 1943: Minute by G. Harrison. In the extract from the War Cabinet's conclusion, it was held that "the best chance of maintaining Austrian independence lay in its ultimate association with some form of Central or South East European Confederation." A main point in the discussion was "there was general agreement that we should aim at a Central European or Danubian Group centered on Vienna. Such a group should aim at combining the

economic stability of the larger units, with the considerable degree of freedom, in purely local affairs, of the smaller National or racial units into which Austria-Hungary had broken up at the end of the last war. The presentation of this conception would, however, call for great care if jealousies and susceptibilities were not to be aroused." (PRO FO 371/34465/C7012, June 16, 1943: "Extract from War Cabinet Conclusions," 16th June 1943).

⁷¹McNeill, p. 336.

⁷²Woodward, pp. 90-91.

⁷³Ibid., pp. 127, 130-32.

⁷⁴FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1944, I, pp. 438-42.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 439.

⁷⁶NA, Lot 60D 224: Box 167, ISO 270, "The Inter-American System and European Regional Arrangements," April 16, 1945.

CHAPTER IX

THE REGIONAL REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Between 1940 and 1943, the exiled governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia and, to some extent, Yugoslavia and Greece attempted to form regional confederations in eastern Europe. The attempt was the most historically noteworthy wartime initiative to create interstate regional groupings as the basis for postwar order in Europe. The initiatives were encouraged and to a degree sponsored by the British government. They foundered when the Soviets, with American acquiescence, opposed the plans in 1943. Their significance lies less in the fact of their failure than in the shift it marked in the thinking of eastern Europe's political representatives. In the decades prior to the 1919 Paris peace conference, political representatives were moved by ideas of nationalism to fight for national self-determination through sovereign statehood as the dominant political goals. During World War II, the political vocabulary was no longer ethnocentric and statist, marked rather by ideas of regional cooperation and the diminution of national sovereignties. Centripetal social and political forces seemed to have overtaken more than a century of

centrifugal tendencies. Understanding this change from a regional, non-nationalistic perspective provides a framework for understanding the diplomatic and nonstate war-time initiatives on behalf of regionalism and postwar order in eastern Europe.

Cultural and Political Dynamics in Pre-War Eastern Europe

After the turn of the 20th century, eastern Europe became the most politically unstable and volatile region on the continent.¹ Southeastern Europe in particular acquired a reputation as the "powderkeg of Europe." With the help of a general war, political nationalism, as the dominant political force in the region, broke up the large multinational empires that had ruled over dozens of peoples and cultures for centuries. The supranational empires were perceived as antiquated forms of political organization by a rising élite of national liberals shaped by modern western, in particular, French republican ideas of politics and national development.

For all their anachronisms (and cooptations of western bourgeois culture), the central and east European empires left distinct marks on the political cultures of the Baltic, Danubian, and Balkan peoples. The German/Protestant Hohenzollern and Russian/Orthodox Romanov empires reigned over a Baltic area of Eurasian coastal plains that later comprised the postwar states of Poland, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), and peripherally, Finland. Geographically, the region is dominated by the Vistulan

basin, which drains the Polish plains into the Baltic Sea. The Austrian/Catholic House of Habsburg, referred to as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1867 and arguably the only indigenous imperial polity in east central Europe, ruled in the Danubian basin, formed by the Alps and Carpathian ranges. Its successor states included Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and parts of Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Geographically, the Danubian region separates the Vistulan basin and the Balkan ranges in the south. Politically, the Danubian monarchy's frontier had by 1914 extended into both the Baltic region and, in particular, the Balkans to encompass a polity of 52 million people comprising more than a score of nationalities and ethnic groups spread over a 677,000 square kilometer area.² The Habsburg gains made in southeastern Europe since the 19th century were at the expense of the third, or Turkish/Muslim Ottoman empire, from which emerged the sovereign states of Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and parts of Yugoslavia and Rumania.

These geographic and pre-World War I political divisions belied an otherwise complex ethno-linguistic and cultural map of human settlements in eastern Europe. While some coherence is gained by dividing eastern Europe into these natural and political sub-regions, "all too often in this part of Europe local variations mock geographical generalization and force historical judgement into qualifying parenthesis."³ As Walter Kolarz remarked in 1946, "there are, as yet, no clear groupings of peoples moving forward towards larger coherent units such as have

developed in the West. Everywhere there is intermingling of diverse peoples, not only two but even three or four such peoples being frequently pressed together in a narrow area."⁴ The Danube basin may well be said, as some Magyar historians have in particular claimed, to divide the north and south Slavs with a band of predominantly non-Slavic cultures, notably the Austro-Germans, Hungarians, and Rumanians. In reality, the Danubian region was also part of a complex zone of intermixed populations where Slavs and non-Slavs have intermingled, fought, and coexisted since the 7th or 8th century A.D.⁵

Religious traditions constituted another layer of complexity. The dominant western Latin and eastern Orthodox traditions met in eastern Europe. But these major religious cultures also contended with significant Protestant, Islamic, and Jewish settlements, not to mention pre-Christian or half-pagan, and half-Christian ideas and rites. Migrating tribes from the east and colonial settlers from the west contributed to the mosaic. The pre-World War II ethnocultural mosaic included: Catholic Austro-Germans in Austria and elsewhere; Lutheran German minorities in non-German lands; Catholic and some Protestant Balts (Lithuanians, Latvians); Catholic Slavs (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croatians, Slovenes); Protestant Slavs (Czechs); Orthodox Slavs (Serbians, Bulgarians, Ruthenians, Macedonians, Ukrainians, Belorussians); Orthodox Latins, or Uniates, in Rumania; Catholic, Calvinist, and Unitarian Finno-Ugrian Magyars, Szeklers, and Csangos in Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, and Serbia; Greek Orthodox in Greece and

parts of Macedonia; Moslem and Christian Slavs in Bosnia and Macedonia; Moslem and Christian Albanians in Albania and Kosovo, Yugoslavia; assimilated and unassimilated Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews; unassimilated gypsies; a host of smaller ethnic groupings such as the Chicks in Slovenia; the Slavic Gorales, Horaks, Zahoraks, Wends, Carpatho-Ukrainians, and Haunaks dispersed in the Czecho-Slovak regions; and Kutzo-Vlachs, or hellenized Macedonians, in Rumania among others.

This pattern of human settlement did not speak in favor of the western form of nation statehood. Rather, it favored large territorial political units such as the multinational and supranational imperial polities of the pre-World War I era. "Instead of a gradual fusion of peoples into larger nations and Nation States," Kolarz argued, "there appeared in the East various forms of federal organization by means of which smaller groups, especially, sought to gain protection. Instead of the Nation State there appeared the composite Territorial State."⁶ Following World War I, however, the west European "one-nation, one-state" principle of political organization (which, ironically, was under attack by significant regionalist movements in France and Spain at the time), was given historical sanction in eastern Europe as the basis of the postwar settlement. The supranational and territorial ordering principle of the imperial polities (whether their regimes were autocratic, authoritarian, or liberal) gave way to ethnocentric states that were administratively centralistic and economically

autarchic. As Czech statesman Jan Palacky envisaged in 1848, when he declared that Austria (i.e., the Hapsburg Empire) would have to be created if it did not exist, the consequences of the national étatisme in a zone of mixed populations proved economically, politically, and culturally disastrous.

The belt of independent states established by the allies in 1919 was designed in part to function as a regional buffer, or cordon sanitaire, between a bolshevized Russia and western Europe. But the experiment proved an exercise in political fragmentation that resulted in an economic and political vacuum filled by German power in the 1930s. The Nazis came to refer to post-1919 eastern Europe as the "devil's belt" (Teufelsgürtel) and viewed the region to their east as their "space of destiny" (Schicksalsraum) or "cultural sphere" (Kulturboden). The consequences of the fragmentation and, after 1933, German Gleichschaltung in Danubian Europe was summarized as follows by economic historian Friedrich Hertz:

The disruption of the former Empire, and the inability of the new states to co-operate, led to terrible mass unemployment, to the impoverishment of wide sections of the people and the rise of the spirit of violence and cynical disregard for the rights of others. Hitler cleverly exploited this opportunity. When trade between the Danubian States had shrunk to a minimum, Germany offered to take large amounts of their production on favorable terms in exchange for her goods. This exchange was greatly welcomed by the States concerned, and for a time was certainly a considerable advantage. Later on, however, the cloven hoof became visible. . . . The predominant political passions worked in the same direction as the economic distress. The Peace Treaties had brought no appeasement to the Danubian area, but had greatly aggravated national and social hatred. It was the lack of any real solution of the Danubian problem which paved the way for Hitler, and

it is very questionable whether there would ever have been a Second World War if the community of Danubian nations had been maintained and reformed instead of destroyed.

The 1919 peace settlement satisfied the aspirations of several dominant nationalities, notably the Poles, Czechs, Serbs, and Rumanians. But it would be more precise to argue that the real winners were the nationalistic middle class élites who acquired power in all the successor states. Hugh Seton-Watson, William McNeill, and others have claimed that nation statehood in eastern Europe essentially satisfied the aspirations of the small urban-based east European intelligentsias of the dominant nationalities.⁸ Under their rule, the smaller nationalities and ethnic groups in their jurisdictions were involuntarily relegated to second-class, or "minority," status. The new power holders came to regard them as potential (and actual) forces of irredentism that threatened their power. Of some 86 million people that comprised the succession states in 1920, more than one-third were classified as minorities.⁹ Invariably, the dominant nationalities sought to homogenize their states through centralization measures that included forced assimilation and population exchanges, not to mention the fratricidal disputes, skirmishes, and wars that were a commonplace particularly in the early interwar years.¹⁰

At the same time, the division of east European society into majority and minority nationalities overlooked the reality that the "people" of the dominant nationalities were largely peasants who on the whole did not share their leaders' nationalistic ideas and centralistic policies.

As the cultural bearers of their nations, peasants never saw an inherent need to identify their ethnicity with separate statehood. Eric Hula demystified the alleged nationalism of peasants:

The nationalism of peasants is essentially of a passive nature. To be sure, students of the problem agree that peasants react vigorously against an policy of national discrimination unfavorable to them, and are therefore difficult to denationalize, more difficult than the inhabitants of the cities; in this sense the peasants are, indeed, the backbone of the national community. But they have not been eager to strive for national statehood. Their attitude belies, as it were, the very philosophy which has inspired the principle of nationalities, by disproving its basic assumption that the existence and integrity of a national group are dependent on its political sovereignty.¹¹

In spite or because of the ensuing atmosphere of institutionalized divisiveness, numerous proposals and plans for reform of the 1919 Paris peace formula for eastern Europe were devised by individuals, groups, and states inside and outside the region during the interwar period.¹² For the division of central and eastern Europe was, as David Mitrany suggested in 1936, "as much a challenge for co-operation as an obstacle to it."¹³ During World War II, Europe's "shatter zone" became a special area of concern for postwar policy planners. The allied wartime plans for regional organization in eastern Europe, including those of east European governments-in-exile, form the bulk of this chapter. The chapter concludes with a presentation of ideas and plans by nonstate social forces in the region.

The British Initiatives

Encouraged by its own research and Prime Minister

Churchill, the Foreign Office actively promoted the idea of regional reorganization along federal or confederal lines in eastern Europe.¹⁴ Its semi-official Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) research unit in Balliol College, which was directed by Arnold Toynbee and included a number of historians such as C.A. Macartney, produced lengthy memoranda recommending a single unit or sub-regional groupings in eastern Europe. Some memoranda speculated on the feasibility of a reconstituted Habsburg Monarchy, an idea that was privately endorsed by Churchill.¹⁵ Whatever the form of government, the Foreign Office's researchers assumed that if British strategy did

not depart widely from the general lines which it has pursued very consistently...for centuries..., then no future British Government will want to see either Germany or Russia overwhelmingly strong, or in sole possession of the key points of Eastern Europe, and in particular, of the Straits. Hence it follows that some buffer state, or combination¹⁶ of states, between the two giants is desirable.

In a September 1943 memorandum of the Foreign Office Research Department (FRPS, FRPS's successor), four possible futures for eastern Europe as viewed from British and world interests were considered.¹⁷ The first two options of hegemonial suzerainty or domination by Germany or Russia were rejected as unacceptable to British, world, and east European interests. While German control was no longer a realistic postwar prospect, the author suggested that German control provided some "valuable work in rationalising and modernising old forms" that could be appropriated by the allies (3). The option of Soviet hegemony over eastern Europe would have a similar leveling effect on the region

but would also "in the long run prove intolerable to the peoples as a whole" (Ibid.).

The third and fourth options outlined an eastern Europe organized into one or several (North and South; Baltic-Vistulan, Danubian, Balkan) regional units. The third, or "selective," organization of the region mandated the major allies to support a system of "selected" dominant nations, as represented by the existing governments-in-exile and their regional unification efforts (see below), relying on them to maintain regional peace and security. But this form of interstate regionalism based on a few leading states would not solve the problem of "minority" representation. Consequently, the unrepresented nations and ethnic groupings would "turn for help sooner or later, to Germany or Russia, as the case may be," resulting again in "a division of spheres between them..." (6).

The fourth, or "comprehensive," scenario was the most creative and hopeful. It meant finding ways to organize the region "on the common interests of all the people inhabiting the area" (6). As a start, it meant granting the "greatest possible equality of treatment" (7). The memorandum's author, believed to be C.A. Macartney, suggested three "fields" of action to achieve this end. The "first field" of application lay in the more equitable revision of existing (or pre-1938) frontiers. After ethnic frontiers were redrawn, exchanges of populations could take place to further reduce the problem of disaffected minorities. This approach was an attempt to use the conceptual categories of

the modern state, among them, strictly defined borders, on the recalcitrant ethno-cultural realities of eastern Europe. But the indigenous pattern of human settlement in eastern Europe defied the prevailing logic of political organization based on the nation state ideal of ethnic homogeneity. The author acknowledged this problem -- "great arguments against the ethnic frontier" existed -- and advocated simultaneous measures that "would make the nation-states thus created in fact if not in name into parts of a larger, multination organization" (7a). In a "second field" of action, economic measures organized along regional-functional lines would be introduced. The measures included free border traffic, common institutions for economic planning, joint functional agencies such as marketing boards, traffic commissions, power grids, and river regulatory boards that would "make the frontier unimportant, or even non-existent as an economic factor" (8-9). The "third field" dealt with the strategic factor. British policy mandated a unified bloc that would serve as a buffer between Germany and Russia. The strategic argument for such a bloc was based on the at once obvious and novel argument that

it was the weakness and not the strength of Eastern Europe which exposed Russia to attack in 1940. That attack came, not from Eastern Europe but from Germany, and it could not have come had Eastern Europe been united. ...Ultimate safety for all lies in making of Eastern Europe a thing which both Germany and Russia regard as a contributing factor towards their own security and prosperity (11).

Once created, the "internal strategic lines" (i.e., state boundaries) of such a regional grouping would become "irrelevant" (9).

Britain's strategic interest in an independent and unified eastern Europe was outlined in a June 1942 Foreign Office policy memorandum by Deputy Under Secretary of State Orme G. Sargent.¹⁸ Sargent struck the theme of the vulnerability of small states organized on "ethnographical grounds, without reference to the strategical and economic factors" that are essential to their security. A confederation of states with some executive machinery for a common defense, a custom's union and common currency, and a common foreign policy was seen as necessary. To this end, "the constituent units should abandon as far as possible the old conception of national sovereignty and agree to setting up some system of collective sovereignty." New and larger sovereign units where the nationality principle was not the state building factor was the goal. Sargent proposed dividing eastern Europe into northern and southern regional groupings of states, "a Central European and a Southeast European confederation." The former included Poland (with any part of the Baltic states not absorbed by Russia and with or without east Prussia), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and possibly Austria. The Southeast European confederation would include all the Balkan states. This north-south configuration corresponded to the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav agreements for union signed by their respective governments-in-exile in January 1942, an outcome which the Foreign Office played no small part in bringing about.

The Union Attempts by the East European Governments-in-Exile

The war years in England and the United States were rife with official and private activities for the postwar reorganization of eastern Europe in one regionalist form or another.¹⁹ The most important among them were the unification attempts between 1940 and 1943 of the London-based Polish and Czechoslovak exile governments, followed by the Greek and Yugoslav governments. Although faced with internal dissensions and external pressures that eventually quashed their efforts, the four governments-in-exile negotiated and in January 1942 signed agreements for regional unions as a basis for postwar order in eastern Europe.²⁰

The upheaval of the war broke apart entrenched patterns of political behavior including peacetime rules of conduct between states and other political actors. This flux helped erase traditional obstacles, notably among them frontier disputes, to cooperation. A significant aspect of the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations was the intent on both sides to put frontier questions aside, at least for the time being. In a February 25, 1941 letter to Polish General Wladyslaw Sikorski, President Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia agreed "to create in Central Europe a new international political organism, whose structure we shall discuss now, irrespective of what the final boundaries of our countries will be."²¹ The war provided the allied states, large and small, with new challenges and opportunities to restructure eastern Europe. Following a testy inter-war period marked by

diverging foreign policy interests and the Teschen border dispute, the first signs of Polish-Czechoslovak rapprochement occurred in the months following the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The process began with informal discussions between self-exiled President Benes and the leader of the new Polish government in France, Sikorski. The British government played a role in initiating this process. In October 1939, the British told the Polish Foreign Minister August Zaleski that "Poland would be too weak to keep the balance between Germany and Russia. Only a confederation based on a closely knit Polish-Czechoslovak federation could do it."²² In a December 20, 1939 foreign policy statement, the independent-minded and flamboyant Sikorski announced Poland's commitment to the "creation of a politically solid bloc of Slav states extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic."²³

Benes, a successful if wily statesman who was seeking allied recognition of a Czechoslovak provisional government, competed in this period with a rival Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris headed by former Prime Minister Milan Hodza. A Protestant Slovak and head of the Peasant Party, Hodza was a steadier interwar advocate of central European cooperation. While Prime Minister between 1935 and 1938, he actively lobbied for a phased regional economic integration plan for Danubian Europe guaranteed by England and France through preferential tariff agreements followed by a customs union and an economic union with common currency.²⁴ Whether acting out of conviction, opportunity, or a mixture of both, Benes outlined his thinking on the structure of postwar

eastern Europe in a 10-page memorandum which he submitted in March 1940 to visiting Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles in London. He reported that "a possible federal organization in Central Europe is being spoken of" and that as Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia for 17 years, he had "attempted to prepare the progressive building up of a federal Central Europe, i.e., of a close economic and political collaboration between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria and Hungary, on the basis of some kind of federation. Czechoslovakia therefore still accepts this principle today" (emphasis in original).²⁵

When the Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia was finally established in London under Benes' leadership after the June 1940 fall of France, Polish-Czechoslovak exchanges on the subject of union intensified under approving British eyes. The starting point of negotiations toward confederation may be said to have begun with Benes' November 1, 1940 letter to Sikorski, in which he expressed,

I am of the opinion that neither Poland nor Czechoslovakia will be able to continue living separately from one another as was the case after the war of 1914. ...The Poles and Czechoslovaks will come out of this war rather weakened and, situated as they are between Germany and Russia, it will be their imperative task, imposed by reasons both political and economic, at least to try to create in Central Europe a bloc composed at first of their two countries and sufficiently strong to give their two peoples²⁶ a minimum security (emphasis in original).

While emphasizing the need for a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union, an objective that was not a high concern for the Poles, Benes proposed a confederation that for the most part retained the sovereignties and institutions of the two

countries intact. Within this formula of interstate regionalism, he favored the restriction of economic sovereignty in the interest of "a common commercial policy, and a transport, customs and currency union." He also proposed common organs in a 1) Council led by the ministers of government whose "resolutions (would) be approved and carried out by both governments" and in which a common foreign policy would be conducted while also retaining separate diplomatic representatives; 2) a common General Staff with standardization of armaments, equipment, and war production while maintaining the General Staffs of each country; 3) a joint Parliamentary Committee, "whose decisions (would) be submitted for approval to each parliament;" and 4) an Economic and Trade Council (40).

General Sikorski responded in a December 3 letter by raising the ante. He called for a higher degree of political integration and argued for a union that was independent of but not unfriendly toward the Soviet Union. Whereas Benes' thinking was oriented toward a loose confederation with links to the Soviet Union, Sikorski favored an independent and western-oriented federation between the two countries. As he stated in a December 7, 1942 memorandum to the State Department, the east European "'bloc' would not have any aggressive designs against Russia. On the contrary, it would serve as a natural shield against any possible recurrence of German aggression. The central 'bloc' would also maintain correct neighborly relations with a disarmed Germany" (87)

In spite of this important difference of emphasis

between the two leaders, both governments issued a "Joint Declaration of the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments Favoring Closer Political and Economic Association" in London on November 11, 1940. They announced their "closing once and for all the period of past recriminations and disputes" and pledged "to enter as independent and sovereign states into a closer political and economic association which would become the basis of a new order in Central Europe and a guarantee of its stability." Other east European states were invited to join the process.

The declaration was welcomed by Churchill in the House of Commons on November 26 and became the basis for subsequent negotiations in 1941 by a Czechoslovak-Polish Coordinating Committee. This Committee supervised two groups of mixed Polish-Czechoslovak commissions. The first, comprised of politico-judicial, economic-financial, social policy, military, and cultural commissions, was devoted to mapping out the proposed union, while the second, consisting of foreign affairs, military, and propaganda commissions, dealt with current affairs. The negotiations proceeded slowly, hampered largely by differences between Benes and Sikorski on the need for gaining Soviet approval. Nonetheless, the Czechoslovak-Polish Coordinating Committee met in early November 1941 to consider the Polish draft of the "constitutional act" of union (63f.). The Polish plan called for a federation that constituted a new political unit where economic and other levels of integration depended on the degree of political integration. Foreign affairs were almost completely merged. While the member states had the

right to conclude some treaties separately, they had to be negotiated through the union. Member states were required to approve treaties dealing with agreements with third powers as well as changes in state boundaries. Integration of defense affairs was not as far-reaching. A joint secretary (ministry) and chief of staff had supreme command over union forces in time of war, but national ministries retained control over their armies though in accordance with general union directives. The economics secretary directed foreign economic policy, coordinated the economic and social policies of the member states, and administered those affairs declared common to the union.

The Czechoslovak counterproposals were less ambitious. The cautious Czechs feared being dwarfed by Poland in any agreement as well as incurring the wrath of the Soviet Union. Whereas the Poles wanted the mixed commissions to assume an important role in the negotiations, the Czechs limited their freedom of action and held that any final decision could only be made after the war.²⁷ The Czechs favored an intergovernmental association in a confederation where member states retained their sovereignty except in designated areas in foreign, defense, and economic affairs where joint policies would merely be "coordinated." In place of integrated ministries, they proposed coordinating councils whose resolutions required adoption and implementation by the member states. It was the less ambitious Czechoslovak proposals which were adopted as the basis for the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement signed in London

January 23, 1942. The 14-article non-binding agreement provided for cooperation in foreign policy, defense, economic and financial matters, as well as social and communications policy. It envisaged a custom's union and the accession of other east European states. Foreign Secretary Eden welcomed the agreement in the House of Commons "as marking a further important stage in the development of closer relations between these two Allies."²⁸

Spurred in part by the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations, the royal Greek and Yugoslav governments-in-exile also began to discuss a closer union in the Balkans. The idea of Balkan unity, which had a history as long as the idea of Europe, acquired tentative institutional form with the inter-war establishment of the Balkan Conference and, in 1934, the Balkan Entente between Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.²⁸ While designed primarily to maintain the territorial status quo in the Balkans, the Entente also represented an attempt to close regional ranks in the face of great power encroachment. The 1940 and 1941 occupation and dismemberment of three of the four states by Germany and Russia underscored both the futility of and justification for regional security efforts in eastern Europe. Under the motto of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples," the Greek and Yugoslav governments signed an agreement on January 15, 1942 for "the Constitution of a Balkan Union."³⁰ The agreement, signed at the Foreign Office in the presence of Foreign Secretary Eden, went beyond both the 1934 Entente and the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation agreement in outlining stronger common institutions, but in

its basic outline it did not differ substantially from them as an example of interstate regionalism. It provided for the establishment of permanent organs with specific tasks for political, economic and financial, and military affairs, with a fourth organ serving as a secretariat for these activities.

The so-called Political Organ of the proposed Balkan union was composed of the foreign ministers of the member states. It would convene at regular intervals to coordinate the foreign policies of the member states, prepare projects for agreements of conciliation and arbitration, and coordinate through media organs "the reciprocal rapprochement of public opinion" in the member states. The purpose of the Economic and Financial Organ was to coordinate trade and tariff policy toward the formation of a custom's union, elaborate a common economic plan and Balkan monetary union, and improve inter-Balkan communications structures. The Military Organ was charged with adopting a common defense plan "to defend the European frontiers" of the union and in general coordinate the military establishments of the member states. Article X of the 11-article agreement declared that the pact represented the foundation for a wider Balkan union, where the parties "envisage(d) ... the future adhesion to this agreement of other Balkan states ruled by governments freely and legally constituted."

Both the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav agreements were conceived by their framers in the context of

a wider eastern European and all-European postwar federative framework. King Peter of Yugoslavia stated upon signing the Greek-Yugoslav agreement that the two unions, which were conceived along similar lines, would create, "together with a single supreme organ, a great organization which would give serious guarantees for the peace and prosperity of Europe." He said a union in eastern Europe would not "attain its full significance unless the rest of Europe is organized in such a way as to oppose the order by which Hitler and Nazis wished to impose upon Europe their cruel domination... ." Similarly, Benes announced on January 19 that "both the Yugoslav-Greek and Czechoslovak-Polish pacts form a basis for wider agreement and complete organization of Central and Southeastern Europe."³¹

In the January 1942 issue of Foreign Affairs, Benes placed the east European union within a larger European federal setting. Anticipating Churchill's ideas, he argued for a postwar order in Europe based "upon the balance of forces between a number of large political units."³² Europe was to be transformed from a skelter of large, medium, and small states into seven or eight political units of approximately equal size and economic and political strength. These units included Western Europe, whose nucleus was France and England, pre-1938 Germany as a decentralized confederation, Italy, Central Europe (with the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation as its core); Balkan Europe, consisting of a confederation between Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, possibly Rumania, with Bulgaria obliged to join after the war; Soviet Russia, which he said had to "take

part in the organization of Europe and in the future cooperation of the new European blocs;" and a Scandinavian union. In southwestern Europe, Portugal and Spain would decide on their future status (228-29). Benes predicted that the Czechoslovak-Polish confederation, which could "already be considered and accomplished fact," and the Greek-Yugoslva union would consolidate into a single central European regional confederation (228, 234-35).

Benes' conception of postwar Europe was based on an interstate regionalism that did not extend the cooperative principle implied in regionalism to the individual states themselves. The sovereign national state and its appurtenances remained a sacred frame of reference. He regarded "minorities," for example as "a real thorn in the side of individual nations" and that "before we begin to define the rights of minorities we must define the rights of majorities and the obligations of minorities" (235, 237). He advocated frontier adjustments, population transfers, and the granting of individual rights rather than ethnic rights as possible solutions to the minority problem (238-239). In language not removed from French administrative centralism, he declared that "the common will must find expression in a united organization (regime)" (240). He also stated he was only prepared to accept those limitations on the state's sovereignty in economic and political affairs "which are accepted by other states" (239).

In spite of Benes' ambivalences, the agreements of January 1942 represented a chrysalis of thought and action

by state actors seeking to combine their political units into larger regional entities. Piotr Wandycz stated the agreements were signs of a "growing trend in favor of regional organization in East-Central Europe."³³ The trend was not confined to state actors living in exile in the West, but was also sustained by transnational social forces inside as well as outside eastern Europe. Before turning to these movements, we examine the major power moves by the Soviet Union, with United States and, in the end, British acquiescence to eviscerate this trend.

The Soviet Veto and Anglo-American Acquiescence

As we have noted above, the adhesion of the United States and Soviet Union into the "grand alliance" on January 1, 1942 radically changed the power configuration of the anti-Axis coalition by diminishing the power and prestige of the lesser allies, Britain included. Prior to that date and after the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, the Soviet attitude toward the unification attempts of the east European governments-in-exile was one of benign neglect if not grudging support. In December 1941, Stalin told Eden in Moscow that the Soviet Union "would have no objection if some European countries wished to federate."³⁴ Benes received similar assurances from his envoy in Moscow, Zdenek Fierlinger, and Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky.³⁵

After February 1942, when Fierlinger privately informed Benes of the first sign of Soviet displeasure with the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations, the Soviet Union began a

campaign, if marked by confusing signals, to undermine the diplomatic efforts on behalf of east European unification. The Soviets accomplished this by exploiting the differences between Benes and Sikorski as well as Czech fears of antagonizing the Soviet Union; weakening the provisional Polish government through criticism, territorial demands, and finally withdrawal of diplomatic recognition in April 1943 (followed by the establishment of an alternative Polish government in Moscow); and influencing western public opinion against the idea of a "reactionary federation" that would serve as an anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire. The Soviet position and strategy was predicted in a May 12, 1942 minute by Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary William Strang:

It will not be long, I think, before Dr. Benes is called upon by the Russians to choose between Russia and Poland: in other words, to conclude a treaty with Russia which will make any Polish-Czechoslovak federal scheme empty of meaning, or even stand in the way of its conclusion. The Russians certainly intend to isolate and encircle Poland and to prevent the formation of a Baltic-Adriatic bloc, based on Poland in the north.³⁶

The Soviet position against the confederation plans of the exiled governments centered on the argument that the regional groupings were conceived as a cordon sanitaire directed against the Soviet Union. The Soviets also held that the plans, promoted by "reactionary" exile politicians living in the West, did not necessarily reflect the wishes of the peoples. Referring to the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav agreements and their possible extension to other central and east European countries, Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov told British ambassador Clark Kerr in Moscow on June 7, 1943 that "the Soviet government does not

find it appropriate to engage in the creation of such a federation and finds the inclusion of Hungary and Austria in this (federation) equally impractical."³⁷ In the same month, the trade union organ The War and the Working Class published an article critical of the east European union plans. Broadcast over Radio Moscow to the United Kingdom on July 28, the article denounced "anti-democratic" and "semi-fascist" elements of "bankrupt political groups in Britain, the isolationists and compromise politicians in the United States," and émigré groups of "Poland, Hungary, Austria and others" who draw up "plans for the reconstruction of Europe hostile to the Soviet Union." The last paragraph concluded with a veiled threat in suggesting that

plans for the establishment of an East European Federation hostile to the Soviet Union can be built up, but only if the renunciation of the necessity for friendship and collaboration between the USSR and the Allies in the post-war period be taken as the starting point and the only if the Anglo-Soviet Treaty be renounced. Honest supporters of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty cannot uphold post-war plans hostile to the Soviet Union and Britain³⁸ or hostile to even one of those countries.

The Soviet position effectively obliged Britain and to an extent the United States to choose between their east European allies and important Grand Coalition ally. The choice was less agonizing for the Americans, who provided lip-service to the idea of cooperation among east European countries but never endorsed the Polish-Czechoslovak or Greek-Yugoslav plans. In a January 1943 visit to Washington, Sikorski solicited a letter of support from Roosevelt that merely stated: "the United States Government desires to

encourage the countries of Eastern Europe to continue to make careful studies of their mutual problems to determine points of agreement and disagreement in order that they may be in a position to present a plan under which lasting relationships would be assured."³⁹ Roosevelt's actual thoughts were revealed in a note to Under-Secretary of State Welles January 1942, the month when both the Grand Coalition and the east European unification treaties were signed: "I think Sikorski should be definitely discouraged on this proposition. This is no time to talk about the post-war position of small nations and it would cause serious trouble with Russia."⁴⁰

As we have seen, Roosevelt was at this time still attached to his "Four Policemen" formula which saw the major powers (including China) as the guarantors of postwar peace and security in a world-wide organization also structured on a regional basis. This conflicted with the views of Secretary of State Hull, who rejected anything approaching regional organization based on the major powers. When the prospect of Soviet hegemony in eastern Europe emerged in 1943, the State Department studied the idea of a reciprocal hegemonial regionalism that recognized Soviet security interests in eastern Europe as parallel to American interests in the western hemisphere. In a February 4, 1944 meeting of the Department's Sub-Committee on European Organization, it was acknowledged that Secretary Hull's internationalism "excluded the development of zones of influence and the concept of balance of power."⁴¹ Nonetheless, as committee member Isaiah Bowman stated, "the

United States might not like to acquiesce in a Soviet 'Monroe Doctrine' for eastern Europe, but Cuba and the Panama Canal might always be pointed out as analogous instances of legitimate concern for national security" (22-23). The problem was one of reconciling legitimate concerns for security with the internationalist principles of the Atlantic Charter. Another committee member, Jacob Viner, felt that "the task of achieving a world order of the kind at present envisaged in this country was almost an impossible one in view of the existence of three great powers" (23). He submitted that it should be recognized that, "as of now, each great power, owing to propinquity or to affinity, stood in loco parentis to a group of other smaller states, a relationship which should imply both duties and responsibilities in both directions" (24). Hegemonial regionalism would be an unavoidable reality of the postwar world.

British support for the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation attempt ultimately foundered on the so-called Polish question, in particular major power displeasure with Sikorski's leadership. Churchill stated that "the attitude of Russia to Poland lay at the roots of our early relations with the Soviets."⁴² The Prime Minister's open support in 1940 for the Polish-Czechoslovak declaration waned with the formation of the Grand Alliance and the need he perceived for the Polish government in London to come to terms with the Soviet Union. General Sikorski's plan for an independent eastern Europe that did not depend on the sanction and good-

will of the Soviet Union caused concern in Britain as well as the United States. The British supported the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav initiatives as late as the fall of 1942. On September 26, 1942, Foreign Secretary Eden advised a public audience that

small states ... are also alive to the need of collaboration among themselves. There are Polish-Czech and Greek-Yugoslav agreements, both of which call for and express a sense of unity. We shall continue to foster such agreements and encourage smaller states to weld themselves into larger, though not exclusive, groupings. Thus they will be better able in collaboration with the great powers to play a part in maintaining peace.⁴³

By early 1943, the British dropped references to the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav agreements and gradually distanced themselves from Sikorski while still favoring regional integration in eastern Europe. In his February 2, 1943 "Morning Thoughts" on postwar security to President Roosevelt, Churchill introduced his idea for a European-wide organization composed of larger states and sub-regional units of confederated smaller states. For him the "need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc and a Balkan bloc appear(ed) to be obvious."⁴⁴ In the spring, as Soviet-Polish relations reached the breaking point, the British became partial to President Benes' idea of a tripartite Polish-Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement while simultaneously promoting the Danubian and Balkan regional confederations. Churchill again stressed in his March 21, 1943 radio speech the importance of creating a European regional council represented by "great states and groups of states" organized into confederations.⁴⁵ In the meantime, Eden, in his March 14, 1943 dinner meeting in Washington

with President Roosevelt and Presidential advisor Harry Hopkins, complained of what he thought were Sikorski's unrealistic ambitions. As recounted by Hopkins, "Eden said Sikorski was forever meeting with the small states of the Balkans promoting Polish ambitions; that all this was known to the Russians and Eden thinks Sikorski is doing far more harm for Poland than good. Poland has very large ambitions after the war and Eden says that privately they say that Russia will be so weakened and Germany crushed that Poland will emerge as the most powerful state in that part of the world. Eden thinks this is completely unrealistic."⁴⁶

Churchill again raised the idea of Balkan, Danubian, Scandinavian confederations in his May 22 Washington meeting with American leaders where he outlined his views on the structure of the postwar world organization. He favored "a Danubian Federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire."⁴⁷ But mindful of the Soviet Union's diplomatic break with the Polish government in April, he seemed to be pulling the British rug from the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement in advising that "Poland and Czechoslovakia should stand together in friendly relations with Russia,"⁴⁸ a view advanced at this time by President Benes. But the tripartite formula, as Wandycz has argued, effectively meant "abandoning confederation of East-Central Europe based on the Czechoslovak-Polish and the Greek-Yugoslav agreements and independent of either of the big neighbors."⁴⁹ Moreover, a treaty joining two small states

with a major power meant the "effective limitation of the Czechoslovak and Polish freedom of action -- which was precisely what the original confederation was meant to preserve and increase."⁵⁰

The issue of regional groupings in eastern Europe came to a head at the October 1943 Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference. At Churchill's behest, Eden placed three items on the 17-point conference agenda whose acceptance would have altered the postwar structure of central and eastern Europe. Churchill sought to block the prospect of Soviet hegemony in eastern Europe by promoting interstate regionalism in the form of an all-European postwar structure in general and voluntary confederations in eastern Europe and elsewhere in particular. Viewed from a Soviet perspective, Britain, "aware that she would be much to weak to face the Soviet Union, ...decided to align Europe against it. The first stage of this alignment was to be the setting up of a series of federations and blocs, and the second -- the formation of a British-dominated European Council to head these federations."⁵¹

The battle for eastern Europe between Britain and the Soviet Union was no contest. At the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, Britain hoped to block the signing of the impending Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty on grounds that the May 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty asked both governments to "avoid entering into any commitments or agreements with other European countries allied with them" pending the peace settlement.⁵² She attempted to accomplish this by placing the "Question of Agreement between the Major and Minor

Allies on Post-war Questions" as an item on the agenda. In the "exchange of views" which took place on this item on October 24, Molotov "could not understand why the British should have any objection to a treaty ... between two countries with a common frontier for the immediate security" (626). At the conclusion of a brief exchange, the minutes noted that Eden "had no objection to the conclusion of a Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty" (752). The issue regarding the "Question of Joint Responsibility for Europe as Against Aeparate Areas of Responsibility," was covered in in the previous chapter. The "exchange of views" on this item and another concerning the "Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan Countries Including the Question of Cconfederation" took place on October 26. Regarding the latter, Molotov read a prepared statement dismissing the confederation plans as untimely impositions of "émigré governments" who were out of touch with the people and reminiscent of the interwar "cordons sanitaires" policy directed against the Soviet Union. While not foreclosing the possibility of small state cooperation after the war, the Soviet government considered the "restoration of their independence and sovereignty as one of the most important tasks in the post-war arrangement of Europe and in the creation of a lasting peace" (639, 762). Apart from protesting that Britain was not interested in creating a cordons sanitaires, Eden did not press the matter, stating merely that "there was great force in Mr. Molotov's argument..." (639). Secretary of State Hull's position was based on the need to adopt "a broad set of

principles capable of world-wide application" before considering separate and specific questions such as the British proposals (638). He stated that the United States government upheld the right of small nations to cooperate "provided such measures did not affect the larger questions of peace and security" (639). Molotov concluded the discussion by understanding from the statements of Hull and Eden that his position "had met with no objection" (639).

The contest between independent interstate regional groupings vs. hegemonial regionalism in eastern Europe was effectively settled with the December 12, 1943 signature in Moscow of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance. The Soviets justified the treaty on the need to contain Germany "and to set up an effective system of cooperation to guarantee the security of Eastern Europe."⁵³ The treaty was seen as an example of "establishing a basis for future relations between a Great Power and a small State, prov(ing) the possibility of the participation of the small countries of Europe in creating a system of general security, without the help of artificial and insolvent associations such as so-called Federations, etc."⁵⁴ According to Piotr Wandycz, the Moscow treaty also "sounded the requiem for a free East-Central European system."⁵⁵

The Role of Transnational Socio-cultural Forces

The wartime trend toward regional integration in eastern Europe was not limited to a contest between state actors vying for interstate or hegemonial alternatives.

Transnational socio-cultural forces, or non-state actors representing mainly peasant (agrarian) but also worker (social democratic, non-Muscovite socialist), neo-liberal (bourgeois radical), monarchist (legitimist) interests played a part in the east European esistance movements and exile/émigré activities in New York, London, and elsewhere.⁵⁶

Following World War I, peasant and to some extent workers' movements, activated by the tumults of war, revolution, and democracy, surfaced in eastern Europe to develop a socially-oriented opposition to the westernized national-liberal or national-conservative regimes.⁵⁷ Although there were deep-seated differences between the various movements, they shared a distaste for the social and political values of bourgeois nationalism and a preference for indigenous, federative principles of political organization. In the Balkans, as indeed in other parts of the region, "federation constituted a fundamental and integral part of their program and philosophy."⁵⁸ By the 1930s, these movements had been suppressed or split into fascist (pro-German), communist (pro-Soviet), or other opposition groups. In that decade, regional unification efforts were conducted primarily by neo-liberals operating within the state-based system who sought to achieve their ends by "persuasion and education rather than by radical social change."⁵⁹

Among these social forces, the peasant movement was perhaps the most important numerically and beguiling intellectually. With peasants or farmers comprising the vast

bulk of the east European population, agrarian parties, with the help of universal suffrage, emerged as significant political forces in the region. Spurred in part by populist writers influenced by the Russian narodnichestvo, or social-minded intellectuals who saw the Russian village commune, or mir, as an organizational paradigm, the peasant parties became grassroots movements for moral regeneration and social and political reform.⁶⁰ As the main architects of land reform following the war, agrarian parties formed governments in Bulgaria (1919-23) and Rumania (1928-30) and participated as uneasy coalition partners in others. "The permanent electoral majorities of these parties, itself a result of the initial aggregation of regional and local interests on which the parties had been founded, had the effect of drawing other political and electoral groups into coalition or cartel with them."⁶¹ In Bulgaria, the Agrarian government of Alexander Stamboliiski introduced sweeping land reforms at home and a policy of regional reconciliation and unity abroad. In 1920 he founded the "Green International" to incorporate the peasant parties and cooperatives, beginning with Yugoslavia, into a South Slav and eventually an east European federation of democratic governments. Although the "Green International" survived him, Stamboliiski's unorthodox, at times demagogic style antagonized the professional classes and army, who overthrew and assassinated him in 1923.

While the agrarian party programs were diverse in response to domestic and other concerns (viz., some were

revolutionary, others parliamentary), they sought to transform the existing bourgeois state into a cooperative polity based on the numerically and morally superior peasant. Ante Radic, a founder and theoretician of the Croat peasant movement, spoke of a "new society based on the heart and soul" that could be built if the peasants were able to overcome the monopoly of power held by the urban classes in the interest of a state governed "from below, not from above."⁶² Another theoretician baldly declared that the Green movement marked

the end of the epoch inaugurated by the French Revolution. It was the town that for a century-and-a-half represented State organization, the home of the intellectual and the artist, the tribune of the politician. The rural community, unorganised, estranged from large centers of public activity, led a dull existence, rarely touched by faint echoes of bourgeois ideas which subsequently would impose upon the village obligations and conventions alien to it both in form and in spirit.⁶³

Economically, the parties shared "a marked preference for cooperative modes of economic organization"⁶⁴ that represented conscious alternative, or "third road," between western consumer and finance capitalism and eastern collectivist socialism. Their concept of agrarian reform centered on self-sufficiency and cooperative ownership of the means of production. Politically, they favored administrative decentralization based on self-governing regional and local units in a larger federative structure. "It seemed to them that a society of prosperous peasants linked by voluntary arrangements was not only more appropriate to agrarian states, but also more attractive and humane than either of the alternatives with their stress on

large-scale enterprise, urbanization, and bureaucratic organization."⁶⁵

Through Stamboliiski's initiative, the southeast European parties developed their agrarian-based co-operative principle beyond the idea of South Slav regional cooperation.⁶⁶ In 1927, the headquarters of the Green International, known officially as the International Agrarian Bureau, moved to Prague under the guidance of Antonin Svehla and Milan Hodza, leaders of the Czechoslovakian Party of Small Farmers and Peasants and opponents of Czech centralism. The green movement lost its Slavophile character with the adhesion or cooperation of Finnish, Baltic, Rumanian, Austrian and even French, Swiss, and Italian parties. A constitution was adopted in 1928 and the movement's first General Assembly in 1929 convened 17 European peasant parties (including two west European parties from France and Switzerland) represented along national and regional lines.

The world economic crisis and subsequent rise of military dictatorships in eastern Europe marked the decline of the peasant movement as a political force in the 1930s. The decade was nonetheless punctuated by "village explorer" activity among populist writers and intellectuals. In Hungary, the populists' "Marciusi Front" (March Front) movement formed in 1937 led to the founding of the National Peasant Party the following year. Similarly, the emergence in Poland of an intelligentsia of peasant origin representing peasant interests led in 1938 to the founding

of the League of Peasant Intelligentsia and Friends of the Village.⁶⁷

Agrarian party leaders resurfaced in the emigration and resistance during World War II. They were represented in all the east European governments-in-exile. In the spring and summer of 1942, delegates representing the peasantry of all countries save Albania met in London under British auspices to devise and adopt a 12-point "Peasant Programme" for peace in postwar eastern Europe.⁶⁸ Issued in July, the Programme's purpose was to examine the postwar aspects of the "peasant community" in central and southeastern Europe. Its signatories rejected "a mere reversion to prewar conditions" and called on the nations of the region to "execute a common policy" in accord with the major allied powers. The Programme was politically sensitive to the interests of the major allied powers to whom it was primarily addressed. It endorsed the Atlantic Charter while stating the need "to develop it in relation to our own European situation." It also denied the inevitability "of hostility between the interests of the urban and rural population" and acknowledged the value of industrial development particularly in the area of processing home-grown agricultural and forest products. This industry would provide employment to alleviate the problem of overpopulation on the land. The cooperative principle of economic and political organization was emphasized along with the agrarian reform principle of peasant ownership. To the extent possible, both industry and agriculture should be organized on a cooperative basis in the interests of a

regional society of small producers.⁶⁹

A transnational spinoff of the Czechoslovak-Polish and Greek-Yugoslav confederation negotiations was the establishment in New York of a semi-official Central and Eastern European Planning Board. In November 1941, representatives of governmental, workers', and employers' organizations of the four east European governments-in-exile met at the International Labor Organization (ILO) conference in New York to issue a common pledge of regional solidarity and cooperation for postwar reconstruction. They established the Board to function both as a inter-governmental organization and transnational planning agency.⁷⁰ When the project was publically announced on January 7, 1942, the four state delegations issued a joint statement of intent that recognized the need of the governments and peoples to unite to solve problems peculiar to their area:

We agree on the essential need of a close collaboration among peoples and governments of the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe, while war is still being fought and later, after peace comes back to the world. The East European region has its own problems and those must be handled and solved by mutual consent and friendly collaboration of the respective nations. Doing so, they believe that the democratic world of today and tomorrow will be enriched by a new sincere effort and by a reconstructive experiment in the way of building of a better order.⁷¹

The Board's steering committee consisted for four members from the respective governments-in-exile and a secretary-general.⁷² Financed by the four governments (though in practice, mainly by the Poles), the Board conducted research from a regional perspective on constitutional, economic, social, and educational matters.

One educational and four economic committees were set up along with a monthly review, New Europe, which served as an organ for collaboration among the members and a wider circle of supporters.⁷³ The work of the Board was conceived in terms of providing a provisional and embryonic structure for a federation organized along regional and functional lines. Sava N. Kosanovich, chairman of the General Steering Committee, stated at its inaugural meeting on May 28, 1942, that the Board was a forum for a "wider concept of order and reconstruction (that would) tackle problems which have a common value and unifying purpose... ." ⁷⁴ For Felix Gross, this meant finding ways to implement "inner" federalism through self-government and territorial autonomy within the member states.⁷⁵ But as the Czechoslovak-Polish and Greek-Yugoslav federation attempts began to unravel in late 1942 and 1943, the Board's work and role also diminished in importance. By the end of 1943, its work was reduced to research on mainly educational issues.⁷⁶

Not least representative among the transnational sociocultural forces in eastern Europe were the resistance movements.⁷⁷ And not unlike their west European counterparts, they called for a regional federation in terms not of an exclusive bloc between western Europe and the Soviet Union, but as a "stepping-stone towards an all-Europe federation from the Atlantic to the Soviet border." They also demonstrated a desire with their western counterparts for decentralization of the state. The program of the Polish multiparty "Committee of Political Understanding" (PKP), for

example, showed "impressive agreement with the basic conception of future policy that prevailed in the West European resistance, especially in its emphasis on human rights and the need for decentralization and 'far-reaching local autonomy' within states."⁷⁸ The underground Polish newspaper, Nowe Drogi, in commenting on January 21, 1942 on the declaration of Czechoslovak, Polish, Greek, and Yugoslavian delegates at the November ILO conference to cooperate in postwar reconstruction, stated that a united Europe had to be composed not of states, but "federated regions," of which the "Central and Eastern European confederation is regarded as a necessary step."⁷⁹

These and other transnational ideas for postwar order combined interstate and autochthonous regionalism to develop a new theoretical approach to political organization in eastern Europe. Its greatest significance lies in its conception of the state in multi-national and not uni-national terms and of Europe "as an entity of democratic and confederated or federated regions, 'une Europe des fédérations' instead of 'une Europe des patries'."⁸⁰

NOTES

¹For a perceptive view of the interplay between culture and politics in eastern Europe, see Ivan T. Berend, The Crisis Zone of Europe: An Interpretation of East-Central European History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1986). A work whose findings and insights has withstood the test of time is Walter Kolarz, Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe (London, 1946).

²The major nationalities in 1914 included (in millions):

12 Austro-German	4 Ukrainian
10 Hungarian	3.25 Rumanian
6.5 Czech	2 Slovak
5.5 Serbo-Croatian	1.25 Slovene
5 Pole	.75 Italian
	1.5 Other

³See Alan W. Palmer, The Lands Between: A History of East Central Europe since the Congress of Vienna (London, 1970), ch.1.

⁴Kolarz, p. 11.

⁵See Francis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe (London, 1949); Mihaly Ferdinandy, Középeuropa (Central Europe) (Budapest, 1940); J. Perényi, "L'est européen dans une synthèse d'histoire universelle," in Nouvelles études historiques II (Budapest, 1965).

⁶Kolarz, p. 12.

⁷Friedrich Hertz, The Economic Problems of the Danube States, op.cit., pp. 222-23. Historian Hugh Seton-Watson made a similar claim: "Hitler's determination to seize the Danube lands and ultimately to proceed to invade Russia from this territorial base, was as much the cause of the Second World War as the national conflicts in the Danube lands had been the cause of the First World War." (Hugh Seton-Watson, The 'Sick Heart' of Modern Europe: The Problem of the Danubian Lands, [Seattle, 1976]), pp. 44-45. See also Antonin Basch, The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere (London, 1944).

⁸See Hugh Seton-Watson, "'Intelligentsia' und Nationalismus in Osteuropa, 1848-1918," Historische Zeitschrift CXCIV (1962); William H. McNeill, Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History (Toronto, 1986), pp. 60-61. See also Walter Kolarz, Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe (London, 1946), p. 9.

⁹Elemer Hantos, Das Kulturproblem in Mitteleuropa (Stuttgart, 1926), p. 19. See also David Mitrany, The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe (New Haven, 1937), passim; Friedrich Hertz, The Economic Problems of the Danube States. A Study in Economic Nationalism, p. 39f. Hugh Seton-Watson,

Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1919-1941 (New York, [1946] 1967), passim.

¹⁰ For tragi-comic list of some of these events, see John Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (New York, 1953), pp. 17-18.

¹² Erich Hula, "National Self-Determination Reconsidered," Social Research, 10 (February 1943), p. 15. Similarly, David Mitrany pointed out that as "strong as the national roots of the peasants are they seem nowhere to have led to nationalist rivalries. In mixed regions like Transylvania peasants of two or three nationalities had for generations live peacefully in the same village, until pressed and prodded by nationalist propaganda from the main towns" (in Marx Against the Peasant, p. 159).

¹² Leften S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times (Northampton, Ma., 1944 [Hamden, Ct., 1964]), pp. 202-258; Rudolf Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe (London, 1945), pp. 419-444; Joachim Kühl, Föderationspläne im Donaauraum und Ostmitteleuropa (Munich, 1958), pp. 7-16 and 34-101; Rudolf Wierer, Der Föderalismus im Donaauraum (Graz/Cologne, 1960), pp. 157-177. For documentation on the wartime east European initiatives, see Lipgens I, pp. 609-58; Lipgens II, pp. 353-413; Walter Lipgens, Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940-1945 (Munich, 1968), pp. 311-337; Felix Gross, Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-central Europe (New York, 1945), p. 17f.

¹³ Mitrany, The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe, p. 241.

¹⁴ Wheeler-Bennett, The Semblance of Peace, pp. 96-97.

¹⁵ CAM, e.g., "Union in Eastern Europe," RB IX/7/v (May 20, 1941); "Austria," RR IX/12/ii (August 27, 1941); "The Austrian Question," RR IX/13/ii (September 15, 1941); "The Habsburgs and South-Eastern Europe," RR IX/16/i (October 13, 1941); "The Monarchy and the Habsburg Question in Hungary," C 4542/3982/21/1942 (Research Department, Foreign Office, December 30, 1941).

¹⁶ CAM, [title/document page missing], n.d. [1940?], p.1 of section II.

¹⁷ PRO FO 371/34400/C 10967, "The Settlement of Eastern Europe: The Definition of the Problem," 20 September 1943. The author is presumed to be C.A. Macartney, who communicated the memorandum to the Foreign Office on September 23. Macartney had argued elsewhere that "any plan which hopes to succeed must consider the wishes and needs of the east European peoples as a whole, not only a favoured part of them" (Problems of the Danubian Basin [London, 1942], p. 151). Page references of this document are cited

in the text.

¹⁸PRO FO 371/33134/R 3793/143/76, Minute O.G. Sargent, June 1, 1942: "Suggested Confederation of States lying between Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and Russia and Turkey, on the other." See summary in Woodward, pp. 18-21.

¹⁹See Witold S. Sworakowski, Bibliography of books, pamphlets, and articles in periodicals dealing with federation plans for Central and Eastern Europe developed during the Second World War, (Stanford, 1954); Office of Strategic Services, The Idea of Federation in Central and Eastern Europe - as reflected among Political Refugees and Foreign Nationality Groups in the United States, Foreign Nationalities Branch, 129 (May 24, 1943); Eugene Gonda, Eastern European Federation Since 1935 (Danubian Plans) (Washington, D.C., 1955) and The Traditional Obstacles to Federation (Washington, D.C., 1955); Lipgens II: Part Two, Ch. II: "Plans by Exiles from East European Countries" (pp. 353-413); and Ch. IV.3: "Views of Austrian Exiles on the Future of Europe" (pp. 629-652); Part Three, Ch. III: "Views of East European Transnational Groups on the Postwar Order in Europe" (pp. 754-785).

²⁰Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers 1940-43, (Westport, CT, [1956] 1979), and Wandycz, "Recent Traditions of the Quest for Unity: Attempted Polish-Czechoslovak and Yugoslav-Bulgarian Confederations 1940-1948," in People's Democracies After Prague: Soviet Hegemony, Nationalism, Regional Integration?, ed. J. Lukaszewski (Bruges, 1970). In the latter work, Wandycz draws on some new documentary sources, esp. Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske polititiky 1939-1943, I, (Prague, 1966). On the system of governments in exile, see Daniel Bell and Leon Dennen, "The System of Governments in Exile," in Challenge to Peacemakers: Conflicting National Aspirations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. J.S. Roucek (Philadelphia, 1944).

²¹Quoted in Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation, p. 46.

²²Wandycz, "The Quest for Unity...", p. 44. It is interesting to note that Zaleski at this time was proposing a federal monarchy of Poland and the Danubian countries under the Habsburg pretender, Otto von Habsburg (Wheeler-Bennett, The Semblance of Peace, pp. 96-7).

²³Quoted in Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation..., p.34.

²⁴See Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Reflections and Reminiscences (London, 1942), pp. 127-139; 165-66. Eugene Gonda, (Eastern European Federation Plans Since 1935, p. 12), described Hodza as "the first Central European responsible statesman" who tried to resolve the 1919 political system.

²⁵PRO FO 371/24370/C 4305. Memorandum dated 20 March 1940, p. 7. See Wandycz, op.cit., p. 36.

²⁶Quoted in Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation, p. 39. Subsequent page references cited in text.

²⁷Wandycz, "Recent Traditions of the Quest for Unity....," pp. 48, 49.

²⁸Quoted in Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation, p. 68.

²⁹Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, pp. 239f.

³⁰Inter-Allied Review, 2 (February 15, 1942), pp. 25-26. The document is reprinted in Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, pp. 311-13.

³¹Both quotes in NA, 60D-224, R-61, T-356: "The Greek-Yugoslav Project for Balkan Union" (July 27, 1943), pp. 6-7.

³²Eduard Benes, "The Reorganization of Postwar Europe," Foreign Affairs, 20 (January, 1942), p. 227. Subsequent pages references cited in text.

³³Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation, p. 70.

³⁴Eden, The Reckoning, p. 335. Compare with FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, v.3, p. 335.

³⁵Wandycz, "Recent Traditions of the Quest for Unity....," pp. 47, 51, 52-53; Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 96-7. Ivan Maisky, who adopted a favorable attitude toward the January 1942 agreements, is said to have envisaged, in early 1942, the formation of three federations in eastern Europe that would "lean on the Soviet Union economically and militarily." These consisted of a Balkan federation formed around Yugoslavia and including Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania, and Greece; a second federation consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; and a third smaller confederation of the Baltic states (NA, Lot 60D-244/R-2Z E125 [Subcommittee on European Organization]: "How much of a Desire for the Unification of Europe has been Expressed by European Leaders and what Plans have been Proposed by Them?," June 4, 1943, p. 4).

³⁶The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-1945, ed. G. Ross (Cambridge, 1986), p. 107. The strong position of Poland through early 1942 was evident at the January 13 inter-allied conference of smaller states which Sikorski convened in London with the major powers participating as observers. Unlike former Polish president Pilsudski's federation plans, which extended westward to the Dnieper and Ukraine, General Sikorski, who was born in Galicia, a multi-ethnic province of the Habsburg Empire, had a north-south orientation that

looked toward the Danube and Balkans (Felix Gross and M. Kamil Dziwanowski, "II. Plans by Exiles from East European Countries," in Lipgens II, p. 361)

³⁷ J.J. Orlik, Imperialisticheskie derzhavy i Vostochnaya Evropa 1945-1965 (Imperialist powers and Eastern Europe 1945-1965), (Moscow, 1968), p. 18. (I am grateful to Gyula Jozsa providing and translating this source.)

³⁸ BBCMS, ISS 1473B/4B USSR Abroad, Moscow in English for U.K., 22.00, 28 July 1943: "What is Behind the East European Confederation Scheme."

³⁹ FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, v.3, p. 319.

⁴⁰ FDR: His Personal Letters, v.2, p. 1290, quoted in Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation, p. 76. Welles told Sikorski in a January 4, 1943 meeting at the State Department that the United States was "studying very carefully the possibility of the creation of an eastern European union of which Poland could be a member..." (FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, v.3, p. 317).

⁴¹ NA, 60D-224, [Sub-committee on European Organization], R Minutes 12, February 4, 1944, p. 22. Subsequent page references cited in text.

⁴² Churchill, v.3, p. 390.

⁴³ Quoted in Howard P. Whidden, Jr., "As Britain Sees the Post-War World," Foreign Policy Reports, October 15, 1942, p. 200.

⁴⁴ Churchill, v.4, p. 711; FRUS, II. The First Quebec Conference, p. 704.

⁴⁵ Winston S. Churchill His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, v. 7, p. 6758.

⁴⁶ FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, v.3, p. 15. See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 710.

⁴⁷ Churchill, v.4, p. 803. In the interest of breaking up Germany, Churchill at times favored detaching Bavaria from Prussia and attaching it to either Austria or a Danubian grouping. Eden disagreed with this plan and in an August 21, 1943 meeting with Secretary of State Hull, stating "it would be more advisable to restore, ... in general lines, the separate states of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and form them as a Danubian grouping" (FRUS, II. The First Quebec Conference, p. 928).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation, p. 89.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹V. Trukhanovksy, British Foreign Policy During World War II, 1939-1945 (Moscow, 1970), p. 372.

⁵²FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1943, v.1, p. 725. Subsequent page references cited in the text.

⁵³BBCMS, 4B USSR Abroad, Soviet European Service in German, 25 December 1943: "War and the Working Class: 'The Completion of the Soviet Czechoslovak Treaty'," p. ii.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation, p. 97. Churchill continued to promote an east European grouping through the fall of 1944. In his October 17, 1944 meeting at the Kremlin with Stalin, he asked the Marshal what he thought of "Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary forming a separate grouping." When Stalin asked if he had an "entente" in mind, Churchill responded that "it would be a Zollverein" oriented for economic purposes. Stalin, supported by Molotov, responded by saying that the "Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles, would first want to build up their national life and restrict their own rights by combining with others." (PRO, PREM 3/434/2: "Record of Meeting Held at the Kremlin on the 17th October 1944, at 10 p.m.," p. 41)

⁵⁶See Walter Lipgens, Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940-1945 (Munich, 1968); Felix Gross, "Views of East European Transnational Groups on the Postwar Order in Europe," in Lipgens II, pp. 755-785; Felix Gross and M. Kamil Dziewanowski, "Plans by Exiles from East European Countries," Ibid., pp. 353-413; OSS, The Idea of Federation in Central and Eastern Europe (as Reflected among Political Refugees and Foreign Nationality Groups in the United States); Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation, pp. 110-115.

⁵⁷Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, pp. 196f.; David Mitraný, Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism (London, 1952), p. 143f.; Berend, The Crisis Zone of Europe, p. 29f.

⁵⁸Stavrianos, p. 223.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ghita Ionescu, "Eastern Europe," in Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics eds. Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (London, 1969), pp. 97-121. See also Margaret Canovan, Populism (New York/London, 1981), pp. 110-28. The classic work on the peasant movement in east Europe remains David Mitraný, Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism (London, 1951). As an exception to the rule, peasant parties did not emerge in Hungary until the 1930s, when they were on the decline in the rest of the region. On Hungarian populism, see Gyula Borbandi, Der ungarische

Populismus (Munich, 1976) and Asher Cohen, Le populisme hongrois avant la deuxième guerre mondiale. Aspects socio-politiques (doctoral dissertation, Paris, 1975).

⁶¹Ionescu, op.cit., p. 112.

⁶²Quoted in Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant, p. 154.

⁶³J. Rutaj, Peasant International in Action (London, 1948), p. 16, quoted in Mitrany, Ibid..

⁶⁴Canovan, op.cit., p. 133.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 124-25. For examples of some peasant co-operative arrangements -- technical, financial, commercial, insurance, social, cultural -- in various east European countries, see Mitrany, p. 131f., 267-68; and Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941 (New York, 3rd ed., 1962), pp. 110-15.

⁶⁶The initial success and potential of the "green uprising" prompted the Soviets in 1923 to encourage refugees in Moscow to form a Communist Peasant International. It held its first congress in 1925, published pamphlets and a periodical, but apparently had no visible impact on peasants anywhere (Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant, p. 158). In the meantime, the fifth congress of the Comintern in Moscow in 1924 approved "the idea of a Balkan Federation of equal and independent workers' and peasants' republics..." (The Communist International 1919-1943. Documents ed. Jane Degras (London/New York/Toronto, 1960), v.2, p. 97).

⁶⁷Mitrany, pp. 152, 162. Borbandi, Der ungarische Populismus, p. 156f. Their "third road" symbolism was evident in the 12-point program they introduced March 15, 1937, the concluding point calling, in opposition to a prevailing irredentism, for "the implementation of the ideas of a self-contained Danubian valley and confederation..." (Quoted in Peter Gyallay-Pap, Regionalism in Hungarian Thought and Action, 1843-1948 [Certificate Essay, Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University, 1974], p. 108).

⁶⁸Quotes are from text in Gross, Crossroads of a Continent, pp. 113-117. See Royal Institute of International Affairs, Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean. Discussion of a Peasant Programme (London, 1944). Signatories of the agreement were representatives, though in most cases not the leaders, of the peasant parties from seven countries: Dimitre Matzankieff, Bulgaria; Ladislav Feierabend, Jan Lichner, Czechoslovakia; Vrasidas Capernaros, Greece; Arnold Daniel, Michael Karolyi, Hungary; Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Witold Kulerski, Poland; Pavel Pavel, Rumania; Rudolf Bicanic, Fran. Gabrovshak, Milan Gavrilovich, Yugoslavia.

⁶⁹The cooperative organizational principle of the agrarians was based on the recognition that the innate solidarity among rural people could serve as a model for comprehensive

cooperation. The peasant leaders did not see themselves in the western sense as advocates of an "interest group," but believed their approach generic in the sense that differences, for example, "between the Danubian peoples were mostly found at the urban level, while affinities were strong at the rural level" (Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant, p. 157). Their organizational model was a society of small agricultural and industrial producers that stood between the large-scale, bureaucratic capitalism of the West and socialism of the East. As Canovan stated,

What the agrarians had in mind was a society of independent producers, linked together not by forcible, bureaucratic state collectivism but by voluntary cooperation. ...Throughout Eastern European populism, cooperative organization became the panacea that nationalization has at times been for socialists. ...The agrarians found inspiration in the example of Denmark, which seemed to have succeeded, partly through the widespread use of cooperative methods, in creating a prosperous society of small producers, achieving modernity while remaining rural and avoiding both large-scale capitalism and socialism (Populism, p. 124).

⁷⁰Felix Gross, "Peace Planning for Central and Eastern Europe," in A Challenge to Peacemakers: Conflicting National Aspirations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. J.S. Roucek (Philadelphia, 1944), p. 170; see Lipgens II, pp. 754-768.

⁷¹Quoted in Lipgens II, p. 765.

⁷²The four members were Sava N. Kosanovich, former Yugoslavian Minister of State and chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Yugoslavian Reconstruction, committee chairman; deputy chairmen Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister; Emanuel Isouderos, Greek Prime Minister and Minister of Labor; and Jan Stanczyk, Polish Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. Felix Gross, a Polish-American professor of economics at New York University, was General Secretary of the Board and Director of its Research and Planning Bureau. (The Idea of Federation..., op.cit., pp. 4-5, 41-42.)

⁷³The five committees and their representatives were: 1) Foreign Trade and Finance Committee chaired by Professor Antonin Basch (Czechoslovakia), author of The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere, (New York, 1944); 2) Relief Committee chaired by Stavros Theophanides, Greek Under Secretary of Merchant Marine and delegate to the Board; 3) Agriculture Committee chaired by Dr. Nicolas Mirkovich (Yugoslavia); 4) Industrial Committee chaired by Prof. Stefan de Ropp (Poland); and 5) Educational Committee chaired by Prof. Boris Furlan (Yugoslavia).

⁷⁴Lipgens II, p. 766.

⁷⁵Gross, Crossroads of Two Continents, p. 44f.

⁷⁶See Documents and Reports of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, Nos.1-6 (New York, 1943); Gross, "Peace Planning....," op.cit., p. 174.

⁷⁷Apart from the Polish underground resistance, which maintained a courier link to the Polish provisional government in London, little documentation has surfaced on the postwar attitudes of the east European resistance. The archives of the Sikorski Historical Institute in London reveal, inter alia, that the four major parties (National, Polish Socialist, Peasant, and Polish Labour) who recognized the authority of the London-based government signed a policy statement in September 1943 in which a central and east European federation played a fundamental part (Lipgens II, pp. 359-60; 754-55). For a selection of Polish underground press articles dealing with unification plans, see Lipgens I, pp. 609-58.

⁷⁸Walter Lipgens, "East European [Resistance] Plans for the future of Europe: the example of Poland," in Lipgens I, pp. 629 (brackets added).

⁷⁹Quoted in Gross, Crossroads of Two Continents, p. 22.

⁸⁰Felix Gross and M. Kamil Dziewanowski, "II. Plans by Exiles from East European Countries," in Lipgens II, p. 360.

CONCLUSION

REGIONALISM, POSTWAR ORDER, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Regionalism is the only truly new phenomenon which has appeared on an international stage which for more than a century has been dominated by nationalism.

Robert Strausz-Hupé, 1945

CHAPTER X

When the fighting ended in 1945, the pre-war system of sovereign national states re-emerged as the structure for world and European organization. The United Nations was not far removed from its parent League of Nations in reaffirming the sanctity of the classical international system in which the state functioned as the sole political unit and actor in international relations. Unlike its predecessor, however, the United Nations also acquired a structure that included some regional and functional organization. "Regional arrangements" in matters relating to security and the peaceful settlement of disputes were recognized, albeit reluctantly, by the internationalists who drafted the United Nations Charter. Functional agencies relating to social, economic, cultural, and technical matters and administered by experts serving as international civil servants were also accorded legitimacy. Both changes introduced a measure of regionalism and functionalism to the traditional universal structure of international organization.

In Europe, the restoration of state sovereignties was also attenuated. The major power occupation of Europe, in particular by the military forces of the Soviet Union and the United States, divided the continent (and Germany) into

eastern and western spheres of control. The Soviet Union exercised regional hegemony of a totalitarian nature over eastern Europe and imposed "people's democracies" as a new form of revolutionary state in the region. In western Europe, the revived states acquired their old forms save western Germany, which was decentralized into a federal republic of autonomous provincial governments. At that time (1949), most west European states joined the United States in an "Atlantic Community" regional security pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). State sovereignties were also attenuated in western Europe by a significant postwar "federalist" movement led by political exiles and the survivors of the resistance movements. In spite or in part because of the major power hegemonies, in their declared opposition to nationalism the national state, they sparked the postwar drive toward west European regional integration. An inter-governmental Council of Europe was established in 1949 and in 1950, Europe's first supranational authority was created in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). These and other postwar initiatives were part of a process or trend toward regional integration that began not at the end but at the outbreak of the war.

Several historical and theoretical conclusions emerge from this study of regionalism and the war-time allied debate on postwar order. In attempting to sort out the conceptual and terminological confusion that surrounded the debate on regionalism, we distinguished in Part I between state-based (interstate, hegemonial) and region-based (autochthonous) theories of regionalism. Interstate

regionalism was a theory of international political organization that retained the state structure of global society while adding to that structure groupings of (usually) contiguous states who agree to relinquish some authority relating to security, economics, foreign policy, or social, cultural, and technical matters. Forms of interstate regionalism ranged from mutual assistance pacts and loose confederations to federations of states. Examples were the Czechoslovak-Polish and Greek-Yugoslav agreements of January 1942; the BENELUX custom's union signed by Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg in September 1944; the League of Arab States (March 1945); and the inter-American system as expressed in the Act of Chapultepec (March 1945). Hegemonial regionalism was a great power orbit theory of world organization where smaller states voluntarily or, as the case may be, involuntarily merge into regional groupings around a large and powerful state. The Soviet Union's "security zone" in eastern Europe is a partial example as is an inter-American system dominated by the United States and the war-time idea of an Asian-Pacific region under China's benign tutelage. At the the time of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance in May 1942, the Foreign Office briefly toyed with the idea of dividing Europe into a British-led western Europe and Soviet-led eastern Europe. Finally, autochthonous regionalism took the organic historical-cultural region and not the state as the primary political unit of global society. Its "regionalist" advocates sought to break up the state by devolving power to

self-governing regional and local units within a larger federative political structure. The process was applied both within and across existing states. A primary example of the former was the decentralization and federalization of postwar (western) Germany, whose historic provinces, or Länder, became self-governing units within a federal state that maintained economic unity and a common foreign policy. A European regional federation or multi-state sub-regional groupings such as for the Balkan, Scandinavian, and Danubian regions of Europe were autochthonous if their internal structures were similarly based on principles of sub-national regional autonomy. Apart from theorists, the main advocates of autochthonous regionalism were such nonstate actors as the resistance movements and the "green" or agrarian parties and so-called "regionalist" movements that became part of the cultural landscape of 20th century Europe.

The interstate and hegemonial theories of regionalism were as a rule advanced, respectively, by idealist and realist theorists of international relations while "regionalist" theorists, if fewer in number, developed autochthonous regionalism as a principle of political organization. The lines between these more or less distinct types of regionalism were by no means clearcut in practice. In practice, internationalists concerned by the powerlessness of the League attempted to incorporate "realist" concepts of power into their schemes. President Roosevelt himself took pride through 1943 in calling himself a "realist" in advocating a postwar order that contained

elements of both interstate and hegemonial regionalism. Some advocates of power politics, such as Robert Strausz-Hupé and Walter Lippmann, acknowledged that regionalism was also a function of historical and cultural "affinities" that did not necessarily express themselves through the state, but "from below." Among the practitioners, for example, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles were essentially internationalists who in their advocacy of interstate regionalism drew on both hegemonial and autochthonous ideas.

A compelling historical conclusion that emerges from this study is that regionalism played a greater role in the debate on postwar world and European organization than is commonly acknowledged in the literature on the origins of the United Nations and the future organization of Europe. Indeed, the issue of regionalism constituted the substance of that debate. Regional forms of organization were not only discussed but preferred in both Great Britain and the United States until 1943. The research and initial policy recommendations of the Foreign Office and State Department and the views of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt attest to this truth. The Soviet opposition to plans for regional confederations in eastern Europe helped turn the State Department away from regionalism and back toward a universalism favored by internationalists. After mid-1943, American internationalism, with the decisive support of the person and office of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, gained ascendancy in the councils of the three

major powers in determining the nature and structure of the new world organization. Although regionalism remained a contentious issue throughout the war, only Churchill and the smaller allied states among the state actors stuck to the regional idea after 1943. The near absence of the regionalist challenge in the historical literature is in part the reality of history being written by the victor. There was little reason for internationalists who fought against or sought to minimize the role of the regionalism in world and European organization to enhance its historical, much less theoretical, significance. Idealist and realist theorists who confronted the issue during the war essentially dropped it after the new international order was established in 1945. The debate and wrangling, which reached its crescendo in May 1945 at the San Francisco conference, had taken its toll. It was incumbent on all, it seemed, to rally behind the United Nations organization that alone stood between order and anarchy in international relations in 1945.

The war-time initiatives toward regional forms of organization, particularly for Europe or within Europe, constitute significant historical event when viewed as a whole. History has tended to judge them as schemes laced with utopian thinking, nostalgia, or romantic sentiment. While these elements were no doubt present, particularly among publicists, we have seen that there was also much serious and tough-minded reconception in the research, thinking, and plans of both theorists and practitioners concerned with the postwar order. At the same time, it

should be acknowledged that seemingly outlandish ideals and sentiments, like the European "federalist" movement in the late 1940s, are not infrequently at the cutting edge of change. In this regard, "sentiment," as Percy Bidwell cautioned his colleagues at a June 1943 meeting of the State Department's Subcommittee on European Organization, "no matter how vague, should not be dismissed out of hand, since the existence of the sentiment is itself a fact of objective importance."¹ The war-time debate on regionalism and postwar order was thus not a marginal historical footnote or "blip" in the development of western political organization but, rather, a period of creative ferment that produced substantial rethinking about international organization and international relations. Regionalism and functionalism were born as alternative models of organization in this period. The research and debate on regionalism in the Foreign Office and State Department, the initiatives of the exiled European governments and governments of Latin American, Arab, and other non-western states, of which this study scratched the surface, are worthy of further serious study. Similarly, considerable material is available on the postwar conceptions of nonstate actors representing social and political forces (e.g., the resistance, populist, "regionalist" movements as well as radical liberals, conservatives, and socialists).

The findings in this study also have theoretical implications for the field of international relations. Regionalism as both an integrative concept and principle of

political organization may be said to have emerged in international relations during World War II. It raised the question of the nature and impact of multistate "regional" representation on an international system of sovereign states. The Foreign Office and State Department research and policy recommendations envisaged multistate regional representation in world and European organization. At what point and under which conditions would state units and actors become regional units and actors? In the interstate regionalism favored by Foreign Office and State Department, plans for a world organization called for regional representation on the executive council. Alongside the three or four major powers would sit representatives of regional groupings of smaller states. Similarly, the British promoted the regional representation of the smaller states of eastern and northern Europe alongside the larger states in a European council. Churchill in turn saw the European council represented on a supreme world council alongside American and Far Eastern council representatives and the major powers. The regional units were for the most part seen as confederations or federations of states joined, presumably by treaty. The Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations for a confederal union between 1940 and 1943 provide considerable insight into the process of sovereign states merging into an interstate regional uni^ty. Under conditions of hegemonial regionalism, states become regional units and actors when they are integrated into continental power blocs under the influence or coercive force of large and powerful states. Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia provided contemporary

Axis models of this great power orbit theory of regionalism. On the allied side, the postwar "Atlantic Community" of the NATO countries was prefigured in early wartime plans, which found expression mainly in the public arena, of an Anglo-American condominium of democratic states. The Pan American Union or inter-American state system with the United States as primus inter pares was an example of a potential hegemonial power bloc.

With autochthonous regionalism, the region itself is the would-be unit and actor in a graded system of political authority. Political organization was based regional autonomy and local self-government within a larger federative political structure of an existing large state, a combination of smaller states, or a combination of regions that cut across existing state boundaries altogether. The regionalization and federalization of Germany is a clear-cut example of autochthonous regionalism applied to a large, centralized states. In a 1943 memo on "the political reorganization of Germany," the State Department's Committee on Germany recommended decentralizing the political structure of Germany by assigning to the federal units, organized along historic provincial lines, such functions as policing and major taxation powers and control over education in domestic matters and the right to ratify international commitments in foreign affairs while maintaining economic unity at the federal level.² Apart from decentralizing large states into natural, self-governing regional units, autochthonous regionalism can also be

investigated as a method of breaking up smaller states into their regional components as units in a larger federal polity. One of the frequently cited cases in point considered during the war by both the Anglo-American powers and social forces within the region was a Danubian federation or confederation. Although in most cases the existing (or pre-1938) states were envisaged as the federal units (i.e., interstate regionalism), in some cases the historical-cultural entities -- Bohemia-Moravia, Croatia, Slovakia, Hungary, Transylvania, etc. -- were advanced as the units of a reconstituted Danubian region. Beneath or perhaps above the clamor of real and threatened population transfers, creeping Sovietization, a nascent Cold War, and the 1947 Paris Peace Conference, the debates and plans for Danubian reorganization put forward by populists, socialists (including communists), and neo-liberal "functionalists" who came on the political scene at war's end is a subject that merits scholarly attention. Drawing on their writings, speeches, platforms, and activities, what were their regional conceptions of postwar order? How and to what extent did these "low politics" forces -- individuals and social groups organized in most cases into political parties -- articulate local and transnational forms of regional community in Danubian Europe as the basis for a new representational political unit?

What regionalism in its autochthonous form introduces in international relations theory is a "region-qua-region" concept in international relations. This questions the "national" basis of the state as sanctioned by the 1919

Paris peacemakers and feasibility of a social reality-based or "low politics" approach to political organization. The postwar restoration of the national sovereign state as the primary unit of international society took place as the nationality principle as it had developed from the 19th century revealed clear weaknesses. As McNeill has argued, "the wars of 1914-45 augured the eclipse of nationalism and of ethnic homogeneity with separate polities as clearly as the wars of 1792-1815 had announced the triumph of the principle of nationality and of an assumed ethnic homogeneity with separate sovereign states."³ From the perspective of social and political forces during the war ("minorities," agrarian interests, the resistance movements, oppositional political parties), the national state seemed to have outlived itself as a credible way to organize human beings in society. This raises the theoretical question of regionalism, seen as a principle of power devolution within the state, as an alternative to nationalism as the basis for political organization in the state. In other words, to what extent does regional self-determination solve the pitfalls of national self-determination in areas of mixed populations?

Political units and their forms have come and gone over time, changed by structures that emerge from within society. The national sovereign state heralded in 1919 as the last word in political organization was perhaps entering its eclipse as this news was being proclaimed. Theoretical efforts in international relations would do well to examine

the regional structure of Europe and the continents before elaborating abstractly conceived ordering principles. Social reality-based concepts and not abstract ideological constructions much less sheer power motives are more reliable tools with which to unravel the art of political organization and relations between political units. For individuals will continue to strive, as Louis Wirth said of Max Weber, to enter the magic garden where the relation between the world as it is culturally experienced and politically conceived actually coincides.

NOTES

¹NA, 60D-224, Notter Records, R-2Z, E125, 4 June 1943.

²Postwar, p. 559.

³William H. McNeill, Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History, p. 34.

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