

Pakistan and the birth of the Regional pacts in Asia.

1947-56

FAROOQ NASEEM BAJWA

Submitted for examination for the degree of Ph.D.

London School of Economics and Political Science



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PREFACE

In the course of any academic study, the researcher is invariably indebted to many people. This work is no exception, and although it will not be possible for obvious reasons to mention everyone who has helped, the debt of gratitude must be acknowledged for others.

First, and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ian Nish. Professor Nish kindly agreed to take on the supervision of this thesis despite initial reservations, but if this work has any merit, it is due entirely to him. His kind yet firm control provided an invaluable lesson in historical scholarship and it was a pleasure to have been able to be one of the last group of graduate students to study under him.

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ABSTRACT

In August 1947, the British Raj was divided into two separate states of India and Pakistan. Relations between the two countries were strained from the very start with a dispute over the princely states, particularly Kashmir. Fighting started within a few months of independence and the dispute was referred to the United Nations.

Pakistan was a country divided by over a thousand miles into East and West wings, forming the largest Muslim state in the world, both in terms of population and size. It was this position which first attracted the attention of the United States. The Cold War had descended on Europe with a vengeance and threatened to break into a 'hot war' over Korea in 1950. The fall of China to the communists had led the American strategic planners to pin their hopes on India to show a non-communist example to the world. The Pakistan government indicated some willingness to help the west if it was given a security guarantee against India. It was a reluctance to antagonise India which prevented any military understanding between Pakistan and the United States.

By 1952, a new administration was in control both in America and Pakistan. The balance that Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan had tried to keep, died with him in late 1951. The team of Eisenhower and Dulles were 'Cold War Warriors' to the core, and so a closer understanding was inevitable. Military aid to Pakistan was initiated in 1954 after the Pakistan government had signed a pact with Turkey and a Mutual Assistance agreement with the United States. The role that Pakistan could play in any 'mutual assistance' was to provide the men to fight in any conflict in her region. After some reluctance Pakistan also adhered to two further pacts, the South East Asia Treaty

Organisation and the Baghdad Pact. How and why Pakistan joined these pacts will be looked at, with the hectic and complicated diplomatic shuttles between London, Washington and Karachi using British and American archives. The effect this had on Pakistan's foreign policy will be examined, with Suez as the case study.

Introduction : Pakistan and the World

Over the first decade of Pakistan's existence, she aligned herself with countries both west and east. In a sense, this reflected the problems with which Pakistan was born on 14 August 1947 with a West Pakistan of 33 million inhabitants and an East Pakistan of 42 million inhabitants, surrounded by a militarily stronger India. To counteract this she entered into a pact with Turkey, which culminated in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, while to the east, she accepted membership of SEATO in 1954. Few states in history have been conceived in similar circumstances to those of Pakistan in 1947. . This thesis will not go into the manner or justification of the event itself, only recording that Pakistan was created, and before the rest of the world really knew what had happened, the British had departed from the sub-continent, leaving behind the states of India and Pakistan. In a world political scene divided by the western capitalist and the eastern communist states, the creation of a state on religious grounds was thought of as an aberration against the trend of world politics. With hindsight, however, religion, particularly Islam, has become an increasingly important political and nationalist force.

The break-up of the British Raj and the partition of the sub-continent caused massive upheaval and problems, not least of which was a feeling of great bitterness between the two successor states. Ironically, the British emerged in 1947 in an influential position in both successor-states, as their dislike of each other, as well as the need for a powerful ally, meant that the Raj was wound up with official popularity in both India and Pakistan. Pakistan's problems were

crippling by any standards: a country separated by over a thousand miles of a hostile India, an underdeveloped infrastructure, the single largest immigration in human history and practically no industrial base or technology. To make matters worse, Pakistan lacked trained and motivated administrators and the one figure in the country capable of leading the nation through such desperate times was seriously ill.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-E-Azam (Great Leader), to the people of Pakistan, was a barrister and had been a distinguished figure in sub-continental politics since the 1920's. He had been the undisputed leader of the Muslim League for over ten years when he took over as the first Governor General of Pakistan in August 1947. As he stood out as a giant in the contemporary scene, all the major decisions were referred to him for judgement, even though the traditional role of a Governor General in an independent Commonwealth state was largely ceremonial. This tradition of referral to the head of state in Pakistan was to have unfortunate far reaching consequences later when lesser personages took over the job.

The organisation of a Foreign Ministry was also far from easy. The ministry was allotted two residential villas in Karachi, several miles away from the rest of the government offices. Not only was the physical distance daunting, the lack of equipment made the job almost impossible. One British visitor to Karachi recalled how the whole of the Foreign Ministry had only one typewriter! (1) The Ministry was initially headed by Mohammed Ikramullah, a former Indian Civil Service officer. The first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, served as the first Foreign Minister as well. It was not until December 1947 that Sir Zafrullah Khan was appointed to that post, and he was instantly called to the United Nation to present Pakistan's case on Kashmir. Pakistani

embassies were correspondingly short staffed, even in London and Washington. One Pakistani diplomat recalled how the first Washington Embassy was run on a shoe-string budget from two rooms in a Washington hotel, with the Ambassador drawing no salary. (2)

Kashmir

Pakistan and India were to have very little time ever to normalise their relationship and develop neighbourly ties. The two states were hardly two months old when the problem of Kashmir erupted, leaving relations so strained that two wars resulted as the direct outcome of that problem; and it has at other times again threatened to do so, right down to the present day. The basic problem of Kashmir was that it was seen as too important for either state to let go. It was seen by Pakistan as vital since the major rivers which flow into West Pakistan have their source there. The cultural, economic, physical and, above all, religious ties which Pakistan had with Kashmir left few people in any doubt in 1947 that Kashmir would join Pakistan sooner or later. The situation was complicated by two factors. Firstly, the Maharajah of Kashmir was a Hindu and had no inclination to join Pakistan, despite the vast Muslim majority of his subjects. Secondly, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, was of Kashmiri origin and had a personal interest in the subject. Some historians have speculated that Nehru was keen to see Kashmiri accession into India to disprove the theory that a Muslim majority state could not be a part of India. (3) The actual version of events leading to armed intervention by both sides has been a matter of great dispute.

What is indisputable is that during September 1947, Kashmir witnessed an uprising against the brutal regime of the Maharajah. The uprising was met with indiscriminate violence by the state army but large tracts of Kashmir were freed from princely rule. In other areas, Muslims were either massacred or driven into Pakistan as refugees. One respected British source puts the figure dead at around two hundred thousand. (4) Many of those driven into Pakistan were ex-soldiers and were preparing to return once their families were safe in Punjab. On the night of 22 October, an armed force entered Kashmir, including a large group of Pathan tribesmen, with the intention of incorporating that state into Pakistan. The Pakistan government accepted no responsibility for the action, claiming the force was guided by patriotic and religious fervour and had no official sanction.

Whatever the truth of this, and it seems implausible that the Pakistan government was not involved at all, the result was that the Maharajah appealed to the Indian government for help against the incursion but was told that he would have to accede to India before he could receive any aid. This he did on 26 October. The accession document itself was to prove another bone of legal contention. Lord Mountbatten, the first Governor General of India, insisted in the document of accession that it was only a temporary arrangement, and that a plebiscite had to be held to determine the fate of the state, once law and order were restored. Pakistan ever since has demanded a plebiscite since she is convinced, rightly or wrongly, that Kashmir would vote to join her. India has been notably reluctant to hold any such referendum and the arguments continue to the present day. The result of the episode was that Indian troops were sent to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir,

and the irregular Muslims were driven back. Jinnah later sent Pakistani troops in to bolster their position and the eventual line of control left India with the Valley and the majority of the state. Pakistan was left with some northern agencies and about one third of the area. India referred the dispute to the United Nations in January 1948, but then lost interest as her troops established a good hold. This is still the present position, despite wars in 1948 and 1965.

Strategic and military problems

The importance of Pakistan as a possible strategic base was not lost on the British. Throughout 1946, the British Chiefs of Staff and the sub-committee of the Joint Planning Staff planned to use the air bases of the North West Frontier as a form of defence agreement with the new successor state. The way in which both British and American strategic planners identified the need for such bases as a key requirement in post-war strategy has recently been looked at by historians. (5) The significance of such bases was their proximity to Soviet cities with a population of over 100,000. The Americans had first showed interest in the bases during the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in November 1945 when the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, had requested American control of such bases in the British Empire. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary informed Byrnes that India was virtually a sovereign state in such matters. The Americans persisted in these requests throughout 1946. The British aim was to secure a defence agreement with both India and Pakistan before the independence of the two states but this was not possible. The Chiefs of Staff still felt, however, that, if India and Pakistan could be retained in the Commonwealth, the two countries could

still be persuaded to co-operate with the west on defence matters. The Kashmir dispute, however, ruled out any possibility that Pakistan and India could work together on defence issues but the British strategy for South Asia continued to work on this assumption for at least two more years.

The military division of the British Indian Army was to prove one of the most contentious issues of the whole partition process. As mentioned before, the British assumption was that the strategic defence of the sub-continent had to be taken as a whole and not as separate units. The British plan seems to have been to cut their political losses, accepting the political partition of the sub-continent, but insisting on a common defence authority. The ability of Pakistan to defend herself against Afghan aggression aided by the Soviet Union was thought to be totally unrealistic. The British strategic nightmare was that West Pakistan lacked the depth to maintain bases and India was seen as vulnerable if Pakistan was defeated and occupied. Jinnah had no objection to some form of joint planning with Britain but insisted that Pakistan was to have an army of her own. The Indian National Congress, however, objected to any idea of Pakistan having her own army and so refused to enter into any defence talks. The division of the army was made all the more difficult by the fact that there were no exclusively Muslim units in the British Indian Army. Pakistan was eventually given one-third of the army and surplus military stores. (6)

The division of the military stores was to prove another bitter experience for Pakistan in her initial dealings with Nehru and the new Indian government. Instead of the promised one-third, Pakistan received less than half of that and what she did receive was mostly rubbish, such

as left-footed boots. Liaquat Ali Khan felt that the lack of stores made the Pakistan Army little better than 'tin soldiers'. (7) Ayub Khan, later to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and President of Pakistan, recalled how 'The position was so bad that for the first few years we could only allow five rounds of practise ammunition to each man a year'. (8)

This desperate economic and military situation left Pakistan with seemingly little choice but to seek allies. The eventual share Pakistan received from the Reserve Bank of India was less than eighteen per cent of the total reserves, and even this was forced on the Indian government by the highly embarrassing fast by Mahatma Gandhi, which among other things, was intended to ensure that Pakistan received a share of her rightful assets. To equip her defence forces, Pakistan used a large part of sterling reserves and foreign currency earnings, with government expenditure on defence in the years immediately after independence averaging nearly seventy per cent. (9) This implies that defence immediately became a top priority for Pakistan which comes to prominence as this thesis opens and that she felt that she had to make up for the military weakness by looking around for the support of friends.

The diplomatic position

The sheer impotence of Pakistan's defence capability, therefore, had been driven home in a rather brutal fashion soon after independence. Because of the economic and administrative problems of the new state the only solution seemed to be to look around for outside help. There has been a fierce debate in Pakistan whether the government should have tried to approach both superpowers instead of just relying on the west. It is true that the creation of Pakistan went almost unnoticed by the Soviet Union and there was no message of felicitations on the creation of the new state. Stalin was reported to have remarked how primitive it was that countries were still being established on the basis of religion. (10) Diplomatic relations were also slow in being established. It was not until April 1948 that Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, suggested to the Soviets that ambassadors should be exchanged. This initiative from Pakistan which was said to have been inspired by frustration with the western attitude over Kashmir.

The first Pakistan ambassador to the Soviet Union was finally sent on the last day of 1949 but the first Soviet ambassador to Pakistan did not arrive till March 1950. (11) It is interesting that Stalin had equally little interest in India at that time. The sister of the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, was sent as India's first ambassador to the Soviet Union. Despite Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit's impressive credentials, Stalin avoided ever receiving her. (12)

The British factor in Pakistan remained significant in the early years after independence due to the British officers who stayed on in senior military, judicial and civil posts into the 1950's. The

realisation was growing amongst Pakistani politicians, however, that Britain was not the power she had been before the Second World War. The United States had emerged by 1945 as the world's undisputed number one industrial, financial and military power. Washington owned two-thirds of the world's gold supply, one third of the world's exports and half the world's shipping. The army in 1948 had 12.5 million service personnel and a virtual monopoly on atomic weapons. It seemed to many to be the age of 'Pax Americana'.⁽¹³⁾ The U.S. also enjoyed a clean record, not having been a colonial power and having supported the freedom movement on the sub-continent. It was true that few Americans had supported the Pakistan movement but then it was a movement which enjoyed little international publicity, let alone support. The Americans were quick to realise two important facts about the new state: firstly, that it was to be the largest Muslim state in the world and secondly, it occupied an area of important strategic value.⁽¹⁴⁾ According to U.S. source material, the Pakistan Finance Minister from 1947 to 1951, Ghulam Mohammed, made a request for 'a helping hand' from the U.S. as early as 1 September 1947. It seems from this evidence that the Pakistan government were committed from the start to trying to interest the Americans in providing help for Pakistan on an economic and military basis.

Fuelling the movement towards America was a desperate realisation that India was not prepared to play the part of a friendly neighbour and that Britain was unwilling and unable to do anything about it. It must have seemed a logical step to approach the Americans for economic aid for two reasons. Firstly, the British and Americans enjoyed a special relationship in the new world order and so the Pakistani approach to the

U.S. would not upset the British. Secondly, given the new role of America as the defender of the 'free world' and protector of the oil wells of the Middle East, Pakistan felt that she could be a valuable ally. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister from 1947 to 1951, was reported to have agreed with a comment from Lord Mountbatten, the last Governor General of British India and the first of an independent India, when the latter said that there were only two major forces in the world at that time. One was the Commonwealth grouped with America, and the other was the communists and Pakistan should be allied with the former. (15)

The problem for Pakistan was not only that India was a non-communist state but also that the Middle East was already under British, thereby western, control. Moreover, America was not in a desperate hurry, as Pakistan was. Throughout the whole of this thesis there are certain recurrent themes; the main one of which is the American and British desire not to antagonise India past the point of no return, always hoping that Nehru would see the errors of his ways and agree to cooperate with the west. This western hope made the job of the Pakistani politicians and diplomats even more difficult, and in the first few years of Pakistan's existence she observed a position of technical neutrality but, in reality, was anxious to secure American help if the right terms were offered. The choice of Pakistan's first representative to America also revealed the importance Pakistan attached to the post. Jinnah appointed one of his closest associates, M.A.H. Ispahani as ambassador to Washington on 8 September 1947, less than a month after independence. The American response was significantly slower. The first American Ambassador to Pakistan presented his credentials in April 1948

but returned home after just a few months due to ill health. In February 1949, the new appointment was announced but he never took up the appointment as he was busy in Indonesia and ended up being the U.S. ambassador there! Avra Warren was eventually appointed the U.S. Ambassador in February 1950. (16)

Pakistan and the Muslim world

Given that the ideology of Pakistan was geared to the unification and independence of the Muslims of the sub-continent, one might have expected her foreign policy to have aimed at the establishment of a Muslim bloc in the world. As one former Pakistani diplomat put it, 'The unification of a part only of the Muslims of the world under the flag of Pakistan was thus not viewed by the founding fathers of Pakistan as the culmination of their efforts but merely as a necessary milestone on the journey towards the ultimate goal of universal Muslim solidarity'. (17) This debate has been covered in depth by Pakistani historians, (18) but there were a number of reasons why the natural extension of such a policy was not translated into any positive form. The initial hurdle was the reaction of other Muslim states themselves.

The creation of the world's largest Muslim state, both in terms of population and size, provoked a mixed reaction. While most states welcomed Pakistan into the fold of Muslim nations, some were suspicious. As one scholar has phrased it, 'other Muslim states seemed to have less difficulty than Pakistan did... in reconciling their allegiance to the concept of an Islamic unity with their functioning as a nation state'. (19) Egypt felt threatened by Pakistan's size and did not like Karachi hosting a whole string of seminars on Muslim affairs. Turkey,

which enjoyed the greatest respect in Pakistan, had tried under Kemal Ataturk to promote secularism and shied away from any talk of 'Islamic unity and brotherhood'. Afghanistan was also a disappointment for Pakistan. The only vote against Pakistan's admission in the United Nations on 30 September 1947 was that of Afghanistan, on the grounds that the Pathans of the North West Frontier wanted to join Afghanistan. Although the vote was later revoked, bitter feelings existed on both sides, with Pakistan concluding that it was surrounded on both sides by hostile states. Pakistan did gain some prestige in the United Nations, however, through the efforts of Zafrullah Khan on the Palestine question. Zafrullah spoke so well in the United Nations against the plans to create a state of Israel that he was later recognised as the main Muslim spokesman on that issue. (20)

Pakistan wasted little time in sending a delegation to the Muslim world. Sir Feroze Khan Noon, a prominent Muslim League spokesman, was sent by Jinnah in October 1947 to drum up support for Pakistan's stance on Kashmir. Noon revealed to the British Ambassador in Jordan how he was working for a union of Muslim states in the Middle East allied with Great Britain and/or the United States. Noon was remarkably perceptive in this as the Baghdad Pact was still not seriously thought of by British and American planners and was eight years away. (21)

The problem of dealing with any aspect of the contemporary history of Pakistan is that western powers like Britain and America have declassified their material and allowed researchers access to almost all files from the nineteen-fifties. This gives a somewhat distorted picture of events as the perspective gained from such papers must inevitably tend to be a western one. The Pakistan archives, till the time of

writing, are not available to public use and so the crucial Pakistani angle is missing. The only person so far to be allowed access to Pakistani archives has been the former head of the Research Division of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry. (22) His account of this period is mostly general and uncontroversial but has a few important references and insights which have been incorporated where relevant. What is, therefore, being presented in this thesis, is a reconstruction of events as accurately as possible, taking into account Pakistani memoirs, writing and interviews wherever available. Any conclusions drawn must, therefore, be seen as interim until the whole picture is complete, in which case some re-assessment will be vital. This aside, the material available in London and Washington is vast enough to provide a very good idea of what the western position and opinion was regarding Pakistan.

What this thesis hopes to cover is an examination of what Pakistan hoped to gain by any military and political alliance with the west and what the west wanted from Pakistan. The slow but inexorable moves towards a formal agreement with the west are examined, with the constant diplomatic moves between Karachi, Washington and London. Although the Pakistani archives are unavailable, the central character in the story is still Pakistan, with the internal dimension being seen as directly relevant to foreign policy in this period, and revealing about Pakistan's decision making process. The fact that Pakistan did not hold any national election, (in fact the first real election was not held until 1971), makes the role of the Pakistani public rather secondary. It was the same small clique which dominated Pakistan from its inception throughout the period under discussion, swapping posts but keeping the policies similar. It is not enough in dealing with Pakistan's foreign

policy to concentrate on the actions and statements of the Foreign Minister. The personal factor also enters in. Certain Pakistani statesmen saw their relationship with Washington as essential to their country's destiny. Other had uppermost in their minds Pakistan's place in the Islamic world.

This personal factor was important because of the nature of the state of Pakistan. The role of the Governor General, especially in the time of Ghulam Mohammed and Sikander Mirza, was as significant as it had been since Mohammed Ali Jinnah held that office from August 1947 to September 1948. The role of the army could also not be neglected; and, while its exact weight in the Cabinet is unclear because of the present lack of sources available, it is fair to assume that the defence minister (and behind him) the Commander-in-Chief, had a considerable impact on policies formulated. In 1953, we even see the two posts being combined with Ayub Khan becoming the Defence Minister. The unique and pressing defence problems of Pakistan made her foreign policy all the more crucial. What the thesis will try to show is to what extent the fundamental problems were solved and at what cost.

CHAPTER 1 Pakistan Seeks Security.

Growing American interest in Pakistan

The hope that the Pakistanis had of obtaining practical American help began to receive a slightly more positive response at the end of 1949. An internal report prepared by the South Asia section of the State Department in November 1949 illustrated a slight, but important, shift in the U.S. attitude towards Pakistan. The report pointed out that in her short history Pakistan had demonstrated a high degree of political stability and vitality and was estimated to be emerging as the strongest military power in Asia between Turkey and Japan. Her vital strategic position was pointed out with close proximity to the Soviet heartland and which offered the prospect of a base closer to Russia than anywhere else available. Her geographic position in relative proximity to the oil fields of the Middle East was also pointed out. The report went on to say that the Pakistan army, consisting of some of the best units of the Second World War, was having, in effect, to shoulder the total responsibility for the defence of the sub-continent against the Soviet Union. The heavy defence burden of Pakistan had also been compounded by the Kashmir dispute which added up to 'an exceptionally heavy defence burden'.

The report went on to recall how the Pakistan government had initially approached the U.S. in 1947 with a request for a five year loan of \$510,000,000. This was seen as virtually meaning total American responsibility for the defence of Pakistan and one which the U.S. had been unwilling to shoulder. Not only was the request refused but an unofficial arms embargo had been placed on the sale of military

equipment to both India and Pakistan. This was done in the hope of preventing a major escalation of the Kashmir dispute but had been seen by Pakistan as being unfair as India had all the stockpiles from the Second World War and so the embargo had affected Pakistan far more. The episode was recognised as having caused bitterness in Pakistan; and when the embargo had been finally lifted in June 1949 a military mission from Pakistan had visited the U.S. It had presented a comprehensive list of Pakistan's defence requirements and it had been interpreted by the State Department as indicating Pakistan's willingness to be associated with the U.S. in long term military planning. The Americans suggested to the Pakistani team that they should approach private sources even though, as the report admitted, the Americans were well aware that they could not provide the type of equipment that Karachi wanted. Pakistan was recognised as totally dependent on outside sources for her defence requirements and the U.K. was seen as unable and unwilling to fulfil the Pakistani requests. The report concluded that, if Pakistan was not assisted by the U.S., then not only could the U.S. not expect any Pakistani support in the future but she could also force Pakistan to make a deal with the Soviet Union. (1)

This slight shift towards Pakistan was continued, thanks to the negative reaction Nehru caused on his official visit to the U.S. in October 1949. The Americans were keen for a powerful ally in Asia after the victory of the communists in China, and Nehru had been regarded as the great anti-communist hope. But Nehru seriously disappointed his hosts by refusing to agree to any pact or formal military agreement with the U.S. President Truman spoke of his feelings about the visit with Avra Warren, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, in February 1950. Truman

told Warren that he had a 'disagreeable' time with Nehru and felt that the attitudes adopted in the Indo-Pak disputes were 'silly'. He went on to say that he had not been able to observe 'any inclination on the part of Mr. Nehru to be reasonable in the Kashmir dispute'. The President did, on the other hand, like Zafrullah Khan and appreciated his gift of a copy of the Koran. Truman said that he was looking forward to Liaquat Ali Khan's visit and the settlement of outstanding Indo-Pakistan disputes. He added that, in view of 'the apparent reasonableness of the Pakistan attitude' he was considering the possibility of proposing to Liaquat that Pakistan should make some sort of concession in the Kashmir dispute, in return for some sort of a quid pro quo, without specifying what that quid pro quo might be. (2)

The threat of war.

In the early part of 1950, the British and Americans were disturbed by reports of a distinct possibility of war breaking out between India and Pakistan over mass communal rioting in both countries. The horrors of partition seemed to be repeating themselves as Muslims fled from West Bengal and Assam in India and Hindus fled from East Bengal in Pakistan. Both sides naturally blamed the other for the trouble and the move to war seemed to be irresistible, but there was little doubt that Pakistan was in no shape for war and that Pakistan's leadership was aware of this. On 23 February, Nehru increased tension by threatening in the Indian Parliament to use 'other methods' against Pakistan to force her to rectify her ways. (3).

The tense situation meant that the U.S. Ambassador in Karachi, Avra Warren, stayed in very close contact with Liaquat and was in constant

touch with other leading political figures in Pakistan, including Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Governor General, and Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance Minister. After extensive conversations with many people, including the U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi, L.B. Grafftey-Smith, who had recently returned from a tour of Dacca and Calcutta, Warren reported on 1 March that the numbers claimed to have been killed were 'grossly exaggerated'. Warren went on to say that this was mainly due to the Indian government's deliberately inflated figures. The press reports on both sides were seen by Warren as also having contributed to the inflamed situation. Grafftey-Smith had also raised the possibility of the Indian government trying to smear Liaquat while the world was focussing on the Kashmir hearings in the United Nations. Warren expected Liaquat, during the visit of the Shah of Iran, to suggest that each government should accept the responsibility for protecting its minorities. The Ambassador regretted that he was unable to receive immediate news of Indo-Pak government exchanges as the organisation of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry was still weak, although he believed that the will to keep him informed did exist. (4)

Grafftey-Smith passed his impressions to his counterpart in Delhi, Sir Archibald Nye, on 16 March in an effort to clarify a few points. He found it puzzling how the commanders of the Indian army could have told Nye that the massive troop movements had been purely defensive while admitting that they could see no sign of any contemplated aggression by Pakistan. Secondly, Grafftey-Smith questioned how the Indian army could argue that its troop movements were designed to reassure public opinion as they were not only carried out in the utmost secrecy but were also on the Punjab border rather than the Bengal side where it would have been

more plausible. He also criticised Nehru for arguing that as Pakistan was a self-declared Islamic state, it could not look after its Hindu minority: that to equate Pakistan as a Muslim country in the same way as Saudi Arabia was as ridiculous as to call England a Christian country in the same way as Spain was under the Inquisition. The High Commissioner to Pakistan believed that there was little to choose between India ^{and} or Pakistan in their treatment of minorities, but for Nehru to issue bellicose statements had only made Pakistani Hindus feel more insecure and increased the flow of refugees. His conclusion was that Pakistan was very keen to avoid another mass exchange of populations as she did not want forty million Muslims in exchange for fifteen million Hindus. (5)

On 18 March, the U.S. Military Attache in Karachi reported a conversation which he had had with the top commanders in the Pakistan army, Generals Gracey and Cawthorn. They had discussed the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities between the two countries. The two generals 'laughed at the thought that Pakistan had the remotest idea of going to war', saying that there had been no movement of Pakistani troops even though India had concentrated almost her entire army on the Pakistan border. The generals went on to say that they had just returned from a Joint Defence Ministers' meeting where the situation had been discussed. All present had regretted the amounts being spent on defence at the cost of development and, in spite of the current situation, the discussion had gone into long-term planning and the possibility of joint defence with India against communism. The U.S. Military Attaché commented that this was the first time he had heard such a suggestion and it led him to believe that Pakistan was not seriously expecting war with India.

The meeting had apparently also agreed that the U.K. should play a bigger role to settle the current dispute as they had recognised that the U.S. saw it as a Commonwealth matter. The Pakistanis had said that, if the western powers did not play a more positive role in settling disputes and giving assurances of help against Russia, the Pakistanis should adopt a policy of neutrality. The Attaché commented that for Pakistan to adopt a policy of neutrality could be a very serious blow to the west as she had always been on the western side and the loss of her 'fine air-fields and soldierly qualities... might be the balancing weight between victory or defeat at the hands of the U.S.S.R.' (6)

The British Embassy in Washington was also involved in the Anglo-American efforts to defuse the tense situation. On 24 March, the Embassy had talks with the State Department over the situation and was informed by the Americans that the Indians had told Loy Henderson, the U.S. Ambassador to Delhi, that if further massacres of Hindus in East Bengal took place, then Indian action was 'inevitable' and no amount of external pressure could stop Indian troop movements. Warren in Karachi had asked Liaquat to make a direct approach to Nehru but was told that he had tried twice before but had been given the 'run-around' and was not going to risk that again. Henderson felt that the best approach for the U.S. now would be a letter direct to Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Indian Foreign Secretary, and pointed out that any wars in the past had been started by troop movements and he would be grateful if Bajpai could give him any information on the situation which he could pass on to the U.S. government. The State Department approved this telegram but had felt that troop movements did not go to the heart of the matter as the underlying problem was communal violence. (7)

The combined pressure of America and the Commonwealth had some effect when Nehru made some conciliatory statements and invited Liaquat Ali Khan to Delhi to discuss the situation. Nye reported on 28 March that he had met his American, Canadian and Australian counterparts and they all reported that their reception had been friendly and 'there was no hint of resentment at our action'. They had all been assured that the Indian troop movements had no aggressive intention. The western envoys were also reported to be relieved by Liaquat's acceptance of the invitation to Delhi. (8) The British even offered to send out a Cabinet Minister to attend the Liaquat-Nehru talks in India. Lord Addison was to have gone but the Indian refusal to accept him at the talks meant that he was ultimately not sent. Pakistan had accepted the proposal but Nehru said that he felt more progress would be made if the two leaders met face to face. The Indians also made it clear that the talks were only to concentrate on the minorities and Kashmir was not on the agenda. (9)

This particular Indo-Pakistan crisis finally receded when Liaquat Ali Khan flew to New Delhi to agree a pact on 2 April. The pact was finally announced to the immense relief of millions on 8 April, but though the negotiations still nearly broke down over the question of 'Minority Boards'. The Pakistan government had involved the western powers by asking the State Department to intervene over this question and the U.S. Ambassador had been instructed to help. (10) The Minorities Agreement, as it became known, promised the minorities in both countries complete equality, a full sense of security and equal opportunity. (11) The agreement did succeed in almost halting the massive flow of refugees from both countries within two months, but as one journal noted, the flow of Muslims from India had not stopped as 'many West Bengalis do not

want the agreement to work'. (12) Both the West Bengali ministers in the central Indian cabinet resigned as a result of the accord and publicly attacked the accord. (13) The British had ruled out the use of any force in trying to defend Pakistan in any conflict but planned to rely on the use of moral force and seriously contemplated calling for a special Commonwealth conference to dissuade India from attacking Pakistan. (14)

On 3 April, following the Minorities Agreement, the State Department drew up a Policy Statement on Pakistan outlining the basic objectives and realities of the American relationship with Pakistan. The basic objectives of U.S. policy were seen as the western orientation of the country, its development politically and economically, peaceful relations between Pakistan and her neighbours and Pakistan's voluntary association with the U.S. on the latter's international objectives. The State Department felt that, as Pakistan was dependent on external help for military and economic assistance, it should receive this aid from friendly western nations, particularly in the Commonwealth. Although the U.K. was not mentioned, there is little doubt that this is what the Department was referring to. It felt that Pakistan should understand why the U.S. was giving priority to the recovery of western Europe and that the recovery of those countries would be the best long-term hope for Pakistan. As far as the defence of the sub-continent went, the U.S. recognised that Pakistan could not shoulder the burden alone and believed that co-operation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan was necessary to the defence of that region. It was clearly stated that any U.S. assistance to Pakistan would also try to bring about the objective of co-operation between these three states.

The State Department policy statement recounted the story of Pakistani attempts to obtain military supplies from the United States and recognised that Pakistan had already started to turn to alternative countries as the U.S. had not been able or willing to help. The possibility of obtaining any bases in Pakistan was obviously not being helped by this turn of events. Public opinion in Pakistan was seen as initially favourable towards the U.S. but had become more sceptical due to a number of reasons; and so the document said it was necessary to remind Pakistan that the U.S. was 'neither pro-Indian, pro-Israel nor anti-Muslim'. The State Department felt that as Pakistan was more likely to be friendly towards the west if she was a member of the Commonwealth, U.S. policy should be to try and keep U.K.-Pakistan relations friendly. To this end, high-level talks were seen as necessary with the British to clarify the American position.

The question of Kashmir was seen as central, not only to the question of Indo-Pak relations, but also to Pakistan's friendship with the U.K. and U.S. The vigorous role Pakistan tried to play in the formation and leadership of a Muslim bloc had forced the State Department to review the previous theory that the destiny of Pakistan was, or should be, bound up with that of India. The Americans felt there was enough evidence to ^{show} ~~see~~ that Pakistan was a viable state and would continue to develop independently if not interfered with. The possibility of a close alliance between India and Pakistan was seen as remote and the breach between them because of partition as being very deep. The manner in which India had pursued its consolidation and the Kashmir dispute had led the State Department to comment that ~~it~~ indicated traits that 'in time could make India Japan's successor in Asiatic

imperialism'. This would have meant that a strong Pakistan leading a Muslim bloc would become desirable to maintain a balance of power. Co-operation, however, was still the U.S. objective as Soviet expansionism was seen as threatening South Asia. (15)

The visit of Liaquat Ali Khan to America

After his successful visit to New Delhi in April, Liaquat Ali Khan paid a visit to Washington in May. This visit has been seen by many Pakistani historians as being of crucial importance, not because of any major agreement signed during his visit, but because of the symbolic message it gave. Liaquat was invited to visit the Soviet Union in 1949 and had accepted. This was seen by G.W. Choudhry, the former head of the Research Division of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, as being a direct result of Nehru's visit to the U.S. He believed that the Soviet Union had noted how the British and Americans were paying far more attention to India than to Pakistan and the latter's resentment of that fact. This showed, Choudhry says, that the Soviet Union was quicker than the west to realise that the 'pivot of Pakistani policy' was her relationship with India. (16)

In the memoirs of Sajjad Hyder, a senior figure in the Pakistan Foreign Ministry in the fifties and sixties, he has described how Liaquat accepted the Russian invitation, which had come from the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, since no direct diplomatic relations existed between Karachi and Moscow. Hyder claimed that Liaquat was serious about the visit and had even drawn up an entourage of around twenty people and worked out a schedule of his trip. The invitation to Washington was said by Hyder to have been first suggested to Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance Minister who had been on a trip of America in September 1949. Hyder was

based in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington at that time and claimed that the feeling there was that Liaquat should visit Moscow first.

A visit to Moscow by the Pakistani Prime Minister was seen as an opportunity to remind the west of Pakistan's earlier commitment to stay neutral in the cold war; and Hyder claimed that there was after the announcement 'a sudden warmth in America's attitude towards Pakistan and its Mission in Washington after the Soviet invitation'. (17) The Pakistan Ambassador to Washington also seemed to agree with this view. In a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan on 7 September 1949, Ispahani wrote :

'Your acceptance of the invitation to visit Moscow was a masterpiece in strategy... Until a few months ago, we were unable to obtain anything except a few sweet words from middling State Department officials. We were taken so much for ~~for~~ granted as good boys; boys who would not play ball with communism or flirt with the left; boys who would starve and die rather than even talk to the Communists... we were treated as a country that did not seriously matter. With your acceptance of the invitation from Moscow overnight Pakistan began to receive the serious notice and consideration of the U.S. government... every effort is being made to rid us of the feeling that the U.S. is being partial to India ... efforts are now being made to rid us of our suspicions and to impress on us that we shall be accorded the just treatment and attention that we deserve'.

Choudhry claims that there was also a powerful clique in Pakistan who 'sought to sabotage any move toward Moscow'. This group was said to include Zafrullah Khan, Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah and 'other senior bureaucrats'. Choudhry claims that the Pakistan Ambassador to Iran was pushing hard for Liaquat to visit Moscow and when he was told by Ikramullah ~~to~~ ^{with} being careful in dealing _L the Russians, the Ambassador had replied, 'While fear of Russia is still as yet a mere bogey, there are others (the western powers) who have let us down so often'. (18)

No mutually acceptable date could be agreed upon by the Soviet and Pakistani governments and Liaquat had, therefore, indicated the urgency of the matter by agreeing to the Soviet request to exchange ambassadors before his visit. Hyder believes that Liaquat's acceptance of the invitation to America during the visit of George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State, to Pakistan in November 1949, before the exchange of ambassadors with Russia had taken place, led to a change of heart on the part of the Soviets who did not respond to Liaquat's offer to visit their country in November. Hyder describes the episode as 'a pity' and says that the 'history of Pakistan-Soviet relations might have taken a different course had he, (Liaquat), not been stood up'. (19) For whatever reason, Liaquat never visited the Soviet Union but followed the path of the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, and landed in the U.S. on 3 May 1954.

The Americans described Liaquat as a 'calm, industrious premier' in an intelligence report prepared before his arrival. Although the Americans recognised that Liaquat could never 'achieve in the minds of his people the peculiar eminence of the Quaid-i-Azam', he was still seen as providing very satisfactory leadership. Liaquat was seen at the time as 'dec idedly pro-American' and, although he had made many strong criticisms of former and present British policies, not as violently 'anti-British as some of his colleagues'. (20) The intelligence report further stated that in regard to Russia, Liaquat tried to keep an open mind and was 'more wary than receptive', adding that the opinion of the Embassy in Karachi was that a visit by Liaquat to the U.S.S.R. under ordinary circumstances would not be dangerous and 'may even be an education for him' but warned that, if Liaquat had found that 'Pakistan

was being sold down the river in favour of India by the U.K. and the U.S., he might be tempted to use the U.S.S.R. as a counter'.

His acceptance of the Russian invitation was also seen as coming after he had returned from a Commonwealth conference in London at which he had felt that Pakistan was treated badly in comparison with India and was being treated as a camp follower of no consequence. The Americans realised that opinion in Pakistan was divided over the visit of Liaquat to the States. Some had welcomed it enthusiastically, while others had felt that the American attitudes towards the problems of Palestine and India made any close friendship between the two countries undesirable. (21)

On his way to the States, Liaquat stopped in London for talks with the British Prime Minister on 1 May. Liaquat met Clement Attlee to discuss the situation between India and Pakistan. Liaquat described in some detail the talks which he had had with Nehru on the minorities problem and admitted that, despite agreement on the minorities question, he ~~was~~ been unable to ~~make~~ any progress on the question of Kashmir. Liaquat told Attlee that ~~that~~ this was still his main preoccupation and until it was resolved 'all other agreements were likely to be infructuous'. Liaquat tried to argue that Britain had her Commonwealth responsibilities to see that war did not break out and that the Commonwealth should take some action against the aggressor. When Attlee asked how the aggressor in such a conflict could be determined, Liaquat replied that he was willing to let any international body study the situation and to accept their arbitration. Attlee later described himself as being 'much impressed' by Liaquat's 'responsible attitude'. (22)

Liaquat Ali Khan arrived in the United States on 3 May. Liaquat's public tone throughout the tour was one of trying to explain the arrival of Pakistan on to the world stage. His speeches were later published by Harvard University Press under the title, 'Pakistan, the Heart of Asia'. Although Liaquat was given all the pomp and ceremony a head of government is accorded on an official visit, his tour did not arouse the same public interest as that of Nehru's. (23)

The danger of the Soviets making a tempting offer to Pakistan raised its head just as Liaquat was starting his visit to Washington. The Americans learnt through Henderson of a Russian offer to Pakistan of one thousand of the latest Soviet tanks, as many fighter aircraft as Pakistan could maintain and large shipments of machinery which would enable Pakistan to industrialise rapidly. All this equipment would have to be installed west of the Indus river. The Pakistan government was in return to be allied with the eastern bloc. Although she refused the offer, Henderson thought the Soviets were simply trying to tempt Pakistan and felt the offer was 'almost inconceivable' and 'stupid'. He wondered whether the story was not being deliberately circulated among official circles in Karachi in order to extract more help from the U.S. (24)

The Americans were unmoved by reports from India that the visit of Liaquat was proving to be a source of real worry to the government there, in particular to Nehru and Patel. Webb, the acting Secretary of State, replied on 9 May that the Americans felt it 'difficult to understand' Indian nervousness regarding the visit as it was planned months before as a visit identical to that of Pandit Nehru. Webb said

Indian fears of Liaquat trying to purchase arms should not be surprising as Nehru had also tried to purchase ammunition during his visit and the Indian Embassy in Washington was still trying to purchase military equipment. Webb emphasised that, although there were shortages of stock, the U.S. government had not changed its attitude of not objecting to commercial arms ^{Sales} ~~purchases~~ but turned down flatly ~~//~~ an Indian request to be kept informed of the nature of the talks which Liaquat would have in America, as the Pakistan government had not received, or even requested, information during the visit of Nehru. Webb said, however, that Indian fears would be kept in mind during talks with Liaquat just as Pakistani worries were during Nehru's. His conclusion was that Liaquat would do no more than ~~//~~ to present the viewpoint of his government, in the same way that Nehru had presented his governments. Webb added that the U.S. government had ^{er} ~~received~~ no comments or complaints from the Pakistan government before or during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister. This was an obvious dig at the contrast to Indian behaviour as Liaquat's visit was approaching. (25)

Liaquat Ali Khan had high-level talks during his visit with the President, Secretary of State, Defence Secretary and senior Pentagon figures. Liaquat created a favourable official response as the Americans feared a repetition of the neutral stance taken by Nehru. Liaquat spoke of his country's resolve 'to throw all its weight to help in the maintenance of stability in Asia. Stability in Asia is most important not only for our freedom but for the maintenance of world peace'. (26) The contrast with India was clear for all to see and Pakistan's acceptance of the American doctrine ^{that} of Asian countries ^{should} recognising ~~ing~~ the need for joint responsibility could not have failed to go down well in official

American circles. George McGhee wrote later that the Pakistani attitude had created a very favourable impression in America and after 'the wishy-washy neutralist Indians, they were a breath of fresh air'. (27) Liaquat repeatedly hinted at Pakistan's desire to be allied in some way with America and it was clear to the Americans where Pakistan stood in the Cold War. (28)

On 20 May, Sir Oliver Franks sent a telegram to London which claimed that Pakistan, 'the world's largest Muslim state', had been cleared by the Americans for large scale arms ^{sales} purchases. U.S. government officials were said to be disposed to allow Pakistan to purchase whatever arms were in the country. Liaquat was said to have emphasised the stable and anti-communist nature of his government. Doubts were still mentioned as to whether the arms Pakistan wanted were available as there were heavy American commitments to the European military programme. Because of the stated American policy of equal treatment in the Indo-Pak dispute, India was also assumed to have obtained the same rights. (29) Within two days of this telegram, Franks wrote that, in talks with the State Department, the Americans had denied that any arms sale had been made and the information above was incorrect. The Department officials ^{appeared} ~~were~~, according to Franks, to have been annoyed by the Indian attitude to Liaquat's visit as they had seen it as 'undignified and petty'. (30)

Liaquat was still in America, recovering from an operation after the official visit was over, when the Korean war erupted on 25 June. He declared that the Pakistan government would back the United Nations action 'to the fullest' and the Pakistani representative to the U.N, declared his government's support for the U.N. resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the aggressor and requesting help to this end from

other states. Although there were hints of Pakistani troops being sent to Korea, the only Pakistani contribution to the long conflict was ultimately five thousand tonnes of rice. Liaquat Ali Khan was said to have insisted on a promise of some tangible support from the west before Pakistan would commit herself fully to the western camp. According to S.M. Burke, a senior Pakistani diplomat, the United States was asked whether it would come to Pakistan's aid if it was attacked from India and, when the Americans refused to give any undertaking, it was decided not to send any troops. (31) This has been confirmed from other sources. Liaquat was said to have had a divided reaction from the Cabinet on this issue, with Ghulam Mohammed being notably eager to comply with the American request for troops. He was even said to have told Liaquat to 'govern or get out'. (32) Liaquat still refused to budge and the Pakistan assembly passed a resolution condemning the North Korean invasion but offered to send wheat rather than men. The Americans, however, did not feel upset about the Pakistani refusal to send troops to Korea. Their ambassador reported that the Pakistani decision was taken, not because of any reluctance to make a stand against Soviet imperialism, but because of a blockage of any progress on Kashmir. He therefore urged the State Department to try and find a solution to that insoluble problem. (33)

Western co-operation on Pakistan

On 4 May, a Top Secret formal agreement had been reached between British and American officials about the sub-continent. It was agreed that close liaison between the two states about problems of the sub-continent showed close agreement regarding their aims and that the U.S. role should be to 'supplement, not to supplant, the endeavours of the United Kingdom'. This was because of the primary interest the U.K. had in the region. It was further agreed that for all future difficult situations, the two governments should work out a joint response in case of 'profitable intervention or assistance'. On Kashmir, both sides agreed to support the role of the U.N. as a mediator and, although it was seen as politically inadvisable for either country to propose partition, if a solution involving some form of partition were to be proposed, it was decided that it would be 'considered sympathetically'. The other headache the Pakistan government had was the Afghan demand for 'Pakhtoonistan' or ^{an}/_h independent state for the Pathans. This was one dispute in which the U.K. and U.S. were not afraid to voice their support for Pakistan. It was decided that the Americans should take the advice of the British and warn the Afghans 'of the dangers of their agitation about the tribal areas'. (34)

The simmering dispute between India and Pakistan throughout the early part of 1950 caused serious concern to the U.K. government. To see two of the largest populations in the Commonwealth at each others' throats so soon after independence was the last thing Britain wanted. The Americans were also concerned about the possibility of war, although their main fear was the possible Russian exploitation of the situation.

On 24 July, Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington, sent a telegram to Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, suggesting that the Pakistanis had recently been trying to raise the alarm about the danger of Indian aggression. Franks recounted how a certain M.O.A. Baig, the Minister in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington and later to become Foreign Secretary, had called a member of the British embassy staff to him and proceeded to talk about the dangerous state of Indo-Pak relations. Baig had quoted at length from a report which had been sent to Liaquat while he was in America. Shortly after that conversation, Baig gave the British diplomat a copy of a Pakistani record of a conversation between Ispahani, the Pakistan Ambassador, and Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State on 5 July.

The main part of the conversation dealt with Indo-Pak relations but other subjects were also raised. One was the Indian objection to any Pakistani arms purchases and the other was the candidature of Zafrullah Khan for the Presidency of the U.N. General Assembly. A member of the British Embassy had asked the State Department if they were worried about the present state of the sub-continent. The Americans replied that they had asked their ambassadors in India and Pakistan for their evaluations but the report from Karachi was encouraging. Zafrullah had said a sincere effort was being made by the prime ministers of India and Pakistan to improve relations but this was not being reflected at other levels. Franks felt that Ispahani was trying to gain American sympathy for Pakistan in the run up to the U.N. debate on Kashmir and taking advantage of American annoyance at Nehru's stance over Korea. (35)

The meeting between Ispahani and Acheson on 5 July certainly took place along the lines outlined by Baig but the request for the meeting

was seen by the Americans as Pakistan's response to the Indian ambassador's allegations that Liaquat was making some misleading statements regarding the division of British arms between India and Pakistan. Acheson was advised by the Near Eastern section merely to go through the formalities with Isphani and stay non-committal. (36)

The main American pre-occupation throughout the latter half of 1950 through the formalities with Isphani and stay non-committal. (36) was, of course, Korea. As the U.N. forces faced setbacks in the Korean campaign, it became painfully obvious to the Americans that they lacked a reliable, useful ally in Asia. Of the two largest states, China was actively involved in an undeclared war with America by the end of the year, while India maintained its neutral stance and, despite arousing some hope in the State Department by supporting the initial U.N. action, Nehru totally refused to send anything but an ambulance unit. (37) McGhee had then flown to London to urge the British to take some action over Kashmir which would solve the problem for ever. The main reason underlying the American thinking was not the negative reason for fear of all-out war but the hope that an end to the dispute would enable Pakistan and India to release troops to fight in Korea. McGhee was also thinking in terms of the two states joining in an Asian defence system. (38)

This theme was developed in an evaluation of the State Department on 25 December. The problem was to try and predict how Pakistan's relations with the United States would be affected by an American conflict with China or Russia. A basic recognition was made that Pakistan's overriding fear was that of Indian domination. The Americans realised that they could not expect any Pakistani help in the ongoing conflict in Korea if it developed into a full-scale war with China. Pakistan was

expected to place her political influence on the American side and allow the Americans unlimited access to her raw materials. In case of a major war with Russia, Pakistan was expected to allow her bases to be used by the west. If the U.S. gave Pakistan firm military guarantees, then Pakistan was expected to become a solid ally. Other action hoped for from Pakistan was the possibility of taking parallel action with the U.S. in regard to China and Russia as well as taking part in an Asian defence system and the use of her influence with the Arabs to solidify anti-communist feeling. It was recognised that to win firm Pakistani support, the Americans should take firm action on Kashmir in the U.N. and help solve the Afghanistan problem. (39)

Warren was aware of the danger of moving too slowly. The decision to postpone the debate on Kashmir in the United Nations raised a storm of protest in Pakistan. Pakistan was to see the highest level of press criticism yet seen against the United Nations and the western powers. On 4 December, Warren pointed out the growing frustration within Pakistan with the lack of progress on Kashmir and said this would harm the position of Liaquat Ali Khan. The Ambassador said that Liaquat was already under attack from many quarters for his pro-west foreign policy and its failure to produce any positive results for Pakistan. This weakening domestic position, he thought, may force Liaquat to take a more visibly independent line. (40) Warren also said that the High Commissioner had asked his government to do something to strengthen Liaquat's position and he wondered if the U.S. government could also do something, preferably in tandem with the British. Warren suggested that a joint statement of support during Attlee's visit to Washington might be a good ^{line} ~~time~~. (41)

There was not a great deal of hope that Pakistan would join the western camp at this stage by helping to set up an Asian anti-communist bloc. The Americans felt that the Pakistanis would try to avoid antagonising the Russians. The Americans did feel, however, that the Pakistanis got on better with Americans, than with the Russians or British. The conclusion of the American analysis was that unless Pakistan was handled badly, she would remain in the western camp. (42)

The meeting of interests

1951 was to be crucial for Pakistan and the future direction of her foreign policy. The first major event of the year was the appointment of the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. There had been growing speculation about this, given the important practical and symbolic significance of the post, and on 17 January 1951 General Mohammed Ayub Khan took over. He had served as commander in East Pakistan and had recently been brought back to Rawalpindi, West Pakistan. Ayub recorded in his autobiography, Friends. Not Masters, how he was conscious of the significance of the event. He was honoured that 'after nearly two hundred years a Muslim army in the sub-continent would have a Muslim Commander-in-Chief'. (43) There is no real documentation on the selection decision but General Gracey definitely had a say. The Americans were reassured by the selection as Ayub was seen as 'pro-American'. (44) Few people could have guessed that this was a job he would hold till 1969, which would include two extensions till 1958 and then, nearly eleven years as the President of Pakistan!

Considering his later career, it is somewhat ironic that one of his first statements to the army was to 'keep out of politics'. He went on

to say that the army was 'the servants of Pakistan and as such, servants of any party that the people put in power' (45) Whether he liked it or not, however, Ayub was instantly involved in national politics. Evidence had come to light of a plot to carry out a coup along the lines of Turkey in the twenties. Gracey had mentioned to Ayub on leaving his post that there was a 'Young Turk' element in the Pakistan army. This was to be known as the 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' when, in early March, the Chief of the General Staff Akbar Khan, and a group of other senior officers in the armed forces, were arrested for plotting a coup. Akbar was one of the heroes to have emerged from the Kashmir conflict in 1947-8 and was thought to be the natural choice of Commander-in-Chief. Even Ayub described him as 'a brave officer who enjoyed considerable prestige in the army'. (46) The conspirators were thought to have had backing in the air force and civil service, along with several communists. Liaquat decided to hold ~~call~~ a special tribunal to hear the case, which would be heard 'in camera'. The defendants engaged a certain Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy to be their defence counsel.

Suhrawardy was to remain a prominent political figure throughout the ¹⁹fifties, and Prime Minister for over a year. Ayub was furious at the line of questioning Suhrawardy followed and later said that he could not 'forgive Suhrawardy's unnecessarily harsh and undignified cross-examination of the army officers'. This was to have later repercussions as Ayub and Suhrawardy were to become Cabinet colleagues ~~later~~ and Ayub felt that Suhrawardy was 'no friend of Pakistan'. (47)

The conspirators were accused of wanting to sever Pakistan's relations with the Commonwealth, move closer to the Soviet Union and re-open the Kashmir campaign. The proceedings of the case are still closed

but all the fifteen defendants were found guilty and imprisoned. The sentences ranged from one to twelve years rigorous imprisonment but despite a half-hearted attempt to secure their release, there was little public knowledge regarding the case. In October 1955 Sikander Mirza quietly remitted all the sentences and all were released. (48) One result of the episode was the fact that Ayub Khan was now the undisputed leader of the Pakistan army, and had gained the confidence of the west by his removal of the 'communist' element in the armed forces. This whole episode has been seen as evidence of how international strategic considerations had begun to affect the political process of Pakistan. (49) Army headquarters were moved to Rawalpindi as Karachi was a 'hotbed of intrigues' according to Ayub Khan, and the difficult task of restoring morale to an army which had been purged of some of its most popular officers began. (50)

American foreign policy took a giant step when President Truman presented his budget in early January ¹⁹⁵¹. Its main clause was to more than double the budget to pay for increased American military commitments around the world and to pay for the protection of U.S. national security interests worldwide, but particularly in Asia. Truman also approved the National Security Council's advice on policy towards South Asia, which accepted that the U.S. would have to take 'calculated risks' in that area. One of these ^ccalculated risks was to ensure that all was done to win _hPakistan and India over to the side of the west in the Cold War. (51) Before making any firm decision on how to do this, a conference of American ambassadors and State Department officials, was held in Ceylon between 26 February and 2 March to discuss this. Warren, the Ambassador to Karachi, reported that Pakistan was willing to provide forces for the

defence of the Middle East but would insist on a military guarantee against India. The U.S. was extremely hesitant on such a move as it might mean discounting India, the largest non-communist Asian power. The ambassadors decided that the Persian and Iraqi sector could not be defended without Pakistani assistance. (52) Such a decision, backed with the huge financial increase in American foreign military aid, was to signal a significant move towards Pakistan which was clear even then. (53)

American moves to displace Britain

American policy on Pakistan was spelt out in a policy statement in early 1951. (41) The basic objective was seen to be to increase pro-western feeling in Pakistan and to support any non-communist government in that country. Pakistan's manpower potential was recognised as important to the west at a time when Pakistan was trying to replace the role of the old British Indian army.

The document pointed out that the U.S. wished to avoid the responsibility for the economic welfare of Pakistan, while trying to help her to achieve some economic development. Impartiality in Indo-Pakistan disputes being seen as necessary, as U.S. policy was to support the British and Commonwealth initiatives for any settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It was recognised that American promises of help to Pakistan had always exceeded performance and improved implementation of promises was needed before any real objectives could be realised. Her policy of allowing the U.K. to play the leading role in western efforts to settle the Kashmir question had led to instructions to the Ambassador in Karachi to co-ordinate as much as he could with his British counterpart. Warren replied on 8 January that understanding between the

two missions was excellent, indeed it had possibly been too close in the past and that, while their approach to international issues was independent, their recommendations were nearly always identical. Warren suggested that, as the Pakistanis were becoming extremely sensitive to any suggestion of an Anglo-American front, care should be taken to avoid giving that impression. (54)

The Americans were aware of Britain's high opinion of the potential of Pakistan's army through conversations with the British military and an article written by a retired British general for a British newspaper which received attention in Washington. (55) The main thrust of the article was that the nucleus for the best army in Asia was in Pakistan, and military aid would be better spent there than anywhere else. The Americans themselves were also being convinced of this: in a memorandum, the State Department noted that, despite the seemingly formidable problems facing the Pakistan military, if military equipment was provided with some technical expertise, then as in the last two world wars, the potential for an impressive and large army existed. The fact ^{that} the British furnished military equipment first, rather than being inactive and leaving the area to itself, was seen as being of crucial importance. The limitations on Pakistan's ability to help the west were seen as a direct consequence of no major power being willing to take an active interest. (56)

The Americans were at this stage very interested in keeping Pakistan firmly in the western camp but were under no illusion about the difficulty of the task. Another State Department memorandum discussed the various policy-makers as well as the opinion-moulders who could be used by the Americans to keep Pakistan on a pro-western keel. The basic

policy-makers were seen as inherently pro-west^{ern} and hence in little need of any persuasion. The press and universities were identified as the major influential areas where work could be done. (57) The Americans were become increasingly aware that, despite the obvious western leaning of the leaders of Pakistan, there was one issue which could yet persuade them to join an alliance with Russia and turn their backs on the west. That was the question of security against India in general, and Kashmir in particular. The Americans noted that the British were trying to extricate themselves from this seemingly hopeless knot, thereby shifting attention back to the Security Council and the U.S. The Americans saw the problem of Kashmir in the wider context, not just of Indo-Pakistan relations , but also of it's own ability and willingness to accept international responsibilities. The U.N. wing in the State Department did not feel that the risk of offending India justified abdicating their international responsibilities and alienating the entire Muslim world who were already critical of the U.S. over Israel.

The policy review specified that the U.N. should not drop the Kashmir question but did not go so far as to suggest that the U.S. should now shoulder the responsibility of the initiative which the British had previously done. The definite political benefits of allowing the U.K. to play the leading role were recognised and the U.S. now wanted to be patient and wait for Indian concessions. (58)

In April, George McGhee met his British counterparts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices to discuss a joint strategy for Pakistan and South Asia. He was in favour of giving Pakistan some assurances against the threat of India in the event of a general war. He felt it was highly unlikely that India would take advantage of the situation by attacking

Pakistan. On Kashmir, McGhee felt that to placate Pakistani fears of an Indian fait accompli, the U.S. and U.K. governments should give Pakistan an assurance that they would not recognise any settlement in Kashmir which was brought about by the unilateral action of India. The British officials agreed with him that Pakistan was a vital link in the Near East but wanted to avoid any commitment to Pakistan which would antagonise India. The British felt that, if Pakistan was associated with the west in a defence pact, that should be sufficiently reassuring for her rather than demanding specific assurances. (59)

Anglo-American discussion on Pakistan continued in Washington in May. The Foreign Office had asked for a number of clarifications to the previous talks. The Americans said that, although a Foreign Service convention of theirs had concluded that Pakistani participation was highly desirable in the Middle East defence plans, there were no definite plans as to how this would be carried out. The meeting had concluded with the Americans promising to keep the British informed over any proposals over Pakistan. (60)

The Americans were not idle in the meantime however. They had been considering ways of trying to persuade Pakistan to join an Asian defence system. An official South Asia Regional conference had recommended that 'the U.S. should encourage Pakistan's participation in problems common to the Middle East and its orientation towards Turkey. In addition, the U.S. should consult more carefully with the Government of Pakistan on questions of common interest in the Middle East'. (61) The Americans also recognised that a great deal of tact and patience would be needed to achieve their objectives. The main problem which the State Department saw in their strategy of building Pakistan up, was that countries like

Egypt and Turkey would resent any attempt by Pakistan to assume leadership of the Muslim world. The Americans felt that the first positive steps they could safely take was to provide some experts for an Islamic Economic Conference and to assist in the setting up of an Islamic university. Pakistan was also to be kept informed of U.S. plans for economic and military assistance to the Middle East. (62)

It is interesting to note that none of these proposals seems to have conveyed to the British. This could be because of two possible reasons: firstly, the U.S. had not firmly thought out its own course of action as well as being unsure of the Pakistani response and had decided to wait until something definite was agreed upon before telling the British. The other, seemingly more likely, explanation, is that the U.S. had decided that Pakistan and the Near East was too important an area to be left entirely to the British and were now determined to play a solo role to secure American interests. In answering a query from the State Department, Warren certainly favoured an independent role for the U.S. and wrote ~~that~~ that the composite thinking within his Embassy was that it was becoming more and more necessary to play an independent role in Pakistan, as the British were showing themselves to be increasingly less willing to play the leading role in South Asia. He recommended that the old idea of letting Britain play the ~~leading role~~ should now be abandoned. Warren went on to say, however, that British co-operation was still a desirable objective as British prestige still remained high in Pakistan and it was desirable to uphold the global understanding which existed between the two western powers. Warren concluded that regular exchanges of information still continued and relations between the two missions were excellent. (63)

The assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan

Liaquat Ali Khan had remained in the shadow ^{of} the Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, almost all his active political life and had first come in to his own after the death of Jinnah on 11 September 1948. He was widely respected at home and abroad but it was becoming obvious, however, from late 1950 that his position was under growing threat. There were a number of reasons for this, but the failure of his government to achieve anything positive on Kashmir, either in the United Nations or in direct talks with India, was a major factor. The consistently high defence expenditure ~~made~~ development expenditure low even by Asian standards, and the fact that he ^{came} from a part of central India ^{left} ~~made~~ Liaquat without a natural constituency, and ^{made him} feel an outsider. (64) Members of his Cabinet were growing restless and a British historian with high level contacts in Pakistan believed that they were 'too ambitious to accept his sensible, selfless advice'. (65) Even if this was a somewhat partial view, there is little doubt that Liaquat was facing a restless and increasingly uncontrollable Cabinet. Ayub Khan later recalled that Liaquat had started to look 'too slow to regain the initiative'. His eye-sight was deteriorating and ^{he} was surrounded by people who were 'slow and indecisive'. (66)

Apart from Kashmir, Liaquat had to contend with a public upsurge of popular Muslim nationalism, exemplified by the events in Egypt and Iran. In Iran, a dispute between the British oil companies and the nationalist leader, Mossadeq, caught the Pakistani public imagination. In Egypt, the government had enforced the blockade of ships bound for Israel and refused to re-negotiate an old treaty which gave the British the right

to station troops there. Liaquat publicly declared his support for the nationalists and there has been speculation that Liaquat was going to capitalise on this sudden crest of popularity by removing some^{of} his critics in the Cabinet. (67)

In July, Liaquat addressed a huge crowd in Karachi in a 'Defence Day' rally called in response to Indian troops massing on the Punjab border. Liaquat told the crowd that he was not willing to throw away the freedom which Pakistan had won so dearly and pleaded with the nation to remain united, preferably behind him. Liaquat then made his famous gesture of leaning out of the window and holding up a clenched fist, declaring that to be the new symbol for Pakistan. This posture was maintained for nearly three minutes while the crowd burst into shouts of 'Pakistan Zindabad' (Long live Pakistan). (68) There seemed then to be a real possibility of war with India, and Ayub later admitted that Liaquat had told him that he was fed up with the situation and wanted to fight it out with India. Ayub said it was not only the politicians but also the troops who wanted to 'settle accounts', but it was his 'job to hold them back', which he did. (69)

Although the 'triumvirate' of Ghulam Mohammed, Ayub Khan and Sikander Mirza wanted Liaquat to ignore the public mood and co-operate with the west in the Middle East, the Prime Minister had something else in mind. There is evidence to suggest that Liaquat instructed the Pakistan Ambassador in Iran to discuss with Mossadeq the possibility of a joint Pakistan-Egyptian-Iranian policy in the Middle East. (70) Liaquat was now far more critical of the western attitude over Kashmir and noted sarcastically that Pakistan saw how 'action happens in short order where the Americans are concerned'. (71) Warren approached Liaquat on 12



October on the question of Pakistan's contribution to Middle East defence and reported that Liaquat was 'cagey' and most reluctant to commit himself in any way. Liaquat told Warren that he was not as concerned with the Middle East as he was with Kashmir and he hoped that the United Nations would, at last, propose something concrete by 15 October. (71) Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated just four days later.

On 16 October 1951, Liaquat was to address a Muslim League meeting in Rawalpindi. There were rumours that Liaquat was due to make a very important statement but, before he even started, a man near the front stood up and fired point blank into the Prime Minister. Liaquat collapsed and died, but more shots rang out killing the assassin, and all hope of tracing the motive ^{disappeared} _h. The assassin was identified as Saeed Akbar, an Afghan national, on the pay-roll of the Pakistan government.

Conspiracy theories abound as to the motive of the killing. Few believe that Akbar was acting without any instructions from anyone and many have pointed the finger at members of the government itself. There is no evidence directly pointing to anyone in the Cabinet; but the fact that Akbar was on the government pay-roll has been seen as significant. Whether anyone was involved or not, the removal of Liaquat from the scene certainly benefitted almost all the Cabinet. The lack of investigation after the murder and the claims that Liaquat was about to purge his Cabinet, all added to the suspicions. The British government has also been seen as a possible culprit as it is rumoured that Liaquat was taking Pakistan too far away from the Commonwealth into the arms of America. The United States has not escaped accusation that it killed Liaquat to prevent him from forming an independent Muslim alliance in the Middle East. The Indians were seen as relieved that Liaquat had died

just when war fever between the two neighbours had reached another high point. Whatever the truth, and it has to be said that no serious attempt was made to find it, Liaquat's death marked a turning point in Pakistan's history. The last national politician of standing had been removed and the new men to take over were not accountable to anyone and the democratic process in Pakistan slowly ground to a ~~charade~~ halt.

Ayub Khan was in London when the event took place and on his return professed himself shocked at the attitude of Cabinet Ministers. He recalled that 'not one of them mentioned Liaquat Ali Khan's name, nor did I hear a word of sympathy or regret from them...it seemed that every one of them had got himself promoted in one way or another'. (72) In a bizzare move, the Governor General Khwaja Nazimuddin, who had taken over the post after the death of Jinnah in September 1948, stepped down to become Prime Minister. Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance Minister, became the new Governor General and it was obvious to all political observers where the real power now lay, despite the technically ceremonial role of the Governor General.

Among the many strange incidents following the assassination is the fact that a letter written by him on 25 August 1951 surfaced in Washington on 18 October that year. The letter was to Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, and was a request for America ~~for it~~ to supply Pakistan with new weapons. The request was not a plea for aid as Liaquat pointed out that 'financial arrangements have been made by my government'. (73) A copy of this letter was also sent to Britain, who regretted their inability to help. Both these letters were hand delivered by a figure who was to play an important role in Pakistan's foreign affairs over the next few years, Mohammed Ikramullah. Ikramullah

at the time was the Foreign Secretary in Pakistan, and had accompanied Liaquat on his visit to the States in 1950. He was described after that visit as being 'thoroughly westernised. Ikramullah is.. friendly towards Americans.. he seems to prefer to associate with Americans and British rather than his own compatriots'. (74) In other words, Ikramullah was exactly the sort of Pakistani the Americans liked to deal with.

Anglo-Pakistani relations took another turn for the worse in autumn. The Deputy British High Commissioner in Lahore visited the British officers stationed in Sialkot. He said that the British and Americans were agreed upon the need never to antagonise India and, in the event of an Indo-Pak war, all British personnel would be withdrawn. When a British officer had inquired whether officers would be allowed to assist Pakistan in a personal capacity, he was told that this would not be permitted, but that British officers could volunteer to join any U.N. forces which might be sent to the area to restore peace. This conversation, with all its potential implications, reached the ears of the Defence Secretary, Sikander Mirza.

Mirza asked Ambassador Warren to find out from the British whether the story was true. Warren raised the subject at the next regular weekly meeting he had with his recently arrived British colleague, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite. Laithwaite appeared to be completely confused by the incident as he said that he was unaware of the meeting altogether, let alone the nature of the conversation which took place. Laithwaite admitted, however, that he had received a top secret message the night before to the effect that, in the event of war, all British personnel were to be withdrawn. Laithwaite believed that this decision had come about as a result of Indian pressure. Warren pointed out to the State

Department that there were about ninety British personnel in India and one hundred and forty-three in Pakistan. The Pakistan Air Force was seen as particularly reliant on British help. Laithwaite said he thought that the decision was both premature and vague.

Warren informed Mirza that, to the best of his knowledge, the account of the meeting was untrue. Mirza then gave Warren a transcript of the conversation of the meeting, which seemed incontrovertible. Warren met again Laithwaite and told him that Mirza's story seemed to be true. Laithwaite said Jaspar, the Deputy High Commissioner, was obviously the culprit and Warren should be aware of the immense embarrassment he had caused the High Commission on a number of occasions. ^{He} ~~and~~ was now due to be transferred. Warren commented to Washington that this whole incident was an unfortunate start for Laithwaite as the Indians would probably leak the new decision to the press and the Pakistan government would be furious. (75)

American moves to secure Pakistan's alignment

The Americans had by now decided to take a more aggressive role in trying to push Pakistan into accepting some form of a military alliance, such as a mutual security programme. Warren said he had spoken to Liaquat about it before his fateful trip to Rawalpindi and he had promised to give an early answer. Warren then waited until the period of official mourning for Liaquat was over before raising the matter with Ghulam Mohammed. Warren had also raised the question with the new Foreign Secretary, Mirza Osman Ali Baig. (76)

The British slowly began to realise that all was not well with the earlier pact with the Americans over the sub-continent. On 23 October, Laithwaite reported to the Commonwealth Relations Office that

his 'usually very forthcoming' United States colleague had not kept him informed of American moves to involve Pakistan in a Middle East defence pact. Warren had told Laithwaite that he had tried to persuade Liaquat on 12 October but Liaquat was reported to have shown only a general interest and had been reluctant to commit himself in any way, as he wanted some sort of guarantee over Kashmir.

Laithwaite reported that he met Zafrullah and 'threw out a fly at him' but he had not risen to the bait and had said the important thing now was for the new government to settle down. Nazimuddin was asked by Reuters around this time about his views on Middle Eastern defence and had also given a non-committal reply. Laithwaite declared that his own impression was that, the Pakistanis were not actively interested in the Middle East at that time, and any interest which did exist was designed to secure supplies of equipment and training. This would give Pakistan a greater negotiating hand over Kashmir and there was no serious risk of discouraging them if the matter was not immediately taken further. Warren had agreed that timing was the important thing now and he declared himself to be firmly to be against a four-power delegation. The four-power idea was that Turkey, the U.S., Britain and France should send a delegation to Pakistan to ask them to join a Middle East military pact. (77)

On 6 November, Donald Kennedy of the South Asia desk at the State Department, asked members of the British Embassy in Washington to meet him to discuss the two countries' joint approach to Pakistan and the Middle East and to give the State Department's views on what the next steps should be. The main agreement between the two countries was that an early approach to Pakistan to join any military pact would depend on

the reaction of India. The Americans openly said that they attached less importance to the Indian reaction than the British did and more weight to the importance of having Pakistan in the command. The Americans also felt that the British gave too much importance to long-term considerations, as the current situation was serious enough to demand immediate action and a western build-up of influence and defence. The State Department, therefore, were formally requesting the British to re-think their attitude to Pakistan's membership and wanted an immediate joint approach to Pakistan 'to ask them to join the Middle East Command and to agree to provide forces for the defence of the Middle East in the event of war'. If the British felt it was desirable, then the Americans were willing to make an identical offer to India.

Kennedy said that he assumed from previous discussions with British officials that the main reason for British hesitancy over Pakistan's membership of a defence pact would be the Indian reaction. He felt that progress should not be held up for that reason as there was, in his opinion, very little hope from India beyond neutrality and the government of India should be able to realise that Pakistan had different and legitimate interests in the Middle East. If the Indians were also given an equal opportunity to participate, then they would have no justifiable cause for complaint. The British agreed that it was highly unlikely that the Indians would ever agree to join the pact themselves but said that if Pakistan was involved without due consideration to Indian feeling, then great damage might be caused. The British line was that Indian reactions might be so strong ~~as~~ as to undo all the efforts ~~the~~ the west had put in to India to 'bring about a more realistic view on international questions'. These efforts were believed

have
to at least as ~~achieved~~ a benevolent neutrality. As far as Indo-Pak relations were concerned, the British believed that the Indians might well show their anger with Pakistan on the Kashmir question and take a harder line if Pakistan was ^{to} join the Command. Public opinion in India might also assume that Pakistani membership of the pact had ensured western military support for Pakistan, ^{It might} ~~and may~~ lead to bitter anti-Pakistani feeling in India.

The discussion moved to Pakistan's possible effectiveness in the proposed organisation. Kennedy argued that the requirement from Pakistan would be a commitment to provide forces, not immediately, but in the event of a general war. The American generals who had visited Pakistan had spoken highly of the quality of her armed forces. Pakistan would receive equipment in return from the U.S., which would have to be paid for. Pakistan was seen as being in a valuable strategic position and, as India would not take advantage of a general war to declare war on Pakistan, she would be able to reduce her internal forces considerably and have forces available for the Middle East. The British again pointed out the dangers of the intensification of the existing 'cold war' between India and Pakistan and said it could undo many of the advantages expected from Pakistan's membership.

Kennedy did agree with the British that it was likely that Pakistan would lay down certain conditions but the west was not obliged to accept those conditions and the Americans saw no harm in ascertaining them. Kashmir was specifically mentioned as an unacceptable condition. Kennedy mentioned that an indication of Pakistan's eagerness to co-operate was shown when Ghulam Mohammed had wanted to go to Tehran to meet a State Department official while he had been there but had been ^{per} ~~dissuaded~~ not

to. Kennedy had also mentioned remarks made by a Mr. Baig on the question of the possible Pakistani reaction if they felt they were being ignored by the west. An invitation to Pakistan to join the Command would show her that the west was serious. Kennedy suggested it was equally possible that Pakistani dissatisfaction with the west might be increased if they were asked to join a western sponsored defence pact without any support on the thing which mattered most to Pakistan; Kashmir. In conclusion, Kennedy said that he appreciated that both Pakistan and India were members of the Commonwealth, and the State Department did not want to put any undue pressure on Britain, but as it was the considered opinion in the State Department that ^{the advantages of} an early approach to Pakistan outweighed the disadvantages, he hoped the British would reconsider their attitude. (78)

The conversation of M.O.A. Baig which had been drawn to the attention of both the British and Americans, was with the Turkish Ambassador in Washington. The latter had informed the British that Baig had told him that now that he, (Baig), had ~~now~~ been appointed Foreign Secretary in Pakistan, there was going to be a change in Pakistan's foreign policy. Baig said the Pakistan government had seen the advantages of a 'policy of blackmail in international affairs'. In the light of this, Pakistan was going to move closer to Russia as a means of pressurizing the west. Baig declared that Pakistan was 'fed up' with the western attitude to Pakistan and had little hope of any gain in the relationships with these countries under the present circumstances. (79)

Baig continued this line of argument in Pakistan on taking up his post of Foreign Secretary. It may be interesting to note that Baig had been in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington and ^e _a ~~and~~ was chosen by Liaquat

to take up the job of Foreign Secretary. Laithwaite reported that Baig told Warren on 11 November that there was nothing for Pakistan to look for from the west and that a tougher line would now be appropriate for Pakistan. Warren hoped that Baig was not taking himself too seriously and asked Laithwaite for his views. Laithwaite replied that he was aware of similar comments from him while in America but had not attached too much importance to them. Baig, he felt, was very new to his post and was trying to use a new broom. Laithwaite added to the Commonwealth Relations Office that he intended to keep a closer eye on Baig and said that Baig was mistaken in trying to use tough tactics with the west as Britain was playing a firm role in Egypt and, as western support was crucial over Kashmir. (80)

On 26 November, the Commonwealth Relations Office prepared a memorandum on Indo-Pakistan relations. It started out by recognising that Kashmir lay at the heart of the strained relationship between the two countries and, without any settlement of that dispute, any hope of improving relations was futile. It felt that Nehru's attitude lay at the heart of the Kashmir dispute as he had a sentimental attachment to ^{the} ~~Kashmir~~ ^{place} which allowed no Indian minister any say in the dispute. The policy of the U.K. was reported as being one of supporting the principle of the plebiscite held under U.N. auspices but trying to avoid taking positions which would antagonise either side. The British felt, however, that the maximum pressure of world opinion should be exerted on India to force her to compromise. The U.S. policy was noted as one which looked to the U.K. and the Commonwealth to take a lead in the Security Council. The Americans, however, were seen as starting to lose patience with India and were pressing Britain to condemn the Indian attitude. This was

seen by the Commonwealth Relations Office as consistent with the latest American policy of writing off India as a potential ally of the west, and concentrating ^{on} winning the support of the other Asian countries. This had not ~~lead~~ ^{led} to any major divergence of views, the memorandum pointed out, but it was seen as possible that America ~~may~~ ^{might} start to lean heavily towards Pakistan. (81)

On 16 November, Ikramullah met Kennedy and Metcalf in the State Department. The Americans pressed Ikramullah on Pakistan's attitude to the question of Middle Eastern defence. Ikramullah replied that he did not know what the attitude of his government was to this question and he did not know enough about the topic to give his own opinion. He asked the Americans to supply him with as much data as possible so he show his government. (82) It is highly unlikely that the Americans gave him a copy of a report on U.S.-Pakistan relations which had been written earlier that year. The report had noted that Pakistan's insecurity had led it to be more western orientated and went on to say that Pakistan's problems with its two main neighbours, India and Russia, had led Pakistan to look more to the Middle East for security and allies. This was seen as very encouraging for the west as Pakistan and the west had a common interest in trying to curb Russian influence in the area. (83)

In January 1952, the State Department wrote an intelligence report on Pakistan's foreign policy which ~~had~~ pointed out that Pakistan was frequently disappointed by the lack of American support in its disputes with India. This was described, however, as a temporary setback in a relationship which was seen to be improving all the time. Pakistani officials were described as playing down the areas of differences

between the two states and as being keen on developing close ties with the U.S. (84)

The death of Liaquat was recorded in the next quarterly survey in February, of Pak-U.S. relations, as having a sobering effect on Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan and India. Pakistan's role as a moderator in the Muslim world was noted appreciatively. The decision to sell weaponry to Pakistan was thought^{of} as having a good positive effect but Pakistan was seen to be reluctant to sign any mutual security programme, partly because of Pakistani anger over a large amount of aid being granted to India and, partly because of the sheer indecision following the death of Liaquat. The report described Liaquat as 'a staunch friend' but foresaw no fundamental change in direction following his death. The moderate approach of Pakistan at Islamic conferences was regarded as very helpful as 'moderation in the Muslim world was at a premium'. (85)

Views on Pakistan's role in the Middle East

A split in Anglo-American co-operation over Pakistan became obvious in March 1952, when an American decision to sell aircraft to Pakistan was withheld from the British. (86) The discussion about the possible role of Pakistan in a Middle East defence plan was becoming an international one. The idea that Pakistan should become responsible for the eastern side of Central Asia, while Turkey was responsible for the western side, was one on which the Americans and some Pakistanis were very keen. The Turkish Foreign Minister was not too convinced in 1952 about the viability of such a scheme but Ambassador Warren in Karachi strongly favoured it. Warren argued that Pakistan had not only accepted but had actively sought political responsibilities in the Middle East.

He cited as examples the way Pakistan had played a moderating role in the Iranian oil crisis, as well as disputes in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Eritrea. He believed that Pakistanis saw themselves as part of the Middle East and recognised the need for social and economic reforms and the current power vacuum and disorganisation. The Ambassador went on to say that he believed Pakistan's leadership was aware of the basic threat of communism and intended to do all it could to meet that threat. Warren wrote that Liaquat had told him that, once Pakistan's own frontiers were secure, she was willing to accept joint responsibility with Turkey for the security of Iran. He had no reason to believe that the current leadership had deviated from this stance at all. The major problem Pakistan felt in the security of her own frontiers, which Liaquat had mentioned, was obviously Kashmir. Warren believed that, despite this pre-occupation, Pakistan's perspective on the region had not been distorted or lost. It was clear, he argued, that, until progress was made on the Indian side, Pakistan could not be expected to assume any military responsibilities elsewhere. The old argument that Pakistan had inherited the former British responsibility for keeping the Russian bear at arms length was again mentioned and believed still to be the case. (87)

On 20 March 1952, the Foreign Office reported in detail to the Washington Embassy on the talks British officials had been having with representatives of the State Department. Olver of the Foreign Office, commenting on the American view of Britain's attitude towards Pakistan, said it was untrue that the U.K. was coldly ignoring Pakistan's 'offers' to help in the defence of the Middle East. To correct this view he pointed out that as a result of a recommendation by the Commonwealth

Prime Ministers' meeting in October 1948, the British had offered to hold defence talks with Pakistan in April 1949. After some correspondence with Liaquat, the British proposal was turned down. The reason for this was that the British were unwilling to discuss 'local', ie Indian, threats to Pakistan and the problems of a world war. Towards the end of 1950, the British had again put out feelers to Pakistan but these were also rejected by Pakistan. When Liaquat was in London in 1951, the British Defence Chiefs had explained the British Middle Eastern position to him and expressed the hope that it would be possible for Pakistan to play a part. Liaquat had told the Defence Minister, Shinwell, that he recognised the inherent dangers for Pakistan in such a plan. Liaquat was reported to have felt that 'it would be easy to raise Pakistan divisions - but he could do nothing until Kashmir was solved'. On 30 August 1951, the Under-Secretary, Gordon Walker had told Zafrullah Khan that the British were prepared to sit down and discuss with Pakistan, the strategy in the Middle East and his country's possible contribution.

Those incidents were cited by Olver as being the main ones, but he said there had been numerous other conversations at all levels with Pakistani officials. In other words, he felt that there was no justification for American fears that Pakistani authorities might doubt whether the British would be glad of Pakistan's participation in the defence of the Middle East. On the question of the Indian angle, Olver wrote that it was not really a case of what the British or Americans felt, but that Pakistan was obsessed with the fear of India which was the key to her military assistance in the Middle East; the main British reason for not wanting to approach Pakistan at the present time was that

negotiations on Kashmir were at a critical juncture. On doubts about Pakistan showing a willingness to participate in a defence plan only to obtain more arms against India, Olver commented that the American view that Pakistan was willing to pay for any arms supplies did not prove anything, as Pakistan had always shown a willingness to pay for arms but was always frustrated by having a low priority, and so not receiving the arms. The British did not accept that improved Indo-American relations had led to 'restiveness' in Pakistan and stressed that the British policy remained one of trying to maintain a parity in arms supplies between India and Pakistan . (88)

On 5 April 1952, Eric George Norris in the U.K. High Commission in Pakistan wrote to the Commonwealth Relations Office with his assessment of Pakistan's attitude to the problems in the Middle East and Arab world. The military authorities in Pakistan were described as being far ahead of their government in their interest in the defence and security of the Middle East; and whatever Pakistani politicians said in public, they were well aware of the potential threat to that region and appreciated the western desire to bolster up the region's ability for self-defence. Norris believed that, if the Pakistan government could help, it would be prepared to help in return for some quid pro quo, such as arms and training but, in spite of hints from senior Pakistani officials, there was no real indication that Pakistan was willing to play an active role. Norris pointed out that some of the Arab states might not be too keen on Pakistani participation at all as the Pakistan government tended to see themselves as the natural leaders of the Muslim world. Pakistan was seen as far more moderate than Iran or Egypt but was still supportive of Muslims in any conflict with outsiders. (89) It was

certainly true that the Pakistan Foreign Ministry was sensitive to any suggestion that it was failing to follow a 'Muslim foreign policy'. On 3 June, the Karachi High Commission reported how Zafrullah had defended himself against an article in the 'Economist' which claimed that Pakistan was veering towards the west and against the Muslim states. Zafrullah called a full press conference to deny this allegation and the British saw it as significant that he had had to resort to 'artillery to scotch a fly'. It was believed to show Pakistani sensitivity to the charge, as well as Zafrullah's own weakening position in the government. (90)

Ambassador Warren in Karachi felt so strongly about the State Department's apparent mishandling of Pakistan that he requested a period of consultation in Washington, so the U.S. could re-examine its policy towards South Asia. Warren had been particularly concerned about the way in which the U.S. was seemingly leaning towards India in the Kashmir question by taking no action. He was convinced that, if this perception continued in Pakistan, it would ~~to~~ lead to increased sensitivity and possible unfriendliness. Warren was also concerned about the lack of food aid which Pakistan was receiving from America, as Russia was making far more attractive offers to Pakistan. Warren was certainly correct in his perception that the Pakistan government was growing increasingly concerned about the lack of any sign of real positive help from America. In June, the Prime Minister, Nazimuddin, had written to Dean Acheson:

'...I must confess a growing sense of insecurity is spreading over the minds of the people of this country... The Government of Pakistan feels it is a matter of vital importance both for the present and future to restore full confidence and self-reliance among the people as they may have to play an important role in the future strategy of this region of the world'. (91)

Nazimuddin was obviously attempting a subtle hint at the need for increased U.S. help in the military sphere if it wanted Pakistan's co-operation in any plans for Asia.

A review of Pak-U.S. relations in October stated that relations had remained much the same as before, as 'the Cabinet was unable to define specifically its attitude towards the west in general and the U.S. in particular'. The review noted that the Pakistanis had willingly co-operated at the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951 and had supported the American line over ~~on~~ the Japanese treaty but on issues closer to home had adopted a rather cynical wait-and-see attitude. An example of this was ~~on~~ Pakistan's determination to place a time limit on the U.N.'s negotiations on Kashmir before trying other tactics. Anglo-Pakistan relations were seen as remaining steady in this period; but Pakistani hopes of playing an influential role in the Middle East had received a setback as Turkey had refused to attend a proposed conference of Muslim Prime Ministers. The U.S. hoped this would teach the Pakistanis that 'it is not profitable not to place undue emphasis on Islam in their dealings with some of their Muslim neighbours.'⁽⁶⁰⁾

On 18 June 1952, the Secretary of the British Staffs Committee, V.W. Smith, wrote a Top Secret memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for their views on the position of Pakistan in any Middle East defence organisation (MEDO). The British position on Pakistan and the Middle East defence plan was then outlined by the Commonwealth Relations Office and is important enough to be quoted at length. It started by saying that the possibility of Pakistan's participation had been discussed in depth in 1951 and the conclusion was that, although Pakistan was a desirable member in the long-term, no useful short-term purpose would be

served by her membership. The reason for this was that Pakistan could not make a useful contribution for the time being and the severe Indian reaction could be dangerous for the west. A review of that position was seen as desirable as MEDO was shaping up into a realistic possibility.

The previous proposal behind setting up MEDO was to invite selected Arab states who could make a useful strategic or military contribution. The new proposal was to invite all Arab states and, under this system it seemed difficult not to invite Pakistan, without running the risk of her feeling snubbed. Any adverse Pakistani reaction would be directed at the U.K. as the U.S. had favoured Pakistani participation from the beginning. The sticking point over Pakistan's membership seemed also to be her desire to see as members Iraq and Egypt, neither of which figured on the British list of invitees.

On balance, however, it seemed to the British government a better idea to invite Pakistan in 1952 than in 1951 but there was a possibility of Pakistan herself turning down an offer to join. The reason for this could be that Pakistan seemed unwilling to offer bases to the western allies or to station troops in the Middle East and Pakistan's response was seen as depending on the Arab reaction to the proposals. The British line was now to invite Pakistan to join without urging her to do so, while making it clear that the Kashmir issue would be harder to resolve, and Pakistan 'ought to have her eyes open'.

A Top Secret appendix was added to give the views of the Chiefs of Staff. Their view was that a contribution of raw manpower to the Middle East would be of no value but a Pakistani offer to station troops in the Middle East or send troops there in the event of war would be useful. The British would then be prepared to give training equipment in 1952

and mobilisation equipment in 1955. From a military perspective it would be beneficial to have Pakistan's participation but it was unlikely that Pakistan could make any contribution with the state of her relations with India. The C.R.O. had agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that the Kashmir situation made any early Pakistani contribution impossible. The participation of Pakistan was described as a 'long-term object of policy for the United Kingdom government'. A fundamental problem was also seen as India's ability to make any Pakistani contribution impossible. Pakistan had hinted in the past that before any firm commitment could be made, certain guarantees against India would be needed. This was described as 'an impossibility' by the British. In a covering letter he had received from the Commonwealth Relations Office, Smith quoted them as saying that 'If it is firm policy to bring in all Middle East Muslim countries into MEDO, then Pakistan could not be left out of the invitation list'.

The British conclusion was that the first important task was to secure some progress on Kashmir and a general improvement in Indo-Pak relations. Any premature call to Pakistan would strengthen Indian hostility and poison relations. The United States view was seen as one of being 'greatly interested in the possibility of securing Pakistan assistance in the Middle East'. The U.S. had been urging Britain to invite Pakistan to join a Middle East Command with the commitment to send troops in time of war. It was hoped the U.S. would let the matter lie dormant for a while. (93)

The British government was well aware that Pakistan was now looking increasingly to the U.S. for military and economic help. They were also aware that Nazimuddin had sent a personal representative, Mir Laik Ali,

to Washington to purchase arms. The Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington, Burrows, had called upon the State Department on 28 July 1952 to gauge the success of the mission and was informed that the main purpose of Laik Ali's visit was to purchase military planes which the British could not supply because of limited production capacity. Burrows was then asked whether the British government was concerned over the proposed size of the Pakistan army and Burrows replied that his government did have some doubts about whether Pakistan was interested in a large army for defence against India or Russia. (94)

The British reviewed the position of Pakistan and MEDO in August 1952 in a Top Secret report. No decision had yet been taken by the Foreign Office, but the intention hitherto had been to inform Pakistan of the proposed new organisation in the same way India would be informed, that is, under the Commonwealth framework and not as a potential founding member. Pakistan was recognised to have a unique position in the Commonwealth as it was one of the world's leading Muslim states and one whose strategic interests were involved in the proposed plan.

Apart from the standard reasons for not inviting Pakistan, such as Indian misgivings and the suspicion that Pakistan was only interested in membership to obtain arms against India, a new reason was that Pakistan might not support many British plans for the Middle East. The reason for now reconsidering Pakistan's membership was the change in the basic conception of MEDO from having a Supreme Command and a standing army to having a centre in Cyprus with troops only required in war. The political upheavals in Egypt and Iran had made Pakistan look a more

attractive member, as well as the new arms export policy, which could satisfy many of Pakistan's requirements.

The main objectives of MEDO were outlined as being to increase the ability and will of the countries of the region to defend themselves, as well as safeguarding the eastern flank of NATO and oil supplies. Pakistan's membership would be useful to the organisation for her strategic position and her bases and airfields. The good quality of Pakistan's soldiers was also mentioned. MEDO was likely to offer Pakistan increased security on her western border and an opportunity to play a leading role in the area with British and American support. If Pakistan was not invited to join, the report considered it would have a bad effect both on the Arab states who would want Pakistani participation and inside Pakistan itself. Indian objections would be diminished in view of the proposal not to have a standing army as Pakistan would not be receiving large quantities of arms or special training. A strong Pakistan could also be portrayed to India as being a valuable barrier to communism. For the first time the Foreign Office said that, the Indian reaction notwithstanding, the advantages of Pakistani participation should be taken seriously. (95)

The Americans were left in no doubt about the strength of Pakistan's feeling when ^{they} ~~it~~ decided to sell over two hundred tanks to India in September 1952. The Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army, Ayub Khan, told the American Consul General, Raleigh Gibson, about this very clearly. Ayub told Gibson that he thought the Indians had not ~~the~~ bought the tanks for internal security at all but for use against Pakistan. He stated that the Pakistani public was becoming restless over Kashmir and that the government would have a difficult time controlling this

feeling. He said it would be ^a job ^{for} ~~of~~ the army to see that this agitation did not get out of control and hoped passions would not be raised to the point of hostilities against India as Pakistan was in no condition to go to war. Ayub felt that the U.S. should trust Pakistan far more than India as he believed that the latter was heading for communism and Nehru might have to ride with that tide. Gibson reported that he had never known Ayub to be more upset or serious than he was over the sale of the tanks to India. He was sure that Ayub would do his best to calm his government but was unsure how influential Ayub was. (96)

The quarterly review of Pak-U.S. relations in December mentioned some differences between the U.S. Embassy in Karachi and the State Department. The Department believed that a barter agreement which had been reached between Pakistan and Russia was a possible reflection of the re-orientation of Pakistan's foreign policy. The Embassy believed that the agreement with the Russians had only been signed after Pakistan had been disappointed with the American response before turning to Russia. As for a possible revival in the popularity of America after a gift of U.S. wheat, which the Department believed in, the Embassy saw this as only a temporary halt in the overall slide downwards. The Embassy noted with alarm comments from the Punjab wing of the ruling Muslim League which called the U.N. a body 'which moves only in the imperial interests of the United States of America'. (97)

In December rumours about MEDO and Pakistan's possible membership reached a level where the American Embassies in Karachi and Delhi asked some officials for their reactions. These reports were shown in confidence to the Foreign Office and relayed to the British Embassy in Washington. The Pakistani reaction came from the acting Foreign

Secretary, Akhtar Hussain, who said that Pakistan would 'jump at an invitation to join'. He felt such a move would offset the mood of anti-western feeling which had built up over Kashmir. Akhtar Hussain felt that as the Foreign and Defence Ministries in Pakistan supported such a move, the Cabinet would agree. The British were, however, inclined to take such statements with a pinch of salt. The Indian reaction was that they would be forced to react strongly to such a move and knew that the initiative must have come from the U.K. and not the U.S. The Indians also said they would be forced to increase defence spending to keep up with any military aid Pakistan might receive. The Americans were reported to be unaffected by these reactions and to continue as planned. (98)

Chapter 2 Alignment with the West

The Pakistan Army and Alignment

The Americans gradually began to realise the growing political importance of the Pakistan army and its Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan. Ayub was not shy of stating his opinions and the Americans encouraged him to air them. In February 1953, Ayub had a long conversation with Gibson, the Consul General in Lahore; he told him that he had just spent several days discussing the army budget with several cabinet ministers, but he saw the wheat shortage as a more important need. He said Pakistan looked to the U.S. for help in this matter and, on the question of the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), Ayub complained that Pakistan had not been approached for membership by the U.S. He said the communists in Pakistan were carrying out a propaganda war against MEDO and the longer the wait was, the more time the communists would have for complaint. Ayub said that he hoped Pakistan would sign a defence agreement with the U.S., similar to the one the latter had with Turkey. He stated that Pakistan was a friend of the U.S. and pointed out that the U.S. had a strategic interest in Pakistan.

The conversation then moved on to the visit of an Egyptian military mission to Pakistan led by General Ibrahim. Ayub told Gibson that he had advised Ibrahim that Egypt should be friends with America. Ibrahim had replied that America was friends with Britain, who was Egypt's greatest enemy. On the topic of possible Egyptian membership of MEDO, Ibrahim said they had not been approached and they would never take the initiative to approach the U.S. for membership. (1)

Ayub Khan's stated desire for some form of a military pact with the U.S. led to his ordering the Pakistani military attache in Washington to hand a document to the State Department in April 1953. The document was marked 'Top Secret' and had been written by Ayub Khan in December 1952. Its topic was his assessment of the Soviet military threat to Pakistan and the armed forces required to meet this threat. The tone and angle of discussion seems almost designed to appeal to the Americans. It starts, 'In order to assess the forces required to meet the Russian threat to Pakistan resulting from her political ideology', and goes on to speak of Moscow's hope that 'sooner or later the whole sub-continent will fall as a ripe but undamaged plum into the Soviet paw'. Other Russian objectives in the Middle East, according to Ayub Khan, were to destroy the influence of the western powers and gain oil and raw materials. Ayub went on to say that the defence of Pakistan was really the defence of the sub-continent, and to blame Nehru for this, as he was against any commitments with the west in the field of mutual security. A detailed list was then made of the forces and equipment required to defend East and West Pakistan. (2)

The first quarterly survey for 1953 revealed a friendly attitude towards the new Eisenhower administration, which had been inaugurated in January, and believed a 'keen positive interest in MEDO shared by the public and many top civil and military authorities' existed in Pakistan. The survey indicated psychological factors rather than diplomatic achievements were responsible for the rise in U.S. popularity. The Eisenhower administration was thought to be more independent of the British, as well as being keen to improve Middle East security. The Indian offensive against MEDO was seen to have increased Pakistan's

interest in it. The Americans took Pakistan's interest in MEDO as satisfying one of their basic foreign policy objectives, namely closer ties with neighbouring Muslim states. This would be a development applauded within Pakistan, as well as a strong card to play against India. Despite recognising this, the State Department still believed that Pakistan would honour any commitments made in a treaty. (3)

On 17 April, the Prime Minister Nazimuddin, was summoned by the Governor General Ghulam Mohammed, and asked to resign. As Nazimuddin still enjoyed the confidence of his Cabinet and parliament, he declined to do so. Ghulam Mohammed, setting a tradition regularly followed in Pakistan, ignored such technicalities and dismissed him. Nazimuddin tried to appeal to the Queen, as Pakistan was still a dominion, but was unable to get through. It is unlikely that it would have been of any use, in any case, as the Foreign Office was unconcerned by the news. The Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, Mohammed Ali Bogra, was appointed. This appointment was made for three probable reasons: firstly, the Prime Minister had ideally to be an East Pakistani, due to the sensitive political situation there, secondly, Bogra was without any real support in Pakistan and so could not pose any threat to Ghulam Mohammed, and thirdly, as Ambassador to Washington, Bogra was well-known by the decision makers there and could demonstrate to the U.S. that Pakistan was ready to take business. The American files confirm that the State Department was indeed pleased to see such a friendly figure in Karachi.

The next major step towards alignment was taken in May. John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, arrived in Karachi as part of an unprecedented tour of the Middle East and South Asia. Dulles had appointed as Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace Hildreth, soon after taking

office. Hildreth was a professor at Temple University and was chosen for his matching views on American responsibilities in the new world order, beliefs that the American leadership shared. Possibly the most memorable part of Dulles' stay in Pakistan was the guard of honour which met him at the airport on 22 May. He later described it to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. 'I was truly impressed by the carriage and demeanour of their people and their army. They had an armed guard for my visit which is one of the finest I have ever seen in the world. The lancers that they have, they were fellows that had to be six foot two inches to be qualified and they just sat there on these great big horses, and they were out of this world...' (4) Dulles was greatly encouraged by his meetings with Ghulam Mohammed and Bogra but it seemed the really important talk, reflecting perhaps, American recognition of where the real power lay, was with General Ayub Khan.

The meeting between Ayub Khan and the Secretary of State was held on 23 May at the U.S. Ambassador's residence. The participants were the U.S. Secretary of State, J.F. Dulles, the new U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace Hildreth, Ayub Khan and Lt. Colonel Meade. Dulles opened the conversation with an inquiry as to the state of the Pakistan army. Ayub started by explaining the difficulties Pakistan had encountered at partition and how, with will-power and determination, Pakistan had built up an efficient force of approximately twenty-five thousand men. He admitted that heavy armour was still required and therefore infantry was still the main strike force. Ayub expressed gratitude for the sale of three hundred and fifty Sherman tanks, as well as tank destroyers. He believed that the most critical problem facing the armed forces was one of ammunition supplies and stocks. His aim was to

keep a six-month supply but the economy had not permitted that and so reserves varied from one to five months. Ayub pointed out that, despite these handicaps, the discipline and training of the Pakistan army made it a force to be reckoned with. Dulles asked Ayub to be specific on the military needs of Pakistan. Ayub then handed Dulles the same document given to the State Department a month earlier. Dulles examined it at length and expressed interest and agreement with the thoughts in it. The topic moved on to the air force and air bases in Pakistan. Ayub stated there were six squadrons based around the country and it was an efficient service but restricted by the lack of funds. As for air bases, Ayub said there were many of these, many with long runways which could yet be extended. Hildreth inquired about the state of the navy, to which Ayub replied it was very small and was just designed really to protect Karachi and Chittagong.

When the subject then moved on to Kashmir, Ayub argued that it was necessary to put pressure on Nehru as he seemed content to bide for time, something Pakistan did not have. He attempted to reassure the Americans that any military aid which Pakistan received would not be used against India, as he felt war would weaken both countries and be too expensive. Meade reminded the Commander-in-Chief of the statement Ghulam Mohammed had made to the effect that Pakistan was willing to go to India's aid if she was attacked by another power. Ayub thanked Meade for the reminder and Meade said that he had already informed Dulles of this fact. Ayub continued on this theme and expressed his belief that after Nehru, India might split up into separate states, which might turn to communist influences. This scenario worried him as it would be dangerous for the future of Pakistan.

Dulles then spoke on the perceived change in Soviet tactics which seemed to be directed at South East Asia. Ayub said that he was well aware of the global conflict between communists and the rest. Ayub felt that the U.S., as the undisputed leader of the free world, should not be afraid to aid those countries who were willing to co-operate with them. He reiterated the potential, both in manpower and in bases, that Pakistan had and said the present government in Pakistan was extremely anxious to co-operate with the U.S. Ayub said he firmly believed that, if the U.S. gave Pakistan military and economic aid, it would result in India ~~||~~ dropping its intransigent attitude towards Kashmir and world security. (5)

After this positive discussion, Dulles returned from his trip to Pakistan convinced that Pakistan would be a reliable ally and recommended to the Foreign Affairs committee of the Senate that aid to Pakistan was necessary for U.S. interests. The 'Northern Tier' concept was a result of this visit as Dulles believed that there was more concern of Soviet intent where borders were near to it. Turkey and Pakistan were seen as the potential guardians of the flanks, with the responsibility to defend Iran and Afghanistan.

Dulles even sent a message to the Pakistan Prime Minister, that he had 'passed on my sincere feeling that the combination of the strength of religious feeling and martial spirit of your people makes Pakistan a country that can be relied upon as one of the great bulwarks in that area against communism... I shall continue to follow this matter, urging quick action, as I completely share your view that it is in our common interests to assist your country in this regard'. (6)

American moves to send aid

The U.S. then tried to weigh up the political consequences of a decision to grant military aid to Pakistan. The Intelligence Advisory Committee to the State Department estimated that the non-communist regimes in both India and Pakistan were likely to continue for some time to come. There was little likelihood of a resumption of hostilities over Kashmir and Pakistan seemed to be willing to provide the west with base rights and possibly troop commitments in return for substantial military and economic aid and security guarantees. The Committee recognised that the conclusion of a military assistance agreement between Pakistan and the west would be resented by India but would probably not lead to war. (7)

In commenting on the dismissal of ^{the} Nazimuddin government in April, the State Department was not worried about the legality or wisdom of the move and dismissed the former government as 'ineffective' in their next quarterly survey. The survey stated that the new cabinet was ~~stronger~~ ^{one} than the old one and more friendly towards the U.S. Nazimuddin was described as 'vacillating and mullah-bound'. The State Department was obviously familiar with Bogra through his tenure as ambassador. He was described as having 'real friendliness with the U.S.' The Americans were also encouraged by Bogra's remarks on the need to come to a settlement with India on all issues. (8)

The State Department sent the American Embassy in Karachi a 'Psychological Intelligence Report' on 15 June. The basic idea of this report was to try and analyse South Asia's response to U.S. policy objectives. While a copy of this report is unavailable, the reply by the Karachi Embassy gives the researcher many clues as to its contents. The

reply is long and detailed but important enough to be quoted at length as it is an examination of Pakistan's whole perception of, and relationship to the U.S. and the west. The first point raised in the reply was that it was a mistake to bracket Pakistan constantly with Ceylon and India because conditions were so different in these countries now that it was no longer true; although Pakistan was 'basically suspicious of U.S. policy and intentions' until early 1953, it was no longer the case because of changing internal and international conditions. The report accepted the old Pakistani line that the communists were influential in India, whereas Islam in Pakistan prevented the spread of communism. Economic conditions in Pakistan were seen as a reason for Pakistan to look to external help; and membership of the Commonwealth was the reason for close ties with the U.K. and the west. For these reasons the Karachi Embassy felt that Pakistanis were not nearly as suspicious of U.S. intentions as the Indians.

The report went on to say they believed that many Pakistani cabinet ministers were now openly pro-American in their statements but felt that an ordinary persons' views were hard to know because of widespread ignorance and illiteracy. The increasingly friendly attitude in Pakistan was seen as due to recent positive American acts such as the wheat gift and a lack ~~the~~ of concrete Soviet action, despite their conciliatory moves. The change in the presidency in America was also seen as a positive move as Eisenhower's statements on the importance of Asia to the U.S. were appreciated in Pakistan. Bogra, whose appointment was seen as accelerating a more sympathetic approach to America, spoke of the U.S. in such favourable terms that the danger that he might be regarded as 'too American' was mentioned. Closer economic and cultural

contacts with America, along with a corresponding disillusionment with Russia, were obviously positive developments appreciated in the embassy. The conclusion of the report was that the government and the people were not fanatically pro-American nor were the poor in danger of succumbing to communism. The previous six months were seen as crucial as Pakistan could have turned either east or west as it was previously uncommitted. The battle was not won, Withers said, but a beachhead had been established; a long time ^{would be} needed before local suspicions could be removed, as well as sporadic criticism, but a general drift towards America was seen as inevitable, unless unforeseen domestic or international events occurred, and even then, the goodwill built up would not disappear overnight. (9)

Hildreth sent the State department the text of an assessment report he had received on arriving in Pakistan as ambassador. The brief resume said that U.S.-Pakistan relations were better than ever before. Various reasons were given for this including American recognition of the fact that Pakistan's basic motive had been to improve its military balance with India. Apart from that, Pakistan's ambitions in the Middle East needed some form of military arrangement with the U.S. The decision to become a republic, although it still had to be announced, was seen as part of a gradual shift away from the U.K. and towards the American system, American methods and America itself. The realisation of the world position of the U.S. and the potential she had to help countries like Pakistan was seen as crucial. Pakistani officials were said to watch American moves in Asia carefully, particularly in the Muslim world and Israel. Bogra was seen as a big help in the shift towards the U.S. as he was a popular figure who went out of his way to praise America and

receive American visitors in Karachi. The wheat gift which the Americans had given the Pakistanis was a major psychological factor in the new favour with which America was viewed. (10) The only jarring note for Bogra and the U.S. was the criticism for the way in which the gift was received. Bogra ordered camels to carry the wheat from Karachi harbour with placards round their necks reading 'Gift from the U.S.A'. This was seen by many as undignified and lacking in national self-respect. (11)

On 5 September, Ambassador Hildreth sent a top secret telegram to Dulles on his analysis of Pakistani attitudes and suggested certain lines of action with respect to Pakistan. Hildreth emphasised that Pakistan was not prepared to follow the U.S. blindly or to agree with all U.S. actions. He listed a number of differences, the main one of which was Pakistan's intense dislike of Israel and U.S. involvement in the whole affair. Pakistan's recognition of Communist China was also at variance with the U.S., although Pakistan was known to be aware of the communist threat.

The other main area of difference was Pakistan's support for the North African liberation movement and her fierce criticism of the French and American roles. Hildreth believed these differences should be seen in perspective. The argument he put forward was that Pakistan was a Muslim country and aspired to leadership in that community. Pakistan was seen to be closer to Turkey than the Arab states and envied Turkey's position as a close military ally of America. Israel and Africa were not vital to Pakistan and so she could not obstruct close military ties developing. Pakistan's vital interests were closer to home, that is, India. By participating in MEDO or any similar organisation, Pakistan could break away from the fetters of Indian relations. Kashmir, however,

was still the focal point of all her foreign relations and the U.S. attitude towards that problem was seen by Hildreth as determining her attitude towards America.

The Ambassador then went on to answer some specific questions asked by Dulles. The first of these was whether Pakistan accepted U.S. leadership of the free world. Hildreth believed that Pakistan did accept this, but as her interests were centred in the sub-continent and the Middle East, all American actions were interpreted in the light of their effect on these regions. The second reply to Dulles was that Pakistan was not yet confident of continuing American support. Hildreth pointed out that he heard frequent complaints of American aid to India, despite the latter's professed neutrality. The third question was one relating to America living up to its responsibilities in Asia. He believed Pakistanis were unconvinced on this point. The main reason for this he believed was the failure of the U.S. to bring any pressure to bear on India over Kashmir, something Pakistan believed would force the Indians to be reasonable.

Hildreth pointed out that the common Pakistani belief was that the U.N. was little more than an American agency. In his view, the effect of domestic American events on Pakistan was slight; specific American issues were reported in the Pakistani press but aroused little interest. He then went on to outline the basic U.S. objectives in Pakistan. These were the creation of a strong Pakistan which was non-communist and similar to Turkey. Other objectives were a settlement in Kashmir and better relations with India. To contribute towards these objectives Hildreth had a number of suggestions, starting with a bilateral military assistance agreement with Pakistan. He saw this as ~~as~~ strengthening the

pro-western government as well as improving the defensive potential of the Middle East. The only serious objection to the move was its likely effect on Indo-Pak relations. The Ambassador believed it was necessary to keep the Indian government fully informed of such a move and to offer her a similar agreement. He thought that the U.S. should obtain a solemn commitment from Pakistan that no military equipment received under this agreement would be used against India. Hildreth believed that even with American weapons Pakistan would still not be in a position to initiate action against India and so the latter could not really object. The other suggestions he had to make were the continuation of technical assistance and economic aid and a reassessment of policies in areas which affected Pakistan in the U.N. and elsewhere. The U.S. could also, suggested Hildreth, help promote better Indo-Pak relations without seeming to (actively) interfere, in which ^{case} the Delhi Embassy might play some role. (12)

Ayub Khan in America

The visit of Ayub Khan to the States in late 1953 has often been seen by historians as a watershed in Pakistan's foreign policy. There was little doubt that Ayub was going to discuss the details of a possible American aid package, although he was technically going to inspect American military installations. Hildreth sent a message to the State Department on 15 September 1953 reporting that Ayub had told a member of the American Embassy that he was not going to the U.S. for 'pleasure or sightseeing' and wished to see top policy makers in the State and Defence Departments. Ayub said he had never believed in the MEDO concept as the Middle East was in a mess and bilateral agreements

were far better. Ayub asked the Americans whether they were afraid of an agreement between Pakistan and the U.S. because of the Indian reaction or the fear that Pakistan might use the arms granted against India.

Ayub answered these points himself by saying that a bilateral agreement with Pakistan would be the best way for the U.S. to get India on their band-wagon. In the latter instance, Ayub was prepared to give any guarantee that might be required that American arms would not be used against India, unless India attacked Pakistan first. Ayub added that he could not understand why the Americans had been so patient with Nehru after his numerous rebuffs to Washington and his support of communists. He stated that the U.S. needed bases south of Russia and Pakistan might be willing to make a contribution. The Deputy Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Musa, told the same American officer that, at a recent meeting of defence officials in Pakistan, Ayub had stated that he was going to the U.S. to 'see what contribution Paks could make to the free world fight and how best contribution could be made'. Ayub had also promised to speak bluntly at the War College in America as 'one friend could be plain spoken with another friend'.

Hildreth reiterated his belief that the visit of Ayub Khan would be an excellent opportunity to discuss regional defence problems. He said that, if the Americans believed in any closer arrangements with Pakistan, then as Ayub was the 'strongest individual in Pakistan', he was the right person to talk to. Ayub was seen as consistently following the line that Pakistan's best friend was the U.S. and if Ayub's 'Grand Tour' was in any way rebuffed by the Americans, it might have an adverse ^e affect on him and jeopardise any chances of an agreement in the future. Hildreth ended his message with the hope that senior State Department

figures would talk with Ayub. (14) It is interesting to note that no mention of this visit is made by Ayub Khan in his autobiography.

The ball was, therefore, in the court of the United States. On 25 September, the Assistant Secretary of State in the Near Eastern section, Byroade, wrote a memorandum to Dulles. Byroade pointed out that Ayub Khan was due to visit Washington in one weeks time and raised the question of what, if any, measures the Americans could take to demonstrate to the Pakistanis the American interest in the military contribution the former could make to the defence of the free world. Hildreth's warnings not to snub Ayub were noted in order not to endanger any possibility of an agreement. Byroade declared himself convinced that the Americans should offer some military assistance to Pakistan in spite of the certain adverse Indian reaction.

To minimise Indian reaction, Byroade believed that the military assistance given should be specifically to arm a brigade for use in Korea, with the arms to be permanently kept by Pakistan. The tentative estimate to arm a brigade of three thousand men would be around fifteen million dollars. The Indian reaction would be muted as the decision would not be obviously directed at them as the arms would not be for Pakistan's domestic use and would not upset the military balance in Asia. The other advantages of such a move would also be, believed Byroade, that another Asian country would be added to the U.N. command at a time when some of the allies in Korea wanted to withdraw and that a Pakistani regiment would free a corresponding American unit. Byroade said that the risk in such a measure was worth taking as the alternatives would weaken the pro-American government in Pakistan and

prejudice any chance of American hopes of building her up as a bulwark against communism. (15)

On 30 September, Byroade prepared a brief for Dulles who was due to meet Ayub Khan that afternoon. Dulles was reminded that the American advisers in Pakistan were quite impressed with him and, as he had an extremely frank approach, he would probably offer complete co-operation. Dulles was reminded not to mention to Ayub the American idea that a Pakistani ~~regiment~~ ^{brigade} should be equipped for Korea. While discussions with Ayub were seen as important, Dulles was reminded that Ayub had not been given any authority by the Pakistan government to negotiate and was technically invited by the American army to inspect U.S. military installations, and so, while Ayub should feel that he had made progress, the real discussions would take place in Karachi with Bogra, the Prime Minister. Byroade recommended that Dulles should give Ayub the impression of the friendly feelings 'which we do in fact have for Pakistan'. Dulles was told not to forget to mention his impressive guard of honour at Karachi! (16)

Later that day Dulles opened the conversation by asking Ayub what the purpose of his trip to the U.S. was. Ayub replied emphatically that it was to seek military assistance for the Pakistan Army. Dulles had smiled and said that, although it was not his business, he hoped Ayub would get what he had come for. Ayub remarked that everyone he had met so far had said the same thing and he wanted to know who would finally decide such matters. Dulles replied that it rested with the President to give such instructions saying that he could only tell the Defence Department if he did not want aid to go to Pakistan. Dulles then pointed

out the adverse Indian reaction to any military aid to Pakistan, in the same way as the Arabs objected to any aid to Israel.

Ayub countered by saying that no-one would get anywhere if everyone was to wait for all opposing factions to agree. He considered that Nehru was trying to dominate the Middle East and South East Asia and the two obstacles in his way were American influence and the state of Pakistan. He believed the way to deal with Nehru, and possibly settle the Kashmir dispute, was to go ahead with the strengthening of Pakistan and restore a balance between India and Pakistan. Dulles agreed that he did not consider the Indian factor to be fundamental to the present situation and, from a purely political point of view, he was prepared to assist Pakistan but he was unsure whether America could supply all the military equipment Pakistan needed. Ayub then closed the conversation by saying he hoped that Dulles would tell Eisenhower all the things he had just been told. (17)

The Governor General, Ghulam Mohammed, left Karachi on 19 October for a six week tour that included America for 'medical reasons'. As Ayub was already in America, there was inevitably speculation on defence talks taking place. (18) Ghulam Mohammed was to join Ayub in discussions regarding military aid. Ayub was said to have briefed him that the talks were going well. The Pakistan parliament or Cabinet were not consulted or even informed about the discussions, although Bogra and Zafrullah 'actively participated'. (19) Dulles felt such a valuable opportunity should not be missed and recommended that Ayub should meet Eisenhower himself. In a note to Byroade on 1 October, Dulles said that he had mentioned it to Ayub at lunch and 'he seemed to agree'. It is not hard to imagine how Ayub must have jumped at the chance! Dulles said he

personally would be glad to arrange the meeting on Ayub's return to the States in mid-October. (20).

On the same day, Dulles noted approvingly that the historic political decision to grant military aid to Pakistan had been approved by President Eisenhower on 31 October. Dulles said that he 'wholly concurred' with the decision. This decision was so novel that even Admiral Radford of the National Security Council was unaware of it when Dulles mentioned it to him. (21) The Americans did not mention the decision to Ayub and continued to talk to him as if no firm line had yet been decided. On 12 November, Ghulam Mohammed met President Eisenhower. Unfortunately no archive material was available of their talks, but it hard to believe that they discussed nothing more than stockbreeding, which was all Ghulam Mohammed would reveal to reporters! (22) Ayub Khan was later to describe the talks as 'highly complicated' and occasionally 'extremely slow' but eventually successful. (23)

A glimpse of what was in ~~the~~ American minds is provided by the diaries of a reporter for the *New York Times*. Sulzberger noted on 23 November that Eisenhower looked grim, and said Pakistan wanted to help the western cause but needed military aid to do so. Eisenhower said the Pakistanis were 'vital, brave people like the Turks and the Greeks'. The President's patience with Nehru was obviously wearing thin as he described the Indians as simply being a 'nuisance' and resented ~~at~~ the delay that their attitude was causing to aid for Pakistan. Byroade also met Sulzberger and declared that the U.S. did not want any bases in Pakistan, and only wanted to build up the defence of a friendly state. Byroade did not mention that the U.S. had seen bases in Pakistan as vital to the defence of the 'free world for decades and once military

aid was given to Pakistan, the latter would find it hard to refuse any request for bases. (24)

The British watch the U.S. take control

The Anglo-American discussions on the pros and cons of military aid to Pakistan continued in late 1953. On 16 October, a meeting took place in Washington between Beeley and Crowley on the British side and Jernegan and Smith on the American side. The British had asked for the meeting in order to report back on London's response to the American proposal, relayed to the British a week earlier, about granting military aid to Pakistan. Beeley started by saying that, 'broadly speaking, London did not like the U.S. proposal'. The U.K. would also like to see Pakistan militarily strengthened, he said, but there was the problem of the Indian reaction. India would consider that the U.S. was spreading the cold war to the sub-continent and had decided to take the Pakistani side in the Kashmir dispute. Indian reaction might be so sharp as to threaten certain British bases in India which were of importance to western defence. Furthermore, reported Beeley, there was the question of the Pakistan government's attitude. The British government hoped that the U.S. would not put Pakistan in the position of finding it embarrassing to refuse western assistance. Both Liaquat and Nazimuddin had said that the Kashmir problem had to be solved before Pakistan was ready to take any responsibility for wider defence. Bogra's actions had also shown a similar tendency and it was doubtful whether Pakistan would want to send any troops to Korea. The U.K. hoped that the Americans would only grant military aid to Pakistan after it was requested by the Pakistan cabinet and not just by Ayub Khan. The British also hoped that

there would be no security leak as it could lead to a violent Indian reaction. (25)

Ayub Khan's return visit to America started with a meeting with Byroade on 21 October. The Pakistani Ambassador, Amjed Ali, U.S. officials from the Defence Department, South Asia desk and the Mutual Security programme, were also present. Byroade said that Ayub had indicated an interest in the possible content of a mutual assistance agreement and he had therefore prepared a purely speculative draft which should not be taken to illustrate the U.S. position. Grey, of the Mutual Security programme, upon request, read out the draft paragraph by paragraph and answered all questions raised. Since the draft had not been cleared by the State Department, it was decided not to give Ayub a copy. Ayub believed that everything which had been mentioned could be cleared through negotiation. What Ayub really wanted to know, however, was what the U.S. wanted from Pakistan in return for military assistance. The Defence Department official said that America's primary interest lay in strengthening Pakistan's defence capability and its association with the west and in accepting the political assurances contained in an agreement. No specific military commitment to provide troops outside the area was involved. Byroade mentioned that the U.S. might be interested at a later stage in developing some regional defence groups and he hoped that Pakistan would discuss her participation in a 'friendly and co-operative spirit'. Ayub said this would, of course, be the case.

Byroade emphasised that the U.S. had still reached no decision on military aid to Pakistan but, when it did, negotiations would be carried out in Karachi. Hildreth would be brought up to date and, depending on

the decision, would take up the question with the Prime Minister. Byroade also said that at the start of any such programme there would not be any large sum of money available as it would concentrate on providing Pakistan with useful, specific items; a military assistance group would then be set up which would develop a thorough programme on the spot. Byroade said that as the majority of Pakistan's equipment was presently British, the problem of co-ordinating equipment would have to be sorted out between British and American engineers. Ayub indicated that the majority of Pakistan's engineering equipment and tanks were in fact American, while guns and small artillery were British. He added that he and his colleagues^a would be willing to discuss this problem and he foresaw no problem. The question of the Indian reaction came up and Ayub felt that after a 'horrible fuss' the Indians would calm down. Byroade tried to emphasise that the American grant of military aid would be a major step for Pakistan and not one which she should take lightly. Ayub and Amjed Ali said that, if the decision was made to grant military aid to Pakistan, then that decision should not be changed, no matter what the reaction from others. All present at the meeting finally agreed on the great need for absolute secrecy. (26)

Before finally leaving the U.S., Ayub Khan wrote on 2 November to General Bedell Smith, who was the Under Secretary of State, saying what a great pleasure the trip had been for him and hoping that Smith would keep an 'eye on things' from his angle, as he, Ayub, would keep an 'eye on things from his angle'. (27) At a press conference on 19 November, Eisenhower emphasised that aid to Pakistan would have to be handled with great care because of the Indian reaction. The Pakistanis were afraid that this meant that the administration had decided not to give

aid. A diplomatic offensive was launched by Amjed Ali to get the U.S. to clarify their position, but a tight lid was kept on the real position, much to the frustration of the Pakistan government. (28)

In Karachi on 2 December, Hildreth met Bogra to clear the ground for a visit by Vice-President Richard Nixon. Hildreth asked Bogra if he was going to 'stick by ship and in which direction he was going to sail it'. The Prime Minister admitted to being unhappy with the situation but said he was going to sail the ship out of its present crisis and towards the west. He felt he could regain some ground lost to the 'reactionaries' during his illness. Bogra believed he still had the majority of the cabinet with him, and even the East Pakistan delegates would soften their anti-American stance. He showed Hildreth the Soviet note of anger and warning over the rumoured American military aid package. Bogra expressed resentment over the note which demanded an explanation of Pakistan's dealings with the west and over its bases. The Pakistani Prime Minister pleaded strongly with Hildreth to make sure that, once any decision was made public by the U.S., they should stick by it against all pressure. Hildreth quoted Bogra as saying, 'Take what time you need but once the decision is made stick by ^{it} and don't leave us out on a limb'. Hildreth assured him that he would emphasise this point and pointed out that it would be disastrous for the U.S. to renege on a decision made if it expected any of its allies to have faith in American commitments. (29)

The visit of Nixon to Pakistan led to telegrams of advice and requests being sent from Washington to Karachi and back regularly. On 4 December, the State Department cautioned the American team against taking a patronising tone with Pakistani officials. It was seen by

Washington as desirable that Nixon should give positive encouragement to the Governor General and Prime Minister. Nixon was told to emphasise how the U.S. was aware of the magnitude of the problems Bogra had to face but the U.S. was confident that his sincere approach to these problems would be successful. Nixon was instructed to avoid all questions on military aid to Pakistan by saying that he had come to hear the Pakistani position and had been away from America for some time and was not aware of the latest line of thinking himself. (30)

The Vice-President arrived in Pakistan on 7 December for a three-day tour and, in talks with Ghulam Mohammed two days later, he was told that if military aid was granted to Pakistan, he, Ghulam Mohammed, would personally fly over to Delhi to see 'his old friend' Nehru. He said that, although Nehru would be angry, he believed that his anger would blow over without his moving closer to the communist world. Ghulam Mohammed warned that on the other hand not giving any aid to Pakistan would have 'a disastrous effect'. He pointed out that military aid would be a pre-requisite for Pakistani membership of any Middle Eastern alliance. Bogra in conversation with his important American visitors said that he did not believe that India should be afraid of Pakistan. Other Pakistani cabinet ministers had told the Americans that the position of Bogra, who was known to be openly pro-American, would be severely damaged if aid was not granted. The result would be that other Pakistani politicians would not be so willing to stand up to the Russian threat.

Eildreth said that the final evaluation should take three factors into consideration. Firstly, the importance of Pakistan to the defence of the Middle East; secondly, the Indian reaction and thirdly, the

negative impact in South Asia if no aid was granted to Pakistan after the prospects have been publicised. He emphasised his belief that the risks were worth taking. Nixon also urged Dulles to delay the decision of the National Security Council until he can personally consult with him and the Defence Secretary. Nixon was reassured that no action would be taken until his report. (31) G.W. Choudhry, after examining the Pakistani archives of the time, believes that Nixon, more than anyone else in the Eisenhower administration, sympathised with Pakistan's defence problems and he assured the Pakistani leadership of his support. Nixon was to prove true to his word. (32)

On his return from the States, Ayub Khan sent a message to the Pakistani Military Attache in Washington, Brigadier Jilani, dated 3 January 1954. The message was intercepted by the Americans and a copy of it sent to the State Department. The message read : 'Please tell Mr. Keyes on my behalf that delay over decision matter I discussed with you is going to do no good to your or our interests. A lot of goodwill exists in this country for your country. This liable to evaporate if no confirmation from your side. Also India very busy poisoning Middle East and Southeast Asian countries against us and you. All this will come to an end once an agreement between Pakistan and U.S. is reached. See that this is done quickly. Thereafter events will take the course as I predicted and told you'. (33) This letter is a piece of concrete evidence of American interception of Pakistani mail and shows how aware they must have been of Pakistani intentions and ideas.

The final details

On 4 January, Jernegan, of the Near Eastern Section, wrote a Top Secret memorandum for the President on military aid to Pakistan. It

pointed out that 'all high officials' in the Pakistan government badly wanted military aid from America and that Pakistan had recently been forced to make some cuts in her defence budget for the next year. The Americans were unsure as to how much the cut was but the military attache in Karachi had estimated that the Pakistan army was even weaker as a result than it was six months ago. Hildreth was warned by Bogra that the American indecision was placing him in an embarrassing position. The report noted that the Indian reaction was as feared, but Ambassador Allen in Delhi believed that it would not be fatal to Indo-U.S. relations. The Americans had asked the Turkish government whether it would be interested in some loose defence arrangement with Pakistan, which would involve consultation and defence planning. They believed that such an agreement would provide a framework for military assistance and reduce hostile reactions from other countries. The preliminary reactions from Ankara were seen as favourable but tactics had yet to be decided. The Pakistan government had been informed of the approach to the Turks and they were confident the Turks would happily agree to the suggestion. India had asked other countries to express their objections to the U.S. but no official objections had been received. The British government was said to have promised support for the U.S. programme and Thailand and Ceylon had expressed 'positive support'. (34)

The British were beginning to realise that they were being kept out of the picture. The Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Knox Helm, reported on 2 January that neither the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey nor the Turkish Foreign Ministry had said anything to him about the possibility of any talks with Pakistan. Helm expected the Turks to be flattered by the role the Americans wanted them to play but thought they would also be

cautious. The Ambassador said that Turkey had been impatient for some time for action to be taken in strengthening the Middle East and the possibility of this had been discussed with Ghulam Mohammed on his visit in December 1953. (35) The Indians' reaction to the possibility of American financial aid to Pakistan was to ask the British not to supply Pakistan with arms purchased with U.S. dollars. This was not a request considered practical in the Foreign Office. They felt it would be better if the Indians 'displayed a greater sense of proportion'. (37)

The U.S. Ambassador reported from Delhi on 8 January that the High Commissioner there had been informed by London that the U.S. had decided to give military aid to Pakistan, provided it was under the aegis of a pact with Turkey, which would also be open for Iraq and Iran to join. The High Commissioner was asked whether such arrangements would make the idea of aid more acceptable to the Indians. Middleton, who was the acting High Commissioner, replied that, in his opinion, the arrangement would be less palatable to the Indians, as it would appear that a regional group was being set up under western influence. The Pakistan government had been stressing that the aid had no strings attached. Allen explained to Middleton that the point of the Turkish connection was to make it clear to the Indians that the focus of the group would be the Middle East and not India. He admitted that Middleton was right in the opinion that the Turkish card would not calm India down, especially her fear that, if Pakistan joined a western alliance, the west would support Pakistan over Kashmir. Any larger group was also thought likely to do the same. The fact that Turkey, Iran and Iraq were Muslim states would also stir the old Hindu fear of Muslim revivalism. Allen still, however, regarded the Middle East tie-up as useful as it would enable

the U.S. to justify aid to Pakistan to the world in general and might mean India's abandonment of neutralism as there would be a direct link to the western world. (37)

The Foreign Office was unsure about Pakistani reaction to the question of military aid or, as one official put it, 'we are still very much in the dark about their attitude'. A note in the Foreign Office had stated rather regretfully that, 'It is rather surprising, to say the least, that the Americans should have launched the wholly new idea with its wide implications for the Middle East generally, without a word to us first'. (38)

On 14 January, at 3 p.m., a top level meeting took place at the White House to discuss the question of military assistance to Pakistan. The participants were President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, Admiral Davis and Byroade. Dulles opened the meeting by outlining the recent exchange of cables with the Turks in which they had agreed to take the initiative in the formation of a security pact with Pakistan. This was to be formulated in such a way that other nations, particularly Iran and Iraq, would be open to join. Dulles stated that the point had been reached where the U.S. should not proceed further unless committed to the course ahead. Dulles said there were many problems to be worked out in secret with the Turks and Pakistanis.

Dulles gave Eisenhower a summary of his own views in which he stressed the danger of not going ahead, especially as Nehru had now expressed opposition to the plan; this would establish Nehru as the leader of a large part of Asia which would not be able to act without his approval. Dulles mentioned how certain Asian countries had supported the U.S. before in the face of Indian opposition, as for example, the

support he had received over the terms of the Japanese peace treaty. In the general discussion that followed, the President stated that he believed the U.S. should proceed. There was not to be any public statement until after 23 January in view of the Korean situation. He also stated his concern at the situation in India and wanted all action to be taken to soften opinion there. Eisenhower agreed with the draft of a statement to be made on the subject at the appropriate time and also instructed that a letter should be sent to Nehru prior to any public announcement. (39)

A Top Secret memorandum was written by a special assistant to Dulles on 18 January 1954 with the title, 'The probable effects of a U.S. decision to grant or deny military aid to Pakistan'. It disclosed that the Intelligence Advisory Committee had estimated that a decision to grant modest military aid to Pakistan would increase the Bogra government's prestige at home and increase friendly relations with the U.S. The other main effect would be that it would arouse grave concern and indignation in India, and the danger was that the friction in relations with India would allow the latter to drift away from the west, and be more susceptible to communist pressures. An American decision not to grant aid to Pakistan would cause great disappointment there and weaken the pro-U.S. lobby, leading to changes in the cabinet and prime minister, while there was little likelihood of any improvement in U.S.-Indian relations. (40)

Pakistani complaints at the delay

Ambassador Hildreth faced pressure in Pakistan from powerful parties interested in military aid from America. On 27 January, he was summoned by Ghulam Mohammed, who was very sick by this time. His speech

was defective to the extent ~~where~~^{that} Hildreth had difficulty in understanding him. The Governor General bitterly assailed the U.S. for an hour for the awkward personal position in which the American government had placed him. He told Hildreth that he had to read the comments and plans of people like Nehru to dispose of the government of Pakistan, as if it was a pawn in a game, and, because he was not assured by the U.S. of anything, he was unable to make any reply. He went on to complain that U.S. reporters told him more than the State Department and said he was on the verge of writing to the Turkish president to tell him that he was not a beggar or a pawn.

Hildreth told Ghulam Mohammed that he sympathised with his position and had urged the State Department to act and would report back at the end of the week, even if there was no definite news. The Ambassador assured him that he was convinced that a positive reply was coming but Ghulam Mohammed reiterated how badly he had been used. He pointed out that the situation was developing where he might have difficulty in getting the cabinet to agree to any proposal. He had not been approached by the Turks or Americans and felt humiliated by press reports, in spite of promises on his visit to America that the whole idea would be kept entirely secret. The Governor General pointed out that he would not be prepared to discuss raising any more money for defence, as it would be at the cost of economic and educational development. He went on to say that he felt that the State Department was too much influenced by the British. When Hildreth said he doubted such a claim was true, Ghulam Mohammed replied, 'Forgive me if I disagree'. Ghulam Mohammed went on to say that he now felt it had been a mistake to meet Eisenhower as, although he had been treated very well during the visit, he had been

treated shamefully since his return; the U.S. press was turning against Pakistan which could not say anything on the subject.

Hildreth felt that Ghulam Mohammed was discouraged as he only expected aid to be disappointingly low and was bitter about his own treatment. Hildreth felt, from this conversation and one with Zafrullah, that there might be trouble when American intentions were known, and said that he intended to speak to Bogra as he was easier to deal with than Ghulam Mohammed. (41)

Hildreth did indeed write to Dulles to ask what was happening over aid to Pakistan in early February. Hildreth assured Dulles that he was 'proud and happy to serve under a Secretary of State who was performing so ably and courageously'. He said the reason he had not written this before was to avoid giving the impression that he was trying to 'butter up' Dulles. However, he felt that as this letter also contained a complaint, he was free to write the above. The Ambassador said that for the past few weeks the question of military aid to Pakistan had been the leading news item throughout the world. Negotiations had been going on with the Turks, about which the Pakistanis had been kept uninformed but were aware of, to their intense irritation. Almost every item in the 'Top Secret' wires had been written about in the press in the U.K. and U.S., Hildreth continued. Ghulam Mohammed had exploded as recounted in the telegram earlier, Hildreth had been accordingly authorised by Washington to make apologies and to assure Ghulam Mohammed that he would hear from Turkey immediately.

That morning, however, Hildreth had seen a news story from New York which was 'shockingly consistent with our Top Secret cable information, giving the order of events and the whole programme, even stating the

amount'. He said that because of the accuracy of past news stories, the public recital of information, about which even the Embassy was unaware, was shocking. Hildreth thought that it made the U.S. government look ridiculous and was exceedingly irritating for the Pakistanis: 'presumably the history of military aid to Pakistan is duplicated in other parts of the world. If so, something is decidedly wrong. I have no idea where the blame lies but experienced officials in the Embassy agree with me that the sad history of public stories on the military aid question warrants my writing to you on the above lines'. Hildreth added a postscript which said that conferences had been held with the Pakistanis which had made them feel better. (42)

Rumours continued to grow in Karachi that there was a split in the Pakistan cabinet over relations with the U.K. and the U.S. This was highlighted in a conversation between a Pakistani official and a U.S. Embassy officer. According to the Pakistani, A.G. Soofi of the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, the Pakistan cabinet was split on the question of U.S. military aid. The leader of the pro-British faction was alleged to be the Interior Minister, Gurmani, who was supported by Sir Feroze Khan Noon and they hoped to bolster their own positions by currying favour with the British and pro-British factions in Pakistan. The Embassy believed that the cabinet was united over the question of military aid from the U.S. and that the Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, was aware of the intrigues and that Gurmani was possibly about to be removed. (43) Evidence from Pakistani writers suggests that the pro-American group consisted of Ghulam Mohammed, Bogra and Zafrullah Khan. The Finance Minister (and next Prime Minister), Chaudhri Mohammed Ali,

was seen as being neutral and supportive of American aid as the best option for the country. (44)

British frustration at being ignored

British frustration at being ignored and taken for granted by the Americans in their strategic planning in general, and in the Middle East in particular, was close to spilling over by the time of the Berlin Conference in January. The brief written for Macmillan, the Foreign Secretary, at the conference said that Macmillan should take up with Dulles the divergence between 'certain aspects of U.S. policy in the Middle East and British interests and responsibilities. In failing to consult Her Majesty's Government in advance, as over the proposal for joint planning between Turkey and Pakistan... the United States Government has disregarded our position and made it's maintenance more difficult'.

On the subject of U.S. aid to Pakistan, the pent-up annoyance was even more obvious. It was emphasised how the Americans, without any prior consultation with the British government, proposed to Turkey that she should announce her intention of holding staff talks with Pakistan. This was the obvious excuse needed to announce American military aid to Pakistan, and was intended to form the basis of Middle Eastern defence, with which the Iraqis and Iranians could be associated later. The Foreign Office felt that the scheme was unlikely to prove useful and might 'in fact be positively harmful by explicitly excluding western participation, and thus ignoring existing British commitments'. In short, it could make no real contribution to Middle Eastern defence and might cause the countries concerned to wonder whether the British could

be counted upon for any real support. The scheme was also open to question as being provocative to the Soviet Union without proving to be a deterrent. The British were relieved to learn that the Turks were unenthusiastic ^{about} ~~to~~ the idea, as they felt it was premature. The Foreign Office said that the Turkish objections gave the British the chance to point out to the Americans that Anglo-American agreement was essential to any progress in the defence of the Middle East. (45)

The Turko-Pakistan Pact

The decision to give military aid to Pakistan had, as shown, been a decision taken, not by the National Security Council in Washington, but by Eisenhower and Dulles. The National Security Council met in early February to hear the report of Vice-President Richard Nixon. He gave the Council a two hour report on his nineteen nation tour. He was said to have impressed them so much that he received a standing ovation. The National Security Council agreed with Dulles that aid to Pakistan should seem to come after she had decided to join Turkey to defend the Middle East. (46) The Turkish government view was given during consultations with the Americans as to what agreement could be drafted with Pakistan. A senior Turkish politician said openly that Turkey was not interested in any military arrangement with Pakistan 'because any contribution that Pakistan could make was negligible' and, if they do have a pact it would be 'as the result of an American alliance with Pakistan, not as a direct arrangement between Pakistan and Turkey'. (47) This statement did not come as a real surprise to anyone but must still have been embar^vassing_^ to the governments of America and Pakistan.

On 13 February, the Turkish government sent a draft treaty to Karachi for comments. The agreement was mainly relating to economic,

political and cultural co-operation. The Turkish Ambassador in Karachi proposed that, if ~~the~~ Pakistan agreed with its terms, the Turkish government would like six days before the treaty was released to inform its allies and friends. (48) The Foreign Office, on 9 February, noted with some alarm that the more information that was being received about the Turkish and Pakistani talks, the clearer it was that the 'U.S. moves had begun earlier and gone further than we previously realised'. (49)

Speed was now of the essence for all parties. On 19 February, an announcement was made that the Pakistan and Turkish governments had agreed on the principle of joint co-operation. Although Bogra and some members of the Cabinet hailed the pact as being the first step on the road to Muslim unity, few were fooled. The same day, a formal request was made for U.S. aid. An official request written by Zafrullah Khan was needed by Dulles before the U.S. government could go ahead with its plans to give military aid to Pakistan. This was to try and persuade a rather sceptical world that the U.S. was only now considering the possibility of aid now.

Zafrullah started by saying that Pakistan was a peace-loving state and had fulfilled its responsibilities under the U.N. Charter. He wrote that during Pakistan's short history, it had given ample proof of its being one of the free nations in the world and/ one that believed in collective security for the maintenance of peace. Pakistan's position made it an area of vital importance to both east and west and it had already declared its intention of co-operating with the Turks. Although Pakistan had committed maximum resources to its defence, it was still seen as necessary to seek assistance which would enable it to strengthen the army and secure economic development. The crux came with the

statement that 'Pakistan requests the supply of aid, equipment and other assistance by the United States within the scope of the U.S. Mutual Security legislation. Before making this request Pakistan has informed itself of the requirements of that legislation and finds itself in agreement with them. Pakistan desires to make it clear that the assistance that it asks for will be utilised for the purpose of maintaining and promoting internal security... and enabling it to participate in the United Nations system for collective security'. Zafrullah ended ~~ed~~ by saying that economic and defensive strength were both necessary to secure national and international security. It was hoped that the U.S. government would give an urgent and favourable reply as soon as possible. (50)

On 25 February, Eisenhower declared that the U.S. was ready to aid Pakistan militarily, but this was tied to Pakistan and Turkey agreeing on a defence strategy. This was exactly what the Pakistan government had been hoping and expecting to hear for some time; but the initial euphoria was dampened by the Indian reaction in dealing with the problems of the Indus waters and Kashmir.

Ghulam Mohammed, in a letter to Dulles on 27 February, congratulated him on the declaration of arms aid to Pakistan but reminded ^{him} that on his visit to the State Department he had warned Dulles about the increasing problems over Kashmir and the canal water^s. Ghulam Mohammed said he had just read the World Bank proposals over the distribution of the river water and did not think that they constituted a fair settlement; indeed, 'they seem to have been guided by political considerations rather than justice and fair play. I expected and looked forward that the U.S.A. will exert their influence in favour of justice, but unfortunately my

impression has been belied'. This was strong stuff from someone well known to be pro-American and shows the depth of feeling in Pakistan at the time over these issues. Ghulam Mohammed went on to say that Pakistan had taken a calculated risk in accepting American aid over these issues and was depending on American promises. He hoped Dulles would forgive him for this letter but he felt he must speak frankly to 'the one man whom I regard as a great friend of Pakistan and a well-wisher of Muslim countries'. (51)

Ghulam Mohammed's letter raised a few eye-brows in Washington. Byroade immediately recommended to Dulles that he should write a rather stiff letter back, making it clear that U.S. military assistance did not mean any change in the American stance of impartiality in Indo-Pak disputes. The letter was also embarrassing, as it did not come through the normal diplomatic channels, but was sent direct. Ambassador Hildreth was bypassed in the process, as was the Pakistan Cabinet. Dulles was told to recommend that Hildreth should personally hand over the reply and request that Bogra be informed of the initial letter and the reply. (52) Byroade also wrote to Hildreth with a copy of the Ghulam Mohammed letter enclosed and warned him that he would find it 'an astonishing document'. (53) Whether the request that the letter be shown to Bogra was agreed to by Ghulam Mohammed is unfortunately not known.

Once American military aid had been granted, the Pakistanis started to speak more freely about the Indian threat than when aid was still in the balance. This worried the Americans who were being informed by the British on this point as Pakistan was well aware of the U.S. aversion to any mention of her defence against India. An official in the U.K. High

Commission informed the U.S. Consul General that the Punjab Chief Minister, Feroze Khan Noon, had informed him that ~~that~~ he felt Indian foreign policy was imperialistic and that he had no real fear of Russian aggression. Noon was reported to have said that the best effect of the Turko-Pakistan agreement would be to limit Indian expansion westwards. The British official said that he had questioned Noon on this point to confirm there was no possible misunderstanding but Noon had repeated himself with considerable emphasis. The same British officer had questioned a Pakistani general and believed that Noon's views were prevalent among the Pakistan army. The Consul General reported that such views had never been expressed to him, possibly because it was well known in Pakistan that America's main priority was to oppose communist expansion and so Pakistanis spoke to Americans only of their concern about the same objective. (42)

The Turko-Pakistan pact was finally signed and published on 2 April. The agreement was ~~a~~ inconclusive as no decision on joint defence planning was reached but had important symbolic importance. The two countries agreed to try and co-operate on cultural and regional security matters. The military aspects were said to be covered by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which allowed for legitimate self-defence. Bogra ~~calimed~~ the treaty to be the first 'concrete step toward the strengthening of the Muslim world'. There were few dissenting voices on the treaty from the Pakistani press and, there is little doubt that the American decision to initiate an agreement between Pakistan and Turkey, was the most popular way for the announcement of military aid to Pakistan.

A U.S. Military Mission

A U.S. Military Mission visited Pakistan in March 1954 to make an assessment on the spot as to what Pakistan's requirements were and how far the U.S. could go in meeting them. The secret aspects to the talks were what Pakistan would be required to do. On 3 April, the American team met senior members of the Pakistan cabinet, along with the heads of the Pakistan armed forces. Hildreth was present, as were senior Pakistani civil servants. Bogra opened the proceedings by thanking the Military Team for the understanding and sympathetic way that they had carried out their survey. He said that Pakistan's decision to receive U.S. military aid was a correct one and was in the mutual interest of both countries. In fact, the Prime Minister claimed that the U.S. had more to gain from the agreement than Pakistan; Pakistan would also benefit but had taken the risk of incurring hostility from Russia and India as a result. The Soviet government was said to have already sent a second protest note. Pakistan had taken the risk because of her desire to combat communism and her desire to stand alongside the western democracies. The U.S. gain was seen by Bogra as having the prestige of having an independent and neutral country aligning herself firmly with the U.S.

Ambassador Hildreth then pointed out that the recommendations of the team would be their own, and not his, as he was not a military man. However, he appreciated what Bogra had said and was sure that it would be relayed to Washington. General Meyers, the leader of the U.S. Military Mission, emphasised the technical nature of the team, and that political considerations were not their concern. The Finance Minister, Mohammed Ali, then thanked the team and wanted a few points to be

cleared up. He said that the Meyers plan, which had been briefly outlined, was only trying to make good the deficiencies in the first phase of Pakistan's Five-Year plan. However, Pakistan had not been able to achieve any target of that plan due to the slump in world commodity prices and that yardstick was unreliable. The military programme, moreover, was designed with the idea that Pakistan's best hope of defence against communist aggression hitherto had been the expectation that the Russians would not attack a neutral country. Now that Pakistan was a firm western ally, her defence requirements had to change completely. When she approached the U.S. for military aid it was to enable her to meet the communist threat effectively and, if the objective was that she should be in a position to safeguard peace in the region, then the U.S. military plan should be modelled on that basis. The communists had already targeted Pakistan for hostile statements; and there was now no hope of a settlement with India over many problems being reached.

Mohammed Ali said that Pakistan was willing to take the risks of being allied with America in the interest of democracy, and in the hope that American aid would enable Pakistan to lighten its excessive defence burden thus, speeding up economic development. The common man was prepared to accept the decision of his government and the belief was widespread that there would be direct benefits of increased resources. If, however, there were to be very small benefits, as outlined by Meyers, then Mohammed Ali felt that many people would openly question whether the acceptance of any aid had been worth the political price and no democratic government could ignore public opinion. He said that, unless Pakistan and the U.S. were agreed on a common objective, and if

that was not going further than shoring up the deficiency of old plans, there was really nothing to be gained. Hildreth said that he had appreciated the 'lucid and restrained statement' Mohammed Ali had made.

Mohammed Ali had hit the nail uncomfortably on the head, Meyers tried to say that he was concerned about Pakistan's present capability and not about long-term planning. Mohammed Ali persisted and said that until basic objectives were agreed upon, Pakistan would never be able to develop in the future.

The American Army Attache, who had been present at the meeting, added his own comments to the report sent to the State Department. He said that Pakistan had high hopes that U.S. aid would have allowed the expansion of her army at no extra cost to herself. Pakistan believed that no orderly expansion was possible until a final figure was defined. Pakistani hopes were seen as high as no American official had discouraged Ayub Khan or Ghulam Mohammed since they had presented plans for expansion eighteen months previously. Mirza had even mentioned that the sum of fifty million dollars annually would be needed.

The Americans saw complete co-ordination amongst Pakistani officials in their attempt to increase the amount of American aid. Past events were being distorted as, for example, when the Pakistanis claimed that the U.S. had taken the lead in setting up the military aid programme and totally ignoring how they themselves had been requesting it for two years previously. The Pakistani claim that the military aid had destroyed any chance of a settlement over Kashmir was different to previous statements that a strong Pakistan was the best guarantee ^{of} a quick settlement. It seemed clear to the U.S. Embassy that Pakistan would exert pressure in the near future to get agreement on a long-term

military programme but the pressure was seen as being in a friendly spirit. The Pakistani demands were not seen as unreasonable and the military attache concluded that with frank discussion an acceptable policy could be agreed upon, without a deterioration in relations. (55)

Hildreth added his own observations on the important meeting which had taken place. In a despatch of 8 April, Hildreth observed that the remarks of Mohammed Ali had been directed more at him than at the military men. The thought, also repeated in private conversations, was that Pakistan was receiving insufficient aid for the risks it was incurring. Hildreth recounted an incident which he noted had not appeared in the minutes sent earlier. Hildreth asked the Pakistani government officials to remember the atmosphere of November 1953 when Vice-President Nixon was visiting their country. Nixon had asked the Prime Minister and one of his assistants what would happen if Pakistan was not granted any military aid. The assistant had replied that 'Pakistan would feel like a girl who had been led up a primrose path under a spotlight and then abandoned'. Hildreth had asked the assistant if the analogy was a fair one as it might be more accurate to say the the U.S. had been chased down the primrose path and he had laughingly replied that it might be more accurate but the result was the same. Hildreth recalled that the Pakistanis had all laughed and enjoyed the point but Mohammed Ali had given an alternative analogy. That was that of a man going to his neighbour to borrow a gun to shoot a mad dog, and being given a needle and thread to repair a hole in his trousers instead. Zafrullah Khan had then added, 'Especially if the mad dog was intelligent enough to know that you had gone to borrow a gun'.

In his report Hildreth then dealt with the claim that Mohammed Ali had made about there being no hope now for any settlement of the Kashmir and water disputes with India. He felt that the 'long-term aspects and implications of military aid to Pakistan with concomitant economic support deserve the most careful and thorough consideration on the basis of our long-term policy for the Middle East. In my opinion, a programme of military assistance to Pakistan makes no sense from either a military or political point of view as a one year hand out of some military equipment'. The Ambassador concluded by saying that the exaggerated views of the Pakistan military had to be 'shaken into reality'. Hildreth certainly believed in a firm hand in Pakistan as he said that 'it behoves the U.S. Government to co-ordinated ~~ed~~ military and political policy for this country'. He believed that to leave the Pakistanis without further guidance about American intentions would result in a deterioration in relations. (56)

The growth of American involvement and the sudden loss of British influence in Pakistan left the High Commissioner in Karachi, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, feeling it that was time to face a new situation. He wrote in a telegram to the Commonwealth Relations Office that the British position in Pakistan was weak and getting worse 'because of the difficulty of seeing what can be done effectively to remedy it. Financially and in terms of supply, we cannot, unfortunately, hope to compete with the United States'. Pakistan now recognised that 'it is not we, but the Americans who now have something to give, and who are ready and anxious to take political, diplomatic and military initiatives which for good reasons are not open to us'. He pointed out that Briti~~an~~ should not 'adopt a dog in the manger attitude' and there was nothing for it

but to welcome American aid, even if it ^{was} ~~is~~ in 'certain respects^s palatable^{un} to us'. He ended by admitting that 'This is a depressing and in some senses rather humiliating analysis. But it is no good blinking at the facts'. (57)

The information coming from Hildreth in Karachi prompted Jernegan to send detailed instructions and advice on 22 April. Jernegan hoped that the Ambassador would have been able to clear up after the visit of the Military Mission, which seemed to have ruffled some Pakistani feathers. It was intended to reassure Hildreth that, although there was some confusion in Washington, there was no chaos or utter contradiction as Hildreth had been implying. Jernegan wrote that the first element to understand was that the nature and importance of the Middle East to the U.S. had not yet been clearly defined. That meant that the amount of investment needed in the area was still being debated, but there was a movement towards accepting the real need for the U.S. to protect its interests in that region. The State Department had long been convinced that this should be a matter of high priority for the U.S., he continued, but the Pentagon felt that U.S. resources were inadequate for any fresh undertakings. A complete reconciliation had still to be achieved even as the decision to supply aid to Pakistan had been decided.

When the decision was finally reached, Jernegan believed that there was a recognition amongst those who made it that it would be necessary to carry it through on a significant basis. Eisenhower and Admiral Radford were said to have been of this opinion. Jernegan hoped that they had been able to move quickly and so limit any damage that the Meyers Mission might have caused and he had no doubts that the U.S. would be

able to follow through with a programme for Pakistan which would convince 'even the doubters that the U.S. supports its friends'. He expected the programme would take time to work effectively as this had been the case with military aid programme elsewhere. He said that the 'logic of the situation is too clear and the supporters of the Pakistan programme too strong to permit any other development'. Ambassador Hildreth was told not to allow the inevitably slow start or confusing statements to discourage either himself or the Pakistanis. Jernegan ended by saying that there were solid reasons for believing that the programme was the start of important developments and everyone should proceed with that in mind. (58)

The new relationship

On 26 April, Ghulam Mohammed met Hildreth and expressed the hope that the two might exchange ideas freely about the Middle East. Ghulam Mohammed first produced a telegram written by the Pakistani Ambassador in Iraq, which referred to a talk with Nuri Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, about the possibility of Iraq joining the Turko-Pakistan Pact. Hildreth said that it seemed clear that any approach to the Iraqi question was the business of the two main parties and not of the U.S. His understanding was that, as things had to take a turn for the worse as far as U.S. military aid to Iraq went; the State Department was demanding that Iraq should make up it's mind over the Turko-Pakistan agreement as the U.S. was losing interest; and only a telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq pleading that the U.S. should grant aid to Iraq had allowed a change of heart and without reference to any pact, it seemed, that aid had subsequently been granted. Hildreth noted that the Iraqi government must have suspected that the amount of aid to be

granted had some relation with Iraqi co-operation to Turkey and Pakistan.

Ghulam Mohammed then turned the conversation to Saudi Arabia. He said that he did not want to hold anything back from Hildreth and so showed him a memorandum of a conversation between King Saud and Zafrullah Khan. Saud had expressed the hope that Pakistan might use her influence with Turkey to persuade her to sever her diplomatic ties with Israel. The bait was that Saud in return would make sure that all Arab countries, with the possible exception of Egypt, would join the Turko-Pakistan Pact. Zafrullah had replied that this was certainly not the time for Pakistan to try and bring any pressure to bear on Turkey as Turkey's greatest worry about the Pact was that it might become too Islamic and might create problems of unwanted or excessive Islamic activity in Turkey. Ghulam Mohammed commented to Hildreth that, apart from that argument, trade between Turkey and Israel was too profitable for Turkey to break off diplomatic ties. Ghulam Mohammed felt that the fact Saud had suggested such a thing suggested two points: firstly, that Saudi Arabia and other Arab states would like to join the Pact; and secondly, that the only real hurdle was the question of Israel.

Ghulam Mohammed moved on to his own talks with Saud, which he described as firm and frank. He felt that there were two key points in Saud's position. The first of these was that Saud had stressed his long friendship with, and admiration for, the U.S. His main sadness was that the U.S. was building up his enemies, the Israelis, and that something would have to be done about that. Ghulam Mohammed felt that by the King's constant reference to this point, he wanted to be more closely allied with the west and just to be given an assurance that Israel would

not expand any further and would return a reasonable portion of land to the Arabs. The second major subject in the talks with Saud had been that of U.S. military aid. Saud was described as indignant about the U.S. offer of military aid as he felt it intruded upon his sovereignty. Ghulam Mohammed 'really bristled' upon this point and said: 'I don't believe they are impinging upon your sovereignty. Certainly the United States has not tried to impinge upon our sovereignty and I am not a stooge on the payroll of the United States. Anyone who believes that they are impinging upon my sovereignty or that I am their stooge is a fool'. Ghulam Mohammed had pressed Saud on this point and had examined the form of military aid the U.S. had offered the Saudis telling him that it was 'bunk' that the U.S. was trying to impinge upon his sovereign rights. Israel seemed to Ghulam Mohammed to be Saud's sticking point and the rest was 'irrational argument'.

Ghulam Mohammed told Hildreth that he was going to send Saud a detailed report of how he viewed things and the Ambassador then announced that he was going to America to report personally and Hildreth suggested that it would be useful if he could have a copy of the report Ghulam Mohammed was going to send to Saud. Hildreth then rechecked the facts with Zafrullah Khan and received his confirmation. (59)

Pakistan completes the formalities

The formalities of a Pakistani alliance with the United States were completed when, on 19 May, a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed in Karachi. (60) The main terms were that the U.S. would furnish Pakistan with arms and services which the U.S. felt Pakistan needed. The arms were to be used for internal security, self-defence and collective defence of the region. No aggressive acts were to be permitted. Pakistan

in return was to make a full contribution to the 'defensive strength of the free world'. The agreement was signed by Zafrullah Khan and the U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Karachi. J.K. Emmerson, who was a senior member of the ~~the~~ Karachi Embassy, reported on 27 May that the publication of the text without any explanatory material had given rise to numerous misunderstandings: that the unfriendly section of the press in Pakistan was exploiting picked phrases in the agreement to the detriment of the U.S. Emmerson reported that there was a widespread misconception ~~was~~ that a large number of high ranking U.S. army officers were going to take over the Pakistan army. He, therefore, requested additional information from Washington regarding the agreement and suggested that Hildreth should consider making a major speech on his return to Pakistan spelling out how the agreement was to work and how it would not result in any loss of Pakistan's sovereignty. Emmerson also advised that, now that military aid had been granted, the public relations role was becoming more difficult than before as doubts and disappointment were naturally appearing while the amounts were being decided. Even staunch Pakistani friends of the U.S. were reported as becoming more critical. (61) The completion of formalities was over and now, as far as Dulles was concerned, the serious business of constructing the Northern Tier could begin. As far as the Pakistan leadership was concerned, the nightmare of having to fight an unequal battle with India, alone and weak, was at last seemingly lifted with an alliance with the most powerful country in the world. Using that power to defend Pakistan against India, however, was to prove as elusive for Pakistan as a solid anti-Soviet alliance in the Middle East was to prove for the Americans.

In June, Emmerson wrote an evaluation of Pakistan's foreign policy entitled, 'Pakistani attitudes toward India and the United States'. He believed that Pakistan was obsessed by India with a feeling of envy and frustration, but this was now less acute as the pact with Turkey had enabled the Pakistanis to look towards the Middle East, and that the Pakistan government thought that in aligning themselves with the west, they had taken a very serious step, as the agreements with Turkey and the U.S. had been signed within a few months of each other. There seemed to be a vast change from the way the U.S. was perceived in the previous year. At the time of the message, Emmerson believed the U.S. enjoyed a wide popularity. Pakistanis still pointed ^{out} the risk that Pakistan was taking by aligning herself with the west and emphasised that her position must be strong enough to command respect from their new potential enemies. They argued that any half-hearted development would be worse than none at all. It was in that context that a storm blew up when U.S. grants to India were reported. He found a feeling in Pakistan that America was inclined to take Pakistan for granted and to appease India. He accepted that it was impossible for the U.S. ever to expect Pakistan to like U.S. economic aid to India, or the Indians ever to like U.S. military aid to Pakistan, but he felt that the U.S. could only continue to explain its grounds for doing both these things. Emmerson recommended that the U.S. should remember not to take Pakistan for granted: the Pakistan government was a very new and hesitant member of the western camp and 'a pat on the back was inexpensive and yet sometimes vastly effective'. (62)

On 23 June, Emmerson reported that Bogra had asked him to call the previous evening to show him a letter from the U.K. High Commissioner which proposed that the government of Pakistan should send one representative from each of the armed services to the U.K. for general talks on Middle Eastern defence, with particular emphasis on shipping. The letter stated that these talks were envisaged as continuing the very close and frank discussions between the British Chiefs of Staff and Iskander Mirza during the latter's visit to London. Laithwaite had stated that there was no commitment attached to the talks and was sure that the U.S. would not object. Bogra told Emmerson that in view of the close Pak-U.S. friendship, he wanted to consult the Americans before replying. Bogra felt inclined to favour the proposal as he believed the U.K. could make a helpful contribution as Pakistan would be completely dependent on sea transportation if it was to make a defence contribution. Bogra also said, however, that he did not want any conflict between the talks with the British and the U.S. aid programme.

Emmerson agreed with the latter point and said it would be unfortunate if there was a lack of co-ordination in military talks between the U.S. and U.K. He promised to enquire ~~he~~ what the State Department would say. Bogra requested a reply as soon as possible so he could reply to the British. In reporting to Washington, Emmerson added that the High Commission had not discussed this matter with the Embassy and the U.S. Military Attache had learnt from his British counter-part that the British felt they were making useful progress with Mirza. Although the British told Bogra that the talks involved no commitment, Emmerson felt that it was clear that they would be conducted on the basis of certain agreed assumptions and seemed certain to crystallise

Pakistani thinking to some extent. The purpose of the U.S. Military Mission might be complicated from the outset by the existence of some Pak-U.K. understanding which might not be consistent with U.S. objectives. He felt that this underlined the necessity of early Anglo-American talks aimed at developing an agreed position on the Middle East. Emmerson, therefore, recommended that the U.S. should request the Pakistanis to defer all discussions with the British until the U.S. Military Aid Programme was established. (63)

Dulles replied on 28 June by telling Emmerson that he should inform Bogra that the U.S. appreciated the fact that he had consulted the Americans prior to replying to the British request that talks on Middle East defence should be resumed. While the U.S. did not wish to object to the resumption of talks, Dulles said that the Americans hoped that the Pakistanis would treat the views and conclusions reached as tentative, and would appreciate being kept informed of the nature of talks and views exchanged. Dulles added a section for the information of the Embassy only. It stated that America was keenly aware of the need for talks with the U.K. on the Middle East but, as it could not be predicted when such talks would be completed and/ detailed talks with Pakistan could begin, he had felt it was unwise to (actively discourage) the inclination of the Pakistani authorities to accept the British proposal. (64)

The U.S. Embassy in Karachi wrote a long and important evaluation on U.S. policy towards Pakistan on 10 July. This report was said to have been prompted by the critical economic situation in Pakistan and the urgent appeals by the Pakistan government for help. The Embassy believed that the substantial economic requests by the Pakistan government

presented the opportunity for an examination of the policy of the U.S., including her intended objectives and the prospects for their accomplishment. The report started with the basic assumption that it was in the interest of the U.S. to see Pakistan economically and militarily stable and anti-communist. These assumptions were said to have been implicit in the military aid agreement that had been signed recently. The unanswered questions were seen as what the importance of Pakistan was in the U.S. eyes and what level of investment the U.S. was willing to make in Pakistan to attain the objectives mentioned earlier.

The question as to whether the U.S. wanted to see Pakistan develop into a strong military power, was not one which the Embassy felt they could answer, as it involved the world wide strategy of the U.S. but the Embassy did say that, if the U.S. wanted to see Pakistan built up into a power to complement that of Turkey, then the magnitude of the future investment should assume some calculable shape. The Embassy did not foresee any change in the 'ruling group' in Pakistan. This group was characterised as being anti-communist, pro-American, fully supported by the Pakistan army and powerful enough to maintain political stability in the country. Pakistan's involvement in the Middle East was seen as diminishing her 'obsession' with India. The signing of the military aid agreement was seen as placing the two countries in a relationship of military partnership, at least as far as Pakistan was concerned. Once the high Pakistani hopes for a two billion dollar commitment by the U.S. were dashed, Ayub Khan was seen as looking to the Americans as senior associates, for guidance and instructions. Now that an agreement had been reached, the Pakistan military were getting impatient that they had not been assigned a role in the strategic concept of the area.

Bogra had reported that, on his recent visit to Turkey, he had taken the line that the two countries should make joint plans which should then be submitted to the U.S. The Pakistanis could then say to the U.S. that, if they were given certain things, they could do certain other things, depending on the type and quantity of aid. The British invitation for talks had been accepted by Pakistan and Ayub was leaving in August ^{to} attend. The Embassy said that the final decision about the extent to which the U.S. was prepared to underwrite Pakistan was linked inextricably to economic, military and political factors. Previous decisions to assist Pakistan had been determined by a belief in the survival of Pakistan and its potential development as a firm member of the free world. The Embassy had believed that the decision to aid Pakistan militarily was influenced by public statements of Nehru which made the 'refusal of aid difficult for any self-respecting nation'. The Embassy now believed that, if the U.S. was going to increase its investment in Pakistan, she would be justified in trying to pressurise the Pakistan government into becoming more 'realistic' in its aims. Pakistan was seen as trying to become too strong, too quickly and then presenting the bill to the U.S. The problem was, however, that, if the pro-western government of Pakistan was not helped, its reputation which was a real asset to the best interests of the United States would suffer. The report stated in its conclusion that the Embassy believed Pakistan to be a 'tolerable risk' but said the investment in her should be scrutinised with 'unrelenting care'. The prospects for returns should be compared with those expected in India and the Middle East. American influence was seen to be expanding in Pakistan through decisions taken already. But as the report tellingly concluded, 'with influence comes

responsibility'. (65) What is conspicuously absent from this assesment is an account of what the U.S. could, or should, be doing for the democratic experiment which had been going on in Pakistan since 1947. So preoccupied is it with the Cold War, and the attitude of the Pakistani leadership towards that problem, that the State Department and the Karachi embassy, seem^{ed} ^{to be} barely aware of the political factors within Pakistan, the weakness of political parties and the absence of general elections.

This report summarised some of the contradictions and problems that the United States was faced with in its new relationship with Pakistan. The Dulles plan for the creation of a Northern Tier, of which Pakistan and Turkey were to be the two flanks, in protection of the Middle East, had some serious handicaps. If Pakistan was to play a role comparable to that of Turkey and be an 'eastern bastion' of the west, then it needed a huge investment from the United States: economically, politically and militarily. The economic burden was a debatable issue but with American concern that China was now a serious threat in South East Asia, American attention was not focussed on the Middle East. The political price for America was the possibility of unremitting Indian hostility. Despite great annoyance with Nehru over his strictly neutralist approach, the Americans never discounted ~~on~~ India and aid still flowed to Delhi. The potential alliance that India and America could form was too tantalizing a prospect for the State Department ever to give up on. Militarily, the cost of constructing a formidable army in a poor and physically divided country was huge. Pakistan could obviously not afford to pay for the weapons it needed to deter any Soviet attack and so huge military grants would have to be made, diverting them from other areas of more

pressing concern. For Pakistan, in comparison, the choices were simpler. The Pakistan governments' objective from May 1954 onward was simple: to squeeze as much out of the alliance as possible. The possible pressure exerted by a smaller power on its larger ally could be considerable and the U.S.-Pakistan example has been seen as a case study for this problem. (66) In return for American military and economic aid, Pakistan was taken into two further pacts, one of which could not conceivably interest Pakistan; the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. How and why Pakistan subscribed to that pact is examined next.

Chapter 3

Pakistan and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation

The Origins of SEATO.

South East Asia was to be an area of great concern to both the western powers of Britain and America throughout the fifties. The British empire had all but collapsed world wide but Malaysia, or Malay,^a as it was then known, remained a colony. The Americans had been relatively unconcerned about South East Asia following the end of the Second World War, but the invasion by communist North Korea of South Korea in June 1950, changed the situation dramatically. The United States realised to its horror that the communist menace was not confined only to Korea but was spreading to Vietnam. In Vietnam, a nationalist communist movement was threatening by 1954 to over-run the whole of Indo-China. In March 1954, Dulles declared that the situat^oin^h was so serious that it ought to be met by the united force of the 'free community'. Shortly afterwards, he said this united action should be taken by ^{the} ten states involved in that region, but Pakistan was not mentioned as one of them. (1)

The idea of a South East Asia Treaty Organisation or a South East Asia Defence Organisation, as it was sometimes called, was first seriously discussed in the Geneva Conference in May 1954. This was called after the French surrendered at the battle of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May and agree^dment to participate in a peace conference to ^{discuss} ~~agree on~~ their withdrawal from Vietnam. The Geneva Conference focussed attention on the future of Indo-China. Right in the middle of deliberations at the Geneva Conference, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote to the Foreign Office, and said that a South East Asian defence agreement

was needed to create a deterrent to communism. He went on to say that he hoped that 'ultimately India, Pakistan and Ceylon may be able to provide the local military backing that the western powers, because of their commitments elsewhere, cannot furnish alone'. The idea of using Indian and Pakistani troops was also mentioned by him. (2) Eden's speech to the Geneva Conference had pointed out that the governments of Pakistan and Burma, which were not represented there, were being kept fully informed of the Conference developments day by day as they were seen as being affected by the outcome, and might wish to play a part in the defence of the region in the future. (3)

Just a few days after this telegram was sent, the British delegation to Geneva informed the Foreign Office that they had heard that Dulles had already invited the Colombo Powers to join in a pact for the defence of South East Asia and that Burma had refused. (4) It was clear even at this stage that there were serious Anglo-American differences over the strategy/and concept of a South East Asian defence organisation. In a possible attempt not to be left far behind Eden sent a message on 18 May to the governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon which said that Britain had decided to hold talks on the defence of South East Asia and was inviting all interested countries to attend without any commitment. (5) Just the day before this telegram was sent, Selwyn Lloyd of the Foreign Office was asked a Parliamentary Question on what proposals Britain had received from the Colombo Powers on the question of South East Asia defence. Although Lloyd answered that discussions with those powers were continuing, a Foreign Office official noted that a more truthful answer to the question would have been 'None, Sir!'. (6)

Some of the substantial Anglo-American differences over the question of a South East Asian defence organisation were starting to come out into the open. On 20 May the Foreign Office had been informed that President Eisenhower in a press conference had gone so far as to suggest that collective security in South East Asia was such a basic and important goal of U.S. policy that it would go ahead, without British participation if need be. (7) The British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Roger Makins, suggested that the main reason for the Anglo-American division over this question stemmed from the U.S. feeling that, if the first steps towards SEATO were worked out quickly, it would help the western position at the Geneva Conference while the British had disagreed with that assumption. Makins also felt that some differences were caused by the British being more mindful of Asian opinion than the Americans. (8) Eden replied to that view by saying that the Anglo-American rift over this question was more fundamental than Makins was suggesting. Eden said that the Americans had tried to convert the Five-Power Chiefs of Staff talks into a formal alliance and that had weakened the western position at Geneva, adding that 'but for the Americans, these Staff talks could have begun long ago'. Eden felt that the inclusion of Siam (Thailand) and the Philippines would result in only a token Asian presence and the British wished to avoid that. In a stinging criticism of the American attitude, Eden argued that the Americans 'appear to contemplate an organisation that would assist them to reconquer Indo-China. Her Majesty's Government, for their part, would not be prepared to participate in such a venture'. (9) Eden also told the House of Commons on 23 June that the defence of South East Asia without the good-will of India and other free nations was impossible. (10)

On 27 May, the High Commissioner in Delhi informed the Commonwealth Relations Office that he had just met his American counterpart. The U.S. Ambassador, Allen, who had just returned from Washington where he had met both Dulles and Eisenhower, said that he had emphasised to Dulles that a step by step approach was needed for there to be any chance that India would contemplate joining SEATO. Dulles was reported to have asked whether the Indians could not 'organise a scheme of collective defence among South East Asian countries with the U.S. and U.K. standing behind in support'. Dulles did not specify whether Pakistan was going to be one of those countries joining an Indian sponsored defence organisation. Allen replied to Dulles that he thought such a scheme would have to be very carefully planned with the Indians but was still unlikely to succeed. The High Commissioner felt the whole scheme was a virtual impossibility. (11)

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, the High Commissioner in Karachi, had a talk with Mohammed Ali Bogra on the contingencies the Five-Power Staff Talks had been planning for South East Asia. Laithwaite told him that the British government had tried to keep the Pakistan government informed of the talks throughout. Bogra expressed his gratitude at being kept informed, even though Laithwaite had told him that India and Ceylon were also being kept informed. Laithwaite welcomed the fact that Bogra had sent a message to Eden regarding the Indo-China situation as it was important that Pakistan be involved. (12) On 19 July, the British Embassy in Washington discussed with the Foreign Office the problem of defining the treaty area, if Pakistan was to join SEATO, and India did not. A visit by the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at the end of

June had tried to resolve Anglo-American differences over the form of a South East Asian defence organisation. A study group was set up with officials to try to iron out differences between the two western powers. This joint Anglo-American study group, which had been meeting in Washington, had come across the problem of Kashmir, as Pakistan could argue that it was of concern to it as signatory, and India was not involved. (13)

Any indications from the west that Pakistan might not be invited to join SEATO were treated with some resentment in the Pakistan Foreign Ministry. Murray, of the High Commission, was reproached by the acting Foreign Secretary in Pakistan, Agha Hilaly, for a suggestion from London that none of the Colombo Powers would wish to join SEATO. The 'Colombo Powers' was a term used to signify India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia. This was after a series of meetings between these countries in April and May 1954. Hilaly, while acknowledging that the chances of India or Indonesia joining were remote, felt that Burma offered the U.K. some scope for helping to develop a foreign policy independent of India. Even more to the point, Hilaly said that he felt that Pakistan would wish to be associated with the defence of South East Asia or, at least take part in discussions about the establishment of a defence pact. This was in spite of any Pakistani commitments in the Middle East. Hilaly emphasised that Pakistan took all decisions affecting her own interests regardless of any common Asian line. Laithwaite added that this obviously implied India. Hilaly said that the fact that East Bengal was a part of Pakistan made her a South East Asian country.

Hilaly continued that, although he hoped that Ceylon would join, he could not rule out the possibility that Pakistan might be the only member

of the Colombo Pact to participate in SEATO. He admitted that the issue did raise many large problems for Pakistan and that he had no idea what the view of his Cabinet would be on the subject. He said it would depend to some extent on what the reaction of other Colombo Powers would be. Hilaly told Murray that the Americans had not up to that time raised with Pakistan the question of SEATO. Laithwaite commented that, although the participation of Pakistan in any SEATO talks would annoy the Indians, it was unlikely that that would sway Pakistan in any way. Hilaly's comments were seen by Laithwaite as very valuable as he was 'thinking aloud' what the view of the Foreign Ministry was. Laithwaite, therefore, urged that any other information which could be passed to the Pakistanis should be sent as should an indication of whether the British government was still keen on Pakistan joining SEATO even if she alone was involved. (14)

On 24 July, the State Department sent a circular to its Embassies in Asia which reached Karachi the following day. The circular stated that agreement had been reached between America and Britain in Geneva on the first moves towards a conference on South East Asian defence. The British government was to consult the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan on the possibility of these governments participating in establishing a collective security agreement in South East Asia. France would also be approached and the U.S. was also to ask the Philippines and Thailand to join. The two sides had also agreed at Geneva that preliminary discussions should be completed by 7 August and representatives should meet not later than 1 September to discuss the details. The procedure for the birth of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, (SEATO), was finalised. The

circular continued to say that the information then available suggested that India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon would not be willing to participate in such a scheme. In such a case, the U.K. government would like these governments to adopt a favourable attitude towards this group or at least not be hostile to it.

British and American views on Pakistan's participation

The attitude of Pakistan was unknown to the State Department but they anticipated that the Bogra government might be willing to participate from the outset in an effort to establish collective defence. Before taking a definite position, the Americans had anticipated that Pakistan would like to hear the American view of the pact regarding the most desirable course of action. In view of the other Colombo Powers, the Americans had doubts about Pakistan becoming an influential member of the group as it might well affect the Indian attitude to the proposed pact adversely. This in turn was seen as having an unfavourable effect on the other Colombo Powers. The Americans had also felt that, if Pakistan did not become an initial participant, she might be able to exert some constructive influence on the other South Asian countries; this could lead to a favourable attitude being taken towards a South East Asian defence pact and perhaps later their own smaller grouping. This was seen by Dulles as 'tentative thinking' on Pakistan; and the U.S. wished to have an opportunity to consult with the U.K. and others 'before expressing any definitive views' to the Pakistan government. Before that happened, however, the previous view was used in discussion with Pakistani government officials. (15)

The attitude of the Pakistan government was not seen as crucial by the U.S. Embassy in Burma. On 27 July, a telegram was sent to the State

Department which said that the government of Burma had already stated on several occasions that it would not join SEATO but would not oppose it either. (16) Amjad Ali, the Pakistan Ambassador to the U.S., discussed some aspects of SEATO with State Department officials on 27 July. Amjad Ali said that communist 'cells' in Burma were a cause for concern to the Pakistan government because of the delicate situation in East Pakistan and so Pakistan was interested in the final proposals for SEATO. He added that his country had the 'bodies' that were needed; the requirement now was for equipment. Jernegan, of the Near Eastern section, suggested it might be better for Pakistan to remain outside SEATO if no other Colombo country joined. The ambassador had not answered the question directly but said that, if Pakistan wanted to join, it would do her best to persuade Ceylon to do likewise. He had said that, if both joined, it would have real advantages, leaving the implication open that it would not if Ceylon refused. (17)

The important factor governing Pakistani membership, as far as the U.S. was concerned, was that of India. On 28 July, Allen in New Delhi agreed in a report analysis for Washington that Pakistani participation in SEATO would increase Indian hostility to it but added that India was sure to oppose such an organisation anyway. Allen then listed the pros and cons of Pakistani membership of SEATO. The arguments against were that U.S. military aid to Pakistan was already an important reason why India was improving her relations with China. Further Indian concern could drive the two large Asian powers even closer together. Allen also said that, in view of Pakistan's economic condition, it may be desirable to discourage her from increasing her commitments too much or from leaning on the U.S. for additional support. While Pakistani abstention

would not soften the Indian reaction, it might lead to less public criticisms against SEATO if Pakistan was not a member.

The positive aspects were seen by Allen as the favourable effect its membership would have on Burma and Ceylon. While the Burmese were seen as unlikely ever to admit it, they would feel more assured of prompt help, just as the Afghans did, now that Pakistan had signed a pact with Turkey. The closeness of East Pakistan to the vulnerable areas in South East Asia could serve as a justification for Pakistani participation. If Pakistan's security interests were primarily directed towards the Middle East, Allen believed that it would be more difficult to justify the introduction of American military equipment into East Pakistan, whereas Pakistani membership of SEATO would enable American personnel and equipment to be based in Dacca. Allen had also foreseen the problem of trying to discourage Pakistan if it wanted to join. Allen thought that the views of the Pakistan government should be the chief determinant and that India's attitude would be softer if one other Colombo power could be induced to join. Ceylon seemed to be the best candidate and Pakistan was seen as the best country to sound her out. If Burma could be persuaded to take up a benevolent attitude, then it was seen as unlikely that Nehru would lash out at all his neighbours. (18)

On 28 July, Laithwaite sent a telegram to the Commonwealth Relations Office recognising the problem of tactics regarding the possible participation of Pakistan in SEATO. He felt that the Indian reaction to SEATO would not put Pakistan off joining; in fact he believed it might be a welcome chance for the Pakistan government to emphasise 'their political independence and their active support for western policy'. Laithwaite felt that with the extent of American aid

to Pakistan still undecided, the Pakistan cabinet might want to take a line which would please the U.S. The Cabinet was still expected to weigh up the political considerations of being the only Colombo power to join. Ceylonese reluctance was seen as having considerable influence on Pakistani thinking. Laithwaite, therefore, recommended that all the Colombo powers should be told that they could attend any conference on South Asian defence without any commitment to join any organisation that emerged.

The High Commissioner had not spoken to Zafrullah or Hildreth at that stage but felt it important that the U.K. and U.S. should agree in advance on the line to be adopted if Pakistan was to be the only Colombo power ready to participate actively in SEATO. Laithwaite pointed out the danger to the U.K. position if they felt unable to welcome a Pakistani offer to join and the U.S. welcomed such an initiative. He said this would 'further increase American influence and expose us to the criticism that a Commonwealth country was better understood by the Americans than by the United Kingdom'.⁽¹⁹⁾ The High Commissioner in Delhi warned on the same day that India would not join any SEATO type organisation and would resent it if Pakistan did. He pointed out that India feared that West Pakistan would be strengthened by a Middle East defence pact and East Pakistan through SEATO.⁽²⁰⁾

On 29 July, a Foreign Office official outlined the official arguments in favour of Pakistan's participation in SEATO. Tahcurlin started by saying that he was aware that Eden was anxious to secure Pakistani participation in SEATO even if she was the only Colombo power at the meeting. He wrote that some doubts had been expressed in the Commonwealth Relations Office and Dulles was still believed to be

undecided on the question. Tahourdin, however, then listed seven advantages in Pakistani participation in support of Eden's views. Pakistan's association with SEATO would not be seen as a new departure as her differences with India over this question were long-standing and generally recognised. Secondly, if Pakistan was to join from the outset it would be easier for countries like Ceylon to join later. Thirdly, Pakistan could make a more useful military contribution than either Siam or the Philippines. The last point was connected to the next as Pakistan was seen as a useful Asian counter-balance to 'the American proteges - Thailand and the Philippines'. Fifthly, if Pakistan were to be excluded then it would be blamed on the U.K. rather than the U.S. The American reasons for wanting to exclude Pakistan were seen as hard to understand as it would exclude all Colombo powers and the U.S. would be able to dominate SEATO. Lastly, East Pakistan was seen as giving Pakistan a direct interest in South East Asian security. (21)

This positive approach to Pakistan was spelt out in a message from the Commonwealth Relations Office to Delhi and Karachi on the following day. The telegram said that, although the U.K. hoped that there would not be too negative a reaction from Nehru if Pakistan was the only one of the Colombo powers to join SEATO, 'there can be no question of our dissuading Pakistan or Ceylon from joining if they feel so inclined'. (22) This British position was in contrast to the American thinking at that time. Makins reported from Washington that the State Department had inquired how the British approach to the Colombo Powers was going. Makins wrote that it seemed clear to him that Dulles had not made up his mind on Pakistan. Hildreth had been instructed not to discuss the project with the Pakistanis, partly as they wanted to test

the Pakistani reaction, and secondly as the State Department was said to be divided 'on the value and wisdom of distinguishing between Pakistan and the other Colombo Powers in the context of South East Asian security'. (23)

Dulles told Karachi on 30 July that the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington admitted to an officer in the State Department that he had urged his government to join SEATO. The Ambassador had also said that he believed he had convinced Zafrullah Khan of the need and would be glad to resume his efforts in that line if he knew this was what the U.S. government wanted. The Department officer had not given a direct answer but had raised the question of whether Pakistan might not be more effective if she was initially outside the organisation and used her influence to induce the other Colombo powers to join. The Ambassador had replied that, if Pakistan makes up its mind to join, it would do all it could to convince Ceylon to do likewise. (24)

On the same day, Laithwaite informed London that his weekly talk with his U.S. counterpart had revealed that the State Department line was that it might prove disadvantageous for Pakistan to join, particularly in isolation. Hildreth had made no approach to the Pakistanis on the subject and said that he was trying to avoid the subject but was afraid it would be raised as General Sexton was visiting the country. This confirmed the news from Makins in Washington. Hildreth raised the subject with Ghulam Mohammed who had said that they were awaiting a report from Zafrullah. Laithwaite had gone on to report a conversation with the Australian High Commissioner in Pakistan, who told Laithwaite in the strictest confidence that, in a talk with Zafrullah, the latter had claimed to know the time-table set by Dulles and Bedell

Smith and, while he had not talked to Bogra, he was confident that the majority of the Cabinet would instantly agree to participate in any proposed conference. Zafrullah had said it would depend on the nature and clarity of the invitation and proposals. The Australian High Commissioner was reported to be embarrassed to find his instructions from Canberra had told him to tread carefully because of Anglo-American doubts over the advantage of Pakistani participation. Laithwaite had said it was now obvious that the Pakistanis were expecting an invitation and were not put off by the possible adverse reaction it could generate. (25)

The Geneva Conference had ended in some disarray with Dulles refusing to sign the peace treaty, or Final Declaration, as it was called. He did promise, however, not to disturb the basic principles of the Declaration by the 'threat or use of war' (26) On 30 July, Dulles held a Staff Meeting to discuss SEATO. He said that he was now disturbed at the way Eden had been 'dragging feet' over the issue. The Under Secretary, MacArthur, agreed that Eden had been unhelpful but said that 'Pakistan would definitely join if asked; that Zafrullah Khan had made this commitment to him as he boarded his airplane to leave Geneva'. This is an extremely important statement, particularly in hindsight. It means that Zafrullah was merely trying to bargain for the most acceptable deal in Manila, but Pakistan's signature was not in doubt. (27)

Hildreth continued the flurry of telegrams on Pakistan's membership of SEATO on 3 August. He wrote to Dulles that Zafrullah had said that he was seeing the Prime Minister to suggest to him that the Pakistani cabinet should approve at its next meeting the sending of a telegram to Ceylon. This would be to invite the Ceylonese Prime Minister to hold a

discussion on SEATO in Colombo. Zafrullah felt that this would flatter Kotelawala, the Prime Minister, so much that he would not be able to resist and might bring him into the western camp. Zafrullah also told Hildreth that he was sure that he could convince Bogra and the cabinet that Pakistan should attend the SEATO conference as a participant and not as an observer. Zafrullah also hinted that the Prime Minister would agree with him that Pakistani attendance as an observer would be a hedge and, as they had cast their die with the west, they should not give the appearance of hedging. Bogra was due to leave for Saudi Arabia with Ghulam Mohammed on 5 August, and so Hildreth sought instructions before acting on the suggestion that Bogra should write to Kotelawala. Bogra was not due to return until 13 August and so Hildreth saw time as being ^{the} of/essence. (28)

On 4 August, Hildreth summarised the views of his Embassy on Pakistan's participation in SEATO. Hildreth reported that with each day there were increasing signs that the Pakistanis were willing to join SEATO and were increasingly willing to take the initiative in inviting Ceylon also to join. This was in spite of a non-committal attitude from the U.S. Embassy and a somewhat negative position indicated in an earlier telegram. Hildreth believed that the point had already been reached where it was awkward to discourage Pakistani participation and it was becoming increasingly more so. Hildreth said that, in the opinion of the Embassy, there were very dubious advantages in counselling delay in Pakistani membership. The available information seemed to Hildreth to indicate that the passage of time rather than any hope of winning over India and Indonesia was hardening attitudes amongst these powers and allowing opposition the time to move in. Nehru's concept of an

alternative South East Asia pact exclusively for Asian powers seemed, to Hildreth, designed to frustrate and negate U.S. policy in that region. The initiative which the Pakistanis seemed willing to take appeared to hold some promise to Hildreth as it would include two Colombo powers and seriously embarrass Nehru. Hildreth wrote 'If this sound reasoning as Embassy believes seems high time we got started'. Hildreth ended by noting, however, that, if Pakistan felt it was taking this initiative with U.S. support, it would expect returns in increased political, economic and military support. (26)

Negotiations on Pakistan's possible membership

On 4 August, the Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, Amjed Ali, met Jernegan and Smith from the South Asia section of the State Department. Amjed Ali had requested the meeting and first noted that the proposed time for the visit of Bogra had been changed from early to mid-October. Jernegan replied that this was due to reasons unknown to him and had been quite embarrassing for them all. The ambassador then raised the question of Zafrullah's candidacy to the International Court of Justice. The next few minutes were spent in discussing the way various countries were going to vote. Amjed Ali then moved to the main purpose of his meeting, which was to discuss developments in connection with the South East Asia security organisation. Jernegan offered to bring Amjed Ali up to date and gave him a review of recent developments.

The British government had approached the Colombo powers to invite them to discuss the formulation of a collective security organisation of which they would also be members. Negative replies were received from India and Indonesia. Burma declined to attend but was adopting a position of benevolent neutrality and Ceylon decided to study the

proposal in detail. No official reply had been received from Pakistan but Zafrullah had said that Pakistan favoured membership. Jernegan continued that they had received confirmation that Ceylon had asked other Colombo powers that they should meet in Rangoon to determine a joint position. It had seemed probable to the Americans that this move was partly the responsibility of Nehru who had in mind to construct a rival regional organisation. There were no details of Nehru's alternative available at the time but it seemed likely that it would include some clauses relating to defence and designed for the Colombo powers.

Amjed Ali launched into an extensive discussion of objections to any grouping Nehru might propose, giving his view that one of the basic principles of any pact would be that the members should not have any military arrangement with any other countries outside the Colombo powers. Such a clause would be destructive of American efforts in the Middle East and South East Asia. Jernegan explained that the Americans did not have the details of Nehru's plan and therefore the Department had not reached any response to it. However, he gave his personal opinion that the formation of the Colombo powers would be useful as it could bring those powers closer together. This was obviously referring to India and Pakistan! At the worst, Jernegan said, the group would declare itself opposed to aggression and intervention from any quarter. This was still seen by Jernegan as helpful to the U.S. At best the organisation would be something which was similar to what the U.S. had in mind but with no non-Asian members. Amjed Ali declared that the Indian plan would in effect be similar to the Locarno pact. Jernegan disagreed with that by saying that Locarno was an agreement between

opposing states whereas this plan would be between countries on the basis of collective security. It had been clear to the Americans that the Pakistan Ambassador was greatly disturbed over the prospect of a South or South East Asia group under Nehru and the calm American acceptance of such a scheme.

The discussion then moved on to the Middle East, with Amjed Ali making an inquiry about Egypt. Jernegan had told him that the U.S. was close to signing a military assistance treaty in the very near future with Egypt. Amjed Ali was surprised by this and asked whether the U.S. intended to ask Egypt to sign the pact with Turkey and Pakistan. When Jernegan said there was no intention to do so at the time, he further inquired whether there would be any objection if Pakistan asked Egypt to join in a tri-partite alliance. Jernegan replied that the U.S. would favour such an idea. The ambassador said as the Haj was soon to take place in Mecca it would be a good opportunity for Pakistan to approach any other Muslim states the Americans had in mind but Jernegan was not able to suggest any other likely candidates. After some general discussion over other matters the meeting drew to a close. (30)

On the same day that Amjed Ali had been discussing the possibilities of South East Asian defence with the Americans and the future, if any, of Pakistan participating in such a group, the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, accepted the British invitation to attend a conference to discuss the proposal. Although acceptance of the invitation itself did not necessary ^{it mean} acceptance of the terms of membership, it was an important gesture.

Bogra wrote:

'My colleagues and I have carefully considered your secret personal message of 30th July. I am glad to be able to inform you that Pakistan will be represented at the proposed meeting which is planned for the beginning of September to consider possible measures of collective defence for South East Asia and South West Pacific. Our participation in the meeting does not imply prior acceptance of any scheme that might emerge from the discussions in the meeting. Any recommendations made by the meeting will be considered on their merits. Like you, we too attach much importance to the meeting and would emphasise that a meeting of a level lower than Ministers would not carry much weight. I am hoping it may be possible for our Foreign Minister to attend on our behalf. We agree that meeting should take place at some suitable place in the region. We have no particular preference but should like to be consulted on choice of the place of the meeting before a final decision is reached'. (31)

The Pakistani decision to accept the invitation pleased the Foreign Office immensely. Tahourdin recorded on 5 August that the acceptance was 'very satisfactory'. He also said that he had been informed by Australia House that the Australian Government were now also strongly in favour of Pakistani participation. Another Foreign Office official called it an 'excellent development' and said that Britain should now do all it could to exploit it, especially as regarded Ceylon. (32) The Pakistanis were soon busy discussing the possible venue for the meeting with the British. Hilaly informed the British that he had been dismayed by a Burmese suggestion that a meeting of Colombo countries to discuss the SEATO proposal should meet in Delhi. He added that Pakistan would certainly use her influence with Ceylon and Burma in trying to take a softer line on SEATO and perhaps even persuade them to attend the conference without any commitment. (33)

On 6 August, Amjed Ali was again at the State Department in conversation with Jernegan. This time he had been invited to come and

listen to a briefing on U.S. thinking on SEATO but the conversation began with Amjed Ali telling the Americans that he had received a telegram from Ayub Khan in Karachi which had depressed him. Ayub was reported to be 'dejected and broken-hearted' by his conversations with General Sexton, the Chief of the Military Mission in Karachi, where he had learnt of the small amount of U.S. aid available. Ayub had reportedly told Bogra that it would be better not to have been in a defence agreement with the U.S. for those amounts. Jernegan tried to reassure Amjad Ali by saying the amount per year might seem small but larger amounts were coming and the sum total was large. (34)

The briefing was conducted by the Assistant Secretary of State, Merchant, who welcomed the news that Pakistan was to be represented at the forthcoming meeting on South East Asia defence. Explaining the American viewpoint, Merchant said that the U.S. had, since the previous March, felt a sense of urgent need for a collective security grouping in South East Asia. Dulles had considered that it would have been best formed before the Geneva conference, but for a variety of reasons it had been postponed. The American thinking with regard to the general timing had been that there would be a meeting of foreign ministers of the countries concerned in that area in early September. The Americans thought a site such as Baguio or Manila might be suitable, but as yet there had been no firm decision. The Americans also felt that, in advance of the meeting, it would be useful if each of the countries made a public announcement to the effect that they were going to be represented at the meeting to plan collective security and that there should be a conference of experts at the working group level to develop

a draft agreement and reduce the problems to those few involving principles.

The French were unwilling to make any public announcement of intent before the final clauses of the Vietnamese and Cambodian armistices had gone into effect, which would be 7 August for Cambodia and 11 August for Vietnam. The British were awaiting the result of their approaches to the Colombo powers before setting a date. Australia, New Zealand and Thailand were all agreed as to the establishment of a working group. The Americans felt that the working group should meet in Washington because most of the experts who had been working on the problem for some time had been there. The British believed that the experts should gather at the site of the foreign ministers' conference a week in advance of the main conference and work out an agreement prior to the main gathering. The Americans regarded that plan as undesirable as they were unsure how long the preliminary conference would last.

With regard to the treaty itself, the fundamental American position was spelt out to Amjed Ali. Firstly, it should be a deterrent to overt aggression. Secondly, it should provide for consultation and action amongst the members in meeting communist infiltration and subversion in individual countries. Thirdly, it should provide for economic co-operation amongst the member states and other states in the area. Lastly, it should be a simple organisation with no elaborate secretariat or staff such as NATO had. Merchant handed Amjed Ali a document which he described as the second draft of a working paper giving an outline of U.S. thinking. The date had not yet been set for the meeting of experts but the Americans hoped that the circulation of the draft would help set the wheels in motion.

The ambassador inquired about two aspects of the American proposals. Firstly, with regard to economic co-operation, he wanted to know if the treaty would merely recognise the fact that economic support was necessary or if it would go further. Galloway, of the U.S. financial team, said the U.S. was unsure if this organisation was the correct vehicle for economic co-operation, so only a general clause had been thought necessary. Amjed Ali then asked whether economic help was limited to those states who were members or if ^{it} would apply to India, Burma and Indonesia. Merchant indicated that it had not been the intent of this treaty to exclude non-members from economic co-operation.

Amjed Ali's second main point was concerning the use of force. He said that it was his understanding that the U.S. did not contemplate the setting up of regional forces. In the event of a communist conspiracy on the Burmese border and a request from Burma for help, would the organisation go to the assistance of Burma? Merchant replied that it was a hypothetical question, but he felt that if Burma was to make an appeal, the organisation would go to her aid. Amjed Ali continued by saying that it was his understanding that the organisation would not provide for the creation of military forces, but he failed to see how overt aggression could be met without the creation of such forces. Jernegan explained that it was his understanding that the organisation would assist member states to strengthen their own forces. On the basis of individually stronger forces the members would be able to resist aggression individually and collectively. Merchant added that his view was that a constant exchange of information between member states would take place leading to agreement among members on what action to take in

the event of an attack. The very fact that such an organisation existed was seen by Merchant as having a deterrent ^e affect on such aggression.

Amjed Ali then referred to a conversation which he had with Jernegan a few days previously. The ambassador had said, and now repeated, that the people of Asia have the impression that the U.S. had created a pact, NATO, in the west which was supported by military force and were now trying to create one in the east which would not be supported by such forces. The Asian people, according to Amjed Ali, would now think that the U.S. was not serious about an Asian regional agreement, in other words, that the U.S. talked big but the proposed pact would have no teeth. Merchant noted that Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Pakistan were interested in having a military establishment to meet the situation, while Jernegan pointed out that in the beginning NATO itself did not have a military organisation and Galloway noted that it did not come into being until after the Korean war. The meeting concluded with some general talk on the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister of Ceylon to discuss South East Asia defence proposals. (35)

The first issue to be resolved before the main conference on South East Asian defence was held, was the problem of where the working party should meet to agree some terms of reference for the conference. The Americans had suggested Washington as the venue. Amjed Ali was instructed to inform the State Department that Washington did not suit Pakistan but, if necessary, she would reconcile herself to attending there but would only be represented by its ambassador there.

Laithwaite volunteered this information to the Commonwealth Relations Office in a telegram on 10 August. He also said that for Pakistan the ideal venue for both the working party and the main

conference would be Ceylon. This was because Pakistan could easily send a well-briefed team there, and the Philippines was seen as the next best alternative. Australia was as unwelcome as Washington because of the distance and the fact that it was non-Asian. Laithwaite revealed that he had been very tentatively sounded out as to the possibility of holding both meetings in Karachi. The High Commissioner replied it was unlikely to be accepted because of the reaction of India and other Asian states. The Pakistan government agreed to withhold any official announcement regarding SEATO until an agreed date and place of the meeting was decided. It was also reported to be reluctant to see any Colombo Power conference being held to discuss the implications of SEATO but would say nothing against the proposal in case it was accused of being western puppets. (36)

News that Ceylon had finally made up her mind not to join SEATO reached Pakistan on the morning of 11 August. Laithwaite reported that the news had 'extremely depressed' Hilaly and had also taken him by surprise. Hilaly, the acting Foreign Secretary, was said to be feeling that Pakistan was now out on a limb and cross-examined Laithwaite and Dodds Parker, the British Joint Under Secretary of State, who was visiting Karachi, on the value of Pakistan being the only South East Asian country participating in the proposed organisation as he did not count Thailand as being of any importance. Hilaly suggested that Pakistan might be of more use to the U.K. as a member of the Colombo group rather than being expelled from it for joining SEATO without deriving any new advantages which Pakistan already enjoyed through contacts with the Commonwealth and the U.S. He felt that the Ceylonese

had been afraid of being left out of any Indian scheme for a South East Asian federation.

Hilaly then read to his British visitors the Ceylonese telegram which had basically said that Ceylon had made up her mind not to join SEATO and it was unlikely that any Colombo Powers' meeting would now take place to discuss the idea. Hilaly added that, although the British were unenthusiastic about the idea of that meeting, it might have proved to be useful in persuading Ceylon and Burma in taking a more positive look at SEATO. Hilaly continued that he was now doubtful about the reaction of Zafrullah and Bogra to this latest piece of news as Pakistan was now out on her own. Laithwaite did what he could to try and encourage Hilaly by saying that Pakistan 'had added to her stature by the clear and independent line she had taken'. By the terms of Pakistan's acceptance, she was still entirely uncommitted and reserved the right to consider the scheme on its merits. Pessimism at this stage was said to be premature and there was no need to be depressed even if Ceylon had backed out. (37)

R.H. Scott of the British Embassy in Washington, discussed the latest thinking regarding SEATO with Amjed Ali on 12 August. Scott informed the Foreign Office that the ambassador had received a copy of the draft treaty which the Americans had prepared and seemed to be well aware of the position. Amjed Ali had put forward some suggestions which may be seen as a useful guide to what Pakistan really hoped the treaty and pact might achieve. The first of these was that all parties to the treaty should commit or earmark certain troops for the defence of the treaty area, even though these troops need not leave their national boundaries until needed. Pakistan believed that there was a serious

possibility of trouble on the Burmese border and to cope with the situation, troops would need to be ready. The ambassador said that the treaty could serve as a useful way of developing the idea of common responsibility as this would make it easier for Asian countries to ask for and accept help from outside. The third main point which he raised was that economic aid was necessary to allow for the build-up of the extra defence forces.

Scott believed that it was clear that Amjed Ali was hoping for additional troops to be sent to East Pakistan as the Pakistani contribution to the pact but for this to be paid for by the Americans. Amjed Ali emphasised that the treaty should be 'loose' enough to calm the fears of Ceylon and Burma and might even induce them to join at a later date. Scott arranged at the end of the discussion for the Pakistan Ambassador to be kept informed on any amendments and developments. (38)

Meanwhile back in Karachi, Laithwaite met Zafrullah Khan on 16 August at a social gathering, and said that Britain was very glad about the 'courageous and sensible' line that Pakistan had taken over SEATO. Zafrullah replied that Pakistan was anxious to give what help it could and Laithwaite reported that Zafrullah had not appeared to be worried about the Ceylonese withdrawal. (39)

The Foreign Office spelt out its own reservations regarding SEATO on 20 August. It was noted that Britain only accepted ^{the creation of} SEATO to avoid a serious breach with the U.S., Australia and New Zealand, 'all of whom put strong pressure on us'. British hopes were that SEATO should become an organisation which should supersede ANZUS (the Australian, New Zealand and United States defence agreement of 1952). SEATO was also seen as the instrument through which the U.S. should increase her

spending in that region. Britain realised that none of her objectives could be achieved unless the Americans co-operated and so SEATO was necessary. (40)

Ambassador Horace Hildreth reported to the State Department on 17 August on the theme of Pakistani disappointment over the amount of aid being offered. The acting Foreign Secretary had echoed the sentiments of Ayub Khan, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister and others in saying that the increased commitments through Pakistan's attitude to SEATO would deserve more than token support. Hilaly also said that Bogra and Ghulam Mohammed felt that their energetic efforts to persuade other countries to join the western alliances had gone unrecognised and Pakistan was being made to look ridiculous. Hildreth commented to Dulles that, although there was a lot to commend about the Pakistan government viewpoint, they always tended to overstate their case.

Hilaly went on to say that Zafrullah would attend the meeting scheduled at Baguio and the working group session starting on 2 September. He felt that the Pakistan government was handicapped by a lack of knowledge of the previous staff talks and working group discussions on SEATO, and would find it difficult to make decisions on only a few days' meetings. He therefore asked whether there was any advice for Zafrullah before he left. Hildreth pointed out to Washington that he realised the great advantage of both Pakistan and Ceylon attending the conference and said he assumed that Pakistani attendance and affiliation to SEATO was still desirable even if Ceylon did not attend. He added that the Pakistanis were convinced that the U.S. wanted them to join SEATO. Hildreth then requested guidance from Dulles on this

question as he thought it very important that the Pakistan government should know the role the U.S. wanted them to play. Hildreth said that, although the U.S. had deferred to the U.K. on this point before, he felt that Zafrullah expected, and should be given, further guidance before leaving. (41)

In response, Dulles commented ~~in~~ on the question of Pakistani expectations following the Mutual Assistance agreement and talk of SEATO in a detailed message to the U.S. Embassy on 23 August. Dulles said that he was convinced that/ it was in the interest of healthy U.S.-Pakistan relations that the 'self-stimulated and publicized' expectations of U.S. aid, should be replaced by a clearer understanding of the objectives and capabilities of the U.S. and of Pakistan's own responsibilities. The development and maintenance of an effective military machine, the costs of which Dulles thought Pakistan could pay for from her own resources, would require growth over a period of years with a well balanced economy. The Secretary of State pointed out that it was not within U.S. financial capabilities that such an economy could be created by massive economic aid. It had to be built by Pakistan herself; but American willingness to support such efforts had been demonstrated by the fact Pakistan had received a large amount of aid even before the defence agreement had been signed. Dulles said that Pakistani officials had expressed such full and sincere gratitude for this help, that it was embarrassing to have to repeat them, but U.S. resources were not unlimited or unchecked.

Dulles' message then moved on to the question of priorities. Turkey received a high priority as it was self-reliant, adjoining Russia and, although under threat, willing to fight regardless of outside help.

Pakistan's case was different, mainly because of adverse economic conditions: it was implicit in the military aid agreement that the U.S. wanted Pakistan to attain that degree of military strength and sound economic base which would enable it to play an effective role in Middle Eastern defence. The first objective had to be that the Pakistan army was properly equipped at its present strength, before thinking of enlarging its size. Even that objective was seen as involving a heavy monetary outlay. The Heinz Mission was instructed to evaluate the basic requirements. Dulles felt that after this initial phase, it would be possible to see a clearer picture and was pleased to note that Pakistans military and civil authorities appreciated the importance of long term planning. Dulles concluded by saying that the U.S. could not express things more concretely at the present in terms of dollars and later troop strengths than this. (42)

On 24 August, Hildreth reported to Dulles that Hilaly, the acting Foreign Secretary, was leaving for Manila on 27 August and would be accompanied by General Sheikh, the Army representative, and Rashid Ibrahim of the Economic Ministry. Zafrullah Khan was due to leave on 1 September. The Foreign Ministry expressed concern over the attitude the Pakistan government should take over SEATO. Hilaly was said to have been concerned that, if Pakistan joined SEATO and was the only South Asian country to do so, she would be isolated. Hilaly had reportedly made the same comments to Laithwaite in Karachi ten days previously and was asked which club Pakistan really wanted to belong to and whether Pakistan did not have more prestige and influence thanks to the club she was now in. This was thought to have allayed Hilaly's fears but they had apparently

resurfaced. Hildreth requested any guidance to the Pakistan delegation to be sent as soon as possible as they were due to leave shortly. (43)

Replying on 25 August, Dulles pointed out that the State Department had clearly outlined the U.S. position to the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington. This concerned both the functions of SEATO and its likely implementation. Amjad Ali had been given a draft of the treaty which he had forwarded to Karachi and in their most recent conversations, the Americans had answered all his questions regarding SEATO. Dulles repeated for the benefit of Hildreth that the U.S. did not visualise any special role for Pakistan in SEATO other than attending the conference and signing. The official U.S. line was that the Americans believed that it was in Pakistan's national security interest to join SEATO. However, this was seen as a decision for the government of Pakistan to make and the U.S. did not wish to influence it. (44) This meant, of course, that the Americans need not feel obliged to Pakistan for joining SEATO and so Pakistan should not expect any increased aid.

The Run- up to Manila

The first official Pakistani reaction to the draft treaty drawn up by the Americans and British was on 26 August. Zafrullah informed Laithwaite that he had two main points to make immediately. The first was that, there should not under any circumstances be any reference to communism in the treaty and, the second was that, Pakistan would not contemplate any wording which might allow Formosa to be brought in at a later stage. (45) On 30 August, a letter from the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office revealed an interesting insight into

the Pakistan Foreign Ministry. Crawley, a British diplomat, said that he had been keeping his Pakistani counterparts informed as instructed and he had come to realise that this had meant that he was giving them 'an opportunity for the first time of being aware of their own government's thinking'. (46)

Anglo-American differences persisted throughout the drafting stage of the SEATO treaty as to what form it should take, who should be allowed, or invited, to join and what the main purpose of such an organisation should be. Dulles tried to persuade Eden to attend the SEATO conference in the Philippines at the last moment. He further asked Eden to allow the representatives of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam to have unofficial observers at Manila, arguing that, as one of the main aims of the organisation was to protect South East Asia from communism, those states should be present. Dulles said that it would subject those states to humiliation if they were prevented ~~them~~ from observing the making of a treaty which was designed for their benefit. Dulles then moved on to the 'prospective role' of Pakistan. He wanted to clarify whether Pakistan would be counted as in the 'treaty area' and if it would sign the agreement if excluded. Dulles clarified his main objection regarding Pakistani membership, which was that, if Pakistan did sign the agreement and was deemed to be in the treaty area, then it was 'imperative to make clear that the treaty deals only with aggression from the Communist area so as to exclude our getting involved in India - Pakistan disputes'. (47)

Before the Pakistan delegation was to leave for Manila, Zafrullah met Laithwaite on 1 September and informed him of the Pakistan Cabinet conclusions on SEATO. These were that the Pakistan government was in

general agreement with the British and Australian line and could not accept any reference to communism in the treaty. There should be no designation of area, even of Vietnam or Cambodia, until after the treaty had been concluded. There should be no help given in the case of aggression unless there was prior consent from the government concerned. The treaty was also to be re-drafted to include West Pakistan in the treaty area. The Colombo Plan was to be unaffected by the treaty and economic provisions of any treaty should be confined to the parties to the treaty. Finally, there should be ^a caveat as regards military obligations to be undertaken by Pakistan. (48) G.W. Choudhry believes that the Pakistan Cabinet was worried about the prospect of having to make any military commitment as a member of SEATO. He says that ~~not only~~ were they concerned at possibly having to provide troops, not only to protect fellow-members of SEATO, but also those areas the treaty was trying to defend, such as Indo-China. The military establishment, led by Ayub Khan, were still recovering from the shock at the proposed level of American aid under the mutual assistance agreement and wanted a firm commitment from America of a certain amount of aid for membership of SEATO. Ayub Khan was reported to have said, 'If America wishes us to ~~to~~ help countries outside Pakistan, an agreement has to be reached as to what we shall be required to do and what force will do it'. (49)

The full SEATO conference in Manila did not get underway until 6 September but the countries attending had sent their experts on ahead to discuss the various proposed clauses drawn up by the Anglo-American working party in Washington over July and August. The first point the Pakistan representative raised on 3 September was whether the whole of Pakistan would be covered. The American delegate said that, if the

aggression was communist-inspired, then the whole of Pakistan would be covered but, if it was not communist, then the further one got away from South East Asia, the less it became a threat to the security of the U.S. The British delegation reported that the American delegate was under absolute instructions to limit commitments to the case of communist aggression, although, if an alternative could be devised with different wording but the same meaning, it would be considered. The Pakistan representative reserved his right to submit an amendment to that Article. (50)

On the following day, the Pakistan delegate put forward his suggestion on the question of economic aid. The draft was sent by the Commonwealth Relations Office to Karachi on 6 September. The draft stated:

"In order to promote economic stability and social well-being and thereby remove a basic cause of weakness in the Treaty area, the parties recognise the urgent need for fuller and more effective development of economic resources in the area, and undertake to co-operate with one another for the purpose. The parties appreciate the desirability of supplementing the economic and technical assistance available to the area and of continuing the utilisation of existing bilateral arrangements for the purpose where they are regarded as adequate".

The British delegation reported that, despite discussions on this draft, no alternative was agreed upon but the Americans made a number of objections. These were that the Treaty was not designed to provide new economic aid, that it was important not to raise expectations which could not be fulfilled and, finally, that the economic considerations should not be limited to the proposed Treaty area. The Pakistan delegate agreed with this but pointed out that as Article III was the only non-

military one, it needed emphasising as it was the article which would have the most attraction for the Asian countries. The French representative agreed with this view but the British delegate waited for instructions on this point from London. (51)

The South East Asia Treaty Conference

The First Plenary Session of the Manila Conference was held on 7 September. There were delegations from eight countries, namely; Britain, America, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, Pakistan, France and New Zealand. The conference lasted only three days as the major ground-work had been done by the Americans and British over the summer, as well as the Ministers conference in the first week of September. Zafrullah Khan led the Pakistan delegation to Manila and, though Pakistan clearly stated that she had agreed to attend the conference with an open mind, there was little doubt that Zafrullah was keen to see Pakistan enter in such a large alliance. Zafrullah's aim, therefore, was obviously going to be an attempt to obtain some promise of fresh economic and military aid and, if at all possible, some promise of security against an Indian attack.

In the proceedings of the Second Plenary Session, Zafrullah attempted to water down the military aspects of the Treaty so as to make it more acceptable to the other Colombo Powers. Zafrullah proposed a change to Article V which had stated 'The Council shall set up such subsidiary machinery as may be necessary to achieve the military and other objectives of this Treaty'. Zafrullah proposed to change this to read 'all the objectives of the Treaty'. The Australians and French argued that, as it was obviously a military treaty, there was little point in beating about the bush. Zafrullah said that he did not object

to the use of the word 'military' but that it created the impression that the 'other' objectives were of little importance. (52)

The problem of defining the 'Treaty area' involved Zafrullah as he hoped that the whole of Pakistan would be covered. Pakistan was then covered by an amendment which stated 'the general area of South and South East Asia, including the entire territories of the Asian parties'. However, if Zafrullah hoped that this would mean that Pakistan was going to be protected by the might of America against India then he was to be sadly mistaken. Dulles included a reservation under Article IV, paragraph 1, that the U.S. obligation to the Treaty would extend only in cases of Communist aggression. Zafrullah tried to argue that 'all aggression is evil' but Dulles was unmoved. (53)

The American attempt to specify that the Treaty should refer specifically to communism was blocked, much to Zafrullah's relief, by Australia and New Zealand, who feared the possibility of a Japanese resurgence. Australia also had an ongoing dispute with Indonesia over New Guinea, which was a non-communist state. The deletion of the word 'communist' did not help Pakistan in this case either, as Australia and New Zealand publicly declared that they did not feel bound by SEATO to take any action against a fellow Commonwealth state. (54)

The Pakistan Foreign Minister also attempted to obtain some promise of practical military help as a result of the Conference. He talked to Dulles on 8 September about the need to build up Pakistan's armed forces, stressing that Pakistan was willing to do everything that she could in building up her forces but the financial resources were simply not there. Zafrullah mentioned the heavy existing tax burden and said that he would be glad to let the Americans look at their budget to see

if anything else could be squeezed out of it. Dulles replied by pointing to the very heavy burden that the U.S. was already bearing in terms of assistance to friendly countries and said such matters were not the sole decision of the State Department but of others, particularly Defence. Zafrullah stated his belief that Ceylon was wavering in regard to SEATO and would have come if she had not been strongly dissuaded by India and he suspected, the U.K. He told Dulles that the U.K. had tried to dissuade him from coming to Manila as anything other than an observer. (55) How Zafrullah could possibly have got this impression after August when the U.K. was doing everything to try and persuade Pakistan to attend is hard to understand. It is possible, however, that Zafrullah was trying to exploit the almost visible Anglo-American split.

The Australians gave the American and British delegations a shock when the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, instructed Casey, the Foreign Minister, only to sign the Manila Treaty under the same reservation as Dulles. The Australians were thought to be worried about any commitment to act against India in event of war with Pakistan. Casey urged Menzies to reconsider as he told the British delegation; he was convinced that Menzies was mistaken.

The Americans were said to be strongly opposed to any Australian reservation and Dulles stated that 'it would have an unjust effect in the United States since Australia would be regarded as running away from commitments in their area'. Casey went ahead and signed the agreement and had stated that the Australian government could decide whether to ratify it. Casey was said to have been persuaded partly by Zafrullah to sign. Zafrullah was said to have 'waved aside any idea that Pakistan if attacked by India would expect help under the treaty'. (56) This implies

that Zafrullah was only trying to obtain language acceptable to the Cabinet in Karachi, and public opinion, and not really attempting to obtain real security for Pakistan from this Treaty.

Zafrullah Khan ~~had~~ then made the controversial decision to sign the treaty. He added the qualification of 'Signed for transmission to my Government for consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan'. According to G.W. Choudhry, Pakistan's accession to SEATO 'was due only to one person, Zafrullah Khan, who exceeded the mandate of the Cabinet and scorned the advice of the military'. Bogra was said to have written to Zafrullah on 9 September asking for an explanation, and the Foreign Minister replied after two days, arguing that a refusal by Pakistan to sign would have jeopardised Pakistan's military and economic aid and be greatly misunderstood by the Americans. (57)

The South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed, therefore, on 8 September by the representatives of all the eight participating countries. Eden demonstrated his coolness to the whole idea by not attending and so Britain was represented by Lord Reading, Minister of State in the Foreign Office. 'SEACDT' was not an abbreviation likely to catch on and the pact was still known as 'SEATO', the name officially adopted in 1955. The Americans were reluctant to allow the use of that term at first because of the comparisons that would be made with NATO. (58)

The draft of the Treaty had been a controversial matter, even after all the preliminary meetings. One of the most contentious sections in the Treaty was Article IV, Paragraph 1. This had stated:

Each Party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory with the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. (59)

This section as well as the wording of Article VIII which had defined the Treaty area as including 'also the entire territories of Asian parties' caused some concern in London. The Foreign Office noted on 8 September that this final form of words had been drafted without any consultation with them and said that the reasons had yet to be fully explained. It was thought that Zafrullah Khan had insisted on the inclusion so as to leave no doubt that the whole of Pakistan was inside the Treaty area. The Foreign Office felt that the last addition made it clear that Article IV(1) now applied to an Indian attack on Pakistan. It also noted that as India was not covered in the Treaty area, a Pakistani attack on India would not be the concern of SEATO. Only the United States had contracted out of any obligation in a conflict not involving communism. (60)

The explanation for the wording of Article IV was given by a member of the British delegation to Manila, Sir G. Fitzmaurice. He argued that the need to suppress any reference to communist aggression was 'politically essential' in order to make it more acceptable to Asian countries and to avoid too direct a threat to China and the Soviet

Union. The principal difficulty in not mentioning of communism had been the contingency of an Indian attack on Pakistan. This problem was seen as impossible to overcome as many alternatives had been considered and rejected. Fitzmaurice argued that such a situation was not a new theoretical problem as Britain was bound under the Charter of the United Nations and, if Pakistan had appealed to the Security Council for help, Britain was seen as 'politically and morally' unable to use her veto. It was accepted that explanations would have to be made to the Indians and criticism would have to be answered. On the whole, he felt that it was 'a choice of evils and on balance the course actually followed was thought to be best'. (61)

Disappointment and delay from Pakistan

As far as Pakistan was concerned, however, there was little in the Treaty to be excited about. She had previously hoped for a standing army to be developed along NATO lines or a joint military command to be established but Dulles was firmly opposed to both these suggestions. (62) Pakistan failed to obtain a single promise of increased economic aid; there was no promise of large arm shipments to enable the Pakistan army to build up East Pakistan; and the Americans officially stated what the British had unofficially told them, that Pakistan could not expect any help in case of a war with India, even if the latter was the aggressor. This could not have been a great surprise for Pakistan as they must have been aware of the realities.

There was little knowledge or interest in Pakistan regarding SEATO. Even Ayub Khan, known for his western sympathies, described SEATO as a 'political stunt'. (63) Those in Pakistan opposed to the Treaty, accused Zafrullah Khan of the lowest personal motives in signing the

Manila Pact. Within a month of signing the Treaty, Zafrullah was elected to the International Court of Justice with British, American and French help. (64) Zafrullah seemed to know his political career was over as he did not even return to Karachi, but went to America from Manila. There is also the little known promise that he had made to the American Under Secretary, MacArthur, in July that, if Pakistan was invited to attend the conference, she would join. Zafrullah's controversial signature at the Manila Conference reached the ears of London as the British Ambassador in Burma reported, through conversations with his Pakistani counter-part, that Zafrullah seemed to have 'gone rather further than his Government intended, and that there had been genuine embarrassment between the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister about something the latter had done in order to be as co-operative as possible with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Casey'. (65)

The reluctance of Pakistan to ratify the Manila Treaty unless offered something tangible in return was obvious as Pakistan simply delayed any decision. On 30 September, Mohammed Ali Bogra, the Prime Minister of Pakistan from April 1953, met Eden in London to discuss Pakistan's ratification of the Manila Treaty and was said to have 'haggled a lot and adopted a stupid and rather blackmailing attitude on the lines of "what do we get out of it if we become members, what about India, etc." '. He was pressed strongly on the loss of prestige Pakistan would suffer if she failed to ratify the Treaty and agreed that he would rethink on his return to Karachi after his visit to Washington. (66)

The Pakistan Prime Minister went on from London to America in October. On 18 October, Dulles received him in Washington. The other participants at the meeting were Amjed Ali, Byrhone from the Near

Eastern Section and Thacher from the South Asian desk. Dulles started by explaining that, with regard to the Manila Treaty, or SEATO, the U.S. had made it clear from the outset that it could not ask the U.S. Senate to accept the concept that any dispute in the region would be considered a threat to the peace and security of the U.S. Dulles gave the example of a dispute between Burma and Thailand, rather pointedly saying that it did not involve a communist power.

Bogra tried to argue that such a dispute would almost certainly pose a threat to the security and viability of the U.S. as Burma would only undertake aggression against Thailand if Burma came under communist control. Bogra pointed out that Pakistan was the one nation amongst the signatories which feared aggression from a non-communist state. This meant, Bogra argued, that the U.S., in its view of the Manila Treaty, was condoning aggression from a non-communist state. Dulles replied by saying that the U.S. did realise that the danger from non-communist countries existed but that, unless it was communist inspired, it would not be a threat to the security of America. Dulles said that the U.S. would be obliged to consult the other signatories of the Treaty.

Bogra then discussed the risks which Pakistan had taken by aligning herself with the west in her relations with India, Russia and Afghanistan. He felt that the risks incurred, to himself personally and to his country as a whole, were justified by the need to preserve freedom for posterity. Pakistan had, in effect, undertaken to play a dual role in the defence of the free world, one in the Middle East and the other in South East Asia. With such responsibilities, Bogra felt that he would be derided in Pakistan if he could only obtain the sum of

thirty million dollars from the U.S. That sum was seen by Bogra as only adequate to fill the existing gaps in the Pakistan army.

Dulles responded by saying that some consideration was now being given to the possibility of increasing the first year programme of military assistance to Pakistan. Dulles pointed out, however, that he thought that Pakistan had taken the anti-communist course it had because of a feeling that it was right, not to make itself eligible for certain amounts of dollar aid. Far more important than the receipt of aid was the admiration and sympathy that Pakistan had won for herself in America, who, Dulles said, would be reliable friends whenever Pakistan was in trouble, as the gift of wheat had proved in 1953. Dulles pointed out that America's friends must be aware that the U.S. did not have limitless resources and that the U.S. budgetary situation was such that any appropriation made for a foreign nation would probably result in a reduction in America's own armaments. (67)

Dulles realised in November 1954 that there had been no positive response from India over the fact that America had specifically limited her involvement at Manila to anti-communist action. Dulles sent Byroade a memorandum asking whether the U.S. had tried to make capital out of that fact and saying that the reservation was 'of course, not pleasing to the Pakistani but it showed clearly our unwillingness to get involved as a partisan in possible disputes between India and Pakistan'. Dulles pointed out that there had been no Indian indication of appreciation, specially as the U.S. was the only state to take that line. (68)

By 25 November, Pakistan had still not decided whether to ratify the Treaty. Murray, who was acting as High Commissioner in Karachi, reported that the Pakistan Cabinet was still considering the proposal. The

Foreign Ministry was reported as not treating ratification as a foregone conclusion. The chief difficulty was said to be the American reservation to Article IV and similar Australian views. Bogra was believed to feel that with that reservation the Treaty was not 'worth while for Pakistan to ratify'. The Foreign Ministry, however, had submitted a paper to the Cabinet which recommended ratification despite the lack of protection it offered. Murray believed that, in view of the American aid recently announced, the Pakistanis would not fail to ratify. (69)

The Commonwealth Relations Office authorised the High Commission in Karachi to use their discretion in showing a U.K. paper on the economic aspects of SEATO to the Pakistan authorities. Murray felt that it would not have been a good idea to pass that information on to the Pakistani authorities as 'they would be extremely disappointed at the implication that countries which sign the Manila Treaty will receive no more economic and technical assistance than countries which do not...the Government of Pakistan have always felt that there would be economic rewards for participation'. He felt that the Pakistan government was already hesitant over ratifying the Treaty and this news would give them another reason for delaying. As Amjad Ali was attending the meetings of the Working Party in Washington, Murray requested advance warning if it was to be shown there as 'it would be polite in that case to give a copy to the authorities here'. (70)

In trying to persuade the normally enthusiastically pro-western Bogra government to ratify, Dulles sent a note to Bogra, informing him that even if the attack on Pakistan was non-communist the U.S. 'would be by no means disinterested or inactive'. Dulles promised that he would meet with the other members of SEATO to decide what action to take. (71) This

was still short of any firm promise, but the Pakistan government was always going to have to ratify the treaty, despite their reservations. Amjed Ali had requested further information on the proposed action on Article III of the Manila Treaty which dealt with the economic aspects. Dulles replied that the State Department was still working on their policy regarding economic aid but emphasised that the U.S. was not going to make any special arrangements for members of SEATO. (72)

Pakistan did eventually, ratify the Treaty on 19 January 1955, as the first meeting of the SEATO council was starting. There were reports that the Pakistan government only ratified under 'intense' pressure from Britain and America. (73) There is little doubt that, without Pakistan's membership of SEATO, the Asian content looked militarily insignificant. Thailand and the Philippines were almost entirely dependent on the U.S. for their military and economic aid and the alliance would easily have been accused of being an American show. Although the Pakistan government had been reluctant to ratify for the lack of tangible gain, it had little choice due to the need of American economic and military help. Bogra had to face his critics because of the lack of tangible gain for Pakistan, but the U.S. Secretary of State, J.F. Dulles had his domestic critics also. The Treaty had been ratified in the Senate by a decisive eighty-one votes to two and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee warmly praised the wisdom of the Secretary of State. (74) Not everyone was convinced, either that it was a useful agreement, or that Dulles knew exactly what he had done.

At a dinner party soon after the Manila Conference, Walter Lippman, the noted journalist, criticised the pact by pointing out that it was

composed largely of Europeans, plus Pakistan, which was seen as nowhere near South East Asia. Lippman's biographer gave the following account;

"Look, Walter," Dulles said, blinking hard behind his thick glasses. "I've got to get some real fighting men into the south of Asia. The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis. That's why we need them in the alliance. We could never get along without the Gurkhas."

"But Foster," Lippman reminded him, "the Gurkhas aren't Pakistanis, they're Indians."

"Well," responded Dulles, unperturbed by such nit-picking and irritated at the Indians for refusing to join his alliance, "they may not be Pakistanis, but they're Moslems."

"No, I'm afraid they're not Moslems, either, they're Hindus."

"No matter," Dulles replied, and proceeded to lecture Lippman for half an hour on how SEATO would plug the dike against communism in Asia. (75)

It may be relevant to note that if one is to 'nit-pick' as Lippman had, then the Gurkhas are not Indian either! They are, in fact, Nepalese.

Pakistan and SEATO : A retrospective look

Pakistan's membership of SEATO, therefore, if one accepts the available evidence, came about by the decision of her foreign minister to exceed his brief and decide to take a foreign policy initiative himself. There can be few examples in modern history of such an event, but then, Pakistan had very rapidly built up a number of dubious firsts. All that can be said in Zafrullah's defence is that any Pakistani foreign minister at that time and place, would have been subjected to great pressure to do the same. From the archives available, it seems that there was a rift between the Pakistan Foreign Ministry and the army ~~and~~ the question of membership. Conversations recorded in Karachi with
over

ministry officials, and in Washington with the Pakistan ambassador, show a real enthusiasm^S for the idea of another pact.

There are probably two reasons why the Foreign Ministry felt that SEATO was a good idea: firstly, the mutual assistance agreement and the pact with Turkey earlier did not provide any territorial guarantee for Pakistan, something Pakistan had longed for since independence and not received; and secondly, there seemed to be a feeling amongst the Foreign Ministry that membership would give Pakistan a feeling of greater security in East Pakistan, the Achilles heel of Pakistan's defence. Ayub Khan's reservations regarding SEATO were unlikely to be just an objection to using troops in countries and areas irrelevant to Pakistan's own security, it was probably that he felt that Pakistan was not getting enough money and arms in return for doing so. Given the situation, however, Ayub could not prevent Pakistan from adhering to the pact.

Dulles has been accused of creating SEATO as a means of carrying out 'collective security' in the name of unilateral action, as became more blatant during the Vietnam war. Pakistan made it clear from the start that she could not spare any troops for SEATO and refused a request to do so in 1962 in Thailand. Any faint hope that Pakistan had of trying to induce some solidarity from her allies on the question of Kashmir was also soon despatched. The two visible gains which Pakistan got from the pact were that SEATO training centres were set up in Asian member countries, and Pakistan managed to train hundreds of its workers under this scheme and secondly, the prestige and importance of being represented where India was not, rubbing shoulders with some powerful fellow-members.

The disadvantages were that Pakistan did, despite efforts not to, alienate the communist powers, and the Pakistan government was regarded as little more than a western puppet. Already bad relations with India also suffered which, ironically increased and justified the need for defence spending. Another factor why Pakistan delayed the ratification of the Treaty was for internal problems. During Prime Minister Bogra's tour of the United States in October, he was recalled by Ghulam Mohammed and told to resign. Once he had done so, Ghulam Mohammed re-appointed him prime minister, having asserted his political supremacy. In the new cabinet, Ayub Khan was appointed Defence Minister and Sikander Mirza was made Interior Minister. Ayub Khan later claimed that Ghulam Mohammed had offered him the post of martial law administrator at that time which he had declined. (76) Given the direction and nature of Pakistani politics, however, such a result was inevitable.

Chapter 4

THE BAGHDAD PACT

The origin of the Pact

Few areas in the world have dominated world attention as the Middle East ^{has} since the end of the Second World War. With the independence of many of the states controlled by Britain and France, the Middle East has proved to be one of the great headaches and political minefields of international diplomacy. Two factors contributed to the importance of the region: firstly, the discovery of enormous quantities of oil on which the western economies grew to depend, secondly, and related ^{to} the previous point, the proximity of this area to the Soviet Union. The British had controlled the lion's share of the Arab states in the region but ⁱⁿ the ~~new~~ post-war ^{period} ~~position saw~~ this position ^{came} under fire from Arab nationalists and gradually the Americans, with the Soviet threat always hanging over the region. The British had military advisers and bases scattered around the Arabian peninsula, including Iraq, Egypt, Oman, Jordan and Kuwait. This impressive looking position was belied by the fact Britain could not afford to keep large forces there and could only pretend at being a Great Power.

The Baghdad Pact can be viewed as the accidental, rather than the natural, successor to the ill-fated Middle East Defence Organisation, which had never got past the planning stage. Egypt, under Abdul Gamal Nasser, was an Arab nationalist government and was in no mood to play any part in the American or British strategic plans for the region. The 'Northern Tier' concept was one on which the Americans had become particularly keen, especially with the advent to power of the Republican Party under Eisenhower and Dulles. The American hope in 1954 was that

the Turko-Pakistan Pact would lead to the establishment of a new regional pact, which did not, however, come about. The British were interested in a regional pact based in Cairo, with western backing. The idea of MEDO foundered on the rock of total disagreement by everyone who was supposed to be a member.

Iraq was a natural focal point of interest. Under its Prime Minister, Dr. Jamali, Iraq had accepted American aid and support in defence issues relating to the Middle East. It was inevitable that Iraq would have to do more to justify that aid and the ascent of a new Prime Minister, Nuri Said in December 1954, helped the western orientation. The Iraqis had had a previous defence agreement with the British dating from 1930 in addition to military ties with the Americans, which allowed the British the use of two air bases and ^{the right} to station troops. (1) According to an experienced American diplomat and former Ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, Britain believed by the mid 1950's that the only way it could maintain troops and bases in Iraq was as part of a larger defence agreement. Britain, therefore, had a greater sense of urgency in achieving ~~of~~ some defence agreement with Iraq even than the Americans.

(2)

In January 1955, the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, led a Turkish delegation to Baghdad to try and work out some understanding on a defence agreement. Nuri Said told British diplomats in Baghdad that he did not expect the meeting to prove particularly useful or productive. All that Nuri was prepared to discuss with the Turks were general issues regarding regional defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The main reason for this reluctant attitude was Arab mistrust that Turkey desired to resurrect the Ottoman Empire. (3) As the

meeting was about to get underway in Baghdad, the State Department informed Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador in Washington, that they were concerned about reports that Britain was not encouraging Iraq to ally herself with the Turko-Pakistan Pact of 1954. The Americans agreed with the British that it was important not to press the Iraqis to join against their will, but felt that any advice on the matter had to be carefully phrased, so as to avoid giving Iraq the impression that the western powers were not keen to secure Iraqi membership of that agreement. (4)

The Turkish and Iraqi expectations of the meeting were quite different as both sides were ^{to} discover on 12 January. The Turkish delegation was pushing the Iraqi side hard for some commitment to a defensive regional pact but the Iraqis were unprepared for that at the time and were only interested in general statements of agreement, similar at most to the Turko-Pakistan Pact of the previous year. British diplomats were asked by the Turks to lend their weight and influence in trying to get the Iraqis to be more flexible and accommodating in their approach. The Turkish team also wanted the British government to issue encouraging statements from London which would help to shake Iraqi resolve not to sign a defence pact. (5) On 13 January, however, the Turkish and British governments got the outcome they had been hoping for when a communique was issued from Baghdad which stated that Turkey and Iraq were going to meet at a later date to discuss the details of a defence pact between them. (6)

This announcement by the Turks and Iraqis was welcomed in Pakistan. The Foreign Ministry issued a note describing the announcement 'as an important step towards the establishment of a collective security system for the region in which Pakistan, by reason of her geographical position, her vital national interests and close religious and cultural affinities with the other countries of the Middle East, must naturally be closely concerned'. (7)

If the Iraqis and the Turks had differing views on Middle Eastern defence, it was no less a gulf than existed between the British and Americans. The State Department believed fervently that an alliance of the northern states of the Middle East; Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq, was the best bet for a secure defence of the Middle East. The differences came out when, on 11 January, Evan Wilson of the U.S. Embassy in London met Evelyn Shuckburgh, who was an Additional Under Secretary of State, 1954-56. Shuckburgh claimed that Britain still believed in the Northern Tier concept but was keen to encourage the 'indigenous approach', that is, the notion that the countries of the area should themselves form pacts without outside interference. This was a reversal from 1954 when the British line was that no pact in the Middle East was viable without themselves and the Americans had stressed the need ^{for} local management.

Britain had since been impressed by the strength of Egyptian opposition to any proposed defence pact which threatened the position of the Arab League and, as any Middle Eastern defence agreement without Egypt was bound to be very weak, it seemed wise not to push the Northern Tier concept too hard at the moment. Wilson said the State Department

felt that the Northern Tier concept was still the 'most reliable concept' for defence in that region and that British thinking in the region was not as positive as it used to be. Wilson pointed out that the U.S. had no desire to see Egypt angry with the west either, or implacably opposed to Iraq but they felt that, if Iraq's membership of the Northern Tier led to the breakup of the Arab League, it could lead to a new grouping around the Northern Tier.

Shuckburgh claimed that Britain was not any less keen about the future of the Northern Tier than the Americans but that there was a difference of emphasis between them. The Americans were pressing rather hard for the Northern Tier to become a reality, while the U.K. was not convinced that it was the wisest way of approaching the problem. Britain felt that the present rise of Arab nationalism, as exemplified by Egypt, was not ready for this. Egypt was seen by the British as the key to the whole Middle East defence structure and so Egyptian opinion did count.

Shuckburgh added in his report that a possibility did exist that Nuri, by joining the Northern Tier, would receive enough aid to make Nasser change his attitude and also apply for western aid. This was seen by the Foreign Office as a risky policy, and Shuckburgh had added, 'If the U.S. policy works it would be a great success, but it is risky and if it fails, Britain must avoid being blamed for its failure'. (8)

The American concept of Middle Eastern defence also included the possibility of Israel being included in the proposed pact. Jernegan, a senior State Department figure, told Harold Beeley in the British Embassy on 9 February that the U.S. had not ruled out the possibility of Israel, Jordan and the Lebanon joining the formative pact. Jernegan said that although American policy was to encourage as many Middle Eastern

countries as possible to join together in a pro-western alliance, they realised that it would make American accession to such a pact more difficult. This unrealistic hope of the Americans shows how seriously they under-estimated the force of Arab feeling against Israel. (9)

The agreement itself, which became known as the Baghdad Pact, was signed on 24 February in Baghdad. It has been suggested that Iraq joined partly out of traditional rivalry with Egypt but, whatever the reason, the Egyptian reaction was extremely hostile. The details of the Iraqi-Turkish understanding in February were vague. The parties agreed to cooperate for security and defence purposes but the military details were left to be worked out at a later conference. The major concession given by Turkey to Arab public opinion was to sign an Exchange of Letters with Iraq on the Palestine question. These stated that both sides recognised the need for a fair settlement of the Palestinian question in accordance with United Nations resolutions calling for a return to the 1947 boundaries. This Exchange was obviously the price that Iraq demanded from Turkey for an alliance with her as Turkey was the only Muslim country with diplomatic relations with Israel. Any failure to mention the Palestine problem would have made the agreement unpopular throughout the Arab world. As mentioned earlier, the Iraqis were rather reluctant to sign any specific pact with the Turks and even this agreement went further than Nuri Said had anticipated. This was due largely to British pressure, as admitted by the Ambassador there. (10) In Iraq, the view according to a well-known British journal was that 'the government had gone beyond public opinion in signing the Pact with Turkey'. (11)

The Turks were keen to assume the mantle of leadership as they would become the link between NATO and the Middle East. The Turkish government

wanted to encourage Pakistan also to join by telling them how welcome they would be. The Turks also asked the American and British governments to inform the Iraqis of this proposal and encourage them to send similar messages. A Foreign Office minute noted that, although it had refrained from telling any country to join, it could not prevent the Turks and Iraqis from doing so, indeed it would welcome that. The Commonwealth Relations Office felt that, if Pakistan was to be approached, it should as a Commonwealth member, be approached by the British as well. Sir Alexander Symon, the recently arrived High Commissioner in Karachi, had already reported that the Pakistan government was giving the matter 'urgent consideration'. The Foreign Office felt that any hesitation on the Pakistani side was due to the fact that the Arab world was divided on this question and so Pakistan did not wish to take sides. (12)

In addition to the text of the Pact there was an Exchange of Letters. This caused the United States some concern and certainly strengthened Israeli feeling against the Pact. The U.S. was mainly left to worry about how to limit the damage and prevent other signatories from subscribing to the Letters. The last thing the Americans wanted was to turn the focus from communism to Israel in this Pact, however unlikely the prospect. The Americans asked the British for support in trying to prevent Pakistan from subscribing to the Letters when it joined the Baghdad Pact. The Foreign Office noted that the Commonwealth Relations Office had been unwilling to do so strongly on the grounds that 'it may be unpalatable'. They only suggested that Symon should have the discretion to raise the subject when the timing was right. Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, had commented alongside the word

'discretion' in the margin, 'From what I saw of the High Commissioner this is not his strong suit anyway !'. The C.R.O. had suggested acting in unison with the Americans in this question. The Foreign Office felt that this approach was 'very feeble' on the grounds that, if Britain felt that the advice was correct, then it should be given on its merits. (13)

Attempts to expand the Pact

J.A. Rahim, the Secretary of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, met Symon on 9 March to explain the Pakistani perspective on the Baghdad Pact. Rahim said that, although British membership of the Pact was very necessary, there was the question of timing which had to be taken into consideration. The government of Pakistan would like one or two other Middle Eastern states to join the Baghdad Pact before Britain did. Early accession by Britain would be viewed with 'misgivings' in Pakistan as it would not seem to be an indigenous idea if Britain joined too soon. In Pakistan's view, the membership of Iran was very necessary, as had been agreed by the Turkish President and Ghulam Mohammed, the Pakistan Governor General. The inclusion of Afghanistan had also been mentioned by the Turks but Pakistan's reaction was noticeably cooler on that suggestion, given the history of strained relations between the two states. The last point Rahim made was that Pakistan had still not made up her mind whether to join. The split in the Cabinet over this was spelt out later as events unfolded. (14)

The Indian reaction to possible Pakistani participation in the Baghdad Pact was predictably strong. The Secretary of the Indian External Affairs Ministry, Pillai, told the High Commissioner in Delhi that, if both Pakistan and Britain joined the Baghdad Pact, then Britain

would become military allies. This, he said, was bound to cause resentment against Britain in India. The High Commissioner replied that the hypothesis seemed both far fetched and misleading. (15) Despite this advice to the contrary and the possible repercussions, Britain joined the Baghdad Pact on 30 March. Eden gives a frank reason for this in his memoirs; 'our purpose...was very simple. I think by doing so we have strengthened our influence and our voice throughout the Middle East'. (16) Be that as it may, it provoked a predictable response from all concerned but it only served to underline what every one had already suspected: that Britain had had a large part to play in the very creation of the Pact and her accession was only natural. The Americans, meanwhile, were still dragging their feet over the issue. Makins in Washington was informed by the State Department that the U.S. was concerned about the lack of any specific non-aggression clause in the treaty and that was providing ammunition for India, Israel and others to attack the Pact. The Americans told Makins that they would like to see this problem resolved before they could join. (17)

The Turkish and Iraqi pressure to secure more signatories to the pact continued, and particular attention was focused on Pakistan. The Turks found it puzzling that Pakistan should hesitate to join the Pact after signing a similar agreement with Turkey a year before. A joint Iraqi-Turkish message was sent to Pakistan on 2 April. The message said that both parties had 'Pakistan in mind as among the most important states whose adherence is necessary and important'. It continued by saying that Pakistan was 'fully qualified for and worthy of becoming a destined member of all organisations which would be set up in the Middle East for the maintenance of peace and security'. (18)

This invitation to Pakistan was discussed by a Foreign Office official with the Counsellor in the U.S. Embassy in London. The Counsellor was informed that the Iraqi and Turkish Ambassadors had met Bogra and had delivered the ~~the~~ message together. Bogra had expressed pleasure at the invitation but did not commit Pakistan to anything and left for Switzerland to attend a conference of Pakistani diplomats. It was noted in the Foreign Office that Iraq, Turkey and America hoped that Pakistan would announce her accession to the Pact before the Bandung Conference started in a month. (19)

The British and Americans had expected that Pakistan would be more enthusiastic about the Baghdad Pact than the South East Asia Treaty Organisation but it was not to be as simple as that. On 14 June, Symon reported that Ayub Khan, the Defence Minister of Pakistan and the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army, would visit Turkey. The King of Iraq and Nuri Said, the Prime Minister, would also be in Turkey at that time and so discussions as to Pakistan's adherence to the Iraqi-Turkish Pact would inevitably figure on the agenda. Ayub who would be accompanied by J.A. Rahim, would speak to the Turks along the lines adopted by the Pakistan government. This was that Pakistan was in principle in favour of defence groupings which added to the strength of the region. However, Pakistan was sceptical about the value and prospects of a Middle Eastern pact without American membership; British adherence notwithstanding. The Pakistan government noted that in case of war the British government intended to rush troops to the area but that might prove problematic in case of a full scale war in Europe and the general progress of the war. Pakistan, therefore, hoped to secure a full American military commitment before joining. A Commonwealth Relations

official commented on the telegram, 'At last they have come out into the open. There seems no prospect of our now pressing them to join'. (20)

Symon had tried to talk to Ayub Khan on these Pakistani reservations before his departure. Ayub confirmed that the views expressed in the previous telegram were indeed the thoughts of the Pakistan Cabinet. The High Commissioner attempted to put forward the British perspective as strongly as he could. He said that it was wrong to assume that the U.K. would be unable to reinforce the Middle East in case of war or that the British forces already stationed there along with local forces would be inactive. The defence of the Middle East was seen as depending on the co-operation of local countries and in this Pakistan was seen as having an important role to play. (21)

Symon discussed the same topic with Sikander Mirza on 15 June. Mirza confirmed that Ayub's visit was of an exploratory nature; its main objective being to ~~to~~ bring home to the Turks and Iraqis that, in the present circumstances, Pakistan could not commit itself to making any positive contribution whatsoever to the defence of the Middle East. Mirza told Symon that before Ayub's visit was agreed to there had been a heated debate in the Pakistan Cabinet during which he, as Interior Minister, had tried to get a resolution adopted that Pakistan, should adhere to the Turko-Iraqi pact. Mirza said he had not succeeded but still hoped this would be the Pakistan government's ultimate decision. Symon reported that he was keeping in close contact with his Australian and American counter-parts on this issue. (22) G.W. Choudhry has confirmed that it was the Defence Minister, Ayub Khan, who spoke against the pact in the Cabinet. Speaking for the army, Ayub stated 'In our

opinion this pact can only be saved if the Americans join in. Our joining in earlier will be premature and do no good to us or them'. (23)

The Commonwealth Relations Office replied to Symon almost immediately. He was praised for the 'admirable arguments' which he had employed while talking to Ayub Khan. Symon was given some further arguments to use in trying to stiffen Pakistani resolve. The Chiefs of Staff suggested that Symon should point out to Ayub that the provision of adequate defence depended on the creation of confidence and that the area could only be defended if all the countries in the region, including Pakistan, did everything possible to contribute towards this end. The U.K. was planning to make a maximum contribution towards this end and it was hoped that Pakistan would do the same. Further arguments were also supplied by the Commonwealth Relations Office. These were that, if more Asian countries joined the Pact, it would give it a less western image and would increase the likelihood of American accession. The U.S. Congress and public opinion would have to be convinced that the Pact was an effective grouping of indigenous states before that could happen. The second main argument used was that with the inclusion of Pakistan there could be set up a Permanent Council, which would further co-ordinate local countries efforts. As the effectiveness of the organisation grew, so did the chances of American adherence. (24)

The Pakistani attitude to the pact was described by the Foreign Office as 'disappointing' and it was noted that it confirmed the feeling that Pakistan was less than enthusiastic about the way in which the Pact was shaping up. The Foreign Office decided, however, to make the best of the situation and to use the Pakistani attitude as further ammunition in some forthcoming talks with the Americans on 20 June, to try 'to get the

for what was then described as the Tripartite Agreement. Ayub Khan had passed through Damascus on his way to the talks in Turkey and had asked the Pakistani Ambassador to find out why the Americans were so lukewarm about the Baghdad Pact. Ayub felt that the American ambivalence could not be entirely explained in terms of the Jewish votes. The British Ambassador said that he 'gathered that Ayub Khan's views on Pakistan's adherence to the Ankara-Baghdad Pact would be largely influenced by the American attitude'. (28)

The visit of Ayub Khan and J.A. Rahim was later described by the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir James Bowker. The King and Prime Minister of Iraq had arrived in Turkey before the Pakistani delegation and had been given the full red carpet treatment. The talks which the Turks and Iraqis were having became tripartite with the arrival of Ayub Khan. What is interesting to note is that General Ayub Khan was at this time not only the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army but was also the Defence Minister. This gave him not only the official status to negotiate and discuss all issues relevant to Pakistan's role in the regional pacts, but also greater clout than any other single minister, possibly including the Prime Minister. According to one authoritative study, the opinion of the military was given great importance in Pakistan where decisions were often taken on a joint basis with the political leadership. (29)

The first round of talks were concerned with Pakistan's accession to the pact. By the end of the first day Ayub Khan had been convinced by the arguments put forward to him by Nuri Said and President Menderes. Ayub was reported to have come to Istanbul convinced that the Pact could never be an effective instrument for Middle Eastern defence unless the

Americans to take a more positive line'. (25) The Foreign Office minute on 16 June was written explaining the British view of the Turko-Iraqi Pact. It noted that Britain had not brought any pressure to bear on Jordan to join the Pact, in spite of hopes that the latter would adhere to the agreement. It went on to note that 'It was hoped that the next accessions to the Pact would be Pakistan and Persia. It now looks as if Pakistan will not join unless the Americans join, or at least make it worth her while in some concrete way to do so'. The danger of the whole proposal running out of momentum was mentioned and so it was decided that the Americans had to be convinced of the value of the Pact and breathe some new life into it. (26)

The British and Pakistanis would have been disappointed if they had known of a memorandum sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence in Washington on 16 June. The Joint Chiefs said that, if the Pact showed signs of consolidating, the U.S., having stimulated its development, could not resist remaining outside it indefinitely. The really important line was that U.S. adherence should be in the broadest possible sense 'carrying no obligations for the earmarking of the United States forces to the area, nor any implied commitment as to the order of financial or material support we may give'. (27)

Ayub Khan's visit to Turkey

The obvious American coolness to the Baghdad Pact was reported as being a source of disappointment not only to Pakistani diplomats, but also to the Turks. The British Ambassador in Syria reported to the Foreign Office that his Pakistani and Turkish colleagues were disappointed by the American failure to remove doubts about their support

pointed to the necessity of some kind of link being provided between the pacts in western Europe and Asia. Ayub Khan in the end made an admission. He said that Pakistan's hesitation over acceding to the Pact had not been due to the politicians but to himself. From a military point of view, he had wanted to know the extent of Pakistan's responsibilities before joining.

The second day of talks was of a more general nature after the question of Pakistan's adherence to the Pact had been cleared up. The possible inclusion of Iran was discussed with Ayub Khan expressing the opinion that its inclusion was crucial to any plan regarding the Northern Tier. All the parties agreed that the Iranians should be encouraged in all ways and so the Iranian offer to hold Staff Talks with Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey was accepted. During a general review of the position of other Arab states, Ayub suggested that, in view of America's present difficulties with Israel, the question of other Arab states joining should be treated with circumspection. The Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry informed the British Ambassador that, once Ayub Khan had accepted Pakistan's accession into the Turko-Iraqi Pact, the strained atmosphere which had marked the beginning of the talks had disappeared as had the 'noticeably reserved manner' in which Nuri and Ayub had eyed each other. The talks had been carried out in a frank and open manner and Nuri had even asked Ayub bluntly if Pakistani hesitation in joining the Pact was due to its regard for Saudi Arabia. This was a supposition which Ayub emphatically denied. (30)

United States became a signatory and so Pakistan's accession would be useless. Ayub was also apprehensive about Pakistan taking on new commitments in view of her present limited military resources and internal and external preoccupations. He was further understood to be suspicious about the designs Iraq might have for the support of Pakistan's armed forces in case of war.

Nuri Said spoke first and was described by Bowker as being at his most convincing, as he combined flattering references to the lead Pakistan had given to the idea of a Northern Tier by concluding the pact with Turkey, with 'clear and convincing answers to the General's several doubts'. Both Nuri and Menderes reassured Ayub about the American intentions about the Northern Tier and the Turko-Iraqi Pact. It was pointed out that American support was assured as continued American aid was being given to Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan, although for particular reasons accession itself was difficult. Nuri and Menderes also pointed out to Ayub that the Pact contained no new commitments and Nuri claimed it amounted to little more than Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The pact, being only a framework, it was up to the signatories themselves what to do with it. When Pakistan acceded, it would also be possible to set up a Permanent Council as provided for by Article 6 of the Treaty.

When Ayub asked a direct question as to what would be required of Pakistan in case of a war in which Turkey was involved in as a member of NATO, he was told that Pakistan's position would be no different then to what it was, and Menderes expressed the view that, although there would be no question of any automatic action being taken, there ought to be an understanding amongst all the parties to the Pact to see what kind of help could be provided in case of war. Both Nuri Said and Menderes

Pakistan agrees to adhere

The talks that Nuri and Menderes had with Ayub Khan seemed to have such an effect on the latter that he immediately sent a telegram from Istanbul to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry recommending that Pakistan should join the Pact. He even said that he did not mind action in this regard being taken even in his absence, implying that now that his veto had been lifted, there was no obstacle to ratification. On 30 June, when the High Commissioner, Symon, was receiving this information from Baig, he was also informed that the Cabinet in Pakistan had decided to adhere to the Pact but with a proviso. The nature of this proviso was unknown to Baig, but the Deputy Foreign Secretary promised to inform the High Commissioner of any formal announcement the government might make, but that was not expected to be for some time. (31)

The following day, 1 July, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, summoned the American and Turkish Ambassadors, the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires and Morris James, in the absence of Symon who was on tour. Bogra announced that Pakistan had decided to accede to the Turko-Iraqi Pact. This would be publicly announced that evening on Pakistan Radio. In making this statement, Bogra wished to clarify a number of points. Firstly, Pakistan's obligations would be strictly limited to a direct attack on Turkey or Iraq, that is, if Turkey was drawn into a war through her membership of NATO by an attack on Norway, then Pakistan would not be involved. Secondly, Pakistan would make no greater commitment than her military potential would allow and would not accept any commitment which would mean a weakening of her own defensive capabilities. Bogra said he would not emphasise these points in his

broadcast and might not even refer to them but he wished there to be no official misunderstandings. The Turkish and Iraqi representatives said they felt the Pakistani reservations were perfectly understandable. They pointed out that the first reservation could apply in reverse to Pakistan through her membership of SEATO. The main point which everyone understood was that the Turko-Iraqi Pact was a defensive instrument in the Middle East. James said only that the news of Pakistan's adherence would be most welcome to his Government. (32)

News that the Pakistan Government had decided to adhere to the Baghdad Pact came as no real surprise but was still welcome news to the previous members. The British Counsellor in Ankara met the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey on 4 July. The Secretary General said that he was not worried by Pakistan's reservations at present as Pakistan's announcement was still only a declaration of intention. Nevertheless, he recognised that the reservations may lead to difficulties and could set an awkward precedent for the alliance. The Secretary General said that Ayub Khan also had some reservations regarding Pakistan's obligations in case of Turkey being dragged into a European conflict through her membership of NATO. He said Ayub had been told that, although there could no question of any automatic action being obligatory in such a case, an understanding should exist which enabled all members to confer and see what help they could provide each other. The idea that the defensive pacts running from Western Europe to Pakistan should in some way be linked was mentioned again by the Secretary General. He noted with satisfaction the way in which Bogra had make no public reference to any reservations and hoped

that the three existing members could accommodate any Pakistani fears. (33)

Ayub Khan returned from Turkey on 4 July and issued a statement regarding his visit. He emphasised that the talks which had taken place in Turkey were held in an atmosphere of great frankness and cordiality, with agreement being reached on all major issues. He still pointed out that Pakistan was not strong enough to take her rightful share of the responsibility for the defence of the Middle East. The decision to accede to the Baghdad Pact was reported by the High Commission in Karachi as being received favourably by most sections of the press in Pakistan. Dawn of Karachi argued that the decision was in line with the aim of Pakistan foreign policy, namely 'to promote international peace through co-operation with like-minded nations'. It pointed out, however, that the ultimate aim of the Pact was to ensure 'social betterment and economic advancement'. (34)

With the decision of the Pakistan government to join the Baghdad Pact, discussions moved on to the practical stage of where and how to manage the new Pact. As Sir James Bowker in Istanbul pointed out, one of the arguments used by Menderes and Nuri Said in trying to persuade Ayub Khan to join the Pact was that, with Pakistan's accession, the moves to establish a Permanent Council could begin. The Turks and the Iraqis expected that the Permanent Council would discuss the form that defence co-operation between the members should take. Bowker recalled that the Foreign Office 'were not particularly enthusiastic' about the idea of a Permanent Council when the Pact was being negotiated but pointed out

that Britain should not be seen to be lacking enthusiasm and could instead influence the form any Council might take. (35)

On 27 July, the Foreign Office prepared a paper relating to the position of Pakistan regarding the Baghdad Pact. E.M. Rose, who wrote the document, pointed out that Pakistan's delay in acceding to the Pact had been caused by the preparation of two necessary documents. One of these was the form of Pakistan's subscription to the exchange of letters between Iraq and Turkey on the United Nation resolutions regarding Palestine. The other document was one setting out Pakistani reservations. These were that Pakistan's obligations would be limited to the case of direct aggression against Iraq or Turkey. Secondly, that Pakistan could give no greater assistance than her military potential allowed and could accept no military commitment which would weaken her capacity to defend her own territory. The Commonwealth Relations Office were reported to be anxious to send instructions to Symon in Karachi. These would be to urge the Pakistan government to desist from association with the exchange of letters which raises the Palestine question and could make that issue more difficult to solve. These views were conveyed to the Pakistan government in April, along with the request to Pakistan to refrain from putting forward her reservations formally at the time of accession. These reservations were seen as unnecessary in view of the wide drafting of the Baghdad Pact.

It was recalled by Rose that the Turks had pointed out to Ayub Khan during his visit to Turkey that any commitment with regard to actual troop dispositions would only come about as a result of the signing of special agreements as the British had done with Iraq. The correct forum for discussing this was seen as the ministerial council which would be

set up under Article 6 of the Baghdad Pact. The Foreign Office believed that any prior formal reservations would greatly detract from Pakistan's decision to adhere to the Pact. It was pointed out that, if Bogra felt that public or parliamentary opinion needed to be calmed down, there would be no objection to his pointing out publicly that adherence does not entail any commitment to NATO or specific commitments about the positioning of troops which would only be as a result of a special treaty. Rose suggested that American support should also be enlisted for these representations in Karachi as it was known that they did not like the idea of Pakistan associating herself with the Exchange of Letters openly. (36)

On 28 July, Morris James, the Deputy High Commissioner in Karachi, and Alexander Symon met J. A. Rahim. On the Baghdad Pact, Rahim said that he had put to the Cabinet some proposals on how Pakistan's accession to that Pact might be managed. He had suggested that there should be three documents. One would be a short formal Instrument of Accession, mentioning in its preamble the Turko-Pakistan Pact. Secondly, there should be a letter indicating Pakistan's agreement with the exchange of letters on Palestine and, thirdly, a note sent to the governments of Iraq, Turkey and Britain recording the reservations set out earlier. Rahim had suggested to the Cabinet that the first two of these documents should be published but the third should not. He hoped that he could show these documents to the relevant governments before they were finalised.

Symon reminded Rahim that the British government had expressed the hope that Pakistan would not subscribe to the letters on Palestine. Rahim said that it was unfortunately not possible for Pakistan to meet

the British wishes in this respect. For Pakistan to refrain from subscribing to the Exchange of Letters would be a pointed and deliberate abstention from Muslim solidarity which neither the Pakistani people nor the people of Iraq and Turkey would understand. Rahim appreciated the British view that this might make a settlement more difficult but he did not see how Pakistan's acceptance of the Letters would affect the issue. He said that Britain had to realise that the Arab countries were nervous of Israel and an essential element in any defence combination between them must be a correct understanding that they would act together in the event of further Israeli aggression. Indeed, such an understanding was vital prior to any negotiation as the Arabs would not negotiate from a position of weakness.

James went on to inform the Commonwealth Relations Office of the views which the Egyptian Ambassador has been propagating in Karachi. He had been advising Pakistan to go slow in completing her accession to the Baghdad Pact. The reason he gave for this was that the climate between east and west had improved so much that it was no longer necessary to build up a system of Middle Eastern defence. The Egyptian Ambassador believed that the western attempt to build up weak states like Iraq and Iran at the cost of alienating Egypt and the Arab League was misdirected. He believed that, given time, Egypt could build up her own capacity for leadership in the Middle East and weld the whole Middle East into an effective whole, in collaboration with Britain and America. The motive behind the argument seemed clear enough, that is, in a more relaxed atmosphere it would give Egypt enough time to regain her lost position of leadership in the Middle East. Symon and James had said that it was only because of western firmness that the atmosphere had improved

and it would be folly for the western nations to relax at the time when their firmness was beginning to produce results. The reason James was mentioning the Egyptian Ambassador's views in such detail was that it was becoming clear that talks between the latter and Suhrawardy had been taking place along the same lines. With the prominent position of Suhrawardy in Pakistani political life, the British were worried as to the possible consequences.

James went on to say that the High Commission was aware that the decision to adhere to the Baghdad pact had only been taken after a 'fairly stiff tussle'. There was always the possibility of some ministers having residual doubts and the prospect of the Egyptian Ambassador plugging his line to them as he had been with Suhrawardy was taken seriously. Symon had asked Rahim how he viewed the position following some relaxation of tension between the Nato and eastern bloc allies. Rahim's cautious reply satisfied Symon and James who described it as 'extremely sound'. James ended by reporting that the Pakistan government had not been able to meet with the Turkish and Iraqi request not to document the Pakistani reservations but had decided to treat them as a tacit understanding between the governments concerned. Symon wanted the Commonwealth Relations Office to record his considered judgement that it would be a mistake to push the Pakistanis any further on this point. The reservations were introduced as a result of a deliberate Cabinet decision and for the sake of unity amongst its members. With the Egyptians in full cry, it seemed to him dangerous to try and push the Pakistanis into dropping the idea of recording the reservations as it would lead to further dissent in the Cabinet and provide an opening for those who wished to hold up Pakistan's accession. (36)

Pakistan delays accession

Pakistan's democratic credentials, weak since birth, took another battering in August. The Governor General since 1951, Ghulam Mohammed, had to retire due to his ill health which had affected him for some time. Ghulam Mohammed had played a role of considerable importance - and intrusiveness - over Pakistan's political life and foreign policy. On 7 August, Sikander Mirza was sworn in as Acting Governor General and it was announced that he would take over this job permanently when Ghulam Mohammed officially retired on 6 October. In the power struggle which followed Mirza's promotion from Interior Minister to Governor General, the Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, was removed. This has been seen as a result of Bogra's attempts to prevent Mirza from getting the job. In a rather bizzare twist, Bogra was sent back to the States as ambassador and Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, the former Finance Minister, was made Prime Minister.

An era of some turbulence followed as Mirza did not command the same fear and respect that Ghulam Mohammed had, and so relied on political intrigues to keep himself in power. A cabinet existed without any legislature to which it was in any way accountable, and no member of the assembly had been elected since independence. To prevent Ayub Khan from becoming too powerful, Mohammed Ali kept the defence portfolio, and turned his attention to drafting a constitution for Pakistan, which eight years after independence it was still lacking! These events obviously disturbed Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact but the British and Americans were not too worried by the events, knowing that there was to be no real change in policy, only personalities. (37)

The Exchange of Letters was to prove to be a tussle between the western powers and the Middle Eastern ones. On 4 August, Rahim informed Symon that the Iraqi Ambassador in Karachi had expressed his government's strong desire that Pakistan should subscribe to the Letters. Hildreth, the U.S. Ambassador in Karachi, told Symon that he had been authorised to use his discretion on whether or not to apply any pressure on this question. He had decided not to do so as he felt too much pressure on Pakistan at once might be counter-productive. (38) The Turkish Foreign Ministry attempted to find a way out of Pakistan's insistence that the reservations be recorded. The Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that Pakistan's objections could be kept secret but should be understood by all the other signatories. (39) This question was to crop up throughout the month and the British line was that it was best not to keep the reservations secret as the United Nations was supposed to keep a record of all international agreements made. The other side of the coin was that Pakistan should not stipulate such severe reservations that it would detract from her very membership.

Symon noted with some trepidation that the draft of Pakistan's Instrument of Accession had not been cleared with Bogra before his resignation, and so the new draft would have to be cleared with the new Prime Minister and, possibly even the reconstructed Cabinet. The High Commissioner said that this 'troubles me somewhat since, if my information is correct, the new Prime Minister is not, repeat not, wholeheartedly in favour of Pakistan's accession to the Pact'. Symon fully agreed with the hope of the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry that Pakistan's accession could be cleared quickly but he felt that the internal situation in Pakistan meant that any

intervention, however well meant, would mean a further delay. Rahim also informed Symon that he had been under strong Turkish and Iraqi pressure to drop the reservations altogether but he was still unconvinced.(40) Rose in London inferred that 'the new Pakistan Government may not be as anxious as its predecessor to accede to the Baghdad Pact'.(41) He felt that, although the resignation of Bogra and the installation of a new Cabinet would obviously result in some delay to Pakistan's adherence to the Pact ~~that~~ it would not endanger it.(42) This was to prove correct.

On 11 August, the High Commissioner met Sikander Mirza to discuss the Baghdad Pact. Symon urged Mirza that Pakistan should push ahead hard to complete the accession. Mirza told the High Commissioner that there had been three doubters in the old Cabinet; Ayub Khan, Chaudhry Mohammed Ali and Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani. Mirza said he did not expect Mohammed Ali to try and get the decision changed at this late stage despite his earlier reservations. Symon reiterated his request that Pakistan should join the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible. Mirza promised to do all he could to achieve this.(43) The battle of the Letters resulted in a rather inevitable western victory when, on 17 August, Baig told Symon that Pakistan had decided not to subscribe to the Exchange of Letters. The reason given for this was that the Iraqi Ambassador had told the Pakistan Cabinet that his government knew the feelings of Pakistan on the Palestine question and so there was no need to publicise it. This comment was in direct contradiction to the reported Iraqi line of 4 August and seems to indicate that there had been some British and American pressure behind it.(44) There was probably little opposition to this within the Pakistan Cabinet as the main doubter, Ayub Khan, had

been won over and the deal worked out within the old Cabinet did not apply to the present one.

Iraq and Turkey continued to feel dissatisfied with Pakistan's reservations over the Baghdad Pact. (45) The Foreign Minister of Iraq sent for a member of the British Embassy in Baghdad, Beaumont, to express his dislike of the conditions Pakistan was laying down. He felt that the reservations were obvious and constituted a bad precedent. The fear that any new or possible signatory to the Pact could lay down their own particular condition and lead to a distortion of the Pact was a fear shared by the British and Turks. The Iraqi Foreign Minister asked Beaumont whether it was possible, even at this late stage, for pressure to be applied on Pakistan to drop the reservations altogether. (46) The Foreign Office replied that it seemed dangerous at the present time to push Pakistan any more. The recent dropping of the desire to subscribe to the Exchange of Letters by Pakistan was obviously what the Foreign Office meant but this was not mentioned. The Foreign Office felt that confidential letters sent to all the other signatories on ~~what~~ ^{the} reservations Pakistan insisted on seemed to be the least objectionable way of putting her conditions on the record. (47)

The Iraqi Minister in the Embassy in Karachi, Gaylani, also tried to get Symon to apply pressure in Pakistan. The High Commissioner replied that he did not plan to influence Mohammed Ali any further on this question because Mohammed Ali was a member of the Cabinet which took the original decision to accede to the Pact with ~~the~~ certain conditions and so the new Prime Minister was fully aware of all the facts. The second reason for not interfering at that time was that any further pressure would lead to an even longer delay in Pakistan's accession. The third

reason was that Mohammed Ali might refer the matter to the Cabinet which meant opening up the question to the 'unpredictable views of the East Pakistani elements in the new government'. (48)

The next British move to secure immediate Pakistani membership of the Pact was to propose that Pakistan should deposit her Instrument of Accession without delay and leave the text of the reservation document to be decided at a later date. (49) Mohammed Ali was too experienced a bureaucrat to be hurried and he told Symon on 25 August that it would be necessary to consult the Cabinet before any decision on when to ratify. This would still leave open the question of Pakistan's reservations and Mohammed Ali said that 'he did not wish to take two bites of the cherry' by discussing both ratification and reservations at one meeting. The Turkish Ambassador informed Symon that he had been instructed not to push the Pakistan government any further at this point as the situation was too delicate. (50)

The Completion of formalities.

The American interest in the Middle East was re-activated in September by an American intelligence report that Russia was planning to 'jump over the Northern Tier' and sell arms to Egypt. Faced with this development, the U.S. suddenly became enthusiastic about the Baghdad Pact and encouraged Pakistan adhere quickly to it. On 23 September, Pakistan formally joined the Baghdad Pact. The State Department announced that the U.S. government was pleased by this development as it had always favoured the aspirations of Middle Eastern countries to promote their defence through an effective collective security arrangement. (51)

The Baghdad Pact membership was completed with the decision of the Shah of Iran to join on 11 October. This meant the completion of the 'Northern Tier' concept which the Americans had been hoping for since 1953. In spite of this, America's reaction to the Iranian decision was muted, as she made it clear to Iran that any decision she had taken was her own and not in response to any American persuasion. The reason often given for this is that the Americans did not wish to see immediate Iranian accession as it might provoke a strong Russian reaction as Iran shared a border with the Soviet Union. The other reason was that it might lead to Iran demanding large quantities of U.S. military aid to bolster her defences. (52) As mentioned earlier, the Turks and Pakistanis were very keen on Iran's accession and the British government felt it was a natural and correct step for Iran to take.

The Iranian decision to adhere to the pact was welcomed in Pakistan by Sikander Mirza. He told Symon that although it was good news, it would be expensive for the west to supply Iran with arms. Mirza inquired whether it would be the British or the Americans who would pay for those arms. Symon ventured the guess that it would be a joint venture, with the Americans paying for the bulk of it. The need for the Baghdad Pact Council to be established and functioning was considered to be vital by Mirza. He said that the members should know what they were expected to do and how to do it and that Ayub Khan would attend.

The seemingly invincible position of Ayub Khan within the Pakistan army was reported to the Commonwealth Relations Office to be under some threat in October. The Chief of Staff, Nasir Ali, was reported to be intriguing against his Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan. During the same meeting with Mirza, this rumour was mentioned by Symon. The Cabinet

reshuffle in August had meant that Ayub Khan had lost his position as Defence Minister and so inevitably some power. Mirza said that Ayub had now 'settled down well' after being a 'little upset' at his removal from that important job. As for the intrigues, Mirza dismissed them by saying that there was no cause for concern. Nasir Ali was being carefully watched and action would be taken if necessary. Ayub Khan would be given an extension as Commander-in-Chief and Nasir Ali would be retired rather than promoted. (53)

Attention focused increasingly on the United States as the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact approached. Mak, an American diplomat in London, discussed American views on the Baghdad Pact with Hadow, of the Foreign Office, on 18 November. He said that all the American ambassadors in the Middle East had recommended to the State Department that the U.S. should accede to the Pact. Hadow replied that, although the British government would welcome such a development, the Foreign Office had understood that this was impossible because of the strength of the Jewish lobby in America and the Israeli dislike of the Pact. Mak said he felt that, although this had been the case, the fear of Russian infiltration in the Middle East had grown so strong in the past few weeks that the American public were quite ready to support such a move. He even said that he personally felt that America should join the pact. The 'Russian infiltration' Mak was referring to was obviously the Egyptian decision to buy Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia. (52) The American view of the Baghdad Pact was sent to all the members at the end of October. It stated that it welcomed the setting up of the organisation and would set up military and political liaison with the Pact. The military aspect of American involvement was played down; and

the message ended by saying that America would keep in close contact with the Pact and did not rule out the possibility of future accession. (54)

On 3 November, Baig informed James that Pakistan had received the American memorandum on the Baghdad Pact. He repeated the old Pakistani line that Pakistan would have been happier if the U.S. had joined the Baghdad Pact to start with and hoped it would still join. (55) Baig then read to James 'in strict confidence' a secret minute from Ayub Khan. Ayub made his frustration clear by demanding how much 'concrete help' in the way of equipment the U.S. was willing to make. He continued to express his old belief that any defence arrangement in the Middle East without the membership or full support of the U.S. was bound to be ineffective. He went on to complain that American aid had been 'halting and tardy' and this was 'contrary to the pledged word' of the United States. (56) Mohammed Ali held views similar to Ayub which he informed Symon of the same day James was meeting Baig. Mohammed Ali tried to calm Symon down about the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia by saying that the strong western reaction had only succeeded in inflating Abdul Gamal Nasser. The incident, according to Mohammed Ali, could be seen by some countries as showing that neutralism pays off and so the west should do something to counter-act this. The Pakistan Prime Minister said that he now regarded SEATO as little more than a 'paper pact'. The Middle East, however, was seen as far more important and as he wanted to see the Northern Tier to be strong, he hoped that the U.S. would soon become a full member of the Baghdad Pact. He felt that the Russians had not given up their plan to try and dominate the Middle East but had changed their tactics in the face of overwhelming western military

superiority. What the Russians were going to rely on now was 'probing and infiltration' rather than any direct confrontation. He went on to say that the west should try and strengthen all weak spots, of which the Middle East was one. (57)

After adhering to the Pact, Pakistan seemed to play the role Turkey had done earlier by trying to persuade other states to join. The British Ambassador in Syria reported to the Foreign Office that the Pakistani Minister in Damascus was doing all he could to persuade Jordan to accede to the Pact. The Pakistani Minister met with the King and deputy Prime Minister of Jordan on 14 November and he told Gardiner that he felt that he ^{had e} _h succeeded in ensuring that Jordan was favourably disposed to the Baghdad Pact. The Minister had said that Pakistan had an advantage over Turkey and Iraq in that, while she had only the defence question to worry about, the two Middle Eastern states could be seen as having other motives in Jordanian accession. (58)

The Indian government left the Foreign Office in little doubt as to their feelings about Pakistani and British membership of a defence pact. The Indian Foreign Secretary had protested strongly over the whole arrangement to the High Commissioner in Delhi and so the Commonwealth Relations Office told that him Britain would do all it could to strengthen the Pact and the defences of its members but this would be done in a way which would cause minimum offence to India.

The Commonwealth Relations Office pointed out that they 'had to meet criticism from Pakistan that in the present circumstances they receive very little material benefit from their close collaboration with the west, both in SEATO and the Middle East. There is a danger that Pakistan may become disillusioned with its present policy, to which we attach the

utmost importance, and come to the conclusion that neutralism pays equally well'. This telegram was mainly for the benefit of the High Commissioner but India was to be left in doubt as to Britain's motives. (59)

The first meeting of the Baghdad Pact was held, aptly enough, in Baghdad starting on 20 November. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan were represented by their prime ministers and Britain sent her Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan. The U.S. attended the meeting as observers and the American Ambassador to Iraq was the liaison officer. Chaudhri Mohammed Ali gave a press conference before leaving Karachi for Baghdad. The main points he made were that the Asian members needed far more military equipment before they could be adequately equipped for an effective defence of the region. American membership of the Pact was still seen as necessary and Pakistan believed that the Pact should ensure that the Council of the Pact should discharge its function of ensuring a viable defence of the area. (60) It was to prove to be a frustrated hope.

Pakistan and the Baghdad Pact : A retrospective look

The Pakistan government and army had been looking to the Middle East to prove their worth to the western powers and in the process, increase their own military potential. Such hopes were to prove futile. Unlike SEATO, the ^aBaghdad ₂Pact did provide for a military council which was supposed to co-ordinate and plan defence amongst all the members. In reality, the Middle Eastern powers were left to draw up plans and discuss strategies over which they had little control. The United States refused ever to join the pact. There have been three reasons suggested

for this, to avoid antagonising Egypt, to avoid Israeli pressure and to preclude a Senate fight over ratification in an election year. (61) An uncharitable fourth reason could be that the U.S. wished to avoid further financial commitments. By leaving Britain to carry the can, the U.S. could enjoy the best of both worlds, the Northern Tier without any responsibility. Other historians have seen the Baghdad pact as a product of Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East, rather than a well-considered military strategy to protect that area from Soviet attack. (62) For Pakistan, however, the result was that it proved to be the final straw for Soviet patience. The Soviet Union started to cultivate both Kabul and New Delhi and so any hope of resolving the Kashmir dispute in the United Nations was over.

Pakistan found herself in the rather extraordinary position of having military commitments ranging from Turkey to the Philippines. There was no way that Pakistan could hope to ~~hope to~~ honour those commitments given the state of relations with India and her own economy. The irony of the Baghdad Pact for Pakistan was that it came close to the initial idealism of her foreign policy, the combination of Muslim states in a military agreement. Events in Egypt, however, were to show the British reasons for initiating the pact and within a year, it was all but over.

Chapter 5

PAKISTAN AND THE SUEZ CANAL - July to October

The background.

The year 1956 was fateful for many countries and people but few could have forecast the dramatic events which unfolded within a few months. Pakistan is not one of the countries normally thought of as being greatly affected by the events in Egypt, but for the rulers of that country, the whole episode was painful and one which they would have preferred not to have happened at all. The dilemma was whether to choose between its former colonial masters and recent Baghdad Pact allies: the British; or to side with a fellow Muslim country, with whom Pakistan sincerely wanted good relations, not only as a country whose trade depended heavily on the Suez Canal, but also for the rather vague hope of encouraging Muslim unity: Egypt.

The prime minister of Pakistan since August 1955 had been Chaudhry Mohammed Ali and the foreign minister was Hamidul Haq Choudhry, a man who by his own confession would rather have been in charge of the Finance Ministry! (1)

The background to the whole episode is typical of the problems facing newly independent countries, trying to develop internally, while coping with the realities of Cold War politics. Gamal Abdul Nasser was the darling of militant Arab nationalists. He proclaimed that his ultimate dream was to build up one Arab state, sweeping away borders between Arabs, with the eventual destruction of Israel. Such fiery, revolutionary rhetoric, however, was tempered with the realization that the economic clout and technical skills of the western powers would be of immense help in Egypt's own development. Nasser, meanwhile, also

hoped to keep good relations with the Soviet bloc, thus irritating the Americans in particular, who tended to see anyone trying to woo both sides with suspicion. Nasser, along with Nehru of India and Tito of Yugoslavia, was in the forefront of the Non - Aligned Movement. Nasser's original request to the west for help in building the proposed Aswan Dam, was quite well received and original indications were that the west welcomed the chance to wean Nasser away from the east altogether.

Nasser's acceptance of eastern bloc arms in early 1956 sent shock waves, not only to Israel, who dreaded the thought of a strong Arab attack, but also the Americans, who felt Nasser was taking them for a ride. On 19 July 1956, John Foster Dulles, the U.S. secretary of state, told the pro-west Egyptian ambassador in Washington, that the U.S. had decided not to help the Egyptians in building the Aswan Dam. On 26 July, stung by this refusal, yet mindful of the symbolic importance of his action, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. The Canal revenues, claimed Nasser, would be sufficient, to help Egypt finance the dam itself. The die was cast.

The news of this action stunned the whole world. Few countries thought that Nasser could pull off such a spectacular coup, and even his friends, the Indians, were far from delighted with the news, feeling that Nasser's act was high handed. (2) In the Arab world, however, the news was greeted with unrestrained joy, and even some pro-west governments were forced by ~~the~~ public feeling to send their congratulations to Nasser. (3) In Pakistan the press reaction was noted by the Americans as being revealing as it strongly supported the Egyptian action. The Embassy in Karachi saw this as giving an insight to the emotions, which were described as 'pro-Islam and anti-imperialism'.

The Pakistan government was seen as vulnerable to attack on this question as it had asked the U.S. not to finance the Aswan Dam. (4)

The issue was portrayed by Nasser as an independent country taking charge of its land and resources and striking a blow at the exploitation of poorer countries by the richer ones. The Suez Canal company was owned jointly by the British and French, who immediately denounced Nasser's action as illegal and unacceptable. The U.S. was concerned by the fact that a man, in their view, as politically unreliable as Nasser, should have complete control of a waterway as strategically and economically important as the Suez canal. As later events were to show, however, the U.S. was not too keen on the British neo - colonial attitude of treating certain areas as their own, as they felt it was counter - productive.

On 2 August, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, declared in the Commons that it was unacceptable that any single power should exercise unfettered control over the Suez Canal, in pursuit of national policy, and with a possible lack of technical know how. (5) Even before a joint statement by the foreign ministers of Britain, France and the U.S. could be issued, Eden called up reservists and despatched troops and aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean. Notice was given to the world in general, and Egypt in particular, that Britain was not prepared to sit back and be taken so lightly. Eden had convinced himself that Nasser was a particularly dangerous character, (references to Hitler were also made) (6), and that he must not be allowed to get away with this act. While plans were being drawn up to capture the canal by force, the British led the diplomatic war in trying to rally all the main canal users behind her in trying to show Nasser how diplomatically isolated he

was. The conference was called for by the three foreign ministers of Britain, France and the U.S. The conference was called in London on 16 August . Nasser did not attend, despite Indian and Russian advice that he should go. (7)

Pakistan's reaction

Nasser's action had widespread support throughout Pakistan, even amongst senior political figures. In a statement to the press on 1 August the Pakistan Foreign Ministry stated that Pakistan's thinking was as follows : firstly, free navigation of the canal was vital to Pakistan's economic interests, as 56% of its exports and 49% of imports passed through the canal. Secondly, a peaceful solution to the problem had to be found, which was acceptable to all parties. Thirdly, Pakistan was unhappy with the military manoeuvres in the Mediterranean. And finally, Pakistan believed that the Arab-Israeli dispute must be kept separate from the Suez Canal and hoped that this dispute would not be used as a pretext to give arms to Israel. (8)

The U.S. Embassy was informed that despite Chaudhry's efforts, some members of the Pakistan Cabinet had congratulated Egypt on her action, and noted how the Pakistan government was trying to be as non-comittal. (9) The Americans recognised how the Suez issue had shown the problem of Pakistan's leaders in that the 'wide gulf between their view of what is important and the emotions of the people has never before been so strikingly apparent'. The Cabinet was thought to have handled the situation with caution yet responsibility. (10) Little satisfaction was derived by the acting British High Commissioner in Karachi, Sir Morris James, in a meeting with the prime minister on 13 August. Chaudhri Mohammed Ali told James that he wanted freedom of the Suez

Canal guaranteed^e but Pakistan would not support the use of force. He said the reason Pakistan was going to the conference was to try and help in a peaceful settlement of the dispute. (11)

At an Independence Day rally on ~~the~~ 14 August, the Prime Minister elaborated on his views. He stated clearly that Egypt as a sovereign state had the right to nationalise the Canal. (12) Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the founder of Pakistan, and a formidable political figure in her own right, stated that Nasser's step was a bold and correct one. Sardar Nishtar, another figure revered for his role in the Pakistan movement, was the most outspoken of the senior figures. As a top ranking official in the ruling Muslim League, he was a senior official figure. He stated that whatever the differences between Pakistan and Egypt, Pakistan should stand firmly with Egypt in this dispute to combat what he called 'British colonialism'. (13) The most muted response was that of the leader of the opposition, H.S. Suhrawardy, who merely called for a 'mutual adjustment' to be made. Suhrawardy, however, was more than the leader of the opposition. As the chief minister of Bengal during the raj, he was a political figure with considerable standing. In April that year, he had been sent on a semi-official European tour by the Pakistan government, and was seen by many, including his hosts in the many countries he visited, as being groomed for future prime ministership. When Pakistan was invited to the London conference, starting on 16 August, she accepted.

The Pakistan delegation was to be headed by the Foreign Minister, Hamidul Haq Chaudhry, and consisted of Tayyab Hussain, Pakistan Ambassador to Egypt, joint secretary, S.K. Dehlavi and Ikramullah, the High Commissioner in London. Chaudhry decided to visit Nasser on his way

to the conference, after receiving an invitation. Pakistan was hoping to play some role as a mediator between Egypt and Britain, using both its Islamic credentials and its membership of the Baghdad pact. Relations between Pakistan and Egypt had been strained since Nasser came to power. Nasser saw the Baghdad pact as a western tool to keep its influence in the east. He had directly criticised Pakistan's role in the regional pacts and had made the error of siding with India with its disputes with Pakistan, thus losing support from a section of the population and the press. Despite this, Nasser had been encouraged by many expressions of support from a wide section of Pakistan since the nationalisation of the canal, and therefore hoped to gain Pakistani help in the forthcoming conference, and possibly beyond. Chaudhry, therefore, met Nasser on 14 August, with instructions to warn Nasser of the need to be careful in matters of the freedom of navigation and the payment of dues. Pakistan thought that these two things might provoke a military response. (14). The British ambassador in Egypt also met Chaudhry while he was there, and reported that Chaudhry had been impressed by Nasser's argument that the British had acknowledged only a few years earlier Egypt's capability to run the canal. (15)

Chaudhry was said to have suggested to Nasser that the canal could be run by an international board with Egypt having the final veto or deciding vote. Chaudhry was giving this version of events at a lunch at 10 Downing Street on 17 August. He claimed that Nasser was interested in the proposal but the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Fawzi, said any suggestion that Egypt was not to be in complete and sole control of the canal was unacceptable to its sovereignty. Nasser was to have asked Chaudhry to use Pakistan's good offices with the west to negotiate on

Egypt's behalf. According to Chaudhry, Nasser was sweating profusely throughout the meeting and had said that a British warship had been sighted only six miles off Egypt's coast. (16)

Meanwhile, reactions from all over the world were starting to flow back, through the Foreign Office. It is almost certain that Nasser did not inform any government of his action in advance, including many friends and sympathizers. The Pakistan counsellor in Peking told his British counterpart that there had been no correspondence between the Chinese and Egyptians on the Suez issue. The British counsellor was inclined to believe this because, as he put it, 'Muslim solidarity tends to be rather strong in these parts'. The British diplomat regretfully noted that the Suez crisis had become another disputed topic between India and Pakistan, as the Indian ambassador had been overheard saying that the decision to withdraw finance from the Aswan Dam project had been taken at the recent Baghdad Pact meeting. This infuriated the Pakistan ambassador. (17)

Nehru was shocked by the announcement, not only because Nasser had not even hinted ^{at} ~~of~~ his move on the canal, even though they had met just a few days earlier at Briorn, but also because of the possible consequences of his action and its ~~illegality~~ legality. (18) A cynic may point out that Nehru's own actions in Kashmir had hardly met with unanimous international approval. Nehru's opinion of Nasser as a person was rather unflattering. He considered Nasser 'inexperienced and narrow-minded'. (19). Nehru took nearly two weeks to come out in favour of Egypt, in a speech to parliament on 8 August.

King Saud of Saudi Arabia was similarly surprised and insulted. He did not, therefore, send Nasser any congratulatory telegram. The

Pakistani and Egyptian ambassadors to Saudi Arabia were good friends and the Egyptian ambassador confirmed this story to his Pakistani counterpart. It may be interesting to note that the Egyptian ambassador was seen as not being very keen on Nasser himself. (20) This was confirmed by the U.S. Embassy in Karachi. Baig revealed that when King Saud had heard the news ~~of the~~ of Nasser's action, he had said 'May God save Nasser'. (21) As Saudi Arabia was growing in importance, both politically and economically, Britain was keen to see Pakistan - Saudi links grow, as a possible means of extending her own influence, through Pakistan. (22) Pakistan, as mentioned earlier, was not averse to the idea of acting as mediator, as in the possible outcome of a successful agreement being reached, it would have earned the gratitude of both the Muslim and western blocs. The Pakistan Ambassador to Washington, the former Prime Minister, Bogra, together with his Iraqi colleague, suggested to the Egyptians on 4 August that they should agree to Arab control of the Suez canal, with finance provided for the Aswan Dam. Dulles was impressed ^S with ^{the} idea as neither Britain or France were willing to consider it and he himself felt that greater international control was the only solution. (23) In conversations with the Syrian Foreign Minister on 7 August, the Pakistan Ambassador in Damascus suggested that, if the Egyptians wanted a neutral site, then Pakistan was available. The Syrians also told the Pakistanis, who passed on the message to the British, that the Egyptians would attend a conference if it was held anywhere other than London and if the British and French ceased their military threats. (24)

The other Baghdad pact powers were more hostile to Nasser than Pakistan. The Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes, told the British that on

his recent tour of Iran and Pakistan, they had both been agreed on the threat of Nasser, but had agreed not to follow too similar a line to prevent popular discontent against the Baghdad Pact. (25) He accepted that many people in these three countries were pro-Nasser as his action had 'demagogic appeal'. Menderes said that he regarded Nasser as a stooge of Russia's, which in turn he saw as Turkey's 'mortal enemy'. (26) The Shah also made clear his contempt for Nasser, and although he realised the political folly of a full scale attack, he suggested a similar removal of Nasser to that of the former Iranian prime minister, Mossadeq, which enabled him to take the throne. (27)

The first Suez conference

The British had, therefore, succeeded in calling a conference in London, as they had wished. Twenty-two countries were represented, the majority supporting the Anglo-French line, but the Egyptians were comforted by the fact that Russia and India were there. Dulles had suggested to the British that the best course of action would be one in which friendly nations should be lobbied before the conference, and a draft prepared before the conference starts. (28) Whatever Nehru's reservations earlier about the whole episode were, he had now come out firmly with Nasser on the crucial points that the threat of force was unacceptable and that if Egypt did not agree to international control voluntarily (a highly unlikely event), there should be no compulsion. The British were under no illusions about the conference. A Foreign Office document on 9 August shows their line of thinking quite clearly. (29) It was obvious from the list of invitees that a large majority would favour the British, French and American line on the

crucial question on whether Egypt has the right to complete control over the canal or not.

The discussion, even before the conference had started, was therefore what the next move should be, once the conference had voted for the internationalisation of the canal. There were two options after the conference, stated the document. One was to appoint a small committee to negotiate with Nasser and the other was to adjourn and wait for Nasser to compromise. If Egypt was to reject both approaches, then three courses of action were discussed. Significantly, the first option to be discussed was that of military action to occupy the canal, and if necessary the rest of Egypt. The main drawback was seen to be the lack of a suitable pretext, although the reason of Nasser's total refusal to compromise was seen as a possibility. The second option was the immediate establishment of a company, to which the anti-Nasser countries would pay their dues to. Interference with this committee would also provide a good excuse to attack Egypt. The third choice was to present counter-proposals to Egypt, such as an international authority to run the canal, and not a company, which the Egyptians would obviously find too objectionable.

The public statements of the Pakistan government had not left the British with a great deal of hope ^{of} securing whole hearted Pakistani support. Although not categorized with Russia or India, from whom the British expected nothing, the Pakistanis were classed with the Iranians and Spanish, in the category of 'doubtful ^{NE} qualities'. It was clearly stated that they could not be 'counted upon for positive support'. (30) Pakistan was lobbied, nevertheless, from the double angle of being a Commonwealth member and also a member of the Baghdad Pact. The

Commonwealth Relations Office said that Pakistan would be pulled both ways. It also said that she would hesitate to come out too firmly with Britain on the question of international control, if Egypt was adamant. (31) The Commonwealth Secretary had spoken to both the Pakistani and Indian High Commissioners on 1 August, and had gathered that they expected to attend the conference along with other Commonwealth states. (32) On 15 August, the secretary of state for foreign affairs met the representatives of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Chaudhry had not yet arrived from Cairo and so Ikramullah was representing Pakistan. Ikramullah stated the official view that Pakistan stood for a peaceful settlement, but he agreed to the crucial point that exclusive control of the canal, particularly by a person like Nasser, was dangerous. (33)

Chaudhry arrived later on the same day, 15 August, with clear instructions. Before he left Pakistan, the Cabinet had approved the Pakistan Foreign Ministry recommendation that they should uphold both of Egypt's main claims, that is, the ownership and the ultimate control of the canal. However, Pakistan did agree to a possible committee to be set up by the United Nations, which would supervise the canal and in which users from both east and west should be equally represented. (34) This is confirmed by the U.S. Embassy in Karachi, which was informed by Mohammed Ali that if compensation was paid by Egypt, then the legality of her action was indisputable. The Prime Minister voiced grave doubts to the Americans about the wisdom of insisting on international control. (35)

Upon arrival, Chaudhry met Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary. The conversation seemed to be mainly an interview. (36) Chaudhry asked Lloyd how much support he expected for the proposal to call for international control of the canal. Lloyd replied that he hoped

at least nineteen out of the twenty-two delegates ^{would} ~~to~~ support the motion. One wonders whether Pakistan was one of the expected nineteen! Lloyd said that he hoped that such a large majority would send a clear signal to Nasser that a large ^o ~~prop~~portion of the canal users agreed with them. Chaudhry reported that Nasser had seemed quiet and subdued but had still refused to discuss the question of Egypt's control of the canal. He said Nasser admitted that the way he nationalised the canal may not have been the best one, but it should not have come as a great surprise as they had been discussing it for two years. Chaudhry then asked what India's position was. Lloyd replied that the Indians knew very well that they were not going (to just) sit back, and if necessary would take firm action.

Chaudhry rather simplistically asked how far the British were prepared to go. Lloyd replied that Britain was prepared in the end to fight for her interests, in the same way as he supposed Pakistan would to defend hers. Lloyd gave the example of Pakistan being prepared to fight over Kashmir. Chaudhry accepted this rather strange analogy without argument. He said that he thought it was best to keep the proposed role of any future association ambiguous, as it would be less offensive to the Egyptians and their supporters, the Russians and Indians. He went on to say that it would be better if Pakistan was seen not to be too close to the west on this issue, as it would not go down with the Muslim world very well. One wonders whether he had heard his prime minister's speech the previous day, which stated that Egypt, as a sovereign state, had the right to nationalise the canal ! One is often left wondering what to make of the contradictions in statements between ministers and their own public and private views. Lloyd then emphasised

the fact that Dulles was firmly with the British on the issue of international control and 'as the power of the U.S. in both the economic and military fields was overwhelming, a firm statement by Mr. Dulles would do much to clear the air'. This was a veiled reminder to Pakistan, as to where it received its military and economic aid.

Chaudhry was certainly given attention by the western powers. On 17 August, the day after the conference started, Chaudhry was one of six foreign ministers invited to 10 Downing Street for lunch.(37) On the following day, Dulles went to visit Chaudhry in his hotel, canvassing for support for the U.S. proposal for an international control board to manage the canal. Dulles said that this was necessary as the Egyptians lacked the technical know-how to manage the canal. Chaudhry seemed to accept this, ignoring the fact that since nationalisation, many ships had passed through the canal without hindrance or problem. Chaudhry asked for permission from Mohammed Ali to omit that part of his statement which required him to support Egyptian control of the canal.(38).

Ikramullah confirmed the proposed change in Pakistan's ground. He said that Chaudhry was personally convinced that Dulles' proposals were right and Pakistan should support them. Chaudhry was said to regard his brief as 'unsatisfactory'.(39) For this reason he had kept his opening speech deliberately ambivalent, in order to leave open the possibility of support for the idea of international management.

Mohammed Ali went straight to the heart of the matter in instructing Chaudhry to ask Dulles how any resolution about international control could be carried or enforced in the face of

Egypt's determination never to accept any such control. (40) He was said to be convinced that eventually control of the canal would have to be left to Egypt. These instructions were still not acceptable to Chaudhry, let alone the British or Americans. He asked that he should be allowed to propose the establishment of a small committee, to negotiate with Egypt to discuss how to set up an organisation, in which Egypt would be fully represented, to manage the canal. He argued that this would also safeguard the right of the user's and that anything else would isolate Pakistan, and, worse, in his view, place Pakistan in the wrong company.

This was confirmed in a conversation which James had with Baig on this issue on 21 August. (41) Baig said that official thinking was that a sharp Egyptian reaction should be avoided if possible. Also, Pakistan wanted to go as close to international control as possible, but wanted to avoid it in name. Baig revealed that, in Chaudhry's trip to Cairo before the conference, Nasser had accepted the idea that an international consultative body should be set up. Baig said that, if this formula was acceptable to the west, Pakistan would do all it could to get Egypt to agree. James said it was inconceivable that Nasser should be given the power of veto.

James reported that the press was covering the conference fully but because of a strike since the 16th, public interest had declined. The question was whether this body would have any real control of the canal or not, and Baig said Pakistan was in favour of having the committee's advice being binding. (42) The whole argument, in a nutshell, was whether Egypt had the right to ultimate control of the canal or not. The suggestion to set up a committee to negotiate international control was obviously one the Egyptians would not reject but would find offensive.

The British were sceptical of the whole idea and were determined that the world should be shown that Nasser, and all future leaders, could not get away with such actions.

Mohammed Ali agreed that a negotiating committee be set up, which would do no more than discuss with Nasser what operational arrangements could be made to safeguard the interests of all concerned. He was said to have instructed Chaudhry to ask Dulles how international control would be set up and maintained in the face of Nasser's opposition. (43)

On 20 August, at 10.30 am, Lloyd met the Baghdad Pact representatives and asked them what they thought of the draft resolution which had been prepared mainly by Dulles. Chaudhry immediately replied that it was splendid. (44) He said, however, that Pakistan, Iran, Ethiopia and Turkey had some slight amendments to make and he hoped this was agreeable to the British. The British noted appreciatively the role Pakistan had played in the final draft declaration, and the fact that they had lobbied the Ceylon and Indonesian delegations to support their proposals in an effort to isolate Russia and India. (45) Even Dulles' proposals, although presented as a purely American initiative, were first discussed and agreed upon by the British and French. These amendments were purely cosmetic in nature and were recognised as such by the Americans and British and were, therefore, accepted without a murmur.

President Eisenhower said later that Dulles' skill showed when 'with nominal amendments these four nations agreed to introduce our proposal as their own'. (46) This became known as the Five-Power proposal. As far as Dulles was concerned, the fact that three large Muslim states were so closely involved in the preparation of the final document, must have

been a godsend. On 18 August, Dulles had told the French that too much could not be expected of Pakistan because of ~~their~~ internal pressure. (47) He said their prospect of taking any action or adhering to any western declaration, was unlikely. The French also appreciated the tactical advantage of the proposals coming from Muslim countries, rather than the west (48)

Chaudhry also wanted the negotiating time with Nasser over these proposals to be reduced from a suggested four months to three weeks. In presenting the amendments to the conference, which merely tried to make the wording of the declaration more acceptable, Chaudhry declared that although the west had tried to befriend many poor countries, they had to be careful not to appear too domineering. He said that, although big improvements have^d been made, more needed to be done. He said that his amendments also sought to separate the question of compensation from that of a canal board. Chaudhry told Lloyd that Nasser had offered to pay adequate compensation to the shareholders, which had been one of the main British and French demand^s. Lloyd dismissed the offer as impossible as Nasser could not have had the sterling reserves. (49)

Chaudhry further said that he thought that the terms that should be presented to Nasser should be kept as ambiguous as possible, so as not to give Nasser a chance to reject the proposals. He emphasised the need for flexibility, and a 'psychological approach'. (50) On 21 August, the first Suez conference came to an end. Of the twenty-two countries invited, eighteen supported the call for some form of international organization to manage the canal. The four countries not to accept the proposal were Russia, India, Ceylon and Indonesia. (51) What was

important to Nasser was the fact that three Muslim countries, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, accepted the resolution.

It was the role of Pakistan, however, which particularly infuriated Nasser. Chaudhry on his way to the conference had pledged that Pakistan would recognise sole Egyptian control and rights of the canal. The fact that Chaudhry was closely linked with the declaration calling on Egypt to accept an international board to manage the canal, was seen as treachery by Nasser, who in an outburst pointed to the chair Chaudhry had sat on, assuring Nasser of Pakistan's support. (52) It was perhaps just as well that Nasser did not know that Chaudhry had earlier suggested to the Americans that Pakistan should be a member of the committee which would seek to negotiate with Egypt. (53) Little more is heard of this suggestion, but it seems likely that the Pakistan government decided against it. However, according to Dehlavi, a member of the Pakistan delegation, the Egyptian Ambassador in London had thanked Pakistan for their role in the conference and said Egypt may be able to negotiate with the five-power proposals. (54) Baig said to James that this may be worrying as the Egyptians may demand control of the board but James said the important thing was what the users were prepared to accept and that Nasser was in no position to dictate to them.

The conference aftermath

Chaudhry now had to explain his decision to the people and press of Pakistan. There is little doubt that public opinion in Pakistan was far and away firmly with Nasser. On 29 August, a 'Protest Day' meeting was called to protest against the government's attitude over the Suez issue. The biggest crowds since independence were seen and many of the

newspapers in Pakistan strongly criticised the Pakistan government's stance. The government responded with the imposition of Section 114(C), which forbade political meetings after 30 August. Chaudhry, however, had to meet a hostile press conference on the 29th. (55)

In this press conference, Chaudhry's tactics were to deny that Pakistan had been led by the west to take an anti-Nasser stance. Instead, he claimed, rather unconvincingly, that Pakistan had influenced the U.S. more than the U.S. had influenced Pakistan. He claimed that the amendments, which he had helped to frame, had altered the resolution a lot and had emphasised the need to negotiate a settlement, rather than use force. He claimed that some countries often surrender some of their rights in exchange for others. This means that he was accepting Egypt's right to nationalise the canal but was hoping that she would voluntarily relinquish it ! Chaudhry claimed that Pakistan's membership of the Baghdad Pact had not influenced her foreign policy but found it hard to explain why more Middle Eastern countries, with a vital interest in the outcome of the dispute, were not invited to the conference. The British high commission, reporting Chaudhry's return, said that he was trying 'to pull the wool over the eyes of the press here' with his comments over Pakistan's real attitude to the management of the canal. (56) The newspaper 'Dawn' declared that Pakistan was, for the first time supporting the west in a quarrel with another Muslim state. The ruling Muslim League also declared the proposal to be interference with Egypt's sovereign rights. (57)

Meanwhile, world attention was focused on the delegation led by the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, and four other countries' delegates. The mission has often been seen as an exercise in

futility, (58) but few people must have realised that Menzies, in taking a series of peace proposals to Nasser, had discussed the possible military support Australia could give the British in the event of an attack. Menzies told Home that Australia could give naval and air support, and said he was going to warn Nasser of the 'horrible folly' of his refusal to compromise. (59)

The British line of thought becomes clear in a memorandum prepared by Beeley in the Foreign Office, on 28 August, outlining the situation and options. (60) This stated that the thought of letting Nasser get away with the nationalisation unchallenged was simply an unaffordable option. British prestige in the whole Middle East would collapse and even the present position would fall apart. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria were seen as soft targets in the spread of Nasser's influence. It also stated the belief that, if Nasser got away with this, it was only a matter of time before oil in Iraq was also nationalised. The memorandum accepted the fact that many Arab states might be offended if Egypt is attacked, but stated that they would be less offended if Nasser gave them a reason. It was realised that, if Israel was in any way involved in the attack, then Arab condemnation would be unanimous. The memorandum ended by saying that the ideal situation would be one in which the dispute is settled peacefully, and with Nasser being seen to lose face and give way.

What the British were now determined upon was to keep up the pressure on Nasser hoping he would crack first, either giving a pretext to use force, or give in to the idea of international control and be humiliated. This meant keeping the eighteen powers united and of these, Pakistan was the weakest link. The Foreign Office noted that ' The

Pakistanis have been very feeble and equivocal in their statements since the London conference'. (61) Although Pakistan's role in the first conference had been acknowledged by Selwyn Lloyd as 'helpful' (62), the next conference was a different situation with a different government in Pakistan. As the Foreign Office files confirm, a determined effort was made to keep Pakistan in the fold, not only for its own sake, but because of the fear it may discourage Iran and others to keep away. (63)

The Pakistan front

The situation in Pakistan was now becoming more complicated as the ministry of Mohammed Ali resigned on 8 September and the President, Sikander Mirza, was to choose a new prime minister. This was done on 10 September and the East Pakistani, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, was appointed. Suhrawardy was seen as a tougher proposition than Mohammed Ali ~~in keeping to a pro-western line and~~ ^{being} more sympathetic to the Egyptian stance. Suhrawardy was said to have been offered the job only after having agreed to three conditions of Mirza's: firstly, that he would not try to alter Pakistan's pro-western foreign policy, secondly, that he would not interfere with the army and thirdly, he would keep the left-wing element of his Awami League Party in control. (64)

The Egyptians kept up a diplomatic offensive in trying to win over government support in Pakistan. On 6 September, James sent a report of the Egyptians activities. (65) Handouts were circulated, but with the more extreme language removed. The Egyptian Ambassador, Seoud, invited over press correspondents and gave them prepared statements. He also invited a correspondent from the pro-Nasser 'Pakistan Times' to visit the canal and meet top Egyptians. The newspaper's top reporter, Kamal Hyder, was to have gone but the Pakistan government stopped him by

withholding his passport. The government did not wish to lose all press support, and so allowed Z.A. Suleri of the 'Times of Karachi' to go instead. They must have wished they had not sent him later ! Suleri termed Nasser a 'second Salladdin', and printed a long and favourable account of his visit. Seoud also used all social occasions to lobby ministers hard for support. He complained to a British diplomat, (of all people!), that the Pakistani ministers were evasive in their replies over the issue and when pressed would claim support for Egypt, but Seoud claimed they were lying. On 22 August, Seoud remonstrated with Baig over Pakistan's attitude. (66)

Seoud was said to have become unpopular with many ministers because of the widely held belief, whether true or not, that he had organised the heckling of Mohammed Ali during the independence day rally, calling for firmer support for Egypt. Ministers were also annoyed at the method that Seoud used of appealing through the Pakistani newspapers over the head of the government. The government hit back by inspiring leaks that Nasser was not supporting Pakistan over Kashmir and was reported to have called Nehru 'the giant of Asia'. They also expressed bewilderment, however genuine, at Nasser's ungratefulness after Pakistan's role in the conference. (67)

To make matters worse for the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, trying desperately to stave off harsh criticism, internally and externally, when the director-general of the Pakistan information service, Syed Farid Jafri, visited Cairo on 6 September. (68) Jafri started by saying that Egypt was his 'spiritual home' and Nasser was his 'beloved hero'! He was reported to have said that Pakistan only joined the Baghdad Pact because of Kashmir and, should Egypt be attacked, Pakistan would

relinquish membership of that pact and the Commonwealth. He also stated, much to the fury and embarrassment of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, that Pakistan had only agreed to the Dulles plan 'under duress'. This was enough to send shock waves, not only in Karachi, but London, where the Foreign Office demanded the remarks should be denied. (69) On ~~the~~ 20 September, the British information secretary reported that Jafri had been instantly recalled, despite having tried to issue denials that he had been misquoted. (70) Jafri had been dismissed and the British secretary noted that Jafri would find it extremely difficult to find a job now, given his record. The deterioration of relations in Pakistan between the Information Ministry and Foreign Ministry was also mentioned.

The diplomatic war was now in full swing. Egypt had offered to host a conference where all interested parties could work out their arrangements bilaterally with Egypt. On 14 September, a Pakistani newspaper announced that Pakistan had agreed to go to the Cairo conference. (71) James immediately met Baig and Noon, the new Foreign Minister, who said they had only agreed to go if a majority of invited countries also accepted. Baig said this was typical of Egyptian attempts to pressurise Pakistan into going.

On 12 September, James reported more diplomatic Egyptian attempts to woo Pakistan. (72) A note was sent by Seoud to the Foreign Ministry, expressing the hope that Pakistan would attend the conference proposed by Egypt. Baig showed James the letter and said he had asked Seoud which other countries had expressed their acceptance. Seoud was unable to give a definite answer to this. The moderate tone of the note was noticeable, as Egypt had now decided to try and draw some of the eighteen powers in

the first conference away from that declaration. Baig pointed out the dilemma Pakistan was in, as public opinion was firmly behind the Egyptians, not only in Pakistan, but throughout the middle east. He said that Pakistan would still not be committed to Egypt, but they hoped for a peaceful settlement. The Egyptians also used friendly countries to try and lobby Pakistan. (73) The Syrian Foreign Minister asked the Pakistan minister in Damascus what his country's attitude was to Egypt's offer to host a conference. The Pakistan minister said that Nasser's statements on Kashmir had not helped his case but he would still refer Nasser's offer back to Pakistan. He also said Nasser should realize that the British were serious in their determination to have international control of the canal.

After the rather bruising experience of the first conference, Pakistan was not going to jump at the invitation to participate in another. The Pakistan government was facing harsh criticism at home, through the press and political parties across the spectrum, and popular discontent. Even the British accepted the popularity of Nasser and said the 'ignorant masses of Pakistan' were firmly behind him. (74) The British also noted with alarm the growing criticism in Pakistan, not only of the Suez crisis, but of the whole direction of that country's foreign policy. (75) On ~~the~~ 14 September, one of Pakistan's leading political figures, Maulana Bhashani, called for Pakistan's withdrawal from the military pacts. Another major figure, Mumtaz Daultana, said that Pakistan should support Egypt over Suez, regardless of other issues. 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unpopularity in the Muslim world. Attempts by the British to tell Pakistan about the effect on the price of goods if Suez was closed, were not meeting with great success. For obvious reasons the British could not criticise Nasser on Kashmir too much ! (76)

On ~~the~~ 14 September, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry explained its stance, the first time since Sir Feroze Khan Noon had been appointed Foreign Minister. (77) The substance had not changed much. The first point was that Pakistan favoured U.N. mediation in settling this dispute. Secondly, they would regard the use of force as touching off an already explosive situation in the middle east. It was felt the setting up, and implementation, of a users' association, might precipitate the crisis if any attempt was made to force those ships through the canal. Thirdly, Pakistan was of the view that negotiations with Egypt were far from exhausted yet.

On 15 September, James conveyed the formal British invitation to Baig, for the second Suez conference due to start on 19 September. (78) Baig, after studying the invitation, said that he had thought the only purpose of the conference was the setting up of a users' association. In that case, said Baig, Pakistan's position would have been disapproving as it would have seemed that the British and Americans were trying to impose a settlement, rather than negotiate one. He said that attendance of the conference would have to be decided by the Cabinet, and as Suhrawardy was away in Dacca till 17 September, it left Pakistan with very little time. James replied if Pakistan did not attend, it would be a very great shock in Britain and would undo the good Pakistan had done at the first conference, and not only for itself. Her attendance at the

conference did not commit the country in any way and if the Pakistani government wished to make this clear, then it was free to do so.

James argued, rather cheekily, that, if Pakistan wished to attack the users' association, then the best place to do it was at the conference. James added that, if Suhrawardy had agreed in principle to the idea of attending a conference organised by Nasser, then it was only logical that Pakistan should carry on its peace efforts in London. The Deputy High Commissioner said if Pakistan went, she 'would be free to speak her mind'. Baig replied that the idea of a users' association had not even been discussed with Pakistan, as a result of which there was a good deal of public alarm about the whole idea. He thought the whole idea looked as if the association was going to shoot it out with the Egyptians. Baig felt that confidence had been damaged after the first conference and the government was operating within narrow horizons from the beginning, but now they were getting smaller. James reported to London that it was obvious from this conversation that Pakistan's acceptance of the invitation could not be assumed, but he felt he had succeeded in convincing Baig.

James was informed later on the same day that Noon and Mirza agreed Pakistan should go to the conference and, if Suhrawardy agreed, then the delegation would set off the next day. (79) In the event, the delegation did set off as planned, but not without some drama. Baig informed James on 16 September that he had received a phone call from Suhrawardy in Dacca, at 5 p.m. local time, to inform Baig that he had decided that Pakistan was not going to ^{attend} the conference. (80) Baig told James that his main problem was trying to explain to Suhrawardy why he had changed his mind since last Friday and was now advising that Pakistan should attend.

Baig claimed that Mirza and Noon had argued in vain with Suhrawardy, but in the event it was, he, himself that had persuaded Suhrawardy. This claim seems highly dubious given Mirza's conditions on appointing Suhrawardy. He was, no doubt, confident that Mirza would not wish to appoint a third prime minister in a month, particularly on an emotive issue like Suez, but eventually agreed to a compromise. James says that this confirms what he had earlier suspected, that is, until his talk with Baig on 15 September, Pakistan had no intention of going to the London conference.

Hildreth confirmed this sequence of events by describing them to Dulles. Hildreth pointed out that the Pakistan Foreign Ministry was very irritated by the western assumption that Pakistan would rubber stamp all their ideas. The ~~Amb~~assador said he could detect some irritation and surprise by the British in Karachi that he had no instructions to push the Pakistan government into accepting the idea of the user/s' association. Hildreth said until he was instructed to the contrary, he would leave the 'initiative and labouring oar' with the U.K. (81)

James had his first talk with Suhrawardy on Suez on 17 September. Suhrawardy told him that the most important aspect, as far as Pakistan was concerned, was that Egypt's sovereignty over the canal should not be questioned. Suhrawardy believed that only economic or military force could budge Nasser, and in the present world, Suhrawardy said military action should not really be an option, particularly in a dispute between rich and poor countries. Suhrawardy added that he hoped Nasser's regime would come to an end quickly, as it was nothing but trouble for everyone. James thought it was pleasing that Suhrawardy had been persuaded to send a delegation without reference to the cabinet. (82)

James wrote a long and important despatch to the Commonwealth Relations Office on 17 September (83), which described the situation in Pakistan. He started by saying that, as he had stated earlier, great care would be needed to help the Pakistanis to get over their 'psychological block' over the use of force. He felt there had been a real danger after Eden's speech to the Commons, before the conference, of Pakistan completely parting way with the west over the whole Suez issue, with all the 'adverse consequences' that would have accompanied that action. Luckily, James reported, thanks to the material sent and reassurances given, Pakistan had changed her mind but had only given a stiff and formal reply to the invitation to the conference, making clear that Pakistan was not keen on any users' association and that Pakistan would never support the use of force. (84) He said it was fortunate that Pakistan had accepted the invitation, otherwise a personal message from Eden to Suhrawardy would have been called for. A meeting with Mirza would no doubt have helped as well. James professed himself unable to say whether the appeal to Suhrawardy would have succeeded, but he was sure that Mirza was firmly behind them.

James then elucidated Mirza's point of view, that is, had Britain and France taken immediate military action in the canal, it would have been accepted in Pakistan as a 'fait accompli'. Pakistan's loyalty in this dispute was firmly with the British and anti-Nasser. However, because of the present situation and strength of feeling, Pakistan now wanted a peaceful solution to the dispute, through negotiations because, if Pakistan came out in favour of strong action and the dispute was settled through peaceful negotiations, Pakistan would be left in the cold. James said this meant that, even Mirza would not come out too

openly in support of the British, and because Suhrawardy was now prime minister, he, James, would have to be careful in going over Suhrawardy's head to meet Mirza as this would lead to resentment. This implies that James could have gone over Mohammed Ali's head, but Mirza had not been needed at the last conference, as Chaudhry was doing the job ! A compromise had now been reached within the Pakistan government to send a delegation to the second conference, but not, ^{id} ~~says~~ James, without its anxious moments.

James believed that, had the Pakistanis been consulted in advance about the idea of a users' association, there would have been more support for the idea than there was at present. He felt that getting them to this conference, which the Pakistanis had been naturally reluctant to attend, after the reaction of Egypt and public opinion following the last one, had used Pakistan goodwill and a sense of self-interest. James expressed the hope that such a severe strain was not imposed again. He said it would make his task much easier if Hildreth and the French Ambassador, were to co-ordinate meetings with him to maximise the pressure.

James then recounted a most interesting story. He told London that when he was with Baig in the evening of 16 September, Baig had just ^{er} received a telephone call from Suhrawardy in Dacca, after Pakistan had formally accepted the invitation to the second conference. The exact nature of the call was revealed in the earlier telegram (85), that is an attempt to stop any delegation from representing Pakistan. James, no doubt, had been called by Baig to let him know, as this meeting was well outside office hours on a Sunday. Baig then received a phone call from the Egyptian counsellor, who said that he understood that Pakistan was

not to attend the London conference. Baig told James this was extraordinary as, to the best of his knowledge, only he, Mirza, Suhrawardy, Noon and James knew of this decision. Baig said it was only possible to assume that some of the pro-Nasser factions of the Awami League had got hold of the news and were gleefully spreading it. It was a known fact that the Egyptians had some contacts within Suhrawardy's party, who may have convinced him of the inadvisability of attending. James said this method of Egyptian diplomacy sometimes paid dividends, but not this time.

In another, and equally important, despatch to the Foreign Office/ on 19 September, James described a dinner party thrown by Mirza. (86) The reason for the party was a farewell dinner for Mohammed Ali. James was one of the guests who also included the American and Iraqi ambassadors, former and present ministers, including Suhrawardy, the new prime minister. James described the party as a nice gesture, and one which removed some of the bad feeling created by political fights over the last few days.

Mirza took James aside for a private talk. He first informed James of the attempt by Suhrawardy not to attend the conference by his phone call to Baig. James naturally did not say that Baig had already told him. This shows how James was building up individual contacts among the Pakistan hierarchy. Mirza described how he had remonstrated with Suhrawardy over the decision and said, 'Only a few days ago, you gave me an assurance that there would be no alteration of the main trend of Pakistan's foreign policy; yet you are already seeking to alter it'. Suhrawardy was then said to have assured Mirza that this was not the case and the basic trend would continue. The eventual compromise was

that Pakistan would attend the conference on the assurance that attendance would not bind Pakistan to any users' association, that the association would not be used as a pretext for the use of force, and should Nasser refuse to deal with the association, then the matter would be referred to the Security Council. Mirza expressed his own view that he would personally resign rather than see a change in Pakistan's alignment. Mirza repeated his views that Pakistan wished to see Nasser lose, but could not be too open in case a negotiated settlement was reached. James found the suggestion of Mirza resigning rather surprising, and mentioned it in later despatches also.

James then met with Suhrawardy . Suhrawardy said that Nasser, by keeping the canal open and functioning normally, was seen to have won the first round. The Prime Minister expressed the belief that because of this, this was the correct time to negotiate, as Nasser would not feel too threatened. James replied that it was too early yet to say who had won the first round. He suggested to Suhrawardy that, if he wanted to see Nasser, he should privately consult Eden first. James also pointed out the danger of going to see Nasser. He said the Egyptians could use it as a propaganda victory, as they had when Chaudhry had seen Nasser in Cairo. Suhrawardy did not contest these points and they both agreed the best thing to do now was to wait for the outcome of the second conference.

James thought Suhrawardy was thinking aloud to test his reaction, and felt it significant that, so soon after his appointment, Suhrawardy was willing to try and play a significant role in such a delicate matter. Also important was the fact that Suhrawardy had not mentioned these plans to Mirza, (who (James was sure) would have told him. James

noted this would have been unthinkable under Mohammed Ali and noted that for the first time in Pakistan's history that there was a strong president and prime minister, and these two characters were evenly matched. James said the decision to send Noon, after an argument, might bring the two of them together, or it might lead to a future split. He said that neither of the two was ready for a showdown, and, if and when it ^{took} ~~took~~ place, the outcome was unpredictable. This explains the care with which James dealt with Suhrawardy during the next few weeks and his reluctance to meet Mirza to veto Suhrawardy.

Before the Pakistan delegation had left for London, Hildreth informed Dulles that Noon wished to meet him there. Hildreth recommended that Dulles should do this as soon as possible as Noon was a prominent pro-western politician. The U.S. Ambassador warned Dulles that Seoud, the Egyptian Ambassador, had been working hard on Noon and other Pakistani officials in trying to get more support for the Egyptian position. (87) Noon issued a statement to the press before leaving Pakistan. He said there were three main issues to be discussed at the conference, firstly, the Menzies mission, secondly, Nasser's proposals, and thirdly, the user's association. He said that Pakistan was a party to the five-power proposal and would now give careful consideration to Nasser's counter-proposals. He made clear that Pakistan was not clear what the users' association would entail and said that Pakistan had satisfied herself that attendance at the conference did not bind her to membership. He noted with satisfaction the British statement that the association could not function without Egyptian co-operation and in the event of any incidents, the matter would be taken to the Security Council. He said Pakistan had stood for a peaceful settlement from the

start and would be ready to attend a conference called by Egypt, provided the majority of those invited agreed to do so. (88) The last point seemed to be a ploy of keeping both sides happy. By saying Pakistan would be willing to attend, it kept the pro-Nasser faction satisfied, and yet, Pakistan must have known that the majority of the canals major users would not attend. Noon read out this statement, almost in its entirety at Amsterdam airport, before reaching London. (89) This was for the benefit of the world press, Nasser and Pakistan's public opinion. Pakistan's position, at least at the beginning of the conference was, therefore, spelt out.

Pakistan and the second Suez conference

The Pakistan delegation to the second conference consisted of the Joint Foreign Secretary, M.S.A. Baig, an under secretary, Sajjad Hyder, and was led by the Foreign Minister, Sir Feroze Khan Noon. In London, they were joined by Ikramullah. On 18 September, Noon, along with the Australian and New Zealand delegates, met the Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Home. Noon proclaimed himself utterly opposed to any users' association, and to the proposed diversion of shipping around the Cape. He said that if the association was set up with great fanfare and Nasser refused to deal with it, it would make them all look ridiculous and destroy the prestige of the west in Asia, once and for all. This was politely seen by Home as a first reaction and the meeting was still termed friendly. No doubt Home was remembering the change in Chaudhry's attitude once the last conference got under way. (90)

A meeting of Baig and Noon with Eden was also recorded by Hyder in his memoirs, and considering the nature of the meeting, it is not surprising that no record of this conversation is to be found elsewhere

Hyder says that Eden told Noon that he had decided to attack Egypt, with or without American support. (91) Hyder says that Eden requested that this information should be kept secret. This indicates either the degree of trust Eden had in Noon, or, as seems more likely, the British expected Noon to transmit this information to someone friendly to Nasser, in the hope it may force the latter to negotiate out of fear. This second conference was held on Dulles' suggestion but it was apparent now that the British and Americans were not seeing eye to eye on the use of force. Eisenhower said later that he thought this issue was a wrong one for the west to make a stand on as Nasser had both legal and sovereign rights. (92) The British were obviously hoping that Nasser would think the west was united against him, and therefore feel obliged to make concessions.

Noon, according to Hyder, decided to warn Nasser through King Saud. (93) A telegram was certainly sent to Saud but the British saw it as a useful gesture, in trying to get Nasser to negotiate. (94) However, instructions were given that the telegram should be traced. On 26 September, the British Embassy in Jeddah sent a transcript of the telegram. (95) The gist of the telegram was, although Pakistan spoke for Egypt at the opening session of the conference, there was very little chance of this crisis ending peacefully, unless Nasser came to some agreement with the British. Noon said if this is not done, Egypt and Syria would be 'in grave danger'. He pleaded, therefore, for Saud to use his influence on Nasser, and try to persuade him to come to some compromise. The telegram ended with a warning to Nasser not to rely on 'pseudo-friends' like Russia and India to protect him. This telegram was also shown to the British as it was sent. (96)

The British Embassy in Jeddah discovered through conversation with the Pakistan Ambassador there, that Noon's telegram was also a reply to one which Saud had sent Noon before he left for the conference. (97) Saud had argued that Nasser was right in this dispute and the proposal to set up a users' association was one which might easily touch off an already explosive situation. Saud hoped, therefore, that Noon, as a personal friend, and Pakistan, as the most important Muslim country, would support Egypt's claim. The Pakistan Ambassador said that he thought Nasser had asked Saud to send this message. The British Ambassador, Parkes, said he thought that was regrettable, but he was glad that Noon had given him such a firm reply.

Once the conference got under way, on 19 September, much of the friendly atmosphere was replaced by surprise and annoyance at the Pakistan delegation's stance. Hyder said that the Pakistanis saw the second conference as little more than a last minute attempt by Dulles to prevent a British and French attack. (98) Bearing this in mind, along with the hesitation about whether even to attend this conference, Noon's brief was clear. He was the only delegate to speak out against the proposed users' association. (99) Not only that, Noon criticised its legal basis and said its establishment was an unnecessary prelude to going to the security council. He also said that the terms of reference of the Menzies committee were inadequate, as they were not negotiating with Nasser, only taking a series of proposals to him. Noon said the users should negotiate with Nasser without any terms of reference, and if Nasser rejected that approach, then the matter should be taken up by the security council. This speech was delivered even before the motion to set up any association had been moved and so took everyone by surprise.

Dulles was said to have remonstrated with Noon after his speech and threatened economic pressure, unless the Pakistanis fell into line. (100) The Egyptians were delighted by the speech and Anwar Sadat, writing in a Cairo newspaper, said it was 'the return of the prodigal'. (101) The British embassy in Cairo also noted that the change in Pakistan's direction had received wide publicity in Egypt and was warmly welcomed. (102)

In private talks with the British, however, Noon seemed to more accommodating. He said the speech was made purely for domestic consumption and he was confident of getting the thinking on the association changed within two days. (103) He further stated that Pakistan's thinking was as follows: firstly, the main objection to the users' association was to its being set up now; secondly, the best step now would be negotiations with Nasser, taking as a basis the existing proposals of both sides. Thirdly, if this failed then Pakistan did not mind what the rest do. The Security Council is mentioned as an alternative but the use of force was not ruled out. It was also reported that Noon gave the impression of 'being irresolute and unsure where he stood with his own government'. (104) Noon was said to become nervous after Dulles and others 'talked hard to him' and was calmed down only when he received his final instructions from Suhrawardy. It was doubtful whether the British anticipated any problems with Noon and his earlier appointment was seen as good news. Hyder hinted that Noon tried to get the brief changed, as Chaudhry had managed to do earlier, and Noon wrote to Suhrawardy 'informing him of the general trend of the conference after the opening plenary session, and he, (Suhrawardy), told

us quite sharply that we were not to depart from our written brief'. (105)

The Pakistan delegation absented themselves from the discussion of 20 September, on the setting up of a users' association. (106) This was despite assurances that any delegation taking part in the discussions, would not be associated with the final draft. This was especially worrying as the Turks and Iranians also started to have cold feet about joining, if Pakistan refused. The British recognised that any association without any Asian members would be morally weak, and therefore instructed James to try and persuade the Pakistan government to send some helpful instructions to Noon, preferably an agreement to join the association before the conference ended.

The British and Americans could have had little inkling at that time what exactly Noon's instructions were at the final session. An emergency telegram was sent to James, telling him that confidential information had been received that Noon had been instructed by Suhrawardy in a telegram to denounce the whole idea of a user's association in no uncertain terms. (107) This information was leaked to the British and Americans by none other than Noon himself! This news reached Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd during a discussion on S.C.U.A. but a member of the American team had already persuaded Noon to modify it to saying simply that Pakistan could not join the organisation. Dulles and Lloyd instantly sent instructions to Karachi, telling their representatives there to point out to Suhrawardy and Mirza 'the catastrophic effects' such a change in foreign policy would have. (108)

James was instructed to meet Suhrawardy, and Mirza if necessary, and try and change this brief. Within an hour of the telegram being sent, a

reply from James said that Suhrawardy's new instructions to Noon were that he should say, 'I have made the position of my government clear. The revised proposals will be referred to my government'.(109) James said that these instructions had been sent to Noon, but if they did not reach him in time, the British could inform him of the change. James said if these changes were not enough, he could go back to Suhrawardy, although he doubted they could be improved. James said he was reluctant to go to Mirza as he wished to avoid a possible showdown. In the event, these instructions were very welcome to the Foreign Office and they revealed later that pressure was brought to bear on Noon from many quarters and they also thanked the Iranians for their help.(110) Hildreth reported later that James had managed to persuade Suhrawardy with considerable difficulty but single-handedly.(111)

Whatever Noon's real feelings about the whole issue, his closing speech was still strong enough to make him something of a hero amongst pro - Nasser supporters and he also received an invitation from Nasser to visit Cairo. Noon declined the invitation, aware no doubt of the snub Suhrawardy received from Nasser when he offered to visit Nasser.(112) Noon did ask the Americans, however, for their opinion on whether he should go to Cairo or not and was willing to have gone if given the green light. He did tell the U.S. Ambassador in London that he did not want to give out the wrong message by going to visit Nasser.(113) Dulles agreed with Noon that his going to Cairo might be misunderstood and so suggested that he write to King Saud before Nasser was to arrive there.(114) Noon told Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, that he could see Nasser in Karachi or he could write to him.(115) Before Noon left London, he went to visit Selwyn Lloyd on 25 September. (116) Noon

said he had no intention of running after Nasser like everyone else and giving him a sense of his own importance. He also said that Pakistan should now be given plenty of time to decide whether or not to join the association, so as to give a chance for hostile criticism to die down. Ikramullah was accompanying Noon and he said that Suhrawardy seemed to be less critical of S.C.U.A., at the moment. Ikramullah also said that Suhrawardy had asked him to reassure everyone that Pakistan intended to stand by her allies and fulfil her obligations.

Before returning to Pakistan, Noon went to Turkey where the British and Americans hoped, extra pressure would be put on Noon to agree to the proposal. The Pakistan Ambassador in Ankara was also anti-Nasser. He earlier told a British embassy official that he regretted the fact that force had not been used at the outset of this dispute. (117) Dulles sent a message to the Turks while Noon was there, urging them to stand firm and stiffen up Pakistan. Noon also received a message from Dulles while he was in Ankara, which said that he understood that Pakistan had to try and maintain a position in the Muslim world, and was, therefore, unable to come out too strongly against a fellow Muslim state but the friendly ties expressed in the Baghdad Pact should not be undermined. (118)

The Post - Conference Aftermath.

The British were, therefore, disappointed by the lack of Pakistan's support to the idea of the Suez Canal users' association. (S.C.U.A.) Even if one is to take the view that the proposed association was not even expected to do anything, the fact that the largest Muslim state in the world had sided with the west in a dispute with another Muslim state, would have been a diplomatic coup for the British. In the event of force being used by the British, they felt it

expedient to have as many Muslim countries on their side as possible. Turkey, Iraq and Iran needed little persuading; in fact such was their enthusiastic support for the west, that they often urged Pakistan to join them. (119) As fellow - members of the Baghdad Pact, they urged Pakistan to join the first meeting of the users' association planned for 1 October. The British tried to use the Baghdad Pact as a means of persuading their Muslim allies to counter Nasser's anti-British propaganda. This was discussed at a meeting of the Baghdad Pact counter-subversion committee. (120)

In a review of the second Suez conference, the general British satisfaction with the way it had proceeded, was spoilt by the Pakistani attitude which had emerged. Noon was described as 'the most recalcitrant representative'. (121) Noon had insisted on fresh negotiations with fresh proposals to be opened with Nasser and refused to cooperate in the final phrasing of the Statement and Declaration. The Foreign Office noticed that it was only after discourse with Karachi that Noon even agreed to refer the conference's decision back to Pakistan. (122). This contrasts with the views of Chaudhry, and the Pakistan line in the first conference, quite sharply.

The next move by the British and Americans was now to apply pressure on Suhrawardy to agree to join S.C.U.A. On 22 September, James indicated that any further concessions from Suhrawardy would be difficult. (123) He said the previous meeting, the day before, had been 'somewhat chilly'. When Hildreth met Suhrawardy at a party, the American Ambassador said he assumed once Noon returned the government would make up its mind on whether to join S.C.U.A. or not. Suhrawardy replied, 'There is nothing more to decide. I was willing to concede to the west

that I would not embarrass them by denouncing the association at the conference, but we have made it clear that we will not join it; and that is all there is to it'. But he told Hildreth that he would consider any further points the Americans wished to put to him. (124) Hildreth added that he felt in view of the growing emotions and bad publicity over Suez, the Prime Minister would be 'swimming up stream' in trying to get the Cabinet to agree to join S.C.U.A., even if he felt inclined to do so. Hildreth concluded that, in view of the firm attitude Suhrawardy had adopted, the only chance seemed to be a direct appeal to Mirza, but that was seen as dangerous as forcing a split between the President and Prime Minister. (125)

James recommended that the only way to move Suhrawardy was by a personal letter from Eden to him. He believed there was a streak of vanity in Suhrawardy, which meant he would be flattered by the personal attention, and Nasser had recently also sent him a message. James believed that Suhrawardy's present ruffled feelings were because he felt he was being used as a pawn. James also emphasised the need for the Turks to persuade Noon, but urged quick action, in case opinions in Pakistan hardened.

Mirza, of course, needed no persuading. In a meeting with James and Hildreth, on the evening of 22 September, he said Suhrawardy had informed him of the previous day's events. (126) He said that he would strongly recommend to Suhrawardy that he agreed to join S.C.U.A. Mirza said Pakistan should weigh the scheme on its merits and not be deterred from supporting its friends by thoughts of who they might offend. Mirza also promised to say nothing of this talk to Suhrawardy, and endorsed the idea of a joint approach to Suhrawardy next week. Mirza expressed

his determination to keep Suhrawardy 'on the rails', and take strong action if necessary. He elaborated by saying that if he is 'forced' to take over the country, people in the U.K. and U.S. should not say that he had done so for personal reasons. James, not surprisingly, called the meeting 'very satisfactory'.

James' advice was taken and within a few days, Eden sent a personal message to Suhrawardy. (127) The message consisted mainly of a request for Pakistan to maintain the unity of the eighteen countries at the second conference, as this was the best way to persuade Nasser to negotiate, and for the crisis to end peacefully. Eden flattered Suhrawardy by saying that he was aware that Pakistan had an important role to play, and he hoped Pakistan would help in settling the dispute. The State Department was requested by the Foreign Office to also send a message to Suhrawardy to keep up the pressure of a united western front. (128)

When the British message was delivered by James on 26 September, Suhrawardy said that as far as Pakistan was concerned, Eden's reference to Pakistan's special position was the key point. (129) Suhrawardy said at a key moment he may be able to intervene, and for that, it was necessary that Pakistan for the present, should keep Egypt's confidence. Suhrawardy said that Eden's reference to the Baghdad Pact was unnecessary as there was no question of Pakistan repudiating her membership, but he said the issue was a separate one. He went on to say that if Pakistan could be seen to be taking a manifestly independent line over Suez, it would help him justify Pakistan's alliances and claim that Pakistan made foreign policy decisions for the good of her country, rather than subservience to anyone. Suhrawardy said the present

situation was that Nasser meant to dominate the Middle East and Nehru South East Asia. He said Pakistan intended to stop both, through her two parts. When James raised the question of S.C.U.A.'s first meeting on 10 October, he dodged the issue by saying that the last conference had shown that Pakistan could attend such meetings without commitment. James said as the last conference had shown Pakistan had an independent foreign policy, and so attendance, even on an observer basis, could be defended, and be consistent with Pakistan's desire for a negotiated settlement.(130)

The Australians also attempted to do their bit. The Australian High Commissioner delivered a personal message from Menzies to Suhrawardy on 24 September.(131) Suhrawardy told him that as a lawyer he saw great difficulties with S.C.U.A., and was afraid Pakistan would not be able to join it. Suhrawardy, however, promised to keep an open mind on the subject. He told the Australian that it was difficult for poor countries to support Nasser as his actions were harming them and pointed out that as only Israeli shipping was not being allowed through the canal, and it was operating smoothly, Nasser could claim that the west was doing all this to help Israel. He said Nasser could raise the slogan 'Muslims against Israel' which would make Pakistan's position very awkward. He expressed optimism that everything would work out all right.

The really important message for Suhrawardy was that from Dulles in response to the British request. A transcript was sent to London on 27 September.(132) Dulles started by thanking Pakistan for sending a delegation to the conference. He said Noon had promised to take the proposals for S.C.U.A. to Pakistan and he was trying to clarify the position. He emphasised the peaceful nature of the association and the

need for unity amongst the eighteen nations. The really important point was in the end. Dulles said that in the event of the canal, for whatever reason, ceasing to operate effectively, it would be natural 'that concern for meeting the resultant problems... would ~~be~~ first be directed towards issues facing the members themselves'. In other words, if Pakistan did not join, and there was any problem, she should not expect any help from the members, that is, America or Britian. Hildreth was told by Dulles that if Suhrawardy should show reluctance for fear of displeasing Egypt, then he should mention that failure to adhere to S.C.U.A. for that reason, may be seen by the Americans as indicating that Pakistan was more concerned with pleasing Egypt than the U.S. and her other allies. (133)

On 27 September, Hildreth had another talk with Suhrawardy, after Dulles' message had been delivered. (134) Suhrawardy remained firm and said he doubted that Pakistan would join S.C.U.A. because, firstly, he believed it would be futile, secondly, now that the matter was before the U.N., it was 'sub judice', and thirdly, Egypt felt that international control was inconsistent with its sovereignty. He agreed, however, that the west was rightly concerned at the thought of an important waterway in the sole control of a man like Nasser, with the possibility of blackmail. He said the Egyptians had been 'scoundrels and trouble makers', and had tried to play off the western powers against the 'eastern democracies'. Suhrawardy summarised his thinking. Firstly, the issue must be settled peacefully. Secondly, S.C.U.A. must make it clear to the Egyptian's that their sovereignty was not in question. Thirdly, Pakistan would turn against Egypt if she proved herself unwilling to accept a reasonable solution but that had yet to be done.

Suhrawardy said that he was sceptical of S.C.U.A. as there was a threat of force in the background, and at least of economic force.

Suhrawardy repeated the same point which he had made to James, that is, that although Pakistan was siding with the west, Pakistan could play a more effective role by not being seen to be too close to it. Hildreth firmly intervened to say that Pakistan's refusal to join S.C.U.A. can only have encouraged Nasser and public opinion may see this as a move away from the west, and even the military pacts. Suhrawardy merely reassured Hildreth on Pakistan's commitment to the regional pacts. Hildreth suggested that Suhrawardy should send a representative to the S.C.U.A. meeting and issue a statement on the pacts. Suhrawardy now said that the two questions should be kept separate. He said he had to first convince the country that he was following an independent foreign policy and then secure support for the pacts. Suhrawardy conceded that a statement on S.C.U.A. would have to be made soon, and an observer might be sent. James and Hildreth said this is as far as Suhrawardy can be pushed till his return from a tour on 6 October. (135) Hildreth added in his message for Dulles that, the more Suhrawardy is approached, the more he develops his own thinking. Hildreth felt by 26 September that Suhrawardy was starting to develop an interest in S.C.U.A. for his own use. (136)

Suhrawardy replied to Eden's telegram on 28 September, and said briefly he was awaiting Noon's return and he appreciated the observation that Pakistan was in a special position to help and was keen to secure the objective of bringing about greater understanding between Asia and Europe. He also said he was glad the issue had been referred to the U.N. (137) Suhrawardy replied to Dulles on the same day and in much the

same manner. He said that nothing would give him greater pleasure than to be able to maintain 'the unity of all the nations who realised the serious repercussions that will arise if the passage of ships through the Suez Canal was impeded'. Other than that, Suhrawardy merely stated that he was awaiting the report of Feroze Khan Noon. (138)

Ikramullah had now arrived from England and did his best to persuade Suhrawardy to join S.C.U.A. as he had promised the Commonwealth Relations Office in August. Being related to the prime minister, Ikramullah certainly seemed to have a better chance than the others who had tried. (139) Quite a few attempts were made to persuade Suhrawardy to join S.C.U.A. but with a lack of success. Instructions were sent to James on 12 October, (140) that he should reassure the Pakistan government that by joining S.C.U.A. , Pakistan in no way committed herself to any hostile act against Egypt. Also, the membership of Israel was not even considered in S.C.U.A. and thirdly, as a large proportion of Pakistan's imports and exports pass through the canal, it was surely in Pakistan's interests to see the canal operate efficiently.

On 15 October, another attempt was made ^aseparately by James and Hildreth to persuade the Prime Minister. (141) This time Suhrawardy decided to counter-attack. James described how Suhrawardy 'launched into a long harangue'. He said he was not convinced that S.C.U.A. was likely to have any negotiating role and future negotiations would involve Egypt with the three western powers. He said Pakistan would play a more useful role out of S.C.U.A. and, if a small committee was set up under the U.N., it was more likely to include Pakistan if she had not lined up with the west. He repeated his belief that any settlement must include no use of force and recognition of Egypt's sovereignty. He said, if

Egypt proved awkward, then there was a possibility of Pakistan joining S.C.U.A.

Suhrawardy said that, if Pakistan did join, it would ask for certain assurances. Firstly, no force would be used against Egypt. Secondly, Israel would never be a member and thirdly, if force was used, Pakistan would be free to leave. James said he could have ²forseen _h that Suhrawardy would not rule out joining S.C.U.A. altogether. James said that agreement in the U.N. had been reached on tolls and charges and this meant the possibility of a role for S.C.U.A., from which Pakistan was excluding herself. Secondly, balanced membership between east and west in S.C.U.A. was a point the British took seriously. Thirdly, the effect of Pakistan not joining S.C.U.A. had to be considered and Pakistan could exert moral pressure by joining. Suhrawardy said he would discuss the matter on his return from China - around 3 November.

In his meeting with Hildreth, Suhrawardy was slightly more encouraging. He said that if there was any crisis over Suez, Pakistan would be with the west but repeated that S.C.U.A. seemed to be of no use at the present time. He said that he would like to join the association for reasons of solidarity but the continued threat of force made the decision very difficult. Hildreth was encouraged that he did not rule out the possibility of future membership. (142)

The pressure was relentless. In the event, Pakistan did not send a delegate to the S.C.U.A. meeting but both the British and Americans wanted Pakistan to join, to help exert that extra pressure on Egypt. Hyder says that within a few days of the delegation's return, Noon, Hassan, Baig and himself were called to Government House. (143) He said Mirza rebuked them for the ^{ir}stance at the conference ^{which} ~~and~~ had let down

Pakistan's friends and allies. Mirza said the only thing to do now was to call on James and Hildreth to agree to join S.C.U.A. This meeting was confirmed by Hildreth. He said that the Pakistani team which had attended the second Suez conference, met himself and James, but did not see the value of S.C.U.A. Hildreth and James argued that the association would avoid the use of force and, by not joining S.C.U.A., Pakistan was giving the impression of moving away from the west. Hildreth said the heart of the Pakistani position was that they were opposed to the use of force and did not want to join any organisation that Egypt was opposed to. Noon pointed out that Pakistan did not feel she had been consulted in this matter at all. When the two western diplomats protested, Noon withdrew his remark. Hildreth ended sarcastically by saying that the Pakistanis seemed very 'taken with the idea that they can become "honest broker" between Egypt and western powers in settling the Suez dispute'. (144)

Mirza expressed great annoyance to Hildreth about the reluctance of Suhrawardy and the Foreign Ministry to join S.C.U.A. Mirza claimed that his understanding with Suhrawardy was that if the west really wanted Pakistan to join, then she would do so. He went on to say that he did not fully trust Britain in this situation but had faith in Dulles in wanting to avoid war. Hildreth said it was obvious that Pakistan was moving slowly in case a settlement was reached with Egypt and Pakistan was left looking silly. Hildreth asked Dulles if additional pressure should be applied on Pakistan at this time, suggesting he felt it should not be. (145) Dulles, however, replied that Pakistan's membership of S.C.U.A. was 'highly desirable' and pressure should be maintained. (146)

This pressure was maintained. Another attempt to secure Pakistan's membership was made on 28 October, the night Egypt was attacked. Hyder writes that the delegation previously summoned before Mirza, was recalled again, in Suhrawardy's absence. Hildreth and James were present, and Hildreth asked for Noon to sign up for membership of S.C.U.A. immediately. (147) Noon asked for an assurance that Egypt would not be attacked. Hildreth was then reported to have likened Pakistan's attitude 'to an offensive metaphor, which does not bear repetition in print'. Hyder says everyone was stunned but Noon insisted he would wait for the assurance before signing, at which point, the meeting was over. If Hyder's version is correct, it is remarkable that Noon told Hildreth on 30 October that he and Mirza had sent a message to Suhrawardy in China, recommending that Pakistan join S.C.U.A. Suhrawardy had still refused to agree. Hildreth made it clear that the U.S. wanted Pakistan to join yesterday, today and tomorrow. (148) It seemed clear that action would have to await the return of the Prime Minister but events in Egypt, with the Israeli invasion, made the whole point academic.

REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

From 1947 to 1956, the period of this thesis, the steady movement of Pakistan into the western orbit can be clearly seen. As mentioned in the introduction, the problem with attempting an examination of Pakistan's foreign policy without access to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry files, causes problems. The only work ever to be written based on those documents has been that of G.W. Choudhry. Unfortunately from the point of view of this thesis, it is a wide-ranging study of the sub-continent and the super-powers, of which the regional pacts are a small part. The most comprehensive survey of the American role in Pakistan's first steps towards alignment has been done by M.S. Venkataramani. This work is useful for its comprehensive survey of American diplomatic files, but is lacking the British angle and understanding of the possible motivation behind Pakistan's diplomacy. Recent work using both British and American material has been done by Ayesha Jalal. This is done, however, to study the effect within Pakistan of her alignment, and not of the regional pacts themselves. Memoirs have been written by some of the characters involved in this period and have been consulted. The Pakistani angle has come from Ayub Khan, Sajjad Hyder, Agha Shahi and S.M. Burke. The main characters from Britain and America have also written memoirs but they devote little attention to Pakistan, and even less ^{to} the regional pacts. What little work there has been done on the regional pacts themselves had either been officially sponsored or poorly researched. It is hoped that this work will contribute to plugging the gap in this department.

There are two differing schools of thought on the question of Pakistan's foreign policy in this period. One school believes that the

Americans were generous in their aid and Pakistan had no right to expect any more, thereby accepting the whole policy as worthwhile. The other view is that the decision makers in Pakistan were harbouring a dangerous illusion if they believed the west was now in alliance with Pakistan against all potential threats. The first view accepts that Pakistan did not receive all it might reasonably have expected from the alliances, but received enough over the period from the Americans to be able to hold off India throughout the fifties and specifically in the 1965 war which she would have been unable to so otherwise.

There are two related questions relating to the first decade of Pakistan's foreign policy. One is whether Pakistan could, or should, have remained neutral. The other is at which point Pakistan, having decided to align herself with the west, moved out of the British orbit and into the American. The latter question seems easier to address than the former as it is less subjective. An important point which is worth mentioning in relation with the latter point is that, according to existing documentary evidence, any delay in the Pakistani move towards the United States was due almost entirely to American hesitancy in becoming involved in the Kashmir dispute and Indo-Pakistan relations. The Pakistanis seem to have been keen from the start to accept American help due ^{to} the all-consuming fear of Indian hostility taking a military form. The initial American recognition that Pakistan was a potential ally worth making can, reasonably safely, be dated from March 1951 during the conference of American ambassadors in Ceylon. Although this was then agreed upon in the State Department, it was not until the advent of Eisenhower and Dulles in 1953 that the first real steps towards alignment were taken. The British could not hope to compete with

what the Americans could offer Pakistan militarily and economically; nor did they really wish to try. The British had, unsurprisingly, decided early on that India was the far more desirable ally of the two and, although Pakistan's air bases and manpower made her useful, she was simply not in the same league as India.

Throughout this thesis the presence of India crops up regularly on the sideline, mostly in reference to the western powers reminding themselves not to antagonise her too much. As a factor in Pakistan's foreign policy, on the other hand, the importance of India can hardly be over-emphasised. The fear the Pakistani leadership had that the Indian government would attempt to undo partition seemed to be gaining credence by Indian actions within the first year of independence in Kashmir and Hyderabad. Although Pakistan's archives in this period are still closed to public access, it would be a safe bet to assume that India was the constant factor behind Pakistan's desire for weapons and support by the west and, if that meant taking sides in the Cold War and risking Indian and Soviet anger, it was a price which almost every member of the Pakistani ruling group was willing to pay. A Pakistani cabinet minister later recalled how a member of the Pakistan Foreign Service had told him that his main duty during the period of initial alignment with the west, had been to receive the Soviet protest notes and give suitable but polite replies! (1)

The few Pakistanis who felt uneasy at the thought of alienating two huge neighbours were ignored or silenced. The 'Young Turk' element in the Pakistan army was removed in March 1951 during the 'Rawalpindi conspiracy' case, while the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, and removal of Nazimuddin, meant that by April 1953 there was no opposition

to the pro-western policy in either the army or the government. There was widespread speculation in Pakistan that these events were too well co-ordinated to have been accidental or spontaneous. There is obviously no solid evidence to suggest that either the British or American intelligence agencies planned those things but little doubt that they were deeply concerned about the outcome. What is notable in this period is the way certain individuals in Pakistan seemed to take it upon themselves to ensure that a close relationship between Pakistan and the west should develop. Ghulam Mohammed, Sikander Mirza and Ayub Khan are three names which are automatically associated with this. What is also very noticeable is the extent to which other Pakistani politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats seem at times to bend over backwards to keep the west informed of Pakistani intentions and moves.

This point leads on to the one mentioned earlier; namely, whether Pakistan could or should have remained neutral in the Cold War. What is striking is that after the creation of Pakistan, there was very little of the radical anti-imperialist feeling or rhetoric associated with newly de-colonised states. The Indians always accused the Muslim League of being hand-in-glove with the British and were therefore annoyed, but not surprised, by the close relationship between Pakistan and the British after independence. Pakistani politicians countered angrily to such statements by pointing out that Lord Mountbatten had been made the first Governor General of India and had prevented Kashmiri accession to Pakistan by flying in Indian troops.

There seem to have been a number of reasons why Pakistan did not attempt a 'radical' foreign policy in the first few years. Firstly, the creation of Pakistan was not the result of a nationalist uprising and

was directed primarily against possible Hindu domination. Feelings ran so high amongst some Muslims that the British Raj was seen as possibly preferable to a 'Hindu Raj'. Secondly, once Pakistan had been created there was a proportionately high number of British civil and military officers in senior positions which made any change in perspective difficult. Many Pakistani historians still resent the fact that the British army officers serving in Pakistan did not follow the order of Jinnah to move into Kashmir in 1947. (2)

Thirdly, those who supported the ideological policy of Muslim solidarity were disappointed by the lack of response to such a call. Even those few states who agreed with the ideal, such as Saudi Arabia, were not in any position to help Pakistan. Turkey, Iran and Egypt in 1947 had pro-western governments and were suspicious of such calls. By 1951, the embryonic move towards an 'Islamic foreign policy' was killed with the deaths of Mossadeq in Iran and Liaquat in Pakistan, while in the Arab world, the call of Arab nationalism held more attraction than Islamic nationalism. Another reason which made Pakistani neutrality, let alone hostility, improbable was the training and education of the men in charge of Pakistan. The education in England, or on British lines, was a must for every Pakistani army officer, civil servant, diplomat and most politicians. These were 'Macaulay's children', that is, British in morals, tastes and opinions. The spirit of independent nationalism seems to have been conspicuous by its absence in almost every major figure of the time. Given this, it seems naive and unrealistic to have expected that an independent foreign policy would be sustained; and when this is coupled with the fear of India, such a possibility seems even more remote.

The central issue of this thesis is, however, the regional pacts in Asia, not the internal dynamics and problems of Pakistan. The Pakistani oligarchy ruling in the fifties was fortunate to have Dwight Eisenhower elected as President of the United States in November 1952 and John Foster Dulles appointed as his Secretary of State. This is not to suggest that it was a dramatic shift in American policy, but ^{the} new sense of urgency which the Eisenhower administration brought to the question of regional defence, certainly ~~sped~~ ^(Speeded) up the departure of the Pakistani posture of neutrality.

Without an American willingness to set up, encourage and finance regional pacts, the Pakistan government could have shouted itself hoarse without any American response. It was this coincidence of interests which led to the succession of pacts. Dulles seems to have been convinced of two things regarding Pakistan. Firstly, that she would never go communist and secondly, that she had the right sort of raw material: brave and hardy men. These factors, combined with an almost missionary belief that communism was an evil force which all decent governments should isolate, led him to break with the American policy of treating India with kid gloves and risking Indian alienation with the west, against British advice. Though he never quite gave up the hope that Nehru would see the error of his ways, he was prepared to risk Indian anger by giving military aid to Pakistan, while constantly reminding India that they were welcome to the same aid.

The Foreign Office were more sceptical of Pakistan's commitment to fight communism than Dulles. The British felt that the fear of communist expansion, expressed so eloquently by Pakistani leaders, was more for

ationalism following the end of the Second World War and were determined not to jeopardize their future position by being too closely associated with either of the two colonial powers.

A certain amount of British and American rivalry was, therefore, inevitable as Britain wanted to defend her oil and strategic interests in the Middle East, and hoped for American help in doing so. Dulles had no intention of doing this; and Suez was to prove not only the end of British power in the Middle East, but also to demonstrate American reluctance to attract unnecessary opprobrium from peoples in the area. The contemplated role of Pakistan in all this was to provide the men willing to fight in case of war. The Pakistani ruling group had no objection to doing this, but wanted the money and arms to equip an army powerful enough to hold off the Red Army until American reinforcements arrived. The constant references to Ayub Khan being disappointed by the amount of American aid on offer showed the gulf between Washington and Karachi over what were Pakistan's legitimate needs. What the Americans obviously realised was that, a Pakistan army capable of worrying Soviet military planners, would be a serious threat to India and, as events in 1965 were to prove, once the Pakistan army felt militarily capable of winning Kashmir, they attempted to do so. Whatever the impatience Dulles and Eisenhower might have felt against Nehru, they were only too aware that he was still preferable to some alternatives and the balkanisation of the sub-continent, with all the opportunities that would create for the Soviets to exploit, was a fear present in American policy towards South Asia.

Once the American decision to grant military aid to Pakistan was taken, Dulles had refused to divulge the amount of aid to Pakistan until

the benefit of the Americans than the Russians or Chinese. In this they were almost certainly right. The mask of Cold War rhetoric slipped occasionally when some statements were made along the lines of 'Better a communist Pakistan than no Pakistan'. The Pakistani leadership were especially careful not to alienate China too much and, despite the avowed dislike of communism of Mohammed Ali Bogra, he was always careful to restrict his criticism to the Soviet Union. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation was clearly designed to prevent Chinese-sponsored communism from sweeping South East Asia, but the Pakistani leadership attempted to have the best of both worlds; adhering to the treaty, while assuring China that she had no cause for worry from Pakistan. (3) The strategic value of Pakistan to the western powers was recognised by her own leaders, and milked for all it was worth in front of British and American policy makers.

The American initiative which originally took shape in 1951 made a major advance two years later. The removal of Nazimuddin, and the appointment of a hopelessly pro-American Prime Minister in the shape of Bogra, did no harm to this move at all. Bogra admitted that his position depended on the amount of American aid he could get, and he could have mentioned that he was not the only one who would suffer if American aid was inadequate. The real value of Pakistan to American strategic planning was in the Middle East, specifically Iran and Iraq. Dulles' masterplan was to create a Northern Tier of states running along Soviet Asia, committed to its defence against the Red Army. Following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France had been the dominant powers in the Middle East, with French influence limited to the Lebanon and Syria. The Americans noted with some alarm the birth of Arab

The Mutual Defence Agreement with America was signed in May 1954, just a few months after the pact with Turkey. It was not until November that any arms reached Pakistan, and American suggestions that the money allocated would be the ceiling of aid, rather than the ^h ~~withdrawal~~ for establishing a certain number of army divisions, hit the Pakistan government like a bomb. Assurances which were then given by various American officials that more was planned in the future calmed the Pakistani military down, but the grand illusions of a large well-equipped army paid for by the Americans, all but disappeared.

The Mutual Defence agreement made it clear to Pakistan that the United State^S_A was under no obligation to defend her, and Pakistan would be able to use any aid only for internal security and self-defence, and for the defence of the 'free world' and not for other purposes. The agreement also lacked any American commitment to guarantee the security of Pakistan. The constant ensuing struggle with the Americans, behind the scenes, was based upon the differing perspectives of the ^W ~~two~~ nations. Pakistan viewed the alignment as a possible way for security against a three thousand mile frontier with a hostile and more powerful India. For the Americans, however, the perspective was Pakistan's role in defending the 'free world', which, in reality, meant defending the oil wells of the Middle East, for the west and from the Russians. As recent events in the Middle East have shown, whatever the situation there, western troops and bases are an unpopular and last solution. The use of Muslim troops, on the other hand, was seen as a far more attractive military and political option. It was this differing viewpoint which led some Pakistanis to write off the regional pacts as useless to Pakistan, as they offered her no lasting protection against

a military mission had visited Pakistan and, she had committed herself to the western cause by signing a military agreement with Turkey, the eastern flank of NATO. This method of alignment with the west was the most acceptable way for the Pakistan government to proceed, as Turkey was held in high regard in Pakistan for historic and nostalgic, rather than practical, reasons. The Turkish government had to be prodded into this by Dulles, but their eventual acceptance of the idea was never in doubt. Within days of the announcement that Turkey and Pakistan had agreed to co-operate on various things, including military matters, only the formalities needed to be completed with the United States, as previously agreed during the visit of Ghulam Mohammed and Ayub Khan to America in late 1953. Zafrullah Khan had, therefore, made the formal application for aid, which was instantly accepted by President Eisenhower, much to the amusement of observers at the time, who were told that the decision to grant aid was made only after a mutual and independent decision by Pakistan and Turkey had been reached to move co-operate. (4) The die was cast.

With the long courtship over, Pakistan wanted to know what the dowry was. As in almost all such cases, she was disappointed. The initial figure of \$25 million seemed a ridiculously small amount, particularly given the high Pakistani expectations, which the Americans had done little to dampen in case Karachi pulled out. Having accepting the offer before knowing the figures and learning of its details, Pakistan, according to Ghulam Mohammed, felt like a girl being used, and like girls in such circumstances, was extremely hesitant to back out as she would be left with nothing but a bad reputation and could only protest loudly, hoping to improve the deal.

what was seen as the real enemy, but the Pakistani leadership attempted to balance this out by obtaining enough aid to satisfy both needs.

The details of the amount and nature of U.S. aid to Pakistan still had to be resolved when Dulles moved his plan a stage further in mid-1954. The pressing American concern in the fifties, was not the Middle East, but South East Asia. The Korean War had broken out in 1950, and with the emergence of Communist China the year before that, it seemed to the Americans that the impoverished but important strategic states of South East Asia were vulnerable to communism. To defend this area in general, but Thailand and Vietnam in particular, the South East Asia Treaty Organisation was devised. The British were similarly interested in some defence pact for that region but, as shown earlier, with rather different ideas.

East Pakistan could only loosely be described as falling within 'South East Asia', and the thought that the Pakistani government was really worried about communist expansion in that area stretches one's imagination. However, the fact that the alliance needed some Asian allies for purposes of respectability meant that Dulles had to encourage Pakistani membership of the scheme. It is difficult to contemplate what the Pakistan government could possibly have hoped to gain from the Manila Pact, given the American reluctance to set up any standing army in Asia along Nato lines, and an express understanding that America was not concerned with non-communist, that is, Indian, aggression. In his eagerness to please her new allies, the Pakistan representative, Zafrullah Khan, signed the Manila Pact without any knowledge of the new aid figure or of the commitments involved and most importantly, without the permission of his own government! Keen though Bogra and his

ministers, including Ayub Khan, were to cement the relationship with America, they wanted at least a promise of increased aid before antagonising the Chinese, in addition to the previous list of Russia and India. After much haggling, both in London and Washington, Bogra gave way to the inevitable, and ratified the treaty with only the promise of an additional five million dollars.

The flurry of pacts was completed with the most difficult one of the four to negotiate, the Baghdad Pact. As pointed out earlier, the British pushed the Iraqis into signing a defence agreement with Turkey. The British were keen to secure their declining position in the Middle East but this was not to prove the way to do it. The Americans stayed well clear of the Pact in the hope that they could get the best of both worlds: a pro-western alliance in the Middle East, without Arab League criticism led by Egypt and without worrying Israel, which felt uncomfortable with the idea of Muslim countries joining up for defence purposes.

As the United States showed no inclination to follow the British lead, and accede to the Pact, Pakistan also kept her distance. When Dulles had talked of the Northern Tier, the Pakistanis had assumed America would either take the lead, or encourage the Turko-Pakistan accord to develop into a Middle East defence agreement. Eventually, the Turks and Iraqis convinced Ayub that the Pact was worth joining and that it would enjoy strong but tacit American backing. Yet again, Pakistan signed up for an agreement in which she had little to gain, either materially or in terms of prestige. Although Pakistan's leadership hailed it as a move in the step towards an Islamic defence pact, the presence of Britain served as a reminder that this was hardly the case.

The Suez crisis showed the fragility and contradictions of the pact as no joint action could be agreed against Egypt. The British motivation for sponsoring the pact became clear and what little hope there was of other Arab states joining was finished. No government in the Muslim world could have taken action against Nasser and hoped to survive. The contradictions were, therefore, ruthlessly exposed in just over one year. The Baghdad Pact limped on and even suffered the humiliation of Iraq withdrawing in 1958, leaving the organisation without its headquarters! The remaining members re-grouped under the name of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

For the Pakistani leadership, Suez was a diplomatic nightmare. The crisis had evoked a popular reaction inside Pakistan and set the government one ^{of} its trickiest problems. For a country which claimed Muslim solidarity to be a tenet of its foreign policy, to go against an obviously popular leader like Nasser, in direct contradiction with the popular mood in Pakistan was very difficult. On the other hand, Pakistan was committed to the western alliance, and America had no interest in seeing a wave of Arab nationalism sweeping the Middle East, as it would upset their own plans. Sikander Mirza had no sympathy for Nasser but was unable to say so openly, and so Pakistan was desperately trying to balance the two sides, with Suhrawardy left with the unenviable task of avoiding membership of S.C.U.A. Pakistan was saved from further embarrassment once the crisis broke as the United ^S states refused to support the British-French-Israeli action. This enabled the Pakistani leadership to make a few statements against the British and to continue with its western alignment policy. It is interesting, if futile, to

speculate what the Karachi government could possibly have done if the U.S. had backed the invasion of Egypt.

In under two years, therefore, Pakistan went from being a nominally neutral and non-aligned state to being the most 'allied ally' of a U.S.-sponsored global network for the containment of the Soviet Union. (5) The appearance was obviously deceptive. There was no longer any doubt by 1954 where Pakistan stood in the Cold War but there was considerable doubt where America stood in Indo-Pakistan relations, which for Pakistan was a more relevant criterion. In spite of the profusion of agreements, the United States had managed to secure Pakistan's help in the defence of the Middle East without any commitment of its own, other than a limited and unspecified amount of military aid. Four pacts later, Pakistan still lacked a single ally and, as one historian has pointed out, the sad but hard fact of the matter for Pakistan was that there was not a 'single country which could be counted as an unfailing friend and ally willing to lend aid and comfort in time of need' (6)

Such a position might not be a worry to those surrounded by friendly neighbours; but West Pakistan occupied a very strategic position, sandwiched between India, China, Afghanistan and Iran and East Pakistan was almost surrounded by Indian territory. Given the underlying hostility from both India and Afghanistan, Pakistan needed allies more than most countries. The United Nations had disappointed Pakistan by its inability to agree on any action over Kashmir.

The precise contribution which Pakistan could make to American strategic interests seems never to have fully decided by the State Department. With domestic instability in Pakistan and the constant threat

of war with India remaining a feature of the fifties, the possibility of Pakistani troops being deployed abroad seemed unlikely. The chorus of demands from Pakistan has been seen by some historians as being 'extraordinarily effective in forcing the United States to respond'. (7) Critics of the Eisenhower-Dulles approach to military aid for Pakistan charged the administration with major strategic and political bungling. They believed that the agreement would alienate India and Afghanistan to the extent where they would turn to the Soviet Union and thereby lead to an arms race in South Asia; such an environment would make any settlement of regional disputes, particularly Kashmir, harder to resolve. Even more seriously, these critics charged that the belief that limited aid to Middle Eastern countries would be enough to defend that area from Soviet attack, was nothing but self-delusion.

Dulles had replied to such criticism by arguing that no policy was entirely trouble-free and the rationale of aid to Pakistan outweighed any possible disadvantages. He remained convinced that Pakistan was an ally worth having in Asia but the exact role she could play in the western alliance was never spelled out. It is possible that such decisions were reached at such a secret and high level that the American papers on the subject have not been released but it seems more likely that the exact nature was never quite discussed because no clear vision existed on that question.

Pakistan's motivation for the membership of the regional pacts was clear: security. Pakistan was clearly willing to turn to anyone willing and capable to help preserve her independence. This was summed up by Feroze Khan Noon who pointed out, 'If the Hindus give us freedom... then the Hindus are our best friends. If the British give it to us, then

the British are our best friends. But if neither will give it to us, then Russia is our best friend'. (8)

The option which Noon did not mention was the United States, who was originally not too interested in the freedom of Pakistan, but had the financial and military power to guarantee if it wished. Pakistan was obviously not pulled into the western alliance against her will; in fact, if anything, she pressed America into making decisions sooner than she might have liked. That is not to suggest that Pakistan got everything she hoped for out of the pact. The level of aid never reached the amount hoped for, America refused to take Pakistan's side on the Kashmir question in the United Nations; and Dulles refused to let the regional pacts be used for anything other than a possible agreement for attack by communist aggression. The fact that military aid came at all, however, strengthened the position of the armed forces in Pakistan to an extent where the Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan, could virtually decide Pakistan's foreign policy and some have suggested that martial law in 1958 was an inevitable result of this programme. Pakistan's other losses may be said to include a loss of sympathy in the Muslim and non-aligned world, particularly when contrasted with India's steady refusal to tie herself to any camp. The dream of a Muslim bloc, independent of the Cold war alliances, as an objective of Pakistan's foreign policy was finally and rudely shattered by Suhrawardy in 1956. He told the Pakistan Assembly that 'zero plus zero plus zero is still zero'. (9) By classifying Pakistan as a zero, he showed why he had remained in the western alliance, in spite of his early criticisms and constant disappointments and disagreements.

It is hard, therefore, to avoid the conclusion that Pakistani involvement in the regional pacts was born out of mutual needs, mutual misunderstandings and differing perspectives. There was little chance that the pacts would ever serve as a satisfactory defence structure for the Middle East and no chance that they would ever defend Pakistan against India. The fact of the matter seems to be that the regional pacts were never thought of by the Americans as military assets, only political ones. By succeeding in persuading countries to declare their interest and sympathies in the Cold War, the Americans seemed to have been playing a tactical diplomatic game. By ensuring that countries became aligned to the western side, the chances for the Soviet Union trying to outbid her in those nations became very difficult. The defence of the region was never to be left to the power of local countries, or even to be shared, but in the hands of the United States. The problem for the United States in these tactics was some countries like Pakistan saying, 'Give us the tools and we'll finish the job!'

If defence against India is accepted as the touchstone of Pakistan's diplomacy, the regional pacts were irrelevant yet dangerous. Irrelevant, because they afforded Pakistan no collective or individual protection; dangerous, because they increased Indian hostility and made Pakistan a target of Soviet annoyance in the Middle East, thereby creating a threat which could have been avoided by neutrality. The main justification for the pacts from a Pakistani perspective is that they lessened the feeling of international isolation and enabled her to receive nearly a billion dollars worth of military aid and an almost equal amount of economic aid within the first decade of alignment. (11)

Pakistan's leadership always tried to portray the pacts as agreements of mutual benefits, based on respect and understanding. This myth of mutual partnership was best dispelled by an American official in 1944. He said that in every alliance one partner wears the boots and spurs, while the other wears the saddle. 'We are obviously wearing the boots', he noted; but 'if we are to stay in this fortunate position, we have to find some way to feed the horse.'⁽¹²⁾ It could be said by critics that the aid provided was just enough to ensure that Pakistan remained the horse. The aid did not encourage self-reliance in military or economic matters. Another justification used by the Pakistan government for the acceptance of aid was that it would enable them to divert those scarce funds into development. Unfortunately, the figures do not agree with that assertion. The figures spent as a percentage of total revenue stay steady throughout this period, recording a small fall only in 1957/58.⁽¹³⁾ There is little doubt Pakistan was militarily strengthened as a result of this combination of defence spending brought about by the regional pacts. In that criterion, at any rate, the policy was a success for Pakistan. The point is, however, how long defence can take ~~over as a~~ priority over development. It is fascinating to see that Pakistan's domestic scene and international ^Pperspective has, after some spectacular movement, returned to a picture _L which seems uncannily similar to the fifties. Whether anything has been learnt by anyone, or if the results are to be the same, remains to be seen.

C

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
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
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(TABLE I)

Division of the Armed Forces between India and Pakistan

<i>THE ARMY</i>		<i>India</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>
Infantry Regiments	...	15	8
Armoured Corps	...	12	6
Artillery Regiments	...	18½	8½
Engineering Units	...	61	34
Signal Corps	...	The then existing static layout remained unchanged	
Supply Units (RIASC)	...	in each Dominion.	
Electrical & Mechanical Eng. Units	...	10	4
Indian Pioneer Corps	...	Group	2 Coys.
		H Qrs & 9 Coys.	
Animal Transport Regiment	...	4	3
Mechanical Transport Units (RIASC)	...	34	17
Ambulance Platoons	...	15	7
Indian Army Medical Corps Hospitals	...	82	34
		11,713	4,037
		beds	beds
Military Farms	...	29	20
Mountain Regiments	...	2	1
<i>THE NAVY</i>			
Sloops	...	4	2
Frigates	...	2	2
Fleet Mine-Sweepers	...	14	4
Corvettes	...	1	Nil
Survey ship	...	1	Nil
Trawlers	...	4	2
Motor Mine sweepers	...	4	2
Motor Launch	...	1	Nil
Harbour Defence Motor Launches	...	4	4
Landing crafts	...	All existing Nil crafts.	
<i>THE AIR FORCE</i>			
Fighter Squadrons	...	7	2
Transport Squadrons	...	1	1

Defence Expenditure 1947-59

<i>Year</i>	<i>Defence Expenditure (in Million Rs.)</i>	<i>Percentage of the total Government Expenditure</i>
1947-48*	236.0	65.16
1948-49	461.5	71.32
1949-50	625.4	73.06
1950-51	649.9	51.32
1951-52	792.4	54.96
1952-53	725.7	56.68
1953-54	633.2	58.7
1954-55	640.5	57.5
1955-56	917.7	64.0
1956-57	800.9	60.1
1957-58	854.2	56.1
1958-59**	996.6	50.9

* : 15th August 1947 to 31st March 1948.

** : Covers the period of 15 months from 1st April 1958 to 30th June 1959.

***Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement
between The Government of Pakistan
and The Government of the United
States of America***

The Government of Pakistan and the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to foster international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purpose and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in support of those purposes and principles;

Reaffirming their determination to give their full cooperation to the efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter and to participate in United Nations collective defence arrangements and measures, and to obtain agreement on universal regulation and reduction of armament under adequate guarantee against violation or evasion;

Taking into consideration the support which the Government of the United States has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended;

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such assistance;

Have agreed:

ARTICLE I

1. The Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Agreement will be furnished under the provisions and subject to all the terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory or supplementary thereto, appropriation acts there-under, or any other applicable legislative provisions. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in defence of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and no longer required or used exclusively for thr purposes for which originally made available will be offered for return to the Government of the United States.

4. The Government of Pakistan will not transfer to any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, property, information, or service received under this Agreement, without the prior consent of the

Government of the United States.

5. The Government of Pakistan will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.

6. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this agreement.

7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Pakistan will so deposit, segregate or assure title to all funds located to or derived from any programme of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States so that such funds shall not, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organisation or government.

ARTICLE II

The two Governments, will, upon request of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them relating to the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defence which will expedite such exchanges and at the same time protect private interests and maintain necessary security safeguards.

ARTICLE III

1. The Government of Pakistan will make available to the Government of the United States rupees for the use of the latter Government for its administrative and operating expenditures in connection with carrying out the purposes of this Agreement. The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such rupees and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such funds.

2. The Government of Pakistan will, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, grant duty-free treatment on importation or exportation and exemption from internal taxation upon products, property, materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with

this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of any other country receiving military assistance.

3. Tax relief will be accorded to all expenditures in Pakistan by, or on behalf of, the Government of the United States for the common defence effort, including expenditures for any foreign aid programme of the United States. The Government of Pakistan will establish procedures satisfactory to both Governments so that such expenditure will be net of taxes.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including personal temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of Pakistan, operate as part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same privileges and immunities as are accorded other personnel with corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States who are United States nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States the Government of Pakistan will grant full diplomatic status to the senior military member assigned under this Article and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officers and their respective immediate deputies.

2. The Government of Pakistan will grant exemption from import and export duties on personal property imported for the personal use of such personnel or their families and will take reasonable administrative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of the personal property of such personnel and their families.

ARTICLE V

1. The Government of Pakistan will :

(a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;
(b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;

(c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;

(d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defence capacities; and

(e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilisation of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

2.

(a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States, or to such other governments as the Parties hereto may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as may be agreed upon in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self-defence and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for collective security.

(b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Pakistan. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements

of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export.

ARTICLE VI

In the interest of their mutual security the Government of Pakistan will cooperate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace.

ARTICLE VII

1. The Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of Article 1, Paragraphs 2 and 4, and arrangements entered into under Article 1, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, and under Article II, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.

2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this Agreement.

3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the Union Nations.

Done in two copies at Karachi the 19th. day of May, one thousand nine hundred and fifty four.

The Agreement For Friendly Cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey

Preamble. Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, and their determination always to endeavour to apply and give effect to these purposes and principles; desirous of promoting the benefits of greater mutual cooperation deriving from the sincere friendship existing between them; recognizing the need for consultation and cooperation between them in every field for the purpose of promoting the well-being and security of their people; and being convinced that such cooperation would be in the interest of all peace-loving nations, and in particular of nations in the region of the contracting parties, the two countries have therefore decided to conclude this Agreement for friendly cooperation.

ARTICLE I

The contracting parties undertake to refrain from intervening in any way in the internal affairs of each other, and from participating in any alliance or activities directed against the other.

ARTICLE II

They will consult on international matters of mutual interest, and, taking into account international requirements and conditions, cooperate to the maximum extent.

ARTICLE III

They develop the cooperation, already established between them in the cultural field under a separate agreement, in the economic and technical fields, if necessary by concluding other agreements.

ARTICLE IV

Consultation and cooperation between the contracting parties in the field of defence shall cover the following points:-

- (a) Exchange of information for the purpose of deriving joint benefit from technical experience and progress.
- (b) Endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the parties in the production of arms and ammunition.
- (c) Studies and determination of the manner and extent of cooperation which might be effected between them, in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from outside.

ARTICLE V

Each contracting party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that this Agreement shall not affect, and cannot be interpreted as affecting, the aforesaid engagements. They undertake not to enter any international engagement in conflict with this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

Any State, whose participation is considered by the contracting parties useful for achieving the purposes of the Agreement, may accede to this Agreement under the same conditions, and with the same obligations, as the contracting parties. Any accession shall have legal effect, after the instrument of accession is deposited with the Turkish Government.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement, of which the English text is authentic, shall be ratified by the contracting parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, and shall enter into force on exchange of instruments of ratification in Ankara. If no formal notice of denunciation is given by

either of the contracting parties to the other one year before the termination of a period of five years from the date of its entry into force, the Agreement shall automatically continue in force for a further five years. The same procedure will apply for subsequent periods thereafter.

Done in two copies April 2, 1954.

The South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty

Preamble. The parties to this treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore, agree as follows :

ARTICLE I

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes, in which they may be involved, by

peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of government toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area or of any other state or territory to which the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the

measures which would be taken for the common defence.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any state designated by unanimous agreement under Paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and under-takes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other state in a position to further the objectives of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the parties, be invited to accede to this treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast

Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any state acceding to this treaty in accordance with Article 7 or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other signatories.

2. The treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other state on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XI

The English text of this treaty is binding on the parties, but when the parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF U.S.A

The United States of America in executing the present treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article 4, Paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of the aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2.

Done at Manila eighth day of September, 1954.

(The treaty was signed by the principal members of all eight delegations at the Conference).

THE PROTOCOL

Designation of states and territory as to which provisions of Article 4 and Article 3 are to be applicable:

The parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty unambiguously designate for the purpose of Article 4 of the treaty the states of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the state of Vietnam. The parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article 3.

This protocol shall come into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the treaty.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty.

Done at Manila eighth day of September, 1954.

The delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines,

Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific;

Convinced that common action to this end, in order to be worthy and effective, must be inspired by the highest principles of justice and liberty;

Do hereby proclaim:

First, in accordance with provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote the self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire in and are able to undertake its responsibilities;

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to insure conditions favourable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional processes;

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region;

Fourth, as declared in the southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey

WHEREAS the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of friendship and good neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and His Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on the 29th of March, 1946, which recognized the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas Article II of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of the Treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect any of the rights and obligations accruing to the contracting parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty King Faisal II

King of Iraq

His Excellency Nuri-Al-Said

Prime Minister

His Excellency Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Celal Bayar

President of the Turkish Republic

His Excellency Adnan Menderes

Prime Minister

His Excellency Professor Fuat Koprulu

Minister for Foreign Affairs

who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will cooperate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

ARTICLE II

In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the cooperation provided for in Article I above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present Pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE IV

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present Pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third state or states. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present Pact.

ARTICLE V

The Pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the concerned is deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State party to the present Pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with Article 1, with one or more states parties to the present Pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Government of the Parties concerned.

ARTICLE VI

A Permanent Council of ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this Pact when at least four Powers become parties to the Pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

This Pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the Pact by notifying the other Parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the Pact remains valid for other Parties.

ARTICLE VIII

This Pact shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

IN WITNESS whereof, the said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Pact in Arabic, Turkish and English all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

DONE in duplicate at Baghdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding to the twenty-fourth day of February 1955.

(Signed) Nuri Al-Said

For His Majesty The King of Iraq

(Signed) Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan

For His Majesty The King of Iraq

(Signed) Adnan Menderes]

For the President of the Turkish Republic

(Signed) Fuat Koprulu

For the President of the Turkish Republic

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Unpublished

In this category, the public record office is dominant. The FO 371 category reveal much unresearched material. The minutes from both the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office are in this section because of the interest both these departments have in Pakistan. Despatches from the British High Commission in Karachi are also here, as well as outward instructions. The American material was mostly in the Central File index at the National Archives, but the Embassy Files at Suitland were also useful. The Eisenhower Library was useful in providing a glimpse of the rationale behind American thinking of this period but the bulk of the papers were available in Washington.

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CORRIGENDA

1. Contents page : For Chapter 6, read Chapter 5.
2. Page 29. Lines 3-4 from bottom should read 'when he was told by Ikramullah to be careful in dealing with the Russians'.
3. Page 34. Line 9 from bottom should read 'The Department officials appeared...'
4. Page 38. Line 5 'Ispahani'.
5. Page 48. Line 1 'Shadow of the Quaid-e-Azam'.
6. Page 48 Line 10 should read 'the fact that he came from a part of Central India left Liaquat without a natural constituency, and made him feel an outsider.'
7. Page 86. Line 8 For 'regiment', read 'brigade'.
8. Page 113. Line 1 should read 'even if it was "in certain respects unpalatable to us" '.
9. Page 123. Line 7 from bottom after 'discounted' delete 'on'.
10. Page 124. Line 7 after 'one of' add 'which'.
11. Page 125. Line 3 for 'Malay' read 'Malaya'.
12. Page 132. Line 8 should read 'He added that his country had the 'bodies' that were needed'.
13. Page 141. 2 lines from bottom should read 'although acceptance of the invitation itself did not necessarily mean acceptance of the terms of membership, it was an important gesture'.
14. Page 155. Line 12 should read 'he says that they were concerned at possibly having to provide troops, not only to protect fellow-members of SEATO, but also to cover those areas the treaty was trying to defend, such as Indo-China'.
15. Page 168. Last line for 'and' read 'over'.
16. Page 171. Line 10 should read 'but in the post-war position this position came under fire'.
17. Page 172. Line 13 after 'the use of two air-bases' read 'and the right to station troops'.
18. Page 187-8. Delete.
19. Page 216. 4 lines from bottom for 'doubtful qualities' read 'doubtful quantities'.

20. Page 226. Line 13 sentence should read 'Suhrawardy was seen as a tougher proposition than Mohammed Ali being sympathetic to the Egyptian stance'.

21. Page 236. Last line should read 'these plans to Mirza, who (James was sure) would have told him'.

22. Page 251. For reference '123' read '139'.

23. Page 252. Last line should read 'Mirza rebuked them for their stance at the conference which had let down' etc.

24. Pages out of sequence : page 261 - 262
 262 - 261
 263 - 264
 264 - 263

Left in air -
 Pak played no
 role in Suez.
 But ended British
 role -

Abstract -
 spelling

33 184-8
 49 unscrambled
 51 204
 8 5
 90-1 6
 107 {210}
 {207}
 119 - sense
 e.g. for bottom
 123 year
 125 dates
 139 224
 157 228
 163 229
 mandoodi
 234/238/255/273/26/271/272

was there no U.S.
 reception?
 Pak sources must be
 more detailed on
 Kashmir than US/UK archives.
 K a regional rather than
 international problem
 at any time.
 Paks trying to
 ingratiate themselves
 anti-Ahmedi.
 Zafullah Khan r
 seats
 importance of 1953
 as power passing to
 army (Guevara)
 If U.S. had joined
 Cento
 Siddiqi

Flawed

B alignment lapsed
 ① Messerley.
 ② B cs not match US
 military supplies.
 not attracted to western
 alliances until
 Eisenhower + Dulles.
 - Johnson accepted.
 There is no foreign policy
 + after 47 drift until
 U.S.
 While Stalin was around,
 S Union was very attractive
 option.
 Abrogation of Muslim League
 Pak gov't has no options
 no Islamic program 47-8.
 of India