

SOVIET-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION TALKS IN 1955-56:
With Special Reference to the Attitude of Britain

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Dissertation for Ph.D.

The London School of Economics and Political Science.

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

Soviet-Japanese relations were re-established in October 1956. After the end of the Pacific war, the Soviet Union and Japan did not restore diplomatic relations because of Soviet refusal to participate in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the middle of the 1950s, both countries began to search for a way to normalization. In the summer of 1955, the negotiations for normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations started in London. The most intractable problem was the territorial question over the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The negotiations were prolonged because the two governments could not reach a definite agreement on this issue. On 19 October 1956, as a result of the negotiations which had lasted for more than a year, both the two countries finally reached an agreement to re-establish diplomatic relations by shelving the territorial issue.

This thesis mainly deals with process of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. The following points were mainly focused in this thesis. Firstly, the negotiations on the territorial issue are examined and described in detail. Chapter 1 deals with Anglo-American treatment of the issue during the period from the Yalta Secret Agreement to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and describes how the territorial issue came into existence. Chapters 3 to 8 describe the development of the negotiations on this issue in 1955-6. Secondly, this thesis examines British and American

attitudes towards the normalization talks. Previously, American attitudes have been touched on by the preceding works. But the attitudes of Britain, which was one of the most important signatory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and one of the most significant western allies for the Japanese, have been ignored. This thesis attempts to cast some analytical light on the British attitudes by relying on the documents of Public Record Office. The American attitudes are also examined, based on the State Department documents. Finally, domestic influence in Japan on the negotiations is analyzed. Though there are many domestic factors which should be examined, focus of analysis is placed on policy divergence within the Japanese political leaders. These foci are not treated separately in this thesis. Rather, the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks are dealt with in this thesis as an interaction among those abovementioned factors.

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PREFACE

On 19 October 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan normalized their relations after more than ten years of the lack of diplomatic relations. For Japan, normalization with Russia was one of the most crucial tasks which she had to carry out as an independent country after the San Francisco Peace Treaty had come into effect. For the Soviet Union, it was a crucial goal of her new foreign policy which was aimed to reduce international tensions between East and West. As a result of Soviet-Japanese normalization, the two countries terminated the state of war and exchanged ambassadors. But Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute over the disposition of Japan's former northern islands, the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, could not be settled. Since then, the territorial question between Russia and Japan has been a stumbling block to further improvement of their relations. Even now, when the leaders of both of the superpowers have declared the end of the cold war, the territorial question seems to prevent the Japanese and the Russians from expanding new horizon of Soviet-Japanese relations. In other words, the result of Soviet-Japanese normalization in 1955-56 have been imposing negative effects on relations between the two, more than three decades. This thesis is primarily an account of the negotiations leading up to the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, whereby the two countries re-established their diplomatic relations.

Although the official documents on this issue of the Soviet Union and Japan were still closed, it has recently become possible to have an access to British and American documents regarding foreign policy in 1955 and 1956. In addition to that, several important private diaries have also recently become open to public in Japan. It is now possible to examine the progress of Soviet-Japanese negotiations more deeply and more satisfactorily by relying on those materials. At the same time, American and British attitudes towards the negotiations can be more positively examined. Researches for this thesis have mainly been carried out at the Public Record Office in Kew. I have also visited the National Archives in Washington D.C. to consult the State Department files. This visit was financially assisted by the Central Research Fund of the University of London. Here I would like to express a gratitude to the Fund for enabling me to carry out the research in Washington.

Finally, I would like to thank Professor Ian Nish for having offered me many interesting and stimulating suggestions without which I would not have chosen this greatly significant and also interesting topic and without which I could hardly have proceeded with this thesis.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Cab British cabinet papers, deposited in the Public Record Office.
- F.R.U.S* *Foreign Relations of the United States.*
- F.O. British Foreign Office, or Foreign Office papers, deposited in the Public Record Office.
- G.H.Q. General Headquarters of American troops occupying Japan.
- J.C.P. Japan Communist Party.
- J.S.P. Japan Socialist Party.
- Kôno Kôno Ichirô, *Imadakara Hanasô -- Kôno Ichirô Memoirs*
- Kubota Kubota Masaaki, *Kuremurin eno Shistsu*
- L.D.P. Liberal-Democratic Party.
- Matsumoto Matsumoto Shunichi, *Mosukuwa ni Kakeru Niji*
- N.A. American State Department papers, deposited in the National Archives in Washington D.C.
- P.R.C. People's Republic of China
- S.F.P.T. San Francisco Peace Treaty.


MAPS



MAP I. SAKHALIN AND KURILES

STRAITS

- 1 La Perousa (Soya)
- 2 Sangarski (Tsugaru)
- 3 Tsushima




MAP II.

THE KURILES

STRAIT

- 1 Nemuro & Notsuke




MAP III.

RUSSO-JAPANESE BORDER LINES


- A border line drawn on the basis of the Treaty of Shimoda, 1855.
- - - - - A border line drawn on the basis of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1875.
- · - · - A border line drawn on the basis of the Portsmouth Treaty, 1905

Source: *JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES*
by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Tokyo:1982.



MAP IV.

ROUTE OF SOVIET ADVANCE: AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1945



} Movement of Soviet Forces.

The dates shown in the map indicate the dates of Soviet landing.

Source: *JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES*
by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Tokyo: 1982

INTRODUCTION RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1855-1951

The Soviet-Japanese normalization which forms theme of this thesis can only be understood against background of development of Russo-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations from the origins of their inter-governmental relationship in 1855 to the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. While it is not necessary to deal with all aspects of relations between the two countries since the middle of the 1850s, it is necessary in this introduction to discuss some aspects of the relationship which have influenced the post-war Soviet-Japanese dispute.

Since Russia began to move into north-east Asia in the 1850s, the most important issues for the two countries were the definition of the Russo-Japanese frontier and the revision of their unequal treaty. The frontier questions were solved when Tsarist Russia and the Tokugawa shogunate hammered out a peace and friendship treaty in the Treaty of Shimoda (1855), whereby Japan entered into commercial and diplomatic relations with Russia. Its second article stipulated that the frontier should be drawn between Etorofu and Uruppu of the Kuriles and that Sakhalin should remain unpartitioned between Russia and Japan. [See Map III]

While they defined the frontier in the Kuriles, the question of Sakhalin remained unsettled until after the Meiji Restoration. In 1875, Enomoto Takeaki, the then Japanese minister to Russia, and Peter Stremoukhov, director of the Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, finally settled the question along the line that the parties should exchange the Kuriles for Sakhalin. Thus, Japan became entitled to the whole of the Kuriles including 18 islands located to the north of Etorofu, in exchange for Japan's recognition of Russian possession of the whole of Sakhalin. This agreement was contained in the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875), which is also called the Treaty of the Sakhalin-Kuriles Exchange. In 1950s, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was to start to assert that 'the Kuriles' did not include Etorofu and Kunashiri by interpreting the Treaty of St. Petersburg as that it defined the 18 islands as 'the Kuriles'.

In this sense, the Treaty of Petersburg was greatly important for the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute almost 80 years later.

In August 1889, a new treaty revised the peace and friendship treaty of 1855 and provided for the Russian renunciation of extraterritorial rights, and increased tariff rate for Japan and most-favoured-nation status for Russia. While relations in 1870s and 1880s were relatively stable, Russian expansionist attitudes seem to have planted in the minds of the Japanese people a sense of threat. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russians had tried to open Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate by sending a mission headed by Nikolai Lezanov. This mission was met with a

strong refusal from the Japanese and tuned out to be a failure. On his way back home, he ordered an officier, Lieutenant Khvostov, to attack the Japanese residents on the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Russian warships attacked Sakhlain and Etorofu, burned Japanese residences and abducted some Japanese inhabitants. Information about this incident was communicated to Edo (Tokyo), and led to its being alarmed by the threat from Russia.² This sense of threat was confirmed by the *Posadnik* incident in 1861. A Russian warship *Posadnik* attacked and occupied Tsushima for more than six months. Long after the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate, as a result of these incidents, the Japanese military and political leaders held the view that Russia was the most malignant menace to Japan's security.

With the arrival of the railway age at north China in the 1890s, the Japanese thrust towards Korea and Manchuria was intensified. This culminated in Japan declaring war on Russia in February 1904 and defeating the Russian troops in Korea and southern Manchuria. The war came to an end in 1905 through good offices of President Theodore Roosevelt. As the victor in the war, Japan acquired the southern half of Sakhalin and substantial territorial and railway interests in Manchuria. Even then, public opinion in Japan was not satisfied with the result of the peace with Russia and showed in riots how hostile Japanese feeling towards Russia was. After the war, the two former-enemies tried to avoid any direct clashes by entering into various treaties; in 1907, they agreed to establish the first Russo-Japanese entente, which was revised in

1910 and 1912. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 even strengthened Japan's ties with Russia which needed Japanese assistance in the supply of war materials and manpower. In July 1916, the two countries signed the Russo-Japanese alliance. Ten years after reaching a peak of tension, Russo-Japanese alliance reached a peace of cooperation.³

The success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 provoked the Japanese to fear communist infiltration from the Soviet Union. Relations now took on the character of relations between a communist country and an imperialist one, and created opportunities for pursuing Japanese imperialist ambitions in the east by taking part in the Siberian intervention from 1918 to 1922. During this intervention, the Japanese occupied northern Sakhalin in 1920. The fact that the first encounter between Japan and the Soviet Union took a form of Japan's military intervention was an unfortunate one. Distrust towards Japan must have been deeply planted in the minds of the Soviet leaders. More than thirty years after the intervention, the Soviets were still quoting it as an example of Japan's violation of international rules.⁴

In May 1924, the first formal negotiations for the first normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations were convened in Peking between Yoshizawa Kenkichi, the Japanese minister to China, and L. Karakhan, the Soviet minister to China. Though there were sharp divergences, the two governments finally managed, in January 1925,

to hammer out an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The two countries exchanged ambassadors in the spring of 1925, Tanaka Tokichi being appointed to the Soviet Union and V.L. Kopp the first Soviet ambassador to Japan. In addition, Japanese troops which had been stationed in northern Sakhalin since 1920 were withdrawn in May 1925. A fishery agreement, worked out in January 1928, guaranteed stable fishing rights for the Japanese for the following eight years.

But there were ideological differences underlying the new relationship. These were raised to a new level by the actions of the Kwangtung Army in 'Manchuria' in 1931-3. The tensions between the two countries became even more acute, when the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded between Japan and Germany in 1936. The Soviets retaliated by refusing to renew the fishery agreement of 1928. Moreover, Japan's economic interests in northern Sakhalin became considerably limited. At the end of the 1930s, the tense relations led to large-scale military confrontations over the border between the Soviet Union and Manchuria: in July 1938, Soviet and Japanese troops clashed at Chankufeng and in May 1939 at Nomonhan, the first clashes involving modernized armaments like airpower and tank warfare.⁵

The Japanese military reverses over the Soviet-Manchurian borders generated intense anti-Soviet feelings in the Japanese army and people. Within the Japanese government, however, there emerged a strong opinion that Japan should urgently improve her

relations with the Soviet Union. It was Matsuoka Yōsuke, the foreign minister of the Kōnoe administration, who embodied the view by concluding the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 1941. Despite the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact, some influential Japanese political and military leaders began to argue for Japan's advance to the north. The outbreak of the Soviet-German war on 22 June 1941 not only changed the European situation drastically but also encouraged anti-Soviet hardliners among the Japanese leaders. The Japanese military insisted on attacking Russia in order to take advantage of the strategic situation which was favourable to Japan. After the cabinet reshuffle at the middle of July, the Japanese government finally decided not to attack the Soviet Union.⁶

As the Pacific war went unfavourable for the Japanese, the government approached the Soviet government with an offer for good offices for a Soviet-German peace. But the Russians rejected the proposal. It became the utmost goal for the Japanese to maintain Soviet neutrality in the Pacificwar, and they tried after 1943 to settle the problems relating to fishing and the liquidation of Japanese interests in northern Sakhalin. By the spring of 1944, these problems were solved on the basis of the compromises on the Japanese part. Although the Japanese were hoping that the Soviets would agree to renew the Neutrality Pact, the Soviet Union declared in April 1945 that she had no intention to renew it.⁷

As the state of the war became disastrous for Japan, the Soviet Union came to be perceived by the Japanese leaders as the last resort for achieving a dignified defeat. The Japanese government decided in May 1945 to ask for Soviet good offices to bring about peace with the Allied Powers. But the Soviet Union ignored the Japanese requests which continued until July 1945. The U.S.S.R. had already promised the Allied Powers, the U.S. and Britain, at the Yalta Conference in February to enter the war against Japan within 6 months of the surrender of Germany. Instead of accepting the Japanese request, the Russians declared war on Japan on 8 August and their troops advanced southward to Japan through Manchuria and the Kuriles. The Japanese interpreted the Soviet advance into those areas as the violation of the Neutrality Pact because the Pact was still effective even though the Russians had refused to renew it. Consequently, many Japanese leaders came to hold a strong hostile feeling and mistrust towards the Soviet Union.

Faced with the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the two Atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese government finally decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration and, on 15 August, the bloody war which had been fought for almost four years was terminated by the unconditional surrender of Japan. Because of the Russo-American discord over their interests in Japan, the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers and the peace settlement with her became the stage for superpower confrontation. During the occupations period, Soviet-Japanese relations evolved

strictly within the framework of Soviet-American relations or the relations between the Japanese government and the Japanese Communist Party, which was greatly influenced by Soviet instructions. U.S.-U.S.S.R. power struggles took place over questions of form of occupation organizations, and questions over which socio-political regime post-war Japan should adopt. These struggles resulted with American victory: General MacArthur came to dominate the decision-making of occupation policy and finally succeeded in stopping expansion of influence of the Japanese progressives through the so-called 'Red Purge' and 'Reverse Course'.

Since 1947, the cold war had been intensified and spread to the far east. In October 1949, the People's Republic of China came into existence. The Korean war broke out in June 1950. The fate of Japan was affected by this development of the cold war in the far east. The Peace Treaty with Japan was concluded in San Francisco in September 1951. The Peace Treaty reflected this international context of the cold war. The Soviet Union refused to become a party to this treaty. As a result of this, the state of war between Japan and Russia remained unresolved. In theory, the Soviets were able to attack Japan without a new declaration of war. The American and British government did not hesitate to conclude the peace with Japan without Soviet participation. With the Peace Treaty, Japan signed the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact. The establishment of the U.S.-Japanese defense system meant a military confrontation between two camps in the far east.

The United States played the most important and responsible roles in making the peace with Japan. In this sense, it was the U.S. which mainly dragged Japan into the cold war in the far east. But it must not be ignored that Britain, as one of the architects of the Peace Treaty, also contributed to this result. In fact, an original idea of a bilateral security arrangement which was embodied by the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact had been suggested to the United States by the British. The British government also hastened to conclude the peace treaty with Japan even without Soviet participating the treaty. The two countries basically worked together to keep the Japanese in the western camp, though there were various differences between Britain and the U.S. over the issue of the peace with Japan: for example, the treatment of China and the disposition of the Kuriles and Sakhalin.²

On 28 April 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect. The Yoshida government made it clear that it did not recognize any diplomatic authority of the Liaison Mission of the Soviet Union for the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo, on the ground that diplomatic relations had not yet been restored between Japan and Russia. The Japanese government notified on 30 May the Soviet Mission in Tokyo that it had already lost the legal ground for its stationing in Japan, with the termination of the A.C.J. In reply to the Japanese notification, on 11 June, the Soviet Mission refused to dissolve the Mission. Consequently, the Mission remained in Tokyo, but without any legal status as a

recognized diplomatic organization. Japan and the U.S.S.R. entered into a period during which both countries did not even have any official diplomatic channels for negotiating normalization of their relations.

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PART I.

BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1
SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY
AND
SOVIET-JAPANESE
TERRITORIAL QUESTION

YALTA SECRET AGREEMENT

One of the origins of Soviet-Japanese territorial disputes over the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Habomais and Shikotan can be found in the Yalta Secret Agreement. According to this agreement, the Soviet entry into the war against Japan was to be carried out on the basis of several conditions. One of those conditions included the cession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin from Japan to the Soviet Union as a reward for the latter's joining in the Pacific war. The agreement stipulated that the interests which the Japanese had obtained in the Portsmouth Treaty which had been concluded as the peace settlement at the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, should be restored to the Soviet Union. Southern Sakhalin was defined as one of those interests. With respect to the Kuriles, the agreement only provided: 'the Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.'

This agreement contained several problematic characteristics and they were to become sources of future disputes between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. First of all, it was secretly made without

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participation of Japan. Although the Japanese accepted the Potsdam Declaration which provided that the future limitation of Japan's sovereignty would be defined by the four leading powers, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Britain and China based on the wartime agreements, the Secret Agreement was to offer a good reason for the Japanese to claim that they were not bound by the agreement on the ground that they had not participated in it. Secondly, this agreement failed to define the range of the Kuriles. This lack of exact definition caused a complicated problem. Later, the Japanese government was to claim that Kunashiri and Etorofu were not part of the Kuriles. These problems were to rise up to the surface of the normalization talks between Japan and the Soviet Union a decade later.

Thirdly, the Yalta Secret Agreement was, in fact, totally contradictory to the non-territorial-expansion clause of the Cairo Declaration. The Cairo Declaration provided that Japan should be stripped of the territories of the following categories:

- (1) All the islands in the Pacific which Japan has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914.
- (2) All the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores.
- (3) All other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

In addition to that, the United States, Britain, and China, declared that they had no thought of territorial expansion as a

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result of the war.² According to historical facts, the Kuriles were handed over to the Japanese in exchange for southern Sakhalin in the St. Petersburg Treaty in 1875. By this fact, the Japanese were given good reason to claim that the Kuriles were not territories which Japan had gained by violence and greed and that the possession of the islands by the Soviets after the war was an unmistakable example of the territorial expansion. The Soviet Union did not directly sign the Cairo Declaration but she joined the Potsdam Declaration after her entry into the war against Japan. The Potsdam Declaration clearly stipulated that the signatories should respect the wartime agreements, including the Cairo Declaration. No efforts were made to dissolve this contradictory nature of the Yalta Agreement and the Cairo Declaration, during the period between the Yalta Conference and the Potsdam Conference. In consequence, this contradiction complicated the legal aspect of territorial problems with respect to the Kuriles and left a room for the evolution of the Japanese irredentism.

The Yalta Secret Agreement had an aspect of being a product of the Anglo-American leaders' desire to maintain cooperative relationship with the U.S.S.R. in view of future stability in the far east. Roosevelt and Churchill seemed to mortgage the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin for future big powers harmony. It is still not very clear whether Stalin shared this idea with the other leaders. At any rate, if the desire to keep the great powers harmony had been constantly held by those leaders, then the Yalta

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Secret Agreement on the far east would not have caused complicated problems involving the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin which Japan had to be faced with later. But shortly after the death of Roosevelt on the American part, at least the struggles for influence over Japan and the struggles in the context of the cold war overwhelmed the desire for harmony. That inevitably affected international relations developing around the issue of the Kuriles and Sakhalin.

THE KURILES AND SOUTHERN SAKHALIN DURING THE EARLY OCCUPATION PERIOD:

On 9 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and immediately despatched her troops to Sakhalin and the Kuriles. It was on 18 August, three days after Japan's surrender, when Soviet troops reached Shimushu, the northernmost island of the Kuriles. By the 29 August, the Soviets occupied Urrupu and Etorofu. By 3 September, Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais were placed under control of the Soviet troops.

Hardly had Japan surrendered on 15 August, when a series of minor frictions over the Kuriles started between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. On 20 August 1945, G.H.Q. issued the 'General Order No.1' to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese forces and to provide instructions for the Allies stationing forces in Japan.

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Before the issuance of this, Soviet Premier Stalin claimed that the draft of the General Order should include provision for all the Kuriles and the northern part of Hokkaido in the regions where surrender of Japanese troops should be made to the Soviet Commander.³ U.S. President Harry S. Truman was prompted by Stalin's request to agree to include all the Kuriles in the area where the Japanese should surrender to the Soviet Union. But he firmly refused the Soviet request regarding northern Hokkaido and demanded the right to use one of the Kuriles as a U.S. air base for military purposes and commercial use.⁴ In the State Department, there had been an anxiety over the possibility that the Soviet Union would expand her sphere of influence beyond the rewards with which the Yalta Agreement provided the Soviets.⁵ Holding this sort of suspicion, the Americans could not accept Stalin's request. Instead, they seem to have attempted to check the possible Soviet intention for expansion by requesting the right to use the Kuriles as an American base.

Not surprisingly, Stalin angrily replied to Truman on 22 August and refused the U.S. request for the right to use the archipelago. Stalin's reply said, 'demands of such a nature are usually laid before either a conquered state or such an allied state which is in no position to defend with its own means certain parts of its territory.'⁶ This implied that Stalin assumed that the Kuriles had already been the territory of the Soviet Union. But he accepted Truman's refusal to authorise the Russian troops to

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occupy the northern part of Hokkaido, though he expressed a displeasure with this American refusal.⁷

The U.S. officials quickly reacted to Stalin's refusal to accept their demand for American bases on the Kuriles and to his implication that the Kuriles had already been under the Soviet sovereignty. On 25 August, Secretary of State James Byrnes transmitted a message from Truman to Stalin, which was handed over to him on 27 August. In the message, the Americans withdrew their first request for bases on the Kuriles and suggested that they desired only the landing rights for U.S. aircraft on the Kuriles, and that it was very important in view of the occupation of Japan for the U.S. to use air bases on the archipelago.⁸ Although the Truman administration was suspicious about Soviet intention to expand their influence over Japan, it seemed to be attempting to keep a cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. But the message clearly opposed the Soviet implication that the Kuriles had already been transferred to the Soviet Union. It said that the Kuriles were still Japanese territories, not Soviet ones.⁹ At last, Stalin showed a conciliatory gesture and agreed to offer the Americans the landing rights on a temporary basis and for commercial use only.¹⁰ Stalin also tended to avoid having more serious friction with the United States over this issue.

Although the minor friction described above resulted in a negotiated compromise, during the rest of 1945 and 1946, both of the two countries gradually came to show unilateral tendencies in

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dealing with the Kuriles and Sakhalin issue. Moreover, the difference in the interpretation of the nature of the Yalta Secret Agreement became clearer between the both superpowers.

The question over the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was discussed at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference with the participation by James Byrnes, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, and V.M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister. On 24 December 1945, Molotov took up this territorial question. Byrnes stated that 'there was no agreement on this question, which could not well be discussed until they came to consider a peace treaty.' But he went on to say that 'as for specific islands, he only knew of a decision about the Kuriles' and that 'he had only learnt recently that this had been agreed at Yalta.' Responding to this ambiguous remark, the Soviet foreign minister sharply counterargued: 'Yalta had settled the fate of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.' Through this conversation, the gap between the Americans and the Soviets emerged clearly. Molotov unmistakably asserted that the Soviet possession of those islands was a *fait accompli*. But Byrnes implied that the Yalta Agreement should be confirmed by a peace treaty with Japan.

The British foreign secretary took a different stance. Bevin assured that 'the British government were not going back on what Mr. Churchill had agreed and would not do so.'² The British point of view was that, whatever further procedures might be

followed, the government would support the Soviet claim based on the Yalta Secret Agreement on the far east.

In 1946, the great powers' divergence became much more explicit on this territorial issue. On 22 January, Dean Acheson, the U.S. under-secretary of state, publicly admitted the existence of a secret agreement signed at Yalta. He added that the Yalta Secret Agreement only granted the U.S.S.R. the right to occupy the Kuriles, but that the Agreement did not stipulate a final decision to hand them over to Russia. In response to this, *Tass* criticised Acheson's statement, saying, 'Mr. Acheson is indeed "mistaken" with regard to the Kurile Islands.' Then it claimed:

...it is precisely stated that after victory over Japan the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union,, and that the southern part of Sakhalin island and all islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.¹³

After this, probably, as a measure to counter the American effort to deny the full validity of the Yalta Secret Agreement, the Soviet government launched on a series of unilateral activities to confirm Russian possession of those islands. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ordered the creation of 'southern Sakhalin *oblast*' and designated it a component of the Khabarovsk region on 2 February. At the same time, the Kuriles were also absorbed in the Khabarovsk region. This administrative absorption of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was followed by the final step when the Soviet Constitution was amended to include the

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archipelago and southern Sakhalin as integral components of the U.S.S.R.¹⁴ In addition, the Soviet press started a propaganda campaign to present the world with the impression that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had already been the Soviet territories.¹⁵

Following Acheson's statement, the U.S. government finally decided to confirm to the public that the U.S. government had signed a secret agreement stipulating the cession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. Secretary Byrnes officially admitted the existence of the Yalta Secret Agreement on 11 February 1946 and the three signatories published the entire text of the Agreement. The British response to the publication of the Yalta Secret Agreement clearly differed from the U.S. position. As Foreign Secretary Bevin had promised at Moscow, the government expressed its support for the Russian claims to the islands. On 4 March 1946, there was a discussion over the validity of the Yalta Secret Agreement in the House of Commons. Asked if the British government would observe the Yalta Secret Agreement, Phillip J. Noel-Baker, the then minister of state, answered that the 'Government evidently must regard themselves as bound by what was done before.'¹⁶

**EARLY PLANNING OF A PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN AND SOVIET-JAPANESE
TERRITORIAL QUESTION IN 1947**

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When the American government raised the question of a peace treaty with Japan in 1947, the interested powers were faced with the question how to dispose ^{of} the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the peace treaty. Although the question of the disposition of those islands would not become a focus of attention, and although no intensive negotiations took place during this period because soon after the U.S. proposals for convening a preliminary conference for a peace with Japan were quickly rejected by the Russians, some noteworthy development with regard to the Kuriles and Sakhalin question could be seen during this period.

In 1947, the State Department seemed to hold the view that Japan should retain the southern Kuriles, the Habomais, and Shikotan. In August, the Borton group in the Department prepared a draft treaty. This 'Borton Draft' provided that the southern Kuriles, namely Kunashiri and Etorofu, and the Habomais and Shikotan should be retained under Japanese sovereignty.¹⁷ George F. Kennan also held the same idea for the disposition of the southern Kuriles. In P.P.S. 10, a policy paper prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, he wrote that the southernmost islands of the Kuriles should be retained by the Japanese.¹⁸ He considered that the presence of Soviet forces on those islands would constitute an imminent strategic threat to the security of Japan.¹⁹

It is, however, essential to note that both Borton and Kennan did not intend to scrap the Yalta Agreement. What they took up as a matter for consideration was not the question as to whether the

Kuriles should be ceded to the Soviet Union, but the question which definition of the Kuriles should be adopted, a narrower one or a broader one. It seems that Kennan and Borton intended to take advantage of the vagueness in the definition of the Kuriles in the Yalta Agreement and to adopt the narrower definition. But this line was based on the assumption that the Yalta Agreement should basically be implemented. Furthermore, during that period, there was a legal view in the State Department that the Soviet Union was entitled to preserve the *status quo post bellum* vis-a-vis Japan, so far as consistent with existing international allied agreements.²⁰

Unlike the Soviet Union, the British government responded positively to the American proposal for a preliminary peace conference. From August to September 1947, the British Commonwealth convened the Canberra conference to discuss a peace with Japan. Prior to the conference, the Overseas Reconstruction Committee which was under direct control of the British Cabinet prepared a briefing for the conference, entitled 'Territorial, Political and General Clauses of Peace with Japan'. The article dealing with territorial questions did not directly mention the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Rather, the main attention was paid to the small islands between Hokkaido and the Kuriles and between Hokkaido and the southern Sakhalin. The paper by the Committee stated that those small islands could be a future source of dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Japan if the peace treaty mishandled them.²¹ Thus, the British government does not

seem to have had a very clear idea with regard to the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the wake of the movement for a peace with Japan.

JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM IN 1945-9

At this point we should examine the preparation which had been carried out on the Japanese part. While the Japanese government were not allowed to conduct diplomacy by themselves during the occupation period, they realised the necessity to get ready for the coming peace treaty and hoped to exert some slight influence in favour of Japan during the course of the peace making. For this purpose, the Foreign Ministry of the first Yoshida administration set up a committee to study the problems of a peace treaty with Japan in November 1945.²² On 22 May 1946, this committee prepared a series of papers containing their views with regard to the peace treaty. Among them, there was a document entitled 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government for the Supposed Conditions Which the Allied Forces Will Present at the Heiwajōyaku no Renjō Koku-an < Sōtei > to Waga hō Kibōan to no Hikaku Japanese Peace Treaty Conference'. (Hereafter, this is cited as 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government.')²³ This document was leaked to the media more than a year later in December 1947 and disclosed to the public. In it, the following paragraph was contained, dealing with the issue of the Kuriles and Sakhalin:

Territories (Probable Conditions of the Allied Powers)

1. Formosa and the Hoko (Pescadores) islands will be returned to China as stipulated in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations.

2. Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands will be returned to the Soviet Union under terms of the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration.

(Japanese Counter-Proposals)

1. None.

2. Japan must make clear that she did not secure possession of the Kuriles Islands by any aggression whatsoever. At least the Southern Kuriles, Habomai, and Shikotan Islands (the latter off Northern Hokkaido) must be left as Japanese territories. The Northern Kuriles must be placed under United Nations trusteeship at most.²⁴

The points that seem important in this document are as follows: first of all, the Japanese government had an idea that Etorofu, Kunashiri, the Habomais and Shikotan should be returned to Japan. This assertion was continuously held until the 1980s. Secondly, but more importantly, the government denied in regard to the northern Kuriles the validity of the Yalta Agreement on the far east. In other words, they desired that the northern Kuriles should not be possessed by the Russians.

Why did the Foreign Ministry come to these ideas? The adoption of a U.N. trusteeship for the territory would leave the Japanese with a hope to regain those islands in the future. But another important reason for the proposal seems to have been the Foreign Ministry's legal views on the contradiction between the Yalta Agreement and the Cairo Declaration. The Allied Powers had issued the Cairo Declaration and made it clear that none of them had any intention to expand their territories as a result of the war. From the Japanese viewpoint, the treatment of the Kuriles in the

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Yalta Secret Agreement, was in contradiction with the Cairo Declaration. The Foreign Ministry caught this shortcoming of the Yalta agreement.²⁵ Its claim in the document 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government' was based on this understanding of the contradiction between the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta Agreement. Added to that, the demand of the Foreign Ministry for the return of Kunashiri, Etorofu, the Habomais and Shikotan was based on its contention that the Yalta Agreement had failed to define the territorial range of Kuriles. As a whole the Japanese Foreign Ministry took a position which seems to have resulted from its effort to find and utilise the loopholes of the Yalta Agreement.

Apart from 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government', the Foreign Ministry of the Yoshida government prepared a series of explanation papers on the subject of territorial disposition in a peace treaty with the purpose of conveying the Japanese views to the American government. Those explanation papers asserted that the Kuriles, the Habomais, and Shikotan were historically and traditionally inalienable territories of Japan. There is no evidence to show that those reports were seriously taken into account by the U.S. government. But after 1948, these reports and papers could be delivered to the U.S. government through informal channels.²⁶

A direct step to influence the peace making on the territorial issue was taken by the Katayama administration in 1947. During

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the development of exchanges of views among the Allied powers after the American initiative in July, Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi of the Katayama Cabinet, managed to contact several G.H.Q. staff and tried to hand over a memorandum which contained nine requests of the Japanese government with respect to the peace treaty. This memorandum, the so-called 'Ashida Memorandum', contained a request dealing with the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Paragraph 7 of the memorandum said that the Japanese government hoped that the decision on disposal of the small minor islands adjacent to the main islands as mentioned in the Potsdam Declaration would be made by taking into account the historical, racial, economic, and cultural background of the relations between the minor islands and the main Japanese islands.²⁷ This did not specifically refer to the Kuriles and Sakhalin, but probably the basic idea embodied in this memorandum may have been Ashida's strong desire for the reversion of those islands. In fact, Ashida seemed to be seriously concerned about the possibility of the Soviet invasion through the Kuriles and Sakhalin and emphasized the necessity to offer the U.S. stationing troops the right to use bases in Japan if necessary.²⁸ This memorandum, in consequence, was not to be accepted by G.H.Q. which considered it would only irritate the Soviet Union and cause some unfavourable consequence for the Japanese.²⁹

In October 1948, Yoshida came back to office as prime minister after the downfall of the Ashida Cabinet. Under the second Yoshida Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry continued to prepare a

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series of explanatory papers on the territorial issues. The basic character of the government policy on the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin seems to have remained unchanged from that in the paper prepared in May, 1946. It seems that the government's line in 1946 on the future status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was continuously held by his Cabinet in 1948-49. In fact, in December 1949 before the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Parliamentary Vice Foreign Minister Kawamura admitted that the government's interpretation of the status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was that Japan could assert her own title to those islands because the Potsdam Declaration did not refer to the Yalta Agreement.³⁰ It showed that the government position denying the validity of the Yalta Agreement had not changed since 1946 when the 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government' had been prepared.

As for reactions to the Japanese view from the Allied Powers, it can safely be said that they basically ignored the Japanese claims. G.H. Q. refused to receive the 'Ashida Memorandum'. When the document entitled 'Preparatory Measures of the Japanese Government' was leaked to Japanese and American media in December 1947, Chief of the British Mission in Tokyo, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, showed rather a cool response and the British Foreign Office did not show very much interest to it, either.³¹ In 1949, however, the State Department seemed to start to take into account Japanese views on the southern Kuriles'. In June, the State Department tried to avoid expressing any views and comments which would be

able to upset the Japanese claims.³² Clearly, the U.S. Department of State recognised that their view on the southern Kuriles and the Japanese view were basically identical in the sense that both the Department and the Japanese Foreign Ministry desired to regain those islands. It seems, however, unreasonable to assume that the U.S. government were influenced by the Japanese claims. Instead, the Department may have intended to take advantage of the Japanese claims in order to materialise its own strategic goal in the far east. The Policy Planning Staff and Kennan desired those southernmost islands of the Kuriles to be retained by the Japanese. On the other hand, the divergence between the U.S. view and the Japanese view was clear. The State Department still took a position that the Yalta Agreement was valid if it was going to be confirmed by a peace treaty with Japan. But the Japanese government unequivocally asserted that the Japanese government was not bound by the Yalta Agreement.

In this period, there was a confusion among American officials over the legal status of the southern Kuriles. In Tokyo, a political advisor to G.H.Q. argued that, based on historical background of the four islands, Japan was entitled to expect some re-adjustment of the Yalta Agreement over the disposal of them.³³ Contrary to this, the State Department argued in November that the Habomais and Shikotan were legally not part of the Kuriles but that 'there seems to be no sound legal reason for claiming that

Kunashiri and Etorofu are not part of the Kuril Islands.'³⁴ This argument by the State Department seems to have been accepted as the official view of the U.S. government. In fact, during the peace-making in 1950-51, the U.S. State Department seemed to adopt the line described above.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES' 'SEVEN PRINCIPLES' AND BRITAIN'S REACTIONS

Whereas the British government were steadily preparing for the peace treaty with Japan, the U.S. government in the first half of 1950 was still struggling with the stagnation caused by the divergence between the State Department and the Defence Department. But after John Foster Dulles, the consultant for the secretary of state, was assigned to the peace settlement with Japan on 18 May, the stagnation began to be gradually overcome. His handling of the peace settlement with Japan reflected his perception of the existing divergence and of the necessity to dissolve it.

It seems to have been in early August 1950 that Dulles for the first time dealt with the territorial disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. He prepared a draft treaty on 7 August, which provided, as far as the territorial issue was concerned, that the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would be decided by the future decision by the four powers, namely, the

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U.S., Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, and that, in case of any failure among them to decide it, the General Assembly of the United Nations should decide the disposition.³⁵ This idea became embodied in his 'Seven Principles' of the peace treaty on 11 September.

The 'Seven Principles' dealt with the territorial issue as follows:

Territory Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea: (b) agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and (c) accept the future decision of the U.K., the U.S.S.R., China and the U.S. with reference to the status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In the event of no decision within a year after the treaty came into effect, the U.N. General Assembly would decide.³⁶

The territorial clause in the 'Seven Principles' seemed to be an example of ignoring the Yalta Secret Treaty on the part of the U.S. government. The 'Seven Principles' showed that the disposition of the territories ceded by the Japanese should be left for future decision. Before the advent of Dulles, the State Department had held the idea that the American government should support the Yalta agreement at a peace conference. Their attention had, therefore, been focused on the question of the definition of the Kuriles. Dulles' 'Seven Principles' indicated, however, that the attention of the State Department and the government had moved to the question of whether the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin should be transferred to the Russians or not.

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This was a clear expression of the American defiance of the Yalta Agreement.

The changes in the 'Seven Principles' were in a sense a reflection of the international situation and the U.S. domestic situation. First of all, the Korean War and the 'loss of China' intensified U.S.-Soviet tensions in the far east. The effect of superpower confrontation affected the various dimensions of the peace with Japan. The U.S. government intended to show a firm attitude towards the Soviet Union even in the peace treaty. The defiance of the Yalta Agreement in the territorial clause of the 'Seven Principles' must have reflected the hard line policy in Washington.

The advent as the chief negotiator for the peace treaty of John Foster Dulles, who was well-known as a 'cold warrior', also considerably influenced the U.S. views on the peace with Japan. From his point of view, to show firmness was essential, in order to cope with the Soviet Union in the context of the cold war. Furthermore, compromise was regarded as a sign of weakness. He assessed that the strategic importance of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was very high. Undoubtedly the loss of these islands to the Soviet Union must have been considered as a great loss for the U.S. security interest in Japan.³⁷ But it is hardly realistic to consider that Dulles believed that the situation where the Russians occupied those islands could easily be revised. Even so, he should show that he did not accept that

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situation. The defiance of the Yalta Agreement in the 'Seven Principles' was an indirect expression of his desire to refuse to accept reality.

Another important factor which may have exerted some influence on the American change of attitude, though seemingly very slight, was pressure from the Japanese. In May 1950, Ikeda Hayato, the finance minister of Japan, visited the U.S. and had an informal conversation with Joseph Dodge, the financial advisor to the S.C.A.P. In his conversations, Ikeda said, 'There is also the possibility that the Soviets may offer a peace treaty in advance of the United States and might include in that offer the return of Sakhalin and the Kuriles.'³⁰ Ikeda intended to urge the U.S. government to step up progress in the peace settlement with Japan. But it cannot be denied that the Americans were faced with the necessity to pre-empt possible Soviet initiative as such.

The 'Seven Principles' were circulated to the major interested countries and Dulles launched a series of bilateral negotiations with them with the 'Seven Principles' as the basis of discussion. On 22 September, Dulles met Denning in New York and discussed the peace treaty. He commented on the 'Seven Principles' by saying that the peace treaty should just delimit the areas remaining under Japanese sovereignty without specifying precisely how the ceded territories were to be disposed of. Added to that, Denning disagreed with the idea that the General Assembly of United

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Nations should decide the future disposal of the islands, on the ground that the U.N. did not have such an authority to relocate the power relationships in international politics, and that, because of firm possession by the U.S.S.R. of such territories as the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, it was not practicable to attempt to change such a situation.³⁹

In replying, Dulles remarked that the territorial clause in the 'Seven Principles' might be useful in talking to the Russians.⁴⁰ He may have considered that, by taking a firm position against the Russians, the Western allies could stand on a strong bargaining position. In this sense, Dulles uses those islands as a bargaining chip for negotiations with the Russians. This tendency of Dulles to regard these islands as a tool or bait towards the Soviet Union in the process of the peace making was to be appearing again in 1951.

After the discussion between Dulles and Dening, the Foreign Office started to define its official view on the 'Seven Principles'. The main British overseas offices agreed with Dening. The chief of British Mission in Tokyo, Sir Alvary Gascoigne supported Dening's view. He sent the Foreign Office a memorandum prepared by G.L. Clutton, the counsellor of the British Mission in Tokyo. Dening's point of view had a defect in that it could not define the country to which the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would be ceded. But Clutton considered that this defect would not do much harm. He wrote, 'if no juridical

solution is reached, no harm will be done. There are plenty of territories throughout the world whose juridical status has never been determined by any international instrument.⁴¹

The Far East (Official) committee, a subcommittee of the Cabinet and composed of higher rank officials of the Foreign Office, however, took a different view from Dening. On 7 October, the Committee prepared a policy paper on the British view with regard to the 'Seven Principles', which was to be sent to the British delegation in New York, Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks and F.S. Tomlinson, the assistant at the Far Eastern Department. The view expressed in the policy paper indicated the strong influence of the 'Seven Principles'. As mentioned above, the British position was that a peace treaty with Japan should not include any names of countries to which the territories would be ceded. But the Far East (Official) Committee, on the contrary, proposed that Japan should renounce all rights to the islands to 'parties principal' of the peace treaty and that those parties would decide the disposal of those territories.⁴²

This position implied the following points. Firstly, the British government seemed to change their previous position of supporting the Yalta Agreement. The new position clearly meant that the disposal of the territories which the Agreement had decided to transfer to the new possessor would have to be decided afresh by the 'parties principal'. This position was contradictory to the previous British position supporting the

final validity of the Yalta Agreement. Secondly, it is important to notice that the Far East (Official) Committee seems to have tried to expand the decision makers on the territorial issue from only the four great powers to more nations probably including the main British Commonwealth countries, such as Australia and New Zealand. In fact, Australia and New Zealand had been asserting that they should have more influence on the peace making with Japan. The British government could not ignore their assertions.

Thirdly, the British view seemed to be based on the idea of maintaining the *status quo post bellum*. The Committee indicated that Japan should renounce all rights and claims to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. This seems to have been intended to play a role of safety-valve in case of failure for the 'parties principal' to reach the agreement on the disposition. If Japan renounced the right and title to those islands, the Japanese could not claim any *de jure* sovereignty over them. By making Japan renounce all right to those islands, the peace treaty could legitimise the *status quo post bellum* where the Soviet Union firmly held them. It is clear that the basic idea behind the British attitude on the territorial question, was that the peace treaty should not leave any questions which may cause disturbing factors for the far eastern stability.

This new policy line on this territorial issue set up by the Committee was conveyed to the British delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Sir Oliver Franks and Tomlinson in

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New York on 23 October. But before it was sent to them, the Committee seemed to encounter a great dilemma. The dilemma was the fact that, though the government had clearly expressed its support for the Yalta Agreement, the new line of the Committee was, as mentioned above, in contradiction with the Agreement. The focus of problem for the Committee became the question as to whether the Yalta Agreement should be fully implemented or not.⁴³

On 3 November 1950, the Foreign Office received from New York a reply prepared by Tomlinson. This memorandum emphasized that 'the most practical and realistic course would appear to be for Japan to be asked to renounce her sovereignty over these areas in favour of the Soviet Union in the treaty of peace.' This suggestion was based on, at least, three considerations. Firstly, the reality that the Soviet Union had placed the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin under her firm control could not be ignored in the peace treaty. Tomlinson emphasized this fact and recommended that the treaty should recognise the reality. He concluded that the Soviet forces of occupation 'could be only dislodged by war.'⁴⁴ Tomlinson assumed that the neglect of the reality would create an additional unnecessary source of friction with the Soviet Union but that the recognition of the *status quo post bellum* would not make such a disturbing situation for the stability of the far east. Secondly, the British government was already committed to the Yalta Agreement. Tomlinson did not

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think that his government could easily scrap their previous commitment.

Finally, he was afraid that, if the peace treaty had a clause implying that the disposal of those islands would be open to discussion, it would give the Soviets a good reason to put the onus for the Soviet non-participation on the shoulders of the U.S. and the UK. He argued that, in order to avoid that, the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should unequivocally be ceded to the Soviet Union in the peace treaty.

Tomlinson's letter enjoyed full support from the Far East (Official) Committee and, consequently, his view came to be embodied in a new policy paper of the Committee on 22 November. This paper said on the territorial issue that Japan should renounce all right to southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles in favour of the U.S.S.R. The reasons for this position taken by the Committee were the same as mentioned by Tomlinson in his letter on 3 November.⁴⁵ On 19 and 20 December, the Cabinet paper entitled 'Japanese Peace Treaty: General' was prepared contained the following recommendation on the territorial issue.

As provided in the Livadia Agreement [the Yalta Agreement], South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands be cede by Japan to the U.S.S.R. '[My brackets]'⁴⁶

This paper was approved by the Cabinet on 2 January as the basic policy line of the British government on the disposition of those

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islands.⁴⁷ This position would continue to be the fundamental standpoint of the British government until the creation of the Anglo-American joint draft in May 1951.

In late October, the 'Seven Principles' was delivered to the Soviet Ambassador to the U.N., Yakob Malik. On 26 October, Malik met Dulles and they discussed the 'Seven Principles' and an oral statement, which was attached to the 'Seven Principles', that the Soviet Union would gain the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin on condition that she would be a party to the peace treaty. Malik's reaction to this was not straightforward. As far as the territorial issue was concerned, he only stated 'there had been express agreement regarding the islands to be detached [from Japan], i.e. Kuriles, Pescadores, and Formosa.'⁴⁸[My brackets]

Dulles' intention behind his remarks to Malik can be understood as follows. First of all, those islands were used by Dulles as a bait for the Soviet Union in order to drag them into a peace treaty with Japan. As an idea of this kind has been held in the State Department since, at least, 1947,⁴⁹ Dulles may have considered that a confirmation of the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union was one of the most important benefits that the Russians could derive from the peace treaty with Japan. Secondly, although the American government had been determined as early as late in 1949 to carry out a peace settlement with Japan even without Soviet participation and although Dulles himself did not expect the Russians to become a

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party to any peace treaty, he could not provide the Soviet Union with a good pretext to put the onus of her non-participation in the peace treaty on the U.S. violation of the Yalta Agreement. In fact, Dulles argued in his conversation with Dean Rusk, the assistant secretary for far eastern affairs, that the additional statement indicating that the U.S.S.R. would be able to gain those islands when she participated in the peace treaty could be a good tool to avoid a Russian propaganda attack on the U.S. To avoid such an attack, Dulles had to indicate U.S. willingness to recognize the Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin on condition that Russia would become a party to the peace treaty.

The Soviet government reacted to the 'Seven Principles' by issuing an Aide-Mémoire on 12 November. As far as the territorial issue was concerned, the Soviet counterargument was concentrated on the U.S. treatment of the Yalta Agreement. According to the Aide-Mémoire, the Soviets clearly understood that the 'Seven Principles' were intended to replace the Yalta Agreement and they insisted that the Agreement be implemented. The Aide-Mémoire did not even touch on the oral proposal by Dulles on 26 October. Obviously, Dulles had failed to prevent the Soviet propaganda attack of which he had been afraid. A month later, the U.S. government counterargued in their aide-mémoire by saying that the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration had to be confirmed by the peace treaty before they

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took effect. The superpowers cleavage became wider and clearer.

DULLES-YOSHIDA CONSULTATIONS

On 25 January 1951, Dulles arrived at Tokyo to have the first substantial consultation with the Japanese government. On the Japanese part, the Foreign Ministry had been preparing for negotiations with the United States on the peace treaty since President Truman had announced on 14 September 1950 the U.S. decision to convene preliminary negotiations for purpose. The preparation for the negotiations was called 'Operation D' and, as a result of this, the Foreign Ministry staff managed to complete a paper on 27 December which set out a general policy design for the peace treaty. After some amendments, this memorandum was submitted to Prime Minister Yoshida on 20 January 1951. Yoshida ordered his Foreign Ministry staff to amend it further and the memorandum was completed under the title 'Our Views On Japanese Peace Treaty' (Wagahô No Kenkai).

This memorandum, which was submitted to Dulles on 30 January,⁵⁰ did not contain any reference to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The original Foreign Ministry paper prepared during 'Operation D' (Sagyô D), however, contained the Japanese request for the return of those islands, which was as follow:

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We are delighted that the U.S. government intends to leave the disposition of the Kuriles to the United Nations General Assembly. The attachment of the Japanese people to the Kuriles is not at all weaker than that to Rykyu and the Bonins. We request the U.S. government to make every effort until the last stage in order to help us to materialise the desire of Japanese people.⁵¹

This paragraph seems to indicate that the Japanese government preferred to have the UN General Assembly defining the status of the islands to the four main Allied powers as stated in the 'Seven Principles'.

But Yoshida ordered that the part dealing with the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin be omitted. He seemed to consider that it was not a proper thing for the Japanese government to request the U.S. to do something about the Kuriles which was an issue between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Nishimura Kumao, then the director of Treaties Bureau, however, recalled that the prime minister may have wanted to avoid any possible delay in the peace talks which could have been caused by disputes over the disposal of the Kuriles. Indeed, Yoshida desired to achieve a peace as soon as possible by adopting a 'majority peace'.⁵² In addition to that, it can be argued that Yoshida had to cope with the more important territorial question: Okinawa and the Bonins. Yoshida, who strongly desired to obtain a guarantee from the U.S. government to return those islands to Japan, may have considered that too many requests should not be made on the other territorial questions. Consequently as a result of Yoshida's omission of the paragraph about the Kuriles and southern

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Sakhalin from the original Foreign Ministry document, the disposition of those islands was not discussed during the consultations with Dulles in Tokyo.

Having finished with the first substantial consultations with the Japanese, Dulles and the State Department began to prepare a draft which was based on the result of Dulles' bilateral negotiations with the member states of the Far Eastern Commission. At the beginning of March, as part of the preparation for the draft, Dulles drew up a provisional memorandum in preparation for talks with the Japanese over some issues which had not been dealt with in Tokyo.

With regard to the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, the memorandum can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Unless and until the Soviets dissociate themselves from the treaty talks, it appears to be preferable that the draft assumes their participation.
- (2) The draft should provide for the return by Japan of southern Sakhalin and all islands adjacent to the Soviet Union and the handing over to the Soviets of the Kuriles as they may be defined by a bilateral agreement or by a judicial decision under treaty disputes procedure.
- (3) The provision would be operative only if the Soviets sign and ratify the treaty.⁵³

The nature of the territorial clause of this memorandum was remarkable in the sense that it dropped previous idea indicated in the 'Seven Principles' that the disposition of those islands would be entrusted to the United Nations General Assembly in case of failure of the four main Allied powers in deciding their

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disposal. This seems to have been because there had been opposition from some quarters in the State Department to the using of the UN organisation for final decision of the disposition. George Kennan criticized Dulles' idea saying that if the General Assembly dealt with this territorial question, those northern islands would 'become a bone of contention in the United Nations,' and argued that the UN was not a suitable organisation to alter power relationships in the world in the cold war situation.⁵⁴ The second point of the provisional memorandum suggested that the U.S. government tried to avoid involvement in some future Soviet-Japanese dispute over the definition of the Kuriles. The Americans actually hoped that only directly interested states should be involved with this question: Japan and the U.S.S.R.

As this memorandum was handed to Japanese Foreign Ministry officials, the Japanese quickly responded to this American intention and attempted to pull them back to the issue of defining the Kuriles. In their reply to the provisional memorandum, the Japanese expressed their desire on 16 March that the final disposition of the Kuriles should be decided, '*as they may be defined by the powers concerned, including Japan.*'⁵⁵ The Japanese government did not want to cope with the Soviets to define the range of the Kuriles without direct American involvement. The Japanese also proposed that the territorial clause over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be eliminated from the peace treaty if the Soviet Union did not

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participate in the treaty.⁵⁶ The Japanese objective may have been to retain *de jure* sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in case of Soviet non-participation.

On 20 March, Secretary Acheson sent a reply to the Japanese government, suggesting the following points. First of all, no specific way to define the range of the Kuriles should be stipulated in the treaty but the definition should automatically go to the World Court for elucidation. Secondly, it suggested, 'if it is apparent in advance that the Soviet Union is definitely out of picture, we would be prepared to reconsider whether reference to Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be totally eliminated from Treaty.'⁵⁷

It seems that the State Department persistently tried to avoid deep involvement in the dispute over defining the scope of the term 'Kuriles'. But simultaneously, they dropped from the treaty the possibility that the Japanese government would have to cope with the Russians alone on this issue. In this sense, the new line described in the reply from Acheson had an aspect of being a compromise with the Japanese. The second point in Acheson's memorandum also contained another compromise. Basically, it accepted the Japanese claim to *de jure* sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the case of Russian absence from the peace conference. Apart from this memorandum by Acheson, Dulles also suggested on 21 March the possibility of the removal of the clause dealing with those islands from the treaty.⁵⁸ Thus,

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at this stage, the U.S. view on the handling of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was to some extent influenced by the Japanese demands.

It should, however, be emphasized that the U.S. government did not change their position that the peace treaty should provide that those islands would be ceded to the Soviet Union only if she became a party to the treaty. Indeed, because the Japanese government did not show any opposition to that part of clause, the Americans did not have to change their position. Moreover the consideration that the propaganda warfare might develop with the Soviets may have been in Dulles' mind. But in this period, Dulles seemed also to be under some domestic pressure. On 19 March, Dulles explained the government's position regarding a Japanese peace treaty before the Far East Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Alexander Smith asked Dulles whether any concessions the U.S. might hope to get from the Soviets justified her giving Russians title to southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles in the treaty. This question clearly implied the anxiety held by Congressmen over the possibility that the peace treaty would provide the Russians with excessive benefits.⁵⁹

Not only congressional pressure but also internal discord within the administration were influential. During the meeting with the Senators described above, Dulles had exposed the fact that the Pentagon desired the Soviet Union to participate in a

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peace treaty with Japan and 'thereby terminate their belligerent rights.' Dulles went on to say that it would, therefore, be useful to try to hang a certain amount of bait in front of the Soviets.⁶⁰ During the earlier stage of the peace making, the Department of Defence had adopted the line of an 'all-over peace' with Japan on the ground that peace without the Russians would provide them with belligerent rights and make it easy for them to launch a military attack on Japan. In August 1950, the Pentagon clearly abandoned this line once. But they still had a sense of Japan's vulnerability to Soviet attack through Hokkaido. In January 1951, during a meeting between Dulles and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the latter expressed an anxiety that 'early conclusion of the treaty would be provocative' and that 'any steps taken in that direction might increase likelihood of overt Soviet action against Japan, particularly Hokkaido.'⁶¹ Although Dulles was fully authorized to promote the early peace with Japan before his visit to Tokyo, he, as a mediator between the Pentagon and the State Department, could not ignore the anxiety expressed by the Pentagon. In this sense, the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were used by Dulles as the tool to hamper the Pentagon's opposition to an early peace treaty.

U.S. 'MARCH DRAFT' AND BRITISH 'APRIL DRAFT'



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On 23 March, the State Department prepared the so called 'March Draft' partly based on the exchange of views with the Japanese government . But before that, the Truman administration had exchanged views with the British government also.

During the Yoshida-Dulles consultations in Tokyo, Dulles met Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the chief of the British Liaison Mission in Tokyo, on 30 January. Gascoigne expressed the view that southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles should be turned over to the U.S.S.R. in the treaty. In response to this, Dulles asked, 'why we should go out of way to clear the Soviets title to these territories if they were not parties to the treaty!'⁶² Knowing the view of Dulles, the British government decided to inform the U.S. government of the formal British view. On 5 March, the Foreign Office prepared an Aide-Mémoire on the peace treaty with Japan,⁶³ and sent the Department of State on 12 March. The paragraph relating the territorial issue was clearly based on the paper approved by the Cabinet on 20 January.

(III)As provided in the Livadia Agreement (Yalta Agreement) signed on the 11th of February, 1945: South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands should be ceded by Japan to the U.S.S.R.⁶⁴

The Department of State replied on 14 March. The contents of the reply with regard to the territorial issue were the same as the contents of Dulles' provisional memorandum of 12 March. The difference between the two governments was undeniable. The British argued that Japan should hand over those territories to

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the Soviet Union whether Russia would become a party to the treaty or not. But the Americans insisted that they should not be ceded to the Russians unless they signed the treaty.

On 21 March, John Allison, the acting assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, had a meeting with the Foreign Office staff in London and tried to coordinate the Anglo-American differences over the territorial issue. Allison referred to the territorial issue while they were discussing about the possibility and desirability of Soviet participation in the peace treaty. Both the British and American officers concurred with each other in understanding that though the Soviet Union would not agree to the present Anglo-American proposals on the peace treaty in general, she should be given the chance to become a party to the treaty. They differed, however, on the issue of the disposition of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Allison reiterated the U.S. position which had been expressed in their Aide-Mémoire to the British government of 13 March. Then, Allison added that, in case of Soviet non-participation, the suspending clause which would be contained in the peace treaty would prevent the Russians from gaining any benefits from it. The British under-secretary, R.H. Scott, refuted this in an indirect manner, saying 'suspension of legal transfer of the Kuriles until Soviet acceptance of the treaty would leave the Kuriles an open point of friction between the U.S.S.R. and Japan!'⁶⁵

The British suggestions and criticisms during the consultations in London do not seem to have affected the American draft-making. Article 5 of the 'March Draft' dealt with the territorial question in these terms:

Japan will return to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it and will hand over to the Soviet Union the Kurile islands.⁶⁶

This article has to be interpreted along with the suspending clause which was Article 19 in this draft:

....the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, title or benefits to or upon any State unless and until it signs and ratifies, or adheres to, this Treaty; nor....shall any right title and interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision hereof in favour of a State which does not sign and ratify, or adhere to, this treaty.⁶⁷

After the London consultations, the Foreign Office started to re-examine their position on the territorial issue. The opinion on this issue in the Japan and Pacific Department was divided. The head of the Department, Charles Johnston, was supporting the U.S. position. He prepared a memorandum on 22 March, in which he compared the merits of British position with those of the Americans. As the beneficial points of the former, he listed the following elements: First of all, the British territorial view on the disposition of the Kuriles and Sakhalin would clear the whole range of Japanese territorial concessions to the Soviet Union and would be 'a tidier settlement' than the American one.

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Secondly, the British view 'would also, by preventing the Japanese from exercising a theoretical claim to these territories in the future, remove one potential element of instability from the general far eastern situation.' Finally, Johnston suggested that to cede those territories to the Soviet Union even in case of her absence from the peace treaty would become a gesture of civility towards Russia which would be useful from a propaganda point of view.⁶⁸

Johnston indicated the benefits of American view, as follows: Firstly, according to international law, he suggested, the peace treaty did not have to give any gain to Russia unless she did participate in the treaty. Secondly, by retaining an important territorial issue between Japan and Russia, 'the risk of Japan later joining the Russian camp is thereby proportionately reduced.' Thirdly, the Japanese communists would face a great dilemma between the pro-Soviet line and their necessity to obtain popularity from the Japanese nation which desired to get back the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Finally Johnston explained that the existence of an unsolved territorial problem with Japan could compel the Soviets to make more strategic commitment in the far east. As a result of the comparison between the merits of the British view and those of the American one, he reached a conclusion that 'the balance of advantage seemed to lie in favour of the American view.'⁶⁹

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Johnston's account was met with objections from his colleagues. George Clutton, the counsellor of the British Liaison Mission to Japan, suggested that the American clause regarding the Kuriles and Sakhalin would not become a bait to draw the Russians into the peace treaty, because the U.S. government had already made it clear in the 'Seven Principles' that they would not respect the Yalta Agreement. Secondly, if the British government agreed with the American view despite their clear recognition of the full validity of the Yalta Agreement, the Japanese would suspect that the British may attempt 'to provoke bad blood' against the Russians.⁷⁰

C.P. Scott, an assistant in the Japan and Pacific Department in London, supported Clutton's contention. He suggested that the ceding of those islands to the Russians with no strings attached would prevent future Russian propaganda attacks on the peace treaty, and that the existing situation where the Soviet Union had already put down firm roots on those islands could not be altered without waging a major war against Russia.⁷¹ Moreover, the superintending under-secretary in the Japan and Pacific Department, Robert Scott, was on the side of Clutton and C.P. Scott. He discussed that the existence of an unsolved territorial problem would rather bring about an Russo-Japanese entente, which was undoubtedly against British interests. Consequently, Johnston's view was withdrawn and the British draft treaty which was in preparation embodied the position on the ✓

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Kuriles and Sakhalin problem which the British government had been taking since November 1950.

While the American government were preparing the 'March Draft', the British government also undertook a draft treaty. As a result of the effort, it accomplished their first official draft treaty on 7 April. Between the middle of February and the middle of March, the Foreign Office had prepared at least two drafts as the basis of discussion. Interestingly, as far as the Kuriles and Sakhalin clauses were concerned, there was a significant difference between these two drafts, on the one hand, and the official draft treaty dated 7 April, on the other. The former decided that the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, and the Habomais should be ceded to the Soviet Union. Especially, Britain's view of the status of the Habomais is suggested in the following draft provision:

Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile islands, that portion of South Sakhalin over which Japan formerly exercised sovereignty and *the Habomai groups of islands*, and agrees to the arrangement respecting these territories set out in (Annex).⁷²[My Italics]

Furthermore, Article I of these drafts dealing with the delimitation of the range of Japanese sovereignty excluded the Habomais and even Shikotan from the range of Japanese sovereignty.

But, in the official draft of 7 April, Article 3 dealing with the Kuriles and Sakhalin said:

Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kuriles islands and that portion of South sakhalin over which Japan formerly exercised sovereignty.⁷³

Added to that, Article I included the Habomais and Shikotan in the range of Japanese sovereignty.

What made this alteration is not very clear. Although, on 29 March, the Foreign Office officials held a meeting to refine the second draft, they did not discuss the alteration of the Kuriles and Sakhalin clause.

On 16 April, John Foster Dulles visited Japan to assure the Japanese that U.S. policy for the peace treaty would not be changed even after General MacArthur had been sacked by President Truman. During the consultations between Dulles and Yoshida, the Japanese prime minister raised the question of the disposal of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. According to the Yoshida Memoirs, he requested Dulles to provide clearly in the peace treaty that the southern Kuriles should be excluded from the range of the 'Kuriles'.⁷⁴ Dulles was, however, very reluctant towards Yoshida's request. He answered that such an argument over the territorial definition would considerably delay the conclusion of the peace treaty because it would be necessary to obtain the

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support of the interested states for the definition. Dulles seems to have been in too great a hurry for an early peace with Japan. Dulles suggested that the Japanese government would be able to announce their own view regarding the definition of the Kuriles at the peace conference.

ANGLO-AMERICAN JOINT DRAFT TREATY AND DULLES - YOUNGER CONSULTATIONS

As both the American and the British governments had prepared their own draft treaties, they had reached the stage where they had to undertake the efforts to work out a joint draft. For that purpose, an Anglo-American working conference was held from 25 April to 4 May in Washington D.C.

It was on 2 May when the issue of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was discussed. Gerald Fitzmaurice, the second legal adviser of the Foreign Office, and John Allison, the deputy to Dulles, dealt with this issue. Fitzmaurice suggested to Allison that it might be better to exclude Article 5 of the U.S. 'March Draft' dealing with the disposal of those islands from the scope of Article 19, namely the suspending clause. Otherwise, Fitzmaurice continued, southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would remain as a potential source of trouble between Japan and the

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Soviet Union. Allison opposed by pointing out that there were difficulties with U.S. Senate over this issue.⁷⁵

On 3 May, as a result of this consultation, the British and the Americans agreed on a joint draft. The territorial clause with respect to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was worded as follows.

Japan cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Kuriles Islands, and that portion of South Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan formerly exercised sovereignty.⁷⁶

Indeed, the terms of the British draft regarding the disposition of those islands was fully embodied in the clause of the joint draft. But it was the British who made a substantial concession. Unless this clause was excluded from the scope of the suspending clause, the fundamental character of the treatment of those islands in this draft was totally based on the American position of the 'March Draft.' But in this joint draft, the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin clause was not excluded from the scope of the suspending clause.

Why did the British government made such a concession? Circumstantial evidence suggests the following two reasons. First of all, the reasoning by Allison of the American position may have been persuasive. The British could fully understand the vital importance of U.S. Congressional support for the peace

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treaty with Japan. Secondly, the retirement of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the new appointment of Herbert Morrison as the Foreign Secretary in March considerably affected the British attitudes. Morrison tended to put much greater emphasis on the significance of Anglo-American cooperation in the peace making with Japan. For instance, he prepared a memorandum for the Anglo-American consultations in Washington, which contained so many proposals for concessions to the U.S. that his cabinet colleagues did not give him full support. ⁷⁷ This strong pro-American tendency of Morrison may have had a profound effect on the British decision to concede to the U.S. on the Kuriles and Sakhalin issue.

Through the Anglo-American consultations in Washington and their efforts to produce a joint draft, both countries managed to reach agreement on most of the main issues. There were, however, still some disagreements between them, especially the question of representatives from China. In this connexion, the disposal of Formosa was the most crucial point. To solve these problems, Dulles flew to London at the beginning of June. His main counterpart on the British side was Kenneth Younger, the minister of state for foreign affairs. During this London consultation, Dulles raised the question of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin on 5 June. He proposed to revise the clause of the joint draft with respect to the disposition of those islands. According to Dulles, the peace treaty should merely stipulate that Japan should renounce all claim and right to those islands. Moreover,

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he proposed to combine the Kuriles and Sakhalin clause and the Formosa clause into a more general clause. Regarding this proposal for the revision of the Kuriles and Sakhalin clause, Dulles pointed out that for the purpose of presentation it would be better for the treaty not to appear to confer a direct benefit on the Soviet Union.⁷⁸

On the British part, it was again Fitzmaurice who chiefly dealt with the issue of those islands. He did not directly oppose Dulles at all. Instead, he warned that the Soviet Union could obtain legal right to possess those territories even under such a provision as proposed by Dulles.⁷⁹ Dulles' revision was brought to a Cabinet meeting for examination and decision. On 7 June, the British Cabinet approved the revised territorial clause and Article 4 of the Anglo-American Joint Draft dealing with the Kuriles and Sakhalin was amended in accord with Dulles' proposal.

The background idea behind Dulles' proposal for the revision was a combination of several conditions and considerations. Firstly, as Dulles had mentioned in his conversation with Fitzmaurice, Congress disliked any clause which appeared to confer any direct benefits on the Soviet Union whose participation in the treaty was now most unlikely. The territorial clause on the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin could have been one of the weakest targets for Congressional attack. The idea that the peace treaty with Japan should not be beneficial to the Russians was an expression of the general

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concept that American foreign policy should take a firm stand against Russia in the cold war. These Congressional cold war sentiments exerted a great influence on Dulles' decisions with regard to the peace treaty in general, which were more clearly shown in his handling of the Chinese problem. Also the revision of the territorial clause on the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was done under the great pressure of the cold war sentiment in the Congress. Dulles, as a cold warrior, may have played a role of a sounding-board for the Congress's cold war ideology.

Secondly, at this stage in the treaty negotiations, Dulles did not have to take into account the necessity to hang some attractive bait in front of the Russians. As the Russian memorandum of 7 May indicated, it became most unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a party to the treaty. The Russians did not change their rigid attitude and refused to resume any negotiations for the peace with Japan. In addition to that, the Defence Department had, under Secretary of Defence George Marshall, started to take a conciliatory attitude towards the course taken by the State Department,⁸⁰ and therefore, the pressure on Dulles from the Pentagon to make an effort to draw the Russians into the peace treaty may have weakened. In the situation where the Soviet Union had continuously been showing her unwillingness to resume negotiations for peace, the Pentagon's pressure which had been imposed at the time of the 'March Draft', became impractical. Dulles, therefore, did not have to adopt the tactic of offering the Kuriles and southern

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Sakhalin to Russia only in case of her participation in the peace treaty.

Thirdly, in connexion with the second point mentioned above, the firm Soviet refusal to negotiate on the peace treaty actually released Dulles from the necessity to take into account the possibility of propaganda warfare developing. One of the most crucial reasons why Dulles had decided to add to the 'Seven Principles' an oral protocol that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would be ceded to Russia on condition that she should be a party to the treaty of peace, when he had met Malik on 26 October 1950, was that Dulles had considered, that by showing America's willingness to cede those islands, the U.S. government would be able to avoid being accused by the Russians of violating the Yalta Agreement and to preempt the Soviet intention to pass the responsibility for their non-participation in the treaty onto the American shoulders. But now that the Soviets had solidly refused any resumption of the negotiations, the responsibility for non-participation of the Soviet Union could not be passed to the Americans.

In the fourth place, Dulles expressed the view during his consultations with the British in London that, with the clause in the Anglo-American Joint Draft, the sovereignty of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would legally be retained in Japanese hands and that the U.S. would be trapped into territorial disputes between Japan and U.S.S.R. Because the U.S. was intending to

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conclude a security pact with Japan, Dulles was concerned that, it would be possible for the American forces to the American forces to be dragged into some type of military involvement.⁸¹ The United States seemed to intend to avoid such a situation.

A linkage between the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin question and the Formosa question should not be ignored. At the last stage of the treaty making, one of the most vital and entangling questions between the two co-authors of the peace treaty was the question of the disposal of Formosa. The British government insisted that the peace treaty should provide that Formosa should be returned to 'China' without defining which China meant 'China'. On the other hand, the American government disagreed with this. Because the U.S. neither recognized nor intended to recognize the PRC in the near future, it was impossible for her to agree to any provision which could be interpreted as implying the possibility of future recognition of the PRC by the U.S.. The U.S. government asserted, therefore, that Japan should merely renounce all the right and title to Formosa without deciding which country it would be ceded to.⁸² Dulles strongly desired the British to agree with the American idea. Furthermore, Dulles was faced with the necessity to cope with a claim from the Nationalist China regarding the disposal of Formosa. On 29 May, he met Wellington Koo, the ambassador of Republic of China to the U.S., and discussed the Formosa problem. Koo expressed the

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desire of his government that Formosa be treated in the peace treaty exactly as were the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁸³

Dulles had to cope simultaneously with these claims from Britain and the Nationalist China. But he did not intend to alter the U.S. position on the disposal of Formosa. Rather, he seems to have attempted to neutralise those claims from the UK and the Nationalist China, by altering the Kuriles and Sakhalin clause in the Anglo-American joint draft of May in such a way as to eliminate the distinction between this and the Formosa clause. In fact, during the meeting with Foreign Secretary Morrison on 6 June in London, Dulles explained that 'it was desirable to avoid any distinction in the treatment of Formosa on the one hand, and of South Sakhalin and of the Kuriles on the other.'⁸⁴ He also explained to Secretary Acheson after the consultations which resulted in the British concession on the issue of Formosa that the British acceptance of the U.S. proposal on Formosa 'was made easier for U.K. by earlier U.S. suggestion that Sakhalin and Kuriles be similarly treated and not definitely ceded to U.S.S.R. by treaty.'⁸⁵ Thus, Dulles' considerations on the handling of the disposition of Formosa had some influence on the revision of the territorial clause in the Anglo-American joint draft.

As for the reasons why the British government accepted Dulles' revision of the territorial clause, the following can be pointed out. Firstly the British government were persuaded by Dulles'

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explanation that, by making the Japanese only renounce all the rights and titles to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, the U.S. could avoid her military involvement in future territorial disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union. On 7 June, Foreign Secretary Morrison employed this reasoning by Dulles to persuade his colleagues at a Cabinet meeting.⁸⁶ Secondly, Morrison suggested that, because under the revised clause the Soviet Union could secure her title to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, the Russians would be satisfied with the clause. In other words, Morrison emphasized that future stability in the far east could be maintained by revising the territorial clause along the lines of Dulles' suggestion.⁸⁷

It is essential to note that the British government interpreted the revised clause as an indication of the recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. As Fitzmaurice had discussed during his consultations with Dulles on 5 June, the British government took the stand that, because the Japanese would renounce all rights to those islands, the Soviet Union would legally be able to possess them. It seems that there was a background idea that the future situations in the far east could be made stable by the peace treaty in spite of the existing cold war. On the contrary, the intention of Dulles behind the revision was to indicate U.S. non-recognition of the Soviet possession of those islands. In other words, the British seemed to recognize the *status quo post bellum* but the Americans did not. In this sense, the last edition of the

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territorial clause had only one appearance but different interpretations. Probably the divergence between the United States and Britain in interpreting the clause may have been a reflection of the differences between them in visualizing the cold war in the far east. To handle the cold war, the U.S. tried to show their intention to change the situation which obviously was not beneficial to the United States. The British tried, however, to stabilize the situation by recognizing them in the peace treaty and to base her containment policy on a situation which was already stabilized.

On 14 June, the revised Joint Draft was completed and the territorial clause with respect to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was decided as follows.

Article 2.....

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.^{ee}

Apparently this clause does not contain any provision for the legal definition of the Kuriles. Both the U.S. and Britain endeavoured to avoid any commitment to a possible future dispute over this problem between Japan and the U.S.S.R. They seem to have intended to cope with this question in accordance with Article 22 which stipulated that disputes relating to the peace treaty should be remitted to the International Court of Justice.

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But they also intended to support the Japanese claims to the Habomais and Shikotan at the peace conference.

SAN FRANCISCO PEACE CONFERENCE AND RATIFICATION OF PEACE TREATY

After several minor amendments, the Anglo-American draft was brought before the San Francisco Conference. The territorial clause regarding the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was not, however, amended after the revision of 14 June. What newly emerged, as far as those islands were concerned, at the San Francisco Conference were the statements with respect to the status of the southern Kuriles, the Habomais, and Shikotan which were made by the representatives of the United States, and Japan. Because of the pressure and necessity of concluding the peace treaty as soon as possible, the U.S. and the Japanese avoided dealing with the definition of the Kuriles during the draft making process. At the conference, however, both governments decided to make a brief reference to the status of those islands which was questioned.

When Dulles made an explanatory speech at the second plenary session on 5 September, he clearly remarked that the U.S. government took the view that the Habomais were not a part of the Kuriles, and that, in the case of disputes over this question,

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it could be brought to the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 22.⁸⁹ Dulles did not, however, even touch on the Southern Kuriles and Shikotan. His address was an indication that the U.S. government did not support the Japanese claim to the Southern Kuriles and Shikotan which had been made by the Yoshida administration and the Foreign Ministry. As mentioned before, the Department of State had investigated the legal status of the Southern Kuriles, the Habomais and Shikotan in November 1949 and reached the conclusion that the Habomais and Shikotan were legally not part of the Kuriles but that 'there seems to be no sound legal reason for claiming that Kunashiri and Etorofu are not part of the Kurile islands.'⁹⁰ Dulles' speech seems to have been based on this State Department view, but it should not be overlooked that Dulles completely ignored Shikotan at the conference. The reason for his omission of Shikotan was not clear. It is, however, obvious that the U.S. government publicly supported only a part of the Japanese territorial claim.

The British representative showed an even clearer attitude of non-commitment. Kenneth Younger, the British representative, the then minister of state for foreign affairs, did not even touch on the definition of the Kuriles. This does not, however, mean that the British government did not have a clear idea on the the definition of the Kuriles. In fact, the British draft of April embodied the view that the Habomais and Shikotan came under Japanese sovereignty. In May, the Foreign Office also undertook an re-examination of the legal status of those islands. R.S.

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Milward of the Research Department suggested that 'it would appear more correct in us to recognize Japanese *de jure* sovereignty and Soviet *de facto* occupation.' With respect to Shikotan, he recommended to keep open mind on this question.⁹¹

Furthermore, Milward discussed that 'It would do us harm with the Japanese - and little good with the Russians - to become a party to this Soviet theft, albeit a small one. It would seem necessary however to ensure that the Japanese realize that this does not in any way commit us to eject or to assist in ejecting the Russians.'⁹² The British Mission in Tokyo also supported the Milward memorandum.⁹³ If the Foreign Office based their policy on the suggestion by Milward, all that the British delegates could do at the conference was to say nothing specific about the definition of the Kuriles.

The Soviet representative, Andrey Gromyko, also made a speech at San Francisco on 5 September. As far as the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were concerned, he merely repeated the previous basic position of the Soviet Union. It clearly insisted that those islands were already Soviet territories, and that the peace treaty should confirm this reality by amending the territorial clause.⁹⁴

During the peace conference, the Japanese tried to make the best use of the opportunity to reveal their opinions on the peace treaty. One of the most typical examples was Yoshida's remark on

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the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin question. The points which Yoshida made were as follows. Firstly, Yoshida suggested that Kunashiri and Etorofu had been inalienable territories of Japan, quoting the historical fact that Tsarist Russia had never raised objections to the possession of those islands by Japan. Secondly, the northern part of the Kuriles was peacefully transferred to Japan by the treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875. This implied that those territories were not those that Japan had obtained through greed or violence. Thirdly, he insisted that the Habomais and Shikotan were part of Hokkaido, not of the Kuriles.

The position of the Japanese government was quite clearly expressed in the speech by Yoshida. First of all, Yoshida's speech seems to have been designed to make an appeal that the transfer of the Kuriles itself was against the Cairo Declaration. That Declaration had provided that the territories which Japan had gained through her greed and violence should be stripped off from her. Yoshida undoubtedly attempted to insinuate that the Kuriles, including Kunashiri and Etorofu could not be included in the category as described in the Cairo Declaration. In other words, Yoshida tried to affirm that the Kuriles had been legitimate Japanese territories. Here, one can see that he endeavoured to insist that the Soviet possession of those territories should be a case of violation of the Cairo Declaration, which provided that there should be no intention of territorial expansion on the part of the Allied powers. His

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suggestion about the status of the Habomais and Shikotan was slightly different. He directly indicated that those islands could not be included in the Kuriles and that, therefore, 'the Kuriles' in the peace treaty did not contain the Habomais and Shikotan. Yoshida's statements were only the expression of views, and should not be regarded as reservations to the peace treaty. They did not, therefore, have any legal significance to alter or delimit the meaning of the territorial clause dealing with the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed on 8 September. The territorial clause of the treaty was approved as described in the Anglo-American draft of June. The problems contained in that draft were not solved at the peace conference but remained as they had been. First of all, the peace treaty failed to define the range of 'the Kuriles'. Especially, in the circumstances where the Japanese claimed that some islands were not part of the Kuriles, it was inconvenient that there was no territorial definition of the Kuriles. It left a crucial problem not only between Japan and Russia but also between the U.S., Britain and Japan. As mentioned above, both the British and American governments considered that Kunashiri and Etorofu, which the Japanese strongly wished to regain and which they considered as their inalienable territories, were part of the Kuriles. This certainly made possible, Anglo-Japanese or U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the future on this territorial issue, very difficult.

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Secondly, the peace treaty failed to specify the country to which the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would be ceded. This inconclusiveness in the terms of the treaty gave the Japanese good reason for believing that there was room for manoeuvre to get back those territories from the Russians. This became the main background against which the territorial problem constituted a stumbling block between the Soviet Union and Japan. In this sense, the legal inconclusiveness of the peace treaty created one of the problems for the normalization talks between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1955-6.

Thirdly, the fact that the territorial clause dealing with the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was interpreted in different ways by the co-authors of the peace treaty caused another future problem. As mentioned above, the territorial clause, Article 2 (c), meant to the American government and probably Congressmen that the Soviets were being refused any territorial

benefits from the peace treaty and the clear expression of scrapping the Yalta Agreement. On the other hand, the British government interpreted that under Article 2 (c), as meaning that the Soviet Union could obtain the legal right to possess the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The British government clearly showed their willingness to recognize the full validity of the Yalta agreement on the far east. Article 2(c) tacitly contained such an Anglo-American divergence. Five years later, this divergence would become an obstacle to Japanese efforts to construct an Anglo-American common front in

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favour of the Japanese during the negotiations with the Russians for the normalization.

The U.S. Senate ratified it on 20 March 1952. Before then, there had been a remarkable response from the Senate to Article 2(c) and the handling of the Yalta Agreement on the far east. Although the Senate, when it ratified the peace treaty, made no reservations, it made a declaration with respect to its action. This declaration was mainly connected with the territorial issue between the Soviet Union and Japan, as follows:

As part of such advice and consent the Senate states that nothing the treaty contains is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in favour of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the Allied Powers as defined in said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the island of Shikotan, or any other territory, rights or interests possessed by Japan on December 7 1941 or to confer any right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union; and also that nothing in the said treaty or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification thereof, implies recognition on the part of the United States of the provisions in favour of the Soviet Union of the so-called 'Yalta agreement' regarding Japan of February 11 1945.⁹⁵

Although this was not a reservation, the fact that this declaration was approved by the Senate signified that it held a particular interest in the issue of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. At the same time, it seems that the refusal to treat those islands and the Yalta agreement in favour of the Soviet Union was an expression of the strong cold war sentiment prevailing in the Senate. It is very easy to see how much

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pressure John Foster Dulles must have felt from the Senate with regard to the handling of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin during the peace treaty negotiations.

The British Parliament ratified the peace treaty on 3 January without very much difficulty. British members of parliaments were more interested in the treatment of economic issues in the treaty than the territorial issue of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. In fact, it seems that the British Labour government tended not to provide members of parliament with much information on the process of the peace-making. Under these circumstances, the territorial question of those islands, which was undoubtedly a minor issue for British national interests, did not attract much attention from parliamentarians.

The Japanese National Diet ratified the peace treaty on 18 November 1951. During the sessions at the Diet for ratification of the peace treaty, the government made clear its interpretation with regard to the disposition of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Habomais and Shikotan. This will be dealt with in next chapter.

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SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS FROM SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY TO DOWNFALL OF YOSHIDA

Soviet-Japanese relations from the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to the middle of 1953 were much affected by the subversive activities of the Japan Communist Party (Hereafter cited as the J.C.P.). The party seemed to be basically obedient to instructions from the Soviet Union, while the Yoshida administration made continuous and strenuous efforts to counter the communist subversive activities. There was, therefore, an undercurrent of domestic confrontation which inevitably affected diplomacy with the Soviet Union

TACTICAL CHANGE OF JAPANESE COMMUNISTS UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE

The distinctive characteristic of the communist subversive activities in Japan after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty was the J.C.P.'s tactical change from 'peaceful revolution', which had been adopted during the occupation period, to 'national-liberation democratic revolution' which was adopted in October 1951. The 'national-liberation democratic revolution' line gave

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more emphasis to militant and armed subversive activities, and ultimately aimed at the revolution through such violent operations.' The Soviet Union exerted a great deal of influence on this tactical change by the Japanese communists.

On 6 January 1950, the Cominform sharply criticized the 'peaceful revolution' thesis in its bulletin *For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy*, and denounced the thesis as 'anti-Socialism and anti-Democracy'.² In August 1951, the leaders of the J.C.P., Tokuda, Nosaka, and some others, who had been in exile in Peking since 1950 were invited to Moscow. They went there with a draft of a new party programme and sought advice from the Soviet leaders. Soviet Premier Stalin amended a part of the draft.³ In particular, a part describing the method for democratic reform and liberation of Japan, was altered to read, 'It is wrong to consider that democratic reform and liberation of Japan can be achieved by employing peaceful methods.'⁴ On 16 October, the J.C.P. convened the fifth National Party Congress (Go Zen Kyô) and finally adopted the draft programme which was revised by Stalin. The draft programme now became the new party programme which was the so-called 'Party Programme of 1951' (5inen Kôryô). Based on this new party programme, a series of militant subversive activities were conducted by members of the J.C.P. from then on until July 1952.

During the occupation period, the communist subversive activities had been restricted by the Political Organization

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Restriction Act (Dantai Tô Kiseirei) which was part of the Potsdam Ordinance issued by General MacArthur. With the termination of the occupation, the Japanese government foresaw the urgency to make its own legal restrictions on the activities of organizations which would possibly undertake subversive activities and prevent their establishment. Prime Minister Yoshida, who clearly assumed the close linkage between the Japanese communists and the Soviet Union, regarded the task of setting up an anti-communist regime as a crucial policy goal of Japan which was to achieve independence in April 1952.⁵ In March 1951, the government began its investigations into new anti-subversive regulations. As the result of this, the Ministry of Justice prepared the first draft of a new restriction at the end of August. According to the summary of the draft which was issued on 28 September, the following activities were banned as illegal: firstly, activities inviting and assisting aggression ^{into} Japan from foreign countries and, secondly, destructive activities inflicted on American forces stationed in Japan.⁶ These attempts by the government to set up a new restriction was to be embodied in the Anti-Subversive Act (Hakai Katsudô Bôshihô) which was to be passed by the Diet in July 1952.

The effort by the government was, however, faced with strong opposition from the intellectuals and the labour unions. They became anxious about the possibility that the Act would be used to restrict freedom of speech and political activities. But the

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May Day incident was a fatal blow to the opposition movements. On 1 May 1952, the people who had been participating in a May Day rally at the Outer Garden of the Meiji Shrine clashed with the police on the guard of the Plaza. It turned out to be a riot, which resulted in a tragedy with two demonstrators shot dead, over 2,000 injured and 1,230 demonstrators arrested. Some of the demonstrators were reported to have been equipped with bamboo spears and the riot was alleged to have been planned by groups related to the J.C.P.

Faced with the May Day incident, the Yoshida administration stepped up its effort for establishing anti-subversive restrictions. In July, it finally succeeded in getting through the bill for the Anti-Subversive Activities Act, by exploiting effectively the antipathy against the communists aroused in public opinion by the incident.

It now became clear that the aim of the J.C.P. described in its 1951 Party Programme had failed to be achieved. The J.C.P. had aimed at securing at least the following two goals: to overturn the government through violent activities, and to promote support for the communist cause from broader segments of the Japanese progressives. The subversive activities led by the J.C.P. had, however, invited the legislative response of the Anti-Subversive Activities Act, and generated strong antipathy against the J.C.P.'s revolutionary activities in public opinion and even among the socialists. Under these circumstances, the

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number of communist subversive activities began to decrease after July 1952.

Moscow seems to have reacted to this disadvantageous situation for the J.C.P. and for Soviet political strategy towards Japan. On 3 August, the Pravda published the article by Tokuda Kyūichi, one of the most influential leaders of the J.C.P., entitled 'For the 30th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Japan' ('K 30-i gadavshchinie kommunisticheskoi partii yaponii') The article called for the alteration of tactics of the J.C.P.. It stated that the weakness of the present tactics of the J.C.P. lay in placing too much emphasis on demonstrations and sabotage and, as a result of this, in ignoring legal activities to increase the political influence of the party.⁷

It is highly likely that Tokuda's article reflected a change of foreign policy principle on the part of the Soviets themselves. The principle of Soviet foreign policy seemed to alter its centre of emphasis at the latest in February 1952. The change could be seen in an article written by Stalin entitled 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.' In this article, Stalin implied that the Soviet Union should soften her foreign policy towards the western countries.⁸ It seems reasonable to argue that the Soviet leaders may have considered that it would be better for them to recommend the J.C.P. not to take too radical

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and militant a course which would possibly provide the Japanese government with a good reason for taking a firmer anti-communist attitude in its domestic and foreign policy, and which would prevent the contradiction between Japan and the U.S. from being intensified.

A disastrous defeat for the Japanese Communists came at the time of the general election for the Lower House in October 1952. The 25th general election in 1952 saw a sharp decline of the J.C.P. It lost all seats which it had won in 1949. It seems that its militant subversive activities had deprived the J.C.P. of public support. Now, the Japanese Communists had to alter the militant revolutionary strategy. For instance, in the middle of November, the J.C.P. announced that it would re-start its party activities as the 'lovable Communist Party'.³

Thus, the phase of the confrontation between Yoshida's anti-subversive efforts and the J.C.P.-Soviet subversive operations substantially ended before the end of 1952. Yet Yoshida continued his further endeavours to consolidate the anti-communist regime in Japan. An example was his attempt to amend the Police Act in order to centralise the police system to cope with the communist activities more effectively. Communist activities lost the previous militancy and in late 1954, it started to draft a new party programme again under Soviet influence, which would be approved at the 6th National Party Congress (6 Zen Kyô) in 1955. Through this process, the

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national-liberation democratic revolution policy was entirely replaced by a new soft line policy emphasising the importance of peaceful legal activities.

JAPAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS PEACE WITH RUSSIA, 1951

Immediately after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese government made clear its negative attitude on restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The prime minister implied on 15 October 1951 at a plenary session of the Upper House of the National Diet that the government had no intention to normalize the relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁰ This negative attitude was to be basically maintained throughout the Yoshida period, though some changes took place especially over the territorial issue between the Soviet Union and Japan. What factors made the government take this negative attitude towards normalization?

Firstly the Yoshida government considered that there were at least two crucial problems which must be solved before a peace treaty or normalization could be negotiated: namely, the repatriation of Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union, and the reversion of a part of the former Japanese islands which were occupied by Russia.¹¹ Shortly after the end of the Pacific War,

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ex-Japanese soldiers began to be repatriated to Japan by the Allied powers. The Soviet Union did not, however, send them back to Japan, but took them away to Siberia, Outer Mongolia, and Central Asia for hard labour. In 1946, facing strong pressure from G.H.Q., the Soviets had started to repatriate the Japanese detainees. But on 22 April 1950, the U.S.S.R. had announced that repatriation had been accomplished except that of suspected war criminals.¹² The Japanese government assumed that there must be more detainees in the Soviet Union. It was, therefore, a crucial task for the government to get back those Japanese.

As for the territorial question, Yoshida stated that the Habomais and Shikotan should be returned to Japan if the Soviet Union desired to normalize the diplomatic relations with Japan.¹³ At this period the Japanese government held a stance that the Habomais and Shikotan had not been renounced in the peace treaty because they were not part of the Kuriles, which the Japanese had renounced in the Peace Treaty. The government seemed to be determined to regain those islands from the Soviets, as this intention had been expressed in Yoshida's address at the Peace Conference. An interesting point is that at this stage the government did not claim that Kunashiri and Etorofu, or the Kuriles should be returned. All it wanted to regain was the Habomais and Shikotan. This view was repeatedly revealed at the Diet by high-ranking officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

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On 19 October, Nishimura Kumao, the director of the Treaty Bureau, stated that the Kuriles which were mentioned in the Peace Treaty included Kunashiri and Etorofu, though the historical background and status of these two islands were very different from the rest of the Kuriles.¹⁴ Vice Minister Kusaba also confirmed that the Japanese government had renounced in the peace treaty the Kuriles including Kunashiri and Etorofu as a result of taking into account all aspects of those islands such as their historical, geological and political backgrounds.¹⁵ The government argued that even the Kuriles were under wartime occupation because the disposition of sovereignty over the archipelago must be confirmed by concluding a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it admitted that Japan had definitely renounced Kunashiri and Etorofu.¹⁶

The second main reason for Japan's reluctance to normalize her relations with the Soviet Union was Soviet attitude towards the S.F.P.T. which had been expressed by Gromyko at the San Francisco Peace Conference. Gromyko's statement at the conference was substantially against the existence of a post-war U.S.-Japanese coalition. This Soviet attitude meant the denial of the fundamental premises of post-war Japan's foreign policy. Faced with this Soviet attitude, the Japanese government must have realized that it was unrealistic to conclude a peace treaty with Russia. The third reason was a fear of communist infiltration into Japan which could be enhanced by Soviet-Japanese normalization. Yoshida was reported to have spoken to

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the effect that 'to enter into friendly relations with communist nations would mean the encouraging of communist infiltration into Japan. Accordingly the government had absolutely no intention of taking such an action.'¹⁷

Finally, it must be emphasised that Yoshida held a firm dichotomous view about the world situation. He often stated in the Diet that the most important task for Japan was to reduce the strength of the communist world, by firmly placing herself in the western bloc as an anti-communist country. In replying to an interpellation in October 1951 which asked about the government's intention to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, he maintained that in a world divided into two blocs, the communists and the capitalists, Japan could not take a position like 'Nue'.¹⁸ (Nue is an imaginary creature appearing in the *Tale of Heike*, which has a monkey's head, a racoon's torso, the tail of a snake, and tiger's hands, arms and legs.) Thus, Yoshida clearly excluded the possibility that Japan would take a neutralist position in the world of the cold war. For Yoshida, to take up a position favourable to normalization or peace settlement with the U.S.S.R. meant nothing but to take a neutralist position like 'Nue'.

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Many of the analysts contend that the change in Soviet foreign policy took place after the death of Stalin. But it seems that a significant change occurred during the last part of Stalin era. It seems to have been the beginning of 1952 that a new foreign policy framework was confirmed. The principle of Soviet foreign policy seemed to alter its centre of emphasis at the latest in February 1952. The change could be seen in an article written by Stalin entitled 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.'. He first wrote it in February and later published it in *Bolshevik* in September.¹⁹ It was argued in the article that contradictions among the western capitalist countries had become and would become more salient and that war between the capitalist and the socialist worlds would be less likely than war amongst the capitalist countries themselves.²⁰

In connexion with this overall analysis, Stalin explained with regard to the situation of Japan.

'Let us pass to the major vanquished countries: Germany (Western) and Japan. These countries are now languishing in misery under the jackboot of American imperialism. Their industry and agriculture, their trade, their foreign and home politics, and their whole life are fettered by the American occupation "regime".....To think that these countries will not try to get on their feet again, will not try to smash the U.S. "regime" and force their way to independent development is to believe in miracles.'²¹

This argument logically suggests that the Soviet Union should wait for, and encourage, the contradictions in the capitalist countries to become sharp and should take advantage of them.

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According to Stalin, Japan was also included in the capitalist world and was expected to stand ^{out} against the U.S. control over her economic life and national security. In other words, the new framework of Soviet foreign policy towards Japan was to take (rather a soft line) than ^a hard one which could evoke the Japanese resentment in public opinion towards Russia and lead the Japanese government to consolidate its ties with the United States. Nevertheless, there was no clear soft line policy towards Japan taken by the Soviet Union in 1952 except the message by Stalin on the New Year's Day of 1952. Considering that the Stalin article was written in February 1952, it is likely that he had already had in mind a crude outline of the new framework of foreign policy before his New Year Message. Stalin's Message may have reflected his new policy framework, because the message was obviously intended to indicate good will towards the Japanese.

In 1953 the Soviet Union was faced with significant and large-scale changes. At the beginning of March, Stalin died and Georgy M. Malenkov succeeded him as the premier. Malenkov had been an advocate of Stalin's new foreign policy principles. At the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, where the new principles was confirmed as official policy guidelines of the Soviet Union, he had unequivocally supported Stalin's new line. In fact, he launched a series of 'detente' policies after he came ^{to} in office.

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In the far east, Soviet softening of Soviet policy was shown in her positive attitude towards the armistice of the Korean war. On 28 March 1953, the Soviet government agreed to exchange the prisoners of war who were badly injured or seriously ill, and proposed to resume the armistice talks which had been suspended in 1952. This Soviet initiative led, at last, to the cease-fire of the war in Korea on 27 July 1953. The termination of the Korean war prepared the way conditions for Soviet peace overture to Japan. While the Korean war was being fought, Russia could not undertake such an overture because that could have injured her relations with Communist China. But the end of the war swept away this restriction of Sino-Soviet relations. In fact, Communist China also started to express her desire to normalize relations with Japan two month after the armistice.²²

The first expression of Soviet readiness to resume diplomatic relations with Japan came in a speech of Premier Malenkov to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on 8 August. He stated that 'normalization of relations between all the Far Eastern states, and with Japan in particular, is a matter of urgent moment.' He suggested that the stumbling-block to the normalization was U.S. foreign policy which prevented Japan from achieving her true independence and made her a bridgehead of U.S. far eastern strategy against Russia. The Japanese people should, he went on, overcome these obstacles in order to resume the normal relations with 'all the Far Eastern states'. Malenkov concluded that 'Any steps that Japan takes along these lines will meet with the

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sympathy and support of the Soviet Union and all peace loving nations.'²³ This speech indicated that the Soviet Union was ready to normalize her relations with Japan on condition that Japan should change her relationship with the United States.

What were the main motives behind Malenkov's overture? Why did Russia have to take a new approach towards Japan? First of all, as long as Soviet foreign policy towards Japan was a part of her world strategy, the new approach to Japan reflected the grand framework of Soviet foreign policy which Malenkov had repeated since the death of Stalin. It should be, however, pointed out that there were some motivations particular to Japanese-Soviet relations. Firstly, the Japanese Communists had lost so much support in domestic politics in 1952 because of its too much dependence on revolutionary subversive activities. For the Soviets to reconstruct the Japanese domestic basis of support for the U.S.S.R. and to consolidate the Japanese progressives against the American course, they had to adopt a foreign policy which would generate a broader level of support from the Japanese public.

Japanese reaction to the Malenkov Speech came quickly. On 10 August at the plenary session of the Upper House of the Diet, Foreign Minister Okazaki stated that, if the U.S.S.R. approved the S.F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact, the government would not be unwilling to consider a peace settlement with

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her.²⁴ The Japanese government had not basically changed its negative attitude towards the issue of a peace with the U.S.S.R.

The Japanese government did not seem to alter its Soviet policy even after the death of Stalin. The non-alteration of the Soviet policy of the Japanese government reflected its rigidity of perception with regard to the change in Soviet foreign policy. On 7 March, the Foreign Ministry transmitted to the British Foreign Office its views on the effect of the change in Soviet leadership, saying that it did not expect any drastic and immediate change in Soviet foreign policy towards the far east and Japan, though it expected that 'the Communists may become well disposed towards peace' in Korea.²⁵ In addition to this, an official of the fifth division of the Bureau of Europe-American Affairs was reported to have expressed the opinion that it was unlikely that Soviet policy towards Japan would be affected by the death of Stalin.²⁶ Thus, as far as the Foreign Ministry was concerned, the death of Stalin did not affect the general framework of perception about Soviet foreign policy towards Japan. As a result of this, basic Japanese policy towards Russia did not change.

As early as the end of July 1953, the Japanese Foreign Ministry actually predicted that the Russians would undertake a new overture towards Japan. Before the end of July, the Ministry obtained information that two Russian officials of the Soviet Mission in Tokyo, were recalled to Moscow. The Foreign Ministry

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interpreted this move as a sign that the Soviet Union would launch some new movement towards Japan. A Japanese official said that he was sure that the recall of the Russian officials had something to do with the resumption of normal relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.²⁷

The same information was passed to the American Embassy in Tokyo. Given this information, Ambassador John Allison recommended the secretary of state, who was scheduled to arrive at Tokyo on 8 August, as follows:

We have now learned informally from Japanese Foreign Office official that in his opinion Russians are preparing make [sic] bid any day to impose relations with Japan....possibility of some overt friendly gesture by Russians is yet another important reason for us to announce N.S.C. decision regarding Amami group soonest. If announcement were made only after Russian move, it would look like hasty defensive action on our part rather than genuine initiative by us. Under such circumstances pshychological benefit to us would be nil.²⁸

The United States government had already decided, as the document quoted above shows, to return the Amami group of islands to Japan, aiming at some favourable psychological effect on the Japanese people. Allison tried to prevent the psychological effect of the return of the Amami group from being diminished by the possible future Soviet friendly gesture. But it is also undeniable that he may have intended to counter and pre-empt possible Soviet peaceful overtures by announcing the reversion of the Amamis. For it is not realistic to consider that he was not

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aware of the counter-effect of the announcement of the reversion of the Amamis on the Soviet overture. Following Allison's suggestion, Dulles made an announcement on 8 August that the U.S. government would return those islands to Japan as soon as necessary arrangement would have been made between the two governments.²⁹

The speech by Malenkov of 8 August was revealed by the Japanese press later than Dulles' announcement of the return of the Amamis. The Japanese government seemed to use the American reversion of the Amamis in order to neutralize the effect of the Malenkov speech. A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman even went as far as to announce that Malenkov's speech had been aimed at reducing the value of U.S. decision to return the Amami islands.³⁰ Thus the return of the Amami islands was used as a tool of psychological warfare against the U.S.S.R.'s overture for the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviet government seemed well aware of U.S. and Japanese intentions. On 26 August, *Pravda* issued an article which sharply condemned the U.S. government for its still possessing Okinawa and the Bonins.³¹

Thus, it can be argued that Soviet-Japanese relations developed to some extent in the context of Soviet-American psychological warfare over Japan. An important point is that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were trying to manipulate Japanese nationalism. The return of the Amamis was seemingly intended to satisfy the

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Japanese public, who held intensified nationalistic sentiments, in order to neutralize effects of Soviet friendly gestures towards Japan. At the same time, the Soviets seemed to attempt to keep anti-American sentiments by reminding the Japanese that the U.S. were still occupying some of Japanese territories.

CHANGE IN JAPANESE POSITION ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE

On the territorial issue, an interesting change in the Japanese government's standpoint may be seen in the statement issued immediately after the Malenkov speech by the Foreign Ministry on the territorial issue. Foreign Ministry sources were reported to have spoken to the effect that 'Even for propaganda purposes, the Soviet regime under Malenkov was not in a position to intimate its intention to return *the Kuriles and Sakhalin* in the current situation prevailing in that country.'³²[My Italics.] The Japanese government had continuously taken a position since the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty that Russia should return the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan. But, by the time of the Malenkov speech, the government seemed to amend its previous position. The Foreign Ministry now seemed to request not only the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan but also the return of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. When and how did the Japanese government change their position on this issue? Circumstantial evidence indicates that the government had

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gradually amended its position somewhere between February and August 1953.

A sign of the alteration had appeared at the beginning of February, shortly after President Eisenhower who had been elected a new president in November 1952, had issued his first Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union on 2 February. In his message, the president expressed his intention to repeal a 'secret understanding of the past'.³³ The Japanese government did not fail to catch the implication of this part of Eisenhower's message. Though the speech by Eisenhower did not define the precise meaning of the 'secret understanding', the Japanese regarded it as the Yalta Secret Agreement. N.H.K., the national broadcasting company of Japan, announced in a radio programme that Japan had heard no brighter news than the Eisenhower address since the day of the surrender.³⁴ In response to the Eisenhower message, Prime Minister Yoshida stated before the Upper House on 3 February that he would make utmost effort to regain *the Kuriles and other former territories of Japan*.³⁵ On the next day, Okazaki, the foreign minister, made a statement following Yoshida's line and expressed his hope that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would be returned to Japan. Given the fact that the Japanese government had adhered to the idea that Japan could expect only the return of the Habomais and Shikotan in late 1951, the statements by Yoshida and Okazaki were a clear departure from the previous line.

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Interestingly, the Japanese Foreign Ministry took quite a different stance from its prime minister and foreign minister. On 3 February, after its executive meeting, the ministry issued an official statement that, because the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had already been renounced in the S.F.P.T., the possible American abrogation of the Yalta Agreement would have no effect on Japanese position over the territorial issue.³⁶ Another source provides a clearer picture of the ministry's position. According to a report prepared by Sir Esler Dening, the British ambassador to Japan, the Foreign Ministry was reported to have indicated its view that even if the U.S. abrogated the Agreement, Japan herself was not in a position to claim the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin but that the Yalta understanding to cede the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the U.S.S.R. would be cancelled.³⁷ This divergence between the ministry officials and the prime minister and foreign minister seems to have been dissolved in favour of Yoshida and Okazaki. On 5 February, when asked for his comment on the Foreign Ministry's official statement, Okazaki promised to warn the ministry officials.³⁸ Given the fact that Yoshida had a very strong influence on the Foreign Ministry through Okazaki who was very obedient to Yoshida, it can safely be said that the Foreign Ministry was forced to adjust its view to that of the prime minister and foreign minister.

It was the British Foreign Office which reacted to the Eisenhower Speech with acute anxiety over the rather over-

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excited Japanese response to Eisenhower's speech and U.S. carelessness in evoking Japanese irredentism. Immediately after Eisenhower's speech, alarmed Foreign Office staff made an inquiry to the U.S. Department of State about the meaning of the repudiation of the secret understanding of the past which had been referred to in the presidential speech. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles replied that the 'secret understanding' in the speech meant the Yalta Secret Agreement, but added that it had only referred to the Agreement relating to the relations between the U.S.S.R. and China.³⁹ The Foreign Office could not be satisfied with that ambiguous reply from the U.S. government and considerably disturbed by the possibility that the Japanese irredentism would be provoked by the speech. Moreover, the British concern came to reality when Yoshida and Okazaki showed their clear intention to extend their efforts to get back the Kuriles and 'other former Japanese territories'. Under these circumstances, the Foreign Office decided to prevent the Americans from scrapping the Yalta Agreement.

The British had endeavoured to hinder Dulles' attempt to nullify the Yalta Agreement during the making of the S.F.P.T. This basic position was still held by the Foreign Office in 1953. On 4 February the staff quickly prepared a memorandum in which desirable British positions were clarified. This memorandum recommended Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, to take the following position.

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(a) Her Majesty's Government are not in favour of unilateral repudiation of international agreements.

(b) Japan has already renounced her rights to their northern territories (S. Sakhalin and Kuriles). Therefore Japan does not have any rights to assert title to these territories. Logically, the repudiation of Yalta agreement does not have any effect on irrelevancy of Japanese calling for reversion of these territories.⁴⁰

The anxiety over the Japanese intentions towards her former territories was also expressed in the House of Lords. On 11 February, Viscount Elibank questioned with regard to Yoshida's statement on 3 February. He was concerned about the possibility that the Japanese would start to ignore and erode S.F.P.T. and other agreements bit by bit. He argued that the British government should not become a party to any attempt to break the agreement and the peace treaty in relations to those territories. In reply to Elibank, ^{the} Marquess of Reading, the minister of state in charge of foreign affairs in the Lords, clearly declared that the British government did not intend to depart from the international agreements governing the position of these territories.⁴¹ This issue was also brought in the House of Commons on 16 February. This time, Eden made it clear that the government did not agree to repudiate the agreements unilaterally. This was a sharp but indirect criticism towards the Americans and poured cold water on the Japanese ^{expectations}.⁴² In the United States, there had been a movement in the Senate for making a resolution to repudiate the Yalta Agreement since the speech by Eisenhower, but at last this did not materialize. The

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British influence may have been one of the reasons for this failure.

While the British officials seemed to assume that the Americans had carelessly made such a statement as the Eisenhower address, the possibility cannot be denied that Eisenhower's statement was a well-calculated one to evoke anti-Soviet and pro-American sentiment in Japanese public opinion. In January 1953, the National Security Council approved a programme, entitled 'Psychological Strategy for Japan'.⁴³ As already examined by some scholars, the Eisenhower administration tended to emphasize the significance of psychological warfare in the cold war.⁴⁴ Eisenhower's reference to the abrogation of the Yalta Secret Agreement may have been a result of the application of psychological strategy to the foreign policy towards Japan.

During 1953, despite the first Soviet expression of their readiness for normalization, Soviet-Japanese relations were not at all improved. Partly this was because of the rigid anti-Soviet attitude of the Japanese government, which was even intensified by its making tougher its position on the territorial issue, and partly it was because the Soviet Union made the alteration of U.S.-Japanese relations a necessary condition for the normalization. But Soviet efforts were to be continued in 1954 and became more vigorous as international tensions were reduced and the Japanese political scene became rather disorderly.

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VISHINSKY AND MOLOTOV'S PEACE OVERTURES IN 1954.

Soviet overtures for normalization towards Japan tended to become clearer and more positive. During 1954, the Soviets undertook totally three peace overtures: First Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky's expression of a desire to restore diplomatic relations with Japan in July; Foreign Minister Molotov's reply to an inquiry from the editor of a Japanese newspaper in September; and the Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué in October. These vigorous attitudes on the Russian side seem to have reflected changes in the international and Japanese domestic situation in 1954.

Basically, there were in 1954 growing potential threats for the Soviets, as far as Soviet-Japanese relations were concerned. First, Japanese rearmament reached a new stage in 1954. The Yoshida government had been trying to rearm Japan gradually since 1950 under U.S. pressures, though Yoshida, who had attached more significance to Japan's economic recovery, had tried to resist undue American demands for more rapid rearmament. At any rate, beginning with the National Police Reserve which had been established in July 1950 under MacArthur's instruction, Yoshida continued his efforts for the gradual intensification of rearmament and increase in size. In July 1952, the government managed to set up the National Security Forces, almost doubling the manpower of the National Police Reserve. This rearmament was

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virtually to place Japan more firmly in the orbit of U.S. anti-Soviet military strategy in the far east. Even so, the Japanese had tried to limit the use of these forces to the case of disruption of internal security. In other words, in principle, Japanese rearmament until 1954 was supposed to be aimed at anti-subversion operations.

But in March 1954, the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement was worked out between Japan and the U.S. This agreement obliged Japan to use U.S. aid to sophisticate and modernize the equipment of her military forces. Based on the agreement, the Japanese government decided to expand significantly the National Security Force and to set up the Self Defence Force. In June 1954, the Self Defence Force Act was approved by the Diet, which clearly stipulated that the S.D.F. could be used against attacks from both inside and outside Japan. Now it became unequivocally clear that the S.D.F. had ^{been} given a role as an anti-Soviet force.

This rearmament must have been perceived by the Soviets as an enlarged threat. Many articles in the Soviet press explicitly showed the alarmed concern. *IZVESTIA* sharply criticized two pieces of legislation which were defence related, namely the Self Defence Force Act and the Act for Establishing the S.D.F. Agency, which had been approved by the Diet in March. The Soviets called the S.D.F. Agency the 'Ministry of War'.⁴⁵ *Soviet News* also criticized the combination of the M.S.A. Agreement and the two defence related acts, saying that the

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Americans and the Japanese aimed at 'restoration of militarism' in Japan. In addition to this, the combination of the M.S.A. and two defence bills was also described as 'An Asian variant of the notorious "European Defence Community"'⁴⁶ The perception of threat from the Japanese rearmament may have driven the Soviets to set up a less tense relationship with Japan.

The domestic political situation in Japan provided Russia with an opportunity to weaken the power of the Japanese conservatives and to strengthen that of the Japanese progressives by showing friendly gestures towards the Japanese people. The popularity of the Yoshida administration sharply declined. A fatal event for Yoshida was the shipbuilding scandal which lasted from January to late 1954. When the Public Prosecutors Offices decided to arrest Satô Eisaku, who was the General-Secretary of the Liberal Party and one of the right hand men of Yoshida, the minister of justice abused the right of command to stop the arrest. There was no doubt that the minister of justice did it under a strong pressure from Yoshida. The attitude of public opinion over this scandal was clearly against Yoshida. Moreover, public opinion may have been bored by Yoshida's foreign policy, which was well-known as 'whole hearted pro-American' line. Since the achievement of independence, nationalistic sentiment in Japan had grown up and the Japanese people began to support a foreign policy which was free from U.S. pressures. Anti-American sentiment was also provoked by the Fifth Lucky Dragon incident. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union was in a position to

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be able to take full advantage of the weak position of the Yoshida government in order to obtain broader support for the course of Russia from the Japanese public.

Turning our eyes to broader international aspects surrounding the Soviet Union, it seems that the Soviet leaders had to cope with threats from inside and outside the Soviet bloc. The prospect for the German rearmament was still positive. The Russians still feared a 'double frontal war', unless they established stable relationship with West Germany or Japan, or both. In Asia, Chinese attitude on the Taiwan issue became tougher than in 1953. The Soviet Union still had to try to constrain the Chinese from aggressive actions. In order to break through these international situations, the Soviets may have had to step up their efforts to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations.

On 21 July 1954 Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky suggested that the Soviet Union desired to promote trade relations and cultural exchanges with Japan and to normalize relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. On the same day at Geneva, the armistice of the Indochina war was worked out. The achievement of a cease-fire in the war in Indochina may have triggered Vishinsky's announcement. V.A. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, played a very important role as a co-chairman to bring the Indochina war to an end at the Geneva Conference. More than that, the Soviet role in the Conference would, the

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Soviets may have considered, add more persuasive power to the Soviet peace overture towards Japan.

The statement by Vishinsky included several specific proposals. He told a Japanese delegation of Diet members visiting Moscow that the Soviet government aspired to the restoration of diplomatic relations with Japan, and suggested that the Soviet government would agree to the Japanese sending marine transportation experts in order to discuss the issue of Japanese fishermen who were forced to land at Soviet fishery ports because of bad weather. Moreover, he suggested that the Soviets would accept a Japanese trade mission to Moscow in order to expand Soviet-Japanese trade.⁴⁷ It is notable that the proposal for normalization was accompanied by other minor proposals. This showed that, unlike the Malenkov speech in 1953, the Soviet overtures began to become more positive. In fact, there was another sign that the Soviet Union intended to undertake more positive and more realistic means to deal with normalization with Japan. In March and May 1954, the Polish overseas office in Paris approached its Japanese opposite number and proposed to restore the diplomatic relations between Poland and Japan. Interestingly, the Polish proposal for normalization included a statement that, even without any alteration of the present U.S.-Japanese relations, it was possible to normalize Polish-Japanese relations.⁴⁸ It is difficult to imagine that the Polish did so without Soviet instructions. It is, therefore, highly likely that the fact that the Poles were prepared to drop their

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insistence on the adjustment of U.S.-Japanese relations was an indirect indication of the Soviet preparedness to do so also. The Japanese government and the Foreign Ministry, however, ignored the Polish proposal.⁴⁹

Japanese reactions to the Vishinsky proposal were not at all receptive. On 22 July, the Foreign Ministry issued its official comment on Vishinsky's statement. It stated that, if the Soviet government really intended to normalize the relations with Japan, it should clarify its position with regard to the San Francisco Peace Treaty because the Japanese government had already clearly indicated that a peace settlement with the Soviet Union should be based on the S.F.P.T.⁵⁰ As the Foreign Ministry assumed that the U.S.S.R. would not accept the S.F.P.T. or any peace settlement based on it, the official comment on the Vishinsky statement was substantially a rejection.

On 13 September, *Pravda* revealed full contents of Foreign Minister Molotov's reply to several questions with regard to Soviet-Japanese relations asked by editor of the Chûbu Nippon Shinbum, Suzuki Mitsuru. Molotov stated in the reply that the Soviet Union was willing to restore normal diplomatic relations with Japan. In answering to a question about Soviet intention to conclude a neutrality pact or a non-aggression pact with Japan, he clearly denied existence of such intentions on the Soviet side. But he clearly stated that 'As for the Soviet Union, it expresses its readiness to make normal its relations with Japan,

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bearing in mind that Japan will display a similar readiness.⁵¹ His reply contained, however, several conditions which should be fulfilled by Japan for the normalization, though they were not explicitly indicated. He related:

The chief barrier hindering the restoration of normal relations between the two countries, in my opinion, is the fact that certain circles in Japan follow the dictate of the ruling circles of the United States, which strive to retain Japan in the position of a dependent country.⁵²

This passage meant that Japan should change her relations with the United States.

The fact that Molotov made the alteration of the present U.S.-Japanese relations based on the S.F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact a condition for normalization meant that the Soviet Union had not basically changed her attitude from that earlier expressed by Premier Malenkov. This aspect of Molotov's reply caused western observers to judge that his statement was mere another example of a 'peace offensive'. The British embassy in Moscow reported that there was not even a rumour in Moscow about the moves for normalization with Japan, and concluded that Molotov's statement was a 'peace offensive'.⁵³ The Japanese Foreign Ministry reacted to the statement by Molotov in the same way as the British did. According to *Asahi*, the Foreign Ministry also defined the statement as 'peace offensive' and issued an official comment:

The Japanese government are prepared to conclude a peace treaty, as provided in Article 26 of the S.F.P.T., with the

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U.S.S.R. if it is identical or substantially identical with the S.F.P.T.⁵⁴

Regarding repatriation and territorial questions, the Foreign Ministry was reported to hold the view that, if the Soviet Union declared the termination of war against Japan and if *de facto* normalization was achieved, Japan would be willing to accept normalization on condition that the Soviets agreed to enter into negotiations on territorial and repatriation questions immediately.⁵⁵ A Soviet declaration of the termination of war against Japan was now added to the previous Japanese position as a new condition. This meant that the Japanese government had tightened its attitude towards normalization.

Immediately after the announcement by the Foreign Ministry, the U.S. Department of State issued its comment on the Japanese reaction to the Molotov letter. In this, the Department of State made clear that it was satisfied with the Japanese response and that the statement by Molotov was part of a 'peace offensive'. In addition, the State Department assessed that some form of Soviet-Japanese normalization was possible, though it would depend on the conditions attaching to it. But it declared that normalization with the People's Republic of China would be impossible.⁵⁶ This announcement indicated that the United States government took the view that the Japanese could restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on condition that the terms attaching to normalization were acceptable to the United

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States. Though the Americans did not seem to show explicitly any items of those terms, it seems reasonable to assume that they were the terms included in the S.F.P.T., because the Americans were satisfied with the Japanese treatment of the Molotov statement.

In addition to the State Department announcement, the American government seemed to attempt to neutralize the effect of the Molotov letter. On 25 September, Charles Bohlen, the American ambassador in Moscow handed a lengthy note of protest regarding an incident in which a U.S. B-29 bomber had been shot down above the Habomais on 7 October 1952. In the note, the Habomais were defined as Japanese territories. The note also contained the resolution issued by the U.S. Senate at the time of its ratification of the S.F.P.T. in order to demonstrate that the Americans had not yet recognized that those territories and the Kuriles were already under Russian sovereignty. This note was undoubtedly intended to evoke anti-Soviet nationalism in Japan and to neutralize the effect of the Molotov letter on the Japanese public. But unfortunately for the U.S., this event did not draw very much attention from the Japanese press.

SINO-SOVIET JOINT DECLARATION

It seems that, in October, the Soviet leaders had further stepped up their efforts for restoration of diplomatic relations with Japan. At the end of September, the Soviet delegation visited Peking. The delegation was chiefly composed by N.A. Bulganin, the first vice premier of the U.S.S.R., A.I. Mikoyan, the vice-premier, and Nikita S. Khrushchev, the first secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Both the Soviet and the Chinese leaders worked out several agreements and issued a joint communiqué on 12 October. The Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqués included a joint declaration towards Japan. The joint declaration contained the usual condemnation of the U.S. control over Japan. But it also included an expression of readiness on the part of the Soviets and the Chinese to establish normal relations with Japan:

They (=the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China) also express their readiness to take steps to normalize their relations with Japan and declare that Japan will meet full support in her striving to establishing political and economic relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and that all her steps to provided condition for her peaceful and independent development will meet full support.⁵⁷ [My brackets]

The significance of this joint declaration can be explained as follows. First of all, it was important that this overture for normalization was issued as a joint declaration with Communist China. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, / Mutual
and

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Assistance ^{had} provided that each of the contracting countries should conclude a peace treaty with Japan on condition that they reached some agreement on this issue. It seems that the Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration in 1954 was an official indication that the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. had reached an agreement to start their joint effort to restore normal relations with Japan. On the basis of Sino-Soviet agreement, the Soviet Union was now able to take more concrete and positive steps for normalization with Japan.

The second significant point was that this Joint Declaration did not include any pre-conditions for normalization, unlike the previous Soviet overtures. Although the Joint Declaration contained criticisms of the continuation of the U.S. 'occupation regime' in Japan, they did not amount to a condition for normalization. This must have demonstrated that the Soviet Union would take a realistic and flexible position on the issue of Soviet-Japanese normalization. The Japanese government had continuously claimed that normalization or a peace settlement would have to be based on the S.F.P.T. The Soviet removal of the condition previously insisted on, namely the alteration of the existing U.S.-Japanese relations, may have been intended to convince the Japanese government of the sincerity of the Soviet desire for normalization.

The response of the Japanese government to this joint declaration was a mere repetition of its previous attitude. On

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12 October, the same day that the joint declaration was issued, the director of the Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry published the following statement:

No change in the attitude of the Soviet Union and Communist China towards Japan can be observed in the Sino-Soviet joint declaration on Japan reported by Peking Radio today, in which the two countries express their readiness to normalize their relations with Japan. The contents of the declaration indicate that they are still adhering firmly to their policy of opposition to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan's relations with the U.S. and other free countries. The declaration can be considered only as continuation of the Communist peace offensive.....There will be no change in Japan's established policy not to enter into normal relations with the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. so long as they fail to accept the principles underlying the San Francisco Peace Treaty.⁵⁸

This was a plain rejection of the Soviet overture. The Japanese government still adhered to its principle that it would agree to start to negotiate normalization on condition that the Russians accepted the S.F.P.T. and the present U.S.-Japanese relations. The Japanese government ignored the subtle change in Sino-Soviet attitudes shown in the Joint Declaration.

Prime Minister Yoshida, who had left Japan on 26 September for Europe to meet the European leaders, also stated that the Joint Declaration was merely an example of a 'peace offensive'. He defined the Joint Declaration as a Sino-Soviet attempt to separate Japan from the U.S. and assured that Japan would not be hoodwinked by such an attempt. Turning to the possibility of Soviet-Japanese and Sino-Japanese normalization, he argued that if the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. were truly sincere about their

desire for the normalization, they should have repudiated the anti-Japanese alliance before they proposed the normalization with Japan. He held to a strong suspicion about Sino-Soviet intentions because he, 'as a Japanese, cannot forget the fact that the Soviet Union had abrogated the Soviet-Japanese non-aggressive pact of 1941 as if she was tearing a piece of paper.'⁵⁹ Thus, Yoshida held a strong anti-Soviet suspicion and that his suspicion caused him to ignore the significance of the Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration.

DOWNFALL OF YOSHIDA

Prime Minister Yoshida had been travelling around Europe and the United States from the end of September to November. To visit European and American leaders appeared to be the main purpose of this overseas journey. But one of the most vital goals of this journey seemed to be closely connected with domestic politics in Japan. The Yoshida administration had been faced with a crisis which was caused by the shipbuilding scandal. The overseas mission by Yoshida was widely regarded as a measure for surviving his domestic political crisis. He may have intended to transfer public attention from the scandal to his diplomatic achievements. But he returned to Japan almost empty-handed.

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Moreover, the domestic political crises had broken out just before his departure. The opposition parties had continuously raised questions about the way the government had prevented the arrest of Satô Eisaku. In August, Yoshida had made a remark that the questions raised should just be neglected. Reacting furiously to this remark, the opposition parties decided to summon Yoshida to the Lower House Standing Budget Committee to interrogate him. On 18 September, however, Yoshida refused to be summoned on the ground that he had already planned to depart for Europe and the United States. The Standing Committee adopted a motion to accuse him. Yoshida entirely ignored it and left Japan on 26 September. The Japanese public, which had already been disappointed enough by the scandal itself, was disgusted by his irresponsible attitude. Public opinion which had been disenchanted over this never supported Yoshida after his return from the overseas mission.

More importantly, domestic power struggles veered in an unfavourable direction for Yoshida. The Liberal Party, headed by Yoshida, had been faced with inner struggles led by an anti-Yoshida faction, especially since Hatoyama Ichirô had been depurged in 1951 and had come back to political life in the following year. In 1946, Hatoyama had been the president of the Liberal Party when it obtained a majority in the first general election after the end of the war. But he was purged by G.H.Q. when he was appointed the prime minister. His colleagues had to find someone who could take his place and decided on Yoshida

whom they regarded as the right figure. When Yoshida agreed to become prime minister for Hatoyama, there were some agreements between him and Hatoyama providing that, when Hatoyama was depurged, the status of prime minister and president of the Liberal Party would revert to Hatoyama.⁶⁰ Yoshida did not, however, concede his status when Hatoyama came back to political life in 1951, and did not show any sign of doing so after that time. Furthermore, Hatoyama considered that Yoshida tried to prevent him from being depurged. Hatoyama and his close political colleagues, such as , Kôno Ichirô and Miki Bukichi were, therefore, determined to make Hatoyama the prime minister by replacing Yoshida, after he came back to political life.

In 1954, another conservative party, the Progressive Party headed by Shigemitsu Mamoru, also endeavoured to seize power. In 1953, the Liberal Party had attempted to merge with the Progressive Party in order to consolidate conservative power in the Diet. But the latter had not agreed with it. When in September 1954, the anti-Yoshida factions in the Liberal Party showed their intention to walk out of the party to make a new political merger with the Progressive Party, it showed a great willingness to cooperate with the anti-Yoshida movement. The leaders of the Progressive Party, which was the second strongest party in the House of Representatives, may have regarded this occasion as a great chance to seize power because the members of Hatoyama faction and others were less than that of the Progressive Party. On 19 September 1954, six anti-Yoshida

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political leaders, namely Hatoyama, Shigemitsu, Kôno, Kishi Nobusuke, and Ishibashi Tanzan, met and agreed to set up a new anti-Yoshida party and established a preparatory committee for the new party two days later. Hatoyama was appointed the chairman of the committee at the beginning of November.

It was on 24 November that the Democratic Party was established as a result of the activities of the committee. Hatoyama became the president of the party. The new party came to have 121 members in the Lower House of the Diet. A special session of the Diet was summoned on 30 November. The Democratic Party decided to introduce a no-confidence bill with the cooperation of both the Leftist and Rightist Socialist Parties. The bill was scheduled to be submitted to the House on 7 December. On the day before, Yoshida and other executives of the Liberal Party met to consult about how to cope with the no-confidence bill. Yoshida stubbornly insisted on the dissolution of the Diet. But Vice President of the Party Ogata Taketora and others forced him to announce the resignation of his Cabinet *en masse*. Yoshida finally accepted their contention and resigned from the president of the party. The Yoshida administration resigned *en masse* on 7 December, not waiting for the submission of the no-confidence bill.

As explained above throughout this chapter, the Yoshida administration had been continuously refusing to accept a series of Soviet overtures for normalization. Instead, it had been

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stiffening its rigid negative attitude towards Russia since the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This attitude reflected Yoshida's anti-communist sentiments, his rigid perception of the cold war, and his anti-Soviet strategic idea. Now Yoshida walked out of the government and Hatoyama who had already in 1952 made it clear that he intended to normalize Japan's relations with the Soviet Union came into office. The previous pattern of Soviet-Japanese relations was to be changed. In fact, under the Hatoyama government, Japan and Russia managed to restore their diplomatic relations in 1956.

Regarding American and British attitudes towards Soviet-Japanese relations, the pattern of their involvement did not basically change during the era of Hatoyama. The U.S. government occasionally attempted to intervene in Soviet-Japanese negotiations for normalization in indirect ways, for instance, by expressing its support for the Japanese territorial claims. Though it did not obviously try to impose any direct influence on the process of the normalization talks in 1955-6, it did attempt to prevent the Japanese from making too many concessions to the Soviet Union. The tactics often employed were psychological methods; mostly taking the form of subtle warning. The British government was to endeavour to neutralize American efforts. As they recognized that the status quo established by the S.F.P.T. should be maintained in the interest of stability in the far east, the British intended to restrain U.S. and Japanese efforts to change the status quo by trying to assert the latter's

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territorial rights to the renounced Kunashiri and Etorofu (the southern Kuriles).

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PART II.

NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON

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CHAPTER 3 ROAD TO THE LONDON TALKS

On 9 December 1954, Hatoyama Ichirô was appointed prime minister. Although his Democratic party did not initially have a majority in the Diet, it managed to obtain support from both Socialist parties to form its administration on condition that his government should dissolve the Diet at an appropriate time. The advent of Hatoyama as prime minister had a significant impact on Soviet-Japanese relations. Unlike Yoshida, the new prime minister was one of the most positive advocates of Russo-Japanese normalization and was determined to achieve this goal as part of his government's policy. But Hatoyama and his foreign policy advisers, who were also positive advocates of the normalization, were surrounded by various disturbing circumstances, from Hatoyama's view point, in domestic and external politics.

ADVENT OF THE HATOYAMA ADMINISTRATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS NORMALIZATION POLICY

After the first meeting of the Hatoyama Cabinet, on 10 December 1954, the prime minister held a press conference and expressed

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his desire to establish good relations with the U.S.S.R. and Communist China and expand Japan's trade with them in order to avoid another major war.' The next day, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru issued a statement to outline the foreign policy of the new cabinet. In it, Shigemitsu exposed the government's desire to restore Japan's normal relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China on mutually acceptable conditions based on the principle that Japan would maintain basic cooperative relations with the free world.²

What were the government's motivations behind the announcement of its positive attitude towards normalization? The announcement of the government's policy idea had an aspect of being propaganda and advertisement for the coming general election. Their emphasis on completing Japanese independence in their initial policy programme reflected their understanding of an increasing nationalistic sentiment in Japanese public opinion. It can be assumed that the Democratic Party leaders recognized that normalization with the Soviet Union and Communist China would attract this nationalist sentiment because it would be regarded as an indication of the government's determination to carry out a foreign policy independent of American pressure. When Kishi Nobusuke, the secretary-general of the Democratic Party, had a conversation with George A. Morgan, the counsellor of American Embassy, on 21 December, he told him that the announcement of the government's intention for normalization was made with the purpose of taking over the issue from the

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Socialists.³ Matsumoto Takizô, the deputy chief cabinet secretary, who enjoyed close relations with Hatoyama, also suggested on 31 January 1955 that 'The Prime Minister's talk of normalizing relations with the Communist bloc was almost entirely for election purposes.'⁴ It cannot be denied that the leaders of the Democrats held that the normalization policy had to be announced in order to win the domestic political struggle between the conservatives and the progressives.

But the fact should not be ignored that Hatoyama was very much devoted to the idea of normalization itself. According to the memoirs of Kôno Ichirô, then the minister of agriculture and forestry, Hatoyama insisted in his conversations with Kôno and Miki Bukichi, the executive board chairman of the Democratic Party, he was firmly determined to achieve his main policy goals, namely the revision of the constitution and the Russo-Japanese normalization, especially the latter.⁵ In fact, Hatoyama seriously desired to restore normal relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, based on the interpretation of world politics in which he and his foreign policy advisers' believed.

What were Hatoyama's basic foreign policy ideas which supported his approach to normalization? First, they included the view that the international political and strategic situation around Japan was such that she was faced with the necessity to reduce tensions in order to get rid of the potential dangers of the cold war. Moreover, the change in Soviet policy towards Japan since

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1953 provided a good opportunity. Thanks to his policy advisers composed of ex-diplomats with distinguished careers, such as Sugihara Arata and Matsumoto Shunichi, Hatoyama seemed to adopt rather progressive ideas with regard to Japan's foreign policy. Hatoyama's basic idea was that Japan should contribute to reduction of international tensions between East and West, and at least in the far east, through restoring normal relations with communist countries. This view was based on their interpretation that the trend of 'detente' were dominant in the world politics in the middle of the 1950s. Unlike Yoshida, Hatoyama and his advisers understood the Soviet peace overtures in the context of 'detente' and that they were not examples of a 'peace offensive', but a clear indication of substantial alteration of her foreign policy towards Japan. This understanding of the international change in the middle of the 1950s constituted a fundamental background for Hatoyama's positive attitude towards normalization with the Soviet Union.

RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION: Approach Through The Domnitsky Letter

When the Shigemitsu statement was issued, the Soviet leaders did not, however, fail to catch the expression of a positive Japanese attitude towards normalization. On 15 December, Radio Moscow announced that the Japanese government was ready to

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restore diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia without altering existing U.S.-Japanese relations.⁶ Radio Moscow broadcast on the following day, a statement by Foreign Minister Molotov, which was a direct reply to that by the Japanese foreign minister. It suggested that the Soviet Union understood that the new Japanese administration was prepared for the re-establishment of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. It went on to say that the Soviet Union was ready to take a practical step towards negotiations for normalization.⁷ Considering the Soviet response to the Shigemitsu statement was so quick, it would seem that the Soviet leaders had been waiting for some positive reaction on the normalization issue from the Japanese government since the fall of Yoshida.

Unlike the Soviet response, Japanese reaction to the Soviet statements was ambiguous and ill-prepared. On 17 December, the Japanese government convened a cabinet meeting to discuss the Soviet positive responses to the Shigemitsu statement. After this cabinet meeting, both Shigemitsu and Hatoyama adopted a cautious attitude. Shigemitsu said that he could not conclude whether the Molotov statement was a sincere proposal or a mere example of 'peace offensive' and proposed that the government should wait and see the future developments to know the real Russian intention.⁸ Hatoyama also admitted that cabinet ministers could not reach any conclusion regarding how the government should respond to the Molotov statement.⁹ As mentioned above, the Hatoyama cabinet's positive policy on

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Japan's relations with her communist neighbours had been issued to a great extent as part of its election campaign. Moreover, there was already a divergence of ideas over this issue within the cabinet. It was, therefore, impossible for the Japanese government to evolve a specific and detailed policy for the normalization with the Soviet Union at this stage.

Despite these ambiguous and slow response from the Japanese, the Soviets did not stop their vigorous efforts to seize this opportunity. On 22 December, *Izvestia* confirmed that Japan would not have to alter her relations with the United States in order to achieve normalization with the U.S.S.R.¹⁰ Five days later, the Russians stepped up their overtures. On 27 December, the Soviet government instructed the Soviet Mission in Tokyo headed by A.I Domnitsky, to contact the Japanese Foreign Ministry as soon as possible and to deliver a letter which proposed to start normalization talks. This was called the 'Domnitsky letter'.¹¹

Because the Soviet Union had not participated in the S.F.P.T., she did not have authorized diplomatic representatives in Japan which were recognized by the Japanese government. Hence the Russians had to rely on unofficial channels in order to contact the Japanese government. From the end of December to the beginning of January 1955, they attempted to contact the Foreign Ministry and the prime minister through Fujita Kazuo, a newsman of the Kyôdô New Agency, and Majima Kan, the then chairman of the

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National Conference for Soviet-Japanese and Sino-Japanese Normalization which had been established in October 1954. While Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was reluctant to receive these unofficial approaches, Hatoyama finally decided to see Domnitsky,

The first meeting between Hatoyama and Domnitsky was convened on 7 January. An important fact about this meeting was that Domnitsky sketched in some aspects of the Soviet plan for the negotiations. According to Matsumoto, Domnitsky remarked during the conversation that the Soviet Union desired to terminate the state of war between the two countries by a declaration, to exchange official documents normalizing Soviet-Japanese relations, to exchange ambassadors, and, after these, to negotiate various specific problems about territorial disputes, trade, war criminals and Japanese admission to the United Nations.¹² It can, therefore, be argued that the most significant objective for the Soviets was to terminate the state of war and to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations. Solving the specific problems between the two countries was given only a secondary priority.

On 25 January, Hatoyama saw Domnitsky again and received the 'Domnitsky letter'. Although this letter was unsigned and undated, it was obviously intended to convey to the Japanese government, Soviet willingness to start the normalization talks as soon as possible. It was composed of only four paragraphs. In the first paragraph, it stated that the Soviet Union had

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consistently proposed to normalize her relations with Japan as indicated by the Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration of 12 October and the statement by Molotov on 16 December 1954. The letter also showed that the Soviet government understood that the Japanese government was now willing to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations as expressed in Hatoyama's various speeches and in Shigemitsu's statement on 11 December. It then suggested that it was the right time to start to exchange views for the purpose for normalization, and proposed to open the negotiations in either Moscow or Tokyo.¹³

Shigemitsu was sceptical about the authority of the letter because it was undated and unsigned.¹⁴ But the Japanese government received through Ambassador to the U.N. Sawada Renzô from the Soviets a confirmation that the 'Domnitsky letter' was officially authorized.¹⁵ The same day, Radio Moscow assured that Domnitsky had handed over the letter under instructions from the Soviet government.¹⁶ Now, the Japanese government had to decide its position about whether it would accept the Soviet proposal to start the negotiations for normalization.

JAPAN'S DECISION TO OPEN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U. S. S. R.

There had already been divisions over the normalization issue within the Hatoyama cabinet ever since it was established.

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Despite Hatoyama's enthusiasm for normalization, the government contained some leading members who opposed the Russo-Japanese normalization. Miki Bukichi was one of these. He was one of the closest and oldest of Hatoyama's friends and had contributed enormously to bring Hatoyama to the premiership. But he strongly disagreed with Hatoyama's policy for normalization.¹⁷ Miki, who already seemed to hold the vision of a future conservative merger with the Liberal Party,¹⁸ could not take a positive position in favour of normalization which was likely to obstruct the merger.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was not enthusiastic about this issue either. On 27 December, he remarked in his conversation with John Allison, the American ambassador to Japan, that his statement on 11 December had been designed to show a positive attitude towards Communist China in order to satisfy and calm down rising nationalistic and anti-American sentiment in Japan.¹⁹ The statement by Shigemitsu was presumably intended to show that the government's positive approach was not towards the Soviet Union but towards Communist China, and this primarily for election purpose.

Furthermore, Shigemitsu, as a prominent and very cautious diplomat,²⁰ tended to be anxious about the concerns which were supposed to be held by foreign governments over the advent of the Hatoyama administration and the possibility that the Japanese were beginning a neutralist drive. When he was informed on 25

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January that the prime minister received the Donnitsky letter, he called American Ambassador John Allison to discuss this Soviet approach. Shigemitsu assured Allison that 'he had no intention of making any precipitate reply to Soviet approach,' but that 'in view of present government's announced policy of hoping to normalize relations with U.S.S.R., it would be necessary to make some sort of reply.' He also promised that 'every effort would be made by Japanese to prevent this demarche being used by the Soviet for propaganda purposes.'²¹ He could not accept Hatoyama's rather careless treatment of the Soviet approach.

As the gap between the prime minister and foreign minister seemed to become wider, the other leaders of the government attempted to resolve the divergence. On 28 January, Tani Masayuki, the then counselor for the foreign minister, tried to persuade Hatoyama that the prime minister should leave the Foreign Ministry and the foreign minister to deal with the main diplomatic issues.²² Moreover, in the morning of 29 January, Hatoyama was visited by General Secretary of the Cabinet Nemoto, and Sugihara Arata, then the vice chairman of Research Committee for Political Affairs of the Democratic Party. These two influential political leaders also tried to persuade the prime minister to restrain himself.²³ Even so, Hatoyama reiterated his strong hope that the Soviet Union would declare an end to the state of war and that, after the declaration, both of the countries could move on to the economic issue, and then to the political issue, such as the

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territorial issue. His enthusiasm for the normalization was so strong that his various colleagues could not stop him.

On 4 February, a cabinet meeting was held to discuss as to how to proceed with the normalization talks. Hatoyama and Shigemitsu there sharply collided. Hatoyama insisted that the government should negotiate with Russia with the objective of inducing her to issue a declaration for the termination of the state of war, and that political issues such as the territorial question and economic problems such as trade issue should be negotiated after the state of war had been terminated.²⁴ On the other hand, Shigemitsu said that the declaration of terminating the state of war had no legal relevance and argued that specific issues such as the territorial question and the safety of the Northern Water fisheries should be solved first and that on that basis diplomatic relations with Russia should be restored. Moreover, he expressed his anxiety that the Soviets would shelve those specific issues and establish their embassy in Japan if diplomatic relations were resumed first.²⁵ This anxiety was also shared by the Foreign Ministry officials. According to one of its Soviet desk officers, the Soviet Union would not discuss the various significant questions between her and Japan if the termination of the state of war was realised first.²⁶ The foreign minister and the Ministry assumed that the vital interest of the Soviets on the normalization issue was to terminate the state of the war and to establish their official diplomatic representatives in Japan.

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Facing this sharp divergence, the cabinet members, who were basically in agreement to negotiate with Russia for normalization, finally reached a compromise. They stepped aside from the main source of the divergence: the question which should be done first. The cabinet meeting worked out an agreement that the government should start negotiations by dealing with some specific problems which were relatively easy to settle. At the same time, it figured out the main objectives of the negotiations as to obtain Soviet support for Japan's admission to the UN; to solve the territorial problem; to make arrangements over trade and economic issues; and to obtain early repatriation of Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union.²⁷ This compromise was of a very ambiguous kind. It was not at all clear whether the Japanese would walk out of the negotiations if those four objectives were not met by the Russians. This ambiguity was the result of the precarious compromise between the prime minister and the foreign minister and was not to be satisfactorily resolved even after the beginning of the negotiations in London.

As for the government's attitudes towards specific issues, its position on the territorial question was also specified, though not the final policy formula. The government seems to have favoured a demand for the return of not only the Habomais and Shikotan, but also the Kuriles. On the day of the cabinet meeting, Minister Shima of the Japanese Embassy in Washington made it clear to a State Department officer that the Japanese government was considering requesting U.S. to back Japanese claims

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for return of the Kuriles, probably to be put forward before beginning the negotiations with the Soviets and before the general election. The Japanese minister argued that taking such a firm position against the Soviet Union over the territorial issue was very important in order to obtain support from the Japanese public which was showing strong nationalistic sentiments. He said that it would be helpful if the U.S. government implied in some form that it had been wrong in agreeing to offer the Kuriles to the Soviet Union in the Yalta Agreement. With regard to the legal basis for this Japanese demand for the reversion of the Kuriles, Shima explained that Japan believed that those islands had not been seized by Japanese aggression as defined in the Cairo Declaration. He mentioned the minimum demand by the Japanese government on the territorial issue, as follows:

Foreign Office (=Japanese Foreign Ministry) feels Soviets will agree at once to support Japan's membership in UN and will agree also to give later favourable consideration re fisheries and return POW's. Thus crux would be territorial question, on which Foreign Office hoped to maintain position that minimum acceptable condition would be return Habomai and Shikotan, with hope Soviets would agree later consideration Jap claim to Kuriles.²⁰[My brackets]

Shima's account being reliable, it can be argued that the Japanese government intended to request the Russians to return the Habomais, Shikotan, and the Kuriles, at an early stage of the negotiations. It also seemed to intend to strengthen its request by extracting U.S. support. But the Foreign Ministry defined the return of the Habomias and Shikotan as the minimum condition for a peace settlement with the Soviet Union. Added to that, the

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ministry seemed to plan to make efforts to secure some sort of Soviet agreement to consider the issue of the Kuriles later on.

Another important fact was that the cabinet agreed that negotiations should be conducted by the foreign minister and his ministry.²⁹ As a result of this, the negotiating channels had become limited to the Foreign Ministry and press releases had to be made by it.³⁰ Shigemitsu insisted on this because he and the Foreign Ministry wished to monopolize the influence on foreign policy, and to prevent interference from outside the Ministry.

Based on the decision reached by the cabinet meeting, the Japanese government started to take a further step towards normalization. Sugihara and Tani were assigned to formulating more detailed and specific policies for the negotiations. Based on the work by these two men, the final policy for the normalization talks were embodied in Instruction No.16 (Kunrei 16 Gô) on 24 May.³¹ Immediately after the cabinet meeting Shigemitsu sent another instruction to Sawada to hand the Soviets a 'Note Verbale' saying that the Japanese government officially agreed to the Soviet proposal for 'exchange of views on the question of possible steps aimed at the normalization of the Soviet-Japanese relations.'³² The Japanese had finally taken an actual step towards normalization talks.

At that moment, the Soviet government was faced with a change in its leadership. On 8 February, Malenkov resigned as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and Bulganin was

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promoted to occupy his position. This change in Soviet leadership was widely regarded as the start of the Khrushchev era. For example, the British Embassy in Moscow concluded that it was clear that Khrushchev had become the most influential figure among the Soviet leaders by obtaining the primacy of the Party over the government.³³ But the impact which this would have on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was not clear.

On the same day, Foreign Minister Molotov made a speech at the Supreme Soviet and referred to his policy towards Japan. In his speech, he reported that direct channels had been successfully set up with the Japanese government for the purpose of talks and that he expected a fruitful result from the normalization negotiations.³⁴ This speech clearly indicated that, as far as Soviet foreign policy was concerned, previous policy had not changed despite the change in the leadership. Actually, the influence of Malenkov in the Soviet government foreign policy making had already diminished in the autumn of 1954.³⁵ If so, it seems that Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, had been in charge of foreign policy making since the decline of Malenkov's influence. The fact that he played the most significant role in the Sino-Soviet negotiations (September-October 1954) shows Khrushchev's dominance in foreign policy. Moreover, the exclusion of Molotov from the Soviet delegation to China was also a sign that the foreign minister had already lost some of his power. Given the fact that the Soviets started in October 1954 to adopt a more positive policy on normalization by

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permitting Japan not to alter her relations with the U.S., it can be argued that it was Khrushchev who was one of the main makers of this positive policy towards Japan. If so, Malenkov's downfall could not very much affect Soviet foreign policy towards Japan.

The Japanese correctly recognized that there would be no drastic alteration in Soviet attitude towards Japan. On 11 February, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was reported to have announced at the cabinet that he did not assume the Soviet attitude towards Japan to be affected by the change in the Russian leadership because Soviet policy to Japan had previously been based on Khrushchev's idea.³⁶ Thus, the alteration in the Soviet leadership did not affect either Soviet foreign policy towards Japan nor the response of the Japanese government.

From February to the end of April, the Soviet and the Japanese governments exchanged views on the site for normalization talks. At first, the Japanese government, especially Shigemitsu, desired to have the negotiations in New York. But the Soviets disagreed with it. Instead, they proposed Tokyo or Moscow. The Foreign Ministry disliked this proposal, because it was afraid that the Russians would appoint the unrecognized Soviet Mission^{as} the Soviet representatives for the talks. Moreover, Japanese negotiators would not be able to use sufficient diplomatic facilities in Moscow because there was no Japanese overseas office there. While the Japanese started to think of Paris and Geneva as a suitable venue for negotiations, the Soviet government proposed London and

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Geneva as the options for the site for the negotiations. In London, Russia had a prominent 'Japanese expert', Yakob Malik, as the ambassador to Britain, who had been ambassador to Japan during the Pacific war. The reason for the Russians proposed London in addition to Geneva was probably that they considered that Malik was the right choice as the chief negotiator. Faced with this new proposal, the Japanese were inclined to agree to have the negotiations in London.

The British Foreign Office received information from its embassy in Tokyo that the Japanese government would like to hold the normalization talks in London. On 19 April, Matsumoto, who had been already designated as plenipotentiary, met Sir Esler Dening, the British ambassador, and indicated that he preferred London since 'he knows the ropes' because he had been Japanese ambassador to Britain. Dening asked the Foreign Office for its view on this matter, attaching his basic agreement to invite the negotiations to London. He said, 'my own feeling is that the Japanese would feel happier in London and to extent that they may seek our counsel you may consider it in our interests that negotiations should take place there.'³⁷

In fact, Anglo-Japanese relations were not very good in the middle of the 1950s. In particular, relations between Britain and Japan had got worse over the problem of Japan's entry into G.A.T.T. and problems caused by the so-called 'unfairness' of Japanese trade practices. Dening was one of those who were most

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alarmed by this deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations. He may have, therefore, thought that, by supporting the Japanese in the normalization talks in London, Anglo-Japanese relations could be improved. More importantly, we should not overlook the fact that Dening was sceptical about American diplomacy in Asia. In 1954, while he had made various suggestions regarding the principles to govern Britain's foreign policy towards Japan, he mentioned that Britain could exert some influence on Japan by helping to maintain U.S.-Japanese relations.³⁸ It is not difficult to imagine that Dening assumed that the British would be able to exert influence on the Japanese by playing a role to check U.S. overreactions to Japanese conduct in the negotiations, if they were held in London. He in fact said, '...I believe that we can be of help to the Japanese and since they know that we will not give them away they will be more likely to come to us for advice than to the Americans.'³⁹

Within the Foreign Office, there seemed to be no opposition to the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks taking place in London. It was rather broadly recognized that having the negotiations in London would be convenient to the Japanese. R.T. Higgins, the Japan desk officer at the Foreign Office, commented on Dening's contention described above, saying that the Japanese could escape the political pressures which would be brought to bear on them in Tokyo and could use much better communication facilities in London than in Moscow or Geneva. Moreover, 'there is no clamorous public opinion to satiate with results of what is very

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likely....to be an abortive negotiation.'⁴⁰ In fact, Japanese Minister Oda of the Japanese Embassy in London, stated that one of the reasons for Japan's preference for London was that the political atmosphere was tranquil there.⁴¹

On 20 April, the Foreign Office accepted the Japanese desire for having the negotiations in London. Its spokesman was reported to have announced that the British government did not know whether the Soviet Union and Japan would accept London as the site for the negotiations or not, but that the two countries were free to convene their talks in London or in other capital cities of Europe.⁴² On 23 April, Sawada delivered a 'Note Verbal' to Sobolev and informed him that the Japanese government hoped to start the negotiations in early June in London. Two days later, the Soviets agreed with the Japanese proposal and the next day Sobolev indicated that Russia agreed to start the negotiations on 1 June.

JAPAN'S BASIC POLICY FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS: Instruction No. 16

Since the decision by the cabinet meeting on 4 February to start the normalization talks, the Japanese government had been endeavouring to devise a more specific policy for the negotiations. The Hatoyama cabinet had reached an inner agreement to make efforts to terminate the state of war with Russia while simultaneously negotiating to solve various problems pending

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between Japan and Russia. Now its main task was to specify what Japan could concede to the U.S.S.R., what she could not, and what kind of basic positions should be taken on the various problems, such as the territorial question, and the issue of repatriation of Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union. This specific policy was embodied in the government guidelines called 'Instruction No. 16' (Kunrei 16 Gô) which was approved by the cabinet on 24 May and handed to the plenipotentiary, Matsumoto Shunichi two days later.

This instruction was a top-secret document and, therefore, has not yet been declassified by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. It has, however, become known because one of the most recent works on Soviet-Japanese normalization written by Kubota Masaaki, a Japanese journalist who was engaged in reporting the normalization talks, has exposed the existence of this extremely important document.⁴³

As this document is greatly significant, it is worth while quoting the whole contents here, though it is rather long.

'Instruction No.16'

In negotiating with the U.S.S.R. with the purpose of normalizing our diplomatic relations with her, the delegation should make every effort to realise the following points.

1. (The Purpose of the Negotiations) The negotiations are aimed to conclude a Soviet-Japanese Peace Treaty (including, the establishment of peaceful relations, the exchange of diplomatic representatives, the solution of existing various problems) in order to normalise Soviet-Japanese relations.

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2. (The Basic Position of the Japanese Government) Japan unequivocally belongs to the free world by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, and other arrangements. The delegation should, therefore, examine Soviet views on this basic point before starting to discuss specific issues. Added to that, the delegation should argue that, in the wake of normalization, neither of the two countries should undertake any propaganda activities in each other's country which might possibly cause domestic disorder. Before entering into discussions on specific issues, the delegation should obtain from the Russians the promise not to undertake such activities.

3. (The Problems to be Solved during the Negotiations) If it becomes clear that the Soviets do not have any disagreement on our basic position described in paragraph 2, the delegation should start to negotiate in order to settle the following questions:

- a. The commitment by the Soviet Union not to veto Japan's entry into the United Nations;
- b. The release and repatriation of all of the Japanese detained by the Soviet Union including the war criminals;
- c. Territorial problem:
 - (1) the return of the Habomais and Shikotan;
 - (2) the return of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin;
- d. Fishery problems (including the repatriation of the fishing boats and fishers captured by the Russians):
- e. Commercial problems.

4. (Crucial Points in the Negotiations) The delegation should make every effort to achieve our goals on the issues listed in paragraph 3. The delegation should not concede on the issues, in particular, of the release and repatriation of the detainees and the return of the Habomais and Shikotan. In event of Soviet refusal of the release and repatriation of all detainees, the delegation can accept the imprisonment in Japan of the war criminals. It will be necessary for us to decide our position by taking into account the co-relation among those various problems, depending on Soviet reactions. The delegation should, therefore, send detailed information frequently and ask for instructions.

5. (Unacceptable Conditions) Conditions which may be offered by the Soviets and which should not be accepted by us are as follows:

- a. To abolish or revise the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty;
- b. To conclude a Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact;
- c. To demilitarize some parts of the Japanese territories including territorial waters;

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- d. To restrict the size and equipment of Japan's defensive forces and the sovereignty of Japan;
- e. Reparations.⁴⁴

The Instruction indicated the following significant points. First of all, the Japanese intended to proceed with normalization within the limitations set by the S.F.P.T., and the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact. The Japanese had no intention to do anything in contradiction to the S.F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact. For example, the goal of the negotiations was limited to concluding a peace treaty. They clearly excluded the possibility of concluding a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union and of disarming Japan. Secondly, the Japanese government regarded the territorial issue and the repatriation of Japanese detainees as the most crucial problems to settle. The return of the Habomais and Shikotan and the repatriation were set as conditions prerequisite to the conclusion of a peace treaty. The relatives of the detainees became an influential political factor when the negotiations approached. They set up an organization called Association for the Families of the Detainees (Rusukazoku no kai) and tried to put pressure on the Hatoyama administration and Plenipotentiary Matsumoto.⁴⁵ The territorial problem had also been widely recognized as one of the most important issues between the two countries since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. In July 1952, July and November 1953, the Lower House of the Diet passed resolutions to express a strong desire for the return of the Habomais and Shikotan. This reflected the

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strong desire of the Japanese for the reversion of those islands.⁴⁶

Thirdly, this Instruction indicates that the Japanese government had decided to endeavour to conclude a peace treaty based on the solution of the various crucial problems listed in paragraph 3. It denied the possibility of terminating the state of war with the Soviet Union without solving those problems. But no item was included about what the negotiators should do in case of a Soviet refusal to return those islands and the repatriation of the detainees. Whether the negotiators would walk out of the negotiations or not, depended on the government leaders in Japan. In fact, the Japanese did not decide what should be done in that event. Shortly after the Instruction had been made, Tani Masayuki met American Ambassador Allison. When asked by Allison whether it was firm Japanese policy to obtain agreements on specific questions before consenting to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviets, Tani answered as follows: 'This was at present Cabinet's position and was definitely position of Foreign Office [=the Foreign Ministry], but that domestic political considerations might make it impossible strictly to adhere to this principle.'⁴⁷[My brackets] In this sense, the instruction had an ambiguous nature.

This ambiguity of Instruction No. 16 was partly a product of struggles within the government. The Foreign Ministry seemed to take the position that, if the specific problems were not

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settled, the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan should not even be considered, not to mention the peace treaty. The Ministry even attempted to authorize the delegation to walk out of the negotiations in case of failure to obtain Soviet concessions on vital issues such as the territorial issue. But some of the pro-normalization Democrats, including Hatoyama, blocked this attempt by the Foreign Ministry.⁴⁸

Shigemitsu and his colleagues at the Foreign Ministry seemed to design the Instruction to make the negotiations prolonged. As long as it set the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan as a prerequisite condition and ordered the negotiators to settle the specific questions before agreeing to the normalization, the negotiations could not be ended in a short time. The Foreign Ministry seemed to take into consideration the possible results of the coming Four Powers Summit Meeting due to be convened in July. Tani stated in his conversation with Allison that the Japanese intended to prolong the negotiations until ^{the} results of the coming Summit Meeting in Geneva became clear.⁴⁹ The Japanese may have expected that the Summit Meeting would produce the international circumstances which would make it easier for the Soviets to make concessions to Japan. In this sense, it can be argued that the Japanese leaders expected that as some successful results of the Summit Meeting the Soviets would soften their attitudes towards Japan more.

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It seems that the United States government exerted some influence on the making of the Instruction. On 26 January, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles prepared a secret memorandum in which American attitudes towards Soviet-Japanese normalization were described. The Dulles memorandum was intended to exert indirect influence on the Japanese. In the second paragraph, Dulles listed 'several important considerations' which Allison could discuss with Tani and Shigemitsu. This part was virtually a statement of what the Americans could not accept on the issue of the normalization talks: they did not expect the Soviet-Japanese normalization to alter the existing treaty relations in which Japan was involved, particularly, the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and the Peace Treaty between Japan and Nationalist China. Soviet-Japanese normalization should not affect the substance of the S.F.P.T. or be inconsistent with it; the United States would continue to support Japan's claim that the Habomais and Shikotan were not part of the Kuriles; the U.S. government expected Japan to obtain a favourable agreement on fishery problems and the release of the Japanese detainees in the U.S.S.R. In addition, he expressed his hope that the Japanese would obtain a Soviet guarantee of unconditional support for Japan's application to the United Nations; that Japan would resist any Soviet attempts to bring the Communist China into the discussions; and that the American government expected that Japan would ensure any arrangements reached would minimize the

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inevitable Soviet efforts to extend espionage, subversion, and the propaganda network in Japan.⁵⁰

The substance of the Dulles memorandum was conveyed to Tani by Allison on 28 January. Tani responded by saying that its contents were in fact identical with what Shigemitsu and he had in their minds with regard to normalization.⁵¹ It is highly likely that Shigemitsu and his close colleagues who took a cautious stance over the normalization had already held positions similar to those mentioned in the Dulles memorandum. But it still cannot be denied that they were influenced by American attitudes. Shigemitsu and his close colleagues like Tani were firmly convinced that Japanese-American relations should not be affected by normalization between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Moreover, they were willing to receive information and advice from the United States government.⁵² It is, therefore, arguable that the Japanese leaders were ready to listen to American suggestions with regard to normalization. At the cabinet meeting on 4 February, Shigemitsu's contention that the government should try to settle various problems laid between the Soviet Union and Japan before terminating the state of war may have reflected some influence of the suggestions in the Dulles memorandum. It must be noted that the main lines of Instruction No. 16 were very similar to the American suggestions included in the Dulles memorandum. Rather, it seems that the Instruction was based on the latter. There is no evidence suggesting that the Japanese leaders made the Instruction in accordance with the memorandum. It seems, however, unreasonable

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to exclude the possibility that the Foreign Ministry may have drawn up it in accordance with the American suggestions.

INSTRUCTION NO. 16 AND JAPAN'S POLICY ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION

After the government's decision to open negotiations with the Russians was made at the beginning of February, the necessity to define the government's normalization policy grew. Political leaders now started to make a move with regard to the territorial issue. On 11 March, Kishi Nobusuke, the general-secretary of the Democratic Party, maintained at a press conference that it was possible for Japan to demand the return of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. But he argued that it was wrong to consider rigidly that, even if the Soviets refused this demand, Japan should not agree to exchange the ambassadors.⁵³ On the other hand, Hatoyama appeared to try to prevent the government from making tough territorial demands its fixed negotiating policy. On 25 March, Hatoyama stated at the plenary session of the Upper House: 'Japanese sovereignty over the Habomais and Shikotan is uncontested. But as regards the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, we cannot claim the return of them because we renounced all rights to them in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.'⁵⁴ Clearly, Hatoyama disagreed with demanding the reversion of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin from the Soviets.

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Shigemitsu took a cautious position. On 28 March, he stated at the House of Representatives that Japan's sovereignty over the Habomais and Shikotan was uncontestable. Regarding the other islands, he declined to comment, saying that the government had not yet defined its policy about them.⁵⁵ But it seems that Shigemitsu had already made up his mind over the territorial question during March. In the Shigemitsu Diary, he did not write anything in this month except a short note. The note reads: 'territorial problems, the views of the U.S. government, southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles, the Habomais, Shikotan.'⁵⁶ Although this note is too short for us to draw any definite conclusions, it suggests that Shigemitsu took into account the American attitude on the territorial question and decided to choose the hardest policy. In the middle of March, the U.S. government declassified its secret documents relating to the Yalta Conference. *Asahi* reported that an American official stated that the government had intended to support the Japanese and that it would not recognize the Soviet possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁵⁷ If this report is reliable, it is highly likely that Shigemitsu took this American attitude as a kind of indirect warning, and that he may have considered that adopting a hard line was suitable in the light of U.S.-Japanese relations.

The territorial policy, which was embodied in Instruction No. 16, was made under those inner divisions in the Japanese cabinet. The Japanese position on the territorial question in the Instruction can be simply summarized. Firstly, it instructed the Japanese

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negotiators to demand the reversion of the Habomais, Shkotan, the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. This was equivalent to asking for all of the territories that Japan had lost to the Soviet Union at the end of the Pacific war. But, secondly, the Instruction clearly divided those islands into two categories: those territories which could be given up during the negotiations, and those that should be demanded to the last, as a condition prerequisite to normalization. The latter contained the Habomais, Shikotan, and the former the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. These policy guidelines on the territorial question reflected the position which the Foreign Ministry had adopted in February, and the ideas held by Kishi and Shigemitsu. Hatoyama's soft line seemed to be withdrawn. It seems that the Foreign Ministry played a dominant role in the making of the Instruction.

The Instruction No.16 was merely a general guideline for the negotiators. The Foreign Ministry also prepared a more specific negotiating strategy on the territorial issue. Shimoda Takezô, then the director of the Treaties Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, recalls in his memoirs:

.....before Plenipotentiary Matsumoto left for London, we examined within the Foreign Ministry how to proceed with negotiations. At that time, the following plan which consisted of three stages was discussed: (1) To assert that the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Northern Territories [=the Habomais and Shikotan] are Japanese territories. (2) To make the restoration of Kunashiri, Etorofu, the Habomais and Shikotan the condition for normalization; (3) To demand the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan to the last. As a result of this examination, the first option was adopted as the policy of the government, because it was considered

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reasonable to put forward the maximum demand.^{5e}[My brackets]

According to these memoirs, the Foreign Ministry's strategy can be explained as follows. First of all, the Japanese delegation should make the maximum demand on the Soviet Union: demand for the reversion of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The Japanese attempted to derive some concessions from the Russians, by taking that hard line with them. If the Russians refused the maximum Japanese demand, the negotiators should move to the second stage. At this stage, the Japanese delegation were expected to promise to renounce the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. But the delegation was to request the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu, which constituted the southernmost part of the Kuriles, as well as the return of the Habomais and Shikotan. If this proposal was rejected, the negotiations were to proceed to the final stage and the Japanese were to insist strongly on the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan -- the minimum acceptable condition.

An additional instruction based on this three-stage strategy was handed to Plenipotentiary Matsumoto before he left for London. Matsumoto admitted this fact in an interview with the American scholar, Donald C. Hellman.

... Plenipotentiary Matsumoto Shunichi had been given additional instructions specifying that three distinctions in regard to the disputed territory were also factors in the negotiations. First, the Habomais and Shikotan were to be claimed unconditionally as inherently Japanese, and most

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importantly, *the return of these islands was to be considered satisfactory grounds for a treaty.* Second, priority was attached to the Southern Kuriles, which were demanded for "historical reasons" but were not deemed essential for an overall settlement. Finally the Northern Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin were claimed simply for bargaining purposes.⁵⁹ (Hellman's italics)

Now a significant fact which should be pointed out is that Japanese demands for the reversion of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, and Kunashiri and Etorofu had a characteristic as bargaining cards. In other words, the Japanese government originally recognized that those islands were not vital to Japan's national interests.

BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS NORMALIZATION: January to May 1955

Unlike the U.S. government, the British government exerted no significant influence on Japanese policy before the negotiations started. Public opinion in Britain was not interested in the Russo-Japanese normalization talks. In fact, one of the reasons why the Japanese government chose London as the venue for the negotiations was that the Japanese assessed that ^{the} political atmosphere in London was tranquil.⁶⁰ But the British government had been interested in the development of events with regard to the normalization. Between January and May, the British were keenly observing Japanese and Soviet attitudes on this issue and trying to settle their own standpoint.

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In order to understand the British attitude towards the Russo-Japanese normalization, it is useful to look back to the Foreign Office's policy to Japan which had been outlined early in 1954. On 6 January 1954, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the then Permanent Under-Secretary, instructed the Far Eastern Department to prepare a general guideline on British policy towards Japan.⁶¹ In response to this instruction, the Department prepared a draft, which was approved as a cabinet paper C(54)92 in February.⁶² This policy guideline reflected British apprehension about the possibility that the Japanese would be dragged into the communist camp. Particularly they feared that Japan would establish a Sino-Japanese coalition: 'The combination of Japanese technical skill, equipment and drive with Chinese manpower would mean a decisive shift in the world balance of power.'⁶³ In order to prevent this Sino-Japanese coalition, the guideline suggested, the British government should try to improve Anglo-Japanese relations by softening the hostile feelings of the British people towards Japan, and should try to assist Japanese economic recovery through promoting her trade with the sterling area. The guideline of British foreign policy towards Japan seemed not to be altered in 1955. The anxiety which the Foreign Office had held in 1954 continued to be held in 1955.

From the end of January to the beginning of February 1955, it became clear that the Hatoyama government started to aim at normalization by positively responding to Soviet overtures. This

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move was ^{too} extraordinary ^a step for any ^{government} care-taker ^{to} take. Faced with this unexpected development, the British began to be worried by the possibility that Japan would be dragged into the communist bloc. Ambassador Dening was most alarmed by it, and sent a recommendation to the Foreign Office on 1 February, urging that the British government should attempt to do something more to improve the relations with Japan, in order to counter the Sino-Soviet attempts to woo Japan.⁶⁴

It was Prime Minister Hatoyama's attitude on the normalization issue that worried the British ambassador. He argued that 'the Japanese Foreign Office attitude towards the Russian approach appears both correct and sound', but that 'that of the P.M. may play into the hands of the Russians and get Japan into difficulties with the United States.'⁶⁵ He knew that the Japanese government did not intend to proceed normalization at the expense of relationship with its western allies.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, he could not get rid of his anxiety because he was aware of the fact that 'Though unsound, the P.M.'s attitude has more popular appeal to the elector than of that of the Foreign Minister.'⁶⁷ Dening was afraid of the possibility that the Japanese people would be misled, from his viewpoint, into the communist hands by Hatoyama's unsound diplomacy.

The Foreign Office agreed with Dening's analysis. At the beginning of February, the Foreign Office prepared a statement for the Commonwealth Conference. It warned that Japan's capture

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by communism would be a serious disaster for the Commonwealth.⁶⁸ Moreover, British representatives in the far east also expressed anxiety over relations between Japan and communist countries. At the beginning of March, the British representatives to the far east held a conference in Mallaig and the participants were aware that the Soviet Union and China intensified the efforts to establish relations with Japan, 'with the obvious purpose of undermining her internal situation and of weakening her association with the free world'.⁶⁹

Thus, the British government seemed in 1955 to fear that Japan would be dragged into the communist camp. But it did not intend to interfere with the Japanese efforts for normalization. Rather, it tended to emphasize the significance of improving Anglo-Japanese relations in order to keep the Japanese in the western camp. As shown above, Dening urged his government to do something for that purpose. Malcolm MacDonald, the then High Commissioner for South East Asia, also reported that the British representatives to the far east 'recognized the necessity to improve Anglo-Japanese relations in spite of the prejudices created by the war and the difficulties created by Japanese

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economic competition, and to encourage the Japanese in their present tendency to look to Britain as the greatest stabilising influence in international affairs.'⁷¹

Why did the British take this indirect measure? What restrained them from adopting more direct policy to prevent the Japanese from going to the communist camp? One of the reasons is that the British government recognized that the United States was to take the main responsibility for Japanese issues in post-war period. A cabinet paper which had been prepared in 1954 suggested that Britain should assist the Americans in keeping the Japanese in the western camp.⁷² Secondly, the Foreign Office was fully aware of the intensification of nationalist sentiments in Japan in the middle of the 1950s. Regarding characteristics of the Hatoyama administration, the Foreign Office held the view that the new government had the stronger nationalist tendency. Prime Minister Hatoyama was described as an 'anti-American traditionalist'⁷³ Denning also suggested: 'However things go, we should now expect that nationalism, economic and otherwise, is bound to be a more potent influence in Japanese policies whether these are directed by Messrs. Hatoyama and Shigemitsu or by any of their likely successors.'⁷⁴ After Hatoyama had announced his desire for normalization, a Foreign Office minute characterized the mood in Japan as a combination of a 'hysterical nationalistic mood' and a susceptibility to Sino-Soviet peace overtures.⁷⁵ It can be argued that the Foreign Office may have assumed that under these situations any direct warning or pressure would irritate the

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Japanese and might provoke anti-western sentiments among the Japanese public.

More importantly, the British seemed to recognize interrelations between the intensified nationalist tendencies in Japan and the Japanese desire for normalization with the Soviet Union. This can be seen in their observation that it was Hatoyama Ichiro, who had a reputation as an 'anti-American traditionalist' and a 'symbol of a return to pre-war Japanese politics'⁷⁶ who were the most enthusiastic about normalization with the Soviet Union. In fact, Hatoyama's normalization policy was enthusiastically supported by the Japanese people. The Japanese public had been showing anti-American tendencies and normalization with the communist countries seemed to become a symbol of foreign policy independent of American influence. In other words, the intensified nationalist sentiments encouraged the Japanese to get away from the shackle of cold war policy of the United State. The British seem to have recognized this even as early as in the summer of 1954. They had observed that after the Geneva Conference the Japanese public became more nationalistic and came to tend to argue for normalizing relations with the communist powers.⁷⁷ If so, it can be argued that the British may have realized that any direct warning and pressure on the Japanese would further intensify the nationalism in Japan and would provoke them to take more positive steps towards the communist orbit. This was, needless to say, what the British government disliked. On 31 May, the British government stated that, though it welcomed the negotiations taking place in

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London, it would take no part in the normalization talks.⁷⁸ Probably, this non-committal attitude reflected the British ideas explained above.

Among the various issues to be discussed in London, the one of greatest concern for the British was the territorial question. Britain had had to deal with it as a signatory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and as a country which had taken a hand in drafting the Japanese treaty with the United States in 1950-1. Moreover, Britain was a country which had participated in the Yalta Conference and signed the Yalta Secret Agreement. Britain agreed to hand the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. She could, therefore, expect Japan to request them for support for her claims to those islands in the negotiations with Russia. In 1955, what kind of position did the Foreign Office take with regard to this controversial question?

It was in the middle of March when the Foreign Office examined the British position on the territorial issue. On 19 March, Gerald Fitzmaurice, the Foreign Office legal adviser, issued a brief account of the disposition problems of the former Japanese northern islands. In the memorandum, he developed a legal interpretation of the status of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Habomais and Shikotan. As for the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, Fitzmaurice admitted the relevance of the American argument that Russia's occupation of these islands was only a war-time occupation and that no actual cession of them had yet

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been made to the Soviet Union. But he considered that this American argument could only remain true immediately after the conclusion of the S.F.P.T. He concluded that 'with the passage of time, Russia can acquire sovereignty to these territories on an independent basis of occupation, control and effective administration, or she can acquire a sort of prescriptive title.' It is obvious that his interpretation was based on the idea of 'prescriptive title', that is, territory can be acquired as the result of the peaceable exercise of *de facto* sovereignty for a very long period over territory subject to the sovereignty of another. The Soviet position regarding the Kuriles, he continued, was also based on the fact that Japan had renounced the territories in the San Francisco Treaty and that those islands had become *res nullius*.

As regards the Habomais and Shikotan, he employed the same argument. Although he argued that they could be assumed not to be a part of the Kuriles, and that the Russians were in unlawful occupation of them, he admitted that it would still be possible for the Russians to acquire them on the basis of prescriptive rights, if they stayed on long enough. The period of peaceful occupation of the Habomais and Shikotan was not supposed to be long enough, but the possibility that the Soviets might acquire *de jure* sovereignty over them as time passed was not denied by Fitzmaurice.⁷⁹

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Based on the contention of Fitzmaurice, the Foreign Office drew up a position paper of its own views on the territorial question in May 1955, in order to prepare for the Russo-Japanese talks which were about to begin. A summary made by a Foreign Office official is available to us. Because of its great significance, it is quoted here in full.

For our own views on the former Japanese islands see Research Dept paper of May 1955 at FJ1081/8. We consider that:

- a) The Russian claim to South Sakhalin is incontestable.
- b) Japan has lost de jure sovereignty over the Kuriles, while the U.S.S.R. had acquired sovereignty de facto and probably also de jure.
- c) The legal position on the Habomais and Shikotan is in doubt, our advisers inclined to the opinion that Shikotan is part of the Kuriles, and the Habomais are part of Japan. We should not object, of course if both were handed back to Japan.'³⁰

It is interesting that Fitzmaurice and the Research Department paper introduced above did not even mention Etorofu and Kunashiri. It seems as if the British had not even recognized the distinction between the two islands and the rest of the Kuriles. Perhaps, the Foreign Office may have held on to its view of 1951 that the border between the Soviet Union and Japan should be drawn between Hokkaido and Kunashiri.

Thus, the British views on the territorial issue were very unfavourable to Japanese territorial claims against the Soviets. The Americans took the position that, though the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had been renounced by Japan, those islands were not yet under Soviet sovereignty. The British Foreign Office,

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however, tended to recognize Soviet possession of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Moreover, it was doubtful even about Japanese sovereignty over Shikotan. This Anglo-American difference of views reflected the difference which had already surfaced during the making of the S.F.P.T. The British had tended to support the decision at Yalta on the territorial disposition of the Kuriles and other former Japanese northern islands and to try to maintain the status quo in the far east which had been established as a result of the Pacific war in order to avoid causing instability in that region. In 1955, the British government must have based its view on the territorial issue on the same kind of basic attitude that had been adopted four years earlier.

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THE FIRST LONDON TALKS:
PHASE 1

The London Talks in 1955 can be divided into two phases. The first phase is from the start of the negotiations to the sixth negotiation on 28 June, during which the Soviet delegation and the Japanese delegation exchanged their own hard line positions as an opening gambit and reached stalemate. The second phase is from the eighth negotiation to the end of the London talks, during which the Soviets indicated their intention to make a concession to Japan on the territorial question but faced Japanese refusal, and during which they reached deadlock again. The first phase will be dealt with in this chapter.

THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

On 1 June, Matsumoto Shunichi, visited the Soviet Embassy at 13 Kensington Palace Gardens on a courtesy call, and had an informal meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Yakob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to Britain. They did not enter on any discussions on the main agenda, but reached an agreement with regard to the procedure and schedule for the negotiations. Regarding the form of the negotiations, they agreed that both parties would first

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hold an introductory plenary meeting with all members of each delegation but, after the first meeting, they would only hold confidential meetings between both plenipotentiaries, twice a week. Concerning the place for the negotiations, they decided to meet alternately at each Embassy and agreed to use both the Russian and Japanese languages for negotiation.'

The Soviets seemed to try to create a peaceful and conciliatory atmosphere. At this meeting, Malik was very friendly and seemed very eager to settle the negotiations. The next day, Malik returned Matsumoto's visit and had an informal meeting, during which they spent forty minutes in talks whose contents were not publicised. In his memoirs, however, Matsumoto emphasised Malik's friendly attitude.² These Soviet attempts to make a peaceful gesture towards the Japanese were also carried out at the other places. On the occasion of Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to Yugoslavia, for example, the latter, at a reception in Belgrade, told the Japanese Minister there that their government was very anxious to conclude the normalization talks rapidly. The Japanese Minister in London was also similarly assured.

The Japanese expected, however, that despite the Soviet expression of their desire for an early conclusion, the negotiations would take a long time. At the press conference held after the first informal meeting, Matsumoto said that he had not had the impression that the Soviets were in any hurry to conclude the normalization, because it had been they who proposed to have

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meetings twice a week.³ Some of the staff of the Japanese Embassy in London seemed to have a suspicion that the Soviet attitude was only a part of their policy of creating a conciliatory impression.⁴

On 3 June, the first formal meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy as scheduled two days earlier by plenipotentiaries. This was an introductory meeting, and both plenipotentiaries introduced all members of each delegation to each other but did not enter into a discussion. At this meeting, Matsumoto and Malik exchanged some words in private. The former suggested that it would take a long time to conclude the negotiations. Malik replied to it, 'I think it will be concluded in two or three months.'⁵

What can be assumed about the Soviet negotiation plan? The Soviet Union, at that stage, may have expected the negotiations to reach a dead-end, sooner or later, on the territorial issues, because it was very clear from the statements in the Japanese Diet and elsewhere that the Japanese government was anxious to secure the reversion of some of the former Japanese northern territories. Even if this was so, Malik still predicted an early settlement. This might indicate that the Soviet Union had an intention to conclude normalization rapidly by conceding some of the northern territories at some stage when the negotiations reached a stalemate. Otherwise, they would have underestimated

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the Japanese determination to get back their former northern islands, and to solve the other questions prior to normalization.

The main discussions started on the second formal meeting which took place on 7 June, at the Japanese Embassy. Although Malik and Matsumoto brought their advisers, the two plenipotentiaries took charge of almost the whole discussion. At this meeting, Matsumoto submitted a memorandum which consisted of seven points describing Japan's fundamental purposes and position in the negotiations. The seven points had the following contents.

First of all, the Japanese government requested the Soviet Union to start and complete immediately the repatriation of the Japanese detainees held on Russian soil and to offer full details regarding the Japanese detained by the U.S.S.R. The aim of this demand was to emphasise the importance which the Japanese attached to the issues. It insisted that they must be solved immediately and separated from other questions. The Japanese government attempted to make it clear that the Japanese regarded the solution of repatriation issues as a precondition for beginning the negotiations for normalization.⁶ This attempt was aimed at deriving Soviet concessions, by taking advantage of the U.S.S.R.'s strong desire for normalization.

The second point was concerned with mutual respect for existing international obligations and rights in which each country was at present involved, which included the obligations which Japan

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should carry out with respect to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty and the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Japanese intended to assert that they would never accept any conditions which would jeopardize U.S.-Japanese relations.

Thirdly, based on the historical evidence, the memorandum insisted that the Habomais, Shikotan, the Kuriles, and southern Sakhalin were Japanese territories. But Matsumoto simultaneously made it clear that they were ready to exchange frank views on the disposition of these islands. Matsumoto's intention regarding this issue was to show the Soviet side that, although Japan would insist on her sovereignty over all of the northern territories, she would not mean to demand the reversion of all of them at the last stage of the negotiations. He emphasises in his memoirs that he had intended to demonstrate that Japan would take a flexible position on the territorial issues. In fact, before he left for London, Matsumoto had received Instruction No. 16 and additional instructions concerning the territorial questions, from the Foreign Ministry. According to these the delegation should take the hardest line at the first stage of the negotiations by demonstrating that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were inalienable Japanese territories, and afterwards move to the less firm demand, the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu, while at the last stage, the instruction authorized a retreat up to the reversion of only the Habomais and Shikotan. But at the meeting, Matsumoto indicated that there was room for concession on the Japanese part on the territorial issues by implying that Japan did

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not intend to get back all of the islands. Here it became quite clear that he was trying to direct the stream of the negotiations to attain an early normalization, by modifying the original harder stance contained ⁱⁿ the instructions from the Foreign Ministry.⁷

On the fourth point, the Japanese requested the Soviets for favourable consideration to avoid troubles and obstacles in fishing on the high seas in northern waters and strongly demanded immediate repatriation of crews arrested and boats confiscated by the Russians. The fifth point referred to encouragement of economic transactions between the two countries. The Japanese government proposed that both countries should immediately start special negotiations to enhance economic transactions between themselves.

In the sixth article, the Japanese emphasised that both countries should mutually assure that each country would respect the U.N. Charter, each other's territorial rights, the peaceful solution of conflicts and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other. The final point stated the strong Japanese hope that the Soviet Union would unconditionally support Japan's admission to the United Nations.⁸

These seven points were basically in accordance with Instruction No.16 and additional instructions which had been given to Matsumoto by the Cabinet before he left Japan. This

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meant that he exposed all of Japanese bargaining positions on which she would base her assertions during the negotiations. The foreign minister, Shigemitsu, confirmed that the seven points memorandum was in accordance with the governmental instructions to Matsumoto. But, in fact, in Tokyo, Shigemitsu seems to have been irritated by Matsumoto's activities at the second formal meeting. He did not hide his displeasure at the way Matsumoto was carrying on the negotiations. When he saw Esler Dening, the British Ambassador to Japan, at the Queen's Birthday Party held by the British Embassy, he told Dening rather sarcastically that Matsumoto was a brave man and that he had laid all his cards on the table.⁹ Shigemitsu's idea was to show the Russians that the Japanese would stand firm, in order to derive greater concessions from them. In addition to this, the Foreign Ministry intended to prolong the negotiations at least until result of the Geneva Four Powers Summit became clear. Matsumoto seemed, however, to ignore this intention of the Foreign Ministry.

Shigemitsu's strong intention to control the negotiations from Tokyo was obvious. For example, on 4 June, he stated that, if southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles were returned to Japan, she would not fortify them.¹⁰ This statement seemed to be designed to emphasise the Japanese desire for the reversion of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Although this statement implied that Japan was prepared for concessions in order to obtain the return of these two territories, it is quite clear that Shigemitsu intended to control the negotiations in London by showing the Japanese

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eagerness to demand the return of them. Matsumoto implied, however, to the Russians that it would be possible for the Japanese to compromise on the territorial questions. Thus, the policy divergence between Hatoyama and Shigemitsu was reflected in the London talks as a tacit friction between Matsumoto and Shigemitsu.

To the seven points in the Japanese memorandum, the Soviet plenipotentiary did not show much reaction, except to say that he would refer the memorandum to his government and that he doubted whether its contents could be fitted into the peace treaty in question.' ' But at the third meeting on 14 June, Malik clarified Moscow's position. At the opening of the meeting, he submitted the Soviet draft of a peace treaty consisting of twelve articles. The first article referred to the mutual respect of the signatories for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs. As Matsumoto indicated in his seven points, the Japanese government paid a special attention to the importance of the non-interference principle. In Japan there were strong feelings that the Soviet Union was looking for any chance to subvert Japanese domestic politics and that the Soviets had the motivation to establish the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo as the centre for espionage activities. That is why the Japanese should put special emphasis on the non-interference principle. The first article of the Soviet draft, however, included this principle and in this sense it was not in

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conflict with one of the most significant lines which the Japanese government took.

The second article was not, however, one which the Japanese could accept. It referred to the restriction on Japanese attempts to establish any military alliances directed against countries which had fought against Japan in the last war. This article was not at all new, because in 1951 at the San Francisco Peace Conference, A.A. Gromyko had already proposed to amend the Anglo-American draft treaty and to include the same clause in a peace treaty with Japan. But this article in the Soviet draft came to have a different meaning from the clause submitted at the San Francisco Conference.

The International situation had changed since the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan was now one of the most important allies of the United States in the Far East, because of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, concluded together with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. In these circumstances, the second article of the Soviet draft must imply that the Soviet Union wanted to abolish the existing U.S.-Japanese military alliance. This article was, therefore, incompatible with the Japanese position described in the second paragraph of the seven points. Matsumoto sensitively responded to this article and asked Malik whether this provision was directed against the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Malik did not answer directly and just asked him to refer the proposal to the Japanese government. ¹²

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Article 3 stipulated that the Soviet Union renounced all reparation claims while the fourth article provided that Japan should renounce all claims against the U.S.S.R. which had arisen as a result of the war. These articles did not, therefore, become crucial items in the talks.

The fifth article was concerned with territorial problems, which were the most controversial questions between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. The article said:

Japan recognises the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the southern part of the island of Sakhalin, with all the islands adjacent to it, and over the Kurile islands, and renounces all rights, titles and claims to these territories. The state frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Japan lies along the middle of the Strait of Nemuro-Kaikyo, Notsuke-Kaikyo, as shown on the map appended.¹³

This provision was also the same as that which Gromyko had proposed in 1951, except that the clear definition of the national border between the two countries was included in the draft treaty. At any rate, in this article, the Soviet Union clarified that they would urge Japan to recognise the *de facto* and *de jure* sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. over the whole of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. This was in sharp conflict with the Japanese position. Matsumoto did not comment on this article at that moment, but the territorial issues would be literally the key to normalization of relations.

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Article 6 provided that both countries should not hinder the free navigation of commercial ships in the Straits La Perouse/Soya, Nemuro Kaikio, Notsuke-Kaikio, and Koemai-Kaikio, and that Japan should not prevent free navigation in the Straits Sangarski/Tsugaru and Tsushima. In addition to these, the second paragraph stipulates that the Straits mentioned above should be open for the passage only of those warships which belonged to powers adjacent to the Sea of Japan. What this article meant was that only warships of the P.R.C., the U.S.S.R., Japan, and both north and south Korea could navigate through those straits. In other words, the American navy was excluded from the Japan Sea. Japan who based her own military security on the alliance with the United States could by no means accept this provision. This article had already been contained in the Soviet proposals made by Gromyko for amendment of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It seemed that the Soviet Union had not changed their views on their aim to make the Japan Sea a Communist lake. Moreover, it seemed that the Soviets intended to make the U.S. Japanese alliance substantially ineffective.

In Article 7, the Soviet Union promised to support Japan's admission to the United Nations, and this article was compatible with the Japanese position. Both Articles 8 and 9 related to economic relations. The former stipulated that the contracting countries should start negotiations on a treaty of trade and navigation. The latter obliged both countries to enter into discussions on conservation of resources of fish and other fauna.

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These were not very much in conflict with the Japanese position, either.

Articles 10 and 11 were concerned with post and parcel exchange and the establishment of telephone-telegraph and radio links, and related to the development of cultural ties between the two countries. The final article defines the procedure of ratification. These three were unlikely to be controversial matters during the negotiations.¹⁴

Matsumoto declined to comment on the draft of the treaty. He intended to avoid getting involved in discussion on each article of the Soviet draft, since he had to keep insisting that the repatriation of detainees be a precondition for any negotiations on the normalization or a peace treaty. He only promised, therefore, to present the Japanese views on the draft afterwards, and took up instead the repatriation issues. Again, he emphasised that the Soviets should repatriate Japanese detainees in the U.S.S.R. prior to the start of substantial discussion on the other issues. Malik replied to Matsumoto that 1,016 ex-soldiers of the former Japanese Imperial Army and 357 civilians were detained in the U.S.S.R. and that they were all war criminals and were now serving their sentences. He added that the repatriation issues would be settled in Japan's favour as soon as a peace treaty was signed. Matsumoto considered that Malik did not intend to concede to Japan on the repatriation issue, but he resolutely requested

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the Soviets to reconsider the possibility of immediate repatriation.¹⁵

After these exchanges of views over three meetings, Japan was led to conclude that the Soviet Union was taking a very firm and rigid position. It was impossible for Japan to accept Articles 2, 5, and 6, and the Soviets refused to accept the Japanese request for the immediate repatriation of all detainees. Facing these attitudes of the U.S.S.R., the Japanese government decided to continue the negotiations patiently and firmly. On 16 June, Shigemitsu explained the development of the negotiations at the Standing Committee of the House of Representatives. He stated that the Soviet attitude towards Japan was not at all different from the proposals made by Gromyko in 1951, and that it seemed that the Soviets had never changed their opinion since then. He declared, however, that the Japanese Government would continue to insist on their own positions and that, at the same time, they would make efforts to realise normalization.¹⁶

As the result of the third meeting, Matsumoto reconsidered how to manage the future negotiations. Because their drafts showed a wide gap between the two sides on such important issues as repatriation and the territorial problem and the irrelevance of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, he also had to expect great difficulty in proceeding with the negotiations. But he did not consider that the draft treaty indicated the ultimate position of the Soviet Union and decided to adopt a very flexible negotiating

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strategy in order to grasp what the Russians really wanted to gain, and to achieve Japan's purposes.

The strategy consisted of the following four factors. First of all, the discussion about the Soviet draft treaty should be avoided in the negotiations, and the repatriation of Japanese detainees prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty should be repeatedly demanded. Secondly, the Japanese should gradually transfer the focus of the discussions towards the territorial questions and political problems such as the issue of treatment of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. While doing so, the Japanese should demonstrate their firm resolution that unless the U.S.S.R. indicated their sincerity with respect to questions of territories, of U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, and the repatriation of detainees, they would not begin the discussion on other questions. Thirdly, by doing this, the Japanese should find out what the Soviets really wanted to gain. Finally, the presentation of a Japanese draft should be postponed, since, if this had been submitted, it would have meant that Japan agreed to begin the talks for normalization without insisting on the fulfilment of their request for immediate repatriation of detainees.¹⁷

Indeed, Matsumoto intended not to get involved in substantial discussion for normalization by avoiding presenting a Japanese draft. But he now clearly deviated from the negotiating tactics which was embodied in Instruction No. 16. The Instruction

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provided that the Japanese delegation should negotiate important issues such as the territorial question and repatriation question, when the Soviet confirmed that they would recognize the S.F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Besides this, the Japanese were instructed to obtain a Soviet promise not to undertake any subversive activities. But Matsumoto now discussed the territorial and the repatriation questions without obtaining such a promise from the Russians. Actually, the Russian draft was designed to prohibit the U.S. naval fleets from navigating through the three straits. More importantly, the Russians attempted to prohibit the Japanese from entering into any military alliance which was aimed at any countries which had fought against Japan in W.W.II. As far as Instruction No.16 was concerned, the Soviet attitudes were not conciliatory enough for the Japanese to move to the substantial discussions. Nevertheless, Matsumoto decided at that stage to start to discuss the territorial and repatriation issues. He seemed to speed up the negotiations for achieving immediate normalization.

In Tokyo, Shigemitsu seems to have been anxious as to how Matsumoto would deal with the Soviet draft. Shigemitsu had stated in the Diet, the Government intended to continue to cope with the Soviets by keeping the resolute position against their draft treaty. He was, however, probably afraid that Matsumoto would gradually withdraw from the original position of the government. On 18 June, the Foreign Ministry instructed him to follow the original policy line of the government and

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to require the repatriation as a prerequisite condition for starting
of the normalization talks.^{1e}

Both plenipotentiaries were exchanging opening gambits by demonstrating their own fundamental positions at the first stage of the negotiations, especially at the second and the third meeting. After this stage, the negotiations would go into detailed discussions over the most important problems between the two countries: the territorial and the repatriation questions.

REPATRIATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

The fourth meeting was held at the Japanese Embassy on 21 June. At this meeting both plenipotentiaries discussed the repatriation issues. Matsumoto started by emphasising the importance which the Japanese government attached to the immediate repatriation of internees. He explained to Malik that the government regarded a settlement of the repatriation problems as imperative to create a favourable atmosphere for the negotiations. Malik replied that the Soviet government regarded the normalization of relations as the first and most important matter to be settled and any attempt by the Japanese delegation to impose prior conditions would not help in creating the favourable atmosphere. He added that

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the Soviet government would be ready to deal with the repatriation problem favourably at the same time as the normalization of relations was taking place.¹⁹ Both plenipotentiaries showed a sharp difference over the timing of the repatriation of detainees.

Matsumoto emphasized again that the question of timing was most crucial for the Japanese government because the Japanese people were calling for immediate repatriation. He asked Malik to collect the names of Japanese detainees, 1,016 ex-soldiers and 357 civilians. Malik answered that it would take much time to make a list of detainees because they were scattered all over Russia, and he warned that any attempt to settle this question first would only delay the main negotiations.²⁰ This meeting resulted in nothing but the mutual confirmation that they had conflicting ideas about the timing of repatriation.

On 24 June, the territorial problem were for the first time discussed between the two plenipotentiaries at the fifth meeting. At the opening of the meeting, taking up the territorial issue, Matsumoto argued that the Habomais and Shikotan were historically and geographically inalienable Japanese territories, and that, when ex-Prime Minister Yoshida had referred to the same view at the San Francisco Conference, no objection had been raised.²¹ Matsumoto handed to the Soviets a document which described the historical background of legal status

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of these islands, the definition of the area which had been called the Habomais and Shikotan, and how international treaties had been dealing with them.²²

According to the records on Matsumoto's argument at the meeting, it seems that the discussion was centred on the disposition of the Habomais and Shikotan, though Foreign Ministry's original policy intended to submit the hardest demand to the Russians: reversion of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. It cannot be denied that the Russians may have obtained an impression from Matsumoto's treatment of the territorial question that Japan's main concern was with the Habomais and Shikotan, not with the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Matsumoto slightly moderated the original governmental stance on the territorial issues, so that the Soviet might be able to accept it relatively easily.

Malik reacted to Matsumoto's attempt in two ways. First of all, he suggested that they should both look at the points on which they seemed to agree, and that it seemed that both parties were willing to restore relations and exchange ambassadors. He tried to demonstrate the basic Soviet position that the Russians were very anxious to settle normalization even without solving any other area of conflict between the two countries. Secondly, he moved into the territorial question, arguing that they had already been settled in Russia's favour by various international agreements. As examples, Malik listed the Yalta Agreement,

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Clause 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, the Army and Navy General Directive No.1, and S.C.A.P.I.N. No.677. In addition, he referred to Yoshida's statement at the San Francisco Conference and asserted that the reason why there had not been any objection to it was that the U.S. had put pressure on the participating countries to refrain from raising objections. After rebutting the Japanese views in this way, he concluded his remarks, saying 'The present Russian proposals were more magnanimous than the San Francisco Treaty and imposed no unilateral obligation upon Japan. If relations between the two countries could be normalized in this generous way, a new era would dawn in relations between the two countries.'²³

The Japanese attempted to refute Malik's argument. Matsumoto explained that, in the view of the Japanese government, none of the documents referred to by Malik covered the final disposition of these islands, and that the S.C.A.P.I.N. No.677 distinguished the Habomais and Shikotan from the Kuriles and made it clear in its contents that it did not define any ultimate status of territories. But Malik just repeated his original remark.²⁴

At the sixth meeting on 28 June , Matsumoto tenaciously tried to persuade the Russians to reconsider the repatriation question and requested Malik to inform the Japanese government of the names of detainees. Malik avoided answering this request and reiterated that, if the Japanese government were anxious to settle the repatriation questions as soon as possible, it should

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hasten the normalization of relations.²⁵ At this stage of negotiations, it became clear that the Soviets attempted to take advantage of the strong Japanese desire for repatriation to settle normalization in Russia's favour, just as the Japanese were trying to use the Soviet desire for early normalization to achieve repatriation.

Since the delegates had not made any progress on the repatriation issue, they entered discussion on territorial questions. Matsumoto eagerly rebutted Malik's views expressed at the previous meeting. First of all, he explained that, according to international precedents, territorial changes as a result of war had to be covered in a peace treaty. He argued that the only international treaty defining the range of Japanese territories was the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and that Article 2 of that treaty did not stipulate the ultimate status of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Secondly, he clarified the Japanese interpretation of the validity of the Yalta Agreement. Because Japan had neither participated in the Yalta Conference nor signed the agreement, the territorial clause in the Yalta secret agreement was invalid as far as Japan was concerned. Furthermore, regarding S.C.A.P.I.N. No.677 and General Directive No.1, Matsumoto claimed that they were only decisions on technical procedures to cope with the Japanese surrender. He concluded that the Soviet justification based on the documents prior to the San Francisco Peace Treaty was totally wrong and

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strongly emphasized that the territorial question had not yet been settled.²⁶

Responding to this, Malik repeated that the territorial problem was in any case all settled, and suggested that, even though the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not mention the disposition of the Habomais and Shikotan, there was no question but that they belonged to the Soviet Union. Added to this, Malik pointed out that the real trouble was that in Japan there were many anti-normalization groups influenced by the U.S. He expressed his suspicion that the U.S. had put pressure on the Japanese to make the immediate repatriation of detainees, the precondition for normalization, and warned the Japanese government against doing it.²⁷

Matsumoto insisted, however, on the immediate repatriation of detainees and the solution of the territorial question. After that, he responded to Malik's remarks with regard to the domestic situation of Japan, suggesting that, although some Japanese had not been very willing to hold the present talks, there was a general desire among Liberals and Socialists as well as Democrats for the restoration of diplomatic relations and that everyone in Japan was most anxious that the internees should first be repatriated and that the territorial problem should be settled. By saying this, he implied that if these two issues were settled, the normalization would be supported by all Japanese.²⁸ Matsumoto's aim was apparently to use the domestic lack of

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consensus to normalization as a lever to make the Soviets concede on the repatriation and territorial questions. In a sense, this was one of the most effective negotiating tools for the Japanese. If Japan's domestic consensus remained divided with respect to these two problems, it would be very likely that the normalization could not be ratified in the Diet, even if it should be signed by the plenipotentiaries. It was not very wise for the U.S.S.R. to ignore the Japan's domestic situation.

During the first month since the negotiations had started, some points had become clear. First of all, the U.S.S.R. and Japan had demonstrated a sharp difference between their positions with regard to the territorial question. As mentioned above, the ultimate territorial demand by Japan was for the return of the Habomais and Shikotan, even though Matsumoto expressed Japan's view that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were the historically and geographically inalienable territories of Japan. On the other hand, the Soviet Union took the position that the territorial question were all settled in Russia's favour in the Yalta Agreement, and the other documents made at the end of WWII. In short, the Soviets refused to accept even the ultimate demand of Japan. Secondly, they did not intend to make any concession on the repatriation issues, but the Japanese persistently attempted to trade Russian acceptance of immediate repatriation for their own acceptance of normalization. To sum up, although both countries were willing to restore diplomatic relations with each other, the negotiations reached a stalemate.

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Territorial questions and repatriation issues had been dealt with as the main items of agenda at the fourth, fifth, and sixth meetings. But political problems with regard to U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty were not discussed at all, though after the third meeting Matsumoto tried gradually to steer the discussions towards topics about the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Why did he stick to territorial problems and repatriation questions?

This was mainly because the Foreign Ministry instructed him not to hasten the negotiations. Matsumoto wrote in his memoirs that Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, sent an instruction that the frequency of meetings should be reduced from twice a week to once a week and that no reasons for this were indicated in the instruction.²⁹ In addition, he sometimes quoted this instruction as evidence which proved Shigemitsu's reluctance to carry out the normalization talks. But the truth was that the Foreign Ministry sent more detailed instructions. On 30 June, two staff of the Japanese Embassy in London, Shigemitsu Akira (the first secretary, a nephew of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu) and Sunobe Ryôzô (the first secretary), called on A.L. Mayall of the Foreign Office to report the development of the negotiations. They told Mayall that the Japanese government instructed them not to push the negotiations along too fast until the Four Power Summit Meeting which would be held from 18 July but instead to hold meetings only once a week. The Japanese officials explained to Mayall that this was why the Japanese delegation were limiting the talks to two subjects: the repatriation of Japanese detainees

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and sovereignty over former Japanese northern territories.³⁰ If so, the reason for reducing the pace of the negotiations was not Shigemitsu's interruption of progress in the negotiation but his attempt to break through by using the outcome of the Summit to support Japanese claims. In short, facing the stalemate in negotiations, the Japanese government attempted to carry out filibuster tactics in order to wait for the world political situation to turn in Japan's favour. Shigemitsu's instruction mentioned above was an example of it.

The Japanese government paid much attention to the Four Power Summit. The prime minister, Hatoyama, sometimes stated in the Diet that international politics would be directed towards world peace by the Summit Conference, and that there would, therefore, be no reason for the Soviet Union to stick to the small problems such as the Habomais and Shikotan. Shigemitsu was much cooler than Hatoyama in his expectation of drastic change in international politics as a result of the Summit, but he also recognised that it was likely that the Summit should contribute to reduction of tension between East and West.³¹ On 1 June, Ōda Takio, the minister at the Japanese Embassy to Britain, visited Geoffrey Harrison, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of the Western Department at the Foreign Office. The purpose of his visit was to obtain information regarding the western powers' plans for the Summit Conference, and, specifically, to know whether the Conference would discuss Far Eastern matters or not. In his conversations with Harrison, Oda expressed his

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anxiety that an unsuccessful result of the Four Power Conference would have some harmful effects on the Russo-Japanese negotiations. Harrison answered that the western powers did not intend to deal with far eastern matters at the Conference.³² But the Japanese still expected the Conference to affect the negotiations in London.

Apart from its attempt to take advantage of the Four Power Conference, the Foreign Ministry approached the British Foreign Office with a request to support the Japanese claims to the repatriation of detainees on Soviet soil. As already mentioned above, on 30 June, Sigemitsu, and Sunobe, called on Mayall. At the meeting, Sunobe expressed his hope for an early decision by the British government to release Japanese war criminals in its hands so that the Japanese could use this as 'an additional argument to obtain the repatriation from the Soviet Union of those Japanese whom the Russian declared to be war criminals.'³³ They could, however, not obtain any clear answer to their hope from the Foreign Office.

The seventh meeting was scheduled to be held on 5 July, but the Soviet plenipotentiary suddenly flew back to Moscow three days earlier, in order to participate in consultations over the coming Four Power Summit Conference. In the meantime, the Japanese government took another step to obtain strong supports from the western powers for the Japanese position in the negotiations, especially with respect to the territorial issue.

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The Japanese government decided to deliver to the U.S., Britain and France a questionnaire regarding the legal status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.

REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES

It is needless to say Japan was the most important ally to the United States government, strategically and politically, in its far eastern policy.³⁴ Soviet-Japanese relations was, therefore, one of the most sensitive matters for the Americans. Before the negotiations started in London, the U.S. had been trying to exert influence on the Japanese through statements of the Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command or the personal message from the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, to the prime minister, Hatoyama. Moreover, the Dulles memorandum of January to some extent affected the decision making in the Japanese government. But the U.S. did not seem to attempt to intervene directly in the negotiations after they had begun. In this section, the American reactions to the negotiation in London will be dealt with.

Even though the American wished to avoid any direct involvement, the Japanese government sent the U.S. government a questionnaire on the territorial question, at the end of June or

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the beginning of July. The contents of the questionnaire were as follows:

- 1) Should the Yalta Agreement, which was not known to Japan at the time of its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and which was not referred to in the said Declaration, be considered the determination by the Allied Powers as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the said Declaration?³⁵
- 2) Does the American government consider that the Soviet Union can singly and unilaterally decide the disposition of the sovereignty over the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin?³⁵

In response to the questionnaire, the State Department prepared a confidential document entitled 'Territorial Issues: Japan-Soviet Negotiations' probably before 5 July. The first part dealt with the basic American position with respect to the territorial question and, therefore, constituted its reply to the questionnaire. Its view consisted of the following six arguments:

- a) The U.S.S.R. cannot singly and unilaterally make the determination referred to in paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Declaration since the proclamation clearly leaves the question of Japanese territorial determination for subsequent consideration by the signatory powers to the Declaration.
- b) The Yalta Agreement was not meant to be a final determination of purposes expressed therein. It was a statement of common purpose reached by the leaders of the U.K., U.S., and U.S.S.R. Japan is not bound by the terms of the Agreement since Japan was not a party to it.
- c) Shikotan and the Habomais are legally, historically and geographically an integral part of Hokkaido and are not a part of the Kuriles.
- d) Neither General Order No.1 nor S.C.A.P.I.N. 677 should be construed as the final determination of status of these territories.
- e) Although Japan renounced all her rights to the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, the San Francisco Treaty did not transfer the title to the islands to another state.
- f) As the U.S. Congress confirmed at the time of ratification of the Peace Treaty with Japan, the disposition

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of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin is 'a matter of future international negotiation.'³⁷

Added to these, the document noted that the Japanese government could quote these views as *Japanese points of view*. In fact, this part was sent to the Japanese government as the reply to its questionnaire.

Secondly, under the heading of American objectives, the document indicated that the U.S. wished that Japan could secure all possible gains in the negotiations, but that she wanted Japan to support her own cases without any possibility of shifting the responsibility for any failure of the negotiations to U.S. interference.

Finally, as the position the U.S. government had to take towards the public, the following three points were made:

- a) In view of U.S. public attitude of lack of immediate concern with the negotiations, the U.S. government should deal with the development of the negotiations very carefully, avoiding any implication of U.S. involvement.
- b) The U.S. should repeat that the Habomais and Shikotan are Japanese territory.
- c) Regarding the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, the U.S. government should state that their position clarified at the time of ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty had not been changed.³⁸

What can be seen from this document is that the Americans were trying to avoid appearing to be interfering in the Japanese

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decision making or in the talks in London. But this did not exclude the possibility of U.S. intervention behind the scenes in the negotiations, and of its announcement of moral support for the Japanese stance. The document also included the implication that if the American public or their government itself recognised their 'immediate concern with the negotiation', they would possibly get drawn into the negotiation openly. Nevertheless, its basic tone was that the government should avoid any possibility that it would have to take the responsibility for any Japanese failure in the London talks. Considering the U.S. perception of the importance of Japan, she could not worsen U.S.-Japanese relations which had been already damaged by the Lucky Dragon Incidents in 1954. This may have been one of the most important reasons why the State Department tried to avoid the appearance of the U.S. intervention in the talks between Japan and the U.S.S.R.

The State Department seems to have tried to build up a kind of united front with Britain in order to collect information about the negotiations in London and to advise the Japanese. On 2 June, M.G.L. Joy of the British Embassy in Washington saw Richard B. Finn of the Japanese Desk at the State Department and discussed Japanese matters. In the ³conversations, Finn suggested that it would be necessary to keep in the closest contact over the impending Russo-Japanese negotiations, and implied that the State Department had asked the U.S. Embassy in London to keep a close eye on the development of the negotiations and maintain contact

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with the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department. This meant that the U.S. State Department wanted to collaborate with the British to cope with the Russo-Japanese normalization. Why did they want to do so?

It may be the most important reason that the U.S. officials may have recognised that there was a certain difference in views over the various problems regarding the talks in London. Finn suggested that neither Britain nor the U.S. should offer the Japanese any advice without coordinating their policies with each other. 'Otherwise there was a danger that our counsels would be contradictory,' he said.³⁹ In fact, there had been divergent views between the U.S. and Britain on the status of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin when they were making the draft peace treaty with Japan in 1950-1. At the stage of drafting, the British government expressed the view that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be handed over to the Soviet Union and that the peace treaty should stipulate it clearly. On the other hand, the Americans insisted that the peace treaty should stipulate only the renunciation by Japan of all rights to those territories. It was not wise for both of the two countries to widen the gap between themselves which had already been caused by sharp frictions with regard to the 'Yoshida Letter'⁴⁰ and the Geneva Conference for the Indochina War in 1954. Paradoxically, the more salient became reduction of tensions between East and West, the more eagerly the leader of each bloc sought the consolidation of their own camp. Under these circumstances, the

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United States had to avoid disagreeing openly with the other major allies in the western bloc. That was why the U.S. sought collaboration with Britain to cope with the Russo-Japanese normalization.

There was another reason. Referring to Anglo-Japanese relations, Finn suggested as follows:

The United Kingdom is in many matters better placed than the United States to influence the Japanese: historically, because of their constitution, and for other reasons, the Japanese find themselves more in sympathy with the United Kingdom than the United States. I think the G.A.T.T. problems with the Japanese are comparatively unimportant. ⁴¹

If this remark had any significance, it can be argued that the United States, at least the Japanese Desk of the State Department, considered the role of Britain to cope with Japan as a very important one.

This consideration may have been based on American perception of prevailing anti-American sentiment in Japan in the middle of 1950s. The U.S. government, therefore, must have felt some difficulty in dealing with the Japanese. On the other hand, it seemed to the Americans that Anglo-Japanese relations were better than U.S.-Japanese relations at that time, despite the G.A.T.T. problems in the former. Thus, they may have considered that it would be more effective to exert indirect influence on

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the Japanese through the channels of Anglo-Japanese relations than to do it directly. They tried, therefore, to cooperate closely with the British in coping with Japan.

Added to this, it cannot be denied that the U.S. government intended to share the responsibility for dealing with the Japanese with the other important western allies. The Japanese government sent to Britain and France the same questionnaire on the territorial question as they sent to the Americans. There is evidence proving that the U.S. government suggested to the Japanese to do so. The British Ambassador to Japan, Dening reported that he obtained from the staff of the Foreign Ministry an information that, after discussion with the American government the Japanese seemed to have decided to send the same questionnaire to Britain and France.⁴² The American attempt can be interpreted as efforts to involve the two countries in the Russo-Japanese territorial problem. The U.S. government may have tried to make it ambiguous, who would have to take the responsibility, by involving them in the matter.

BRITISH VIEWS AND REACTION

The British position regarding the normalization talks in London was a kind of non-committal policy. From an early stage in the

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Russo-Japanese talks, the British government occasionally made it clear that it would not take any initiative in the negotiations, though it welcomed the fact that London had been accepted as the site for negotiations in late April. On 26 April, *The Times*, for instance, reported that, if the talks were held in London it would not mean that Britain was sponsoring them or that she would take any part in them. In addition, shortly before the opening of the talks, *The Times* reported that the British government had expressed its willingness for the talks to be held in London, but that it was taking no part in them.⁴³

It was in the British reply to the Japanese questionnaire on the territorial issues sent to the Foreign Office on 5 July that the British government more clearly showed their reluctance to get involved in the normalization talks. As the questionnaire sent to the United States government, it consisted of the following two questions as to: 1) Whether the British government considers that Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration refers to the Yalta Agreement; 2) whether the British government considers that the Soviet Union can singly and unilaterally decide the disposition of sovereignty over the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin.

On 11 July, the British government sent back its reply containing its informal views. According to the Matsumoto Memoirs, the British reply was as follows:

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- 1) It is irrelevant to consider that Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration refers to the Yalta Agreement.
- 2) The Soviet Union cannot singly decide that the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin are Soviet territories.⁴⁴

As for the contents of the British answers we have so far had to rely on the Matsumoto Memoirs. But thanks to the recent release of American and British documents, it now becomes possible to use official primary sources with regard to this issue. Relying on some British and American documents, it must be pointed out that Matsumoto's accounts with regard to the British answers to the Japanese questionnaire were not entirely true.

Regarding the British answer to the first Japanese question, it was revealed by a British document of 1956:

We have no doubt that the Yalta Agreement should not be considered as the determination by the Allied Powers foreshadowed in paragraph 8 of Potsdam Declaration.⁴⁵

This line was substantially the same as Matsumoto's description. But as to the British answer to the second question, his description seems to be incompatible with other evidence relating to this issue. According to various American and British documents, it seems that the British government actually sent the Japanese an answer which was unfavourable to them.

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On 18 August, about a month after the Foreign Office had handed over its answers to Japan, Sir Esler Dening in Tokyo commented on the second British answer, saying:

....the second opinion which seems to me to amount to possession being nine points of the law, hardly finds favour with the Japanese; indeed Hogen, the new head of the Russian Section in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Ledward last week that the Ministry did not agree with it. The Russians, on the other hand, if they got to know of our opinion, would no doubt be very pleased with it.....⁴⁶

In addition, in July 1956, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu asked the British government to permit him to quote the British answers in his negotiations with the Soviets in Moscow. Interestingly, Shigemitsu only desired to use the answer to the first Japanese question. With regard to his request, the Foreign Office commented as follows. William D. Allen, the assistant under-secretary in charge of the Far Eastern Department, suggested that the British second answer was 'of course of less help to the Japanese'.⁴⁷ C.T. Crowe of the Far Eastern Department also said:

Question two is of course a very different matter and might lead us into controversy from which we shall do well to stay clear. But fortunately the Japanese have not asked permission to use the second answer, and in any event, it would not help their case.⁴⁸

Both of them indicated that the British second answer was unfavourable to the Japanese. If the British had really responded to the questionnaire as Matsumoto described in his memoirs, the Japanese would have desired to quote the second answer as well. ✓
But they did not.

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There is another clearer evidence suggesting that the British government in fact answered that those islands could be legally possessed by the Russians without any confirmation such as a peace treaty. In September 1956, the American government had a plan to establish an international cooperation with Britain for supporting Japan's claims to the southern Kuriles. This plan could not, however, obtain a consent from the American ambassador to Japan. Ambassador Allison expressed one of the reasons for his opposition as follows:

U.K.[sic] even suggested U.S.S.R.[sic] would acquire preemptive rights by *de facto* possession in course of time.⁴⁹

The British answers had actually been communicated to the American government in the summer of 1955. Hence, Allison's account must have been based on the real contents of the second British answer. If so, it now becomes understandable why the Japanese did not want to quote the second British answer. Although it is still dangerous to rely on Allison's accounts entirely, it seems reasonable to conclude tentatively that the British government sent the Japanese the answer unfavourable to them. In fact, the Foreign Office held the views that the Russian claim to southern Sakhalin was incontestable and that the Soviet Union had acquired sovereignty *de facto* and probably also *de jure* over the Kuriles.⁵⁰ The second British answer must have been based on these official legal views.

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As mentioned above, the British government adopted a sort of non-committal policy over the normalization issue. Hence, the Foreign Office transmitted the answers as unofficial communication and as an oral statement. In Tokyo, Denning had a very strong suspicion about the Japanese motivation behind their demand on reversion of their former islands which were occupied by the Russians. He considered that the Japanese were taking advantage of their negotiations with the U.S.S.R. 'to try to re-open the whole question of their territorial cessions under Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty of Peace.' He even considered that the Foreign Office should not have given any answer to the Japanese questionnaire.⁵¹ Why did it give a reply to the Japanese? London was not able to refuse to give any answer because the Japanese had put similar questions to the Americans and the French, who gave them a reply.⁵²

Perhaps, the British could have sent a reply such as Matsumoto described in his memoirs, despite its legal position which was not in favour of the Japanese. At that time, as shown in the previous chapter, the British government was faced with the necessity of improving Anglo-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, why did it send such a reply which could irritate the Japanese government? Because of lack of documents, it is hardly possible to give a definite answer to this question. But at least the following two points can be argued. Firstly, the British may have recognized that keeping good relations with Russia was significant to their national interests. For example, the

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British took the initiative in convening the Four Power Summit at Geneva. In 1954, Anthony Eden, the then British foreign secretary, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had cooperated in settling the Indochina war at the Geneva Conference. Perhaps, the British government had no intention to worsen its relations with Moscow in order to keep good relations with the Japanese even by distorting its legal interpretation of the status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.

Secondly, the British tended to maintain and recognize the status quo in the far east established after the Pacific war. This tendency could be seen in their attitude towards the issue of the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin during the peace making with Japan in 1951. The British had asserted that the Yalta Secret Agreement should be implemented by the S.F.P.T. In 1954, they also showed this tendency in the Geneva Conference. They seemed to settle the Indochina war by respecting the situations which were produced by the war and by confirming and freezing those situations as the status quo. The British held the view that local stability in Asia should and could be maintained by confirming the status quo by establishing some arrangements to maintain the status quo. In the Southeast Asia, S.E.A.T.O. had an aspect of being a device to maintain the status quo. Perhaps, they took a similar attitude towards Soviet-Japanese relations. The territorial dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Japan was a source of local conflict in the far east. Settling this kind of dispute in a peaceful way was in accordance

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with British national interests. The British government may have held the view that expressing its official legal interpretation of the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin would restrain the Americans and the Japanese from taking unrealistically tough attitude towards the Russians.

It is not at all clear how the British answers affected the Japanese government. But it is not difficult to imagine that it must have been disappointed by the second British answer. At least, it must have realized that Japan could not and perhaps would not obtain any strong British support for her claims to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.

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5. Matsumoto, p. 29.
6. Minute by W.D. Allen, 16 June 1955, F.O. 371 115233, F.J..
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7. Matsumoto, pp. 30-1.
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9. Dening to the Foreign Office, 17 June 1955, F.O.³⁷¹ 115233,
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15. Matsumoto, p.32.
16. Asahi, 17 June 1955.

17. Matsumoto, pp. 32-3.
18. Mainichi, 19 June 1955.
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40. For the 'Yoshida Letter', see Hosoya Chihiro *San Furansisuko Kôwa Eno Michi*, pp. 279-81, pp. 299-305.
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42. Dening to Allen, 27 July 1955, F.O. 115233, F.J.10338/56.
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which are still retained by the Foreign Office.

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CHAPTER 5 THE LONDON TALKS: PHASE II

SOVIET CONCESSIONS

Soviet Plenipotentiary Yakob Malik, who had returned to Moscow at the beginning of July, arrived back in London on 14 July. The main purpose of his journey to Moscow is assumed to have been to assist the preparations in the Kremlin for the Four Power Summit Conference in Geneva.¹ But the negotiation which was held after his return from Moscow suggested that Malik came back to London with some new instructions for concessions to the Japanese. On 15 July, at the seventh meeting, the main items on the agenda were again the territorial and the repatriation issues. Malik and Matsumoto repeated their previous contentions and did not reach any agreement on those questions. It should not be ignored, however, that the Soviet plenipotentiary gave a subtle indication of Soviet preparedness to compromise on the issue of a military alliance, which was expressed in article 2 in the Soviet draft treaty. During the meeting, Malik asked whether the phrase 'the obligations which Japan has in the treaties with the United States', contained in the memorandum submitted by Matsumoto at the beginning of the negotiations, included obligations directed against some third countries.² He may have tried to obtain a guarantee from Matsumoto that the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact was not an anti-Soviet alliance. This was the

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first step towards a concession on the Soviet side. Perhaps the Soviet Union needed that guarantee in order to justify her concession. It is not clear how Matsumoto reacted to the question posed by Malik. According to his memoirs, Matsumoto seems not to have replied to Malik's enquiry. After the meeting described above, Malik left London again for Geneva to attend the Summit Conference.

On 26 July, the eighth meeting was held after Malik had come back from Geneva. At this meeting, he, for the first time, clearly indicated Soviet willingness to remove Article 2 of their draft treaty, stipulating that Japan should not participate in any military alliance against the countries which had fought against her during W.W.II. Matsumoto took up this issue, saying that the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty was a measure undertaken purely for purposes of self-defence in the form of a collective agreement, and that it was, therefore, not directed against any third power. The Soviet plenipotentiary replied that, concerning the second paragraph of Article 2 the Soviet Union had no intention to ask Japan to renounce her existing treaties with other powers.^a This implied that the Russians would adopt a flexible stance on the issue of Japan's military alliance. On the repatriation issue, the Soviets also make a favourable gesture: Malik expressed Russian readiness to repatriate 16 of the war criminals who had already completed their sentences and promised to supply the names of all the Japanese detainees as soon as possible. But he still held on to the view that the

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detainees would be returned to Japan when diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored.⁴

It seems that these conciliatory Russian gestures were influenced by the Four Powers Summit Conference in Geneva. Indeed Soviet concessions were first noticed after Malik had come back from the Summit Meeting. But no direct influence could be seen. In fact, no items relating to the Soviet-Japanese negotiations were dealt with in Geneva. The Japanese Foreign Ministry was reported to hold that there was no reason to believe that the Soviet attitude towards Japan would change as a result of the Geneva Conference.⁵ Rather the general atmosphere of 'thaw' generated by the Conference created a favourable psychological condition and the Soviets may have taken advantage of this. Although those present at the Geneva Conference could not reach any remarkable specific agreements, it was widely felt that international tensions between East and West blocs had been considerably reduced. The public image of the Soviet Union in the western countries ⁿ had improved. In this situation, Soviet concessions could be more effective than before, because western public opinion tended to regard such concessions as a genuine indication of peaceful attitude of the Soviet Union. In the intensified atmosphere of 'thaw', if the Japanese refused to accept Soviet concessions, the Soviets could accuse western countries of not wanting to reduce international tension.

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At the ninth meeting on 2 August, Matsumoto for the first time commented on the Soviet draft. His comments covered its articles except Article 2 (prohibition of Japan's military alliance), Article 5 (the territorial issue) and Article 6 (the straits issue). Commenting the draft, he made clear that despite minor differences, both parties could reach agreement without great difficulty on most articles, except the three above.

In order to settle those three difficult issues, Matsumoto managed to keep up the pace of the negotiations by holding informal meetings with Malik. According to his memoirs, he considered that it would be useful to change the atmosphere by such informal conversations and decided to invite the Soviet diplomatic corps to luncheon.⁶ Matsumoto intended to take advantage of the 'thaw' created by the Geneva Conference and to pursue the talks in a more friendly spirit. On 4 August, the first informal meeting was held by the Japanese delegation and the Soviet negotiators were invited. During the meeting, Malik asked what was Japan's ultimate territorial demand. The Japanese plenipotentiary replied that the Habomais and Shikotan were regarded as a part of Hokkaido and that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin could not be renounced because of the historical background of those islands. This reply may have been intended to imply to the Soviets that Japan's minimum territorial demand was to restore the Habomais and Shikotan. Matsumoto clearly implied that the Japanese had a stronger desire for the

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Habomais and Shikotan by indicating that these were a part of Hokkaido, namely undoubtedly an integral part of Japan. Malik seemed to understand Matsumoto's subtle signal. He replied that the Japanese had already renounced their claims to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in the S.F.P.T.⁷

A clear result of this informal conversation quickly came out. On 5 August, when Matsumoto invited the Soviet plenipotentiary to a tea party, Malik suggested that the Soviet Union would make concessions on the territorial issue and the treatment of Japan's right to participate in a military alliance. Despite its length, Malik's statement as recorded by Matsumoto is worth quoting here.

On 5 August, while we were having tea, Mr. Malik all of a sudden and vaguely said, 'If all of the other questions are settled, we could hand over the small Kuriles (= Russian terminology indicating the Habomais and Shikotan) in accordance with the Japanese request. As regards the clause prohibiting a military alliance, if the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact is genuinely defensive as you previously mentioned, we can withdraw this clause when the other problems are settled.' At first I did not believe what I had heard, but was very pleased, assuming that Malik had received some new instructions from his seniors such as Bulganin and Khrushchev... and that he would propose some new lines.⁸[My brackets]

Matsumoto's assumption was correct. At the next formal meeting, the Soviets confirmed the informal statement of the concessions. On 9 August, Malik officially announced Soviet willingness to return the Habomais and Shikotan and to drop the clause prohibiting Japan's participation in any military

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alliance. According to Matsumoto's memoirs, which is the only available account of the Soviet proposal, Malik related:

With regard to Article 2(2) (=prohibition of a military alliance), Plenipotentiary Matsumoto gave assurances that none of the treaties which Japan had concluded including the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact are directed against any specific third countries. Given this assurance by the Japanese government, we consider that this problem will be settled when both sides reach agreements on the other questions.

As for the small Kuriles, I would like to state as follows: On the Soviet part, we would think that both parties of the negotiations can work out an agreement on this problem, by not separating the issue of the Habomais and Shikotan from the other territorial problems, but linking up with them, and together with a satisfactory settlement of the problems above. "[My bracket]"

Malik suggested that the return of the Habomais and Shikotan should be dependent on whether a peace treaty was concluded or not and on how the disposal of the rest of the territories in question was dealt with. This implied that the Russian government would concede those islands on condition that Japan should recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Though there is no evidence Malik's suggestion exposing Soviet intentions, the fact that the Russian draft treaty clearly indicated their desire to secure Japan's recognition of Soviet possession of the Kuriles and Sakhalin supported the above speculation. In addition, Malik also seemed to link the reversion of the small Kuriles with a settlement of the straits question. The Soviet Union had not yet shown their willingness to make a concession on this issue. The Soviets must have held this as a bargaining card.

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It is now necessary to examine why the Soviet Union made the territorial concession over the Habomais and Shikotan and why they did so at this time. First of all, the Soviets must have come to realize that the territorial issue was so crucial for the Japanese that they would not agree to restore diplomatic relations without gaining some reasonable territorial concessions from the U.S.S.R. Because the Soviet Union strongly desired immediate normalization, they intended to settle this key problem as soon as possible by indicating their willingness to hand some of the territories back to the Japanese. In fact, through examining the past attitudes of the Japanese government and the Japanese negotiators, the Soviets could easily have formed an impression that Japan's minimum territorial demand was for the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan. It must be remembered that since the conclusion of the S.F.P.T., the Japanese government had been continuously asserting that the return of the Habomais and Shikotan was a condition prerequisite to negotiating the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Hatoyama had stated before the start of the London talks that the Japanese government could request those islands to be returned.

The Soviets also may have taken into account the fact that Dulles had stated at the San Francisco Peace Conference that the U.S. recognized that the Habomais and Shikotan were Japanese territories and the fact that he did not make any reference to other territories at the conference. It can be assumed that the

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Soviets knew that the Japanese would not be able to obtain positive support from the U.S. for their demand for more than the Habomais and Shikotan. Matsumoto's implication on 5 August was the most important indication that the minimum territorial concession required by the Japanese was the restitution of the Habomais and Shikotan.

The Soviet assessment of U.S.-Japanese relations must have been another important factor. It must be assumed that the Soviets had been regarding U.S. pressure on the Japanese as the main obstacle to the normalization. In order to achieve the normalization as soon as possible and also for more general political purposes, the Soviets aimed to weaken U.S.-Japanese ties. The concession over the Habomais and Shikotan was made partly for this purpose. Generally, U.S.-Japanese relations seemed less smooth than before, in particular than they had been in the Yoshida era. For example, the Japanese government's plan to send Shigemitsu to Washington had been refused by Dulles in early April. Under these circumstances, a Soviet indication of the reversion of those islands could induce the Japanese public to pro-Soviet feelings or anti-American sentiments. Moreover, the Japanese government had a plan to despatch the foreign minister to Washington again and the visit was scheduled for late August.

After the Geneva Conference, the atmosphere of 'peaceful coexistence' spread and the image of Russia was considerably

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improved around the world. If the Japanese were to be prevented from repairing their relations with the United States, this was the best timing for the Soviets to propose the return of the Habomais and Shikotan. Any suggestion for the reversion of those islands could be expected to provoke in Japanese public opinion arguments for an immediate normalization. The public pressure on the Japanese government for immediate normalization would place it in a dilemma between public opinion and the U.S., which would be particularly awkward shortly before the coming U.S.-Japanese negotiations which was scheduled to be held at the end of August. This being the case, it can be argued that the Soviets attempted to utilize the disturbing effect of the territorial concessions on U.S.-Japanese relations.

JAPANESE REACTIONS TO SOVIET CONCESSIONS: NEW TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS

Given the suggestion by Malik on 5 August, the Japanese plenipotentiary immediately sent a top-secret telegram to Tokyo to convey the information about the Soviet concessions. He also attached to this telegram, his view that the government should carefully examine the Soviet concessions by taking into account possible reactions from the U.S., Britain, and France, and also possible repercussions on Japanese public opinion.¹⁰

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The plenipotentiary seemed to intend to settle the normalization talks in line with the new developments created by the Soviet concessions. Because of limited access to primary documents on the Japanese side, it is still hardly possible to clarify what Matsumoto had in mind at that time. But members of the embassy staff in London revealed that, given the sign of Soviet concessions, Matsumoto formulated the following plan as the next step in the negotiations. First of all, Japan should receive back the Habomais and Shikotan. Secondly, with regard to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, Matsumoto had in mind these two options: to make no reference to the territorial question in a peace treaty with the Russians, and to stipulate in the peace treaty that the Soviet Union should take note that Japan had renounced her sovereignty over southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.¹¹ Although the Soviets argued that Japan should recognize their possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in order to regain the Habomais and Shikotan, Matsumoto tried to avoid giving any positive recognition of that kind. Nevertheless, it seems that he intended to reach an agreement with the Russians that the Soviet Union should return the Habomais and Shikotan in exchange for Japan's implicit recognition, whether temporary or not, of the present situation of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.

The telegram conveying the information about the Soviet concessions presumably arrived at Tokyo on 10 August. Tokyo's reaction was complicated. It has been suggested by some

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preceding works, however, that the Ministry and Shigemitsu kept the information about the Soviet concessions secret from Hatoyama and almost unilaterally made a decision on how to react officially to the Soviet offers.¹² Given the tendency of the prime minister to mention in public even crucial and confidential information in public, it is natural to assume that the foreign minister attempted not to circulate this information to Hatoyama. Also, the Foreign Ministry must have been concerned about the possibility that Hatoyama would utilize this information in order to strengthen his policy of an immediate normalization. At any rate, the prime minister seems to have been effectively excluded from a most important aspect of policy making on the Soviet territorial concession.¹³

It seems to have been 18 August that the final decision was made in the Foreign Ministry on official Japanese reaction to the Soviet concessions.¹⁴ The decision was embodied in an additional instruction which was sent to London on 27 August. Its contents were as follows:

- (1) The delegates should secure a Soviet commitment to complete repatriation of the Japanese detainees prior to signing a peace treaty.
- (2) As regards the territorial question;
 - (a) The delegates ought to make the utmost effort to obtain the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan unconditionally and should attempt to regain Kunashiri and Etorofu.
 - (b) The delegates should contrive to reach an agreement to convene an international conference to discuss the territorial disposal of the northern Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.¹⁵

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This new formulation of territorial demands was an indication of Japan's willingness to make a minor concession in response to the Soviet concessions. The previous Japanese position expressed in Instruction No. 16 had been that all the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin ^{should be returned to Japan}. This position had been based on Japan's contention that in S.F.P.T. Japan had never renounced those islands in her relations with the Soviet Union. But the new instruction implied that the Japanese government accepted the fact that those islands had been actually renounced in the S.F.P.T. even in relations with the Soviet Union. In other words, the Japanese accepted the theoretical possibility that the Soviet possession of those islands would be confirmed at an international conference. The new demand for Kunashiri and Etorofu should also be understood in this context. The Japanese government reduced its maximum demand to one for the two islands. In this sense, the territorial demands in this instruction contained an element of a minor concession.

Why did the Foreign Ministry not decide to retreat to the position which Matsumoto seemed to have in mind in London? Why did the Foreign Ministry and Shigemitsu not intend to work out an agreement by positively accepting the Soviet concessions? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine several significant factors which influenced the policy-making of the Foreign Ministry. At least the following three factors should be dealt with: first, their considerations of negotiating tactics; second, their concern about the U.S.-Japanese relations;

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and finally, the inner struggles of Japanese politics, both within and outside the cabinet.

The evidence of concessions stated by Malik was ambiguous. To be sure, Malik enunciated the Soviet intention to concede the Habomais and Shikotan. But this Soviet territorial concession could be understood to be part of a package deal. Malik stated that the question of the Habomais and Shikotan should not be separated from the other territorial questions. This may have been understood by the Japanese to imply that the return of the Habomais and Shikotan would depend on Japan's recognition of the Soviet possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Malik also indicated that the territorial question should be settled in connexion with some other issue. These characteristics of the Soviet concessions were received with caution by the Japanese. In fact, the Foreign Ministry seemed to be concerned about the price Japan would have to pay for the Soviet concessions and to expect the Soviets to demand Japan's concession on the straits issue.¹⁶

The Foreign Ministry was not at all prepared to accept this package deal, at least, at that moment. Its main focus of attention was the impact of Soviet concessions on U.S.-Japanese relations. The Japanese government could not make any concession over the straits question. If they agreed with the Soviet position on this issue, it would seriously damage the U.S.-Japanese defence system, the breakdown of which would be fatal

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for Japanese security. If the Japanese had to recognize the Soviet possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, it would be regarded by the American Congress as damaging U.S. national interest and as a sign of Japan's lack of loyalty to the United States. Moreover, the American government had occasionally suggested that Japan should not make too many concessions to the Soviets. In particular, U.S.-Japanese negotiations were to be convened from 29 August. Shigemitsu, who was particularly sensitive to Japanese-American relations, may have thought that Japan should not do anything which could damage this relationship. If she decided to settle the Russo-Japanese normalization by accepting only the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan and by making concessions over the issues of disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and the straits issue, U.S.-Japanese negotiations might be put in jeopardy. In order to improve the relationship and to show Japan's loyalty to her most important western ally, Shigemitsu may have considered that she had to take firm stance against the Soviet concessions.

It is still not clear whether the Americans exerted any direct influence on policy-making with regard to this issue. Among the newly declassified American documents, we cannot find any evidence proving the existence of direct American involvement. But it is still impossible to deny the possibility that the U.S. government indirectly imposed some influence on the foreign minister. In fact, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu met American Ambassador Allison on 17 August,¹⁷ the day before the Foreign

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Ministry made the decision on the additional instruction which was to be sent to London on 27 August. Though Shigemitsu wrote nothing specific with regard to the meeting, Allison may have given Shigemitsu a confidential suggestion.

Domestic political situation also restrained Shigemitsu from being satisfied with Soviet concessions over the Habomais and Shikotan. Moves towards the conservative merger developed further in the summer of 1955. Despite internal oppositions both among the Liberals and the Democrats, the party leaders agreed by the middle of June to proceed with preparations for the union. On 30 June, four party leaders, two of whom from each party, agreed to endeavour to work out a policy agreement in order to establish a common policy for the merger.¹⁸ Nevertheless, one of the questions obstructing progress towards the union was how to deal with the Soviet-Japanese normalization. The Liberals were not keen on early normalization and opposed conceding Kunashiri and Etorofu to Russia. Particularly, the Yoshida faction was a spearhead of that opposition and linked its disagreement to the territorial concession and to an immediate settlement, with its firmly unfavourable attitude towards the conservative merger.¹⁹ Under these circumstances, the kind of policy towards normalization that was adopted by the Democrat government affected future development of the unification of the conservatives to a great extent. The government had to indicate its willingness to adopt

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a policy which did not differ very much from that of the Liberals.

Shigemitsu seems to have been well aware of this domestic necessity. Interestingly, on 15 September, he said to Ashida Hitoshi, who was well known for being a leading figure in the anti-normalization faction, 'Let's do our best to achieve the merger of the conservatives through coordinating our foreign policy.'²⁰ Shigemitsu considered that the conservatives should consolidate themselves in order to fight against the progressives or the left wing. Though this conversation was held almost a month after the making of the new instruction, it still cannot be denied that Shigemitsu partly attempted to manoeuvre the normalization policy in order to facilitate, or at least not to obstruct, the conservative merger based on his concept of domestic politics: the conservatives versus the progressives.

Not only Shigemitsu, but also Hatoyama's closest political allies took a similar stance. On 11 August Kôno Ichiro, the then agriculture and forestry minister, was sent to London by the prime minister to inform Matsumoto of domestic political developments. But the fact was that the purpose of Kôno's visit was to restrain Matsumoto. According to Matsumoto, first of all, he said to Kôno that the negotiations had been going very well, and were promising because the Soviets had begun to imply that they intended to return the Habomais and Shikotan. In reply to this, Kôno suggested that Matsumoto should not proceed

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with the talks too fast before his visit to the U.S.²¹ Given these political developments in Japan and the coming U.S.-Japanese negotiations, even Kôno could not insist on immediate normalization. Hatoyama may have been very dissatisfied with this development. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that he strongly opposed the new instruction prepared by the Foreign Ministry. When Tani Masayuki told Hatoyama of the new instructions on 28 August, the prime minister was easily persuaded by Tani to accept it.²²

It must be remembered that the Foreign Ministry had constructed its long-term three-stage negotiating strategy in respect to the territorial question. The Foreign Ministry staff and the foreign minister seemed to try to follow this negotiating strategy. According to this strategy, Japan should at the first stage of negotiations request the restoration of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Habomais, and Shikotan, and if the Soviet Union made concessions, Japan should at the second stage request the southern Kuriles, the Habomais, and Shikotan. At the final stage, she would only insist on the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. After the Soviets had indicated their willingness to concede the Habomais and Shikotan, Shigemitsu may have recognized that it was the time that they should move on to the second stage of their strategy. In this sense, they basically followed their long-term strategy which had been drawn up shortly before the beginning of the negotiations in June.

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The legal basis of the new Japanese demands should be examined. According to Matsumoto's Memoirs, it is clear that the Japanese government held the view that Kunashiri and Etorofu were not part of the Kuriles but Japan's inalienable territories because they had never belonged to any foreign countries before. In support of this, the government referred to the St. Petersburg Treaty concluded in 1875 by which Japan had obtained 18 islands located north of Etorofu and approved Russian possession of Sakhalin. The government also argued that the fact that the agreement had been called 'the Treaty of the Kuriles-Sakhalin Exchange' was unequivocal evidence to prove that only those 18 islands could be defined as 'the Kuriles'.²³ Hence, Kunashiri and Etorofu had been excluded from 'the Kuriles' in 1875. We must remember that this argument is the same that used by Yoshida in his address at the San Francisco Peace Conference. Despite his assertion, the Yoshida government had decided not to insist on Japan's claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu. According to Yoshida, the reason for dropping the claims had been that otherwise the ratification of the S.F.P.T. would have been delayed.²⁴ Now that the Japanese had become an independent country since the ratification of the peace treaty, the Foreign Ministry picked up again this argument earlier abandoned in 1951, in order to support its new territorial demands in 1955.²⁵

As mentioned above, Hatoyama did not show any strong opposition to the new instructions prepared by the Foreign Ministry. He must, however, have become very concerned over the possibility

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that the normalization talks would reach deadlock and break up because of the firm line adopted by the Foreign Ministry. He seems to have attempted to prepare for that possibility. According to Hatoyama's memoirs, the prime minister and his advisers, Sugihara and Matsumoto, had already, before the start of the London talks, constructed a policy whereby the Japanese government could reach some understanding with Russia by shelving the territorial question. The prime minister may have considered that he would have had to establish a political foundation on which his policy would be able to obtain public and political support. For this purpose, he met Suzuki Mosaburo, the chairman of the Leftist Socialist Party, at Karuizawa at the end of August or the beginning of September. Hatoyama recalled as follows.:

..... I frankly said, 'We must settle the Soviet-Japanese talks by putting aside questions and must achieve early repatriation of Japanese detainees and Japan's entry into the U.N. I strongly intend to follow this line. I desire that the Socialist Party would indirectly assist me.' After all, the negotiations have been settled as Suzuki and I expected. I still think that I met Suzuki at a very good time.²⁶

Hatoyama intended to cultivate all the support he could get, even if it came from an opposition leader rather than his own party.

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DEADLOCK

After the Soviets had proposed territorial concessions, it took more than two weeks for Matsumoto to obtain the new instructions from Tokyo. The negotiations were carried on during this period. Faced with this delayed reaction from Tokyo, Matsumoto decided to play for time by discussing a Japanese draft of the peace treaty which had been prepared on 16 June. On 16 August, at the eleventh meeting, the Japanese plenipotentiary brought the Japanese draft to the negotiating table. The draft consisted of twelve articles. Significant points are covered in the following paragraphs.

Article 1 provided for the termination of the state of war. But there was no mention about the restoration of diplomatic relations. The second article provided that the Soviet Union should unconditionally support Japan's application for membership of the United Nations. The third article was the provision that both Japan and the Soviet Union should observe Article 2 of the U.N. Charter which obliged the member states of the United Nations to settle international disputes in peaceful ways. In addition, the Japanese draft also affirmed the right of both contracting parties to take measures of self-defence in accordance with U.N Charter Article 51. This article was undoubtedly intended to counter the Soviet assertion that Japan should not participate in any military alliances with any former

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belligerent countries against Japan. The fourth article was an article of non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

The territorial issue was dealt with in Article 5, which consisted of two sub-clauses. The first one stipulated that complete Japanese sovereignty should be resumed over 'those Japanese territories which were occupied by the Soviet Union as the result of the war.' The second one provided that Soviet troops and officials in those territories should return to their own country no later than 90 days thereafter. This article did not specifically define which territories were included in '*those Japanese territories which were occupied by the Soviet Union*'. Indeed the article implied that it meant the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, including the Habomais and Shikotan. But this article may have been designed to make the Japanese position rather ambiguous in order to play for time, until new instructions came from Tokyo.

Article 6 and 7 respectively provided for Soviet renunciation of reparations and Japan's renunciation of claims to anything resulting from the war. The eighth article stipulated the continuation of the effects of the agreements and treaties between both parties concluded before the war. Article 9 and 10 respectively were agreements to begin fishery and trade negotiations. The eleventh article obliged both parties to rely on the International Court of Justice in order to settle the problems which might possibly be raised over interpretation of

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this peace treaty. The final clause referred to the necessity of this treaty being ratified.

Matusmoto explained the purpose and meaning of each article and commented on differences between the Soviet draft and the Japanese draft. Then, he refuted Soviet assertions on the straits issue.²⁷ He made it clear that the fact that the draft included no mention about the straits issue meant that Japan objected to the Soviet position on the issue.²⁸

At the twelfth meeting on 23 August Malik made several enquiries, the most significant question being over the territorial clause of the Japanese draft (Article 5). Malik objected to this clause, saying that 'he could see no reason for the insertion of this article' and that 'The disposal of these territories had been settled by Potsdam and the San Francisco Treaty and there was nothing to discuss.'²⁹ Then, he went on that Article 5 could not serve as a basis for negotiations.³⁰

The new instructions from Tokyo arrived at London on 27 August. Three days later, at the thirteenth meeting, Matsumoto presented the new territorial proposals to the Soviets. He offered the following article, which was prepared in accordance with the instruction from Tokyo, as an amended version of Article 5:

1. Among the Japanese territories that the Soviet Union occupied as a result of the war,
 - (a) Japan's sovereignty over Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais should be restored on the day when the treaty comes into effect.

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(b) With respect to southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles, the disposition should be defined through negotiations between Japan and the ex-Allied Powers including the Soviet Union.³¹

2. Troops and governmental officials of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presently stationed in the territories described in the preceding paragraph shall depart as soon as possible following the effective date of this treaty and in any case no later than within 90 days thereafter.³²

This revised article irritated Malik. He retorted that he could not help but conclude that Japan was not at all sincere about the normalization talks. Matsumoto replied that the Japanese were as eager to achieve the normalization as before, and then proposed to have a frank discussion on the territorial issue. During the discussion, Malik made clear the following three points.

- 1) The Soviet Union agreed on unconditional reversion of and withdrawal of troops from the Habomais and Shikotan.
- 2) The Soviet Union could not accept the Japanese proposal in 1 (b) for holding an international conference to discuss territorial problems.
- 3) The Soviet Union would never give up the idea that Kunashiri and Etorofu were definitely a part of the Kuriles and that they were undoubtedly Soviet territories.³³

The first point was not very clear, and, in particular, what 'unconditional reversion' meant was very ambiguous. The second and third points were predictable ones. The Russians had all along asserted that the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had already been determined by the Yalta Agreement, the Potsdam Declaration, and other occupation orders. Accepting any

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international forum to discuss the territorial issue over those islands would immediately have meant renunciation of that assertion. At the same time, it was obvious to the Russians that the international forum would be used by the western allies for propaganda purposes. As for Kunashiri and Etorofu, the Russians could not concede them mainly because of their military significance. According to some American military information, the Habomais and Shikotan were relatively less significant because the Soviets only installed early warning system on these islands. But Kunashiri and Etorofu had not only early warning systems but also air bases for fighters.³⁴

The straits issue also seems to have been closely connected with the issue of Kunashiri and Etorofu. In terms of Soviet naval strategy, securing access to the Pacific Ocean must have been still of enormous significance. It can be argued that the strategic significance in possessing Kunashiri and Etorofu was great, because, if they could secure those islands without suffering from U.S.-Japanese blockade of the three straits, La Perouse (Soya), Sangarski (Tsugaru), and Tsushima straits, the Soviet Union could obtain safe outlets to the Pacific Ocean. This being the case, the Soviets could never concede Kuanshiri and Etorofu, and it seems that the Soviets may have use the straits issue as a bargaining card in order to make the Japanese give up these islands.

The Soviet attitude became tougher on 6 September at the fourteenth meeting. This meeting exclusively dealt with the

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territorial issue.³⁵ Malik developed Soviet comments on the new Japanese proposal. First, he firmly asserted that the new Japanese demands were totally unacceptable and that the islands to which the Japanese referred as their inalienable territories 'incontestably' belonged to the U.S.S.R. Then, he related that the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned to Japan on condition that those islands should be neither fortified nor militarized after their reversion. In this, the Soviets were adding a new condition to their previous position of the 'unconditional return' of the Habomais and Shikotan. There is no doubt that the Russians were attempting to counteract against the new Japanese demands.

It is an interesting fact that the Soviets seemed to regard the new Japanese territorial proposals not as an indication of concession on the Japanese part, but as a demand additional to the previous one. It must be remembered that on 4 August when asked by Malik what the minimum territorial demand of the Japanese was, Matsumoto implicitly indicated that it was the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. But the new Japanese instructions contained a request for Kunashiri and Etorofu. This request actually signified that the Japanese government retreated from its previous tougher line. But it is not difficult to imagine that Malik felt betrayed. The Japanese demands may have appeared to become all the tougher because of the demand for Kunashiri and Etorofu. In this sense, discrepancy

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in intentions between Matsumoto and Tokyo partly provoked the hostile Soviet reaction to the new Japanese territorial request.

Moreover, what the Soviet Union desired to get from the Japanese was their recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The Japanese did not, however, show any intention to satisfy the Soviet desire. Now the Soviets decided to adopt a harder line towards the new Japanese proposals in order to derive more concessions from the Japanese. That was why Malik attached the condition of non-fortification and non-militarization to the return of the Habomais and Shikotan.

The Soviet adoption of a tougher stance may have been related to the on-going U.S.-Japanese negotiations in Washington at the end of August. The Russians seemed to seek to prevent the negotiations from resulting in strengthening U.S.-Japanese ties. Sir William Hayter, the then British ambassador to Moscow, reported to the Foreign Office that the Soviet press reacted to Shigemitsu's visit to the U.S. without delay, saying that the Japanese were at the moment faced with a choice of independence from or dependence on, the United States.³⁶ For instance, *Pravda* of 3 September issued an article by E. Zhukov entitled 'What can promote the strengthening of Japan's international positions?' The article argued that the Japanese were still under American occupation and emphasised the necessity to improve Sino-Japanese relations.³⁷

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On 30 August, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru made a statement before the National Press Club in Washington that the Japanese government did not intend to establish a friendly relationship with the Soviet Union.³⁸ This statement certainly irritated the Russians. On 13 September, Malik accused the Japanese government of a lack of sincerity, pointing to the Shigemitsu statement. In these situations, the Russians tried to show that Japan's attempt to strengthen U.S.-Japanese ties would affect the Russo-Japanese negotiations unfavourably for Japanese interests. It must be noted that it was a week after the statement of Shigemitsu at the National Press Club that Malik withdrew the proposal for 'unconditional' concession of the Habomais and Shikotan and made a proposal for conditional concession at the fourteenth meeting on 6 September.

At the fifteenth meeting on 13 September, the Soviets still refused immediate repatriation before normalization, and there was no sign that the Soviets would make any more concessions. It became clear that the negotiations had reached a deadlock. At the end of meeting, Malik announced that he had to leave London for New York, in order to attend disarmament negotiations at the U.N. General Assembly and that he did not know how long he would be away. Malik was also supposed to attend the Foreign Minister's Conference in Geneva which was due to be held in the end of October.³⁹ On 15 September, the Japanese government instructed Matsumoto to assure the Soviets that the government

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agreed to resume the negotiations as soon as the Russians were ready. The government also ordered him to return to Tokyo.⁴⁰

Although the negotiations had reached deadlock, both parties recognized that this suspension of the negotiations was only an interlude. Even during this, the Soviets tried to strengthen their position by exerting indirect influence on the Japanese government and public opinion. On 21 September, Khrushchev had an interview with a Japanese parliamentary delegation visiting Moscow. There Khrushchev attempted to impress them with Soviet sincerity. He stated that the most crucial goal of the London talks was to end the state of war and that the Soviets intended to offer a package deal whereby the repatriation issue, fishing problems and the termination of the state of war would be settled altogether. Then he accused the Japanese government of intentionally delaying normalization without being satisfied with Soviet territorial and other concessions.

The most important fact is that Khrushchev hinted that the Soviet Union was determined to refuse the new Japanese territorial demand. He asserted ^{that} the territorial problem had already been solved with the Yalta Agreement, but that the Soviet government was willing to concede the Habomais and Shikotan, as an indication of Soviet good-will to the Japanese and because of the closeness of those islands to Japanese territory.⁴¹

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This statement seemed to be intended to influence the future course of negotiations. Khrushchev aimed to tell the Japanese that the Soviet Union could wait. Faced with the new Japanese territorial proposals, the Soviet negotiators must have recognised that the Japanese had been employing delaying tactics. One of the closest observers of the Soviet attitudes, British Ambassador Sir William Hayter in Moscow reported:

The object of this interview seems to have been to make clear the Soviet government's position with respect to the negotiations in London and by a mixture of blandishments and of the same truculent 'we can wait' attitude as they adopted during the talks with Dr. Adenauer to induce a change of attitude in the Japanese government.⁴²

This tactical alteration on the Soviet part presented the Japanese with a serious problem. Khrushchev's '"we can wait" attitude' immediately meant that the Japanese detainees would not be able to return to their own country in the very near future. Prime Minister Hatoyama frequently mentioned that the government was making many efforts to achieve the repatriation before the coming winter. The groups of relatives of the detainees had a certain political influence, in particular, on public opinion. In these circumstances, the government was under considerable pressure to arrange for early normalization. In other words, the Soviet Union adopted a policy whereby she could use those detainees as hostages.

The Khrushchev statement may also have been designed to influence Japanese public opinion, in particularly over the

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territorial question. In fact, the Japanese public had not been clearly informed of the reality of the Soviet concessions on the Habomais and Shikotan. Professor Wada suggests that the Foreign Ministry manipulation of information through a series of intentional leakages succeeded in leaving the public with an impression that the Soviet Union had made her territorial concessions because the Japanese had made a concession over their territorial demands.⁴³ This manipulation of information gave the Japanese public the wrong impression that the Soviet Union had continuously been tough and harsh in the negotiations. The Foreign Ministry had to hide the information that the Soviet Union took the initiative in making the territorial concessions because it did not want public opinion to be seduced by any indication of Soviet 'good-will'. Through his statement to the Japanese parliamentarians, Khrushchev exposed the reality to the Japanese public by emphasizing that, though the Russians had already made generous concessions, the Japanese were unwilling to make any concessions in return. The Khrushchev statement, in this sense, was partly made to counter the Foreign Ministry's manipulation of Japan's public opinion.

JAPAN'S QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR HER TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

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After the London talks had reached stalemate over territorial matters, the Japanese government was faced with the task of re-examining strategy for future negotiations. In order to strengthen its negotiating position, the Japanese government had to make sure that Japanese territorial claims would be supported by its western allies. Then, it decided to send them another questionnaires over the territorial issue. On 12 October, Shigemitsu handed Ambassador Allison a note explaining the Japanese government's claim to Kunashiri and Etorofu as not being a part of the Kuriles.⁴⁴ The Japanese questionnaire must have been handed to Allison at that time.

The Japanese government asked the U.S. government the following two questions:

(1) Whether the leaders of the Allied Powers participating in the Yalta Conference recognized the following historical facts when they adopted the word 'the Kuriles' in the Yalta Agreement: that Kunashiri and Etorofu which are directly adjacent to Hokkaido were inalienable Japanese territories where Japanese people had lived in large numbers, that those islands had never belonged to any foreign countries, and that in the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 'the Kuriles' were defined as only 18 islands located northward from Etorofu.

(2) Whether the United States government who played the main role in drafting the S.F.P.T. understood that 'the Kuriles' in Article 2 (c) did not include Kunashiri and Etorofu.⁴⁵

The Department of State's reply to this questionnaire was conveyed to Tani by Allison on 21 October⁴⁶ and the contents were as follows:

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(1) No definition was made at the Yalta Conference with regard to the range of the Kuriles. No discussion was held about the history of the Kuriles. The Yalta Agreement was neither intended to transfer territorial sovereignty nor valid for that purpose. There are no any records at all indicating that the signatories to the Yalta Agreement had the intention to transfer the sovereign right to territories which were not Russian territories.

(2) Neither the S.F.P.T. nor the records of the San Francisco Peace Conference contain any definition of the range of the Kuriles. Our view is that any conflict with regard to 'the Kuriles' can be submitted to the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 22 of the Peace Treaty.

(3) The disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be subject to 'a future international decision', since any conflicts over the territories categorised under those geographic names are to be settled by the I.C.J. It is impossible at this moment to expect such a settlement to be materialized.

As an alternative, the U.S. government has no objection to Japan's efforts to persuade the Russians to return Kunashiri and Etorofu on the ground that those islands are not part of the Kuriles. Considering the Soviet position which has so far been announced, however, it is unlikely that the Japanese demands would be successful. In case of failure, it is advisable for the Japanese government to assert that the questions about 'the Kuriles' should be submitted to the I.C.J. by both the interested countries. As another alternative, the U.S. government has no objection to the Japanese and the Soviets reaching agreement that the Soviet Union would return those two islands to Japan in exchange for the latter's confirmation in a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty that she renounced the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.⁴⁷

What did the U.S. government intend to convey in this reply? Among newly declassified documents, we can unfortunately discover no direct evidence with regard to this question. But, it is still possible to give an impression of American background attitudes by relying on a related document. The Department of State prepared a position paper on 22 August for

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the forthcoming U.S.-Japanese negotiations between Dulles and Shigemitsu, which dealt with the territorial questions between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. According to the position paper, the Department predicted that the Japanese would make the following requests at the negotiating table. First, the position paper expected them to ask for U.S. endorsement for their claims to the Habomais and Shikotan and request the American government to proclaim its view that the Soviet Union had never obtained sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Secondly, the Japanese were expected to request the Americans to support their territorial right to the southern Kuriles. Finally, the paper assumed that the Japanese would propose to convene an international conference in order to determine the territorial status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. A significant fact is that the Department feared that Japan would also argue for the return of another territory she had lost as a result of the war, that is, Formosa.^{4e}

Based on those predictions, the position paper expressed the general satisfaction of the U.S. government with Japan's cautious handling of the Russo-Japanese rapprochement. As a whole, however, the response by the Department was unfavourable to the Japanese territorial demands. Although it agreed to endorse Japan's claims to the Habomais and Shikotan and to deny Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, it concluded that any public announcement of those official attitudes was undesirable. It seems that the State Department

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still followed the basic policy of avoiding direct involvement. As for Kunashiri and Etorofu, it admitted that because of the lack of information and investigation the U.S. could not take any clear position. Finally, the paper also expressed her reluctance to support the plan to convene an international conference for determining the status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, by reasoning that, without Soviet concurrence, any attempt to revise the previous agreements on Japan's territorial issues would be meaningless and that such an attempt would be interpreted by the other signatories to the S.F.P.T. as evidence of Japan's ambition for overall alteration of the peace treaty.⁴⁹

The views contained in this policy paper were reflected in the American reply to Japan's questionnaire. Regarding the issue of Kunashiri and Etorofu, the attitude expressed in the reply was very ambiguous, considering that this issue was the most significant one for the Japanese. The U.S. government did not give any clear endorsement to the Japanese claims to those islands. Instead, it only mentioned that neither the Yalta Agreement nor the S.F.P.T. had defined the range of 'the Kuriles'. Moreover, it recommended the Japanese to submit the disputes over definition of the Kuriles to the International Court of Justice.

These statements suggested that the American government did not positively endorse the Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles. To be sure, it made clear that it had no objection to Japan's

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attempt to ask the Soviet Union for the return of those islands. Nonetheless, it stated in its answer that it was very unlikely that Japan's demand would be accepted by the Russians. The negative attitude towards the idea of convening an international conference to determine the status of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin was clearly¹ expressed in the reply to the Japanese government. The U.S. government never used the word 'international conference' in it. Rather, the third paragraph of the reply suggests that 'a future international decision' means a decision by the I.C.J. Thus, the American reply contained answers which were substantially unfavourable to the Japanese.

Behind this American reply, we can see American reluctance to get deeply involved in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. The basic U.S. position embodied in it was that Soviet-Japanese normalization was fundamentally a bilateral issue between the two countries. In fact, the U.S. government still tried not to exert any direct or explicit influence on the Japanese in the summer of 1955. During Shigemitsu's visit to Washington at the end of August, Shigemitsu-Dulles conversations over the normalization talks clearly indicated this American tendency.

It was on 29 August when the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks were discussed. To start with, the Japanese foreign minister read a statement describing the general posture of Japan's foreign policy under the Hatoyama administration.

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Because the American sources contain no documents read by Shigemitsu, what he explained to the American representatives is not clear. Since one of the main purposes of this U.S.-Japanese meeting for the Japanese was to sweep away misunderstandings caused by recent developments in Soviet-Japanese relations, it is relevant to assume that Shigemitsu certainly referred to Japanese policy towards Russia.⁵⁰

Dulles replied to Shigemitsu's rather lengthy statement. First, the U.S. secretary of state began his comments with a lecture about recent developments in international affairs. Dulles emphasized that the recent cordial tendencies of Soviet foreign policy was a product of Soviet weakness and that Communist China was still a great threat towards the free world. He said that 'he believed some progress was being made but that progress requires the free nations to stand firm and solid and to make it clear to the Communist nations that they must change their policies.'⁵¹ Clearly he attempted to persuade the Japanese to continue to carry out tough Soviet policy. Then, Dulles moved on to specific issues.

As for the Russo-Japanese normalization talks, the U.S. Secretary of State made clear the following four points. First, he pointed out that, according to Article 25 of the S.F.P.T., the Soviet Union could not obtain any territorial benefits. Secondly, he indicated his satisfaction by saying that 'Japan is handling the talks very well.' But, thirdly, he warned that

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'very little could be achieved by making concessions to the Soviets on small points.' Finally, he argued that he thought the Soviets were making serious efforts for normalization.⁵² Dulles' message to the Japanese was clear. Dulles implied with his comments that the Japanese government should carry on tough negotiations and that only through this policy would Japan be able to obtain Soviet concessions, since the Soviets were eager for normalization.

Interestingly, Dulles did not refer to specific territorial questions, namely the Soviet return of the Habomais and Shikotan. But his mention of Article 25 of the S.F.P.T. and his warning against the Japanese making concessions to the Soviet Union amounted to implicit pressure on the Japanese government. From Shigemitsu's point of view, the suggestions made by Dulles confirmed that his policy was adequate. In this sense, this U.S.-Japanese meeting influenced the Japanese to continue to adopt a tough line on the normalization talks. But it must be emphasized that the American government did not exert any direct influence on Japan's decision making over her new territorial demands. Rather Shigemitsu fixed Japan's stance almost entirely by himself and took the decision to Washington in order to reassure the Americans that Japan could handle relations with her communist neighbours without disappointing her most important western ally.

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Thus, the American government tried not to put explicit pressure on the Japanese. Moreover, it tried not to make any direct reference to the territorial question. Perhaps, the Americans were really satisfied with Shigemitsu's handling of the normalization issue and, therefore, they did not have to influence the Japanese in an explicit manner. But, more importantly, the U.S. government also tended to adopt non-committal policy to avoid getting deeply involved with Soviet-Japanese negotiations. The American reply to the Japanese questionnaire reflected this American tendency.

BRITISH ATTITUDES

Although, according to Matsumoto's memoirs, the Japanese government also sent the same questionnaire to the British Foreign Office as it sent to the U.S. government, there is no evidence among the British documents that the British government was asked the questions and answered them. It seems, however, reasonable to rely on the description given in the Matsumoto memoirs, because there is also no evidence that Matsumoto's description is false.

Matsumoto stated that the British government replied that on the territorial issue it held several views different from those of the United States government. The British reply

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particularly emphasized that they differed in their interpretation of the allies' intentions behind the Yalta Agreement.⁵³ In fact, since the making of the S.F.P.T., the British government had been claiming that the Agreement should be observed as it stipulated. Unlike the Americans, the British in their reply indicated that they kept their view recognizing the validity of the Yalta Agreement in 1955.

Thus, the British reply was also ambiguous one, and did not at all make clear their position with regard to the specific Japanese territorial demand. Although the Americans seemed to attempt to make their position rather non-committal, the British made even greater efforts to be non-committal. The ambiguity of the British reply clearly embodied their intentions to avoid any possibility that they would be blamed by the Japanese for a possible failure of the negotiations. In Tokyo, Denning pointed out that the Japanese government might attempt to blame the British in event of the failure of the settlement.⁵⁴ The Foreign Office staff also agreed that the British government should not be involved in the negotiations.⁵⁵ They knew from long diplomatic experience the danger of becoming the scapegoat for failed negotiations.

More importantly, the British tried at that period to restrain the Americans from getting deeply involved in and overreacting to the Russo-Japanese negotiations. It seems that after Shigemitsu's visit to Washington the British government started

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to become alarmed by the possibility that U.S.-Japanese relations would deteriorate because of the U.S. imposing pressure on the Japanese over the normalization talks. The Foreign Office knew very much about the development of the Shigemitsu-Dulles conversations from Robert H. Scott, the minister in the British Embassy in Washington. Scott informed London of the following four points. Firstly, he observed that, faced with the Soviet territorial concessions over the Habomais and Shikotan, the Americans now felt that 'the Russians may mean business.' In other words, the Americans became alarmed by the possibility that the normalization talks would be settled in line with the Soviet concessions.

Secondly, Scott suggested that the main fear of the U.S. government was that the establishment of Soviet Embassy in Japan as a result of Russo-Japanese normalization would encourage the Communist movement in Japan. Thirdly, Scott observed that,

Dulles tried to lead the Japanese to take a more stiffen attitudes towards the Russians. He knew that Dulles had told Shigemitsu that 'There was no sense in making too many concessions to the Russians.' Scott conceived that Dulles imposed an implied threat on the Japanese. Finally, Scott also understood that the Americans 'are clearly uncertain whether they really want a Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, at least on the lines of anything which could be obtained today!'⁵⁶ To sum up, according to Scott's description, the U.S. government could not decide its final attitudes towards the Soviet-Japanese

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normalization talks, though they tended to fear some possible result of normalization.

Besides these analyses, Scott conveyed the information that the United State wanted British comment on the Soviet-Japanese normalization.⁵⁷ In response to this, the Foreign Office started to prepare for the official comment to be offered to the Americans. Now the Foreign Office started to estimate a balance of merits and demerits in the case of a Russo-Japanese settlement on the Soviet terms: concessions of the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan in exchange for Japan's recognition of Soviet possession of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Based on this examination, the Foreign Office also examined whether American attitudes towards Japan over this normalization issue were reasonable.

In the Foreign Office, the dominant view was that the Soviet-Japanese normalization on the Soviet terms would be beneficial to the Japanese. For example, W.D. Allen listed merits and demerits of normalization. Firstly, the main merits of normalization could be found in that it would satisfy the Japanese aspiration towards greater national independence and provide them with more opportunity to expand trade with Russia and the P.R.C. According to Allen, the demerits were seen in that it would increase the risk that the Russians had more influence on Japan through encouraging the J.C.P.'s activities and increase the pressure for a Japanese agreement with China, which would embarrass the U.S. He argued that the balance sheet seemed to ✓

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be even balanced, but he concluded that, considering that Japan would be able to regain the Habomais and Shikotan, she would obtain a great advantage from normalizing her relations with the Soviet Union.⁵⁸

There was another significant opinion which also supported the positive value of Soviet-Japanese normalization. C.T. Crowe, the head of the Far Eastern Department, discussed that a Russo-Japanese agreement or peace treaty would contribute to 'general stability' in the far east, and that, therefore, advantages of a Russo-Japanese settlement would outweigh its disadvantages.⁵⁹ Sir Esler Dening in Tokyo also suggested that the American fear for the expansion of Soviet espionage activities as a result of normalization was a clear example of their oversensitivity and overreaction.⁶⁰

Moreover, Dening feared that any American attempts to impede the Japanese efforts at normalization with Russia would cause U.S.-Japanese relations to deteriorate. His anxiety was based on his understanding of Japanese nationalism at that period. He concluded that 'I regard a deterioration in Japanese-American relations as much more dangerous for all of us than what I conceive to be only a limited improvement in Russo-Japanese relations.'⁶¹ It must be remembered that the Foreign Office had in 1954 adopted a principle of policy towards Japan that Britain should contribute to keep smooth relationship between Japan and

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the U.S. Denning's argument seems to have still reflected the policy principle.

Now it seems that the Foreign Office decided to suggest to the Americans that they should not get deeply involved in Soviet-Japanese negotiations. The official position which the Foreign Office derived from those analyses mentioned above was transmitted to Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador to the U.S. in the middle of October. The Foreign Office intended to convey British official views to the State Department, as follows: Referring to the territorial question, the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin could not be confirmed by Japan's recognition of Soviet sovereignty over those territories because she had already renounced them in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Although it admitted that such Japanese recognition would operate in favour of the Soviet Union, it clearly implied that Japan's recognition would not significantly affect the disposition of those islands.⁶² In other words, the British Foreign Office took the view that the Japanese could reach a settlement with Russia on the latter's terms without greatly harming the present legal disposition of those islands.

Then, this legal argument about the territorial question was followed by the suggestion that the U.S. government tended to overestimate the increase of direct Soviet influence in Japan which the establishment of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo would cause. This argument was also a warning against American

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attempts to impede the Russo-Japanese settlement. Added to that, the telegram to Makins argued that a possible increase in communist influence after normalization would be limited 'so long as a government of conservative complexion is in power in Japan.' The Foreign Office also contended that trade between the U.S.S.R. and Japan would not develop to such an extent that Japan would depend on the communist economy. Here again, the Foreign Office clearly criticized the oversensitiveness of American reactions to Soviet-Japanese normalization.⁶³

The telegram moved, then, to the argument supporting the restoration of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. First, it said that 'a treaty with the Soviet Union might remove from Japanese minds the irritation which they feel at being so closely dependent on the United States.' It also suggested that a Russo-Japanese settlement would lead to a more realistic understanding in Japan of the value of Soviet friendship. Secondly, such concessions as the Japanese were likely to obtain from the settlement, namely the small territorial gains, the Habomais and Shikotan, the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war and increased self-respect, would overwhelm 'any consequent increase of Soviet influence in Japan.' Thus, the Foreign Office argued that normalization was beneficial to Japan and that, hence, it should not be obstructed. Finally, the telegram concluded: 'The decisive argument appears to be that any attempt to prevent Japan from restoring normal and correct diplomatic relations with so

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powerful a neighbour as the Soviet Union risks doing permanent harm to Japan's relations with the West.'⁶⁴

What kind of influence the British attitude exerted on the American handling of the normalization talks is not yet clear. The Foreign Office telegram to Makins arrived at Washington before the U.S. State Department sent its reply to the Japanese questions to Tokyo. But there is no evidence that the Americans had received the information from the Foreign Office before they had prepared their reply to the Japanese. Hence, it is uncertain that the U.S. Department of State even referred to the British arguments before it issued a reply to the Japanese questionnaire. Even if the British position was taken into consideration, the State Department may have regarded the British view as basically similar to its position in that it also tried to avoid any commitment which would let the Japanese blame the U.S. government for failure in the normalization. It can be, therefore, argued that the British warning against the U.S. being deeply involved in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations did not affect the U.S. reply to the Japanese questionnaire very much.

**CONSERVATIVE MERGER AND ITS EFFECT ON JAPAN'S NORMALIZATION
POLICY**

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The movement for conservative merger which had been intensified during the summer proceeded to its last stage in October and November. Since early summer, the Liberal and the Democratic parties had been making joint efforts to search for common policy formulas on which a new conservative party could base its platform. It seems that their efforts to coordinate foreign policy, in particular over the normalization, did not take any concrete shape until the results of the London talks became clear. But, since the London talks had reached stalemate in the middle of September, both parties must have been trying to set their own policy on normalization.

By the middle of October, the two parties managed to establish within each party a firm consensus on the merger. Now, each started to assert its own policy formula in order to gain the initiative in the policy-making of the new party. It was on 22 October that the Liberals launched a campaign over foreign policy. The chairman of the Research Council for Foreign Affairs (Gaikô Chôsa Kai) of the Liberal Party issued a statement describing party lines with regard to the normalization. This statement reflected the general tendencies in the Liberal Party and came out against immediate normalization with Russia. It argued that the government must try to regain Etorofu and Kunashiri as well as the Habomais and Shikotan unconditionally and that the disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be dealt with at an international conference. Furthermore, the Japanese detainees should be repatriated prior

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to the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Russians.⁶⁵ This statement followed virtually the same lines as the present government's policy, which had been mainly led by the Foreign Ministry and Shigemitsu. Three days later, Ogata Taketora, the president of the Liberal Party, also emphasized that his party would endeavour to bring Hatoyama's normalization policy closer to the Liberals' one.⁶⁶ Hatoyama quickly countered these movements by the Liberals. On 25 October, the prime minister revealed his personal view that it would be very difficult to regain Kunashiri and Etorofu. The next day, Matsumoto Shunichi visited Ogata and reported on the progress of the London talks. He was reported to have explained to the president of the Liberal Party that the Russians would not return Kunashiri and Etorofu.⁶⁷

Despite these policy differences over the issue of normalization, both parties made steady progress towards merger. During late October and early November, most attention was devoted to the question about who would take the presidency of the new party. Many of the Democrats asserted that Hatoyama should be unconditionally appointed as the president. On the other hand, the Liberals insisted that the president should be elected by the members of the new party. This confrontation was, however, the last obstacle to amalgamation, though it was most crucial. A compromise was devised early in November. The leaders of both parties who were the driving force of the merger, such as Miki Bukichi and Ono Banboku, proposed to shelve the presidency issue and to appoint Hatoyama and Ogata as

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commissioners for the time being in place of the president. This proposal was accepted by both parties and the last but the most controversial problem was successfully solved. On 15 November, the Liberal-Democratic Party was born.

In parallel with these general developments, efforts had been made to construct policy formulas as the basis for a new platform of the merged party. The platform was announced at the inauguration assembly on 15 November. The part of the platform dealing with foreign policy, declared that the Liberal-Democratic Party aimed to restore diplomatic relations between Japan and countries with which she had not yet concluded a peace treaty with Japan.⁶⁸ In respect to normalization with the Soviet Union, however, more specific policy formulas had been established by the bipartisan policy planning committee for the conservative merger before the establishment of the L.D.P. The formulas, named as 'Rational Coordination of Russo-Japanese Negotiations' (Nisso-Kôshô No Gôriteki Chôsei), were announced on 12 November and contained the following specific policy:

With regard to the negotiations now proceeding between Japan and the U.S.S.R., we aim at conclusion of a peace treaty and hold on to the following positions, based on public support:

- (1) The Japanese detainees should be immediately and completely repatriated.
- (2) As for the territorial questions,
 - (a) The Habomais, Shikotan, and the southern Kuriles should be unconditionally restored.
 - (b) The disposition of the rest of the territories in question should be internationally determined by interested countries.

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(3) We should eliminate such Russian demands as to limit the sovereignty of our country and restrict our existing policy.

(4) Mutual non-interference over domestic affairs.

(5) Besides inducing the Russians to endorse Japan's entry into the United Nations, various issues emerging as a result of the normalization should be settled.⁶⁹

Of enormous importance was the impact of this announcement⁰ as the policy of the united conservative party. This policy was perceived by the Japanese public as a fixed governmental policy. Given the strength of party influence on the government, the party policy had to be followed by the government, particularly until the L.D.P. consolidated itself. In this sense, negotiators and the government came to be restrained by the party policy formulas. In fact, the party policy formula on normalizationⁱ had elements which were virtually identical with government instructions on new territorial proposals sent to London at the end of August. Moreover, this policy formula clearly embodied the position of the Liberals which had already been announced on 22 October. Hatoyama and Matsumoto were placed under overwhelming pressure from this party policy to continue to hold on to a firm line in the negotiations. Matsumoto regretfully recalled:

As a result of the conservative merger, the Soviet-Japanese negotiations were remarkably obstructed. Even at the time of the Democrats' one party cabinet, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu tried to restrain the immediate normalization advocated by the prime minister and tended to interfere with my negotiations in London. At that time, the Liberals were in cooperation with this disturbance from outside. The influence of the cautious diplomacy carried out by the foreign minister was not, therefore, very strong. Also I

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could ignore obstruction by the Liberals because that could be treated as a matter outside our party. Given the united party between the Liberals and the Democrats, however, the influence of anti-normalization group, based on the combination between Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and former-members of the Liberal Party, was undeniably strengthened.⁷⁰

As Matsumoto explains in this passage, the Japanese policy for normalization lost flexibility under the influence of the conservative merger. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu intended to carry out the three-stage negotiating tactics over the territorial issue which had been formulated in May. In order to implement these tactics, the Japanese government should have kept the flexibility, because in response to Soviet attitude, the Japanese had to make reasonable concessions. Moreover, the Japanese government must have known that it could not obtain substantially positive supports from its major western allies for its territorial claims late in October. It should have been the time for the Japanese to reconsider their negotiating policy in order to make it a more flexible and milder one. But the conservative merger deprived the government's policy of this necessary flexibility and of the opportunity for the re-examination of policy.

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PART III.

NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

&

SOVIET-JAPANESE

JOINT DECLARATION

CHAPTER 6
THE SECOND LONDON TALKS
&
MOSCOW FISHERY NEGOTIATIONS

Soviet-Japanese normalization talks were resumed in London in January 1956. The absence of the Soviet plenipotentiary from Britain had been the main reason for the suspension of the first London talks. The Japanese government which was now based on the united conservative party, the L.D.P., had composed its policy for the resumption of the normalization talks on the basis of the new party policy, the 'Rational Coordination of the Soviet-Japanese Normalization Talks'. Hence, when it received the information that Malik would return from New York to London on 21 December after the end of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Japanese proposed on 24 December to resume the negotiations. The Soviets accepted the proposal and both sides agreed to start the second London talks on 17 January.'

THE SECOND LONDON TALKS: January-March 1956.

Despite the agreement reached on the normalization policy for the new party in November, there was still some divergence in the

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Japanese government. Ashida Hitoshi, the chairman of the Research Council for Foreign Affairs, attempted to restrain the early-normalization faction led by Hatoyama, by strongly requesting it to adhere to the already agreed negotiating position policy, namely to take a firm stance on the territorial issues.² Foreign Minister Shigemitsu also made it clear that the government would continue to follow this firm policy and went as far as he stated that the Japanese people would not support the government even if it would achieve the normalization by shelving the territorial questions in order to settle the repatriation issue as soon as possible.³

There had not been a salient development in the Soviet position since the Khrushchev statement in September 1955. It could be easily expected that the Soviet Union would not easily change her previous rigid position on the territorial issues. Despite the lack of clear development of the Soviet position, the Russian government seemed to rely on encouraging various domestic circles in Japan to lead their government to an early settlement. On 31 December, the leaders of the National Congress for Soviet-Japanese and Sino-Japanese Normalization sent a telegram to Molotov. A reply from the Soviet foreign minister arrived on 8 January, which praised the activities of the National Congress.⁴ This kind of attempt was to take a more intensive form later. Faced with the rigid attitudes of the Japanese government, the Russians may have realized that it might be effective to exert indirect influence on the Japanese negotiation through non-

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governmental organizations which were in favour of an early settlement.

The negotiations were reopened on 17 January. Both sides basically tended to indicate conciliatory attitudes towards most of the issues, except the following: the territorial issues, the repatriation of the Japanese detainees, and the straits issue. It was clear that both plenipotentiaries attempted to get agreement on the issues which seemed to be relatively easy to settle. At the second meeting on 24 January, Malik commented on the Japanese draft treaty which had been submitted on 16 August in the previous year and expressed the Soviet willingness to agree on the preamble, Article 1, and Article 3 of the draft. In particular the Soviet acceptance of Article 3 was of great significance. The article included the sub-clause permitting Japan to join collective defence systems based on U.N. Charter Article 51. By accepting this article, the Russians meant that they confirmed the concession which had been stated by Malik on 9 August. In fact, at the negotiating table on 24 January, Malik clearly maintained that the Soviet Union would drop Article 2 (2) of the Soviet draft treaty banning Japan from entering into any military alliances which were against any of the countries which had fought against Japan during WWII.⁵

The items in the Japanese draft remaining to be settled were the draft provisions concerning 1) unconditional Soviet support for Japan's admission to the United Nations (Article 2 of the

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Japanese draft); 2) non-interference in domestic affairs (Article 4); 3) the territorial issues (Article 5); 4) commercial agreements (Article 9); 5) fishing problems (Article 10); and 6) the settlement of disputes which might be raised over interpretation of the peace treaty (Article 11). Among these, the issue of Japan's entry into the U.N. was not discussed during the second London talks. The issue of the commercial agreement, the fishing questions, and the resolution covering the settlement of the conflict were dealt with thoroughly during the negotiations, and both parties reached agreement on them.

As results of the second London talks, both sides had reached agreements over the following nine items: Preamble; termination of the state of war; Observation of the U.N. Charter; Soviet waiver of war claims and reparations, 5) Japanese waiver of war claims; treatment of pre-war treaties; settlement of disputes; fishing, and final clause. These accords were to a great extent a result of compromises on the Soviet side. This is clearly indicated by the fact that the Soviet representatives based their negotiations on the Japanese draft prepared in the previous year. But on what were from Japan's point of view more vital issues, such as the issue of unconditional Soviet support for Japan's admission to the United Nations, the territorial issues, the repatriation question, and the straits issue, the Russian had shown conciliatory attitudes during the negotiations.

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As for the repatriation issue, the negotiations did not get anywhere. Basically, neither party showed any alteration in its position. The Japanese government again requested immediate repatriation of the Japanese detainees. But the Soviets persistently insisted that they would be returned after concluding the peace treaty. At the beginning of March, a story came out about resistance movements by the Japanese detained at the Khabarovsk internees camp. In December 1955, the Japanese detainees had started refusing forced labour in order to protest against Soviet maltreatment. This story was reported to the Foreign Ministry by some detainees repatriated on 6 March.^e Matsumoto took up this incident at the meeting with Malik on 20 March in order to press the Soviets for immediate repatriation. His attempt was, however, in vain.

The issue of Soviet support for Japan's admission to the U.N. does not seem to have been dealt with during the second London talks. At least, there is no evidence proving the existence of any conversations between the Japanese and Soviet plenipotentiaries over this question. Perhaps the Russians may have regarded this as one of their most useful bargaining cards and to be kept until the later stage of the negotiations.

Among those issues which were not settled, the territorial questions were, needless to say, the most intractable one. The Soviet attitudes which had become firmer and more rigid after Japan's submission of new territorial demand in August 1955. The

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Japanese government had also decided prior to the second London talks to continue to take a firm position over the territorial issues by adhering to its previous policy. Under the circumstances, both negotiators could not discover during the second London talks an easy way out of this deadlock. On 7 February, Malik indicated that the Soviet Union had not altered her previous position, holding that the questions over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had been already settled and therefore should not be part of the agenda for these negotiations. 'But', Malik went on, 'the Soviet Union are ready to discuss the transfer of the small Kuriles (=the Habomais and Shikotan).' [My brackets] In reply, Matsumoto also repeated the previous Japanese position and emphasized that the new Japanese demand submitted at the end of August was the ultimate demand of the Japanese government.²

A slight change was shown at the next meeting on 10 February. The Soviets brought to the negotiating table a new draft of a territorial clause.

1. The Soviet Union shall transfer the small Kuriles (the Habomais and Shikotan) to Japan, in response to her desire and in view of her interests. The procedure for the transfer of those islands mentioned above should be defined in a protocol attached to this treaty.

2. The border between the Soviet Union and Japan should be the line drawn in the middle between Kunashirsky Strait and Izmena Strait, as an attached map.³

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A remarkable point in this new draft provision is that the Russians for the first time proposed the return of the Habomais and Shikotan in the form of a written document. But obviously they did not intend to make any further concessions. Malik added that, although the small Kuriles had definitely been Soviet territories and the Soviet Union was not obliged to hand them over to any foreign country, she would transfer those islands as an indication of her generosity and that the new draft provision was her final position.

This Soviet attitude was predictable from Matsumoto's point of view. He already knew that the Soviet concession of the Habomais and Shikotan had been their final offer.¹⁰ Shackled by a policy formula moulded at the time of the conservative merger, however, Matsumoto could not accept the Soviet assertion. Faced with this dilemma, he decided to propose a compromise plan which he had brought with him from Tokyo to London at this time, which is now called the 'Matsumoto plan' (Matsumoto Shian). At an informal meeting with Malik, the Japanese plenipotentiary indicated his plan:

Japanese sovereignty should be restored over Kunashiri and Etorofu on condition that both islands should be entrusted to *a peaceful administration for former residents* and that Soviet military ships and commercial fleets should be allowed to navigate freely through the straits adjacent to those islands.' [My italics]

Matsumoto asked Malik to take into account this proposal. Then, Malik promised to convey the Matsumoto plan to the Soviet

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government when he went back to Moscow for attendance to the 20th Party Congress.

It is still unclear what Matsumoto intended to do with the new plan. There are no primary sources available to us which describe his intentions and the meaning of his plan. In fact, the Matsumoto plan is too ambiguous to grasp its definite meaning. In particular, the specific meaning of the phrase, '*a peaceful administration for former residents*', was not at all clear. Taking into account the rather strange use of 'peaceful' in the phrase, it seems that the phrase implies in a very subtle way non-militarization or non-fortification of Kunashiri and Etorofu. Matsumoto probably realized that one of the main reasons for the Soviet refusal to return those islands was a strategic one. Because these islands were significant Soviet bases, they could become a dangerous strategic outpost and threat against the Soviet Union if they were transferred to the Japanese. In fact, Malik stated that the Russians had in the past suffered from strategic disadvantages because of Japanese possession of the Kunashiri and Etorofu and that the Soviets had, therefore no intention to return them to Japan.¹² Hence, Matsumoto attempted to wipe away this kind of Soviet anxiety. At the same time, Matsumoto seemed to be aware that there was a close linkage between the territorial issues and the straits issues. The straits between Hokkaido and Kunashiri and between Kunashiri and Etorofu had a very crucial strategic significance for the Soviet far eastern fleet. Matsumoto may have assumed

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that, if the Soviet Union could retain their right to free navigation through those straits they would not have any reason to refuse to return those islands. A promise of non-militarization must have been intended to be a double guarantee for free and innocent passage by the Soviet vessels.

On 12 February, Malik left London for Moscow in order to attend the Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was 5 March when he came back to London. Although the 20th Party Congress was a landmark on the way to de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union and although many analysts consider that the Party Congress constituted a watershed for alteration of Soviet foreign policy, this was not the case in terms of her foreign policy towards Japan. On the day following Malik's return, both the plenipotentiaries had an informal meeting. Malik reported the results of his consultation with senior leaders in the Kremlin over the Matsumoto Plan and told Matsumoto apologetically that he could not obtain any favourable reaction.¹³

After all, no constructive agreements were reached over the territorial issue during the second London talks. After the Soviet refusal of the Matsumoto Plan, the Japanese delegation did not make any new move on this issue but insisted on the reversion of the southern Kuriles. On 12 March, Matsumoto sent Shigemitsu a personal telegram to suggest that the government should modify its negotiation policy.¹⁴ But Tokyo instructed him three days later that he should come back in case he found there would be no

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breakthrough over the territorial question.¹⁵ There were several significant facts which seemed to cause this rigidity on the part of the government in Tokyo. On 18 March Dulles visited Japan and had a meeting with Japanese governmental leaders, including Hatoyama, Shigemitsu and Miki Bukichi. Although he only stayed in Tokyo for 26 hours, he gave them a long lecture emphasizing the threat of communism and communist countries.¹⁶ It must have seemed impossible for the Japanese government to change its firm stance to milder one. Moreover, since the date for the election for the Upper House was approaching the Hatoyama administration did not want to cause any serious contention in the cabinet altering its previous negotiating policy.¹⁷

The Soviets also stood on the same stance they had taken on 10 February. On 20 March at the last meeting of the second London talks, Malik suggested that, if the Japanese government accepted the Soviet position, it would be made considerably easier to settle the straits issue. Now the Soviet delegation for the first time exposed so clearly their intention to link the territorial issues with the straits question. In fact, the Soviets did not intend to press hard on the straits issue. According to Winthrop W. Aldrich, the American ambassador to Britain, a Soviet spokesman told him that the statement for the promotion of free passage rights in the high seas made by Molotov at the Four Powers Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva, inevitably affected the Russo-Japanese normalization talks in London.¹⁸ Nevertheless, it was also clear that the

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Soviets would not make any more concessions on the territorial question. For the Soviets now tried to make Japan give up their territorial claims, by threatening to raise the straits issue unless she renounced the claims.¹⁹

FISHERY NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW: April-May, 1956

Immediately after the London talks had reached a stalemate at the end of March, the Soviet Union took a step to drag the Japanese back to the negotiating table. On 21 March, the Soviet Council of Ministers announced that the Soviet Union would impose a restriction on fishing activities by the Japanese in the north western Pacific area adjacent to Soviet territorial waters. Firstly, the Japanese fishermen had to obtain a special permission from the Soviet government to catch salmons in a restricted area. Secondly, the Soviets intended to impose a quota on the Japanese catch of salmons in the area.²⁰

The Japanese government was now faced with the necessity to open negotiations over this fishery dispute as soon as possible. Japanese fishing interests seemed to have certain influence on the Hatoyama administration. Kôno Ichirô, the minister of agriculture and forestry, had a specially strong connexion with them. He had once been the president of the leading fishing company, Nichiro Gyogyô, in 1947. It was commonly acknowledged

that one of the important power bases of Kono was the fishing industry group.²¹ At the beginning of April, Hiratsuka Tsunejirô, the chairman of *Dai Nihon Suisankai* (the Association of Japanese Fishing Industries), visited Kôno and pressured him to start fishing negotiations as soon as possible.²² Moreover, Hiratsuka and his association established a special committee for Soviet-Japanese fishing negotiations and made a resolution that the government should commence the negotiations over this issue as soon as possible, even through the Soviet Mission in Tokyo.²³ Under these pressures, the Hatoyama government proposed to start fishing negotiations and this proposal was conveyed to Malik through Nishi Haruhiko, the Japanese ambassador to Britain.

Political pressure for the opening of fishing negotiations with the Soviet Union was, though less directly, imposed on the government by other domestic organizations. Organizations for relatives of the Japanese detainees, which had been totally disappointed by the failure of the second London talks, became more desperate in demanding resumption of normalization talks. The exposure of the story of the protest movements at the Khabarovsk detainees camp must have intensified their feelings of desperation. On 30 March, members of those organizations decided to begin a sit-in as a demonstration of their strong desire for the early settlement of the normalization talks.²⁴ Furthermore, the Upper House of the Diet on the same day passed a resolution in favour of the repatriation of detainees.²⁵ In these circumstances, the government could not refuse to begin the

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fishery negotiations, refusal of which could have irritate those organizations.

The Japanese government requested the Soviets to answer its proposal for fishery talks on 3 April. On 9 April, Malik replied that the Soviet government agreed to start the negotiations. The Soviet reply consisted of the following three points. Firstly, the Soviets had no objection to negotiating the fishery question separately from the normalization talks. Secondly, as to the venue for the negotiations, Moscow or Tokyo was preferable. Finally, the Russians stated that they were ready to discuss the various problems laid between the two countries when the fishery negotiations reached an agreement.²⁶ On 10 April, the Japanese government instructed Ambassador Nishi to reply to Malik that the government wished to convene fishery negotiations in Moscow as soon as possible.²⁷

One of the central question in Tokyo was who should be appointed as the representative. Despite his reluctance, Kôno Ichiro, the then minister of agriculture and forestry was appointed on 11 April. Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry, however, had asserted that Ambassador Nishi should be appointed.²⁸ The reason was that Shigemitsu wanted to prevent Kôno from taking advantage of this opportunity to promote an early normalization through some understanding with the Soviet leaders in Moscow. Unlike Kôno, Nishi was known for being a hard liner on the normalization issue. He had persistently argued that, if

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Japan continued to insist on her territorial demand over Kunashiri and Etorofu, the Soviet Union would finally return them.²⁹ Moreover, it is assumed that Nishi had played an important role the previous year in decision-making on the revised territorial demand of 27 August.³⁰ It is natural that Shigemitsu considered Nishi to be a suitable choice. The decision by the government and the leading party, however, turned out to be opposite to Shigemitsu's ideas.

The group within the government and the L.D.P. opposed to normalization attempted to restrain Kôno from negotiating more than the fishery issue, before he left for Moscow. On 12 April, the executive board of the L.D.P. warned Kôno against dealing with any issues other than the fishery questions.³¹ On the other hand, Hatoyama rather encouraged Kôno to do something to promote an early normalization in Moscow. On 14 April, he suggested: 'a settlement of the fishery problem would certainly contribute to promotion of peaceful relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.'³² Hatoyama could not help voicing his desire to break through the stalemate of normalization talks through Kôno's mission.

On 27 April, Kôno arrived at Moscow. The negotiations began the next day. Taking into consideration the fact that the beginning of the fishing season was at the latest the end of May, Kôno intended to settle the fishery issue by 10 May. But the negotiations did not go along smoothly. At the beginning of May,

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A. Ishkov, the minister of fishery of the Soviet Union, and Kôno reached a basic understanding that prevention of overcatch was desirable and that an agreement on sea rescue was necessary. They could not, however, narrow the gap over the range of the fishing restriction zone and the kind of sea products whose catch should be restricted. Faced with rigid Soviet attitudes, Kôno seemed to be convinced that it was impossible to settle the fishery dispute in a form of a fishery agreement. He decided to attempt to conclude a provisional agreement which would enable the Japanese fishing industries to carry out less restricted activities.³³ On 8 May, Kôno proposed to discuss a provisional fishery agreement which would be applicable only for fishing in 1956. Ishkov did not accept the Japanese proposal. He suggested that a permanent fishery agreement should be concluded to settle the fishery issue between the two countries and that the fishery agreement could come into force only when the Soviet Union and Japan restored their diplomatic relations.³⁴ The Soviets now clearly showed their intention to link the fishery issue with the normalization issue. This suggestion could not be accepted by the Japanese. The fishery concerns interested in fishing in the northern waters could not wait for normalization. Kôno tried to break this stalemate by holding an informal conversation with Premier Bulganin.

On 9 May, Kôno met the Soviet premier at the Kremlin. Kôno did not bring any other members of his delegation, even an interpreter. According to various secondary sources, what

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Bulganin during the meeting asserted, covered the following points. Firstly, he argued that the fisheries agreement could come into force only when the normal diplomatic relations were restored. Secondly, the Soviet premier strongly insisted that Kunashiri and Etorofu, Japan's demand for which had been a great obstacle to normalization, were Soviet territories. Thirdly, Japan should contribute to early normalization whether she would adopt the so-called 'Adenauer formula' or a conclusion of a peace treaty.³⁵ The 'Adenauer formula' is the method which West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had adopted to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1955. He had normalized Soviet-West German relations without concluding a peace treaty. Instead, the two countries had only agreed to terminate the state of the war, to exchange ambassadors, and to repatriate German detainees in the Soviet Union. In the case of Soviet-Japanese relations, the people who were in favour of early normalization assumed that the two countries would be able to re-establish their diplomatic relations without concluding a peace treaty. In other words, they argued that Japan should be content with normalization which was achieved by shelving the most intractable question: the territorial issue. According to the Kôno memoirs, though Bulganin indicated the two options, he seemed to have emphasized the Adenauer formula.³⁶

In fact, the major political objective of the Soviet government of the fishery negotiations may have been to lead the Japanese to tend to adopt the Adenauer-type normalization. In

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fact, the unrecognized Soviet Mission in Tokyo had been operating to set up domestic support for this formula in Japan. Domnitsky, the ex-representative of Soviet Mission in Tokyo, had attempted to contact the leaders of Japanese fishing industries for the same purpose since the end of January. On 28 January, Domnitsky met the president of Hokuyô Suisan (Northern Water Fishing Company), and suggested that Japan could achieve normalization with the Soviet Union by adopting the Adenauer formula.³⁷ The same suggestion was brought to Miki Bukichi. According to *Asahi*, Miki received the impression that Russia would unilaterally declare the termination of the state of war and repatriate the detainees and that then both countries would exchange ambassadors. It also said that the territorial questions would be discussed by the ambassadors.³⁸ In response to the press reports with regard to this development, the Japanese government denied the possibility that it would accept this Soviet suggestion.³⁹ Thus, Domnitsky had tried to utilize his unofficial connexions with Japanese fishing interests in order to build support for an early settlement.

Moreover, Prime Minister Hatoyama had still at times spoken out his pet policy: immediate normalization by shelving the territorial questions. On 26 January, he stated at a press conference that he preferred an immediate settlement. This was a clear indication that the prime minister was ready to adopt the Adenauer formula. The Soviets could not ignore this kind of development inside Japan. They certainly knew the close

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relationship between Kôno and Hatoyama and also the close ties between Kôno and fishing industries. It can be assumed that the Soviets might have planned to use these connexions to promote influence of a group in the Japanese cabinet in favour of adopting the Adenauer formula. Perhaps, Bulganin's emphasis placed on the formula may have linked with the above operations conducted by Domnitsky and Soviet perception of tendencies shown by Hatoyama.

According to the Kôno memoirs, his reply to Bulganin covered the following points. Firstly, he asserted that in order to achieve world peace which the Soviet Union seemed to aim at, she should make a concession which was within her power. Secondly, Kôno implied that Japan's domestic differences on the normalization issue, even within the cabinet, were so sharp that it was very difficult for the Hatoyama administration to restore diplomatic relations as soon as the Soviets expected. Thirdly, in connexion with the second point, Kôno went on to say that, in order to improve Japanese public sentiments towards the Soviet Union and to contribute to establishing a Japanese national consensus in favour of normalization, a concession on the fishery issue on the Soviet part was necessary. It should be only a trivial matter for the Soviet Union. Finally, he threatened the Soviet premier to return to Tokyo.⁴⁰ Kôno said in his memoirs that Bulganin seemed to agree with him and that the Soviet premier immediately decided to approve of the provisional agreement.⁴¹

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Bulganin did not accept Kôno's proposal for the provisional agreement without obtaining any practical gains from the Japanese. Kôno had to be subjected to Soviet insistence on an early settlement of Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. He finally agreed to resume the negotiations for normalization by the end of July. Although it seems that the Soviet premier asserted that Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations should be restored by the end of July, Kôno refused to do so on the ground that the Japanese domestic political situations were not favourable for such early normalization.⁴² But he accepted the Soviet assertion that the fishery agreement should come into effect after normalization.

The secrecy with ^{which} Kôno had met Bulganin provoked among groups which were not in favour of early normalization in Japan a suspicion that he might have made a secret understanding with the Soviets. Kôno's political enemies suspected that Kôno might have promised to withdraw Japan's claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu. Although there is no definite evidence proving this allegation, it can be said that Kôno may have made some statement which could be interpreted as that Japan would not pursue her claims to those islands any longer. First of all, Kôno had not expressed any objection to Bulganin's strong suggestion of the Adenauer-type normalization. On the contrary, he had implied that he intended to induce his government to adopt the Adenauer formula.⁴³

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Moreover, on 15 May, on the verge of his departure from Moscow, he asked Ishkov whether the Soviet Union would recognize the fishery agreement and would take a favourable attitude towards Japan's application for membership of the United Nations even when normalization was achieved without concluding a peace treaty.⁴⁴ Adopting the Adenauer formula meant that Japan would agree to normalize her relations with the U.S.S.R. without settling the territorial disputes between the two countries. In other words, even if the Japanese would interpret the Adenauer type settlement as a temporary shelving of the territorial issue, the Soviet Union could understand this to be Japan's withdrawal from her strong claims to the southern Kuriles and to be an opportunity to make an impression that the Soviet occupation of those islands was tacitly recognized by the Japanese. In this sense, Kôno's favourable attitude towards the Adenauer formula had an important meaning for both the Soviet Union and the Japanese.

Secondly, Kôno seems to have made a careless statement, whether intentional or not, during his meeting with Bulganin. According to a press account, Bulganin had at the beginning of the meeting complained of the Japanese attitude towards normalization and remarked that the southern Kuriles had already become the Soviet territories. In reply to this, Kôno was reported to have said: 'All of your views are understandable. The only point with which I do not agree is with regard to the Japanese detainees who are still kept in your country.'⁴⁵ More importantly, a similar but

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much clearer bit of evidence came out in August during a Shigemitsu-Shepilov conversation in London. Shepilov is reported to have stated as follows.

Although I have not got the memorandum of the Kôno-Bulganin meeting with me now, it is possible for me to tell you the contents of the meeting as they were. Premier Bulganin stated as follows. "Although the Habomais and Shikotan are essentially Soviet territories, we decided to concede and hand them over to Japan for the sake of the re-establishment of Soviet-Japanese relations in London. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has begun to claim Kunashiri and Etorofu in addition to the aforementioned islands and, therefore, the London talks reached stalemate. Soviet possession of Kunashiri and Etorofu has already been confirmed and we can never alter this principle." Mr. Kôno replied: 'This proposal of Premier Bulganin is both understandable and practical. I appreciate that it is acceptable to the Japanese.' ⁴⁶

Perhaps, this part of conversation overlaps with the abovementioned press account.

There is another significant evidence about this matter. On 28 October 1956, Tsutsumi Yasujirô, who was one of the most influential supporters of Shigemitsu in the L.D.P., wrote a letter to Shitemitsu. In this letter, Tsutsumi referred to the Bulgain-Kôno conversation. According to his letter, his colleague named 'Kitazawa' had read official records of the above Shepilov-Shigemitsu conversation. 'Kitazawa' seems to be Kitazawa Naokichi, who was an ex-diplomat and a member of L.D.P. Tsutsumi revealed in his letter the story which he obtain from Kitazawa. The contents of the story were substantially the same as Kubota's description showed above.⁴⁷ Thus, it is highly

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likely that Kôno gave an impression to the Soviet Union that the Japanese were ready to accept the Soviet contention over the territorial issue. But it is still uncertain whether he promised it or not. Even so, it can be argued that Bulganin had accepted Kôno's proposal for the provisional agreement partly because of his implication of Japanese readiness to take the Adenauer formula.

After his meeting with Bulganin, Kôno carried on the fishery negotiations with Ishkov. During these conversations, Kôno proposed that negotiations for normalization should be resumed at the latest by 31 July.⁴⁸ Ishkov at first suggested an earlier date. But he accepted Kôno's statement that an earlier resumption was impossible because of Japanese domestic situations that Diet was in session and the election for the House of Councillors was approaching.⁴⁹

The Soviets attempted, however, to press the Japanese hard again to acquiesce in the Adenauer formula. On 12 May, the Soviets asserted that for the fishery agreement and the sea rescue agreement to come into effect, diplomatic relations should be re-established by 10 August. Otherwise, they concluded, the provisional agreement would not be recognized.⁵⁰ Surprised at this proposal, Kôno furiously insisted that Bulganin had already assured him that the provisional agreement would be carried out before normalization was achieved. Then, the Soviets compromised and withdrew the proposal. On 15 May, Kôno

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and Ishkov finally signed all the agreements worked out during the negotiations and issued a joint statement, which provided that the normalization talks would be resumed by 31 July.

Looking through the fishery negotiations at Moscow, one cannot help but conclude that the negotiations resulted in a Soviet diplomatic triumph. First, they finally succeeded in dragging the Japanese to the negotiation table for normalization. Second, under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, Kôno indicated, though subtly, that it would be possible for the Japanese government to adopt the Adenauer formula. Looking at the balance sheet of the Japanese side, judgement should be divided in terms of factional differences. The group in favour of early normalization must have regarded the result of the fishery negotiations as a positive instrument for their cause. Particularly, Prime Minister Hatoyama must have been quite satisfied with it. On the other hand, for the Foreign Ministry and Shigemitsu, the result of the Moscow fishery talks was a disappointment. The initiative of diplomacy was taken up by Kôno and from their viewpoint Kôno intruded in the field of the Foreign Ministry. Moreover, his promise to re-start the normalization talks was totally against the thinking of the Foreign Ministry.

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CHANGES IN JAPAN'S POLICY BEFORE THE NORMALIZATION TALKS IN MOSCOW

After the fishery negotiations at Moscow had ended, the Japanese government was faced with the necessity to modify its normalization policy. As a result of the Kôno-Bulganin meeting, it had been made clear that the Soviet Union would never return the southern Kuriles. At the same time, Bulganin's strong suggestion of the Adenauer type normalization and Kôno's subtle affirmation of adopting the Adenauer formula brought the possibility of earlier normalization through the formula to a more concrete and practical stage of policy-making. It also excited more public interest. For instance, *Asahi* reported that, within the L.D.P., the majority of the party supported an early-normalization whether it would take the form of the Adenauer type or not.⁵¹ Under these circumstances, the Hatoyama administration began to search for a suitable policy for the forthcoming negotiations.

It seemed that the government tended to put aside the Adenauer formula as a policy for the normalization. On 29 May, even Hatoyama declared at the Diet that the government would continue efforts to conclude a peace treaty.⁵² Two days later, both Hatoyama and Shigemitsu explained to the Diet that it would be very difficult for the government to demand the Habomais and Shikotan while shelving the issue of the other islands. At

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that time, though the prime minister did not refer to the Adenauer formula, Shigemitsu clearly pointed out the defects of the formula. He argued that if the government adopted the Adenauer plan, it would have to shelve the question of the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. On 5 June, a cabinet meeting was convened and the government leaders were reported to have reached a conclusion that the forthcoming normalization talks should be treated as the continuation of the second London talks and that the previous policy should be carried on.⁵³

Although the press reported that the cabinet had concluded that it would continue to pursue its previous policy goals, the Hatoyama administration, in fact, began to deviate from the previous line. In the middle of June, during his conversation with George Morgan, the counsellor of American Embassy, Secretary-General of the L.D.P. Kishi Nobusuke clarified the following two points, with respect to the cabinet decision of 5 June. First, the government had decided to carry on the previous policy but it had recognized the necessity to modify its policy afterwards in order to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union. Second, with regard to the southern Kuriles, the government intended to take a firm position for the time being and to become finally content with the existing situation on the basis of mutual understanding that the status of those islands should finally be decided through an international conference.⁵⁴ The Japanese government had been endeavouring to re-gain the southern Kuriles since the end of August 1955. The L.D.P. had in November formulated its

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platform which stipulated that Japan should achieve unconditional return of those islands. But if Kishi's above description is reliable, the cabinet now became determined to realize a Soviet-Japanese settlement even by giving up unconditional reversion of the southern Kuriles.

Behind this alteration of the government's policy, there seems to have been change in attitude on the part of Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry had started to re-examine its policy on the territorial issues immediately after the end of Kôno's Moscow talks. As a result of the fishing negotiations, the Foreign Ministry seemed to realize at least the following two points. Firstly, it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would return the southern Kuriles. In Moscow, Bulganin had strongly asserted the futility of further Japanese attempts to restore those islands and suggested the Adenauer formula as a suitable method for settlement. These facts suggested that the Soviets would not return those islands. Secondly, now the Soviets gained an upper hand against the Japanese, because they had succeeded to make the Japanese agree that the fishing agreement would come into effect only after the normalization was materialized. The Foreign Ministry and Shigemitsu could not fail to realize that an early settlement was imperative.

In these situations, it was reported that the Foreign Ministry had almost established the consensus that Japan ought to give up restoring the southern Kuriles and to normalize her relations

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with the U.S.S.R. as soon as possible by accepting the Soviet terms.⁵⁵ Of a great importance was the Ministry's determination to exclude the Adenauer type normalization from the policy options. Asahi reported that the Ministry held the view that the normalization should be achieved by concluding a peace treaty.⁵⁶ Thus, the Foreign Ministry opposed the Adenauer formula. The reason for the opposition was exposed by Shigemitsu at the National Diet on 31 May. Shigemitsu discussed that if his government adopted the Adenauer formula, Japan might have to shelve the questions over the Habomais and Shikotan.⁵⁷ He implied that adopting the Adenauer formula would lead to the possibility that Japan could not restore even the Habomais and Shikotan. This being the case, Shigemitsu could not agree with the Adenauer formula. Perhaps, the Foreign Ministry may have had to soften its previous line in order to prevent the Hatoyama group from adopting the Adenauer formula. It seems reasonable to assume that the Foreign Ministry chose an option whereby Japan at least could obtain the Habomais and Shikotan, even if they had to admit that Japan might have to be content with the existing Soviet occupation of the southern Kuriles.

It must be remembered that the Foreign Ministry had drawn up a three-stage negotiating strategy at the end of May in 1955. After the Soviet concessions of the beginning of August, the negotiations proceeded to the second stage of the strategy, where the Japanese government should demand the return of the southern Kuriles, the Habomais and Shikotan. Now faced with the repeated

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Soviet refusal, the Foreign Ministry may have realized that it should move on to the third stage: Japan should concentrate on the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan. If so, the normalization talks were still being run along the original long-term negotiating strategy of the Ministry.

It is undeniable that the softening of the Foreign Ministry may have been affected by Shigemitsu's consideration over the maintenance of his position in the cabinet. Since the end of May, there had been a plan for reshuffling the Hatoyama cabinet. This plan was to consolidate the power basis of Prime Minister Hatoyama by changing even the cabinet ministers who had been occupying their post since the birth of the Hatoyama government. Shigemitsu was reported to be the first target of this reshuffling plan.⁵⁸ It was speculated by his junior colleague that Shigemitsu had been urged to retreat from his original tough policy in order to escape from the reshuffle.⁵⁹

Now that the general line of government policy was decided, it was necessary to decide on the plenipotentiary for the negotiations. The government which was determined to settle the negotiations held the view that, besides Matsumoto, some more prominent politician should join, and preside over, the delegation. Moreover, the Japanese had certainly learned the lesson from Kôno's negotiations at Moscow that meeting senior Soviet political leaders was one of the most effective methods to extract compromises or concessions from the Soviets. The

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government decision to choose another plenipotentiary may have been based on this consideration. The selection of the plenipotentiary was complicated by factional struggles. As a result of the complication, Kishi Nobusuke unexpectedly recommended Shigemitsu as plenipotentiary, and he also unexpectedly accepted this recommendation on 13 July.⁶⁰

Shigemitsu's acceptance of his appointment was regarded as not understandable in some quarters. The most interesting account was that by Sir Esler Dening, the then British ambassador. Dening understood that Shigemitsu was caught in the middle of an intractable dilemma. In a situation where most of mainstream tended to desire early normalization, Shigemitsu was obliged to take on the normalization talks in order to avoid his own political downfall. On the other hand, if he were to succeed in the Soviet-Japanese settlement, he would have to alter his original tough line. That alteration might cause him a lot of trouble in his relations with anti-normalization factions. Dening had difficulty in finding out why Shigemitsu should have allowed himself to be selected. But he speculated:

.... it may just be that Shigemitsu is that kind of chap. He accepted the Foreign Ministry and the journey to the "Missouri" for Japan's surrender when most other Japanese would have refused the job and his attitude towards his trial and sentence as an "A" class war criminal was much the same. It is partly perhaps fatalism and partly the Japanese characteristic of self-immolation.....And it is an attitude which Japanese are capable of admiring upon reflection, so that if Shigemitsu does fall over this Russian business, it is conceivable that in the long run he may gain more in the eyes of his fellow-countrymen than any of his present political colleagues.⁶¹

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It may be true that Shigemitsu's decision came from his sentimentality. Furthermore, as several memoirs suggest, he decided to accept the appointment considering that, if he succeeded in carrying through the Japanese territorial demands in some form, his political prospect for being the next prime minister would improve.⁶² But his consideration over the normalization itself should not be ignored. When he accepted the appointment as plenipotentiary, the situation was that, if he had refused, someone closely connected with Hatoyama and Kôno would have been selected. From Shigemitsu's viewpoint, this possibility should be avoided, because the initiative in diplomacy would be taken from the Foreign Ministry to the Hatoyama group including Kôno and because it was very likely that they would try to lead the negotiations to be based on the Adenauer formula. Perhaps this consideration may have greatly influenced Shigemitsu's acceptance of the appointment.

As for the venue for the negotiations, Moscow was chosen by the Japanese government after Shigemitsu had been selected as the plenipotentiary. The foreign minister had suggested that London was preferable⁶³ but the cabinet decision turned out to be against him. Because the foreign minister was appointed as chief negotiator, it was unreasonable to choose a third country as the venue for the negotiations.⁶⁴ Another possible and secondary reason for avoiding London may have been the attitudes taken by the British since the start of the normalization talks. The British government had kept a non-

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committal attitudes towards the Soviet-Japanese normalization. Moreover, it had even expressed a view on the territorial issue which had been unfavourable for the Japanese. The Japanese government had already known that the British would not be very helpful to Japan over the territorial issue. If so, there was no point of sticking to London as the venue.

On 18 July Tokyo instructed Ambassador Nishi in London to inform the Soviets that the Japanese government were ready to open the negotiations at Moscow. Three days later, the Soviet government communicated to Tokyo that it accepted the Japanese proposal and that it appointed Foreign Minister Shepilov as the plenipotentiary.⁶⁵ The negotiations was due to be resumed on 31 July.

What kind of negotiating policy did Shigemitsu have in his mind? Despite the lack of documents describing his policy, it is possible to picture its outline by relying on some indirect evidence. He seemed to intend at first to take a firm attitude over the territorial issue. On 19 July, during a meeting with American Ambassador Allison, he said that 'he would follow pattern "we (=the Americans) knew very well" on territorial issues.'⁶⁶[My brackets] Japanese Minister Shima in Washington also confirmed that Shigemitsu would take a hard line but that he did not intend to bring the negotiations to a break-down.⁶⁷ This was also in accordance with the cabinet decision made on 5 June.

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Secondly, Shigemitsu was determined to achieve a settlement after taking such a tough line. Hanyû Sanshichi, a Socialist member of the Diet, had a private conversation with Shigemitsu several days before his departure for Moscow. During the conversation, Shigemitsu seriously said to him, 'this time I am absolutely determined to settle the negotiations.'" Hanyû was astonished since I could never believe that such a crucial determination was privately stated by the foreign minister. When he met Shigemitsu again three days before his departure for Moscow, the foreign minister re-assured that he seriously intended to settle the negotiations.⁶⁹

When Shigemitsu again met Allison on 24 July, he asked if the U.S. government would oppose if the Japanese government reached an agreement with the Soviet Union on the territorial issue on terms which the Japanese considered favourable. Allison did not give him any official affirmation. But he replied that in his opinion, neither the United States nor ex-Allied powers would have any objection if both the Soviet Union and Japan would be satisfied with their agreement.⁶⁹ It seems that Shigemitsu tried to secure the American guarantee that the U.S. government would not interfere with Japanese efforts to reach an agreement on the territorial question even by making some territorial concessions to the Russians. Thus, Shigemitsu intended to preempt any possible future accusations from the United States. As mentioned above, the Foreign Ministry and he considered that the Adenauer formula was so risky that the Japanese might be forced

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to agree to postpone the settlement of the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. Perhaps in order to avoid a situation where the Japanese government was urged to adopt the Adenauer formula, Shigemitsu may have been determined to bring the negotiations to a settlement even by making some territorial concessions to the Russians.

Thus, Shigemitsu's negotiating strategy was basically in accordance with the cabinet decision of 5 June, which was described by Kishi Nobusuke. But there seemed to be no concrete and specific understandings between Hatoyama and Shigemitsu on an important question: to what extent and when the Japanese government should accept the Soviet terms. It is reported that the prime minister and foreign minister only exchanged greetings before the latter left Japan for Moscow. The former only said to Shigemitsu that he hoped that the foreign minister would carry out his job well.⁷⁰

As for the question whether there were any specific instructions given to Shigemitsu, there is another interesting story. On 20 July, Kôno had a meeting with the American ambassador. During his conversations, Kôno stated that Shigemitsu was going to Moscow with instructions with which the cabinet had agreed. It was on 17 July when a cabinet meeting had been held and finally selected Moscow as the venue for the negotiations. If Kôno's remark is reliable, it may have been at the cabinet where the instructions had been drawn up. More

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importantly, Kôno said that the instructions contained a condition that Shigemitsu 'should insist as minimum on Soviet recognition of Japan's *residual sovereignty in Southern Kuriles.*'⁷¹ Moreover, even Shigemitsu referred to the residual sovereignty, though it was in September after the Moscow talks were over. He stated that the Soviet Union would not recognize Japan's residual sovereignty.⁷²

The proposal for restoring residual sovereignty over the southern Kuriles was in favour of the Japanese. By proposing this to the Soviet Union, the Japanese could have indicated that they were willing to retreat from their previous tough demands for complete sovereignty over these islands. Moreover, in a situation where Japan was only entitled to residual sovereignty over Okinawa by the U.S., the Soviet Union would have become unable to rely on the contention that the Japan's territorial claims to the southern Kuriles were in contradiction with her recognition of U.S. occupation of Okinawa. If Russia had accepted it, the Japanese government could have satisfied Japanese public opinion and the opposite within the government which had been demanding the reversion of the southern Kuriles. Besides that, Kôno may have considered that the Americans would be content with Japan's restoration of residual sovereignty over the islands on the ground that it would be possible for Japan to re-gain complete sovereignty in future.

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Perhaps, Kôno may also have assumed that if the Soviets accepted this proposal, it would become a great pressure on the Americans to return to Japan the administrative rights over Okinawa and the Bonins. It could be expected that the U.S. government would try to neutralize the effect of the Soviet acceptance of the 'residual sovereignty' proposal by adopting some policy favourable to the Japanese on the Okinawa issue. It seems that Kôno and Shigemitsu clashed on this matter at the cabinet meeting which was held on 3 July. Shigemitsu wrote in his diary: 'A cabinet meeting, at 10:00. Had a heated discussion with Minister Kôno mainly on the issues of Okinawa and Soviet-Japanese normalization.'⁷³ Probably, Shigemitsu, who desired not to complicate the Okinawa question,⁷⁴ opposed Kôno's suggestion on the ground that such a proposal would damage U.S.-Japanese relations. At any rate, it is highly likely that the 'residual sovereignty' proposal was discussed in the cabinet meeting. It is still unclear whether the 'residual sovereignty' proposal mentioned by Kôno to Allison reflected any government instructions. But it seems that Kôno's remark about the proposal may have indicated that he and possibly Hatoyama may have considered that Shigemitsu would be allowed to settle the negotiations on condition that the Soviet Union returned the Habomais and Shikotan and residual sovereignty over the southern Kuriles.

Outside the government, the trend of domestic opinion was rather complicated. The opposition party, the J.S.P., asserted

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early normalization. It argued that the government should request the southern Kuriles but that if Russia did not accept it, it should adopt the Adenauer formula.⁷⁵ The Socialists took a very similar position to Prime Minister Hatoyama. On the other hand, the Yoshida faction still remained a formidable opposition group against early normalization. Although the Yoshida faction was not very big within the L.D.P., the influence of the former prime minister in diplomatic field could not be ignored. Moreover, he had his supporters within the circle of old experienced ex-diplomats, such as Ashida Hitoshi, and Nomura Kichisaburo, who had been the Japanese ambassador to the United States when the Pacific war had broken out. On 22 July, Yoshida sent Shigemitsu an open letter, which was made public by Sankei Jiji Newspaper. In this letter Yoshida condemned the Soviet possession of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, and holding Japanese detainees. The letter was coloured by strong anti-Soviet sentiments. It must have been intended to promote hard line sentiments among the Japanese over the normalization talks before Shigemitsu's departure.⁷⁶ Thus, when Shigemitsu left Tokyo for Moscow, there was not a national consensus over the normalization issue, particularly the territorial question.

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CHAPTER 7 THE FIRST MOSCOW TALKS

MINOR CONCESSIONS BY JAPAN AND SOVIET REACTIONS

The Japanese delegation headed by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu arrived at Moscow on 29 July. At the Vnukovo Airport, Shigemitsu issued a brief statement. In this statement, he declared that 'The aim of my present negotiations is to put an end quickly to the unnatural "state of war" which has continued to exist for more than ten years since the end of the war, and to find ways of normalizing Soviet-Japanese relations.' Then, he emphasized that 'a solution must be found which will satisfy both sides and at the same time leave no evil roots for future relations.' This statement reflected Shigemitsu's determination to reach a settlement whereby all problems between the U.S.S.R. and Japan would be solved. In other words, he clarified that Japan's goal was to conclude a peace treaty with Russia.

The first plenary meeting was held on 31 July. The meeting started with a statement made by Soviet Foreign Minister Dmytri Shepilov. Shepilov referred to the following three points. Firstly, he pointed to the fact that the Soviets had already made various concessions including the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. Secondly, he suggested that all the negotiators ought

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to do this time was to decide the form of expressions for the territorial and the straits issues. Thirdly, he made it clear that the concession over the Habomais and Shikotan was the maximum concession that the Soviet Union could make.² The Russian position on the territorial issue which had been made clear during the Kôno-Bulganin conversations had not at all changed. Russia seemed to be firmly determined not to return the southern Kuriles.

In reply, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu made rather a lengthy statement. It was published by the Foreign Ministry of Japan shortly after the first meeting. In it, Shigemitsu offered minor concessions. He offered to submit a new draft provision on the commercial issue which reflected the Soviet position expressed at the second London talks. He also suggested that Japan desired to insert a provision for resumption of diplomatic and consular relations into the clause ending the state of war.

Then, Shigemitsu moved on to the main agenda: the territorial question. He explained the Japanese position by developing detailed legal arguments. Firstly, Shigemitsu argued that, because the U.S.S.R. had not signed the S.F.P.T., the issue of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin 'remained undecided between Japan and the Soviet Union.' Shigemitsu implied that those islands had not been renounced in Japan's relations with the Soviets. But he now continued:

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Under the San Francisco Treaty, Japan has given up South Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Allied Powers. We will have no objection to confirming this stipulation of the San Francisco Treaty to the Soviet Union if Japan's position is recognized relative to the two islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri.³

Now he clarified that Japan would give up her claims to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in exchange for Soviet reversion of the southern Kuriles. He argued that Kunashiri and Etoforu were Japan's 'inherent territory', and by quoting the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration, he justified Japan's claims to these two islands. According to Shigemitsu, the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration were based on the 'highest principle not to seek territorial aggrandizement.'⁴ He went on that the southern Kuriles could not be possessed by the Soviets because the Soviet annexation of these inherent islands of Japan would undoubtedly be inconsistent with the principle.

Then, Shigemitsu proposed a new draft provision.

Japanese sovereignty over the Habomais, Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunashiri, which were occupied by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a result of the war, should completely be restored on the day when the peace treaty comes into effect. Japan should renounce all rights to the Kuriles and a part of Sakhalin over which Japan obtained her sovereignty as a result of the Portsmouth Treaty of 5 September 1905. The forces of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics should be withdrawn from the abovementioned Japanese territories within 90 days after the peace treaty comes into force.'⁵

The Shigemitsu statement clearly contained a newly modified Japanese line on the territorial issue. Until then, the Japanese

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government had asserted that Japan had never renounced the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in her relations with the Soviet Union. But it was now suggested that she would renounce all of the right to those islands in exchange for Soviet recognition of Japanese sovereignty over Kunashiri and Etorofu. Also, Shigemitsu no longer proposed to convene an international conference for deciding the disposal of the Kuriles and the southern Sakhalin. These alterations must have been intended to indicate that the Japanese were willing to make some minor concessions on the territorial issue. It must, however, be noted that this gesture could not be interpreted by the Soviets as a concession. With only Japan's recognition of her renunciation of those islands, there was still the possibility that Japan would later assert that the final disposition of those islands should be decided through some international arrangement. In fact, the Japanese government did not mean to drop the previous position with regard to holding the international conference. On 3 August, it issued a statement to the effect that if the government was reported to have dropped the proposal of an international conference, it was a misunderstanding.⁶ Shepilov certainly refused to regard the Shigemitsu statement as a concession on the Japanese part. He replied that it seemed that the Japanese position adopted during the London talks had not developed at all.

The second plenary session was convened on 3 August, when Shepilov refuted the statement previously read by Shigemitsu on 31 July. Firstly, Shepilov argued that Japan attempted to alter the

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situation which had already been fixed by international arrangements, and that the Soviet Union could not accept the Japanese unrealistic demands. Secondly, Japan had lost the right to invoke the treaties with regard to the status of the Kuriles, which had been concluded in 1855 and 1875, on the ground that she had started an aggressive war in 1904. Thirdly, Shepilov continued that the territorial questions had finally been settled by Article 2 of the S.F.P.T. He also went on to assert that Kunashiri and Etorofu were part of the Kuriles, which the United States, Britain, and the U.S.S.R. had agreed in the Yalta Agreement to transfer to the Soviet Union. Finally, he concluded that the Soviet Union would concede the Habomais and Shikotan in response to Japan's desire and on the basis of the peaceful approach of the Soviet Union.⁷ Added to this, he declared that there was no point in discussing the issue which had already been settled. In addition, the Russians poured cold water on the Japanese hopes by submitting a Soviet version, which was the same as had been submitted by Malik at the second London talks.⁸

Shigemitsu seemed to be irritated by the Soviet contentions. In particular, Shepilov's statement dealing with the Russo-Japanese war annoyed him. His bitter feeling was expressed in his diary.⁹ He started a counterargument by saying that the Soviet contention that the Russo-Japanese war was started by Japan's aggression was a dogma of the triumphant countries of World War II. Then, he repeated that because the Soviets had not signed the S.F.P.T., the territorial questions still remained to be settled between the

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U.S.S.R. and Japan. He added that the Yalta Agreement meant nothing to Japan because she did not participate in the Agreement.¹⁰

At the third plenary meeting on 6 August, Shigemitsu again counterargued against the Russian contention by referring to over ten points. His argument was virtually a mere repetition of his previous contentions.¹¹ Shepilov also did not show any indication of altering his position. The Japanese foreign minister now decided to hold an informal conversation with the Soviet plenipotentiary, hoping for a break-through. On 7 August, the informal meeting was held at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. But no break-through was achieved. On 8 August, the plenary meeting was held but there was no development of the negotiations on the territorial issue, either. Rather it seemed that Soviet attitudes became harder. Shepilov threatened to withdraw the Soviet concessions which had been made during the previous negotiations.

....if Japan refuses, by sticking to her present policy, to settle the problems on the Soviet terms, the Soviet concessions which had been made would come to nothing. The Habomais and Shikotan should be returned on condition that a peace treaty shall be concluded on the Soviet terms. They will not be transferred on any other conditions.¹²

In conclusion, Shepilov stated that the Soviet Union would not have any objection to suspending the negotiations.¹³

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SHIGEMITSU'S DECISION TO ACCEPT SOVIET TERMS

Shigemitsu was now made to realize the limitation of his hard-line tactics. Being determined to avoid a break-up of the negotiations, Shigemitsu decided to solve this stalemate through meeting with the top leaders of the Kremlin. The next day, he proposed the meeting and the Soviet foreign minister accepted the proposal and the meeting was planned to be held on 10 August. Late on the night of 9 August, Shigemitsu assembled the press accompanying him from Japan. In front of them, he remarked that he had already done everything possible to secure more concessions from the Soviet Union and that he realized that she never would make any more territorial concessions.

I have found that the U.S.S.R. will by no means alter her present position. I have been searching for a solution, but there is no way. Now I feel that I have gone to the limit of my strength. I shall do my best tomorrow at the meeting with Bulganin and Khrushchev. Then, I shall thoroughly examine the question and make my final decision. Prime Minister Hatoyama will be informed of my decision but I do not intend to ask for his instructions. Taking into full account domestic and international situations, I will sort everything out on my own responsibility. Even if someone will throw a bomb at me at Haneda Airport, I will make up my mind for the future of Japan. I believe that Japan will reach the stage to restore the spirit of the nation as she did at the time of signing the Instructions of Surrender on the Missouri.¹⁴

This statement was intended to convey to the Japanese that everything had been done to fulfil Japan's territorial demands but that it had been in vain. He may have considered that the Japanese people would be content with this result because even he,

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who had been pursuing the hardest line so far, had to accept the Soviet assertions. In this sense, the above statement of Shigemitsu was an indication that he decided to make some major concessions on the territorial issue.

On 10 August, Shigemitsu visited the Kremlin with his private secretary and an interpreter. At the meeting, Premier Bulganin explained that the Soviet position presented by Shepilov was a conclusion supported unanimously by the Soviet government and that therefore it was impossible to alter it. Khrushchev also emphasized that Russia would not change her position and condemned Japanese aggressiveness by quoting her past invasions. Shigemitsu tried to re-assert the Japanese territorial claims but the Soviet leaders did not compromise.¹⁵ Then, Shigemitsu seems to have retreated from the hard line policy. He proposed to devise a wording for the territorial clause based on mutual understanding of each other's standpoint.¹⁶

Finally, the Soviet leaders compromised and made it clear that they were ready to cooperate in searching for a mutually agreeable wording for the territorial clause on condition that the Japanese recognized the Soviet principle that the disposition of the southern Kuriles had already been settled. According to Kubota, who was at that time in Moscow as a member of the press, it was Khrushchev who suggested this compromise. He reports that Khrushchev said, 'If the Japanese agree with the Soviet position that the questions over the southern Kuriles had already been

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settled, I would like you to discuss with Shepilov the details as far as they do not substantially damage each other's interests.'¹⁷ It seems that Shigemitsu was greatly satisfied with the result of this conversation.¹⁸

On 11 August, the Soviet and the Japanese plenipotentiary had their third informal meeting. Shigemitsu's intention to work out a compromise was clear, as he based the discussion on the previous Soviet draft which had been submitted to the negotiating table on 3 August. The draft provision stipulated:

1. Desirous of meeting the request of Japan and considering the interest of the latter, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transfers to Japan Little-Kurile archipelago (Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island). Order of transfer of the Island referred to in this paragraph will be provided for in the protocol annexed to the present treaty.

2. Frontiers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan will run on the centre of the straits of Kunashiri (Nemuro) and Ismena (Notsuke) as shown on the map annexed hereto.¹⁹

The Japanese foreign minister proposed to amend this provision. He requested to delete a part of the first sentence of paragraph 1: 'Desirous of meeting the request of Japan and considering the interest of the latter'.²⁰ This part seems to have been intended by the Russian to emphasize that though the Habomais and Shikotan had been recognized as Soviet territories, they would return them as an indication of Soviet goodwill and generosity. The Japanese could not accept this argument. From the Japanese viewpoint, those islands were definitely Japanese territories on the ground that they were not part of the Kuriles and had illegally been occupied

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by the Soviet Union. Besides that, Shigemitsu asked to remove the whole of the second paragraph, which was obviously intended to fix the frontier in order that the southern Kuriles were included in Soviet territory.²¹ The Japanese foreign minister attempted to alter the territorial clause to contain no reference to the disposal of Kunashiri and Etorofu. The deletion of the second paragraph was intended to keep the question of the disposition of those islands unclear by not referring to it in the peace treaty. In other words, Shigemitsu endeavoured to shelve the question in substance.

In fact, the proposed amendment by Shigemitsu was a great concession from the Japanese viewpoint. For the Soviet Union could interpret the amended provision as Japan's tacit recognition of the territorial status quo of the Kuriles and the southern Sakhalin. But it was true that this provision was devised in order to leave the possibility of Japan's future re-submission of territorial claims to those islands. Shigemitsu must have planned to arrange his amendment for this purpose. In response to this new Japanese line, Shepilov did not alter his previous tough attitude, explaining that the Soviet government intended to settle the territorial problems by transferring the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan. The second paragraph was, he continued, necessary in order to leave no source of future trouble between the two countries. He also opposed the first part of Shigemitsu's amendment by maintaining that its deletion was

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equivalent to ignoring the fundamental standpoint of the Soviet Union on the territorial issue.²²

Faced with Shepilov's rigid attitude, Shigemitsu made another proposal which included further concession on the Japanese part. He proposed to replace the second paragraph with the same provision as the territorial clause of the S.F.P.T. By this new provision, Japan was to renounce all claims to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin in relations with the Soviet Union. But this Japanese concession did not affect Shepilov's rigid attitude. He merely repeated that the Soviet position would never change and insisted that there was no other way for the Japanese than to accept the Soviet draft as it was.²³

Shigemitsu's second proposal also had dual characteristics. It implicitly indicated that Japan was willing to be content with an existing situation of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin: Soviet occupation of those islands. For inserting Article 2 of the S.F.P.T. meant that Japan was ready to ^{withdraw her} claims to sovereignty over those islands and the right to demand the reversion of them from Russia. Regarding the southern Kuriles, Shigemitsu's proposal had no reference to their disposition. This implied that Japan did not intend to demand immediate return of them. Thus, the proposal had an aspect of an indication of concessions on the Japanese part.

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On the other hand, Shigemitsu elaborated his proposal in order to maintain the possibility that Japan would be able to re-gain those territories in the future. It must be remembered that Article 2 of the S.F.P.T. was interpreted particularly by the Americans as that the final disposition of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be decided by some international arrangement. Perhaps, Shigemitsu intended to rely on this legal interpretation and cling to a slight hope for future reversion of those islands. Regarding Kunashiri and Etorofu, Shigemitsu also maintained a chance to restore them. By making no reference to those two islands, he seems to have tried to leave the possibility that the territorial issue over those islands was interpreted as unsettled. To be sure, he may have intended to leave even the slightest chance to regain those islands in the future. But it cannot be denied that he may also have assumed that his proposal could be accepted by the opposite political groups in Japan and by Japanese public opinion because the proposal did not entirely exclude the possibility of restoring those islands. Thus, Shigemitsu's proposal seems to have been designed to satisfy both the Russians and the Japanese.

Despite Khrushchev's suggestion at his informal meeting with Shigemitsu, Shepilov did not accept Shigemitsu's second proposal. Instead, the Soviet foreign minister attempted to compel Shigemitsu to accept the Soviet terms without amending them. Because of the lack of access to Soviet materials, it is hardly possible to know Shepilov's motivations behind his rigid

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attitudes exactly. But it is possible to speculate as follows. Although Khrushchev had shown an understanding attitude towards Shigemitsu on 10 August, the Soviet government may probably have been determined not to cede the Habomais and Shikotan unless the Japanese recognized Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles, including the southern Kuriles, and southern Sakhalin. If so, Shigemitsu's proposal was far from satisfying the Soviets. Moreover, the Soviets may have recognized that Shigemitsu's proposals were designed to leave the chance for Japan to re-gain those islands in the future. If the Japanese would not recognize Soviet sovereignty over those islands, it would be more beneficial for the Soviets to normalize their relations with Japan on the basis of the so-called 'Adenauer formula', because they would not have to return even the Habomais and Shikotan under that formula. Hence, the Soviet Union was not at all urged to make more concessions in response to Shigemitsu's indication of territorial concessions on the Japanese part.

Faced with the rigid Soviet attitude, Shigemitsu seemed to conclude that he ought to accept the Soviet terms. On 12 August, Shigemitsu made it clear to his delegation members that he intended to settle the normalization talks on the Soviet terms. According to the Matsumoto Memoirs, Shigemitsu stated in his telegram to Tokyo on that day that he was afraid that the Soviets would withdraw their concessions over the Habomais and Shikotan, unless the Japanese government accepted the Soviet terms.²⁴ Shigemitsu may have come to this idea because Shepilov

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had on 8 August suggested that the Soviet government would withdraw its offer to return the Habomais and Shikotan in the case of Japanese refusal of accepting the Soviet conditions. Moreover, Shigemitsu may have considered as follows: If a peace treaty was not concluded at this time in Moscow, the last resort for normalization that the Japanese could rely on would be the Adenauer formula. From his viewpoint, if Japan adopted the formula, the Soviets would insist on shelving the issue of the Habomais and Shikotan and, as a result of this, Japan would substantially lose those islands. The only option that Shigemitsu could adopt to prevent this was to accept the Soviet terms and to be content with only the return of the Habomais and Shikotan.

At first Shigemitsu thought that all members of his delegation agreed with his view.²⁵ But Matsumoto disagreed with him because of the political climate in Japan. Because of Shigemitsu's firm attitude over the territorial issue at the early stage of the Moscow talks, Japanese public opinion was encouraged to hold a stronger desire to regain the southern Kuriles.²⁶ The government and the party leaders in Tokyo were affected by this trend of public opinion and tended to oppose a settlement on Soviet terms. At the same time, the political situation in Tokyo was confused over the issue of the successor to Hatoyama who had expressed a wish to retire after the achievement of Soviet-Japanese normalization.²⁷

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Under these circumstances, Tokyo could not accept Shigemitsu's decision which might cause more disruption in the political arena because the decision was completely against the party platform of the L.D.P. Matsumoto considered that this domestic situation could hardly be ignored. Moreover, he seems to have had personal resentment towards Shigemitsu. In fact, in the summer of 1955, Matsumoto had already reached the same conclusion as Shigemitsu. But it was the foreign minister who had prevented the settlement proposed by Matsumoto. He could not now accept Shigemitsu's decision.²⁸ Matsumoto tried to persuade Shigemitsu to change his mind.

Shigemitsu was so adamant that he insisted on signing a peace treaty including the territorial clause embodying the Soviet terms. He asserted that he was fully authorized by the government to make a decision without consulting Tokyo.²⁹ On 13 August, however, the prime minister finally sent the instructions to Moscow to the effect that the cabinet opposed the settlement along Shigemitsu's idea. It seems that there were several exchanges of views between Shigemitsu and Tokyo. But it is still very uncertain what kind of views were exchanged, despite some description by Matsumoto. In fact, the descriptions in Matsumoto's memoirs were in contradiction with the contents of the Shigemitsu Diary in several important points.³⁰ At any rate, Tokyo decided not to approve the settlement on the Soviet terms and Shigemitsu informed Shepilov that because he would attend the international conference of the Suez User's Union scheduled to be

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held from 16 August in London, the negotiations should be suspended temporarily. The Soviets accepted this proposal.³¹

The main reasons for the cabinet decision to refuse Shigemitsu's suggestion were closely connected with the domestic political situation. It seems that Shigemitsu realized this constraint imposed on him by domestic politics. He did not hide his resentment in his diary: '

13 August, Monday.

Last night, a special cabinet meeting must have been held. Although I have never asked Tokyo for any instructions, they are making such a fuss there. I have tried to settle the negotiations and I am ready to take all blame for it. But Tokyo obstructed my efforts.

At the time of the Chankufeng Incidents, they had pushed the opposite side, now they are pushing their own side. Tokyo is filled up with the selfish.³²

Thus, political struggles within the L.D.P. and the government undoubtedly affected the government decision. The death of Miki Bukichi in early July meant a great loss of a balancer in the party power struggles. Although Hatoyama was the president of the L.D.P., he had acquired the post because of the sudden death of Ogata Taketora, ex-president of the Liberal Party. In the L.D.P. there was still a strong anti-Hatoyama faction based on the former Liberal party members. Moreover, members of the Yoshida faction were still spearheads of opposition to normalization itself. The existence of this strong anti-Hatoyama group complicated and disrupted the government's management of diplomacy. Under these circumstances, the prime minister on 10

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August expressed a wish to retire when the settlement of the normalization talks was achieved. In the middle of this political complication, Shigemitsu's suggestion to accept the Soviet terms arrived at Tokyo. The suggestion by the foreign minister could be another source of political confusion, because his suggestion was not at all consistent with the party platform drawn up in November 1955. If the government had accepted Shigemitsu's recommendation, the unity of party could have been greatly disrupted.

As the instructions from Hatoyama on 13 August had indicated, another reason for the cabinet decision was the influence of public opinion.³³ Public opinion became very firm and tough over normalization, particularly the territorial issues. In the press, *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, and *Sankei Jiji* had been taking a firm position over the reversion of the southern Kuriles.³⁴ Hence, it can be argued that the Hatoyama administration was affected by the influence of the tough press attitudes. But what is interesting is that the opinion poll held at the end of August by *Asahi* rather showed a trend opposite to the government assumption. The *Mainichi* opinion poll held in the middle of June had shown that 61% of the Japanese people were for the government demanding the southern Kuriles. The *Asahi* opinion poll indicated, however, that only 50% showed affirmative attitude towards normalization on the basis of the restoration of the southern Kuriles.³⁵ This shows that the Japanese public did not particularly intensify its demand for the southern Kuriles during the Shigemitsu Moscow talks. In

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this sense, it can be argued that the government decision did not entirely reflect the trend of Japanese public opinion.

Finally, should the Shigemitsu recommendation be accepted by the cabinet, it could not be certain if a peace treaty based on the Soviet terms could be ratified. The divisions within the L.D.P. and the J.S.P.'s rigidity on the territorial question may have been expected to obstruct normalization on the basis of Shigemitsu's suggestion.³⁶ It would, therefore, be very difficult, if not impossible, for the government to secure enough support for the ratification of the peace treaty on the proposed basis.

Thus, Shigemitsu's Moscow talks resulted in failure. Now the Japanese government was faced with the necessity to search for the next step. But before they reached a conclusion, external pressure started to exert a great influence on the policy-making of the government.

SHIGEMITSU-DULLES CONVERSATIONS

On 19 August, Shigemitsu held a meeting with the U.S. secretary of state in London. Dulles was also attending the international conference over the Suez Canal problems in London. It was Shigemitsu who proposed the meeting.³⁷ One of the main purposes

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was to inform Dulles of the development of the Moscow talks. But it seems that Shigemitsu also intended to ask for American support for his new normalization policy, which he seemed to have drawn up after the Moscow talks. During the meeting, the Japanese foreign minister reported the development of Soviet-Japanese talks in Moscow and explained that he understood that because the Soviets would not return the southern Kuriles, there would be no way other than for Japan to accept the Soviet terms.³⁸ Then, Shigemitsu asked Dulles as to what the U.S. thought about convening an international conference over the disposition of the Kuriles and the southern Sakhalin.³⁹ It seems that Shigemitsu's new policy was composed of the following two factors. First, Japan basically has to accept the Soviet terms on the territorial issue: Japanese recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles including Kunashiri and Etorofu. Second, the final disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be decided through an international conference of the powers involved. Perhaps, his new line may have been based on the consideration that even if Japan recognized the Soviet possession of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, the final disposition ought to be confirmed by an international agreement by the signatories to the S.F.P.T. Furthermore, this policy may have been intended to prevent the Hatoyama faction from becoming dominant in foreign policy making as a result of Shigemitsu's failure in Moscow.

Dulles' reactions were very disappointing for Shigemitsu. In response to the latter's question with regard to the international

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conference, Dulles did not show much enthusiasm over this. Originally, the Americans had not been positive about the international conference proposal since 1955. Instead, Dulles made a controversial statement over the southern Kuriles question. Dulles made a remark which was later to cause a stormy reactions in Japan. According to Matsumoto, Dulles stated to the effect:

The San Francisco Peace Treaty does not stipulate that the Kuriles should belong to the Soviet Union. Hence, if Japan accepts the Soviet territorial terms, it means that Japan offers the Soviets more benefit than is provided in the Peace Treaty. In this case, under Article 26 of the treaty, the United States is entitled to assert her annexation of Okinawa. I consider that the Soviet arguments are totally unreasonable.⁴⁰

It can be argued that Dulles was warning against Shigemitsu's intention to concede to the Soviet Union over the territorial issue.

If the reference to Article 26 was intended as a warning to the Japanese, it must be concluded that the U.S. attitudes towards the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks had considerably changed. In fact, the Americans had begun to show a clear sign of deviation from their attitude of a benevolent observer at the end of May. Since shortly before the fishing negotiations in Moscow, the U.S. government had again been concerned about the possibility that the Japanese government would make too many concessions to the Soviet Union. The Americans were alarmed particularly because it was Kôno who was appointed as the Japanese chief negotiator for the fishing talks. Even so, Dulles still tried to avoid any

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semblance of direct intervention. On 18 April, Dulles instructed that if Kôno asked for any advice, Allison could tell him that Japan should not accept Soviet terms without a proper quid-pro-quo. But he also instructed him not to give any specific advice on the territorial issue.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the American anxiety became stronger as the fishing negotiations went on. On 10 May, at his meeting with Shigemitsu, Ambassador Allison gave a more explicit warning, pointing out that if Japan offered Russia something without gaining anything from her, the United States would have misgivings.⁴²

It was the improvement of relations with China which intensified the American anxiety over Soviet-Japanese relations. Since the start of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks in 1955, the United States had been sensitive to the possibility that a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement might trigger a more dangerous, from the American point of view, rapprochement with China. On 15 May, it was made clear that Chinese Prime Minister Cheu En-lai had suggested that the P.R.C. was willing to welcome a visit by Hatoyama and Shigemitsu.⁴³ Probably, because of this development, the U.S. seemed to become alarmed by the possibility of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. A week later, Allison held a meeting with Shigemitsu and talked about domestic trends towards normalization with the P.R.C. As a result of this conversation, the American ambassador came to the conclusion that the U.S. government should take more positive steps to prevent Sino-Japanese rapprochement and recommended that President Eisenhower

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or Dulles send a personal message warning against the Sino-Japanese rapprochement.⁴⁴ This recommendation eventually did not receive the backing of the secretary of state. But the Department of State did instruct Allison at his discretion, to inform the Japanese that the U.S. government was concerned that 'Japan may accede to resumption [of] diplomatic relations [with the U.S.S.R.] without obtaining adequate returns.'⁴⁵[My brackets] The U.S. government evidently intended to prevent Sino-Japanese normalization by indicating its anxiety over Soviet-Japanese normalization.

Moreover, in connexion with the Soviet-Japanese fishing dispute, an interested Congressman requested the American government to take more positive steps with regard to Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. From the end of May to the beginning of June, Senator William Knowland, who was closely connected with American fishery interests engaged in northern water fishing, seemed to request the government's deeper involvement in Soviet-Japanese normalization. He was concerned about the damaging effect on the American fishing industries as a result of the Soviet-Japanese fishing dispute.⁴⁶

On 1 June, Senator Alexander Smith sent a personal letter to Walter Robertson, the assistant secretary, and suggested that the U.S. government should more positively commit itself to Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. He said,

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It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the consequences to the American position in the Far East if the fears of our friends in Japan are fulfilled. What dismays these friends is that, with all this going on, the United States seems to be either ignorant of or indifferent to the potentialities of the situation. They are even considering sending a group to Washington to inform our government of what is transpiring and to urge us to manifest our interest in a situation which might well deprive us of an important ally.⁴⁷

'Our friends' in the above passage meant the anti-Hatoyama faction represented by former Prime Minister Yoshida. It must be remembered that Smith had been an influential member of the Far East Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1951-2 and that he had most strongly opposed transfer of the Kuriles and the southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union at the time of the peace treaty making in 1951.⁴⁸ His firm opposition was embodied in an attachment to the instrument of ratification of the S.F.P.T. which expressed the Senate's objection to the government offering any benefit to the Soviet Union over the treatment of the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, the Habomais and Shikotan.⁴⁹ Now in 1956, Smith requested the U.S. government to get more deeply involved with the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. He must have had a certain influence, though an indirect one, on the government's attitude towards the territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan. Dulles, who was susceptible to congressional influence, may have been affected by these pressures from Congress. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration had to handle Congress very carefully because the presidential election was approaching.

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Finally, it should not be overlooked that the Republic of China tried to exert some influence in order to prevent Soviet-Japanese normalization. In late June, President Chiang Kaishek asked the U.S. to intervene in the normalization talks. Chiang was reported to consider that the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement 'may lead to "disaster"' and to hope that 'U.S. will do everything in its power to render abortive all efforts in that direction.'⁵⁰ The Nationalist government must have been worried about the future possibility of Sino-Japanese normalization as a result of Soviet-Japanese rapprochement. It is not clear how the U.S. government reacted to Chiang's suggestion. Considering the importance of smooth relations with the Nationalist China after the Formosa crisis in 1955, however, it can be argued that the American government must have been aware of the necessity to take into consideration the anxieties of Chiang.

Under this considerable pressure from various quarters the United States government decided to take a more positive attitude towards normalization. Dulles' intentions behind his reference to Article 26 may have been to induce the Japanese back to the previous tough line after the failure of Shigemitsu who had been regarded as a leader of hard-liners on the normalization issue. Dulles' reference to Article 26 was leaked by Matsumoto to the Japanese press and was exposed to the Japanese public on 23 August.⁵¹ For Matsumoto, Dulles' warning was an effective instrument to hamper Shigemitsu's insistence on accepting the Soviet territorial terms. It was expected that Dulles' warning

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would sweep away support for early normalization on the basis of the Soviet terms. Even so, Matsumoto should have recognized that the leakage would also help the anti-normalization factions represented by Ashida and Yoshida.

On 24 August, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Dulles held their second meeting. It seems that Shigemitsu raised at least the following three points. Firstly, he again proposed the international conference over the final status of the Kuriles and Sakhalin.⁵² Secondly, he asked Dulles 'whether the allied powers objected if Japan found it necessary to accede to the Soviet position.' Shigemitsu stated, finally, that 'in his judgment it would serve the peace of the world, and be desirable from the standpoint of the community of nations, that the abnormal relations between Japan and the Soviet Union be terminated.' Then, he asked for Dulles' opinion on this argument.⁵³ Shigemitsu had not changed his position since the previous meeting with Dulles. He seems to have still asserted that normalization should be realized through a peace treaty on the Soviet terms.

Dulles had not basically changed his previous position, either. According to a Foreign Office document based on the information given by an official of U.S. Embassy in London, Secretary Dulles, 'in a further effort to strengthen the Japanese, tried to insist that the Russians needed a Peace Treaty as much, if not more than, as the Japanese.....and suggested that the Japanese might argue

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that the two islands in question were of vital strategic importance to them.' In reply, Shigemitsu requested Dulles to let him have a statement of Dulles' view on the strategic, legal and other aspects of the islands: Kunashiri and Etorofu.⁵⁴ Perhaps, Shigemitsu may have considered that such a statement would be an effective political instrument to prevent Hatoyama's effort to adopt the Adenauer formula. In fact, on 19 August Hatoyama made it clear that he wished to visit Moscow for negotiations.

The United States was still reluctant about the international conference proposal made by Shigemitsu. Dulles considered that there were many drawbacks in the proposal and that there was very little possibility that the conference could yield the desired results for Japan. But he did not deny that the call for an international conference might be worth considering from the standpoint of U.S.-Japanese relations.⁵⁵ When Dulles asked Allison for a comment on this point, however, Allison entirely opposed the international conference. He considered that, the Soviet Union would not attend such a conference and that if such an international conference was to be convened, the Soviets would attempt 'to broaden it to include Taiwan and Ryukyus, and bring in Communist China.' Moreover, he suggested that there would be pressure from the J.S.P. to include discussion of the full return of Okinawa. Allison concluded that, though an international conference would never produce any practical result, the United States would be the loser on the inevitable propaganda battle during the conference.⁵⁶

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Allison, then, recommended another method to assist the Japanese, in particular Shigemitsu. The American ambassador suggested to the secretary of state that the U.S. government could no longer keep up its non-committal policy in view of the furore in Tokyo over the reports with regard to Dulles' reference to Article 26. Moreover, he was aware that Shigemitsu was involved in the political crisis in Tokyo and might possibly be ousted from the cabinet. He thought that 'we can probably best serve our interests in Japan and at the same time give Shigemitsu some support, not by favouring international conference, but along following lines.' Then he suggested that urgent consideration should be given to 'public statement by the U.S. government and by as many other San Francisco Treaty Powers as we can round up in brief time, to effect we support Japan's interpretation of "Kurile Islands" in Article 2 of Peace Treaty as excluding Etorofu and Kunashiri, that on moral, historical and legal grounds, we believe they should be returned promptly to Japan.'⁵⁷ This recommendation by Allison was accepted by Dulles. The Department of State started to prepare for the recommended public statement.

The Shigemitsu-Dulles meetings in London constituted a watershed in U.S. attitudes with regard to the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement. The United States changed her previous 'hands-off' policy and started to take a more committal position. This change was triggered by Dulles' reference to Article 26 of the S.F.P.T. It is likely that Dulles was determined to intervene in the normalization talks at this stage. The fact that on 28 August at

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the press interview he did not deny the existence of his remarks on Article 26 supports this assumption.⁵⁸

BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE

British attitudes since the second London talks were in a sharp contrast to the American ones. During the second London talks run by Matsumoto, the British Foreign Office seemed to be a mere recipient of information from Japan. Even during the period of the fishery talks in Moscow, in which the U.S. government had shown acute anxiety over the negotiations, Britain had been a cool observer.

Even so, the Japanese sometimes tried to obtain some assistance from Britain. From 18 to 25 April, Soviet Premier Bulganin and First Secretary Khrushchev visited Britain. The Japanese government seemed to take advantage of this occasion to break through the stalemate of Soviet-Japanese negotiations. On 18 April Japanese Ambassador Nishi called at the Foreign Office to see William Allen and brought a summary of developments at the second London talks. Then, touching on the question of the Japanese prisoners still detained in the Soviet Union, the ambassador expressed the hope that it might be possible for United Kingdom Ministers to make some reference to the question in the course of their conversations with the Russian leaders.⁵⁹

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This Japanese request was conveyed to the Northern Department and British Ambassador William Hayter, who had returned to London to deal with the visit by the Soviet leaders. Allen wrote, 'It would indeed give considerable pleasure in Japan if it were found possible to mention the matter to the Russian leaders.'⁶⁰ It seems that they actually prepared an Aide-Memoire to meet the Japanese request. But the Japanese request was too late. At that time, there was only one more meeting with the Soviet leaders. The Northern Department considered that it would not constitute a very suitable occasion for handling the Japanese request and that to do so at that stage would give disproportionate importance to it. At last, the Foreign Office decided to drop this issue owing to the difficulties of timing.⁶¹ It must be noted that though the British tried to avoid getting involved with any vital issue of the Soviet-Japanese talks, namely the territorial issue, they did not refuse to do something over the repatriation problems. Rather, the Foreign Office seems to have considered it beneficial in terms of Anglo-Japanese relations to indicate its will to help the Japanese on the issue.

Regarding the fishery dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Foreign Office kept a cool attitude. Firstly, because Britain did not have crucial interests involved in the dispute, she was not very much interested in this problem. Secondly, the Foreign Office estimated that Soviet restrictions on Japanese fishing in the northern waters would not very much harm the general economic situation of Japan.⁶²

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Shortly before the Moscow talks by Shigemitsu, Ambassador Denning had for the first time expressed to Shigemitsu his opinion as to how to settle the negotiations. Denning met him on 18 July at the latter's request. During their conversation, firstly Denning suggested that the Russians would not give way over the Kuriles, saying 'If they did, I should regard it as the most startling event since the end of the war.' Then, he referred to the possibility of shelving the issue of the Kuriles and other territories and criticized the idea of shelving on the ground that it would seem normal to define the boundary between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Shigemitsu agreed with these points Denning made.⁶³ It is now easy to figure out what Denning had in mind as to how to deal with the normalization. He considered that the Japanese would have to settle the negotiations on Soviet terms. In this sense, Denning had accurately predicted the future development of the negotiations. To be sure, he exposed to Shigemitsu his opinion over the negotiations. But it was done as his personal view. It is wrong to assume that the British also started to make a positive reaction to the normalization talks.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry once sought a minor assistance from the British shortly before the foreign minister's departure to Moscow. On 20 July, Minister Oda of the Japanese Embassy in London called at the Foreign Office, and asked for its permission for the Japanese delegation to quote at the negotiations with Russia a part of the British answers to the Japanese questionnaire sent in early July 1955.⁶⁴ As already described in

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the previous chapters, the Japanese questionnaire contained two questions as to: whether the British regarded the Yalta Declaration as constituting the final determination of the fate of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin foreshadowed in the Potsdam Declaration; whether in British opinion the Soviet government had the right to make such determination unilaterally. The British answer to the first question was negative, which meant that the answer was beneficial to the Japanese. But their reply to the second question was unfavourable to the Japanese, because the Foreign Office suggested to the Japanese in its reply that the Soviet Union would acquire preemptive rights by *de facto* possession in the course of time.⁶⁵ Hence, the Japanese did not desire to quote the British reply to the second answer. The Foreign Office conveyed its permission to Ambassador Nishi on 23 July.⁶⁶

During the Moscow talks by Shigemitsu, information with regard to the development of the negotiations was not often delivered to the Foreign Office by the Japanese. Even in Moscow, the Japanese delegation seemed to avoid contacting the British Embassy.⁶⁷ After the failure in Moscow, Shigemitsu came to London to attend the Suez Canal Conference. The Foreign Office expected Shigemitsu to pay a courtesy call on British Prime Minister Anthony Eden or Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd. For the possible meeting, the Office prepared a brief policy paper. According to this, the Foreign Office predicted that Shigemitsu might ask if the British would support a Japanese proposal that the future of the Kuriles

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should be referred to an international conference of the powers concerned. The briefing suggested that the British should not give any consent to the proposal because Britain should not be involved in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. It said: 'we might find ourselves in trouble with both sides.'⁶⁸ On 25^{August} Shigemitsu had a conversation with Foreign Secretary Lloyd, but he did not raise the issue. He only handed a memorandum pointing out that the territorial issue between the Soviet Union and Japan had an international character. A member of the Foreign Office staff wrote, 'So we are continuing to lie low,.....in the hope that we shall not have to say anything. The more we look at the idea of a conference the more we dislike it.'⁶⁹ The British Foreign Office, unlike the Americans, persisted in its non-committal attitudes towards the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks.

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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION OF
SOVIET-JAPANESE
JOINT DECLARATION

DECISION ON HATOYAMA'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

Since the first Moscow talks had turned out to be a failure, the Hatoyama group in Tokyo intensified its efforts for the prime minister to visit Moscow and normalize Soviet-Japanese relations through the Adenauer formula. On 19 August, Hatoyama made it clear that he wished to go to Moscow for normalization talks. But there was strong opposition to Hatoyama's decision in Japan. Even some leaders of the pro-normalization group, for example the Minister of M.I.T.I. Ishibashi Tanzan, disagreed with sending Hatoyama on the ground that there was no point of Hatoyama going to Moscow, unless there was some prospect for success.' Criticism from the anti-normalization group was harsher. The Yoshida faction certainly attacked the prime minister's decision. To cope with this political complexity, the Hatoyama group implied that the prime minister would retire when diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were restored. Behind this, there must have been the consideration that some of the factions of the L.D.P. whose leaders desired to be the next prime minister would come to support Hatoyama in order to acquire a favourable reward from him

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in terms of selection of his successor. In fact, on 1 September, it was reported that Hatoyama intended to appoint his successor in order to avoid further confusion within the party.²

On 3 September, Shigemitsu arrived in Tokyo. At the cabinet meeting held in the afternoon, he still asserted that Soviet-Japanese relations should be restored in the form of a peace treaty on Soviet terms.³ Having failed to secure American support for his international conference plan, however, Shigemitsu could not exert as much influence as he had done before the first Moscow talks.

Hatoyama and his supporters seems to have attempted to set up a *fait accompli* through a series of secret meetings with the Soviet Mission in Tokyo. Kôno and Takasaki, the director of the Economic Planning Agency, consulted Sergei Tikhvinsky, the representative of the unrecognized Soviet Mission, who had succeeded Domnitsky in May, with regard to conditions for resumption of the normalization talks from 3 to 5 September.⁴ The Japanese brought a proposal regarding the conditions for the resumption of the talks, which was constructed by Matsumoto. On 3 September, coming back to Tokyo with Shigemitsu, Matsumoto exposed his plan along the Adenauer formula to Hatoyama and Kôno.⁵ It is said that Matsumoto had already arranged with Malik the proceedings for the next talks.⁶ Perhaps he had already set up this plan as the result of his consultation with Malik. His plan was to be embodied in the five conditions for the resumptions of

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the negotiations expressed by Hatoyama on 5 September. Kôno and Takasaki must have talked about the Matsumoto plan to Tikhvinsky and figured out the conditions based upon it.

After these secret preparation, Hatoyama explained to the party leaders those five conditions on 5 September. He explained that he intended to go to Moscow on condition that the Soviet Union should accept the certain Japanese positions. As the most important prerequisite condition, the territorial issues should for the time being be shelved for future negotiations. According to Hatoyama's explanation, the Soviets should then accept the following five conditions: the Soviets should agree to the termination of the state of war; the exchange of ambassadors; the immediate repatriation of Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union; the coming into force of the fishery agreement concluded in May 1956; and the support for the Japanese application for membership of the United Nations.⁷ Now Hatoyama decided to contact directly the Soviet leaders. Hatoyama sent a letter containing the above five conditions to the Soviet premier. The substantive part of the letter is as follows.

With a view to normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Japan I would like to arrange this without a treaty, on condition that negotiations on the territorial question be continued at a later date, in the following manner:

1. Termination of the state of war.
2. Mutual establishment of Embassies.
3. Immediate repatriation of detainees.
4. Implementation of the Fisheries [Agreement].
5. Soviet support for Japanese entry into the UN.

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From the Kono-Tichvinsky talks we gained the impression that these five conditions are acceptable to the Soviet Government and I would appreciate it if your Excellency would confirm this in writing. We are ready to resume negotiations in Moscow as soon as we receive your confirmation.

In these negotiations I hope those matters agreed upon previously by the delegates of the two countries at London and Moscow will be adopted to the extent possible. [My brackets]

Premier Bulganin's reaction came very quickly. On 13 September, he replied to Hatoyama, as follows:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated September 11 in which you express the readiness of the Japanese Government to resume the Japanese-Soviet negotiations in Moscow immediately and in which you request confirmation of the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarding the normalization of the relations between the two countries.

I have the honour to confirm the readiness of my Government to resume negotiations for the normalization of relations without a peace treaty in view of the impasse arising from the following matters which have been discussed by the two countries. We are ready to proceed in accordance with the following several points:

1. Declaration of termination of the state of war.
2. Resumption of diplomatic relations and mutual establishment of Embassies.
3. Release and repatriation of all Japanese nationals sentenced in the U.S.S.R.
4. Implementation of the Fisheries Treaty signed [sic] May 4, 1956.
5. Support of Japan's request to enter the UN.

Moreover, regarding your desire on the points agreed upon during the course of negotiations in London and Moscow, I consider that both sides shall be able to exchange views on these points.

Bulganin accepted the five conditions, and agreed to re-open the normalization talks. But a vital divergence between the two letters can be seen. The Japanese intention to obtain Soviet

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confirmation of continuing the territorial negotiations was ignored in the Bulganin letter. In Japan, anti-Hatoyama and anti-normalization groups did not overlook this. They asserted that it was necessary to confirm if the Soviet Union understood that the territorial questions still remained unsettled, and they insisted on sending Matsumoto to Moscow for that purpose. On 17 September, a top leaders of the government met and they decided to send Matsumoto.¹⁰ On 13 September, the U.S. Aide-Memoire over the disposition of the Kuriles and Sakhalin was publicized. The Aide-Memoire clearly expressed the view that the U.S. government supported the Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles. Anti-Hatoyama groups were encouraged by this and, therefore, Hatoyama could not ignore their insistence.

Matsumoto arrived at Moscow on 25 September. That day, Matsumoto called at the Soviet Foreign Ministry and met Deputy Foreign Minister N.T. Fedorenko. Prior to this meeting, Matsumoto and Takahashi Michitoshi, the vice-directore of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, had prepared a draft of official memorandum to be exchanged, which was handed the memorandum to Fedorenko. This memorandum was designed to state clearly Japan's desire that 'even after the restoration of normal relations between the two countries, Soviet-Japanese relations will become firmer on the basis of a formal peace treaty containing territorial issues,' and that 'the negotiations for the conclusion of the peace treaty including the territorial issue will be continued after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations

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between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.¹¹ This letter was addressed through Fedorenko } to Andrey Gromyko, the then first deputy foreign minister.

Two days later, Fedorenko conveyed the information that the Soviet government had no objection to Matsumoto's draft. On 29 September the letters were exchanged between Matsumoto and Gromyko. The letter from Gromyko simply repeated Matsumoto's draft and added:

The Soviet government understands the Japanese government's aforementioned view, and confirms that it agrees to continue the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue after normal diplomatic relations is restored between the two countries.¹²

While the Soviet confirmation was obtained in Moscow, the domestic struggle in Tokyo developed to a new stage. In fact, on 20 September, immediately after Matsumoto's departure, an emergency assembly of the L.D.P. decided to establish a new party policy for normalization. This policy excluded the Adenauer formula from acceptable policy options. The main points of the new platform were: to request the immediate and unconditional repatriation of the Japanese detainees; to request the immediate reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan; to continue the negotiations on the disposal of Kunashiri and Etorofu after the conclusion of a peace treaty; to deal with the other territories in accordance with the contents of the S.F.P.T.; and to include in a peace treaty the clauses with which an agreement was worked

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out during the previous Soviet-Japanese negotiations in London and Moscow.¹³ The hard liners, such as Ashida, did not admit the validity of the Matsumoto-Gromyko exchange documents on the ground that they were not consistent with the new party platform. Faced with this adamant and somewhat intriguing obstruction from hostile factions, Hatoyama seemed to decide to adopt an unilateral method. On 2 October, Hatoyama held a cabinet meeting and made the final decision on his visit to Moscow. By doing so, he realized his visit to Moscow, in spite of domestic obstruction to it.

U.S. AIDE-MEMOIRE ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES QUESTIONS AND BRITISH ATTITUDE

In the middle of September, while the Japanese government was being confused over the issue of Hatoyama's visit to Moscow, the U.S. government attempted to exert more direct influence on the Japanese. Ambassador Allison's proposal of 30 August for issuing an Aide-Memoire to support Japan's claims to the southern Kuriles had been taken into consideration by the Department of State. Around 3 September, the Department completed a draft Memoire. With several amendments, the completed Memoire was handed to Tani Masayuki, the Japanese ambassador to the U.S., by Secretary Dulles on 7 September. The next day, Ambassador Allison also handed the same Aide-Memoire to the foreign minister.

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A document called 'Oral Points' was also attached to the memoire.¹⁴

The Aide-Memoire, the 'Oral Points', and the Tani-Dulles conversation provide significant clues to understand American policy at this period towards the normalization talks. The Memoire contained at least the following five main points. Firstly, it was claimed that the state of war between the U.S.S.R. and Japan should *formally* be terminated. Secondly, it clearly denied the legal validity of the Yalta Agreement by simply characterizing the agreement as a statement of common purpose, not as a final determination. Thirdly, it indicated that the U.S. government understood that Japan did not have the right to transfer sovereignty over the territories which had been renounced by her in the S.F.P.T. Fourthly, the Aide-Memoire said that the signatories to the S.F.P.T. would not be bound to accept any actions by Japan of the kind like the territorial transference. Finally, it clearly enunciated that Kunashiri and Etorofu along with the Habomais and Shikotan which were part of Hokkaido had always been part of Japan.¹⁵ What the U.S. government meant to express by this Aide-Memoire is now clear. It tried to stop the Japanese from giving away the Kuriles and Sakhalin and to dissuade them from giving up restoring the southern Kuriles. In addition, the first point may have implied that the normalization should take a 'formal' form, namely a peace treaty.

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The 'Oral Points' also indicated significant characteristics of American policy. The American assertions embodied in the 'Oral Points' were as follows. Firstly, it was stated that the United States government did not support at this stage the international conference plan proposed by Shigemitsu. Secondly, it was assumed that the Soviet Union would not return the southern Kuriles because Soviet military strategic interests made their reversion unlikely; but it added, 'this does not necessarily affect the possibility of a treaty formula by which Japan does not purport itself to relinquish sovereignty.' Thirdly, the Oral Points indicated that the U.S. government was not at all keen on the Adenauer-type normalization. It suggested that Soviet insistence on the Adenauer formula might well be a bargaining device and that the Soviet Union which had a record of breaking treaties would possibly not implement the promises made under the Adenauer formula. Finally, it was suggested that the U.S. was willing, if the Japanese desired so, to give her diplomatic support to Japanese requests to other nations that they should make declarations similar to the American one. Dulles also recommended to Tani that Japan take a tougher line on the ground that the Soviets were more eager to restore normal relations than the Japanese were.¹⁶

From those documents and the contents of the conversations, we can derive certain conclusions. The U.S. government implicitly suggested that from its viewpoint it was desirable for Japan to conclude a peace treaty with Russia without transferring or

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giving up any of the former Japanese territories. In other words, the Americans, and in particular Dulles, preferred a peace treaty in which the final disposition of southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles including the southern Kuriles remained to be settled in the future. Furthermore, the U.S. government was willing to encourage the Japanese to endeavour to restore the southern Kuriles by setting up a common front with the other western allies who were the signatories to the S.F.P.T.

The Aide-Memoire was published on 13 September in Japan. Although Foreign Minister Shigemitsu seemed to be unhappy about its contents,¹⁷ the anti-Hatoyama factions took advantage of it in order to justify their opposition to Hatoyama's visit to Moscow. In fact, the Yoshida faction had already known the contents of the Aide-Memoire before 13 September. On 12 September, Ikeda Hayato, who was one of the most influential leaders of the that faction, issued a statement to the effect that the Japanese should not give up their territorial claims to the Kuriles because the most important signatory to the S.F.P.T. finally came to support the Japanese claims to those islands. He also criticized the Adenauer formula by saying that it would result in substantial transference of the southern Kuriles to the Soviet Union.¹⁸

Although the U.S. government was reluctant to support an international conference over the disposal of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, it was willing to offer Japan good offices to acquire some kind of support for her territorial claims to the southern

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Kuriles. Originally, this idea had been given by Ambassador Tani at his meeting with Dulles on 7 September. Since then, the Japanese had not requested the U.S. to proceed with this goal. Secretary of State Dulles was, however, very positive about calling the international support. He seemed to intend to obtain Japan's support over the Suez crisis by helping her in the normalization talks. For this purpose, he thought of calling upon Nationalist China, Britain and countries which had participated in the Potsdam Declaration, to issue their support for Japan's territorial claims to the southern Kuriles.¹⁹

In the middle of September, the American government attempted to acquire British consent to this plan for international support. Noel Hemmendinger, the acting director of the Office of Northeastern Asian Affairs, who was the author of the Aide-Memoire, met A.J. de la Mare, a counsellor of the British Embassy in Washington and talked about the international support plan.²⁰ Although Hemmendinger did not mention anything specific about the plan, the British could readily expect that the United States would ask for their cooperation. The British reaction to the American intention was, however, not at all favourable. De la Mare wrote, 'I naturally did not commit us in any way but I told him quite plainly.... that we were not anxious to become involved...'²¹

The British Foreign Office actually did not agree even with the line of the American Aide-Memoire regarding the status of the

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southern Kuriles. On 13 September, the information regarding the Aide-Memoire came to the Foreign Office. Its legal adviser, G.L. Simpson, reacted to the part of the memoire referring to the status of the southern Kuriles. He doubted whether an international arbitration should be applied for the matter of Kunashiri and Etorofu and concluded, 'we cannot go as far as the Americans.'²² A.L. Mayall, an assistant of the Far Eastern Department expressed disagreement with the American position more strongly. He wrote, 'we should have great difficulty in accepting the American contention.'²³

The Japanese must have known that the British were not very helpful on the territorial issues. In July and October 1955, the British government had answered the Japanese questionnaires regarding the validity of their territorial claims against the Russians unfavourably. The Japanese must have known that it was almost impossible to obtain British support on this issue. As indicated in the Oral Points, the Americans were reluctant to canvas for international support without a request from the Japanese government. In a situation where the Japanese themselves had to deny the feasibility of the international support plan, there was no possibility that the plan could be achieved. It was unlikely that Hatoyama would ask the U.S. for good offices for the international support. For he had already decided to adopt the Adenauer formula and such international support would be inconsistent with his decision to shelve the territorial question in Moscow. Moreover, the U.S. government had

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to give up using Shigemitsu as a leverage in the Japanese government for that purpose. Ambassador Allison was clearly aware that Shigemitsu had already lost influence in the decision-making process in his government.²⁴ Dulles was faced with a dead-end. In consequence, the international support plan was cancelled.

SECOND MOSCOW TALKS AND CONCLUSION OF JOINT DECLARATION

As mentioned above, Hatoyama and his supporters in the government and the party had only brought about his visit to Moscow by ignoring strong opposition from anti-normalization quarters in the party. Considering the necessity of obtaining their support for the ratification of normalization in the Diet, however, Hatoyama had to take into consideration the influence of those opposition forces, when the negotiating policy was drawn up. Hence, the government line for the second Moscow talks became in the nature of a compromise between his Adenauer formula and his opponents' hard line policy which had been presented by the new party policy issued on 20 September. The most significant point on which Hatoyama and his supporters were urged to make a concession was in respect of the treatment of the Habomais and Shikotan. The result most feared by the hard-liners was that the Soviet Union would postpone the settlement of the Habomais and Shikotan questions under the Adenauer formula. They insisted that the government should demand immediate reversion of those islands.

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Moreover, there was another demand in hard liners that the Japanese should endeavour to obtain also Kunashiri and Etorofu. As to this question, Hatoyama must have felt some pressure from the United States as presented in her Aide-Memoire of 7 September.

According to Matsumoto, the Hatoyama cabinet drew up its negotiating policy based on the compromise described above, before the departure of the prime minister which was scheduled for 12 October. The policy for the second Moscow talks consisted of three stages. First, it instructed that the delegation should at the first stage attempt to conclude a peace treaty. The peace treaty should be based on the settlement of the territorial issues as follows:

- (1) The Soviet Union should agree,
 1. To return immediately the Habomais and Shikotan,
 2. To hand over Kunashiri and Etorofu to Japan after the restitution of Okinawa.
- (2) Japan should renounce southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles northward of the abovementioned islands in paragraph (1).²⁵

It is clear that the Japanese government now clearly decided to renounce the Kuriles excluding the southern Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. But it did not go as far as to recognize Soviet sovereignty over them. Regarding the southern Kuriles, the government included a condition for their reversion. There is no evidence to clarify why it referred to the reversion of Okinawa as the condition for that of Kunashiri and Etorofu. But it can be argued that the government attempted to show its willingness to make a concession over the southern Kuriles. At the same time, the

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Japanese government may have tried to make a use of Soviet criticism of American occupation of Okinawa.

In fact, during the second London talks, Soviet Plenipotentiary Malik had once stated that 'The United States were still controlling Japanese territory without any justification.'²⁶ He had intended to use this fact of American occupation of Okinawa in order to point out the contradiction between Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles and Japanese approval of American occupation of Okinawa. Perhaps, this connexion between the southern Kuriles question and Okinawa problem may have been perceived in the Japanese government. It must be remembered that Kôno had stated on 20 July that the Japanese government had formulated a proposal for restoring 'residual sovereignty' of the southern Kuriles from the Soviet Union. Probably the government had at that period considered that it would be able to take advantage of this connexion between Okinawa and the southern Kuriles. It can be argued that the Hatoyama cabinet also tried to use it in Moscow. Considering that the 'residual sovereignty' proposal seems to have been put aside because of Shigemitsu's firm opposition, the policy which Hatoyama would bring to Moscow indicated that influence of Shigemitsu in the cabinet had drastically decreased after his failure in Moscow.

The government also intended to ask the Soviets for the immediate return of the Habomais and Shikotan. Originally, Hatoyama had hoped to get back the Habomais and Shikotan even if

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he had intended to adopt basically the Adenauer formula. He expressed in June that he had in mind a mixture of the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan and the shelving of the settlement of the other territories.²⁷ The prime minister retreated, however, from this position which had been expressed in his letter to Bulganin. These territorial claims apparently reflected a compromise between the proponents of Hatoyama and his opponents.

The second stage of the government's negotiating policy was to attempt to conclude a basic convention in case of Soviet refusal of the Japanese territorial claims described above. It was suggested that the basic conventions should include the following clauses:

1. The termination of the state of war and the resumption of diplomatic relations.
2. The observation of the U.N. Charter.
3. Non-intervention in domestic affairs.
4. Commercial clause.
5. Fishery clause.
6. Ratification.²⁸

It was also recommended to attach a joint communiqué providing for the repatriation of the Japanese detainees, Soviet support of Japan's entry into the U.N., and a schedule for the future conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue.

At the third stage, in case of Soviet refusal of the second proposal, it was suggested that Japan should work out an exchange of notes and a joint communiqué. The exchange of notes was

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intended to include the following items: the termination of the state of war; the resumption of diplomatic relations; basic principles for relations between the two countries, namely non-intervention in domestic affairs, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts; an article stipulating schedule for the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial question; and ratification. A joint communiqué was designed to stipulate an understanding on repatriation of the detainees and Soviet support for Japan's entry to the U.N.²⁹ Looking at the policy for the third stage, we can recognize that Hatoyama was so determined, as to intend to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations even in the form of an exchange of notes, which did not have to be ratified by the Diet to come into effect.

Hatoyama, Kôno and other members of the delegation arrived at Moscow on 13 October. Kôno immediately started preliminary discussions with Ishkov, the Soviet minister for fishery. As Matsumoto recalled, the most important point was how to cope with the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.³⁰ At this first meeting, Kôno asked Ishkov to communicate to Bulganin that the Japanese strongly desired immediate restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan.³¹

The first plenary session was convened at noon on 15 October. The session started with addresses by the Soviet premier. After having emphasized the importance of normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations, Bulganin enunciated that the Soviet government

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accepted the Japanese request for continuation of the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial question.³² In reply, Hatoyama made a speech and explained that the Soviet government had accepted the five conditions submitted in his letter to Bulganin and that it had also agreed to resume the normalization talks on condition that both countries would continue the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue.³³ Both sides made it clear that they desired a fruitful outcome from the negotiations and that the negotiations would be run on the basis of a mutual understanding that the two countries would continue their efforts to conclude a peace treaty by settling the territorial issue in the future.

After the addresses, the Soviets submitted the drafts of a joint declaration and a commercial and navigation protocol as a basis of the negotiations. Then, both parties agreed to set up an expert committee to work out drafts acceptable to both parties. Matsumoto was appointed as the Japanese representative on the committee and Gromyko as the Soviet representative.

In the afternoon, Kôno held an informal meeting with Ishkov again. During the luncheon hosted by the Soviets after the first plenary session Kôno managed to acquire Khrushchev's promise to have an informal conversation with him.³⁴ The meeting with Ishkov was a preliminary meeting for the coming conversation with Khrushchev. At the meeting with Ishkov, Kôno took up the

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Soviet draft declaration as an agenda. The draft stipulated the following points:

1. Termination of the state of war.
2. Resumption of diplomatic and consular relations.
3. Observation of the U.N. Charter
4. Soviet support for Japan's entry to the United Nations.
5. Repatriation of the Japanese detainees.
6. Waiver of war claims.
7. Start of commercial negotiations.
8. Implementation of the fishery agreement and the sea rescue agreement concluded in May 1956.

Added to these, the Soviet draft contained a clause on banning the production, experimentation, and use of nuclear weapons as Article 9. Article 10, which was the final clause, stipulated that both parties should agree to continue the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty including the territorial issue after the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries.³⁵

The problem for the Japanese delegation was that the Soviet draft did not contain any clause stipulating the immediate return of the Habomais and Shikotan. Kôno picked up this point and argued that the Japanese government could not accept it. He explained that the delegation was bound to follow the new party platform formulated shortly before their departure which provided that the Habomais and Shikotan should be immediately returned to Japan. Then, he proposed to provide in the joint declaration that those islands should be immediately returned to Japan and asked the Russians to examine the idea that the Soviet Union would

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return Kunashiri and Etorofu when the United States retroceded Okinawa in the future. But Kôno added that it was sufficient for the declaration to stipulate that the territorial problems except the Habomais and Shikotan should be negotiated some time later or when Okinawa was retroceded. Ishkov promised to convey the proposals to Bulganin and Khrushchev.³⁶

On 16 October, Khrushchev invited Kôno to the Kremlin. During his meeting, Kôno requested Khrushchev to return the Habomais and Shikotan immediately when diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored. But the first secretary asserted that, because the Japanese had suggested that the territorial problem would not have to be discussed at this time, the Soviet government had accepted the five conditions and agreed to resume the normalization talks. The questions over the Habomais and Shikotan were, he continued, none other than the territorial issue. Khrushchev argued that the territorial problem had to be dealt with in future negotiations for a peace treaty and that, if Japan desired to conclude one, the Soviets would agree to include a clause providing the transference of those islands.³⁷ Khrushchev clearly refused to return the Habomais and Shikotan immediately.

Then, Khrushchev proceeded to criticize Japan's attitudes towards the territorial question. He said, 'Although the Japanese repeatedly request us to return the northern four islands (=the Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu), the United States has not yet returned Okinawa. We shall return the Habomais and

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Shikotan after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union when the Americans return Okinawa.³⁹ In reply, Kôno asked if the Soviet Union agreed to return Kunashiri and Etorofu when the Americans returned Okinawa. Khrushchev retorted that the Soviet position would never change.³⁹

On 17 October, Kôno met Khrushchev again and repeated his request for the immediate reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. In response, Khrushchev started to show a sign of minor compromise. Although he still suggested that the joint declaration should stipulate that the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned at the time of the conclusion of a peace treaty and of the American reversion of Okinawa, he implied that Russia could accept a *modus vivendi* providing that those islands would be returned to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty regardless of when the U.S. retroceded Okinawa.⁴⁰ It seems that Kôno did not make any comment on this. Instead, he submitted a Japanese draft of the joint declaration over the question of the Habomais and Shikotan.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in response to the desire of Japan and in consideration of her interests, agrees to transfer the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan to Japan.

Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, agree to continue their negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty including the treatment of territorial question and for the comprehensive settlement of the problems resulted from the existence of the state of war between the two countries, even after normal diplomatic relations have been re-established between the two countries.⁴¹

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This proposal was intended to imply that the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned immediately when normalization was achieved. Khrushchev did not, however, accept it, and repeated the idea of *modus vivendi*.⁴²

In the evening, Fedorenko, the deputy foreign minister, brought the draft embodying Khrushchev's ideas indicated at his meeting with Kôno.

Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to continue their negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty after normal diplomatic relations have been re-established between the two countries. ✓

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in response to the desire of Japan and in consideration of her interests, agrees to transfer the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, provided, however, that the actual transfer of these islands shall come into effect after the peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is concluded and after the island of Okinawa and other Japanese islands under the control of the United States of America are retroceded to Japan.⁴³ ✓

Fedorenko also handed a draft of the *modus vivendi*, which read: ✓

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to transfer the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan after the peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is concluded and even before the island of Okinawa and other Japanese islands under the control of the United States of America are liberated.⁴⁴

On 18 October, the third meeting was held between Kôno and Khrushchev. Kôno brought with him a proposal which contained a crucial concession on the Japanese part.

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Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to continue their negotiations for the conclusion of the peace treaty between the two countries *including the territorial question*, after normal diplomatic relations have been re-established between the two countries.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in response to the desire of Japan and in consideration of her interests, agrees to transfer the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, provided, however, the actual transfer of the islands shall be effected after the peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been concluded.⁴⁵[My italics]

The Japanese now accepted in this draft the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan after the conclusion of the peace treaty. They requested Russia, however, to delete from the Soviet draft the part referring to the reversion of Okinawa.

Khrushchev agreed with the draft except on one point. He requested Japan to remove the phrase 'including the territorial question'. The Japanese were astonished, because the Soviets had already agreed in the Bulganin letter to Hatoyama and the Gromyko-Matsumoto letters to continue the negotiations on the territorial issue after normalization. In other words, from the Japan's viewpoint, the phrase 'including the territorial question', had been an essential condition for the resumption of the negotiations. Khrushchev explained that with this phrase, the declaration would clearly mean that the disposal of Kunashiri and Etorofu would be discussed later and he firmly insisted on deletion of the phrase.⁴⁶ It became obvious to the Japanese that Khrushchev desired to avoid any expression in the declaration

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which was not consistent with the Soviet contention that the territorial question had already been settled.

Faced with this adamant refusal by Khrushchev, the Japanese decided to accept his amendment of the Japanese draft on condition that the Soviets should agree to publish the Gromyko-Matsumoto letters. These letters clearly mentioned that the Soviet Union and Japan had agreed to resume the normalization talks on the basis of a mutual understanding that the territorial questions would be dealt with in future negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty. According to Matsumoto, Kôno and he feared that the Soviets would raise the issue of Okinawa again if the Japanese refused to accept their assertion, and that it would complicate the negotiations further.⁴⁷ They wanted to avoid any prolongation caused by this kind of complication. They were confident in convincing the Japanese public and the party leaders that even without the phrase, 'including the territorial issue', the joint declaration could be interpreted as providing that the Soviet Union and Japan had agreed to continue their negotiations over the territorial questions. Hatoyama wrote in his memoirs,

....The delegation examined and discussed this question. As a result, we reached the following conclusion. Even if we delete the phrase, 'including the territorial questions', 'continue their negotiations for the conclusion of the peace treaty' can be understood to imply that the two countries would negotiate the territorial issues in the future, because no other issues than the territorial issues over Kunashiri and Etorofu remained unsettled.⁴⁸

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The Japanese delegation informed the Kremlin that they agreed with the Soviet amendment to the Japanese draft provision.

Another important issue during the negotiations was Soviet support for Japan's entry to the United Nations. The Soviet government did not show any objection to Japan's request for its support. On this issue, however, there were strong suspicions within the Japanese and United States governments over the credibility of the Soviet guarantee to support Japan's entry to the United Nations. For example, Secretary Dulles more than once warned the Japanese that the Soviet Union had a record of treaty breaking. In order to confirm the Soviet promise, Hatoyama proposed to exchange letters with Bulganin on this matter together with several other issues. Bulganin agreed and the letters were exchanged on 18 and 19 October. In the letters, Hatoyama and Bulganin confirmed their understanding that the Soviet Union would unconditionally support Japan's entry to the United Nations. As a minor issue, the Soviets proposed to insert a clause expressing a mutual understanding that both countries would make efforts to ban the production, experimentation, and use of nuclear weapons. From the Japanese viewpoint, it was unacceptable in the light of her relations with the United States. Hatoyama requested Russia to remove this clause from the joint declaration. The Soviets accepted this claim.

Both the Soviets and the Japanese had reached final agreement on the contents of the joint declaration. At 5:45 pm on 19 October,

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the ceremony of signing was held in the presense of all members of the Japanese delegation, Bulganin, Shepilov, Gromyko, and other leaders of the Soviet government. Khrushchev could not attend the ceremony because he had flown to Warsaw to cope with the unstable situation in Poland. The plenipotentiaries of Japan, Hatoyama, Kôno and Matsumoto, for the Japanese part and Bulganin, and Shepilov for the Soviet part signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration and the protocol concerning the development of trade and mutual granting of most-favoured-nation status.

The Japanese delegation returned to Tokyo on 1 November, after visiting London and New York. In London, Hatoyama called at 10 Downing Street to see Prime Minister Anthony Eden. They do not seem to have talked about the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks. In particular, Eden had been recommended by the Foreign Office not to 'enter into any detailed discussion of them beyond perhaps saying that he welcomes the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries as a contribution to lessening tension in the Far East.'⁴⁹ The British government kept its non-committal attitude. In the United States, Hatoyama could only see Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson because he arrived in the middle of the Presidential election campaign. Hence, Eisenhower was unable to see Hatoyama, nor could Dulles because of the uprisings in Hungary and Poland. But we cannot deny the possibility that the Americans were showing their displeasure about the result of the second Moscow talks. In fact, during the conversation with Robertson, Kôno asked the American government to

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issue a statement to the effect that the United States supported the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration. Robertson did not, however, give any assurance about this.⁶⁰

In Tokyo, domestic reaction to the Joint Declaration was rather cool. The Yoshida faction and anti-normalization groups within the L.D.P. furiously opposed the outcome of the Moscow talks. But the general trend in Japanese political circles and in public opinion was to support the Joint Declaration. Although the Socialist Party accused the Hatoyama government of delaying the normalization, it indicated its support for the result of the Moscow talks. On 27 November, the Joint Declaration was unanimously ratified by the House of Representatives. But over 70 dietmen of the L.D.P. abstained from voting. At the House of Councillors, it was ratified on 5 December. On 9 December, Radio Moscow announced that the Soviet government had ratified the Joint Declaration. The instruments of ratification were exchanged on 12 December, and the Joint Declaration came into effect.

On the same day as the coming into effect of the Joint Declaration, the U.N Security Council passed the Peruvian resolution recommending the General Assembly to accept Japan's entry to the United Nations. The Soviet Union did not veto it. On 18 December, the General Assembly unanimously recognized the entry of Japan into the United Nations as its fifty-second member. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu made an address at the Assembly to express his gratitude at accepting membership of the U.N. and

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indicated his hope that 'Japan will become a bridge between the East and the West.' The repatriation of the Japanese detainees was also carried out immediately after the coming into effect of the Joint Declaration. 1,025 detainees arrived at Maizuru on 26 December.

Hatoyama resigned from the prime ministership, as he had promised, on 20 December. His successor as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Ishibashi Tanzan, had already been elected on 14 December and was duly appointed as prime minister.

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CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration put an end to the state of war between the Soviet Union and Japan. As a result of this, diplomatic channels between the two countries were restored. The two countries succeeded in settling various specific problems during the negotiations for the normalization. In fact, each of the two countries obtained significant gains from the negotiations. The Japanese finally could have the Japanese detainees repatriated from Siberia. Moreover, the Soviet Union implemented her promise to support Japan's entry into the United Nations unconditionally. In addition, the Japanese succeeded in concluding a fishery agreement with the Soviet Union which guaranteed safe and stable catches in northern waters.

It appears to have been the Soviet Union which made concessions on almost all issues. In effect, the Russians satisfied the Japanese requests over the abovementioned issues. Moreover, they offered to return the Habomais and Shikotan on condition that Japan would recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Russia finally dropped both the article prohibiting the Japanese from entering in any military alliance and that limiting the navigation of the three important straits connecting the Japan Sea and the Pacific. But she achieved her most crucial goal: to re-establish diplomatic relations with Japan. As an integral part of global detente policy adopted by

the Soviet Union in the middle of the 1950s, reducing tension between Japan and herself must have been regarded as important by the Russians. The fact that the Soviets promised to return the Habomais and Shikotan indicated how crucial normalization with Japan was. In this sense, they also gained a significant benefit from normalization.

With regard to the territorial issue, the Soviet Union skilfully retained even the Habomais and Shikotan at the very last stage of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. She promised to return the Habomais and Shikotan at the time of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. But this means that the Soviets could retain those islands until the time of the future peace settlement between the two countries and that until then they could use those islands as useful political instruments to exert a significant influence on the Japanese. In fact, the Soviet government put pressure on Japan by unilaterally altering the conditions for the reversion of those islands when Japan revised the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact in 1960. The new condition was that the Soviet Union would only return the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan when a peace treaty was concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Japan and when all of the foreign troops stationed in Japan evacuated. In this sense, the Japanese were placed on a weaker position because they failed to achieve the immediate reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.

TERRITORIAL QUESTION

When considering the results of normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations afterwards, one may conclude that the normalization talks in 1955-6 had a negative effect on relations between the two countries. That was on account of the unsettled territorial question. The Joint Declaration stipulated that the Habomais and Shikotan would be ceded to Japan when a peace treaty between the two countries was concluded. But it did not at all provide that negotiations for the peace treaty should deal with the rest of the territories of which the Japanese had been requesting the Russians to return. The Japanese held that the Joint Declaration implied that the territorial issue would be discussed at the peace treaty negotiations. But this interpretation was only a device to persuade Japanese domestic opposition to the Joint Declaration to take a favourable view.

The Joint Declaration itself in fact did not stipulate that the territorial question with regard to the disposal of the southern Kuriles, the Kuriles, and southern Sakhalin would be dealt with in the future. But the domestic political situation in Japan forced the Japanese negotiators to make a distorted interpretation. Once the public opinion and the domestic opposition accepted the interpretation, such an interpretation became a basis for Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviets rather interpreted the Joint Declaration did not guarantee that the territorial question

would be discussed at the peace negotiations. After normalization, the Japanese were to continue to demand the southern Kuriles on the ground that the Joint Declaration guaranteed the continuation of negotiating on the territorial question. But the Soviet Union was to keep rejecting this Japanese demand by contending that the territorial questions had been settled. This divergence impeded to a great degree the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations after normalization.

Thus, the failure to reach a definite settlement on the territorial question was the most crucial defect of the Soviet-Japanese normalization talks in 1955-6. Why did the two countries fail to settle the problem?

In order to answer this question tentatively, it is helpful to sum up policy of each country of the two. Russian policy on the territorial issue was rather simple. The Soviet Union was prepared to concede the Habomais and Shikotan on condition that Japan should recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles including Kunashiri and Etorofu and southern Sakhalin. The concession of the Habomais and Shikotan was linked with Japan's concession over the rest of the territories in question. In other words, the Soviet government had no intention to return Kunashiri and Etorofu to Japan. The Russians could not give them away for military-strategic reasons. Hence, they never showed any sign to accept the Japanese claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu. ✓

Compared with the Soviet position, the Japanese policy was more complicated. The complication may have been caused by confusion within the decision-making process of the Japanese government. It can, however, be argued that the most basic policy formula was embodied in Instruction No. 16 prepared shortly before the start of the normalization talks in London in the summer of 1955. Combined with other evidence, the Japanese territorial policy can be characterized as a three-stage-negotiating-strategy. Briefly speaking, according to this strategy, Japan should submit to the Russians the following three sets of territorial demands:

[1] The First Stage:

- (1) The reversion of the whole of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.
- (2) The reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.

[2] The Second Stage:

- (1) The reversion of the southern Kuriles
- (2) The reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.

[3] The Third Stage:

- (1) The reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan.

This strategy contained the following characteristics. First of all, the Japanese government intended to retreat from the first stage to the second and to the third, depending on how the negotiations progressed and the domestic political situation

developed in Japan. Secondly, Japan's minimum territorial condition for normalization was the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan. In this connexion, thirdly, the request for the reversion of the whole of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin at the first stage, and that for the reversion of the southern Kuriles at the second stage, were both devised as bargaining cards. At least, the Japanese leaders involved with the making of this strategy were ready to concede the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin and the southern Kuriles.

The Japanese negotiators seem to have proceeded with the normalization talks along the lines of the three-stage strategy until the second Moscow talks conducted by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. When the Soviets indicated their preparedness to return the Habomais and Shikotan in August 1955, the Japanese plenipotentiary, Matsumoto Shunichi, seemed to consider that this was a chance to settle the territorial question. Because the Japanese government's minimum condition was the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan, it was natural for Matsumoto to expect that the government would take a positive steps for settlement of the territorial question. But the foreign minister adopted an extremely cautious policy. He instructed the Japanese plenipotentiary in London to make a new request for the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu, in addition to the Habomais and Shikotan.

Behind this decision, there was a mixture of international and domestic considerations. Though the minimum condition for the normalization was the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan, Shigemitsu had to work out the treatment of the other territories, the Kuriles, and southern Sakhalin. The United States was clearly against any Japanese attempts to deviate from the S.F.P.T. and Shigemitsu must have remembered that the U.S. Congress had declared at the time of the ratification of the S.F.P.T. that the Soviet Union should not derive any benefit from the treaty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Moreover, the Liberal Party, which was headed by Ogata Taketora but was still under a strong influence of Yoshida, firmly opposed the normalization itself and took a tough policy over the territorial question. While the conservative merger between the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party was the central political issue in Japan, the foreign policy of the Democratic government could not ignore the possible effect of making territorial concessions to the Soviet Union on the attitude of the Liberal Party. On the other hand, the Soviet territorial concession over the Habomais and Shikotan was made on condition that the Japanese should recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Considering the possible U.S. reactions and negative effects on the conservative merger, Shigemitsu could not accept the Soviet terms. He then seemed to offer a minor concession in his instructions at the end of August, namely, that Japan could be satisfied with an international conference over the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and would not demand

outright reversion of those islands. But, in order to make Russia drop her request for Japan's recognition of her sovereignty over the Kuriles and Sakhalin, he also intended to show a firm attitude of by requesting Kunashiri and Etorofu.

Thus, the first chance to settle the territorial question between the U.S.S.R. and Japan was not successfully handled. What was worse was the fact that, as a result of the conservative merger in November 1955, the reversion of Kunashiri and Etorofu was adopted as the fixed policy of the newly emerged L.D.P. This policy was undoubtedly formed under great pressure from the Liberals. Now the restoration of the southern Kuriles which had originally been put on the negotiating table as a bargaining card had become a fixed national policy. One must admit that this was an unfortunate factor in Soviet-Japanese relations. Furthermore, this hard line territorial policy was strongly supported by the sense of nationalism which had been enhanced since Japan had achieved independence thanks to the S.F.P.T. Even the opposition party, the J.S.P., took the hardest position on the territorial issue: they called for the restoration of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, as well as the Habomais and Shikotan. Under these circumstances, Japan's foreign policy lost its flexibility.

At his first Moscow talks, Shigemitsu also suffered from interference from domestic politics. The Moscow talks were the last negotiations in which the Japanese tried to settle the

territorial question through a peace treaty. Though Shigemitsu asserted the previous Japanese position at an early stage of the Moscow talks, he finally started to retreat from the hard-line position. At the last stage of the negotiations, Shigemitsu decided to accept the Soviet terms which had never been altered since August 1955. But Tokyo refused to approve his decision which was out of line with the party policy on the territorial issue. This would have caused serious trouble for the Hatoyama administration. Moreover, public opinion also had become tough and nationalist sentiment had been further provoked by Shigemitsu's firm negotiations at the earliest stage of the second Moscow talks. Taking into account these conditions, the Hatoyama cabinet decided to put aside Shigemitsu's suggestion.

The Japanese should have concluded a peace treaty on Soviet terms, as Shigemitsu suggested. The Japanese tried to restore the southern Kuriles but they seemed not to have any right to demand them. First of all, their rationale for their demand was that the southern Kuriles were not part of the Kuriles. But this contention has effectively been refuted by Professor Wada Haruki. According to Professor Wada, the Kuriles-Sakhalin Exchange Treaty in 1875, on which the Japanese government based its claims to the southern Kuriles, indicated unequivocally that Kunashiri and Etorofu were part of the Kuriles. The Japanese claims to them was, Wada argues, a product of Japanese misinterpretation of the authorized Russian and French text of the treaty. Moreover, the Japanese government had already declared at the National Diet in

1951 that it defined the southern Kuriles as part of the Kuriles. It also should not be overlooked that the Japanese demand for the reversion of the southern Kuriles was originally devised as a bargaining card. It must be said that it is unreasonable for the Japanese to have mortgaged the future improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations in order to get back the territories which had only been regarded as a mere bargaining card had been attached. In this sense, domestic political situations in Japan seem to have dominated the reasonable process of diplomacy.

Thus, the last chance during the normalization talks to settle the territorial dispute between the two countries was mainly spoiled by the Japanese domestic political confusion. But the Soviet Union could not escape its responsibility. At least, the Soviets failed to calm down anti-Soviet nationalism and suspicion in Japan. To be sure, anti-Soviet nationalism had been intensified through psychological manoeuvres by the United States and the conservative leaders of Japan, such as Yoshida, since the end of W.W.II. But the harsh treatment of the Japanese detainees in Siberia by the Soviet Union and her intention to use those detainees as hostages or diplomatic instruments to extract Japanese concessions during the negotiations reduced the possibility that she could secure general public support for an early normalization at the expense of the southern Kuriles.

**SOVIET-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE
MIDDLE OF THE 1950S: The Cold War, Detente, and Normalization**

Specific reasons for the failure in settling the territorial issue can be described as above. But the meaning of the Soviet-Japanese normalization and of their ^{failure} in reaching a territorial settlement can also be understood in the broad context of international politics.

In the middle of the 1950s, the general trend of international politics seemed to be transformed. The basic structure of the cold war still remained unresolved. Rather, the East-West arms race had been intensified and the world had entered into the era of thermo-nuclear weapons. The western bloc almost completed its establishment of a network of alliances in the far east, south-east Asia, and the middle east. On the other hand, many examples of international attempts to reduce East-West tensions could be seen at this period, which made a sharp contrast to the early 1950s. The Soviet Union softened her foreign policy and the policy of 'peaceful coexistence' was carried out in various regions of the world. In 1953, the Korean War reached the ceasefire. In 1954, the Indochina War was brought to an end through co-operation between Britain and the Soviet Union. The Austrian problem was solved through the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. The Soviet Union also established diplomatic relations with West Germany in the same year. In this sense, there was an emerging trend of detente in the

international politics in this period. To sum up, the general international situation could broadly be characterized as the inter-section of two trends: the trend of the continuing the cold war, and the trends of the detente.

The Soviet-Japanese normalization can be located in this broad spectrum of international politics. In other words, the Soviet-Japanese normalization in one of its aspects was an example of mixture between the reduction of tensions and the continuation of the cold war. Moreover, this attempt at normalization was closely connected with diversity in Japan which in a way reflected the new international situation.

Both before and after the conclusion of the S.F.P.T., Yoshida Shigeru had been in charge of foreign policy. Yoshida's foreign policy seemed to be strictly based on the principle that Japan should be loyal to the United States as a member of the free world in the context of the cold war. A series of Soviet peace overtures had been rejected by the Yoshida government. Peace with the Soviet Union was from Yoshida's point of view a deviation from the international relationship which had been established by the S.F.P.T. and the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact. His rigid cold war foreign policy at last became unpopular to Japanese public opinion in the international atmosphere of detente in 1953-4 intensified by the cease-fires in Korea and later in Indochina. Thus, in 1954, domestic and international conditions became now favourable to Hatoyama who had been

asserting the significance and urgency of Soviet-Japanese normalization.

The mixed character of world politics seemed to make it very difficult for the leaders to build up national consensus with regard to the world trend and therefore to Soviet intentions. Broadly speaking, there were two groups fighting with each other over the normalization issue. One was the group which could be called the cold war oriented group represented by Yoshida and Ashida. This group asserted that Japan should be loyal to the United States and, therefore, that the normalization itself and making territorial concessions to the Soviet Union were undesirable in terms of U.S.-Japanese relations. In this sense, this group emphasized the significance of the aspect of the cold war in the international relations in the middle of the 1950s. In fact, the people who could be categorized in this group held a strong suspicion about the credibility of Soviet softening international attitudes which had taken place since the death of Stalin. The other group may be characterized as the detente oriented group, which was represented by Hatoyama and his foreign policy advisers. Hatoyama had been asserting that Japan should restore normal relations with neighbouring communist countries since 1952. The group tended to emphasize the significance of the new trend of international political situations emerging in the middle of the 1950s: the trend towards reduction of international tensions. They also held the view that Japan should contribute to the reduction of international tensions or at least

participate in the trend. The territorial question seemed to be considered less significance than the necessity of normalization with the Soviet Union. This group played the most important role to realize the normalization.

These two groups were struggling against each other. Faced with the growing strength of the J.S.P. and the urgency of the conservative merger against the Socialists, however, the two groups also had to compromise in the field of normalization policy. Normalization policy of the Japanese government was formed through compromises between the two conflicting policies held by each group. As a result of the compromise, normalization with the Soviet Union was sought. As for the territorial question, however, the view of the cold war oriented group was embodied in government policy. The persistent claims of the Japanese to the southern Kuriles reflected this view of the cold war group.

Soviet policy towards Japan also had a character of duality. The Soviet offer to return the Habomais and Shikotan reflected their determination to reduce tensions between Japan and their country even at the expense of those islands which they had been asserting were their own territories. But they could not give away the southern Kuriles. Those islands were vital to Soviet anti-American military strategy. Thus, Soviet persistent refusal to return the southern Kuriles reflected constraints imposed by cold war considerations.

After Shigemitsu's failure in Moscow, the detente oriented group managed to grasp the initiative in approaching normalization by shelving the territorial question. Shigemitsu did not actually belong to the cold war oriented group. He was rather a practical mediator between the two groups. He formulated normalization policy, based on a delicate balance of various factors, internal and external. Hence, Shigemitsu played a role to project the view of the cold war oriented group into the government's foreign policy. But, after the first Moscow talks, Shigemitsu's influence in the cabinet drastically declined. Hatoyama's policy ideas became more significant than ever: the territorial problem was seen as less significant than the achievement of the normalization. Though Hatoyama had to request an immediate reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan during his visit to Moscow because of strong pressure from the cold war oriented group, he finally managed to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by making substantial concessions on the territorial issue: the Japanese agreed to the postponement of the return of the Habomais and Shikotan until the time of the conclusion of the peace treaty and to the deletion from the Joint Declaration of a phrase which indicated that the territorial question would be dealt with in future peace negotiations between the two countries.

Thus, the duality of world politics, in other words the interaction of the cold war and the detente, affected Soviet policy towards Japan and the domestic divergences in Japan.

Soviet-Japanese normalization was a product of the detente in Soviet-Japanese relations in the middle of the 1950s. In addition, it can be argued that the failure to settle the territorial question had an aspect of being a product of the clash between the cold war phase of Soviet policy and the influence of the cold war group in Japan.

Did Soviet-Japanese normalization transform world politics? Or more specifically, did it alter international relations in the far east? Since the conclusion of the S.F.P.T., far eastern international relations surrounding Japan had basically been characterised by the following factors. Firstly, the confrontation of two military alliances: the U.S.-Japanese Security Pact and the Sino-Soviet pact of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Secondly, the lack of normal relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and between Japan and Communist China, on the other. The lack of communication channels between those countries meant the lack of a basic mechanism for restraining regional conflicts between them. Moreover, conflicts between them could easily escalate to the stage of the superpower conflicts.

The first factor was not transformed by normalization. Rather, normalization was realized on the basis of the mutual understanding and recognition of the existence of the confrontation between those military alliances. During the negotiations, the Japanese had made it a pre-condition that the

Soviet Union should not request Japan to do anything contradictory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Security Pact. The Soviets did not seriously try to challenge this. Thus, one of the most important components of the cold war, East-West confrontation of the military alliances, was not at all dissolved by normalization. The second factor was partly changed. Needless to say, diplomatic relations were re-established between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, and the basic machinery for conflict solving, namely embassies, was set up. But the failure to settle the territorial question left a stumbling block to the further improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations. Perhaps, the normalization talks rather paradoxically provoked irredentist sentiments among the Japanese and crystallized mutual suspicion between the two countries. Sino-Japanese relations were not directly affected by the normalization between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. But it can be argued that some of the Japanese political leaders and business leaders may have been encouraged by the normalization to promote Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan, the successor to Hatoyama, announced at his inauguration that the new government's policy would be to normalize relations between Japan and Communist China. But his cabinet collapsed shortly and the issue of Sino-Japanese normalization was put aside.

Thus, except for the termination of the state of war and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the

U.S.S.R., the new arrangement did not drastically alter far eastern international relations. To be sure, Soviet-Japanese normalization contributed to some extent to the reduction of international tensions in the far east, and can be regarded as one of the examples of detente in the middle of the 1950s. But the normalization did not have an effect whereby the international situation in the far east could escape from the constraints of the cold war.

INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS: Britain's and the United States' Attitudes

The Soviet-Japanese normalization involved not only the U.S.S.R. and Japan, but also the countries which had been deeply involved in the making of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, particularly the United States and Britain. The Japanese were well aware of the necessity to rely on support from their western allies in order to steer the negotiations in their favour. Japan had not been a great power for long. Without international support, there would not be any good prospect for acquiring gains from the Soviets, in particular on the territorial issue. Hence, the Japanese government sought support and advice from Britain and the United States.

The British government was a host-country of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. It seems that the British government was quite willing to serve as a host-country because they expected that they could exert some influence on the development of the normalization talks. It is also likely that, they considered that if the normalization talks succeeded in London, Anglo-Japanese relations which were supposed by the British Foreign Office to be very bad could be improved because the British would be thanked by the Japanese for their assistance as the host-country.

More importantly, and more directly connected with the contents of the negotiations, Britain was asked by the Japanese for assistance in their effort to promote the repatriation of the Japanese detainees. The Japanese Foreign Ministry seemed to carry out a plan to request a milder treatment of Japanese war criminals captured by Britain and plead for their early release in order to urge the Soviet Union to return those detainees by quoting British favourable treatment. Furthermore, in April 1956, Japanese Ambassador Nishi also requested the British government to refer to its support for Japan's position over the repatriation issue at a meeting between Prime Minister Eden and Bulganin and Khrushchev during the latter's visit to Britain. The British did not give a response favourable to the Japanese requests. The question of the Japanese war criminals was still a serious issue in Britain. Considering domestic reactions, the British government could not treat this issue for the purpose of

the Japanese negotiations with Russia. As for the latter request from Japan, the British government explained that because of the shortage of time this issue could not be dealt with at the Anglo-Soviet summit meeting in London.

The most important issue of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations with which the British were closely connected was the territorial issue. As one of the main architects of the S.F.P.T., Britain could not avoid a certain involvement with this issue. Also the Japanese government sought British support and advice. In July 1955, the government asked the Foreign Office for its views on the territorial issue. The Foreign Office sent a memorandum to Tokyo, which must have been disappointing. It seems that the British answer contended that the Soviet Union could possess the Kuriles and southern Kuriles on the basis of the prescriptive principle. The Foreign Office held that southern Sakhalin was incontestably under Soviet sovereignty and that Japan had already lost her *de jure* sovereignty over the islands, while the Soviets gained the *de facto* sovereignty and probably *de jure* too. The British retained the original views they had originally expressed in the process of the peace making with Japan in 1950-1. It must be remembered that Britain had even suggested that the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin should be transferred to the Soviet Union even if she did not participate in the S.F.P.T. The British contention in 1955 was still based on ideas originally put forward in the Yalta Agreement.

With regard to the definition of 'the Kuriles', there is no evidence suggesting that the Foreign Office dealt with the issue seriously around 1955, preferring to hold the views constructed in 1950-1. In April 1951, the British government had prepared a draft peace treaty with Japan, in which it clearly drew a border line between the Soviet Union and Japan which clearly indicated that Kunashiri and Etorofu were included in the Kuriles and in Soviet territory.

Even though the British government had such a clear view on the territorial question, it tried to keep itself strictly non-committal on the issue. The British government could not openly support Japanese territorial claims with these views described above. In August 1955, the Japanese proposed that the Soviets convene an international conference to discuss the disposal of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. It is not surprising that the British reaction to this proposal was negative. The reasons for the non-committal attitude of Britain can be pointed out as follows. Firstly, the Foreign Office feared that, if Britain got involved, the Japanese would put the blame on the British for their interference if they failed in normalizing their relations with the Soviet Union. The British were well aware of the upsurge of Japanese nationalism since her independence and that any interference would be received with hostility. They also realized that Japan should be kept in the free world in order to prevent a Sino-Japanese coalition. The Foreign Office desired, therefore, to avoid inducing Japanese nationalistic sentiments to

turn towards anti-western or anti-British feelings. Secondly, Britain was faced with a dilemma. British foreign policy in the middle of the 1950s tended to aim at the improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations. If the British had to support the Japanese territorial claims positively, Anglo-Soviet relations could be in difficulty. The British government would have to revise its basic position that it was still observing the Yalta Agreement. The alteration of this position would have had an enormous effect on Anglo-Soviet relations.

Although they took such non-committal attitudes, the British were in favour of Soviet-Japanese normalization. They argued that, even without Japan's regaining the southern Kuriles, normalization would be beneficial to the Japanese. Moreover, it seems that the British tended to consider that normalization would operate as a stabilizing factor in the far east. Dening even suggested in his own opinion to Shigemitsu that Japan should define the border line with the Soviet Union, even if she could not have back Kunashiri and Etorofu. It can be assumed that the British government tended to make efforts to stabilize regional conflicts in the middle of the 1950s such as the Indochina war and the Taiwan crisis and, therefore, never tried to do anything which could be interpreted as interference against the normalization between Japan and the Soviet Union. In other words, it can be argued that the British attitudes towards the Soviet-Japanese normalization were based on the general orientation of British foreign policy towards detente. That

being the case, it can be argued that the British attitudes were, in general, a fusion between their desire to keep the Japanese in the western camp, on the one hand, and their recognition that normalization could contribute to far eastern detente on the other.

Basically, the U.S. government also tried to remain non-committal towards the normalization talks between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. But its attitudes were those of a worried observer, rather than a benevolent observer like the British government. The Americans assumed that the normalization would enhance Soviet and communist subversive activities in Japan. They also feared that a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement would finally lead to a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, which the U.S. government was most anxious to prevent. Moreover, American security interests were closely connected with the disposal of the Kuriles. Hence, from the U.S. government's viewpoint, Japan should be discouraged from making any territorial concessions and recognising Soviet territorial claims. But Washington was also aware of the strong anti-American sentiment among the Japanese people. It was most important for the Americans not to irritate Japanese nationalist feelings and not to provoke further anti-Americanism by giving the appearance of exerting influence on Japan's decision-making. Under these circumstances, the American government only expressed its general hope for the Japanese to gain as many concessions from the Soviets as possible during the negotiations

and subtly warned the Japanese against making too many concessions to the Soviets.

There was actually a reason why the United States government did not wish to intervene in the normalization talks at any cost. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was widely regarded as a pro-American diplomat. Even after the start of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, the State Department appreciated Shigemitsu's cautious handling of normalization talks with the Russians. Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry certainly made the utmost efforts to keep the appearance of Japan's loyalty to the United States. Even Prime Minister Hatoyama tried to assure the Americans that his cabinet had no intention to adopt a neutralist foreign policy. In this situation, the U.S. government could rely on the sensitivity of the Japanese leaders to its possible reactions and its desires with regard to the Soviet-Japanese normalization.

In May 1956, the situation started to change. Within the Hatoyama administration, particularly in the foreign policy-making process, the influence of Kôno Ichiro became stronger. His success in the fisheries talks in Moscow and his promise to resume the normalization talks by the end of July marked the point where the influence of the Foreign Ministry began to fall. Shigemitsu's failure in Moscow in August seemed to the U.S. leaders to imply the loss of their useful leverage in the Hatoyama cabinet. Added to that, the lobbyists interested in

Japan and the far east now started to assert that the U.S. government should exert more direct influence on the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. The State Department also seemed to start being more anxious about the possibility that the achievement of the Soviet-Japanese normalization would enhance Japanese desire to normalize her relations with Communist China. In September, the United States finally decided to end her non-committal stance and issued an Aide-Memoire explicitly supporting the Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles. Moreover, she even planned to offer the Japanese her good offices to arrange a international support for the Japanese territorial claims jointly with Britain.

Perhaps based on the lesson derived from the Anglo-American dispute over 'the Yoshida letter', and taking into account a friction between the two having taken place in the Geneva Conference for the Indochina war in 1954, the U.S. government endeavoured to keep in touch with the British in handling the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. Until the U.S. had issued her Aide-Memoire, the British seemed to warn the Americans subtly against committing themselves too much to the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. Faced with the Aide-Memoire, moreover, the British immediately issued a statement that they did not approve the contents of the Aide-Memoire. Here, we can see again the pattern that Britain tried to restrain American open intervention in Asian affairs.

Regarding the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute, American views also changed in September 1956. Since the making of the S.F.P.T. in 1949-1951, the State Department had taken the view that the southern Kuriles were part of 'the Kuriles' and that only the Habomais and Shikotan were under Japanese sovereignty. Even after the start of normalization talks, the U.S. continued to hold this view. Unlike the British, the Americans had already in 1946 taken the position that the Yalta Agreement would be invalid unless it was confirmed by a peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers. But, until September 1956, they gave no clear sign of strong endorsement for Japan's claims to the southern Kuriles, not to mention her claims to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin.

The U.S. decision to give up being non-committal in the middle of 1956 also affected her position on the territorial issue. The U.S. government had been adopting since 1949 the view that the southern Kuriles were part of the Kuriles. Dulles did not, therefore, show any clear support for the Japanese claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu, though he supported their claims to the Habomais and Shikotan at the San Francisco Peace Conference. The U.S. government now clearly stated that it endorsed Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles in its Aide-Memoire of September. The U.S. statement had the effect of discouraging Japanese leaders from signing a peace treaty on Soviet terms. Under the circumstances where the Soviets showed their determination not to return the southern Kuriles, the issue of the Aide-Memoire

operated as an effective wedge driven between Japan and the U.S.S.R. This wedge has been operating to divide Japan and the Soviet Union on the territorial question ever since. The U.S. Aide-Memoire is still quoted as an evidence of international support for Japan's claims to the southern Kuriles. If so, it can be now argued that although the United States did not prevent the Japanese government from normalizing Soviet-Japanese relations in 1956, she set up an effective obstacle to further improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

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