Soviet Strategy and the Warsaw Pact:
Military Policy in the History of an Alliance

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role of Soviet military policy in the formation, history and decline of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). It traces the relationship between two functions of the alliance, an external strategic role and an internal military-political function, and asks whether the decline of the WTO in the late 1980s was the result of a change in external requirements, of the abandonment of the internal role, or of some combination of the two.

The internal political functioning of the WTO, its military command structures, and the question of Soviet strategic goals in Europe during the 1955-1987 period are examined. It is argued that both internal and external alliance functions were important, but that while there were fluctuations in the level of internal political control by the USSR, this was less noticeable in the military command sphere. This suggests that the external strategic role may have been primary, though it does not establish this beyond doubt.

An examination of Soviet policy in the late 1980s shows that the functions of the WTO were placed in question in different ways by projected reforms of military strategy and by the logic of "New Thinking" in foreign policy. However, it could not have been predicted on the basis of the Soviet strategic debate alone that the USSR would accept the political transformation of Eastern Europe, the early withdrawal of Soviet forces, and the virtual collapse
of the WTO as an alliance during 1989–90. It is therefore argued in conclusion that this collapse can best be explained in terms of a political calculation about the future of Eastern Europe which the Soviet leadership made at a time when the military-strategic debate was still unresolved.
Acknowledgments

This thesis draws in part on already-published material, which has been used to contribute to a substantively new formulation of questions relating to the strategic history of the WTO. The publications concerned are *The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Security and Bloc Politics* (Basil Blackwell/United Nations University, Oxford 1989), and *Soviet Military Reform: Conventional Disarmament and the Crisis of Militarised Socialism* (Pluto Press/Transnational Institute, London 1991). In addition, parts of Chapter 8 have appeared in *The End of an Alliance* (PRIF Report 16-1990, Frankfurt, December 1990).

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Abbreviations

ADC - Alternative Defence Commission
ALB - AirLand Battle
ATTU - Atlantic-to-the-Urals
C(S)BM - Confidence (and Security) Building Measures
CDE - Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CDM - Committee of Defence Ministers (of WTO)
CFE - Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFM - Committee of Foreign Ministers (of WTO)
C-in-C - Commander-in-Chief
COMECON - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
FOFA - Follow-on Forces Attack
FRG - Federal Republic of Germany
GDR - German Democratic Republic
GSFG - Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
IEMSS - Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist System (Moscow)
IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
IMEMO - Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow)
INF - Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
ISKAN - Institute for US-Canadian Studies (Moscow)
JAF - Joint Armed Forces (of WTO)
JHC - Joint High Command (of WTO)
MBFR - Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

MC - Military Council (of WTO)

MEMO - World Economy and International Relations (journal)

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NVA - Nationale Volksarmee (GDR)

OMG - Operational Manoeuvre Group

PCC - Political Consultative Committee (of WTO)

SDI - Strategic Defense Initiative

TC - Technological Committee (of WTO)

TVD - teatr voennyh deistvij (theatre of military operations)

WTO - Warsaw Treaty Organization
INTRODUCTION

This thesis presents a case-study of the formation, history, and decline of one of the two main Cold War alliances, the Warsaw Treaty Organization or Warsaw Pact (WTO). It takes as its most central concern the role of military strategy within the alliance, which entails a close examination of Soviet military strategy. However, I have sought to explore strategy not just as a military-technological phenomenon, but also as a political factor in the history of the alliance. The reason for this approach should become clear if we consider the dual functions which the WTO was traditionally considered to have fulfilled within the overall scheme of Soviet security policy. On the one hand, the WTO united into a military alliance the states occupying a "buffer-zone" or strategic glacis between the USSR and its western antagonists. This function was related ultimately to the territorial defence of the USSR, but rested for many years on essentially offensive principles of Soviet military strategy. On the other hand, the alliance united those states on the basis of their political, economic and social systems, even if this was obscured in the wording of the Warsaw Treaty itself. This second function made the alliance an instrument whereby the USSR ensured its capacity to monitor, and sometimes to intervene with military force in, the internal politics of those buffer states, in order to prevent or remove
political challenges to what were considered to be Soviet interests in the region. After 1968, this internal alliance function was identified in western analyses as resting on the "Brezhnev Doctrine".

The military-political history of the WTO therefore invites a study of the relative significance of external strategic goals and internal political calculations in the history of the alliance. This seems particularly relevant in the aftermath of the political transformation of Europe which took place during 1989-90: the end of the European Cold War confrontation on terms which amounted to a comprehensive political, economic and ideological defeat for the Soviet system, the reunification of Germany within NATO, and the virtual collapse of the WTO both as a military and as a political alliance. The question to be investigated is taken from the period of the WTO's decline in the late 1980s. Did the collapse of the alliance come about because its external security functions changed, or because its internal military-political functions were abandoned or became redundant? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to establish whether and how the two alliance functions were related to each other throughout the history of the WTO. On the basis of this historical analysis, it should be possible to establish whether the events of the late 1980s were the result of changes in the relationship between the two functions, or of simultaneous but unconnected changes in both areas of policy, and to assess which of the changes were the most
significant.

I have attempted to answer these questions by tracing the relationship between the two alliance functions through the military and political history of the WTO, and through the main developments in Soviet military strategy which affected the alliance directly or indirectly. I have paid particular attention to the Soviet strategic reform debates of the late 1980s, which initially promised significant defensive strategic adjustments without entailing a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and were then largely overtaken by the course of events as the existing political order collapsed during 1989-90.

I have not tried to make any consistent comparisons between the WTO and NATO or to address technical questions concerning military balance in Europe, though some passing comparisons with NATO are made where they seem appropriate. Nor have I dealt with Soviet relations with other non-WTO socialist states (China or Yugoslavia), or with the economic aspects of Soviet-East European relations in the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or CMEA).

The sources used in compiling this study are a combination of western (English-language) and Soviet (Russian and English-language). There are some areas in which information from Soviet sources is relatively easy to find - basic documents and statements of the WTO, a number of institutional questions, and some questions of military strategy. In other areas, informed speculation and
secondary sources play greater roles. There has always been a need for some care in assessing any findings about the WTO. As one commentator put it in the mid-1980s: "...with an alliance such as the Warsaw Pact, whose workings proceed behind a veil of secrecy, the greatest caution, even humility, is necessary". It is of course possible that with the political transformation of Eastern Europe and the USSR, scholars will in future obtain access to sources relevant to the history of the WTO which have not previously been available - records of meetings and decisionmaking, personal memoirs, and other military documents. For this reason any account of the WTO must be regarded as subject to correction in the light of new material which may emerge, and perhaps more vulnerable to correction than work in other areas of international relations.

The term "Eastern Europe" is often controversial in itself, but it is used here in its most conventional sense, to refer to the USSR's six WTO allies - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This is not intended to imply any judgement on whether the USSR should or should not be considered part of "Europe". In English usage, the terms "Warsaw Treaty" and "Warsaw Pact" are sometimes used to distinguish the treaty document from the organization established by it. Strictly speaking, the full title of the document should be rendered as: "The Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance", and of
the organization: "Organization of the Warsaw Treaty" or "Warsaw Treaty Organization". However, "Warsaw Pact" is also used at times to refer to the entire spectrum of the Soviet-East European alliance system, in its political and economic, as well as military, aspects. In this study, "Warsaw Treaty Organization /WTO" is preferred for the security alliance, although this does not entail an assumption that political and economic factors can be ignored. "Warsaw Pact" is used only in direct quotations.

In this introductory chapter I provide a brief history of the WTO from 1955 to 1990, describing the main events between the alliance's formation and the Paris CSCE summit of November 1990. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical international relations literature on the problem of alliance, and other bodies of literature on Cold War history, Soviet military strategy, and on the WTO itself.

Chapter 3 gives an account of the WTO's political structures and history up to the beginning of the crucial transition period in the late 1980s, covering the history of the alliance's political bodies, its role in internal interventions and East-West detente, and the intra-alliance bargaining over nuclear "counterdeployments" in the early 1980s. I show how the East European elites managed periodically to gain some increased room for manoeuvre within the alliance, but argue that this did not overcome the alliance's basic weakness, namely those elites' lack of domestic political legitimacy. This political perspective is complemented in Chapter 4 by an account of the military
command structures of the WTO, covering the questions of East European integration into the alliance's joint armed forces, the military aspects of internal intervention and the relationship between WTO institutions and Soviet command structures. I show that by contrast with the degree of relaxation which occurred in the political sphere, Soviet control over the East European military forces became tighter between 1955 and the mid-1980s.

Chapter 5 focuses on Soviet military strategy and its relationship to the alliance. I review some competing western accounts of Soviet policy in an attempt to evaluate the relationship between military strategy and political goals, and trace the shifting emphasis on nuclear and conventional operations in different phases of Soviet military planning. I suggest here that a renewed emphasis on conventional military operations in Soviet thought during the early 1980s appeared to reinforce the importance of East European territory, and so of the external alliance functions.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between changing Soviet security policy and the WTO during the late 1980s. In Chapter 6 I tie together the analysis of East-West relations and military strategy by examining Soviet and WTO policy on conventional arms control during the 1970s and 1980s, and then by reviewing the security reforms of the Gorbachev era, dealing with the new keywords of the period, "New Thinking" and "Reasonable Sufficiency". I show how the conclusion of the INF Treaty
in 1987 served to refocus attention onto conventional armed forces in Europe, and how the logical implications of New Thinking posed challenges to both the external and the internal roles of the WTO.

In Chapter 7 I trace the impact of western concepts of alternative defence on the strategic debate in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and show how some of the themes of the alternative defence debate were taken up by the Soviet leadership and in WTO declarations. I offer a number of possible interpretations of this development, and document the Soviet civil-military debates which emerged and their impact on Soviet force postures and on negotiating positions adopted at the beginning of the CFE talks.

Chapter 8 concentrates on the events of 1989-90, giving an account of the Soviet leadership's increasingly explicit declarations to the effect that the Brezhnev Doctrine had been abandoned. I attempt to reconstruct the thinking behind the Soviet leadership's response to the political upheavals in Eastern Europe, with their implications for the WTO itself. I come to the conclusion that the Soviet leadership had based its calculations on a more managed and gradual process of political reform and military disengagement in Central and Eastern Europe, but had no alternative other than to accept the political and military unravelling of the WTO because it had already ruled out the possibility of further internal military intervention. At the end of the study I have used my findings to shed some light on wider questions relating to
alliance politics in the Cold War period, and to the general phenomenon of alliance in international relations.

A Brief History

The Soviet alliance system in Europe did not begin with the signature of the Warsaw Treaty in May 1955. Before that date, the members of the Soviet bloc were linked to the USSR by a network of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaties. The treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland dated from 1943 and 1945 respectively. Treaties with Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria followed, all signed during 1948. In content, these treaties committed the signatories to military and other assistance in the event of renewed aggression by Germany or any state allied with Germany. The East European states also had a network of bilateral treaties with one another. In 1950, the USSR signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with China, directed against any future aggression on the part of Japan or its allies. The bloc also included Albania and, until June 1948, Yugoslavia, as well as the six East European states which remained members of the WTO until 1990. The Soviet treaties with Yugoslavia and Albania dated from 1945 and 1949. The GDR did not technically exist as a state until 1949.

By 1955, Eastern Europe was therefore already firmly tied to the USSR by a network of political, economic and military ties. COMECON had been formed in 1949, though it
was hardly a functioning economic mechanism by 1955. In June 1953 the GDR had suffered the first of a series of crises within Eastern Europe which seemed to threaten the region's political stability and therefore the viability of an alliance of socialist states closely allied to the USSR.

The Warsaw Treaty itself was signed in Warsaw on 14 May, 1955, by representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia. A combination of internal and external factors was at work even at this early stage. The most immediate cause of the signature of the treaty at this particular time was the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to NATO. The FRG joined the Western European Union in October 1954, and NATO on 5 May 1955, when the Paris Agreements of the previous October were ratified.

The FRG's accession to NATO is the event most frequently cited by Soviet commentators on the origins of the WTO, and since the USSR and its allies had seen no need to form a multilateral alliance in 1949 at the time of NATO's own formation, there is no reason to doubt that this was viewed as an event of great importance. The first collective consideration of the European security situation by representatives of the socialist countries is described by Soviet sources as having taken place at a meeting of foreign ministers in Warsaw in 1948. After the formation of NATO, the USSR made a number of diplomatic moves aimed at preventing the reintegration of the FRG into the western
alliance, including a March 1952 proposal for a reunified and neutralized Germany, and a 1954 proposal (put forward with the USSR's allies) to draw up a collective European security treaty. A Moscow conference of the European socialist countries in November-December 1954 warned against the ratification of the Paris Agreements. Indeed, the fact that the Warsaw Treaty itself was signed within a few days of the FRG's entry into NATO supports the argument about the importance of the German issue, since much of the preparatory work for the Warsaw Treaty must have been done in advance.<3>

There has been much debate as to whether Stalin or his immediate successors would indeed have "abandoned" the GDR in a German reunification process if terms acceptable to both the USSR and the FRG could have been reached. It does seem quite possible that Stalin's 1952 initiative was serious, and the GDR leadership may well have feared abandonment. Ann L Phillips has argued that the USSR remained ambivalent in its commitment to the GDR as a separate state right up until 1955, and that the eventual decision was prompted by the need seen after 1953 to increase political and economic support for the weak Ulbricht leadership. In any event, the 1952 proposal was unacceptable to the Adenauer leadership in the FRG, and by mid-1955 both German states were tied by security treaties to their respective camps. In 1955, in fact, both Poland and Czechoslovakia were still suspicious of the GDR, and sought reassurance about the security of their borders from
their own allies and the USSR. The persistence of these suspicions helps to explain the delay in the GDR’s integration into the WTO’s military structures.<4>

The threat perceived in the FRG’s reintegration into the western bloc, however, was as much political and economic as it was military. It was feared that a revived West German state would aspire to Germany’s former dominant economic, and thus political, role in East-Central Europe. The FRG’s accession to NATO, furthermore, was not the only factor at work. Soviet commentators often referred to the development of western-backed alliances outside Europe as a relevant consideration. The alliances particularly mentioned were ANZUS, formed in 1951 (Australia, New Zealand, and the USA), SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization, including Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK, and USA), formed in 1954, and the Baghdad Pact, later CENTO, formed in 1955 (Central Treaty Organization, including Britain, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, with the USA as an associate member).<5> This suggests that the WTO was seen as serving a global political/diplomatic purpose of demonstrating the USSR’s ability to form its own alliance, but that this amounted to an indirect admission of weakness since the USSR was unable to call on an alliance system as geographically widespread or as powerful as the USA’s.

A number of western commentators have placed more emphasis on circumstances other than those directly relating to the FRG.<6> It has been argued that military
efficiency was important at this early stage, since the practices of the Stalin era, involving stress on sheer numbers of armed forces and close Soviet control of East European military and security establishments, were militarily wasteful and needed revision. Others have considered that immediate military considerations carried relatively little weight at this time, and it was only in the early 1960s that the WTO began to be used seriously as a vehicle for coordinating defence policy beyond the measures which had been taken before 1955. According to this view, diplomatic considerations were more important in 1955, partly because by 1955 tentative steps were being taken by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership towards detente with the West, and partly because in those circumstances more subtle methods of managing Soviet-East European relations were needed. A treaty embodying the equal status of the states concerned was seen as making a useful contribution to these objectives.

One point often made is that the signature of the Warsaw Treaty legitimized the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania, since they would otherwise have had to withdraw once Soviet forces withdrew from Austria with the signature of the Austrian State Treaty. Presumably it would have been possible to regularize the presence of these troops by means of some bilateral arrangements, but the Warsaw Treaty did provide a broad legal basis for Soviet troop-stationing in Eastern Europe. There also seem to have been some more specific bilateral agreements on military
cooperation in force before 1955, although little is known about them. After 1955 new, more public arrangements were made for the stationing of Soviet troops (see Chapter 4).<7>

Robin Remington argues that two differing Soviet motivations existed in 1955. On the one hand Molotov, then Foreign Minister, saw the WTO primarily in terms of safeguarding the military security of the socialist camp. For Khrushchev (then First Secretary) and to a lesser extent Bulganin (who replaced Malenkov as Prime Minister in February 1955), the WTO was part of the beginnings of a detente policy towards the West, and it was Khrushchev's conception which took precedence in the treaty text. Perhaps Remington poses the opposing conceptions too starkly, for detente was not then, any more than it was later, considered incompatible with consolidating the unity of the Soviet bloc, but there is certainly evidence of differences within the Soviet leadership and of shifts away from the strictest Stalinist positions (which of course were also taking place in domestic politics). Molotov had central responsibility for the Austrian State Treaty (signed the day after the Warsaw Treaty), but had reservations about Khrushchev and Bulganin's policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia (Khrushchev visited Belgrade later that month). Khrushchev was also preparing for the Geneva East-West Summit Conference later in the year, at which he met Eisenhower, Dulles, Eden, and Faure. This was also the time of the Soviet withdrawal from the Porkkala
base in Finland, and of the Soviet leadership's admission of the injustice of aspects of the USSR's past economic relations with Eastern Europe.

In his memoirs, Khrushchev provides some evidence to support Remington's interpretation. He comments (albeit in an interrupted passage which had to be partially interpreted by his American editor) that Molotov expressed doubts about the inclusion of Albania (and possibly other countries) in the alliance, on the grounds, it seems, that the USSR was not really strong enough to guarantee Albania's security. Since the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav rift had left Albania geographically isolated from the rest of the USSR's allies, this objection would have made some sense. However, it would clearly have been less important for the kind of diplomatic purposes attributed by Remington to Khrushchev, and to which he himself alludes, or for the consideration of "strengthening the internal situation" in each of the countries involved.<8> Albania, for its part, already had poor relations with Yugoslavia, and probably derived reassurance from the Warsaw Treaty at a time of thawing Soviet-Yugoslav relations. In the chapter of his memoirs dealing with the reconciliation with Yugoslavia, Khrushchev says that the Yugoslavs refused to join the Warsaw Treaty because of their commercial relationship with the West and their border dispute with Bulgaria. In spite of this evidence of diverse views in the Soviet leadership, one should retain some caution in speculating on the precise roles and motivation of particular individuals at a
time of continued rivalry in the post-Stalin jockeying for power. (Khrushchev had originally opposed Beria and Malenkov's post-Stalin moderation of foreign policy, but later adopted positions close to Malenkov's on domestic economic priorities and the importance of peaceful coexistence in external relations.)

Whatever roles may have been played by particular individuals, there were certainly some contradictory factors at work at the time of the WTO's formation. The USSR had clearly decided to seek improved relations with NATO and the West, notwithstanding the immediate problems caused by the FRG's action in joining NATO. At the same time, the USSR was trying to consolidate its own bloc not through the previous Stalinist tactics, but via an alliance which tried to make the equal status of its members more apparent. In effect, Khrushchev seemed to be attempting to replace the charismatic-cum-despotic forms of legitimation involved in the Stalinist methods of control of Eastern Europe with a more muted, bureaucratic type of legitimation based on multilateral interstate institutions. This is a theme which reappears in the later history of the WTO - the need to pay particular attention to the unity of one's own bloc at a time when relations with the opposing system are improving. Khrushchev's own account of the Geneva summit captures both elements, and also his own nervousness at approaching talks with the western leaders from a position of relative weakness.<9> Whether or not the USSR would have considered bargaining the WTO away in negotiations with the
West, the formation of the alliance did give Khrushchev a bargaining chip of sorts, as well as a visible symbol of the socialist bloc's supposed unity.

The developments which took place in the WTO's forces, institutions and diplomatic activities between 1955 and 1990 will be examined in detail in later chapters of this study. In the eyes of most western observers, the WTO's history was a matter of successive crises which occurred at strikingly regular intervals. Little more than a year after the treaty's signature, the Hungarian crisis of October-November 1956 erupted. During the course of these events, the Hungarian premier Imre Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the alliance, although his leadership was almost immediately overthrown by Soviet intervention forces and replaced by that of Janos Kadar.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, unrest in Poland was resolved by the appointment of Wladislaw Gomulka as First Secretary, and without the use of force, though confrontation between Polish and Soviet forces was only narrowly avoided.

The Hungarian events were almost repeated in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, though with less bloodshed and with the help of an intervention force which included small detachments from all the other East European states except Romania, as well as a large Soviet force. Subsequently, the reformist Czechoslovakian party leadership of Alexander Dubcek was replaced by that of Gustav Husak.<sup>11</sup> In Poland in 1980-81, a rapidly-evolving political crisis following the emergence of the Solidarity trade union movement ended
not in Soviet intervention, but with the declaration of martial law in December 1981 and an extensive militarization of Polish politics under General Jaruzelski. Martial law was technically lifted in July 1983.<12>

Apart from the brief period of Hungarian withdrawal in 1956, only Albania withdrew from the WTO between 1955 and 1990. No other state joined, although there were some reports in 1986 that Libya had approached the USSR with a view to joining in the aftermath of the US air attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi. The WTO thus remained a European body, by contrast with COMECON, which was joined by several non-European states (Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam).

Soviet publications date Albanian non-participation in WTO bodies from 1962, although in fact the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Albania in late 1961 after a period of increasing estrangement centering largely on Chinese hostility over Soviet destalinization and policies towards the West, and Albanian support for Chinese positions.<13> Albania finally withdrew in 1968 after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. China had originally sent an observer to the Warsaw Treaty signature ceremony, but China's relations with the USSR worsened during the early 1960s, and the other East European states were not always unreserved in their support for the USSR.<14> Relations with China remained a potentially divisive issue throughout the 1970s.

Soviet relations with Romania also worsened in the 1960s, and in the late 1960s the USSR tried to deal
simultaneously with Romania, the Czechoslovakian reform developments, and the GDR's fears that detente with the West threatened its interests. After the 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis these pressures seemed to have been contained, and while US-Soviet relations improved with the SALT talks, both the USSR and the individual East European states improved their relations with the FRG and signed treaties "normalizing" relations and state borders in Central Europe. A further stage in this process was the all-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which began in 1972 and culminated in the August 1975 signature of the Helsinki Final Act. Although the Helsinki Act became such a bone of contention in the collapse of this phase of detente, its signature was seen by the Soviet and East European leaderships alike as a fruit of their longstanding pressure for a European security conference, as specified in the Warsaw Treaty, and an important indication of western recognition of the political and territorial status quo in Europe. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, which started in 1973, were a kind of **quid pro quo** which the West persuaded the USSR to agree to in return for the Helsinki process. It is, of course, debateable whether the Helsinki process did amount to an acceptance of the political status quo. Nevertheless, this was certainly an important Soviet objective and interpretation of the results.<15>

The Polish crisis of 1981 merged with the more general breakdown of detente, and continued to sour East-
West relations for the first few years of the decade. There were indications of tensions between the USSR and its allies in the 1983-5 period, as negotiations with the USA over Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) were breaking down and the question of Soviet "counterdeployments" arose (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, by the time the Warsaw Treaty fell due for renewal in early 1985, disarmament talks between the USA and USSR had been resumed, and a new Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev was beginning to take the diplomatic initiative, perhaps with some prompting from the East European leaderships. The treaty was duly renewed for a further period of twenty years, with an option of a further ten, and with only one minor change to the original text, on 26 April 1985.<16>

This minor change to the treaty provides a curious footnote. The original version was said to be valid only in the Russian, Polish, Czech, and German languages. The 1985 Protocol of Renewal added Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Romanian to the list. This was an understandable way of emphasizing national equality, but it is odd that it was not done originally. It does suggest that even in 1955 the three northern states of Eastern Europe were seen as being more important, and in a way this might amount to evidence that Molotov’s conception of the alliance gained a minor victory over Khrushchev’s. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR were always the USSR’s most important political and military partners, even if the GDR was still very weak in 1955. Some analysts have suggested that the USSR originally
considered a more limited regional alliance restricted to what was later termed the "Northern Tier", and perhaps Molotov's conception had something to do with this. At any rate, this minor but possibly symbolic point about the 1955 text does lend some support to that theory.<17>

The treaty was renewed just at the time when the Soviet strategic reassessments of the mid-to-late 1980s were getting under way. The next few years saw the development of an increasingly explicit strategic debate in East European and Soviet scholarly and policy circles, which had direct implications for the role of Eastern European territory in Soviet strategy. The WTO was used as a vehicle for the announcement of declaratory revisions in military doctrine, most notably through the publication of two documents on WTO doctrine in May 1987 (see Appendix II). At the same time there were increasingly explicit disavowals of any Soviet right to military intervention in Eastern Europe, both in published policy discussions and in statements by Soviet political leaders. New negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (the CFE talks) began in March 1989, at a time when the USSR was already withdrawing some of its forces from Eastern Europe and claimed to be restructuring the remainder. Finally came the dramatic events of 1989, when the authority of the communist leaderships crumbled throughout Eastern Europe, and the parties abandoned their claims to a leading role in society. All of these political upheavals occurred without a hint of Soviet military intervention, except in the case
of Romania where the anti-Ceausescu forces seem to have sought Soviet assistance, but eventually achieved victory without it.

By the end of 1989 the two security functions traditionally attributed to the WTO seemed either to have been substantially eroded, or to have been abandoned altogether. During 1990 these development were taken to their logical conclusions. Post-communist leaderships came to power throughout Eastern Europe, although in Romania and Bulgaria the break with the past was less unambiguous than elsewhere. The USSR negotiated troop withdrawal agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and after general elections in the GDR and a certain amount of diplomatic uncertainty, accepted the unification of the FRG and GDR within NATO. It was agreed that all Soviet forces would leave the territory of the former GDR by the end of 1994.

The Soviet leadership and its new East European counterparts continued to meet in the existing WTO bodies, and attempted to find a compromise formula which would wind up the alliance's military institutions but leave a political body of some kind in existence. This had not been finalized by the end of 1990, at which time the WTO still existed on paper, without the GDR. However, the effective end of both the WTO and the European Cold War was symbolized by the Paris summit of November 19-21, 1990, which saw the signature of a treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and of the Paris Charter on the future of the continent. The arms control treaty confirmed the Soviet
military retreat from Central Europe, which had already been agreed in bilateral agreements. The Paris Charter committed its signatories, the USSR included, to political pluralism and market economics. This marked the demise of the WTO in real political terms, and symbolized the victory of the North Atlantic Treaty over the Brezhnev Doctrine. This study seeks to explain how the WTO reached this point.
There are several bodies of existing literature which suggest possible approaches to the WTO as a military alliance. In the first place, there is an established literature on the history and theory of alliance. In my discussion of this literature, I identify a number of weaknesses which stem from its lack of attention to unresolved controversies in international relations theory and Cold War history. I therefore supplement the theoretical discussion with a reading of alternative schools of Cold War historiography, and draw out some of the implications for a study of the WTO. There are also substantial bodies of work on Soviet military strategy and on the WTO itself, whose assumptions and findings can usefully be reviewed in assessing their value as secondary sources.

Alliance Theory

The literature on the history and theory of alliance is voluminous. This is not surprising in view of the pervasiveness of alliances as, in Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan's words, "apparently a universal component of relations between political units, irrespective of time and place." The same authors also offer a definition which would seem to suffice as a starting-point for this study: "For our purposes....an alliance is a formal agreement
between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues."<2> This limits the subject under examination to agreements involving some military commitment, although there are problems hiding behind the apparently innocuous use of the category of "nations".

Holsti and his co-authors published their review of alliance theories and literature in 1973, and accompanied the review with a selection of propositions on the nature of alliance culled from the literature in existence at that time. They provide a total of 447 propositions on the causes, characteristics, and effects of alliance, which bear witness to the diverse areas of controversy affecting the subject. Not surprisingly, many of them provide competing explanations. A few quotations will give the flavour of this section of the book: "Alliances are formed when the balance of power is threatened" (Organski); "Existence of an external enemy serves to unify alliances" (Boulding); "Rigid alliances lead to war" (Frankel); there is no shortage here of pithy statements and hypotheses which might be tested in a general study of alliances.<3> Among the questions most frequently posed are the contribution of external threat to internal alliance cohesion, and the effects of bipolar or multipolar alliance systems on the prospects for stability.

The major problem with many of these hypotheses, as Holsti et al themselves point out, is that they seek to provide statements which hold true for all alliances and at all times. Notwithstanding the persistence of the
phenomenon of alliance throughout history, it does seem strange that international relations scholars should think a unified theory to be necessary or even possible. A moment's reflection on the historical evolution of the "nation", or the relatively recent appearance of the concept of "national security", should be enough to raise doubts about the undertaking. It is not surprising that an all-embracing theory has proved an elusive quarry. Such attempts in the alliance theory literature seem to be related to the quest for the grail of a general theory of international relations per se, which one might argue has been no more successful.

It becomes rather easier to organize a review of the existing literature if we break it down into different areas of theory. Holsti et al suggest four categories of questions which the theoretical literature has tried to answer. Questions about alliance formation are related to the motives which lead nations to conclude treaties, for example the factors which prompt a small power to seek or avoid alliance with a larger one, or the influence of a state's political system on its choice of alliance partners. The area of alliance performance pertains to the internal cohesion and distribution of power within an alliance, and its effectiveness in attaining its stated goals. Questions of alliance termination deal with the endurance or disintegration of alliances, covering issues like the effects on cohesion of the possession of nuclear weapons by one or more partners. Finally, questions related
to effects of alliances concern their roles as potential guarantors of stability, causes of war, or vehicles for integration between states.

This classification makes matters a little more manageable. At the end of their study, Holsti et al conclude that it is unrealistic to hope to find anything more than a partial theory of alliance. They also make the more substantive claim that alliance behaviour is affected by the state of relations within the international system as a whole, but do not claim to have found anything more than a partially satisfactory theory of their own.

I will return later to some of the specific findings made by these authors in testing hypotheses offered by other scholars. The importance of their overall contribution lies in their advocacy of a search for partial theories whose limits are carefully defined. Much of the standard alliance theory does indeed fall into the trap of searching for a unified theory for all periods, or searching for answers to specific and time-dependent problems in alliance politics without conceding the historical specificity of these concerns. Even Holsti et al do not follow their own advice consistently, since they seem to assume that even a limited theory about one aspect of alliance politics should be true for all "nations" at all periods of history. In the review which follows, I relate these problems in the literature partly to the model of international relations which much of it takes for granted, and partly to the assumptions about Cold War
politics which are made by many of the authors concerned.

The general literature on the theory of alliance pays relatively little attention to the WTO. Some of the literature from the 1950s and 60s did not even consider the WTO to merit consideration as a genuine alliance, though this belief tended to be moderated in later work. Much of the general literature is based on orthodox and traditional realist axioms of international relations theory. Realism can be understood as a paradigm of international relations which treats the world as a collection of "billiard-ball" states, each of which is compelled by the insecurity of its international environment to conduct a foreign policy seeking to maximize its own power and/or provide defence through military and other means. A recent introduction to the international relations inter-paradigm debate summarizes realism as resting on three main assumptions: nation-states are the most important actors; there is a clear dividing line between domestic and international politics; international relations is primarily the study of war, peace, and power.<4>

This approach is reflected in a comment made by Morgenthau which is frequently cited in the general alliance literature: "Alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system."<5> There is often an assumption that the diplomatic practice of concluding alliances has remained essentially the same throughout history, and writers like Thucydides and Machiavelli are cited in support. Nations
and nation-states are taken to be the unit of account, and although affinities in political or economic systems are sometimes considered as factors influencing the conclusion of an alliance, the basic model is one in which billiard-ball nation-states decide to ally with others in order to increase their own power or protect themselves against more aggressive billiard-balls acting within the state system. The concept of a nation-state is not considered to be problematic or even deserving of definition, and there is little or no basic disagreement over how the competitive multi-state system should be conceptualized. These assumptions seem to equally strong within alternative approaches based, on the one hand, on the exploration of diplomatic history, and, on the other hand, on more quantitative or behavioural assessments of the nature and history of alliance and war.

This characterization of the state system is frequently related to assumptions about the role of alliances in Cold War politics. The USA’s post-1945 alliances tend to be seen in orthodox action-reaction terms, as necessary balances against Soviet or Sino-Soviet expansionism. It is noticeable that several of the central works in the general alliance literature seem to have been prompted by a perceived need to provide a theoretical basis for western alliance politics during the period of the late 1950s-early 1960s, at a time when the strategic dilemmas of an emerging nuclear stand-off between the USA and USSR were contributing to strains within NATO. Presumably scholars
working in this period felt they had to account for the appearance of apparently permanent alliances in the post-1945 period, by contrast with the more familiar phenomenon of shifting patterns of alliance. In a number of cases, though, it was only NATO which was of interest to the theorist. Soviet alliances with East European states are described by Morgenthau as "not true alliances....Power is here not superimposed upon common interests, as in a genuine alliance, but becomes a substitute for them."<6>

Here there is an overlap between the axiom that alliances can only be concluded between genuinely sovereign nation-states, and a view of the role of the post-1945 Atlantic alliance as a power-balancing response to the USSR.

A more detailed examination of some of the existing literature will illustrate how prevalent these assumptions are. Arnold Wolfers' 1959 collection, *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, contains the chapter by Morgenthau from which I have already quoted. The collection rests on a geopolitical understanding of containment as a US policy of power-balancing to restrict Soviet expansion out of the Eurasian "heartland", and the book expressly sets itself the goal of guiding US policy. One of the most interesting features of the book, however, is the fact that the only chapter which deals specifically with the Soviet alliance system runs quite counter to the book's prevailing ethos by examining the WTO as a body created partly to provide security for the USSR against a genuinely perceived external threat.<7> The approach of this chapter is much
more nuanced than that of Wolfers himself or Morgenthau, but it finds no reflection in the book's statement of policy-oriented goals. This kind of policy-orientation does seem to be a feature of American literature of this and later periods. If one looks at the work of a European contemporary like Raymond Aron, one finds a more consistent awareness of the need to be conscious of the distinction between theorizing and policy recommendatton.

The two American works of the early 1960s which still occupy a central position in the alliance literature are George F Liska's Nations in Alliance and William H Riker's The Theory of Political Coalitions. Liska uses a discursive method based on diplomatic history, which he describes as a "somewhat systematized discussion", and "theorizing" rather than a theory. Liska sees the basic role of alliances as reactive and preventive, seeking to create or preserve a balance of power. Decisions on alliance formation are made with reference to "national interests", but there are always costs as well as gains, so alliances cannot exist without internal strains. Ideology serves to rationalize alliances and to keep them together, but there are no intrinsically convergent interests between states. Alliances are likely to dissolve when there is a decline in the capability of a crucial ally, when there is a divergence in strategic emphasis between partners, or when the enemy against whom they provided a balance disappears. Offensive alliances may take advantage of a weakened enemy to "digest the spoils of victory", but
defensive ones will tend to break up after the external threat declines.

Liska sees the history of pre-nuclear diplomacy and contemporary nuclear alliances as characterized by an essential continuity. He considers post-1945 British and US diplomacy to have followed a model established by France in the post-1918 period, a policy of balancing against a power threatening to dominate Europe. He argues that the emerging strategic stalemate of the late 1950s reinforced some of the traditional alliance functions and traditional relations between great and small powers. However, Liska is concerned about the declining cohesion of alliances on both sides in the late 1950s-early 1960s, and in particular about the internal strains caused in NATO by the strategic dilemmas of a nuclear deterrence policy. (This is also the chief concern of Robert E Osgood's 1962 study, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance.* ) The declining cohesion of the Sino-Soviet bloc is seen to be related to the absence of a specifically socialist ideology of interallied relations, and the WTO is interpreted as reflecting a Soviet attempt to counteract alliance erosion through a system of multilateral controls. Liska is more prepared than Wolfers or Morgenthau to consider the WTO to be a respectable alliance, but shares their view of its expansionist objectives.

Perhaps the most promising hypothesis provided by Liska which could be tested with application to the later history of the Cold War alliances is his suggestion that
the "success" of an alliance will tend to reduce its cohesion. This hypothesis is close to one put forward by Riker. Riker's method is very different from Liska's, being an application of game theory to the alliance politics of the Cold War era. Whereas Liska's balance-of-power framework leads him to focus on preventive diplomacy, Riker assumes a search for gain or victory as the basic motivation behind coalition formation. However, Riker is even more explicit than Liska about his concern to suggest ways of guiding US policy in what he calls the "Age of Maneuver". Riker describes the 1945-60 period as the "Age of Equalization", during which the western coalition diminished in size and the communist coalition expanded. The ensuing period, the "Age of Maneuver", would be one in which the costs to the leading powers of maintaining their alliances would increase, other nations would emerge as world leaders, and the danger of general warfare and the temptation to use nuclear weapons would also increase.

Riker uses the theory of n-person zero-sum games to construct a theory of coalitions which can help in the study and guidance of international politics in this period. He takes the theory from Von Neumann and Morgenstern's game theory, which contains an assumption of rationality. Riker argues that the rational political man wants to "win", which he sees as something more specific than the desire for power, and says that the rationality assumption can be applied to political coalitions. He develops three main propositions, said to be applicable to
both domestic and international coalitions.<9> The size principle states that winning coalitions tend towards the minimal winning size, in order to ensure maximum gains for all participants. The strategic principle states that when the size principle is operative, participants in the final stages of coalition-formation should and do move towards a minimal winning coalition. Finally, the disequilibrium principle states that when the first two principles are operative, the systems or bodies concerned are themselves unstable. This third principle of instability is an important part of the argument. According to Riker, it follows that rational behaviour in zero-sum situations is intrinsically disequilibrating, which denies the assertion of a hidden stability in politics which is part of balance-of-power theory.

Riker offers a rule of thumb for moderating this inherent instability during the "Age of Maneuver", suggesting that there should be an implicit agreement not to eliminate losers from the international competition. It is not quite clear when and how this would operate, and his more clearly-stated prescription is that the USA and USSR should aim to prolong the "Age of Maneuver" for as long as possible in order to preserve their leadership roles. The USA can afford to see its coalition decline relative to the USSR's, since a larger-than-necessary coalition increases the costs of leadership. Essentially, then, he seems to be offering a theory to support a diplomatic practice of more sophisticated burden-sharing in a period of declining US
hegemony. His identification of this problem is certainly prescient.

However, the main problem with Riker's argument is that even the author does not really seem to believe in the applicability of his game-theoretical assumptions to international politics. He says that international politics becomes a genuinely zero-sum game in periods of total war or within organizations like the United Nations, but that the threat of nuclear war makes it non-zero sum because the common benefits of peace and civilization seem greater than any possible gains derivable from conflict. If this latter point is correct, as it certainly appears to be, Riker's three propositions cannot be derived from his premises. Even though, as Riker says, the zero-sum assumption is not a necessary part of a basic game-theoretical model, he clearly does think his principles, especially the instability principle, rely on the assumption.

Liska and Riker do provide some thoughts around which a study of the WTO could be constructed, since they are both concerned with the decline of alliance cohesion in post-1945 East-West relations. However, each of these studies raises more questions than it answers. Liska assumes an essential continuity between pre-1945 and post-1945 diplomacy, while Riker identifies one major discontinuity. Neither of them, though, seeks to explain what exactly would be the meaning of either "winning" or "losing" in the Cold War, which might help in establishing whether the continuities are greater than the
discontinuities. Presumably a Cold War alliance would lose the contest by breaking up altogether, or by losing its capacity to provide the benefits originally sought from alliance. Both Liska and Riker are more interested in the West than the WTO, and seem to have been more worried about the consequences of the West "losing" than any other outcome. Even so, they pay comparatively little attention to the mechanics of losing coalitions, which is what the WTO eventually turned out to be. And finally, to return to my earlier point, neither of them questions the centrality of nation-states as actors. Even Riker's association of coalition-formation with an inherent disequilibrium does not altogether dispense with the balance-of-power principle. His main reservation is about the wisdom of trying to eliminate losers, which he sees as making the long-term instability worse, and in effect he seems to be saying here that it would be sensible to maintain some kind of balance even after a victory. Moreover, the two main Cold War coalitions showed few signs of flexibility between 1949 and 1990. Defections were rare and strongly discouraged, to say the least, by the two superpowers. The eventual collapse of the WTO demonstrated the problems of sustaining a tightly-controlled alliance, not the flexibility of the system as a whole.

In the period following Liska and Riker's contributions, there was an increasing use of quantitative tools of analysis in the study of alliance politics. Ambitious and detailed quantitative work was done on the
relationship between alliance and war, in J David Singer's "Correlates of War" project. Singer and Melvin Small found that the relatively weak alliance bonds between states in nineteenth-century Europe correlated with a low incidence of war, while tighter and more concentrated alliances correlated with an increased incidence of war in the early-to-mid twentieth century. This raises the question of how to account for the absence of war between NATO and the WTO in the Cold War period even in circumstances of alliance confrontation, more or less tight alliance cohesion, and massive military buildups in Europe and elsewhere. Moreover, Singer and Small did not claim to have established causal relationships between alliance and war, as distinct from correlations.

Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan also used the tools of behavioural analysis to test some of the hypotheses in the literature they reviewed, and applied these methods to the eastern and western Cold War alliances. They tested the hypothesis that inter-alliance conflict correlated with intra-alliance cohesion, and two corollaries. The first of these predicted that inter-alliance conflict would exert symmetrical effects on the cohesion of competing alliances, and the second predicted that the cohesion of component alliances would be greater within a more tightly bipolar international system. They then used computer content analysis of statements issued, and events interaction data, to test these propositions as applied to NATO and the "Communist system" in respect of four events between 1950.
and 1965. Two were considered to involve high levels of inter-alliance tension (the Korean War and the US bombing of North Vietnam), and two to involve low tension levels (the 1955 Geneva Summit and the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty).

Holsti et al took the communist system to include China, North Korea and North Vietnam, in addition to the Warsaw Treaty states, so their findings were not directly applicable to the WTO itself. They found that greater conflict between alliances did affect internal cohesion, and tended to produce increased integration within the alliances. Declining bipolarity in the international system as a whole tended to contribute to declining cohesion in the two opposing alliances. This last finding was qualified, however, by the fact that for NATO, alliance cohesion seemed to be possible in periods of low tension as well as high. This finding prompted the authors' cautionary remarks about the search for all-embracing theories.

It is not clear, however, that this kind of sophisticated behavioural analysis can get round the problems related to the nature of the nation-state and to the question of the continuity or discontinuity between the pre-nuclear and nuclear eras. MV Naidu, in his study *Alliances and Balance of Power* (published in 1975), criticized the assumption of an essential continuity rather trenchantly. Naidu argued that if the concept of a genuine alliance entailed an equal partnership on the basis
of sovereign equality few contemporary alliances could qualify, since nuclear-armed superpowers could not allow equal status to their alliance partners. He argued further that the traditional balance-of-power framework allowed and required the possibility of fluid and transitory associations. Nuclear-armed Cold War alliances, with their institutional rigidity and ideological inflexibility, bore very little resemblance to this model.

Naidu’s arguments were placed in the context of a statement of the need for non-aligned states to establish a space for manoeuvre in order to undermine superpower domination. In some ways he tended to overstress the bipolarity of world politics even in the 1970s, and so to reinforce the phenomenon he was deploring. Nevertheless, these comments on some political realities of the nuclear era did inject a measure of common sense into a body of literature which seemed at this stage to have worked out some more refined methodological tools, but at the cost of finding itself unable to say anything very informative about the East-West alliance politics of the period. It is particularly disappointing to see how little in the way of explanatory substance was produced by the Correlates of War approach, given Singer’s own description of his work as deriving from the policy-oriented concerns of peace research. Part of the problem seems to have been the presence of underlying realist assumptions, which persisted in spite of the methodological innovations of the behaviouralists.
If quantitative behavioural research made an impact in the 1960s and early 1970s, more discursive approaches to the problem of alliance made a comeback with the literature of neorealism during the late 1970s and 1980s. Neorealism reasserted the centrality of inter-state power relations in the international system, in a reaction against work on political and economic interdependence rather than the quantitative methods of behaviouralism. The neorealist revival was closely connected with more directly political arguments about US decline and the heightened East-West tensions of the "Second Cold War" period, and was accompanied in the early 1980s by a renewed flurry of publications on the future of NATO.

In his Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz developed some views about the Cold War alliances in the light of his structural neorealist theory of international relations. Waltz argues that alliance formation can proceed in one of two ways, through "balancing" or "bandwagoning", depending on the structure of the overall system. To balance is to join the weaker side, and to bandwagon is to join the side which looks like winning. In Waltz's view, states tend to prefer balancing to bandwagoning because they seek not simply power as an end, but power as a means to stability and the maintenance of their position in the system. Secondary states, in particular, will move to the weaker side if free to choose, because they feel more threatened by the stronger side.

These general arguments about alliance are made before
Walts deals directly with the international system of the 1970s. Waltz sees the post-war system as robustly bipolar, and basically stable because a fairly rigid bipolar system creates pressure for moderate, conservative behaviour, and simultaneously allows the two great powers flexibility in managing their relations. He sees important discontinuities with previous power-balancing systems, pointing out that the two superpowers dominate their respective alliances to a far greater extent than any pre-1939 great power was able to do. In this sense, Waltz does not really consider the problem of alliance to be very central to the international politics of the 1970s. However, the connections between his general theory and his characterization of the system of the late 1970s seem weak. Waltz devotes a good deal of space to countering the arguments of interdependence theorists and their view of a relative US decline in the postwar period. In this context, he insists on the USA's continuing global economic dominance. If this phenomenon is traced back to the period of post-1945 alliance formation (a period which Waltz does not deal with), the general theory would seem to entail a rush to ally with the much weaker USSR, which is hardly an accurate description of the 1945-50 period. More unsatisfactory still is Waltz's frequent and apparently unselfconscious use of the first-person plural in his discussion of US foreign policy; thus a work which sets out to be a dispassionate essay in theory turns, particularly in the last three chapters, into another guide to US diplomacy.
Stephen M Walt took up Waltz's neorealism and applied it to alliance formation in the Middle East. Walt agrees that balancing is much more common than bandwagoning, but relates it to perceived external threats rather than power alone. This adjustment of the theory certainly helps to resolve the problem in Waltz's treatment of the Cold War: Walt can allow for the USSR being perceived as a threat even if it was in fact much weaker than the USA. Walt himself goes on to argue that the USA need not worry so much about being abandoned by its allies, and can afford to conduct a less activist foreign policy because regional powers tend to be more worried about local threats than global superpower competition.

Walt makes his search for relevance to the US policy debate clear from the start, and his theoretical and policy concerns are well integrated. However, this does not mean that the neorealist theory itself is satisfactory, for as Robert Keohane has pointed out in a review of Walt's book, the approach is ahistorical and pays little attention to the role of international institutions, which would be much more important in a study of alliances like NATO or the WTO.<12>

It should be clear from this review of the theoretical literature on alliance that although it provides some general propositions which might be applied and tested in the case of the WTO, the literature itself either ignores the WTO or suggests that the general propositions cannot be applicable because the WTO was never a genuine alliance. I
have suggested that one of the main reasons for this lack of attention to the WTO is the preoccupation of many of these theorists with relevance to the NATO or US policy context. This does not imply that the most dismissive of the theorists were wrong to deny the WTO alliance status, but it does suggest that realist criteria alone will not suffice for an analysis of the post-1945 bloc system. After all, the WTO states certainly behaved like participants in an alliance: they established armed forces which cooperated with each other, their leaders attended regular meetings where they made speeches and issued declarations to the leaderships of other alliances, notably NATO. On the surface, therefore, the WTO would seem to have met realist criteria of alliancehood.

The view of the theorists who considered that the WTO was never an alliance rested on an argument to the effect that the East European leaderships had no genuine democratic legitimacy, unlike the western powers which joined forces in NATO, and that they owed their positions to Soviet military power. There is a good deal of truth in this description, as my later examination of the WTO will show. However, it is not a consistently realist argument. It certainly focuses on the role of state power in international relations, but it is also based on an assessment of post-1945 East-West relations as a competition between social or political systems, rather than as a system of power-balancing between sovereign entities. This brings us to the root of the shortcomings of
the work I have summarized up to this point: it fails to get to grips with the semi-permanent nature of the post-1945 Cold War alliances, the levels of military and political integration which characterized them, and the extent of the interaction between domestic and foreign policy within the alliances and within the individual states. Since the WTO turned out to be the weaker and less permanent of the two alliances, some of the insights of the alliance theorists may still be worth returning to later. For the moment, however, their arguments needed to be supplemented by a consideration of different theories of the Cold War.

Theories of the Cold War

I have suggested that the weaknesses of much of the existing alliance literature are related both to its realist premises and to its assumptions about Cold War history. (Many accounts of the Cold War would trace it back to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 or even earlier. Here, however, I limit my discussion to the post-1945 period.) In terms of its classification within the range of theories of the Cold War, much of the material I have summarized so far is orthodox or "pre-revisionist". It takes Soviet expansionism as an unquestioned given, and from this it is seen to follow that the WTO was principally a vehicle for consolidating and potentially expanding Soviet gains. A brief review of the Cold War literature will serve to illustrate what alternative hypotheses about the WTO might
be generated by different conceptions of the Cold War.

In the view of the original architects of US containment policy, Soviet policy after 1945 was characterized by an expansionist ideology backed by military force. George Kennan argued that these Soviet expansionist tendencies coexisted with a disposition to caution and flexibility, so that if a western policy of the "vigilant application of counterforce" were pursued, the USSR could be contained. Moreover, such pressure might be able to bring about the breakup of Soviet power. Kennan later insisted that he had not seen the USSR as a military threat in the late 1940s, and that the real threat had been "ideological-political". But whatever role Kennan played in the militarization of the Cold War, he certainly helped to lay the foundations for a US policy of political and economic counter-pressure and for a corresponding scholarly analysis: the USA may have been unwilling to remain entangled in European affairs, but it did its duty in response to the Soviet threat. This broad interpretation of Soviet and US policy prevailed until the revisionist historians began to publish their reinterpretations of US policy from the late 1950s onwards.

The revisionist accounts were based on an analysis of the USA as an assertive (and, in many versions, imperialist) power which had little need of Kennan's call to action. William Appleman Williams traced the dynamic of US "Imperial Anticolonialism" back into the nineteenth century, and identified the 1898 US-Spanish war over Cuba
as a turning-point in American history. US policy towards the USSR at the end of World War II was guided by the priority of ensuring US access to markets and opportunities for economic expansion, the "Open Door Policy" originally formulated under the McKinley administration at the turn of the century. David Horowitz analyzed the US global approach as a policy of containing social revolution. Gar Alperowitz focused on President Truman's attempts to use the possession of nuclear weapons as a way of reversing Roosevelt's implicit assent to a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. <14>

Joyce and Gabriel Kolko largely endorsed Williams, basing their explanation of US foreign policy on an analysis of the structure of the American economic ruling class. They argued that at the end of World War II: "Essentially, the United States' aim was to restructure the world so that American business could trade, operate, and profit without restrictions everywhere." <15> This necessitated an economic alliance with a greatly weakened Western Europe and the defeated opponent Japan, the defeat of left-wing forces within the capitalist world, and political and economic pressure on the Soviet sphere of influence and the USSR itself. The military instrument could be used in support of these goals if need be, though in practice, the Kolkos argued, even the use of force could not ensure success for the overall strategy.

For many of the original revisionists, the assumption of a post-war Soviet threat to Western Europe was seen as
having acted as a rationalization for policies needed to keep the USA and Western Europe in alliance for quite different reasons. In the process, legitimate Soviet security concerns were seen to have been neglected, though any substantive hope of integrating Eastern Europe into the capitalist trading sphere was soon abandoned. In some more recent work by the American scholars Henry Ryan and Fraser Harbutt, attention has focused on the US-British relationship, and on the British preoccupation with preserving Britain's great power status in an era when the USA was the new hegemonic western power. Alan Wolfe has argued that the beginning of the Cold War was ultimately determined by the need for US domestic political consensus.<16>

The problem with much of the classical revisionist work was that it had relatively little to say about Soviet policy. Although this was hardly surprising in view of the comparative unavailability of source material on the Soviet side, revisionism remained primarily a reassessment of US policy. Nevertheless, the issues contested by the historians can be fairly simply stated: how far was the Cold War inevitable given Soviet ideology and interests in Eastern Europe, and to what extent did Soviet policy evolve in response to allied policy in Germany, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan?

Some of those who have written in more detail on Soviet policy in the immediate post-war period (for example Alexander Werth and Werner Hahn) have argued that Stalin
would have preferred to preserve the wartime alliance with the West, but was forced to respond to US and western policies which were genuinely perceived as threatening to Soviet interests.<17> Others have offered a contrasting account which has some similarities with revisionist accounts of western policy, though without the element of economic expansionism. Domestic Soviet political circumstances, it has been argued, dictated that Stalin needed to re-impose ideological control and internal discipline because his own power was far from secure at the end of the war. The USSR needed to recover from its own wartime devastation, but the emerging Cold War provided Stalin with a way of re-mobilizing Soviet society internally by cutting the country off from the West and reversing the wartime cooperation policy.

Kennan himself had originally seen the Stalinist assumption of implacable capitalist hostility as a mechanism for maintaining dictatorial authority at home. However, his description of the assumption as a "semi-myth" suggested that he also saw a genuine antagonism at work, and his advocacy of counter-pressure certainly assumed and helped to ensure that a conflict would exist in future. Elements of Kennan's view can also be found in the work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose account paid very little attention to East-West relations in the late 1940s, but focused largely on communist ideological imperatives. One can argue, however, that these domestic factors could have operated equally effectively with or without a genuine
external threat or antagonism. Various other forms of this argument can be found in the work of Hugh Thomas, William O McCagg, and Mick Cox, and it is worth noting that there are some significant overlaps here between relatively conservative western analyses and the western Trotskyist critique of Stalinism.\(^{18}\)

Almost all of these theories of the Cold War make it very difficult to analyze it in terms of a realist model of interactions between sovereign nation-states in alliance. On any of these accounts, the interpenetration of domestic and international politics in post-1945 international relations was profound, and the Cold War as an international system seems to have been profoundly over-determined. A kind of realism does survive in what John Lewis Gaddis has termed the "Post-revisionist synthesis" on the origins of the Cold War. His analysis sees a meeting in Central Europe of spheres of influence belonging to great powers, which resulted in a long and, in Gaddis's view, successful period of power-balancing. Even Gaddis, however, uses the concept of a US "defensive empire", and it is not clear that any kind of empire can be satisfactorily understood in realist terms, with power largely divorced from domestic and transnational economic formations and processes.\(^{19}\)

One could perhaps classify Vojtech Mastny's work on Soviet policy alongside Gaddis's.\(^{20}\) Mastny has argued that Stalin's policy in Eastern Europe during the 1941-45 period was not guided by any master-plan, and that during
the war itself Stalin had no fixed design for establishing Soviet control over the entire area. Nevertheless, Stalin was not prepared to entrust Soviet security to a policy of continued cooperation with the West.

There is a particularly interesting unresolved debate between interpretations of the Cold War as either primarily a clash between competing social systems, or a device for managing intra-bloc relations within the respective camps. Perhaps the clearest statements of the inter-systemic conflict view are to be found within both orthodoxy and revisionism, in the latter case in Isaac Deutscher's *The Great Contest*, and in Fred Halliday's refinement of the thesis which applies the term Cold War only to certain periods of the post-1945 East-West relationship. Among the writers who have offered variants of the alternative argument are EP Thompson in his "Exterminism" thesis, and the Italian historian Gian Giacomo Migone, with his idea of the Cold War as a kind of early joint venture. Up to a point there is nothing new in pointing out respects in which US and Soviet interests coincided after 1945, most obviously in the suppression of German nationalism. However, Migone means something more than this. He contrasts the "theoretical" East-West conflict with "actual" conflicts which occur within blocs, when autonomous policies are pursued within either alliance in a way which challenges superpower bipolarity.

Mary Kaldor puts forward a more detailed exposition of this kind of view in *The Imaginary War*, where she argues
that the real conflict between capitalism and socialism took place within the West, and the real conflict between freedom and totalitarianism occurred within the East. The external "imaginary war" acted as a way of legitimizing power relations and containing dissent within the two systems.<23> What these arguments about intra-bloc politics share is a view that the Cold War facilitated a homogenization of social models in the allied states on either side of the East-West divide: "managed capitalism" under US hegemony in the West, and Stalinism/post-Stalinism in the East.

For the purposes of a study of the WTO, it is the implications of these diverse interpretations for the post-war position of Eastern Europe which are most important. Eastern Europe itself was primarily affected by the conflict between the principle of post-war national self-determination, as asserted in the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1945 Yalta Declaration of Liberated Europe, and the USSR's insistence on friendly governments in the region. Gaddis has argued that Roosevelt never really appreciated the contradiction, while Migone has suggested that US policy was never in practice concerned with the status of Eastern Europe, but far more preoccupied with the USA's own priorities in the West. Insofar as the classical revisionists examined Soviet policy, they tended to argue that Stalin was prepared to tolerate coalition governments in the People's Democracies until 1947-48, and only abandoned this policy after he lost hope of coming to an
accommodation with the USA.

In Brzezinski's study of The Soviet Bloc, originally published in 1961, events in Eastern Europe were analyzed as following the logic of the international communist movement's priorities. Stalin and the East European communists initially developed the concept of "People's Democracy" to describe a transitional phase between the bourgeois and proletarian orders, during which popular front coalition governments would continue to rule. Once it became clear that the West had effectively abandoned Eastern Europe to the USSR's sphere of influence, and Soviet domestic priorities entailed a need for tighter international communist cohesion, the phase of political diversity under people's democracy could be cut short. Between 1947 and 1949, therefore, the East European states were incorporated into the Stalinist political, economic, and interstate systems.

It is worth summarizing Brzezinski's account of what this entailed. In terms of theory, there was an assertion of one-party hegemony and proletarian dictatorship, of the primacy of the Soviet experience, and of the approaching transition to a socialist society. In practice, non-communist parties were either abolished or merged into front organizations, centralized planning, nationalization and collectivization were adopted, and political purges carried out by a police force which became "a state within a state, feared by both the population and the party membership". In interstate relations, the USSR signed
bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the People's Democracies. These included commitments to assistance in the case of external aggression, and usually specified a rearmed Germany as the most likely opponent. Informal mechanisms of Soviet control included links established through Soviet ambassadors, party and government institutions, and security and military apparatuses. East European external trade was drastically reoriented towards the USSR.<24>

The classic insider's account of Stalin's policy towards parts of Eastern Europe is contained in the Yugoslavian communist politician Milovan Djilas's 1962 book, *Conversations with Stalin*. Djilas records Stalin's view, expressed in early 1945, on the distinctive nature of the Second World War: "This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory imposes his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise." Djilas goes on to record suggestions that in 1948, just before the Soviet-Yugoslav split became open, Stalin considered the idea of incorporating the People's Democracies into a reorganized USSR, by joining Hungary and Romania to the Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia to Byelorussia, and the other Balkan states to Russia itself.<25>

In most accounts Soviet concerns are seen to involve more than the need for a purely military buffer-zone. The East European states could form an important buffer-zone against a western political/economic system on the verge of
revival under US hegemony, as well as against any future attempt to invade Russia from the West: hence the Soviet pressure on Poland and Czechoslovakia to refuse Marshall Aid. A number of left-wing writers have seen Stalin as content to see the western powers resolve the post-war affairs of Greece and Italy to their own satisfaction as long as the Soviet security zone was not threatened (though Germany was always something of a special case). In this view, forces of the left were squeezed to the edge of the effective political spectrum in the West as the consensus on managed capitalism was created and fostered, and in the East the Stalinist orthodoxy was imposed on unenthusiastic populations by more ruthless methods. Whichever interpretation one favours, however, it is clear that the populations of the East European states paid a high price for their unfortunate location in the Soviet buffer-zone.

The traditional Soviet account of the origins of the Cold War involved a mixture of realism and inter-systemic conflict. This hybrid explanation prevailed until the late 1980s, when some drastic reinterpretations of international history began to be offered at a time of revisionism in many areas of Soviet intellectual life.

According to the traditional account, victory over Nazi Germany in 1945 changed the correlation of class forces in the world in favour of socialism, since the defeat of fascism was also a blow against imperialism as a whole. Victory simultaneously demonstrated the economic, political, and military advantages of the Soviet system,
and enhanced the prestige of the USSR as the first socialist state. The USA and other imperialist powers were alarmed by this growth in the USSR's power and international authority, and resorted to the creation of aggressive military blocs (NATO and others) as a way of meeting the challenge of communism. In doing this, the western powers breached the 1945 Potsdam agreement on the future of Germany, and partially restored the previous orders in West Germany and Japan as instruments of their anti-communist policies. They also tried to intervene in Eastern Europe with attempts to force changes in the make-up of the popular-democratic governments there.

Within Eastern Europe and some nations of Asia, the presence of Soviet forces at the end of the war did not amount to interference in the internal politics of these states or the export of revolution. The role of the Soviet presence, and more generally of the USSR's enhanced international prestige, was to provide conditions for the transformation of the wartime national liberation struggles into a revolutionary struggle against colonialism and capitalism. This was a natural process which grew out of economic and political conditions in the countries concerned, and which contributed to the creation and growth in power of the world socialist system. International relations between the states of people's democracy were of a new type, founded on the principles of socialist internationalism and close cooperation in all spheres. The creation of the WTO in 1955 took place as a way of
defending the European socialist states against the remilitarization of West Germany and its integration into the North Atlantic bloc.<27>

One of the most striking things about this traditional Soviet account is that it mirrors certain key aspects of the western orthodoxy, by treating western policy as a more or less rational power-balancing reaction against the emerging power and authority of the USSR. Of course, there is an explicit denial of any element of Soviet military expansionism, and the condemnation of the USA for its militarized response to the increasing strength of socialism, but there is nevertheless a combination of realism and inter-systemic conflict in both accounts. If anything, the realism is the stronger element in the Soviet version, since the strengthening of socialism is clearly stated to have been the result of the USSR’s own increased power. Despite the inter-systemic element, however, there are no structural elements in this Soviet version of realism. This broad account survived within Soviet international relations theory until the 1980s, when the argument of the 1970s to the effect that increasing socialist power had been the main factor pushing the West into détente began to be questioned.

It is also worth noting that this standard Soviet account differs in one important respect from the accounts of the western revisionists. Many of the latter were led by their Marxist or near-Marxist analyses of US policy to place much stress on the actual imbalance in economic power
between the USA and USSR in 1945, which, they tended to argue, gave the USA a virtual free hand in global policy. This was glossed over in the traditional Soviet account, which made an unconvincing attempt to suggest a much more evenly balanced Great Contest. The Soviet account therefore tended to direct attention towards the role of military power in East-Central Europe in spite of its attempt to play this element down, since this was one of the few areas of capability or policy in which a balance could legitimately have been claimed.

If we now jump ahead to some of the historical debates which emerged in the late 1980s "New Thinking" period, we can see the kind of challenge they posed to the traditional Soviet interpretation. Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev published an article in Literaturnaya gazeta in May 1988 which was virtually a manifesto for a Soviet revisionist approach to the Cold War.<sup>28</sup> Dashichev started from an account of the traditional power-balancing functions of alliances against a single power seeking hegemony, and went on to suggest that the post-1945 anti-Soviet western coalition was founded on legitimate fears of Soviet policy. Stalin's foreign policy, he argued, was based on ultra-leftist, Trotskyist, hegemonic great-power ambitions, and gave the USA a suitable pretext for its own hegemonic designs in Western Europe and elsewhere.

Dashichev then went on to criticize Brezhnev's foreign policy, but his basic challenge was to much of the existing framework of Soviet Cold War analysis. Important elements
of his analysis were evidently taken on board by the Foreign Minister of the time, Eduard Shevardnadze. Speaking to a CPSU Central Committee plenum in February 1990, after the communist leaderships had already collapsed throughout Eastern Europe, Shevardnadze traced the failure of East European socialism back to the late 1940s: "People prefer to forget that force was used at the end of the 1940s, when the structure of the popular-democratic regimes formed after the second world war was broken. The democratic forces which had worked with the communists in the name of victory over fascism, of freedom and democracy, were forced out of the coalition governments of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and regimes of personal power were established and called dictatorships of the proletariat. Neither politicians nor scholars have yet come to grips with this phenomenon." Thus did Shevardnadze undermine forty years of Soviet Cold War historiography in a few sentences.

This Soviet revisionism still needs to be subjected to analysis; it is not sufficient to look for the most iconoclastic Soviet account and accept it as a final synthesis. In Dashichev’s version, for example, the concepts of Trotskyist ultra-leftism and great power hegemonism sit rather uncomfortably together, and he still seems to overestimate Soviet power. The main point, however, is to emphasize that Cold War historiography, East and West, provides us with a wide range of analyses of the origins of the Cold War and the two major Cold War
alliances. These scholarly debates relate in the first instance to the 1945-53 period, but they are of course also theories about the whole post-war period. They provide an important background to a study of the WTO in two respects. In the first place, they support the findings of my discussion of the theoretical literature, to the effect that the Cold War alliances do not seem to be traditional alliances (whatever these may be), and the Cold War cannot be satisfactorily analyzed as a replay of Athens versus Sparta. Indeed, as I have already suggested, most writers from the orthodox schools of Cold War analysis could not consistently claim to be theoretical realists, since they would be among those who would describe the Cold War as a clash between freedom and totalitarianism, or capitalism and communism, in ways which would be incompatible with a consistently realist analysis.

Secondly, the debates reviewed here confirm the commonsense view that Soviet and WTO military policy need to be examined both as strategies directed against an external antagonist, and as strategies related to intra-alliance functions. If one of these strands of policy turns out to be much more important than the other, this would amount to evidence in favour of one or other of the theories of the Cold War.

Chapter 1 has already drawn attention to the combination of external and intra-alliance motivations which influenced Soviet policy at the time of the WTO's formation in 1955. One can also point again to the paradox
that the period of the tightest Stalinist control of Eastern Europe was the pre-1955 period, and observe that Khrushchev apparently sought to use the alliance as a way of destalinizing Soviet-East European relations. Perhaps the key to understanding the WTO lies in an appreciation of the political gap that was never bridged, between Khrushchev’s conception of a post-Stalinist alliance of socialist states and the reality of an East European political order that never succeeded in establishing its legitimacy without the sanction of the possible Soviet use of force.

The Formation of Soviet Strategy

One of the major asymmetries between NATO and the WTO lies in the divergent roles played by nuclear weapons within the two alliances. For NATO, nuclear weapons stationed in or near Western Europe traditionally played a crucial role not only in the alliance’s concrete military strategy, but also in the public creation and fostering of a political consensus between governing elites. Flexible response, the strategic concept which governed NATO thinking from the 1960s until the late 1980s, was always centrally concerned with the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces in deterring a military and/or political threat considered to emanate from the USSR. Nuclear weapons were always seen to be indispensable within this framework, since the officially-held view was
that the USSR could not be successfully deterred by conventional military strength alone, and needed to be confronted with the possibility of nuclear retaliation both from Western Europe and from the USA itself. Furthermore, flexible response served as a political compromise as much as a military strategy, and although the USA was not the only NATO nuclear power, NATO’s major crises of political cohesion, such as the INF crisis of the early 1980s, occurred as a result of controversy over the role of nuclear weapons and US political leadership within the alliance. Studies of the political processes behind NATO strategic decisionmaking have also demonstrated, whether by accident or design, how traditional alliance theory fails to confront the complexities of Cold War alliance politics. (30).

The WTO functioned differently. The USSR was always its sole nuclear power, and in terms of military capability and defence spending the USSR played a much more dominant role within the WTO than did the USA within NATO. (The USA almost certainly remained a stronger military power than the USSR, and its West European allies were also significantly stronger than the USSR’s East European allies.) Perhaps more importantly, the WTO had no equivalent of flexible response in the sense of a publicly-stated strategic concept from which a strategy for the use of nuclear forces could ostensibly be derived. Soviet nuclear strategy evolved separately from the vicissitudes of alliance politics, even if this at times caused
discomfort among East European elites and populations (see chapters 3 and 5). Conventional military forces, however, were much more centrally involved in the history and politics of the WTO.

This was partly a function of the role of Soviet and other WTO conventional forces in ensuring internal political control within Eastern Europe, as outlined in Chapter 1. It was also a consequence of the importance of conventional military strength in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR as a key element in Soviet security policy as a whole. There is some evidence, reviewed in later chapters, of East European military thinkers playing a role in the elaboration of conventional military postures, but an explanation of WTO conventional policy has to be given principally in terms of the development of Soviet thinking. The later examination in chapters 5, 7, and 8 of the history of eastern strategy, the military reforms of the late 1980s, and their contribution to the decline of the WTO, therefore concentrates on the evolution of Soviet thought.

There are as many controversies in western analyses of Soviet conventional military planning as in Cold War historiography. Not all of this literature includes an analysis of the WTO as an alliance, but it is summarized here with some indications of its implications for the alliance. In Chapter 5 I return to these different models of explanation for a more detailed discussion, and set them against Soviet accounts of the evolution of strategy.
published both before and during the late 1980s reform period.

If there is a single seminal article which encapsulates the historical controversies over Soviet strategy in Europe, it is without doubt Matthew Evangelista's 1982-83 article in International Security, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised". Evangelista contrasted public western statements on Soviet military strength and intentions in the 1947-48 period with the assessments made in subsequently declassified reports by various US national security agencies. He argued that the claim of Soviet conventional superiority made at the time was inaccurate, and that Soviet troops were incapable of carrying out an invasion of Western Europe for a number of reasons. On the question of numbers of forces, Evangelista argued that Soviet demobilization took place quite rapidly after the war, and that figures given by Khrushchev in 1960 for demobilization in the 1945-48 period were substantially correct. The remaining forces would not have been capable of invading Western Europe. Soviet forces were very short of transport and other equipment, and road and rail transport in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR were in a serious state of disrepair. Indeed, large sections of the rail network in Eastern Germany had been dismantled. Furthermore, the actual functions of Soviet forces in the region at this time were related in large part to collecting reparations, and ensuring political control both within Eastern Europe and inside Soviet borders. Armed
resistance to Soviet rule continued into the early 1950s in parts of Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic, and large-scale deportations from the Baltic were being carried out by military forces up until the beginning of the 1950s. The most important aspect of Soviet policy related to external military tasks, Evangelista suggests, was the organization of air defence forces to guard against attack by nuclear bombers.

Evangelista’s work forms a basis for a discussion of the evolution of Soviet strategy in two respects. Firstly, it provides us with strong evidence against the argument that there was a Soviet military threat to Western Europe in the immediate post-war period. Although there is little dispute in either the western or the Soviet literature that Soviet strategy later evolved into an “offensive-defensive” posture requiring offensive operations against Western Europe in the event of war, there is strong evidence that this evolved in a process of interaction with western strategy, and not as something formed prior to any interaction with the West. Secondly, Evangelista poses the question of the internal functions of Soviet forces within Eastern Europe and even within the USSR, and offers us a basis on which to relate the two functions to each other from the pre-WTO period, through the alliance’s formation and evolution and into its period of decline in the late 1980s.

Although there is little dispute in the existing secondary literature over the offensive-defensive posture
subsequently adopted by Soviet and WTO conventional forces. However, this does not mean that there has been any consensus on the planning assumptions behind, or the goals sought by, this posture. There are five central contending interpretations in the existing western literature:

(1) Invasion and occupation of Western Europe, or the use of such a threat to "Sovietize" or "Finlandize" the region.

(2) War-avoidance, and deterrence of the USA from attacking the USSR by means of a threat to retaliate at an early stage against Western Europe; this posture was maintained after the USSR was able to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the USA itself, and maintained its importance as the focus of military development shifted back towards conventional strategies.

(3) Deterrence of West Germany or other European powers from intervention in Eastern Europe.

(4) Maintenance of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and the prevention of territorial defence by East European states.

(5) No identifiable goal beyond the sheer inertia of Soviet military institutions, which were unable to shake off their traditional adherence to the offensive.

Some of these alternatives incorporate an analysis of the WTO alliance more directly than others, and some of them do not treat the alliance as a central concern at all. Some of these interpretations will be taken up later in more detail, and their application to specific aspects of
the WTO tested. What is needed here is an indication of the kind of analytic model which is implicit in each variant, so that their potential application to a study of the late 1980s period can be assessed.

Alternatives (1) and (2) presuppose a rational actor type of strategic decision-making driven by the imperatives of East-West military confrontation. In these accounts there are fairly direct implications for the strategic role of East European territory, but the WTO as an alliance is not seen as central to strategic planning. Alternatives (3) and (4) bring the WTO more centrally into the picture, with differences of emphasis depending on the view taken of western policy towards Eastern Europe. In alternative (5), internal Soviet policymaking procedures are seen to dominate over both external and intra-alliance concerns, with strategy analyzed as an output of bureaucratic politics in the form of civil-military relations and/or inter-service rivalry.

These alternatives are by no means mutually exclusive, and some analysts draw on a number of strands of interpretation. However, much of the existing literature does tend to favour one type of explanation as primary, and to overlook the possibility that strategic choices made in the USSR (and elsewhere) may be seriously overdetermined. It can easily be seen that the alternative explanations fit rather well on top of the alternative theories of the Cold War as I outlined them earlier in this chapter. In the first two cases inter-systemic conflict is seen as primary,
with differences of view over the levels of offensiveness or defensiveness attributed to the USSR. In options (3) and (4) there is more stress on the internal maintenance of an alliance, and the fifth option concentrates on the dominant weight of Soviet history and institutional practices.

Examples of interpretation (1) can be found in the writings of military analysts like PH Vigor and Christopher Donnelly. The stronger form of this interpretation, in terms of actual military expansionism, is in fact fairly rare in academic literature, and writers of this school tend to argue in terms of the availability of offensive military options as support for a competitive and combative foreign policy. In either case, though, there is an assumption that the USSR has traditionally set the strategic agenda, and the West has been in the position of having to find a response.

A good example of option (2) can be found in the writings of Michael MccGwire, most notably in his 1987 study Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy. MccGwire preserves the assumption of rational strategic planning which is part of option (1), and posits a process in which Soviet planners assess the USSR's strategic environment and come to clear-cut decisions with direct implications for strategy and procurement priorities. However, MccGwire's account describes a much more reactive process than that of option (1). He argues that from a point in the late 1960s the USSR began to plan for the possibility of achieving conventional victory in Europe as
a result of a calculation that an East-West conflict would not necessarily escalate to nuclear war, so that even if war did break out the nuclear devastation of the USSR could perhaps be avoided. The key point here is that this calculation was in large part a reaction to NATO’s flexible response concept, with its statement of the possibility of delayed escalation. For the purposes of labelling interpretations (1) and (2) for future reference, they can be identified as the "Sovietization" and "Deterrence" accounts of Soviet strategy.

Rationality is still present in options (3) and (4), but Soviet planning is associated more directly with policy in Eastern Europe and so with the WTO as an alliance. Christopher Jones’ 1981 study Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe is the clearest expression of this school of thought, and is essentially a statement of hypothesis (4) with some additional elements from option (3).<34> In Jones’ view, the training of East European forces for offensive operations against NATO territory was principally a way of denying them any way of defending their own territory or political leadership against Soviet intervention, and of deterring western powers from intervening to support any dissident regime in Eastern Europe. Jones supports his argument with a detailed analysis of WTO institutional structures, and this hypothesis is clearly an important one to bear in mind when considering the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine in the late 1980s. I will argue in later chapters that there are
problems with Jones' analysis both in respect of his neglect of possible external strategic motivations, and in respect of his treatment of the actual functioning of WTO institutions.

The argument which I have identified as option (5) is sometimes put forward as a component part of broader explanations of Soviet policy, but there is no fully-fledged book-length exposition of it as an autonomous hypothesis. Jack Snyder has provided an embryonic version in an article in *International Security*, in which he deals with Khrushchev's security reforms as an example of a period of strategic innovation by the Soviet political leadership and an unenthusiastic response by the military leadership. Snyder argues that the revival of the conventional offensive in the 1960s did not occur as a result of rational planning, as McCGwire's account suggests. Rather, it was the result of institutional pressure from sections of the Soviet military, notably the traditionally-dominant ground forces, in response to Khrushchev's attempt to marginalize the traditional branches of service within a doctrine dominated by nuclear missiles.

Snyder's account is not based on a purely internal model of bureaucratic politics, since he places the argument about strategy in the context of a broader argument about the history of "offensive detente" and zero-sum foreign policy assumptions in Soviet thinking. The main potential of the argument as an explanation of the events
of the 1980s lies in its suggestion that the security reforms of the Gorbachev period presupposed a fundamental institutional shake-up if they were to be carried through successfully, and in an argument that Snyder has made elsewhere at greater length, to the effect that military establishments have tended to insist on the importance of offensive strategies at times when they are under pressure from their political masters to reform. This second conclusion was drawn by Snyder from a study of civil-military relations in the continental great powers, France, Germany, and Russia, before 1914.<36>

Some Soviet accounts of the evolution of strategy are examined in later chapters. The traditional Soviet account tended to stress the influence of external threats to Soviet security without conceding that the West might perceive a threat from the USSR, and without admitting any influence from the need to "police" Eastern Europe internally. But just as revisionist Soviet accounts of Cold War history emerged in the late 1980s to undermine the traditional versions, so the strategic debates of that period questioned established orthodoxies. Among the challenges which emerged were criticisms of the emphasis on offensive operations within a supposedly defensive military doctrine, a questioning of the need for military forces which could ensure "victory", and even the near-endorsement by Soviet scholars of Snyder's thesis about internal military resistance. Strangely enough, though, the history of Soviet policing operations within the WTO remained
largely unexamined.

In assessing the application of these diverse models of strategic explanation to the decline and collapse of the WTO, it is important to recognize the possibility of overdetermination of military strategy, whether of an alliance or an individual state. It will become clear in the following chapters that I consider the WTO's external security functions to have been a substantial factor in Soviet policy, and not merely a means of legitimizing internal control. Both elements need to be integrated in order to provide a satisfactory account. The accounts summarized above are all based on the events of earlier periods, before the late 1980s strategic reforms and the collapse of the WTO. I shall seek to explain the events of the later period against the background of the alternative theories, but without assuming that any one of the models can furnish a full explanation. The events of the late 1980s may provide evidence favouring one or another theory of the history of Soviet strategy, but it may also be the case that some theories provide more illumination for one period, while different theories provide better explanations for other periods.

The final body of literature that needs to be considered consists of material on the WTO itself, and overlaps to some degree with the literature on military strategy. The question of the relative significance of an alliance's internal and external functions is one whose
importance can be appreciated when one examines the existing body of English-language literature on the WTO. A number of different schools can be identified. A substantial body of work written primarily for military audiences has been oriented towards military balance questions, often with the unstated assumption that Soviet and WTO military policy was a given to which the West had to respond. In this kind of writing, the internal/external question tended to be downplayed.<37> The contrasting school of analysis favoured by Christopher Jones, and summarized above, has placed the focus almost entirely on internal questions, and the possibility of the WTO performing traditional external security functions has been excluded almost by definition.

In between these fairly easily identifiable extremes is a large category of analysis of the WTO with a more balanced approach to the alliance, but which tended to deal with questions of WTO cohesion and reliability as issues to be addressed by US foreign policy without much consideration of the possibility that West European actors might view these issues differently, or that the search for policy relevance might be an obstacle to rigorous analysis. In practice, these analyses often turned into recommendations for the exertion of pressure on identified weak points in the WTO.<38> European analysts seemed less inclined to oversimplify in this way, but were not immune.

Much of this western work on the WTO is well-researched and valuable, and this study makes use of a
considerable amount of it. Some of the material written during the period when the WTO seemed a relatively stable alliance would have benefited from a more rigorous examination of the relative weight of the internal and external alliance functions, since there was a tendency to make unexplained assumptions about their relative importance in a way which coloured the subsequent analysis. The precise role of the search for policy relevance also needs to be established. It is noticeable that the most impressive books on the WTO, which did not fall into the trap of making unsubstantiated assumptions about the alliance, were also among the ones which were most cautious in urging policy options on their readers. Robin Remington's 1971 study, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution, is one example, and David Holloway and Jane Sharp's 1984 collection, The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition 7 is another. There is also the problem, of course, that a great deal of work published in recent years and even written during the Gorbachev period, whether on Soviet strategy or on the WTO itself, has gone out of date very rapidly. There is therefore an urgent need for reconsideration and updating.

Some other relevant bodies of literature will be discussed where appropriate in later chapters. The literature reviewed here has been found to be only partially useful in suggesting a framework for analysis of the WTO. As we have seen, alliance theory literature provides a rather weak basis for such a study. I have
suggested that this is because much of the existing literature rests on questionable realist assumptions about international relations, and because its concern with the provision of policy advice to the western alliance leads to confusion and inconsistency. If the alliance literature is supplemented by a reading of different schools of analysis of the Cold War, it becomes clear why a realist account is unable to deal satisfactorily with the semi-permanent alliances of the Cold War period. It is equally clear, however, that there were significant differences between the ways in which the eastern and western blocs were formed, and I have noted some important respects in which revisionist Soviet accounts have now moved towards acceptance of the traditional western version. Different theories of the Cold War and accounts of the formation of Soviet military strategy give us a variety of viewpoints from which to consider the military-political history of the WTO. Using them to study the eastern alliance may in turn shed light on the competition between these theories.

With this theoretical base established, it is possible to turn to an examination of the military-political history of the WTO, and to attempt to answer the questions set out in Chapter 1 about the relationship between external and intra-bloc military policy in the alliance's evolution and decline.
In chapters 3 and 4 of this study, the WTO's institutions are divided into "political" and "military". There is obviously a danger of begging questions here, and some of the discussion does not fall naturally into one chapter rather than the other. However, the objective is to establish a framework without presupposing that given bodies had either a military or a political essence. Inevitably, there is some overlap between the two chapters.

In both, an outline characterization of WTO institutions is taken from Soviet sources. This outline is then explored in some detail, taking note of historical developments and differing analyses of institutional functions. Figure 1 presents information relevant to both chapters in diagrammatic form. The account given in this chapter takes the story up to the beginning of the crucial transition period in 1988-9. Here, I try to clarify the functioning of the structures which existed up until that time. The developments of 1989-90 are the subject of Chapter 8.
**Figure 1 - Principal WTO Institutions**
(as in 1989, with dates of establishment)

**Political Structure**

- **Political Consultative C'ttee** (1955)
  - Joint Secretariat (1956)
  - C'ttee of Foreign Ministers (1976)

- **Plus** -
  - Technological C'ttee (1969)
  - Military Science & Technology Council (1969)
  - Disarmament Commission (1987)
  - Experts' Group on Conventional Forces (1987)

**Military Structure**

- **Committee of Defence Ministers** (1969)
  - Staff of Joint Command (originally formed 1955, consolidated 1969)
  - Joint Armed Forces

Comprising:
- Soviet forces in Eastern Europe & western USSR
- GDR armed forces
- additional E.Eur. units
- Other East European forces - under national command, at least in peacetime.
The Treaty Text

The preamble to the Warsaw Treaty identified the reintegration of West Germany into the western bloc as giving rise to the need for a counterbalancing alliance. (1) The treaty itself then went on to commit its signatories to:

- settle international disputes by peaceful means (Article 1)
- work towards the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction (Article 2)
- consult in the event of a threat to the signatories' security, and render assistance as considered necessary in the event of an armed attack in Europe on any one of them (Articles 3 and 4)
- establish a joint command for their armed forces, and a political consultative committee with the power to create auxiliary organs (Articles 5 and 6)
- not join any alliance with conflicting aims (Article 7)
- cooperate in economic and cultural relations, while not interfering in one another's internal affairs (Article 8)
- allow other states to accede irrespective of their social and state systems (Article 9)
- seek a general European treaty of collective security, in which event the present treaty would become ineffective (Article 11).

In some points of phrasing the Warsaw Treaty was
clearly modelled on the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which established NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty did not specify a joint military command, though it did provide for a defence committee which would implement measures for a collective capacity to resist armed attack. However, it is also interesting to compare the two treaties in respect of their coverage of spheres other than defence cooperation. The North Atlantic Treaty, in its preamble and Article 2, made it clear that NATO was seen as an alliance of states with common political and economic systems and institutions: "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.................contribute towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."<2> The Warsaw Treaty, with its article specifying openness of accession to all states irrespective of social systems, had no directly analogous clauses, and its article on economic and cultural relations was politically neutral. Article 5's commitment to safeguarding peaceful labour could, however, be glossed without too much difficulty as entailing a commitment to a particular kind of social system.

The North Atlantic Treaty said nothing about the reduction of armaments or the conclusion of a European
collective security treaty. Consequently, the WTO had at least a textual basis for its claim to have been particularly concerned about negotiations on security. These clauses lend weight to Remington's argument about the considerations which were most important for the Soviet leadership in 1955, and it was indeed the WTO which pressed originally for the Helsinki process to be set in motion. On the other hand, the WTO emerged with little credit from its textual claims to political neutrality. NATO could at least argue that it was fairly explicit about being an alliance committed to Atlantic capitalism and liberal parliamentary democracy (to put something of a gloss on the above quotations from the treaty), even if some of its member-states, notably Portugal, Greece and Turkey, had little enough to do with the latter at various times. The North Atlantic Treaty also specified (Article 4) consultation whenever "territorial integrity, political independence or security" were threatened, which, one can speculate, was put in at the time as a pre-emptive legitimation of any intervention which might be deemed necessary in the event of a communist or socialist election victory in, say, Italy. With the partial exception of Article 5, the text of the Warsaw Treaty did not specify any ideological basis for the alliance, still less any right of military intervention in support of such a commitment. Indeed, Article 8 specified non-intervention in internal affairs. Consequently, the treaty could provide no foundation for the armed interventions carried out in Hungary in 1956, and
in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Political Institutions

The WTO's chief body, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), was specified in the text of the Warsaw Treaty along with a joint command for the signatories' armed forces. Article 6 of the treaty empowered the PCC to create additional organs as the need arose, and stipulated that it should be composed of members of government or any other representatives of the signatory states.\(^4\) According to the treaty, the PCC was established "for the purpose of holding the consultations provided for in the present treaty among the states that are party to the treaty, and for the purpose of considering problems arising in connection with the implementation of this treaty".\(^5\) The PCC was identified in Soviet sources as the WTO's supreme political body, though there were also times when it was described as a military body. Its functions were described as follows in the *Soviet Military Encyclopaedia* in 1976: "At sessions of the PCC the most important foreign policy questions are discussed, decisions are worked out collectively on international questions which affect the interests of all participants in the [Warsaw] Treaty, and the most important problems connected with the strengthening of defence capability and carrying out of the obligation of the states party to the Warsaw Treaty to collective defence are examined."\(^6\) This gave the PCC a combination of political and military duties, indicating
that subordinate bodies of both types reported to it. It was often stated that the PCC had no supranational functions and did not impinge upon the WTO states' sovereignty.

On the same day as the Warsaw Treaty was signed, an announcement was made on the formation of the Joint Armed Forces of the WTO signatories. Marshal IS Konev of the USSR was named Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C); the allied ministers of defence or other military leaders were appointed as his deputies and as commanders of allied units assigned to the Joint Armed Forces; a staff was formed with representatives from the member-states, to be located in Moscow; and the stationing of the signatories' armed forces was to be arranged by mutual agreement.<sup>7</sup> The treaty itself was to remain in force for twenty years, to be extended automatically for a further ten years for those who did not renounce it (Article 11).

Although the Warsaw Treaty itself was signed by the prime ministers of the respective states, from 1960 onwards it was the general or first secretaries of the respective parties who signed the PCC's communiques. The membership of the PCC was described as comprising the general or first secretaries plus the heads of state or their deputies, ministers of defence and foreign ministers, plus the C-in-C of the WTO armed forces and the General Secretary of the PCC.<sup>8</sup> Some accounts suggested that the Chief of Staff was also a member. The General Secretary's post was for a long time mentioned only infrequently, and involved a much less
public profile than the work of NATO's Secretary General. In the more adventurous diplomacy of the early Gorbachev era, however, the General Secretary became rather more visible, as it was suggested that direct talks could be held between the NATO and WTO incumbents. The WTO post appeared to be held by a deputy foreign minister of the country responsible for hosting the next scheduled PCC meeting. In Berlin in May 1987, the GDR's Herbert Krolikowski handed over to Poland's Henryk Jaroszek, who was then succeeded by the Romanian Constantin Dancescu after the July 1988 Warsaw meeting.<9>

The PCC's first meeting, in Prague in January 1956, saw the power to create additional organs used to set up a Permanent Commission (PC) and, according to its communique, a Joint Secretariat (JS). Curiously, however, a later communique also claimed to have set up the JS in 1976, and the later date was sometimes given elsewhere for the Secretariat.<10> Perhaps the original Secretariat had not functioned very well, and needed to be revived in 1976. The January 1956 communique also specified that the PCC should meet "when necessary, but no less than twice a year"; the twice-a-year specification was seldom met, and was omitted from later accounts of the PCC's obligations.<11> In fact, there were ten meetings between 1955 and 1969, with only four between spring 1955 and spring 1961, and no meeting at all in the period between January 1956 and May 1958. During the Brezhnev period, 1965-1982, there were a total of 12 PCC meetings, though a further expansion of WTO bodies
after 1969 may have relieved the pressure on the PCC.<sup>12</sup> By the late 1980s PCC meetings were held annually, and rotated around the seven WTO capital cities.

The Permanent Commission was described as providing recommendations on foreign policy,<sup>13</sup> while the Secretariat was credited by western sources with preparation of the PCC's agendas and also responsibility for armaments and logistics.<sup>14</sup> Presumably the Commission and Secretariat had multinational staffs; as a permanent body, the Secretariat presumably also implemented decisions taken by the PCC (and, after 1976, the Committee of Foreign Ministers). The PCC retained the functions of appointing the WTO's Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, and General Secretary, although actual announcements of appointments did not coincide with PCC meetings.<sup>15</sup>

The PCC remained the WTO's senior body, and the presence of the C-in-C on this committee indicated that this was where he reported on the work of the military bodies. In March 1969, a Committee of Defence Ministers and some additional military bodies were formed (see Chapter 4). A further body was formed in 1976, when the Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM) was set up by the Bucharest PCC meeting, and the CFM held its first formal meeting six months later in Moscow.<sup>16</sup> This committee was set up shortly after the signature of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, although the foreign ministers had been meeting without being identified as a committee since 1959.<sup>17</sup> In addition, summer holiday meetings between the
leaders were arranged in the Crimea from 1971 onwards. Presumably a more formal structure was seen as necessary in the new situation created by the signature of the Helsinki accords, though the founding communique did not elaborate on the CFM's functions beyond giving the aim as "further perfection of the mechanism of political cooperation within the framework of the Treaty". The CFM met annually after its formation.

No new political institutions were set up between 1976 and 1985, but after Mikhail Gorbachev became CPSU General Secretary in March 1985 there were a number of further developments. The June 1986 PCC meeting endorsed the principle of annual PCC meetings, and also resolved that CFM sessions would henceforth be held twice a year. It was agreed that there would be changes in the form of the various meetings, to allow the delegation heads to meet in small groups and without any previously agreed agenda. There was also to be more cooperation between working groups of deputy ministers, between foreign ministry representatives, and in other expert groups. In the following year the PCC set up a working group for information exchanges and a commission to deal with disarmament questions, which consisted of representatives of the defence and foreign ministries. By mid-1988 a joint foreign and defence ministry group was said to be working on proposals for the upgrading of political and military cooperation within the alliance.

In analyses of the objectives of the WTO and of the
functions of the constituent bodies described here, there tended to be a sharp dividing line between eastern commentators who treated the alliance as concerned primarily with European peace and security, and western works which focused more on its domestically repressive or potentially militarily expansionist functions. Both approaches have their drawbacks. The eastern approach was inadequate in that it sought to deny the all-too apparent evidence of the repressive functioning of the alliance system, while a number of western writers excluded almost by definition the possibility of the WTO performing orthodox security functions in Soviet or East European eyes. It is also clear that the increasing institutional complexity of the WTO needs to be weighed as evidence for or against its "alliancehood", as related to the theoretical controversies summarized in the previous chapter. While it could be argued that the existence of permanent institutions does not in itself resolve the question, the evidence presented so far does at least suggest that the WTO developed over time into something more complex than it had been in 1955.

Intervention and Bloc Management, Before and After 1968

In the earlier discussion of the text of the Warsaw Treaty, mention was made of its attempt to suggest ideological neutrality, thereby providing a contrast with the North Atlantic Treaty. Since Article 9 stipulated that the treaty was open to states of any social system, social
and political issues should in theory have been irrelevant. In practice, this fiction was not seriously maintained, and WTO mechanisms played a significant part in sustaining the political cohesion of the eastern bloc as a whole. In a basic definitional document, the WTO was described in 1976 as having been formed "with the aim of defending the gains of socialism". This was a formulation which, though absent from the treaty, became commonplace in later descriptions of the WTO's purpose. A glance at a selection of material published around 1985, at the time of the WTO's thirtieth anniversary and renewal, gives some indication of the traditional Soviet conception of the alliance.

One of the Soviet texts already cited claims that:

"The military cooperation of the fraternal socialist countries in the framework of the WTO is a qualitatively new social-historical phenomenon, characterized by the mutual relations between the peoples and armies of the socialist states. This cooperation is based upon the objective necessity of the joint defence by the workers of the gains of socialism." Marshal Kulikov, the WTO C-in-C at that time, said in a 1985 article in the CPSU's theoretical journal Kommunist: "On May 14th 1955, they [the socialist countries of Europe] signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which has entered history as the Warsaw Treaty, in which were expressed the wish and aspirations of the fraternal peoples for unity, for their collective responsibility to provide
for the defence of the gains of socialism, for the preservation of peace and international security."<24> The then Chief of General Staff, General Gribkov, explained how the existence of the socialist system had pre-dated the formation of the WTO: after World War II "Socialism moved beyond the frame of one country and formed a world system".<25> In 1985 Aleksandr Yakovlev saw the WTO's function to be as important as ever in a period of a US "crusade" against communism: "In this situation one can see even more clearly the enormous role which the Warsaw Pact plays in the defence of peace, of revolutionary gains, in securing the progress of socialism."<26>

To cite these references to the WTO as sustaining a social system is in some ways to repeat the obvious: after 1955 two social systems and military blocs in apparent competition with each other existed in Europe (and beyond), and the political cohesion of these blocs needed to be regularly reaffirmed. These traditional Soviet formulations do not really take us any further in respect of the argument over the interpretation of the Cold War as a genuine inter-systemic confrontation or an essentially intra-systemic imaginary war. They are nevertheless of great significance in assisting an appreciation of just how dramatic the decline of the WTO was in the late 1980s. Yakovlev, whose assessment seemed so orthodox in 1985, became one of Mikhail Gorbachev's key foreign policy advisers in the presentation of "New Thinking" in the subsequent period, and was one of those who watched from
Moscow with apparent equanimity as the communist leaderships collapsed throughout Eastern Europe during 1989 and 1990.

In addition to the WTO institutions already mentioned, the network of bilateral treaties which existed before 1955 was later updated, so that it continued to provide a distinct mechanism for affirming the obligations of the bloc's states to one another. Many of these bilateral treaties made the commitment to a shared social system explicit in a way which the Warsaw Treaty itself did not. The bilateral treaties are perhaps best described as military-political in nature and function, and they can be distinguished from the more specific troop-stationing agreements. A later round of bilateral treaties was concluded during the 1970s, and these shared with a number of other documents, such as domestic East European party programmes and state constitutions, commitments to the alliance with the USSR, to the joint defence of socialism and peace, and to the "combat confederation" (boevoe sodruzhestvo) of the armed forces of the "socialist confederation" (sotsialisticheskoe sodruzhestvo).<27> The GDR's 1974 constitution, for example, stated that "The German Democratic Republic is for ever and irrevocably allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."<28>

Western commentators on the WTO sometimes argued that Soviet proposals to dissolve the alliance were meaningless, since the network of bilateral treaties between the USSR and its allies would not be altered by such a dissolution.
Ironically, Soviet commentators themselves sometimes conceded almost as much. In the words of Valentin Alexandrov, writing in 1980: "Of course the world socialist system will not perish if the Warsaw Treaty Organization ceases to exist simultaneously with NATO under an agreement reached by the two sides. It will not perish because there will remain other components of the strong structure of socialist international relations."<29> This does not necessarily mean that all the functions of the WTO could equally easily have been carried out by the bilateral treaty system, though it does remind us that the collapse of the communist leaderships placed in question the terms of the bilateral treaties in a way which did not immediately apply to the Warsaw Treaty itself.

Ceausescu's Romania provided an exception to this pattern. The 1970 Soviet-Romanian treaty was emphatic about Soviet-Romanian friendship, but careful not to commit Romania to joint defence of the gains of socialism, and limited Romanian obligations to consultation and the defence of state borders as specified in the Warsaw Treaty.<30> These are the distinctions which were frequently cited as identifying Romania as a non-adherent to the Brezhnev Doctrine spelled out in 1968. An account of the early history of the WTO will help to clarify how they came to acquire such weight.

The WTO was little more than a year old when the Hungarian crisis erupted in 1956, and the organization as such played little part in its resolution. The events of
1956 grew out of a combination of worker and peasant discontent and intellectual anti-Stalinism, with Imre Nagy becoming head of government just before the transition to violent conflict. At the height of the crisis, Nagy abolished the one-party system and announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the WTO and neutrality. Although the latter measure has sometimes been interpreted as a tactical step made to gain western support, Nagy’s own writings before 1956 had displayed an interest in neutrality and the possibility of an independent Hungarian foreign policy. The USSR used its own forces to restore its authority, though it presumably had a degree of Romanian and Polish cooperation since some of the troops involved were stationed in those countries. Although the USSR subsequently cited the Warsaw Treaty as a justification for the intervention, there seems to have been no coordination through WTO channels, as opposed to Soviet consultation with other East European leaderships, which did take place (including consultation with Tito). Whatever the USSR may have claimed, the Warsaw Treaty itself certainly did not specify a general right of Soviet intervention. In fact, the intervention was a clear breach of articles 1 (on the non-use of force) and 8 (on non-interference in internal affairs), and no PCC meeting seems even to have discussed the Hungarian crisis.

The crisis can be explained partly in terms of Khrushchev’s attempts to destalinize Soviet foreign policy, and their inherent limitations. This can perhaps be seen as
reflecting a Soviet failure to realize that destalinization
could threaten the very existence of East European regimes
in a way in which it did not threaten the Soviet leadership
itself. In the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration issued in June
1955, and again in Khrushchev's main speech to the 20th
Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, the Soviet
leadership explicitly conceded the possibility of a number
of different national paths to socialism. This,
understandably, encouraged anti-stalinist reformers like
Gomulka in Poland and Nagy in Hungary, and assisted their
returns to power during 1956. (Gomulka became First
Secretary of the Polish party, while Nagy became Prime
Minister of Hungary.) Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in his
secret speech at the 20th Congress caused even deeper
traumas within the communist movement, and weakened the
East European leaderships even though it was not a public
document. While Gomulka was then able to convince the
Soviet leadership that the goals of his liberalization were
consistent with maintaining the role of the Polish party
and with Soviet interests, Nagy was not.

One important aspect of the Hungarian crisis was the
Soviet government's declaration of 30th October 1956, which
appeared after the first round of fighting between Soviet
forces and the rebels. This declaration restated the
principles of sovereignty and noninterference in relations
between socialist states, and stated that the principles of
peaceful coexistence applied in relations between socialist
countries as well as in the USSR's overall foreign
relations. The declaration also said that the Soviet government was prepared to review the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary, Poland and Romania (i.e. everywhere except the GDR), with the proviso that withdrawal would have to be agreed by all the treaty signatories. Some historians have suggested that the declaration was a subterfuge on the part of the USSR, designed to conceal preparations for the more decisive second intervention, while others have argued that Nagy could have taken advantage of it to negotiate Soviet withdrawal from Hungary. In any event, Nagy could not satisfy Hungarian popular demands without going on to the introduction of a multi-party system and the declaration of neutrality, which was made on November 1st. In strict technical terms Hungary never in fact left the WTO, since the delegation charged with presenting the decision to the government of Poland, the depository power, did not leave Budapest. The second Soviet intervention then followed on November 4th.<31> (NATO was at the time conveniently split over the Suez crisis.) Nagy himself was immediately replaced by Janos Kadar, and was subsequently executed in 1958.

Perhaps because of Soviet concern that there should be no repetition of the Hungarian crisis, the 1960s saw the development under Marshal Grechko of the programme of multinational exercises between Soviet and East European forces. Although significant for military reasons (see chapters 4-5), these exercises were not without political importance. They took place within the conception of
"coalition warfare", which not only laid stress on co-operation on the battlefield between WTO armies, but also emphasized ideological ties between states and armies. The multilateral exercises were part of a pattern of multilateral and bilateral WTO institutions which have been painstakingly documented by Christopher Jones.

Less visible than the well-publicized meetings of ministers and party leaders, these institutions were a careful blend of the military and the political. They included: a committee for sporting links between WTO states and other Soviet allies; a possible directorate for WTO military doctrine which trained the armies according to the shared set of military-political axioms already mentioned; close ties and exchange arrangements between political administrations in the respective armies (though the political administrations themselves had existed before the formation of the WTO); coordination of military education policy and the training of the most promising East European officers at institutes like the prestigious Voroshilov Academy in Moscow.<32> A key part of Jones’ argument is that in practice, many of these institutions were more bilateral than genuinely multilateral, which enabled the USSR to maintain close surveillance of each East European army individually.

One purpose of these institutions was to create a homogeneous military elite, a "greater socialist officer corps", at the highest level, and to inculcate a specific set of military-political virtues and attitudes in the
armies as fighting units. The central political conclusion
drawn by Jones from these phenomena is that they were
designed to pre-empt movement towards political autonomy in
Eastern Europe. No army which was integrated into this
system was trained to defend its own national territory,
and so none of them would be able to defend an East
European government against Soviet military intervention.
Essentially, this aspect of the WTO was a device to control
political developments by preventing any military capacity
to support an anti-communist, or nationalist and anti-
Soviet though still communist, government in the region. By
extension, the existing regimes in the region also relied
on the threat of Soviet military intervention to protect
themselves against potential domestic threats.

Jones rests his case heavily on Romania’s non-
participation in these structures and achievement of
relative political autonomy. It is true that Romania
abandoned the multilateral exercise arrangement at an early
stage, in 1962-3, and from that time on steered a course
close to non-alignment within the alliance, stressing the
principle of sovereignty, calling independently for bloc
dissolution, and distancing Romania from Soviet foreign
policy in other ways. During the 1960s Czechoslovakia also
began to voice some unhappiness with the WTO’s political
organization. In May 1968, the Czechoslovakian Gottwald
Academy floated publicly a number of possibilities for an
alternative Czechoslovakian defence policy, including a
Central European security system without the USSR and
outright neutrality. The implied criticisms were of Soviet political domination of the WTO, and also of Soviet military strategy itself (see chapters 4 and 5 for a more military perspective). Jones and others, including Condoleezza Rice, have argued that these developments were a major factor in prompting the Soviet decision to intervene.<33>

Jones' work is particularly relevant to the debate over the politics of WTO intervention, but as outlined in Chapter 2, it also contains a broader argument about the nature of the organization. He argues that although the WTO armies trained for offensive operations against Western Europe, this was not the main purpose of the alliance. The prevention of autonomous territorial defence in Eastern Europe was the main aim, and the offensive posture directed against Western Europe was just a way of discouraging NATO from intervening in East European conflicts.

Jones' central insight is an important one which underlines the interconnections between military, political, and ideological security in Eastern Europe. "Preservation of the gains of socialism" was not just, or even primarily, a question of defence against NATO, but of sustaining a specific social system which might not survive without the constraints of a military alliance. However, Jones' arguments in themselves provide insufficient evidence for ranking the internal political purpose so clearly above the external military role. Jones does not in fact even examine the two possible alliance functions as
alternatives, since he never seriously considers the possibility of the WTO playing a role in a more fundamental East-West confrontation. He also tends to overestimate the importance of Romania. Even though Romania's territorial defence policy was indeed a departure from the WTO norm, Romania was always the least important of the WTO allies to the USSR in strategic terms. A territorial defence posture in Romania which excluded the USSR was a different matter from the possibility of one in Czechoslovakia. One also needs to assess the extent, nature and desirability of the political autonomy achieved by Ceausescu's Romania before arguing that it was the key to understanding the WTO.

As a contribution to the literature on the internal functioning of the WTO, Jones' analysis is therefore valuable, but it does not rule out the possibility of the USSR also having regarded Eastern Europe as a strategically significant area in East-West terms. Jones also seems to assume that the mechanisms he describes provided a highly efficient way of realizing Soviet political goals. This seems questionable even if we accept that the goals were as he describes them. They did not, after all, prevent the rise of Solidarity in Poland, even if they were effective for a while in suppressing the movement under martial law.

It is also important to remember that the principles later identified as the "Brezhnev Doctrine" were close to formulations which had been used after 1956 and then around 1960-61 in the elaboration of "socialist internationalism" as a principle governing the supposedly voluntary joint
efforts of socialist states. These formulations amounted to a retreat from the language of the 1956 Soviet declaration with its application of the term "peaceful coexistence" to inter-socialist relations. Their elaboration after 1956 was also linked to attempts to reassert Soviet primacy in relations with Yugoslavia and China, and so was not new in 1968 and had not originated in concerns related solely to the WTO states.<34>

During the course of 1968, the Czechoslovakian reform movement provoked Soviet concern, then political pressure, and finally multinational WTO intervention. The criticisms of security policy which emerged during this period from within the armed forces were only one strand in the political developments which took place in Czechoslovakia. The processes involved in the Prague Spring amounted to an apparently open-ended agenda of political, social and economic reform, with the prospect of party supervision of internal and external security policy being taken over by the state. Within the Soviet leadership, there were a variety of reasons why these developments were seen as threatening, ranging from fear of "spillover" into domestic dissent and implications for Soviet economic reforms, to fears of the delegitimization of Soviet leadership of the bloc.<35> As far as the WTO itself was concerned, the USSR’s difficulty was essentially the same as in 1956 – the Warsaw Treaty did not sanction military intervention by one signatory against another, but intervention might be the only solution if political measures failed. During the
summer of 1968, pressure was put on Czechoslovakia in a variety of ways. Military exercises were coordinated both inside and outside Czechoslovakia; political meetings took place on a bilateral basis between the Soviet and Czechoslovakian leaderships, and on a multilateral basis with the involvement of other WTO leaders. However, no meeting took place which was identified as a WTO meeting. Two of the key pre-intervention meetings, in Warsaw in July (excluding the Czechoslovaksians) and in Bratislava in August (at which the Czechoslovaksians were present) were ad hoc meetings of WTO leaders, but not meetings of the PCC or any other WTO body. Romania attended neither meeting, and the significance of this is plain — Romania would not have endorsed any measures which were designed to serve as groundwork for an eventual intervention. When the decision to intervene was finally taken, after hesitation and probably divisions in the Soviet leadership, the Soviet armed forces themselves took command of the actual operation. (The convening of ad hoc meetings was not, however, resorted to only in internal crises; a similar emergency meeting took place in June 1967 during the Middle East War.)

Two particular documents emerged from these meetings which amounted to a revision of the Warsaw Treaty and an extension of its terms to cover internal political developments in a signatory state. The "Warsaw Letter" emphasized collective security and membership of the socialist community, and also the principle that
Czechoslovakia's membership of that community was the "common concern" of its allies in the WTO. The "Bratislava Declaration", which the Czechoslovakian leadership signed, said much the same things, and noted the "common international duty of all socialist countries to support, strengthen and defend" the gains made by socialism (without mentioning Czechoslovakia specifically). These principles followed in the tracks of earlier formulations of "socialist internationalism", were enunciated by the Soviet leadership after the intervention and dubbed the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in the West, and were traceable through the WTO members' bilateral treaties and party programmes of the late 1960s and 70s and in the military-political axioms on which WTO military training rested. According to Pravda's commentary of 26 September 1968: "every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement."<36> The "common defence of the gains of socialism" also appeared in the 1977 Soviet constitution.

The Czechoslovakian armed forces did not oppose the intervention of 21 August, not least because Dubček’s leadership had always assumed such an event would not occur and had not prepared for the contingency. Some Czechoslovakian military officers may, however, have presented a plan for resistance to the party Praesidium, and the Soviet leadership may have got wind of this. If such a plan was presented, Dubček must have rejected it. It is important to stress that the USSR did not need the
military assistance of the GDR, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian contingents that participated. These contingents were small, and quickly withdrawn. What was important was their political complicity in the operation — indeed, the GDR and Polish leaderships were at least as concerned as the USSR about developments in Czechoslovakia, even if Kadar was less worried. Dubcek’s leadership was not formally removed until April 1969, and in view of the widespread passive resistance to the Soviet occupation, it might be argued that more organized resistance could have strengthened Dubcek’s hand. As had happened earlier in Hungary, popular resistance continued after the reestablishment of Soviet authority at the leadership and governmental level.

The intervention led to the renunciation of the Warsaw Treaty by Albania, which had been estranged from the USSR since 1961, and the refusal by Romania to accept that the treaty provided grounds for the action. Although it is unlikely that Ceausescu had any sympathy with the political aspirations of the Czechoslovakian reforms (for example, the abolition of censorship), he supported Dubcek on the principle of national sovereignty, and both he and Tito had visited Prague before the intervention to show their support. After the intervention, the Romanian armed forces were put on alert, and Ceausescu may genuinely have feared a Soviet attack on Romania. During 1969, military manoeuvres were conducted in Soviet Moldavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which were fairly certainly intended as warnings.
to Romania. In 1971 Romania resisted Soviet pressure to permit the transit of troops across Romania to Bulgaria.<37>

In both 1956 and 1968 some unconvincing attempts were made by Soviet spokespersons to cite the Warsaw Treaty in support of the interventions, though the treaty’s lack of provision for internal intervention was all too apparent. The USSR also argued in both cases that it had been invited in by forces within the allied country. In the Hungarian case, there was certainly an invitation to the USSR before the initial use of troops from Ernst Gero, the party leader, but Nagy denied that this came as a collective appeal from the whole of the Hungarian leadership. In 1968 the USSR published a document purporting to be a similar appeal, but a number of the Czechoslovakians whose names appeared on it denied their authorship. Significantly, the Soviet leadership was unable to install an immediate replacement for Dubcek after he was flown off to Moscow. The events of 1956 were described as a “counterrevolutionary rebellion” by reactionary forces relying on the support of Nagy’s revisionist group, which necessitated counter-action from Hungarian revolutionary forces and units of the Soviet army. After 1968 it was said that a counterrevolutionary situation had also arisen in Czechoslovakia and had brought the country to the brink of civil war, which prompted the Czechoslovakian appeal for internationalist help.<38>

Zdenek Mlynar’s account of Brezhnev’s meeting with
Dubcek in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention, when Dubcek had been flown to Moscow, does not take us inside the Politburo's deliberations, but gives an impression of the impulses which lay behind the Soviet leadership's actions. According to Mlynar, Brezhnev said that he had been angered by Dubcek's failure to consult Moscow or to take Brezhnev's advice. "Brezhnev spoke at length about the sacrifices of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: the soldiers fallen in battle, the civilians slaughtered, the enormous material losses, the hardships suffered by the Soviet people. At such a cost, the Soviet Union had gained security, and the guarantee of that security was the postwar division of Europe and, specifically, the fact that Czechoslovakia was linked with the Soviet Union, "forever.".....Our [i.e. Czechoslovakia's] western borders were not only our own borders, but the common borders of the "socialist camp". The Soviet politburo had no right to allow the results of that war to be jeopardized, for it had no right to dishonor the sacrifices of the Soviet people.......For us, Brezhnev went on, "the results of the Second World War are inviolable, and we will defend them even at the cost of risking a new war." Brezhnev went on to say, according to Mlynar, that there had in fact been no risk of war, since he had contacted President Johnson, who had confirmed the USA's recognition of "the results of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences" as applied to Czechoslovakia and Romania.<39> This last comment, of course, rather belies Brezhnev's account of his own indifference to the
danger of war, and suggests that prudence was allowed to moderate the instinctive requirement to hang on to the gains of World War II.

Robert C Tucker reports a similar remark made by Brezhnev to Dubcek during one of their meetings before the intervention. According to Tucker's informant, who was present at the meeting, Brezhnev replied to Dubcek's assurances that Czechoslovakia was not going to abandon socialism with the words "Don't talk to me about 'socialism'. What we have we hold."<40>

Brezhnev, it would appear from Tucker's evidence, was a convinced realist in his choice of paradigm. The events of 1956 and 1968 certainly showed the USSR to be prepared to use force on a formidable scale if and when it considered events to have escaped its control. This could be interpreted either as a demonstration that Khrushchev's conception of the WTO as a less coercive framework for Soviet-East European relations had failed miserably, or that it had never been seriously intended in the first place. After 1968, however, came the further developments in the WTO's political institutions which have already been summarized, and which need to be interpreted against the background of the history of intervention.

One view, favoured by Christopher Jones, sees the post-1968 changes as a simple reimposition of Soviet domination to avoid possible Romanian vetos. This does not seem convincing, since the USSR could in the last resort manage without Romania, and did so in 1968. It is more
likely that the USSR recognized the dangers of its allies resenting under-consultation and of small grievances snowballing into major crises, and created new institutions so that it could oversee the alliance more closely, but also so that its allies felt they had, and perhaps did have, increased political weight. If this second interpretation is correct, then the WTO seems to have developed during the late 1960s and 1970s into something more of a mechanism for settling conflicts between political elites without the use of force, as Robin Remington argued in her book published in 1971. Remington and others have also pointed out that there were other occasions on which the USSR retreated or compromised when clashes arose.

In 1967 accommodation was reached between the USSR and Romania over strengthening the WTO and Romanian claims to independence. Throughout the 1960s, the USSR had to deal with challenges from China to its authority and legitimacy as leader of the world communist movement, a problem unforeseen in 1955. Romania in particular was able to use some of the leeway afforded by the Sino-Soviet dispute to expand its limited area of autonomy, when it became important for the USSR to have the visible public support of the East Europeans.<41> (The 1971 Soviet pressure on Romania seems to have been related to Romania’s endorsement of Nixon’s trip to China.)

As Soviet policy towards the FRG and the West in general grew more complex in the late 1960s, tensions grew
between the GDR and the Soviet leadership, echoing fears from the pre-1955 period about a possible weakening of Soviet commitment to the GDR. In 1971 Walter Ulbricht was replaced by Erich Honecker as First Secretary of the GDR's Socialist Unity Party (SED). This problem merged with the wider question of bloc management under conditions of emerging detente, and the need to limit West German influence in Eastern Europe. However, the main point to be made about the handling of these issues by the WTO does not relate to the specific solutions found in each case, but to the fact that they had to be dealt with by fudge and compromise. The invasion of Czechoslovakia represented the most extreme form of problem-solving within the bloc, but a number of other problems were resolved through a more sophisticated, and less decisive, bargaining process. This bargaining was not necessarily done in WTO institutions as such, but it added significantly to the alliance's capacity to defuse possible conflicts between leaderships, at the same time as it went some way to reduce outright Soviet dominance.

These problems did not disappear in the 1970s, for although the Helsinki process was successful in achieving a major goal of the Soviet and East European leaderships, recognition of the territorial status quo (see below), it could also be argued that the relaxations of detente created a different set of problems for bloc management in Eastern Europe. Increased economic cooperation with the West helped to raise living standards, but also led to
indebtedness and so helped to worsen some of Eastern Europe's economic problems, contributing indirectly to the Polish crisis at the end of the decade. Perhaps the 1976 creation of the WTO's Committee of Foreign Ministers was intended both to recognize the role played by the East European leaderships during the Helsinki process, and to deal with the possible dangers of increased polycentrism. The CFM certainly did not give the USSR any way of outmanoeuvering Romania on questions like relations with China or defence spending, which continued to rumble on unresolved during the late 1970s; the China issue became even more sensitive as China moved closer to the USA and NATO, only to shift again to a more equidistant position in the 1980s.

The Polish crisis again placed severe strains on the WTO's political structures and military unity. It may well be that the alliance would not have survived another Soviet intervention, since parts of the Polish army might have resisted. On the other hand, it was the Polish military leadership itself which eventually moved to impose martial law on 13 December 1981, after an unprecedented period in which party authority had collapsed, and Solidarity had been legalized and played a major role in revitalizing Polish society in spite of a severe economic crisis. As had been the case in 1968, there was evidently concern in the Soviet leadership that there would be a spillover of discontent into the Western USSR. It seems clear that the USSR made contingency plans to invade. According to Ryszard
Kuklinski, a defector from the Polish General Staff, a decision-in-principle was made in late 1980 to crush Solidarity either by external intervention with Soviet, Czechoslovakian, and GDR forces or through internal actions. General Jaruzelski, then Minister of Defence, seems to have managed to dissuade the Soviet leadership from intervening in December 1980 by assuring them that the Polish high command and security forces could achieve the same results on their own.<sup>44</sup> It has also been suggested that Jaruzelski moved to pre-empt a coup against his own leadership by harder-line elements in the Polish elite.

The Soviet handling of the crisis suggested greater reluctance to intervene than in 1968, and so perhaps a clearer understanding of the political disutility of direct military intervention as well as its military difficulties. In addition, Soviet intervention would only have worsened the Polish economic crisis. During 1980 and 1981 a number of features of the Czechoslovakian crisis were repeated: an ad hoc multilateral WTO meeting (Moscow, 5th December 1980), and a March 1981 meeting which endorsed a "Brezhnev Doctrine" formulation; intimidatory military manoeuvres, in this case largely between Polish and Soviet forces, and some fairly explicit threats of intervention, particularly in March 1981; a series of bilateral meetings and visits to Poland by figures like Marshal Kulikov and Mikhail Suslov. Kulikov seems to have been in Poland at the time of the declaration of martial law, and to have monitored developments via a WTO/Soviet command post in Legnica.
There was a flurry of consultations by WTO bodies at the beginning of December, 1981 - the CFM met in Budapest, and the CDM in Moscow. These may have been used to inform alliance members of the impending military takeover, though there is no firm evidence of this.

One can argue that the precedents of 1956 and 1968 gave the Brezhnev Doctrine a kind of deterrent influence over Solidarity during most of the period up to December 1981. One of the clauses of the August 1980 Gdansk agreement which legalized Solidarity was a commitment to respect Poland's international alliance commitments. By December 1981, however, Solidarity was drawing up plans to conduct a referendum on aspects of Polish politics which included the question of external alliances.<45> This may well have influenced the timing of Jaruzelski's clampdown. On the other hand, neither the deterrent effect of the Brezhnev Doctrine nor the presence of the Soviet forces already stationed in Poland could do much to prevent the initial rise of Solidarity or its subsequent revival.

What actually happened in December 1981 can still be seen as an indication of the short-term political effectiveness of the bilateral military integration measures described by Jones. Senior Polish officers sufficiently trusted by the USSR took over the government; conservative and loyal junior officers and security police units obeyed their orders; and the rest of the army, whatever reservations it may have had, went along with the takeover. The resolution of the crisis, such as it was, did
not depend on the WTO's multilateral apparatus, and may have been made easier by the relatively high degree of respect previously enjoyed by the military within Polish society.

George Sanford has described martial law as effecting a short-term symbiosis between the central party apparatus and the military elite, and there is evidence that the expansion of the Polish officer corps during the 1970s was planned with domestic functions in mind. However, it is also interesting to note that much of the legislative apparatus on which martial law was based derived from a framework designed to give the Polish armed forces a partial territorial defence mission, which weakens Jones' case for a strong linkage between offensive strategies and domestic repression.<46>

The extent to which military interventions in Eastern Europe undermined officially-held views on the functions of armies in socialist states can be seen if we examine the "defence of the gains of socialism" formula a little more closely. It has already been noted that the formula was applied in 1968 to relations within the socialist community. However, both in standard Soviet military sociology and in the 1986 party programme, it was claimed that the internal functions of a socialist army (such as restraining the class enemies of the socialist state from open military action) disappeared once the victory of socialism had been assured.<47> These internal functions should therefore not have been relevant in post-1955
Eastern Europe, but the mere fact of the military interventions which took place illustrated the precariousness of Soviet ideology’s grip on the political realities of Eastern Europe. Soviet sensitivity on this point would seem to be indicated by the fact that although Jones’ analysis of internal control mechanisms came to occupy such a central position in western scholarship on the WTO, it only rarely came under attack in Soviet criticisms of the western literature, where the usual focus was on challenging western claims about eastern military aggressiveness.<sup>48</sup>

The Polish crisis also indicated the deep-rooted nature of the problems which WTO political structures had attempted to deal with. The alliance’s political organization had evolved into a structure of some complexity by the mid-1980s, but the USSR remained the ultimate military arbiter of political developments in Eastern Europe. "Defence of the gains of socialism" remained significant in that it underpinned political cohesion and implied a shared understanding of the limits of Soviet tolerance of political developments in Eastern Europe. These limits seemed to be reached in the event of a threat to party rule, as in Poland, or to adherence to the WTO itself, which had never been the case in Romania but was very much present in Hungary in 1956. In Czechoslovakia in 1968 neither of these principles seemed to be immediately threatened, but the Brezhnev leadership evidently believed that Dubcek’s leadership had gone too
far in its reforms and was implicitly placing them in question. At the same time, however, we have seen that the Brezhnev Doctrine was not strong enough in its deterrent effects to be able to pre-empt a political development like the rise of Solidarity, which suggests that by 1981 there were limits to its efficacy.

These distinctions between the different crises and the Soviet response in each case point to a difficulty of the Brezhnev Doctrine analysis. Although the doctrine underlined basic geopolitical realities and the fact that there were limits to Soviet tolerance whether or not those limits were publicly articulated, the concept did not in itself provide an adequate explanation of how and why particular Soviet responses were made to particular crises. Jiri Valenta has argued that the Brezhnev Doctrine was an ex post facto explanation for the USSR as much as it was for the West, and that actual Soviet decisionmaking on Czechoslovakia was far more complex than the conceptualization suggested. Brezhnev's vulgar realism, as attested by Mlynar and Tucker, may not therefore provide an exhaustive explanation.

The central analytic task remains: how to explain the way in which the apparent broadening of the bounds of Soviet tolerance after 1969 was qualitatively transformed into an outlook which was able to accept the collapse of the communist leaderships throughout Eastern Europe in 1989-90. The evidence of Brezhnev's instinctive reaction to Dubcek suggests that part of the explanation may be found
in a revision by his successors of the Soviet conception of what was required to ensure security. In addition, it is necessary to follow up some of the evidence on intra-alliance bargaining which has already been presented. One area in which this trend can be followed is the field of foreign policy and detente, which provides an opportunity to observe the effects on the alliance of changing levels of external tension.

Foreign Policy and Detente

The involvement of the WTO in central questions of East-West relations was implicit in the treaty itself, with its commitment to a European security settlement and disarmament. It is difficult to approach these questions without trying to give an overall characterization of Soviet security policy in Europe. In the two following chapters the reflection of security policy in military organization and strategy is examined; here, an attempt is made to deal with security policy as evidenced in some areas of European diplomacy. In the most general terms, the existence of the WTO lent Soviet foreign and security policy the added weight and legitimacy which came from being seen to negotiate as part, and leader, of a bloc, rather than as an individual state. However, there were occasions on which the foreign policy interests of one or other of the East European leaderships were seen to diverge from those of the USSR, and the USSR had to take its allies' preferences into account. In the early years of the
WTO, the alliance's diplomacy placed great stress on the issue of Germany and then on the convening of a European security conference, with the objective of gaining western, particularly West German, endorsement of the post-war territorial and political status quo. This objective was broadly shared by the East European leaderships, although, as already mentioned, the GDR was constantly alert to the danger that the USSR's search for an overarching settlement might weaken its commitment to the GDR itself.

As Chapter 1 described, Stalin's pre-WTO diplomacy had indeed given the GDR some grounds for concern, in that Stalin sought to settle the issue of Germany within the scope of Four-Power discussions, envisaging the possibility of a unified and neutral state. He thus saw the German issue as something distinct from the division of Europe as a whole, and so the GDR leadership had reason to be worried that the GDR's interests were not for him overriding. After 1955, with the integration of the two Germanies into their respective blocs, the German problem became for the Soviet leadership more a function of the general European security problem. This problem obviously had to be settled on terms which were not the FRG's, and West German influence in Eastern Europe had to be limited; nevertheless, the possibility of tactical disagreements between the Soviet and GDR leaderships still existed, and came back to the surface in the late 1960s.<49>

The late 1950s saw continued WTO diplomatic activity on the issue of Germany, including the 1958 endorsement of
a GDR proposal for a German Confederation. This proposal was made at the same time as other approaches on a non-aggression treaty and measures to halt the nuclear arms race, and on the possibility of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. Particular urgency was given to these initiatives by NATO’s policy of the time of introducing shorter-range nuclear weapons more widely on European territory and among the smaller West European armies, in which policy the WTO saw a particular danger of West Germany obtaining access to nuclear weapons. The nuclear-free zone proposal grew out of a number of Central European demilitarization and denuclearization plans put forward by the USSR, GDR, and Poland after 1956. The Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki had put forward the Rapacki Plan, which envisaged the denuclearization of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanies, at the United Nations in 1957. He subsequently proposed revised versions in 1958 and again in 1962, after a degree of interest had been shown by some NATO governments (though not by the FRG, and only briefly by the USA). There were also some western counterproposals on Central European disengagement.

Nothing came of these approaches, though they acquired extra urgency for the eastern bloc in the early 1960s when NATO began to discuss the possibility of a Multilateral Force sharing European control of nuclear weapons. Poland’s advocacy of the idea was interesting, in that Rapacki saw Poland as a possible bridge between East and West in solving the German problem. It has sometimes been suggested
that the USSR endorsed these proposals only reluctantly, being concerned about independent East European initiatives and the constraints a nuclear-free zone might place on its own plans for nuclearizing military forces and strategy. The USSR's own version, the Gromyko Plan, was formally linked with great power responsibilities for Germany, and overall East-West disarmament negotiations. As detailed later in chapters 4 and 5, this was a period of cuts in WTO conventional forces, but also of nuclearization of Soviet strategy.<sup>51</sup>

Poland's arms control initiatives suggested that some of the East European leaderships saw a particular urgency in their own regional problems and might seek possibilities for detente somewhat independently of the USSR.<sup>52</sup> The 1961 Berlin Crisis and the building of the Berlin Wall can be seen as a counterbalancing affirmation by the GDR and USSR that the West would have to accept the status quo, and the separate existence of the GDR, before any substantial agreements could be reached. Proposals for a European security conference began to be made again more insistently from around 1964, after US-Soviet relations had recovered from the Cuban Crisis and improved with the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. At that particular time, differences could be detected between Polish calls for a conference which would include both the USA and USSR, and a Soviet preference for excluding the USA, though the Soviet attitude to this had fluctuated and continued to do so.

WTO bodies endorsed the calls for a European security
conference, and Soviet sources tend to date the WTO's initiatives from the July 1966 Bucharest PCC meeting.\(^{53}\) It should be noted, though, that at this stage the USA was regarded as to be excluded from the conference; a shift to implied acceptance of US participation was not made until the March 1969 Budapest PCC meeting.\(^{54}\) A noticeable difference between the two documents produced by these meetings was that while the earlier appeal explicitly called for the removal of foreign troops and the dissolution of military blocs, by 1969 these points were no longer being stressed, implying a clearer commitment to the status quo and a resolution of the USSR's ambivalence about US involvement.

One reason for the shift to a more relaxed attitude to the US presence in Europe could be found in the fact that centrifugal pressures within the WTO increased between 1966 and 1969. There was Romanian resistance to Soviet policy, the Czechoslovakian crisis itself and the consequent alienation of West European communist parties, and increased tension between the USSR and China. In early 1967 Romania broke ranks with the rest of Eastern Europe and established diplomatic relations with the FRG, after which Romania was the only WTO state not to break off relations with Israel following the June 1967 Six-Day War. It is quite likely that with the unity of the WTO requiring increasingly complex management, attempts to exclude the USA from Europe were abandoned in favour of stabilizing the existing situation, and accepting the USA as a continued
restraining influence on the FRG. By early 1970 it was clear that the eastern conception of the European conference involved US participation. The events of this period provide some evidence in favour of the Migone-Kaldor interpretation of Cold War alliance politics (see Chapter 2), since there was an evident Soviet interest in accepting the legitimacy of the opposing alliance in order to facilitate the management of problems in relations with the USSR's own allies.

On the western side, France's disaffection with NATO had been accompanied by de Gaulle's floating of the idea of "Atlantic to the Urals" détente, but this was moderated after France's shift to the right in 1968. However, an even more significant shift had to occur in the West German position before any real progress could be made. Between 1955 and December 1966, West German diplomacy followed the "Hallstein Doctrine" of not establishing diplomatic relations with any state which recognized the GDR. In December 1966 Kurt-Georg Kiesinger's "Grand Coalition" of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, with Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister, effectively abandoned this policy, thus opening the way for the establishment of relations with Romania. Reunification of Germany was still said to be the FRG's objective, the GDR was not recognized as a state, and the FRG still claimed to speak for the entire German people; this still amounted to a threat to WTO unity, since there appeared to be a danger of other East European states, including Czechoslovakia, establishing relations
with the FRG before the GDR was recognized. The FRG’s diplomatic approaches to the East seemed to be halted by the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which served to demonstrate that the USSR had to be treated as the West’s primary interlocutor in expanding relations with the East. After 1968, however, the FRG’s approach became more flexible. By late 1969 Brandt’s new "Small Coalition" of the Social Democratic and Free Democrat parties had adopted the formula of two separate German states within one nation, dropped the claim to sole representation, and offered to negotiate renunciation-of-force agreements with the East European states, including the GDR.

Paradoxically, this created additional problems for the GDR. While the stated GDR demand was for full and unconditional recognition by the FRG, it became clear that the USSR and Poland were prepared to improve relations with the FRG without obtaining the GDR’s maximum demands. It was from this situation of possible conflict that there arose the need for compromise and bargaining between the GDR and USSR, as already mentioned, and Ulbricht’s eventual retirement and replacement by Honecker in May 1971.\(^56\)

When the European detente treaties of the early 1970s were signed, they served to illustrate the ways in which the GDR had to go along with the requirements of Soviet detente policy even if full recognition was not forthcoming, and the GDR leadership had to make the best of the situation by insisting on the GDR’s distinctness from the FRG. The treaties involved were the August 1970 Moscow
Treaty between the FRG and USSR; the November 1970 Warsaw Treaty between the FRG and Poland; the June 1972 Four-Power Agreement on Berlin; and eventually the December 1972 Basic Treaty between the FRG and GDR. This last agreement included the mutual recognition of borders and sovereignty, but not full recognition - the two states exchanged permanent missions rather than ambassadors, and the FRG did not recognize a separate East German nationality. The two German states were both admitted to the United Nations in 1973. Although the GDR-USSR bargaining process continued throughout this period, a good indication of the gains perceived by the WTO as a whole is provided by the PCC's December 1970 statement in its comment on the FRG-USSR and FRG-Poland treaties: "The recognition of the existing situation in Europe, which was established as a result of the second world war and of postwar developments, the inviolability of the present borders of the European states, observation of the principle of resolving disputes exclusively by peaceful methods, not resorting to force or the threat of force - all this has great significance for the fate of peace in Europe, for the peaceful future of the European peoples."<57>

At the same time as these developments were taking place in Europe, the SALT negotiations on strategic nuclear arms between the USA and USSR had been in progress since December 1969. As far as US motivations for involvement in European detente were concerned, one important factor was a US desire to preclude a separate Western Europe-USSR
process. Henry Kissinger's memoirs make this abundantly clear: "While as I have indicated I had come to the view that Brandt's decision to modify the policies of his Christian Democratic predecessors was inevitable and potentially beneficial, this would be so only if it did not give the Soviets the whip hand over German and European policy. Unless we managed to get some control over the process Brandt would become more and more dependent on the Soviet Union and its goodwill for the fulfillment of German goals in the new policy."<58> Brandt, of course, had no intention whatever of taking the FRG out of the western political or security system, but Kissinger's response was an interesting indication of residual US suspicion not only of Soviet motives, but of Europeans in general, and of Germany in particular.

NATO as a whole wanted to establish talks with the USSR on conventional force reductions, and this in turn was partly motivated by the need to control or at least get some reciprocation for unilateral US reductions of forces in Europe during the Vietnam War. In this area, the previous Soviet shift to acceptance of US participation in a European security conference was repeated in a speech made by Brezhnev in May 1971, when he accepted the idea of such force reduction talks at a crucial time for the US Senate's discussion of the Mansfield Amendment on unilateral reductions.<59> Thus there was sufficient shared interest on all sides for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or Helsinki process, and the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks to go ahead from 1973.

The establishment of these new negotiating fora introduced a new element of complexity into relations within the WTO, since they simultaneously stabilized the more extreme risks of centrifugalism (in both alliances) and provided opportunities for the East Europeans discreetly to articulate their own preferences. On the most basic questions under discussion, the East European leaderships' interests still coincided with those of the USSR — the European security process offered the prospect of further and multilateral endorsement of the inviolability of borders and the other principles of the bilateral treaties with the FRG.

In other respects, however, possible divergences of interest can be identified. The CSCE process was seen as enhancing the status of small nations, encouraging East-West trade, and possibly reducing pressure for higher defence spending. Romania in particular was able to act as a relatively independent agent in CSCE fora, though the more restricted membership and bloc-to-bloc format of MBFR made this less of a feature of the conventional arms negotiations. In MBFR itself, the USSR sought to maintain acceptable force ratios between NATO and the WTO, between the West German Bundeswehr and Soviet forces in the GDR, and between US forces in Western Europe and the Bundeswehr. East Europeans were less keen, however, on the fourth Soviet objective which could safely be assumed to have been
involved, that of maintaining a favourable balance between Soviet and indigenous East European forces. <60>

The failure of the MBFR talks to reach agreement, largely through differences over data, is well-known; these talks are examined further in Chapter 6 of this study. In the case of the CSCE, the August 1975 signature of the Helsinki Final Act was again assessed as an important achievement in confirming the status quo. As a declaration of the WTO PCC put it in November 1976: "The [Helsinki] Conference has reflected the changes which have taken place in Europe, confirmed the territorial and political realities which took shape on the continent as a result of the peoples' victory in the anti-fascist war and post-war developments, and reflected the peoples' will to live and work together in conditions of peace and security." However, the same statement sounded warning notes about the possibly dangerous consequences of Helsinki and detente in attacking western use of the humanitarian Basket III for what was termed interference in the WTO's internal affairs. <61> This reflected the way in which the West succeeded in forcing the WTO states onto the defensive over these human rights clauses. Although Hungary and Poland were attacked less strongly than the USSR and other states, the growth of civil rights and dissident groups within WTO countries in the post-Helsinki period caused problems for the individual leaderships and for their evaluation of the detente process as a whole. It may well be that the creation of the WTO's Committee of Foreign Ministers in
November 1976 reflected a recognition of the need for more regular consultations in these new circumstances. Increased contact with the West also necessitated greater public insistence on ideological cohesion at home, but the survival of civil rights groups like Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia dramatized the way in which the WTO states had taken on commitments which they had little intention of observing.

Despite these unwanted consequences of detente, the Soviet leadership remained much more explicitly committed to the concept and the process during the late 1970s, as their US counterparts gradually dropped the vocabulary of detente. In western analyses of detente, it was often argued that its breakdown could be traced to the differences between the US and Soviet conceptions of the process. While there is a limited amount of truth in this, the argument is often made as if there was substantial naivety on the western side. The attribution of naivety to Nixon, Kissinger, and Brzezinski, however, is scarcely credible. The real problems with detente were the inherent contradictions in its combination of cooperation and competition, which simultaneously recognized and challenged the status quo. It should be remembered that as far as the West was concerned, peaceful political change was not ruled out in Europe any more than the East ruled it out outside Europe; "inviolability" of frontiers excluded only change through the use of force, and Basket I recognized the possibility of changing them by peaceful means and
agreement. Furthermore, superpower political parity represented a historical political gain for the USSR, but a net historical loss for the USA, which was why Kissinger tried so hard to deny it in practice, for example in the Middle East. It is quite true that there were "losses" for the USA during the 1970s, in the shape of a series of Third World revolutions which were to a greater or lesser extent supported by the USSR and so were (erroneously) regarded as Soviet-inspired. In this sense, detente did benefit the USSR. Kissinger's own concept of detente, however, was partly premised on using a relaxation of relations with the USSR as a way of assisting the US retreat from Vietnam. Kissinger's critics and successors objected to the loss of US power which seemed to be involved, and this helped to produce the swing back to confrontation in the late Carter and Reagan periods.<62>

From the WTO's point of view, the growth of dissent during the 1970s seems to have been a consequence the various governments felt they were able to control and consider offset by the political gains already summarized. East European leaderships, in turn, had opportunities for quietly "dissident" activity. During the late 1970s there were rumours of Hungarian and Romanian disquiet over Soviet plans for the deployment of SS-20s in the USSR, an indication that there might now be increased opportunities for some of the East Europeans to drag their feet even over sensitive issues like missile deployment.<63> Other rumours spoke of unhappiness being voiced in 1974 with the
continued notional obligation to assist the USSR with troops in the event of any future application of the Brezhnev Doctrine. There was also foot-dragging over military spending, and the spending burdens of some of the East European states do seem to have declined during this period. There is therefore some evidence here to support the hypothesis that alliances tend to become less cohesive internally at times when the external threat is perceived to have diminished.

A discussion of the late 1970s and the breakdown of detente would not be complete without some examination of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its effect on the WTO. While the intervention was not the sole cause of the breakdown of detente, as was sometimes claimed, it was a qualitatively new commitment of Soviet combat forces outside traditional areas of deployment, and symptomatic of the wider breakdown of East-West relations. The East European WTO members do not seem to have been consulted or even informed in advance, and were embarrassed by the intervention. The GDR and Hungary did release government statements endorsing the Soviet action, while Romania implicitly criticized the USSR in a statement opposing foreign intervention in general. No WTO meeting seems to have paid much attention to the Afghanistan issue, and although Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR seem to have rendered technical and economic assistance to Afghanistan and perhaps to Soviet forces, these arrangements were made bilaterally, outside WTO structures.<ref>
Perhaps the most revealing events of the early 1980s were those surrounding the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) controversy and the eventual Soviet decision to station "counterdeployment" missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. A short case-study of this episode provides a good opportunity to consider the evolution of WTO institutions since 1955, and a view of the strains imposed on WTO foreign policy coordination by the breakdown of detente.

The Counterdeployments Episode

The possibility of Soviet deployments of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe had emerged as early as 1958, when Khrushchev raised the issue as a possible response to deployments with West German forces. This had also become an issue during the Czechoslovakian debates on security policy in 1968 (see chapters 4 and 5), though there was no certain knowledge of whether warheads for Soviet nuclear-capable systems in Eastern Europe were stationed there or on Soviet territory. The issue came back into the limelight after NATO's December 1979 "Dual-track" decision on the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, and 1983 saw the first Soviet statements confirming the presence of nuclear-capable weapons systems in Eastern Europe.<65>

It is possible that President Brezhnev's announcement in October 1979 of a unilateral troop withdrawal from the GDR was partly prompted by East European pressure to try and head off NATO's plans for INF modernization. After
NATO’s December 1979 announcement, there was evidence that the East Europeans did not entirely share Soviet perceptions of the problem. One reason for this was East European reluctance to become a site for the Soviet missiles which might be deployed in response if the NATO deployments went ahead, as well as a more general concern to limit the damage to East-West relations. Soviet statements made during 1983 tended to remind the West that the USSR would take countermeasures if cruise and Pershing II deployments went ahead, while collective WTO statements attacked the NATO proposals and supported Soviet negotiating offers, but went no further. For example, the January 1983 "Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty", signed by the WTO party leaders after a PCC meeting, expressed their "appreciation" of proposals made by Yurii Andropov in December 1982, but did not mention possible countermeasures. Interestingly, a statement on the Declaration made a few days later by the GDR Politburo and Council of Ministers was much more enthusiastic about Soviet proposals; the GDR "greatly appreciates" Andropov’s initiatives, and there is also a mention of the need to take "whatever steps are required to safeguard ............... defence capacity".<66>

Another WTO summit in June 1983 received wide coverage in the western press because it was assumed that it had been called to issue a tough statement on countermeasures, but did not do so because of East European resistance. The USSR went so far as to deny that there had been any sort of
split, and it is impossible to be sure. A Soviet government statement issued shortly before had made more specific threats about countermeasures, such as placing US territory under comparable threat. Reports at the time credited Romania and Hungary with blocking calls for a tougher line, and the GDR and Czechoslovakia with backing the USSR.

The June 1983 meeting was not, technically, a WTO meeting. It was described as "a meeting of party and state leaders" from the WTO states, and was in this respect a successor to the previous extraordinary meetings held in June 1967 during the Middle East War, and in December 1980 during the Polish crisis.<67>

A C FM meeting took place in October in Sofia, which warned against NATO's precipitation of a further round in the arms race and insisted that NATO would not be allowed to gain superiority over the WTO.<68> Marshal Kulikov attended the meeting and went further: according to an Associated Press report, he stated that if the NATO deployments went ahead, the USSR would suspend its moratorium on medium-range weapons (announced by Brezhnev in 1982), deploy additional weapons after consultation with its allies, and strengthen WTO conventional forces.<69>

In the second half of October the West German magazine Stern published an interview with Colonel General Chervov of the Soviet General Staff, in which he said that Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were already in place in Eastern Europe, and would be modernized if the NATO deployments went ahead. There were then critical comments from
President Ceausescu, implying that the USSR would be at least partly to blame if the Geneva INF talks broke down; a statement from an "extraordinary" session of the CDM stating that although the WTO member states did not seek military superiority, "in no circumstances will they allow others to gain superiority over them"; and a statement from a COMECON session, repeating the Soviet negotiating offer to destroy a number of Soviet missiles in return for the non-deployment of cruise and Pershing II.\<70> 

However, when official statements began to mention specific counterdeployments, the channels used were not WTO ones. In late October, separate statements on preparatory work for counterdeployments were made by the Soviet Ministry of Defence, the Czechoslovakian government, and the GDR National Defence Council.\<71> Andropov's formal statement on the breaking off of negotiations and on counterdeployments, made on 24 November, spoke of the counterdeployment decision as one adopted by the Soviet leadership "on agreement with the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia".\<72> The measures were subsequently endorsed by the CFM in April 1984, although evidence of East European discomfort over the new missiles emerged in spite of the collective display of unanimity.

The April 1984 CFM noted tersely that the Geneva talks had been broken off and counterdeployments started: "This has compelled the Soviet Union to adopt a number of response measures. Talks on nuclear armaments have been terminated."\<73> This absence of enthusiasm contrasted with
language being used in the Soviet press in early 1984, where a January article in Krasnaya zvezda spoke of the "unshakeable resolve" of Soviet missilemen stationed in the GDR. It is also interesting that no PCC meeting took place between late 1983 and Gorbachev’s announcement of a freeze on Soviet counterdeployments and SS-20s in April 1985, so the counterdeployments had not in fact been endorsed by the WTO’s senior body at that point. However, the illness of Konstantin Chernenko probably caused plans for a PCC meeting to be put off in late 1984.

The evidence of the counterdeployments episode suggests that the East European states were concerned to limit the damage to East-West relations caused by the failure of the Geneva INF talks. They were less prepared than the USSR to stress the military countermeasures which were seen as being necessary, and even after the countermeasures became a fact of life, indications of concern about them emerged. Some reports credited Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland with having refused to take additional counterdeployments. The military arrangements made were bilaterally agreed between the USSR, GDR, and Czechoslovakia.

Even Erich Honecker and Lubomir Strougal, from the countries which accepted counterdeployments on their territory, expressed some degree of disquiet at the end of 1983, as a result of a mixture of military, political, and economic concern. In military terms, the counterdeployments made East Europeans even more vulnerable
to attack and were inconsistent with the 1982 Soviet pledge on No First Use of nuclear weapons. In political terms the whole episode had damaged East-West relations and raised the spectre of domestic anti-nuclear unease. When a substantial number of the counterdeployment missiles were scheduled for removal with the signature of the INF Treaty in December 1987, the GDR and Czechoslovakian leaderships must have breathed substantial sighs of relief.

The WTO’s behaviour during the transition from detente in the mid-1970s to Second Cold War in the early 1980s conformed in part to what one would expect of a traditional alliance. The cohesion of the alliance was loosened during the period of East-West relaxation, and was only reimposed by the USSR with some difficulty in 1983. During the second period, though, came the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, a sharp reminder that one would not, in theory, expect an alliance of sovereign states to rely on the internal use of military force to head off wavering loyalty in one member-state. But anyone studying NATO during the same period would be confronted with events which were, although much less violent, equally hard to reconcile with the model of an alliance in which domestic and foreign policy are distinct spheres, and political leaders can take their countries in and out of coalitions at will. NATO went through its own INF crisis, in the course of which domestic anti-nuclear movements challenged not only the substance of the 1979 Dual-track decision but also the secretive nature of security decisionmaking in
western parliamentary democracies. Alliance cohesion was also reestablished within NATO, since the anti-nuclear movements were unable to gain state power or influence those who held it, but the political struggle was a fierce one. After the INF crisis was over, it looked as though it had had as much to do with the reimposition of intra-alliance and domestic political discipline for their own sakes as with a rational power-seeking approach to foreign policy conducted by autonomous nation-states. The whole INF controversy indicated how difficult it is to assimilate the behaviour of either of the Cold War alliances to the models used in the traditional alliance literature, and discussed in Chapter 2.

Dilemmas of the Late 1980s

Once the immediate problems of managing the counterdeployment of missiles in Europe had passed, attention turned back to the future of East-West relations. Throughout most of 1984 the chill created by the events of the previous year meant there was little contact between the USSR and USA. This situation was hardly to the liking of some of the East European leaderships, and it appeared that several of them had to be discouraged from taking independent initiatives towards Western Europe. Erich Honecker, and Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, abandoned plans to visit West Germany during the summer, apparently (though perhaps not entirely) under Soviet pressure. The GDR's resistance over this question testified to the growth in
its leadership's self-confidence over the previous ten years, its privileged economic position vis-a-vis West Germany, and perhaps to the fact that detente retained deeper roots in Europe than between the USA and USSR.<sup>78</sup> (Honecker finally made his trip to the FRG in September 1987.)

By early 1985 there was a marked improvement in the atmosphere. Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko as CPSU General Secretary in March; the Geneva disarmament talks began again in the same month; and on 26 April the Warsaw Treaty was renewed for a further twenty years, with an option of renewal for another ten years after that.<sup>79</sup> Although there were rumours of East European reluctance to renew the treaty, there is no firm evidence of any serious attempt to impede renewal. There may, however, have been some bargaining which encouraged Gorbachev to take an initiative on April 8th by announcing a freeze on Soviet deployments of SS-20s and of counterdeployments in Eastern Europe.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization had survived almost intact for thirty years. What conclusions can be drawn about its development as a political alliance over that period? Perhaps most striking is the extent to which the alliance had evolved into a bargaining forum for defusing and resolving inter-elite conflicts of interests, at the same time as it retained the characteristics of an alliance held together ultimately by the military and political preponderance of its largest power. Although the last case
of external Soviet military intervention had taken place in 1968, the Polish crisis underlined the continued uncertainty over the WTO's ability to resolve peacefully any social upheavals which seemed to threaten either a member country's commitment to the alliance, or the authority of its ruling party.

Nevertheless, within the framework of the USSR's power as the ultimate arbiter of developments in East European politics, the WTO provided a fairly complex mechanism for coordinating foreign and military policy by the mid-1980s. After 1969, a wider range of institutions provided East European leaderships with more opportunities to discuss and influence policy. It may even be doubted whether the Brezhnev Doctrine still applied in its original form by 1985, since the Polish crisis went beyond the stage where Soviet intervention would surely have been considered inevitable ten years earlier; however, the outcome of that crisis demonstrated that military intervention did not have to come from the USSR.

The root of the political problems with which the WTO's mechanisms had tried to cope lay in the fact that the communist parties of Eastern Europe were uncertain of their own political legitimacy, and knew that popular acceptance of the strategic alliance with the USSR was hardly better than lukewarm in any of the WTO states. At least, one can say that they would have found this to be the case if they had asked their populations, but the fact did not become undeniable until they began to do this in 1989. The East
European leaderships were therefore always in the position of trying to convince their domestic publics that they were doing their best to safeguard national interests within the alliance, but could not afford to take too many risks because they could not realistically challenge Soviet interests. While this amounted to a form of blackmail exercised on the populations of Eastern Europe, it may also have carried some conviction with them. Simultaneously, the leaderships had to reaffirm the alliance regularly in order to reassure the USSR about its security interests in the region.

If there is a simple conclusion to be drawn, it is probably that the East European leaderships which existed up until 1989 preferred the WTO to embody a fairly lax bloc discipline. No leadership of that period had any real desire to leave the WTO, and any kind of political regime in Eastern Europe would have had to make an accommodation of some kind with the strength of the USSR. Strict bloc discipline, however, was not in their interests because it disrupted relations with the West. From the Soviet point of view, strict bloc discipline as in the Stalinist era was no longer possible in practice or desirable in principle, and the USSR appears to have made concessions in the political machinery of the WTO which amounted to a greater loosening than had occurred in the military command structure (see following chapter). The beginnings of these developments could be seen even in the WTO’s foundation and early days, as was suggested in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, there were

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times when the USSR needed to enforce a stricter discipline for specific military-political purposes, as in the INF counterdeployment period. If necessary, this could be done outside WTO fora. However, the enforcement of strict discipline was only possible for limited periods.

The USSR's main interests in the mid-1980s in the WTO region, and in Europe as a whole, were stability and predictability. A large part of the motivation behind this search for stability was the concern to retain Eastern Europe securely within a Soviet military and political sphere of influence. The price of this requirement, however, was chronic regime instability within the East European states. As Ulrich Albrecht put it in an analysis of the relationship between external and domestic stability and security, published in 1983: "The Soviet Union will only be secure if the regimes in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest are secure because they enjoy the demonstrable support of their populations."<80> The assessment of the Czechoslovakian civil rights activist Jiri Dienstbier, writing in 1985, was: "If the populations of these countries were offered the status of Finland in a free referendum, they would vote for it with overwhelming enthusiasm, and would certainly prefer it to transferring their allegiance into the other camp." The Hungarian author Miklos Haraszti expressed a similar view: "Neutralize these countries the Finnish way, with military guarantees - which they would happily give: guaranteed neutrality is their highest dream - and in exchange, let them become
politically, culturally, economically part of Europe again."

It became clear after the accession of Gorbachev to power in the USSR that the possibility had arisen of another period with similarities to Khrushchev's destalinization period, in which the Soviet leadership's advocacy of reform might become too radical for some at least of the East European leaderships. In these circumstances, the kinds of East European aspirations described by Dienstbier and Haraszti could become uncontrollable demands. Significantly, the introduction of more regular consultations and more informal procedures in WTO fora from 1987 onwards seems to have made some of the East European leaders uncomfortable because these innovations meant they found it harder to avoid substantive discussion. It is worth noting, however, that the formulations of some at least of the dissidents did not seem to exclude a security relationship with the USSR. They excluded any alliance which maintained the WTO's implicit limitations on political choices in Eastern Europe, but they did leave room for an alliance of some description.

If there were advisers to the leadership in Moscow monitoring the writings of East Europeans like Dienstbier and Haraszti, they may have drawn this conclusion. In Chapter 8 of this study, the process of reassessment in Moscow which allowed the USSR to reconcile itself to the dramatic transformations of 1989 without resorting to military intervention will be reconstructed. By the end of
that year the Berlin Wall had been opened, Dienstbier had become Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, and Haraszti was engaged in preparations for multi-party elections in Hungary.

An analysis of the WTO's political history between 1955 and 1988 suggests that the alliance operated along a spectrum ranging from military intervention by the USSR and the East European armed forces to a kind of intra-elite bargaining which sometimes permitted the East European leaderships to protect their own interests against Soviet pressure. This intra-elite bargaining was facilitated by the creation of additional bodies in 1969 and 1976, and a further loosening of structures in 1987-8. Throughout this period, however, the WTO was essentially an alliance between political elites whose domestic political legitimacy was weak, and part of this weakness was due to the unpopularity of the alliance itself. Nevertheless, this does not give us grounds on which to conclude that the WTO was not an alliance of any sort, since this kind of question about the relationship between domestic and foreign policy lies beyond the scope of most formulations of alliance theory. It directs our attention back once more to the question of the internal and external functions of the semi-permanent Cold War alliances, and sets the stage for an investigation of the WTO's military command structures.
MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURES

The Military Institutions

As noted at the beginning of Chapter 3, there is a certain arbitrariness in dividing the WTO's institutions into "political" and "military", but the same procedure is followed here as in the previous chapter: basic data from Soviet sources, expansion and commentary. Once again, Figure 1 gives a rough outline of the most important WTO institutions. In addition, some indications are given of the relationship of these WTO bodies to the central military institutions of the USSR, and of the position occupied by East European forces within the overall command structure. This historical account takes the story up to the announcements of defensive restructuring which were made in 1987-8, and are the subject of Chapter 7. The existing structures were then placed in question even more fundamentally by the political upheavals of 1989-90, which are the subject of Chapter 8.

The WTO's Joint Command (JC) was set up under Article 3 of the Warsaw Treaty itself. At the same time the Joint Armed Forces (JAFs) were established, together with a multinational staff to work with the Commander-in-Chief, to be located in Moscow. The appointment of the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff was vested in the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), and from 1955 onwards both
posts were filled exclusively by Soviet officers. There was a long period of stability in the WTO high command between 1976-77 and early 1989, when the long-serving Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff, Marshal VG Kulikov and General AI Gribkov, were replaced by General Petr Lushev and General Vladimir Lobov, respectively.<1> The position of WTO C-in-C carried with it the position of one of three Soviet First Deputy Ministers of Defence.

There was no provision in any WTO document to justify this level of Soviet dominance of the upper echelons of the alliance. It certainly furnishes some strong a priori evidence to suggest that Soviet strategic priorities were always paramount within the alliance, and that the East Europeans played a subordinate role throughout its history.

Further institutions were added later. In an extensive reorganization in March 1969, a Committee of Defence Ministers (CDM), a Military Council (MC), and probably a Technological Committee (TC) and Military Science and Technology Council (MSTC), were set up by a PCC meeting in Budapest.<2> Soviet sources indicated that the CDM had 9 members, the 7 defence ministers plus the C-in-C and Chief of Staff. The Joint Command consisted of the C-in-C, Chief of Staff, and deputy C-in-Cs, who were usually East European deputy ministers of defence or chiefs of staff. According to some accounts, the Military Council's membership would appear to have been identical to that of the JC. Their functions differed in that the MC was concerned with questions of arms and military equipment,
and usually met twice a year; the JC was mostly occupied with the integration of forces into the JAFs, and was presumably in notionally permanent existence. The MC may also have included a number of other Soviet and East European officers with responsibility for armaments, logistics, and air defence. The Command seems to have started life as part of the Soviet General Staff, though at some time it became an independent element within the Soviet Ministry of Defence, with its own staff. The date of this is slightly unclear, but John Erickson has attributed the formation of the Joint Staff as a permanent body to the same 1969 PCC meeting.<3>

This multinational JAFs staff was said to deal with all questions of the activity and preparedness of the WTO's troops and fleets, and to work closely with the allied staffs in preparing manoeuvres, meetings, and training, and in carrying out the recommendations of the CDM and Military Council. In addition to the allied representatives on the Staff, the C-in-C had representatives in the allied armies to assist the national commands.<4> Representatives of the WTO Staff and other bodies serving abroad were accorded a kind of diplomatic status by the 1973 WTO Convention.<5>

The CDM itself was supposed to meet annually, with its location and chair rotating. The MC advised the CDM, which was technically the senior body; the CDM, in turn, supervised the Joint Command's work. As with the foreign ministers, the WTO defence ministers had been meeting for ad hoc consultations before they were given a committee of
their own; in the defence ministers’ case, they had met since at least as early as 1961. It has been suggested that the formation of the CDM took place as part of a response to the 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis, and possibly in response to specific criticisms of the WTO’s functioning which were voiced during 1968.

In July 1968, the head of the Czechoslovakian Central Committee’s Department for Defence and Security Affairs, Lt. General Vaclav Prchlik, held a press conference during which he expressed a number of criticisms of Soviet domination of the WTO. One of his criticisms was that the East European defence ministers sat on the Joint Command as deputy commanders-in-chief, but were subordinate to a Soviet C-in-C who was only a deputy defence minister.<sup>6</sup> After the immediate crisis had passed, it seems, this protocol problem was sorted out by giving the defence ministers their own committee, which together with the creation of the Military Council gave the East Europeans greater opportunities than previously for policy discussion. The deputy defence ministers then replaced the full ministers in the Joint Command. During 1968 the Czechoslovakians also suggested the creation of a Technological Committee, and this suggestion also seems to have been heeded.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the significance of the 1969-70 reorganization has been a subject of debate. Christopher Jones argued that the measures taken were not concessions by the USSR to make the alliance’s functioning
more equitable, but an attempt to use additional bodies as a way of outmanoeuvering any future resistance to Soviet policy by Romania in the PCC. Most of the observers who gave the 1969 reorganization credit as a genuine attempt to provide more room for consultation and head off East European discontent nevertheless considered that there was a simultaneous move to tighten up Soviet military control of WTO forces, and that the reorganization thus worked at two different levels. The March 1969 meeting’s vague statement on measures to strengthen defence organization did not give much away.

A few years earlier, in September 1965, Brezhnev had made a proposal to strengthen the WTO’s organization, the substance of which never became clear. Whatever the proposal contained, it evidently met with resistance from Eastern Europe. In 1966 Romania countered it with a series of complaints and proposals about consultations over nuclear weapons, cost-sharing, the stationing of Soviet forces, and the Soviet monopoly of the Commander-in-Chief’s position. Then came the Czechoslovakian complaints of 1968. There is some evidence that the USSR considered trying to deal with these problems by moving towards a more integrated supranational military structure, but then opted for the path of greater consultation with the creation of the additional bodies. In addition, it emerged that the military measures adopted included a revised statute for the WTO Joint Armed Forces, the text of which was not published. Discussions of the new statute left it unclear
whether East European forces were assigned to the JAFs temporarily (e.g. for manoeuvres) or permanently, and this led some commentators to suspect that there were basic ambiguities in the document.<7>

The 1969 organizational changes do not seem to have ended the discussion, since there may have been some further pressure for increased military integration in 1974 and then again in 1978, at the same time as differences (particularly with Romania) over defence spending. In any event, the CDM, Military Council, and Technological Committee did constitute additional fora for East European participation, even if there was no real relaxation in military command structures. Of course, the fact of the creation of the new bodies did not mean that they functioned as the pre-1968 critics might have liked them to; nevertheless, as in the political sphere, the new bodies allowed for an increase in the amount of consultation which took place during the 1970s.

The Groups of Soviet Forces (GSFs)

In the immediate post-war period, Soviet troops withdrew from Czechoslovakia (in 1945) and Bulgaria (in 1947). In 1955, therefore, there were Soviet forces stationed in the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and Romania. The forces in the GDR and Poland were there in accordance with the Yalta and Potsdam agreements; little is known about the precise pre-1955 arrangements elsewhere. The USSR's occupation regime in the GDR was formally ended by the
Soviet-GDR Treaty of September 1955, and a section of the Soviet General Staff which had previously supervised the bilateral treaty system took over responsibility for coordination after the signature of the Warsaw Treaty. In the years immediately following 1955, more public agreements on troop-stationing were signed by the USSR and the respective countries. Treaties were signed with Poland in 1956, and with Romania, Hungary, and the GDR in 1957. This may well have been done as part of a process of calming tensions after the crises of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, but it was consistent with the trend towards clearer recognition of national prerogatives which pre-dated the crises. In several cases (that of the GDR excepted) the new treaties gave the host countries more nominal control over the activities of Soviet troops; in all cases these agreements were concluded bilaterally, outside WTO structures.

Khrushchev relates several conversations with East European leaders about possible reductions in Soviet forces. According to his account, the Romanian leadership first approached him about a possible Soviet withdrawal "not long after Stalin's death", while in the Hungarian and Polish cases Khrushchev himself put the idea to Kadar and Gomulka. The reasons given are expense, since the maintenance of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe cost twice as much as normal, and the desire to show that Eastern Europe was not being "prodded along the path of socialism at bayonet point by Soviet troops".
Khrushchev is being sincere here, it is unfortunate that he was not swayed by the argument in 1956. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Soviet government’s statement of October 30th 1956, issued during the Hungarian crisis, did hold out the possibility of Soviet withdrawal from everywhere except the GDR.

Khrushchev himself does not give any reason why the plans for withdrawal from everywhere except the GDR were not carried out, but there were still some troop reductions during the late 1950s. The number of Soviet divisions in Hungary increased from 2 to 5 in 1956, and then went back down to 4 in 1958. At the same time, the 2 Soviet divisions in Romania withdrew altogether. (11)

The late 1950s were a period of substantial overall reductions in Soviet ground forces. There were reductions of something like 2 million men in total Soviet forces between 1955 and 1961, but the imprecision of figures available for this period makes it difficult to tell whether the cuts in GSFs in Eastern Europe were proportionate to overall cuts. It seems likely that the main savings were made in forces within the USSR itself, but the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) does seem to have been cut, and even to have experienced manpower shortages during the mid-to-late 1950s. (12) Khrushchev planned further reductions, but his plans were halted after mid-1961 by a combination of pressure from increased East-West tension, Kennedy’s decisions on US weapons development, and resistance from the Soviet ground forces,
who were unhappy about his extensive demobilizations and increasing emphasis on nuclear forces at their expense.<sup>13</sup>

In 1968 there was another significant change, when 5 Soviet divisions remained in Czechoslovakia after the WTO occupation of that country. Their presence was confirmed in a treaty of 16 October 1968.<sup>14</sup> In 1979 Brezhnev announced that 20,000 Soviet servicemen and 1,000 tanks would be unilaterally withdrawn from GSFG. Some western sources argued that the announced reduction was in fact made up by reallocations to other units, but the IISS saw no evidence of this and confirmed the withdrawal of a tank division. It was also argued, probably more relevantly, that the troop withdrawal was more than compensated for by overall increases in GSFG's firepower. This withdrawal took place at a time when Brezhnev was trying to head off NATO's moves towards a decision on new intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western Europe. In mid-1989, GSFG was renamed as the Western Group of Forces.<sup>15</sup>

The East European Forces.

During the late 1950s, substantial cuts were made in East European as well as Soviet forces. One Soviet source gives a figure of 337,000 for reductions in East European forces between May 1955 and May 1958, comprising 141,500 Polish, 44,000 Czechoslovakian, 30,000 GDR, 60,000 Romanian, 18,000 Bulgarian, 35,000 Hungarian, and 9,000 Albanian troops.<sup>16</sup> In the case of Hungary, these reductions were in large part a consequence of measures
taken after 1956, but the general and large-scale cuts were also part of a process of post-Stalinist rationalization of military establishments, as well as measures with potential diplomatic value in disarmament negotiations. In addition, a process of "renationalization" was going on, involving the replacement by locals of a number of Soviet citizens who had held posts in East European armies and security establishments. This was particularly important in the case of Poland, but took place to varying degrees throughout Eastern Europe. The forces of the GDR, however, remained much more tightly controlled by Soviet command structures.

Another feature of the late 1950s and early 1960s was that these cuts in force levels were taking place at a time of rapid developments in Soviet military doctrine, which amounted to placing increasing reliance on nuclear weapons at the expense of ground forces. At this time it was assumed that if war started, it would be nuclear from the outset, and in these circumstances the strength of a country's ground forces became less significant than formerly. Khrushchev speaks of the growth of a nuclear missile arsenal being more important than the number of bayonets, though as we now know, the kind of claims Khrushchev made on occasions at the time about Soviet nuclear superiority were groundless. Khrushchev himself has often been argued to have favoured a policy of minimum deterrence, but a recent study has shown him to have been a supporter of tactical nuclear weapons by the late
The net effect on East European forces seems to have been that the initial manpower cuts of the late 50s were followed by an upgrading of forces and equipment in the early 1960s. They received some nuclear-capable equipment such as FROG and SCUD missiles, but probably had no access to nuclear warheads. They were also trained for coalition warfare in nuclear conditions, as the hitherto dormant joint command machinery began to be put to more use.

One likely explanation for Soviet policy in this period is that there was an attempt to maintain and upgrade forces in Eastern Europe while making troop cuts in order to free resources and labour for the Soviet civilian economy. The 1961 Berlin crisis probably also prompted increased Soviet attention to the East European forces' capabilities, and it was around this time that an integrated air defence network began to be built up in the region. However, Khrushchev's policies of the early 1960s were not sustained by his successors, and the USSR embarked on a more coherent attempt to obtain strategic parity (at least), while negotiating with the USA on arms control from the late 60s. At some time in the late 1960s, Soviet and WTO priorities began to shift towards thinking in terms of conventional operations at the outset of war, partly in response to NATO's adoption of flexible response (see the detailed discussion of strategy in Chapter 5).

Some more specific comments can be made on the strength and development of the individual East European
states' forces between 1955 and the mid-1980s.

**Bulgarian forces** remained approximately the same size over a long period. The absence of Soviet forces from Bulgaria can be seen as a reflection of Soviet confidence in Bulgarian political loyalty to the USSR, and the fact that although Bulgaria confronted two NATO allies in Greece and Turkey, relations between these two NATO countries were sufficiently poor to reduce anxieties about Bulgaria's external situation. Bulgaria's forces were large as a percentage of the population, but they do not seem to have been maintained at a high level of readiness.<22>

**Czechoslovakian forces** suffered a sharp cut after the events of 1968, and the introduction of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia represented the largest single fluctuation in Soviet troops in Eastern Europe during the WTO's first 30 years. Among the consequences of the 1968 intervention were mass resignations of Czechoslovakian officers and purges of those who remained, while the overall strength of the armed forces fell from 225,000 in 1967-8 (Ground Forces 175,000, Air Force 50,000) to 168,000 in 1970-71 (Ground Forces 150,000, Air Force 18,000).<23> Although the Czechoslovakian armed forces later recovered some of their strength, by 1988 the army (though not the air force) was still smaller than it was before 1968. The Soviet Central Group of Forces more than made up for this shortfall, but the question inevitably arises of whether these forces should be considered as having primarily fulfilled an external task against NATO or a policing function within
Czechoslovakia. These two motivations should not be assumed
to be mutually exclusive, in this instance or elsewhere. There is evidence that the USSR had put pressure on
Czechoslovakia to permit the stationing of Soviet troops
with nuclear weapons before there were any worries about
the internal political situation, and also that before 1968
the Soviet High Command was concerned about the poor
performance of Czechoslovakian forces in exercises, so it
is quite consistent to view the Central Group of Forces as
having fulfilled both functions.<24>

GDR forces were always smaller than those of
Czechoslovakia, even though the GDR’s population was
larger. They were also heavily outnumbered by the GSFG.
However, the GDR Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) was
traditionally considered by western commentators to have
been the most efficient and best equipped of the East
European armies, and its six divisions were considered to
be kept at Category 1 readiness, which made it unique among
them. The relatively small size of GDR forces resulted from
a mixture of necessity and design. They did not officially
exist in 1955, though in practice they already existed in
embryo.<25> Although no distinction was made between the
GDR and the other Warsaw Treaty signatories in the treaty
itself, the NVA was only technically admitted to the WTO’s
joint command by the January 1956 PCC meeting, which also
appointed the GDR defence minister as a deputy commander.
Before this, the GDR did not technically have a Ministry of
Defence.<26> Conscription was not introduced in the GDR
 until 1962, and the period of service was shorter than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The demands of the civilian economy tended to leave the GDR with a labour shortage, and a residual Soviet suspicion of Germany might have prompted the USSR to restrict the size of the NVA even if further expansion had been feasible.

Hungarian forces were numerically the WTO's smallest, and almost balanced by the four divisions of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces. Malcolm Mackintosh wrote in 1969 that the Hungarian Army had been "virtually disbanded" after 1956 and that in 1969 it was half its 1956 strength. The Army then continued to decline in size (95,000 in 1967, down to 84,000 in 1987-8), though the Air Force grew from 9,000 to 22,000 between 1964-65 and 1987-8.<sup>27</sup> However, it is hard to see Hungary, with a population of around 11 million in 1987, and no border with a NATO state, wanting or needing significantly larger forces, and the army in the mid-1950s must have been unnecessarily large on any sober calculation of the country's position. In the late 1980s, the Hungarian forces had no units estimated at Category 1 readiness.

Polish forces were always the largest of the East European armies, in accordance with Poland's position as the largest in terms of population. In addition to five tank and three motor rifle divisions traditionally estimated at Category 1 readiness, Poland also had an airborne brigade and an amphibious assault brigade, and so disposed of considerable and potentially versatile military
strength. The Polish navy, though the largest of the East European navies, still numbered only 19,000 men in 1987-8. There were no major fluctuations in Polish force levels between 1955 and 1989. The army played a direct or indirect role in a number of political crises even before the imposition of martial law in 1981. Between 1981 and 1983 paramilitary forces and security police were the forces most directly involved in the physical enforcement of martial law, while the regular army largely played a secondary role.<sup>28</sup>

The Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF) was the smallest of the four Soviet contingents in Eastern Europe. Although Poland was obviously of vital importance for communications with Soviet forces in the GDR, one can speculate that this group of forces was kept relatively small because a more visible Soviet presence in Poland could have been counter-productive in terms of the Polish resentment it might have aroused, and because Soviet forces in the GDR and in the USSR itself were more crucial to effective control of Poland. The NGF was in fact stationed only in the western areas of the country, the former German territories which became Polish in 1945.

**Romanian forces.** Under the Ceausescu leadership, the Romanian armed forces represented the lowest percentage of the population in any WTO state. Only two Romanian divisions were considered to have been maintained at Category 1 readiness, and there were no Soviet forces stationed in Romania after 1958. In 1964, Romania cut
military service from 2 years to 16 months, which resulted in a reduction in the armed forces totals. Like Hungary, Romania had no border with any NATO state. From the mid-1960s onwards, Romanian defence policy played down the regular army's role at the expense of the concept of armed resistance by the whole population. In October 1986, Romania announced that it would implement a 5% cut in forces, weapons, and defence spending. As argued in Chapter 3, this quasi-independent stance was of less political and strategic significance than appeared at first glance; nevertheless, it is dealt with in rather more detail below.

It is interesting to make some rough quantitative comparisons between the respective military strengths of the "Northern and Southern Tiers" of the WTO, that is to say between its two regional groupings of states: Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia in the North, and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in the South. For example, on IISS figures for the late 1980s, the three Northern Tier states contained over 1.5 times the population of the Southern Tier, almost twice as many regular forces, about twice as many tanks and combat aircraft (forgetting for the moment the levels of modernization of this equipment), and total military budgets 4 times as large. Since all Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were in the Northern Tier countries with the exception of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, it is clear that there was a pronounced top-heaviness in the WTO's military strength within Eastern Europe.
This bias was equally marked if we look at the degrees of readiness of divisions. All 30 Soviet divisions were estimated at Category 1 readiness, while for non-Soviet division the figure was almost certainly less than 50% (though incomplete information on Bulgaria made this figure tentative). Of non-Soviet divisions at Category 1 readiness, only two Romanian divisions were positively identified as being in the Southern Tier.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is some evidence that prior to the formation of the WTO, the USSR considered a more limited regional alliance between itself, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The majority of WTO exercises held between 1955 and 1976 in Eastern Europe took place on Northern Tier territory - out of 50 multilateral exercises held during that period, 41 took place in the Northern Tier.<30> The Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe represented the highest concentration of well-prepared forces available to the Soviet Union. The IISS's readiness estimate in 1987-8 of Soviet forces elsewhere suggested that only about another 20 divisions and ten air assault brigades stationed in the USSR were at Category 1 readiness, excluding those then in Afghanistan.<31> An assessment of forces in Europe would obviously have had to take into account Soviet forces in the Western USSR at some stage, though here again caution is necessary. The more alarming calculations of conventional imbalance in Europe tended to rely on assumptions which were not universally shared about weapons performance and forces available
within given time-spans to each side.<32>

Military balance considerations aside, however, what was significant in the WTO context was the fact that the Soviet forces in the Western USSR served to underline the relative weakness of the East European armed forces. If we add together Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe and the European USSR Military Districts (ie, Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Leningrad, and Odessa), they comfortably outnumbered the 58 non-Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, even before readiness came into the calculation.<33>

It is at least clear that in terms of personnel, East European forces in the WTO played a less significant role than the USA's West European allies played in NATO. A calculation of ratios within the alliances, based again on the figures for 1937-8, reveals a ratio for all armed services of almost 4:1 for Soviet to allied personnel in the WTO, and of approximately 2:3 for US to allied personnel in NATO. These figures may have been a result of conscious political choices, but they also reflected the fact that the USA's NATO allies were always stronger than the USSR's allies by almost any standards of measurement - population, economic strength, military traditions and potential.<34>

These rather unsophisticated quantitative indicators suggest some interim assessments of the WTO's military functions. The concentration of both Soviet and East European military power in North-Central Europe suggests that WTO priorities did follow the logic of East-West
confrontation, since NATO was also strongest in this region. This fact alone is not enough to settle the question of whether one side or the other was the initiator of the conflict, but it does suggest that there was an East-West strategic calculation involved on the eastern side. To put the argument at its simplest: the maintenance of around 400,000 Soviet troops in the GDR for many years cannot be satisfactorily explained by the need for internal control alone.

**WTO Command and East European Forces**

The question of the integration of East European forces into WTO structures is a difficult one for anyone analyzing the WTO from the open literature. Uncertainties surrounding the 1969 reorganization have been noted. The Soviet Military Encyclopaedia recorded in 1976 that: "The Joint Armed Forces comprise forces and resources which are earmarked according to agreements between the WTO participants for joint actions, and joint military bodies which are formed in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty." The joint bodies referred to here are the Military Council, Staff, etc. As to the military units involved, a number of Soviet sources stated that those forces which comprised the JAFs remained under national command at all times, which is to say that the WTO was not a supranational military command any more than the PCC deprived the treaty signatories of any national sovereignty. Since the national commanders were
technically the respective ministers of defence (or perhaps heads of government), and the deputy defence ministers sat on the Joint Command, it was presumably through this mechanism that national command was formally retained.

The most likely East European units to have been permanently incorporated into the JAFs would seem to have been some or all of those assessed at Category I readiness, which would have included forces from the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly Bulgaria. Among these would have been specialized elite units such as the Polish airborne division and amphibious assault division, and perhaps also the Polish and GDR navies, which would have formed part of a United Baltic Fleet together with the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Indeed, national command seems to have been non-existent in the case of the GDR, where the 1964 USSR-GDR Treaty placed the NVA under WTO command at all times, and the commander of Soviet forces in the country could conduct manoeuvres and troop movements, and impose a state of emergency in the country, without consulting the host government.<37> The particular importance of the GDR was also underlined by the fact that the C-in-C of GSFG was traditionally identified as a glavnokomanduyushchii, which gave him a status equivalent in this respect to the WTO C-in-C himself, and superior to the commanders of the other groups of Soviet forces.<38>

It is difficult to arbitrate between the different accounts given of WTO command structures. In the version given in the past by the IISS, the Joint Command was seen
as exercising peacetime authority over Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR, with the East Europeans themselves only remaining under national control until war broke out.\textsuperscript{39} Command of air defence networks was assumed to be centralized in Moscow, but this would not have applied to those parts of East European air forces supporting ground troops. This control of air defence might not have been operated through the Joint Command, since air defence forces have a separate existence in the Soviet system (this is taken up further below). John Erickson has suggested that there were permanent WTO commands for navies, air forces, and special troops.

Other sources questioned the IISS view of East European forces falling under the Joint Command once war broke out. Some argued that the Joint Command would have had no wartime function, and on the outbreak of war command would have passed into the hands of the Soviet supreme commander, who would have exercised it through his own headquarters and general staff. The Soviet defector Viktor Suvorov argued that once the transition to wartime conditions took place, no East European unit larger than a division would have been commanded by a national officer, and Soviet command would have operate at Corps, Army, and Front levels.\textsuperscript{40} The essence of this argument was that whatever functions the WTO's military structures had in peacetime, they would have become redundant once war had broken out. Their functions would therefore seem to have been limited to training and standardization concerns, the
Inevitably, there can be little firm evidence for either view. According to Soviet sources, the order for the decisive second intervention in Hungary in 1956 was given by Marshal Konev, the WTO C-in-C, although no non-Soviet forces were involved. In 1968, although preparations for the occupation of Czechoslovakia were made via WTO channels, the operation itself was commanded by General Pavlovskii, who did not hold a WTO post, but was Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces. The WTO also lacked its own bodies for administering mobilization or logistics, and did not itself seem to plan exercises, as distinct from supervising them; all of these functions would seem to have been carried out by Soviet bodies. It does therefore seem likely, from what little evidence is available, that the Joint Command had an intermediate role, whereby command would have passed through it at times of threat or crisis, and would been passed on to Soviet bodies if WTO forces had to go into action, as in Czechoslovakia or in the hypothetical case of a conflict with NATO. Similarly, the WTO Staff’s functions would appear to have been entirely, or almost entirely, peacetime ones. In the late 1980s, further evidence emerged about changes made to procedures for integrating East European forces around 1979/80 (see below).

Chapters 2 and 3 have already introduced the argument of Christopher Jones, to the effect that the WTO’s military organization was designed to pre-empt any East European
state preparing an armed defence of its own territory. For the specific purposes of a discussion of command structures, Jones' argument is that East European formations were in practice, even if not in theory, detached from national control; bilateral mechanisms tied allied forces to the Soviet military; and combined training and exercise programmes served to drill a multinational force suitable for intervention purposes within Eastern Europe.<42>

It is not clear, however, that these features of WTO command mechanisms provide the key to understanding the essence of the alliance. The system of multinational exercises and the creation of the "greater socialist officer corps" are certainly likely to have been of use in the fostering of political cohesion, but these mechanisms did not of themselves entail that there were no more traditional external security considerations involved. If the USSR feared military attack from the West, or contemplated attacking Western Europe but was worried about the weakness and/or unreliability of its allies in the region, these measures of military integration would also have made perfectly good sense. It is true that Jones explained WTO mechanisms partly in terms of the deterrence of western intervention in Eastern Europe, but this was treated as a problem which arose solely out of political dynamics within the bloc, rather than because the region might play a role in a broader East-West military confrontation. One could equally well argue that if the
Soviet leadership had ever considered that it might, in extremis, have to go to war with NATO for any reason, there would have been no point giving reluctant East European allies any way of blocking the effective implementation of a vital military decision.

The WTO's multinational exercise programme began in 1961, when it was instituted by the then Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Grechko. The timing of its initiation may have been related to the Soviet ground forces' reassertion of their interests in response to Khrushchev's attempted downgrading of traditional arms of service, and to recent events such as the Berlin crisis and Kennedy's decision to expand NATO's conventional forces, as well as to the more general concern to bind East European forces into Soviet structures. Confirmation that the purposes of WTO exercises were at least partly intimidatory and cohesive can be seen in the fact of increased numbers of exercises in 1968 and 1980-2, at the times of the Czechoslovakian and Polish crises. Apart from the ground force exercises, joint exercises of Soviet fleets with ships from the GDR, Poland, and Bulgaria also probably had as much political as military significance; given the comparative weakness of these East European navies. At the same time, however, multinational exercises were observed by western analysts to keep pace with developments in Soviet thinking on the relationship between preparation for nuclear and non-nuclear operations, which undermines the argument that their purposes were purely internal. The figures
quoted earlier, on the relative numbers of exercises in the Northern and Southern Tiers between 1955 and 1976, also indicate differentiated degrees of attention being paid to different regions. Since both the Czechoslovakian and Polish crises occurred in Northern Tier states, the continuation of the geographical imbalance in the later distribution of exercises is unsurprising, and can readily be seen from Jeffrey Simon's documentation of exercise locations.

It is worth recalling the significance of the bilateral Soviet-East European treaties and troop-stationing agreements, whose contents were outlined earlier. The Warsaw Treaty itself, it will be remembered, provided for consultation in the event of the threat of an armed attack on any of the signatory states, and "In the event of an armed attack in Europe......immediate assistance.......by all the means (considered) necessary, including the use of armed force" (Article 4 - see Appendix I). The bilateral agreements which additionally provided for the stationing of Soviet troops in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary differed in the obligations which they placed on local Soviet commanders. The Polish and Hungarian treaties required the host government's agreement before Soviet troop movements could take place, but these requirements were absent from the GDR (1957) and Czechoslovakian (1968) treaties. In the case of the GDR, the Soviet commander was also in command of the national armed forces and, as already mentioned, had the
right to declare a state of emergency independently of the GDR government. In the light of these special provisions for the WTO's two frontline states, it looks unlikely that the GDR and Czechoslovakian governments would technically have been able to veto the 1983 introduction of nuclear counterdeployments, even though separate agreements were said to have been reached with them (see previous chapter).

Despite the original treaty's limitation of the obligation of mutual assistance to the event of an armed attack "in Europe", the round of bilateral treaties signed after 1967 did not limit the allies' mutual assistance obligations with any geographical qualification. WTO meetings had regularly commented on non-European issues (e.g. Vietnam), but the most likely explanation for the treaty wordings is that the USSR attempted in the late 1960s to extend its allies' commitments to include defence against China. The years 1969-73 were the period of Soviet military buildup in the Far East, following increased tension and Soviet nuclear threats made against China in 1969. It has been suggested that there was a specific Soviet attempt to pressurize the East Europeans at the 1969 Budapest FCC meeting. If this pressure was applied, it does not seem to have been very successful at that time, though some reports did later emerge about the presence of East European advisers or forces in Afghanistan.

The evidence presented so far on the WTO's military command structures suggests that they were designed to fulfil several functions. Soviet predominance at the
highest levels of command was moderated to some extent in lesser bodies like the Committee of Defence Ministers, but the command mechanisms themselves seem to have been designed to facilitate a strict reimposition of Soviet control over decisionmaking in case of emergency or war. These mechanisms were consistent both with a Soviet desire to preserve an intervention capability within Eastern Europe, and with the logic of East-West confrontation. In neither of these respects can the WTO easily be seen as a coalition between militarily or politically equal units, and this provides the strongest evidence so far against the application of traditional alliance theory to the WTO.

Military Intervention and the Question of Romania

As Chapter 3 has already argued, military interventions in Eastern Europe revealed as much about the WTO as a political organization as from a military perspective. Nevertheless, some more narrowly military observations can still be made.

The 1956 Hungarian crisis was accompanied by a similar crisis in Poland, which was resolved without military conflict and with the appointment of Wladislaw Gomulka as party leader. The Polish army was used to suppress demonstrations in Poznan in June 1956, but in October senior officers threw their weight behind Gomulka in his confrontation with hard-line Stalinist factions and with Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership. For a time Soviet military action against Gomulka’s leadership seemed
possible, and one of the key factors which defused the situation was Khrushchev's recognition that a significant part of the Polish Army would resist any Soviet action, as well as the assessment that Gomulka could, on the whole, be trusted by the USSR.\textsuperscript{48} In Hungary Soviet forces did intervene, and met resistance from some Hungarian army units and armed civilians, though Khrushchev could not, presumably, have been sure in advance of the likely extent of resistance.\textsuperscript{49}

In 1968, the Czechoslovakian leadership had these precedents to go on. Dubcek's approach seems to have been to assume that the Soviet leadership could be persuaded that political developments in Czechoslovakia did not threaten Soviet interests, and that there was no need to consider military defence against possible intervention. One can argue that Dubcek was naive, but one can also argue that if he had prepared the army to support his leadership, the intervention would have come even sooner. This may have been why the rumoured preparations by some military officers of plans for resistance made no headway. At any rate, the Czechoslovakian Army had no orders to resist, and did not do so.\textsuperscript{50}

It has been suggested that one purpose of the WTO manoeuvres during the pre-intervention period was to reduce the Czechoslovakian army's stocks of live ammunition, in case resistance was considered. The intervention itself was swift and relatively efficient (it is sometimes cited as an instance of Soviet attainment of "strategic surprise"),
though the occupiers were surprised by the extent of the civil disobedience they encountered. This may have been because the Soviet leadership held the genuine belief that if Dubcek's leadership was removed, a grateful population would welcome the Soviet occupiers. There are regular references in the literature on the WTO to morale problems in the occupying allied armies, particularly among the Russians and Germans.\(^{51}\) It is worth noting that the GDR units which participated in the 1968 intervention did so as components of Soviet formations from GSFG, by contrast with the Polish units, which operated independently.

Rumours from 1980 and 1981 suggested that there would have been substantial discontent had an intervention in Poland been attempted, to say nothing of the risk that parts of the Polish Army might have resisted. It was rumoured that in 1980-81 the GDR leadership, the Soviet commanders of GSFG, and Marshal Kulikov himself, were among the strongest advocates of WTO intervention in Poland. Although they were evidently overruled, East German forces appear to have been prepared for the eventuality of another intervention, in which they would again have operated as component parts of GSFG.\(^{52}\)

This disaffection did not substantially affect the ability of the USSR to occupy Czechoslovakia, or of the Polish armed forces to impose martial law. However, they do suggest that 1968 represented a kind of "high point" of the USSR's ability to impose crisis solutions by military means. While the events in Poland indicated that the
mechanisms described by Jones had succeeded in sustaining an East European officer elite which could perform this function, anyone looking coolly at Eastern Europe from Moscow after 1981 must surely have been aware of: (a) the limited utility of direct Soviet military intervention to resolve political crises; and (b) the fragility of any short-term solution imposed by domestic military forces, as in Poland. The evidence from internal military intervention within the WTO does not by itself resolve the question of the priority of the internal or external tasks performed by the alliance, but it does underline the fact that it cannot be consistently described as an alliance between sovereign entities.

The discussion of intervention leads naturally to some further consideration of the most unorthodox member of the WTO, Romania. Mention has already been made in Chapter 3 of Jones' arguments concerning Romanian non-participation in a number of WTO structures which served to lay the foundations for possible Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. Here, the nature and significance of Romanian unorthodoxy are examined in rather more detail.

Soviet troops left Romania in 1958. Romanian troops are believed to have participated in no multilateral WTO exercises after 1963, though Romanian officers may have attended manoeuvres elsewhere on a staff basis or as observers, and some staff map exercises did take place in Romania. Soviet sources give varying accounts of the extent of Romanian participation. Romanian forces were therefore
not trained to participate in joint operations under a common Soviet-WTO doctrine, and Romania even refused to permit the transit of foreign troops across its territory - a fact which prompted the USSR and Bulgaria to pay particular attention to their sea links between Odessa and Varna.<53>

In place of the shared doctrine adhered to by the rest of the WTO, Romania substituted a doctrine similar to Yugoslavia’s, characterized as "homeland’s defence by the entire people". Although Romania began to distance itself from the rest of the WTO before 1968, the heretical revision of military doctrine can be traced to the 1968-9 period. This Romanian doctrine rested jointly on the defence of national territory and sovereignty, and the notional involvement of the entire people in the defence of the nation. The doctrine was formalized in a law on the organization of national defence adopted by the Grand National Assembly in 1972, and subsequently updated in a 1978 law and presidential orders. Although potential enemies were not openly specified, there seems to have been little effort to conceal the fact that the doctrine amounted to an attempted deterrent against Soviet intervention as much as any other threat.<54>

Such a commitment to defence by the entire population implied a heavy reliance on reserves and on low-level military training throughout society, involving women as well as men. It should probably be classified as a "high entry price" alternative defence strategy, rather than one
which hoped to maintain total territorial integrity in the event of war. The prospect of military/political stalemate was intended to deter any aggressor from attempting occupation of the country. At the same time it assumed a preparedness on the part of the population to sustain high casualties in fighting a much stronger and better-equipped opponent. As far as the rest of the WTO was concerned, there remained a tension between Romania's treaty obligation to render assistance to its allies, and the implications of the rest of the military doctrine that deployment of troops outside the country's borders was not contemplated. Technically, at least, Romania remained committed to assisting its allies in defence against a NATO attack, though not in any aggressive campaign.<sup>55</sup> This distinction was sometimes overlooked by some western commentators, but it may not have had much real significance for Romania in any case, given the absence of any border with a NATO state. The Warsaw Treaty's assistance clause, it will be remembered, was not automatic, and depended on consultation and the view taken of what was "necessary". Even so, Romania's participation or non-participation in the l'TO air defence network would have been significant, and here the situation was not entirely clear.

The Romanian press agency, Agerpress, specified in 1973 that Romanian forces would remain under national command in wartime, thus implying that this was not the case for the other East European armies.<sup>56</sup> It seems
likely that this 1978 episode was a response to a Soviet attempt to reform the WTO command structure to Romania’s disadvantage. As already mentioned, this had happened before, Romania having reacted sharply to proposals put forward by Brezhnev in 1965.<sup>57</sup> Soviet publications dealing with Romanian defence affairs tended to play down these Romanian departures from the norm, though mention was made of the “war of the entire people” concept, and on some occasions of the limited Romanian contributions to WTO manoeuvres.<sup>58</sup> Conversely, Romanian publications tended to play down the extent of Soviet-Romanian cooperation in the pre-1968 period.

The policy described here reflected a number of military, political, and economic concerns. In practical strategic terms, unduly close Romanian integration into the WTO would have served few Romanian interests. Given that Romania’s geographical position made the country relatively unimportant as a target in itself, it had little to gain through being dragged into a Central European conflict through the remaining technical commitment to the collective defence of WTO territory.

Chapter 3 has already given some indications of ways in which a broader foreign policy stance lay behind Romania’s distant relationship with the WTO structures. Measures of dissent over the years included the 1964 reduction of military service from 24 to 16 months and the 1986 defence cuts; the defence spending issue and Romania’s diversification of its sources of military equipment; the
maintenance of good relations with China during the worst period of the Sino-Soviet split; non-participation in and condemnation of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the specific phrasing of the 1970 Soviet-Romanian Treaty to give no grounds for legitimizing intervention; periodic calls for mutual bloc dissolution (though this was also a common WTO position).

Romania's unorthodoxy also had important economic roots, since it evolved in the early 1960s partly in response to Soviet pressure for a particular conception of the division of labour within COMECON.<59> This issue was also revived in the mid-1970s. However, although Romania's quasi-independent posture thus extended beyond the sphere of military command and control, the country's domestic politics were not liberalized in any way which would have caused Soviet alarm. The term "Stalinist" continued to be applicable to Romanian politics during the 1980s in a way which had become inaccurate for the rest of the eastern bloc by that time. Furthermore, Romania's peripheral strategic position made it of minor concern to the USSR, and Romania never tried to suggest that its military doctrine should be a model for any other WTO states. Ceausescu may have genuinely feared Soviet intervention in 1968, but after that the likelihood was slim, and there is no evidence that Ceausescu ever contemplated withdrawal from the WTO. It is likely that he had an astute awareness of the limitations of his position, and would not have risked the uncertainties attendant upon attempted
After Gorbachev became CPSU General Secretary in 1985 the position was if anything reversed, and the USSR was more worried about the absence of political and economic reform in Romania than about gestures of independence in foreign policy.

If taken at face value, the Romanian military doctrine elaborated during the Ceausescu period seemed to assume a high level of popular support for the country's political leadership, which would deter any aggressor. In fact, the doctrine was designed as much to protect the regime itself from its own citizens as to protect the country from outside attack. This was evidenced in the low priority accorded to the ground forces' training and equipment, while the air force and navy were better equipped but much smaller, and could pose no real challenge to the regime. Furthermore, the security forces of the Ministry of the Interior, notably the Securitate forces, were better equipped and trained than much of the regular army, and Ceausescu's regular shuffling of the military leadership from post to post was designed to prevent senior officers creating a power base from which they might challenge his regime.

There were still incidents, real or imagined, of disloyalty within the armed forces, and a number of reported coup attempts over the years. When the regime was finally overthrown in the revolution of December 1989, Romania's independent military doctrine was shown to be ultimately unable to protect Ceausescu against a military
establishment which was prepared to throw its weight behind the popular uprising (for further discussion, see Chapter 8).

The history of Romania's relationship with the rest of the WTO suggests that the USSR did not consider unified military concepts to be so important that they had to be imposed whatever the cost. This permitted a higher degree of mutual non-interference between Romania and the USSR than was the case with the other five member-states. However, the evidence from the Romanian case is ambiguous in terms of my central questions about the external and internal functions of the WTO, since Romania was simultaneously the least important partner by virtue of its strategic location, and the most repressive in its domestic politics.
Figure 2 - Soviet Defence Organization


President of USSR - C-in-C of Soviet Armed Forces and Chair of Defence Council

Defence Council (in peacetime) - Supreme High Command (in wartime)

(overlapping memberships)

Minister of Defence

Deputy ministers of defence

Chief of Main Political Administration

1st Deputy MoD & Chief of General Staff
2nd Deputy MoD & C-in-C
1st Deputy MoD

WTO forces

Deputy MoD & C-in-C
Strategic Forces

Deputy MoD & C-in-C
Ground Forces

Deputy MoD & C-in-C
Air Defence Forces

Deputy MoD & C-in-C
Air Naval Forces

Deputy MoD & C-in-C
Strategic Forces

Deputy MoD & C-in-C
Ground Forces

Deputy MoD & C-in-C
Air Defence Forces

Deputy MoD & C-in-C
Air Naval Forces

C-in-C
High Command of Forces (TVD)

C-in-C
High Command of Forces (TVD)

C-in-C
High Command of Forces (TVD)

C-in-C
High Command of Forces (TVD)
Soviet Defence Organization

In order to get a clearer picture of the East European armed forces’ position in the European Cold War military system, it is necessary to give a rather more detailed account of the USSR’s own command structures. This is of particular importance because these structures went through a period of reorganization during the 1980s, even before changes began to be announced in Soviet and WTO doctrine and strategy.

The Defence Council, whose existence was first revealed in 1976, was for many years the USSR’s highest decision-making body with specific responsibility for security policy. Chaired by the General Secretary, it seems to have been a joint party-state body, but its relationship to the party’s Politburo was never entirely clear. The membership of the Defence Council was traditionally believed to include the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the Chairman of the KGB, the Chief of General Staff, and key figures in the defence industry.

Most of the Defence Council’s preparatory work was traditionally been done by the General Staff. The General Staff itself is technically an agency of the Ministry of Defence, though it is in fact larger than the ministry. The ministry, as a state body, was responsible for the implementation of party policy. It has a Main Military Council, described as "attached to" the Defence Council, which is chaired by the Minister and runs the day-to-day activity of the ministry. In wartime, the Defence
Council would be transformed into the Supreme High Command.

The Defence Council underwent several transformations during 1989-90 as the relationships between party, parliamentary, and executive bodies changed. In the present context, however, it is the Soviet bodies' relation to the WTO which is important. The WTO Commander-in-Chief's position within the Soviet high command is illustrated in Figure 2. There were numerous changes in these upper echelons during Gorbachev's first five years in office. In March 1985, the senior officers in position were Marshal Sergei Sokolov as Minister of Defence and Marshal Sergei Akhromeev as Chief of Staff. In July of that year General Yepishev, the head of the Main Political Administration (MPA) in the armed forces, was replaced by General Alexei Lizichev. Further command changes followed at the top of the various service branches of the armed forces, including the retirement of Admiral Gorshkov, who had commanded the navy for almost thirty years. Marshal Sokolov was replaced as Minister of Defence by General Dmitrii Yazov after Mathias Rust landed his light aircraft in Red Square in May 1987. There was also a rapid turnover in the commands of the groups of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and of the military districts within the USSR.

At the time of Gorbachev's announcement of extensive force cuts in his UN speech in December 1988, it became known that Marshal Akhromeev had retired as Chief of Staff and been replaced by Colonel-General Mikhail Moiseev (see Chapter 7). In early 1989 came the appointments of General
Lushev and General Lobov as C-in-C and Chief of Staff of the WTO respectively, replacing Kulikov and Gribkov.

As far as the WTO C-in-C himself was concerned, he would seem to have been at best an advisory member of the Defence Council, while the Chief of the Soviet General Staff may have been a full member. It is not easy to be certain about the relationship between positions occupied in different parts of the Soviet leadership. For example, when Sokolov succeeded Ustinov as Minister of Defence in 1984, he did not inherit Ustinov's Politburo seat, becoming only a non-voting or candidate Politburo member, but he must nevertheless be assumed to have taken over Ustinov's seat on the Defence Council. Yazov also became a candidate Politburo member at the June 1987 Central Committee Plenum, shortly after his appointment as Defence Minister, and presumably also became a member of the Defence Council.

The relationship between WTO and Soviet structures also needs to be examined with care. In 1977, Kulikov and Nikloai Ogarkov were appointed simultaneously to their posts as WTO C-in-C and Soviet Chief of Staff. Kulikov had previously been Chief of Staff himself, and although the post of WTO C-in-C had formerly outranked the Chief of Staff, it subsequently emerged that Ogarkov was now senior, and that Kulikov had in effect been demoted vis-a-vis Ogarkov. Differences over defence spending, detente and negotiations policy, as well as sheer factionalism, seem to have been involved. Since no particular changes within the WTO itself were identified at this time, one can only
assume that these events were related more to debates within the Soviet leadership than to developments which affected Eastern Europe directly. Presumably Kulikov remained subordinate to Akhromeev, Ogarkov’s successor, although Ogarkov’s transfer to other duties in September 1984 raised further questions about command structures. The most convincing account of Ogarkov’s transfer suggested that he took command of a new grouping of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR, which would have been a command requiring close integration, and perhaps competition, with Kulikov’s WTO command.<64>

It has already been mentioned that the C-in-C’s peacetime supervision of WTO forces is not thought to have extended into an operational command function. The picture traditionally painted suggested that if war broke out Soviet groups of forces in Eastern Europe would have been transformed into Fronts or groups of Fronts, into which East European divisions would have been integrated, but under Soviet command at Front and Army level. (A wartime Front consists of several Armies, an Army of several divisions – thus the larger-than-average GSFG would have split into more than one Front.) This Soviet command would have been exercised via orders from the Stavka/Supreme High Command, a process which would presumably have involved the WTO C-in-C in some capacity, but without the kind of pre-eminence which his title seemed to imply. He might, at this stage, have carried no more weight than the five service chiefs who were technically his subordinates.
Air and naval units would have been organized slightly differently. The relative unimportance of the East European navies made it possible that they would have fallen under the authority of the C-in-C Soviet Naval Forces even in peacetime, and the Soviet commander may have acted as WTO naval commander in addition to his main duties. Presumably this did not apply to the Romanian Navy in the Black Sea.

There is a need for more caution in describing air force structures, as these were considerably reorganized after 1980-81, and most of the explanations given of the reorganization applied to the Soviet air forces as a whole rather than to the participation of the East European forces. The generally agreed account of these structures before 1980-1 was that the entire WTO air defence system was centralized in Moscow at all times, under the control of the C-in-C of Soviet Air Defence Forces, known then as the PVO-Strany. (Even if there was a technically distinct WTO air defence command, presumably the WTO and Soviet commanders were in practice the same person.) This would have meant that East European air forces would have fallen under more than one command: air defence interceptor elements under the Moscow-centred command; and ground-attack and battlefield support elements under a more local command. This local command would have been closely integrated with locally-stationed Soviet air armies (in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland), but was not necessarily part of the Soviet structure, except in the case of the GDR. Romania may again have remained outside
this structure altogether.

As Figure 2 indicates, Soviet Air Defence and Air Forces have firmly-established identities as separate services. The air defence forces formerly included not only interceptor aircraft, but also Surface-to-Air Missiles and Anti-Ballistic Missiles. The two major components of the Air Force proper (the VVS) were Long-Range Aviation (bombers) and Frontal Aviation (for ground support and strike missions). Frontal Aviation aircraft were assigned to Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, where they were known as Air Armies, as well as to Military Districts within the USSR. One aspect of this system which remained unclear was the question of whether Soviet interceptor aircraft based in Eastern Europe would have fallen under the PVO-Strany or under Frontal Aviation, i.e. under a Moscow or a local group of forces commander.

At any rate, this system was made more cumbersome by the existence of Ground Forces Air Defence Troops, operating anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles (in both Soviet and East European armies). Its reform in 1980-1 formed part of a more general overhaul of the Soviet command and control system, but may also have been accelerated by the impending deployment by NATO of cruise missiles in Western Europe. Air defence had always been a key concern of the USSR in Eastern Europe, and one could have predicted that the advent of modern cruise technology would prompt renewed emphasis on traditional air defence.
Accounts of an early 1980s reorganization of Soviet air forces appeared in a number of sources, and they were accompanied by further accounts of a more general restructuring of Soviet forces in the Western USSR and Eastern Europe. The essence of the air forces' reorganization appears to have been as follows:<67>

The former PVO-Strany changed its name to Voiska-PVO, or Air Defence Forces. There were some differing interpretations of the changes, but it appears that the Voiska-PVO were to operate at theatre and army/front level, and included the interceptor element and also antiaircraft rocket forces. In addition, the Voiskovaya PVO (Troop PVO) was established, comprising antiaircraft rocket and artillery forces, and providing ground antiaircraft defence at division level. This meant that Frontal Aviation forces were reduced in size while retaining a separate identity, and also lost other aircraft to a new command identified by some sources as "Aviation Armies of the Soviet Union", replacing Long-Range Aviation for air strike missions. At the same time, however, other sources spoke of Long-Range Aviation becoming part of "Strategic Nuclear Forces", a formulation which was thought to suggest that all strategic nuclear delivery systems (land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and nuclear bombers) had been brought within a more integrated planning mechanism, and perhaps within a new command.<68>

This reorganization of air defence forces was related to a more general restructuring of command systems. The
command of the integrated Voiska-PVO force just described abandoned the previous pattern which combined a national Soviet command system with more local command of Frontal Aviation by commanders of groups of forces or (in wartime) Fronts in Eastern Europe. Instead, the Voiska-PVO forces would have been in the hands of commanders of Theatres of Military Operations in wartime, and possibly in peacetime as well. After the reorganization, Air Force commands corresponded to these Theatres of Military Operations. It was later suggested that in the 1986-88 period, the Soviet air defence system reverted to its pre-1978 form of organization.<69>

The reorganizations of Soviet nuclear forces and Theatres of Military Operations (the Russian acronym is TVD) appear to have been conducted simultaneously. Evaluation of these changes is difficult, since some of the western analysts who gave accounts of them relied not only on open Soviet sources, but also on privileged information which included lecture materials obtained from Soviet military academies. During 1988 some lecture materials from the Voroshilov Academy, delivered in 1973-5, began to be published in the West. In the account which follows, I have tried to pick out the elements common to these western analyses without taking sides where disputes occur, or endorsing the more far-reaching strategic conclusions which were drawn.

Firstly, it was suggested by some analysts that the new strategic nuclear command grouped strategic nuclear
forces into a single command which took them away from their original service commanders. Further suggestions made about this reorganization included the idea that Marshal Ogarkov carried it out and placed the command initially in the hands of his then subordinate, Akhromeev; and that one reason for Admiral Gorshkov's dismissal in 1986 was his reluctance to see the navy's missile-carrying submarines removed to the new command.<sup>70</sup>

In some accounts it was suggested that these changes also gave the Soviet High Command and Staff an expanded peacetime role at the expense of the Ministry of Defence, the Minister, and his Collegium.<sup>71</sup> Whether or not this interpretation was correct, there was widespread agreement that the reorganization also established an intermediate command level between the Staff and frontal commands, at a level which would seem to have integrated land, sea, and air forces as well as, conceivably, theatre and shorter-range weapons which did not form part of the strategic nuclear command.<sup>72</sup>

There were a number of divergences in the terminology used to identify these intermediate commands in the different accounts. In the US Department of Defense's version, which was largely shared by the IISS, the USSR was considered to have introduced the concept of three theatres of war (Far Eastern, Southern, and Western), of which the Western was sub-divided into Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern Theatres of Military Operations or TVDs. (Other TVDs were the Atlantic, Arctic, Southern, Far
Eastern, and Pacific.) According to this scheme, Eastern Europe was divided between the Western and Southwestern TVDs along the Northern-Southern Tier divide (though the TVDs also covered Soviet territory and military districts). Viktor Suvorov favoured a different terminology, identifying a Western TVD which covered all of Europe, but was sub-divided into Strategic Directions. Hines and Petersen preferred TSMA, for theatre of strategic military action, but again divided Europe into three, which corresponded to the DOD's TVD scheme. TSMAs/TVDs were understood as regions identified for a certain type of military action, rather than command organizations per se; the corresponding command structures were termed High Commands of Forces (HCFs or HCDFs).<73>

The confusion which may be engendered by these different accounts should not, however, obscure the main point. These intermediate command structures were thought to exist in peacetime, and to have an existence distinct from the persisting WTO and military district organizations. It was presumed that in wartime they would have formed an additional, and crucial, link between the Soviet High Command and front commanders. Ogarkov was variously identified as C-in-C of the Western TVD (plainly the most important, covering Central Europe), or of the whole Western Theatre; in either case, he would appear to have occupied a position of greater importance than that of the then WTO C-in-C, Kulikov. John Hemsley suggested that if Ogarkov took command of the entire Western Theatre,
Kulikov’s command may have covered the Western TVD as well as the WTO itself. An important command post at Legnica in Poland may have served as both a TVD and a WTO headquarters.

These intermediate regional commands were not new features of Soviet military organization, and much of the material from which their existence and constitution were pieced together related to operations carried out in World War II. The Soviet Military Encyclopaedia dated the concept from the writings of Jomini in 1815, and traced its importance through the Russo-Japanese War and World War II into the nuclear era. The significance of their reintroduction from the mid-to-late 1970s onwards was generally considered to be related to a Soviet reassessment of the possibility of prolonged conventional conflict, involving deep conventional strikes, and/or a presumed attempt to establish (via the concurrent nuclear reorganization) a back-up capacity for effective nuclear war-fighting. However, it would be a mistake to draw immediate conclusions about the import of this reorganization (assuming it has been described correctly) before closer attention has been paid to the evolution of Soviet strategy itself, and also to evolving Soviet arms control and disarmament policy. For the time being, the only deductions that will be attempted concern the likely relevance of the reorganization as described to the WTO.

As far as the WTO was concerned, the Soviet command restructuring would seem to have involved a reallocation of
air force and air defence units, and a presumed but unclear effect on the WTO C-in-C's position in the chain of command. It has been suggested that East European forces, in particular ground forces, were by the late 1980s being more directly integrated into the TVD/HCOF structure, or were at least coming under increased pressure to be subordinated to a single command authority. Soviet Military Power 1988 identified a new command and control arrangement set up in the 1980s to permit the integration of East European forces without national approval, and also reported a Western TVD headquarters as falling under WTO control, but did not explain the latter's relationship to Soviet structures.<75>

According to Ryszard Kuklinski, the Polish defector whose evidence about the Polish crisis has already been mentioned, the USSR signed an agreement with its allies in 1979 or 1980 which dealt with their readiness and mobilization, the "Statute of the United Armed Forces and the Organs for Directing Them in Time of War". This agreement gave the Soviet or WTO commander authority to order changes in the readiness and mobilization status of East European forces during crisis periods, and enabled him to bypass the national authorities altogether. Kuklinski says that Romania refused to sign the agreement, but that it placed up to 90% of Polish and other forces under direct Soviet command in case of emergency or war. These measures would have ensured both that East European forces could be more easily into Soviet offensive or defensive strategic
operations, and that any capacity for autonomous defence of national territory would have been even further reduced. Ivan Volgyes argued that Hungarian forces became increasingly integrated into the Northern Tier armies from the mid-1970s onwards.<76>

The Soviet strategic reorganizations described over the last few pages seem to have been conducted almost entirely over the heads of the WTO states and armed forces, and so were clearly not the result of agreement between genuinely equal alliance partners. They had implications for the integration of East European forces into Soviet command structures, and for the relationship between planning for conventional and nuclear operations. In most respects they can be interpreted as having been prompted by external strategic concerns as well as by the need for internal political control of Eastern Europe, although a final assessment of this question must wait until after the examination of military strategy which follows in Chapter 5. At the very least, however, one can say that such an extensive reorganization seems unlikely to have been required solely in order to keep the East European forces under effective Soviet control for internal political purposes.

Conclusion

This survey of the WTO's military command structures has suggested that, over the period 1955-87, there were some moves away from strict Soviet control of decision-
making and discussion fora, at least in peacetime. The involvement of defence ministers and their deputies seemed to give the East European defence establishments extra opportunities for participation, so that whatever public opinion in the various countries may have thought about the Soviet alliance, the military and political establishments seem to have benefited from the evolution of the WTO after 1955. Robin Remington has pointed out that the need to professionalize East European armed forces required that their importance be recognized institutionally.<77>

At the same time, however, these relaxations do not seem to have been extended to the sphere of likely wartime command, and there is no evidence to suggest that these major Soviet strategic reorganizations were elaborated or even discussed in detail in WTO fora. If anything, Soviet control over East European armed forces seems to have become tighter during the early-to-mid 1980s. Nor was WTO decision-making put in the hands of potentially "disloyal" elements, and here Christopher Jones' work is useful in outlining the way in which a conservative "greater socialist officer corps" was nurtured throughout the military establishments of Eastern Europe.

There is one noticeable contrast between the political procedures examined in Chapter 3 and the military bodies which have been the subject of the present chapter. Chapter 3 described a fluctuating and developing relationship between the WTO political elites, in which the levels of discipline and cohesion ebbed and flowed in apparent
response to the overall state of East-West relations, and to the strains put upon the alliance by political developments within the individual East European states. This chapter has shown that while intra-bloc considerations undoubtedly played a role, the goal of integrating East European forces as subordinate parts of Soviet command structures seems to have been pursued consistently, without regard to the likelihood of the use of force within the alliance. This confirms the suggestion that a fuller examination of military strategy is required in order to shed more light on the internal-external relationship.

The picture of Soviet command structures that has emerged in this chapter leaves us with a view of the WTO C-in-C enjoying an imposing title, but a much less important practical role in wartime. This does not mean that the WTO was superfluous to Soviet security concerns, but it does underline the fact that the importance of the organization itself was political as much as military. One should be careful, however, in drawing out the implications of what appears to be evidence of the relative insignificance of the East European states in the Soviet military command system. It would be a non sequitur to argue that this implied that Eastern Europe was not a militarily important area for the USSR. This chapter, and my following chapter on military strategy, suggest that the traditional Soviet problem in the region was that it was a militarily important area and remained so throughout successive phases of Soviet military thinking, but the WTO allies were not
seen as either strong enough, or reliable enough, to ensure Soviet security interests independently of a Soviet-dominated defence organization.

The relationship between offensive and defensive concepts and uses of the East European buffer-zone is examined in chapters 5 and 7, where I show that although the zone might seem to have diminished in importance in the era of strategic missiles, it regained importance in some respects in a period when the emphasis shifted back towards planning on both sides for conventional military operations which might not (in theory at least) have involved the use of nuclear weapons.

The USSR's traditional military concerns in the region can perhaps be summed up as a need to encourage the East Europeans to maintain their military establishments at an adequate level, and so to share the burden of defence costs and strengthen the East European states domestically, but without allowing the most crucial areas of military command out of Soviet hands. Simultaneously, the USSR had to guard against the danger of its allies perceiving themselves as mere instruments of Soviet policy, and it seems that it was this tension that WTO institutions attempted to resolve.

This examination of WTO structures takes us up to the period of reform in the late 1980s, when the strategic tasks of the alliance began to be described differently, Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe was disavowed with increasing explicitness, and there was talk of a need for fundamental reform of the alliance's
institutions. In the second half of this study I examine these changes in more detail, and suggest that while they did not originate in policy discussions conducted within WTO fora, the alliance's institutions did play a diplomatic role in this new period. However, political changes in Eastern Europe then occurred so rapidly that the alliance seemed more likely to dissolve altogether than to reform itself into a politically sustainable body, and its military structures unravelled even more quickly.

My last two chapters have made it clear that in both the political and the military spheres, the WTO rested from its inception on a network of institutions which integrated the leaderships of its member-states into a kind of transnational elite. This elite engaged in internal bargaining processes within a framework defined ultimately by Soviet military and political priorities in Eastern Europe. The room for manoeuvre available to the East European leaderships seems to have been greater in the political sphere than in the military, but in either case it is hard to see how this arrangement corresponded to the realist concept of an alliance as a temporary and flexible arrangement between sovereign national entities.

It might be argued that this interim finding does lend support to the orthodox Cold War analysis that the WTO was never a genuine alliance. However, any detailed analysis of NATO would reveal a number of analogous (though not isomorphic) features. NATO may not have seen internal military intervention by its strongest military power on
the lines of Soviet interventions in the WTO, but NATO developed an even more elaborate structure of transnational bureaucracy than the WTO. NATO also relied for its cohesion on a public political compromise over the possession and use of nuclear weapons, in a form which, as I have argued, had no equivalent on the eastern side. Not even the most charitable interpretation of nuclear deterrence and flexible response would suggest that they were compatible with the retention of sovereign national control, over decisions on war and peace. The specific features of the WTO which I have explored, therefore, suggest not the uniqueness of the Warsaw alliance, but the inadequacy of realist alliance theory as an explanation of either of the two main Cold War alliances.
STRATEGY AND POLITICS

The findings of chapters 3 and 4 on the history of the WTO's political and military institutions now need to be amplified via an enquiry into some of the most basic questions of European security politics: what have been the essential features of Soviet military doctrine and strategy in Europe, what political considerations have influenced them, and how can their recent development be characterized? This chapter addresses these questions in three stages. Firstly I examine the development of Soviet doctrine and strategy, and set this alongside an examination of the western debate in an attempt to clarify what that debate has traditionally been "about". Secondly, I look at the involvement of East European forces in the Soviet military posture in Europe. Finally, I examine the relationship between nuclear and conventional strategies in Soviet thinking.

Throughout the discussion, I seek to explore the questions already posed about the relationship of military strategy to the internal and external functions of the WTO, and to explain whether and how this relationship changed over time. As in the cases of chapters 3 and 4, this chapter takes the story up to the transitional period of 1987-8. This paves the way for the examination in chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the transformations of the late 1980s in the fields of arms control, strategy, and Soviet-East European
relations, which immediately preceded the collapse of the WTO.

**Soviet Strategy and Western Debates**

Some of the major controversies surrounding the Soviet military posture towards Western Europe in the immediate postwar period and during the following decades were outlined in Chapter 2. A large part of the orthodox western conception of the Cold War rested on a view of the USSR as seeking to extend its political influence over Western Europe with the help of the Soviet military presence in the eastern half of the continent. Although some versions of this argument considered military expansion to have been part of the Soviet plan, it was more common, at least in the period after the formation of the WTO, to attribute to the USSR a desire to exercise some kind of political leverage.

As I argued in Chapter 2, the assumption of a post-1945 Soviet desire to expand beyond the territorial limits set by Stalin’s agreements with his wartime allies is questionable. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Soviet military posture in Europe did evolve into one which placed a high premium on conducting operations on the opponent’s territory if at all possible. This was a conception which came under explicit questioning only in the late 1980s, and whose abandonment or erosion seemed to be a significant factor in the decline of the alliance.

Military tradition and recent history were powerful
influences on Soviet military thinking in the postwar period. The experience of World War II was bound to create or strengthen a Soviet preference for fighting any future war outside Soviet territory; in the post-1945 situation, this inevitably meant as far to the West as possible, in or beyond the newly-acquired "buffer-zone". This preference was not wholly a product of World War II, however, since the theory of large-scale mobile operations pre-dated 1941 and even 1914, and could easily be explained by a tradition of Russian thinking in terms of mobile offensive-defensive operations to combat foreign adversaries on a flat and open terrain, where positional defence had never really been feasible. A glance at the output of the main military publishing house, *Voennoe izdatel'stvo*, or at any issue of the Soviet Ministry of Defence's journal *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Journal of Military History), will provide eloquent evidence of these historical influences.<1>

The decade between 1945 and 1955 was also a period of US monopoly or near-monopoly in nuclear weapons, and for most of this period the only real weapon available to the USSR to offset the USA's nuclear predominance was conventional military strength in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR. The American nuclear monopoly prevailed until 1949, and one recent American study has argued that the Soviet armed forces had no deliverable nuclear warheads until 1954. It is uncertain whether these first warheads could have been used against the USA itself or against
Western Europe, and although the latter may seem more likely, it has also been argued that there was little interest in the USSR in developing tactical nuclear weapons, for use on a European battlefield, until around 1953. At the time, US intelligence considered that the USSR had usable nuclear weapons before 1954.<2>

The USA, for its part, had stationed nuclear bombers capable of striking the USSR in Britain as early as 1948. These deployments took place during the Berlin Crisis of that year, but it is debatable whether they were genuinely a reaction to Soviet policy in Germany.<3> During this period of US monopoly, and when the USSR had the capacity to retaliate against Western Europe but not the USA, it may have seemed no less than prudent to Soviet military planners to prepare for conventional and/or nuclear operations against Western Europe, the only available target. If this is how Soviet planners viewed the situation, it falls some way short of amounting to planning for a war of conquest in Western Europe. However, it contributed to a strategic stand-off in Europe which was essentially in place by the time the WTO was formed in 1955. The West would henceforth argue that its nuclear forces were there to offset Soviet conventional strength, while the USSR held that the reverse was the case, and the strategic knot was tied.

The twin factors of military tradition and the USSR's immediate strategic environment were therefore both influential in the creation of an "offensive-defensive"
posture, involving rapid incursions onto enemy territory in the event of conflict, as a cornerstone of Soviet military strategy in Europe. The relationship between this strategy and nuclear weapons varied over time. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet thinking seems to have assumed that any war in Europe would be nuclear from the outset, or would very rapidly become nuclear. During this period, the possibilities of victory in nuclear war and pre-emptive nuclear attack could be found in Soviet military writings, but from the late 1960s onwards more attention began to be paid to the possibility of conventional operations at the outset of a future war. In this period, the emphasis shifted towards viewing Soviet nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the use of and, if need be, a means of pre-empting NATO's own nuclear weapons after a period of conventional conflict. The increased attention to conventional operations developed in parallel to, or perhaps in response to, NATO's own shift away from massive retaliation towards flexible response. At the same time, the possibility of nuclear victory began to be phased out of publicly-available Soviet writings. After about 1980, western observers detected refinements of these developments in Soviet thinking, in the shape of particular forms of offensive conventional operations, notably the much-discussed Operational Manoeuvre Groups, which were seen as a way of achieving rapid conventional victory in Europe.<4> These debates are reviewed in the third section of this chapter.
In order to get a clearer idea of the structure of Soviet military thought during the postwar period, it is necessary to start with some basic definitions. "Military doctrine" was traditionally defined as "the established views of the state at a given time on the aims and character of a possible war, on the preparation of the country and armed forces for war, and also on the methods of waging it". This conception had its roots in the early elaboration of Soviet military thinking by figures like Mikhail Frunze in the 1920s. In more recent years military doctrine has been said to have two sides, the political and the military-technical, of which the political side is "leading". Although some materials published in the 1960s and 1970s described Soviet doctrine as essentially offensive, from around 1980 onwards there was an increasing insistence on its defensive character. It was said that: "Soviet military doctrine takes an exclusively defensive direction, and its chief feature is the defence of the socialist fatherland". Despite this, the importance of carrying the war onto the opponent's territory continued to be recognized on the military-technical side of doctrine, and during the 1970s and early 1980s the officially-held position was that: "Together with the offensive as the decisive form of military actions, [Soviet doctrine] also recognizes the legitimacy of the defence at the strategic, operational and tactical level. However, Soviet military doctrine considers the defence to be a temporary and enforced form of military actions, which can be
used...when...it is necessary to win time for...the creation of conditions for the subsequent transition to a decisive offensive".<5>

There were a number of other important distinctions in Soviet military thought. "Military science" is the "system of knowledge about the character and laws of war and the methods of conducting it." "Military art", a sub-category of "military science", is the "theory and practice of the preparation and conduct of military actions on land, at sea, and in the air". Soviet military art is described as having developed with the use of deep operations, encirclement and rapid breakthroughs; in addition, "the offensive" was traditionally characterized as "the basic form of military actions", while "the defence" was seen only as "a form of military actions". "Military strategy", in the strict Soviet usage, is a constituent part of "military art", and occupies a subordinate position with regard to doctrine. It is defined as "The highest sphere [of military art], embracing the theory and practice of the preparation of the country and armed forces for war, the planning and conduct of strategic operations and of war as a whole."<6>

These concepts were widely and publicly acknowledged in texts translated for foreign readers as well as in those intended for a Soviet military readership. In early 1987, the English-language edition of Soviet Military Review carried a "Tactical Glossary" describing offensive battle as the main way of achieving victory, with defensive combat
considered as suitable for providing conditions for going over to the offensive. The concepts were also preserved through successive phases of Soviet thinking on the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet armed forces are described as having progressed through a number of stages of development in the post-1945 period. During the 1945-1953 period, Soviet military theory rested on five principles promulgated by Stalin in 1941, known as the five "permanently operating factors". These were: the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the forces' armaments, and the organizational ability of the command personnel. Soviet nuclear weapons were certainly being developed during this period, but the public insistence on the continuing dominance of pre-nuclear concepts was almost certainly motivated by a desire not to draw attention to the USSR's weakness in deployed nuclear forces. By the time of Stalin's death in 1953, however, this problem needed to be addressed. In the 1953-1959 period, the USSR continued its development of nuclear weapons and began to deploy warheads on bombers and missiles. At the conceptual level, the permanently operating factors were increasingly placed in question. Khrushchev declared in 1956 that there was no longer any "fatal inevitability" of war, partly because of socialism's greater military strength and partly because of the growing global forces of peace. Military thinking was simultaneously coming to the conclusion that any future war
fought with nuclear weapons would be heavily influenced by the element of surprise, which did not figure among Stalin's principles.

The main fruit of this transitional discussion period was the declaration by Khrushchev in January 1960 of what was in effect a new military doctrine for the USSR. This stated that nuclear weapons would be the decisive factor in any future war between the West and the USSR, and that if war did occur, it would mean the end of capitalism; the USSR, however, would survive. In circumstances where nuclear firepower was more important than the size of armies, the USSR's armed forces could be reduced. The early years of the WTO, therefore, coincided with a phase in Soviet military thinking in which the value of a territorial buffer-zone between the USSR and NATO was implicitly devalued as the emphasis shifted towards nuclear weapons.

These conceptual shifts were not uncontroversial within the Soviet military-political establishment. For one thing, Khrushchev had a tendency to make exaggerated claims for Soviet nuclear potential, even on some occasions claiming superiority over the USA. Khrushchev himself, and presumably a certain number of his military commanders, knew these claims to be false. Secondly, the commanders of the Soviet Ground Forces, which had traditionally been the dominant service, were not best pleased by the elevation of the Strategic Rocket Forces (formed in 1959) to a position of primacy. Some senior commanders insisted on factors like
the importance of mass armies, and the need to prepare for a prolonged war, as ways of resisting Khrushchev's attempts to reduce the ground forces below the levels reached after the cuts of the late 1950s. Khrushchev was forced to retreat on a number of occasions during the early 1960s, his retreats taking the form of statements on the continued need for combined-arms operations, increases in the military budget, and the suspension of some of the planned further troop cuts. Several of these adjustments of policy, however, were also apparently related to external events like the 1961 Berlin Crisis and the Kennedy administration's decisions on US strategic policy. It is therefore hard to determine the exact balance between these external motivations and internal bureaucratic pressures in Soviet policy during this important phase.

Whatever the contributory factors, the strategic compromise which emerged became embodied in a text which was for many years the source most widely quoted by western scholars, Marshal Sokolovsky's Military Strategy (in fact a collectively-authored work). This book went through three editions in 1962, 1963, and 1968. All three editions insisted that any war would inevitably escalate into a nuclear conflict, but later editions began to pay more attention to the possibility of local wars. Throughout all three editions, a requirement was posited for Soviet superiority over the potential aggressor. Although nuclear operations over long distances would make future wars profoundly different from any fought in the past, it was
argued that final victory in nuclear war could be achieved only through the cooperation of all the services. The ground forces would have a particular role to play, and would need to be able to seize the most strategically important areas of enemy territory. Conventional weapons were said to retain an important role even in nuclear war.

Offensive operations were considered here to be of greater importance than defensive, though the purpose of preparation for nuclear war was its prevention, following the classic paradox of nuclear deterrence.<sup>9</sup> The book was one of the places in which it was claimed that the USSR had superiority; presumably Sokolovsky and his contributors were aware of the inaccuracy of this claim. Another text from a few years later, Sidorenko's *The Offensive* (1970), also attributed decisive significance to the offensive, while distinguishing this from any aggressive intention to attack the West. This book painted a horrifying picture of the need to prepare for combat involving high manoeuverability and on broad axes in conditions when nuclear weapons were being used.<sup>10</sup> Like Sokolovsky, Sidorenko went out of his way to stress the continuing importance of all branches of the Soviet armed forces in nuclear combat. The Sokolovsky compromise was also translated into weapons procurement and deployment, as other services apart from the Strategic Rocket Forces acquired nuclear weapons and so were able to retain some of their threatened prestige.

These Soviet debates rarely treated the WTO as a
factor of much importance in itself, but their outcomes nevertheless had important implications for the relationship between Soviet military planning and the East European states. If Khrushchev’s new formulations about the primacy of nuclear weapons had been retained in their original form, they would have seemed to entail a fairly low priority for the retention of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. If nuclear missiles alone were to determine the outcome of a future war, the occupation of territorial buffer-zones would seem to have become irrelevant. With the dilution of the emphasis on purely strategic nuclear operations, however, it became easier to think of Soviet and East European ground forces as providing the necessary capacity to ensure victory by occupying foreign territory. This also made it easier for the USSR to continue to identify its access to East European territory as one of its primary strategic interests, which as we have seen in chapters 3 and 4 was an identification instinctively made by Khrushchev in 1956 and Brezhnev in 1968.

The new Soviet strategic concepts provided the context for the developments in WTO forces and equipment which were described in Chapter 4, and for Marshal Grechko’s multilateral WTO exercise programme beginning in 1961. Sokolovsky and other authors stated that any future East-West war would be a coalition war between opposing social systems, and this concept provided the basis for the slogans of "combat cooperation" and "combat fraternity" within the WTO, under which the alliance’s joint exercises
The assertion of the possibility of nuclear victory grew weaker during the 1970s, and more attention was paid to conventional operations (albeit with continued stress on the dangers and possibility of nuclear escalation). This switching of attention towards conventional operations can be traced both through theoretical writings and through the evidence of Soviet and joint WTO exercises, from around 1969 onwards. Even so, the Soviet commitment to large-scale mobile operations did not disappear. Here is Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov writing in 1981, in what has been interpreted as a reference in keeping with the command structure reorganization examined in Chapter 4: "In this connection, not frontal operations, but a wider-scale form of military actions, the strategic operation in a theatre of military action, should be examined as the basic operation in a future war". The Soviet armed forces were said to be capable of conducting "not only defensive, but also modern offensive operations on the ground, in the air, and at sea". In Ogarkov's 1985 pamphlet, Istoriva uchit bditel'nosti (History Teaches Vigilance), he again spoke of offensive combat and deep operations within a defensive military doctrine, as important parts of Soviet military tradition.

The controversial Ogarkov was not alone in continuing to elaborate these concepts, though he was perhaps the most frequently cited. After Ogarkov's transfer, his successor as Chief of Staff, Marshal Akhromeev, repeated the gist of
Ogarkov's remarks and referred to the increased importance of conventional weaponry, though without linking this point explicitly to offensive operations.<14> Colonel-General Gareev, a Deputy Chief of General Staff, argued in 1985 that while technological superiority was not important, superiority in military art was (perhaps by way of admitting the impossibility of technological superiority over the West): "But a defensive military doctrine, far from precluding, also presupposes high combat readiness for retaliatory strikes and offensive, decisive actions of our armed forces should an aggressor decide to attack us. We do not strive for superior military technology, but we will do everything, as during the Great Patriotic War, so that we not only do not give way, but ensure the superiority in military art of our military cadres and in the combat skills of our personnel. This is one of the inexhaustible sources for increasing the fighting efficiency of the army and navy without any additional material expenditures."<15>

In his 1985 book on Frunze, Gareev summarized the defensive-offensive relationship as follows: "The defensive character of [Soviet] military doctrine does not exclude either a high level of military preparedness in the Armed Forces, or active offensive actions against an aggressor, should he carry out an attack on our country or its allies."<16>

By the mid-1980s, then, Soviet military thinking seemed to have reached a certain equilibrium with regular assertions that offensive operations were a necessary part
of a defensive military doctrine, and that conventional operations had become more important. There was continued debate among western analysts over the precise relationship between preparation for nuclear and conventional warfighting within this posture, but analysis was to some extent hampered by the absence of any authoritative statement of Soviet military concepts which might help to resolve these disagreements. Gareev’s 1985 book on Frunze was considered by some to be a candidate for this role, and Gareev himself observed that Sokolovsky’s Military Strategy was by then somewhat out of date. Gareev then seemed to hint at the possibility of victory in a limited nuclear exchange, and also to stress the increasing significance of high-accuracy conventional munitions.<17>

The evidence that can be drawn from Soviet strategic planning supports Chapter 4’s findings on the WTO’s military structures. The consistent commitment of Soviet military planners to offensive-defensive operations in Europe in the event of war required an effective command structure which could integrate the East European forces without giving them any chance of impeding Soviet operations. However, Soviet strategic literature of the type discussed here sheds no light on the preparation of Soviet forces for possible internal intervention missions, so it cannot provide any conclusive evidence in the debate over internal and external alliance functions, or confirm or disprove the hypothesis that the bounds of Soviet tolerance had widened by 1985.
However authoritative Gareev's book may have been at the time of its publication, the doctrinal reformulations which were made in the following years suggested that Soviet military thought had entered a period of more profound uncertainty and transition by 1986-7. Gorbachev proposed "reasonable sufficiency" as a criterion for military capacities in 1985-6, and the WTO itself provided a new public formulation of its doctrine in 1987. In early 1989, the Soviet Chief of General Staff, General Moiseev, said that a new period of military structuring had begun in 1985-86.<18> Taken together, these statements seemed to entail the end of the period which had begun with Khrushchev's January 1960 speech.

The following 3 chapters of this study examine the significance of these changes and their relationship to the decline of the WTO as an alliance. Before moving on to these developments, it is useful to examine some of the alternative interpretations offered in the West of the external aspects of Soviet strategy in the period up until 1987. An appreciation of these differing interpretations assists an understanding of the overall dynamics of East-West security politics, and is also instructive in demonstrating the differing frameworks within which western analysts tried to follow and explain the dramatic developments of the late 1980s.

The principal contending western interpretations of Soviet strategy were outlined in Chapter 2, where it was noted that they differ considerably in their assessments of
the importance of the WTO and Eastern Europe within Soviet thinking. It should also be emphasized that the policy goals entailed by these alternative interpretations, ranging from "Sovietization" of Western Europe to the maintenance of Soviet domestic institutional structures, are not mutually exclusive. One could, in principle, consider them all to have made a contribution to Soviet policy. One does not have to attribute total coherence to Soviet policy any more than to that of any state: security policies may be over-determined or confused and/or inconsistent, the products of competing or mutually reinforcing internal and external influences.

The most influential contending interpretations of Soviet strategy up until the late 1980s were the two accounts which gave more or less straightforward rational actor explanations, and paid comparatively little attention to the WTO as an alliance. In Chapter 2 I identified these variants with two particular analysts, Christopher Donnelly and Michael MccGwire, and labelled them the "Sovietization" and "deterrence" schools of interpretation.

Despite their relative lack of attention to the WTO as such, these two interpretations deserve further analysis because they pose some of the most central questions about the nature of the Cold War, and about the legitimacy of western fears of the USSR - and vice versa. They are therefore examined in some detail here, in the hope of shedding some light both on Soviet policy itself, and on the nature of the western debate on Soviet policy at a
certain stage of its evolution.

Christopher Donnelly is one of the most influential western military Sovietologists, and was one of the principal commentators on the development in Soviet conventional strategy identified during the 1980s as the Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) concept. Michael MccGwire developed his alternative analysis of Soviet military objectives as part of a more general critique of western security thinking and its reliance on nuclear deterrence. They wrote from differing institutional bases - Donnelly from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, and MccGwire from the Brookings Institution. Thus one was writing primarily for a British and NATO military audience, and the other from a civilian think-tank on the liberal wing of the American debate. There was therefore a reversal of the more familiar divergence between American "hawk" and European "dove", though MccGwire, as a European liberal intervening in the US debate, may have seen himself in the first instance as challenging prevalent American ideas rather than those of a British military analyst like Donnelly.

Since Donnelly and MccGwire might not accept that their respective views were as opposed to each other as I am suggesting, I will sketch out what I take to have been their essential arguments.<19> They shared an awareness of the importance of Soviet historical experience, and drew from this the conclusion that the avoidance of war, and especially of nuclear war, was a top priority for the USSR. From this it was seen to follow that if a war between
East and West were ever to be fought, the USSR would need to ensure a speedy victory in Europe, by conventional means if possible. Donnelly described the OMG development as an attempt to work out a strategy which could defeat NATO conventionally, before NATO could respond to a Soviet attack by using nuclear weapons. Donnelly did not rest his case solely on the operational capabilities of OMGs for conventional deep-strike operations, but added arguments about combined arms operations and the Soviet need to ensure surprise by various deception techniques. McCGwire also saw a Soviet hope of defeating NATO in Europe as the first phase of a possible two-phase war with the West. In both accounts, the strategy was intended to be put into operation only if war became inevitable, though there were differences over what this amounted to. McCGwire's account of a hypothetical attempt to defeat NATO in Europe was described as an attempt to establish a Soviet "defense perimeter", which would deny the US a bridgehead in Europe, and seek to avoid provoking nuclear attack on the USSR itself by not attacking North America.

So far the two accounts have identifiable similarities, and they both implied that the NATO strategy of flexible response gave the USSR some slender expectation of being able to carry out the strategy. McCGwire said this explicitly, but as part of his general critique of nuclear deterrence rather than as an argument for any alternative strategy. He also characterized the Soviet strategy as having emerged as a response to NATO's flexible response
planning. Donnelly's writing, without expressing it explicitly, seemed to involve a certain dissatisfaction with flexible response. The important difference between the two accounts lay in their divergent views of the wider political context in which Soviet military strategy should be seen.

For Donnelly, the unquestioned long-term Soviet foreign policy goal was taken to be the communization of Europe by stealth. The military strategy was seen as a kind of back-up to this policy, and the question arises of precisely how the military strategy was related to the political goal. He argued, for example, that: "The Politburo......is pursuing a policy of communizing Europe at the moment by peaceful means: subversion, espionage, political manoeuvering and pressures, economic activity - that is, anything which falls short of armed hostilities"<21>; and that "War and peace, to any communist leader, are only alternative tools for achieving all-important objectives of a policy, and to any communist leader the all-important policy is and remains the establishment of communism (of his own particular brand) throughout the world. No ideological or pseudo-intellectual argument, however well-meaning, must be allowed to obscure this essential point. Equally vital is to understand that, to a true communist, the triumph of communism is inevitable, and can only be hastened or delayed, not prevented".<22>

Many would find this unconvincing as a description of
East-West relations. The immediate question to be answered, however, concerns the relationship of these arguments to Donnelly’s characterization of Soviet military strategy, and here there seemed to be a crucial gap in his case. It was not clear whether the offensive features of the military strategy were to be taken as evidence for the offensive nature of Soviet foreign policy in general or whether, since the offensive foreign policy was a given, the offensive military strategy must have supported it. Presumably the latter argument was what Donnelly intended, since he said that though the WTO did not want a war, the existence of a strong military force was in itself intimidating. (In this sense Donnelly is not a straightforward advocate of the “invasion or occupation” variant of my option (a), as set out in Chapter 2.) But this in turn was problematic, partly because he assumed the offensive foreign policy but did not present an argument for it, and partly because the connection was not self-evidently true. Had Soviet military strength been a factor which had intimidated Western Europe into submission or into opposition? (Bandwagoning towards a threatening stronger power or balancing in resistance to it, in the language of the alliance theory debates reviewed in Chapter 2.) One could equally well argue that West European states had not seen the USSR as inherently politically expansionist (at least, not in the way that many in the USA had), but saw a need to cooperate in military opposition to the USSR as long as it remained the major Eurasian military
power. The Soviet leadership may conceivably have believed, along with Donnelly, in the intimidatory potential of their military power for communizing Europe, but it is by no means clear that they would have been right to do so. If a military posture is seriously intended as a back-up to a political strategy of intimidation, then one has to be able to identify political means of wielding the threat convincingly, or it is no more than a bluff. Furthermore, a classical security dilemma is likely to come into operation, and neighbouring states will respond with enhanced military preparations of their own as long as they perceive a neighbour to present a threat.

Donnelly's reply to my criticisms would, I suspect, be that his discussions of operational military planning, OMGs, etc., did not require or entail any particular set of political assumptions, and that I have placed too much emphasis on a nonexistent link between two distinct arguments. In reply, I would say that while it is perfectly true that there was no entailment from the one sphere to the other, that was precisely the problem, since the passages I have quoted did seem to make that connection.

Similar problems existed with other analyses which followed the same general pattern as Donnelly's. PH Vigor's analysis in *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory*, published in 1983, appeared to be careful to limit itself to dealing with likely Soviet strategy in the hypothetical event of a Soviet decision to attack NATO, but at no stage did Vigor offer any substantial account of the political
circumstances which might produce such a decision.\textsuperscript{(23)} At one point he even seemed to be arguing that there could be no Soviet political action which could count as evidence that the USSR was not intending to attack NATO, thus invalidating his own general caution.\textsuperscript{(24)} This tendency to focus on Soviet operational planning at the expense of political objectives or intentions was not confined to Donnelly and Vigor, but could be found more widely in mainstream western literature.\textsuperscript{(25)} It came under criticism not only from radical critics of NATO, but also from Michael MccGwire, to whose account I will now turn.

MccGwire did not take issue with a Donnelly-type analysis of Soviet operational thinking \textit{per se}. His challenge was to western strategic analysis in a wider sense, since he was concerned to question the assumption of a Soviet urge to expand into Western Europe by means of military conquest, and to expose the contradictions in western deterrence theory to which this basic mistake had led.\textsuperscript{(26)} MccGwire offered an alternative analysis of Soviet strategic objectives as concerns motivated by the goal of war-avoidance if possible, and the avoidance of defeat and nuclear attack on the USSR if war seemed inevitable. Up to a point, it could be argued that Donnelly was not MccGwire's primary target, since Donnelly could reply that he did not postulate a Soviet war of conquest in Western Europe, merely a politically expansionist disposition backed up by an offensive military strategy, and would agree that the latter was only to be used if war looked
inevitable.

Even so, MccGwire was clearly challenging Donnelly along with others in a methodological sense. In 1984, he wrote: "That mindset [i.e. deterrence theory] encourages us to ignore Soviet political-military doctrine about the restricted circumstances in which a conflict might justifiably be initiated (none of which can be met by a premeditated attack) and to focus instead on Soviet operational doctrine about how such a war might be fought and won."<27> He described this misleading approach as the "coloneI's fallacy", the carrying out of threat assessment at the wrong level of analysis. (He also pointed out that the hope of not losing if war was inescapable was shared by the West, but the fact was not a very reliable guide to political intentions.) Such a charge did seem to be a challenge to Donnelly, whether intended or not, given the latter's insistence on the importance of the operational level of Soviet military planning as one to which western military establishments had paid insufficient attention. MccGwire observed: "NATO military planners are required to ask not "Is there a threat?" but "Where is the threat?"."<28> Donnelly, fairly certainly, fell within the category which MccGwire called "the keepers of the threat".

There would also have been substantive disagreements between MccGwire and Donnelly over the source of the danger of war. MccGwire associated himself fairly clearly with the Soviet view that there was a danger of war arising from an uncontrollable chain of events as much as from a deliberate
decision to attack, which he contrasted with a US view "that war could only come about through some Soviet initiative that the West had failed to deter".\(^\text{29}\)

Donnelly, one can surmise, would have leaned towards the US view here, and there was no evidence that he would have accepted MccGwire's injunction to "avoid the assumption that US intentions are self-evidently benevolent".\(^\text{30}\)

This cautionary comment on US policy was of course fairly mild in tone, and fell well short of the analysis which might have been offered by a Soviet commentator or many more radical western critics of US policy. MccGwire's own thesis rested on his identification of a clear shift in Soviet assumptions in late 1966, away from an assumption that war would inevitably lead to a nuclear attack on the USSR, to a view that it might be possible to deter the USA from initiating a nuclear exchange.\(^\text{31}\) This, he argued, was accompanied by a gradual reassessment which had begun earlier, and saw the danger to Soviet security lying less in premeditated western attack than in the risks of nuclear escalation from a conventional conflict. (MccGwire shared with a number of others a general view of significant shifts in the late 1960s, but his own account was very specific.) From this he derived his account of the objective of establishing an "extended defense perimeter" including Western Europe in the event of war, clearly in the context of a policy of war-avoidance though still within a theory of a struggle between two competing social systems. MccGwire described the role of Soviet nuclear
forces as that of deterring NATO's own use of nuclear weapons, with the help of a public insistence that any US nuclear attack on the USSR would result in retaliation against the USA itself. This Soviet posture was not seen as entirely ruling out the possibility that a nuclear war might need to be fought, but it did carry the implications that: (a) nuclear preemption by the USSR was not contemplated, and (b) as long as strategic reductions were balanced on the US and Soviet sides, cuts in nuclear weapons could benefit Soviet security.<32>

MccGwire's analysis suggested a downwards revision of the Soviet assessment of the threat from the West, due to increased Soviet strength. However, any view which took seriously Soviet views of a security threat from western nuclear weapons, particularly in terms of the mid-1980s deployments of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, could quite easily accommodate MccGwire's account of Soviet strategy as having evolved in reaction to an external threat rather than as an intimidatory instrument.<33> One of the weakest points of Donnelly's analysis was the exclusion, almost by definition, of the possibility that the operational developments he described might be reactive as well as, or rather than, assertive. One could also argue that the more threatened the USSR felt, the more reason it had to devise military options on the lines Donnelly identified, but that this did not in itself carry implications about political intentions.

Other analyses supportive of MccGwire's general line
of argument emerged in this period from mainstream writers on strategic affairs, in addition to the more radical challenges to NATO policy. Among those who followed McCwire in distancing themselves from more alarmist work were Michael Howard and (at times) John Erickson. Howard refocused attention onto Soviet political concerns in a way which, I would suggest, was not too far removed from the more radical work of the Alternative Defence Commission.<34> Howard did not challenge nuclear deterrence as such, but his analysis of the USSR’s chief political concerns was not very different from the ADC’s. In the case of John Erickson the position was a little more complicated. In 1978 Erickson was writing about the USSR’s "drive for control of the Eurasian land mass",<35> but he then apparently reacted against the hair-raising rhetoric of the first Reagan administration by presenting a more doveish view of Soviet nuclear thinking.<36> A 1985 article seemed to incorporate a rather uncomfortable mixture of the two approaches,<37> while a 1986 publication saw a return to a fully-fledged "colonel’s fallacy" treatment.<38>

In spite of the thoroughness of McCwire’s construction of an alternative hypothesis, some problems remained with his analysis. The documentary evidence which McCwire adduced in support of his location of the shift in Soviet planning at December 1966 was painstakingly presented, but not overwhelming, and it was not clear that his evidence was strong enough to support the argument’s entire weight.<39> To be fair to McCwire, however, one has
to recognize that no other analyst writing in this period made any attempt to reconstruct the Soviet decisionmaking process in such detail, and most of the criticisms made of his thesis were much less substantial than his original work.

The real question to be asked about McCGwire’s explanation seems to me to have been not whether there were loopholes in his account, but whether the attempt to give any account of Soviet planning could be satisfactory if it assumed such a high degree of rationality and coherence. Like Donnelly, McCGwire accepted a straightforward rational actor model of decisionmaking in the USSR, with planners reassessing the global military confrontation and coming to clear and rational decisions. But was this really the case? It is obviously quite possible that Soviet policymaking was more reactive and clear-cut than the West’s, but one should at least examine the possibility that factors akin to bureaucratic politics and inter-service rivalry had operated in the USSR. McCGwire himself said that he had chosen to concentrate on why certain decisions were made rather than how, but this rather begged the question. For example, since one of the elements in the policy described by both of these analysts seemed to be a renewed and reinforced emphasis on the importance of the Ground Forces, and since there was evidence (reviewed below) of continued conflicts of view over questions like the military utility of nuclear weapons, both accounts of smooth, streamlined decisionmaking and consequent unanimity looked
oversimplified. McCGwire did deal briefly with interservice rivalry with reference to the Soviet Navy, but not really in such a way as to convince the reader that the issue as a general problem had been adequately considered and ruled out. There was, perhaps, something of a parallel here with McCGwire's earlier work on Soviet naval policy, which made many of the same basic assumptions about rationality.<40>

For the purposes of the discussion which follows in Chapter 7 of this study, it is interesting to end this section with the concluding comment made by McCGwire in 1987 on the role of offensive operations in the Soviet posture: "...one can conclude that NATO has no alternative to living with Soviet forces that are structured for offensive operations against Western Europe, but that the assertiveness of the threat will diminish as the Soviets think war less likely."<41>

The East Europeans

In his book on the WTO Southern Tier, Volgyes makes a daunting comment in referring to the question of East European roles within the alliance: "Perhaps for no other component can we find so little evidence as for the military doctrine regarding the mission of the armed forces within the Warsaw Pact as a whole."<42> However, piecing together information about the possible wartime roles allotted to the various WTO armies is not entirely a lost cause. Evidence can be gathered from exercises, from the
nature and quantity of equipment in the East European forces' inventories, and from military publications monitored extensively by western experts and intelligence services. The results need to be interpreted with care, but there is enough material to make the attempt worthwhile.

We have already seen how East European units appear to have been closely integrated with Soviet forces at a fairly low level of command, and how the East Europeans' lack of access to the highest command levels makes it doubtful whether they ever exercised much influence on the most important questions of strategic organization, in spite of their increased role in policy discussion after 1969. The East European forces' role in the WTO military posture was always a secondary one, though they enjoyed a nominal equality. A representative Soviet source published in 1980 commented that: "It is also important that the armies of the allied countries should be guided by the same military and strategic concepts, the same principles of military development."<43>

At the time of the 1960s equipment modernization programme and initiation of training in "coalition warfare", the East European armies were equipped with some nuclear-capable weapon systems (Su-7 aircraft, SCUD and FROG missiles), and trained for warfare in nuclear conditions. Some western commentators considered that they were trained to use nuclear warheads as well as to fight in nuclear conditions, but majority opinion doubted that they ever possessed nuclear warheads for these weapons
or that they would have received them in wartime. If this is correct, it indicates a sharp difference between the WTO and NATO, and a clear subordination of the WTO to Soviet strategy and doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons.

As far as the command structure was concerned, the overall picture seems to have been that East European units in Central Europe were intended to support Soviet operations as part of Soviet commands, and the relative degree of responsibility borne by the different armed forces seems to have been indicated by their readiness levels. One of the main tasks of Soviet military representatives in Eastern Europe is thought to have been the precise assessment of the role each unit could be allotted in the event of war. As noted in Chapter 4, there is evidence that East European forces were more directly subordinated to Soviet command structures during the early and mid-1980s.

In one or two cases, it is worth picking out certain respects in which official East European security thinking sought to distance itself from the prevailing Soviet concepts before the 1980s. The clearest example of this was in Czechoslovakia during the mid-1960s, when shifts in thinking within the military establishment were influenced by a number of considerations: leanings towards detente with the FRG as the Cold War ebbed; discontent with Soviet political domination of the WTO machinery; a general concern that Soviet strategy in Central Europe had scant
regard for Czechoslovakia's own interests. Some of these concerns were similar to sentiments voiced by Romania in the mid-1960s. The Czechoslovakian concerns emerged in mid-1968 in the shape of the Gottwald Memorandum, drafted by officers at the Gottwald Academy, and the press conference given in July by Lt.-General Prchlik, the head of the Central Committee military affairs department. The content of the Gottwald Academy's proposals included the development of a specifically Czechoslovakian national defence doctrine, a Central European security system which might involve agreements with the FRG and conceivably neutrality, and a call for public discussion of Czechoslovakia's security needs. In addition, reforms proposed within the army would have reduced party supervision and increased governmental control. Some of these ideas were included in the unpublished Action Programme intended for the 14th Party Congress. Along with Prchlik's very specific complaints about Soviet domination of the WTO and the unwanted presence of Soviet troops supposed to be "manoeuvering" on Czechoslovakian territory, these developments seem to have alarmed the USSR and added weight to the arguments in favour of military intervention.<44>

It is not clear whether Czechoslovakian worries included concern about actual Soviet strategies. Alexander Alexiev argues that Czechoslovakian military circles were worried that Soviet strategy envisaged limited nuclear options in Central Europe, but quotes a commentary from the
period which looks more like a worry that the Soviet security guarantee would not be credible in a crisis, reminiscent of de Gaulle's query about the US guarantee to Western Europe. In any case, worries about vulnerability in any form would be quite understandable for a small Central European state like Czechoslovakia. The USSR, with no forces in Czechoslovakia prior to 1968, had encountered resistance from the Czechoslovakian leadership earlier when it had argued that the gap in the WTO defences needed to be filled. This indicates that the Czechoslovakian fears were not simply a product of the liberal Dubcek leadership, but were quite rational fears for any Czechoslovakian to entertain. One Czechoslovakian source has claimed that this Soviet pressure resulted in the stationing of some nuclear weapons in the country at some point in the 1960s, under the command of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Although Czechoslovakia's experimental thinking was interrupted in 1968, it seems likely that fears of being turned into a particularly vulnerable nuclear target area were reawakened by the 1983 counterdeployments of Soviet missiles in the country. This would account for the muted expressions of concern which were mentioned in Chapter 3.

The history of Polish involvement in WTO military doctrine indicates some degree of specialization. The Polish army seems to have had responsibility for a time for an external front with a mission against Northern Germany and Denmark. This "Polish front" concept was elaborated
during the late 1950s at the time of the renationalization of East European forces, but seems to have fallen victim during the mid 1960s to the tighter control which accompanied the introduction of "coalition warfare". In addition, part of the Polish army was traditionally designated as "Defence of National Territory" (OTK) troops, a role which involved a combination of air defence, civil defence, resisting enemy penetration, and general internal security.<sup>47</sup> Johnson’s view is that there was a considerable gap between the theory of OTK and the practical preparation for it, but one can see why Poland might develop such a concept. Poland was not as vulnerable as the GDR, but was nevertheless a clear target for NATO nuclear and conventional bombing in the event of war. However, the OTK concept was developed as part of a strategy for securing a strategic rear area, rather than as a genuine territorial defence, and as mentioned in Chapter 3, provided much of the legislative apparatus for the declaration of martial law in December 1981.<sup>48</sup>

Enough has been said already about Romanian defence policy to indicate that it did not fit the standard WTO pattern, and that Romanian forces were in practice not available to the WTO command for most of the Ceausescu period. The structure of the Romanian armed forces also supported a territorial concept of defence, but partly because of the decision to invest in the air force and navy at the expense of spending on the army, Romania’s military strength was never great, and so was no great loss to the
WTO.

To get some idea of the limitations of East European forces within the WTO, it is worth identifying some of the military roles allotted to Soviet forces in Europe which East European forces would never have had any part in.

They would have played no part in Soviet operations in Northern Scandinavia, which can be seen as partly strategic operations in view of the importance of the Kola peninsula to Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The East European forces never had a long-range naval capacity to support the three Soviet fleets based in the Western USSR. The East Europeans had no long-range bombers which could have attacked British or French ports to carry out the mission of cutting Western Europe off from the USA, and they almost certainly had no nuclear bombs or warheads for the systems in their inventories which were nuclear-capable. Their chief contributions to the WTO consisted of air defence capacity, in which area only Romania's role was questionable, and conventional ground force strength, to which the three Northern Tier states in particular made valuable contributions in spite of a significant lag in modernization of equipment. These were not negligible contributions to the WTO's military division of labour, and should not be overlooked, but they were always of secondary importance by comparison with the roles allotted to Soviet forces.

As in the sphere of command structures, changes in WTO military strategy would seem to have been planned and
implemented at a level above that at which East European participants played any significant role. However, it seems likely that the strategic importance of East European territory increased during the period described by both Donnelly and McCGwire as involving renewed attention to conventional operations in the "European theatre". There is some evidence that East European as well as Soviet forces were trained and exercised in Operational Manoeuvre Group-type formations, in particular in exercises held in 1982 in Poland and Bulgaria, but their more likely allotted wartime role in this period would have been in operations behind front-line Soviet forces.<49>

This can be seen as an illustration of a long-term military development visible in both East and West. Once it became apparent how difficult it was to make a posture based on the immediate use of nuclear weapons look credible, military thinking on both sides turned back towards earlier concepts of mobility and deep-strike operations using conventional forces and munitions. These plans may have been quite irrational, given the enormous numbers of nuclear weapons in the inventories and the likelihood of their being used if a war should break out, but at the planning level that irrationality could be pushed to one side. As a result of the renewed emphasis on mobile operations, the possession and capture of territory regained some of the importance it had been in danger of losing in the period when immediate or near-immediate nuclear use had been assumed, and so the Soviet position in
Eastern Europe retained its military as well as its political importance.

In terms of an assessment of the purposes of the WTO, it becomes clear from an examination of military strategy that an analysis purely on the internal lines described by Jones is inadequate. WTO strategy as it affected Eastern Europe may well have prevented a genuine territorial defence, but it did more than that. Through a variety of devices, some of which did in fact involve a degree of notional commitment to national defence (as in the case of Poland), WTO military strategy tried to organize East European armies as effective supporting forces in areas of vital importance for Soviet military operations.

It is nevertheless helpful to consider WTO doctrine and strategy in the light of the problems of political legitimacy which were discussed in Chapter 3. Even though East European forces seem to have been thoroughly subordinated in concrete terms to Soviet strategic requirements, there were a number of respects in which nationally-tinged rationalizations had to be offered for the roles of East European armies. In the structure of WTO institutions, as we have seen, it was awkward for the government and party leaderships to appear too explicitly subordinate to the USSR. In domestic civil-military politics a somewhat similar problem arose. Attempts were made throughout Eastern Europe to harness national military traditions or tasks as resources for the political legitimation of the armed forces, in a way which amounted
to an admission of the inadequacy of internationalist concepts, and revealed the persistence of nationalist instincts among the communist leaderships.

In Poland, the army presented itself as the inheritor of a pre-communist military-patriotic tradition, and continued to use traditional military symbols, ranks, and designations for some units (for example the Kosciuszko Division). This appeal to tradition was used with particular insistence in the post-martial law "normalization" period. One can also mention the increased emphasis (after about 1968) on the Prussian military tradition as part of the GDR's heritage, and the use of the concept of territorial defence in explanations of Hungarian policy and in military-political education. It therefore appears that although none of these states (with the exception of Romania) went so far as to develop a national military doctrine which explicitly sought to differentiate itself from Soviet doctrine, and although they could not in practice plan for a genuinely territorial defence, they did still rely on the affirmation of nationalist values in their search for domestic military-political cohesion.

The reasons for this are not difficult to discern. Each of the communist leaderships in Eastern Europe had its own problems of domestic authority, and the systems of conscription and military-political education performed important socializing functions in domestic politics. It would have been counterproductive to insist exclusively on an internationalism which would have been regarded as
largely a Soviet imposition, so nationalism could still be a valuable resource. Like Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania used nationalism in military doctrine as an explicit way of asserting national independence from Soviet military thinking and control, but this element was not entirely absent elsewhere in Eastern Europe. As strategists, however, East European military thinkers may have seen elements on the military-technical side of Soviet doctrine with which they were not unhappy. Given the vulnerability of the East European states, it may not have seemed entirely a bad thing that the USSR planned to fight in the first instance on enemy territory rather than on that of its own allies. This calculation began to be challenged in the mid-1980s, as I show in Chapter 7.

Nuclear and Conventional Developments

Strictly speaking, the debate over Soviet nuclear and conventional planning should be conducted as a sub-argument within that over the "colonel's fallacy", since a shift from nuclear to conventional planning would be compatible with either Donnelly or MccGwire's general accounts of Soviet political objectives. A discussion of these developments can, however, be useful as a background to Soviet disarmament policy and the possibility of alternative security concepts, since the relative weight of nuclear and conventional concepts should indicate the importance attached to East European territory and so to
the WTO.

It has already been argued that in the 1970s and 80s there were major shifts away from Soviet claims about the possibility of victory in a nuclear war, and that military planning paid more attention to conventional operations after the late 1960s. It was also argued within the western debate that the Soviet commitment to No-First-Use of nuclear weapons, made in 1982, was tantamount to a further acceptance of Mutually Assured Destruction and a signal that the USSR had no interest in nuclear warfighting. However, there were continuing arguments over whether a nuclear warfighting strategy was retained in reserve, and the extent to which the political consensus against nuclear warfighting was shared throughout the Soviet military establishment.

In its simplest form, this debate was often presented as being over the extent to which the USSR had come to accept western conceptions of deterrence, and it was all too often conducted in terms which suggested that the nature of western deterrence policy was commonly agreed and unproblematic.<sup>51</sup> Setting this difficulty aside, the most convincing accounts written during the early 1980s led to the conclusion that while the USSR was aware of the paradoxes and problems of nuclear deterrence, it had no more coherent view than the West on the relationship between war-prevention and the preparations for fighting wars which war-prevention was seen to require.<sup>52</sup>

The Pentagon's published view of Soviet planning in
1988 was that: "Soviet military doctrine now recognizes that neither strategic nuclear nor conventional forces are by themselves "decisive", but that they only achieve their maximum effectiveness in concert. The Soviets have spent great resources to modernize and expand their conventional forces, while continuing to expand their strategic nuclear and offensive forces, stressing their ability to fight under both nuclear and conventional conditions."<53> Other treatments examined Soviet planning in the mid-1980s by focusing on the views and role of Marshal Ogarkov, with various arguments to the effect that he was dismissed for continuing to insist on the possibility of nuclear warfighting in defiance of Marshal Ustinov (Defence Minister until his death in 1984); that he did not abandon his belief in victory in nuclear war; and that he (and others) had genuinely moved the focus of their attention towards the option of fighting a possibly prolonged war with advanced conventional weapons. One of the texts most frequently cited as evidence for Ogarkov's belief in the possibility of victory in nuclear war was his contribution on Military Strategy to Volume 7 of the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia (published in 1979), and this passage was certainly uncompromising in its assertion of the possibility of victory.<54> A close reading of Ogarkov's often-quoted 1985 publication, however, suggests that though he was unwilling to abandon the dictum that "victory is possible" in any war, he saw it as militarily incompetent to think that war could be fought effectively
with limited nuclear strikes, a charge which could conceivably have been aimed at Soviet as well as western opponents.

He argued, for example, that: "Military actions will be conducted simultaneously across wide areas, and distinguished by unprecedented destruction, will have a high-manoeuvre, dynamic character and will continue until complete victory over the enemy"; "The military-technical content of Soviet military doctrine...envisages the conduct of active, decisive military actions involving the military might of the state and its armed forces until the complete rout of the aggressor, if he attempts to encroach upon our country"; and, referring to US plans described as envisaging a limited but decapitating strike: "Such adventuristic, militarily incompetent reasoning is completely groundless. The purveyors of such ignorant conceptions must be unmasked. They are dangerous."<55>

One should not put undue emphasis on Ogarkov's views alone or assume that they were internally fully coherent, but it is still worth noting that:

(a) his insistence that a disarming first-strike was impossible seemed to imply that he did not regard SDI as a first-strike threat;

(b) he made a number of comments on the possibility of prolonged conventional war, and called for heightened capacity, and so could well be interpreted as having maintained his earlier insistence on the need for higher
spending on conventional weapons.

If Ogarkov's argument about the military disutility of nuclear weapons was a genuinely-held belief, he would have been fully in tune with Gorbachev's disarmament diplomacy on this point. He may, however, have been polemicizing with internal opponents in military circles. The political leadership evidently took very seriously the statement made by Reagan and Gorbachev at Geneva in November 1985, that nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought. There was nevertheless evidence that there was not total agreement on this view in the USSR, and that Ogarkov may have been challenging domestic opponents who may have included Colonel-General Gareev, author of the book on Frunze mentioned earlier, or Marshal Kulikov, then WTD C-in-C.<sup>56</sup> Once again, these debates were not hidden from view, and were hinted at in publications such as the Soviet Peace Committee's English-language journal. In a 1986 interview with Nikita Moiseev, an academician involved in Soviet work on the nuclear winter hypothesis, the interviewer said: "Even in our country not everyone - alas - yet understands the inevitability of universal demise in the event of conflict."<sup>57</sup> An outspoken attack on unnamed parties who still insisted that socialism could defeat capitalism in a nuclear war was published in early 1987, by GA Trofimenko of the US-Canada Institute, and similar exchanges took place in early 1988.<sup>58</sup>

If one accepts something like MccGwire's description of a two-tier strategy which retained nuclear forces but
did not envisage using them at the outset of a war, if at all, then clearly the basic dilemmas would not disappear as long as the USA and USSR (or anyone else) possessed nuclear weapons. However, the existence of Soviet military thinkers who were more reluctant than Ogarkov to accept the principle of military disutility of nuclear weapons was something distinct from the risks of nuclear escalation attendant on any conflict between nuclear-armed powers. The balance of evidence, though, did suggest that a shift in thinking towards conventional strategies had taken place by the mid-1980s.

Brezhnev's declaration of the Soviet commitment to No-First-Use of nuclear weapons, made in 1982, lent further weight to the argument. In amplifications of the move which sought to convince the West of its sincerity, Marshal Ustinov and Mikhail Mil'shtein described it as having been accompanied by a tightening of control over nuclear weapons to ensure against unauthorized release, and other changes in military planning.<ref> In one way this was convincing, since it was consistent with the kind of command structure changes described in Chapter 4. If control over strategic nuclear weapons had been given to a central strategic command, then Ustinov could have been referring to a genuine attempt to keep nuclear forces out of the early stages of a war. On the other hand, these explanations left something to be desired in that they (a) were inconsistent with the subsequent counterdeployments of nuclear-capable shorter-range systems in Eastern Europe at the end of
1983, and (b) refocused attention onto conventional strategies.

The counterdeployments represented a challenge to the No-First-Use declaration in that the forward deployment of such highly visible and vulnerable nuclear-capable systems would invite pre-emption and increase the pressures towards first use in a crisis on both sides. One could argue that the counterdeployments were a primarily political move which might have conflicted with purely military developments, and that if up until that time the USSR had been sparing in its deployment of nuclear weapons within Eastern Europe, it was signalling to the USA that it did not consider a nuclear war limited to Europe as a possible option. On the other hand, one could ask why the USSR had developed short-range nuclear systems at all if it did not consider limited nuclear conflict a possibility, as the Czechoslovakians may have asked themselves in the 1960s.

The USSR had evidently not abandoned dual-capable short-range systems at this stage, and it remains quite possible that the new preference for conventional operations was still entangled with a strategy which envisaged the widespread use of nuclear weapons if it appeared that NATO was about to use its own nuclear forces. Such a strategy also raised questions about the role of intermediate-range nuclear forces, particularly SS-20s. It was in fact possible to give a fairly satisfactory account of the development of SS-20s and of planning for their use which viewed them not as a qualitatively new
threat to Western Europe, but as the preservation of a capacity to retaliate against US forward-based systems and the regional nuclear powers, Britain, France, and (by no means least) China. They could also be seen as broadly consistent with the No-First-Use declaration in that one of their main military purposes would have been to deter the use of NATO's own theatre nuclear forces, though pre-emption may not have been entirely ruled out. In diplomatic terms, they were probably seen as a bargaining chip to be set against the US forward-based systems in Europe.<62>

The implications of these Soviet strategic developments for the WTO itself were indirect, but nevertheless significant. While the highest-level Soviet strategic debates were conducted almost entirely without reference to the USSR's alliance partners, the latter would certainly have been affected by the Soviet strategic revisions. As long as nuclear weapons remained closely integrated into Soviet military planning in Europe, the territory of the East European WTO states provided a base for some nuclear forces, but the actual occupation of that territory as a buffer-zone appeared less crucial than it might have seemed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. To the extent that Soviet planning shifted back towards an emphasis on conventional strategies, however, the strategic significance of East European territory and of Soviet forces stationed there would seem to have increased again. Whether one views Soviet strategy as having been essentially offensive or defensive during the 1970s and
80s, it seems clear that conventional strength in Eastern Europe continued to play a vital role in the calculations of the Soviet high command.

Throughout this discussion of the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in Soviet thinking, one is faced with the problem of relating it to its political context, and of asking whether a Donnelly-type or MccGwire-type account is more convincing. This becomes a particular challenge when we look at the more detailed accounts of forces and strategies believed to have come to the fore in Soviet thinking in the early 1980s, notably the Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) concept. These were described as groups of Soviet (and possibly East European) forces which were designed to break rapidly through into NATO rear areas in the event of conflict in Europe, in order to capture or destroy NATO's airfields, communication centres, and nuclear weapon sites. The objective was to win a quick conventional victory before NATO could use nuclear weapons, thus preventing NATO from dictating (notionally) the terms of nuclear escalation. Air and airborne forces would be closely involved in such operations, and it was argued that counterdeployment missiles used in a conventional mode would also play an important part. OMG operations were designed to fit into the organizational innovations of TVDs, and to be coordinated with naval and amphibious operations on the flanks. Their first appearance in exercises was traced to the Soviet Zapad-81 exercises in September 1981, a few months after the appearance of the
What one makes of these analyses, however, depends very much on one's view of the Donnelly-MccGwire debate and, once again, on one's view of Soviet threat assessments. Much of the conventional analysis adhered very closely to the model of taking Soviet developments as a given to which the West had to find a response, but the debate about OMGs and analogous western developments like AirLand Battle and Follow-On Forces Attack (ALB and FOFA) raised far more fundamental questions than this. Firstly, one should consider the Soviet fear of NATO forward-based systems against which the Soviet strategy seems in large part to have been targetted. Secondly, Soviet commentaries on western developments treated them as measures prompting Soviet responses - predictably, perhaps, but one should not dismiss reaction in both directions.

In my own view, both the Soviet and western developments should be seen as products of two long-term trends: the military search for escape routes from the apparent cul-de-sac created by the self-deterring nature of nuclear weapons, and the technological impetus of rapid developments in conventional weaponry which seemed to reopen the possibilities of prolonged (and possibly mobile) conventional combat. The former influence could be seen in western attempts to embellish flexible response with further conventional options, and in the Soviet strategic revisions documented by both Donnelly and MccGwire. The second factor appeared in the form of a general shift of
military-technological competition towards conventional means, and in particular in the Soviet fear of US military-technological superiority (partly achievable via the SDI programme, perhaps) and in increasing western attention to the possibilities of strategic conventional weapons, as advocated for example in the 1988 "Iklé Report", Discriminate Deterrence. Concepts of limited nuclear use may not have been replaced by these developments, and the USA's AirLand Battle concept in particular seemed to integrate nuclear and conventional battlefield warfighting capabilities. In some respects, however, limited nuclear use concepts were not necessarily the most alarming of strategic developments during this period. There was, of course, a further question as to whether either side could seriously hope to devote the resources seen as being necessary to the full development of these conventional capabilities. A habitual optimist might have hoped to see the progressive entropy of conventional warfighting capacities through financial stringency, regardless of strategic priorities.

It is worth commenting that western analysts were on occasions quite open about having drawn on Soviet operational concepts in elaborating AirLand Battle and associated ideas, in a kind of "Sovietization" of NATO strategy. While the standard Soviet response was to criticize the new western developments as involving dangerous shifts towards offensive conventional warfighting, this response was not universal on the eastern
side. Colonel-General Gareev, for example, noted with a certain satisfaction that the USA was by the early 1980s acknowledging the existence of "operational art" as a distinct category, after several decades of levelling criticism at Soviet military theory for making supposedly unnecessary distinctions. <65>

The evidence from developments in Soviet strategic thinking up to the mid-1980s supports the findings of Chapter 4 concerning the WTO's military command structures. In Chapter 3, I described how the WTO's political structures allowed more room for manoeuvre to the East European leaderships during the period of detente and even into the 1980s, except when there was an urgent need to reassert political unity for the short-term purposes of Soviet foreign policy. Chapter 4 showed that this was in contrast with an apparent tightening of Soviet control over East European armed forces, and an attempt to integrate them more directly into Soviet structures. My discussion of Soviet strategy in the present chapter suggests that the need to maintain such close control in the military sphere was consistent with, and perhaps a consequence of, military revisions which served to reemphasize the strategic significance of East European territory. Soviet planning had become more preoccupied with the capacity for conventional operations in Europe, with the corollary that Eastern Europe was now perhaps even more important as the territorial basis for such an offensive-defensive strategy.
The findings of my last three chapters therefore show the WTO to have behaved in some respects as the alliance literature would predict, and in other respects to have been nothing like an alliance between equals. During the period of detente there was some loosening of alliance cohesion, which was followed by a reimposition of Soviet authority during the Second Cold War period. The alliance's internal intervention functions were maintained throughout, but they took different forms over time and gradually allowed the East European elites more leeway within an overall framework of commitment to Soviet military and political priorities. Chapters 4 and 5 showed how the instruments of Soviet military control tightened their grip on East European military structures up until the mid-1980s, and I have argued that the offensive-defensive military goals served by this process were indeed related to changing Soviet external strategic priorities, and not simply to the need for internal control.

This does not necessarily mean that the external strategic motivation was always primary, but it does tilt the balance of probability in that direction. One can perhaps come to the interim conclusion that the internal control functions of the WTO were a necessary consequence of Soviet military strategy, since the decision to try to fight a future war beyond Soviet territory, if possible, meant that the political loyalty of the buffer-zone might need to be ensured by military means. The internal control mechanisms were used on several occasions between 1955 and
1987 even though the external strategy was never needed. This, however, does not rule out the possibility that the internal mechanisms were used in order to preserve the external strategic capability as well as to ensure political control.

It is therefore possible to refine the questions posed in Chapter 1 about the decline of the WTO in the late 1980s. Although it would be an exaggeration to say that there had been a consistent trend towards a political loosening of the alliance between 1955 and the mid-1980s, there was at least a degree of oscillation and a trend towards looser structures and more inter-elite bargaining during certain periods. It is now necessary to explain how these trends were qualitatively transformed into the explicit retreat from the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Soviet acceptance of the political transformation of Eastern Europe, which amounted to a dramatic rejection of the principle of even a more flexible WTO. In the military sphere, however, an even more dramatic reversal has to be explained. The Soviet strategic reforms of the late 1980s amounted, it appeared, to the abandonment of the offensive-defensive option against Western Europe. If genuine, this was not only a reversal of forty years of Soviet military planning, but also a reversal of the most recent trends, which had actually enhanced the offensive functions of conventional forces based in Eastern Europe. In this respect, the military reforms of the late 1980s mark an even sharper break with the past than that represented by
the political collapse of the WTO.
In order to establish the basis for an evaluation of the WTO's decline and collapse, this chapter analyzes the developments in Soviet foreign policy which became visible from 1985 onwards, and which seemed to entail challenges to the alliance's traditional functions as explained in the previous three chapters. These challenges are examined first in the area of conventional arms control, where I trace changes in Soviet policy between 1973 and 1989. The broader developments in Soviet policy thinking which were presented to the world under the banner of "New Thinking", and which were accompanied by changes in military thinking under the umbrella term "Reasonable Sufficiency", are then discussed. This prepares the ground for an examination of the consequences of these developments in relation to conventional military strategy (in Chapter 7), and to the political status of Eastern Europe (in Chapter 8).

Conventional Arms Control

It is almost a commonplace of discussions of Soviet security policy to point out that Soviet conceptions of the East-West "balance of forces" traditionally covered much more than a military balance. Factors like the economic achievements and potential of the USSR and its socialist allies, the strength of peace and workers' movements in the West, and Third World national liberation movements, were
traditionally considered to act as restraints on western policy, in addition to the USSR and WTO's own military strength. These forces were also considered to have shifted the global "correlation of forces" towards the ultimate victory of socialism. However, close observers of Soviet writings on international relations from the Khrushchev period onwards saw Soviet theory evolving away from class-based approaches to pay more attention to the primacy of politics and the states-system, and to the complexity and indeterminacy of a system in which the earlier US hegemony had declined substantially.

In drawing inferences about Soviet approaches to disarmament negotiations, some western writers traditionally saw the USSR as a follower of a rigorously self-interested policy: aiming at the avoidance of war if the desired ends could be achieved without it, and favouring only measures of disarmament which would not undermine areas of Soviet strength and advantage. A good representative of this school of thought is PH Vigor, who saw a shift from Soviet support for General and Complete Disarmament before 1937, to support for measures of partial and nuclear disarmament after 1945, when Soviet strength vis-a-vis the West was greater but general disarmament would have affected conventional forces.\(^1\) This analysis can be seen as fitting in closely with the views of Soviet military strategy advanced by Christopher Donnelly, and by Vigor himself.

Others were less convinced that Soviet policy rested so
squarely on the search for advantage, and also treated the USSR as less of an awesomely-logical Clausewitzian-Marxist-Leninist monolith. These writers pointed to factors in Soviet arms control and disarmament policy which amounted to an acceptance that security depended on the potential opponent as well as one’s own strength, and the acceptance of treaties which might have fallen short of the optimum demands of the Soviet military. For example: the acceptance of mutual vulnerability in the ABM Treaty; the explicit disavowal of superiority as a goal; the exclusion of US Forward-Based Systems from the SALT agreements when the military might have preferred to include them. Substantial debates took place in the USSR during the 1970s over issues like the value of security through consultation, and, more broadly, how far Soviet trade and diplomacy should cooperate with the capitalist world.

The negotiations of most direct relevance to the WTO’s role in European security were the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks on conventional forces (1973-1989), and to a lesser extent the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) talks of the 1980s. Chapter 3 showed how the MBFR talks came to be set up in the context of moves towards the wider CSCE process. The main task of the historical analyst is to account for their failure to reduce the two blocs’ forces in Central Europe by a single rifle or soldier.

The formal title of the MBFR talks was “Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and
Associated Measures in Central Europe". The insertion of the word "balanced" into the more familiar and abbreviated western version, "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions", reflected a fundamental divergence in the premises from which the two sides approached the talks. The West used the word "balanced" to mean "asymmetrical" (i.e. unbalanced), assuming from the outset that the East would have to reduce its forces more sharply because of existing numerical advantages and geographical asymmetries (Soviet forces in the USSR itself being closer to the Central European negotiation zone than US forces in the USA). Although the East eventually conceded the principle of asymmetrical reductions, it did this only reluctantly and initially argued that equal cuts were all that could be contemplated. The eastern position was, in fact, quite justified as far as the original Terms of Reference for the negotiations went, and this basic difference of view illustrates how little shared understanding there was of the goals of the talks.

The geographical area covered by the talks comprised the Benelux countries, the two Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Ground and air forces stationed in this area were subject to reduction (both forces and equipment), though France, which had forces in West Germany, refused to participate. The states which participated directly were, for NATO — the USA, Canada, Britain, FRG, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; for the WTO — the USSR, GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Other members of the two
alliances participated indirectly as "flank" states (Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece and Turkey; Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria).

It should be noted that the MBFR Terms of Reference did not specify that only conventional forces and weapons should be covered. There was a period between 1975 and 1979 when the two sides explored possible deals involving nuclear-capable missiles and warheads, aircraft, and tanks, but nothing came of the possibility. NATO was for the most part reluctant to include equipment as a separate item unless the East could be persuaded to reduce its own tanks without western reciprocation. MBFR has gone down in arms control history as an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate cuts in conventional forces, which stumbled over disagreements in three main areas: the number of forces existing on each side and to be reduced; the principles according to which reductions should be calculated; and the "associated measures" to be used to verify compliance with an agreement.

As could have been predicted from the prehistory of the talks, the USSR viewed MBFR with some suspicion. It was feared that acceptance of western demands for rights of inspection on eastern territory would legitimize espionage, and that West German forces would be built up to compensate for any US reductions unless sub-limits were set within the alliances. The USSR did develop a concept of "military detente", as a complementary and subsequent stage to follow on from political detente. "Military detente" was
said to be applicable both to superpower relations and to East-West relations in Europe, but the wide gaps which existed at the outset between the two sides’ positions in MBFR narrowed only slightly between 1973 and 1989.

As already noted, the East claimed that approximate parity existed, so that balance could be preserved at lower levels by means of numerically equal or equal percentage cuts. This was fundamentally incompatible with the West’s assumption of eastern numerical superiority and the need for asymmetrical cuts, and the concrete western proposals put forward were premised on the perceived need to eliminate any eastern advantage in the first few days of a conventional attack. There was no way of resolving this incompatibility of approaches without an agreed data base on the forces under discussion. Part of the problem was the absence of agreement on who exactly should be counted as a soldier. At the outset of the talks in 1973, the West provided estimates of both sides’ forces. When the WTO provided its own figures in 1976, it put its own forces at a level 175,000 below the NATO estimate. This data dispute was never resolved, even though further exchanges took place subsequently. If Ryszard Kuklinski’s testimony is correct, the USSR instructed its allies to present data on their own forces which they knew to be false. The East did, however, eventually accept the western argument that the object of the talks should be to reach equal ceilings of forces, at 700,000 for ground forces and 900,000 for ground and air forces combined.
After this eastern acceptance of the principle of cuts to equal ceilings, there was movement towards agreement on a small asymmetrical cut in US and Soviet forces in a first phase. The figures under discussion by the late 1970s envisaged an asymmetrical cut of 13,000 US ground forces as against 20 or 30,000 Soviet ground troops, though the East was still concerned to establish constraints on other European forces (i.e. the West Germans) at as early a stage as possible. By 1982 the West had made some concessions to eastern insistence on this point.

There was also some movement towards agreement in the area of "associated measures" of inspection and verification. The East was originally reluctant to concede inspection procedures which involved the use of anything other than "national technical means" (satellites). In 1979, NATO put forward a package of proposals for notification of large troop movements, observers to monitor troop movements in and out of the MBFR zone, and the verification of residual troop ceilings. The East conceded some of these points, and later agreed in principle to the establishment of permanent observation posts and to on-site inspection in Eastern Europe.

By 1983 there was some optimism among western observers of the talks that a limited agreement, involving a few thousand troops on each side, might be within reach. This expectation remained unfulfilled, and by this time much of the immediate political energy of the USA and USSR was being put into negotiations over, and deployments of,
nuclear forces. MBFR, therefore, marked time until its ultimate demise in February 1989.<3>

Jonathan Dean, a former head of the US delegation to MBFR, has made some harsh criticisms of political leaders and military establishments on both sides who, he says, devoted insufficient energy to the search for an MBFR agreement. Dean argues that political leaders feared that even a limited MBFR accord would undermine the rationale for maintaining large standing forces, and has particularly sharp words for the FRG leadership's retreat from its initial enthusiasm for conventional arms control. He is also strongly critical of the Soviet military establishment for pursuing such an obstructionist line over the provision of data.<4>

Dean's criticisms have a degree of force, coming as they do from a diplomatic expert whose writings show him to have a sincere interest in reducing the risk of military confrontation in Europe. However, they beg the question of whether MBFR was ever a negotiation undertaken in good faith. There are substantial grounds for thinking that the talks were seen by both sides as providing a way of stabilizing and entrenching the existing situation. It should therefore come as no surprise that there was only a limited political momentum behind the MBFR talks, and if we accept this argument, they can be considered to have succeeded in ensuring that very little changed. It is also revealing that Dean should make the mistake of not querying his own assumption that the talks were originally intended
to produce results. There is a strong thread running through his writings which stresses the need to maintain or re-establish a basic NATO consensus on East-West relations. MBFR did a good deal to maintain this consensus, constituting as it did a long-running set of unproductive negotiations in which the opposing side could be presented as the unreasonable party.

This is not to say that Dean's specific criticisms are unjustified. In the eastern case, it is indeed hard to argue that the USSR showed much serious interest in cutting WTO forces via the MBFR forum. I argued in chapters 4 and 5 that Soviet strategy placed a strong emphasis on maintaining a conventional offensive capacity in Europe from the late 1960s onwards. Coupled with a concern to preserve interventionary capacities within Eastern Europe, this gave the USSR its own military reasons to resist the kind of asymmetrical cuts being sought by the West. Even equal cuts might have been looked on with suspicion by a conservative military establishment which was not under undue political pressure, and this might help to explain the data dispute.

Soviet policy towards MBFR can in fact be explained fairly satisfactorily regardless of the rights and wrongs of the data dispute. If the USSR thought it needed conventional superiority in Central Europe in order to carry out its military strategy of that time, it would resist the principle of asymmetric cuts whether or not it had such superiority in fact. Even the establishment of
balance in Central Europe on NATO's terms could be seen in this light as involving a net shift of advantage towards the West in a global balance calculation, since there were few other areas of the world or of military technology in which the East could lay claim to either superiority or balance. The circumstantial evidence available on Soviet weapons procurement during the 1976-81 period also supports this analysis, since it suggests that whatever self-imposed constraints there were on strategic forces in this period, there was much less of a throttling-back on theatre nuclear and conventional forces.<5> In short, Soviet policy towards MBFR may have been obstructive, but it was not incoherent. The East European leaderships may not have been entirely happy with this situation, but if so they were evidently unable to influence Soviet policy significantly, and they could not, it seems, even present accurate data on their own armed forces.

Two distinct sets of European negotiations on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) were conducted during the MBFR period. Within the Helsinki CSCE forum, talks on CBMs took place not between the member-states of NATO and the WTO, but between all of the 35 Helsinki participants. Military security issues did not play a large part in the Helsinki negotiations, and the USA in particular was keen to avoid any linkage between CSCE and MBFR in a way which would give the neutral states a right of even indirect participation in MBFR. Nevertheless, a limited number of CBMs were negotiated within the Basket I on security of the
CSCE agreement concluded in 1975. These covered: the prior notification (21 days in advance) of major military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops, on the European territory of participating states (Soviet territory was included up to a distance of 250 kilometers from the Soviet frontier with any other participating state); the exchange of observers to attend such manoeuvres; exchanges of military personnel to improve mutual understanding; and a vague future commitment to lessen military confrontation and promote disarmament.\(^8\)

These provisions, like the Helsinki accords as a whole, did not have the status of legally binding obligations. They represented a compromise between the US and Soviet preference for keeping military measures out of CSCE altogether, and the desire of the European neutral states to compensate for their exclusion from MBFR. Nor were they of great military importance in themselves, since they placed no constraints on permissible activities. The USSR's acceptance of western observers on Soviet territory, however, was a significant innovation, whereby an important western goal of diminishing the secrecy of Soviet military activities was partially achieved.

Since the Helsinki CBMs agreed in 1975 placed no mandatory obligations on the parties, there was no way of enforcing compliance with them. The West invited observers to a higher percentage of the manoeuvres it notified than did the East. Some unsuccessful attempts were made within the Helsinki review process to introduce further measures,
but the next major development was a 1978 French initiative to set up a new forum within CSCE, to deal first with further CBMs, and then with the reduction of offensive conventional armaments. With MBFR still in progress, the USA was reluctant to agree to the French proposal, but it suited both the WTO and a number of neutral and NATO states to separate talks on security from the clashes over human rights which tended to dominate the Helsinki review conferences.

A Soviet concession enabled the new forum to get under way, when Brezhnev accepted its geographic extension to the Ural Mountains in February 1981. The East still hoped to include naval forces as a way of obtaining a reciprocal geographical concession on the western side, but the new talks began in Stockholm in January 1984 without agreement on this point. This demand was eventually dropped by Gorbachev in January 1986.

The new forum, the CDE (in full, Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe), was able to reach agreement within three years. This was due in part to an increasing degree of eastern acceptance of the western view of the kind of military-technical CBMs to which priority should be given. The outcome was an agreement signed in Stockholm in September 1986, the Stockholm Accord, which extended the Helsinki provisions to a significant degree. Along with the inclusion of Soviet territory as far as the Urals, notification had to be given of a wider range of military
activities, and some time in advance (a year or more in some cases). The threshold for the size of military activities which should be notified was lowered to 13,000 troops, and foreign observers were required to be present at all exercises involving over 17,000. States were given no right of refusal of requests for inspection of notifiable activities, up to a certain number per year. The preamble to the document also contained an obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against any state, "regardless of that State's political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that state relations of alliance"; this amounted to a clear rejection by the USSR of the Brezhnev Doctrine, at least on paper. The Stockholm regime was identified by the term "confidence-and security-building measures" (CSBMs), to distinguish it from the Helsinki CBM regime.<7>

Western negotiators considered that the acceptance of mandatory on-site inspection amounted to a defeat for the military representatives in the Soviet delegation. The acceptance of this principle was highly significant in that it paved the way for intrusive verification on Soviet territory under the later INF Treaty. Some loopholes remained in the Stockholm regime in the sense that exceptions to the notification requirements were made for "alert" activities and also for mobilization (at the insistence of the neutral and non-aligned states, in fact). The West had resisted any limitations on the frequency or
length of exercises, or the numbers of troops involved, thus safeguarding NATO's annual exercises rehearsing the transfer of large numbers of US troops to Western Europe. Nevertheless, the western diplomatic verdict on the Stockholm agreement was that it had met the criterion of agreeing on measures that were "militarily significant".

Movement towards the Stockholm agreement coincided with other eastern initiatives on forces in Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a package of European force reductions in a speech in East Berlin in April 1986, and on June 11, 1986 this became a formal proposal from the WTO Political Consultative Committee, the "Budapest Appeal". This proposed reductions of manpower and equipment across the whole Atlantic-to-the-Urals region, of 150-200,000 men in the first stage, and later cuts of 25 per cent on each side in the early 1990s; tactical air forces and short-range nuclear weapons would be reduced simultaneously, and the forum could be either an expansion of MBFR or a further CSCE forum. The Appeal also, and perhaps more importantly, said that: "In the interests of security in Europe and the whole world, the military concepts and doctrines of the military alliances must be based on defensive principles."<8> A complementary proposal was put forward in early May 1987 by Poland's General Jaruzelski, entitled "Plan of nuclear and conventional arms disengagement in Central Europe".<9> This differed from the WTO proposal in that it covered only Central Europe, and weapons and equipment rather than manpower, but it dealt with both
nuclear and conventional disengagement and with the evolution of "strictly defensive" military doctrines. A degree of scepticism in the response to the Jaruzelski Plan was understandable, given its self-proclaimed intention of bolstering the Polish leadership's international standing, but the proposal fitted well enough within the framework of the WTO proposal and of the Rapacki tradition of concern for Central European disengagement (see Chapter 3).

At the end of May 1987, the WTO's PCC met in Berlin and issued a communique on conventional forces in Europe, and a document dealing with the alliance's military doctrine (see Appendix II). These documents advocated the withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive weapons from Central Europe, and endorsed the goal of defensive military concepts which had been proposed in the June 1986 document.

The references in these statements to defensive military doctrines broke important new ground, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Even the quantitative parts of the Budapest Appeal, however, suggested that the USSR and WTO were moving from positions taken in MBFR. It appeared that substantial troop cuts were no longer ruled out, and although the more sceptical western observers suspected that Gorbachev was trying to snuff out any remaining hopes of agreement in MBFR, a more charitable interpretation saw evidence of a genuine desire to start afresh, with an alternative to MBFR seen as necessary to get away from the unproductive nature of that forum (and from Soviet positions which could not easily be reversed.
within the same forum). Part of the sceptical response was due to the fact that the principle of asymmetrical reductions had been accepted in MBFR in 1978, and the 1986 proposals appeared to return to unrealistically high figures for symmetrical cuts. However, the 1986 initiatives were also accompanied by suggestions of mutual asymmetrical cuts in areas of advantage. Overall, one can perhaps see a progression from MBFR via Stockholm to the proposed new forum, in the sense that the Stockholm negotiations indicated serious WTO interest in western proposals for confidence-building measures, and the new forum could hope to build on this by addressing force cuts once again in the wider geographical area, and even doctrines.

For the new forum, NATO preferred a bloc-to-bloc approach rather than CSCE, although this did not please France. The so-called "Group 23" of NATO and WTO states began informal consultations in Vienna in February 1987, and began to discuss the mandate of the proposed negotiations. These consultations eventually resulted in the conclusion in January 1989 of a mandate for a Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, to take place "in the framework of the CSCE process."<sup>10</sup> I return to the substance and implications of this negotiating mandate in the following chapter; for the moment, however, it is important to set arms control negotiations in the context of more general Soviet foreign policy approaches during the 1985-88 period.
"New Thinking."

The use of the term "New Thinking" seems to have stemmed from a quotation from the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto, incorporated into the title of a book published in 1984 by Anatoli Gromyko and Vladimir Lomeiko, Novoe myshlenie v yadernyi vek (New Thinking in the Nuclear Age).<11> The Soviet account of New Thinking as it had developed between 1985 and 1987 was usefully summarized by Margot Light, under six headings:

(1) the concept emphasized the interdependence of survival in the nuclear age, which necessitated a new approach to problems of security;

(2) it stressed the need for a reduction in the level of military confrontation, while stating that the principle of equality and equal security should be retained;

(3) security was viewed as a political, not a military-technical, problem;

(4) national and international security were considered to be indivisible;

(5) a more flexible foreign policy and a readiness to compromise in negotiations were desirable;

(6) there was a need for a comprehensive view of international security, covering the military, economic, political, and humanitarian spheres.<12> The ecological sphere was also much emphasized; global issues and all-human values were frequently said to override interstate and ideological differences.

One problem with the early Soviet treatment of New
Thinking was that it was not always easy to tell whether it was supposed to be a continuation of past policies or a break with them; thus the extent to which a critique of Brezhnev's foreign policy was involved was not at first made clear with any consistency. In Gromyko and Lomeiko's book the impression was given that the USSR had been guided by New Thinking since 1945, but they later spoke of the need for a "fundamentally new approach" as a reflection of proposals made in 1986. In fact the truth of the matter was probably somewhere in between, since the themes of New Thinking could be identified in scholarly and policy debates, if not in diplomatic practice, stretching back into the Brezhnev and even the Khrushchev periods. Nevertheless, their crystallization in material published under Gorbachev, and reflection in the General Secretary's own speeches and writings after March 1985, does make it possible to speak of a phenomenon of the Gorbachev period itself, and clearer criticism of the previous policies gradually emerged.

By mid-1988, in the period immediately preceding the 19th All-Union Party Conference, explicit comments were appearing in both official statements and academic commentary, to the effect that mistakes could be made and had been made in Soviet foreign policy. Taken collectively, these comments amounted to an initial stage in the application of glasnost' to foreign policy, albeit much later than the phenomenon had appeared in spheres such as economic and cultural policy, and Soviet history. Oleg
Bogomolov published a 1980 memorandum from the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, criticizing the intervention in Afghanistan. Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev published in Literaturnaya gazeta his remarkable article criticizing Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and the Third World, and doing so in an ultra-revisionist way which virtually absolved the USA from having played any significant role in the decline of East-West relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see also Chapter 2).<15> It became clear that these were not isolated contributions when the Central Committee's Theses for the 19th Party Conference were published, to be followed by Gorbachev's speech at the Conference itself. The Theses criticized Soviet foreign policy for failing to use opportunities to ensure Soviet security by political means, and for allowing the country to be drawn into an arms race which affected its social and economic progress and international standing.<16> A number of press commentaries published around the time of the Conference then took up these themes.<17> Gorbachev's main Conference speech repeated some of these points at rather greater length:

"Nevertheless, while drawing lessons from the past, we have to acknowledge that command methods of administration did not spare the field of foreign policy either. It sometimes happened that even decisions of vital importance were taken by a narrow circle of people without collective, comprehensive examination or analysis, on occasion without properly consulting friends either. This led to an inadequate reaction to international events and to the policies of other states, if not to mistaken decisions. Unfortunately, the cost of this to the people, and the implications of this or that course of action, were not always weighed up. In response to the nuclear challenge to us and to the entire socialist world it
was necessary to achieve strategic parity with the USA. And this was accomplished. But, while concentrating enormous funds and attention on the military aspect of countering imperialism, we did not always make use of the political opportunities opened up by the fundamental changes in the world in our efforts to assure the security of our state, to scale down tensions, and promote mutual understanding between nations. As a result, we allowed ourselves to be drawn into an arms race, which could not but affect the country's socio-economic development and its international standing. As the arms race approached a critical point, our traditional political and social activities for peace and disarmament began, on this background, to lose their power of conviction. To put it even more bluntly, without overturning the logic of this course, we would actually have found ourselves on the brink of a military confrontation.

Hence, what was needed was not just a refinement of foreign policy, but its determined reshaping. In the course of our analysis of the fundamental changes in the world we are overcoming many stereotypes which limited our options and, to a certain extent, supplied arguments to those who indulged in misrepresenting our real intentions."<18>

In the western literature which set out to explain the significance of these conceptual statements of the new goals of Soviet foreign policy, there were three main identifiable threads of interpretation. In the first analysis, New Thinking was seen as a genuine shift from a conflictive to a more cooperative paradigm of international relations. Alternatively, it was viewed as an attempt to resolve inconsistencies between the existing theory and practice of foreign policy. Thirdly, it was seen as a conceptual way of covering up a retreat or recognition of failure in foreign policy. Each of these strands of interpretation of New Thinking carried with it certain assumptions about the nature of Soviet foreign policy as it had been conducted prior to the New Thinking period, and
hence about the WTO as an alliance, which will become clear as I examine them in more detail.

The interpretation of New Thinking as a genuine shift in paradigms of international relations saw it as constituting a shift away from theories based on economic forces and the class nature of states, and a retreat from a practice of foreign policy which treated international relations as an arena of global struggle between capitalism and socialism. The assertion of "all-human" or universal values and of the concepts of "common security" was seen as a concomitant of deeper theoretical shifts away from the traditional vocabulary and practice of foreign policy. Some of the most detailed western work on these problems drew out the contributions made to this process by pre-Gorbachev debates on the theory of international relations, debates which in some respects had begun decades earlier.

Allen Lynch identified a number of interconnected long-term theoretical revisions. International political behaviour was no longer seen as deducible from the class character of states, since political activity had become relatively independent of socio-economic factors. The state was seen to have acquired primacy over classes and other social forces in international politics. The international system as a whole was said to exert an influence on the behaviour of states within the system, within which there was increasing multipolarity and diversity. Notwithstanding continued and intensified competition between capitalist economic power centres, the
scientific-technical revolution had stabilized capitalist economies and provided them with longer-term reserves of strength.\(^{19}\) (It would follow from this that a more stable capitalism would be less dangerous.)

Lynch saw a kind of benign convergence here with western non-Marxist analyses. Kubálková and Cruickshank suggested two alternative characterizations, one of which was more complimentary. On the one hand, New Thinking was seen as intellectually weak in that it amounted to "an eclectic mix of liberal, radical, and Marxist normative thought". On the other hand, it was said to have a more positive political potential as a "new Soviet (Gramscian) anti-hegemonic strategic blueprint for the future foreign policy direction of a weakening superpower".\(^{20}\) In this account, the main potential of New Thinking was seen to lie in its intellectual appeal as an alternative to the economic-technical appeal of capitalism, and to "power realism" as a theory of international relations. As I showed in my review of theories of the Cold War in Chapter 2, something close to "power realism" had been a central plank of the traditional Soviet account. New Thinking therefore posed a direct challenge to earlier Soviet modes of analysis.

In the area of policy analysis most directly related to disarmament, a school of civilian writers on the arms race was identified by Pat Litherland and dubbed the "mutualists". Their mutualism consisted of an analysis which conceded that the actions of the USSR contributed to
the arms race, and that traditional concepts of balance were of dubious value in maintaining peace and security. Once again, the work of these writers could be seen to have pre-dated Gorbachev's assumption of power, and Gorbachev's criticisms of earlier policies for relying too heavily on military guarantees of security at the expense of political measures took up some of the important mutualist themes. There was a common thread running through much of this first category of analysis: the more flexible and cooperative foreign policy practice of the New Thinking period was seen to a considerable extent as a matter of catching up with theoretical revisions developed earlier.

The second thread of analysis which can be identified posited a rather different relationship between theory and practice. Here, New Thinking was seen more in terms of the adaptation of theory to a foreign policy practice which had always been more pragmatic than the popular imagery of East-West conflict suggested. In the work of Stephen Shenfield and Margot Light, attention was drawn to the problems which the existence of nuclear weapons posed for theoretical assumptions about the link between war and revolution, and the threat which the danger of nuclear war was seen to pose to the inevitability of communism. Shenfield saw revisionist Soviet ideologists challenging the belief of the 1970s that peace would inevitably be strengthened as the correlation of forces shifted towards socialism. They contributed to New Thinking the ideas
that interdependence had become the main factor sustaining detente, and that "peace" should be prioritized over "socialism" as a goal of foreign policy.

Shenfield shared with Lynch and Litherland an analysis in which New Thinking incorporated features of pre-Gorbachev revisions. His account clearly described theory adapting itself to practice, however, in the sense that Soviet foreign policy had never in practice seen or used nuclear war as a way of attaining the victory of world communism, however it may have been burdened with a theoretical vocabulary which seemed to entail this. Light generalized this basic problem to demonstrate the tensions it had created throughout the post-revolutionary period. The imperative of preserving the revolution in the USSR itself gave the Bolsheviks an interest in prioritizing international order over international revolution, especially during the period when war with capitalism was regarded as inevitable. The consequent prioritization of Soviet national interests was easy enough in practice, particularly under Stalinism. But the commitment to international revolution and class struggle could not be entirely abandoned, and this led to uncomfortable formulations like the Khrushchevite and Brezhnevite definitions of peaceful coexistence, as something which was supposed simultaneously to ensure mutual non-interference between capitalist and socialist states, and to benefit the class struggle within capitalism.

In this account, New Thinking was therefore seen as an
attempt to adjust theory to practice, or at least to confront the theoretical problems and provide a firmer basis for the Soviet commitment to international order. Tensions remained, for it was not made clear how capitalism would be brought round to an acceptance of New Thinking, and the existing global order was still seen as illegitimate in key respects. Nevertheless, there was a strong underlying argument here to the effect that the USSR had never had a seriously revolutionary foreign policy, except for a brief period immediately after the revolution, and that New Thinking was in part a belated coming to terms with this fact.

The third important thread of analysis of New Thinking saw it as closely associated with a Soviet recognition of the USSR's relative decline as a global economic-technological power. While this interpretation formed part of the two analyses I have already summarized, it can be singled out because it provided a central feature of analyses written from both right and left, and has a particular importance for our understanding of arguments about the end of the Cold War. It took the concept of the Cold War as a genuine conflict between social systems rather more seriously than did the view of New Thinking as an adjustment of theory to practice, and in a number of its versions it contained a liberal dash of old-fashioned power realism.

In the USA, this interpretation was associated with a variety of more or less triumphalist analyses of western/US
"victory" in the Cold War, long-term Soviet decline, and, in Francis Fukuyama's case, a vainglorious attempt to reassert Hegel against Marx in the name of the "end of history".<sup>23</sup> Among left-wing analysts, there was a complementary exploration of the implications of Soviet reassessment of, and disengagement from, commitments to Third World allies.<sup>24</sup> Common to all these writers was an acceptance that there had been a genuine conflict in progress, and in some versions it was seen to continue.

In both versions of this argument the USSR was seen as accepting that Third World issues had a negative impact on US-Soviet detente in the late 1970s-early 1980s. Fred Halliday has pointed out that the USSR continued to provide military and diplomatic support to existing Third World allies (states and liberation movements), and that the USSR could not always force its allies to accept "national reconciliation" policies if they did not wish to. Even so, the conceptual basis for a policy of retreat was clearly expressed. One does not have to look too hard in the speeches and writings of the Soviet leadership to find supporting evidence for the theory of the USSR as a power in retreat. Gorbachev, Foreign Minister (until December 1990) Shevardnadze, and other academic commentators were extremely explicit about the Soviet economic crisis, their fears that the USSR (or its system) was in danger of losing the East-West competition, and about how concerns about the USSR's economic-technological (and hence potentially military) lag behind the West helped to prompt re-thinking.
in Soviet foreign policy. They also made it clear that they considered the USSR to have been moving towards a domestic socio-political crisis by the early 1980s, and that continued overextension in foreign policy would have complicated the task of solving domestic problems. In a speech to members of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy in mid-1987, Shevardnadze set out the goal of diplomacy as the formation of an external environment favourable to the internal development of a state. (Hardly a novel idea, of course, but hardly the language of a socialist superpower, either.) He went on to say that Soviet diplomacy had not done this successfully, and that the USSR had declined as an industrial power over the previous 15 years as a consequence of failings in the conduct of foreign policy. It is not difficult, therefore, to see why the Soviet leadership thought it had good reasons to listen to theorists who were offering novel interpretations of, and prescriptions for, foreign and security policy, which would allow the USSR to retrench and concentrate on domestic priorities.

The interrelationship between these diverse facets of New Thinking can be illustrated by a brief examination of three related and controversial issues in Soviet foreign policy debates over the 1985-89 period: the "great nation" problem, the level-of-discourse problem, and the problem of the nature of the West. The "great nation" problem was implicit in the analysis of New Thinking as prompted by an awareness of Soviet decline. Gorbachev made a speech in
October 1984, while he was effectively second secretary to the ailing Chernenko, which was only partly published in the Soviet press but was later reported in an Italian newspaper. He said, inter alia, that huge problems faced the USSR and that what was at stake was "the ability of the Soviet Union to enter the new millenium in a manner worthy of a great and prosperous power." Similar formulations were later used by a number of commentators on foreign policy, including advocates of more or less radical reforms. The argument was sometimes used in support of the need for immediate and radical disarmament measures, but there nevertheless remained a certain basic ambivalence in the way it was sometimes implicitly expressed: the USSR must be prepared to abandon its military superpower status in the short term, in the interests of remaining a great power in any sense in the 21st century.

A related problem concerned the conceptual level at which foreign and security policy were debated: the level of class struggle and values, the level of national security, or the level of universal values and the "deideologization" of foreign policy. The 1986 edition of the CPSU's Programme removed the previous formula about peaceful coexistence being a special form of class struggle, thus cutting through one of the central theoretical knots. Much Soviet civilian writing on security issues came to hover between the shared values asserted in the name of New Thinking and the language of "national security", which seemed to serve partly as a way
of establishing a common discourse with military writers (see Chapter 7). Universal or all-human values were asserted most frequently, along with "ideologization", though the latter was said to apply to "inter-state" relations rather than "international relations" as such.<28> This distinction was said to serve as a recognition that the differences between social systems continued to exist.

There was obviously still something of a tangle here. It led to a much-quoted exchange between Shevardnadze and Egor Ligachev in mid-1988, shortly after the 19th Party Conference. Shevardnadze made a speech to Foreign Ministry staff and diplomats which included an explicit rejection of the idea that peaceful coexistence could still be considered a form of class struggle, and a call for a "pluralism of views and evaluations" of foreign policy. Ligachev replied a few days later, with the words: "We proceed from the class character of international relations. Any other formulation of the question only introduces confusion into the thinking of Soviet people and our friends abroad. Active involvement in the solution of all-human problems in no way signifies any artificial "braking" of the social and national liberation struggle." Aleksandr Yakovlev then came to Shevardnadze's support, insisting on the subordination of class to "all-human" interests.<29> Shortly after this, Yakovlev was appointed to head a new Central Committee Commission on international policy.
A rather different tension emerged in 1989 in the context of Soviet relations with China. Gorbachev’s summit in Beijing with Deng Xiao-Ping was followed almost immediately by the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4th. There was no official Soviet condemnation of the massacre. One might argue that by the criteria of realpolitik and national security, the repairing of fences between the two parties after decades of antagonism and suspicion was too important to be jeopardized by such condemnation. But it was equally hard to see what conception of universal values would dictate turning a blind eye to the action of a supposedly socialist state in unleashing its army against the citizens of its capital city. It was sometimes argued that universal values were consistent with mutual non-interference in internal affairs, but this was a weak argument. It may well be that the attempt to identify actual universal values is fraught with problems of cultural relativity, but it is hard to see how one could claim both that they did in fact exist, and that there should be no actions or expressions of view which could be interpreted as interference in another state’s internal affairs. By mid-1989 the Soviet leadership could not escape without public criticism of this kind of inconsistency in policy. There were expressions of indignation in the press and in the Congress of People’s Deputies, where Andrei Sakharov demanded the recall of the Soviet ambassador from Beijing.\(^{30}\)

An even more fundamental question lay below the
surface of these problems in the theory and practice of foreign policy: the question of the nature and intentions of the West, or of capitalism, or of imperialism. New Thinking did contain a combination of universal moral appeal and foreign policy pragmatism, but neither of these aspects could hope to "work" in the international arena unless they were shared. As far as Soviet views of the West were concerned, it would be hard to see New Thinking as having any chance of taking root in the West if the leading capitalist powers were still seen as motivated by aggressive, militaristic hostility to the USSR and to the socialist system as a whole. Nor was this a purely theoretical question. As this discussion of New Thinking has shown, its leading advocates had made explicit admissions that a recognition of Soviet weakness played a large part in its elaboration. This was an awkward pill for many in the USSR to swallow, particularly in the military.\(^{31}\) One riposte made by supporters of New Thinking was to use reviews of Paul Kennedy's book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, a much-talked about work in US policy circles, as a way of expressing agreement with Kennedy's thesis about the inevitable decline of overextended powers. By implication, the argument here was that although New Thinking and retrenchment were necessities for the USSR, there were limits to the USA's ability to exploit Soviet weakness.\(^{32}\)

In the 1986 CPSU programme, the general crisis of capitalism was still said to be deepening, and the threat
of war said to emanate first and foremost from the USA. At
the same time, capitalism was seen as capable of making
concessions to working people in order to preserve itself
as a system. The strongest contrast with the previous
(1961) edition of the programme lay in the more restrained
tones used by the 1986 document in discussing the future of
the USSR. Khrushchev's 1961 programme had predicted that
the USSR would surpass the USA in per capita production by
1970, and that the material and technical basis for
communism would be created by 1980. In 1986, the new
programme said merely that: "The CPSU believes that under
the present domestic and international conditions the all­
round progress of Soviet society, its onward movement
towards communism can and must be ensured by speeding up
the country's socio-economic development."<33>

After 1986, both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze put
forward analyses suggesting that revised theoretical
assumptions now gave the USSR room to retreat from
previously-held views about capitalism's inability to
survive without militarism, and its impulse towards
military aggression as a result of economic crisis. These
were supplemented by academic analyses of western societies
as ones in which greater public control had been
established over militarism, so that there was no solid
social basis for aggressive actions against the USSR.<34>

The concepts and vocabulary of New Thinking seemed to
touch on some of the most fundamental aspects of the WTO as
an alliance. Insofar as inter-systemic conflict began to be
played down at the expense of values like peace and interdependence, it undermined traditional claims to the effect that the WTO served to defend the gains of socialism in Eastern Europe. At the same time, however, the caveats involved in the argument that different social systems still existed could be interpreted as a warning that the alliance baby would not be thrown out with the bathwater of what was now being described as an "ideologized" foreign policy. Repeated statements concerning the desirability of the non-violent resolution of conflicts, and of non-interference in other states' internal affairs, carried with them an implicit condemnation of the past Soviet role in Eastern Europe, though these implications were not at first drawn out by the Soviet political leaders themselves. Only academics like Dashichev made such explicit connections prior to 1989, though the anti-intervention clause of the 1986 Stockholm agreement was a clear enough acceptance of the illegitimacy of intervention.

New Thinking in the sense of a retreat from a confrontational to a more relaxed approach to East-West relations also posed the question of Eastern Europe with some urgency. One could argue that Soviet policy in Eastern Europe had involved a fairly close correspondence of theory to practice, in that theoretical assertions of the importance of a socialist alliance had been accompanied periodically by the use of military force to bring reality back towards theory. (The theory may have been inadequate, of course, but at least Eastern Europe did not produce the
kind of contradictions visible in Soviet policy elsewhere in the world in cases where good relations were preserved with states whose communist parties were repressed.) If New Thinking involved a recognition that the socialist system was in danger of losing a genuine East-West competition, the question inevitably arose of how secure the socialist states of Eastern Europe were considered to be. If they could no longer be supported by intra-alliance military actions, how would their adherence to the socialist system be guaranteed?

In the Soviet discussion of the staying-power of capitalism, the case for a Soviet retrenchment policy could be related to a retreat from over-commitment in the Third World without this involving too fundamental a challenge to the international socialist system. The states of the WTO, however, comprised the very core of that system. Furthermore, if New Thinking enabled Soviet analysts to start thinking and writing in terms of "national security", did this mean that the security of the WTO states, and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, had become secondary considerations? These political questions about the future of the WTO were only temporarily obscured by the important nuclear disarmament negotiations of the mid-1980s.

"Reasonable Sufficiency" and Disarmament

In the sphere of public diplomacy, the implications of New Thinking became visible in the use of the concept of "reasonable sufficiency", which came to replace parity as
the favoured criterion for measuring the Soviet defence effort. Gorbachev's own use of the term was dated by Soviet commentators from a speech he made during his visit to France in late 1985. Earlier uses of similar terms, such as "sufficient defence" and "sufficient security" (by Brezhnev and Chernenko) have also been pointed out. Gorbachev himself, in making his report to the CPSU Congress in February 1986, specified as one of the principles of his proposed international security system "a strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable adequacy" (razumnaya dostatcchnost'). After this, "reasonable sufficiency" became the more standard translation.

The practical implications of this new formulation were not self-evident from the context, though it was certainly a verbal shift away from the traditional commitment to "parity and equal security". The new Party Programme, as adopted at the same congress, was ambivalent about parity. One the one hand it spoke of the Soviet attainment of parity as a "historic achievement of socialism", thus placing constraints on the ideological elbow-room available for any critique of parity. On the other hand, it revised the formula used to describe the Party's commitment to the provision of resources for defence. Previously (most notably in the 1977 Soviet constitution) the wording was: "The state ensures the security and defence capability of the country, and supplies the armed forces of the USSR with everything
necessary for that purpose."<39> In the 1986 Programme, the Party committed itself only to maintaining forces "at a level ruling out strategic superiority of the forces of imperialism", which was clearly a weaker formulation and suggested a possible retreat from numerical parity.<40>

These new formulations followed on from Gorbachev's January 1986 statement in which he spoke of the need to repudiate the "notorious logic" of the arms race, and outlined his three-stage plan for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000. In his February speech, Gorbachev also spoke of parity as a factor of declining efficacy in ensuring military-political restraint, a concept which clearly owed much to the mutualist analysis identified by Litherland. The relationship between these comments and the disarmament proposals seemed to amount to an acceptance that the level of nuclear overkill involved in the existing parity permitted deep cuts to be made without damage to Soviet security, and even that unilateral cuts were possible on the Soviet side. These points became clear both from publications which elaborated the new approach, and from Gorbachev's subsequent disarmament diplomacy.

Some of the commentators with responsibility for explaining these developments spelled out the declining significance of numerical parity, while others spoke of "approximate parity" in terms which made it clear that what they were talking about was maintaining a retaliatory capability while cuts took place - in effect, a move towards an advocacy of minimum deterrence and mutually
assured destruction at decreasing levels of nuclear forces.<41>

There were some notable ironies in the Soviet negotiating position during this period. Although a thoroughgoing critique of nuclear deterrence on strategic and moral grounds was being presented under the banner of New Thinking, in practice Soviet negotiating policy was asserting the continued need for nuclear deterrence in its simplest form, in the sense of preserving the ABM Treaty from the Reagan administration's assaults on it and plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Soviet scholars produced elaborations of Gorbachev's schematic (in the third phase, highly schematic) plan for deep cuts, and on occasions went out of their way to distance themselves from the suggestion that reasonable sufficiency entailed perpetual minimum deterrence rather than complete denuclearization. This seemed to be part of a debate between different groups of scholars and diplomats, some of whom took the aspiration to a nuclear-free world seriously, while others regarded it as misplaced or naive, particularly in view of the existence of third-party nuclear systems.<42> At the same time, reasonable sufficiency seemed to cover the possibility of the USSR making an asymmetrical or "semi-symmetrical" military response to SDI, if negotiations failed to block the project.<43>

Negotiations at Geneva were about to recommence by the time Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985. His
First initiatives were a new SS-20 and counterdeployments moratorium in April 1985, followed by the moratorium on nuclear testing announced on August 1st 1985, and later extended until early 1987. In October 1985, during his visit to France, Gorbachev made another set of proposals which included a reduction of SS-20s in the European zone of the USSR and the possibility of a separate INF agreement. After the November summit with Reagan in Geneva came the January 1986 statement, which included acceptance of the principle of on-site verification for the third stage. In the course of his February 1986 Congress speech, Gorbachev made the notably mutualist comment that "in the military sphere we intend to act in such a way as to give nobody grounds for fears, even imagined, about their security". This seemed to amount to an admission that earlier military buildups had been excessive. At this stage it appeared that a separate Euromissile agreement was possible independently of negotiations on SDI and long-range missiles, but this position was abandoned at Reykjavik in October 1986. Here, a Soviet offer of major cuts, including the zero-zero INF deal, in exchange for constraints on SDI, was blocked by US insistence on the highly dubious "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. This Soviet position was reversed again in early 1987, perhaps with encouragement from the East Europeans, and the "Zero Option" once again became a possibility. The Izvestiya journalist Aleksandr Bovin openly queried the wisdom of the original deployment of
Soviet SS-20s, and by the end of the year as the Washington Summit and the INF Treaty signature approached, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh endorsed Bovin's view with the words: "a number of decisions have clearly not been optimal".<49>

After much uncertainty during the summer of 1987, especially over the role of Pershing-Ia missiles operated by the FRG with US warheads, the INF Treaty was finally agreed, and signed during Gorbachev's visit to Washington in December. The adjustments to the Soviet position which were made during the course of that year served to expose NATO's disarray and embarrassment at the Soviet acceptance of a "Zero Option" proposal which had not been considered a serious negotiating offer when first put forward by the USA. Indeed, the conclusion of a "Double Zero" agreement covering two categories of land-based missiles amounted to a substantial unilateral cut on the Soviet side, and testified to the adventurousness of the policies licenced by New Thinking. Existing overkill capacities and retargetting capabilities may not have entailed actual reductions in Soviet warheads targeted on Western Europe (or vice versa), but the treaty was undeniably an instance of disarmament as distinct from arms control, and represented a significant shift from the previously established notions of parity.<50> On the NATO side, the perceived requirements of flexible response came under much discussion as a consequence of the treaty, which reflected the way in which Gorbachev had called the West's bluff in
the negotiations. It is true that the treaty appeared to threaten declared NATO strategy more directly than Soviet strategy, even if the more extreme lamentations about the perceived danger of a denuclearized Europe were grossly overstated.\(^{51}\) In terms of Soviet military strategy, the INF Treaty fitted in with the kind of planning described by MccGwire and Donnelly, in the sense that even a limited denuclearization of Europe might reduce the risks of intercontinental nuclear escalation and attacks on Soviet territory in the event of war. It was also consistent with Soviet support over the previous few years for a variety of disengagement plans in parts of Europe: the "Palme corridor" proposal for a nuclear-free corridor along the inner-German border; negotiations between the West German SPD, the East German SED and the Czechoslovakian party for a nuclear- and chemical-free zone; Nordic and Balkan nuclear-free zone proposals.\(^{52}\) These plans, as well as the INF Treaty itself, were all very welcome to the East European leaderships, which had fretted at the immobilism of Soviet diplomacy in 1984 and early 1985.

The argument that this Soviet diplomacy was closely calibrated with the requirements of military strategy, so that the INF Treaty was militarily advantageous to the USSR, was put with some force by a number of commentators.\(^{53}\) There was some justification for this, at least in the sense that the nuclear agreements concluded and proposed presented no threat to the conventionalization of Soviet strategy which Chapter 5 examined. However, a
number of caveats should be entered.

Firstly, Gorbachev's diplomacy during this period was extremely innovative, and major concessions were made—the exclusion of British and French systems from INF calculations; on-site inspection in the Stockholm and INF agreements; delinking INF from SDI. At one stage, an American observer commented that if Gorbachev made any more concessions, he would come close to accepting the Reagan arms control agenda in its entirety. This flexibility also seemed to cause domestic problems for Gorbachev, for as early as mid-1986 there were reports of military unhappiness in the USSR about his persistence with approaches to the West in the face of US indifference, particularly over the moratorium on nuclear tests (though in fact the moratorium probably caused little or no disruption to Soviet weapons development). It was even being suggested, reportedly, that Gorbachev had illusions about the US administration.

Secondly, it is not clear that the INF Treaty had no impact on Soviet planning, in spite of the nuclear retargetting options available. Dennis M Gormley argued: "...the elimination of over 400 SS-20 launchers and 1,500 nuclear warheads will impose unwanted constraints on Soviet nuclear contingency planning for an escalating conflict." The counterdeployment missiles to be removed from East European territory were also among the weapons which had earlier been identified as playing an important role in Soviet conventional planning, since some
of them were dual-capable. Finally, it was quite clear from mid-1986 onwards that the Soviet leadership knew very well that if and when an INF treaty was signed, attention would shift to conventional forces in Europe. The 1986 Budapest Appeal was a recognition of this, and discussions in the Soviet press of reasonable sufficiency as a criterion for conventional forces supported the evidence from public diplomacy. This will be the subject of Chapter 7.

Public discussions of the treaty in the USSR can also be adduced as evidence in the examination of New Thinking and its military applications. There were a number of instances when the Soviet press mentioned public expressions of concern about the unbalanced nature of the treaty, after the rather belated admission that the USSR would have to destroy more missiles than the USA. There was a tendency in the West to dismiss these as window-dressing. However, even though the military leadership fell into line behind the treaty, there was evidence that concern extended beyond the professional military who might have been expected to have reservations. Sceptical currents in public opinion had been expressed well before the signature of the treaty, when an early 1987 opinion poll published in Kommunist echoed some familiar western views about nuclear disarmament: 30 per cent of those questioned thought denuclearization would heighten the risk of conventional war, and 22 per cent thought the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons was impossible because they
could not be disinvented. In their public explanations of the treaty's terms, the military leadership and civilian leaders and commentators made a number of points related to the apparent imbalance: arithmetical calculations were less important than making a first step towards disarmament; approximate parity remained in force both strategically and in Europe; it was especially important to get rid of Pershing-IIIs because of their short flight-time; the number of modern missiles to be destroyed was very close on either side. Shevardnadze made a particular effort to address concerns he said had been expressed by the public. The Supreme Soviet finally ratified the treaty just before the Moscow summit, in late May 1988.

This chapter has shown how the logic of Soviet accounts of New Thinking in international relations placed in question the future of the WTO as an alliance whose cohesion depended ultimately on the threat of the internal Soviet use of force. The immediate diplomatic and military consequences of New Thinking were seen in the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations and in the signature of the INF Treaty. This served to place the external functions of the WTO in question in a less direct but equally fundamental manner, because the conclusion of the treaty brought conventional forces in Europe back into the spotlight.

In chapters 4 and 5, I showed how the logic of Soviet
military developments up until the mid-1980s seemed to entail an increase, if anything, in the importance of the Soviet strategic position in Eastern Europe within the requirements of an offensive-defensive conventional strategy. The prolonged stalemate of the MBFR negotiations served to underline this. At the time New Thinking began to be elaborated there were some identifiable developments in the Soviet position on the inspection of eastern territory, but even the Stockholm CDE agreement did not affect the core of either side's military strategy. If taken at face value, however, New Thinking did entail that the role of military postures in East-West relations could be very radically questioned, and that apparently offensive postures should be revised. The prospect of a new conventional arms control negotiation to succeed MBFR pointed the way to a forum in which this could be tested. My next chapter, on Alternative Soviet Strategies, takes up this part of the story.

In spite of the developments in WTO political structures which I documented in Chapter 3, and the apparent broadening of the limits of Soviet tolerance of political developments in Eastern Europe, it still seemed reasonable in 1988 to suppose that there were limits to Soviet tolerance in intra-bloc affairs. If New Thinking were treated as a serious attempt to limit the role of force in international relations, however, it seemed to entail that no version of the Brezhnev Doctrine could be used to reimpose "normality" in Eastern Europe. The clause
of the Stockholm agreement outlawing intra-bloc intervention seemed to support this. If New Thinking were treated as an exercise in foreign policy pragmatism, it also seemed to allow for the possibility of a Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe if the costs of retaining a security zone there came to be considered too great. However, these hypotheses could not be tested in the absence of a major challenge to the political status quo in Eastern Europe, and the early formulations of New Thinking did not offer clear guidance to Soviet actions in the event of such a challenge. When that challenge came, in the form of the dramatic political upheavals of 1989, many of these questions were answered. As it turned out, these upheavals were able to take place without serious bloodshed in every WTO member-state except Romania, where the USSR’s ability to influence events was lower than elsewhere. These events, together with the USSR’s reaction and their implications for the WTO as an alliance, are dealt with in Chapter 8.
The Soviet and East European discussions of alternative conventional strategies which took place during the mid-to-late 1980s did not develop in a vacuum. At least in their early stages, they were a response to debates which had developed a few years earlier in Western Europe. In this chapter I review the western debates on alternative defence, and assess their impact in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The effects of this western debate are weighed against other influences on Soviet strategic thinking during the period, and the account of the reasonable sufficiency debate is extended with a discussion of its application to conventional forces and strategies. This is related to statements and declarations made by WTO and Soviet bodies and figures, to the December 1988 announcement of reductions in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and to the opening of the CFE negotiations in March 1989. The chief concern of this chapter, therefore, is the evolution of the WTO's external strategic policy as reflected in Soviet military strategy. I comment on the fact that most of the Soviet literature on alternative strategy continued to neglect questions of intra-alliance military policy, and try to account for this omission.
The alternative security debates of the 1980s tried to grapple with several apparently intractable strategic facts of the post-war era. In purely military terms, the USA's main strengths after 1945 lay in the combination of a nuclear arsenal with strong air and sea forces and an extensive overseas base system. The USSR, despite its development of a comparable nuclear arsenal, remained much more of a traditional land power, for which the control of territory in East-Central Europe was considered to be crucial to the security of the USSR itself.

This is not to say that territory was unimportant for NATO, since its central rationale was to ensure the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Germany and its neighbours. However, there was an important asymmetry of threat perceptions within Europe. The USSR feared nuclear devastation arising from escalation from a smaller-scale conflict, or perhaps accident, even after the fear of premeditated attack had declined. The West principally feared Soviet conventional forces, or some political use of them. In fact, Soviet control of territory in East-Central Europe could not by itself ever have prevented western attacks with nuclear missiles, but it undeniably made a contribution to the Soviet military posture, as Chapter 5 explained. Equally importantly, perhaps, it provided a buffer against the political threat to existing socialism from democratic capitalism (for want of better terms).
The alternative defence and security debates in the West tended to take both sets of military fears seriously, as political brute facts, even if not as entirely justified fears. For the most part, however, they treated the ideological Cold War conflict as secondary, suggesting that political conflicts could be more easily resolved once the most dangerous military postures had been removed or reformed. In putting forward proposals to reduce the fears of East and West, proponents of alternative approaches concentrated for the most part on Soviet conventional strategy and on conventional alternatives to the nuclear emphasis in NATO's flexible response doctrine. A certain amount of exposition of the western concepts is necessary before the eastern debate, and its implications for the WTO, can be properly assessed.

On the western side one can identify a spectrum of positions ranging from Atlanticist reformers and advocates of "Common Security", through a variety of concrete military models for alternative defence, to the more radical anti-bloc and pacifist proposals of a number of groups and individuals in the peace movements.

At the establishment end of the spectrum were the Atlanticist reformers, figures like the Foreign Affairs "Gang of Four" who in 1982 advocated No-First-Use of nuclear weapons in the course of an attempt to reestablish a transatlantic consensus in the face of challenges from the Western European and US peace movements. In the international sphere, Olof Palme's global initiative
brought together establishment figures to advocate Common Security in 1982, with the participation of Georgii Arbatov from the USSR.\textsuperscript{2} The Palme Commission proposed a Central European zone free of chemical and battlefield nuclear weapons, but did not go as far as to address non-offensive conventional strategies or advocate bloc dissolution, and was criticized from the left for its state-centred model and relatively cautious challenge to nuclear deterrence.\textsuperscript{3}

In the 1970s and early 80s, groups and individuals in Western Europe, particularly in the FRG, were putting forward alternative models for the conventional defence of Western Europe, with minimum or no reliance on nuclear weapons. These researchers and writers were following in the footsteps of previous attempts on similar lines, including the League of Nations' unsuccessful attempt in the 1930s to reduce all nations' capacity for offensive war, and further attempts in the FRG in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{4} There was considerable variety in the models put forward for "non-provocative defence", but a succinct definition was offered by Egbert Boeker and Lutz Unterseher:

"The build-up, training, logistics, and doctrine of the armed forces are such that they are seen in their totality to be unsuitable for offence, but unambiguously sufficient for a credible conventional defence. Nuclear weapons fulfil at most a retaliatory role."\textsuperscript{5}

This formulation avoided the difficulties involved in attributing defensive or offensive characteristics to individual weapons systems, and allowed for considerable
flexibility. Among the models put forward under this general rubric was Anders Boserup's formulaic advocacy of "mutual defensive superiority" as a criterion for stability, which was designed to prevent a decisive outcome on the battlefield and ensure that crucial decisions remained in the hands of the politicians.<6> A wide variety of more specific models were also put forward, some closer than others to the existing NATO posture. In the FRG the debate inevitably became entangled with relationship of some of the alternative proponents to the SPD.<7> In the UK, the Labour Party's espousal of the principal tenets of alternative defence was not accompanied by such a range of debate, in spite of the Alternative Defence Commission's work (see below), and this contributed to the low electoral profile accorded to the issue in 1987.<8> Elsewhere in Europe, some of the most notable work was done in Denmark, where the University of Copenhagen's Centre of Peace and Conflict Research provided a forum for the work of Anders Boserup and Bjorn Moller.<9> It can be dangerous to generalize about such a diverse body of work, but many of the alternative defence modellers did not want to appear to be posing a fundamental challenge to the existing European security system, in the sense that they tended to accept, if only for the sake of argument, establishment views about the likely form of a possible Soviet/WTO conventional attack on Western Europe. This was done partly because convincing existing military institutions of the value of alternative approaches was
seen as important, and it was argued that WTO reciprocation was desirable, but not a condition for western restructuring. However, they certainly sought to challenge alarmist views about the likelihood of premeditated Soviet attack, and considered the dangers to crisis stability in Europe to lie in the existing mutual threat postures, exemplified in the first instance by NATO's nuclear first-use posture and WTO conventional forces.

One can draw a distinction between some of these writers and more radical currents within western peace movements, which either took up "civilian defence" or pacifist positions, or argued explicitly not only for European nuclear disarmament, but also for European disengagement from the US nuclear umbrella, and for the dissolution of both NATO and the WTO.<10> The alternative military modellers also insisted that military planning had to be seen as part of a détente policy rather than as an autonomous sphere of activity, but within the peace movements there was always a certain wariness between proponents of the two approaches. Although it can certainly be argued that the alternative military modellers had points in common with both the Atlanticist reform currents and the anti-bloc radicals, the underlying tensions between the different political agendas can be seen clearly in any comparison between the views of the reformers and the radicals. The former were explicitly trying to reestablish an atlanticist consensus, while many of the latter were challenging that very concept and tended
towards explicitly anti-imperialist views of both the USA and the USSR. A failure to come to terms with these very different agendas led some academics with broadly alternative sympathies into unconvincing attempts to find a non-existent consensus.<11>

In Britain, the general principles of alternative defence were taken up by the Alternative Defence Commission in its 1983 report, which also aimed positively at the decoupling of US strategic nuclear weapons from Western Europe.<12> In its second report, the ADC presented a more fully articulated anti-bloc argument which moved it further from the alternative military modellers' approach.<13> Within the western debate, the advocates of bloc dissolution often took a strongly critical view of Soviet policy, particularly in Eastern Europe.<14> There was also a limited amount of innovative writing on Soviet military policy in general, but by and large the examination of Soviet military policy was not taken up by alternative writers concentrating on detailed military plans.<15> Criticisms of alternative modelling voiced from the left included not only the charge that it did not challenge the existing bloc structures, but also that it was compatible with arguments for continued high defence spending (which was borne out in the case of the British Labour Party), and that its language could all too easily be turned back against the peace movement (as clearly happened in Reagan's 1983 SDI speech). From the right, meanwhile, came charges that the alternative military
models were not effective, and would leave gaps to be
exploited by Soviet/WTO forces, which would on no account
reciprocate.<16>

It is impossible to discuss these controversies
without paying some further attention to the question of
military balance in Europe. As I explained in Chapter 5,
the assumption that a perceived Soviet military advantage
in Europe could be used as an instrument of political
leverage lay behind many of the fundamental debates about
the Cold War. There is a voluminous western literature on
the methodology of balance calculations, in which the
methods of calculation employed range from static "bean
count" comparisons of personnel and equipment, to more
dynamic models which take into account factors such as the
quality of equipment on the two sides, the terrain of
combat, the quality of the respective forces' training,
tactics and command, and the reliability of the
superpowers' allies (alliance cohesion).

The trend of much of this revisionist literature was
to argue that bean counts were misleading, and that the
eastern advantage in Europe was not so great as to give the
USSR much hope of carrying out a successful offensive in
the region. Nor was scepticism about bean-counting
restricted to peace researchers or left-wing writers on
security, since reservations about the significance of
purely numerical comparisons had been expressed before 1988
even by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies.<17> Even so, much of the revisionist balance
literature carried the clear implication that the military situation in Europe was less alarming for the West than the public discourse of "overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority" had traditionally suggested.

Resistance to this kind of revisionism about the "Soviet threat" did not always take the form of an insistence on numerical comparisons unfavourable to the West. Some NATO analysts argued that force-to-space ratios were more significant than overall numerical superiority, in the sense that what was most important for a successful offensive was the ability to concentrate superior forces where they mattered most, at vital breakthrough points or against weaker formations on the opponent's side. It was argued in this context that Soviet military planners paid more attention to these detailed calculations than NATO's planners, and that the WTO may in fact have had too many forces in Eastern Europe to carry out its offensive strategy successfully. The East, this argument went on, was therefore in a better position to calculate ways in which its forces might be cut in order to make successful offensive operations easier. This was clearly a point at which balance calculations needed to take account of the respective sides' doctrines and strategies, and at which the proponents of alternative defence could confront the balance calculations.

The non-offensive or alternative argument pointed out that as long as offensive strategies existed on either side, the other side would always be able to see itself as
in danger of being attacked, and even debates about force-to-space ratios would have to be conducted within this framework. Balance, therefore, was less important than the achievement of stability through non-offensive postures, and there was room for criticism of western conventional concepts as well as eastern ones (for example, of the offensive capacity of NATO air power, and of US and West German tank divisions).

**Eastern Responses**

In 1984, Stephan Tiedtke challenged an assumption which had been implicit in many of the alternative military modellers' discussions: that Soviet/WTO responses to western alternative proposals need not be explored until after changes had been made in the West.<18> The alternative defence debate evolved rapidly after 1984, but Tiedtke's article remained an excellent model for organizing discussion of the eastern side of that debate as it took shape later in the decade, and posed the central questions about the internal and external functions of WTO strategy with great clarity. His main points could be summarized as follows:

(i) The likely responses and security interests of the WTO countries had not been sufficiently taken into account in formulating alternative defence strategies, but they needed to be considered if such a strategy was intended to be part of a political scheme of detente.

(ii) Soviet and East European commentators had difficulty
dealing with alternative defence concepts, possibly because they were worried about a widening of debate.

(iii) Alternative defence strategies in Western Europe would be bound to have some effect in the East, so the likely response should be investigated. Military detente should be the goal: "As regards detente, the aim of alternative defence strategies should...... be to make it possible for the WTO to forgo its offensive strategy".

(iv) A no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy in the West would remove one of the main deterrence-related justifications for Soviet strategy, which was intended to prevent the USA fighting a limited nuclear war in Europe.

(v) A conventional defence posture "should preclude as far as possible the ability to intervene militarily in the domestic conflicts of the opposing system".

(vi) Corresponding changes would be needed in East European alliance and also social policy, and there was a sense in which alternative western conceptions might present a challenge in Eastern Europe, since the repressive use of military integration would become more difficult.

Tiedtke's own conclusion was that the East-West confrontation in Europe could best initially be reduced by altering the alliances rather than by trying to break them up. His article was a contribution to the German debate, but obviously had much wider application and could equally well have been applied to the British ADC's first Report.

At the time when Tiedtke's 1984 article was published, there had been little indication of Soviet or East European
interest in the western discussions of alternative defence.

At this stage, work published in the USSR remained largely within the confines of the Palme Commission's Common Security advocacy, although on occasions notice was taken of the western discussions.<19> Tiedtke made the point that although this might be partly explained by a Soviet assessment that there was then little likelihood of such alternatives being implemented, one would still expect more attention to have been paid to them. In 1984 his evaluation of the eastern level of interest was certainly correct, and in publications of proceedings of major conferences on alternative security from that time, there was little evidence of substantive East-West discussions either of Soviet strategy or of western alternatives.

Neither a 1983 SIPRI conference, nor a 1985 conference in Toronto, seem to have advanced the discussion very far; indeed, the editor of the latter set of proceedings mentioned the confusion which arose between eastern and western participants in a discussion of non-provocative defence.<20>

From 1984 onwards, however, signs began to emerge of increasing eastern interest in alternative and non-provocative defence strategies. The number of these discussions was at first small by comparison with the attention paid to trends within NATO such as Airland Battle (ALB) and Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA), but from 1986 onwards clear references began to be made to non-offensive concepts in important speeches by Gorbachev himself, and in
1986 and 87 the WTO's Political Consultative Committee issued its statements on defensive military doctrines. The sequence of events suggested that interest spread from foreign policy academics, some of them East Europeans, to the Soviet political leadership itself.

The development of this eastern interest in alternative concepts can be traced through a variety of western, East European and Soviet publications. In early 1984, Stephen Shenfield wrote in ADIU Report about Viktor Girshfeld, a Soviet academic at the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and advocate of "sufficient defence" (dostatochnaya obozona). Girshfeld's concept involved shifting resources from tanks to anti-tank weapons, although without eliminating offensive capabilities altogether. Subsequent interviews with anonymous or pseudonymous Soviet figures in the British journal Detente hinted at similar ideas, but did not go into much detail.<21>

Some fuller analyses of alternative defence possibilities came from East European sources, particularly in Hungary and the GDR. A number of papers dealing with alternative defence were written by Professor László Valki, head of the International Law Department at Eötvös Lorand University in Budapest and Secretary-General of the Hungarian Centre for Peace Research Coordination. Valki presented papers at a number of conferences in Western Europe, and published several versions in English.<22> Valki based most of his treatment of alternative defence on
German writings, plus discussions in Pugwash circles and the Generals for Peace organization. He contrasted NATO deep-strike developments with the kind of alternatives advocated by Horst Afheldt and Albrecht von Müller, and was generally positive about the defensive emphasis and stabilizing potential of the concept, but also voiced a number of reservations:

(1) the realization of defensive defence was unlikely;
(2) defensive defence could be seen as strengthening NATO if NATO could make its European defence impregnable, particularly if any NATO nuclear weapons remained in place while the concept was being implemented;
(3) an invulnerable defence might give a perception of superiority even if not an actual superiority;
(4) sea-based forces should be involved;
(5) conventional war might once again become thinkable in Europe.

Valki tended to be cautious about addressing Soviet strategy directly, but some of the points noted above do merit further examination, in particular his reservations (2) and (3). There was a sense in which these objections rather missed the point of defensive defence, since many of its proponents did not support the retention in Western Europe of offensive nuclear weapons, or at least supported a no-first-use policy and a posture which would make it credible. However, Valki was also making a point about European developments in a wider strategic context, as in his remark: "A strategic balance is a global and complex
phenomenon". To put it crudely, he seemed to be implying that the vulnerability of Western Europe to the WTO was at present an important element in a global balance, though he did not say this in so many words. Bjorn Moller expressed this point slightly differently by saying that: "Every attempt by NATO to attain conventional parity in the European theatre is perceived by the Soviet Union as an American attempt to attain global superiority." One could argue from the Soviet or WTO point of view that if Western Europe became impregnable even thanks to a non-offensive defence, and this was accompanied by, say, uncontrolled developments in offensive US naval strategies and forward-deployment in other regions, there could still be a net loss to perceived Soviet/WTO security.

Some equally sophisticated analyses were produced by writers on alternatives from the GDR. As early as 1983, work was being done within the GDR Federation of Protestant Churches which dealt with the evolution of German-German relations within the existing bloc structure, but in which approval of Palme corridor-type proposals was accompanied by more adventurous comments on the dangers of existing conventional strategies. Writers like Joachim Garstecki and Walter Romberg developed a school of thought which combined a rigorous critique of deterrence (including the argument that deterrence and common security were incompatible) with a search for crisis-stability through non-offensive defence strategies. In a paper written...
for the 1986 IPRA (International Peace Research Association) conference and published in ADIU Report, Professor Alfred Bönisch of the GDR Central Social Science Institute quoted Afheldt approvingly on the need to make both sides unable to use their military forces offensively. He went on to say that scientists from socialist countries had been arguing on similar lines, though here he seemed to be referring to flexible response only.<27>

If these contributions from the GDR placed an understandable emphasis on the need for crisis stability in Central Europe, the global concerns which seemed to underlie Valki's treatment were more noticeable in early Soviet discussions of alternative defence and European security. The global argument seemed a comprehensible concern from an orthodox eastern military standpoint in which balance remained important, and something similar was expressed in 1985 by N Kishilov, writing in International Affairs [Moscow] on "Problems of Military Detente in Europe". Kishilov wrote: "What is the meaning of "the equilibrium of military forces on the European level"? In our view, it is a component element of the global military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA. The main components of the global military-strategic balance include both offensive and defensive forces of the sides." Also: "The equilibrium of military forces on the European level is a complex category comprising many components and at the same time it is a changeable category."<28> This suggested a military approach likely to be wary of non-
offensive defence; the underlying logic seemed to be that whether or not the WTO actually had conventional superiority in Central Europe, this was one of the few areas of the globe where the USSR could have much hope of ever attaining superiority over its western adversaries.

Denis Healey recounted a conversation he had in Moscow with similar implications, and did not seem to appreciate the grounds on which an unnamed Soviet general objected to his (and General Rogers') alternative suggestion: "I recently discussed with a Soviet General in Moscow General Rogers' proposal for laying pipes underground on West German territory which could be filled with an explosive slurry to create wide and deep tank traps in case of war. The Soviet General opposed it on the grounds that it would provide NATO forces with "an inviolable sanctuary" - the best recommendation possible, I would have thought!"<29> Further items in the Soviet press in late 1985 and early 1986 indicated close study of the western debate and its repercussions in Western European political parties, notably articles in International Affairs and SSHA by E Silin, and AA Kokoshin respectively.<30> These articles were non-committal or cautiously positive about alternative ideas, as was G Shakhnazarov in a 1988 review of Dietrich Fischer's book Preventing War in the Nuclear Age.<31> The Kokoshin article contained an intriguing passage which amounted almost to an acceptance that NATO's nuclear first use policy had been justified in the 1950s at a time when NATO conventional forces were weak and the USSR still had
large ground forces, although it was also critical of alternative writers' treatment of Soviet military thought. The 1986 yearbook published by IMEMO also indicated acquaintance with the western literature, and made positive comments about a number of the western concepts.

One comment made repeatedly by these eastern writers came very close to the first point of Stephan Tiedtke's commentary: alternative defence strategies should be regarded as only one element in a broad edifice of European security policy. The point was made implicitly or explicitly by Valki, Silin, Kokoshin, and Bönisch. Up to a point it may have been an attempt to divert western criticism of offensive Soviet strategies, but there seemed to be more to it than that. It was clear by early 1986 that there was a discussion going on in a fuller sense than Tiedtke had seen two years before, though western specialists had not begun to examine the eastern response. The principal eastern reservations about alternatives could at this time be identified as: (a) a political assessment of the peripherality of alternative concepts, which might nevertheless be declining; (b) a military wariness about the implications of alternatives for a global balance; and (c) a political point about the need for military alternatives to be put forward as part of a broader security concept.

Throughout this period, fora for East-West discussion of alternatives were provided by specialist bodies such as
the Pugwash Study Group on Conventional Forces in Europe. This forum began meeting in 1984, and judging by the published reports of its proceedings, it facilitated discussion between civilian and military experts, and also began to look in some detail at WTO strategies.<sup>34</sup> It was also able to make authoritative statements on the problem, such as its Memorandum to the Stockholm Conference in early 1986, *Force Structures Specialized for Defence as a New Approach to European Security.*<sup>35</sup>

From 1986 onwards, Gorbachev began to make some promising allusions to alternative defence, in contexts which seemed to relate it to the concept of reasonable sufficiency already examined in Chapter 6. In making his General Secretary's report to the CPSU Congress in February 1986, Gorbachev made a particular effort to address western fears in his comments that: "The Soviet military doctrine is also entirely in keeping with the letter and spirit of the initiatives we have put forward. Its orientation is unequivocally defensive. In the military sphere we intend to act in such a way as to give nobody grounds for fears, even imagined, about their security."<sup>36</sup> Gorbachev's choice of words here seemed to imply a recognition that past Soviet actions had not been sufficiently reassuring, though the reference was not explicit enough to make it clear whether the self-criticism might be directed at nuclear policies or conventional strategies. More explicit references to non-offensive alternatives began to appear in mid-1986. Speaking in East Berlin in April, Gorbachev
followed up his February remarks with a further appeal to Western Europe: "One more thing. I would like to appeal to all the West Europeans from here, from the capital of the socialist GDR: do not believe allegations about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. Our country will never and under no circumstances begin armed operations against Western Europe unless we or our allies become targets of a NATO attack! I repeat, never!"<37>

The Budapest Appeal of the WTO in June 1986 broke some new ground: "In the interests of security in Europe and the whole world, the military concepts and doctrines of the military alliances must be based on defensive principles."<38> Although the statement went on to restate the traditional position that WTO doctrine was defensive in nature, no such claim was made for military concepts, and the implied opening-up of a discussion of defensive alternatives seemed to be addressed to both sides. Speaking in Vladivostok in July, Gorbachev mentioned reasonable sufficiency as a principle applicable to conventional forces in Asia, in the course of a speech directed towards China and the Pacific.<39> In a number of speeches during early 1987, Gorbachev made some even clearer allusions to alternative defence. Speaking to the Moscow Forum for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World in February, he said: "It is important, in our view, while scaling down military confrontation, to carry through such measures as would make it possible to lessen, or better still, altogether exclude the possibility of surprise attack. The most dangerous
offensive arms must be removed from the zone of contact. Quite naturally, military doctrines must be purely of a defensive nature."<40> One of the western speakers at this Forum was Anders Boserup. Boserup's paper "Road to Trust: Non-Aggressive Defence" was published later that year in the Soviet Peace Committee's English-language journal, together with a paper by Professor Hylke Tromp of the Netherlands, voicing some western criticisms of alternative defence as an attempt to address the symptoms, rather than the causes, of East-West tension.<41> Boserup's contribution to the forum and his principle of "mutual defensive superiority" were also mentioned positively in an assessment of the event by V Abakov and V Baranovskii that was published in MEMO.<42>

Speaking in Czechoslovakia in April 1987, Gorbachev once again paid particular attention to conventional arms. On this occasion, he mentioned reasonable sufficiency alongside a further comment on removing the most dangerous armaments from the contact zone, and acknowledged "asymmetry" and "inequality in certain elements" between the opposing forces in Europe.<43> This section of the speech seemed to be a challenge to more extreme western assertions of Soviet superiority, but was combined with an admission that changes would be needed in Soviet as well as western postures, as Gorbachev put it through a process of levelling down, rather than up, any inequalities which might be revealed through an exchange of data. (This formula had originally been used by Gorbachev on the
occasion of President Mitterand’s visit to the USSR in July 1986.) At around the same time, Gorbachev expressed the view at a dinner for Hafiz al-Assad that the concepts "defensive" and "offensive" were anachronisms in the nuclear age, and in the context of some critical comments about nuclear deterrence in his speech during a visit by Margaret Thatcher, said again that "Arms must be reduced to a level of reasonable sufficiency, that is only the level needed to cope with the tasks of defence".<sup>44</sup> The problem in interpreting Gorbachev’s speeches during this period was that they did not go into sufficient detail to provide an entirely clear indication of the relationship between reasonable sufficiency and possible non-provocative conventional strategies. However, Gorbachev’s own comments did not come out of the blue, but seemed to have a basis in a number of more detailed commentaries by influential Soviet writers, which provided further evidence of a debate in policy-making and advisory circles.

V Petrovskii (a deputy Foreign Minister), writing on "Security Through Disarmament" in early 1987, asked "What are the characteristics of sufficiency?", and replied that it excluded nuclear weapons, excluded the offensive or aggressive use of force, and was a political rather than a military concept.<sup>45</sup> When he moved on to deal with the details of troop reductions in Europe, however, he shifted back to treating it as a question of purely numerical reductions (citing the WTO’s Budapest proposal for a 25 per cent cut), rather than of concepts or strategies.
GA Trofimenko, of the US-Canada Institute (ISKAN), was more explicit. Shortly after the Budapest WTO meeting, Trofimenko commented that "the Warsaw Treaty Organization’s political and military leaders have in fact treated positively the idea of non-provocative defence."<46> Later, he wrote that "The Soviet Union and its partners in the Warsaw Pact are actually planning concrete steps towards the creation on both sides of so-called non-provocative defence, under which conditions the danger of sudden attack would be sharply reduced."<47> Anatolii Dobrynin, the former Ambassador to Washington then working as head of the CPSU Central Committee’s International Department, spoke in May 1986 to the All-Union Conference of Scientists on the Problems of Peace and Prevention of Nuclear War of the urgent need for analysis of problems such as the interdependence of the offensive and defensive and the definition of reasonable sufficiency.<48> It was fairly clear from Dobrynin's remarks that reasonable sufficiency had been announced as a guiding principle before the Soviet leadership had much of an idea of what it actually meant, and that help was now being requested from a broad community of Soviet scholars.

A number of western journalists and delegations visiting the USSR testified to the existence of the debate, and to the presence on the Soviet agenda of reasonable sufficiency and its application to conventional forces.<49> In the course of a trip to Moscow in May 1987, I saw a good deal of evidence that Dobrynin’s encouragement of
discussion had borne some fruit, but equally that the debate appeared to be at a fairly early stage. As far as one could tell, the call had gone out for specialists to give some substance to the concept of reasonable sufficiency after Gorbachev’s initial use of the term. Some arms control specialists who had been following western literature on alternative defence were in a good position to take advantage of this, while others seem to have been rather taken by surprise. Presumably the concept itself found its way into Gorbachev’s Congress report and later speeches through the medium of particular advisers and/or speechwriters, perhaps including Dobrynin himself. (Soviet diplomats in Western Europe also seem to have played a role.) In the ensuing debate, some writers and researchers in like IMEMO and ISKAN began to think about non-provocative concepts as an application of reasonable sufficiency in the conventional sphere. At the same time, however, a number of those who seemed to appreciate the importance of non-provocative defence as a potential way of convincing Western Europe of the USSR’s peaceable intentions seemed to have few illusions about how reluctant the Soviet military establishment would be to move towards such a concept. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these developments was the apparent intention to open up areas of discussion which would formerly have been considered the sole preserve of the military, with the possibility that the party could then use more widespread discussion to counterbalance military inputs into decision-
making. Dobrynin alluded to Western European social democrats' discussions of non-offensive defence in a further speech on May 4th 1987, and spoke of the possibility of exchanging opinions on that basis. In the sphere of public proposals, the WTO foreign ministers repeated the idea of diminishing the danger of surprise attack when they met in Moscow in March.<50>

In the weeks preceding the WTO's PCC meeting in Berlin at the end of May 1987, speculation was again rife that Gorbachev was about to announce another spectacular initiative - a unilateral withdrawal of some Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, or perhaps an initiative on Germany.<51> In the event, the meeting produced only a communique and the document on WTO military doctrine mentioned in Chapter 6, and no speech by Gorbachev was published.<52> (For the full text of the doctrine document, see Appendix II.) The main communique dealt with rectifying imbalances and the withdrawal of the most offensive weapons from the contact zone, and backed the Jaruzelski Plan, but left more detailed doctrinal considerations to the second document. In this second document's treatment, the previous year's advocacy of defensive principles for the "military concepts and doctrines" of both blocs was taken up again, in the context of a proposal for consultations between the WTO and NATO to compare their respective military doctrines, and study developments which could remove mistrust. There also appeared to be a revision of the traditional definition of military doctrine, the formula
used here being: "The military doctrine of the WTO, like that of each of its members, is subordinated to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional." It was also proposed that conventional armaments should be reduced "to the level at which neither side, while ensuring its defence, would have the capacity for a sudden attack on the other side or for the launching of offensive operations in general" (a blend of numerical and qualitative terminology). There was also a compromise in the application of the term "sufficiency" in the military doctrine document, since at one point it was claimed that "they [the Warsaw Treaty states] strictly comply with the limits of sufficiency for defence and for repelling possible aggression", even though familiar terminology about delivering a "crushing rebuff" to any aggression was also retained. Thus, parts of the document accepted fairly explicitly that WTO military concepts had contributed to mistrust and needed changing, while others claimed that present force levels and policies did not exceed the needs of sufficiency. The actual term "reasonable sufficiency" was not, in fact, used.

The statements made by the WTO in Budapest and Berlin had some fairly obvious targets in the West: NATO's longstanding policy of envisaging the first use of nuclear weapons, and the emerging concepts of AirLand Battle, FOFA, and the US Maritime Strategy, would obviously be the subjects of eastern criticism in any discussion of doctrines. But these doctrinal issues were not raised in
such a way as to suggest that the WTO thought it could escape with its own strategic concepts unscrutinized, despite the ambiguities which existed within the Berlin document itself. These WTO approaches went beyond longstanding eastern proposals for a non-use of force agreement, appeared to reflect the influence of western alternative discussions, and also suggested that the WTO itself might have an enhanced role in future negotiations - it emerged during 1987 that a WTO Experts' Working Group on Conventional Forces had been formed, apparently before the Berlin meeting.<53>

In further statements made after the Berlin meeting, senior Soviet figures offered some clarification, but did not really resolve the ambiguities of the document. At a briefing in late June 1987, Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskii and Deputy Chief of General Staff MA Gareev dealt in turn with the political and military-technical sides of doctrine. Gareev provided a fairly strong formulation on the implications for military art: "The basic method of the Soviet Armed Forces in repelling aggression will be defensive operations and combat actions."<54> The new Minister of Defence, General DT Yazov (who replaced Marshal Sokolov after Mathias Rust's landing in Red Square), was more equivocal in an article for Pravda entitled "The Warsaw Pact's military doctrine - a doctrine for the defence of peace and socialism". Yazov combined a traditional exposition of the WTO as dedicated to the "defence of the gains of socialism" with an
explanation of sufficiency and of the need for forces which could not carry out offensive operations. However, this capacity was described as something desirable in the future rather than a present reality, and Yazov also appeared concerned to reassure his audience with his comments that: "The limits of sufficiency are set not by us, but by the actions of the USA and NATO", and "The Warsaw Pact's defensive military doctrine, geared exclusively to repulsing the external military threat, does not mean that our actions will have a passive character".<55>

Probably the most important single piece of military writing published during this period was General Yazov's short book Na strazhe sotsializma i mira (On guard over socialism and peace), which was signed to press on October 9, 1987. This text incorporated both a degree of caution about sufficiency and some genuinely new formulations. Yazov did not avoid the term "sufficiency", and used a mixture of quantitative and qualitative terminology to explain it, as had the Berlin document. On the other hand, he seemed to favour the term "reliable defence" as the basic criterion, and did not use the full term "reasonable sufficiency". Most notably, however, Yazov reversed the traditional formulation which had in the past prioritized the offensive as the main form of military actions (see Chapter 5). His key passage read as follows:

"Soviet military doctrine regards the defence as the main form of military actions in repulsing aggression. The defence must be reliable and stable, firm and active, and must be calculated to halt the opponent's attack, exhaust him, prevent any loss of territory, and achieve the defeat of the enemy groups'
incursion.

However, the defence cannot defeat an aggressor on its own. Therefore, after repulsing the attack, troops and naval forces must be capable of carrying out a decisive offensive. The transition to the offensive will take the form of a counteroffensive, which must be carried out in a complex and tense situation of combat with a well-armed opponent."<56> (Emphases in original.)

There was clearly an inconsistency in Yazov's position here, as this passage followed shortly after a specification that neither side should have the capacity to start offensive operations (a phrase taken from the Berlin document). Nevertheless, this passage about the relationship between defence and counter-offensive was still a revision of the traditional formula. One could not, of course, tell from the text alone whether Yazov's reformulation was substantive or merely verbal.

These statements, therefore, did not remove the impression of an unresolved policy discussion. Gareev did provide a useful expansion of the new formulation of doctrine at a Novosti press briefing in February 1988, when he contrasted it with the traditional definition:

"The present military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states is a system of officially received fundamental views on the prevention of war, military organization, the preparation of [WTO] countries and armed forces for the repulsion of aggression and the means of armed combat for the defence of socialism. What is new here is that if earlier military doctrine was determined as a system of views on the preparation for war and its conduct, now the basis of its content is the prevention of war. The task of war-prevention is becoming the main goal, the kernel of military doctrine, the basic function of the state and its armed forces. Of course, world war must be prevented mainly by political means, but this must also be reflected in military activity."<57>
Explaining the Reassessment

What factors might have accounted for this apparent Soviet/WTO interest in defensive military strategies? More importantly, perhaps, what were its practical implications, and what did the ambiguities noted above reveal about the state of Soviet civil-military relations and the possible strategic effects on the WTO as an alliance? Despite the lack of clarity in the explanations offered by senior Soviet military figures, the logic of their espousal of defensive strategies did challenge the Soviet and WTO structures and strategies which I explored in chapters 4 and 5, with their prioritization of preparation for operations on enemy territory. In answer to the question about the roots of the apparent reassessment, I would suggest that in addition to the factors involved in Soviet New Thinking at a general foreign policy level, there were four specific influences at work on these developments in the field of conventional forces and strategies.

(i) Western influence

The strong circumstantial evidence of interest among civilian analysts and the political leadership in western alternative defence concepts has been reviewed above. There is, however, a need for caution here, since the circumstantial evidence in itself provides no way of judging the weight or extent of this western influence. It was not a priori altogether convincing to put the Soviet interest down to western influence alone. There were also
some crucial items of evidence which suggested that it was less a matter of direct western influence than of the western writings having been in the right place, at the right time, to be noticed and put to use.

For example, Gareev's 1985 book identified a 1984 decision to set up a nomenklatura of specialists to examine questions of military science: "It was precisely on this basis that an approved nomenklatura of specialist scholars in the sphere of military science and other social, natural and technical sciences was appointed in 1984 by the State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers."<58> Thus, although the calls to involve civilian specialists in military analysis became more open later on, some kind of decision to that effect was taken as early as 1984.<59> This is not to say, however, that the civilian specialists would not have been interested anyway, and it does seem clear that once the Soviet debate had been officially opened up to western influences, they were able to play a substantial role.

(ii) Strategic Revisions

The most elegant hypothesis which would explain the Soviet interest in alternative defence at a more fundamental level was offered by Michael MccGwire. MccGwire suggested that major strategic revisions were made by Soviet military planners during the 1980s, which updated the priorities established after 1966 (see Chapter 5). He argues that during the early 1980s, Soviet planners became increasingly concerned about a danger of conflict.
with the USA in the region north of the Persian Gulf. They concluded, however, that such a regional conflict would not inevitably escalate to world war, and from this followed a further conclusion: in those circumstances, there would be no point in escalating the conflict horizontally by launching an offensive into Western Europe, and holding operations in the West would be sufficient. McCGwire also associated this new strategic shift with the creation of the TVD command structure, but was not entirely convincing here since that particular reorganization seemed to have commenced before his postulated strategic revision. The value of his hypothesis lay in the fact that it sought to account for Soviet thinking at a satisfactorily basic level of national security concerns, and solved the problems involved in attributing the alternative defence interest to an implausibly high degree of Soviet openness to influence from Western Europe. Since this was an account of a pre-Gorbachev shift in thinking and planning, it also gave more grounds for seeing the changes as relatively independent of Gorbachev's personal position and diplomacy.

A relative shift of Soviet military attention away from Central Europe towards the southern Soviet border could be documented to a certain extent. Considerable attention was paid to US and NATO deployments away from Europe, such as the US Rapid Deployment Force, the Iran-Iraq War was a matter of concern for the USSR, and of course the war in Afghanistan was in progress throughout
the 1980s. The Afghanistan war undoubtedly gave rise to much operational rethinking in an army poorly prepared for combat against guerilla opponents in mountainous terrain, and may well also have contributed to a reappraisal of the relationship between offence and defence in the southern Soviet border regions, and innovative thinking on questions like the use of helicopters. In early 1983, a new mountain warfare training centre was reported to have been set up in the Central Asian Military District. Service in Afghanistan and the Southern TVD also led to rapid advances in the careers of a number of senior officers who gained significant promotions in the mid-1980s.

(iii) The Role of Western Europe

The strategic reassessments hypothesized by McCrawire would have pre-dated Gorbachev and involved a downgrading of the danger of Central Europe providing a casus belli between East and West. There was also a further sense in which Gorbachev's diplomacy revised Soviet attitudes towards Western Europe, and which seemed more clearly associated with Gorbachev's own leadership: the appreciation of the political disutility of an offensive military strategy towards a neighbouring region.

This problem seems to have been understood, if not clearly stated, by the East European analysts who took up western alternative ideas at an early stage. It challenged orthodox thinking both in the West, in the form of traditional arguments about a potential Soviet capacity for
blackmail and intimidation, and in the USSR, in the sense that the offensive capability had traditionally been seen as a simple strategic necessity.

Soviet analyses of the history of detente saw the process as having deeper roots in Western Europe than in the USA, and on the western side this tended to give rise to allegations of Soviet "wedge-driving" within NATO. However, a search for improved relations with Western Europe in the post-INF world can be explained more soberly in terms of the desirability of increasing economic and technological ties with the region, and of attempts to influence US policy via close US allies like Britain and the FRG. The Soviet Academy of Sciences announced in late 1987 its intention to set up a new institute to study Western Europe. In Gorbachev's early New Thinking diplomacy the concept of a "Common European Home" seemed to be partly an expression of a historical Russian/Soviet desire not to be considered an outcast nation, and partly a way of playing on West European doubts about US security policy. For Gorbachev and a number of academics and advisers, however, there seemed also to be a very basic military factor involved: they had apparently come to the view that offensive military strategies were a bad thing. In rather more general terms, the policy of seeking improved relations with regional powers relatively independently of US-Soviet relations applied to other regions as well as Europe, though there must have been fairly narrow limits beyond which the USA would not be
downgraded as the USSR's primary diplomatic interlocutor.  

(iv) Reactions to NATO

Since the apparent Soviet strategic reassessment may have been partly a reaction to western military priorities to the south of the USSR, it is worth investigating whether this might also have been the case in Europe. Careful analysis reveals a good deal of evidence that improved US and NATO capabilities played a significant role in influencing Soviet revisions. There is evidence that WTO air defence may have undergone reorganization partly in response to the West; that the pattern of Soviet naval deployments was affected by the need to cope with the US Maritime Strategy; and that increased attention in Soviet writings to strategic defence, over a period of several years, can be attributed to a fear of US nuclear and/or general military-technological superiority. There is a distinction to be drawn here between operational-tactical defence, as something to be used during a conventional phase of war before a transition to the counteroffensive, and strategic defence, which had more application in a possible nuclear war. In this analysis, increased Soviet attention to the defensive could be related to expressed concerns about FOFA, AirLand Battle, and advanced conventional technologies, at the operational-tactical level (see Chapter 5), and about SDI at the nuclear level. Even the non-realization of SDI in any form close to its original conception would not invalidate this hypothesis,
since part of the Soviet concern about SDI was a fear that shifts in the overall military-technological correlation of forces were a possible outcome of intensive SDI research.

In a development which tied in with McCGwire's hypothesis as outlined above, material in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal and elsewhere began to reflect increased attention to strategic defence around 1984/5. This discussion was partly conducted in terms of shortcomings in military planning before 1941 which left Soviet forces well-prepared to go onto the offensive, but insufficiently prepared to conduct strategic defensive operations.

This hypothesis might appear inconsistent with the suggestion that Central Europe had been downgraded as an area of concern, but its main contention is that adequate attention should be paid to western initiatives in assessing shifts in Soviet priorities, which is quite consonant with the analysis focusing on the USSR's southern borders. The Pentagon's Soviet Military Power 1988 contained a number of strikingly explicit claims to the effect that Soviet shifts were responses to ALB and FOFA. These comments came as something of a surprise, as western sources had previously been reluctant to acknowledge the possible influence of offensive US/NATO capabilities.<64>

Whether or not the Pentagon's claim was correct, it did draw attention to a possible aspect of Soviet policy which was extensively debated in western commentaries on the possibility of moves towards the defensive. In
essence, this debate was a continuation of the one over the growing role of conventional forces in Soviet military planning in the mid-1980s, which I analyzed in Chapter 5.

A number of western observers of Soviet force structures in Eastern Europe argued that the USSR had, by the mid- to late-1980s, a number of orthodox military reasons for rethinking its posture in Europe, but this did not extend to any far-reaching commitment to restructure forces defensively. These debates are worth reviewing, for although this more sceptical view issued from institutions and analysts who could have been expected to take a suspicious view of Soviet intentions, they did predict that a non-defensive restructuring was compatible with significant quantitative cuts in Soviet forces. The question of the accuracy of this school of analysis therefore becomes important in any assessment of Gorbachev's December 1988 initiative, which promised quantitative cuts and defensive restructuring in Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe.

The general shape of this sceptical argument was roughly as follows: In assessing its future strategic requirements in the conventional sphere, the Soviet political leadership and military establishment came to the view that an altogether new period of military development was imminent. This would be characterized by planning for a more fluid conventional battlefield in which advanced conventional weapons would play a major role. There was a danger that the West would be at an advantage in this field.
unless Soviet forces could be slimmed-down, restructured and, in the medium-to-long term, provided with the appropriate high-tech conventional weaponry.

The rethinking of conventional strategies in this context might involve paying more attention to temporary defensive operations as a way of assisting a return to the offensive, but offensive strategies would by no means be abandoned. As far as the organizational structure of forces was concerned, Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe might be reorganized into corps and brigades and at the same time reduced in number. This fitted in with the argument that the USSR had too many forces in Eastern Europe to carry out its offensive strategy effectively, and that conventional arms control negotiations could be used as an advantageous way of bringing about reductions in western force levels and military preparations, without seriously impairing eastern capabilities.<65>

Proponents of this view conceded that the involvement of civilian analysts in the debate did call into question the assumption that Gorbachev’s arms control strategy remained closely aligned with purely military priorities for military-technological competition with the West. They also conceded that Gorbachev himself appeared to have taken a serious interest in shifts towards more defensive strategies, and that there was a potential for conflict with the military over this issue. Christopher Donnelly, who happened to be giving evidence to the House of Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee on the day of Gorbachev’s 1988 UN
speech, spoke of him as "moving...to a showdown" with the General Staff."
The Problem of Sufficiency

Throughout 1988 and 1989, Soviet commentators published a regular flow of material on military doctrine in general, and on the conventional applications of reasonable sufficiency in particular. The pattern which emerged was, not unexpectedly, one of civilian writers being relatively adventurous in drawing out the implications of the new terminology, while military writers tended to be either more cautious or, on occasions when they were not called upon to comment on doctrine per se, to ignore the changes which were supposed to be in progress. Military writers tended to treat reasonable sufficiency as a quantitative force concept, while civilians were more likely to endorse structural non-offensiveness as a goal, though the division was not absolute. The overall effect was to confirm the sense of uncertainty surrounding the Berlin document itself and the explanations given immediately afterwards. A number of round-table discussions between civilian and retired military analysts were published which confirmed the hypothesis that the content of reasonable sufficiency was not finalized, but that non-provocative defence was among the elements it might be taken to include. Several interesting pieces were published in MEMO by AA Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the US-Canada Institute. In the first, co-authored with V Larionov, he picked out the 1943 Battle of Kursk as an event from Soviet military history which showed that prepared positional defence could withstand a
powerful attack, and thus had some relevance to non-provocative defence (neprovotsiruyushchaya oborona). In a second piece a few months later Kokoshin was less adventurous, but endorsed Boserup’s principle of mutual defensive superiority without specifying its source.

From this point on, the importance of the western alternative defence debate declines. As I have tried to show, there does seem to have been a significant influence from the West during the early stages of the Soviet debate, but from late 1987 onwards it is more instructive to reconstruct the Soviet debate in terms used by the Soviet authors themselves.

By early 1988, three main areas of controversy could be identified in the civilian and military discussions. These were: the relationship between offence, defence, and the counteroffensive; the applicability of planning for "victory" in a conventional conflict; and the relationship between unilateral measures and negotiated agreements in arriving at a condition of sufficiency. The first two issues related principally to qualitative military concepts and strategies, and the third to both quantitative and qualitative considerations. As will become clear, the three questions were often discussed in close connection with one another.

It will be remembered that the 1987 Berlin document retained a traditional formulation about the need to meet any aggression against the WTO with a "devastating rebuff". This appeared to be a loophole via which the existing
offensive-defensive posture might hope to resist change and retain legitimacy.

Several senior officers repeated the formulations used by General Yazov in his 1987 book. According to Colonel-General Gareev: "The main form of combat operations in rebuffing aggression at the beginning of a war, if war is imposed on us, will be defensive fighting and operations". Lieutenant-General V Serebryannikov gave a similar account in the journal Kommunist vooprzhennykh sil, following Yazov’s wording closely: "Of course, one cannot defeat an aggressor using the defensive. Therefore, our troops and naval forces must be able, after repulsing the opponent’s attack, to carry out a decisive offensive, which will take the form of a counteroffensive".<70> This was then amplified by a number of comments from senior officers to the effect that the WTO now envisaged remaining on the defensive for 20-30 days at the beginning of a war, and only going over to the counteroffensive if attempts to resolve the conflict politically within that period were unsuccessful. Marshal Akhromeev also sought to dispel western curiosity about civil-military differences of opinion with a comment that the new doctrine had been adopted after two years of discussion and elaboration in the Defence Council.<71>

Some of the civilian writers took a more sceptical view of the requirement for a counteroffensive capability. The clearest single expression of the deep-rooted problem which needed to be addressed came from Aleksei Arbatov of
IMEMO. Writing in his institute’s 1987 yearbook on Disarmament and Security, which appeared in mid-1988, Arbatov said: “Thus, while [in the past] the military doctrine retained its purely defensive nature, strategy, tactics and, accordingly, individual areas of the military buildup had an increasingly offensive orientation.”<72>

The first civilian publication to move beyond general advocacy of non-offensive strategies, into a more explicit discussion of alternative postures on both sides, was an article published in mid-1988 by Kokoshin and his collaborator Larionov, a retired Major-General then working at the General Staff Academy who is an important figure in the history of Soviet military thought.<73>

Kokoshin and Larionov outlined four alternative models for conventional force postures. In the first option, strategic offensive operations would be carried out on the opponent’s territory as soon as possible after any attack by the other side. This was seen to be derived from the nineteenth and twentieth century military tradition of seeking decisive victory. One consequence would be that the forces required to carry out such a strategy would appear to be as well suited to preemptive attack as to the repulsion of aggression.

In the second option, there would be a concentration on both sides on positional defence in the initial stage of a conflict, but a general counteroffensive onto the opponent’s territory might follow after the enemy offensive had been repulsed. This was described as following the
model of the 1943 Battle of Kursk, the subject of the earlier article by the same authors.

In the third option, the two sides' capacities for counteroffensive action would be restricted to their own territory, and the defender's objective would simply be the restoration of the territorial status quo ante. The possibility of victory would be envisaged at the operational and tactical level of combat, but not at the strategic level (above army group). In the fourth and final option, offensive capabilities would be excluded at the strategic and operational levels. High mobility for counterattacks would only be an attribute of units of division size or below. Such a force would lack strike aviation or any other deep-strike weapons, and the concept of victory would only be admitted at the tactical level.

In their assessment of the different options, Kokoshin and Larionov saw the first two as equally dangerous from the point of view of escalation to nuclear conflict. The fourth was said to be optimal for restricting a conflict geographically if one did break out. The WTO's proposals of June 1986 were seen as a move in this direction, although curiously enough there was no reference to the 1987 Berlin document. Kokoshin and Larionov's criticism of existing concepts was confined to those of NATO. Nevertheless, the use of historical analogies on the Soviet side (Kursk, and the 1939 Battle of Khalkin-Gol) made obvious the universal applicability of the alternative models.
The provocativeness of Kokoshin and Larionov's treatment lay in the fact that Yazov's description of the role in current policy of the decisive counteroffensive came closest to their second option, which they viewed as little better than the unambiguously offensive variant. This also seemed to entail a revision of their views about the Battle of Kursk, about which they had written more positively in their earlier article. An equally important aspect of their argument, in terms of its implications for traditional military modes of thought, was its explicit questioning of the sense that could be attached to victory in a conventional war.

Kokoshin and Larionov were not the only authors to single out the concept of victory as one which needed to be challenged if military thinking was to make a genuine shift from war-fighting to war-prevention. A series of articles appearing during the 1988-9 period focused on this as a fundamental point of disagreement. Aleksei Arbatov wrote: "In existing conditions no war can be won by the offensive either, if by this we mean 'the final rout of the enemy'. No war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, whether nuclear or conventional, can be won at all."

He then went further and criticized by name generals Tretyak and Gribkov, who were continuing to use the "final rout" terminology.

Lieutenant-General Serebryannikov responded by saying that the capacity for offensive action needed to be retained as long as NATO adhered to offensive concepts, though he did not make it altogether clear if this was seen
to apply to nuclear or conventional forces: "Therefore, we must maintain, so far, our potential for offensive action, for giving an aggressor a crushing rebuff. The awareness of it being impossible to win a modern war "works" only when it is admitted by both sides. If we go by this presumption in training and equipping our troops, with the other side setting its sights on victory, we may give the potential enemy a considerable margin of supremacy."<76>

Serebryannikov did not appear as an advocate of an unrestricted counteroffensive, since he favoured making the maximum use of political contacts between the two sides to bring the war to an end at any stage. Nevertheless, he was scathing about what he saw as Arbatov’s opposition to any operations on foreign territory even in response to aggression.

Undaunted, Arbatov denied that he favoured a unilateral shift to a 100% defensive posture for conventional forces, but insisted that the limits of a counteroffensive capacity should be set well short of what would be needed to defeat the enemy on his own territory. He called for clarification of the objectives envisaged for the WTO's counteroffensive after 20 days of defensive fighting, and of a phrase he quoted from General Moiseev, stating that the aggressor "should not be merely stopped but brought to his senses". Arbatov also met Serebryannikov's specific points about victory by arguing that the impossibility of winning a global nuclear war or a war in Europe was an "objective reality confirmed by all
the realistic assessments of the current situation, including those coming from our own military experts. If the USA refused to recognize this, it was not a reason for the WTO to do the same.<77>

This dispute clearly remained unresolved, even though it was still being conducted while the unilateral restructuring announced in December 1988 was supposedly under way (see below). The new WTO Chief of Staff, General Lobov (appointed in February 1989), told New Times in an interview that: "The purpose is to check the enemy offensive, enfeeble the enemy forces, prevent the loss of a considerable part of territory, and provide conditions for a complete defeat of the enemy troops. This is impossible to achieve by defensive tactics only. That is why, having repelled the enemy attack, the Soviet troops must be ready to launch a decisive counteroffensive." Larionov then returned to the fray and spelled out very clearly his view that reasonable sufficiency required the renunciation of the possibility of victory.<78> Not all the civilian contributions were quite as forthright as Arbatov’s. Some stepped back a little, endorsing the general principle of non-provocative defence while recognizing the uncertainty of the current status of the counteroffensive in Soviet strategy, and the unresolved nature of the continuing debates.<79> There was, in fact, little attempt to pretend that Gorbachev’s December 1988 restructuring announcement was the end of the matter, which suggested either that the measures associated with it were ambiguous, or that
different schools of thought still hoped to influence subsequent readjustments of policy.

The principle of unilateral reductions was another point of controversy which emerged out of the debates over the counteroffensive and victory. Prior to the December 1988 initiative, it was relatively commonplace for military figures to insist that the limits of sufficiency could not be determined unilaterally, and that the USA and NATO’s concepts and capabilities had to be taken into account. This argument was partly a dispute over the level of western threat to the USSR, but it was used in support of some explicit statements opposing unilateral quantitative reductions on the eastern side. By contrast, several of the civilian commentators expressed support for unilateral measures of one sort or another. After Gorbachev’s December 7th speech, it was no longer tenable (in theory, at least) to oppose all and any unilateral steps on the Soviet side, and the debate came to be framed more in terms of the extent of acceptable unilateral adjustments, in either the qualitative or quantitative sense.

Akhromeev, Gareev and Yazov all went on record during 1987 and 1988 with statements of opposition to the idea of any unilateral disarmament measures by the USSR. Here is Akhromeev, writing in *World Marxist Review* in December 1987: "...defence adequacy cannot be viewed one-sidedly, irrespective of the balance of armed forces taking shape. It would, furthermore, be a mistake to regard it as one-sided disarmament, and a unilateral reduction of our
defence efforts." Gareev criticized advocates of unilateral measures, calling these "inadmissible". Yazov published an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in September 1988, in which he said: "The idea [of western propaganda] is to make the Warsaw Pact countries agree to a unilateral reduction of their ground troops regardless of the other components of the armed forces.....they are striving for future supremacy over the Warsaw Pact, which they will use to make our side yield political concessions." Yazov even made some similar remarks several months after Gorbachev's UN speech. Speaking to the party aktiv of the Moscow garrison in early March 1989, he said that reactionary circles were attempting to press unilateral disarmament on the USSR in the hope of gaining decisive military superiority.

Before December 1988, the most outspoken advocates of unilateral measures in the conventional field were Zhurkin and his colleagues, who cited Khrushchev's unilateral force reductions of the late 1950s. They argued that these cuts had not damaged Soviet security, and had enhanced the USSR's political prestige. Some unidentified participants in a Foreign Ministry conference in July also advocated unilateral Soviet cuts in Europe. This kind of debate over unilateral measures was familiar enough from the western experience. In some of the exchanges which took place there was an element of theatricality, as military men accused civilian commentators of advocating the near-total abandonment of all Soviet defence capacity, and the
civilians replied that they were advocating no such thing. The Serebryannikov-Arbatov exchange already outlined was an example of this. (Arbatov had mentioned the possibility of unilateral reductions during 1938, but had not advocated them as strongly as Zhurkin et al.)

Alternative Models

The civilian writings discussed up to this point could not be said to have amounted to concrete proposals for military restructuring, in spite of their explicit conceptual disagreements with military sources. Some civilian publications of the same period did, however, come closer to the advocacy of alternative models. It is difficult for the foreign observer working from published material to compare these models with positions adopted by the political leadership, as there is no way of knowing how far the published work corresponded to policy advice submitted through internal channels. Some of the material which I discuss in this section was published before December 1988, and some after.

Arbatov's research group at IMEMO published some fairly detailed work on the conventional confrontation in Europe in the 1987 "IMEMO Yearbook". In a chapter entitled "Problems of Reducing Military Confrontation", four authors discussed force comparisons in the Atlantic to the Urals area. They then examined possible ways of reducing armaments with more clearly offensive functions, identified as tanks, long-range artillery, tactical strike aircraft,
tactical missiles, combat helicopters, and pontoon bridge facilities, as well as of restructuring and redeploying formations to accord with more defensive functions.<ref> They suggested reductions in specialized units with an offensive bias, and force and armament cuts within three concentric zones covering the whole Atlantic-to-Urals area.

This model, however, was put forward as a possible approach for negotiating purposes rather than as a reflection of the strategic tasks to be performed by the remaining forces. It was left to Arbatov himself to spell out the first detailed alternative programme for reasonable sufficiency, in an article which appeared in March 1989 in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'.<ref> Arbatov's article was wide-ranging and dealt with some basic policy goals and strategic assumptions, as well as the nuclear and conventional forces which he considered appropriate to them. In keeping with arguments he had used elsewhere, Arbatov argued that military theory and practice should be consistent with the USSR's economic and foreign policy interests and firmly under diplomatic control. The only role for nuclear weapons should be as a minimum deterrent to deliver a retaliatory and counter-industrial "crushing blow" against an aggressor. The "crushing blow" requirement did not apply to conventional forces, whose task was not offensive strategic operations or a search for victory, but short-term defensive combat to prevent the enemy gaining the upper hand through an offensive. A protracted conventional war was said to be impossible, and
a two-front war against NATO and China "very unlikely in the foreseeable future". Soviet forces should not in future be used in international or internal conflicts in developing countries.

In his detailed recommendations, Arbatov criticized the USSR's continued production of large numbers of different nuclear delivery systems. For conventional forces, he advocated a number of very specific steps. Divisions at low readiness levels could be disbanded immediately, obsolete equipment scrapped (T-54/55 and T-62 tanks were given as examples), and the existing system of mobilizing industry for war could be abolished in view of the high-technology requirements of modern warfare. Radical cuts could be made in forces on the Chinese border and in the Far East, and WTO forces in Central Europe and the Western USSR could be cut to approximately one third of their present numbers. Obsolete aircraft could also be cut, and resources for air operations against the enemy rear reduced. A rear infrastructure should be established which would make it possible to redeploy forces rapidly to any threatened peripheral area. This last point was consistent with Arbatov's reservations about abandoning all counteroffensive capacities; his argument here was that a certain amount of high mobility would remain necessary for switching forces around Soviet borders, but counter-attacks would not be carried onto the territory of other states.

Arbatov saw the unilateral cuts to be made by 1991 as a step in the direction of the reforms he advocated, and
the deeper cuts as possible on a reciprocal basis within the CFE framework. He also used an adventurous argument about the balance of naval forces, at a time when a number of Soviet military figures were arguing that NATO naval superiority should somehow be taken into account as a factor within CFE (from which naval forces were technically excluded). Arbatov argued that the Soviet navy's tasks should be restricted to coastal defence and the defence of Soviet strategic submarines, and that tasks such as the interdiction of Atlantic communications and challenging Western navies in distant oceans should have no place in Soviet strategy. In effect, he was arguing that western global naval superiority was an unavoidable fact, and there was nothing to be gained by trying to challenge it in terms of hardware or in negotiations (at the same time as conceding that the East should be prepared to abandon such superiority as it had in ground or air forces).

Arbatov concluded by suggesting that Soviet defence spending could be reduced by 40-50% in the next 5 years, and by saying that it was false to suppose that the military was uninterested in cutting armaments or expenditure, or in military glasnost' - perhaps partly as a way of preempting military criticism. This did not save him. He was accused of incompetence both in International Affairs and in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, whose editors published an article by Major-General Yu. Lyubimov with a note to the effect that Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' (International Affairs' Russian-language edition) had
refused to publish it. Lyubimov argued that Arbatov’s proposals for sufficiency did not give the USSR equal security with the USA: "There can be no sufficient defence if there is no equal security". Arbatov responded by insisting that the USSR had to realize that its military policy had an influence on other countries, implying that his military critics chose to ignore this.<85>

At ISKAN, work was also being done on the criteria for stability in conventional forces in Europe. This model was published in mid-1989, in the form of a pamphlet co-authored by Kokoshin, Larionov, AA Konovalov, and VA Mazing.<86> The ISKAN stability model was presented in part in some western fora before its Soviet publication, for example at a conference at Texas A & M University in March 1989. Its proposals provided clear evidence of the influence on the Soviet mezhdunarodniki (civilian specialists) of Western European alternative defence writers, notably Albrecht von Müller and Andreas von Bülow, whose writings were cited in footnotes and the bibliography. It constituted the first model published in the open literature which combined detailed proposals for force levels and strategic postures in the Central European area.

The ISKAN collective began by posing some familiar conceptual questions about the counteroffensive, victory, and the establishment of military tasks to be performed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They expressed a preference for guiding conventional
negotiations by von Müller’s principle of setting mutually agreed ceilings on certain kinds of forces or armaments, as long as the resulting force levels did not give either side a potential for surprise attack or large-scale offensives. The four alternative force postures were set out as in Kokoshin and Larionov’s earlier MEMO article, and the paper then moved on to suggest a stable configuration for NATO-WTO general purpose forces after radical reductions.

The model incorporated a patchwork arrangement of 50 x 60 km sectors covering the Central European NATO-WTO front line, to a North-South distance of 780 km and a depth of 150 km on each side. On the North-South axis, one tank or motor rifle division would cover approximately a 60 km section of the front (in total four tank divisions and nine motor-rifle), with barrier forces stationed in each of the 50 km-wide sub-zones on the East-West axis. The counteroffensive potential of the tank or motor-rifle units would be permitted up to battalion strength in the sub-zone of immediate contact, up to regiment strength in the second sub-zone, and up to the remaining strength of the division in the third. There would be agreed limits on the numbers of mobile, large-calibre artillery, combat helicopters, and bridging systems permitted within the third sub-zone of the 150 km-wide strip. The permitted barrier defensive forces in the first sub-zone would consist of light infantry (organized on territorial principles), anti-tank missiles, fixed anti-tank artillery, fixed anti-aircraft systems, and command-and-control systems. There could be limited
numbers of surface-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 50 km in the second and third sub-zones, but no large stores of materiel or mobile refuelling systems in the first or second of them. The idea of light infantry forces was said to be consistent with a new kind of "machine gun-artillery division" which had been formed in the USSR, as an addition to the two basic forms of tank and motor-rifle divisions.

The ISKAN model went on to propose some numerical ceilings for offensive tank capabilities within the 150 km strip and broader geographical areas. 2,460 tanks per side were proposed for the Central European zone, with a further 3,000 per side in the respective Central European rear areas. This zonal approach followed the one adopted by the IMEMQ researchers, with some modifications to establish a sub-regional balance in Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey, plus two Soviet military districts). In all, the two sides would retain 11,500 tanks each in Europe, and an analogous approach was recommended for further counteroffensive force elements, such as infantry combat vehicles and mobile artillery.

A further section then proposed some possible approaches to achieving a similar stabilization in offensive tactical aircraft. Definitional problems in this area were recognized, and an approach suggested based on two indicators: the number of aircraft, and the weapon load carried at a certain radius of operations. A ratio of 2:1 for a superiority of interceptors over strike aircraft was
proposed, though the authors did not go into much further detail, and recognized the difficulties of incorporating medium-range bombers and carrier-based aviation. In conclusion, the threat to stability posed by qualitative improvements in weapons, and new offensive concepts, was noted.

This summary of some of the mezhdunarodniki's publications during the 1988-9 period illustrates how far academic researchers had gone in specifying concrete military restructuring to correspond to the political declaration of a doctrine of defensive sufficiency. There were also a number of occasions in the period before December 1988 on which manoeuvres and exercises carried out by Soviet and WTO forces were described as having been already reoriented towards defensive operations. Reports on these lines emerged from a series of Druzhba-88 exercises in Eastern Europe early in the year, and after a meeting with the then US Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, in March, General Yazov was reported as saying that the autumn round of manoeuvres would provide further evidence. Similar reports then continued to appear in the autumn, as a series of exercises were held in the Southern USSR/Black Sea area (Osen'-88), Byelorussia, and Hungary.<87>

One question which was notably absent from the mezhdunarodniki's treatment of Soviet strategy was any discussion of the history of military intervention in Eastern Europe. It was hard to assess the precise significance of this omission. As Chapter 8 will show, the
1988-9 period saw a number of increasingly explicit indications at the political level that the Brezhnev Doctrine had been quietly laid to rest. This could be regarded either as a long-overdue recognition of the impossibility of resolving East European political crises by military methods, or, in what might be characterized as "old thinking" terms, a significant retreat from traditional conceptions of the USSR's security requirements.

At the same time, it was impossible to tell from the published writings of the mezhdunarodniki whether they thought a continued intervention option in Eastern Europe should remain, or did in fact remain, as a component of sufficiency. The question was simply not discussed, even as a historical issue. The specification of Soviet priorities wavered between the invocation of "national security", which seemed on the face of it to leave Eastern Europe outside the area to be defended, and occasional references to the need to ensure the security of the USSR and its allies, which brought Eastern Europe back into that area. The omission was particularly glaring in Arbatov's Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' article, where his opposition to the use of Soviet forces in developing countries left the question of Eastern Europe hanging in the air. Yazov, on the other hand, continued to speak in terms of the defence of the fraternal socialist countries. The ISKAN model clearly assumed that the Soviet security zone still began at the inner-German border, but this was of course
something different from an explicit discussion of intervention in Eastern Europe.

One explanation for the civilian reluctance might lie in a preference for leaving well alone and not engaging in unnecessary historical debate. It was also difficult for the civilians to repudiate intervention explicitly as long as the Husak leadership remained in power in Czechoslovakia. However, some of the civilian strategists did not seem reluctant to engage in historical controversy where domestic Soviet political history was concerned, and the question was in any case not a purely historical one. It must presumably have made at least some difference to the structuring and training of Soviet and Eastern European forces if they were to be prepared for even the possibility of internal military intervention, and the question became more salient as the alternative military models became more detailed. Furthermore, the interventionary role of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe actually provided quite a strong argument against some versions of the orthodox western "Soviet threat" thesis, so there should have been a range of intellectual and political reasons for addressing the issue.

Gorbachev's UN Initiative

In the middle of this period of civil-military discussion about changes in Soviet conventional strategy came Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988, with its announcement of
reductions and planned restructuring in Eastern Europe. Shortly afterwards, the consultations over the mandate for the CFE negotiations were concluded, and the negotiations themselves began in Vienna on March 6th 1989. As my account of the Soviet civil-military debates has shown, there is strong evidence that there was at this stage no overall agreement on the Soviet posture in Europe; nevertheless, some assessment of the position apparently taken by the political leadership at this, transitional, stage, is necessary.

Gorbachev’s speech included a commitment to reduce the Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men within two years, and to withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and disband them. The total withdrawals from Eastern Europe would amount to 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks. Other offensive units would also be withdrawn, and all remaining forces would be reorganized into a "clearly defensive" structure. Gorbachev gave figures for reductions in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR amounting to 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft, and said that there would also be reductions in Soviet forces stationed in the Asian part of the country and in Mongolia.<89>

The most immediate question which arose out of the speech was related to the almost simultaneous retirement of Marshal Akhromeev as Chief of General Staff, and his replacement a few days later by Colonel-General Moiseev.<90> This prompted speculation in both the western
and the Soviet press that Akhromeev had resigned in protest at Gorbachev’s unilateral initiative. Had Gorbachev had to pull rank on a reluctant military establishment in order to force through the changes outlined in the UN speech? There had been earlier occasions on which rumours of unilateral troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe had surfaced, most notably at the July 1988 WTO meeting in Warsaw. (At that time the rumours centred on a possible Soviet withdrawal from Hungary, and there may have been resistance to the idea from the GDR and Czechoslovakian leaderships.)

Akhromeev himself did reappear quite quickly as a military adviser to Gorbachev, so he may not have been personally opposed to the UN initiative. Akhromeev later told a Moscow News interviewer that the General Staff had participated in the study which resulted in the 500,000 force cut. Other military figures made similar comments, and Shevardnadze commented in an interview that the Politburo and Defence Council had examined the figures very carefully and decided that the country’s defence capability would not suffer as a result of the cuts. Akhromeev said later that the scientific research institutes had also been involved in the discussions which produced the 500,000 figure.<91> Kokoshin later told the US House Armed Services Committee that there had indeed been some military resistance, though he excluded Akhromeev from this.<92> It has also been rumoured that the General Staff was for some time unable or unwilling to give the Politburo the data on
Soviet forces which it required to make the decision, and that this lay behind Akhromeev's resignation.

An initial assessment of the cuts might suggest that although the total reduction of 500,000 troops was substantial, it could be interpreted as consistent with an eventual plan for "leaner and fitter" forces. Some of the western debate over the total numbers of Soviet armed forces had centred on the phenomenon of conscripts carrying out tasks which in the West are done by civilians, and even cuts as large as half a million might not necessarily amount to much more than an adjustment in these areas. It did later emerge that (KGB) border troops, internal security forces and railway troops had been removed from the official strength of the armed forces.

However, the heart of Gorbachev's initiative was its emphasis on quantitative and qualitative changes in Eastern Europe. The figures given for Eastern Europe did not add up, since on western figures six tank divisions amounted to only about 2,000 tanks (and rather more than 50,000 men). This discrepancy seemed to give more credence to the promise of defensive restructuring since in order to make the totals tally, tanks in the remaining divisions would also have to be thinned out. An alternative interpretation has suggested that the General Staff's non-provision of data caused the problem, and Gorbachev made his speech without accurate figures. In a speech in Vienna in March 1989, Shevardnadze shed some light on this question by saying that tanks in motor rifle divisions would be cut by
40%, and those in tank divisions by 20%.<93>

After the UN speech, Soviet spokespersons responded to a variety of western expressions of scepticism. One of these cautioned that only obsolete tanks (or other equipment) might be removed. This was not a priori unreasonable, but even in the West's own terms it was not a very powerful argument. If the IISS's figures were somewhere near correct as given in The Military Balance 1988-89, a reduction of 5,000 would have accounted for approximately half the total number of Soviet tanks in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.<94> If all of these tanks were obsolete, the standard western argument in terms of purely quantitative eastern superiority was weakened. In the Soviet response, it was stated that tanks would be dismantled rather than withdrawn, and denied that only obsolete weapons would be affected.

Gorbachev himself took up the point in a late January speech to a party of representatives of the Trilateral Commission. He gave more details of the distribution of the troop cuts, saying that 240,000 men would be cut in the Western USSR/Eastern Europe, 200,000 in the East, and 60,000 in the South of the USSR. A cut of 12% in personnel was said to be involved, along with a 14.2% cut in the military budget, and a 19.5% cut was promised in the production of arms and equipment. Gorbachev also said that 5,300 of the most advanced tanks would be removed, and that of the 10,000 tanks to be eliminated in Europe, 5,000 would be physically destroyed and the remainder turned into
In the period immediately following Gorbachev's announcement, each of the other WTO states made statements of intention to make cuts in their forces, equipment, and defence budgets, and in most cases to make analogous revisions in their doctrine and training to render them more defensive. Romania made no announcement at this time, but had announced force and budget cuts in previous years.

It was also announced that some Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Poland, which had not been mentioned in the original speech. Presumably the Polish leadership was keen to be seen to be playing a role in the process, and to be able to offer something to Polish public opinion.

The announced WTO reductions made a significant addition to the withdrawals planned by the USSR. The totals of tanks to be cut ranged from 200 in Bulgaria to 850 in Czechoslovakia. Figures were also given for reductions in armoured vehicles, artillery, and combat aircraft, and the announced military budget cuts ranged from 10% in the case of the GDR to 17% in the case of Hungary. The Soviet Ministry of Defence's aggregation of the projected cuts put the figures at 556,300 personnel, 11,901 tanks, 195 personnel carriers, 9,130 artillery pieces, and 930 combat aircraft. Statements were made by the GDR's Erich Honecker, the Polish Minister of Defence, the Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff, and a Hungarian government spokesman, to the effect that these states' forces would be adopting more defensive postures or
doctrines.\textsuperscript{97}

It was fairly clear that the later announcements had been planned to add to the impact of the Soviet initiative without distracting attention from it at the time, and also perhaps that the East European leaderships wanted to share some of the limelight with Gorbachev. Presumably some coordination of the measures occurred through WTO channels, perhaps in the Disarmament Commission set up in 1987. In all cases, of course, it could reasonably be asked whether old or new equipment would be withdrawn. General Moiseev added some further details concerning the restructuring of Soviet tank regiments and air defences in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, saying that all bomber aviation in Eastern Europe would be withdrawn to the USSR.\textsuperscript{98} By December 1989, over half the Soviet reductions were said to have been completed.

In purely quantitative terms, the unilateral withdrawals announced were substantial, and it should be remembered that they were described as independent of any further cuts which might be negotiated in the CFE forum. The Pentagon’s \textit{Soviet Military Power 1989} publication, which appeared in September, was prepared to concede their significance even as it expressed caution about their future reversibility: "It is important to note that these unilateral reductions in manpower are 20 percent more ambitious than any previously proposed in negotiations on conventional forces. For example, the announced size of the Soviet tank withdrawal is greater than the US Army’s
entire active duty tank assets stationed in Europe, and will return the Pact to roughly the level of active tank forces it fielded in the late 1960s."<99>

In their immediate responses, the Pentagon and NATO both took the view that the announced reductions went some way in reducing the eastern conventional superiority in Europe, but did not remove it. Given the problems associated with balance calculations which were outlined earlier, even the quantitative evaluation of the initiative was not as straightforward as this judgment would seem to imply. General Yazov dodged this question in an April interview with Izvestiya. The interviewer put to him a view he attributed to the new US Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney, to the effect that the USSR still had an overwhelming conventional superiority in Europe. Yazov responded by giving figures for the global NATO-WTO balance which he said showed "approximate parity" if naval forces were taken into account, thus appearing to concede a continued eastern ground/air superiority in Europe.<100>

However, as soon as one starts to allow for the qualitative factors which a more sophisticated balance calculation can incorporate, the picture becomes less clear. If the pre-existing balance could have been assessed on a spectrum ranging from substantial WTO superiority to approximate parity, the unilateral eastern reductions could tip the balance at one end of this scale towards a slight but significant NATO advantage. This possibility was apparently supported in a war game
conducted by the Boeing Corporation a short while after the Soviet reductions were announced. Once they were incorporated into the progress of a conventional war in Europe, along with likely reductions based on Soviet proposals in CFE, NATO forces were to be found, after 30 days of fighting, advancing from Warsaw towards the Ukraine.<101>

Calculations made by the mainstream of western strategic specialists, who had tended towards the more pessimistic end of the spectrum in their earlier balance calculations, credited Gorbachev's announced reductions as going some way towards removing the Soviet capacity for a surprise attack in Central Europe. Senator Sam Nunn saw the withdrawals as providing NATO with approximately seven days' additional warning of any impending Soviet attack. Phillip A Karber, in an analysis presented to the House Armed Services Committee in March, argued that if the reductions were carried out as announced and NATO forces remained at their existing levels, the danger of a surprise attack would have been successfully reduced. When the IISS's publication The Military Balance 1989-90 appeared in the autumn, its conclusion was: "Even the unilateral reductions will, once complete, virtually eliminate the surprise attack threat which has so long concerned NATO planners."<102>

If the claimed Soviet surprise attack capability was genuinely reduced as these analysts saw it, there were still some further questions to be answered concerning the
precise nature of the promised defensive restructuring. Some of the mainstream analysts who accepted that the Soviet tank withdrawal was taking place as promised later argued that other equipment, in particular infantry fighting vehicles and artillery, was being reallocated to other units. The result of this, it was argued, was to leave these remaining units with a more flexible offensive/defensive capability which left open the possibility of offensive operations on a fairly large scale, albeit not such a sudden or overwhelming one as previously envisaged. Soviet sources also indicated that some skeleton elements of the six tank divisions being withdrawn would remain in Eastern Europe.<103>

The wording of Gorbachev's speech seemed to entail that restructuring for defensive purposes would take place in Soviet units on East European territory, but not in those on Soviet territory itself. This appeared consistent with the third of Kokoshin and Larionov's proposed models, whereby the counteroffensive would aim only to restore the territorial status quo ante, without moving onto the opponent's territory. In this case, the territory to be restored would clearly include Eastern Europe as well as the USSR. However, Gorbachev's own words were not precise enough to make this sufficiently clear, and it will be remembered that the debates over the counteroffensive and victory which I have reviewed continued throughout 1989. It has been rumoured that deeper cuts than those announced were advocated by a report produced under the chairmanship
of Academician Velikhov, Gorbachev's science adviser, so both the numbers and the degree of defensiveness adopted may have represented compromise positions.

The Soviet military leadership described the readjustments being made in rather general terms. Moiseev said that a new stage in military structuring had been in progress since 1985-6, necessitating new approaches by the General Staff. A new theory of military art was in the process of being created, and Moiseev stressed that the General Staff must deal with questions of strategy and military art - evidently an attempt to shield these spheres of planning from the influence of civilians. New field manuals were said to have been drawn up. Moiseev also commented in a Pravda article that mobilization requirements were being reduced and a number of technical projects related to offensive weapons systems being closed down.<104> General P Lushev, the newly-appointed Commander-in-Chief of the WTO, said that by 1991 all WTO forces would have taken on a "purely defensive character".<105> This looked very much like an attempt to assert that no further changes would be needed once the restructuring announced by Gorbachev had been implemented.

General Yazov told a TASS interviewer that operational manoeuvre groups were among the units being pulled out of Eastern Europe, and the same seems to have been said to western specialists in private fora.<106> This statement was clearly intended as a sign of a recognition that western expressions of alarm about these formations' role
in Soviet strategy had been at least partly justified. However, it was not entirely convincing, since the dominant western view of operational manoeuvre groups had been that they were formations created out of existing units for particular wartime purposes, not specific units which could be identified or withdrawn during peacetime. It was also stated that restructuring in Eastern Europe would involve the deployment of increased quantities of defensive equipment such as air defence and anti-tank systems.

Further details also emerged which suggested that some units on Soviet territory itself would be subject to defensive restructuring. Yazov and other senior figures spoke of plans to restructure a number of motor rifle divisions in the Western USSR, the Far East, and the South, to form machine gun-artillery divisions (as mentioned in the ISKAN stability model). These units were associated with fortified regions or bastions, and placed a low emphasis on mobility and offence. Similar units had existed during the inter-war period, and had been used during the Great Patriotic War. The planned restructuring was said also to involve the construction of fortifications in parts of the Western USSR.<107>

It is interesting to note that if the optimistic western analyses of the unilateral Soviet cuts were correct, Soviet forces would already seem to have been heading by this time towards a level at which a decisive counteroffensive could not seriously have been envisaged. At the very least, it would have been difficult to expand
forces sufficiently to ensure this once fighting had started. This situation seemed in turn to entail further doctrinal revisions to exclude the victorious counteroffensive explicitly, which would place more pressure on the military establishment. On the other hand, the military model of an increasingly fluid offensive-defensive battlefield on which both sides were equipped with advanced conventional weaponry conflicted with civilian attempts to specify a truly non-offensive posture to match the declared doctrine. NATO forces would almost certainly be developing on similar lines.<108>

By mid-1989, the military postures of both the WTO and NATO had also been placed on the agenda of the new CFE negotiations (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). The "Group 23" consultations went through various informal changes of name before the January 1989 conclusion of the mandate for a Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. They then became identified as the CFE talks. The East originally wanted to include nuclear systems of shorter ranges than those covered by the INF Treaty, but eventually conceded the western position on the point. The East also began to raise the question of naval forces from late 1988 onwards, as a way of identifying an area of western superiority, but this never took the form of a serious attempt to get them included in the mandate. The West, for its part, at first wanted to exclude air forces from the talks' initial round, but eventually conceded their inclusion. The Soviet approach was foreshadowed by a
three-stage plan put forward by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in May-June 1988: a data exchange plus the elimination of asymmetries; cuts of 500,000 troops on each side; further reductions to give forces on both sides a defensive character. By January 1989 the sides were ready to adopt a mandate document, which was attached to the final document of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting.

The mandate set out the subject of the talks as "the conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, of the participants based on land....from the Atlantic to the Urals." The stated objectives were: "to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces.....at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action." Nuclear weapons, naval forces, and chemical weapons were excluded from consideration. The problem of dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) systems was dealt with by the formulation: "No conventional armaments or equipment will be excluded from the subject of negotiation because they may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones." The new talks were to be conducted between the 23 members of NATO and the WTO only, but those states were obliged to inform the other CSCE participants on a regular basis, and all 35 CSCE states would participate simultaneously in a
follow-up conference to the Stockholm forum on CSBMs.

The wording of the mandate suggested that NATO had largely got its way in this expression of the talks' objectives, and would be likely to argue that eastern forces and capabilities had been identified as the main problem. The WTO had certainly failed in its attempt to include nuclear weapons or any commitment to address nuclear doctrine (and hence NATO's flexible response and first use policies). The WTO was nevertheless likely to argue that NATO's conventional forces and concepts posed problems in themselves, and had agreed to make its own strategic concepts an implicit subject of negotiation. Questions of data and balance certainly seemed likely to persist in some form. However, the main difference between the situation at the start of MBFR, and the beginning of CFE sixteen years later, was the higher eastern level of interest in conventional arms control and disarmament. The geographical extension of the mandate to cover the whole Atlantic-to-the Urals region was in itself a step which brought far more Soviet forces into the scope of the negotiations, by comparison with MBFR, but made much less difference to the western forces covered. Moreover, conventional negotiations were now seen as addressing strategies and "stability" as well as crude numerical comparisons of forces.

By 1988-89, Soviet newspapers and journals were publishing a range of material criticizing the drawbacks of earlier approaches to negotiations. Some of this was
neutraly phrased, and focused on the inadequacy of leaving negotiators to sort out problems without sufficiently strong political direction from above. Other writers argued for a "theory of negotiations" which could incorporate the role of unilateral steps and the goal of non-offensive defence into a negotiation strategy. Ambassador Viktor Israelyan criticized the USSR's past obsession with secrecy, which had dictated the prolonged rejection of on-site inspection. Shevardnadze and the ex-negotiator and deputy foreign minister, Viktor Karpov, also made specific criticisms of the USSR's inflexible negotiating strategy in MBFR.<111>

Immediately after Gorbachev's UN speech, NATO outlined the tank cuts it would be looking for in the negotiations.<112> Total tank numbers in the Atlantic-to-Urals area would be cut to approximately 40,000, which on NATO's figures would have required a cut of over 50% in WTO tanks, but no cut for NATO. NATO also envisaged that no single country would have more than 30% (about 12,000) of these 40,000 tanks, which would prevent the USSR making cuts in its allies' forces rather than its own. NATO used the term "sufficiency" for this sub-limit, and also proposed restrictions on the stationing of forces on foreign territory, which would have the heaviest effect on Soviet forces in the GDR. An outline of future CSBM proposals to ensure "transparency" was also given.

This NATO communique could be said to have been an unimaginative response to Gorbachev's initiative, making as
it did a series of far-reaching demands on the USSR without offering any reciprocal concessions on the western side. But to point out the one-sidedness of these proposals was to miss some of their significance. Ten years earlier, such an asymmetrical set of demands would have appeared to be a recipe for instant stalemate in negotiations. By early 1989, however, there were few certainties to be relied upon in the politics of European conventional disarmament, and the assumption of the non-negotiability of such unbalanced cuts no longer applied. NATO too was committed on paper to a negotiating goal which implied going beyond the status quo aspirations of MBFR.

Conclusion

The Soviet and WTO declarations on military doctrine and strategy which were made in the mid-to-late 1980s suggested at first glance that western alternative defence ideas had been whole-heartedly embraced. The western ideas undoubtedly influenced a number of Soviet and East European analysts and via them, apparently, the Soviet leadership itself. However, I have also identified some more traditional strategic considerations which seem to have influenced Soviet thinking during this period. This diverse range of influences helps to account for the ambiguities which the new doctrinal formulations contained, and for the persistence of disagreements in the strategic debate between civilian and military writers. In short, by early 1989 Soviet strategy was evidently in flux, but the outcome
of the changes in progress was uncertain.

A number of East European specialists participated in this strategic debate, but its implications for the WTO were ambiguous. Soviet strategic revisions seemed to be following the logic of New Thinking in seeking to reduce the perceived threat to Western Europe from WTO conventional forces. Neither Soviet nor East European writers sought to question the commitment to the defence of existing WTO territory, and a Soviet alternative defence plan like the ISKAN stability model seemed likely to confirm the bloc division of Europe, albeit on more defensive lines, and to leave unresolved the political questions related to the domestic legitimacy of the East European leaderships. Some of the criticisms directed by sceptics at the western alternative military modellers therefore seemed equally applicable to the Soviet contributions to the alternative strategic debate. Nevertheless, the reports of the preparation of fortified defences on Soviet territory suggested that defensive defence in Central Europe might not be the only option under consideration. Moreover, these strategic discussions were taking place in an atmosphere influenced by some increasingly explicit retreats from the Brezhnev Doctrine, as I show in the following chapter.

In March 1989, it appeared that the most important questions to be resolved in the CFE negotiations revolved around the status of the counteroffensive in Soviet strategy, and the levels of quantitative and qualitative
balance which could be negotiated between the two sides. Chapter 8 shows how rapidly these issues became secondary and even irrelevant in the light of the political developments of 1989-90 and the accelerated Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe which followed. This in turn complicated the negotiations themselves, which had been based on an assumption that reasonably stable blocs would remain in existence throughout the period of negotiation and implementation of a treaty. The "stable blocs" assumption had been widely shared, both by the original western advocates of alternative defence and by the eastern analysts who responded to their ideas. The events of 1989-90 showed that the WTO, at least, was by no means a stable and sustainable alliance, and served as a partial vindication of the western anti-bloc radicals who had argued that alternative military models failed to address the roots of inter-bloc and intra-bloc conflicts. However, this did not mean that the discussions of alternative defence had not played a valuable role. Even though they were overtaken by events at the end of the decade, this chapter has shown that they made a substantial contribution to the western strategic debate in the 1980-85 period, and to the Soviet and East European debate between 1985 and 1989.
Chapter 7 has shown how some of the problems in the alternative defence debate which had been identified by Tiedtke and other commentators in the early 1980s remained unresolved even after Gorbachev's December 1988 announcement of Soviet troop withdrawals and the opening of the CFE negotiations in March 1989. As Tiedtke had argued several years earlier, non-offensive strategies might not by themselves entail changes in the WTO's functions within Eastern Europe. I have already shown that the Soviet civilian analysts were reluctant to address this question directly. Other western analysts had also argued that force cuts alone would not necessarily involve changes in the WTO posture towards Western Europe, unless they were cuts of a certain type. In this respect, however, the Soviet leadership had already committed itself to the goals of a non-offensive strategy, both in unilateral Soviet or WTO declarations and in the CFE mandate. The focus of this chapter shifts back towards the internal political functioning of the WTO, in order to follow the interplay between political and military factors in Soviet-East European relations during the period of the WTO's decline in 1989-90.

One of the arguments used within the western alternative defence debate during the early 1980s had been the suggestion that the USSR would be reluctant to forgo
its offensive posture towards Western Europe because of the internally coercive functions of its forces in the eastern part of the continent. This argument seemed at times to involve a fairly straightforward acceptance of Christopher Jones’ thesis that these internal functions were fundamental or primary to the WTO (see chapters 3 and 4).

In the last three chapters I have suggested that Soviet policy towards the alliance also needs to be placed in an external military context. But in either case there would have been no a priori reason why the USSR could not devise a posture which looked less provocative to Western Europe, but which safeguarded traditional concerns in respect of Soviet control within WTO borders.

Even if Soviet strategy had placed a greater stress on territorial defence by East European forces, this would not seem to have been incompatible with this goal, particularly if we look again at the pattern of military intervention in the region between 1955 and 1981. The interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia did depend on the availability of tank-dominated Soviet divisions to cow and, if necessary, to crush resistance. In Poland in 1981, however, it was a domestic military establishment which acted, relying in the first instance on elite security forces rather than the army’s rank-and-file. Up until the mid-1980s, therefore, one could have argued that Soviet capabilities were less important as long as other East European military establishments could be relied upon to step in if and when necessary. In that case, neither less
offensive strategies nor quantitative cuts in front-line forces would necessarily have prevented the use of paramilitary security forces for purposes of domestic control, or their expansion to compensate for front-line reductions. And if the disposition towards military intervention had declined from a 1968 "high point", then perhaps the offensive requirements could be relaxed anyway.

The most important question, however, was not whether alternative defence strategies left the USSR or the East European elites with a technical capacity for military intervention within the WTO, but whether the political logic of Soviet-East European relations continued to require this. If Soviet New Thinking was to be consistently applied within the WTO, perhaps it could be excluded. To investigate whether this was the case, an analysis of the Soviet political strategy towards Eastern Europe during the 1985-90 period is required, at least insofar as it was related to the status of the Brezhnev Doctrine. This can be attempted on the basis of statements made by the political leadership, scholarly and journalistic materials published in the Soviet press, and week-to-week policymaking during the most concentrated crisis period of late 1989. Since there is little documentary evidence to hand on this last question, I have tried to avoid speculation about the Soviet role in events in cases where the evidence is insufficient.

Gorbachev's initial use of the concept of a "Common European Home" during the years 1985 and 1986 suggested
that it was less a well-thought out foreign policy strategy than a way of putting pressure on the USA by playing on West European concerns about the USA's SDI policy. By 1987-8, however, the term was being used rather differently. It was presented as a concept which could allow the East European states more room for manoeuvre to conduct their own initiatives in foreign policy, in ways which would be consistent with the general Soviet interest in improving economic and political relations with Western Europe. At the same time, however, attempts to promote further economic integration within COMECON continued.

Some Soviet political commentators and officials continued after 1985 to emphasize the role of socialist internationalism, the term previously used to define relations within the WTO, while others argued that it was important to recognize national interests within the socialist alliance. Gorbachev did not mention socialist internationalism in his speech to the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, but the term did appear in the 1986 edition of the CPSU Programme. It was not mentioned in Gorbachev's book Perestroika, published in 1987, where he spoke of the "absolute independence" of East European countries but balanced this by continuing to emphasize the shared interests of the socialist community. As I showed in Chapter 6, the Stockholm CDE agreement of September 1986 contained a clause outlawing the use of force within alliances. In his November 1987 speech on the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Gorbachev
identified socialist internationalism with peaceful coexistence; he advocated "A strict observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence by all. This is what the practice of socialist internationalism rests on." Similarly ambiguous formulations appeared in speeches made by Gorbachev during visits to Eastern Europe.<1>

A clearer shift of emphasis occurred in early 1988. In a Soviet-Yugoslavian communique signed in March, it was stated that parties and socialist countries enjoyed independence in defining their own paths of development, and it was also said that the principle of peaceful coexistence should apply to international relations within the world socialist system, as well as to international relations in general. By dropping any mention of socialist internationalism, this formulation returned to the phrasing which had originally been used in the Soviet government statement issued during the Hungarian crisis of 1956, but which was subsequently ignored in favour of the claims of socialist internationalism (see Chapter 3). Its revival in 1988 did not at first seem to provide guidance for Soviet policy in the event of a major political crisis in Eastern Europe, but it did signal a significant relaxation at the doctrinal level. In an equally symbolic move at the organizational level, the Soviet Central Committee’s Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries was merged in September 1988 with the main International Department: an indication that Soviet relations with socialist states would no longer enjoy a special status. The reformulation
of the Soviet-Yugoslav communique was also taken up by Aleksandr Bovin in an article published in mid-1988, in which he discussed Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese relations and also dealt with Eastern Europe, but without spelling out its likely implications for the future of Soviet-East European relations.\(^2\) Gorbachev’s December 1988 speech to the United Nations also contained statements on the principle of political freedom of choice for each nation, and on the variety of paths of socialist development.

The shift seems to have been made possible and necessary at this time because Gorbachev’s leadership had consolidated its authority at home, and had come to a clearer view (or admission) on the interrelationship between economic and political reform, both in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. It was also clear that improvements in East-West relations could be endangered by any major crisis in Eastern Europe, with or without Soviet intervention.

Reassessment of the past was more problematic for Soviet political leaders, not least because at this time the East European leaderships still included a number of figures who had been the direct beneficiaries of previous Soviet interventions. Academics and journalists were less constrained by diplomatic considerations. In his May 1988 Literaturnaya gazeta article which amounted to a manifesto for a revisionist Soviet account of the Cold War (see Chapter 2), Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev related the post-1945 East-West confrontation to the "hegemonic great
power ambitions of Stalinism" in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Dashichev went on to criticize the Brezhnev leadership for contributing to the breakdown of detente through its Third World policies, though he did not explicitly extend his criticism of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe to later periods. As Chapter 6 showed, Gorbachev's own speech to the 19th All-Union Party Conference in the summer of 1988 endorsed the general view that serious mistakes had been made in Soviet foreign policy. Other scholars and journalists used the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia to discuss the similarities between the Prague Spring reforms and Gorbachev's own reform project.〈3〉

Theoretical reformulations and general criticisms of the past soon had to give way to attempts to answer the more concrete questions about the future of Soviet policy. In mid-1988 Academician Bogomolov, head of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System (IEMSS) (where Dashichev also worked), was quoted as saying, during a trip to the USA, that "The Brezhnev Doctrine is completely unacceptable and unthinkable".〈4〉 In an interview with Time published in early 1989, Eduard Shevardnadze was asked whether he could imagine any scenario in which Soviet military intervention would be required to deal with internal disturbances in a Warsaw Treaty country. He replied: "No, I cannot imagine such a scenario."〈5〉 The USSR committed itself once again to the principle of each people's right to social and political self-determination.
in a USSR-FRG joint statement signed by Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl in June 1989. In Gorbachev’s speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg the following month, he stated that: "Any interference in domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states, both friends, allies or any others, are inadmissible."<6>

The Revolutions of 1989-90

The position of the Soviet leadership in late 1988 and early 1989 can best be characterized as a non-intervention policy which apparently rested on the hope that reforms in Eastern Europe would develop at a gradual and manageable pace. Future military intervention had been publicly ruled out, and there seemed to be an assumption that the East European states would follow their own courses of reform in ways which would eventually bring them into line with the Soviet perestroika project. It is possible that additional pressure for reform was being exerted on some of the East European leaderships (e.g. Czechoslovakia and the GDR) in private, but the pace of public events soon left private diplomacy far behind.

The existing political system in Europe collapsed over a period of less than twelve months between mid-1989 and mid-1990. By the middle of 1990 the WTO member-states, the USSR included, had committed themselves to pluralist political systems and market economies. The GDR was moving rapidly towards unification with the FRG within NATO, with the agreement of the USSR. As the East European leaderships
fell during 1989-90, it became clear that the USSR had irrevocably abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine with its ultimately military implications. This did not start with an explicit East European challenge to the postulates of the doctrine, but with the decisions of the Hungarian and Polish leaderships to seek accommodation with their domestic political opponents - decisions which were evidently taken with the agreement, or at least the forbearance, of the Soviet leadership. It is unclear what the Soviet leadership expected to happen as a result of this process, and whether Gorbachev and his colleagues realized quite how quickly and comprehensively the communist parties would be displaced. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership showed itself prepared to accept the removal of the old East European elites and their replacement by new political forces which enjoyed genuine popular support.

After this the WTO’s military structures were placed in question as a direct consequence of the political changes. The alliance’s political structures were faced with the task of trying to maintain some kind of consensus between the USSR and the new East European leaderships. In June 1990 the Political Consultative Committee met in Moscow. The meeting adopted a declaration stating that conditions in Europe were ripe for overcoming the existing bloc security system which divided the continent; "In this new situation, the states represented at the meeting intend to re-examine the character, functions and activity of the
Warsaw Pact, and also to transform it into an alliance of sovereign, equal states based on democratic principles."<7>

A commission was established to draw up concrete proposals on these lines which would be considered by the PCC at its next meeting, which was due to take place by the end of November.

It is worth running through a brief chronology of the key events of 1989, as a reminder of just how rapidly they unfolded. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was the first to concede the principle of multi-party elections, and to abandon its constitutional claim to a leading role, in January and February respectively. In June negotiations began with the Hungarian opposition forces, and in September agreement was reached on a new constitution and the calling of multi-party elections in 1990. The Polish party leadership legalized Solidarity in January and began similar negotiations on constitutional reform and new elections. Solidarity won almost all the seats open to competition in the elections which were held in June, and in August a Solidarity-led coalition government took office while General Jaruzelski remained head of state.

Hungarian policy contributed directly to the crisis in the GDR. In May, fences on the Hungarian-Austrian border were dismantled, making it possible for GDR citizens and others to cross from Hungary into Austria. In September, the border was officially opened to GDR citizens. Massive demonstrations began in Leipzig in the autumn, Erich Honecker was replaced as party leader, and on November 9th
the Berlin Wall was opened. More round-table negotiations produced a coalition government under SED (communist) leadership, and in March 1990 multi-party elections installed another coalition government dominated by conservative parties. In Czechoslovakia, more mass demonstrations forced the leadership to agree to the formation of a coalition government in December, following which the previously imprisoned playwright Vaclav Havel was elected President by the Federal Assembly. The Bulgarian leadership found itself under pressure from a rapid increase in dissident activity with particularly strong ecological protest and the mobilization of an independent trade union, and was apparently further alarmed by events in the GDR. The party removed Todor Zhivkov in November, and opened negotiations with opposition parties in January 1990. In Romania the Ceausescu leadership could not be removed without violence and a brief civil war between the bulk of the army and the regime's internal security apparatus, during the last week of December.

In Hungary and Poland, the communist leaderships seem to have calculated that they could, by initiating reform from above, retain support in subsequent open elections. The original impetus to this strategy probably came from their assessment of the need for economic reform, but in both countries the gamble failed and the communist parties were rapidly reduced to rump organizations operating under new names. In both cases the strategy evidently had Soviet support, for Gorbachev endorsed the Hungarian decision to
legalize a multi-party system, and accepted the Polish round table negotiations. Gorbachev's intervention was reported to have been crucial in August, when he apparently told the Polish party leader Rakowski that the party would have to accept a Solidarity-led coalition government. (Jaruzelski had failed to persuade Solidarity to join a communist-led coalition.) Soviet policy crossed its own Rubicon publicly on August 25th, when Pravda published the Soviet Council of Ministers' message of congratulations to Tadeusz Mazowiecki on the occasion of his appointment as Poland's prime minister.<8>

As events unfolded in the GDR, it was variously reported that Gorbachev told Honecker the USSR would not support him with force in the event of a crisis, that he stepped in to halt a plan of Honecker's to use the GDR's own armed forces against demonstrators, and that Egon Krenz consulted Gorbachev before opening the Berlin Wall. In Czechoslovakia the regime also seems to have been prepared to use force for a time, and it was even rumoured that there was some kind of KGB plot to remove the leadership of Milos Jakes, which coincided with the public demonstrations in Prague. It was also reported that the Romanian National Salvation Front asked the USSR to intervene when the fighting against the Ceausescu forces was still in progress, and that the Soviet leadership refused.

Some of these rumours seem more plausible than others, but all are hard to substantiate, and it is more important to try to assess the broader political calculations on
which Soviet policy was based. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that if certain of these reports were correct, there were still political leaderships in Eastern Europe which were prepared to use force to maintain themselves in power, and that in this sense the Brezhnev Doctrine survived its abandonment by the USSR. Indeed, if the report concerning Romania was correct, even a genuine request for Soviet assistance was turned down.

As one crisis succeeded another in Eastern Europe, Soviet academics and journalists published articles reevaluating the events of 1956 and 1968, and endorsing the political changes in Poland. A range of views was expressed, from direct criticisms of Khrushchev and Brezhnev to military-historical analyses adhering to the traditional view that intervention in Hungary had been necessary to defeat a counter-revolution which had been partly inspired by western intervention.<9> The Hungarian Central Committee itself adopted a resolution describing the events of 1956 as having started as a "popular uprising", although it was still claimed that this had later turned into a counterrevolution. In June 1989 Imre Nagy's body was ceremonially re-buried in Budapest. By August the Hungarian and Polish leaderships had condemned their countries' participation in the 1968 intervention, though the GDR and of course the Czechoslovakian leadership were still defending it. Two days before the anniversary of the 1968 intervention, Izvestiya interviewed KT Mazurov, a member of Brezhnev’s Politburo, and General IG Pavlovskii,
who had commanded the WTO intervention force (see Chapter 4). Both said they still believed the action to have been justified, but VV Nefedov, who had participated as a 19-year-old paratrooper, related how his unit had arrived in Czechoslovakia to find no sign of what they had been told to expect — attempts by right-wing forces to seize power, and imminent incursions by West German troops.<10>

The WTO itself gathered in Bucharest in July for a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. At this time no changes of leadership had yet taken place in Eastern Europe — Jaruzelski still held the posts of First Secretary of the Polish party, and President. The communique issued after the meeting repeated a longstanding proposal to dissolve both NATO and the WTO, beginning with their military organizations. It also stated that there were no universal socialist models, and that each socialist state had the right to work out its own political line without interference from outside: a statement of non-intervention, certainly, but one still couched within the concept of an alliance of socialist states. Commenting on the meeting in various interviews and speeches, Gorbachev himself spoke of a process of transformation of the alliance from a military-political into a political-military organization, and also of the fact that there were now substantial distinctions between the domestic and foreign policies of the different states.<11>

The July 1989 PCC meeting was the last WTO gathering at which the East European states’ representatives were
drawn solely from the communist parties. By the time the Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM) met in October in Warsaw, the Mazowiecki government had taken office in Poland, and was represented by the new Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Shortly after Mazowiecki took office, the Romanian leadership seems to have made an attempt of sorts to revitalize the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Polish ambassador in Bucharest was told that developments in Poland were not a purely Polish affair, and power should not be handed over to reactionary circles. A statement saying that the formation of a Solidarity government would be a serious blow to the WTO was circulated to the other leaderships, but apparently rejected immediately by Poland.<12> The Czechoslovakian leadership expressed similar views, but evidently did not think there was any point in attempting a full-blooded resuscitation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Unrealistic though the Romanian démarche may have seemed at the time, it suggested that there was an acute awareness in Bucharest of a fundamental truth about the events of 1989: once the dam was breached, all the communist leaderships were likely to be swept away.

The October CFM meeting's communique contained several commitments to the sovereignty of states, and lacked any reminder that the WTO was supposed to consist of socialist states. At the same time, Gorbachev stated during a visit to Finland that the USSR did not claim any right to interfere in East European political developments, and the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov
identified a new principle in Soviet foreign policy, the "Sinatra Doctrine": "We now have the Frank Sinatra doctrine....He had a song, 'I had it my way'(sic). So every country decides, on its own, which way to take."<13>

By this time Honecker had been forced to step down in the GDR, and the Czechoslovakian revolution was rapidly approaching. The Polish and Hungarian parliaments' condemnations of the 1968 intervention were echoed in early December by the GDR parliament and then by the Czechoslovakian Communist Party itself, after Jakes was sacked as leader. This process of reevaluation was crowned when the WTO leaders met in Moscow on December 4th. This was described as a meeting of the leaders of the member-states, rather than of a WTO body as such, and was called in the first instance to enable Gorbachev to brief his colleagues on his Malta summit meeting with George Bush. The leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and the USSR signed a joint declaration stating that the events of 1968 had amounted to intervention in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs, and should be condemned. The Soviet government issued a slightly longer declaration on its own behalf, which supported the Czechoslovakian party and government's assessment that the intervention had been groundless and mistaken, "in the light of all the facts now known".<14> The slight reservation which remained in the words of the Soviet declaration implied that the decision-making of the time was still being defended up to a point, though as Andrei Sakharov commented in Moscow News, it was
hard to see what new facts had come to light in the previous 21 years which had not been known at the time.<15> It also appeared that a distinction was still being drawn between the events of 1956 and those of 1968 – the Hungarian parliament then asked for a similar apology for 1956, but this was not forthcoming.

The final act of 1989 was the revolution in Romania. In simple terms, the revolution was resolved by street-fighting in Bucharest between the regular armed forces and Ceausescu's Securitate, and it became clear that most of the military establishment were not prepared to defend the regime. However, there were some aspects of the military's role in the revolution which could not immediately be explained. Some units certainly seem to have obeyed orders to fire on civilians in the course of the events in Timisoara which initially sparked the revolution, and in other cities as well. On the crucial Friday December 22nd, the Minister of Defence, General Milea, was killed or committed suicide, and it was after this that the army apparently changed sides.

Western journalists who attempted to reconstruct the events of December 1989 suggested that the army's initially ambivalent attitude was transformed into open support for the popular revolution only when the Securitate forces launched their attacks on the demonstrators, after Ceausescu was forced to flee from Bucharest. Milea's successor as Defence Minister, General Nicolae Militaru, told Krasnaya zvezda that there had been no hesitation in
the army's shift of allegiance, and that Milea had ordered the army not to fire on the people. However, Militaru himself was forced to resign in February 1990, apparently as a result of demonstrations by younger officers who were suspicious of his links with the old regime.<16>

In the aftermath of the revolution a number of different accounts were given of the level of anti-Ceausescu conspiracy which had existed earlier, of the contacts which plotters might have had with the Soviet leadership, and of the Soviet-Romanian contacts that took place during the fighting itself. There were reports that the National Salvation Front leadership and the Romanian General Staff had asked the USSR to intervene against the Ceausescu forces at the time when the fighting was at its height, and that the request was refused. It seems that at the time, Gorbachev gave only a partial account of the appeal which disguised the fact that it had been turned down. Shevardnadze denied that there had been any previous contacts, though the form of the denial did not appear to exclude contacts with individual anti-Ceausescu Romanians. Shevardnadze also denied that the new Romanian leadership had asked the USSR for military assistance during the uprising, and claimed that there had been sharp criticisms in private conversations between Gorbachev and Ceausescu, even though the USSR had not criticized the Ceausescu regime openly. One can assume that the leaders of the National Salvation Front had calculated that almost any post-Ceausescu leadership would be welcomed.
by the USSR, but whatever conspiracy may have existed seems to have had little or no encouragement from the Gorbachev leadership. After the Romanian revolution was over, Shevardnadze capped the events of the previous 12 months with a comment made during a press conference in Bucharest in early January, 1990: "The Warsaw Treaty should not necessarily be associated with the political systems of the member countries."<17>

What calculations guided Soviet policy during this revolutionary period in Eastern Europe? Had the Soviet leadership been prepared for what happened, or did it merely react to events? Speaking in December 1989 to the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev said that the year's changes in Eastern Europe were most typically characterized by attempts to renew socialism. A few weeks later, in a New Year address, he rather more realistically excluded Poland and Hungary from his list of countries where the combination of socialism and democracy had been reaffirmed.<18> In speeches delivered to a Central Committee plenum in February 1990, and to the 28th CPSU Congress in July, Shevardnadze insisted that what had collapsed in Eastern Europe was not socialism as such but a system of distorted notions of socialism, which had been illegitimately imposed on those countries under Stalin. As I showed in Chapter 2, Shevardnadze's February speech undermined 40 years of Soviet Cold War historiography by drastically revising the orthodox account of the transfer of power in the late 1940s.
In another Congress speech in July, Gorbachev responded to critics of his foreign policy by asking them whether they would really have preferred him to have used tanks again in Eastern Europe, which was certainly a blunter way of putting the choice to a domestic constituency which may have been less interested in debating the nature of true socialism than Shevardnadze supposed.<19> In his main speech to the Congress, Shevardnadze also said that "Yes, in principle we did foresee the changes [in Eastern Europe], we sensed their inevitability."<20>

It is likely that from 1988, if not earlier, the Soviet leadership was being warned by its academic advisers about the profundity of the impending crisis in Eastern Europe, in both its economic and political dimensions. Some of these academics seem to have had few illusions about the possibility of renewing the existing system, while others continued to write in terms which suggested they thought a new form of socialism could rise from the ashes.

The sceptics were evidently to be found principally in IEMSS, Bogomolov‘s institute, which was the institute with the most direct professional responsibility for the study of Eastern Europe. A memorandum written by Professor Dashichev in early 1989 was published in Der Spiegel in February 1990. Dashichev warned of the erosion of the USSR’s political, economic and moral position in Eastern Europe, argued that the GDR had effectively lost the competition with the FRG, and suggested that the creation
of a Common European Home would be impossible without overcoming the division of Germany. Other materials published in the Soviet press in early 1990 also suggested that the institute had developed a realistic, not to say pessimistic analysis of the situation in Eastern Europe during the early Gorbachev years.<21>

However, even if some advisers had been submitting these pessimistic analyses to the leadership, the latter may have been continuing to receive more optimistic assessments from other sources such as the party apparatus or the Soviet embassies in Eastern Europe. Bogomolov himself clearly felt that his efforts to contribute to a better understanding of Eastern Europe during the Brezhnev years, by writing internal memoranda for the leadership, had had little or no effect. In a despairing article written for Ogonyok in September 1990 to announce his resignation from the communist party, Bogomolov reproached himself for having chosen to try to play a moderating role from within the system rather than oppose it openly. The implication of Bogomolov's comments was that even if the Gorbachev leadership had begun to listen to different sources of policy advice, it was by then too late.<22>

Throughout 1989 most sections of the Soviet press only informed their readers in any detail about the various East European crises when they had already swept the old leaderships away, so that most Soviet readers would have been surprised by the turn of events.<23> It is worth remembering, however, that for most Soviet citizens
(political elite and population alike) domestic political and economic problems loomed far larger throughout 1989 than what was happening in Eastern Europe. This helps to explain why the controversies over "Who Lost Eastern Europe?" only really began to emerge in 1990 when the most dramatic events in the region were over.

It is hard to assess whether Shevardnadze's claim to have foreseen the course of events in Eastern Europe should be taken at face value. Shevardnadze's use of the term "in principle" suggested that even he was not making a very strong claim that the leadership had been prepared for what happened. It seems more likely that the Soviet leaders believed that once military intervention had been ruled out, the Polish and Hungarian parties could retain their dominant positions through more open competition with other political forces, and that the more reluctant leaderships could be gradually coaxed along the path of reform.

One could, however, offer an alternative explanation of Soviet policy during 1985-90. Perhaps Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had indeed been paying attention to Bogomolov and his colleagues, and had concluded that there was little chance of a managed reform process in Eastern Europe which could renew the existing system without risking its collapse. If so, this would explain why the Soviet leadership did not insist on reform during the 1985-8 period, but indicated its preferences and hoped for the best. After all, they already had the experience of the Khrushchev period to go on, when reform in the USSR had had
a more destabilizing effect on Eastern Europe than on the Soviet system itself.

If there is any truth in this alternative interpretation, perhaps Shevardnadze was not misleading the party Congress with his claim to have foreseen events. Whichever interpretation one favours, the fact remains that the actual speed of events during 1989-90 meant that the Soviet leadership had little option other than to endorse what was happening. One should also remember that if Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were perplexed, they were not alone. Even Czechoslovakian dissidents expressed their surprise at the speed with which the Prague regime collapsed, and the GDR opposition which launched the autumn revolution found itself rapidly marginalized by the pressure for unification. When the dust had settled, it did not seem to matter quite so much what Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had had in mind a year earlier.

1989 therefore marked the end of the WTO insofar as the alliance had served as a way of maintaining the position of the communist parties as the dominant political forces in the East European states. Military intervention by either Soviet or East European forces to halt the revolutions of 1989 would not have been technically impossible, and its exclusion did not follow automatically as a consequence of the Soviet strategic reorganization which was already under way. Intervention was, however, politically impossible in the sense that it would have contradicted the whole logic of Soviet foreign policy in
the New Thinking period, proved disastrous for East-West relations, and solved none of the political or economic problems of the East European states. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze certainly knew this, and to the extent that they continued to intervene politically in Eastern Europe, their actions may have ensured that there was no internal military intervention, and so hastened the collapse of one-party rule. After this the WTO still existed on paper, but only as a forum in which the USSR would deal with the new East European leaderships on a multilateral basis.

The Retreat of the Military Alliance

Despite the comprehensiveness of the political transformation of Eastern Europe, the WTO's military structures remained in existence into 1990. Furthermore, the continuing CFE negotiations were affected by these political developments. Chapter 7 has already indicated how some of the military functions of the WTO began to evolve, in the first instance as a consequence of the projected changes in Soviet military strategy, during the 1987-early 89 period. Once the political upheavals in Eastern Europe began in earnest in early 1989, a qualitatively distinct period can be identified, in which developments were prompted to a far greater degree by East European initiatives, which the USSR did not resist. As a result of this second phase, the coordinating and controlling functions of WTO military institutions also seem to have largely evaporated, to such an extent that by the time
Soviet authors began to publish ideas for a restructuring of the alliance in 1989-90, many of their recommendations were already redundant.

During the initial phase, the WTO adjusted to the new Soviet prioritization of conventional arms control and disarmament, partly through the creation of additional bodies at the 1987 PCC meeting (see Chapter 3) and the creation of the Experts' Working Group on Conventional Forces. These new bodies also appear to have played a role in the elaboration of WTO positions as the alliance prepared for the CFE negotiations. In this respect their creation was consistent with the steps taken during the 1970s, when additional fora for inter-elite consultations had been created during a period of East-West relaxation, but they also seemed to promise a more genuinely cooperative intra-WTO relationship than had operated during the MBFR negotiations.<24>

It is worth recalling the rumours to the effect that the GDR and Czechoslovakian leaderships had opposed Soviet plans to withdraw some forces from Eastern Europe in mid-1988. If these rumours were correct, they furnish some additional evidence in favour of the interpretation of the WTO as an alliance founded on an inter-elite bargaining process. As long as the East European states were ruled by their communist parties, the Soviet leadership might encounter resistance to its policy initiatives even when these involved attempts to improve East-West relations (once again, there is an echo of the 1960s-70s détente
period here).

Chapter 7 also showed how the Soviet strategic discussion continued throughout 1989, revealing a variety of views on the kind of offensive-defensive capabilities required by the remaining Soviet and WTO forces in Eastern Europe. In spite of these uncertainties, it did at least seem clear during this phase that WTO arms control policy was still based on the assumption that Soviet forces would remain in Eastern Europe for the next 5-10 years, and that the WTO was still operating within a framework set by Soviet strategic priorities. After the East European communist leaderships began to fall and it had become clear that there would be no Soviet military intervention to halt the process, these two assumptions no longer held good. The new East European leaderships were, it seemed, free to restructure their own military planning with little or no regard for collective WTO decisionmaking, and the USSR effectively settled the strategic debate by agreeing to speed up the withdrawal of its own troops. Strictly speaking, of course, the strategic question was only resolved insofar as future Soviet operations could only be launched from within Soviet territory after the withdrawal from Eastern Europe had been completed. There was still a question mark over the offensive-defensive balance which would be seen as desirable for these forces, but there was no longer any question about the fact that the future posture would have to be premised on an initial defence of Soviet, rather than WTO, territory.
There was in fact no clear dividing line between these two phases, and some significant measures were introduced under the old regimes. In response to popular pressure, the Polish Sejm voted during the summer of 1988 to introduce a new military oath which dropped the previous version’s reference to the fraternal alliance with the Soviet army, and to permit conscientious objectors to apply for alternative civilian service.<sup>25</sup> In Hungary, where unarmed military service for objectors already existed, a similar law on civilian alternative service was introduced in July 1989.<sup>26</sup> These measures can be considered symptomatic of the growing political pressure on the East European leaderships.

The trend towards reductions in East European forces and defence budgets which was established in the period immediately after the Soviet announcement of December 1988 continued throughout 1989 and 1990. The economic constraints which had operated on the communist regimes were strengthened by additional political pressures on their successors. The GDR armed forces were a special case, since from early 1990 onwards they were faced with the prospect of absorption into the forces of the unified German state, and had lost their raison d’être. The same applied, of course, to the Soviet Western Group of Forces in the GDR, which had for so many years been viewed by both sides as the elite element of Soviet military power in Europe. Everywhere, however, there were cuts in the periods of compulsory military service, announcements of intent to
remove party organizations from the armed forces, and further elaborations of new national defence doctrines.

There was an obvious danger of civil-military tensions in a situation where the former military establishments remained virtually intact after the revolutions, but were now in theory the servants of radically different political masters. Some of the new post-communist governments, notably those in Poland and Czechoslovakia, retained figures from the old regimes as their defence and/or internal security ministers for a time, as a way of smoothing relations with their own military establishments and with the USSR itself. The whole Polish compromise, whereby General Jaruzelski remained as President when Mazowiecki became Prime Minister, was in fact based on this calculation. Timothy Garton Ash reports an unnamed Solidarity political strategist as saying, just before Jaruzelski's June 1989 re-election as President, that if he did not get the necessary majority "some of us will just have to get 'flu"."<27>

The collapse of the existing political order must have come as a shock to the East European military elites, since it transformed their relations not only with the Soviet military establishment within the WTO, but also with their own societies. In these circumstances, they seem to have seen the reorganization of their institutions and doctrines as a way of preserving their own interests in an uncertain world, while perhaps also welcoming the opportunity to disengage themselves from some aspects of Soviet tutelage
which they may have found constraining in the past. The respective political leaderships supported these developments, although in some cases suspicions seem to have remained about the military’s instinct for self-preservation. In both Poland and Hungary, military reformers began to elaborate defensive national doctrines before the communist parties’ loss of power. Individual national presentations were made at the CSCE seminar on military doctrine held in Vienna in January-February 1990. In February the Polish National Defence Council (of which Mazowiecki and Skubiszewski were members) published the text of a new Polish national defensive doctrine.<sup>28</sup> As so often in periods of military reform, there was in some cases a degree of vagueness in specifying the threat which the new doctrine was supposed to meet. For a while during the middle of 1989 Hungarian (communist) political leaders laid some stress on remarks made by Nicolae Ceausescu about Romania’s supposed capacity to make nuclear weapons. However, Ceausescu’s claims seem to have had little foundation in reality.<sup>29</sup>

The question of party organizations within the armed forces arose as a logical consequence of the various commitments to multi-party political systems. The "depoliticization" of the East European armed forces took the form of the abolition, between late 1989 and early 1990, of the political administration organs which had had the task of overseeing the armies on behalf of the former ruling parties. In several cases they were replaced by
bodies which were to be responsible for general education, and conscripts were only to be allowed in future to join political organizations on the basis of their place of normal residence, rather than their place of service. It was unclear whether these new bodies could be staffed without the participation of the officers of the old political administrations, but this development in Eastern Europe was nevertheless something which conservative military figures in the USSR found particularly alarming.\(^{30}\) By mid-1990, depoliticization had also become a contentious issue in Soviet civil-military relations.

The most important indicators of the USSR’s own disengagement from Eastern Europe were the agreements reached with Czechoslovakia and Hungary in February and March 1990, on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from those countries by July 1991. Talks on withdrawal began in January in each case and were concluded fairly rapidly, with governments in both countries under pressure from public opinion to ensure speedy Soviet withdrawal. The Hungarian leadership, at this time still in the hands of the Hungarian Socialist Party (the ex-HSWP), evidently hoped to derive some electoral benefit from being seen to negotiate the withdrawal, but found itself unceremoniously removed from office nevertheless.\(^{31}\)

The Soviet withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and Hungary proceeded rapidly, but not without controversy. The USSR had already encountered problems in finding accommodation and other facilities for the troops who began to return.

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from Eastern Europe during 1989. Matters were made much worse by the additional withdrawals that began in 1990. In the Czechoslovakian case, President Havel was reported to have agreed to a plea from Gorbachev to accept a longer withdrawal period than he originally wanted, because of the USSR’s difficulties in housing the returning personnel. Relations between the Soviet Ministry of Defence and some local authorities became strained, with the Ministry claiming the local civilian authorities were not doing enough to help. There were also disputes over the condition of the facilities left behind in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the pollution of bases and former exercise areas. It seemed there was no clarification in the Soviet-Hungarian withdrawal agreement as to whether the USSR owed the former host country money for construction assistance and other services rendered in the past, or the former hosts owed the USSR money for the properties they were now inheriting. In the "still-GDR", meanwhile, there was increasing public hostility to the remaining Soviet forces.<32>

In the case of Poland there was also popular pressure for early withdrawal, including a call from Lech Walesa in January. The Mazowiecki government was initially more cautious than the Czechoslovakians and Hungarians, partly because of uncertainties surrounding German unification, but also perhaps in recognition of the USSR’s economic difficulties. Even in the Polish case, however, the Soviet government announced its willingness to discuss the
question of its forces in Poland, and at the end of April 1990 Marshal Yazov visited Warsaw to open the discussions. It was reported that a Polish delegation visiting Moscow had reached agreement on improved terms of payment for goods supplied to Soviet troops. In July, the official responsible for liaison with Soviet forces told the Polish news agency PAP that a major Soviet command headquarters was being withdrawn from Legnica in Lower Silesia. This was almost certainly the USSR’s headquarters for the Western TVD, which would previously have been the main wartime command and control centre for Central Europe and the WTO’s Northern Tier (see Chapter 4). In September the Polish government took a firmer position on troop withdrawal, and Skubiszewski handed the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw a diplomatic note suggesting that formal negotiations should begin soon.<33>

The most difficult East-West problem posed by the withdrawals was the fact that they disrupted the CFE talks, by making it difficult to assess the level at which Soviet forces in Eastern Europe might settle. The negotiations themselves had made rapid progress after they opened in March 1989. NATO’s opening position proposed initial reductions in tanks, artillery, and armoured troop carriers, which were identified as the most destabilizing weapons. NATO also proposed sub-limits for equipment held by any one country outside national borders, which would have affected the USSR most heavily. The opening WTO position included personnel, aircraft and helicopters in
addition to the equipment categories singled out by NATO. Shevardnadze, on behalf of the WTO, also proposed separate negotiations with a view to eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, which NATO ruled out.

There was a stark contrast between the progress achieved in CFE and the snail’s pace at which MBFR had proceeded. There was no repetition of the delays caused by haggling over data, since an agreement in principle was reached to verify the levels of forces and equipment left after an agreement (though this presupposed a complex and expensive verification regime). There was also rapid movement towards agreement on the principle that the agreement would be based on equal ceilings in the Atlantic-to-the Urals (ATTU) area. Since this area contained something like 70% of Soviet ground and air forces, but only 15% of comparable US forces, any reductions to equality within it promised to be to the US global advantage as long as they met the CFE criteria of eliminating surprise attack and offensive capabilities.

By many of the traditional criteria of Soviet military planning, and by the criteria which had apparently guided Soviet policy throughout the MBFR period, CFE therefore appeared to be very much to the WTO’s disadvantage. NATO accepted the principle of including aircraft and personnel after a switch of policy by the USA in May 1989. As the negotiations proceeded it became clear that some of the most serious problems would be related to the offensive and defensive roles of different types of aircraft, and to the
question of naval aircraft, which were mainly land-based on
the Soviet side, but carrier-based in the US force
structure, and therefore excluded. However, the two sides’
positions on force limitations within sub-zones of the ATTU
area gradually moved closer together.\textsuperscript{34}

The two sides exchanged draft treaties in December
1989, although there was still no agreement on the
definitions to be used for some of the categories of
equipment to be included. Up until this time, it looked as
though the chief shortcoming of any agreement would be that
it might cut equipment levels substantially while leaving
significant offensive capabilities in place at lower force
levels, because of the desire of military establishments on
both sides to retain their most modern and versatile
weaponry. In this case, force restructuring would be likely
to fall some way short of the defensive models favoured by
the Soviet civilian analysts, as summarized in the previous
chapter. From the beginning of 1990, however, it was clear
that CFE was threatened by developments of a rather
different nature on the eastern side.

Although the negotiations had not technically been
established as a bloc-to-bloc forum, this was clearly what
they were in all but name. CFE was therefore premised on
the existence of reasonably stable blocs and on the ability
of both alliances to coordinate themselves internally in an
effective manner. With the negotiation of the Soviet
withdrawals from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the
East Europeans’ declarations on their independent military
doctrines, the WTO's capacity to do this began to look doubtful. It seemed possible that by the time a treaty was ready for signature, the only Soviet forces left outside the USSR's borders would be in the GDR, and CFE became entangled with the negotiations over the security status of the unified Germany.

WTO bodies continued to meet, and for a time at least to play a coordinating role in relation to CFE. The Disarmament Commission met in August 1989, and was reported to have dealt with matters concerning the CFE and CSCE talks.<35> The Committee of Defence Ministers met in Budapest in November 1989, and again in Berlin in June 1990 after the important PCC meeting (see below). The communique of the November 1989 meeting spoke of the "further perfection of the Joint Armed Forces", but this must have been an empty declaration by this time in view of the work being done by the East Europeans on their independent national doctrines, which were also endorsed by the communique.<36> There had been evidence during 1989 that a good deal of bargaining had been going on between the WTO states over CFE negotiating positions, with Hungary for example making suggestions for compromises between NATO and Soviet proposals. During early 1990, however, the ultimate dependence of CFE on Soviet policy was underlined as it became clear that the USSR was not prepared to sign a treaty until the question of the unified Germany's security status had been settled. The CFE negotiations slowed down for a period, and Soviet troop withdrawals from the GDR
were temporarily halted in May (perhaps for a combination of economic and political reasons), though they were resumed again in August.
The Search for Compromise

During late 1989 and early 1990, Soviet academics discussing the future of the WTO focused on the prospects of creating more permanent institutions on the political side of the alliance. These, it was argued, would provide for state-to-state, as distinct from party-to-party, relations, could help to stabilize Eastern Europe during an uncertain transition period, and could facilitate bloc-to-bloc dialogue with NATO. ME Bezrukov and AV Kortunov provided one of the fullest versions of this argument in an article published in March 1990. They rejected the views of unnamed scholars who advocated a fully "Finlandized" model for Soviet-East European relations, and argued that a political and "more mature" alliance, between genuinely equal states, was still needed. Bezrukov and Kortunov proposed a permanent political headquarters, to be located in Eastern Europe, an international secretariat to work under the General Secretary, and a number of permanent and temporary committees and subcommittees. VG Baranovskii, VA Mazing and Yu. P Davyдов broadly supported these ideas, though Mazing argued that the right to leave the alliance should be respected.

Two comments on this school of thought in Soviet scholarship seem in order. On the one hand, it had a tendency to blur some nuances in the past history of the WTO. As I have argued in earlier chapters, the WTO had not always served as an instrument of Soviet domination pure
and simple, and its structures had in fact served the former, pro-Soviet East European elites reasonably well. On the other hand, the proposals for improving the alliance by creating additional political structures looked largely irrelevant by the time they were in the public domain, and even to a considerable extent at the time these articles must have been written. Bezrukov and Kortunov admitted that their proposals would have been easier to implement at some (unspecified) earlier date, but made no attempt to assess how attractive they would be to existing and future Eastern European leaderships.

The "Finlandization" model for future Soviet-East European relations, which these authors rejected, presumably involved an acceptance that the WTO could be dissolved altogether as long as the East European states continued to provide some bilateral security guarantees to the USSR. This model seems to have had advocates in Bogomolov’s institute (IEMSS), which we have already seen to have been a source of relatively pessimistic analysis of Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. Its elaboration has been traced by some western scholars back to policy advice offered to Yurii Andropov in the 1982-3 period by figures like Bogomolov and Aleksandr Bovin. Whether or not this is correct, Bogomolov was certainly one of the first Soviet scholars or officials prepared to say, as early as February 1989, that Hungary could in principle leave the WTO. In July Marshal Akhромеев was reported as saying that this applied to all the East European states. <38>
General Nikolai Chervov of the Soviet General Staff commented on possible changes in WTO institutions during the Vienna CSCE seminar on military doctrine at the beginning of 1990. He suggested that the FCC would probably be replaced by a new supreme body comprising heads of state rather than party leaders. General Moiseev mentioned the same idea in an interview with Pravda. The idea of rotating the post of WTO Commander-in-Chief around the member-states was also said to have been mooted by some of the East Europeans.<39> After the March CFM meeting, Shevardnadze said during a news briefing that an agreement had been reached to institute a new Secretary-General post, along with a permanent secretariat and new expert groups. These ideas looked close to Bezrukov and Kortunov's proposals, but there had been no mention of them in the brief joint communique issued after the meeting.<40>

The difficulties encountered by Soviet military commanders in adapting to the new situation in Eastern Europe were vividly demonstrated in two articles published within a few months of each other by General PG Lushev, Commander-in-Chief of the WTO.<41> In the first, published in January and presumably written in October or November, Lushev took up the call for " politicization" of the alliance, but claimed that WTO cooperation was deepening every year, and that socialist internationalism was still the most important criterion of the alliance's political unity. In the second, published to coincide with the WTO's 35th anniversary in May, he cautioned that a military
danger still existed in Europe, but criticized the previous bureaucratic-command style of Soviet "elder brother" leadership, and explained that all this would now change. In further anniversary articles, Lushev argued that the bilaterally-negotiated Soviet withdrawals from Hungary and Czechoslovakia did not affect the fundamentals of the alliance, while Marshal Yazov placed more emphasis on the WTO as a contributory element in a new system of European security. The most relaxed view of all was expressed by Roy Medvedev, the former dissident who was by this time a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. Interviewed together with the former WTO C-in-C Marshal Kulikov, and the head of the CPSU's International Department Valentin Falin, Medvedev argued that the WTO joint command was now largely a formality, since the Polish and Hungarian armed forces could hardly be considered a genuine part of the WTO any more. If the WTO did dissolve unilaterally there would be no danger of instability, Medvedev argued, and this would help progressive forces in the West to demand the complementary dissolution of NATO.

The varying degrees of realism manifested in these Soviet views of the WTO's future can be assessed via an examination of the East European leaders' own views and policies. The new governments did not press for an immediate dissolution of the alliance, though Hungary was eager to extricate itself from its military structures as soon as possible. Few showed much enthusiasm for a strengthening of WTO political structures, which confirmed
the suspicion that the Soviet reformers’ proposals offered too little, and had been made too late.

A combination of domestic political factors and foreign policy calculations contributed to the different approaches adopted by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. (Romania and Bulgaria also committed themselves to the continuation of the alliance, but I will not deal with their policies in any more detail here except to point out that the break with the former political elites was less decisive in the two Balkan WTO states.) In Poland, both Prime Minister Mazowiecki and Foreign Minister Skubiszewski made early statements accepting the country’s existing international treaties. The Polish government and its advisers were conscious of the country’s position between the USSR and a soon-to-be reunited Germany, and evidently did not consider withdrawal from the WTO to be a serious possibility. For a while, the Poles were also left in some uncertainty as to German acceptance of Poland’s western border on the Oder-Neisse line. They were also, as already mentioned, less insistent than the Czechoslovakian or Hungarian leaderships on the need for the early withdrawal of Soviet troops. Skubiszewski and the Deputy Minister of Defence, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, spoke of changing WTO military structures to make the Soviet-East European military relationship a more equal one. These Polish ideas did not appear inconsistent with some of the Soviet plans for maintaining the alliance, though they fell well short of endorsing the creation of more permanent political
structures, and Skubiszewski expressed his scepticism about the possibility of further "political cooperation at large" within the alliance.<44>

The new Czechoslovakian leadership stated that they recognized the continuing role played by the two blocs in the disarmament process in Europe. At the same time they launched several adventurous initiatives which demonstrated the extent to which ideas for Central and pan-European cooperation with their roots in earlier opposition discussions now had a chance to be put forward openly by figures like President Havel and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier. Havel proposed consultations between Central European states, and a mini-summit between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary took place in Bratislava in April. It was also attended by the Austrian, Italian and Yugoslavian foreign ministers. Dienstbier was the architect of a Memorandum on a European Security Commission which was circulated to CSCE foreign ministers, after apparently being first presented to the WTO foreign ministers' meeting in March. The memorandum envisaged a continuing disarmament role for the WTO and NATO, which would coexist with a unified all-European Security Commission based on the CSCE forum, meeting at foreign minister and permanent representative level, and with a subordinate Military Committee. The Czechoslovakian government also endorsed a call first made by Charter 77 activists in 1988 for a Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, which met in Prague in October.<45>
These initiatives represented only the beginning of a new phase of regional politics, on which there was no consensus even within the individual countries. In Poland, for example, Professor Broneslaw Geremek, an influential Solidarity parliamentarian, suggested that Poland should make more of an effort to cooperate with the Scandinavian states than with the countries to the south. If Poland still considered the WTO itself to be a regrettable necessity, the Czechoslovakian initiatives treated it as marginal to the future of Central/Eastern Europe, and only worth strengthening as an instrument of disarmament. The most direct challenge to continued membership of the alliance emerged in Hungary. Here, a consensus that neutrality would be the most desirable status for Hungary emerged rapidly out of debates conducted across the political spectrum during 1989.<46> As with the question of Soviet troop withdrawal, the communist leadership endorsed the long-term aspiration to neutrality partly in an attempt to keep ahead of opposition and public opinion. The Hungarian debate was also fuelled by the hints dropped by Soviet figures like Bogomolov, but up until the end of 1989 even the main opposition parties do not seem to have seen unilateral withdrawal as a serious option for Hungary in the near future. The Alliance of Young Democrats took a more radical position on the need for immediate withdrawal and neutrality.

This Hungarian debate became more immediate during early 1990 after the changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
extended the limits of the possible. The Alliance of Free Democrats argued that Imre Nagy’s 1956 announcement of Hungarian withdrawal from the WTO remained valid, and criticized the USSR for not renouncing its intervention in Hungary. Foreign Minister Gyula Horn even speculated publicly on the possibility of Hungary eventually joining some of NATO’s political bodies. After the general election and the formation of a new government by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Alliance of Free Democrats became the main opposition party. The Free Democrats pressed the government to begin negotiations on Hungarian withdrawal, and to end the country’s participation in WTO military structures. The government itself was initially critical of the Free Democrats’ bluntness in approaching such a delicate subject but later, just before the June 1990 Political Consultative Committee meeting, announced its intention to start negotiations on withdrawal.

The PCC met in Moscow on June 7th. Non-communists comfortably outnumbered communists in the delegations. The declaration issued by this meeting stated the parties’ intention to reexamine the alliance and transform it into an alliance of sovereign states based on democratic principles. A commission was established to draw up concrete proposals on these lines. The WTO called for the creation of a new, pan-European security system, and stated its readiness for cooperation with NATO, its individual members, and the European neutral and non-aligned states.
The external aspects of German unification should, it was said, be settled with regard to the security of Germany's neighbours, and with the provision of firm guarantees of the inviolability of European frontiers.

The communique itself provided little illumination as to what had gone on behind closed doors. By this time, however, the participants were happy to talk to journalists covering the meeting, and they were also more open in providing information to their own mass media on their return home. The new GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere spoke of the WTO going through a "crisis of legitimacy and existence", and said that it was in practice no longer a functioning alliance.<49> It emerged that Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia had prepared a document advocating a strengthened role for CSCE bodies in promoting European security, within which a transformed WTO would play a role for a transitional period, and that Czechoslovakia had drawn up the first draft of the final communique. Gorbachev was reported by Radio Budapest to have accepted the principle of a variety of forms of membership of the WTO, though he argued that it should not be disbanded. The Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall supported the declaration and helped to shape its final wording. The Hungarian delegation stated Hungary's intention to leave the alliance through a negotiated process by the end of 1991 whatever happened. The Hungarian Defence Minister, Lajos Fur, met Marshal Yazov the following day and informed him that Hungary was withdrawing from the military
structures of the alliance, by not participating in any more manoeuvres in 1990 and by removing its forces from the Joint High Command. <50>

It was not clear whether this second element of the Hungarian military withdrawal added anything to what was already happening on the military side of the alliance. Reports of changes in WTO command structures had emerged before the PCC meeting. The Hungarian parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee was told in May that a protocol placing Hungarian forces under WTO command in an emergency was due to expire at the end of 1990. This appeared to be a public reference to the 1979/80 "Statute of the United Armed Forces and the Organs for Directing Them in Time of War", the existence of which had been revealed in 1987 by Colonel Kuklinski (see Chapter 4). The Hungarian account, however, differed somewhat from the one given by Kuklinski, in that the Hungarian president was said to retain a power of veto, while Kuklinski had stated that the statute provided for the majority of non-Soviet forces to be placed under Soviet command in the event of war and for East European commands and parliaments to be bypassed. After the June 1990 PCC meeting, the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Dienstbier told journalists that the East European armies were now under national rather than WTO command. <51> This may have meant that the WTO statute had been allowed to lapse in order to accommodate national military doctrines, though as I showed in Chapter 4, it seems likely that national command had always notionally existed in peacetime for most
of the East European forces. The most likely explanation of Hungary's mid-1990 decision is that Hungary had had a number of units permanently assigned to the Joint High Command, and decided to withdraw these. Both Antall and Fur said that certain unnamed Soviet officers had been displeased by their announcement, which suggests that Hungary had indeed gone beyond the commonly agreed position. President Havel said he had also proposed transforming the staff of the Joint Command into a secretariat at the disposal of the PCC and foreign ministers, and redefining the role of the Committee of Defence Ministers.

At the meeting of defence ministers which took place a few days later in Berlin, Rainer Eppelman of the GDR spoke of the imminent abolition of military structures such as the Joint High Command. The meeting's communique said that it had examined questions relating to the "fundamental restructuring" of the alliance's military organization, as decided by the Moscow PCC. Marshal Yazov put a brave face on things by speaking of the alliance remaining "a real and effective factor" as a coordinator of its members' defence efforts, but it was hard to tell whether this meant he would want, or indeed be able, to obstruct any decisions taken by the political leaderships.<52>

The June 1990 PCC meeting showed the WTO to be in a state of disintegration. Even though the new East European leaderships were prepared to see the alliance remain in existence in the short term, there was no consensus that it
could do anything more than restructure itself in order to
fulfil some limited political functions during a
transitional period in European security politics. The East
European leaders clearly believed that the USSR would have
no choice but to agree to the dismantling of WTO
military structures.

There may, however, also have been a more positive
motivation at work. The USSR itself was in a particularly
weak diplomatic position at this stage. Its allies were all
heading rapidly westwards in the political and economic
senses, and the USSR itself was in danger of being left
behind in the rush. Many of the new East European leaders
took the view that this was not in either their interests
or those of Europe as a whole. A number of figures from
East and West spoke at this time of the need to build pan-
European structures which could include rather than exclude
the USSR (Genscher, Geremek, Eppelmann, Antall); Dienstbier
even stated explicitly that Czechoslovakia saw the
continued existence of the WTO as valuable for precisely
this reason: "For the first time, the Warsaw Pact is useful
to us."<53> By mid-1990 the Soviet leadership was therefore
in the rather undignified position of relying on the
East Europeans to support its bid to avoid isolation from
the rest of the continent and from its former NATO
opponents. It was one of the more pleasing, but also tragic
ironies of European history to see the future of the WTO
lying in the hands of a stratum of East European
intellectuals which had devoted so much intellectual energy
over the preceding decades to the questions of Central-East European identity, and of Russia’s relationship to the rest of Europe.

**Soviet Policy towards Germany**

As the PCC communique indicated, the central question for the USSR’s European diplomacy in mid-1990 was the problem of the security status of the soon-to-be-unified German state. Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and their advisers were faced with the problem of trying to reconcile the East Europeans’ diverse conceptions of the future of the WTO with the evident Soviet military preference that the alliance should continue, and with their own efforts to forestall the united Germany’s entry into NATO. The difficulty here was that even though some of Shevardnadze’s own ideas for a future European security system based on CSCE structures were not radically different from Dienstbier’s, the East Europeans differed from Moscow in seeing NATO membership as the best option for Germany.

After the opening of the Berlin Wall the Soviet leadership was initially cautious in its comments on the possibility of German unification, but in February 1990 Gorbachev stated clearly that this was a question for the Germans themselves to decide. At this stage it was still being said that the process would take "several years" (in Shevardnadze’s words) to complete.\(^{54}\) It was stated repeatedly that NATO membership for the united Germany would be unacceptable, since this would disrupt the
military-strategic balance between NATO and the WTO. Valentin Falin told Der Spiegel in February that German neutrality, guaranteed by the other 33 Helsinki signatories, would be the best solution. However, it soon became apparent that the rest of the WTO governments preferred some kind of NATO membership for Germany to the prospect of a united state existing outside any bloc structures. Although no details were given in the meeting's communique, the USSR was reported to have found itself isolated on this question at the March 1990 foreign ministers' meeting.

Many in the West proceeded from the assumption that the USSR would have no option but to accept NATO membership for Germany in the end. They were encouraged in this belief by comments made in interviews by Major-General GV Batenin of the CPSU's International Department, and by Professor Dashichev. Dashichev's views, however, were disowned by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Shevardnadze tried to find a way round the problem, initially by suggesting joint German membership of both NATO and the WTO, and then by putting the question in the context of a broader restructuring of European security on the CSCE model. Shevardnadze also continued to argue that if a united Germany joined NATO this would disturb the balance of forces in Europe and create a dangerous military-strategic situation for the USSR. In his speech to the "2+4" foreign ministers in May, he went out of his way to stress the dangers this would entail for the domestic position of the Soviet leadership.
The leadership had to take into account opinion in the
country and in the Supreme Soviet, he argued: "I would ask
my colleagues to understand that we are not playing games
here and we are not bluffing." As an alternative, he
offered the idea of a "Greater Europe" security mechanism,
which would complement the "2+4" meetings of the states
responsible for resolving the German problem. This "Greater
Europe" would meet as a council at least once every two
years, its foreign ministers would meet at least annually,
and there would also be a permanent commission or
secretariat for the new forum and a European war-prevention
centre, to be situated in Berlin.

There was still a role for a politicized WTO in this
scheme of Shevardnadze's, as he proposed increased
cooperation between the existing organs of NATO and the WTO
while continuing to suggest that joint membership of both
alliances would be possible for the united Germany.
Although this variant was clearly unacceptable to the West,
Gorbachev revived it briefly in June.

These Soviet ideas did not seem entirely incompatible
with some of the East European proposals discussed above,
although Shevardnadze clearly envisaged a more substantial
role for the WTO than Dienstbier wanted. The new government
of the GDR was the most directly affected among the East
Europeans. By the end of April, de Maiziere and Eppelmann
had publicly committed themselves to German membership of
NATO on the condition that NATO military structures would
not be extended to East German territory, and that there
should be changes in NATO policies for forward defence and nuclear first use. Eppelman’s concept for the GDR’s acceptance of NATO membership envisaged political but not military integration, and tried to take Soviet concerns into account by treating this as a transitional stage on the way to a new comprehensive European security system.

President Havel also advocated changes in NATO’s role and in its name, though he did not state that these should be conditions of united German membership.

The main problem for both the Soviet leadership and the more adventurous East European initiatives was that the process of German unification was advancing too rapidly for any discussion of pan-European security structures to keep up with it. The FRG-GDR treaty on monetary, economic and social union was signed on May 18th 1990, and the USSR was soon confronted with a simple choice over the question of Germany’s NATO membership: to accept it, or to attempt to veto it by refusing to sign a "2+4" agreement and insisting on the continued presence of the Western Group of Forces in the GDR.

The true weakness of the Soviet position was demonstrated a few weeks after the June PCC meeting, when Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl met in the Caucasus and signed an eight-point statement recognizing the right of a united Germany to make its own decision on its bloc allegiance. The unified state was now free to join NATO, and Soviet troops stationed in the GDR were to be withdrawn within three to four years. It was agreed that NATO structures
would not be extended to former GDR territory until after
Soviet troops had left, though this meant that FRG forces
which were not integrated into NATO could be stationed
there. It was also informally agreed that no nuclear
weapons or foreign troops would be permitted on ex-GDR
territory even after the departure of Soviet forces.

What prompted this eventual reversal of the Soviet
position? German promises of financial aid to the USSR
(including a commitment to cover the costs of the Western
Group of Forces until its withdrawal) doubtless played a
large part, though both sides were diplomatic about this at
the time. Some western and Soviet commentators argued that
Gorbachev had consolidated his position in the face of
conservative opposition at the 28th CPSU Congress the
previous week, and could afford to disregard domestic
unhappiness with such a policy reversal.<sup>61</sup> If this was
the case, it was surely still a risky strategy
domestically. Only two months earlier, Shevardnadze had
tried to use the argument about the strength of Soviet
domestic opinion as a lever to dissuade the West from
insisting on NATO membership, so he and Gorbachev remained
vulnerable to arguments they had themselves put forward. It
was also argued that NATO’s London Declaration, issued on
July 6th, had promised the transformation of the western
alliance in such a way as to meet Soviet security
concerns.<sup>62</sup> But here again the position was not clear-
cut. The London communique declared that NATO and the WTO
were no longer adversaries, and announced NATO’s intention
to replace its "forward defence" posture with smaller and more mobile forces. However, the somewhat opaque promise to maintain the "essential role" of NATO's nuclear weapons, while ensuring that they became "truly weapons of last resort", reflected the fact that NATO's consensus-building process was by no means complete. These NATO formulations on nuclear policy also seemed to fall short of the compensation Eppelman and de Maiziere had sought as the price of the GDR's adherence to NATO. Like earlier GDR leaderships, they had found that once the Soviet leadership had made up its mind on a policy course towards the FRG, the GDR itself had to settle for something less than its maximum demands. Gennadii Gerasimov was quoted as saying that the NATO declaration meant that "Now we can tell those grumbling generals that they are wrong", but one of the generals in question, Moiseev, made it clear that he did not think the London Declaration itself amounted to a fundamental change in NATO policy.<63>

Nevertheless, the "2+4" treaty was signed in Moscow on September 12th, and it confirmed the measures already broadly agreed in the July Kohl-Gorbachev agreement: on the size of the future German armed forces (370,000), and on the military activities permitted on ex-GDR territory before and after the end of 1994, the date set for the final withdrawal of Soviet forces from this territory. It was agreed that the united Germany and Poland would sign a further treaty confirming the western Polish border. The USSR and FRG then agreed a separate Treaty of Friendship,
Partnership and Cooperation, which included provisions on non-aggression and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This was accompanied by an agreement that Germany would pay a total of 15 billion marks towards the cost of troop withdrawals from the ex-GDR and the construction of housing in the USSR (12 billion as a grant, plus 3 billion as an interest-free loan.\textsuperscript{64} This treaty was signed during Gorbachev's trip to Germany in early November. The GDR withdrew formally from the WTO on September 24th, a few days before German unification was concluded on October 3rd.\textsuperscript{65}

The simplest explanation for the Soviet change of policy over NATO was that the USSR had no choice, and Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were realistic enough as politicians to know this. Perhaps they had realized this all along, and had only put forward their alternative proposals to try and delay the inevitable. Shevardnadze summed up the alternatives succinctly in a speech delivered to the Party Congress, during the week before the agreement with the FRG. The USSR had been faced with a choice, he said, between seeking an agreement on German unification acceptable to all, within the framework of the "2+4" talks, or of using its forces in the GDR to block the unification process: "We can imagine what this would have led to. Comrades, we chose the first course. I think all reasonable people will support us in this, all those who do not want to condemn Europe and our people to a catastrophe."\textsuperscript{66} This assessment can serve as a summary of the whole range
of Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe during 1989-90, and a tribute to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev's realism. The same reasoning had eventually to be applied to German membership of NATO, for the USSR had in the end no way, short of the use of force, of preventing it.

The Twilight of the WTO

The PCC's restructuring commission met for the first time in Czechoslovakia in July, and again in Berlin in August. Little information emerged about its discussions, although a number of East European government figures made further statements to the effect that the alliance could continue only as a consultative entity, after undergoing significant changes.

Internal negotiations were also required between the remaining WTO states in connection with outstanding problems related to the CFE negotiations. The main dispute here was over the levels of equipment the USSR would be allowed to retain on its own territory under the "sufficiency" principle designed to limit the forces of any single state. The USSR had already agreed to the principle itself, but argued during the autumn that the level for tanks should be set at 40% — which would have allowed the USSR 16,000 of the permitted total of 40,000 tanks between the Atlantic and the Urals. This position was criticized by some Soviet journalists as an attempt to cling to an
unreasonably high level of Soviet forces, and the USA and USSR reached a compromise in early October on a 33.25% figure for tank sufficiency, and an average of 33.6% for all ground force equipment. The East European states, however, objected to the fact that this agreement had been reached over their heads, and argued that it still allowed the USSR more forces than it needed for defence in the region.<67>

This final controversy over conventional force levels was thrashed out in meetings of the Disarmament Commission, and was eventually resolved in late October when the USSR conceded the point and accepted a lower tank total than it had agreed with the USA. Despite this removal of the final obstacle to a CFE treaty, it emerged that the WTO’s PCC meeting would not take place in November as planned, apparently because there was still no agreement on the level of future political coordination. While some East Europeans accused the USSR of trying to delay the inevitable end of the alliance, Marshal Yazov said that there was no dispute on the Soviet side about the conclusion that the WTO’s military organization was no longer necessary. It was also reported that the Hungarian government had changed its mind about an early withdrawal from the alliance.<68>

The Paris CSCE summit of November 19-21, 1990 therefore took place before the WTO had managed to finalize the terms of its own demise. However, the Paris meeting sealed the end of the Cold War in Europe in a way which
demonstrated how peripheral the WTO itself had become by this time. The CFE Treaty confirmed the retreat of the USSR from its post-1945 strategic position in East-Central Europe. Alliance totals and single-country sufficiency levels were agreed for tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, on the basis of the principle of alliance parity between the Atlantic and the Urals.

For tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery there was also agreement on regional sub-ceilings in four regions of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area. The treaty did not leave the two sides with genuinely non-offensive forces, but this was a much less important factor in November 1990 than it had been at the opening of the talks in March 1989. Indeed, the treaty effectively marked a Soviet acceptance of both qualitative and quantitative inferiority to NATO in conventional forces in the ATTU area. Not only could the East European forces no longer be realistically counted in on the Soviet side, but in most categories NATO’s permitted ceilings were above its current holdings.

The agreed reductions were to be completed within 40 months, and although most of the equipment would have to be destroyed there was also a provision for conversion of some of it to non-military uses. The treaty was accompanied by a Protocol on Inspection and by the "Vienna Document 1990" on CSBMs, which went beyond the 1986 Stockholm document and set up a mechanism for the discussion of any unusual military activities which might be causing concern to a
signatory state.\textsuperscript{(69)}

Personnel were not included in the treaty, largely because the withdrawal of Soviet forces from everywhere except Poland had already been agreed bilaterally, but it was stated that continued negotiations with the same mandate should be concluded no later than the March 1992 CSCE Follow-up meeting.

One remaining point of controversy concerned the withdrawal of large numbers of Soviet tanks and other equipment beyond the Urals before the treaty was signed. This meant that the equipment did not have to be destroyed, as would have been the case if it had been within the ATTU area on the date of the treaty's signature. Soviet sources admitted that this had been happening.\textsuperscript{(70)} It was interpreted in various ways: either as an attempt to reduce the financial costs of the destruction of equipment, or as a more calculating way of undermining the political leadership and ensuring that some of the equipment could be transferred to the Ministry of the Interior for internal security purposes.

In addition to concluding the CFE Treaty, the CSCE summit also adopted a NATO-WTO non-aggression declaration and the "Paris Charter" on the future of Europe. This document committed its signatories to pluralist democracy and economic liberty, and stated that "the transition to \textit{the} market economy by countries making efforts to this effect is important and in the interests of us all."\textsuperscript{(71)} The freedom of each state to choose its own security
arrangements was also recognized, and the basis of a new phase in the CSCE process was established in the form of commitments to regular summit meetings of heads of state or government, and to the creation of a CSCE Council for consultations between foreign ministers, a CSCE Secretariat (to be situated in Prague), a Conflict Prevention Centre (in Vienna), and an Office for Free Elections (in Warsaw).

These measures could be interpreted as sowing the seeds of a new European security system, but they did nothing to suggest that NATO would shortly follow the WTO into oblivion. In essence, therefore, the summit marked the end of the Cold War in the very obvious sense that the political and economic values endorsed by the Paris Charter confirmed the victory of the North Atlantic Treaty over the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Despite the continuing uncertainty over the future of political cooperation within the WTO, it was at least clear by December 1990 that the alliance would be rapidly wound up as an integrated military organization, and that the USSR had accepted this outcome.

A number of question-marks still remained over the future of Soviet-East European military relations. The East European armed forces remained predominantly equipped with Soviet weapons, aircraft, and equipment, a situation which could not be easily reversed even if national aspirations could be satisfied in the area of doctrine. It was also unclear whether any bilateral cooperation or guarantees would be preserved in areas like air defence, which had
always been one of the main Soviet military concerns in Eastern Europe. (The remaining bilateral treaties would presumably have to be renegotiated or allowed to lapse.) Within the individual East European countries, there was a danger of civil-military conflicts if senior officers found it difficult to abandon their traditional loyalties to the WTO and the USSR. In Czechoslovakia, for example, the Minister of Defence, General Vacek, was sacked in October 1990 after a parliamentary commission found that he had been involved in the preparation of plans to crush the November 1989 revolution by force.

Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the era of Soviet military intervention within a socialist alliance in Eastern Europe was finally over. Equally clearly, there was no longer any serious possibility that the Soviet armed forces could conduct an offensive against Western Europe in the event of war, even if the military structures still in existence in Central Europe did not yet conform to a fully non-offensive model. Depending on the posture adopted by Soviet forces on the USSR’s own territory, they were likely to retain a significant counter-offensive capacity against Eastern Europe. However, the simple fact that the problems of European security in the 1990s needed to be posed in these terms demonstrated how profoundly the situation had changed between 1985 and 1990.

I have not claimed in this chapter to be able to divine whether Gorbachev and Shevardnadze realized in advance where their European policies would lead the USSR,
and whether they anticipated being left without any kind of socialist alliance. If either of them produces a political memoir to complement Khrushchev's, perhaps future historians will be in a better position to answer these questions. (Following Shevardnadze's resignation in December 1990, it was reported that he was already at work on his memoirs.) In the previous chapter I argued that the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe would not have followed as an inevitable consequence of the adoption of defensive military strategies, and also that the Soviet strategic discussion itself remained unresolved up to and during the period of revolutionary transformation of Eastern Europe. On the evidence of the present chapter one can suggest that the Soviet leadership seems to have concluded, perhaps as early as 1986, that the Brezhnev Doctrine did not provide a satisfactory moral or political basis for the USSR's relations with Eastern Europe. Whatever Gorbachev may have anticipated as a result of the Hungarian and Polish round table negotiations, he was prepared to follow this reassessment of Soviet policy to its logical conclusion, which may have included the vetoing of plans by the GDR and Czechoslovakian leaderships to use force. As a result the WTO was able to wither away, so to speak, with remarkably little bloodshed everywhere except in Romania. This could hardly have been predicted in 1985, and Gorbachev's role in the peaceful transformation of Eastern Europe, with its mixture of principle and pragmatism, may be one of his most lasting achievements.
CONCLUSION

The findings of this study of the internal and external security functions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization suggest that the most important factors in the collapse of the alliance in 1989-90 were a Soviet assessment to the effect that the existing communist leaderships should not be supported by force of arms, and a secondary assessment that their replacement by non-communist leaderships was compatible with Soviet security interests. These Soviet calculations were made at a time when the alliance's externally-directed military strategy was also undergoing significant changes, away from the traditional "offensive-defensive" strategy towards a more clearly defensive posture. This strategic revision had not been completed at the time of the most crucial internal political reassessment, and even a clearer transition to an unambiguously defensive strategy would not have entailed a Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe on the scale which had been agreed by the end of 1990. It therefore appears that during the decisive period of 1989-90, intra-alliance political factors were more important than calculations directly related to military strategy.

This conclusion needs some amplification in respect of its account of Soviet policy during 1989-90, and requires some qualification in that it does not necessarily provide an explanation of the relationship between politics and
strategy which holds good for the entire history of the alliance.

In relation to Soviet policy during 1989-90, I have used the terms "assessment" and "calculation" in preference to "decision", because I have not tried to argue that the Soviet leadership took a specific decision, on an identifiable date, that it was acceptable to abandon Eastern Europe to non-communist regimes and to withdraw the Soviet troops that had supported the previous regimes. This is not to say that this possibility can be excluded by definition, but there is no evidence pointing to such a clear-cut decision, and as good deal of evidence to the effect that what happened was a far messier process. The most important reassessment, concerning the exclusion of internal military intervention, may already have been under way in 1985 or even earlier.

The findings of my chapters on Soviet policy in the 1985-90 period suggest that the Gorbachev leadership started out on the path of reform in its European security policy with the belief that it could change military strategy towards the defensive, and leave the era of internal military intervention behind, while maintaining a socialist alliance in existence. As it turned out they were mistaken, because either they, or their advisers, or the East European elites themselves, made an over-optimistic assessment of the viability of the East European political orders. There was a rather rapid transition in Soviet policy between the 1985-88 period, during which the
Gorbachev leadership was simultaneously taking initiatives in policy towards the West and encouraging reform in the East in a cautious way, and the 1989-90 period in which the USSR found itself increasingly reacting to events it could not control, particularly in Eastern Europe. It is to the Soviet leadership's credit that it did what it could to ensure that the political transition in the region took place peacefully.

In my examination of the earlier history of the WTO, I showed that it was always difficult to disentangle the alliance's external and internal functions. My findings here suggest that for much of the alliance's history, both external and internal military-political logic dictated the maintenance of a Soviet-dominated organization, but that there were some significant differences in the ways the military and political structures of the alliance developed over time. The developments of 1989-90 were therefore particularly striking because the trend towards tighter military integration within the WTO had been maintained even through earlier periods of relative political relaxation, and the Soviet leadership's preparedness to countenance rapid relaxation of this military integration at the end of the Cold War was by no means inevitable.

I would suggest that in earlier periods the external strategic functions of the WTO were probably more important in Soviet eyes than its internal functions. It is not easy to make an assessment of the relative weight of the two functions, because the internal control mechanisms did have
to be put into operation on several occasions while the external strategy, mercifully, did not. The argument for the primacy of external security can be presented in its simplest form by asking why, if the USSR was principally concerned with political control over Eastern Europe, it permitted its subordinated allies to have armed forces at all. This argument is rather disingenuous, since the practical political interests of the Soviet and East European elites did require that these countries should have the trappings of state sovereignty, which obviously included armed forces. However, the simple argument contains a kernel of truth in the sense that the East European forces occupied a clearly subordinate but nevertheless significant place in Soviet strategic thinking, and Soviet strategy was clearly premised on the possibility of conflict with NATO in Central Europe. The concentration of Soviet forces in the GDR and in North-Central Europe, the stress in Soviet strategic texts on preparation for East-West conflict, and the integration of the East Europeans into joint bodies such as the air defence system, all testify to the centrality of the external alliance function. It does not, I think, follow from this that Soviet strategy itself was solely or even predominantly dictated by externally-directed rational motivations, and a more detailed study of the determinants of Soviet policy would be needed to resolve this question.

A brief recapitulation of the strategic and political history will help to illustrate this analysis. In the post-
1945 East-West Cold War confrontation, Soviet military strategy required an alliance of some sort in Eastern Europe, because it was premised on defending the USSR from the territory of neighbouring states. This requirement entailed military coercion, or the threat of it, within the allied states because the pro-Soviet regimes there were more or less politically insecure. Khrushchev may have believed more sincerely in the future triumph of socialism than Stalin had, but Khrushchev was honest enough to be embarrassed by the gap between rhetoric and reality. He therefore sought to substitute a cohesive multilateral alliance for the previous coercive bilateral arrangements.

This policy was ultimately a failure, but it achieved some interim success. It failed in the obvious sense that the centrifugal political pressures in Eastern Europe remained so great that military force had to be used repeatedly to bring errant countries or leaderships back into line, and the WTO had to be shaped internally in such a way as to ensure that the danger of East European resistance was minimized. When the East European elites were no longer willing or able to use coercion to retain power, and the USSR would no longer endorse the use of force, the alliance was effectively finished. One could argue that the relative liberalization before 1989 of a country like Hungary should serve as a reminder that the East European elites did not rely solely on the threat of coercion, and that the evolution to a post-communist system was more gradual in some WTO countries. Even in Hungary,
though, there could have been no guarantee before 1989 that force would not be used in any circumstances.

On the other hand, the attempt to build a multilateral alliance had some success in relations between the political elites themselves. In 1956 Khrushchev did not yet have an effective multilateral structure to employ, and so relied exclusively on Soviet forces to keep Hungary within the WTO. By 1968 Brezhnev could use some alliance mechanisms and other WTO armies to counter the perceived threat from the Prague Spring, and in 1981 he was able to rely on a large enough section of the Polish military-political elite to carry out a task which would undoubtedly have involved far worse bloodshed if Soviet forces had been used. In between crises, the WTO also developed over time into a forum where the East European elites had some room to manoeuvre and to bargain with the USSR, and where they could defend what they saw as their own interests without being seen by the Soviet leadership to be questioning the very basis of the alliance.

These trends became particularly visible during periods of East-West detente, and give us some grounds on which to recognize the WTO as a genuine alliance because it conformed in part to the propositions of alliance theory which predict variations in alliance cohesion in relation to the level of external threat and the overall state of the international system. However, the populations of the East European states never subscribed to this inter-elite consensus, and when they were finally able to express their
views of the existing elites in multi-party elections, their verdict on the alliance was clear in Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. One could even argue that the new political leaderships which then emerged were less hostile to the maintenance of some kind of alliance than the societies they represented, at least in the short term (see Chapter 8), but the force of popular opposition was a telling verdict on Khrushchev’s conception of a socialist alliance.

The most weighty evidence against a view of the WTO as a traditional alliance has been found in the field of military strategy. Throughout the existence of the WTO, the East European military establishments and armed forces had to follow trends in Soviet strategic thinking to which their contribution was minimal. As I have argued, the USSR was not simply trying to neutralize possible threats to its own position in Eastern Europe. It was also following the requirements of a strategic policy which was premised on the possibility of a war with NATO, and required East European armies and territory to be enrolled in support of Soviet goals in such an eventuality. For about the first ten years of the WTO’s existence, the USSR was engaged in adjusting its military doctrine and forces to the priorities of the nuclear era. These developments could potentially have marginalized the East European forces altogether, since the USSR remained the alliance’s only nuclear power. However, East European forces were initially integrated into the Soviet nuclear warfighting strategy,
and then from the late 1960s onwards affected by the evolution of Soviet military planning towards a greater emphasis on conventional warfighting.

Throughout successive periods in Soviet military planning, the East European forces were increasingly subordinated to Soviet command, and WTO military structures themselves seem to have been peacetime bodies which would have been superseded by the Soviet High Command in the event of war. These military integration measures were consistently pursued even after the likelihood of direct Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe had declined, with the apparent goal of ensuring that conventional operations in Central Europe could not be encumbered by any allied reluctance to go along with Soviet strategic decisions.

In my analysis of Soviet security policy in the late 1980s, I identified a number of influences at work. These included a search for less confrontational military postures which derived from the political logic of "New Thinking" in foreign policy and was influenced by the writings of western advocates of alternative defence, and strategic reassessments based on shifting military priorities and changes in the perceived threat from NATO and the USA. I argued that the reforms under way by 1989 were being introduced against the background of an unresolved strategic debate between different schools of thought in the USSR. It is difficult to take this analysis further because the political collapse of the WTO and the
Soviet commitment to a near-complete withdrawal from Eastern Europe served to rewrite the strategic agenda so radically and rapidly.

In early 1989 one could not have deduced from the strategic debate alone that Soviet forces would be withdrawn from the region so rapidly or that their non-intervention in the impending crises would be so complete. I therefore conclude that, even though external-strategic and internal-political considerations had been so closely entwined for much of the WTO's history, with the former probably playing the fundamental role, at the crucial historical moment it was the Soviet leadership's political calculation which was decisive. If the East European political crises had not developed as they did, the WTO could conceivably have undergone a measured military transformation as its strategy became more defensive in Central Europe - perhaps with greater East European involvement in its High Command, and a growth of consensual procedures in its arms control decisionmaking.

This counterfactual cannot, of course, be investigated. It may be more to the point to explore a possible alternative interpretation to my explanation in terms of a Soviet hope of managing a transition to a more stable socialist alliance, which failed because events in Eastern Europe acquired their own momentum. Clearly, there is a gap in my account in that I cannot conclusively demonstrate that Gorbachev hoped or believed that the recognition of the Hungarian and Polish opposition forces
would lead to more pluralist political systems in which the communist parties would nevertheless retain a leading or decisive role. I outlined the alternative interpretation in Chapter 8. Perhaps Gorbachev and his advisers had already accepted that Eastern Europe could be given up, and were not taken aback by the events of 1989 because they understood that a reform process in the region could not be kept within limits which would extend the life of the WTO as a socialist alliance.

The evidence which offers some support for this interpretation falls into two categories: some political evidence which is plausible up to a point, and a less plausible military-technological argument. The political evidence can be found in the policy advice which one can deduce was offered to the Gorbachev leadership by specialists on Eastern Europe in Bogomolov’s IEMSS institute and elsewhere, and which seems at the very least to have contained pessimistic assessments of the future of the socialist states and multilateral institutions in the region. While civilian strategic scholars were reacting to western alternative defence ideas and constructing defensive military models for Central Europe premised on stable bloc structures, their colleagues with actual responsibility for studying Eastern Europe seem to have been suggesting to the political leadership that the assumption of stability was mistaken. As I have shown, some comments made by Shevardnadze in mid-1990 suggested that the leadership had accepted this analysis, but this
evidence is by no means conclusive.

The military-technological argument is neater, but less convincing still. Some western scholars have argued that military logic and doctrinal revisions permitted a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe because the transition to an era of advanced conventional military technology and of mobile offence and defence rendered the territorial occupation of the region irrelevant. In some versions of this argument future Soviet military development is seen as likely to retain significant offensive components, while in others the retreat from the external glacis to the Soviet border is interpreted as a genuinely defensive move.

The weakness of these arguments is that they continue to rely on an assumption of coherence and rationality in Soviet security decisionmaking. Although it is possible to find support for this analysis within the Soviet debate, the conclusions drawn fail to do justice to the complexity and confusion of that debate in the 1989-90 period, and the extent to which the Soviet leadership was, in my view, reacting by this time to events beyond its control. These arguments also tend to take military-strategic discourse too seriously by not setting it against actual developments in the Soviet economy and political system, which would cast doubt on the ability of the leadership to follow any policy course so single-mindedly. Though there may be some plausibility in these suggestions as military-technological arguments, it is hard to believe that the
Soviet military or political leaders had planned a retreat from Eastern Europe which was so rapid, so complete, and associated with such an emphatic reunification of Germany within NATO. The disputes which these developments produced within Soviet domestic politics, and which I review briefly below, provide further grounds for scepticism about this analysis.

It is therefore possible to add a corollary to my conclusion about the primacy of politics over strategic calculation during the crucial period of the WTO's decline. If the analysis of military policy becomes too preoccupied with weapons and strategies at the expense of the political conditions of international security politics, it is likely to be continually surprised by events. The western alternative defence modellers, and the Soviet and East European writers who responded to their ideas, paid too little attention to the internal political state of the WTO, and were less well equipped to foresee its demise than scholars who had been studying the East European societies. This is not to say that alternative strategic ideas played no role in the improvement of East-West relations in the late 1980s, or that they are irrelevant in the post-Cold War world. It is obviously vital that the future armed forces of the USSR and of the united Germany should not be perceived as threatening by their neighbours, to say nothing of the problems of military aggression elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, the findings of my study of the WTO support the view that strategic studies, if it is a
discipline which focuses principally on military hardware and operations, has serious limitations.

**Alliances and the Cold War**

The effective demise of the WTO also provides a vantage-point for a reconsideration of the general problem of alliance in international relations, and of the competing theories of the Cold War which I reviewed at the outset of this study. In certain respects the analyses of the alliance theorists were found to have some relevance to the history of the WTO. In some key military respects the WTO was never an alliance between equal and sovereign states, because the requirements of Soviet policy both within the alliance and in relation to the West dictated that the military priorities of the organization's major power dominated it right up until the time of its effective collapse. On the other hand, I have argued that the attempt to build an alliance of socialist states did result in a certain amount of recognizably alliance-type behaviour in relations between the military and political elites of the WTO states. The period of the WTO's decline and collapse confirmed the interpretation that its history had been conditioned by deep-rooted problems in the relations between the East European elites and their societies, although the basic approach to international relations shared by most of the alliance theorists had not allowed them to conceptualize the WTO in these terms.

Some specific analyses and predictions from the
alliance literature do seem to have a bearing on the international relations of the late and post-Cold War period. George F Liska considered that offensive alliances would take advantage of a weakened enemy to "digest the spoils of victory", while defensive ones would break up once the external threat was seen to have declined. These hypotheses could fruitfully be applied to the development of NATO after the demise of the WTO. Although one could argue that NATO will retain credibility as an alliance as long as the USSR remains a significant military power, the Soviet military retreat from Central Europe makes the circumstances very different from those which accompanied the formation of NATO in 1949, before the WTO existed. Furthermore, the "spoils of victory" after the Cold War are represented by the opportunity to integrate Eastern Europe, and even the USSR itself, into the economic and political orbit of West European capitalism, rather than by military occupation — and these are spoils which the West can hardly renounce, given the fact that the post-communist leaderships in Eastern Europe were by 1990 explicitly committed to integration on precisely these lines.

William H Riker's game-theoretical approach to alliance politics led him to recommend the non-elimination of "losers" from the international competition (though, as I argued in Chapter 2, Riker's derivation of this and other principles from his premises was unconvincing). One can see a reflection of this recommendation in the response of a balance-of-power analyst like John Lewis Gaddis to the
apparent threat of instability posed by the end of the Cold War. Gaddis has advocated the shoring up of the WTO and of the USSR so that they can continue to provide stabilizing poles of international politics. In Gaddis' view the West should not seek to bring about the total break-up of the USSR, since "we should want to see that state survive as a great power".<2>

Kenneth Waltz's analysis turned out to be no more satisfactory as an explanation of the late 1980s than it had been in the case of the late 1940s, since the East European states clearly took the opportunity provide by the USSR's declining authority to "bandwagon" towards the West, rather than "balance" by strengthening their alliance with the weakening power.

Although one can therefore find elements in the post-WTO state of world politics which suggest that some of the alliance theorists' ideas are still relevant, the fact remains that most of these theorists had failed to get to grips with the most fundamental aspects of Cold War alliance politics - the semi-permanent alliances, the integrated military structures, the emphasis on ideological and political competition. I argued in Chapter 2 that this was because most of them were too preoccupied with offering policy advice to the West, and with the danger that the West might "lose", to see that there was a basic need to analyze Cold War international politics rather than simply to offer the USA conceptual tools with which to manage the conflict. However, this does not mean that alliance theory
could not be applied to regions and periods in which Cold War divisions are or were less firmly institutionalized. It might, for example, be found that relations over the last 20 years between the USA, Iran, Iraq, and Syria are more amenable to investigation on the basis of traditional alliance theory.

Now that the East-West conflict has apparently ended after the decline of the WTO and of the Soviet system itself, what contribution do my findings on the eastern alliance make to the Cold War theoretical debate? I have shown that there were genuine considerations of external military policy at work in the Soviet use of the WTO as a strategic instrument, which amounts to an endorsement of the orthodox view of an East-West conflict which both sides thought might at some stage take a military form. At the same time, I have treated the military confrontation as an interactive phenomenon rather than as something imposed on the West by the USSR, and shown that the Soviet reassessment of strategic priorities in the 1980s was an important factor in the ending of the Cold War. I have argued that it is possible to interpret Soviet "New Thinking" as a genuine attempt to make the international order less anarchic and hazardous, rather than simply as a search for a breathing-space forced on the USSR by its own economic, technological and military decline, though this latter element was certainly present.

I have also shown that the maintenance of internal military-political control was a central goal of the WTO’s
structures and functioning, which supports the interpretation of the Cold War as a mechanism for ensuring intra-bloc discipline. I have argued that in Soviet eyes the external strategic function of the WTO was probably more important, but the evidence from military policy nevertheless supports a view of the Cold War as a profoundly overdetermined phenomenon in world history. A discontinuity between strategy and politics was found in the period of the WTO's internal collapse, since I argued that the crucial political decisions of 1989-90 were taken by the Soviet leadership at a time when the debate on military strategy was still unresolved. My findings can therefore be said to contribute to the theoretical debate in that they endorse the view that the Cold War military confrontation was a genuine one, and not simply a projection of intra-bloc politics. However, the primacy of politics in the Soviet leadership's actions in 1989-90 suggests that during this specific period it was a change in the Soviet concept of intra-bloc cohesion (indeed, its abandonment) which was decisive.

One striking, but hardly surprising, feature of western post-mortems on the Cold War is that almost all the contributors to the debate consider their own views to have been vindicated by events. Liberals see the intellectual triumph of liberal democracy, Marxists see the collapse of Soviet-type communism in the face of the greater economic-technological vigour of capitalism, and the theorists who analyzed the Cold War as based on conflicts within systems
see it as ending in both East and West for primarily internal reasons.<3>

In my concluding comments, I will identify an omission which renders these post-mortems incomplete: their failure to examine the effects of the collapse of the WTO on Soviet domestic politics. This means that most of these post-mortems underestimate the extent to which the "losing" power has to adjust to such a dramatic change in its situation. In some respects, therefore, the Cold War was not over by the end of 1990 in the sense that the Soviet political system had yet to adjust to its apparent conclusion. How easy or difficult will it be for Soviet political culture to come to terms with the USSR's position in the post-Cold War world?

It is not difficult to see why a controversy over "Who Lost Eastern Europe?", as Shevardnadze put it, should have emerged as an issue in the Soviet domestic crisis. In Chapter 8 and this conclusion, I have outlined some possible interpretations of Soviet policy during the 1985-90 period, none of which suggest that there were any serious alternatives to the way Gorbachev and Shevardnadze dealt with the collapse of the existing order in Eastern Europe. But it is important to remember that, as I showed in chapters 2 and 3, the creation of an international socialist system in Eastern Europe was for over 40 years held to have been a natural consequence of the victory of Soviet socialism over nazism. To anyone educated and trained on the basis of this belief, the Soviet military
retreat of 1989-90 and the all-too evident defeat of Soviet-type socialism must have been profoundly disturbing.

By early 1990 Shevardnadze had placed the traditional account of the creation of the international socialist system in question. He complained that he was being criticized for having "lost" Eastern Europe, and even his claim that the leadership had foreseen the events of 1989 did not seem to convince his opponents. The argument used by Shevardnadze, by Gorbachev himself and by a number of civilian academics and policy advisers was that what had collapsed in Eastern Europe was not true socialism, but a distorted form of bureaucratic state socialism which was illegitimately imposed on Eastern Europe under Stalin, and had now been abandoned by the USSR. The USSR could not have attempted to preserve the old regimes even if it had wanted to, as this would have destroyed all the gains recently made in foreign policy, and would have done nothing to strengthen the country's security.<4>

This looks convincing enough, but because it seems so unarguable to western eyes and ears we may underestimate the upheaval involved in the emergence of this view as (apparently) the consensus view of the Soviet foreign policy establishment. Some military men and other conservative thinkers saw an over-hasty strategic retreat undertaken without adequate guarantees of reciprocation from the West, a global retreat of socialism, and, in the unification of Germany within NATO, an abandonment of the security gains achieved as a result of the victory of 1945.
Among the most vehement statements of these objections was a speech made by Colonel-General A Makashov, Commander-in-Chief of the Volga-Ural Military District, to the Russian Communist Party conference in June 1990. Makashov ridiculed those liberals who, he said, imagined there was no longer any threat to the USSR at a time when the WTO no longer existed while NATO was becoming stronger and was likely to incorporate the unified Germany. The Soviet army was being forced to retreat, without firing a shot, from the countries it had liberated from fascism, and the civilian authorities were not even providing sufficient help to servicemen withdrawn to the USSR. At the 28th CPSU Congress in July Admiral Khvatov, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, argued that "We have lost allies in the West, we have no allies in the East, and as a result we have returned to the 1939 situation."<5>

These clashes were not scholarly exchanges about the history of the Cold War and the WTO, but very direct interventions in the political struggle over the future of the post-Cold War USSR. They raised the question of how consistently the ideas of New Thinking, as a foreign policy strategy adopted out of both principle and pragmatism by the Soviet political leadership, were shared throughout the military establishment of a superpower in a state of drastic decline both in its external power and, by this time, internally as well. Concerns about the fate of Eastern Europe were probably not widely shared among the Soviet population as a whole, but this did not make them
any less contentious within the military-political elite. They were so contentious, in fact, that they helped to place the whole future of the perestroika reform project in question. Gorbachev was evidently prepared to adjust his domestic policies to accommodate the military establishment's preferred response to the USSR's internal crisis, while Shevardnadze, it would appear from his resignation, could not accept this.

In his resignation speech to the Congress of People's Deputies on December 20, 1990 Shevardnadze did not return explicitly to the question of Eastern Europe, but concentrated on what he described as a slide towards dictatorship in domestic politics. There can be little doubt that his resignation was a protest against Gorbachev's trimming policies towards the military establishment during the second half of the year, which were almost certainly adopted in response to the charges levelled earlier at the leadership in general, and at Shevardnadze in particular. In these exchanges, as I have shown, the "loss" of Eastern Europe played a significant role.

The USSR's post-Cold War crisis may be a prolonged one. At the end of 1990 it looked as though the WTO, even if it was rapidly wound up as a military and political alliance, might continue to exercise a ghostly influence on that crisis from beyond the grave.
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

Between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic.
14 May 1955.

The Contracting parties,
Reaffirming their desire for the organization of a system of collective security in Europe, with the participation of all the European states, irrespective of their social and state systems, which would make it possible to combine their efforts in the interests of securing peace in Europe,
Taking into consideration at the same time the situation obtaining in Europe, as the result of ratification of the Paris agreements, which provide for the formation of a new military grouping in the shape of the "Western European Union" together with remilitarized Western Germany and for the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the threat of another war and creates a threat to the national security of the peace-loving states,
Convinced that, under these circumstances, the peace-loving states of Europe should take the necessary measures for safe-guarding their security, and in the interests of maintaining peace in Europe,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,
In the interests of further strengthening and promoting friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states, and also with the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs,
Have resolved to conclude this Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance and have appointed as their authorized representatives:

[The Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania - Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania,
The Presidium of the People's Assembly of the]
People’s Republic of Bulgaria — Vulko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria,

The Presidium of the Hungarian People’s Republic, Andras Hegedus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic,

The Presidium of the German Democratic Republic — Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic,

The State Council of the Polish People’s Republic — Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People’s Republic,

The Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Romanian People’s Republic — Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People’s Republic,

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,

The President of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic — Viliam Siroky, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic.

Who, having presented their credentials, found to be executed in due form and in complete order, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The contracting parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means so as not to endanger international peace and security.

ARTICLE 2

The contracting parties declare their readiness to take part, in the spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international undertakings intended to safeguard international peace and security and they shall use all their energies for the realization of these aims.

Moreover, the contracting parties shall work for the adoption, in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in this matter, of effective measures towards a general reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

ARTICLE 3

The contracting parties shall take council among themselves on all important international questions.
relating to their common interests, guided by the
interests of strengthening international peace and
security.
They shall take council among themselves immediately
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, there arises the
threat of an armed attack on one or several states that
are signatories of the treaty, in the interests of
organizing their joint defence and of upholding peace and
security.

ARTICLE 4

In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or
several states that are signatories of the treaty by any
state or group of states, each state that is a party to
this treaty shall in the exercise of the right to
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations
Organization, render the state or states so attacked
immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with
other states that are parties to this treaty, by all the
means it may consider necessary, including the use of armed
force. The states that are parties to this treaty shall
immediately take council among themselves concerning the
necessary joint measures to be adopted for the purpose of
restoring and upholding international peace and security.
In accordance with the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations Organization, the Security Council
shall be advised of the measures taken on the basis of the
present article. These measures shall be discontinued as
soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary
measures for restoring and upholding international peace
and security.

ARTICLE 5

The contracting parties have agreed on the
establishment of a joint command for their armed forces,
which shall be placed, by agreement among these parties,
under this command, which shall function on the basis of
jointly defined principles. They shall also take other
concerted measures necessary for strengthening their
defence capacity, in order to safeguard the peaceful labour
of their peoples, to guarantee the inviolability of their
frontiers and territories and to provide safeguards
against possible aggression.

ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of holding the consultations provided
for in the present treaty among the states that are
parties to the treaty, and for the purpose of considering
problems arising in connection with the implementation of
this treaty, a Political consultative committee shall be
formed in which each state that is a party to this treaty
shall be represented by a member of the government, or any
other specially appointed representative.

The committee may form the auxiliary organs for which the need may arise.

ARTICLE 7

The contracting parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions and alliances and not to conclude any agreements the purposes of which would be at variance with those of the present treaty.

The contracting parties declare that their obligations under existing international treaties are not at variance with the provisions of this treaty.

ARTICLE 8

The contracting parties declare that they will act in the spirit of friendship and cooperation with the object of the further development and strengthening of the economic and cultural relations between them, adhering to the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in their internal affairs.

ARTICLE 9

The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states - irrespective of their social and state systems - which may express their readiness to assist, through participation in the present Treaty, in furthering the joint efforts of the peace-loving states to safeguard the peace and security of the peoples. This act of acceding to the Treaty shall become effective with the consent of the states which are party to the Treaty, after the instrument of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

ARTICLE 10

The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The Treaty shall take effect on the date on which the last ratification instrument is deposited. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall advise the other states party to the Treaty of each ratification instrument deposited with it.

ARTICLE 11

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For the contracting parties which will not have submitted to the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement denouncing the Treaty a year before the expiration of its term, it shall remain in force throughout the following ten years.

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In the event of the organization of a system of collective security in Europe, and the conclusion of a general European Treaty of collective security to that end, which the contracting parties shall unceasingly seek to bring about, the present Treaty shall cease to be effective on the date the general European Treaty comes into force.

Drawn up in Warsaw on 14 May 1955, with one copy in each of the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, each of which has the same force. Certified copies of the present treaty shall be sent by the government of the Polish People’s Republic to all the other signatories.

The authorized representatives have certified this by signing the present treaty and affixing their seal to it.


1985 Protocol of Renewal

PROTOCOL

On prolonging the period of validity of the Treaty of Peace, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955.

26 April 1985

The member states of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance — the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic — have decided to sign the present protocol and agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, shall remain in force for the next twenty years. For the contracting parties, which a year before the expiry of this period of time shall not present to the Government of the Polish People’s Republic statements of denunciation of the treaty, it shall remain in force for another ten years.
ARTICLE 2

The present protocol is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The protocol shall enter into force on the day of the presentation for deposition of the last instrument of ratification. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall inform the other member states of the treaty of the presentation for deposition of each instrument of ratification.

Done in Warsaw on April 26, 1985 in one copy in the Bulgarian, Hungarian, German, Polish, Romanian, Russian and Czech languages, each of which has the same force. Certified copies of the present protocol shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all the other parties to the protocol.

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria: Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

For the Hungarian People's Republic: Janos Kadar, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

For the German Democratic Republic: Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and President of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic.

For the Polish People's Republic: Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic.

For the Socialist Republic of Romania: Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and President of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

For the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic: Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic.

Appendix II

On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States

In the current situation it is becoming increasingly important to establish a correct understanding of the goals and intentions of states and military-political alliances in the military sphere, as embodied in their military doctrines. Recognizing this, and basing their approach on the need finally to banish war from the life of humanity, to strengthen peace and security and to accomplish general and complete disarmament, the Warsaw Treaty states have decided to set out the principal tenets of their military doctrine, which forms the basis of the WTO's activity and reflects the shared defensive military-political goals of its member-states and of their national military doctrines.

I.

The military doctrine of the WTO, like that of each of its members, is subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. By the very nature of the socialist social order, these states have not and not consider their future to be linked with the military resolution of international problems. They support the resolution of all contentious international questions solely by peaceful political methods.

In the nuclear-cosmic age the world has become too fragile for war or a policy of force. In circumstances where colossal quantities of the most lethal weapons have been piled up, humanity has been confronted with the problem of survival; a world war, especially a nuclear one, would have catastrophic consequences not only for the countries directly involved in the conflict, but also for life on earth as such.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states is strictly defensive, and is based on the assumption that in contemporary conditions the use of military means for the resolution of any issue is impermissible. Its essence is as follows:

The Warsaw Treaty states will never in any circumstances begin military actions against any state or alliance as long as they themselves are not subjected to armed attack.

They will never use nuclear weapons first.

They make no territorial claims on any state in Europe or elsewhere.

They do not consider any state or people to be their enemy. On the contrary, they are ready to build their relations with all countries without exception on the basis of the interests of security and peaceful coexistence. The
Warsaw Treaty states declare that their international relations are firmly based on respect for the principles of independence and national sovereignty, the non-use or threat of force, the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, peaceful conflict resolution, non-interference in internal affairs, equal rights, and the other principles and goals envisaged by the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the universally accepted norms of international relations.

While advocating measures of disarmament, the Warsaw Treaty states are compelled to maintain their own armed forces in a form and at a level which would enable them to repulse any external attack on any of their number.

The armed forces of the allied states are maintained in a state of readiness sufficient to ensure that they cannot be taken unawares; in the event of being attacked, they will deal a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.

The Warsaw Treaty states have never made, and are not making, any efforts to acquire armed forces and armaments beyond those necessary to achieve these goals. In this way they keep strictly within the limits of a defence sufficient to repulse possible aggression.

II.

The Warsaw Treaty states consider their first duty to their peoples to consist of the reliable provision of security. They make no claim to more security than other countries, but will not settle for less. The presently-existing military-strategic parity remains a decisive factor in preventing war. However, experience shows that raising the level of parity does not bring greater security. Therefore they will continue to make every effort to preserve a balance of military forces at an ever decreasing level. In these conditions the ending of the arms race and the realization of genuine measures of disarmament acquire a truly historic significance. In our time states can follow no other course than that leading to agreements on the radical lowering of the level of military confrontation.

The Warsaw Treaty states adhere firmly to these positions. In full accordance with the defensive essence of their military doctrine, they are consistently striving for the following basic aims:

First. The speedy, general and complete banning of nuclear tests, as an initial step to halting the development, production and further refinement of nuclear weapons, their gradual reduction and complete liquidation, and the prevention of any extension of the arms race into space.

Second. The banning and liquidation of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction.

Third. The reduction of forces and conventional arms in Europe to a level at which neither side, while ensuring its own defence, would have the capacity for a sudden
attack on the other side, or for the launching of offensive operations in general.

Fourth. Strict verification [kontrol'] of all measures of disarmament, based on a combination of national technical means and international procedures, including the creation of appropriate international bodies, the exchange of military information, and on-site inspection.

Fifth. The creation in various regions of Europe of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons, and also of zones of lower concentration of armaments and greater trust, the putting into practice of military confidence-building measures in Europe on a mutual basis and the achievement of agreements on these measures in other regions of the world, including the seas and oceans. The mutual renunciation of the use of military force by the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member-states, and the acceptance of obligations to maintain peaceful relations, the liquidation of military bases on the territory of other states; the withdrawal of forces to within national borders, the mutual removal from zones of direct contact between the two military alliances of the most dangerous offensive types of weapons, and also the thinning-out of armed forces and armaments in this zone to the lowest agreed level.

Sixth. Considering the continued division of Europe into opposing military blocs to be unnatural, the members of the WTO call for the simultaneous dissolution of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and as a first step for the liquidation of their military organizations, and the eventual creation of a comprehensive system of international security.

* * * *

The Warsaw Treaty states propose to the NATO states the idea of meeting for consultations in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances, analyze their character, and examine jointly the course of their further evolution, with the aim of removing the mutual suspicion and mistrust which have built up over the years, achieving the best possible understanding of each others' intentions, and ensuring that the military concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and their members are based on defensive principles.

Imbalances and asymmetries in particular forms of armaments and armed forces could become a subject for discussion in these consultations, as could the search for ways of removing them on the basis of a reduction by the side which is ahead, on the understanding that such reductions would lead to the establishment of ever-lower levels of balance.

The socialist Warsaw Treaty states propose holding these consultations at the expert level, with the participation of military specialists from the countries on both sides. They are prepared to begin these consultations
within 1987. The consultations could be held in Warsaw or Brussels, or alternatively in these two cities.

Sources: Pravda 30 May 1987; author’s translation from PG Lushev (ed) - Varshavskii Dogovor: istoriya i sovremennost’ (Voennoe izdatel’stvo, Moscow 1990).
Chapter 1 Footnotes


2. For the Russian text, see VF Mal'tsev (ed.) - Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora 1955-1985, dokumenty i materialy (Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, Moscow 1986), Document 1, page 9. The English text is reproduced in Appendix I to this study.

3. For Soviet accounts see: KI Savinov - Varshavskii Dogovor - faktor mira, shchit sotsializma (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, Moscow 1986), Chapter 1; AL Narochnitskii (ed) - 60 let bor'by SSSR za mir i bezopasnost' (Nauka, Moscow 1979), chapters VI-IX, and DA Volkogonov (ed) - Armii stran Varshavskogo Dogovora - spravochnik (Biblioteka ofitsera, Voennoe izdatel'stvo, Moscow 1985), pages 3-10.


7. For the bilateral treaties, see Zbigniew K Brzezinski - The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Praeger, New York 1962), Chapter 6, esp. page 109, which gives a chart of them.

8. Khrushchev Remembers, Volume 2 - The Last Testament, Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Penguin, Harmondsworth 1977), Chapter 9 - East Europe: The Making of an Alliance. The first volume of Khrushchev's memoirs published in the West was translated and edited from the transcript of a taped narration, and later the full tape recordings themselves reached the West. Although there was
some early dispute over their authenticity, the tapes were subjected to analysis by "voice-printing", and satisfactorily authenticated - see the contributions by Edward Crankshaw and Jerrold L. Schecter to the second volume. However, there have been cases of scholars using the original transcripts at Columbia University, rather than the published versions, claiming to find slight but significant mistakes in the published translations. See Matthew A. Evangelista - Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1988), in which Evangelista makes some important distinctions concerning Khrushchev's policy on tactical nuclear weapons (at pages 193 and 201).


12. Basic histories of the period include; Neal Ascherson - The Polish August (Penguin, Harmondsworth 1981); Timothy Garton Ash - The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (Coronet Books, London 1985); Harman, Class Struggles in Eastern Europe, Chapter 7. See also Chapter 3 of this study.


15. The most painstaking western account of this entire


17. The possibility of a smaller alliance is mentioned in: Jörg K Hoensch - The Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member States, in Robert W Clawson and Lawrence S Kaplan (eds.), The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means (Scholarly Resources Inc., Wilmington 1982).
Chapter 2 Footnotes


2. Ibid., page 4.

3. Ibid., Appendix C.


6. Ibid., page 206.


19. John Lewis Gaddis - The emerging post-revisionist synthesis on the origins of the Cold War (Diplomatic History Summer 1983, pp 171-204), and The Long Peace: inquiries into the history of the Cold War (Oxford


29. Pravda 8.2.90.

30. For example Jane E Stromseth - The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (Macmillan/St Antony's, Basingstoke 1988). Even in a work like this, however, one finds an assumption on the author's part that what is ultimately required of the scholar is sound policy advice for NATO.


38. Examples include: Ivan Volgyes - The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier

Chapter 3 Footnotes.

1. See Appendix I.


3. Ibid., page 14. See Ben Lowe - NATO and domestic politics: Britain, Italy and West Germany during cold war and detente, in Mary Kaldor and Richard Falk (eds) - Dealignment: A New Foreign Policy Perspective (Basil Blackwell/United Nations University, Oxford 1987).


5. Ibid.


9. Pravda 29.5.87. and 30.5.87; Krasnaya zvezda 17.7.88.


11. For example the SVE description cited in FN 6.


17. In April 1959 the foreign ministers met the Chinese Foreign Minister in Warsaw - see Mal'tsev, Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora, document 9, page 46.


23. Savinov, Varshavskii Dogovor, pages 4-5.


27. See particularly Christopher D Jones - Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (Praeger, New York 1981), Chapter 6 and pages 274-8. For a complete chart of bilateral treaties between the WTO states for the whole period 1943-80, see Robert L Hutchings - Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict 1968-1980 (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1983), Table 5.8, page 161; Table 5.9, page 166, is also useful as a summary of their contents.


29. Alexandrov, The Warsaw Treaty and Peace in Europe, page 26. For contrast see Savinov, Varshavskii Dogovor, page 35, where the bilateral treaties are described in terms of the inviolability of state boundaries only.


38. For details see Jones, The Soviet Concept of 'Limited Sovereignty', chapters 7 and 8; for the traditional Soviet version of events, see the respective entries on Hungary in Bol'shaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya Vol.4 (Izdatel'stvo 'Sovetskaya entsiklopediya', Moscow 1971), page 477, and on Czechoslovakia in Bol'shaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya Vol. 29 (Izdatel'stvo 'Sovetskaya entsiklopediya', Moscow 1978), page 152.


45. See Orbis, loc. cit.

47. See AA Timorin — Sotsial’no-politicheskaya priroda i naznacheniya sotsialisticheskikh armii, Chapter XIX in DA Volkogonov, AS Milovidov, and SA Tiushkevich (eds) — Voyna i armiya — Filosofsko-sotsiologicheskii ocherk (Voenno izdatel’stvo, Moscow 1977), and the 1986 CPSU Programme in Soviet News 19.3.86 (Pravda 7.3.86), which includes the sentence: "From the standpoint of internal conditions our society does not need an army".

48. Two exceptions are: SP Voitenko, KF Pavlikov — Velkaya syla Varshavskogo Dogovora i bessilie ego kritikov (Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 4, 1987, pp 71-8), and a 1987 Main Political Administration pamphlet, SA Tiushkevich — Kritika burzhuaznykh kontseptsii po voprosam sovetskogo voennogo stritel’stva (Voenno izdatel’stvo, Moscow 1987), which engages with some Jones-type arguments without identifying him.

49. See Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance, especially Chapter 1.

50. May 1958 PCC meeting in Moscow — documents 6-8 in Mal’tsev, Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora, pages 24-46. For a summary of PCC proceedings in this period, see Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, Chapter 2.


52. See Sharp, Security through Detente and Arms Control, page 165, and John Erickson — The Soviet Union and European Detente, in Kenneth Dyson (ed) — European detente: Case studies of the politics of East-West relations (Frances Pinter, London 1986).


56. Most of this account is drawn from Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance, chapters 3-4, and The German Factor, in Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal (eds) - Soviet Strategy Towards Western Europe (George Allen & Unwin, London 1984); see also A James McAdams - East Germany and Detente: Building Authority After the Wall (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985), Chapter 4.


59. See Lawrence Freedman - The United States Factor, in Moreton and Segal, Soviet Strategy Towards Western Europe.

60. See Jane Sharp, Security through Arms Control and Detente, in Holloway and Sharp, The Warsaw Pact.


62. An interesting example of an American analysis which attempts an even-handed overview while making the USA’s greater fundamental hostility to detente quite plain in its detailed treatment of the 1970s is Raymond L Garthoff - Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (The Brookings Institution, Washington 1985). For a range of widely diverging analyses, see also: Edward Thompson and others - Exterminism and Cold War (Verso, London 1982); Fred Halliday - The Making of the Second Cold War (Verso, second edition, London 1986); John Erickson, The Soviet Union and European Detente, in Dyson, European detente; Mike Bowker and Phil Williams - Helsinki and West European Security (International Affairs [London] Vol.61 No.4, Autumn 1985, pp 607-18) - Bowker and Williams make the point about the very precise meaning of "inviolability"; Mick Cox - The Cold War as a System (Critique 17, 1986, pp 17-82); Mary Kaldor - The Imaginary War, in Dan Smith and EP Thompson (eds) - Prospectus for a
Habitable Planet (Penguin, Harmondsworth 1987).


64. The literature on Afghanistan is now voluminous. Among the most careful accounts are Garthoff, Chapter 26 in Detente and Confrontation; Jonathan Steele - Chapter 7 in The Limits of Soviet Power: The Kremlin's Foreign Policy - Brezhnev to Chernenko (Penguin, Harmondsworth 1985). On the Eastern European response, see Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, Chapter 8.


The first full-length study of Soviet policy on the SS-20 missile has now appeared, in Jonathan Haslam - The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1967-87: The Problem of the SS-20 (Macmillan/CRES, Basingstoke 1989). Chapter 6 of this study is a valuable reconstruction of the WTO's reluctance to commit itself to Soviet positions on INF countermeasures during 1983. Haslam's argument is that the SS-20 was developed as a bargaining chip to force the USA to include its Forward-Based Systems and European Theatre Nuclear Forces in the negotiating agenda for SALT III. At Vladivostok in 1974, Brezhnev agreed to drop FBSs from SALT II, but the domestic price of this concession was that the Soviet military were allowed to proceed with testing the SS-20. While Haslam's account of Soviet policy carries conviction, his thesis as a whole is weakened by an assumption that there is no need to ask whether any analogous factors influenced western policy over cruise and Pershing II. He accepts that the western missiles were simply responses to the SS-20, without investigating the specific roots of their
development or asking whether any internal political, bureaucratic, or technological pressures were at work within the USA or NATO.

66. Declaration text published in English by Panorama DDR, with the GDR statement contained in the same pamphlet. Russian text in Mal'tsev, Organizatsiya Varshevskogo Dogovora, document 89, page 305.


72. Statement by Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Soviet News 30 November 1983.


75. On rumours about Poland, see D Warszawski - The Soviet "Nyet" (Across Frontiers, Winter-Spring 1985).

76. Robert English - Eastern Europe's Doves (Foreign Policy 56, Fall 1984, pp 44-60).

77. See J Goldblat, S Lodgaard and F Blackaby (eds) - No First Use (Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, London 1984), page 20.

78. Martin McCauley - Soviet-GDR relations and European detente, in Dyson, European detente; Ronald D Asmus - The Dialectics of Detente and Discord: The Moscow-East Berlin-Bonn Triangle (Orbis Vol.28 No.4, Winter 1985, pp 743-74); Jonathan Dean - Directions in Inner-German Relations (Orbis Vol.29 No.3, Fall 1985, pp 609-32); A James McAdams -


82. See Hella Pick’s report from the July 1988 Warsaw PCC meeting, in *The Guardian* 20.7.88.
Chapter 4 Footnotes

1. Kulikov had been appointed in January 1977, and Gribkov in October 1976. Their predecessors were, as C-in-C: IS Konev (1955-60), AA Grechko (1960-67), II Yakubovskii (1967-76); as Chief of Staff: AI Antonov (1955-62), PI Batov (1962-65), MI Kazakov (1965-68), SM Shtemenko (1968-76). See DA Volkogonov (ed) - Armii stran Varshavskogo Dogovora (Biblioteka ofitsera, Voenizdat, Moscow 1985), pages 28-29. For the announcements of the appointments of Lushev and Lobov, see Krasnaya zvezda 3.2.89 and 25.2.89.

2. The communique refers only to the creation of the CDM plus other unspecified measures for strengthening the WTO's defence organization, but one of these measures seems to have been the creation of the MC. See VF Mal'tsev (ed) - Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora 1955-1985: Dokumenty i materialy (Politizdat, Moscow 1986), Document 28, page 113. More detailed information later emerged via Polish sources; see Michael Checinski - Warsaw Pact/CEMA Military-Economic Trends (Problems of Communism Vol.XXXVI No.2, March-April 1987, pp 15-28).


7. See Christopher D Jones - Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (Praeger,


11. The withdrawals were announced by the May 1958 PCC meeting in Moscow, which also announced general WTO force reductions and proposed a non-aggression treaty to NATO. See Mal'tsev, Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogaovora, documents 6, 7, and 8, pages 24-46.


13. See: David Holloway - The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (Yale University Press, New Haven 1983), Chapters 3 and 5; Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, Chapters VI, VII, VIII. Although opinions differ on the issue, the military did not seem to have played any major role in Khrushchev's actual fall from power in 1964. However, they clearly did not support him, as they had done at the time of his showdown with the "anti-party group" in 1957. See Roy Medvedev - Khrushchev (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1982), Chapter 21; John McDonnell - The Soviet Defense Industry as a Pressure Group, in Michael McC6wire, Ken Booth, John McDonnell (eds) - Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (Praeger, New York 1975); Michel Tatu - Power


16. The Warsaw Treaty Organization: Alliance for Peace (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow 1984), page 42. Here a figure is given of 2,140,000 Soviet troops cut in the same period.


21. See Jutta and Stephan Tiedtke - The Soviet Union’s internal problems and the development of the Warsaw Treaty

22. For Soviet accounts, see Chapter 2 in PA Zhilin (ed) - Stroitel'stvo armii evropeiskikh stran sovetskogo sodruzhestva 1949-1980 (Izdatel'stvo nauka, Moscow 1984), and pp 38-57 of Volkogonov, Armii stran Varshavskogo Dogovora; also Daniel N Nelson - WTO Mobilization Potential: a Bulgarian Case Study (Defense Analysis Vol.5 No.1, 1989, pp 31-44). Unless otherwise specified, the data used in this section have been taken from The Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), editions up to and including 1987-8.


28. See A Ross Johnson - The Polish Military, Chapter III in Johnson et al, East European Military Establishments; Christopher Donnelly - The Military Significance of the Polish Crisis, in RUSI and Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1983 (Brassey’s, London 1983); and George Sanford - Military Rule in Poland: The Rebuilding of Communist Military Power,

30. Figure given in Johnson et al, *East European Military Establishments*, page 14.


34. This NATO ratio includes French and Spanish forces; if they were excluded, the ratio of US to allied forces would have been closer to parity (2.1 million to 2.3 million). All these calculations, however, exclude allies on both sides which were not members of NATO or the WTO.


44. See Simon in the chapter mentioned in FN 43, and also in *Warsaw Pact Forces*, Chapter 9.

45. Pointed out in *Keesing's Treaties and Alliances of the World* (Longman, London 1981), page 210. Romania, as noted earlier, was an exception. See also the chart of treaty contents provided by Hutchings, in *Soviet-East European Relations*, Chapter 5.

47. See Chapter 3, and *The Middle East*, December 1985.


52. MacGregor, *op.cit.*; Andrew Cockburn, in *The Threat* (Hutchinson, London 1983), cites a *Washington Post* report from February 1981 about a chaotic attempted mobilization in the USSR's Carpathian Military District. Cockburn suggests that Brezhnev used this event as an argument against intervention at a time when others in the Soviet leadership were pressing for firm measures.


58. See Volkogonov, Armii stran Varshavskogo Dogovora, pp 124-141, and Zhitin, Stroitel'stvo armii evropeiskikh stran sotsialisticheskogo soderzhestva, Chapter 6. The former account says that only Romanian staff representatives participated in WTO manoeuvres; the latter speaks of Romanian participation in exercises in 1970 and 1972 (a naval exercise); of staff map exercises in Romania in 1973, 74, and 78; and of "representatives" participating in the "Shield-82" exercise. For further treatment of Romanian participation in particular exercises, see Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces.


60. See the analysis in Aurel Braun - Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy (Praeger, New York 1978).


63. The fullest account of this period can be found in Dale R Herspring - The Soviet High Command, 1947-1989: Personalities and Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990), chapters 4 and 5.

64. See David Isby - Ogarkov's Demise May Reveal New Command in Eastern Europe (Defense Week 3.12.84); Jane's Defence Weekly, 22.9.84 and 27.10.84; and Herspring, The Soviet High Command, Chapter 7.

65. See the account in Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR. This account is useful as it was published in 1979, and so gives a clear view of the pre-reorganization system.


68. Ogarkov mentioned "strategic nuclear forces" in his 1981 Kommunist (10) article, 'Na strazhe mirnogo truda', at page 87. General Yazov also used the term in 1987 - see DT Yazov - Na strazhe sotsializma, i mira (Voennoe

70. Accounts drawn on here include: Michael J Deane, Ilana Kass and Andrew G Porth - The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation (Strategic Review Vol XII No 2, 1984, pp 55-70); John Erickson - The Implications of Soviet Military Power (Catalyst Vol.1 No.2, Summer 1985, pp 11-18), and contribution to The World Tonight (BBC Radio 4), 6 September, 1984, on the occasion of Ogarkov’s apparent dismissal; Jane’s Defence Weekly 21.12.85 and 28.12.85; on the lecture materials, see Lectures from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (The Journal of Soviet Military Studies Vol.1 No.1, April 1988, pp 29-53). Herspring’s view is that no new command was created as such, but the services which operated strategic nuclear weapons were placed on a more equal footing as a result of Ogarkov’s reorganization.

71. See Deane, Kass and Porth, op. cit.; also Yossif Bodansky - Reorganizing the Soviet High Command for War (Defense & Foreign Affairs, August 1985, pp 27-32); Kenneth Currie - Soviet General Staff’s New Role (Problems of Communism Vol.XXIII No.2, March-April 1984, pp 32-40). This last article was written at a time when Ustinov and Ogarkov were still in their respective posts as Minister and Chief of Staff.


73. For a Soviet confirmation of the existence of these commands published in the era of glasnost’, see Izvestiya 21.2.90, page 6.


Chapter 5 Footnotes.


4. Among the western sources drawn on in this chapter are the following:
   - CN Donnelly - Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet Army - Recent Debates in the Soviet Military Press (International Defense Review Vol.11 No.9, 1978, pp 1405-12);
   - The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine (International Defense Review Vol.14 No.12, 1981, pp 1589-96);
   - Harriet Fast Scott and William F Scott - The Armed Forces of the USSR (Westview Press, Boulder 1979);
   - Derek Leebaert (ed) - Soviet Military Thinking (George Allen & Unwin, London 1981);
   - Lawrence Freedman - The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Macmillan, London 1981);
   - John Baylis and Gerald Segal (eds) - Soviet Strategy (Croom Helm, London 1981);
   - Robert P Berman and John C Baker - Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (The Brookings Institution, Washington 1982);
   - PH Vigor - Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory (Macmillan, London
1983);

David Holloway - The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (Yale University Press, New Haven 1983);

Stephen M. Meyer - Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces (Adelphi Papers 187 and 188, London 1983/4);


8. This account follows Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, Chapter 2; on the Khrushchev period, see also Thomas W. Wolfe - Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1964), and Raymond L. Garthoff - Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis (Faber and Faber, London 1966).


12. Na strazhe mirnogo truda (Kommunist 10, 1981, pp 80-91); quotations from pages 86 and 85.


15. MA Gareev - *Tvorcheskiy kharakter sovetskoi voennoi nauki v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine* (Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 7, 1985, pp 22-30); this has been translated in *Soviet Press Selected Translations*, March-April 1986 (Directorate of Soviet Affairs, US Air Force Intelligence Service), as "The Creative Nature of Soviet Military Science in the Great Patriotic War". I have made some small changes in the translation of this particular passage.


18. C pozitsii oboronitel'noi doktriny (Krasnaya zvezda 10.2.89).

19. The texts on which I am basing this argument are the following:

- CN Donnelly -
  - The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group - a new challenge for NATO (International Defense Review Vol.15 No.9, 1982, pp 1177-86);
  - Soviet Operational Concepts in the 1980s, in *ESECS Report* (see this chapter, FN 4);
  Michael MccGwire -
  - Dilemmas and Delusions of Deterrence (World Policy Journal Vol.I No.4, Summer 1984, pp 745-767);
  - Deterrence: the problem - not the solution (International Affairs [London] Vol.62 No.1, Winter 1985-6, pp 55-70);
  - Soviet Military Objectives (World Policy Journal Vol.III No.4, Fall 1986, pp 667-695);


24. Vigor may not have intended this, but I can see no other way of reading his argument on pages 190-191.

25. For example: General Bernard W Rogers - Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities (NATO Review December 1984, pp 1-9).


28. Ibid., page 756.


30. Ibid., page 668.


32. McCGwire 1987, chapters 3 and 11.

33. Soviet views were presented to the West in publications such as Whence the Threat to Peace (several editions), as well as in the position that NATO's Euromissiles were war-fighting and/or first-strike weapons. For western discussions, see: William V Garner - Soviet Threat Perceptions of NATO's Eurostrategic Missiles (Atlantic Papers Nos.52-53, The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Paris 1983); Raymond L Garthoff - Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (The Brookings Institution, Washington 1985), especially chapters 22 and 25; Stephen Shenfield - Assertive and Reactive Threats, in Stan Windass (ed) - Avoiding Nuclear War (Brassey's, London 1985).


38. Erickson et al, Soviet Ground Forces.


46. Jozef Hodic, cited by Jones and Rice.

47. See Johnson in Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev; also Chapter 1, Poland (Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone), in OREA 33 (Canadian Department of National Defence, Ottawa, November 1984), and Andrew A Michta - Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988 (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1990), Chapter 3.


51. Most of the features of this debate were encapsulated in Strategic Review Fall 1982, pp 56-58 - A Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Strategic Doctrine, comprising: Raymond L Garthoff - Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy; Richard Pipes - Soviet Strategic Doctrine: Another View; A Rebuttal by Ambassador Garthoff.


55. Istoriya uchit buditel'nosti, pages 77, 78, and 90.

57. XX Century and Peace 7, 1986.

58. GA Trofimenko - Novye real’nosti i novoe myshlenie (SSHA 2, 1987, pp 3-15); and the exchange between N Grachev and D Proektor in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ 1 and 4, 1988.


60. This point is made in Blackaby et al., No-First-Use, page 20.


Europe (Croom Helm for the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, London 1985); Raymond L Garthoff — The Soviet SS-20 Decision (Survival Vol.XXV No.3, May/June 1983, pp 110-119) and Chapter 25 of Detente and Confrontation; Bjorn Hagelin — Swords Into Daggers: A Study of Soviet Missile R&D With Special Reference to the SS-20 (Bulletin of Peace Proposals Vol.15 No.4, 1984, pp 341-353) (a rather different perspective, arguing that the SS-20 was not a planned system, but resulted from a failed attempt to build a solid-fuelled ICBM, the SS-16); Don Clark — Why the SS-20? (Defense Analysis Vol.1 No.3, September 1985, pp 211-213); Patrick Litherland — Current Soviet Thinking on the Use of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (Peace Studies Briefing, University of Bradford, August 1984); Jonathan Haslam — The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1967-87: The Problem of the SS-20 (Macmillan/CREES, Basingstoke 1989).


64. For Soviet commentaries see Ogarkov, Istoriya uchitel’nosti, pages 68-72; Gen.-Major M Belov and Lieut.-Colonel V Shchukin — Razvedyvatel’n’no-porazhayuschcie kompleksy armii SSHA (Voennyi Vestnik 1, 1985, pp 86-9); Major-General Ivan Vorobyov — Tactics Today (Soviet Military Review 3, 1985, pp 10-12), and New Weapons Require Sound Tactics (Soviet Military Review 1 and 2, 1987, pp 16-18, 16-18); G Vorontsov — SSHA, NATO i gomka obuchnykh vozrashenii (MEMO 5, 1985, pp 49-60); M Proskurin — Chto kotreva za "Planom Rodgera" (Krasnaya zvezda 3.12.85); Aleksandr Shevchenko — What Lies behind the "Rogers Plan" (Soviet Military Review 3, 1986, pp 46-7); Yu. Molostov — Zashchita ot vyshokotekhnogo oruzhiya (Voennyi vestnik 2,


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7. The fullest account is in John Borawski - From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference (Pergamon-Brassey's, London 1988), with the full document at Appendix B. For additional discussions, see: Martin A Cichock - Soviet Goal Articulations and Involvement at the European Disarmament Conference (Coexistence Vol.23 No.3, 1986, pp 189-207); Breakthrough in Arms Control? (Non-Offensive Defence 5,

8. Soviet News 18.6.86, page 284 - Address of Warsaw Treaty member states to NATO member states, to all European countries with a programme of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. Russian original in Pravda 12.6.86.

9. For text, see Conference on Disarmament document CD/780, 11 August 1987: Letter dated 4 August 1987 Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the Polish People's Republic, transmitting the text of the "Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on Arms Reduction and Confidence-Building in Central Europe". See also reports in Pravda 9.5.87 and 10.5.87; International Herald Tribune 9.5.87.


Important statements made by Gorbachev after his appointment as General Secretary in March 1985 included:

- Statement by MS Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (Pravda 16.1.86, and English version in Soviet News 22 January 1986);
- Report by Mikhail Gorbachev to 27th Congress of the CPSU (Pravda 26.2.86, and Soviet News 26 February 1986);
- Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Pravda 7.3.86, and Soviet News 19 March 1986);
- Mikhail Gorbachev’s Address to Moscow Forum (Pravda 17.2.87, and Soviet News 18 February 1987);
- Mikhail Gorbachev - The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World (Pravda 17.9.87, and Soviet News 23 September 1987);
- Mikhail Gorbachev - Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (Collins, London 1987);
- Mikhail Gorbachev - October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues (Pravda 3.11.87, and Soviet News 4 November 1987);
- Mikhail Gorbachev’s Speech at CPSU CC Plenum (Pravda 19.2.88, and Soviet News 24 February 1988);


17. V Zagladin - Kursom razuma i gumanizma (Pravda 13.6.88); Vneshnyaya politika i perestroika (Pravda 26.6.88); Ot balansa sil - k balansu interesov (Literaturnaya gazeta 29.6.88); Igor Malashenko - Freedom of choice (New Times 29, July 1988); A Bovin - Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie i mirovaya sistema sotsializma (MEMO 7, 1988, pp 5-15); A Bovin - Let’s break the ice on foreign policy (Moscow News 24, 12 June 1988); Editorial - Partkonferentsiya: vneshnepoliticheskoe izmerenie


25. Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at international meeting (Soviet News 11 Nov 1987, and in Pravda 5.11.87); E Primakov - Novaya filosofiya vneshei politiki (Pravda 10.7.87). It is interesting to compare this piece by Primakov with one from a year earlier, in MEMO 5, 1986, in which he was much harsher about capitalism's problems, and more restrained about Soviet economic difficulties (see FN 14 above). An important speech by Shevardnadze can be found in Vestnik MID SSSR 2, 26 August 1987, page 31. On the perceived domestic dangers, see the very first page of Meteor.
Gorbachev’s book, Perestroika, where he said: “Any delay in beginning perestroika could have led to an exacerbated internal situation in the near future, which, to put it bluntly, would have been fraught with serious social, economic and political crises” (Perestroika, page 17); and Peter Frank – Gorbachev’s dilemma: social justice or political instability (The World Today Vol.42 No.6, June 1986, pp 93-5).


27. See, for example: B Pyadishchev – Pervye itogi (Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ 4, 1989), page 160; Alexei Arbatov – How Much Defence is Sufficient? (International Affairs [Moscow] 4, April 1989, pp 31-44); Editorial – Foreign Policy; Lessons of the Past (International Affairs [Moscow] 6, 1989, pp 77-85) (here, the very notion of "great-power" prestige is treated as obsolete).

28. See, for example, Gorbachev in Pravda 8.1.89.


34. Mikhail Gorbachev – October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues (Supplement to Soviet Weekly, November 7 1987); Eduard Shevardnadze’s address to Foreign Policy Association (Soviet News 11.10.89); S Blagovolin – Voennaya moshch’ – skol’ko, kakaya, zachem? (MEMO 8, 1989,
35. See VV Zhurkin, SA Karaganov, AV Kortunov - 0 razumnoi dostatochnosti (SSHA 12, 1987, pp 11-21), page 11. My own attempts to track down Gorbachev's use of the term in France have not met with success, but it can apparently (according to Zhurkin et al) be found in a collection of Gorbachev's speeches published in 1985: MS Gorbachev - Izbrannye rechi i stat'i (Politizdat, Moscow 1985), at page 313.


41. For example: Lev Semeiko - Concerning parity (New Times 20, 25 May 1987, pp 16-17); V Petrovskii - Sovetskaya kontseptsiya vseobshchei bezopasnosti (MEMO 6, 1986, pp 3-13).


44. Soviet News 10 April 1985 and Pravda 8.4.85; Pravda 2.8.85.


52. The best source for following developments in the various proposals for chemical and nuclear-free zones is the monthly digest Arms Control Reporter. The SED-SPD initiative on chemical weapons can be found in: For a Zone Free of Chemical Weapons in Europe: Joint Political Initiative by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Intertext, Dresden 1985). See also Ralf Trapp (ed) - Chemical Weapon Free Zones? (SIPRI, Stockholm 1987), which has contributions from the FRG, GDR, and Czechoslovakia.


57. Dennis M Gormley - A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy (Orbis Vol.29 No.3, Fall 1985, pp 537-569); for a different view see Matthew Evangelista - Exploiting the Soviet "threat" to Europe (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Jan/Feb 1987, pp 14-18).

58. See an opinion poll in Pravda 17.12.87 (reported in the Times 18.12.87); and expressions of concern or mention of them in: Krasnaya zvezda 3.2.88; Moscow News 6, 7 Feb 88; New Times 6, Feb 1988; Izvestiya 16.3.88.

59. V Ivanov - Bez’yadernyi mir i obshchestvennoe mnение (Kommunist 5, 1987, pp 117-119); see also a commentary in Detente 9/10, Winter 1987/8, pp 46-8, pointing out the discrepancies between responses to various questions in this survey.

60. Marshal SF Akhромеev - Na puti k yadernomu razoruzheniyu (Pravda 16.12.87); General DT Yazov - O voennom balanse sil i raketo-yadernom paritete (Pravda 8.2.88); Pravda and Krasnaya zvezda 10.2.88 (Supreme Soviet session, including Shevardnadze speech); Krasnaya zvezda 20.2.88 (report of Akhромеev’s evidence to the Supreme Soviet’s preparatory commission); MEMO 2, 1988, pp 3-34 (assessments of the treaty by E Primakov, D Bykov, and V Baranovskii); Krasnaya zvezda 29.5.88 (report of ratification).
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8. The Labour Party - Defence and Security for Britain - Statement to Annual Conference 1984 by the National Executive Committee.


15. See David Holloway - War, Militarism and the Soviet State, in Thompson and Smith, Protest and Survive, and Roy and Zhores Medvedev's contribution, The USSR and the Arms Race, in Exterminism and Cold War.


25. See Stephen Tunnicliffe (ed): Department of

26. See the synopsis of Romberg’s (German-language only) book on Crisis-Stable Military Security in Central Europe - Criteria, Models and Ethical Aspects, in Non-Offensive Defence 3, November 1986, pp 16-17. In May 1990 Romberg, as Finance Minister in the GDR’s post-communist coalition government, signed the treaty of economic union with the FRG.


28. International Affairs [Moscow] 9, 1985, p.94 (part of an exchange of views on "For Peace and Security in Europe").


32. Pages 7 and 12 of Kokoshin’s article in SSHA 9, 1985.


34. See the abridged paper by Colonel Peter Deak and Dr. László Valki - Certainties and Uncertainties About the Military Doctrine of WTO, in Pugwash Newsletter Vol.24 No.3, January 1987, pp 63-6.

35. Pugwash Newsletter Vol.23 No.4, April 1986, pp 113-5.


38. Soviet News 18.6.86, page 284 - Address of Warsaw Treaty member states to NATO member states, to all European countries with a programme of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. Russian original in Pravda 12.6.86.

40. Soviet News 18.2.87, page 60, original in Pravda 17.2.87.


43. Soviet News 15.4.87, page 128; original in Pravda 11.4.87.

44. Soviet News 29.4.87, and Pravda 31.3.87.


46. Professor Genrikh Trofimenko - Stop the drift to nuclear catastrophe (Soviet News 2.7.87, p.311).


48. AF Dobrynin - Za bez'yadernyi mir, navstrechu XXI veku (Kommunist 9, 1986, pp 18-31). English translation can be found as 'For a nuclear-free world at the approaches to the 21st. century', in FN Fedoseev (ed) - Peace and Disarmament: Academic Studies 1987 (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1987).

49. For example: Patrick Cockburn in Financial Times 13.3.87; John Keegan in The Daily Telegraph 2.3.87; Martin Walker in The Guardian 15.4.87.

50. WTO CFM communique in Pravda 26.3.87; Dobrynin speech in Pravda 5.5.87 and Soviet News 6.5.87.


52. Pravda 30.5.87 and Soviet News 3.6.87.

53. Reports of the meetings of this group include: Arms Control Reporter 3/1987, page 402 B 144.

54. Krasnaya zvezda 23.6.87.


56. DT Yazov - Na strazhe sotsializma i mira (Voennoe izdatel'vto, Moscow 1987), pages 32-3.

57. Krasnaya zvezda 23.2.88.
58. MA Gareev - MV Frunze: voennyi teoretik (Voennoe izdatel'stvo, Moscow 1985), page 422.

59. In addition to Dobrynin's speech in May 1986, see Alexander Yakovlev - Modern Socialism Must First and Foremost Know Itself (Novosti, Moscow 1987), page 26.


69. A Kokoshin - Razvitie voennogo dela i sokrashchenie
vooruzhennykh sil i obychnykh vooruzhenii (MEMO 1, 1988, pp
20-32).

70. Interview with Gareev in Argumenty i fakty 39, 1988,
translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts SU/0267, 27
Sep 1988, pp B/1-B/3; V Sererbrannykov - Bezopasnost'
gosudarstva v yadernyi vek (Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil 9,

71. William E Odom - Soviet Military Doctrine (Foreign

72. Alexei Arbatov - Chapter 11, Military Doctrines, in
Disarmament and Security 1987, Yearbook of the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of
Sciences (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow
1988), page 212.

73. A Kokoshin, V Larionov - Protivostoyanie sil obshchego
naznacheniya v kontekste strategicheskoi stabil'nosti (MEMO
6, 1988, pp 23-31); a near-complete translation of this
article appears as: 'Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic
Interrelations', in Marlies ter Borg and Wim A Smit (eds) -
Non-provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Reduction
(Free University Press, Amsterdam 1989). See also Re-
thinking 'Victory': an interview with Andrei Kokoshin
(Detente 13, 1988). Larionov was a contributor to and co-
editor of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy, which was
discussed in Chapter 5.

74. Alexei Arbatov - O parite i razumnoi dostatochnosti
(Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' 9, 1988, pp 80-92), page 91.

75. Alexei Arbatov - Defence dilemmas (New Times 6,
February 7-13 1989).

76. Professor Vladimir Serebrannykov - More on the
defence doctrine dilemma (New Times 12, March 21-27 1989),
page 17.

77. Alexei Arbatov - Reasonable sufficiency: where does it
remark came from an article in Pravda 13.3.89.

78. 'Towards more security' (New Times 29, July 18-24
1989), 'Winning and going broke' (New Times 31, August 1-7
1989).

79. For example: L Semeiko - Razumnaya dostatochnost' -
put' k nadzhhnomu miru (Kommunist 7, 1989, pp 112-121); A
Savel'ev - Preditvorashchhenie voiny i sderzhivaniye: podkhody
VDV i NATO (MEMO 6, 1989, pp 19-29).

80. Marshal Sergey Akhromayev - The Doctrine of Averting
War and Defending Peace and Socialism (World Marxist

81. Kommunisty - avangard perestroiki (Krasnaya zvezda 12.3.89).


86. AA Kokoshin, AA Konovalov, VV Larionov, VA Mazing - Voprosy obespecheniya stabil'nosti pri radikal'nykh sokrashcheniyakh vooruzechhenyh sil i obychnykh vooruzecheniy v Evrope (Novosti, Moscow 1989).

87. See reports in Krasnaya zvezda 6.2.88, 13.4.88, 21-22-23.9.88, 18.10.88.

88. For example in Krasnaya zvezda 5.7.89.


90. The official announcements were in Krasnaya zvezda 15.12.88.


93. Krasnaya zvezda 7.3.89, Soviet News 8.3.89.

pullout map of 'NATO and Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces: Atlantic to the Urals'.

95. Soviet News 25.1.89.

96. The figures can be found in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, 8, 1989, page 65; Jane’s Defence Weekly 17.6.89.

97. See: Honecker speech on 23.1.89 in Documents on the policy of the German Democratic Republic 1/89; General Florian Siwicki reported in Krasnaya zvezda 28.2.89; Interview with M Vacek in Krasnaya zvezda 5.3.89; Hungarian government spokesman quoted in Jane’s Defence Weekly 9.9.89.


100. DVD-NATO: Neobkhodim politicheskii dialog (Izvestiya 21.4.89).

101. Martin Walker in The Guardian 29.5.89.


104. Moiseev in Krasnaya zvezda 10.2.89 and Pravda 13.3.89.

105. General P Lushev - V interesakh prochnogo mira (Krasnaya zvezda 3.3.89).


107. Yazov in Izvestiya 27.2.89; see also Charles G


109. Eduard Shevardnadze's statement at UN General Assembly (Soviet News 15.6.88).


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3. Vyacheslav Dashichev - Vostok-zapad: poisk novikh otoshenii - O prioritetakh vneshnee politiki Sovetskogo gosudarstva (Literaturnyaya gazeta 18.5.88); August 1968 (Moscow News 35, 28.8.88); Leonid Yagodovskii in Argumenty i fakty 33, 13.8.88, and also on Hungary in Argumenty i fakty 46, 12.11.88.


5. Eduard Shevardnadze replies to questions from Time magazine (Soviet News 10.5.89).


10. Eto bylo v Prage (Izvestiya 19.8.89); this discussion was taken further with a selection of readers' letters,
including one from the former Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Jiri Hayek, in Izvestiya 15.9.89, and with an article by Viktor Sheinis on the relationship between the 1968 intervention and Brezhnevite stagnation in the USSR, in Izvestiya 13.10.89. Hayek denied that he had ever spoken of taking Czechoslovakia out of the WTO, as Mazurov claimed.

11. Communique in Krasnaya zvezda 9.7.89; Gorbachev TV interview (Pravda 10.7.89), and speech to Supreme Soviet (Krasnaya zvezda 2.8.89).


13. CFM communique in Pravda 28.10.89; Gorbachev and Gerasimov quoted in The Guardian 28.10.89.


19. Shevardnadze’s February speech in Pravda 8.2.90; Shevardnadze and Gorbachev 28th Congress speeches in Pravda 11.7.90.

20. Shevardnadze in Pravda 5.7.90.

21. See, for example, Bogomolov’s 1988 paper, in Problems of Communism at PN(4) above; a particularly comprehensive analysis based on discussions at the institute which was prepared in early 1990, but was evidently the fruit of years of study of Eastern Europe: L Shevtsova – Kuda idet vostochnaya Evropa ? (MEMO 4, 1990, pp 86-105); in January 1990 Moscow News published extracts from a memorandum prepared in 1987-8 about the situation in Romania: Sergei Volovets – The USSR had no illusions about Ceausescu (Moscow News 4, 28 Jan 1990); Dashiachev’s memorandum was in
Der Spiegel 6, 5 Feb 1990. For a similarly bleak assessment of the future of COMECON, written by an IMEMO scholar, see M Maksimova - Razdum'ya o perestroike SEV (MEMO 4, 1989, pp 65-77).


24. See reports of meetings in Arms Control Reporter throughout 1988 - pp 407 B.14, 28, 37, 47, 78); 5-89 p.402 B.221-2; Krasnaya zvezda 25.5.89.


30. See Krasnaya zvezda 27.3.90 (on Poland), 28.4.90 (on Romania), 15.7.90 (on Bulgaria); on Hungary, see Zoltan D Barany - Major Reorganization of Hungary's Military Establishment (Radio Free Europe Research Vol.14 No.52, 28 Dec 1989). For a Soviet expression of alarm, see General Lizichev, then head of the Main Political Administration, in Krasnaya zvezda 20.3.90.

31. For the Soviet-Czechoslovakian agreement, see Vestnik MID SSSR 6(64), 31 March 1990, and on the Soviet-Hungarian agreement, Pravda 11.3.90.


34. The course of the negotiations can best be followed through the monthly updates of the Arms Control Reporter from IDDS, Brookline, Mass. See also Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies - Cutting Conventional Forces: An Analysis of the Official Mandate, Statistics and Proposals in the NATO-WTO Talks on Reducing Conventional Forces in Europe (IDDS East-West Conventional Forces Study, Brookline, July 1989).

35. Soviet News 6.9.89.

36. Krasnaya zvezda 1.12.89.


38. See Jonathan Steele's illuminating interview with Bogomolov, 'New thoughts bubbling in the think-tank', in The Guardian 10.1.90, and Phillip A Petersen - A New Security Regime for Europe ? (Problems of Communism Vol.XXXIX No.2, March-April 1990, pp 91-7). Further comments (by Shishlin, Primakov, and Shakhnazarov) on the possibility of departures from the WTO were reported in The Guardian 30.10.89 and 2.11.89. For an examination of Finlandization which did not treat it as entailing the break-up of the WTO, see Andranik Migranyan - An Epitaph to the Brezhnev Doctrine (Moscow News 34, 20 August 1989). Akhromeev's comment was reported in New York Times 25.7.89.

39. See Jane's Defence Weekly 27.1.90 and 3.2.90, Pravda 21.1.90. In Krasnaya zvezda 30.5.90 the head of the Polish
Military History Institute advocated the appointment of a non-Soviet officer as WTO Commander-in-Chief.

40. Izvestiya 18.3.90; Shevardnadze’s remarks in Soviet News 25.4.90. See also Shevardnadze’s article, Varshavskii Dogovor i NATO v obnovlyayushcheisy Evrope (Vestnik MID SSSR 10(68), 31 May 1990, pp 25-29), which was also published in NATO’s 16 Nations May 1990.


42. Gen. P Lushev - Varshavskomu Dogovoru - 35 let (Krasnaya zvezda 13.5.90); Marshal DT Yazov - Ot protivostoyaniya - k sisteme bezopasnosti (Izvestiya 13.5.90).


45. For documents relating to all these initiatives, see East European Reporter Vol.4 No.2, Spring/Summer 1990, pp 55-66.


54. TASS communiqué on Gorbachev-Kohl meeting (Pravda 11.2.90), and Shevardnadze interview (Izvestiya 19.2.90).

55. For example: Gorbachev interview with Pravda, in Soviet News 23.2.90; Gorbachev interview with Soviet and German journalists (Soviet News 14.3.90); Gerasimov briefing on German question (Soviet News 21.3.90); Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister AL Adamishin (Literaturnaya gazeta 25.4.90); Falin interview in Der Spiegel 8, 19 Feb 1990.

56. Batenin article in Berliner Zeitung 5.4.90, Dashichev interview in Die Welt 20.3.90.

57. "Dual membership" suggestion in Soviet News 25.4.90; Shevardnadze’s Bonn "2+4" speech in Izvestiya 6.5.90; Shevardnadze’s Vestnik MID SSSR/NATO’s 16 Nations article as at FN 40 above.

58. See Mary Kaldor’s interview with Eppelman in New Statesman and Society 25.5.90.


60. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 17.7.90 and Izvestiya 18.7.90; English translation in Soviet News 18.7.90.


62. The Guardian 7.7.90.

63. Moiseev comments in a 3.8.90 TASS interview (Soviet News 8.8.90).


65. Frankfurter Rundschau 25.9.90.

66. Pravda 11.7.90.

67. See S Rogov in Izvestiya 21.9.90, and S Kondrashov in

68. On the sufficiency compromise, see reports in Financial Times and Frankfurter Rundschau 5.11.90; on the PCC postponement, The Guardian 24.10.90; Yazov quoted in Soviet News 31.10.90; report of change in Hungarian position in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1.11.90.

69. Focus on Vienna 21, December 1990, and Arms Control Reporter 11-90, especially page 407.B.410 with details of the reductions required, and page 407.B.404 with the agreed WTO allocations.

70. See, for example, Ambassador Grinevsky’s remarks as reported in Arms Control Reporter 11-90, page 407.B.408.

71. Focus on Vienna 21, December 1990, page 16.
Chapter 9 Footnotes

1. The first argument can be found in: Mary C FitzGerald - Advanced Conventional Munitions and Moscow’s Defensive Force Posture (Defense Analysis Vol.6 No.2, June 1990, pp 167-191). The second seems to be Michael McCGwire’s interpretation of the latest trends in Soviet thinking, judging by conference papers presented by McCGwire in mid-1990. To be fair to FitzGerald and McCGwire, they are not both guilty of all the failings I have identified. FitzGerald does recognize that military-technological logic conflicts with the discourse of nonoffensive defence, but she is too ready to accept the military-technological determinism of some of the Soviet writings she reviews. McCGwire is less of a technological determinist, but it is clear that he continues to base his analysis on an assumption of rationality and coherence in Soviet strategic decisionmaking.

2. John Lewis Gaddis - Making the long peace last longer (The Guardian 31.5 and 1.6.90).

3. One can get a good sense of these debates by reading: George Schöpflin - The end of communism in Eastern Europe (International Affairs [London] Vol.66 No.1, January 1990, pp 3-16); Timothy Garton Ash, We The People; Fred Halliday - The Ends of Cold War, and Mary Kaldor - After the Cold War, both in New Left Review 180, March/April 1990, pp 5-23, 25-37; Edward Thompson - The Ends of Cold War, and Fred Halliday - A Reply to Edward Thompson, in New Left Review 182, July/August 1990, pp 139-146, 147-150; Jürgen Habermas - What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the Left (New Left Review 183, September/October 1990, pp 3-21).

4. This composite argument has been constructed from, among other sources: Professor V Dashichev - On the threshold of a European home (Moscow News 5, 4 Feb 1990); Shevardnadze speech to February 1990 CPSU Central Committee plenum (Pravda 8.2.90); EA Shevardnadze - O vneshnei politike (Pravda 26.6.90); Gorbachev speech to 28th CPSU Congress (Pravda 11.7.90); Gorbachev speech in Odessa Military District (Pravda 19.8.90); I Malashenko - Printisp svobody vybora (Kommunist 7, 1990, pp 79-80); E Shashkov - Vostochnaya Evropa: vosprimaniya i novye realii (Kommunist 10, 1990, pp 113-119).

5. Again, a composite argument. See: Aleksandr Frokhanov - Tragediya tsentralizma (Literaturnaya Rossiya 5.1.90); Interview with Lieutenant-General I Sergeyev, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, in Moscow News 8-9, 25 Feb 1990; Col-Gen A Makashov - My ne sobiraemya sdavat’sya (Krasnaya zvezda 21.6.90); Lieut-Gen N Borko - Armiya - chast’ naroda i sluzhit emu (Krasnaya zvezda 22.6.90); Khvatov quoted in Soviet News 11.7.90, page 227.
6. Shevardnadze's resignation speech in *Izvestiya*
21.12.90.
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