SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE WITH REFERENCE TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS 1960s-1980s

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ABSTRACT

For the past fifty years social psychologists have attempted to understand inherently social phenomena within an individualistic and static conceptual framework afforded by the Cartesian paradigm. In contrast, contemporary traditions of social psychology, especially in Europe, reflect the cultural and evolutionary principles of the Hegelian paradigm. According to this approach, social phenomena are constructed through the coordinated activities of inherently social individuals in relationship both with each other and with their cultural and physical environments. I use this perspective to develop Moscovici's theory of social representations and our understanding of the dynamics and transformation of social knowledge. Drawing on recent developments in both the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge I reject Moscovici's distinction between the reified universe of science, which, he claims, is devoid of social representations, and the consensual universe of common-sense, which is impregnated with them. A programme of historical research is reported in which I trace the evolution and diffusion of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations and the emergence of a social dimension in the social psychology of groups. This study demonstrates the dynamics by which scientific knowledge is transformed. These dynamics involve the social processes of interaction and communication and are characterized both by a delicate balance between tradition and innovation, and by an interdependence among individual scientists, the community of scientists to which they belong and the wider society in which the community is embedded. The thesis as a whole has important implications for understanding the processes of science and for the conduct of research in the social sciences.
To my mother
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PREFACE

Part 1 of this thesis is predominantly theoretical and develops Moscovici's theory of social representations. My research programme is set out in Part 2 and traces the evolution and diffusion of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations.

Whilst both Part 1 and Part 2 may be read independently they have been interactive in the development each of the other. Together they justify the claim and demonstrate the means by which social representations are transformed in science.

Moscovici's theory of social representations and Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations both challenge traditional, individualistic forms of social psychology. The 'Hegelian paradigm' has emerged in this thesis as a framework in which to both examine and develop social forms of social psychology.

I would like to thank Rob Farr for our many discussions and his constructive comments on draft chapters; Jan Stockdale for her encouragement and support; and my fellow Ph.D. students in the Social Psychology Department of the London School of Economics with whom I learnt to express and clarify my thoughts. I would also like to thank those who took part in the research and also my family and friends.

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INTRODUCTION

In developing the theory of social representations, Moscovici's aim is to address issues which relate to modern society and culture. There were many important components of culture were identified as phenomena worthy of study in the formative years of psychology, including language, religion, customs, myths, magic and cognate phenomena (Wundt, Voelkerpsychologie, 1900-1920). From the theory's inception Moscovici identified science as one of the most influential forces in modern society, shaping our common-sense understanding in everyday life.

In La Psychanalyse: Son image et son public (Moscovici, 1961) Moscovici examined the transformation of scientific knowledge as it diffused into common-sense, forming a shared reality which shaped people's world view and directed their interactions with their physical and social environment. At one level the study resembles an anthropology of modern society, exploring the impact of psychoanalysis on French culture and common-sense understandings. At another level, it constitutes a study in the sociology of knowledge, tracing the diffusion of psychoanalytic theory into different sectors of French society.

Several reasons contribute to the appeal of the theory of social representations. Firstly, it provides, simultaneously, a critique of traditional Anglo-American social psychology and an alternative framework within which to study social-psychological phenomena. This joins forces with the current movement in social psychology to adopt a contextualist or constructivist approach as opposed to a reductionist or positivist approach. Secondly, it identifies a phenomenon which, until now, has been little studied in social psychology; that is, the form, content and dynamics of consensual beliefs. Thirdly, the theory incorporates and legitimizes new sources of data for research. Social representations exist, not only in people's minds and in their interactions, but also in the cultural products of a particular society. These include the media, books and films
as well as the human-made environment in which we live. Fourthly, the theory suggests a pluralism of methods, ranging from laboratory experiments to interviews, content analysis and participant observation. Finally, the theory provides a framework in which to investigate important social issues and, as a consequence, it has received the support of various funding bodies.

The theory of social representations has acquired international recognition, instigating a broad range of research and critical debate. Much of the early research on social representations (1960's-1970's) was conducted in France. This included field research investigating social representations of health and illness, mental illness, the body, children and cities as well as experimental research on social representations of particular situations in relation to self and to the group. In more recent years the theory has been employed by researchers in other European countries who have studied social representations of AIDS, gender, economic inequalities and intelligence. It has also been incorporated into other fields of social psychology, including social cognition, attribution theory and intergroup relations. Furthermore, although the theory of social representations clearly falls within the realm of social psychology, it has attracted attention from people in other disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, anthropology and history. There has by no means been an unconditional acceptance of the theory and its related research, but the various commentaries and critiques not only facilitate its continuing development, they also indicate the import of this new and expanding field in social psychology.

Like common-sense, science is fundamentally a social activity, situated in a cultural and historical context. Furthermore, science offers an ideal object of study for a theory that focuses on the transformation of social knowledge. Firstly, the science endeavours to provide explanations and to extend our understandings of phenomena in the world. As a result, there is a continual stream of development and change, on a smaller or larger scale. Secondly, scientific documents provide a comprehensive
written account from which to trace the history of change and to examine the dynamics of social knowledge.

Whilst the theory, as it stands, sheds a great deal of light on the dynamics of common sense, it says little or nothing about the dynamics of change within the scientific community. I hope to demonstrate that the theory is relevant to our understanding of how scientific knowledge is transformed. Any new departure presents its problems and this is no exception. Not only has Moscovici explicitly rejected the existence of social representations in science but there are also a number of contradictions and confusions within the theoretical writings on the subject. There is also a considerable diversity of research on social representations. The application of the theory to the dynamics of scientific knowledge directly challenges certain presuppositions and demands the clarification of various theoretical principles. These include the relationship between science and common-sense, between the individual and culture, between knowledge and the environment, and between stability and change. Within this thesis potential resolutions to these problems are constructed by drawing on a diverse literature and elaborating central distinctions between mechanistic (Cartesian) and relational (Hegelian) paradigms within psychology and between a positive empiricist philosophy of science and a social constructionist one.

The research focuses on the transformation of social representations in social psychology and, in particular, on the influence of Henri Tajfel (1919-1982) on the psychology of groups. This examines not only the diffusion and assimilation of Tajfel's ideas to the wider community of social scientists but also the construction of a theory of intergroup relations within a particular social, cultural and historical context. The construction and diffusion of social representations involve the same social processes. Scientific and lay theories evolve and are transformed within their respective communities. They are dynamic in both contexts. The detailed analysis of the transformation of scientific knowledge provides the grounds for developing further the theory of social representations and, in
particular, for elaborating the processes of transformation involved.

Part 1 of the thesis is largely theoretical, examining the theory of social representations within the broader context of social psychology as a scientific discipline. Part 2 presents research on the transformation of social representations within social psychology. These two sections of the thesis are interdependent: the research informs at least some of the theoretical developments in Part 1 and the latter provides the foundations for the research presented in Part 2. The relationship is a dialectical one.

Before going on to present a guide to each chapter I shall outline the general argument which is constructed in the course of this thesis. Moscovici developed the theory of social representations in order to describe and explain those transformations of common-sense knowledge that occur when the innovations and discoveries of science diffuse within society. In so doing, he made a sharp distinction between the reified universe of science and the consensual universe of social representations. Furthermore, he emphasized the collective or supra-individual nature of social representations so as to avoid the individualistic and reductionist perspectives which have dominated Anglo-American social psychology. However, the research on social representations does not always reflect these theoretical commitments. Firstly, much of the research has investigated the transformation of social representations which are only indirectly associated with science, if at all. This means that the theory must account for the construction of innovations within the consensual universe as well as for their assimilation and diffusion. Secondly, much of the research betrays the social or cultural focus of the theory. This reflects the contradictions and confusions within the theory itself, with regard to both its theoretical and its methodological commitments.

The implicit difficulties presented by the theory and by the research are not exclusive to the field of social representations. Rather, they are expressions of the fundamental problems which have confronted social psychology
throughout its history. These find their roots in the divergence between the Cartesian and the Hegelian paradigms (Marková, 1982). The Cartesian paradigm endorses a mechanistic view of the world in which the individual is independent from the environment and from culture. Furthermore, it is consistent with a positive-empiricist view of science. In contrast, the Hegelian paradigm offers an organic or evolutionary view of the world in which individuals can only be conceived of in relation to their environment and their culture. This requires a different approach to the conduct of scientific enquiry.

While the theory of social representations resurrects the Hegelian tradition it still reflects certain aspects of the Cartesian paradigm. Firstly, the theory fails to provide a synthesis of the dichotomy between the individual and culture and, in consequence, fails to give a consistent account of the dynamics of social representations. I resolve this by elaborating a social model of the individual and a social-realist view of reality within the Hegelian tradition. Secondly, Moscovici's notion of the reified universe of science reflects a Cartesian epistemology and a positive empiricist philosophy of science which is antithetical to his own thesis. Science itself must be conceived of as a human and social endeavour in which knowledge is socially constructed. Thus, the theory of social representations is applicable not only to the transformation of common-sense, but also to the transformation of scientific knowledge.

In order to remain consistent with this line of argument a Hegelian or constructionist approach is adopted in the research reported in this thesis. The research on the psychology of groups focuses on the transformation of social representations and the interdependence between the individual scientist and his or her cultural context. This research elaborates the thesis in two ways. Firstly, it illustrates that the theory of social representations can be applied constructively to the realm of science. Secondly, it demonstrates that the study of large-scale social phenomena can only be achieved successfully within the Hegelian paradigm.
Chapter 1 constitutes the starting point or groundwork from which the remainder of the thesis develops. No attempt is made at this stage to critically assess the theory. An outline of the social psychological perspective adopted in the theory of social representations emphasizes the focus on culture and social change. This is followed by a structured presentation of the theory in terms of the nature of social representations, their functions and the processes by which they are transformed. Finally, the role of social representations in modern society is considered and I describe the distinction which Moscovici makes between the reified universe of science and the consensual universe of common-sense.

This provides the basis for a critical review of the heterogenous research on social representations and an assessment of related theoretical and methodological critiques in Chapter 2. I argue that investigations which focus on representations of social objects, or representations in interpersonal interactions, do not reflect the distinctive character of social representations. Furthermore, literature that stresses the consensual nature of social representations as shared bodies of knowledge fails to address their dynamic nature and their origins in social life. Research which examines the role of social interaction and communication, broadly interpreted, is best suited to illuminate the maintainance and creative transformation of social representations as well as the social reality which they form. A definition of social representations must take into account all these characteristics. Finally, a discussion of theoretical principles in relation to the research demonstrates that the theory is applicable to a broad spectrum of social-psychological knowledge.

In Chapter 3 the scope of the thesis is enlarged beyond the theory of social representations to the disciplines of psychology and of social psychology as a whole. In particular, I examine how the relationship between the individual and culture is conceptualized and how this relates to the scientific study of psychological and social phenomena. An examination of the historical development of
psychology and of social psychology shows how the division between the individual and culture has been perpetuated rather than transformed since the inception of psychology as a scientific discipline. This is due, I argue, to a commitment to the individualistic and mechanistic principles of the Cartesian paradigm and to a positive-empiricist representation of science. In contrast, the Hegelian tradition of thought provides an alternative paradigm in which the individual is both the product and the producer of culture. This embraces an evolutionary and constructionist perspective which is beginning to be reflected in current developments in psychology. This chapter serves three distinct purposes. Firstly, it locates the theory of social representations within both the historical and the contemporary context of social psychology, identifying the problems which must be addressed. Secondly, it describes the social representations of the individual and of science which have dominated the historical development of psychology and of social psychology to date. Thirdly, it elaborates two contrasting paradigms of research for social psychology which provide an essential background for the following three chapters.

Chapter 4 is largely a reformulation of the theory of social representations. I commence by explicating the conflicts and confusions within the theory, focusing on the manifest contradiction between the role of the individual and of culture and the uneasy tension between the prescriptive and dynamic nature of social representations. The crucial link which resolves these problems is the conception of the individual as a social being within an 'organism/environment/culture system'. This provides a conceptual framework which supports the claim that social representations exist not only in our minds but also in our interactions and in the cultural environment. It also offers a basis from which to construct a definition of social reality that avoids both a positive empiricist view, locating reality in the external world, and an extreme social constructionist view, locating reality in the heads of individuals. This reformulation within the Hegelian paradigm
allows a reassessment of the dynamics of social representations. Firstly, the social individual necessarily plays a constructive role in the maintenance and transformation of social representations. Secondly, anchoring and objectification are essentially social processes but, in themselves, they fail to explain adequately the transformations in social representations. It is suggested that these processes of both assimilation and accommodation must be understood in terms of a spiral of transformation within systems of social representations.

Chapter 4 deals with the theoretical problems that are relevant to any study of social representations. Chapter 5 focuses exclusively on the relationship between science and common-sense, an issue that, surprisingly, has been ignored but that is crucial to this whole thesis. Moscovici's distinction between the reified and consensual universes is not unusual in the social sciences. But his notion of the reified universe creates substantial problems for his theory. While the theory requires a social constructionist epistemology Moscovici's notion of reified universe perpetuates an antagonistic, positive-empiricist epistemology. By examining developments in the philosophy of science it is shown that Moscovici's description of the reified universe reflects a 'traditional view' of science. This view was challenged by significant advances in physics in the early part of this century and gave rise to alternative philosophies. In particular, Kuhn (1962,1970) propounds an historical, cultural and social-psychological approach to the transformation of scientific knowledge. This shows many similarities to the theory of social representations and, in conjunction with more recent developments, offers a social-constructionist philosophy of science. This view is supported by parallel developments in the sociology of knowledge. The theory of social representations thus provides a suitable framework within which to study the transformation and evolution of science itself. Finally, the arguments presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are illustrated by reference to Darwin's theory of evolution.
The research conducted in this thesis on the transformation of social representations in science contrasts, quite strikingly, with traditional modes of investigation in social psychology, with reference to both its form and its content. In Chapter 6, I discuss the diverse methods of research, from experimentation to participant observation, which have been employed in the study of social representations. Each method is characterized in terms of its strengths and weaknesses in exploring various aspects of the theory and it is argued that the most suitable approach is to develop research programmes which incorporate multiple methods of investigation. This is supported by considering the methodological commitments of the Hegelian paradigm in contrast to those of the Cartesian paradigm. The former focuses on theory construction, adopting an evolutionary approach to the qualitative examination of relational systems. It is this approach which is adopted in the research programme developed in this thesis. The decision to select psychology as a scientific discipline for this study is supported by both theoretical and methodological considerations. A variety of techniques are used to select and to examine the transformation of social representations in the psychology of groups, with particular reference to Henri Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. These include a questionnaire, an historico-interpretative analysis of Tajfel's publications, in-depth interviews with his collaborators, an analysis of citation counts and a critical review of an extensive literature on group psychology. Each method is described giving an account of its use and development within the research programme.

Part 2 investigates the dynamics and transformation of social representations in the social psychology of groups. This requires not only a description of a system of social representations and its diffusion within a specified community but also an analysis of the origins of change and the processes of transformation in the organism/environment/culture system. In order to maintain the socio-psychological and historical perspectives of Moscovici's original theory the research focuses on the contributions of
an influential scientist, in relation both to the scientific community and to the broader society, and involves an historical analysis of transformations within a specified field of study.

Chapter 7 concentrates on the impact of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations on the field of group psychology as a whole. The results of a questionnaire study exploring social psychologists' views of influential contributions to both attitude research and group psychology are reported. These show not only that there is considerable interest and a greater consensus in the latter field of study but also that Tajfel's work has brought about substantial changes in the social representations pertaining to the understanding of group phenomena. This change is assessed using both quantitative and qualitative methods of research. An analysis of citation counts shows that Tajfel's ideas have diffused quite widely in the social sciences. Although his earlier work on social perception, stereotypes and prejudice continues to be cited, his work on intergroup relations has had by far the greatest impact, especially in Europe. To assess the nature of this impact, I examine the historical development of group psychology as a field of study and the gradual assimilation of Tajfel's research and theoretical orientation within the field as a whole. In the past, group phenomena were represented as an individual's response to small group situations and explanations were provided in terms of intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. This can be contrasted with more recent developments in group psychology and related fields of study which have been auspicated by Tajfel's work. Firstly, large-scale social processes and intergroup relations in society have become a more prominent area of study in social psychology. This is due, in large measure, to the respective influences of Moscovici and Tajfel. Secondly, much of the literature on intergroup relations as well as on intragroup processes now presents the group as a theoretically distinctive entity. Thirdly, there is an increasing emphasis on the role of consensual beliefs and of people's relationships within their historical and cultural contexts.
The following three chapters focus on the transformation of the social representations involved in the construction of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. It is not possible to identify how a new perspective in group psychology has evolved without first examining the content and structure of the system of social representations during consecutive periods. Chapter 8 provides a detailed description of Tajfel's work in terms of six phases in his academic career. Tajfel started by studying the effects of value and categorization on the perceptual judgment of physical objects (Phase I). The theoretical principles constructed in this context were then applied to social phenomena and, in particular, to stereotypes (Phase II). This led Tajfel to consider the nature of prejudice and to elaborate the cognitive aspects of large-scale social phenomena (Phase III). Experimental studies on the development of national attitudes (Phase IV) and also on the role of social categorization in intergroup relations (Phase V) gave rise to a number of issues which relating to the social context of human behaviour. Finally, Tajfel explicates the significance of social identity in intergroup relations and the processes involved in social change (Phase VI).

The most striking feature of this evolution is that, whilst Tajfel remained a social psychologist throughout, the form of social psychology which he espoused underwent a radical transformation. In Chapter 9, I trace the major continuities and discontinuities across the six phases in the development of his ideas. This involves both stability and change in the social representations of the individual, of the group and of social psychology as a scientific discipline. Whilst Tajfel retained both a comparative perspective and a functional approach, as the central object of his study changed, so to did his conceptions of the cognitive, evaluative and motivational components of his theory. More significantly, the locus of explanation shifts away from individual cognitive processes towards the socio-psychological concomitants of people's social context. There is also a shift away from a concentration on method and empirical enquiry towards the development of theory and its
application to social reality. These transformations can be explained, at least in part, by examining the emergence of problems and their possible solutions through the assimilation and accommodation of conflicting aspects within the system of social representations. It will be seen that the emergence of a social dimension in socio-psychological explanations of group phenomena was necessitated by the study of large-scale intergroup relations in society.

However, this leaves many questions still unanswered. The transformation of a system of social representations cannot be understood in isolation from its historical and cultural context. In Chapter 10 the concatenation of cultural, social and intellectual influences on Tajfel's work is examined. These include Tajfel's cultural history and the various institutions with which he was associated; his collaboration with other social scientists working in the same field and the emergence of a European community of social psychologists; and the conventions and innovations expressed in theoretical writings and research papers both in social psychology and in the social sciences more generally.

Finally, in Chapter 11, I highlight the implications of this research and the arguments elaborated in this thesis for the theory of social representations itself, for the discipline of social psychology and for our understanding of the processes of science. The Hegelian paradigm simultaneously supports, and is supported by, the elaboration of the theory of social representations, the research on the field of group psychology and the application of the theory to the dynamics of scientific knowledge.
PART 1

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
CHAPTER 1

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

1.1  A PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

1.2  THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

1.2.1 Social reality
1.2.2 The symbolic nature of social representations
1.2.3 The logic of social representations
1.2.4 The conventional and prescriptive nature of social representations
1.2.5 The dynamic nature of social representations

1.3  THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

1.3.1 The interpretation and understanding of objects and events
1.3.2 Enabling communication and social interaction
1.3.3 Demarcation and consolidation of groups
1.3.4 The formation of social identities
1.3.5 Importance in regard to socialisation
1.3.6 Making the unfamiliar familiar

1.4  THE PROCESSES OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

1.4.1 Anchoring
1.4.2 Objectification

1.5  THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

1.5.1 The reified universe
1.5.2 The consensual universe
1.5.3 Science and social representations
1.5.4 Causality and explanation
1.5.5 Social representations in modern society

1.1  A PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The theory of social representations is a distinctively European form of social psychology which has emerged in France. Its earliest formulation and empirical research is properly accredited to Moscovici, with the publication of *La Psychanalyse: Son image et son public* (1961). Since then, an ever-increasing number of European social psychologists have shown an interest in social representations, both in their theoretical writings and in their empirical research (Farr, 1987b). This has resulted in an incredible variety, in both the methods of research employed and the fields of application within psychology.
This will be examined in more detail in the following chapter. The present chapter focuses almost exclusively on the theory of social representations. However, before embarking on a presentation of the theory, it is pertinent to outline Moscovici's perspective on social psychology.

As Wells (1987) explicates and Moscovici (1987) affirms, the theory of social representations reflects a certain way of envisioning social psychology. Moscovici asserts that it must be considered, foremostly, a social science with its own domain and objects of study. Rather than a situation in which a variety of disciplines and subdisciplines, including economics, political science, history, child psychology and linguistics, create their own social psychology it should be a discipline in its own right, constituting a major science alongside those of anthropology, economics and sociology (Moscovici, 1990). As a major science it would be a cultural and anthropological endeavour investigating the problems of our times in their historical context. This is expressed by Moscovici on numerous occasions; for example:

social psychology is a science of culture and particularly of our culture; it is, or should be, the anthropology of the modern world.

(Moscovici, 1981b, p.iix)

Another theme which is central to much of Moscovici's thinking is an overriding concern with change, especially with social change. This is reflected on at least three levels. Firstly, social psychology should study the evolution and transformation of social phenomena. It is the responsibility of social psychologists 'to examine society "in the making", a perpetual creation of its members, materially as well as symbolically (Moscovici, 1987, p.520). It would be 'a science of consensual universes in evolution' (Moscovici, 1984b), studying the transformations from one way of knowing things to another way....and what effect these transformations have on communication and action

(Moscovici, 1982, p.139).

No other discipline is better equipped to study these social transformations and innovations.>1<
Secondly, in order to achieve this, social psychology itself must be reformulated, its accepted norms and methods critically reviewed and adapted to studying social phenomena. A systematic social psychology must be renewed and redeveloped so as to become a real science of those social phenomena which are the basis of the functioning of a society and the essential processes generating in it.

(Moscovici, 1972, p. 55)

Thirdly, social psychology should not be afraid to develop 'dangerous truths' which have consequences for society. As a social science it is in a position not only to discover aspects of social reality (of which we were formerly unaware) but also to participate in the dynamics of knowledge in society through which social reality is transformed and new aspects of society created. To quote Moscovici as a science of our culture, social psychology should and could contribute to criticise a certain number of our ideological 'difficulties', whose political and human consequences are huge

(Moscovici, 1987, p. 528).

This view of social psychology is reflected throughout much of Moscovici's theoretical writings and empirical research. For example, his work on minority influence (Moscovici, 1985c), which arose out of a critique of the 'conformity bias' in much American experimental social psychology (Moscovici and Faucheux, 1972), studies the role of active minorities instigating change in the views of a majority. Other examples include his work on the history of mass psychology (Moscovici, 1985a), and on social representations (1961, 1984b). With regard to the latter Moscovici has gone so far as to state that

the main task of social psychology is to study such representations, their properties, their origins and their impact.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 13)

The notion of social, or rather collective, representation was originally used by Durkheim, a French sociologist. However, within sociology it remained a concept, an explanatory device irreducible by any further analysis.
Moscovici (1961) took up this 'forgotten concept' of Durkheim's. Once located within the discipline of social psychology, it is transformed into a phenomenon, an object of study, the structure and dynamics of which require detailed examination. In this respect it is similar to the notions of the gene or the atom which were originally explanatory concepts in genetics and traditional mechanics but became objects of study within molecular biology and atomic physics respectively. Once the phenomenon of social representations is established as an object of study it is possible to investigate its genesis and function in society and, with the aid of empirical research, to develop a theory of social representations which provides an understanding of why and how they are produced and the way in which they intervene in social life. Whereas other social sciences may refer to social or collective representations it is the specific task of social psychology to undertake their empirical investigation and to develop a theory which would constitute a psycho-sociology of our culture. As such, it would not be, simply, a psychology of opinions and of attitudes about objects that already exist but rather a social psychology concerned with the evolution and transformation of ways of understanding and the impact of these changes on social life. No other discipline examines these social phenomena as a whole and in the light of their specific characteristics. By considering social representations as phenomena, social psychology is able to elucidate those aspects of our culture which are least studied.

Such an endeavour requires methods of investigation and theory-building which are adapted to their object of enquiry. Any theory requires accurate and rigorous techniques but these 'are a function of the phenomena under consideration and the course of research' (Moscovici, 1987, p. 528). The investigation of social representations, language, communication, social interaction and all that is entailed therein requires methods of observation and detailed description of these complex phenomena (Moscovici, 1984b). Only then are we in a position to build descriptive and
explanatory theories that allow an accurate and clear understanding of social representations

Only a careful description of social representations, of their structure and their evolution in various fields, will enable us to understand them and ... a valid explanation can only be derived from a comparative study of such descriptions.

(Moscovici, 1984a, p. 68)

The development of a theory should be based on adequate observations and on comparative studies that reveal regularities and that allow sensible conjectures to be made.

Moscovici is here reiterating Koch's comments on psychology made in 1959

from the earliest days of the experimental pioneers man's stipulation that psychology be adequate to science outweighed his commitment that it be adequate to man.

(Koch, 1959, p. 784)

Rather than maintaining an overriding concern for methodology and making spurious demands for accuracy social psychologists should do justice to the complexities of social and cultural phenomena. In order to achieve this they must develop an adequate representation of human and social phenomena as well as the methods and research strategy appropriate to such a task.

For Moscovici, social psychology must not remain associated exclusively with its parent discipline of psychology, but must establish links with sociology and the other social sciences, including anthropology, economics, linguistics and history. These suggest alternative approaches to research and to theory-building, involving long-range studies that examine given phenomena or problems from a number of different perspectives, and that provide adequate descriptions on the basis of which theoretical breakthroughs and scientific discoveries become possible.

Moscovici's views concerning methodology and theory-building in social psychology are closely associated with his rejection of an objectivist ontology within this discipline. On more than one occasion he quotes Merleau-Ponty (1969) who suggests that remaining within an objectivist
ontology restricts one's understanding of a chosen object of study, hampering research and limiting the 'growth of knowledge' to what we already know (Moscovici 1982, 1987).

At this point it would seem appropriate to define, precisely, what is a 'social representation'. However, although I agree with G. Breakwell (1987), Billig (1987b) and others that conceptual clarification is required I do not believe that this will be provided by a brief and necessarily oversimplistic definition. Any statement concerning social representations can only be understood properly within the context of the theory as a whole. The perspective must be established and a system of related concepts must be developed, before a singular statement attempting to express the nature, function and process of social representations can be attempted. A definition of social representation will not be attempted until the next chapter, drawing both on the theory of social representations and on empirical research.

This chapter will be limited to an overview of the theory, as expressed in the writings of those directly concerned with social representations, focusing on the work of Moscovici. Although Moscovici's style of writing is often expansive, touching on a broad range of issues, it tends to give a nebulous impression of his general approach rather than a clear idea of any theoretical postulates or empirical concerns. Taken as a whole, his exposition of the theory of social representations contains a number of internal inconsistencies and points of confusion. Furthermore, he fails to elaborate on fundamental issues which, as yet, present unresolved difficulties. These include a specification of the nature of reality, the relationship between the individual and society, and the nature of the reified universe of science. This chapter draws together the ideas and postulates expressed in a selection of Moscovici's articles in order to give a clear presentation of the theory as it stands. However, no attempt will be made to discuss the various problems and inconsistencies within the theory itself. These issues are addressed in the following chapters, in which an attempt will be made to provide further
explication and amplification of the theory of social representations. A series of footnotes, in the current chapter, identify some of the problems contained within the theory and indicate the chapters in which they are discussed more fully. (This method is often used in sociological and historical texts, and is adopted here both for the sake of brevity and in order to give a clear exposition of Moscovici's position).

In order to give a clear presentation it will be convenient to distinguish between three different aspects of the theory: the nature, the function and the processes of social representations. Separate sections will be devoted to each aspect. However, it should be understood that these aspects are inter-related and inter-dependent; the divisions are artificial and they are adopted only for the sake of clarity. The nature of social representations supports, and simultaneously is supported by, their function in social life. These functions, in their turn, are inseparable from the processes by which they evolve. A full understanding of the phenomenon of social representations can only be gained by an appreciation of all three aspects of the theory. Furthermore, Moscovici sets a number of boundary conditions to the domain in which the theory of social representations is applicable. In this respect Moscovici has made a start on the task suggested by Billig (1987b) of identifying what is not a social representation. Indeed it is the contention of the research reported in this thesis that some of these boundary conditions (especially that between science and common sense) are set rather arbitrarily. A full discussion of the theory's range of application, however, will be postponed until the following chapter.

1.2 THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

Representations are social constructions that form an environment of thought which is both conventional and prescriptive. As social constructions they assume that humans are active perceivers, actively constructing the social reality in which they think, communicate and act. Their conventional and prescriptive nature ensues from the tendency to conceive social representations as autonomous entities.
that constitute our reality. Such a conceptualization transcends both the distinction between subject and object and between stimulus and response. This being the case, it is essential to recognize the significance of the contents of social representations as well as of their form. Finally, they are dynamic structures that evolve and are transformed through communication and through social interaction. These different aspects of social representations and their interdependence will be presented below in order to illuminate the nature of social representations.

1.2.1 Social reality

The frequently adopted quotations from the writings of Moscovici fail to characterize fully the social nature of reality. Social representations, for example, are:

'theories' or 'branches of thought' in their own right, for the discovery and organisation of reality.

(Moscovici, 1973, p xiii)

or

a system of values, ideas and practices.

(Moscovici, 1973, p xiii)

and also

a set of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily life in the course of inter-individual communications.

(Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983)

These statements can be understood properly only after a thorough explication and understanding of the nature of the reality in which we live, as conceived by the theory; that is, a social reality. Priority is given to the collective, social and cultural aspects of reality which exist in their own right. This requires some amplification.

Social representations are the constituents of our reality. They form an environment of thought which simultaneously determines the reality we perceive/conceive and direct our responses to it. I have reservations in the use of the term 'determine', as this suggests that the social representation and the perception/conception of reality are two separate entities. They are not. This potential confusion may result from an error of translation from French to English which has important consequences for the
understanding of the nature of social representations. The social representation is our reality. This involves two aspects: firstly, the relationship between stimulus and response, and secondly, between subject and object.

Firstly, Moscovici states that to form a representation of something is to apprehend stimulus and response at one and the same time. The response is not a reaction to the stimulus, but, up to a point, constitutes the origin of the stimulus.

(Moscovici, 1973, p.xii)

Representations shape our perceptions and conceptions of an object. I see an object in a particular way only because I have a representation of that object. The representation, in this respect, is prior to the stimulus. Furthermore, a social object is represented in such a way as to permit or support any judgment, communication or action (Marková and Wilkie, 1987). The representation is constructed through our interactions with the social and material world for the purpose of sustaining those interactions. In this respect there is no distinction between stimulus and response, and as such one cannot be said to be the cause of the other.

Secondly, there is no distinction between the perception of the subject and the object which is perceived. That is, we do not perceive an objective reality, rather we perceive a socially constructed reality.

We are never provided with any information which has not been distorted by representations superimposed on objects and on persons.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.12)

To explain further, it is not the nature of the object that determines our construction of it but our relationship to that object; and these relations are social, being dependent on our social interactions and communications. This gives priority to intersubjective and social links rather than to links between the individual as an independent entity and the object. Social representations are created by and are dependent upon not only the subject, but also their relations with others and others' relations with the object. The object is understood through the processes of interaction with and
communication about the object in a social context, that is, with other people. Thus representations are created and transformed through interactions and communication between individuals and groups concerning social objects, which, in turn, are determined by their representations (Di Giacomo, 1980; Abric, 1984; Codol, 1984).

The social reality in which we live has all the force and influence of the material world. Social objects and social relations are just as real, if not more so, as physical objects.

Through communication, individuals and groups give a physical reality to ideas and images (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 53).

For example, the social representation of AIDS (Marková and Wilkie, 1987) is just as powerful and influential in terms of its related social interactions as objects in the physical environment. Finally, in that social representations are shared and strengthened by tradition they constitute a social reality 'sui generis'.

Social representations are 'systems' of preconceptions, images and values which have their own cultural meaning and persist independently of individual experience. (Moscovici, 1982, p. 122)

Social representations are therefore social in origin and refer to social objects; they constitute a reality which consists of an environment of thought as opposed to a world of objects. Thus reality is social through and through; we live in a thinking society and a social reality. >3<

1.2.2 The symbolic nature of social representations

The significance of adopting the term 'symbolic' in preference to 'cognitive' when referring to systems of social representations further emphasizes the social nature of representations. Cognitive theories attempt to subsume the symbolic but the focus of analysis remains on the individual. Fundamental to the symbolic are the common meanings invested in verbal and non-verbal gestures as these are understood by members of a community. The symbolic cannot, therefore, be assimilated to the cognitive (Moscovici, 1982, p. 143, footnote). Furthermore, their symbolic character not only distinguishes
the social from the individual, but also the cultural from
the physical and the historical from the static. The symbolic
is supported and made possible by social norms and rules and
by a common history. It refers to the social significance of
socially constructed objects. An object is not perceived
veridically, nor are events conceived as signs. Rather the
object is both perceived and conceived in terms of a symbolic
reality. The 'stimulus' and 'response' are links in a chain
of symbols which express a code and a system of values. The
distinction between image and reality is thus obliterated.
This symbolic character of social representations emerges in
the process of social interaction and communication and is
predominantly influenced by language. It is here that the
cultural aspects of social representations are most obvious.
And it is here that the emphasis on meaning and understanding
are most apparent (Jodelet, 1986).

For Moscovici, a representation has two facets: the
iconic and the symbolic. They lie somewhere between a percept
and a concept. Percepts 'reproduce the world in a meaningful
way' in terms of images while concepts 'abstract meaning from
the world' (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 17). Thus social
representations are a mixture of conceptual and perceptual
elements, of conceptions, images and perceptions.

An acknowledgement of the symbolic nature of social
representations with all its concomitants - social,
historical and cultural - implies that, as long as we are
studying common sense and everyday thought, it is not
possible to distinguish the form of representations from
their content. Contents make up the substance of our thoughts
and communications and the processes of perceiving and
learning cannot be separated from what is perceived or learnt
within a common culture;

the content not only offers a key to the concretely
activated formal elements but... these formal
elements can exert their influence only through this
social content.

(Moscovici, 1984a, p. 947)

The content will vary between social groups, cultures and
historical epochs and it is not possible to separate the
regularities in representations from the processes that create them (Jodelet, 1984a).

1.2.3 The logic of social representations

Once it is accepted that social representations have a logic of their own, then any system of logic is specific to its cultural context. It cannot be assumed that thought processes are general and invariant, that is, universal. Rather, as the content of a representation differs across cultures or changes over time, within the one culture, so does its form. The form and content of thinking are closely related to the form and content of communications, to discussion and agreements between people which are embedded in a cultural context. The manner of thinking, as well as what we think, depends on the cultural context.

The classic example of this is the law of non-contradiction which is central to western logic yet of only peripheral importance in other cultures. In Western culture we tend to accept the law of non-contradiction as a universal principle of reasoning and of logic which is independent of time and space. It is reflected in the elaboration, structuring and expression of our social representations such that their contents comprise a unified and coherent system. But its influence does not arise from the formal processes of thinking; rather its influence derives from social and cultural factors which are specific to Western society. This is amply demonstrated by anthropological studies of non-western cultures in which the law of non-contradiction is not predominant. For example, Levy-Bruhl's (1923) study of the Nuer revealed that twins are conceived as birds, but at the same time they are not birds. Similarly, Mary Douglas's (1975) essays on implicit meanings in Lele culture and Evans-Pritchard's work on Nuer religion (1940) and Azande witchcraft (1937) illustrate the affinity between culture and knowledge.

A comparable example that is more relevant in the present context refers to the content and form of cognitive and cognitive social psychology. Cognitive psychologists, for example Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) have studied extensively the errors and biases in reasoning and problem
solving by adopting a normative model, based on the logic and rationality of science. Similarly, attribution theorists such as Kelley (1963) have frequently applied a scientific, statistical model (ANOVA - analysis of variance) to investigate the way in which people make causal attributions. But, according to Moscovici, it is inappropriate and misleading to apply the positivistic, scientific rules of thought to social, consensual knowledge, as the logic or form underlying these different contents are also different. The 'psychological laws' are related to the contents of the social representations and hence, to their cultural and historical context.

Thus, social representations form an environment of thought that constitutes a social and symbolic reality constructed by the activity of individuals and groups within a cultural and historical context. With this in mind, it is possible to understand the conventional and prescriptive nature of social representations.

1.2.4 The conventional and prescriptive nature of social representations

Firstly, social representations 'conventionalize the objects, persons and events we encounter' (Moscovici, 1984b, p.7). They act on any previously established social object, or any new object entering into our awareness, constraining them so that they 'fit' into the categories and systems of relationships that we already possess (Moscovici, 1961). Thus, any object is understood in terms of a symbolic system, which is conditioned by our social representations and hence by our culture. Furthermore, we cannot escape from these conventions of perception and conception.

Nobody's mind is free from the effects of the prior conditioning which is imposed by his representations, language and culture.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.8)

Secondly, social representations are prescriptive; 'they impose themselves upon us with an irresistible force' (Moscovici, 1984b, p.8). We experience and understand the present only in terms of the past, in terms of tradition and culture. Our past experiences are active in the experience of
the present. In many respects the past prevails over the present (Jodelet, 1986; Milgram, 1984; Marková and Wilkie, 1987).

Social representations are thus fundamentally historical in nature. All the systems of perception and conception, of description and understanding, which circulate within a society, are linked to previous systems and they are reproduced by the continuity of human cultural and social life, and by the language and actions by which they are expressed.

1.2.5 The dynamic nature of social representations

As social representations circulate and diffuse throughout society their dynamic and plastic character becomes apparent. Not only do they communicate between themselves, but as they circulate and diffuse through society they merge, attract and repel each other, influencing the form and content of each other, changing in harmony with the course of social life. As new representations emerge old ones are transformed or disappear, as do their concomitant social objects and relations. Our understanding, our perception and the meanings we give events, are continually reconstituted and reconstructed.

Thus, social representations are an integral part of the social construction of reality. They are at once determined by and determine the social processes of communication and interaction. They are at once conventional, prescriptive and dynamic, evolving and, hence, transforming our reality. They are an essentially historical, cultural and social phenomena.

1.3 THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

The functions of social representations, inevitably, have been indicated in the previous section. However, being an important aspect of the theory, it is pertinent to give them further consideration.

1.3.1 We have already seen how social representations construct and shape reality, determining the meaning or significance of social objects and events. Social representations thus constitute our reality which is fundamentally symbolic and meaningful. As such, they allow
objects and events to be interpreted and understood. An event or object is understood in relation to the whole, i.e. to its context, as defined by the social representations. Their description, classification and explanations are all dependent on the social representation which embodies them. Social representations contain and define the experience of reality, determining its boundaries, its significance and its relationships.

In this way reality is both continuous and stable. The ambiguity and diversity of life is reduced and the meanings of actions are made unequivocal. Social representations achieve this by indicating where to find the effects and how to choose the causes; by indicating what must be explained and what constitutes an explanation; and by setting an event in the context of a system of relations to other events. Thus they establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it.

(Moscovici, 1973, p.xiii)

1.3.2 Social representations enable communication and social interaction to take place. It is only through shared social representations and the conventional meanings of language and action that individuals and groups can communicate with each other. The social representations provide a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.

(Moscovici, 1973, p.xiii)

The conventional meanings and contents of communications are obviously closely associated with language, which provides the medium for verbal communication.

Similarly, social representations form the environment in which we interact with each other. They imbue our gestures with meaning and hence facilitate the 'interpretation' of human actions. When individuals or groups share the same representations, actions are understood in the same way. The action has the same significance or meaning for both the actor and the perceiver, giving rise to an exchange of gestures which is coordinated. Thus the representation both
guides the social action of an individual or group and allows the actions of others to be understood. However, where representations are not shared, for example, between the members of two different cultures, the misinterpretation of actions is likely to prevail.

It should be noted that the term 'interpretation', as used here, does not imply a two-stage process, first receiving information or perceiving the action, and then giving it a meaning. Interpretation is immediate. The action is perceived as meaningful and significant. The action is a significant gesture and cannot be understood in any other way. This is necessarily so as the social representation constitutes our reality.

We can see that there is a two-way influence between social representations and both communication and social interaction. On the one hand social representations originate in communication and social interaction. They evolve in order to support the purposes and interests of individuals and groups, orientated towards communication, understanding and control. Moscovici has actually defined social representations as

the elaborating of a social object by the community
for the purpose of behaving and communicating.
(Moscovici, 1963, from Breakwell, 1987, p.4)

On the other hand social representations form the environment in which communication and interaction occur. Once the historical and dynamic nature of social life is acknowledged it is essential to recognize and to understand this two way process.

1.3.3 Having explained the relationship between social representations and both communication and social interaction, it can be seen that social representations also function in the demarcation and consolidation of groups (Di Giacomo, 1980; Doise, 1984). Representations which are shared by a number of associated individuals provide a stock of images and ideas which are taken for granted and mutually accepted. The shared meanings of objects and events provide a consensual environment of thought for communication and
social interaction. They serve to consolidate and to maintain the group, as well as to provide an identity for the group members. Furthermore, it is through our shared reality that we form binding relations with others. The consensual representation of social objects draws the individual into the cultural traditions of the group. As Jodelet (1984b, p.372) has expressed, social representations are rooted 'in the life of groups'.

1.3.4 The role of social representations in relation to groups entails a further function of social representations; the formation of social identities. Social representations form the environment in which we perceive, communicate and interact. Our gestures and actions are guided by, and are only meaningful in terms of, social representations. Our representations shape our relations with others and so structure the situation that it conforms to our expectations. Our behaviour is constrained and directed by the classifications and social representations employed by others and by ourselves. The situation is thus created and constructed in accordance with our representations. In that our identities are drawn from our relations with others the influence of social representations is apparent. Our identities are social, not only because they are active in our relations with others, but also because they originate in our relations with others (Duveen and Lloyd, 1987).

1.3.5 Social representations are important in regard to socialisation. Infants interact with their parents who, themselves, embody the social representations derived from their early and adult experiences, from their conversations, and their social interactions. The parents interact with the infant in terms of these social representations, indicating the symbolic significance of the infants' various behaviours. Thus it is the meanings or symbolic significance of behaviours which are internalised by the infant. They become an integral part of the individual and of their interactions with others (Duveen and Lloyd, 1987). Communications, through various forms of social interaction, and the meanings which they express, are inter-personal before they are internalized to become intra-personal. The individual is absorbed into
society and into the collective environment of thoughts. This applies to the socialisation of an individual or of a group moving into a new environment as much as to the socialization of infants.

Every member of a group, by birth or otherwise, has the group's representation impressed on him or her. In this way representations infiltrate to the core of the individual's personality.

(Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p.118)

1.3.6 I have left until last what Moscovici sees as the most important function of social representations; that is, to make the unfamiliar familiar.

the purpose of all representations is to make something unfamiliar or unfamiliarity itself, familiar.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.24)

We have seen how social representations order and stabilise our social reality and how communication and social interactions are directed and understood through them. Objects, individuals and events are perceived and understood in relation to our social representations. This is as true for those events with which we are familiar as it is for those events which seem strange (Jodelet, 1986).

Moscovici characterises the unfamiliar as that which is threatening due to its discontinuity with the past and its meaninglessness in terms of our current representations. This would occur, for example, when conventions disappear, when distinctions between the abstract and the concrete become blurred, or when an atypical behaviour prevents a normal continuation of social interaction. That is, something is unfamiliar when it does not conform to our expectations, resulting in a sense of incompleteness or randomness. This may occur when we enter a new culture or group, or when we are presented with a new object, event or concept. Moscovici suggests that the unfamiliar is disturbing because it is at once there without being there; perceived without being perceived.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.25) >9<
We are aware of unfamiliar objects, events or concepts, only in as far as they are visible, similar and accessible but they are unfamiliar to the degree in which they are invisible, different and inaccessible. What is unfamiliar worries, threatens and preoccupies us as it breaks our sense of continuity and stability and it also acts as a barrier to mutual understanding.>

Representation, or, in this case, re-presentation, transfers that which is unfamiliar to the familiar. This is achieved by separating normally linked concepts and perceptions and setting them in a context where the unusual becomes usual. (Moscovici, 1984b, p.26)

The example used by Moscovici is drawn from his study of psychoanalysis in France (1961). Within the social representation of medicine and of medical treatment the psychoanalyst does not fulfil our expectations and is thus unfamiliar. He or she does not prescribe drugs or tell us what to do, as would an "ordinary" doctor. Rather, the client is expected to do most of the talking and to take an active part in the therapeutic treatment. As such the psychoanalyst is unfamiliar. However, some people, such as Catholics, compared psychoanalysis to the confessional and the psychoanalyst to the priest. In this way, the psychoanalyst is made usual and familiar. The unfamiliar becomes meaningful and significant in our social reality and in our relations with others.

Moreover, what is central to the dynamics of social representations is that, as the unfamiliar is absorbed into the social representations, it alters the structure of the relationships and the content of that representation. So that, for example, confession becomes a form of psychoanalysis. The social significance of confession is thus altered and merged with that of psychoanalysis, simultaneously affecting associated values and feelings.

The receiving representation will be one that is shared by a given group, with its common stock of images, ideas and language. It is the representation into which the unfamiliar
is assimilated, due to some initial association. The content of the receiving representation determines the direction and the means by which the group comes to terms with the unfamiliar. This occurs through the processes of social interaction and communication, that is, the unfamiliar becomes familiar through its use in conversation, and eventually in social interaction, between members of the group. In this way its relation to the receiving social representation become defined and stabilised and thus it becomes part of our social reality.

To summarise, social representations both structure and order our reality, giving it meaning and coherence. They form the environment in which we communicate and coordinate social interaction. Hence they are fundamental to the identity and functioning of groups, to the development and maintenance of our social identities and they are central to the processes of socialisation. Moreover, they allow the unfamiliar to become familiar, for new objects and events to be integrated into our social realities.

1.4 THE PROCESSES OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

Moscovici describes two processes by which the unfamiliar become familiar. These are anchoring and objectification. Both processes will be described in detail but by way of introduction it can be said that anchoring situates strange objects in the context of ordinary categories and images, that is, into a familiar context. Objectification, on the other hand, transforms unfamiliar and abstract ideas into something concrete, ie. a concept is transformed into a social object. Anchoring makes the unfamiliar object meaningful and objectification makes the intangible into something real and tangible. Both these processes are closely linked to memory and to cultural knowledge and this necessitates the inclusion of the historical aspect of social representations.

1.4.1 Anchoring

Within the theory of social representations the process of anchoring is essential. Firstly, all meaningful perceptions and ideas are necessarily anchored in a social representation.
It excludes the idea of thought or perception which is without anchor. Every system of classification and of the relations between systems presupposes a specific position, a point of view based on consensus.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.36)

This is another way of saying that social representations constitute our reality. We can have no perception or idea which is not anchored in a social representation.

Secondly, anchoring gives an object meaning, allows events to be interpreted and understood in terms of what is already familiar. Thus the unfamiliar is re-presented and made familiar, at once transforming the newly integrated object and the pattern of relations into which it is assimilated.

In this way, pre-existing representations are somewhat modified and those things about to be re-presented are modified even more, so that they acquire a new existence.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.67)

The process of anchoring involves two inextricably linked subprocesses: classification and naming. Those objects for which there is neither a category nor a name, although we have an awareness of them, remain meaningless and incommunicable. It cannot be described, either to ourselves or to others, nor can it be evaluated or judged. It is, therefore, unable to enter into our discourse or to play any significant part in our interactions. In such respects it is not part of our social reality.

Indeed, that which is anonymous, unnamable, cannot become a communicable image or be readily linked to other images.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.34)

In so far as our representations are shared the individual's awareness of the unfamiliar will also be shared. Only once the unfamiliar is classified and named does it gain meaning and value and enter into the realm of our social relations.

Classification involves comparing the unfamiliar object to prototypes that represent a given class and the former is defined by its similarity to the latter. Once it is classified those features which coincide with the prototypes are emphasized. The process of anchoring, of making the
unfamiliar familiar thus gives precedence to memory, to the features of a prototype held within a social representation. It is the social representation, rather than the object itself, which is predominant. The response is thus prior to the stimulus; we do not cognise the object, rather we recognise it. In this way classifying something simultaneously constrains it. The classification stipulates which sets of behaviour and rules of action are permissible in relation to other members of the class. By classifying an individual, for example,

we confine him to a set of linguistic, spatial and behavioural constraints and to certain habits.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 31)

And, in so far as an object is reactive, the classification which has been employed will influence it by specifying certain demands that relate to our expectations. In this way the unfamiliar object itself may actually become more familiar.

Classification occurs in one of two ways, either by particularisation or by generalisation. If we wish to emphasise the similarity or the typicality of the objects we will generalise and reduce the differences between the unfamiliar object and the prototype. If we wish to emphasise the difference or the abnormality we will particularise the characteristics of the unfamiliar object. In this way a value, opinion or social attitude is always involved, such that we define the unfamiliar object as either convergent with or divergent from the norm or prototype within which the object is classified. Thus it is the social representation involved in the classification and the value which is attributed to the unfamiliar object, rather than the similarities and differences per se, that are influential.

To categorise someone or something amounts to choosing a paradigm from those stored in memory and establishing a positive or negative relation with it

(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 31)

Once classified, the object is subsequently named. Naming places the classified object in a complex system of
related words; it is given an identity in as far as a consensus is established, which is communicable. Naming, giving an object a verbal label 'precipitates' the object such that there are three consequences. Firstly, once named, the object can be described and acquires characteristics in accordance with the relations the name has with other words. Secondly, the named object becomes distinct from other objects through its designated characteristics and tendencies. Thirdly, the object becomes conventional for those who adopt and employ the same name. In this way language structures the relations designated to an object. Naming not only provides a label by which the object can be tagged but also defines its set of relations with other objects and events in accordance with the relation the name has with other linguistic categories.

By classifying and naming objects within the context of prevalent social representations the unfamiliar becomes familiar, its identification specifying its characteristics and its relations to other objects >11<.  

1.4.2 Objectification

The second process by which the unfamiliar is made familiar is through objectification. By objectification the unfamiliar and unperceived in one generation becomes familiar and obvious in the next.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.37)

Abstract conceptions are transformed into and replaced by concrete images or perceptions >12<. We assume that words expressing a concept do not refer to nothing. In the words of Moscovici, we are 'under a constant compulsion' to give them equivalent concrete meanings, to refer them to specific objects. Also, we imagine and create non-verbal equivalents for the concepts. However, not all concepts can be objectified. There are limits to our imagination, constrained as it is by the social representations that we already possess, and the taboos these entail. Only those concepts which can merge with a complex of images or the 'figurative nucleus' of a social representation, can be objectified.
Furthermore, the process of objectification is particular to modern societies with a scientific culture. In such societies, where science constitutes a major authority, we have come to think and represent things in terms of quantifiable, measurable objects. Representations of abstract concepts are transformed into representations of an object. For example, the concept of psychoanalysis, such as the unconscious and the conscious are merged with our social representations of the body. The processes of the mind are transformed into the organs of the psychic system. In this way, the psychological is merged and assimilated into the biological and the concepts of the unconscious and the conscious are transformed into objects. Thus attributes or relationships are turned into things. This process is also evidenced in the transformations of language, by which they are expressed. Verbs, adverbs and adjectives, which refer to relationships or processes are transformed into nouns. What was once a concept is transformed into an object.

It is essential to realise that objectification is an active process. By objectifying a process, relationship or concept we create objects and invest them with certain properties.

Objectification saturates the idea of unfamiliarity with reality, turns it into the very essence of reality.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.38)

Once transfiguration from a concept to an image has taken place, the image is indistinguishable from reality. It no longer has the status of a sign but becomes a part of our symbolic reality. It acquires an almost physical, independent existence which is perceived as having efficacy, something which can cause effects. Thus, by the process of objectification we create social objects and we objectify abstract concepts precisely in order to forget that they are a product of our own activity. We perceive our own creations but, rather than being a product of our imagination, the object becomes something in reality. For example, returning to the transformation of language and the tendency to turn verbs into nouns we can see that words...
do not merely represent things, but create them and invest them with their own properties.  
(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 42)

Several points can be made with respect to the relationship between the processes and the nature of social representations. It can be seen that anchoring and objectification entail the historical and prescriptive nature of representations. They are historical in that what is unfamiliar is anchored and objectified in terms of what is already familiar. They are prescriptive in that they constrain those characteristics of the unfamiliar which are identifiable, meaningful and employed in social interaction. They are also conventional in that individuals share representations which are taken as givens and are mutually accepted.

Furthermore, they entail the social aspects of the nature of social representations. Anchoring and objectification are the processes by which the unfamiliar is transformed into the familiar, by which social representations are generated and by which reality is socially constructed. After all, that reality is a social construction and that social psychology must take account of the active, meaning-constructing nature of humans is the major thesis of the theory of social representations. These processes do not take place in the minds of individuals; representations are not the creations of individuals in isolation. Rather, as we have said before, individuals and groups create representations, through the processes of anchoring and objectification, in the course of communication and social interaction. It is through these social processes that we establish our physical and social reality.

Thinking is done out loud. It becomes a noisy, public activity.  
(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 21)

Finally, the very process of transforming the unfamiliar into the familiar underscores the dynamic nature of social representations. New concepts and objects are assimilated into our social representations, simultaneously transforming both the structure and the content of the social
In conclusion, the nature and functions of social representations support and are supported by the processes of anchoring and objectification. Taken as a whole, Moscovici has not only established the phenomenon of social representations as an object of study in psychology, but he has also elaborated the outlines for a theory of social representations. Concern extends beyond the description of a phenomenon to an investigation of its functions in social life and the processes by which it is generated and sustained. The theory addresses both the description and the explanation of the psycho-sociology of knowledge.

1.5 THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

Although I have suggested that the theory of social representations constitutes a psycho-sociology of knowledge, Moscovici sets a number of boundary conditions to its realm of application. The theory of social representations is explicitly designed to account for the diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense understandings which are prevalent in modern society. The demarcation of these boundaries involves three related issues: the distinction between the reified and the consensual universes, the relationship between science and common-sense and the differing styles of explanation employed in each universe. It will be seen that the reified universe of science and the consensual universe of common-sense are characterized by distinctive forms of understanding. This distinction underlies Moscovici's break with conventional social psychology which has inappropriately applied scientific thinking in an attempt to describe and to explain everyday understanding. The theory of social representations provides an alternative approach which accounts for the cultural and historical nature of social knowledge.

1.5.1 The reified universe

In the reified universe the world is transformed into a system of solid, basic, unvarying entities, which are indifferent to individuality and lack identity (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 20). That is, the world consists of discrete objects, such as persons, ideas and events,
independent of individuals' interpretations. The environment is indifferent and autonomous from us, independent of human collective life. The reified universe is thus a system of independent entities devoid of human meaning. In these respects, mind is no more than a reaction to reality and the objects of the world shape our thought. Within this universe we are bounded by a pre-established organisation which is generally accepted, along with its rules and regulations. Within the organisation individuals are unequal, constrained by their prescriptive rights and duties.

In the reified universe ambiguities are overcome by processing information. This is done without the involvement of individuals and is directed by the organisational structure. Thinking within this universe is rational and reflective. The precise and objective collection of data leads to the negation or confirmation of the conclusions which have been derived through logical reasoning. This results in a precise and totally unambiguous universe of facts, which are valid for all people, in all places and at all times.

Within the reified universe the aim is to establish a chart of the forces, objects and events which are independent of our desires and outside of our awareness and to which we must react impartially and submissively.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.22)

By rational thinking and the information processing of objective data, values are concealed and the creation of the reified universe is ignored. By these means the reified universe is one of rigour, predictability and control.

1.5.2 The consensual universe

By contrast, in the consensual universe, society is a visible, continuous creation, permeated with meaning and purpose

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.20).

The consensual universe is a source of meaning and the exchanges and interactions within it are purposive. Humans are an integral part of this universe. Mind shapes reality and acts upon it. It is bounded by agreements and
consensus characterised by reciprocal understanding. The world consists of social objects; these emerge in conversation and result in a consensual symbolic understanding of objects and events. Within this universe individuals are equal and free to acquire any competence required by the circumstances. The world is ambiguous and remains so, yet, through conversation, conventions and mutual acceptance are established. These are first and foremost influenced by prior beliefs or theories and the interests and purposes of the group. The consensual universe restores collective awareness and gives it shape, explaining objects and events so that they become accessible to everyone and coincide with our immediate interests.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 22)

It provides a universe in which we can converse, interact, understand and explain.

1.5.3 Science and social representations

It is probably obvious, by now, that the reified universe is that of science and the consensual universe is that of social representations. The former only exists in professional and disciplined spheres and is reflective and precise. The latter is associated with everyday life and is both spontaneous and creative. It is the outcome of our communications and is adapted to our social interactions. It both emerges out of and sustains these communications and actions.

The world of science is dominated by the use of concepts and signs. Its validity lies in empirical observation of discrete entities which function under a set of rules, independent of society and individuals.

The legalistic truth of science, ...keeps asking for proof and, replications and... has more confidence in rules than in people.

(Moscovici, 1987, p. 518) >13<

The world of social representations, on the other hand, is a conventional system of symbolic and meaningful objects and events and is based on consensual validity.
as long as they are shared and circulate, social representations have a fiduciary truth value which manifests itself in terms both of information content and of judgements.

(Moscovici, 1987, p. 518)

These two universes, the reified and the consensual, the world of science and the world of common sense, form two distinct types of reality, each with its own logic, limits and attributes (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983). They have different forms of thinking and a different knowledge of the world which require different modes of examination.

1.5.4 Causality and explanation

It has already been said that the reified and consensual universes have their own distinctive logic. This is most clearly seen in the forms of causality associated with each universe and which give rise to such different forms of explanation. In the reified universe the effect is explained retrospectively by attributing a cause. This I shall term 'scientific causality'. This is achieved by objective collection of data concerning the behaviour of independent entities which are found to co-vary. The direction of causality is determined by the sequence of events: that is the cause always precedes the effect. In order to establish causality certain rules must be followed. These include non-involvement by observers, repetition of correlations and independence from authority and tradition. By keeping to these rules the data may be collected and processed impartially so that specific effects can be associated with specific causes. Scientific causality is, in this way, divested of the intentionality and responsibility associated with conversation, social interactions and other phenomena of the social world. It provides an objective causal analysis of events in the world, independent of social, cultural and historical phenomena.

The causality associated with the consensual universe is more complex, and exists in two forms. These Moscovici has termed primary causality, which infers causes, and secondary causality, which attributes causes. Both however are dependent on our social representations and hence the social, cultural and historical context in which they are
made. For this reason, I shall refer to these as 'social causality'. Secondary causality is very similar to scientific causality in that effects are explained retrospectively by attributing a cause. However, it is an efficient causality dependent on our education, language and scientific view. For primary causality the situation is rather different. In order to explain the sequence of events we infer the intentions or the purposes of others. Intentions give rise to certain behaviours which are the means to an end. In this way primary causality is prospective or teleological.

Both forms of social causality are foremostly dependent on our social representations. We perceive the events and designate effects and causes in accordance with our social representations. Any explanation depends primarily on the ideas we have of reality which, in turn, is constituted by our social representations, not only by determining when an explanation is required but also the form and the content of that explanation. It is our social representations which indicate where to find the effects and where to choose the causes; what must be explained and what explains

(Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p.11)

1.5.5 Social representations in modern society

Social representations 'are those of our current society' (Moscovici, 1984b, p.18); for Moscovici they are a 'specifically modern social phenomenon' (Moscovici, 1984a, p.952-3). Modern society is characterized by a heterogeneity of institutions, religions, ideologies, sub-cultures etc. and an astounding proliferation of original conceptual systems and images, through the development of the sciences. These are disseminated throughout society by various and increasingly efficient means of communication including the mass media, popular books, popular discourse, films, television etc. The heterogeneity of society, the development of new understanding and the means of communication which characterize our modern society, give rise to peculiarly dynamic systems of knowledge; that is, to social representations. Moscovici, (1982, 1984b) even suggests that modern society may be remembered as the 'era of
representations'. This can be contrasted to the more static systems of knowledge, found in primitive societies which are characterized by their stability and homogeneity. In such societies the systems of knowledge are coercive and immutable, they not only determine reality but also maintain a stable, unchanging reality. The phenomenon of social representations is thus a particular mode of understanding and communicating which only emerges in modern society. It has taken the place of the 'myths' and so-called 'common-sense' of more traditional societies (Moscovici, 1984a).

Moscovici conceives social psychology as an anthropology of modern culture, a science devoted to the study of thoughts and beliefs in the society of our times (Moscovici, 1987). There are many important components of culture which were identified in the formative years of psychology. Wundt identified these as language, religion, customs, myths, magic and cognate phenomena in his Voelker psychologie (1900-20). These cultural phenomena were also emphasized by Durkheim when he developed the notion of collective representations. Farr (1987b) recognizes the original contribution Moscovici has made by including "science" as one of the most influential cultural phenomena in modern times.

This forms a point of departure for the theory of social representations which is specifically concerned with the relationship between scientific knowledge and common-sense understanding. Whereas Durkheim was concerned with a full range of 'mental formations', practices of thought with their own rules taught by a certain discipline and communicated by a specific media (Moscovici, 1987), Moscovici is only concerned with those 'mental formations' which are associated with the diffusion of science into the wider society. The reason for this focus becomes apparent by examining the changing relationship between science and common sense, as conceived by Moscovici (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983; Moscovici, 1984b).

In the past, it can be argued that the dominant direction of influence was from common sense to science. Common sense comprised the images, mental connections and
metaphors which were used to talk about and to understand events in everyday life. It was a corpus of knowledge which arose spontaneously in the course of ordinary communication and action, constituting the shared traditions which are stored in the language of a society and in the minds of its members. This consensual knowledge provided the materials which the sciences refined, distilling out contradictions and ordering common sense into coherent systems.

However, with the proliferation of the sciences, and the construction of reified universes, this is no longer the dominant direction of influence. The sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, etc. as well as the human sciences such as sociology, anthropology, psychology and economics, continually produce new theories, information and events within the reified universe. They provide a stream of new information which directly contradicts and upsets the consensual universe or opens up new spheres of knowledge which neither correspond to nor link up with present social representations.

the function of present-day science is not to start from common sense, but to break with it and upset it totally. 

(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 28)

The products of science then diffuse into society destroying traditional ideas and understandings. The acquisition of scientific knowledge is motivated by 'a desire to consume, digest and share science', by a curiosity about how things work, the need to give meaning to one's life and to attain a competence equal to that of society. The unfamiliar products of science, its theories, abstract concepts, inventions and discoveries diffuse into society through communication channels which characterize modern society. The mass media, newspapers, specialist magazines, and programmes on television flood the consensual universe with the products of science. The revolution in communications has allowed the diffusion of images, notions and vocabularies created by the sciences.

However, this alone is not sufficient for the dissemination of scientific knowledge through society.
People's common-sense understanding of scientific theories and concepts is distinct from scientific knowledge in the reified universe. As the abstract concepts of science diffuse into society they are transformed into social objects, involved with meaning and symbolic significance. This is achieved, as described, by the process of anchoring and objectification, without which the reified universe remains, to some extent, unreal and meaningless. As these transformations occur the scientific concepts become detached from their origin in the reified universe and from the methods of proof that prevail in that universe. This work is largely done by those who specialize in spreading scientific knowledge, transforming the unfamiliar into the familiar, such that the lay men and lay women, who, as amateur scientists (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983), may consume and digest the fruits of science.

In this way, links are forged between the purely abstract sciences and the concrete activities of daily life. The lay person, as an amateur scientist, possesses a new common sense, one which has been re-constituted and filled with images and meanings. This new common-sense constitutes a mode of understanding and communicating which has transformed the scientific theories into a shared reality. They fill our minds and conversations, determining our world view and our interactions with the physical and social environment.

Common sense is now 'science made common' (Moscovici, 1984b, p.29).

As a consequence, our ideologies, on a grand scale, and our so-called common sense, on a lesser scale, are full of ideas, images, words and rules drawn from the fields of physics, medicine, psychology, economics and so on.

(Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p.101)

The transformation of scientific knowledge is a fundamental aspect of today's common sense and the theory of social representations is exclusively concerned with the origins and development of its contents, the associated forms of communication and its influence on everyday life >14<.
From the inception, the notion of social representations was conceived in order to study how
the game of science becomes part of the game of common sense.

(Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p.101)

Thus the purpose of social representations is in direct
opposition to science. Whereas science aims to make the
familiar unfamiliar social representation re-presents the
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. This results in an ever
changing, dynamic consensual universe as social
representations are transformed and reconstituted through
the anchoring and objectification of scientific information.

Social representations refer to the ideas and images
originating in the sciences and transformed into the
consensual universe. These include social representations of
the universe, the human body, (Jodelet, 1984a), health and
illness (Herzlich, 1973), economic activities (Emler and
Dickenson, 1985) etc. which diffuse and circulate throughout
society and constitute our social reality. Perhaps the prime
example is Moscovici's original study on the diffusion of
psychoanalysis in French society (1961). This investigated
how a scientific theory is disseminated through society and
transformed into consensual understandings. Moscovici
describes how the abstract concepts of the scientific theory
such as neurosis or Oedipus complex are objectified and
employed in everyday understandings and interactions. He also
gives the examples of Charisma, the 'split brain' and the
double helix (Moscovici, 1984a), all of which have undergone
a similar metamorphosis, becoming an integral part of the
mental and social life within certain sections of society.

It can be seen that science generates social
representations; they produce the unfamiliar systems of
concepts and images, which provide the impetus for the
creation and transformation of social representations. Thus
social representations are a phenomenon peculiar to modern
society, consisting of those beliefs which originate in the
sciences and diffuse through society by particular forms of
communication.
1. 'Science' is used here in the broad sense to include the social sciences as well as the natural sciences. However, Moscovici's notion of the reified universe appears to apply to the natural sciences only. This confusion is discussed in 5.1.

2. In this respect, social representations are as 'coercive' in their nature as Durkheim's 'social facts'. Such a bold conjecture raises problems, both for the dynamic nature of social representations (see Section 4.1) and for the nature of the reified universe (see Chapter 6).

3. Although the notion of social reality clearly opposes a positive empiricist definition of reality, the definition of social reality remains unclear. This is elaborated in Section 4.2.

4. The symbolic nature of reality is expressed more clearly in the writings of Mead and Vygotsky. Section 4.2 draws on their work to illuminate this aspect of the theory of social representations.

5. These contentions reflect the debate between realism and relativism which is elaborated in Chapters 3 and 5.

6. I do not agree with the idea that social representations are autonomous, communicating between themselves independently from individuals. Their dynamic nature is dependent, not only on the social interactions between individuals but also the thoughts of individuals. For example, individuals such as Copernicus, Einstein and Darwin have been the instigators of some of the most dramatic changes in common-sense knowledge. The nature of the individual, and the role he or she plays in the dynamics of social representations, are discussed in Chapter 4.

7. Both communication and social interaction are rather nebulous terms within the theory of social representations. Furthermore, the two-way influence between the structure and content of social representations on the one hand and the role of communication and social interaction on the other is less than clearly explicated. I return to these issues at various points in the thesis.

8. The interdependence between social representations, social identities and groups is discussed in Chapter 11.

9. Such a statement epitomizes the problem of defining the unfamiliar within a theory which postulates that social representations constitute a consensual reality. Furthermore, the unfamiliar forms an essential component in the transformation of social representations. Chapter 4 deals with this problem at some length.

10. Although Moscovici suggests that it is the unfamiliar, per se, which is threatening, the familiar made unfamiliar can be equally disturbing. This is precisely the role that Moscovici allocates to science in modern society, transforming those things which are familiar within common-sense understandings into something unfamiliar.

11. Moscovici's notion of anchoring is very similar to the Piagetian mechanism of assimilation. However, it does not account for the accommodation of the receiving representation to the unfamiliar object or event. These ideas are developed in Chapter 4.

12. The meaning of objectify is very similar, if not identical, to reify. However, to adopt this term would be open to confusion with the 'reified' universe of science.

13. By employing the term 'legalistic truth' with reference to science, Moscovici poses more questions than he resolves. Presumably this choice is based on the fact that the legal system constitutes a formal set of rules. However, on closer inspection it would appear that this system of rules is more akin to the consensual universe. Firstly, the legal system provides guidelines and constraints for social action. Secondly, it consists of a consensus, which is based on precedents and which is founded in tradition. Furthermore, the distinction between the reified and consensual universe is not as precise as Moscovici suggests. This will be expanded upon in Chapter 5.

14. With respect to the nature and functions of social representations it is difficult to see how they can be particular to the diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense. These boundary conditions to the domain of social representations are challenged in Section 2.4 and Chapter 5.
CHAPTER TWO

TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

2.1 THE SEARCH FOR DEFINITION

2.2 REPRESENTATION

2.3 SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

2.3.1 Representations of social objects
2.3.2 Representations in interpersonal interactions
2.3.3 Representations which are shared
   2.3.3.1. Experimental studies
   2.3.3.2. Intergroup relations
   2.3.3.3. Causal attributions
   2.3.3.4. Criticisms
2.3.4 Representations, communication and social interaction
   2.3.4.1 The socialization of children
   2.3.4.2 Experimental studies
   2.3.4.3 Intergroup relations
   2.3.4.4 Field studies
   2.3.4.5 Summary

2.3.5 Representations and social reality

2.4 THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY REVISITED

2.4.1 The object of research
2.4.2 Innovation and traditions
2.4.3 Media of communication
2.4.4 Processes of transformation

2.5 NOT A CONCLUSION

2.1 THE SEARCH FOR DEFINITION

The previous chapter goes some way towards explicating the theory with regard to the nature, functions and processes of social representations and the domain to which they are applicable. The present chapter examines the diverse body of research on social representations and some of the related theoretical and methodological critiques, in order to develop a comprehensive, yet coherent, definition of social representations.
Social representation theorists have been accused of failing to provide an adequate definition of their central concept, that is, of social representations. For example, Potter and Litton (1985) have suggested that the lack of a precise definition and the concept's current state of vagueness has given rise to both theoretical and methodological problems. This is further developed by McKinlay and Potter (1987) who suggest that the problems associated with empirically identifying a social representation and testing the hypothetical mechanisms of anchoring and objectification are a direct result of this conceptual vagueness. Similarly, Eiser (1986) and McGuire (1986) claim that the absence of a precise definition constitutes a major failing in the theory which precludes any substantial progress.

Moscovici, on a number of occasions, (1983, 1984a, 1985b, 1987) has argued that the 'vagueness' of social representations is a virtue and that it arises by design. He suggests that precise definitions would be premature and are a requirement of predictive theories, concerning isolated mechanisms and the testing of hypotheses by the use of limiting experimental procedures. 'We should reject easy definitions as vigorously as misleading precision' (Moscovici, 1987, p. 515). In contrast, social psychologists should

try to build some descriptive and explicative theories that have a wider range and deeper grasp of phenomena

(Moscovici, 1985b, p. 91).

He further suggests that this can be achieved only by careful observation and description of social representations and by a comparative study of such descriptions. This would provide the data and act as a sound basis from which to build an adequate theory of social representations.

Clarity and definition will be an outcome of research instead of being a prerequisite

(Moscovici, 1985b, p. 91).

The structure and content of any particular social representation will only emerge in the course of empirical
research and will not be assisted by *a priori* definitions and operationalization. It is evident that, by adopting this strategy, Moscovici is concerned that social psychology should remain true to its subject matter as opposed to the scientific and methodological principles associated with the natural sciences. However, the problems associated with observation before theory leaves doubts, not that such a strategy is appropriate, but rather whether or not it is feasible. Any research involves philosophical assumptions and a theoretical framework even if these are not clearly explicated or developed.

The initial vagueness of the concept of social representations is a virtue, not only for the reasons suggested by Moscovici, but also because it has allowed a variety of researchers working in different fields and employing different methods to explore the usefulness and possible applications of social representations. This is not without its problems but it is not necessary or perhaps even possible for any one scientist to provide the definitive definition, even if that scientist is the proponent of a revolutionary new approach. Rather, the development of a theory, within which a central concept such as social representations finds its definition, is dependent on the community of scientists which take an interest in that theory. As Billig (1987a) argues in his rhetorical approach we progress as much through negation and conflict as through agreement and consensus. The process of research does not present us with unquestionable facts, but rather with the materials with which to develop arguments and agreements. Thus, in contrast to Moscovici, I would claim that it is not the results of research alone which will provide the foundation for the development of an adequate theory. Rather, and perhaps more importantly, it is the arguments and conflicts which arise from the broad range of research carried out on social representations, something which has been enhanced by avoiding a premature and necessarily restrictive definition. The theoretical and practical work contained within this thesis is a contribution to that debate.
I would go on to propose that there now exists a substantial body of research on social representations which provides the ground for theoretical clarification and more precise conceptual definition. This is not to suggest that the research has been free from theoretical preconceptions. On the contrary, as the theory has developed a number of specific fields of research and different perspectives have emerged. This is reflected, not only in the research, but also in the reviews and critiques pertaining to social representations. The issues addressed in these articles range from the identification of the phenomenon of social representations to the nature of reality and the proper subject matter of social psychology. Billig (1987b) and Breakwell (1987) state that conceptual clarification is required both to guide empirical research and to forge links with other social sciences and, hence, to fulfil the intellectual ambitions of social representation theorists. By examining some of these perspectives it is hoped to develop a coherent and consistent set of theoretical postulates which maintain the most important and novel aspects of the French tradition. This will clarify and, possibly, overcome some of the internal contradictions and confusions which still surround the theory.

One of the central debates concerns the social nature of social representations. This concern is reflected in theoretical papers, review articles, introductory comments to research articles and critiques of the theory. Moscovici has frequently criticized the individualistic perspective which persists in current social psychology. For him, and for many of his colleagues, the theory of social representations offers an opportunity to develop an explicitly social psychology. It is important, therefore, to establish what is social about social representations; what is added to the term "representations" when it is qualified by the adjective "social".

From the previous chapter it will be apparent that social representations are social in a number of different ways: they refer to social objects; they are shared by members of a group or they are characteristic of a particular
society; they originate in social interaction and communication; and they are social in function. Researchers from a wide variety of theoretical and methodological orientations have been attracted to the theory of social representations. However, there is no consensus regarding the meaning of social representations. It will be shown that the different perspectives adopted in research on and critiques of social representations emphasize different aspects of their social nature and reflect the specific field within which the research or critique is developed. This has given rise to a number of contrasting interpretations and developments.

By examining the ways in which social representations have been used in research, I hope to clarify different possible meanings of the term 'social'. It will be shown that research has characterized representations as being social in a number of different ways:

1. with reference to the object being represented;
2. to the social context in which representations arise;
3. to the fact that they are shared by a number of people;
4. to the generis and transmission of representations through social interaction and communication; and
5. to the social reality which representations form.

By examining this research and related critiques, it will be argued that the determination of 'social' in (1) and (2) remain on the individual level and fail to elucidate the distinctive features of social representations. (3) goes some way towards assessing the consensual nature of social representations. However, by focusing on the degree to which representations are shared, this research fails to consider their dynamic nature and, in the last analysis, can still be reduced to the level of individual representations. In contrast, (4) and (5) present characterizations which illuminate the non-individual nature of representations, including their social, cultural and historical features, and describe their symbolic, creative and autonomous aspects. An adequate definition of social representations must therefore emphasize the social nature of representations in the terms presented by the latter two bodies of research. Only then
will it become apparent that the theory of social representations provides an alternative perspective to the predominant approach in social psychology.

Finally, it will be shown that the domain in which research has been conducted extends well beyond the boundaries which have sometimes been advocated by Moscovici. The theory of social representations is not only applicable to the understanding of scientific theories in the consensual universe. Rather, it constitutes a social-psychology of knowledge which subsumes a broad ranging set of social phenomena.

2.2 REPRESENTATION

Before examining in what sense representations are social, it is necessary to establish what is meant by representation. It is first worth examining the meanings of 'representation' in common usage. These are expressed in definitions given in the Oxford Dictionary. This gives us three options:

1. 'To bring clearly before the mind, especially by description or imagination; describe as having specific character or quality'. This suggests that representation is an active process by which an image or description is brought to the mind of the individual, with specific reference to the character or quality of that which is being represented.

2. 'Display to the eye, make visible: exhibit by means of painting, sculpture, etc; reproduce in action or show, play'. By this definition representations lie, not in the mind of the individual, but in the objects or events presented to the 'eye' of the individual. An object or action reproduces or recreates something else which is being represented.

3. 'Symbolize, serve as embodiment of; serve as specimen or example of; stand for or in place of, denote by a substitute; take or fill the place of, by substitute for in some capacity; be accredited deputy for (a number of persons) in deliberative or legislative assembly'. In some respects this is similar to definition 2, in that something symbolizes something else. However, in this case it is not a matter of re-presenting another object or event.
but rather taking the place of something else. The clearest example is that of a Member of Parliament who represents or stands in place of his or her constituents.

'Representation' has also become a central concept in psychology, and, more specifically, in cognitive psychology. As this is likely to be the dominant way in which representation is understood within the Anglo-American community of psychologists, it is worth making explicit the use and meaning of 'representation' in the context of cognitive psychology. According to Gardner (1985) cognitive psychology attempts to provide an adequate description of the structure and mechanisms of representation. The representational entities include symbols, ideas, images, schemata etc. and these entities are joined, transformed or contrasted by various processes.

The centrality of the human mind and of mental representation has had a chequered history within psychology. Behaviourism had all but eradicated from psychology the description and explanation of the states and the contents of consciousness. Scientific research was to be limited to the observation of overt behaviour in terms of stimulus and response links. However a growing disillusionment with behaviourist psychology, which failed to fulfil its early ambitions, led to the re-emergence of mind or consciousness into psychological explanation. In order to understand the relationship between stimulus and response, especially with regard to individual differences, it was necessary to introduce some kind of mediator or intervening variable. Psychologists came to consider the representation of information within the mind as an essential issue in the understanding of human behaviour. During the behaviourist era of 1920-1940 mental representation had by no means completely disappeared as is evidenced by the concerns of the Gestalt psychologists, Bartlett's work on schemata and Piaget's research in developmental psychology and genetic epistemology. However, it was not until dissatisfaction with behaviourism became more widespread that 'mental representations' came to the fore. In the early work on mental representations research took a number of different
forms. Gardner (1985) gives us the examples of Miller who looked at the structural properties and limitations of the representational system; Broadbent and Cherry who focused on the transformation of information from the senses to memory; and Bruner who was largely concerned with subjects' strategies. More recent examples include the work of Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) on heuristics and Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) who developed the notion of mental models and also Tulving's (1972) research on semantic memory.

Today, although the need for positing a level of mental representations is accepted by most psychologists, the variety of approaches and foci of interest relating to the exploration of mental representations is even greater. Cognitive phenomena which are considered to require an explanation at the representational level range from visual perception to the comprehension of stories and includes the representation of common social situations. Consequently, there is a wide variety of different models of representation, both in terms of describing their processes and the representational entities. Contemporary information-processing approaches tend towards the analysis of small-scale units and elementary processes, using visual characteristics, such as colour and shape, and simple perceptual concepts, such as geometric figures, or concepts of animals, plants, physical objects, conservation of weight, volume etc. (Marková and Wilkie, 1987). There are two assumptions underlying this work. Firstly, a thorough understanding of these molecular units and processes will enable the explanation of more complex units and processes. This is often termed a bottom-up approach. Secondly, the processes of representation are the same irrespective of the specific content of the representations (Gardner, 1985).

There has been a reaction against both of these assumptions. Increasingly, psychologists have turned to the analysis of representations at a more molar level. Rather than talking about bits of information, individual percepts or single associations, regardless of their meaning or context of presentation, cognitive psychologists are
developing models of schemata, scripts, frames, and other inferential and organizing processes. This approach contrasts with the former in that it is top-down, taking into consideration meanings, expectations and contexts. At the same time, attention has been drawn to content-specific processes of mental representations. For example, the work of Shepard (1982) suggests that physical objects are represented in the form of images as opposed to language-like propositions and hence are subject to different operational constraints. This is supported by the work of Fodor (1983) and others which suggests that the form of representation is specific to modality; that is there are distinct mental representations for verbal, pictorial, musical, gestatory etc. contents. However, despite this variety in the description and analysis of representational entities and processes there is a common underlying notion of representation as an internal construct in the mind of an individual which stands in place of something else, (usually) existing externally to the individual which may, or may not, be immediately present. This is perhaps closest to definition 1 but covers the full range, from the iconic representation of a physical object to the symbolic representation of a concept, complex phenomenon or event.

Moscovici is well aware of the central place of 'representation' in the social sciences (1982, p.116). Indeed, this is one sense in which we have reached 'the era of representations'. Psychology is, once more, a science of the human mind. Psychologists no longer talk purely in terms of stimulus and response, exchanges of actions and of reactions, but refer to the psychological representation of information regarding those actions and reactions. However, Moscovici goes on to indicate that this reversion to the conscious mind in terms of representations does not constitute a (cognitive) revolution, but is limited, rather, to the accommodation of a behaviourist psychology to the current scientific context and to the impetus provided by anthropology, linguistics, child psychology and computer science. This reformation does not go far enough, for it fails to break with the individualistic paradigm predominant in psychology.
(Farr, 1987a). We may be led to ask if the theory of social representations constitutes the revolution that Moscovici proclaims, or if it is just a further adaptation of the old paradigm. The answer to this question is not immediately clear. By examining the meaning of representation, and in what way these representations are said to be social, we may have a better idea of the theory's status and of any revolutionary qualities that social representations may or may not offer.

The meaning of representation entailed in the theory of social representations is both similar to, and, in some important respects, different from, a cognitive understanding of representation. It might be considered that mental representations are fundamentally perceptual and indeed this is often the sense adopted in cognitive psychology. However, as Moscovici (1984b) and Jodelet (1984b) explicate, representations always have two facets 'which are as interdependent as the two facets of a sheet of paper: the iconic and the symbolic facets. We know that: Representation = image/meaning; in other words, that it equates every image to an idea, and every idea to an image'. Thus the percept or figurative aspect which reproduces the world in a meaningful way, and the concept, or symbolic aspect, which abstracts meaning from the world, cannot be separated. They are not conceived as two distinguishable elements of the genre of representation but they are considered as two aspects of the same representation. The concrete image and the symbolic meaning go hand-in-hand.

Harré (1984c, pp.928-9) suggests that the common practice of translating the French word 'representation' as representation does not adequately reflect the meaning as conveyed and employed in the French tradition of research on social representations. Whereas representation in English speaking countries infers a copy or 'simulcrum' of a concrete object the French tradition implies, at one and the same time, a physical likeness or iconic representation and the representation of a concept or idea. In this way, it is a construction of the represented object, real or imaginary. For these reasons, he suggests that a more adequate
translation of representation would be 'version'. In this sense a social representation is a version of the original object.

Jodelet (1984b) further contrasts the French meaning of representation with its conventional meaning. Representations are defined by their contents which refer to a specific object. A representation is always of something else, whether that object be 'real', mythical or imaginary. This representation can be in the mind of the individual. In this sense it can be considered equivalent to the meaning of representation in Anglo-American cognitive psychology. However, in the French tradition the contents of the representations are of paramount importance whereas in the latter, even where the specific type of content is considered influential, the focus lies on the processes of representation. In addition, that a representation is always of something else does not preclude the representation being outside the minds of individuals (eg. dictionary definition 2). For example, a painting is a representation of something else, but it is also an object in its own right. Thus the representation exists, in some sense, independently of that which is being represented. That this sense of representation is encompassed within social representations is evidenced by much of the field research carried out in France. Representations are not only found in the minds of individuals but also in the media, (Moscovici,1973), in books, films and recreational constructions (Chombart-de-Lauwe,1984), and in drawings (Milgram and Jodelet,1984), to give but a few examples. Representations are thus always of something and exist in their own right both as mental representations and as environmental representations. That a representation is an object existing in its own right is the sense implied by Moscovici when he refers to the 'phenomenon' of social representations. They are representations of something and, at the same time, are objects of study, in fact, the proper object of study for social psychology.

A further word needs to be said on the symbolic nature of representations. Representation is not the passive
reproduction or a mirror reflection of the object being represented. Rather representation has a signifying aspect, it is a sign or symbol for something else which may, or may not, be present (see dictionary definition 3). The representation not only stands in place of the object being represented, providing a substitute for that object, as a politician stands in place of his or her constituents, but can also add something that was previously absent as it is independent of that which is being represented, just as the politician, once elected, may act independently from his or her constituents.

The symbolic nature of representations entails two further aspects: the active and creative aspects. Firstly, representation is a conscious act of thought; it re-presents the object to the mind in the form of a sign or symbol. That it is an active process is reflected in dictionary definition 1, that it is symbolic, in dictionary definition 2. Contrary to some 'straw-man' versions of cognitive psychology the latter also entails an understanding of representation as an active process. However, the notion of representation within the theory of social representations also entails a creative aspect. The act of representation symbolically reconstructs another object and, in that it is a symbolic reconstruction as opposed to a simple reproduction, it is also creative.

the subject is not merely the theatre on whose stage are acted out plays that are independent of him and pre-determined by the laws of an automatic physical equilibrium - no, he is the actor, and often even the author of these structurings which he can alter as they develop.

(Piaget, from Jodelet 1984, p.364)

As representation is not only an active process but also a creative construction, representations are inextricably linked to and imply the construction of the real. With this in mind the emphasis on the origins and transformations of representations is more understandable. Representations are not static entities but dynamic, evolving structures. It is not the process of representation, as such, which is of interest, but rather the process of creating representations with reference both to their form and
content. This creative aspect of representation, I believe, lies at the heart of the theory of social representations. The theory is, in effect, a social-psychology of knowledge which takes as its critical problem the genesis and transformation of representations.

One further point requires emphasis. Representations, once created, are said to be autonomous. A picture, once painted, exists in its own right; a politician, once elected is independent of his or her constituents; a scientific theory, once published, becomes independent of the scientific discipline in which it was created. It is in terms of their independence and autonomy that Moscovici claims that representations 'appear to us almost as material objects ...'(1984b,p.12) and impress upon us with all the force of the material world.

Both these creative and autonomous aspects of representation are not conveyed either in the dictionary definitions or in the work of cognitive psychology (although they may be inherent). The cognitivist's understanding of representation is not contradictory to the French understanding , but rather, the former is entailed in the latter. However, it is the symbolic, creative and autonomous aspects of representations which are emphasized by the French school, and constitute much of what is innovative in the theory of social representations.

Summary:
1. Representations always have an image or iconic aspect and a meaning or symbolic aspect.
2. Representations should be considered phenomena in their own right as well as representations of something else.
3. Representations are symbolic.
4. In that representations are symbolic reconstructions they involve an active process of thought that is creative.
5. Representations, once created, are said to be autonomous.

2.3 SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

From the exposition of the theory of social representations (Chapter 1), it is clear that Moscovici and others are committed to developing a social perspective in social psychology. The previous section elaborates on the
ways in which the meaning of 'representation' entailed in the theory goes beyond traditional approaches in cognitive psychology as well as in cognitive social psychology. However, this is by no means a final statement as to the nature of the phenomenon and the substantive contents of the theory of social representations. In this section I shall examine the broad range of research projects which have employed the notion of social representations and critically examine the various meanings of 'social' which they entail.

2.3.1 Representations of social objects

We have already seen that a representation always refers to an object. The term 'social' as applied to representation may refer to the object that is being represented. In this case they would be individuals' representations of social objects whereby 'social' refers to the subject matter of the representation and not to the representation itself. This is the sense which has prevailed in the literature on social perception. Perception is seen as an individual's representation of a person or social event. Emler (1987) also argues that it is this sense of social which is adopted by the constructivists, most notably Piaget. It refers to the individual's attempt to make sense of the social environment. The process of representation, and the representation itself, maintains its individual character. That is, the representation is constructed through the interaction between an individual's cognitive apparatus and the objective properties of the social environment (not through reciprocal actions or social interactions). This sense of social is also evident in the social cognition literature, whereby the individual is characterized as an information-processor with regard to information pertaining to other individuals, social events, and social situations.

This sense of social has also been carried over into some of the literature and research on social representations. Milgram (1984) suggests that this is the sense conveyed by Farr and Moscovici (1984b) in their invitation for papers, which culminated in the volume on Social Representations. Here their expressed concern was with 'how people "theorise about" or "talk about" the experiences
in which they participate and how these theories enable them to construct reality and ultimately to determine their behaviour. Milgram's interpretation, however, is only sustained if 'people' is understood as 'individuals in general'. In the same volume, Pailhous (1984) examines the representation of urban space and the organization of journeys. However, the research was carried out within the context of cognitive psychology and is limited to individuals' spatial representations of a social object.

My second aim, ... was to strike a fairly un-socio-psychological note on the representation of a highly social object (Pailhous, 1984, p. 327)

Here we would be dealing with how individuals theorize about their experiences, a topic which has been explored in various psychologies already, including social perception, social cognition and Piaget's constructivism. Social representations theory, thus, would be little more than a relabelling exercise, and would fail to constitute a novel approach or revolutionary social psychology.

There are at least two reasons why this sense of social should not be accepted as the defining characteristic of social representations. Firstly, students and proponents of the social representations approach have repeatedly claimed that it constitutes a novel and even a revolutionary theory in social psychology. These claims should not be dismissed out of hand. While it may be true that the theory, as it stands, fails to fulfil the ambition of these students the claim should, at least initially, be given due consideration. Secondly, although much of the relevant research has been concerned with representation of social objects, for example, mental illness (Jodelet, 1986) economic inequalities (Emler, 1987), gender identity (Duveen and Lloyd 1987) and groups (Kaes, 1984), the nature of the research actually carried out indicates that it is not the object which is being represented which is essentially social but rather that the representation itself is social. Furthermore, social representations can be of objects which include physical objects, a material or psychic event, an idea of something
much more complex such as a job to be done, an economic event, an organization etc. A number of studies have investigated social representations of what, normally, would be considered non-social objects; for example, Paris, (Milgram, 1984), psychoanalysis (Moscovici, 1973) and the body (Jodelet, 1984a). However, there are still a number of ways to interpret the meaning of "social" representations. These will be explicated by examining the variety of research which has been conducted within a social representations approach.

2.3.2 Representations in interpersonal interactions

Representations may be considered social because they are socially situated; that is, they arise in a context of social interaction, when two or more individuals are brought together. The significance of the social context in which representations arise is evident in the relatively large volume of literature on experimental studies of social representations and their relationship to behaviour. However, before examining this body of research, in some detail, it is worth mentioning a number of other instances in which the relationship between social representations and interpersonal interaction is discussed.

That representations are socially situated is evident in research on groups and group processes. One example is Kaes' (1984) analysis of representations of the group (social object) and its relation to group processes (social interaction) within a clinical setting (social context). A number of critiques also focus on the relationship between social representations and the social context of research. Farr (1977), in his observations on Herzlich's research, suggests that the emergent social representation of health and illness might be a reflection of the social context of the research interview, as opposed to a representation, held at the collective level. The social context is also emphasized by researchers who are primarily concerned with discourse. This is seen, for example, in the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987) on discourse analysis and what are referred to as linguistic repertoires. The diversity and variability of linguistic repertoires are related to the specific context and social interactions in which individuals...
find themselves. The expression of social representations varies among accounts given in different social settings and even within single accounts. Potter goes so far as to suggest that, due to the specificity of meaning, in relation to the particular context, the notion of social representations should be abandoned in favour of linguistic repertoires. However, although the role of language should not be underestimated, the theory of social representations constitutes considerably more than just the use of language in social encounters or the linguistic repertoires of individuals. Contextual specificity may constitute the identification of a problem, but discourse analysis and linguistic repertoires do not provide a practical or theoretical solution.

There is a considerable body of experimental research carried out in the laboratory which has been directly concerned with the exploration of social representations. (Abric, 1971, 1984; Abric and Kahan, 1972; Codol, 1974, 1984; Flament, 1984). These studies have focused on the relationship between social representations and behaviour and more specifically the system of representations and its relationship to group structure and activity within an experimental setting. They primarily deal with intra-individual cognitive activity and the influence of inter-individual communications and interactions in an artificial social situation. Social representations, in this instance, appear to be individual's representations of social objects within social interactions.

The vast majority of experimental research has been carried out by the Aix-en-Provence group in France. Abric (1984) has employed the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in a number of experimental studies exploring functional relationships between social representations and behaviour. The 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is a game situation in which two individuals are confronted by conflicting play strategies; one which achieves maximum gain for both players and the other which has the possibility of increasing differential gain, depending on the choice of the other player. The behaviour of subjects was found to be dependent on their representations of themselves,
others, the task and the context. For example, by presenting the 'other' as either a student or a machine, subjects employ either a more cooperative or more competitive game strategy respectively. Complementary research by Codol (1984) employed small groups in an artificial laboratory situation in which subjects' cooperative or competitive representations were manipulated by the experimenter.

Another series of experiments has been carried out by Flament (1984) which relies on the mathematisation of balance given in the theory of graphs. By manipulating the instructions Flament and his colleagues were able to show that Heider's (1946) notion of structural balance is not a universal psychological mechanism but rather is dependent on the representation of the group. Furthermore, by manipulating the context of the experiment and the representation of members of the group, different representations of the links between them were induced. Thus the representation of the context and of the group determines the specific characteristics of the perceived interpersonal relationships.

This research will be examined in more detail in order to illustrate the following point: in so far as research emphasizes the social aspects of representations in terms of the object being represented or in terms of the social context in which representations are used it remains within the framework of social cognition and within the approach taken by Anglo-American social psychology. As Semin (1985a) notes, much of the research employing the notion of social representations does not amount to an alternative to the dominant mode of social psychology, either conceptually or empirically.

It will be argued that the experimental research focuses on intra-individual cognitive activity which is characterized as social with regard to the object being represented and the context of representation. This approach is limited to demonstrating the influence of individuals' representations on their behaviour and possesses many characteristics of American cognitive psychology and cognitive social psychology. As such, it fails to characterize the distinctive features of genuine collective phenomena, including their
social, cultural and historical aspects. Ambivalence towards
the experimental literature, expressed by several students of
social representations, further illustrates the erroneous
characterization of social representations which is presented
by the laboratory research. An alternative view is that this
body of research explores the social mechanisms and dynamics
of social representations, including processes of
interaction, communication and influence. It is argued that
these are dependent on the wider culture in which the
laboratory, subjects and experimenters are situated and that
the ways in which culture enters into the laboratory need to
be recognized. In contrast to many sociologically orientated
researchers, it is suggested that experimental methodology
can play a useful role in the examination of social
representations, but that the style of experimenting must be
a direct consequence of the theoretical framework as opposed
to a purely cognitive orientation.

Experimental studies have tended to focus on intra-
individual cognitive activity, that is, the individual's
attempt to organize and structure elements of the
experimental situation. This can be illustrated by Abric's
definition of the system of representations.

By representation system we mean the sum total of
images present in the group and concerning the
different elements with which the group is faced. Individuals confronted with objective conditions
actually develop an internal perceptual and
restructuring activity, which must be considered a
strictly cognitive activity, one which allows them
to integrate, understand, structure, and give
meaning to these elements. The product of this
cognitive activity on the part of each individual
is what we call a representation. By analysing these
representations, one can observe certain elements of
the individual's or the group's subjective - or
internal - reality.

(Abric, 1971, p. 313)

Codol is even more explicit when he states that
the relationships of interdependence (between
representations) studied here are undoubtedly the
product of intra-individual cognitive processes

(Codol, 1984, p. 251).
These representations might be considered social for two reasons. Firstly, the system of representations analysed in these experiments are of social objects, including the task, the group, others and self. For example, Abric (1971) defines the representation of the task as

the theory or system of hypotheses individuals work out regarding the nature of the task, its objects, the means to employ to carry out the task, and the behaviour conducive to effectiveness.

(Abric, 1971, p. 313)

Again, the emphasis is on intra-individual cognitive activity and the representation of social objects. Secondly, these representations are examined in an artificial experimental setting. None the less, it is a social context involving social interactions between a number of individuals who constitute the experimental group and also between subjects and experimenter. Thus, in these experiments individual representations are examined in a social context.

The study of social representations within an experimental paradigm which adopts a cognitive perspective is extremely limited. Experimenters acknowledge the necessary reduction in the richness of the initial ideas and the simplification required to operationalize and manipulate the relevant variables (Codol, 1984). It is also acknowledged that such an approach can only illuminate part of what is understood by 'social representations'. That part which can be included is largely restricted to intra-individual cognitive activity. This is justified on the basis that social representations incontrovertibly partake of the nature of cognitive phenomena and that although social representations are

social forms of knowledge belonging to the cultures and groups in which (an individual) is involved, ... in the final analysis it is always individuals who convey and articulate them

(Codol, 1984, p. 240).

There are two points that should be made: firstly, we have already noted that social representations can be conveyed in the cultural artefacts of a given society; secondly, and more importantly in the present context, the restrictions which a cognitive and experimental approach
place on the study of social representations confines the analysis to those characteristics which do not distinguish social representations from social cognition.

The experiments clearly demonstrate the role of social representations in group dynamics within the laboratory such that

the effectiveness and structure of the group cannot be analyzed exclusively as the basis of the objective elements of the situation... The representational system interacts directly with the objective elements by giving them a specific meaning and interpretation in terms of behaviour (Abric, 1971, p. 325)

The primary aim of these studies is thus to demonstrate the influence of the individual's representation system, on the organization and structuring of the objective features in an experimental situation and the resultant behaviour and group dynamics. There is a remarkable resemblance to the concerns of cognitive and social cognitive psychologists working within the Anglo-American tradition. Cognitive psychologists have long been concerned with individuals' perception and/or interpretation of objective phenomena. Others, including Deutscher (1984b) and Farr (1984), have commented on the similarity of these experiments with the work of American psychologists such as Rosenthal (1966) and Orne (1962) who explored reactivity, effects of the experimental context and experimenter effects. What is emphasized by the French experimenters is that these should not be considered experimental artefacts but rather are naturally occurring features of social interactions which should be studied as such.

So long as experimental studies of social representations continue to focus on intra-individual cognition, and the influence of inter-individual communications, they will fail to realise some of the fundamental aspects of social representations. When 'social' is limited to the object being represented or the context of representation, the theory of social representations remains what Moscovici has termed a 'private' social psychology. As such it fails to characterize the distinctiveness of genuine
collective phenomena. These phenomena have their own structure which is not definable in terms of the cognitions or characteristics of individuals. They are related to the processes of production and consumption, to the rituals, symbols, institutions, norms and values of our society or group. They are phenomena with their own history and dynamics which cannot be derived from individuals alone. (Moscovici, 1972). In the last analysis the experimental studies still portray an individual psychology of cognition as opposed to a social psychology of symbolic representation.

The point to which I am leading is not that these experimental studies fail to illuminate at least some aspects of social representations but that they fail to reflect those features of social representations which distinguish them from other cognitive and social cognitive constructs. They focus on the subjective, cognitive and phenomenological aspects of social representations but do not directly address the social, cultural and historical aspects.

This is reflected in the ambivalence towards experimental studies expressed by some social representation theorists. Herzlich (1972) has noted the contrast between the laboratory studies and the field research within the French school of social representations. Herzlich, amongst others, considers the theory of social representations and the field research to constitute a sociological form of social psychology. However, it is not clear in what way the laboratory research reflects this sociological approach. Similarly, Farr (1984) suggests that social representations operate 'at the level of the scientific community' rather than within the laboratory

the social nature of representations is more directly applicable at the level of a scientific theory or of a research paradigm, than at the level of a single experiment within such a paradigm

(Farr 1984, p. 134).

Representations of science and the laboratory at the level of the scientific community would provide a more accurate characterization of social representations than anything that is carried out within a laboratory. The latter form a 'world
apart' a world which isolates phenomena from their natural social context. Furthermore, experiments are relatively a-historical, and any transformation of representations induced within the experiment are likely to be minor and temporary.

Moscovici (1984b) has also expressed reservations about the use of the experimental paradigm. Although it may be suitable for studying simple phenomena that can be taken out of context and operationally defined, he suggests that it is unsuitable for the exploration of social representations, being a social phenomenon stored in our language and created in a complex human milieu. He states that

the study of social representations requires that we revert to methods of observation for the purpose of providing a careful description of social representations .... A valid explanation can only be derived from a comparative study of such descriptions....what we require of observation is that it will preserve some of the qualities of experiment while freeing us from its limitations

(Moscovici, 1984b, pp. 97, 98)

The limitation he is particularly concerned about is the oversimplification of complex social phenomena required by the need to operationalize definitions of the significant variables, and the isolation of specific phenomena and mechanisms from their natural context. For Moscovici it is more appropriate to adjust the methods of research to the complexities of reality as opposed to adjusting reality to the experimental paradigm. However, Codol emphasizes that the aim of these experiments is to indicate some of the mechanisms whereby representations come about. In this case it is the social processes of interaction, communication and influence giving rise to the formation of representations which characterize their social nature.

Representation may be termed "social" less on account of whether their foundations are individual or group than because they are worked out during the process of exchange and interaction.

(Codol, 1984, p. 251)

But it is not clear that these experiments do actually study the social processes involved in the origins of a
system of representations. Subjects do not come to the laboratory as empty-headed, naive individuals. They bring with them ideas, values and ideologies which they have assimilated from their culture and from their social groups. These include representations of social relations, cooperative and competitive interactions, of social identities and of problem situations. These representations do not originate within the experimental context but rather are primed by the experimenter's instructions or by attributes of the experimental situation. Differences in the behaviour of subjects (dependent variable) are shown to be greatly influenced by the subjects' representations (independent variable). However, manipulation of these representations is dependent on the culture outside the laboratory, shared by both experimenter and the research subjects. For example, manipulation of representation of the task is achieved by presenting the same task as either 'problem-solving' or a 'creative task' (Abric, 1971) or as 'being concerned with deductive and logical thought' versus 'resolution of problems by several individuals collaborating together' (Codol, 1974). Codol's study also manipulated representation of the group by providing feedback such as 'This is a very collective group' or 'this is a very individualistic group'. Similarly, representations of opponents in a game situation were manipulated by presenting them as a 'machine' or as 'another student like yourself' (Abric, 1976). Thus the laboratory research on social representations succeeds only because the wider culture enters into the laboratory which is still a part of the wider society.

Thus, if anything, it is not the social mechanisms by which representations are created that are being studied but rather the inter-individual processes by which preestablished representations are evoked and agreed upon within the particular setting of the experiment. The system of representations being examined thus do not emerge within the experiment itself but rather are representations prevalent in society, i.e. widespread beliefs, being related to the subject's (and the experimenter's) group membership and
location in a wider society. Representations are cultural phenomena although the particular representations evoked and the relationships between them may be influenced by the particular social context. What these experiments help to demonstrate is that culture enters into and is a part of the laboratory. Once culture is recognized to be embedded within the laboratory, most notably through the mediation of language, then concepts such as schemata, scripts, and frames, will be seen to be social phenomena as opposed to individual cognitions and the cultural dimensions of this research will be made more salient and explicit (Farr, 1987b).

Despite the limitations associated with the experimental paradigm, experiments do have their place in social representations research for they provide an analysis quite unlike other methods suggested by Moscovici. We would be wrong to dismiss a methodology which has been extensively developed and utilized and, in some circles, is the envy of other social sciences. There is no a priori reason why experimental studies should not be included in the variety of methodologies which are used for the exploration of social representations (see Chapter 6). I would also suggest that the limitations of the current experimental investigations are not purely a reflection of the experimental paradigm per se but also of their specific content. This is illuminated by examining the context and historical development of the experimental literature now associated with social representations.

One of the earliest laboratory studies which is frequently cited in this literature was carried out by Faucheux and Moscovici in 1968. The experiment explored the influence of respondents' representations of their opponents in a game situation. The game strategy adopted by respondents was dependent on whether or not they had been told that they were playing against nature or against chance. However, this study does not appear to have been designed within the theoretical context of social representation. It was, in effect, a reply to an American study conducted within a games theory approach which had ignored respondents representations
as an important variable. It has, since then, been absorbed into the social representations literature.

Later experimental work can be seen in the same light, having originally been conceived as a critique of American social psychology on group dynamics, conflict studies and games theory. These American studies had failed to consider the phenomenological and social aspects as well as the genesis of groups in their own activity. The laboratory experiments of Codol and Abric, in contrast, were specifically designed to explore these issues. However, it is only through the more recent literature that the link between the laboratory research and social representations has been made explicit. Furthermore, the actual experimental situation employed (eg. Prisoner's Dilemma) and the dependent variables measured were the same as the American studies. It is not surprising then, that the focus of attention has remained on intra-individual cognition and the individual's system of representations as opposed to the interindividual processes involved in social representations. The problems addressed by the experimental research and the consequent characterization of social representations are therefore quite distinct from other studies.

Farr (1984) suggests that there had been an 'error of translation' from the field studies to the laboratory. However, it is questionable whether or not any such translation was attempted. The laboratory research emerged as a critique of American social psychology rather than being initially inspired by social representations. The theory and language of social representations was adopted at a later phase in its development as it provided a useful theoretical framework for the investigation of representation. Because of this it has remained limited in its exploration of social representations and in the characterization of their social nature.

This is not to suggest that the experimental paradigm is totally unsuited to the investigation of social representations. Rather that the style of experimenting should be a direct consequence of the theoretical orientation. Just as the experimental styles adopted by
behaviourists contrasted to those of cognitive psychologists, and the Festingerian's style of experimenting contrasted with the Hovlander's (Farr, 1976), so also the styles of cognitivists and of students of social representations should reflect their alternative theoretical approach. Even so, it still remains questionable whether experimental studies could ever reflect certain features of social representations, including their historical, creative and autonomous aspects.

2.3.3 Representations which are shared

Perhaps the most predominant sense of "social" evident in the remaining research literature is the consensual nature of social representations. Social representations are social because they are shared by a number of individuals in a group or society. This sense of social will be briefly discussed in relation to the experimental studies. However, it is an aspect of social representations which is made more explicit in the intergroup studies (e.g. Di Giacomo, 1980) and in social extensions of attribution theory (Hewstone, 1989; Jaspars and Hewstone, 1990). Moreover, it is an issue which had been central in several theoretical and methodological critiques. This literature is examined below, but it is suggested that it does not accurately portray the sense of "social" which is maintained by the theory. A focus on the consensual nature of social representations implies that they are individual representations which are shared by members of a group. This fails to illuminate their supra-individual status, their dynamic nature and their origins in social life.

2.3.3.1 Experimental studies: The shared or consensual nature of social representations is not a feature which is emphasized in the experimental literature. However, Abric (1971) in his study of representation of the task states that

To the extent that this representation is shared by the whole group it determines a collective representation of the given facts of the environment, that is a social representation of the task.

(Abric, 1971, p. 313)

This implies that social representations are individual representations of a given object which are shared by all members of the experimental group. However, it was argued
that these representations originate in the social milieu which extends beyond the laboratory. They are social representations which exist in the common culture.

Others have taken the consensual nature of social representations as their starting point. This is seen in studies of intergroup relations and the social nature of attributions.

2.3.3.2 Intergroup relations: Previous studies of intergroup relations is one of the few areas of research in social psychology in which representations have been treated as important. This interest goes back to the work of Sherif (1962) and has continued to be significant in more recent research (Tajfel, 1978; 1982). Studies of intergroup relations, within the social representations approach, focus on the real life social membership of the individuals, and the ideas, values and models which are obtained from and shared with their social groups. Interactions between groups influence the representations group members have of themselves and their group, other groups and their members. These representations 'regulate, anticipate and justify the social relations that are thus established' (Jodelet, 1984b).

One example of this perspective is research conducted by Di Giacomo (1980) on intergroup alliances and rejections within a student protest movement. Representation shared by the student population about itself, and their potential partners, were found to be incompatible with their representation of the National Committee and its strategies. Thus, although the student population agreed with the aim of the movement they did not support the National Committee. The incompatibility of beliefs, values, symbols and norms shared by members of the student population and their representation of the National Committee as an outgroup directed and justified a lack of commitment to action on the part of the student population.

2.3.3.3. Causal attributions: Studies of causal attributions which have employed the concept of social representations also focus on their consensual nature. It is first necessary to examine, briefly, the relationship between social representations and attributions. It will then be argued
that, by using social representation theory as a social extension of attribution, emphasis is placed on the socially-shared nature of representations. Moscovici (1984b) suggests that causal explanations and social attribution always have been crucial to those concerned with social representations. However, the approach adopted by those studying social representations can be contrasted with attribution theorists of the Anglo-American tradition. Attribution theory has mainly been concerned with how we attribute causes to people and things in our environment. Humans are conceived as naive information-processors who carry out statistical analyses of evidence present in the environment. Social representationists, in contrast, are less concerned with the individual's ability to process information and more concerned with the content of socially shared knowledge.

Any explanation depends primarily on the idea we have of reality

(Moscovici, 1984b, p.49).

People making attributions start from a system of social representations which determine the experiences they have, the elements of the environment which are taken into account and the causes which are selected. Social representations are, therefore, more basic than or fundamental to the attributions people make.

There can be no attribution without a social representation of individuals, collective relationships, the economy etc.

(Moscovici, 1981a, p.X)

That this is the case is clearly indicated by Ichheiser in his monograph on 'Misunderstandings in Human Relations' (1949) Ichheiser distinguished between the expressions as an actor and the impressions of an observer where the latter may be considered as social representations dependent on socio-cultural symbolic meaning. In order to understand why people make certain attributions about others it is necessary to take into account the social or collective representations of the individual and their expression in representations of success and failure, and of responsibility and irresponsibility.
Hewstone (1989), in conjunction with Moscovici (1983) and Jaspars (1990) has addressed these issues in an attempt to make attribution theory more social. In so doing he has emphasized the consensual nature of social representations, that is, the socially-shared knowledge base which underlies the process and content of attribution and causal explanations.

One way in which .... (attribution) theory (can be) rendered more social is to consider explanations alongside the beliefs that are shared by large numbers of people within and between societies. (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p. 98)

In order to understand how, when and why, attributions are made and where they come from it is necessary to take into account the way knowledge about various aspects of social life is represented in a society and shared by its members. One study which illustrates the relationship between social representations and attributional processes examined pupils' attributions of success and failure in private and state schools (Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee, 1982). It was found that their social representations of people and the social environment influenced the attributions made. Pupils from private schools attributed success or failure to effort and ability (personal) whereas state school pupils attributed them to luck (environmental). Jaspars and Hewstone (1987), note that the role of causal structures in determining peoples' attributions has already been highlighted in work associated with attribution theory. They see social representations theory as a framework in which to study the extent to which such causal structures are socially shared and how widespread beliefs have an impact on causal attributions. Social representations theory thus offers a means by which to study beliefs and knowledge of the world which are shared by large numbers of people in a group or culture. They are thus conceived as socially-shared causal structures or collective beliefs. Social representations theory, in this instance, is used to provide a social extension of attribution theory emphasizing the socially-shared nature of representations (knowledge) in
society. The social psychology which emerges is one which relates the individual psychological processes to the collective beliefs of a group or society. It thus constitutes an attempt to redress the balance between individual and social factors as opposed to redefining the problem.

It should be noted that the understanding of 'shared' is not the same here as for the experimental studies. In the latter 'shared' implied individual representation shared by members of a group. In the intergroup relations and attributional studies social representations are seen as irreducible to a collection of individual representations. Knowledge which is shared throughout a society or group cannot be reduced to individual perceptions and explanations.

2.3.3.4. Criticisms: A number of the criticisms of social representations theory and research have focused also on the shared aspect of social representations. The consensual nature of social representations has been central to criticisms put forward by Potter and Litton (1985). According to them, emphasis on the consensual nature of social representations is evident in the writings and research of a number of people, including Moscovici (1981a,1982), Farr (1987b), DiGiacomo (1980), Hewstone et al. (1982) and Jaspars and Fraser (1984). Furthermore, it is the consensual nature of social representations and their relation to social groups which distinguishes them from individual representations and from collective representations shared across a whole society. Potter and Litton go on to suggest that the degree of consensus tends to be over-estimated through the use of certain research procedures and that agreement at a general level may not be paralleled by agreement at a lower or more specific level. Hence they are concerned with the degree of consensus and the level at which that consensus exists. Breakwell (1987) expresses similar concerns when directly addressing methodological problems of social representations research:

An essential ingredient of a social representation is the 'consensuality': it is shared by a group/sub-group or category.

(Breakwell, 1987, p. 11)
Consensuality gives rise to two problems: establishing the relevant groups or categories independently of their social representations and deciding the 'degree of consensus' which must exist before a social representation can be said to exist.

This focus on 'consensuality' is understandable in the light of the importance of the 'consensual universe' within the theory of social representations. However, I believe it does an injustice to the aims and content of the theory as a whole and is more a reflection of the methodologies which have been employed in research. They assume that the individual is the proper source of data collection. This is evident in the experimental research which explores individual cognitive structures and in investigations which have relied exclusively on elicitation of individuals' accounts. If the starting point is always the individual then the meaning of social becomes limited to those attributes which individuals share. Individual representations are then those which are not shared by a 'significant' number of people; collective representations are those shared by all members of society, and social representations are those shared by members of a group within a society where some divergences exist both between and within groups.

Furthermore, a focus on consensuality is liable to lead to similar limitations, which Moscovici criticizes in his review of attitude and opinion research (1963) in which he states that

Science will not gain much through learning that in Minneapolis 12 per cent of the people interviewed link centrifugal force and gravitations.

(Moscovici, 1963, p. 234)

The theory of social representations is not aimed primarily at finding out what percentage of a particular population share a given social representation, nor the level of consensus which can be considered 'significant'.

It is also the shared sense of social which forms the basis of Harré's conceptual critique. Harré (1984c) suggests that social representations, as currently employed, denote a distributive sense of social by which he means individual
representations which are distributed among members of a group. He further states that

the role of "the social" ...seems to me to be restricted to the influence of social situations on the minds of individual human actors.

(Harré, 1984c)

Harré disputes the value of restricting the sense of social to representations which are shared by a number of individuals. According to Harré, the French School fails to achieve a truly collective social psychology which recognizes the group as a supraindividual entity with attributes which cannot be reduced to the attributes of its individual members.

In so far as research emphasizes an individual's membership of social groups and that social representations are shared bodies of knowledge, it goes some way to elucidating the particular meaning of social expressed in the consensual universe of social representation. Intergroup relations depend on the beliefs and values shared by members of the respective groups. Individuals' attributions depend on socially shared beliefs and causal structures. Representations of events and of others in our environment must be shared with others to sustain the consensual universe in which individuals and groups interact. However, that there is a consensual universe does not imply uniformity or a precise consensus on every element of a representation. As will be seen, their social nature also depends on diversity and controversy within and between representations, giving rise to their transformation and plasticity. There is a very real danger that, by focusing on the consensual nature of social representations as shared bodies of knowledge, their dynamic nature and their origins in social life will become obscured.

2.3.4 Representations, communication and social interaction

Another sense in which social representations are social is that they are socially generated and socially sustained. They originate in the social interactions between individuals and groups for the purpose of understanding and communicating with others.
The word "social" was meant to indicate that representations are the outcome of an unceasing babble and a permanent dialogue between individuals, a dialogue that is both internal and external, during which individual representations are echoed and complemented. Representations adapt to the flow of interactions between social groups.

(Moscovici, 1984a, p. 950)

The transmissions and the stability of existing social representations need to be considered within the same framework as the generation and transformation of social representations. A variety of studies have been concerned, in one respect or another, with the development and maintenance of social representations through the processes of social interaction and communication. These include the experimental studies, and the field studies, as well as investigation of intergroup relations and the socialization of children. However, little or nothing is said about the forms of communication and social interaction involved in the diffusion and transformation of social representations.

2.3.4.1 The socialization of children: Some British studies which deal indirectly with this issue have investigated the socialization of children and the transmission of representations from one generation to the next. Emler and Dickinson (1985) examined children's representations of economic inequalities and their relation to the child's social class and the social milieu in which the child was situated. However, as they themselves recognize, many questions remain unanswered. In particular, the precise influences which produce differences in social representations and the processes by which the social representations are transmitted are not investigated.

Clearer indications are to be found in the work of Duveen and Lloyd (1986; 1987) on the development of children's social identities and in particular their gender identities. This research addresses the transmission of social representations from adults to children. It is generally seen as demonstrating the conventional and prescriptive nature of social representations (see previous chapter) which constitute the environment of thought into which children are
socialized. Social representations exist prior to the child's entrance into the social milieu and, therefore, influence the child's construction of representations concerning themselves, others and objects in their environment as well as appropriate actions, thoughts and feelings. Hence, the social representations already exist and take on an ontological significance in the child's social reality. Emler (1986) has gone so far as to criticize this work in that it fails to characterize the active and constructive aspects of social representations. However, this is not entirely true. This study is interestingly different in that the development and transmission of the social representations of 'maleness' and 'femaleness' are traced through interpersonal relations with the mother and their behavioural expression in interactions with peers. What is important to note here is that the transmission and development of social representations was illuminated by examining the particular interactions with the physical(toys) and social (other people) objects in their environment. A child does not simply absorb or learn the social representations prevalent in its social milieu. Rather, through its own activity and interactions with others and objects in the environment the child actively re-constructs the social representations which influence and structure the responses of others to those objects and events in their shared environment. In this sense Duveen and Lloyd also examine the active construction of social representations through the processes of social interaction.

However, the theory of social representations is mainly concerned with the active construction of social representations in the adult world. Mature members of a society already live in an environment of thought which is constituted by their social representations. Here we would be dealing, not with the child's reconstruction of representations already prevalent in their social environment, but the construction of new representations and the transformation of old ones. Such studies would take social interactions and the forms of communication as the
units of analysis in order to illuminate the origins and development of social representations in the adult world.

2.3.4.2 Experimental studies: It might be considered that the experimental studies are relevant here in that they are concerned with the mechanisms of social representations and the relations between social representations and behaviour. However, they only demonstrate the influence of social representations on behavioural responses rather than the dynamic relationship between social representations and social interaction. They focus on intra-individual cognition taking the unit of analysis to be individual behaviour as opposed to social interactions which transform the social representations. Another 'pitfall' which needs to be avoided is examining the development of social representations in similar fashion to concept formation. It is not the individual's information-processing which is of importance but rather the social interactions between a number of individuals and their environment.

2.3.4.3 Intergroup relations: Studies of intergroup relations have been more successful in shedding some light on the development of social representation. This body of research was previously discussed in relation to the consensual nature of social representations. For example, the actual research carried out by Di Giacomo (1980) demonstrated the incompatibility between the student population's social representations of itself and its potential partners and their social representations of the protest movement and its strategies. This research, in some respects, illuminates the generation of a social representation of a new social object, the protest movement. Di Giacomo goes on to suggest that social representations are more than a system of images inherited from the culture,

they are the result of a given group's confrontation of the objects in its environment with its social reference criteria.

(Di Giacomo, 1980, p.341)

The student population progressively defined the protest committee as incompatible with themselves. These emerging social representations had an anticipatory and justificatory
function in relation to the student population's responses to the protest movement, structuring the social relationships between the two groups. However, the research itself, does not trace the development of the incompatible social representations, their elements and their changing relationships. Nor does it explore the form of communication or the processes of social interaction involved in their generation and transformation.

2.3.4.4. Field studies: Before turning to other research which illuminates, at least to some degree, the social construction of representations, it is important to examine, briefly, what is meant by social interaction and communication. Social interaction should be considered not only to refer to interactions between two or more people; they refer also to interactions with the physical and symbolic products of human activity. That is to say the environment, both in terms of its physical, material characteristics and its social, symbolic characteristics are important elements of social interaction. Social interaction includes inter-action with other people and with the physical and social world. Similarly, communication is not restricted to 'non-verbal' and verbal communications between two or more people in face-to-face interactions. Communication can occur through a wide variety of mediators: through written and pictorial materials, including books, magazines, the media, posters, films etc.; through displays such as those found in museums and shop windows; through construction of the physical environment, for example parks, playgrounds, sports facilities, buildings, towns etc; and through single but dramatic events, such as dropping an atomic bomb for the first time, on a human population. Social representations exist not only in the mind but also in the environment. It is therefore essential to examine social representations not only in cognition but also in the surrounding culture, in the products of human activity including the media and the objects that constitute the environment in which we live.

The exploration of the contents of the mass media and of other cultural objects in our environment is a distinctive feature of the field research in the French tradition. These
studies illustrate the transformation of social representations and explicate the forms of communication involved in their transmission and diffusion. In his study on the diffusion of psychoanalysis into French society, Moscovici (1961), for example, examined the acceptance and rejection of psychoanalytic theory in the Catholic and Marxist press. These investigations described the transformations in the contents of social representations which can, in part, be understood by the processes of anchoring and objectification.

The content analysis of Catholic and Marxist publications implies that the media are an important forms of communication between members of its readership, viewing, listening group, facilitating the diffusion of a social representation of psychoanalysis. It also describes the significant difference between the content of the theory of psychoanalysis and the social representations of psychoanalysis in the media. Moscovici is able to show how these transformations relate to the prevalent social representation within Marxism and Catholicism. However, the social processes by which these transformations come about are not examined. Little or nothing is said about the social interactions involved in the anchoring and objectification of psychoanalytic concepts. Similarly, although other field studies attempt to relate the content and transformation of social representations to the social, cultural and economic circumstances, their origins in social interactions is assumed rather than demonstrated. This is seen in Herzlich's (1973) investigation of the social representation of health and illness. This is a highly informative study which provides an excellent description of Parisians' understanding of health and illness in relation to their urban environment and also developments in medicine and changing doctor-patient relationships. However, it does not examine, in any detail, the form of communication and the variety of social interactions which constitute the means by which the social representation is formed. Hence, as a single study, it fails to portray the active construction involved in the
development and transformation of a given social representation.

Other field studies have been more successful in examining the transformation and diffusion of social representations. This includes the work of Jodelet and Moscovici on the social representations of the human body (1973) and Chombart-de-Lauwe's study of social representations of childhood (1984). Jodelet and Moscovici traced the evolution and transformation of the social representations of the body over a fifteen year period. These were related to historical cultural changes and to the social circumstances of different groups and their changing roles in society. Furthermore, changes in the content of representations of the body were found to be related to people's experience of their own bodies. Differences were related to people's social circumstances and reflected the differential cultural diffusion of information. The transformation of social representation of the body is thus shown to be related to the form of communication and to people's personal experience of their bodies.

One of the most comprehensive field studies has been conducted by Chombart-de-Lauwe (1984) on the social representations of children, their transformation and their social transmission. One study explored the social representations of children in the imagination of adults by examining autobiographies and films in which the central character is a child. By comparing material produced in pre-war, inter-war and contemporary literature, Chombart-de-Lauwe was able to determine the stability, changes and evolution of representations. A similar study analysed novels, comics, films and biographies directed at the child. This revealed divergences with representations constructed for adults as well as changes relating to the structure of society.

A further study was carried out in order to understand the social transmission of these representations to children. Children aged nine to twelve years were asked to write essays comparing media characters with themselves. This revealed influences which differentiate children's representations from the models offered by adults and relate to
socio-biological characteristics of the child (age and sex),
their social situation and their social status.

A completely different domain was studied by exploring
representations of the child in relation to the built
environment. The representations of the child held by
planners, town-planners and architects influence the
construction of the environment and hence the practices,
life-styles and representations of children. For example,
the place of the child in an urban environment is represented
as either being segregated from or integrated with the
structure of the community as a whole. These representations
determine the environment in which children live, the
activities in which they can engage, and hence the
representations which they construct. Although much of this
research explores, in detail, the adults' representations of
childhood it is adults who create the world in which children
grow up. From the perspective of the child these are
confronted as 'social facts' which make up the environment in
which they live.

By examining a variety of forms of communication,
including various forms of literature and the construction
of the physical environment, Chombart-de-Lauwe has
illuminated the means by which representations of the child
are socially transmitted and sustained. Her extensive
analyses also reveal the social transformations of
representations in three respects: transformations within
literature produced by adults for both adults and children;
transformations of representations which occur from one
generation to the next; and also transformations in the
organization of the child's environment. These complementary
and continued studies illuminate various aspects of the
social representations of children; their variations, their
transformation from one historical period to another and
their transmission to a new generation.

2.3.4.5 Summary: Within the theory of social representations
the understanding of social interaction and of communication
extends beyond the non-verbal and verbal behaviour of
individuals. They also involve interactions with and
communication through the physical and social objects which
make up the environment in which we live. It has been argued that the experimental studies are extremely limited in their exploration of the development and transmission of social representations through the processes of social interaction and communication. Similarly, Di Giacomo's investigation of intergroup relations does not directly explore how and why social representations come to assume the form they do. In contrast, British studies on the socialization of children and the field studies carried out in France, are complementary bodies of research which illuminate different aspects of how social representations are socially generated and socially sustained. The British studies illustrate the transmission of social representations from one generation to another and the social interactions involved in the child's reconstruction of those representations. The field studies also examine the diffusion and transmission of social representations but these tend to focus on the forms of communication and transformation in their content over a given historical period. These two approaches to the exploration of the social development and maintenance of social representations need to be combined in order to provide a more complete understanding of the social processes involved.

2.3.5 Representations and social reality

We have seen that there are a number of senses in which social representations have been considered social. Social may refer to the object being represented, to the context in which they are expressed, to the social membership of the individual, to the fact that they are shared by a number of individuals, and to their origins and development in social interaction. These various senses of social have been emphasized in different bodies of research and relate both to the content and the methods employed in that research (see Chapter 6). However, social representations may also be considered social in that they constitute a social reality. This brings us to the sense of social which was emphasized at the beginning of the previous chapter and, I believe, an understanding of which is vital for assessment of social representations theory.
Moscovici clearly considers this aspect of social representations to be of primary importance. This is so not because it has a collective origin, or because it refers to a collective object, but because, as such, being shared by all and strengthened by tradition, it constitutes a social reality "sui generis". (Moscovici, 1984b, p.13)

Jaspars and Fraser (1984) also recognize the central importance of social reality in their comparison of social cognition (cognitive structures) and social representations. The latter has implications for social exchange beyond the interpersonal level and emphasizes the social origins of the content and structure of representations.

However, these differences do not seem to constitute the most important distinction between social representations and cognitive structures....what is social about social representations is not in the first place that such representations are representations of social reality, or that they are social in origin, but that they are social because they are shared by many individuals and as such constitute a social reality which can influence individual behaviour. (Jaspars and Fraser, 1984, p.104, italics added).

Although central to the theory of social representations this point is often lost in research. The experimental studies completely fail to characterize this social reality as a result of an analysis which remains on the intra-individual cognitive level, as previously discussed. Investigations of intergroup relations and social attributions, in so far as they recognize the supra-individual nature of social representations, go some way towards an understanding of social reality. Out of the studies already mentioned, those which incorporate the notion of social reality most successfully deal with the transmission and development of social representations. The studies go some way towards an understanding of how the child reconstructs the social reality of the adult world and how this social reality is changed and transformed.

What is distinctively European about the French School is not that they are concerned with social objects, the
social context in which individuals and groups are situated, or that knowledge is shared, but that social representations constitute a social reality. This is not to say that other social factors are either excluded or unimportant but that they are incorporated in an understanding of the social nature of reality. This understanding draws on European sociological thinking, and in particular on the work of Durkheim. Unlike the experimental studies described previously, which emerged as a critique of American social psychology, the initial conceptualization and development of the notion of social representations arose out of a tradition of thinking which is essentially European. As such, it goes beyond traditional Anglo-American research by providing not just a social extension to this research but an alternative paradigm.

Durkheim introduced the concept of collective representations into his sociology in order to describe 'the system of symbols by means of which society becomes conscious of itself' including religion, law, morals, customs and political institutions. This 'conscience collective' is embedded in our language, tradition and customs, as well as our institutions. Moscovici (1961) refers to the notion of collective representations as a neglected and forgotten concept which failed to have any great impact on research in sociology, anthropology and psychology. Furthermore his aim, in part, is to reestablish this forgotten concept as a legitimate object of study essential to a truly social psychology. He sees the explicit task of social psychology to be the study of the nature and genesis of collective representations, the knowledge and belief systems which shape our social reality.

It has already been said that these representations constitute a social reality sui generis. That is to say, they exist independently of individual representations and have characteristics or attributes which are supra-individual and cannot be reduced to the individual level.

Social facts are in a sense independent of individuals and exterior to individual minds. Society has for its substratum the mass of associated individuals.... The representations which
form the network of social life arise from the relations between individuals... and the total society...collective representations, produced by the action and reaction between individual minds that form the society, do not derive directly from the latter and consequently surpass them.

(Durkheim, 1974, pp. 24-5, quoted in Fransella, 1984, p. 157)

and also

collective psychology cannot be deduced directly from individual psychology, because a new factor has intervened, which has transformed the psychic material, a factor which is the source of all that is different and new, namely association.

(Durkheim, 1898, pp. 273-302, quoted in Harré, 1984c, p. 933)

Hence collective representations do not exist in the minds of individuals but rather in their associations, communications and social interactions. The well-known adage 'the sum is greater than its parts' is as good as any; it is not the understanding in the mind of any one individual but rather it is the understanding provided by the collective, for the collective.

Farr (1990a) and Marková and Wilkie (1987) both stress the collective nature of representation. In their discussion of AIDS as a new social phenomenon, Marková and Wilkie emphasize the need for a social theory of knowledge as opposed to an individualistic epistemology. For them, as for Durkheim, collective representations constitute a reality which has evolved through the co-operation of a multitude of minds over generations. Farr (in press) also emphasizes the collective nature of representations in his examination of individualism in western culture and its influence on the development of psychology. Drawing on the work of Gustav Ichheiser (1949, 1970), Farr explicates how the representation of the individual exists at the collective level and is insidious but pervasive, not only in our social and economic life, but also in our legal practices regarding attribution of responsibility, (in our attribution of success and failure) and also in the historical development of western psychology.
In conclusion, although the experimental literature and research on intergroup processes and causal attribution do have their place within the social representations approach they are not as successful as the field studies and investigations into the socialization of children at elucidating the social nature of representations. Social representations are social, not because they refer to social objects or arise in a social context, although these are not excluded. Nor is the fundamental sense of social portrayed by the intergroup relations and attribution research which emphasizes the consensual nature of representation, being shared by a number of individuals. Representations are social because they reflect a form of social thinking which is apparent, not only in our cognitions but also in the social and physical environment in which we live. As such, they constitute a social reality which is sustained and transformed through social interactions and communication. This sense of social, which goes beyond an individual analysis to include the cultural and historical aspects of human life, is more clearly evident in the field studies and investigations into the socialization of children.

Drawing on the foregoing assessment of the diverse research and the previous theoretical outline, we are now in a position to construct a definition of social representations. It can be seen that social representations constitute the social reality in which we live; they refer to the products of social thinking as well as to the material and social environment. They are symbolic, autonomous entities which are both conventional and prescriptive, constructing and shaping the reality with which we interact. The various forms of communication allow the diffusion of these representations throughout society, and reflect both their stability and dynamics. Representations are also creative or constructive, being generated and transformed through the processes of social interaction and communication. This occurs for the purpose of understanding and communicating about the events and objects which confront us, being directed towards the mastery of our social and material world. As such, they form a consensual universe
which allows the coordination of interactions and the socialization of new members into a given society. The social significance of representations, both in terms of their content and their functions, is thus linked to the social context in which they emerge.

2.4 THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY REVISITED

At its inception (Moscovici, 1961), the concept of social representations was associated with the diffusion of knowledge throughout society, and in particular, with the representation of scientific knowledge in a consensual universe. However, the wide variety of research, especially with reference to the object of study, testifies to its wider application. The theory of social representations has been employed to explore and to describe socio-psychological knowledge which is not directly associated with scientific discoveries, concepts or theories. These studies focus on non-scientific knowledge, emphasizing the importance of both tradition and first-hand experience. This might be considered a misapplication of the theory, but an examination of some of the theoretical postulates supports a more universal conception of social representations. Moreover, tradition and first-hand experience play an important part in the diffusion of scientific knowledge and in the construction of social representations. It will be argued that the dynamic nature of social representations and the forms of communication associated with their diffusion in society do not provide grounds for distinguishing between representations of scientific and non-scientific objects.

2.4.1 The object of research

The early field studies conducted in France were primarily concerned with the diffusion of scientific notions from the reified universe of science into the consensual world of common-sense and everyday understanding. It has already been mentioned that the first social representations study (Moscovici, 1961) examined how the scientific theory of psychoanalysis diffused into French society. Concepts such as 'neurosis' and 'complex' became part of people's everyday understanding of their own and other people's behaviour. Similarly, Moscovici is currently investigating the diffusion
of Marxism in French society. Another early study which reflects this focus explored the transmission and assimilation of scientific facts by workers in the chemical industry (Ackerman and Rialan, 1963).

The interest in common-sense understanding of scientific discoveries is also evident in some of the more recent field studies. Herzlich's (1973) study on the social representation of health and illness illustrates its relationship with the historical development of medicine. For example, illness is now understood in terms of the invasion of a naturally healthy body by external agents such as bacteria or germs. Similarly, the social representation of the body and its transformation, over time, may also be related to changing doctor-patient relationships and to developments within the medical profession (Jodelet and Moscovici, 1975). Jodelet and Milgram (1977) also illustrate how inhabitants' social representations of Paris are influenced by the products of cartography which may be considered a scientific representation of the city.

Other French researchers, however, have chosen objects of study which bear only a tenuous link with the products of scientific disciplines. The most compelling example in this respect is Chombart-de-Lauwe's extensive investigation of social representations of the child (1984). Transformations over time, evident in the literary products of French society, are not directly related to our scientific theories or to the diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense understandings of childhood. It can be seen that, even within the French field work, a diversity of representations have been studied.

Both Farr (1990a) and Breakwell (1987) have commented on the problem of choosing a suitable object as the target of a representation. If social representations theory is concerned with the diffusion of scientific knowledge in society, it might be supposed that a scientific theory should be selected as the target object. However, this does not appear to be the major criterion for selecting the target object. Firstly, a knowledge of both psychoanalysis and Marxism had diffused fairly widely in France during the
post-World War II era and they have since become salient features of French culture. They are consequently socially significant aspects of everyday life in France, and are represented at many different levels within French society. As Farr (1987b) notes, there would have been little point in studying their social representations in Britain during the same post-war era as neither had become socially significant features of British culture.

Secondly, turning to the other major field studies mentioned above, although the transformations in their respective social representations may be related, directly, to scientific theories and discoveries, the object of study is not a scientific theory as such. There is not a scientific theory of towns and cities, or of childhood. Rather, they are socially significant objects which are represented in various aspects of French culture and social life. They are present in the mass media of communication, in people's social interactions and they are often related to debates within French communities.

Other research on social representations also indicates that the theory is not exclusively applicable to the transformation of scientific knowledge into common-sense understandings. These include the laboratory studies carried out in France, inter-group relation studies and research on the socialization of children. As described previously, experimental literature focuses on the representations of the self, of others, of the group and of the task within an artificial situation. These are not usually related to any scientific body of knowledge. Furthermore, it may be considered that they are only socially significant objects within the experimental situation. This is perhaps why Farr (1984) suggests that a more suitable level of investigation would be to study social representations of the laboratory rather than within the laboratory. The experimental investigations explicitly attempt to explore the mechanisms associated with social representations. As Farr (1987b) indicates, this corpus of research is the only direct evidence that a person's actions are a consequence of his or her social representations. However, it has been argued that
the significance of these experiments goes beyond a
demonstrative role as they introduce socially significant
objects, for example "a computer" or "a student, like
yourself" (Abric, 1976), from the wider cultural context into
the laboratory. The reasons underlying Moscovici and
Faucheux's (1968) choice of "nature" and "chance" as the
target representations must relate to their social
significance in everyday life. Thus, experimental researchers
have selected objects of study which are not necessarily
scientific in origin but which do play an important part in
everyday social life. This is also true of the intergroup
relations studies in which the social representations
selected for study are of the significant groups within a
given community. For example, in Di Giacomo's (1980) research
during a students' protest movement, the relevant social
representations are of groups associated with the student
population, such as "workers" and "executives".

The British work on social representations has also
interpreted the theory to be applicable to a wider range of
phenomena than Moscovici first proposed. For example,
children's social representations of economic inequalities,
although they may be associated, in part, with economic
theories, are much more closely associated with the child's
set of social relations, their social class and their general
social milieu (Emler and Dickinson, 1985). The traditions of
a society are experienced and internalized by children
through their interactions with the social and physical
objects in their social milieu. Similarly, Duveen and Lloyd
(1987) have employed the theory to explore the socio-
psychological aspects of gender. The social representations
of "male" and "female" are articulated in a system of values,
ideas and practices associated with each pole. The domain of
social representations is thus

no longer a question of the dispersion of a
scientific theory through society, but with a
general phenomenon which pervades the whole of
society.

(Duveen and Lloyd, 1987, p.4)

Moscovici's original intent was to elaborate a specific
socio-psychological concept which was particular to modern
society and the diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense understanding (see Chapter 1). We have seen that the domain of social representations has been extended by the subsequent research to include a wide range of socio-psychological phenomena which often focus on non-scientific, socially significant objects. It may be considered that, by breaking the boundaries set by Moscovici, the notion of social representations is in danger of becoming, merely, a general synonym for 'culture' or 'ideology'. Indeed, Moscovici warns against identifying social representations as a 'general category concerning the totality of intellectual and social products' (Moscovici, 1976, p. 40). However, the boundaries propounded by Moscovici in specifying the particular domain of social representations are not reflected in the theoretical postulates concerning their nature and function. This discrepancy is evident from the definition of social representations (above) as well as the theoretical exposition presented in the previous chapter. Social representations are conceived as bodies of social knowledge which are orientated towards the practical and social life of a given community. As such, they not only refer to common-sense understanding of scientific theories but to a whole range of practical knowledge found in a given society. The wider domain of the theory is thus not only suggested by the diversity of the research itself, but also by the definition of social representations and by much of Moscovici's own theoretical writings concerning their nature and function in society.

It may still be possible to distinguish between social representations of scientific concepts and other domains of socio-psychological knowledge. Firstly, the former exhibit a peculiarly dynamic character which breaks with tradition, whereas the latter often maintain tradition. Secondly, the former are disseminated through society by means of mass media communication, whereas the latter are more closely associated with people's first-hand experience in their social milieux. Thirdly, social representations are transformed by specific processes, which may be peculiar to the diffusion of scientific knowledge. It will be argued,
however, that these do not provide adequate grounds for distinguishing scientific from non-scientific social representations. The issue addressed here is whether or not these contents are sufficiently different to justify the specification of different forms or modes of representation.

2.4.2 Innovation and tradition

Some researchers may be accused of selecting 'collective' rather than 'social' representations as their object of study. Collective representations are more widespread and permanent elements in the consensual universe and home, and they are more normally associated with more stable societies. Social representations, on the other hand, are dynamic, exhibiting transformations in their content and structure, and are peculiar to modern society (see Chapter 1). (The distinction between these two forms of representation is discussed more fully in Chapter 4). Representations of gender or of childhood are phenomena which pervade the whole of society and are steeped in tradition. Duveen and Lloyd (1987) acknowledge that a description of the gender system corresponds to a collective level of analysis which could be pursued through sociological or anthropological research. However, they argue that, in order to produce a description of how these representations become psychologically active in the regulation of social interaction, it is necessary to present a social-psychological analysis which is afforded by a social representations approach.

It may still be argued that these phenomena do not exhibit the dynamic characteristics of social representations. It will be remembered (from the previous chapter) that the discoveries and original theories of science produce the unfamiliar concepts which provide the impetus for transformations of our social representations. Their main function, in this respect, is to break with tradition. Representations of gender or of childhood are rarely directly influenced by scientific developments. Consequently, it might be considered that they express the cultural traditions of collective memory, embedded in the images and meanings of language and that they do not exhibit
the plasticity of social representations. However, the impetus for change and transformation does not emerge only in science; discoveries and innovations are not peculiar to the realm of science.

Innovation and the impetus for change are produced in other sections of society; in business, marketing, advertising, the caring professions, leisure etc., sections of society which deal with the practical issues of everyday life. Moscovici himself has elsewhere emphasized the important role played by minority groups within society in changing predominant social representations. Unfamiliar concepts and objects may also be imported from other cultures: a case in point would be the invasion of Eastern philosophies and religions into American culture. The object of a representation may thus emerge within the consensual universe of ordinary communication and social interaction without having migrated from the reified universe of science. These provide the unfamiliar objects or events which transform our social representations. This is experienced in the dynamic nature of the relevant social representations. For example, representations of 'male' and 'female' have changed dramatically with the rise of the feminist movement. Representations of the child have undergone extensive transformations during the last twenty years (Chombart-de-Lauwe, 1984). It can be seen that these non-scientific representations also possess the dynamic characteristics of social representations.

From the opposite angle, tradition plays an equally important part in the understanding of scientific concepts or science-related issues. Moscovici is well aware of the role of tradition but, in some respects, he underestimates its influence. Two of the field studies conducted in France illustrate this point. Jodelet (1986) explored the social representations of mental illness in French villages where the inhabitants were hosts to a number of ex-mental patients. Her investigations revealed the re-emergence of centuries-old theories concerning the contagious nature of mental illness, and the failure of modern scientific knowledge to enter into people's common-sense understanding. Similarly, social
representations of Paris, (Milgram and Jodelet, 1976) reflect the historical development of the city. Divisions of the urban area are constructed around the historical heart and belt of the city. The latter no longer exists in physical terms, but is still present in the collective memory and socio-spatial representations of the city. Knowledge drawn from street maps of Paris produced by cartographers is selectively emphasized and distorted to reflect these socio-psychological elements. Thus tradition, in terms of the historical and cultural understandings of a community, is extremely influential in the transformations of social representations associated with the products of science.

2.4.3 Media of communication

So far, it has been established that social representations which relate to scientific concepts and discoveries and those which relate exclusively to socially significant objects cannot be distinguished either in terms of their dynamic (v. static) nature or with reference to the import of tradition.

However, a distinction may still be possible in terms of the forms of communication involved in each sphere. Non-scientific representations are dependent on first-hand experience and the facticity of events. This is so with regard both to the transmission of representations from one generation to the next and to the creation and elaboration of representations in the consensual universe. Scientific theories, in contrast, are pre-existing bodies of knowledge which are disseminated through society by the mass media. However, on closer inspection, such a distinction is not upheld. The elaborations and transformations of non-scientific representations can be seen to involve both forms of communication. On the one hand, representations of maleness or femaleness, of groups within society, or of childhood, are intimately involved in everyday social interactions. On the other hand, these representations are expressed in and disseminated through the media and literature of a given society. They are issues currently addressed in newspaper articles, books, films, TV programmes etc. Similarly, both forms of communication are involved in
the elaboration and transformation of scientific representations. Social representations of Paris are constructed and maintained, not only on the basis of traditional and scientific understandings, but also on the basis of people's first-hand experience of the city. Inhabitants' representations will be divergent from 'foreigners'' representations, who have not lived in and experienced the city. Changes in the social representation of the body (Jodelet and Moscovici, 1975; Jodelet, 1984a) occur not only through the diffusion of scientific knowledge but also through knowledge acquired from people's actual experience of their bodies in social interactions with others.

In his study on the diffusion of psychoanalysis, Moscovici describes how unfamiliar concepts are equated with the familiar, for example with Catholics' social representations of the priest and of confession. On the other hand, the theoretical concepts of psychoanalysis are taken up and assimilated into people's social representations because they answer problems of first-hand, everyday experience. They are useful in solving problems concerning the understanding of people's behaviour. For example, the concept of neurosis allows otherwise unfamiliar and strange behaviours to be categorized and labelled. In this way, it appears to provide an explanation of otherwise inexplicable actions. The form and content of these social representations, and their further elaborations and transformations, not only derive from the diffusion of unfamiliar scientific concepts in the media, but also because these concepts facilitate an understanding of events in people's everyday lives. (This would further suggest that some scientific theories will not readily enter into the public arena of common-sense knowledge.)

2.4.4 Processes of transformation

It is not possible to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific representations with reference to their associated forms of communication. Finally, it is necessary to consider the processes by which social representations
are transformed and elaborated. Moscovici describes two socio-psychological processes; anchoring and objectification.

Anchoring reduces threat and unfamiliarity by imposing familiar categories and providing linguistic names. Systems of social representations provide the familiar categories to which unfamiliar objects or events are anchored. It 'excludes the idea of thought or perception which is without anchor' (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 36). As Billig (1987b) indicates, this is a universal socio-psychological process which applies to any unfamiliar concept, object or event, whether it originates in the sciences or in the consensual universe. In his rhetorical criticism of the universal conception of social representations and anchoring, Billig goes on to describe the counter-process of 'particularization'. Not only are we able to anchor the unfamiliar and represent its similitude with familiar objects, so, too, we can negate this process by representing something familiar as distinct or unfamiliar. Again, the process of 'particularization' is applicable to both scientific and non-scientific representations.

Objectification transforms abstract, unfamiliar concepts into familiar concrete experiences. This process allows the invisible to become perceptible; abstract concepts are 'materialized' or naturalized, such that they become objects existing in the physical and social world. Billig (1987b) suggests that objectification is a particular process. It is particular to those beliefs which are essentially non-religious, and which have originated from abstract scientific thinking. Abstract, scientific concepts are objectified as they enter into the consensual universe. However, objectification can also be seen to occur with respect to non-scientific, even religious concepts. People create images of God and many religious rituals involve the objectification of essentially abstract beliefs. Furthermore, there are some abstract concepts from both the reified and the consensual universes which belie objectification. Ideas of communism or socialism, from the social sciences, and notions of relativity or magnetism, from the physical sciences, are just as difficult to objectify as consensual notions of justice or mercy. Thus, although objectification
may be particular to a certain class of concepts, the division between scientific and non-scientific concepts does not appear to provide an adequate classification.

Billig (1987b) also suggests that there is a counter-process to objectification which he refers to as 'transcendentalization'. This he associates with religious societies in which concrete experience is transformed into something which transcends the material world and takes on an abstract quality. For example, the invisible presence of God is to be observed within the perceptible world of objects and events. However, 'trancendentalization' can also be seen with reference to the sciences. The world of objects, of tables, chairs, of cars and rivers and mountains, we are told, is a world of molecules and atoms, of imperceptible motion and energy. Again, no longer is the natural world made up of discrete objects such as trees and squirrels, or factories and roads, rather it is an ecosystem which depends on a delicate balance of interdependent relationships. Trancendentalization is not the province of religion alone. Furthermore, in some cases, common-sense understandings of the products of science also involve the negation of objectification. For example, computers and machinery are often attributed qualities associated with animistic behaviour, they have intentions and purposes, are given personalized names and are generally not treated as material objects. Again, the processes described by Moscovici and the counter-processes proposed by Billig do not suggest a clear distinction between scientific and non-scientific representations.

Thus it is not possible to distinguish between social representations of scientific theories or concepts, such as psychoanalysis, and social representations of socially significant, non-scientific objects, such as 'male' or 'female', in terms of their mode of representation. This is with reference to their dynamic nature; the role of tradition and first-hand experience; to the various forms of communication involved; and to the processes by which they are elaborated and transformed. It is, therefore, neither useful nor accurate to limit the application of the theory to
social representations of scientific knowledge. It is equally applicable to other domains of social-psychological knowledge and provides a useful framework in which to investigate them.

The boundaries to the domain of social representations which were initially proposed by Moscovici appear to be rather artificial ones, which are reflected neither in the theoretical postulates concerning the nature, function and processes of social representations, nor in the empirical investigations which have been carried out to date. The theory of social representations is applicable to a broad spectrum of socio-psychological phenomena and may indeed constitute a social-psychology of knowledge. There is no doubt that some kind of typology or classification will be required but, just as a definition of social representations must be derived from empirical research so, too, the boundaries of the domain of social representations theory, and the classification of representations within that domain, should not be determined a priori, without reference to empirical research.

2.5 NOT A CONCLUSION

An assessment of the contributions made by the diverse fields of research has assisted in constructing a definition of social representations and in determining the domain to which the theory is applicable. In the course of this chapter, some of the internal contradictions and confusions regarding the phenomenon and the theory of social representations have been addressed and clarified. However, a number of substantive issues remain to be resolved. Although the fundamentally social nature of representations, as depicted by the theory, has been established, it is still necessary to determine the distinction between individual, social and collective representations. This is related to a number of issues. Firstly, there appears to be an uneasy contrast between the prescriptive and dynamic nature of social representations, which at once determine our social interactions and which are transformed by those interactions. Secondly, the autonomous and supra-individual nature of social representations appears to obviate the role of the individual in their transformation. Thirdly, although the
significance of conceiving a social reality has been emphasized in both the theoretical outline and the overview of research, it is still necessary to explicate what is entailed in the social construction of reality. Finally, it remains unclear whether or not the theory of social representations is able to provide an integration or synthesis of the individual and the social which is required by the social psychology which its proponents envisage. These issues will be discussed in the following two chapters in an attempt to clarify the problems and to reformulate the theory in order to provide a potential resolutions.
CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: CHANGING REPRESENTATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND OF SCIENCE IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

3.1 THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

3.1.1 Introspectionism and the Positivist's repudiation of Wundt
3.1.2 Behaviourism and psychology as a branch of natural science
3.1.3 Cognitive psychology: A different perspective

3.2 THE SHAPING OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

3.2.1 Collective perspectives
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3.2.3 Cognitive social psychology
3.2.4 From sociological to psychological forms of social psychology

3.3 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO CULTURE?

3.4 DESCARTES AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF INDIVIDUALISTIC (SOCIAL) PSYCHOLOGY

3.5 AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

3.6 THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE DIVIDED

3.6.1 A note on Darwin
3.6.2 A dilemma for social psychology

3.7 THE INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE

Social psychology is charged with the formidable task of integrating the psychological and cultural aspects of human life. Psychology focuses on the individual, sociology on society and anthropology on culture. The objective of social psychology is to provide a perspective that embraces individuals in their interactions with one another and shows how they relate to the institutional, cultural and social structures of society. This objective is explicitly endorsed by the proponents of the theory of social representations. However, in the previous chapter it was noted that there are a number of outstanding problems. In particular, it is not clear how the individual can play a
part in the maintenance and transformation of a social reality which is, at one and the same time, both prescriptive and dynamic. If these problems are to be overcome the theory must achieve a conceptual integration between individuals and culture.

Firstly, it is important to understand how the psychological and sociological aspects of human life came to be conceived of in terms of two separate and distinct disciplines, namely psychology and sociology. In other words, why was there a need for a social psychology in the first place? Secondly, once a division between the individual and society was established, why is it now necessary to construct an integration? In this chapter, we shall go some way towards answering these questions by tracing the historical development of both psychology and social psychology; by examining the philosophical roots and assumptions underlying the various approaches; and by exploring contemporary developments in social psychology.

It will be seen that the history of social psychology manifests an uneasy tension between a thesis which focuses on the individual, and its antithesis, which focuses on society and/or culture. This tension is perpetuated in contemporary fields of social psychology, despite the fact that, in the past, there have been a number of attempts to construct a synthesis. A crucial component of this debate is the social representation of the individual and its close association with the social representation of science adopted by psychologists.

On the grounds of an empirico-historical narrative and a logical analysis, it is argued that a social representation of science as a positivistic empirical endeavour demands a social representation of the individual which precludes a synthesis of the individual and culture. It is argued that this approach is rooted in Cartesian philosophy and Newtonian physics, which isolates the individual from his or her physical and social environment. In contrast, the Hegelian tradition of thought provides an alternative paradigm in which the individual is both the product and the producer of culture. Furthermore, this Hegelian tradition endorses a
comparative and evolutionary approach to the study of social phenomena. This latter approach, at one stage, was prevalent within social psychology. Its apogee was the Handbook of Social Psychology published in two volumes by Murchison in 1935. It has since gone out of fashion. In fact, 'progress' in social psychology is measured by distance from this landmark (Farr, 1988). This having been said, the Hegelian paradigm is reflected, once again, in various contemporary developments in social psychology. In particular, the social constructionism of Gergen (1985a,b) and the various presentations of social contextualism (Jaeger and Rosnow, 1988), which have emerged out of the 'crisis' in social psychology, are discussed. These provide both a new directive for the conduct of enquiry into social phenomena and a paradigm for the integration of psychology, social psychology and anthropology.

This exposition serves to illuminate the theory of social representations in several different ways. Firstly, it facilitates an understanding of problems in contemporary social psychology; of how they arose and of what would constitute a novel approach. The novelty and value of the theory can only be assessed within both an historical and contemporary context. Secondly, the content of past psychologies can provide important material for resolving contemporary problems and for indicating new directions in which to advance (Billig, 1987a). (Both these points are relevant to the contents of the present chapter). Past works, in which authors have wrestled with the same metatheoretical problems, can shed light on the essential components of a social-psychological theory. Thirdly, this chapter explores the dynamics of social representations in the history of psychology and social psychology. In particular, the exposition focuses on social representations of the individual and of their relationship with culture and to the social representations of science. It is important to understand the evolution of these social representations and their role in shaping social psychology in the past. We are then in a better position to construct a viable synthesis of the individual and culture in contemporary social psychology.
The double use of social representations is fully intentional. It refers both to the theory of social representations and to social representations of the individual and of science within social psychology. This is justified by a belief that social psychology as a discipline needs to be self-reflexive. The history of psychology to date has been more concerned with reflexology than with reflectivity. However, psychology is a human science conducted by humans and, as such, its theories should apply not only to 'the world out there' but also to 'the world in here' i.e. the world of social psychologists. Furthermore, the double use of social representations is consistent with the view that the theory of social representations is applicable to the 'consensual' and 'reified' 'worlds'.

The scientific discipline of psychology has now entered its second century. Although its long past can be traced back to the Greek Philosophers (Hearnshaw, 1986), the world's first psychological laboratory was founded by Wilhelm Wundt at Leipzig in 1879. The recent centenary gave rise to reflections on the discipline's past and on its prospects for the future. Professional historians of science have begun to trace the origins and development of psychology as a discipline (e.g. O'Donnell, 1979; Asch, 1982) and psychologists, themselves, have begun to take a greater interest in their historical roots (e.g. Koch and Leary, 1985). These are not just the reflective musings of psychologists with an interest in history. The past constitutes the very foundation from which the present emerges: in many respects, it sets the problems and provides the context in which novel approaches are assessed. On the other hand, the present is the perspective from which the past is reconstructed (Mead, 1932). When novel events or significant changes occur, renewed interest in the past attempts to locate the novelty in a natural history of development. A new version of history is constructed which emphasizes both continuities and discontinuities between past and present.

The following account builds upon the work of Farr (e.g. 1981a, b, 1983, 1985, 1987a, 1990b) and others (Marková, 1982;
Hearnshaw, 1987; Manicus, 1986; Secord, 1986; Gergen, 1985) who trace the historical development of social as well as of individual forms of psychology in contrast to more traditional histories of the discipline (e.g. Boring, 1929-1950; Allport, 1985; Jones, 1985). The historical narrative presented here emphasizes social representations of the individual and their relation to social representations of science. I propose to show that, despite dramatic changes in the orientation of scientific psychology, from the study of mind by means of introspection, through the empirical study of behaviour to the rationalist study of cognition, psychology has not escaped the individualism it inherited, at birth, from philosophy.

3.1 THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

The division between the individual and culture was inherent in the very foundation of psychology as a scientific discipline. In 1879, Wundt established the first laboratory for the experimental exploration of the contents of individual consciousness. This was a form of psychophysics which applied the experimental methods of physiology to the psychological problems derived from philosophy. By means of introspection the individual observed the contents of his/her own mind. This was complementary to, but separated from, his Voelkerpsychologie (1900-1920) which was concerned with the study of language, customs, religion, myth, magic and cognitive phenomena. The study of these collective phenomena required a comparative and historical approach to scientific investigations and drew on anthropological reports of diverse cultures (Cole, 1987). For Wundt, both were essential to a science of psychology, and the conclusions from the one should be compatible with the other.

Both the experimental psychophysics and the comparative Voelkerpsychologie have been influential in the broader history of social psychology. The former, with its focus both on the individual and on scientific method, can be traced through the history of psychology as an experimental science. The latter, with its emphasis on social and cultural phenomena and on the use of historico-comparative method of
investigation, influenced the development of social sciences other than psychology.

3.1.1 Introspectionism and the Positivists' repudiation of Wundt

As psychology became established as an independent experimental science in America it was transformed into an individualistic and positivistic science. For Wundt, the method of introspection was only applicable in the observation of the immediate contents of consciousness, that is, to the psychic correlates of physical stimulation. The investigation of higher cognitive processes, which were a product of evolutionary and historical changes, could not be accounted for in terms of individual consciousness, since they presupposed the reciprocal interactions of a whole community or 'volk'. The study of these collective mental phenomena was to follow in Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie.

However, Wundt's students rejected the restrictions he placed on the use of introspection and extended the range of phenomena amenable to such investigation to include memory and thought. In so doing, they also failed to realize the significance of Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie. Danziger (1979,1980), shows how this 'positivist repudiation of Wundt' was strongly influenced both by the positivism of Mach and of Avenarius, and by British associationism. These were alien to both Wundt's scientific metaphysics and his Kantian philosophy. The misunderstanding of Wundt's contribution to psychology has been perpetuated by such influential histories of experimental psychology as Boring (1929/1950); and Miller (1966). They have selected for special attention those aspects of Wundt's work which sustain an individualistic and positivistic psychology and, in so doing, they have created a distorted representation of Wundt's work.

3.1.2 Behaviourism and psychology as a branch of natural science

With the rise of behaviourism the science of psychology was transformed from the study of mind and human experience to the study of behaviour. However, despite the change in the object of study, both introspectionism and behaviourism had
adopted a positivistic philosophy of science and both were essentially non-social.

The method of introspection saw its demise with the unresolved 'imageless thought' controversy and was successfully superceded by behaviourism. Behaviourists were united by their social representation of science and their commitment to methodological objectivism rather than any substantive theoretical perspective (Mackenzie, 1977). Like the introspection of Titchener, the behaviourism of Watson was dominated by a positivistic empiricism which was antirationalist and anti-intuitionist. The use of laboratory and experimental research methods was also maintained. What distinguished behaviourism from introspectionism was its rejection of any entities or processes which were not directly and publicly observable. This simultaneously broadened the scope of psychology to include the study of both animals and infants, neither of which could be investigated using introspection, and enhanced the methodological sophistication of research.

The social representation of science adopted by behaviourists was based on classical theoretical physics, as exemplified by Newton's 'Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica' (1687). It involved a mechanistic conception of nature in which elementary and independent particles of matter operated according to discoverable laws. Laboratory experimentation was an ideal method for controlling and isolating independent and dependent variables. For psychology, a new particle entered into the equation of simple cause and effect relationships-the individual. In order to be consistent with the social representation of science, the individual had to be conceived of as an isolated object, in a linear causal mechanism of stimuli and responses. Furthermore, statements were only meaningful in terms of their operationalization and in terms of their verifiable observations. By adopting the methodology of physics and its style of constructing the world, behaviourists attempted to gain the prestige of the physical sciences but, in so doing, they restricted any critical
assessment of its appropriateness as a model of science for
the study of human phenomena.

3.1.3 Cognitive psychology: A different perspective

The dependence of behaviourism on a strict methodological objectivity hindered major theoretical advances and, with a growing dissatisfaction due to its notable lack of progress, the dominance of behaviourism gave way to the rise of cognitivism. Once again, mind had returned to the domain of psychology, this time in the form of information-processing and internal cognitive structures. Not denying some of its major achievements however, cognitive psychology is still inherently non-social and, in many respects, still complies with a positivistic social representation of science (Marková, 1982; Gergen, 1982).

The development of cognitive psychology was much influenced by both telecommunication engineers and computer scientists during and after World War II. Theories of cognition reflected the technological developments of the time, presenting mechanistic models of mind. More recently, the rise of information technology has encouraged a focus on artificial, as opposed to natural (human) forms of intelligence. With the impetus provided by technology, cognitive psychology is now dominated by the information-processing metaphor. Mind is located within the head of the individual set over against the objects of cognition which are located in the environment. Information from the environment is processed in a mechanical, linear fashion such that the stimulus-organism-response sequence is perpetuated in much cognitive theorizing.

The study of language has suffered a similar fate. Language constitutes the major medium for speech and communication, which is inherently social. However, psycholinguists such as Chomsky and Miller, have studied language in abstraction from those who use it as a means of communication. In this way, the discipline of psychology has maintained its allegiance to the Cartesian paradigm and has divorced itself from its counterparts in the social sciences.
3.2 THE SHAPING OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Many disciplines within the social sciences have developed their own distinctive forms of social psychology (Moscovici, 1990). Social psychology has also been influenced by sociology and anthropology (Jaspars, 1983; Cole, 1987). However, it has come to be more closely associated with psychology. In so doing, it has endorsed many of the conventional assumptions and research methods of psychology. The crucial issue in the discipline's historical development has been whether or not social and collective phenomena have a reality 'sui generis', which is irreducible to or different from individual phenomena. Collective forms of social psychology flourished in its early years. But, with the rise of behaviourism in psychology, the study of social phenomena became dominated by an individualistic and experimental approach. Furthermore, despite the emergence of cognitive social psychology, the discipline has remained largely a-social and a-historical.

The publication of two textbooks on social psychology in 1908 is traditionally taken as the formal inauguration of the discipline, although there were other relevant publications which preceded them (eg. James, 1890; Tarde, 1898; Cooley, 1902; Orano, 1902). One was written by McDougall, whose social psychology was based on biological instincts and emotions and whose discourse focused on the individual. The other was by Ross, a sociologist, who was more concerned with the consequence of human relations, and collective behaviours such as fashions, customs, public opinion, conventions and social conflicts. Although neither of these two perspectives provided an effective orientation towards theory and research (Pepitone, 1981), this division between the individual and the social aspects of human life persisted. This is evident in the historical development of theories and research in the study of groups, attitudes and attributions, from collectivism, through behaviourism to social cognition.

3.2.1 The Collective perspectives

Prior to the dominance of the experimental method in social psychology, European students of collective phenomena took the reality of groups for granted. Le Bon (1896),
reflecting on the French Revolution, suggested that crowds were characterized by a mental unity which reflected the collective unconscious instincts of the race. The processes of deindividuation, contagion and suggestion gave rise to crowd behaviour which was to be contrasted with the conscious and rational behaviour of individuals. Drawing on the work of Le Bon (Moscovici, 1985a), Freud developed a psychodynamic analysis of collective phenomena such as religion, myths, taboos etc. in his Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse (1921). Similar to Le Bon, Freud argued that people behave qualitatively differently in groups because the instinctual impulses of the id come to the surface. A significantly different perspective was developed by McDougall, in 'The Group Mind' (1920). The supra-individual quality of group behaviour was maintained: group mind had a reality and existence which was independent of and qualitatively distinct from that of its individual members. However, this emerged out of the interactions or relations between people rather than any collective unconscious motives.

The influence of all three writers on more contemporary social psychology is apparent respectively in the study of collective behaviour (Zimbardo, 1970); in Adorno et al.'s authoritarian personality (1950), and Dollard et al.'s frustration and aggression hypothesis (1939); and in the work of Sherif (1936) and Asch (1952). However, these have not always maintained the collective perspective of the earlier students. The dominance of the collective perspective persisted in social psychology into the 1930's, but not much beyond. This is evident from the contents of the Murchison Handbook of Social Psychology (1935) and other publications of that decade. But, as behaviourism began to dominate psychology in general, American research and theory in social psychology increasingly became more and more individualised.

3.2.2 The behaviourist perspectives

F.H. Allport's (1920, 1924) apparently persuasive arguments against the explanation of crowd behaviour in terms of a collective unconscious or a group mind shifted the perspective of American Social Psychology to one that was individualistic and experimental (Graumann, 1986).
Allport, collective phenomena could be explained purely in terms of the individual. The social aspects of human behaviour were restricted to the influence of others who were present in the immediate environment.

Social psychology is the science which studies the behaviour of the individual in so far as his behaviour stimulates other individuals or is itself a reaction to their behaviour.

(Allport, 1924, p. 12)

As in the social facilitation experiments (Tripplett, 1897; Allport, 1920), collective phenomena such as crowds were reduced to the individual in a social situation, where social implied no more than the mere presence of others. The subsequent distinction between perception and social perception or between cognition and social cognition is rooted in this individualistic understanding of the significance of the social.

3.2.3 Cognitive social psychology

Even before general psychology became dominated by the cognitive perspective, social psychology was already moving away from behaviourism per se. Farr (1985) shows how cognitive social psychology came into being with the migration of the Gestalt Psychologists from Germany and Austria into the context of behaviourism in the U.S.A. Under the influences of the Gestalt Psychologists, including Lewin (1951), Asch (1952) and Heider (1958), social psychology reverted to the study of mind and conscious experience. Unlike the earlier collective psychologies of Le Bon and Freud, cognitive social psychology emphasized the rational character of social behaviour.

At its inception, social cognition was conceived of in relational terms. For example, Heider (1958) emphasized the perspective of the perceiver (P) or self on the behaviour of others (O). The subsequent flourishing of cognitive social psychology in the U.S.A. maintained the shift in perspective from behaviourism to cognition. However, it failed to sustain the social or relational approach of the early theorists (Farr and Moscovici, 1984a). The social representation of the individual and of science which were so highly characteristic
of behaviourism are still evident in much of contemporary social psychology (Pepitone, 1981; Farr, in press). Social psychological questions are reduced to experimental research on dyads and interindividual behaviour. Social groups are reduced to the immediate or implied presence of others, as independent variables which influence the behaviour of an individual. In effect, culture and history remain outside the realm of social psychology. Social cognition refers to the individual's perception and analysis of information about others. Experimental methodology, which dominates research on social cognition, is essentially a-historical. Even in social psychology the individual is conceived of as a 'thinking machine', rather than a social animal embedded in an historical and cultural context (Moscovici, 1982).

3.2.4 From sociological to psychological forms of social psychology

It can be seen that the history of social psychology exhibits a shift from a collective and comparative approach to an individualistic and experimental approach. A particular case in point can be found in the study of attitudes. In the 1920's, Thomas and Znaniecki employed the term 'social attitudes' in their study of 'The Polish Peasant in Europe and America'. In their insightful article, Jaspars and Fraser (1984) show how this inherently social concept became individualised. In the Chicago School of the 1920's, social attitudes and collective representations were one and the same field of study. However, G.W. Allport's review chapter (1935) on 'Attitudes' in the Murchison handbook transformed them into purely individual representations and individual 'states of readiness' to respond to environmental stimuli. This conception has persisted in more recent theorizing and research, including Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance and Fishbein and Ajzen's (1954) model of attitude change.

A similar case can be made for the study of attributions, although its emergence as a field in social psychology and its subsequent individualization did not come until later. Ichheiser's (1949) monograph on 'Misunderstandings in Human Relations' indicates the role of
collective representations in processes of attribution and person perception. This is still present in Heider's phenomenological approach to 'Interpersonal Relations' (1958), which contains frequent quotations from Ichheiser. However, the contemporary tradition of research on attribution theory is rooted in the work of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967; 1973), who individualized 'attribution' by focusing on an analysis of individual cognitive processes in people's knowledge and perception. Even the more recent extensions to attribution theory, which take into account causal schemata or scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1972), are still based on a stimuli-response construction of the world, and a representation of the individual as an independent and isolated identity.

3.3 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO CULTURE?

The influence of Wundt's Volkerpsychologie in social psychology lasted until the 1930's and is apparent in Murchison's 'Handbook of Social Psychology' (1935). Chapters in this volume adopt an historical and comparative approach, and conceive of the human mind as the product of evolutionary and historical change. However, this contrasts quite strikingly with the experimental social psychology which dominates the more recent series of handbooks edited by Lindzey and Aronson (1968/69, 1985) (see Farr, 1988). In order to trace the continued influence of Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie it is necessary to turn to other human and social sciences, including psychoanalysis, sociology, social and cultural anthropology and linguistics (Farr, 1985, 1990b; Cole, 1987).

The divide between the individual and the social appears to be endemic in many of the human sciences. They were treated, originally, as two separate yet related aspects in the study of the human mind; they were then separated as falling within the domain of two isolated and distinct disciplines.

At the turn of the century, the human sciences were not separated out into distinct disciplines and many European scholars studied a combination of philosophy, psychology, sociology and anthropology. At the time, an individual
psychology often went hand-in-hand with a collective psychology. We have seen that Wundt's individual experimental psychology was associated with his Voelkerpsychologie. Similarly, Freud progressed from a clinical analysis of individuals to a 'massenpsychologie' of culture. McDougall followed his 1908 publication on 'An Introduction to Social Psychology' with his book on 'The Group Mind' in 1920. However, these soon came to separate out into distinct disciplines. At the turn of the century, Durkheim made a sharp distinction between individual and collective representations and proclaimed them to be the objects of study of two separate disciplines, respectively psychology and sociology. Collective phenomena were 'social facts' which could not be reduced to psychological explanations. It was the latter which inherited the cultural perspective of Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie. By the 1920's the boundaries between psychology, sociology and anthropology were well established in the institutional structure of most American Universities. Again, the influence of the Voelkerpsychologie can be traced through Mead to the symbolic interactionist tradition within American sociology.

The division between the individual and the social was associated closely with methods of research and psychology's status as a science. The association between the conception of science and the conception of human beings has been illuminated by psychologists, social scientists and philosophers, who have been critical of the dominant approach (eg. Shotter, 1975; Marková, 1982; Gergen, 1982). A social representation of the individual as a discrete and independent entity behaving in response to the environment was associated with an experimental method and a social representation of science based on Newtonian physics. A social representation of the individual, in association with others as a member of a collective with its own language and culture, required a comparative method which was associated more closely with the social sciences.

Social psychologists have been left with the multi-disciplinary task of integrating psychology, sociology and anthropology. However, because the parent disciplines are
characterized by such distinct approaches the different forms of their separation and integration have given rise to a great diversity and variety of social psychologies (Farr, 1985; Jaspars, 1983). Despite this diversity, two major groupings can be identified; the first focuses on culture, traditions, norms, beliefs and skills; and the second focuses on the influence of others on the behaviour of the individual. Both approaches have been evident throughout the history of social psychology but while the former dominated its early development it has been the latter approach which has guided theorizing and directed most research in the last fifty years, especially in America.

Thus, the disciplines of psychology and of social psychology were, at their inception, concerned with both individual and collective phenomena. With their subsequent development in America, these disciplines were transformed into individualistic enterprises. This was largely under the influence of a positivistic empiricism social representation of science, which was first introduced by the American introspectionists and then further established by the behaviourists. In order to be scientific, psychology had to employ empirical methods of objective observation and experimentation and its theories had to conform to the restrictions of behaviourism, operationalism, and causal mechanisms. With the rise of cognitivism, some of these restrictions were removed (most notably behaviourism and operationalism), but the doctrines of empiricism, reductionism, individualism and mechanism proved to be an all-pervasive influence on theory and research. The close association between psychology and social psychology in American institutions led social psychologists into accepting the same social representations of the individual and of science. Thus, despite their explicit concern for social and collective phenomena, social psychological theorizing and research has remained a largely individualistic and positivistic enterprise.
3.4 DESCARTES AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF INDIVIDUALISTIC (SOCIAL) PSYCHOLOGY

Embedded in the individualistic and positivistic form of social psychology are various philosophical presumptions which are rarely made explicit. The Cartesian paradigm or tradition of thought has structured both behaviouristic psychology (empiricism) and cognitive psychology (rationalism). Both have inherited the Cartesian dualism between mind and body and the dualism between the individual and culture.

In its emergence as a science, psychologists created a divide between psychology and its parent discipline of philosophy. However, social psychology and psychology are not independent from philosophy nor, for that matter, are they independent from physics, mathematics, the biological sciences, the humanities and ordinary human experience. In failing to recognise their philosophical roots they have failed to realize the assumptions which they had inherited and the philosophies which would have supported alternative psychologies. In her insightful book on 'Paradigms, Thought and Language', Marková (1982) elucidates the Cartesian assumptions which are still inherent in much of contemporary psychology and social psychology.

Descartes' scepticism led him to doubt everything but the fact that he was doubting. This gave primacy to the individual mind which had a number of implications. Firstly, Cartesian dualism separates the mind from the body: it separates the 'world-of-consciousness' from the 'world-in-itself', the subject from the object, or the knower from the known. Secondly, knowledge and certainty are located in the minds of isolated individuals. An individual's mind is static and passive in the acquisition of knowledge through the recognition of universal ideas. Consciousness and subjective reflection are innate characteristics of the human mind and, therefore, are given priority over action and communication. Thirdly, knowledge is assessed through predetermined and stable external standards, including mathematical and logical systems and the laws of nature. And finally, Descartes' mechanistic assumptions involved a conception of the world in
terms of independent and static elements associated by invariant laws of cause and effect.

Cartesian philosophy was not the only viable paradigm on which to build a new psychology (Marková, 1982; Hearnshaw, 1987), but it provided the foundation both for the philosophy of mind and for experimental physiology from which psychology was born. As psychology gained its independence from philosophy and was rapidly transformed from a science of mind to a science of behaviour, it appeared that psychology no longer bore any relationship to Cartesian Philosophy. Introspectionism had adhered to Descartes' conception of mind but behaviourism, with its faith in empirical objectivism, had banished all reference to mental phenomena. However this, in itself, did not constitute a paradigmatic revolution: many of the Cartesian principles were embedded within the behaviouristic framework.

Most significantly, mind was still separated from behaviour. Behaviourism focused on the body and the behaviour of the other one. In so doing, they excluded the scientist from the process of science. Although the scientist was the knower, he or she observed the external world of objects and behaviour. On the one hand, mind was an epiphenomenon to the object of study. On the other hand, mind, or knowledge, was passively acquired by individual scientists as they conducted research. Furthermore, they maintained Descartes' mechanistic conception of the world. In effect, they failed to realize the inherently social character of both their object of study and of science itself.

By the time cognitivism emerged as the dominant tradition, psychology already had its own history and apparently did not need to reflect on its philosophical past. However, cognitivism simply shifted the perspective back to the mind of the individual whilst remaining within the Cartesian tradition of thought. The knower, in this case the psychologist's subject, was still separated from the known, from the world which is given in an external reality. Priority is given to the human mind which, whilst active in the acquisition of knowledge, is still isolated from other minds.
Thus both behaviourism and cognitivism fall within the Cartesian tradition of thought. They both adopt Cartesian principles concerning the relationship between the individual (the knower) and the known. They are both adhering to a mechanistic conception of the world. Furthermore, neither escape from the individualism which psychology inherited at its birth.

The Cartesian philosophy was also compatible with Newtonian physics and the social representation of science. Psychology's aspirations to the natural sciences only further entrenched the discipline in the dualisms between mind and body between self and other and between the individual and society. Nor was this individualistic paradigm challenged by collective representations in American culture. Farr (in press, 1990b) traces the rise of individualism in Western culture and its insidious influence on the development of experimental social psychology in America. Tajfel (1972) and Billig (1976) similarly indicate the influence of individualism on the form and content of social psychological theories and research on groups. As a consequence, the Cartesian assumptions in contemporary social psychology have gone largely unnoticed. It is only by examining alternative paradigms which adhere to a different set of presuppositions that the Cartesian influence becomes apparent. And it is only by developing alternative paradigms that a new social psychology can be constructed which overcomes the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the traditional approach.

3.5 AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

There is an alternative tradition of thought in the history of social psychology which transcends the dualism between mind and body and constitutes a framework in which the individual is integrated with the cultural. Here, the psychological activity of individuals is conceived of as essentially a cultural product and culture as a human product. I shall refer to this as the Hegelian paradigm as recent developments in social psychology reflect its theoretical and methodological principles (see section 3.7).

The Hegelian tradition of thought contrasts dramatically with the Cartesian paradigm. Firstly, language, myth and
customs are cultural products with an objective existence which influences the mental functioning of individuals. Language is an inherently social phenomenon which is related closely to self-reflexive awareness. It constitutes a system of gestures and symbols of communication which link the psychological processes of associated individuals. The mind of an individual is thus part of a trans-individual psychological system, and language can express the mentality of a nation. By observing the regularities of language and cultural change, it is possible, therefore, to draw inferences about the evolution of mind and the underlying psychological processes of individuals.

Secondly, self-consciousness and reflexion is not something that exists in nature, but rather it develops out of the mutual encounter of one conscious being with another. During interactions, people mutually take the other's point of view. It is through this ability to empathize that individuals come to be able to take the other's perspective towards themselves and attain a reflexive self-consciousness. By reconceptualizing the relationship between the individual and culture, the individualistic concepts of mind, reflexions, and consciousness are transformed into social and dynamic concepts. These transcend the dualism between the individual and culture.

Thirdly, the dualism between mind and body, between the individual and the environment, is transcended by reconceptualizing the relationship between the knower and the known. For Hegel, knowledge is acquired through a 'circle returning within itself'. Humans are not only active in the acquisition of knowledge but there is also a circle of interaction by which the knowing subject and the object of his/her knowing are both transformed. This interactive process constitutes a gradual reconstruction of the 'world-of-consciousness' and the 'world-in-itself', which is creative. Knowledge is thus interdependent with activity in a particular environmental social context. Mind is not given priority over action, rather action is intimately involved in the development of mind.
Fourthly, the subject matter of psychology cannot be constructed in such mechanistic terms as cause and effect, nor can it simply be a science of mind or a science of behaviour. What is required is a science of both mind and behaviour which goes beyond the individual to study his or her development in the physical and cultural environment. Underlying the Hegelian paradigm of thought is an evolutionary perspective on the phenomena of mind and culture. This necessarily entails an historical approach which focuses on the interdependent development of individuals and cultures.

3.6 THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE DIVIDED

Although Wundt's psychophysics and his Voelkerpsychologie were closely related, the historical development of the social sciences saw the separation of the individual from society and the entrenchment of a division between psychology and sociology. Furthermore, they were part of two contrasting paradigms of thought. Within psychology, the Cartesian paradigm and the dominance of a positivistic social representation of science demanded a social representation of the individual as an independent entity set over against the physical and social environment. Within some forms of the social sciences the Hegelian paradigm, which necessitates an historical and comparative form of science, provides a social representation of the individual as relational or interdependent with its socio-cultural environment.

Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie and the sociological forms of social psychology, which are historically and conceptually linked to it, fall within the Hegelian tradition of thought. Danziger (1963) traces the historical antecedents of Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie to the philosophy of Herder (1772) and the Voelkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal (1860). Marková's (1983) article on German Expressivism provides a broader background to Wundt's treatment of language in the philosophies of Herder, Humboldt and Hegel. Hearnshaw (1987) traces the philosophical roots further back to Spinoza (1962-77), who opposed directly the dualism of Descartes. Wundt had separated his psychophysics from his Voelkerpsychologie because, although mind was a cultural
product, consciousness was still conceived of in Cartesian terms: consciousness was an individual phenomenon given in nature.

3.6.1 A note on Darwin

An early and highly significant influence on the development of psychology was Darwin's theory of evolution. This paradoxically facilitated the emergence of both individualistic psychology through Wundt's psychophysics (MacKenzie, 1976) and sociological forms of psychology through Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie (Farr, 1983). Prior to Darwin's theory of evolution, the realm of science encompassed the material or physiological aspects of humans but would not encompass mind and human nature. Precise experimentation from physics, chemistry and even physiology was not applied to the study of mind. Darwin's writings not only integrated men into the natural order but also showed that it was possible to extend dramatically the appropriate units of scientific enquiry.

This, in effect, provided the licence for Wundt to apply the methods of physiology to the phenomenon of mind. Scientific enquiry could be geared to the problems and theories of mind and psychology could be included in the natural sciences. With the establishment of psychology in America, the dominance of positivism instantiated a methodological concept of science, which focused on experimentation rather than on human nature. Moreover, Watsonian behaviourism emphasized the communality between man and animals, which virtually ignored the significance of language and culture.

Darwin's evolutionary science also provided a model for and a legitimization of the Voelkerpsychologie. Darwin's science had been content or problem oriented, and had broadened the available conception of scientific method. He had conducted a major study which was wholly naturalistic: it used historical and comparative methods, drawing on an eclectic data base. Moreover, his theory of evolution employed a variety of explanatory and descriptive terms which were not restricted to physiology, chemistry or physics. Once established scientific, evolutionary theory legitimized the
use of a wide variety of evidence in the study of fundamental problems about living organisms. Other German scientists, such as Humboldt, had used historical and comparative methods to study language. In order to study the varieties of culture and its relationship to the individual, Wundt's Voelkerpsychologie adopted the comparative and evolutionary perspective which Darwin had established in the realm of science.

3.6.2 A dilemma for social psychology

The two paradigms in which the individual and the cultural have been constructed are fundamentally irreconcilable (Holmes, 1988). Firstly, it is not possible to integrate a representation of the individual as independent and a representation of the social as relational. Independent entities remain essentially the same in the context of surrounding change, and they can move freely from one context to another without being changed themselves. In contrast, relational entities vary in the context of surrounding change and cannot move freely: a change in context always involves a change in the entity itself. Secondly, a positivistic empirical approach to knowledge and to science are incompatible with the investigation of relational and evolving phenomena. This is because positivistic empiricism is dependent on the primacy of independent entities. Only then can the known (object) be separated from the knower (subject); and only then can facts be identified as objective reality. If culture is to re-emerge as an essential aspect of social psychology, it is necessary to conceive the cultural and the individual in relational terms.

3.7 THE INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE

The Hegelian tradition of thought has not been well represented in the human sciences over the past five decades, but I would argue that it is essentially more appropriate for the study of social phenomena. The individual and the social must both be conceived in relational terms and as evolutionary products rather than as givens in nature. The integration of the individual and society is dependent upon a social representation of the individual as an essentially social being. This requires a social representation of
science which is not tied to the empirical methodology of the physical sciences but, rather, adopts historical and developmental methods of investigation which are suited to the study of human beings in society (see Chapter 6).

In recent years we have seen a return of culture into social psychology and an increased interest in societal forms of psychology (Farr, 1990b; Billig, 1982; Marková, 1982; Himmelweit and Gaskell, 1990; Cole, 1987; Moscovici, 1972, 1984b; Tajfel, 1984a). Many of these expositions draw on writings from the past, reinstating culture to its proper place in social psychology. In particular, there has been a resurgence of interest in the work of Mead (1920's; 1934) from Chicago U.S.A., and of Vygotsky (1920's; 1929) from the Soviet Union of Russia.

Mead and Vygotsky both adopted and elaborated the Hegelian paradigm (independently of each other) in an explicit attempt to reconcile Wundt's two psychologies. The integration of Wundt's individual and social psychology required that consciousness be re-conceptualized as a social phenomena: thought and self-awareness arise out of culture and are inherently social in nature. Although the writings of Mead and Vygotsky contain some significant differences, their fundamental characteristics are surprisingly similar. Both were committed to an evolutionary and historical approach in which psychology cannot be divorced from the study of culture. Both sought the origins of mind in the communicative act. And both emphasized the dialectic relationship between language and thought. Both focused on symbolic meaning and the means of communication. In the next chapter, I shall draw extensively on their ideas to clarify and extrapolate some of the central principles within the theory of social representations.

Other developments in contemporary social psychology indicate a paradigmatic revolution which has important implications for the conduct of the social sciences. During the 1970's a number of penetrating critiques against mechanistic and reductionistic approaches initiated and sustained a crisis in social psychology. At the heart of the crisis was a loss of faith in objectivity. The work of Orne
(1962) and Rosenthal (1966) indicated the highly reactive nature of laboratory experimentation and led to doubts concerning the validity and certainty of such scientific investigations. Kelman (1968), amongst others, questioned the notion of value-free science and issues regarding the ethics of research in the social sciences further destabilized the establishment. This gave rise to meta-theoretical analysis and debate which challenged the traditional assumptions rooted in Cartesian philosophy and positivistic empirical science.

Disagreements as to whether or not psychology should be considered a natural or a social science are closely associated with the different approaches offered by the Cartesian and Hegelian Paradigms. This has been at the heart of many heated debates within the history of the discipline. For example, in the 1970's, Joynson and Zangwell adopted opposing positions with regard to the relationship between common-sense and psychology. Joynson propounded the view that common-sense constitutes an important source of knowledge which can contribute to the development of psychology. In contrast, Zangwell rejected common-sense knowledge. For him, psychology should be founded in the methods and principles of the natural sciences and nothing was to be gained by incorporating common-sense understandings.

This debate was resumed in a slightly different form with the publication of Gergen's article on social psychology as history (1973). Gergen suggests that there is an ongoing relationship between common-sense and psychology. As the concepts and theories of psychology diffuse into common-sense the nature of the very subject matter which psychology attempts to study changes. Moscovici's own study on the diffusion of psychoanalysis within French culture is a case in point. The diffusion and assimilation of a new understanding of human nature had far-reaching cultual and social implications. Similarly, the work of Festinger on cognitive dissonance (1975), of Asch on group conformity (1956) and of Milgram on obedience to authority (1974) all produced counter-intuitive results. However, once the scientific knowledge diffuses within a culture, it changes
people's understanding of themselves and others, their
behaviour and their social interactions, and hence changes
the phenomena that psychology attempts to explain. As such,
psychology cannot develop universal laws or principles which
apply to all cultures at all times. As culture and society
change so, too, these changes must be reflected in
psychological theory.

Psychology, as an experimental science, tended to
isolate phenomena in the laboratory in order to establish
universal laws or truths. The scientist attempts to create
a cultural and temporal vacuum within the laboratory such
that the relationships found in the experimental manipulation
may be said to apply to all people at all times. In contrast,
the psychologist who includes the dimensions of time and
space recognizes the influence of history (time) and culture
(space). The very subject matter of psychology, be it human
nature, mind or behaviour, varies across time and space. At
any one time, there exists a variety of cultures and
subcultures, which constitute a different subject matter for
the psychologist. (This view is reflected in the quartet of
chapters in the Murchison Handbook (1935) on the social
histories of the white, red, black and yellow men). Also, any
one culture will exhibit changes over time; they have a
social history, a past and a future which should not be
ignored. Furthermore, these differences between and within
cultures must be reflected in psychological theory.

New approaches to psychology and social psychology
emerged, emphasizing the significance of meaning, the role
of culture and the socio-historical context of human life
(eg. Mixon, 1971; Harré and Secord, 1972; Israel and
Tajfel, 1972; Gergen, 1982, 1985a, b; Armistead, 1974;
Shotter, 1975; Meiser, 1976; Strickland et al., 1976; Gould and
Graumann, 1986; Gilmour and Duck, 1980; Cranach and
Harré, 1982, 1984a; McGuire, 1983; Rosnow and Georgoudi, 1986;
Margolis et al., 1986; Marková, 1987; Jaeger and Rosnow, 1989).
Despite their differences, these authors display a number of
common themes, assumptions and principles which constitute a
revolution in both psychology and social psychology. In
effect, this revolution reintroduces the Hegelian tradition of thought into social psychology.

In an illuminating article, Jaeger and Rosnow (1988) outline these contemporary developments under the name of contextualism. They emphasize the active role of individuals in the construction of social knowledge; the changing nature of reality, and the wider socio-historic context. In short, all that was presented in the above section as an 'alternative paradigm for social psychology' could equally well be presented under the heading of 'contextualism in contemporary social psychology'.

At the heart of this paradigm shift lies a transformation in epistemology; that is, the conception of the relationship between the knower and the known. One of the most consistent and provocative proponents of this new epistemology is Kenneth Gergen (1973, 1978, 1982, 1985a, b). Knowledge is conceived of as an active, practical and constructive affair. As such it is relative to specific socio-historical and cultural contexts which evolve and transform. Knowledge is thus relative to time/space (see Chapter 5) and cannot be divorced from either the knower or its context within a particular culture.

This epistemology has important implications for the conduct of scientific inquiry (e.g., Gergen, 1985a, b; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Jaegar and Rosnow, 1988). Behaviourism, by limiting itself to the observation of other people's behaviour, excluded from its analysis the role of the scientist both as a participant in research and in the construction of the research situation. This conformed with the social representation of science which behaviourists adopted from the natural sciences. The reactive nature of psychological research could not be formulated within such a framework and consequently did not appear to be a problem. With the emergence of cognitive psychology it was realized that the human subject does not passively respond to a given situation; rather, he or she actively construes the situation in accordance with his or her beliefs, values and desires. This is as true for everyday life as it is for the research situation. However, this constructive epistemology was
restricted to the object of study: an empiricist epistemology was maintained with regard to the scientists. But psychology is a science in which both the agent and the object of study are humans. Both the scientists and the subjects are observers and actors in research.

By applying the same epistemology to both the social phenomena being studied and the realm of scientific investigation itself contextualists have elaborated an alternative conception of science which is more in keeping with the Hegelian tradition. This self-reflexive approach avoids any inherent contradictions between the conception of the object of study (ie. people) and the conception of science. Such contradictions have been prevalent in the social sciences. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a science which is independent of its subject matter, or how the community of scientists and the community which it studies live and function within different forms of reality.

Scientists are social individuals who are actively engaged in the social construction of scientific knowledge. They are participants in the construction and transformation of theory and research. Furthermore, science is a human activity which is culturally and historically situated. Scientists' observations are dependent on their theories and theories are relative to the social and cultural milieu of which they are a part. Scientific knowledge is thus not objective, individualistic and ahistorical; it is perpetually open to revision and transformation and can lay no claim to certainty. This has far-reaching implications for the endeavour of science. Rather than focusing on observation theory-testing, prediction and control, the greater emphasis is placed on theory construction, understanding, and the relational interdependence of phenomena.

The Hegelian paradigm is expressed in apparently diverse alternatives in contemporary social psychology, including the historical-social psychology, ethogenics, dialectics, hermeneutic analysis, discourse analysis and ethno-methodology, as well as a more critical analysis of the philosophical and meta-theoretical history of social
psychology (Gergen and Morawski, 1980). Moreover, its manifestations are not limited to social psychology; its principles have also been explored in cognitive psychology, life-span development, personality communications, and environmental psychology (Rosnow and Georgoudi, 1986).

The theory of social representations does not stand in isolation from the evolution of social psychology as a discipline and the emergence of alternative orientations in the human sciences. It is, at one and the same time, an initiating force and an expression of this reorientation. However, even though social representation theorists propound a cultural social psychology, they have not entirely broken with its Cartesian predecessors. I propose to show that, while it constitutes a powerful and valid critique of the individualism of conventional social psychology, Moscovici subscribes to a positivistic view of science and this leads him to make a false distinction between the world of science and the world of common-sense with regard to the role of social representations. The theory still reflects certain aspects of the positivistic (Cartesian) tradition of thought while championing the constructivist (Hegelian) tradition. The fundamental differences between these two paradigms underlies many of the contradictions and confusions which are evident in Moscovici's writings.

The exposition of these contrasting paradigms and their expression in the history of psychology and social psychology in this chapter has proved to be essential groundwork for the following three chapters. In Chapter 4, I will elaborate upon the social representations of the individual, and consider the latter's integration with culture within the theory of social representation. This discussion focuses on the dynamics of social representations and the role of the individual in their transformation. In Chapter 5, I take issue with the social representation of science presented by Moscovici and suggest that the theory must adopt a constructivist approach to this realm of knowledge. Furthermore, I shall argue that, far from being exclusive to common sense, the theory of social representations is also applicable to the dynamics of scientific knowledge. In
Chapter 6, I discuss the methodological commitments of the Hegelian paradigm and their implications for research in the field of social representations.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIAL INDIVIDUAL AND THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

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The theory of social representations is heralded as a revolutionary social psychology which is distinguished by its theoretical and methodological approach to social phenomena. Much of contemporary social psychology is individualistic in orientation and perpetuates an empiricist science, as discussed in the previous chapter. This individualistic approach is countered by the French tradition of research on social representations which reflects the ideas of sociological thinkers and, in particular, those of Durkheim. But the re-introduction of culture into social psychology does not necessarily overcome the dualism between the individual and society.

It is argued here that the theory and much of its associated research still betrays a tension between the psychological and cultural aspects of human life. In so doing, it fails to provide an understanding of the dynamic nature of social representations. Drawing on writings within the Hegelian paradigm this problem is overcome by constructing a social representation of the individual as an essentially social being. Individuals develop and live in an evolving system which embraces both the cultural and physical environment. This elaborated theoretical perspective denies the social significance of purely individual representations and argues against a definition of social representations purely in terms of consensual or widespread beliefs. It also provides the context in which we can define social reality with greater precision. This, in turn, leads to a re-assessment of the dynamics of social representations and the social-psychological processes involved in their transformation. Although these ideas presented here may be considered to re-structure the theory in important respects, it is hoped that the central aspects of the theory are maintained while the more blatant contradictions are overcome. Finally, the contribution that the theory of social representations can make to contemporary social psychology is briefly considered.
The first section of this chapter examines some of the major conflicts and contradictions within the theory of social representations and proposes some preliminary steps towards resolving them. It does not comprise a list of problems with suggested solutions. Such an approach is neither helpful nor feasible; rather, the difficulties relate to the theory as a whole and are reflected in its different aspects. It will be seen that the major difficulties arise as Moscovici attempts to convert a sociological concept into a social-psychological phenomenon, as he tries to integrate the sociological or cultural with the psychological to construct a social psychology. Moscovici establishes the supraindividual nature of social representations by borrowing Durkheim's sociological concept of collective representations and by emphasizing their prescriptive and autonomous character. Simultaneously, he asserts the potency of the individual in the dynamics and transformation of social representations. However, in itself, this does not provide a synthesis of culture and of the individual. On the one hand, his emphasis on the prescriptive and autonomous character of social representations leaves no place for the individual. On the other hand, by overemphasizing the potency of the individual, both the collective and dynamic character of social representations is in danger of being reduced to individual cognition.

The dualism between the individual and culture which has bedeviled social psychology is perpetrated in the theory of social representations. Indeed, it is made even more apparent by a theory that attempts to re-introduce cultural phenomena into mainstream social psychology. This dualism is also evident in much of the laboratory and field research on social representations. Three modifications to the theory are suggested as an initial step towards transcending this dualism. These challenge or re-interpret the theoretical principles that deny the dynamic character of social representations and the role of the individual in their transformation. Firstly, their prescriptive character must be
conceived of in the context of a heterogeneous and changing society. Secondly, their consensual character does not imply a purely distributive understanding of social representations. Their transformation depends upon the conflicts and controversies between people living in a heterogeneous society. Thirdly, the autonomous character of social representations is rejected. Social representations cannot be autonomous from the individuals who together create and maintain them.

4.1.1 Intellectual ancestors

Durkheim has been claimed as the intellectual ancestor of the French tradition of social representations. It's distinctly European character reflects Durkheim's sociological analysis and exploits the notion of collective representations, social reality and 'social facts' as expressed in his writings. However, despite proclaiming Durkheim as an intellectual ancestor, there are a number of important distinctions to be made between Durkheim's collective representations and the current use of the term social representations. Moscovici points out a number of differences which emphasize the dynamic character of social representations. Also, in a video-taped interview, Moscovici has said that he only came to read Durkheim after embarking on his study of the diffusion of psychoanalysis in France. In this same interview he suggests a close affinity to the work of Piaget. Deutscher (1984a), furthermore, examines a number of fundamental differences between Durkheim's sociology and Moscovici's social psychology suggesting that the concept of collective representations has been borrowed in isolation from the remainder of Durkheim's writings. This being the case, the choice of Durkheim as a sole intellectual ancestor is mistaken and so we must look elsewhere for the intellectual origins of the theory of social representations. By examining these historical and intellectual roots and the emergence of social representations as a theory we are better able to understand the problems and issues which are addressed and the meaning of the concepts which are central to the theory.

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That we should look to European thinkers is suggested by some of Moscovici's diverse writings. He is concerned that European social psychologists address the problems of their own culture as opposed to borrowing the American problems and conceptions which have dominated theory and research in social psychology.

It is not just this (European) social reality that is shared; for many of us the ideas of, for example, Marx, Freud, Piaget and Durkheim are of direct relevance because they are familiar and because the questions that they were trying to answer are also our own questions. The critical aspects of our social reality including social class structure, the phenomenon of language, the influence of ideas about society - are issues which have hardly been considered by traditional social psychology.

(Moscovici, 1972)

There is indeed an affinity with Piaget's work, although he does not consider some of the social and cultural aspects of social representations. It is possible that Durkheim's notion of collective representations was combined with Piaget's study of representations in the child's world. Piaget studied children's verbalization (a tradition carried over in social representations research) to gain some insight into the intellectual structures of representations, both as to their origins and their development. Other aspects of Piaget's work which appear to have been influential are the relationship between language and action, the role of imagination and the symbolic and meaningful nature of reality, and the child's active construction of reality.

Another possible influence is the work of Freud (Moscovici, 1984a) and the 'interiorization' or internalization of culturally-rooted representations. In this respect, the theoretical work of both Piaget and Freud has been primarily concerned with children whereas social representations theory appears to apply the same principles to adult thinking. There are other possible influences which include Marx, Levy-Strauss, Foucoul, and other structuralists.
4.1.2 Social versus collective representations

We are now in a better position to understand the differences between collective and individual representations as portrayed by Durkheim and social representations as explicated by Moscovici.

a) One of the fundamental differences between Durkheim's collective representations and social representations theory is the conceptualization of the relationship between the individual and society. Durkheim conceptualized collective representations and individual representations as two distinct and opposing forms of knowledge. Collective representations were explanatory devices in his sociology which were irreducible by further analysis. He was concerned to establish sociology as a distinct discipline from psychology with its own object of study which was irreducible to individual psychology. In so doing Durkheim separated individual and collective consciousness as the subject matter of two distinct disciplines, psychology and sociology.

For example, in his study of suicide he explicates how collective representations remain in opposition to individual representations. As the latter proliferate, the former break down, losing their cohesive and stabilizing power, resulting in a state of anomie and an increase in the number of suicides. Individual representations, for Durkheim, led to the disintegration of society and of moral values, isolating individuals from social purposes and social regulation.

This opposition between collective and individual representations expounded by Durkheim is abandoned by social representation theorists in an attempt to provide an integration of the individual and society to define an object of social psychology which is pertinent both to the individual level and to the collective level out of which the content has a clear social value. The ideal being that it can lend itself to a continuous description....

(Moscovici, 1979, p.4 from Doise 1984, p.255)

Social representations are phenomena to be studied, elucidating their content, structure and dynamics. Furthermore, Moscovici is primarily concerned with change in modern society. Individual and social representations do not function in opposition but have a dynamic inter-relationship
essential to the transformation of social representations and, in fact, to all aspects of individual and social life. Hence, whereas collective representations constitute a sociological concept and are seen in opposition to individual representations, social representations constitute a social psychological phenomenon which is intimately related to individual representations.

b) This is closely related to a second distinction which can be made between Durkheim's collective representations and social representations, and is one which is emphasized by Moscovici (1984b). Whereas Durkheim presented a structural sociology in which collective representations are relatively static and exist in a stable society, social representations are dynamic structures which evolve and transform in an everchanging society.

In Durkheim's sociology, collective representations are characterized by their constraining and coercive power on the members of a given society. Social facts current in a stable society determine human behaviour. Furthermore, collective representations, being distinct from, and acting in opposition to, individual representations, are autonomous and independent of individuals and groups. Moscovici (1984) wishes to maintain this characteristic of collective representations in order to avoid the individual reductionism which has been prevalent in psychology for many decades. He states that although individuals and groups create social representations

once created, however, they lead a life of their own, circulate, merge, attract and repel each other and, give birth to new representations, while old ones die out.

(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 13: my emphasis)

Collective representations, being independent of and autonomous from individuals, are clearly supraindividual phenomena with attributes and characteristics of their own.

Moscovici (1984a) also wishes to distance the theory of social representations from such a restricting and coercive characterization. This is done with reference to the
relationship between social representations and the individual:

we should not be led to underestimate... the contribution each member of a given society makes in creating and maintaining beliefs and behaviours shared by all. In other words, what counts is not the separateness of individual representations but the transformation each individual imposes on group representations and the converse.

(Moscovici, 1984a, p. 950)

Hence, while the coercive nature of collective representations are characterized by a one-way relationship, imposing themselves on individuals, social representations are characterized by a dynamic inter-relationship between individuals and the groups or society to which they belong.

4.1.3 The force of society versus the potency of the individual

This poses a substantial problem for social representations' theorists. On the one hand, social representations are prescriptive, imposing themselves on us with irresistible force. The weight of tradition, of collective memory, the images and words embedded in language 'exerts a force against which our mind and conscience is powerless' (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 950). The past, it is claimed, prevails over the present. On the other hand, we are told not to underestimate 'the autonomy of the present'. Individuals are active in the creation and maintenance of social representations and play an essential role in the transformation and dynamic nature of social representations.

The theory of social representation is, paradoxically, in danger of both sociological and individualistic reductionism. At one extreme, in attempting to overcome the individualistic bias in social psychology, Moscovici has borrowed the concept of collective representations from Durkheim, almost by direct quotations. Social representations are autonomous social facts which are independent from individuals; they are external realities which lie outside the individual. By emphasizing the prescriptive and conventional nature of social representations which act as constraints on the perceptions, conceptions and behaviour of
individuals and groups, Moscovici is in danger of presenting a sociological thesis which has little or no regard for the role of individuals. McKinlay and Potter (1987), in their conceptual critique of social representations theory, suggest that Moscovici's historical prescriptive thesis is so strong that it is totally inconsistent with and denies the possibility of change and individual involvement.

At the other extreme, the theory can be conceived of as presenting an individualistic thesis. This has been an argument presented by a number of critics. We have already noted that Harré (1984c) considers social representations to be distributed as aggregate individual representations. While the assessment of the principle of uniformity is surely correct, this use of the concept of 'the social' is still, in the last analysis, a version of individualism.

(Harré, 1984c, p. 931)

The theory of social representations is often conceived of as a purely cognitive theory. Fransella (1984) suggests that for many social representation students it is still a purely cognitive affair and that the relation between social representations as a cognitive concept and behaviour is not clearly indicated.

Similarly, McKinlay and Potter (1987) argue that the social aspects of the theory are in principle reducible to individual cognition:

Social representations theory, as formulated by Moscovici, seems to involve a line of argument which can offer no reason as to why the social ought to be regarded as in principle reducible to more basic cognitive notions.

(McKinlay and Potter, 1987, p. 19)

This argument is supported by two features of Moscovici's exposition relating to the nature of reality. Firstly, although lay men and women inhabit the consensual universe which is constituted by social representations, scientists, who occupy the reified universe, are able to deliver non-social, objective knowledge of the world independently of social representations. Secondly, unfamiliar objects must be perceived by individuals in some way before they are anchored to a social representation. That is, individuals, in
some instances, are able to perceive the world independently of social representations. In both instances the acquisition of knowledge is reducible to the cognitive activity of individuals and there is no reason to accept Moscovici's thesis that social representations are in some way essentially social.

McKinley and Potter build their argument on particular features of Moscovici's exposition of social representations. However, this is perhaps not the most appropriate or productive level on which to conduct a theoretical critique. The problems they discuss are indicative of a more substantial problem which, as yet, remains unresolved. The problem to which I refer is the dualism between the individual and culture; a dualism which must be overcome if the theory of social representations is to provide a revolutionary alternative to traditional social psychology.

Semin (1985a) argues that if the social representational approach is to avoid a cognitive reductionism then some specification of the dialectics between social representations and the social psychological processes involved in social interaction is required. Parker (1987), in his article on 'social representation: social psychologists (mis)use of sociology,' suggests that social representations theory does not provide a resolution of thesis and antithesis. Rather it constitutes the problem in that it attempts to deal with both the individual and the social but, in effect, reinforces the dualism inherent in the divide between psychology and sociology.

4.1.4 Society and the individual in research on social representations

The split between the psychological and the cultural can be seen both in the experimental investigations and in the field studies. Experimental studies have approached this problem from the direction of the individual. The psychological is expressed in the exploration of individuals' cognitive system of representations, in order to analyse the dynamics and development of social representations. On the other hand, I have argued that they only manipulate the system of representations already in existence. The language
used by experimenters to manipulate subjects' representations is an inherent part of the experimental procedure. Language, being a cultural phenomenon, reflects the sociological aspect of the research.

The field studies, in contrast, tend to approach the individual/culture interface from the direction of society. In order to counteract the highly individualistic Anglo-American social psychology, many of the French researchers have stressed the sociological and Durkheimian aspects of social representations to such an extent that the role of the individual remains largely unexamined and is assumed to be unimportant.

For example, Jodelet and Moscovici (1973) were able to trace the evolution and transformation of the social representations of the body in relation to social and cultural changes by means of a longitudinal study repeating her interviews with a fifteen-year interval. Transformations were related to historical/cultural changes and to the social circumstances of different groups, their changing roles in society and the differential cultural diffusion of information. However, although this particular study relates the transformations of social representations to people's position in society, and hence their relations and associations with others, it remains a general and descriptive account of changes in the representations over space-time. As such, it does not address how the transformations are constructed and, hence, does not illuminate the active and dynamic integration of the psychological with the cultural.

The split between the individual and culture is also evident in Herzlich's (1973) study on the social representation of health and illness. Individuals were given unstructured interviews in order to elicit representations of health and illness. The information gathered was then aggregated across individuals to present a single, relatively coherent social representation. Farr (1984) suggests that representation may be qualified by 'social' (as opposed to 'collective') as a sign of caution, that is, the representation of health and illness does not exist on the
Durkheimian collective level. However, this implies that the distinction between the two is purely the degree of their distribution. Harré would go further than this to argue that the representations, being elicited from individuals and then aggregated, may still be conceived of as ultimately individualistic, psychological phenomena. On the other hand, Herzlich also shows how the social representations which people form of health and illness differ according to the historical epoch within one culture, and its relation to the history of medicine; and also drawing on anthropological studies how they differ as a function of culture.

Although field studies include both psychological and sociological aspects of social representations they fail to provide a fusion of the two; they succeed in elucidating the association between the psychological - individuals' representations - and the cultural - the products of society, but they do not necessarily provide the synthesis which would constitute a social psychology to which the theory of social representations aspires. Semin (1985b) is making a similar point when stating

To the extent that the "phenomenon" remains unspecific with regard to the social psychological processes which are involved in the production and reproduction of social representations, it will not be an advance on the type of social anthropology which has been extant for many years.

(Semin, 1985b, p. 94).

Thus, it still remains open to question whether or not the theory itself provides a framework in which the psychological and the cultural can be synthesized. In the previous discussion, concerning the distinctions between Durkheim's collective representations and Moscovici's social representations we have seen that this is certainly one of the prominent aims of the theory. But, more importantly, it is absolutely crucial if we are to succeed in providing an understanding of the dynamic nature of social representations. It is their dynamic nature which both necessitates and suggests a resolution of the individual and culture. However, the majority of studies, even though they
explore the transformation of social representations, fail to elucidate these issues.

4.1.5 The prescriptive and dynamic nature of social representations

In order to achieve this synthesis, it is first necessary to establish an understanding of social representations that allows for both their prescriptive and their dynamic nature. This can only be achieved if the historical aspect entailed in social representations theory is not conceived of as an immutable given, but rather as a dynamic presence which must, itself, be conceived from a genetic and historical perspective. Relevant to this issue is a further distinction, made by Moscovici, between collective and social representations. For Durkheim, collective representations exist in a stable society and are embedded in the subsoil of the society's culture. In contrast, social representations exist in changing societies. Moscovici is at pains to restrict social representations to representations of our current society, to our political, scientific, human soil, which have not always enough time to allow the proper sedimentation to become immovable traditions. And their importance continues to increase, in direct proportion to the heterogeneity and the fluctuation of the unifying systems - official sciences, religions, ideologies (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 18).

The heterogeneous nature of our society and the rapidly expanding forms of communication provide the impetus for change.

This has important implications for our understanding of the prescriptive nature of social representations. There is not just one coherent system of representations, but rather a multitude of systems with inconsistencies, both within and between them. As people interact with each other, these inconsistencies become apparent and present problems which require the active reconstruction of the various representations. As was alluded to in Chapter 1, the prescriptive influence of the past is, itself, dependent on social interaction and communication between groups and individuals. It is, itself, a dynamic and active process.
Moreover, unlike people within a stable, homogeneous society, these groups and individuals do not possess the same past. The prescriptive and dynamic aspects of the theory are thus united by the confrontation between different pasts and different representations.

Furthermore, it is the dynamic nature of social representations which precludes a definition of social in terms of the number of individuals who share a representation. A purely aggregate or distributive understanding of social representations would not sustain their dynamic nature nor their supra-individual status. It is in the differences, conflicts and controversies, which relate to people's pasts, their positions within society, their role and duties and their social relations, which give social representations their distinctive dynamic character and also their supra-individual qualities. These individuals and groups with different pasts and their related systems of representations come into contact with each other, presenting incompatible and problematic representations resulting in controversies which provide the initiative to transform the relevant representations. It is interesting to note that 'controversy' can be broken down to contra-version, 'version' being Harré's (1984c) preferred translation of representation. Moreover, this suggests that Harré's critique of the concept of social representations may be indicative of methodological and research problems as opposed to theoretical and conceptual problems. A proper understanding of the dynamic nature of social representations necessitates that social representations are characterized as social rather than 'distributive' representations.

4.1.6 Social representations are not autonomous

This still leaves a problem with the autonomous nature of social representations. The need to establish the supra-individual nature of social representations must not rely on claims for their autonomy, as this denies the role of individuals in the transformation of social representations and fails to provide a social-psychological thesis.
Social representations are prescriptive but they do not live a life of their own nor give birth to new representations on their own – this would be a sociological thesis. Rather they are continuously modified by individuals, who are involved not only in the creation of social representations but also in the maintenance of those representations. They are the products of a dialectic relationship between the individual and society. Marková and Wilkie (1987) have also questioned the usefulness of claiming autonomy for social representations. Any characterization which assigns agency to collective entities gives a mysterious quality to their dynamic nature. It was to such collectivist thinking which F.H. Allport so strongly objected and which, in opposition, instantiated the individualistic approach to social phenomena. Social representations are prescriptive but, in contrast to Moscovici, I would argue that they are not autonomous.

4.2 THE SOCIAL INDIVIDUAL AND THE NATURE OF REALITY

In the previous section, we examined the expression of the psychological and the sociological in the theory of social representations. A number of modifications were proposed which provide re-interpretations of the main sociological principles involved. These modifications give voice to the dynamics of social representations and the psychological principles of the theory without losing sight of their social or supraindividual nature.

However, the crucial component in the integration of the psychological with the cultural is the social representation of the individual. In order to understand the dynamic nature of social representations, which goes beyond descriptions of their transformations in relation to social, historical and cultural factors, it is essential to explore the role and nature of the individual. It is my contention that, if the theory is to provide an integration of the individual and culture, and, if the theory is to provide an understanding of the dynamics of social representations, it is essential to elaborate and explicate a social representation of the individual as social.
In Chapter 3, it was seen that the social representations of the individual as an independent entity has had a profound effect on the shaping of social psychology. In this section, I shall explicate the means by which the social representations of the individual can be re-socialized. It will be seen that, while some theorists have emphasized the importance of language, a much stronger argument can be constructed. First, by drawing on the writings of Dewey, an organic, as opposed to mechanistic, conception of the relationship between the organisms and their environment, is elaborated. Then, by drawing on the writings of Mead and Vygotsky, this organic conception is extrapolated to include culture. In this way, mind is conceived of in evolutionary and historical terms as essentially social, existing, not only in the heads of individuals, but also in people's social interactions and in their cultural environment. Similarly, social individuals cannot be conceived of as independent from their culture and their social relations.

These developments place the theory of social representations firmly within the Hegelian tradition of thought presented in the previous chapter. Finally, the implications of these developments for our understanding of social reality are considered. Reality is neither an external given nor a collective illusion; rather, reality is socially constructed out of the physical environment within an historical and cultural context.

4.2.1 The social representation of the individual

The idea that the 'individual' and the 'social' are indeed social representations is indicated by the diversity of their representations in different cultures (Dumont, 1970; Kon, 1984) and their transformation in different historical eras (Foucault, 1970; Morris, 1972). The significance of these social representations within social psychology has been discussed in the previous chapter and is also evident from the numerous discussions concerning the image of man and its place in psychology (eg. Shotter, 1975; Semin, 1986).

Again, this issue has been raised within the field of social representations itself. Duveen and Lloyd (1986) argue
that theoretical confusion arises when the constructed and constructive natures of the categories 'individual' and 'social' are ignored. Social representations of the individual and the social have had an insidious influence on social psychology. Furthermore, the representation of the 'individual' divorced from the 'social' is theoretically inadequate. There is no pure 'individuality' which can be apprehended independently of social relations (Duveen and Lloyd, 1986, p. 219).

Farr (1987a) develops a similar argument, drawing on the work of Ichheiser, in his study of the collective representation of individualism and its influence in shaping modern psychology.

Even though the representation of the social individual presented below is not a consensual representation it is still properly considered a social representation. It is a dynamic representation of the individual which has its origins in the social process and social content of the social sciences.

4.2.2 Language and the social individual

The individual human mind is pervaded by the social, by the language, traditions and culture of society. Farr (1984) suggests that this would be a strong sense of 'social' which denies the existence of purely 'individual' representations. One way in which this thesis can be developed is by examining the role of language in the content, structure and expression of social representations.

All representations are social because language is involved in the creation and transmission of social representations.

(Farr, 1985, p. 144)

Moscovici clearly considers language to be of prime importance; 'we think, by means of language', (1984b, p. 8). Language, in a peculiar way, provides the means by which we structure and express our representations.

It is linked to our common everyday method of understanding and of exchanging our ways of seeing things

(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 18).
It relates both to a language of observation, the expression of 'pure fact' and to a language of logic, the expression of abstract symbols. Hence it relates both to the perceptual or iconic and the meaningful or conceptual aspects of social representations. Representations are always of something, a particular object, and of some category.

Jaspars and Hewstone (1990) are making a similar point in their discussion of the role of social knowledge in causal attributions. Central to their argument is that any person explanation always implies also a social category explanation. An individual is always a member of a social category and these two aspects of a person cannot be separated neatly. This point can be extended beyond the realm of persons to apply to any object. An object is always a particular thing and also a thing belonging to one or more categories. As Jodelet (1984b) points out, these categories which structure and express the representation of an object are categories that are drawn from our common culture and are embedded in our language. Even where the focus is on the individual's system of representations, as in the case of the experimental studies, this cultural element is always present. We have already seen how the representations are brought into the laboratory from the common culture that exists outside those laboratories. As Farr (1984) indicates, the emphasis on language encompasses the experimental research on social representation although it should be borne in mind that they do not portray much of what is social about social representations.

4.2.3 The socialization of the individual and the de-individualization of the social

It has been argued that, in order to understand the origins and transformations of social representations, it is necessary to construct a synthesis of the individual and the social. This can be achieved by conceptualizing the human mind and 'individual' thought as a thoroughly social affair. By this, I mean not just that the human mind is pervaded by the social, by the language and traditions of a society, but that it is also social in its genesis. The individual's psychological processes and the contents of their
representations are the products (as well as the producers) of social processes and cultural phenomena.

This is a stronger line of argument than that presented above and denies the existence of purely individual representations. In effect, it entails the reverse of Graumann's (1986) exposition on the individual psychology of groups and crowds in which he states

the individualization of the social is identical with a desocialization of the individual

(Graumann, pp. 100-101)

For social representations theory to overcome individualistic reductionism it requires the socialization of the individual which is identical with a deindividualization of the social.

The idea that the relationship between the individual and society can be understood by propounding the social nature of the individual is not new. Much of the discussion below draws heavily on the work of G.H. Mead (1934) and Vygotsky (1962, 1978). Other, more recent, social scientists have also drawn on the work of these seminal thinkers in addressing this issue, but it is considered here to be worth returning to the original sources. However, before considering the social nature of the individual it is necessary to establish an 'organic' as opposed to a 'mechanistic' conception of the relationship between the organism and its environment. Although this presentation differs in some respects it draws heavily on Dewey's classic article against the use of the reflex arc concept in psychology (Dewey, 1896).

4.2.3.1 The organism and the environment: Mechanistic conceptions construe organisms and their environments as separate parts in isolation and existing independently of one another, such that the characteristics and functions of each can be considered irrespectively of their context. In psychology, this mechanistic approach is epitomized by behaviourism in which causes are located in the environment and responses in the behaviour of the organism. As a result, the analysis of behaviour has been constructed in terms of a
sequence of an organism's responses to environmental stimuli (S-R).

In contrast, an organic conception construes the organism and the environment as a system of mutual influences by which the 'parts' all determine one another's characteristics and functions. Furthermore, the organic system transforms itself qualitatively in a continual process of exchange and growth. The organism is not set in opposition to the environment; rather, they are interdependent aspects of an organic system which function together and define each other at every step.

Dewey illustrates this organic conception using the example of light. Light is construed, not as a stimulus in the environment, but as an act of seeing. Similarly, sound is construed as an act of hearing. Seeing and hearing involve both the organism and the environment simultaneously and interdependently. Furthermore, the meaning and value of seeing or hearing are transformed through the action of the organism/environment system over time.

This organic conception is difficult to express in ordinary language in which the separation of the organism and environment is both implicit and insidious. For example, the statement 'The child sees the candle' immediately locates the seeing in the organism and the candle in the environment. Similarly, the action is located frequently either in the organism or the environment; the child reaches for the candle and the candle burns the child. But the meaning and value of both 'reaching' and 'burning' are dependent upon the organism/environment system. Furthermore, it is through such action that meanings and values are transformed. Rather than assuming that the stimulus and response are givens which exist in nature it is necessary to examine the genesis and development of the organic system over time.

4.2.3.2 The organism/environment/culture system: So far, we have an understanding of the organism in the environment. However, when we come to consider the human organism/environment system a third term enters into the analysis—that of culture, with all its social and historical concomitants. This does not enter as a variable to be
included in a mechanistic analysis. Rather, it entails a qualitative transformation of the phenomena being studied and consequently demands a qualitative shift in the explanatory principles of psychology. The organism/environment system is pervaded by the social; by the language, traditions and culture of society. Both Mead and Vygotsky propounded an organic conception of the organism/environment system which emphasized its evolution or genesis in socio-cultural processes. The individual and the environment mutually determine each other through the activity of the individual in the environment. Objects in the environment change as the patterns of activity or responses to those objects change. What is distinctive about humankind's evolution is that it has been directed through intelligent action, made possible by symbolization. In human societies, the environment is partly constituted by significant symbols, signs and tools of mediation, which are themselves constructed in human interaction. Mead emphasizes the role of language as a system of symbolic gestures by which individuals communicate and develop shared understandings of the world in which they live. Vygotsky emphasizes the creation of systems of communication or cultural elaborations in the environment, such as notched sticks, signs and written language. Both emphasize that the locus of the mind is not in the individual but rather in the significant gestures and cultural artefacts which have a shared symbolic meaning for members of a given society.

Drawing on the writings of Mead, the individual is conceived of as an essentially social being. Through the process of the self, which has its origins in social interaction, the individual is able to take the attitude of the other in a process of symbolic interaction. Individuals adjust to the indications or gestures of other individuals in the social process of behaviour. And gestures become significant symbols when they have the same effect on the individual making it as they have on the individual who responds to it. Individuals acquire a communality of perspective with others by learning the symbols by which they designate aspects of their world. Moreover, the shared
meaning of a gesture, or significant symbol, is determined
by the response to which it gives rise within the social
interaction. Thus, meaning is defined in terms of action and
involves subject, object and third person or generalized
other. In other words, meaning is dependent upon the actions
of the individual, the environment and other individuals.

For Mead, as for Vygotsky, in order to provide an
understanding of human thinking and communication among
individuals it is necessary to understand the origins of mind
in the process of human interaction or what he terms a
'conversation of gestures'.

Mind arises through communication by a conversation
of gestures in a social process or context of experience.

(Mead, 1934, p.50)

The existence of mind or thinking is only made possible
through social interaction. Thinking is thus the
internalization of external conversations of gestures (social
interaction) and once internalized as significant symbols
they have the same meanings for individual members of a
society or social group.

4.2.3.3 Implications: The implications for our understanding
of mind and of the individual are quite profound. Mind finds
its genesis and its expression in the social interaction
between people in a given environmental context. Furthermore,
as Vygotsky argues, human society is distinguished by the
creation of cultural artefacts which exist in the environment
and which are imbued with symbolic significance. In this way,
the social development of mind is dialectically dependent
upon the socially constructed environment. This implies that
'mind' does not exist purely in the heads of individuals, but
exists in the social interactions and cultural elaborations
of society.

In this way, priority is given to the social. The
individual does not exist independently from his or her
surrounding culture, as something over and against society.
Furthermore, the individual is not assumed to be a given in
nature, prior to any kind of analysis. By adapting an
evolutionary or historical approach, it can be seen that the
individual cannot be understood outside the social relations and culture of which he is a part. The individual is social through and through. At the same time, society is not set apart from individuals. It is individuals who together sustain and create the social and cultural environment in which they live.

Once the origin, function and expression of mind is understood in this way the interaction among minds, the communication between people and the consensus of meaning on which they depend, cease to be problematic. Moreover, it transcends the dualisms between mind and body, between organism and environment and, more importantly, in the present context, between the individual and culture. The individual and culture are inextricably interwoven in a dialectical relationship, embedded in a socio-cultural historical context. The representation of the relationship between the individual and the social in terms of an evolving organism/environment/culture system provides a framework in which to avoid both individualistic and sociological reductionism.

If the above argument is accepted then it may well be assumed that everything is social and, as a consequence, there is no need to have a theory of social representations. If the individual's mind is a social phenomenon, then cognitive psychologists and individualistic theorists are necessarily studying the social processes and social contents of mind. The problem is not that these psychologists have studied something which does not exist but rather that they have failed to realize the evolutionary and social nature of their object of study. The framework presented above suggests that we look in different directions for solutions to the problems of social psychology. It is necessary to examine not only the individual but the individual with other individuals and their environmental context; to examine not only individual cognitive processes, but social cognitive processes and the significant context of social interactions in the environment; to examine not only behaviour (in the broadest sense of the term) at a given time but the evolution
and transformation of behaviour in its historical and socio-cultural context.

It may well come to pass that lengthy expositions of the social nature of mind will prove unnecessary. The history of social psychology tells a different story. The dominance of individualistic approaches to social phenomena demands that the 'social' is propounded and explicited every step of the way. It must be remembered that this thesis is written in the context of modern social psychology. This refers both to its argument against the individualization of the social and to the reemergence of the social in social psychology.

4.2.4 The social individual in research on social representations

Those studies which, to my mind, have elucidated the psycho-sociological character of social representations ironically examine the development of the child in relation to its social and cultural environment. Ironical because Moscovici originally wished to investigate the adult world of social representations, examining the social diffusion and transformation of knowledge, values and life styles; and ironic because these studies are often taken to demonstrate the prescriptive nature of social representations. An excellent example of this work is that conducted by Chombart-de-Lauwe (1984) on the social transmission of cultural knowledge and values from one generation to the next during the socialization of the child. For Chombart-de-Lauwe social transmission involves a dynamic process of interaction between the child and the various elements of its environment; it is 'a dialectic of psycho-social phenomena'. This approach does more than demonstrate the prescriptive nature of social representations as it cannot be reduced to a simple indoctrination of children. The child plays an active role in the internalization of social representations, in the reconstruction of the social representations presented to them in their social interactions with adults, and in the social environments created by adults. This explicitly interactional approach addresses not only the role of social representations but also their genesis in the organism/environment/culture system.
Duveen and Lloyd (1986) similarly stress the active role of children in reconstructing their social world and in assimilating the social representations of their culture. Their investigations of social gender identity attempt to elucidate how the adults' social representations structure the environment in which children develop and regulate their activity.

4.2.5 Summary

I have argued that, in order to understand the development and transformation of social representations, it is essential to adopt a social social representation of the individual. The dynamics of social representations and the relationship between the individual and the social must be represented within the dialectics of the organism/environment/culture system. This re-presentation avoids the static and coercive nature which characterize collective representations without denying the prescriptive and conventional aspects of social representations. Similarly, it obviates the sociological thesis which claims the autonomy of social representations whilst simultaneously escaping the individualistic thesis, which reduces everything to individual cognition.

This places the theory of social representations firmly in the Hegelian paradigm of thought. An individual's mind cannot be divorced from the physical and cultural milieu in which it developed and in which it is immersed. It is both the product and the producer of culture and vice versa. Thus, social representations are not to be found 'in the air': they are located in the heads of individuals; in people's symbolic physical actions and interactions with the world; and in the symbolic and cultural artefacts in the environment. And, wherever there are social representations so, also, there is mind. Mind is not simply located in the heads of individuals. It is also expressed in our social interactions and in the cultural products of society, from books and pictures to cities and satellites.

4.2.6 The definition of social reality

The social representation of the individual within the Hegelian paradigm, as presented above, has implications for
the definition of social reality entailed within the theory of social representations. The theory must avoid both a positive empiricist definition which locates reality in the external world and an extreme social constructionist thesis which locates reality in the heads of individuals. It will be argued that the legacy of the Cartesian dualism can be overcome by elaborating a social realist perspective in the tradition of G.H. Mead.

In Chapter 1, it was claimed that social representations are the constituents of our social reality. To recapitulate briefly, the theory emphasises the symbolic and meaningful nature of reality, constructed through the processes of social interaction and communication. In accordance with the Hegelian paradigm the stimulus is not conceived of as prior to the response and there is no distinction to be made between a person's perception of an object and the object being perceived. Objects and events are perceived as meaningful and significant, being structured by our social representations.

This view of reality is a legitimate reaction against a positive empiricist definition in which the individual does no more than passively perceive the external objective world, and in which meaning is either ignored or located in the objects and events themselves. However, the opposition to an empiricist notion of reality does not, in itself, provide a definitive idea of how we should conceive social reality. It is also necessary to deny the extreme social constructivist thesis which suggests that reality is no more than what we believe it to be.

Reality is not located in the heads of individuals: it is not purely the subjective reconstruction of an individual or, for that matter, the intersubjective reconstruction of several individuals. If this thesis were propounded, objects would be social creations which only exist in human experience: they would be no more than their socially created meaning. The untenability of this position is made apparent by a simple thought experiment. Imagine the physical world to have disappeared. If reality were purely a social construction, the absence of the physical world would not
impinge upon normal life at all. I could still go up the stairs to bed, train drivers would still be able to go on strike and hostile countries could still go to war. The world is but an illusion. This simple experiment demonstrates clearly that even if we accept the symbolic and meaningful nature of reality its social construction cannot be given primacy over the physical world. Wells (1987) presents a similar argument, drawing on the philosophical writings of Quine (1976). Culture and its assimilations are dependent upon (but not determined by) the physical senses of our bodies, i.e. to light, sound, touch etc. Social reality may be imbued with meaning and social significance but it is also imbued with physical force. The theory of social representations requires a definition of social reality which both assimilates the physical with the social and which does not dissociate human beings from their environment.

The definition of social reality which avoids these pitfalls is provided by Mead (1934). Social reality must be conceived of in terms of an historical intersubjective objectivity. This can be illustrated by examining Mead's understanding of objects and its association with the notion of perspective. An object has definite qualities that are dependent, both on the physical structure of the organism and the physical qualities of the environment (c.f. Dewey, above). The significance of an object or symbol is dependent on the experience of the object or gesture. The meaning of an object or event will be the same when individuals share a common perspective. The common perspective is dependent upon both the language of significant symbols and the physical structure of organisms and their environments. It is not a given in nature but rather it is socially constructed through ongoing interactions between people in their environment.

The Meadian notion of social reality is the most appropriate for the theory of social representations. It goes beyond the active observation of the environment inherent in much cognitive psychology to the active construction of reality within an organism/environment/culture system. As such, it transcends the dualisms between mind and body, between the social and the physical and between the
individual and the environment. Reality is not located in one particular element but within relations of a continuously changing system. The human individual is not an independent entity but a social being that is part of a physical and cultural context. He or she is both essentially social and essentially physical. Her self-awareness and ability to think is dependent on her body and her awareness of her body is dependent on her mind (Jodelet, 1984). Furthermore, both 'mind' and 'body' are dependent on the individual's relations with the environment. This environment is not a collection of stable and static objects. Rather, it is a dynamic and evolving environment of objects and events, imbued with meaning and social significance. The environment is made up of physical objects with a physical force and is perceived through physical media but these exist in a social, cultural and historical context from which they cannot be divorced. For example, Paris has a physical existence which cannot be denied but nor can it be known outside its social and historical context (Milgram, 1984). In this way, culture denotes an objective social reality which is bounded by time/space. It can neither be located purely in the heads of individuals nor simply in the cultural objects of the environment. The former conception individualizes culture whilst the latter reifies culture. Rather, culture exists in the emerging relationship between people and their environment.

It is important to realise that this conception of social reality provides us with a broader definition of social interaction and communication. 'Social interaction' not only refers to interactions between two or more people, but also to interactions with the physical and symbolic products of human activity. The environment, with its material, physical characteristics forming the foundation for its social symbolic characteristics, is an important constituent element of any social interaction. Similarly, communication not only refers to 'non-verbal' or 'verbal' communication between two or more people. It also refers to communication through written and pictorial materials including magazines, papers, posters, films, television etc.,
through displays in museums, shops, exhibitions etc.: and through the structure of the 'physical' environment, including parks, offices, homes etc. (Chombart-de-Lauwe, 1984).

A final point needs to be made about the dynamic nature of social reality. Not only do relations and meanings evolve in the course of interactions but new objects or events are created. For example, the sciences not only create new concepts or ideas, as was the case for psychoanalysis (Moscovici, 1961): they also create new objects which enter into our daily lives. The invention of toothpaste was of great physical/social significance; the computer has and will continue to revolutionize our social realities, the existence of atomic bombs and the prospects of nuclear warfare has irrevocably changed reality. In more general terms, human activity is continuously transforming the environment in which we live. We build houses, roads, offices, towns; we plough fields, plant forests, build dams; we construct and destroy such that not only do the meanings change but the physical environment upon which the social environment is constructed also changes. Thus, there is not just one absolute reality. Social reality is never independent of its socio-historical context; that is, it will be different depending on one's perspective or one's position in time/space, and it will be different depending on the environmental and social products of human activity. In conclusion, we can say that social representations constitute our social reality if, and only if, they encompass our thoughts and beliefs, our behaviours and social interaction, and the environment in which we live. It is not simply that the social representations in our minds determine our perceptions of the environment and direct our behaviour. Rather, it is that social representations originate, evolve and exist within the dynamics of an evolving organism/environment/culture system.

4.3 THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

The theory of social representations is, in some respects, a social psychology of knowledge. As such, it must provide an understanding of the dynamics of social
representations which is dependent upon individuals. Simultaneously, it must describe the processes of transformation in such a way that they are dependent upon culture. In the previous section we established that both the individual and reality must be conceived of as social, dynamic and evolving phenomena. This provides a basis from which to re-examine the dynamics of social representations and the processes by which they are transformed.

4.3.1 The Role of the individual

From our previous discussion we already have some idea of the individual's role in maintaining the prescriptive and conventional character of social representations. However, Moscovici tells us surprisingly little about the individual's role in transforming social reality. The role of the individual in the processes of innovation and change is given more attention in his writings on minority influence and in the sociology of knowledge.

Having established the role of the individual in the dynamics of social representations it is then necessary to describe, in detail, the actual processes of transformation. It is argued that the social processes of anchoring and objectification are insufficient, in themselves, to provide an adequate account. By giving priority to the past, they focus on the accommodation to the unfamiliar and its assimilation to the familiar. As such, they fail to describe the processes by which social representations are accommodated to the unfamiliar. More significantly, it is argued that the social construction of the unfamiliar is an essential aspect in the transformation of social representations, which has not received the attention it deserves. In this vein, casting-off and de-objectification are proposed as two complementary processes to anchoring and objectification. Finally, it is suggested that the processes occur within and between systems of social representations. The transformation of those systems is represented in terms of our previous discussion as an evolutionary process within an organism/environment/culture system.

4.3.1.1 The maintenance of social representations: Our previous discussion concerning the social individual and
social reality clarifies the individual's role in the maintenance of social representations. We have already seen that the prescriptive and conventional nature of social representations must be understood in terms of an active and dynamic process. Individuals assimilate the social representations of their society into their own social reality through cooperative activity and the mutual exchange of symbolic gestures. Others make symbolic gestures which direct the individual's attention to objects or events and their socially significant characteristics. Over time the communication of symbolic significances becomes indistinguishable from perception. Furthermore, in that mind is a social mechanism by which one indicates objects, events and their characteristics to oneself, perception is also a social process. In this way, social reality is collectively maintained through continuous interaction within the organism/environment/culture system.

4.3.1.2. Minorities, innovation and change: Elsewhere in the writings of Moscovici there is a greater emphasis on the role of the individual in the processes of innovation and change. Both in his work on minority influence (Moscovici, 1976, 1985c) and in his historical treatise on the origins of mass psychology (Moscovici, 1985a) Moscovici makes clearer indications as to the role of the individual in the dynamics of social representations.

Since the mid-1960's, there has been a growing tradition of literature and research that has examined the effect of minorities on majorities. As yet, this work has not been integrated within the literature on social representations. It would normally be considered to fall under the rubric of group psychology and can be seen as a reaction against the 'conformity bias' in North American social psychology. But it is highly germane to issues concerning the dynamics and transformation of social representations. As Farr (1987b) notes

this work on minority influence is all of a piece with his theory of social representations though he himself has not made these links explicit.

(Farr, 1987b, p. 349)
The early experimental research (e.g. Faucheux and Moscovici, 1967; Moscovici, Loge and Neffrechoux, 1969) demonstrated the influence of a minority in a group on the perceptual judgments of the majority. More recent research has examined the behavioural styles of minorities (Moscovici, 1976; Mugny, 1982) and the social and cognitive processes of minorities in society (Tajfel, 1978). Majorities tend to maintain the status quo by perpetuating systems of social representations, including the social beliefs, the social relations and the environmental structure, which sustain their relative position in society. In contrast, minorities try to change existing social representations by inducing social conflict and instability, emphasizing different aspects of the situation, and by proposing novel solutions or alternative perspectives. The minority creates a new social reality by posing new problems and constructing conflict with the social representations of the majority. A minority's success in transforming the social reality of the majority depends upon their behavioural consistency and their ability to negotiate that reality. They must be firm, coherent and personally involved consistently over time but they must not appear to be dogmatic or inflexible (Mugny, 1982). With the diffusion and transformation of social representations through space/time a minority can change significantly the social reality of a society. For example, feminism and, more recently, the Green Movement, have transformed radically our social relations, the environment in which we live and our perceptions and beliefs.

However, much of the research on minority influence has focused on the behaviours of minorities which are more or less successful in influencing the majority. Little attention has been paid to how minorities themselves establish alternative perspectives or the processes by which radical social representations emerge. Similarly, the processes by which the majority assimilates these novel social representations has not been examined in any depth. The integration of the literature on minority influence and the literature on social representations present social psychologists with a field that is ripe for development.
In Moscovici's work in the sociology of knowledge the individual is seen as a source of innovation and change in society. In *The Age of the Crowd* (Moscovici, 1985a) he describes how new bodies of scientific knowledge came into existence. He explores the origins of the theory of psychoanalysis and the influence of Le Bon's mass psychology on Freud's collective psychology and the development of a more social model of mind. The theory of social representations is useful not only for exploring the content and diffusion of social knowledge, but also the origins of those bodies of knowledge and the individual's role in the dynamics of social representations as a source of social innovation and change. Moreover, the theory of social representations requires that all these aspects of social change be considered together.

4.3.1.3 The transformation of social representations: The previous discussion also takes us some way towards understanding the role of the individual in the transformation of social representations. As Farr (1984) points out, an individual is, in effect, a minority of one. The creative role of individuals in the transformation of social representations is most apparent in science. Copernicus, Darwin, Einstein and Freud were all individuals who constructed new social representations of the world and the place of the human in that world. These eventually transformed the social reality of whole societies. But every individual contributes to changes in social reality, however small. Every individual is, to some extent, active and creative in breaking with the prescriptive and conventional force of social representations. The creative activity of individuals, either alone or together, arises in the face of a problem. The individual must first develop or construct his or her own perspective against the conventional ways of thinking, seeing and behaving, and then communicate his or her perspective to others. But the creation of new perspectives, as well as their diffusion, is a thoroughly social process.

The individual's perception and understanding of the world is structured by the social representations extant in
their society. These constrain the thoughts and activities of the individual. But the organism/environment/culture system is not perfect. It presents inconsistency, contradiction, antagonism and conflict, as well as certainty and a sense of the familiar. Problems emerge within the system of social representations, in all its aspects. Discrepancies between social representations give rise to mutually antagonistic responses. This conflict can arise between people with different social representations or within an individual who experiences antagonisms between his or her own social representations. Thus the problem is not an individual phenomenon. It arises within the organism/environment/culture system. The problem initiates creative thought, novel actions, and the reconstruction of an object's symbolic significance. In this way, new ideas and new objects arise out of problematic situations.

Problems belong to the history of a human community, and their solution is constructed in reflective thought which, in its turn, is addressed to the community, or in the social interactions and communications within the system. These solutions will constitute a new social reality in as far as they depart from the conventional social representations.

4.3.2 The processes of transformation: Anchoring and objectification

The theory specifies two processes by which social representations are transformed: anchoring and objectification. These were discussed at some length in Chapter 1. To briefly recapitulate, anchoring situates 'the unfamiliar' object or event within the context of the familiar categories and images of our social representations, establishing it within a 'network of meaning'. This involves two sub-processes: classification and naming. The unfamiliar object is first classified by comparing it with prototypes and determining its identifiable and significant features. Naming places the classified object in a complex system of related words. In this way, the object is said to become both meaningful and communicable. Objectification is the process by which abstract concepts are transformed into concrete
images or perceptions. Concepts are merged with complex
to images or 'figurative nucleii' in such a way that
relationships or attributes are turned into things.

In Moscovici's theoretical formulation it is unclear
whether anchoring and objectification are to be interpreted
as individual or social processes. Semin (1985a) suggests
that they can be readily subsumed under a cognitive social
psychology which employs the information-processing metaphor.
However, the processes must be understood as inherently
social in at least two respects. Firstly, the human mind is
a social phenomenon and individual thinking a social process
in that their genesis lies in the social interactions and
communications among individuals within a society. An
individual anchors an unfamiliar object and objectifies an
abstract concept through the internalized conversation of
gestures, that is, internal thought processes which are
inherently social due to their origins in social behaviour.
Secondly, these processes are rarely carried out by
individuals on their own, but come about through the
communications and social interactions, when confronted with
unfamiliar objects or abstract concepts. The first can be
seen as an internalized 'individual' form of the second, more
obviously, social means of anchoring and objectifying. Thus
the processes described by Moscovici do not imply a form of
cognitive reductionism.

4.3.3 The spiral of transformation

We have established that anchoring and objectification
are essentially social processes involved in the
transformation of social representations. However, these two
processes alone do not provide a sufficient explanation, nor
do they provide an adequate framework for the study of how
social representations are transformed. This is responsible,
no doubt, in part for the dearth of studies which have
actually employed these concepts. By focusing on how the
unfamiliar is transformed into the familiar they describe
only a part of what I shall call the 'spiral of
transformation'. Anchoring and objectification are restricted
to the assimilation of unfamiliar objects, events or ideas
into our social representations. As such, they give priority
to the past and to the prescriptive and conventional character of social representations.

But the transformation of social representations also involves the accommodation of familiar social representations to unfamiliar objects, events or ideas. Every assimilation of an object to a social representation simultaneously involves an accommodation of the social representation to the object. Conversely, every accommodation is an assimilatory modification of the object to which the social representation is accommodated. The two aspects of transformation within the organism/environment/culture system are simultaneous and indisociable (Flavell, 1963). Furthermore, in as far as social representations constitute our social reality, it is also necessary to examine the construction of the unfamiliar out of the familiar. The spiral of transformation is elaborated below and it is argued that, rather than distinguishing between the unfamiliar and the familiar, it is more appropriate to adopt a language which encompasses interrelated systems of social representations.

4.3.4 The social construction of the unfamiliar

Unfamiliar objects, events or ideas threaten the stability of our social representations and instigate or stimulate the social activities involved in their transformation. As such, the unfamiliar constitutes a vital component of the theory that has not, as yet, received the attention it deserves. This is, in part, due to the location of the unfamiliar in Moscovici's writings. According to Moscovici, the unfamiliar emerges from the reified universe of science. Scientists working in a universe of objective observation and pure facts produce unfamiliar concepts and objects to which lay people must then accommodate into their consensual universe of social representations. But such a division between the unfamiliar and familiar is unwarranted. As was argued in Chapter 2, social representations are also transformed in the course of everyday life. For example, social representations of children (Chombart-de-Lauwe, 1984), of our bodies (Jodelet, 1984) of Paris (Milgram, 1984) and of masculinity and femininity (Duveen and Lloyd, 1984) are being continuously transformed through our day-to-day activities.
and interactions. Unfamiliar and threatening ideas or events may also emerge within business, the caring professions, leisure, and society itself. Moreover, the heterogeneous nature of modern society, along with the pervasive modes of communication, means that we are constantly confronted by unfamiliar objects, events or ideas from other cultures or societies.

Thus, the unfamiliar arises within the consensual universe of social representations. In order to understand the dynamics of social representations, the unfamiliar cannot be treated as a given, as something that requires no further explanation. Rather, the theory must embrace the unfamiliar within its historical and evolutionary framework such that it incorporates the social re-construction of the unfamiliar as well as the perpetuation of the familiar. It must encompass both tradition and innovation in all their aspects, both the continuities between past and present and discontinuities between past and present.

Moscovici's specification of the unfamiliar is untenable. For Moscovici,

the unfamiliar is there without being there;
perceived without being perceived

As 'percepts reproduce the world in a meaningful way' it is possible that Moscovici intends to characterize the unfamiliar as perceptions without meaning. But if social representations constitute our social reality and if all thought and perception require an order in our social representations, then the unfamiliar cannot be set apart as something outside our reality. Our very awareness of something unfamiliar means that it must be associated with our social representations in some way. That is, the unfamiliar cannot be totally meaningless, it cannot be totally unfamiliar.

This is illustrated both in the diffusion of science and in the transformation of social representations within society. Common-sense knowledge does not act as a sponge which soaks up scientific innovations indiscriminantly. Rather, we select those scientific ideas and objects which,
in one way or another, are useful to us in everyday life. That is, they have some connection with what we already know or do, or they impinge on our lives in such a way that we are forced to take notice. For example, the diffusion of psychoanalysis in France is dependent upon its association with Catholicism and the use of psychoanalytic concepts is dependent on their ability to describe socially significant behaviour which is unusual yet familiar. Similarly, social representations within society change with the introduction of novel connections between what we already know rather than something totally unknown. For example, changing the social representation of women in sport has largely involved breaking the boundaries between femininity and masculinity.

In this way, what was once familiar becomes unfamiliar. Indeed, this is the role that Moscovici has given science in modern society. Science challenges our conventions, blurs distinctions and threatens the continuity of social interaction. But it is not only scientists who discover or construct the unfamiliar. Any individual or group of individuals in society may be a discoverer or innovator, may find a new solution to an old problem, or may be confronted with a peculiar problem which requires resolution. The point is that the unfamiliar and familiar are not worlds apart. The familiar at once defines what is unfamiliar and is changed by it. Simultaneously, the unfamiliar emerges out of the familiar and is familiarized by it. The transformation of social representations depends upon these interdependent aspects and it is essential that the theory recognizes and explicates this interdependence. Only then can the dynamic nature of social representations be properly understood.

4.3.5 Processes of transformation: casting-off and de-objectification

If anchoring and objectification are the two processes by which the unfamiliar is transformed into the familiar then we should look to the complementary processes of 'casting-off' and 'de-objectification' (Wells, 1984) by which the familiar is made unfamiliar. We can select those features which make an object distinct and imbue a concrete object with abstract qualities. These may be equated with the
processes of particularizations and transcendentalization (Billig, 1988) discussed in Chapter 2. Whereas anchoring and objectification focus on the conventional and physically embodied characteristics of an object, event or idea their complementary processes focus on the unconventional and relational characteristics of familiar objects, events or ideas.

Here we must go a step further and make the unfamiliar interchangeable with the familiar. What is familiar in one context or to one person will be unfamiliar in another context or to someone else and vice versa. If an object, which is conventionally seen as distinct, is anchored in a social representation, this new association is itself unfamiliar. Similarly, an object which is usually given a particular symbolic significance becomes unfamiliar in a context when that significance is removed. This juxtaposition of familiar/unfamiliar can occur in different locations within the organism/environment/culture system. Similarities and dissimilarities, continuities and discontinuities, problems and solutions can occur within or between individuals in different environmental and cultural contexts. Furthermore, all four processes, anchoring, casting-off, objectification and de-objectification, can be involved in both the construction and the assimilation of the 'unfamiliar'.

4.3.6 Systems of social representations

In order to understand this transformation, it is necessary to consider not only one social representation but rather a system of social representations. The organism/environment/culture system is imbued with numerous social representations which overlap to a greater or lesser extent, and the meaning or social significance of any object, event or idea is dependent on the network of relationships within and between these social representations. Changing the relations or meaning of any one element will have repercussions for the whole system. As new associations or links are made between two or more elements, either within or between social representations, the whole network or system of relations must be readjusted.
The nature of the system and its evolutionary transformation can be clarified with an example. In recent years, our social representation of the environment has changed considerably as the impact of human beings on the world eco-system has been increasingly recognized. This has restructured diverse systems of social representations in all their aspects. It has affected our beliefs, our values, our social interactions and our relationship with the environment itself. This has involved not only the transformation of broad social representations but also the creation of associations and conflicts between particular elements of those social representations.

For example, trees constitute one element in the social representation of the countryside but they have also become an element in the world ecosystem and a commodity in the form of timber or paper. The destruction of the Amazon Rain Forest emphasizes their association. Trees are involved in conflicting social representations which must somehow be reconciled. They are no longer simply part of the countryside but are part of a natural balance upon which the very air that we breathe is dependent. This enters our daily lives, not only through media coverage and communication but also in the growing concern for unnecessary waste and the use of re-cycled paper. Similarly, the globe no longer consists of discrete countries and oceans with particular climates, but is an ecosystem in which all the parts are interdependent.

The transformation of these social representations are dependent upon earlier transformations associated with air and river pollution from industrial waste. These forms of environmental hazards were both more local and visible. As such, they inspired the creation of a relational representation of the environment; that is, the deterioration of the environment was related to industrial waste. This representation could then be extended to less tangible issues including acid rain, nuclear waste and the ozone layer. These new social representations are expressed and transformed in our daily activities, from the boardroom to the petrol station. Moreover, 'green' is no longer just the colour of
grass. It is a political, social and environmental revolution.

A second example is offered by Carl Andre's 'Equivalent VIII' familiarly known as the 'Tate Bricks'. We are all very familiar with exhibitions of works of art in galleries. But the purchase of a pile of bricks as a work of art by the Tate Gallery gave rise to great controversy over the nature of art and also may have had implications for architecture.

In abstract terms, as an element from one social representation is located within another social representation, it will change the network of relations and hence transform the meaning of all the elements involved. This creates a route or form in which similar yet novel associations and conflicts are created. Eventually they transform the social representation as a whole, such that previous meanings are forgotten. The system of social representations is conceived of here in terms of an evolutionary process within an environmental and cultural context. It should be remembered that the associations and conflicts do not simply occur: rather, they emerge in the processes of thinking, communicating and interacting in the human/environment/culture system.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Moscovici (1984b) entitled his Chapter 'The phenomenon of social representations'. No doubt, this was to impress upon the readership that social representations have reality and are legitimate objects of study for social psychologists. But social representations considered as a phenomenon over-emphasizes their prescriptive nature and encourages a perspective which ignores their context of generation. They become things, given in reality which can be measured outside their historical and cultural context. This has led some social psychologists to ask inappropriate questions, eg. what is a social representation, where is it found and how can it be measured? But meaning or changing the structure of relationships cannot be measured. By objectifying social representations themselves, Moscovici has betrayed their dynamic nature and the symbolic environment which they describe. Social representations are neither 'object' nor
'process'. Rather, they are the meeting of object and process in the activities of social individuals within an evolving physical and cultural environment.

4.4. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

In this chapter, we have identified a number of important contradictions in the theory of social representations which reflect major divergences in the history of social psychology. These focus on the problem of integrating the individual with society such that neither is given priority over the other. The resolution proposed has adopted an evolutionary perspective for the re-representation of the individual and of social reality. The social representation of the individual as a social being who is both produced by and producer of society overcomes the inherent dualism of Cartesian philosophy. The definition of social reality as an evolving social construction which exists in the interdependence between mind and environment (physical/social) expands the meaning both of social interaction and of communication. This provides a framework within which the dynamics of social representations can be reformulated, such that their prescriptive and conventional nature is complementary to (rather than antagonistic to) the flexible nature and the active role of individuals in their transformation.

This theoretical elaboration of social representations is constructed within the Hegelian Paradigm. The social representation of the social individual and the definition of social reality explicates the dialectic interdependence of the individual and society. The organism/environment/culture system reconceptualizes the relationship between the knower and the known as an interactive 'circle returning within itself'. The whole theory adopts an evolutionary perspective in order to understand the transformation of social representations. Despite some major differences the theoretical principles propounded here are in keeping with Moscovici's general perspective. They present a social social psychology which emphasizes the social, cultural and historical nature of human life.
The theory of social representations, I would suggest, is currently one of the most exciting and challenging expositions of the Hegelian paradigm in social psychology. It has revitalized traditional fields of research in social psychology; it has begun to influence related fields of research, for example developmental psychology; and it has opened up new avenues of research.

The theory has revitalized the earlier historical and collective approach to social phenomena. This is apparent in much of social psychology and particularly in the field of social cognition. Individualistic conceptions of attitudes as cognitive structures or states of readiness which have flourished in North American Social Psychology are challenged and overthrown by social representations. The latter, as Jaspars and Fraser (1984) and Farr (1989) demonstrate, are akin to the notion of social attitudes propounded by the Chicago School in the 1920's. They are attitudes which 'are shared by many individuals and as such constitute a social reality which can influence individual behaviour' (Jaspars and Fraser, 1984, p. 104). Research on social attitudes and social representations have also involved studies of the content of the mass media of communication. This acknowledges their existence in the environment as well as in the mind.

Similarly, attribution as an individual cognitive process in interpersonal relationships is resocialized. As Ichheiser (1949) had explicated previously and Hewstone has currently demonstrated, attributions are dependent upon the content and structure of social representations extant in society. The interconnection between social representations and the psychology of groups has not been fully elaborated, but it is clear that F.H. Allport's individualistic conception of groups is rejected. Groups are not simply individuals in the company of other individuals. A group shares a system of social representations which constitutes their social reality and distinguishes it from other groups. That is, they have a collective reality which emerges out of the interactions and relations within and between groups. This perspective is more akin to earlier social psychologies of Ross (1908) and
McDougall (1921) than to the North American tradition of group psychology.

Contemporary work in Europe on intergroup relations goes some way towards exploring the interrelationships between widespread beliefs, group membership and social identity (see Chapters 11). Furthermore, the theory of social representations should also be able to inform current research on social perception, social cognition, interpersonal relations and socialization.

The theory of social representations also encourages both the study of various phenomena and the use of diverse methods of research, some of which are not included in the more traditional social psychology. The media, in their various forms, are now legitimate objects of study; interviews and participant observation are legitimate methods of investigation; the modes of historical and cultural change are now legitimate fields of concern for social psychologists.

There is no doubt that there will always be specialist fields within social psychology. Having said this, the theory of social representations constitutes a framework which permits their integration. It encompasses people's social cognition, their attitudes and attributions; it relates to their interpersonal relationships and interactions; and it concerns groups and collective action. Moreover, the theory provides an extensive framework within which diverse yet related schools of social psychology can be integrated. It goes beyond the social cognition perspective which has dominated the last four decades of social psychology to a social construction perspective. The former focuses on the individual's perception of an external reality whereas the latter focuses on the collective interdependence between concepts, images and perceptions with the environment. The former is still dominated by Cartesian traditions of thought that sustain an individualistic approach to social phenomena. The latter adopts a Hegelian tradition of thought that advocates an evolutionary and cultural approach to social phenomena.
I would also proclaim that the future prospects for the theory of social representations extend beyond the boundaries of social psychology. The reformulation of the theory's epistemological base emphasizes the interdependence of culture, cognition and action. As such, it suggests a rapprochement between anthropology, psychology and, to some extent, biology.

Wells (1987) concludes that a connection between cognitive science and social psychology is particularly desirable and that the theory of social representation would both profit from such a connection and contribute to the advancement of cognitive science. Farr (1989) extends the boundaries further from cognitive psychology to anthropology. Social representations are already present in cognitive psychology in the form of scripts, scenarios, plans etc. as well as the context and language of research (see Chapter 2). At the other extreme, the theory of social representations is an anthropology of modern society which examines the myths and content of people's beliefs. In similar vein, I have argued in this chapter that all psychology is social psychology as individuals cannot be divorced from the culture and society in which they live. For example, there is no distinction to be made between perception and social perception, cognition and social cognition, or between behaviour and social interaction.

Many psychologists have argued that psychology cannot be an autonomous discipline (eg. Secord, 1986; Moscovici, 1986; Koch, 1985; Cole, 1987): psychology requires an interdisciplinary approach which creates and establishes links between anthropology, sociology, social psychology, psychology and biology. At the end of the day, it is not important if this multidisciplinary work is conducted under the name of social representations, contextualism, social constructivism or something else. What is important is that the work is done and, in my opinion, the theory of social representations currently constitutes one of the most promising developments in this direction.
CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SCIENCE

5.1 THE REIFIED AND THE CONSENSUAL UNIVERSES REVISITED

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5.3 THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

5.4 TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE

Moscovici is one of the foremost proponents of social psychology: a social psychology that goes beyond the individual to embrace culture and meaning; that goes beyond the status quo to examine the social construction of reality; and that rejects an objectivist ontology in the study of social phenomena. I am indebted to Moscovici, amongst others, for introducing me to this perspective in which I am, by now, thoroughly immersed. But, while acknowledging this debt, I also take issue with Moscovici's views concerning the relationship between social representations and science. Moscovici does not push his social thesis of knowledge to its logical conclusion, that all knowledge is socially constructed. In failing to do so, he not only creates a number of substantial theoretical problems, but also excludes social representations from the realm of science. In this
chapter it will be argued that, far from being exclusive to common-sense, the theory of social representations is also applicable in the realm of science. This is supported and elaborated upon by drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge. It is thus claimed that the theory of social representations provides a suitable framework in which to study the transformation and evolution of science itself.

5.1 THE REIFIED AND THE CONSENSUAL UNIVERSES REVISITED

In this section I shall review briefly the relationship between the reified universe of science and the consensual universe of social representations as presented by Moscovici. In contradiction to Moscovici, it is suggested that not only does science transform common-sense, but also that social representations in society enter into science. But the present critique goes much further. It is argued that, rather than constituting two distinct universes of reality, the reified and consensual portray two contrasting epistemologies. The former embraces a positive empiricist epistemology whilst the latter exemplifies a social constructionist epistemology. Both epistemologies can be applied to both science and common-sense. Moscovici broke with traditional social psychology by insisting that the study of social phenomena requires a social constructionist approach. It is argued here, however, that the constructionist approach should be applied to both common-sense and science.

On numerous occasions (eg. Moscovici, 1984b, 1987, 1988, Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983), Moscovici distinguishes between the reified universe of science and the consensual universe of social representations. These were described at length towards the end of Chapter 1 and it is clear that, for Moscovici, they constitute two contrasting forms of reality. The former is a world of objective truth and certainty that is indifferent to context and culture. The latter is a created world of symbolism and meaning dependent on its historical and cultural context. In the former, thought is rational and based on observation. In the latter, thought is social and rooted in interaction and
communication. (This is not to suggest that social thought is irrational, only that it is different from so-called absolute rationality). It is clear that Moscovici wishes to differentiate science from social representations and common-sense. But the contrast between these two realms is presented in a cavalier fashion, with no justification for its acceptance or any considerations of alternative perspectives.

This distinction continues to be employed by researchers and theorists (eg. Farr and Moscovici, 1984b) in the field, although some critics have briefly questioned the plausibility of the reified universe (Jahoda G., 1988; Palmonari, 1988). In this chapter, it will be shown that there are a multitude of reasons why Moscovici's notion of the reified universe should be rejected. But, before presenting these arguments, it is worth examining the historical antecedents of this distinction and the role it plays within the theory of social representations.

5.1.1 Their historical roots

The obvious place to look for the historical antecedents of Moscovici's distinction between these two universes is in Durkheim's sociological writings. Durkheim (1915) postulated a dichotomy between the profane and the sacred, which constituted completely different ways of knowing about the world and, in many respects, contradicted each other. The profane consisted of objective knowledge which was independent of context or culture. It characterized industrialized societies and was epitomized by scientific truth which expressed the world as it is and, as such, could falsify magical and mythological beliefs. The sacred was socially constructed knowledge which was context and culture dependent. This also applied to industrial societies but was epitomized by primitive and religious societies (Lukes, 1973). Douglas (1975) suggests that Durkheim maintained this distinction for two reasons. As in the cultural anthropology of that time, he believed that primitive and civilized societies were utterly different; they were literally worlds apart. He also believed in objective scientific truth which
could not be challenged by his sociological thesis on the social determinants of knowledge.

Moscovici, in a peculiar way, both challenges and maintains these assumptions. In effect, he shifts the boundaries but does not obviate the distinction. He challenges Durkheim's thesis by proclaiming the theory of social representations to be an anthropology of modern culture, focusing on the consensual universe and its place in modern, 'civilized' societies. Furthermore, as a social psychology, it denies the legitimacy of objective scientific truth in the study of social phenomena. On the other hand, by including the reified universe within the theoretical framework, Moscovici maintains both a belief in 'the world as it is' and a clear demarcation between science and common-sense.

Moscovici is by no means alone in proposing the existence of distinct forms of knowledge. Berger and Luckmann (1966) distinguish between non-social and social reality; Vygotsky (1952/1978) contrasts scientific and spontaneous concepts; and Mead (1934) discusses the differences between knowledge and information. All these theorists propound a constructionist perspective for the study of social phenomena and consider science to be a special realm of interest. But Moscovici goes a step further by suggesting that science and common-sense constitute two different realities.

5.1.2 A useful distinction

Why should Moscovici preserve a model of science which is not only antagonistic to his own constructionist approach but is also largely discredited? The only reason I am able to suggest is that the distinction between the reified and consensual universes provided the context in which social representations were first defined. It identifies simultaneously the phenomenon of social representations as an object of study and defines the boundaries of the theory's application. The theory of social representations focuses on the transformation of the concepts and signs produced in the reified universe as they diffuse into the consensual universe. Social representations are science made common.
According to Moscovici (1984), World War II marks a watershed in the changing relationship between the reified and consensual universes. Prior to World War II the direction of influence was from common-sense to science. Knowledge which had emerged in the consensual universe was clarified and modified by the sciences in the course of research and debate. Since World War II, the direction of influence has been reversed. Science now modifies common-sense. The sciences have become more refined and more removed from common-sense and their products have to be assimilated into the consensual universe as they impinge upon daily life. Some of the most dramatic examples include the products of nuclear science, biophysics and biochemistry.

This characterization of the relationship between science and common-sense has encouraged a re-appraisal of the nature of common-sense understanding. It is no longer static and all-encompassing, or unquestioning and irrational. It is a dynamic system of representations which is modified and adapted to a changing world. It has also identified the common-sense understanding of science as a new object of study for social psychology.

5.1.3 A two-way interaction

The relationship between science and common-sense is not as simple as Moscovici suggests. It will be argued that there is a two-way interaction between the reified and consensual universes which persists in contemporary society. The sciences most certainly transformed the consensual universe prior to World War II and common-sense is by no means impotent in the reified universe today. A further difficulty is encountered in identifying those theories and disciplines which are constituents of the reified universe. This makes any clear demarcation between the two universes problematic and raises questions as to how they interact. Both these issues are elaborated upon below.

5.1.3.1 The well-established influence of science: Many of the social representations which are now taken for granted originated in the sciences well before World War II. The most dramatic of these have involved the re-conception of mankind's place in the universe. The earth is no longer
thought to be flat nor to lie at the centre of the universe. With the discoveries of astronomy and the Copernican revolution these conceptions were transformed; for centuries it has been known that the earth is round and but one sphere that revolves around the sun. Similarly, man was once set apart from the rest of nature, closer to God than to the natural world. But, with the Darwinian revolution, man was seen to be but a small part of the natural order. Again, with regard to Mosocivi's study of psychoanalysis, Freud's major impact on common sense understandings of consciousness occurred prior to World War II, during his own lifetime. No doubt there are many other instances in which the sciences transformed the consensual universe prior to World War II, but these will suffice.

5.1.3.2 Social representations in science: In contemporary society, the reified universe is by no means separated completely from common-sense. Social representations which are prevalent in society are embedded in the content and progress of science. The following examples tend to be drawn from periods which extend into the early and middle 20th Century, largely because contemporary studies of this nature are hard to find. It is easier to identify the social representations in science when they diverge from one's own social representations. But there is no reason to believe that today's science is any more 'pure'.

In psychology, social representations of science and of the individual which were prevalent in society have had a dramatic impact on the structure and content of research and theory. These implicit social representations of the individual and society in psychology and social psychology tend to go unnoticed because they reflect the social representations prevalent in society. For example, the social representation of science as an objective empirical endeavour in search of truth has persisted in psychology, despite the fact that it had long been abandoned by physicists, not least because it has been the dominant representation of science in the consensual universe. Also, the contrast between Russian and American psychology, reflects the divergent social representations in their respective cultures. In Russia, the
individual is determined by his or her social activity within a social system. This is reflected in Russian psychology, in which cognition is studied within its social context (Strickland, 1984). Similarly, Luria's contribution in The History of Psychology through Autobiography focuses more on his laboratory than on himself. In contrast, the strong individualism of American society has led to the psychological study of the individual set apart from his or her social relations and environment. The insidious power of these social representations is highlighted by the transformation of originally socially-oriented theories as they reached America from Europe (see Chapter 3). For example, Farr (1976) elucidates how psychologists, as scientists, commit the 'fundamental attribution error'. Attribution to individuals, as opposed to situations, rides on the back of the collective representation of the individual (Ichheiser, 1949). This occurs, not only in lay circles, but also within psychology. For example, in the study of individual differences in ability, personality or attitudes, the variance is invariably attributed to the individual.

Social representations in the consensual universe not only enter into the construction of psychological theory; they also structure our methods of measurement and the interpretation of results. In The Mismeasure of Man (1981), Stephen Gould gives a brilliant exposition of the influence of social representations and social values in the measurement and definition of intelligence. Since the acceptance of Darwin's evolutionary theory the social representations which supported racial and sexual distinctiveness as part of the natural social order were maintained through scientific, as opposed to religious, argument. So-called objective measurement techniques, statistics and ranking procedures were designed and employed, not so much to generate new theories, but more to confirm a priori representations and prejudices.

The possibility that statistics reflect the social representations of society is explored similarly by MacKenzie (1981). In his study of British statistics and its
development from 1865 to 1930, MacKenzie reveals its intimate connection with the eugenics movement and the social interests of the professional middle classes. He elucidates how Pearson and Bateson constructed different statistics and different biologies to defend opposing representations of the social order. Furthermore, it appears that not even mathematics can escape the consensual universe. Dickson (1979) argues that the formal characteristics of calculus correspond to representations of the material world and the labour process in a capitalistic society.

Thus, social representations of the consensual universe provide assumptions about individuals, society and the environment which are incorporated into science; they influence the questions asked, the evidence sought, and the interpretation or conclusions which are accepted. I would suggest also that contemporary society, with its ever increasing rate of change, frequently initiates developments in the sciences. Social movements such as feminism, anti-racism and environmentalism set new agendas for scientific investigation, both in terms of what is studied and what are acceptable solutions.

5.1.3.3 What should be included in the reified universe? The range and diversity of scientific disciplines presents a further problem for Moscovici's distinction between the reified and consensual universes. At first sight, it appears perfectly clear that all sciences fall within the reified universe. But science itself is not so clearly defined. There seems to be general agreement that physics, chemistry and biology are sciences, but what about sociology, anthropology or geography? In particular, it is uncertain whether or not the discipline of psychology should be considered a member of the reified universe.

On the one hand, when discussing the influence of science on the nature and content of common-sense in modern societies, Moscovici refers to a broad selection of disciplines ranging from physics and chemistry to anthropology and sociology and even including psychoanalysis and Marxism. All these disciplines are considered to fall
within the reified universe of science, producing theories and concepts which are alien to the consensual universe.

On the other hand, he argues that the principles of the reified universe cannot be applied to the study of social life and human meaning. If psychologists are to study the consensual universe of social representations they must employ a different framework and different methods from those adopted in the natural sciences. He claims that it is a mistaken endeavour to use the methods and assumptions of science in the study of social phenomena. The theory of social representations and the conception of social reality which it enshrines is

incompatible with a positivist conception of science and a behaviourist approach to reality (Moscovici, 1982, p. 115).

Rather than starting with precise definitions and narrow hypotheses which identify specific causes and effects, the development of a theory should be based on observational and comparative studies which reflect the complexities of social and cultural phenomena. Although we are left in some doubt as to the proper location of the social psychology envisioned, it would appear that it would not conform to the principles of the reified universe.

This confusion is exacerbated by Moscovici's choice of appropriate objects of study for the theory of social representations. Those sciences which he has studied have been explicitly rejected by some scientific communities. The Vienna Circle, for example, did not accept either Psychoanalysis or Marxism into the realm of science. Furthermore, I suspect that the majority of scientists, today, would argue that they are not true sciences, as they do not conform to the generally accepted standards and criteria of science. I have suggested that the selection of psychoanalysis and Marxism was based on practical, rather than theoretical, grounds. In order to conduct an empirical investigation of social representations, Moscovici had to select those theories or sciences which were widely diffused within French culture.
Similarly, there are other disciplines such as geography and history, which must be considered. Like the natural sciences, they have produced ideas which have diffused into common-sense. If the influence of these disciplines is to be excluded from the realm of social representations it would be necessary to establish the criteria which differentiate them from other disciplines which fall within the reified universe.

5.1.3.4 Problems within the reified universe: Not denying the initial appeal of Moscovici's distinction between the reified and consensual universe, its continued usefulness is highly questionable. Rather than providing a coherent framework for the theory of social representations, this distinction engenders confusion and creates unnecessary theoretical complexities.

Firstly, it is difficult to make any clear demarcation between the reified and consensual universes. Secondly, the relationship between science and common-sense involves a two-way interaction. Not only do the products of science enter into the consensual universe but social representations also enter into the reified universe. This creates the difficulty of explaining how two distinct universes of reality interact and influence each other. In Chapter 4 we discussed the difficulties associated with Moscovici's conception of 'the unfamiliar'. How do the unfamiliar products of science enter into the consensual universe? The reverse process is also problematic. How can social representations of the consensual universe enter into the reified universe of science? Thirdly, it would be necessary to establish how the lay person is denied access to the reified universe: why is it that the lay person is dependent upon and embedded in a consensual universe whilst the scientist is not?

Fourthly, in Chapter 2, I argued that the dynamics of social representations is not dependent on the reified universe. The theory applies equally well to the transformation of social representations which are not associated with the products of science. Fifthly, in Chapter 4, I argued that the social construction of the unfamiliar
must be included in a theory which purports to explain the dynamics of social representations. This being the case, it is detrimental to hive off the unfamiliar into a different realm of reality. Moscovici's conception of the 'reified universe' is thus neither an essential nor a useful component of the theory. Moreover, it actually creates problems for a dynamic, social constructionist thesis.

5.1.3.5 The myth of the reified universe: The reified and consensual universes do not constitute two distinct realities; rather, they embody two alternative and contradictory epistemologies. On the one hand, individuals - namely scientists - acquire knowledge independently through the passive and objective observation of events occurring in an external reality which is itself made up of independent causes and effects. This approach to knowledge was described in Chapter 3 as 'positive empiricism', founded in the assumptions of Cartesian philosophy. On the other hand, individuals - namely lay people - actively construct knowledge through social interaction and communication in a cultural and historical context. Furthermore, the environment, the social individual and culture form a dynamic and interdependent evolving system (see Chapter 4). This approach to knowledge, which I have called 'social constructionism', is founded in Hegelian philosophy (see Chapter 3).

In Chapter 3 we discussed the profound effect which the Cartesian philosophy and positive empirical epistemology have had on the historical development of social psychology and psychology more generally. It was also argued that the Hegelian paradigm and a social constructionist epistemology provide an exciting alternative, not only with regard to the object of study (eg. common-sense) but also for the conduct of social psychology itself.

Moscovici goes some way towards revolutionizing social psychology by insisting that the study of social phenomena requires a social constructionist approach. However, for reasons discussed above, he does not apply these same principles to science itself. This is a mistake. Not only does it create the difficulties outlined in the previous
section, but it also stands at odds with recent developments in the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge. Science is a human endeavour and, like common-sense, is better conceived in terms of dynamic social representations than in the a-social and static terms of the 'reified universe'.

5.2 PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

In this section, I shall provide a brief overview of developments in the philosophy of science from the received tradition of positive empiricism to the social constructionist perspective which focuses on the process of science and its transformation. It will be seen that it is the traditional view of science that Moscovici adopts in his description of the 'reified universe'. However, this view was challenged by significant advances in physics, namely the General Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. This encouraged the development of alternative philosophies, most notably by Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. The present discussion focuses on the writings of T.S.Kuhn (1962,1969,1970) who propounds an historical, cultural and social-psychological approach to the understanding of scientific knowledge and its transformation. It will be seen that this approach bears many similarities to the theory of social representations. World views are comparable to social representations in their prescriptive and conventional characteristics and paradigms are comparable to social realities. It is also argued that the dynamics of science should not be conceived of as revolutionary paradigm shifts but rather as a gradual transformation that integrates tradition and innovation. Finally, it is suggested that those philosophies, which include the scientist in the process of science, embrace a social constructionist approach to science, which is commensurate with the 'consensual universe' in the theory of social representations.

5.2.1 The received tradition

The received tradition of positive empiricism in the philosophy of science presented a normative or ideal model. According to this view, scientific knowledge starts with the accumulation of sensory facts acquired through neutral
observation. The scientists' beliefs, attitudes or subjective state play no part in these observations, providing an objective basis from which universal laws and theories are derived by induction. The truth or falsity of these laws are then evaluated by deducing predictions and testing them against new observations.

This philosophy of science emerged out of 17th Century science and, in particular, the science of Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first to give primacy to observation. In contrast to both religious faith and to the Aristotelian tradition, which relied on pure reason to work out the laws of physics, Galileo conducted experiments with different weights to discover that they fall at the same rate. Similarly, the telescope enabled Galileo to observe that there were two moons which revolved around Jupiter, not the earth. These observations presented a direct threat to the established orthodoxy, showing that the sun, rather than the earth, lay at the centre of the solar system. Furthermore, Newton used these observations as the basis of his laws of motion, which were explicitly stated in his Principia Mathematica (1685) (Hawking, 1988). The philosopher Francis Bacon, along with his contemporaries, argued that scientific knowledge must be built on observations of the natural world and not teleological or transcendental explanations. The facts speak for themselves.

5.1.2 The general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics: challenges to the received tradition

The success of scientific theories, and in particular Newton's theory of gravity (which remained unchallenged for three centuries), gave no reason to doubt the positive empiricist philosophy of science. However, Einstein's general theory of relativity (1915) not only constituted a revolution in theoretical physics but it also challenged the traditional view of science.

Newton believed in absolute time which was separate from and independent of space. But studies by Roemer and Maxwell on the propagation of light showed that light travelled at a fixed speed. Einstein was the first to suggest that this implied that there was no such thing as absolute
time. Time is not completely separate from and independent of space but is combined with it in space-time (Hawking, 1988). This revolutionized thought on how the world was conceived. In Newtonian physics objects have shape, mass and volume, which can be changed as a result of physical interference. For the general theory of relativity these properties no longer exist but become relations between objects and a reference frame. Furthermore, these relations can be changed without physical interference by changing from one reference frame to another (Chalmers, 1982; Feyerabend, 1975). This is the essence of Mead's notion of social reality which he derived from Einstein's notion of relativity and was discussed in the previous chapter.

This revolution had two related consequences for the philosophy of science. Firstly, if there can be two radically different theories which describe the world of planets and stars, then scientific theories and laws are not pure extensions of observation. This has come to be known as the theory dependence of observation or the underdetermination of theory. Science does not start with observations because they are preceded by theory and because observations are fallible. Observations do not speak for themselves. Secondly, observations are not independent of the observer's frame of reference or perspective, that is, they are relative to his/her position in space-time.

For example, the motion of a ping-pong ball bouncing on a table in a moving train will be different for a person travelling on the train and someone standing on the track. For one, the ball will be bouncing straight up and down; for the other two consecutive bounces would appear to occur several metres apart. This illustrates the fact that there is no such thing as absolute space. Einstein showed that there was no absolute time either. In other words, objects cannot be observed as independent facts because they are dependent on their relations with other objects. Moreover, the observations of the relations between objects is dependent on the observer's position in space-time. Both the dependence of observation on theory and the significance of perspective contradicts the independence of the known from
the knower (see Chapter 3), a fundamental assumption of positive empiricism.

A further difficulty for the positive-empiricist philosophy of science was presented by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (1926). In order to predict the future position and velocity of a particle, one has to be able to measure its present position and velocity accurately. But, with advances in quantum mechanics, this was shown to be impossible. In order to make these measurements, it is necessary to use at least one quantum of light which disturbs the particle and changes its velocity in a way that cannot be predicted. In other words, the object of observation is affected by the very means of observation in a way that cannot be predicted accurately. Quantum mechanics introduces an unavoidable element of unpredictability or randomness in science (Hawking, 1988).

The underdetermination of theory, the significance of perspective and the uncertainty principle challenged the traditional view of science. Firstly, observation alone does not provide a firm foundation for scientific knowledge. Secondly, there is no absolute reality: objects can only be understood in terms of their relations with each other and not as independent entities. This principle also encompasses the observer, such that the known cannot be independent of the knower (cf. Chapter 3). Thirdly, with the loss of certainty, the doctrine of scientific determinism could not be maintained as an ideal goal for science. Science itself is relative. The model of psychology as a branch of natural science was based on a 19th-century view of physics - if experimental psychologists took Einstein seriously then all of psychology would be a social science since 'man' is both the agent and object of investigation.

5.2.3 The transformation of scientific knowledge

A positive empiricist philosophy clearly did not correspond to the realities of science. By focusing on the context of justification for universal laws and the rationality of science it failed to realise how scientific knowledge changes. Furthermore, by insisting on the independence of observation it failed to reflect the very
principles of science that it set out to explain. The demise of a positive empiricist philosophy of science culminated in the development of alternative philosophies which emphasized the growth and transformation of scientific knowledge and took into account background knowledge and historical context.

One of the vanguard philosophers in this movement was Karl Popper. According to Popper (1968;1969), science progressed through a series of conjectures and refutations. The relative merits of competing theories are assessed, not in terms of observational proof but, rather, in terms of their falsifiability and their novel predictions. This approach again provided a normative model of science, the influence of which is still apparent in psychology. But, for the same reasons that scientists cannot prove a theory, they cannot falsify it either. As a philosophy of science it failed to overcome the problems associated with the dependence of observation on theory. Science was still meant to be an objective and rational endeavour, 'a process without a subject', independent of the scientists who made it. Furthermore, although Popper frequently refers to the history of science, his philosophy fails to give an accurate account of the historical transformation of scientific knowledge (Chalmers,1982; Kuhn,1962,1970).

5.2.4 A Kuhnian philosophy of science

I have mentioned Popper briefly because it would be improper not to do so. But, of greater significance in the current context, is the work of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn started his academic career as a physicist but soon turned his attention to the history of science. In so doing, he was confronted by material which radically undermined his basic conceptions about the nature of science. In his book entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Kuhn develops a philosophy of science which is more in keeping with historical evidence. The main features of this work have important implications for our understanding of science.

Firstly, theories are represented as part of a complex structure as opposed to a collection of refutable statements. Secondly, Kuhn adopts an historical and evolutionary
approach, describing the progress of science in terms of successive periods. Thirdly, he emphasizes the role of sociological and psychological factors. Together, these portray science as a human endeavour in which people identify and solve problems, construct meanings and change the world.

Kuhn describes the growth of science in terms of successive periods: pre-science leading to normal science, then crisis and revolution, then a new normal science etc. Pre-science is characterized by numerous theories and total disagreement over fundamental theoretical assumptions as well as the kind of observational phenomena that are relevant. This is replaced by normal science, when a single paradigm structures and directs the activities of a scientific community. As the number and significance of the anomalies relating to this paradigm increase, normal science gives way to a state of crisis. This is resolved with the emergence of an alternative paradigm which attracts the allegiances of an increasing number of scientists and constitutes a scientific revolution. Once accepted, this alternative paradigm structures and directs a new period of normal science.

5.2.5 Paradigms and social representations

Below, I will describe Kuhn's ideas about the nature and role of a paradigm in normal science. It will be seen that paradigms share many of the features of social representations. Firstly, the tenacity of a paradigm in normal science portrays the prescriptive and conventional characteristics of a social representation. Both constitute a framework or environment of thought which structures a person's observations and guides his or her behaviour. 'The thinking society' (Moscovici, 1984b) here is the community of research scientists rather than that of lay folk. Secondly, initiation of students into the scientific community involves the active learning and application of a paradigm's concepts, laws and theories just as an individual's socialization into society depends upon social interaction and communication. Thirdly, scientific knowledge is transformed through the identification of anomalies and the process of discovery, just as social representations are transformed by 'the unfamiliar' becoming familiar and through innovation.
Furthermore, a paradigm is expressed not only in the activities of scientists but also in the structuring of the research environment, and in their textbooks and journals. These correspond to the media that convey social representations. Indeed, Moscovici frequently employs the terms 'paradigm' and 'theory' in his descriptions of social representations, despite his categorical denial of their existence in the 'reified universe'.

Although the nature of a paradigm belies precise definition, its typical components can be described in general terms. These include general metaphysical assumptions, explicit theories and laws which are applied to a variety of situations using standard instrumental techniques. It also contains general methodological prescriptions which guide analysis of the relationship between the paradigm and nature. Within the scientific community, the paradigm provides a framework for the identification of legitimate problems, the employment of appropriate research methods and the interpretation of observable phenomena. Paradigms constitute a consensual view of the world which coordinate and direct the theoretical and experimental activities of the scientists involved in its elaboration.

The various components of a paradigm are not always explicitly articulated, but are expressed in the research activities of scientists. Individual scientists thus acquire knowledge of a paradigm by solving standard problems, performing standard experiments and eventually doing research in close association with a skilled practitioner within a given paradigm. Students literally have to learn where to look and what to see through their social interactions with skilled practitioners and with the environment.

Kuhn portray normal science as a problem-solving activity. Presupposition of the paradigm gives scientists the confidence to explore esoteric problems on the assumption that it is capable of sustaining their solution. This having been said, the paradigm will remain sufficiently imprecise and open-ended, leaving room for further research. Moreover,
it is able to withstand various unsolved problems and anomalies which do not 'fit'.

Before going on to discuss Kuhn's ideas about crises and revolutions it is worth considering anomalies in a little more detail. An anomaly arises with the awareness or recognition that nature somehow violates the paradigm-induced expectations. Anomalies are thus similar to what Moscovici has called the unfamiliar. Although Kuhn stresses the role of nature while Moscovici stresses the role of sciences in the production of unfamiliar concepts, these two aspects of anomalies are not distinct. Just as Moscovici stresses the interdependence of image and concept, Kuhn emphasizes the interdependence of fact and theory. With reference to our earlier discussions this accommodates the theory dependent nature of observation. Similarly, just as Moscovici highlights the transformation of scientific knowledge as it enters into the realms of the consensual universe of lay folk, Kuhn stresses the adjustment of the paradigm required to assimilate anomalies. Discovery involves more than the simple addition of a new fact to the conceptual system; it demands the restructuring of conceptual categories such that nature is seen in a different way. There is thus no clear distinction between discovery and invention. Furthermore, discovery and invention cannot be attributed to an individual at a given moment. Rather, it is a complex process which is structured by and restructures the paradigm. 'Anomalies appear only against the background provided by the paradigm' (Kuhn, 1980, p. 65) and discovery/invention involves both experimentation (interaction with the environment) and assimilation (thinking and restructuring) over time. It entails

the previous awareness of anomaly, the gradual and simultaneous emergence of both observational and conceptual recognition, and the consequent change of paradigm categories and procedures often accompanied by resistance' (Kuhn, 1970, p. 62).

5.2.6 Revolution or transformation: the dynamics of science

In this section, I will discuss Kuhn's ideas about the emergence of a crisis and the revolution of a science. These
ideas further emphasize the similarity between paradigm and social representations. Both denote 'world views' or 'frames of reference', constituting a social reality for the relevant community. Both depend upon psychological and sociological factors which cannot be described in terms of the 'reified universe'. And both are transformed through the processes of interaction and communication. However, there are also substantial differences between Kuhn's paradigms and social representations with regard to their dynamics. Kuhn describes paradigm shifts as dramatic and discontinuous events which demand a 'gestalt switch' in world views. This contrasts with the dynamics of social representations which involve the gradual transformation of content and structure. In contrast to Kuhn, it will be argued that there is not a clear distinction between normal science and revolution but rather that, even in normal science, there is an ongoing balance between tradition and innovation.

Although a paradigm can withstand a number of anomalies they will eventually lead to crisis and revolution. This will depend on the number of anomalies, their persistance, their association with social needs and their relation to fundamental aspects of the paradigm. The accumulative force of anomalies gives rise to a state of crisis in which there is a loss of confidence in the paradigm and 'pronounced professional insecurity'. As this persists, scientists turn to argument and debate over the fundamental theoretical assumptions and relevant observational phenomena, giving rise to philosophical and metaphysical dispute. The seriousness of a crisis deepens when a rival paradigm emerges. This lack of consensus encourages the articulation of the old paradigm: what was once implicit is made explicit in the face of alternative viewpoints. It is at this juncture that science exhibits extraordinary dynamics and undergoes revolution. The new paradigm, according to Kuhn, 'emerges all at once, sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man deeply immersed in crisis'. Adherents of the new paradigm undergo a 'religious conversion' or 'gestalt switch' as they change their allegancies from the old to the new paradigm.
This dramatic and discontinuous character of revolution will be challenged below but first it is worth looking at the nature of competing paradigms. Kuhn depicts revolutions as changes in world view. After a revolution, scientists are living in different worlds. This does not imply that scientists are transported to a different planet, but that the world is seen as made up of different things. They may look in the same place with the same instruments but they will observe different phenomena. Observations are not fixed by the nature of the environment and perceptual apparatus. They are not given in immediate experience or communicated in a neutral observation-language. What a person sees depends not only on what he or she looks at, but also on what he or she looks for. This will depend on his or her paradigm or frame of reference, which is gained through social interaction and communication. Furthermore, the paradigm legitimises different problems, makes new kinds of data relevant and suggests different modes of investigation.

Kuhn elaborates on his conception of paradigms as world views by drawing on evidence both from psychology and from the history of science. His examples focus on change in meaning which relate to both perception and conception. It involves both change in relations within the paradigm and the paradigm's relation to the environment. In other words, changing the meaning of one item has repercussions for the meanings of related terms and experience. Although the same terms may be used by competing paradigms their meanings will not be the same. For example, by postulating that the sun was not a planet but a star, the Copernican revolution changed the meaning of 'planet', which had repercussions for the distinction between various celestial bodies. It transformed the conceptual system such that our experience of the solar system was also transformed.

It can be seen that paradigms constitute the social reality for a community of scientists just as social representations constitute the social reality for the lay person (as defined in Chapter 4). They are a frame of reference in which meaning is defined and in which problems are identified or legitimised and they also constitute the
world of things. As such, competing paradigms offer alternative social realities in which scientists do science.

This is frequently referred to as the incommensurability of competing paradigms which has important implications for our understanding of science. Firstly, it is not possible to choose between paradigms on the basis of neutral observations. Observation is always structured by and imbued with meaning from the perspective of a given paradigm. Secondly, there are no purely logical grounds on which to make a rational choice between paradigms. Different paradigms embrace different metaphysical assumptions, standards of evaluation etc. Supporters of one paradigm will not accept the premises of the alternative paradigm and hence do not have to accept its conclusions. Seen in this light, the transformation of science cannot be described within the terms of the 'reified universe' or a positive empiricist philosophy of science.

Unlike previous philosophies of science, Kuhn's account of 'paradigm shifts' emphasize the importance of psychological and sociological factors in the growth of science. This applies not only to the emergence of new paradigms but also to the processes by which revolutions are resolved and a new normal science instantiated. According to Kuhn, a new paradigm emerges first in the minds of one, or at most, a few individuals. These will be scientists whose attention is focused on crisis-provoking problems and who usually are either so young or so new to the field that they are less socialized and, hence, less committed to the old paradigm. But a scientific revolution requires the abandonment of one paradigm and the adoption of a new one, not just by a minority of scientists, but by the relevant scientific community as a whole. This is achieved through the social processes of argument, debate and persuasion.

Those arguments that appear to be most persuasive depend on the comparative problem-solving ability of the alternative paradigm. This is particularly true if the new paradigm can resolve those anomalies that instigated the crisis. However, these are not the only considerations. It is rarely the case that an emerging paradigm immediately improves on its
predecessor. Indeed, those scientists committed to the old paradigm will produce convincing counter-arguments resisting the change to an alternative world view.

Furthermore, the incommensurability of paradigms hampers communication and debate between opposing factions. Other considerations which are equally, if not more, influential are less obvious. Scientists may be persuaded by the aesthetic appeal of the new paradigm, being 'simpler' or of 'greater beauty'. The new paradigm may be more applicable to a pressing social need. Scientists may also come to believe that it offers greater potential for future research.

Paradigm shifts and the transformation of social representations, at least in some respects, display the same characteristics. It may well be that the criteria, values and content of arguments will vary across different sciences and in different spheres of life. But, just as the transformation of social representations is dependent on socio-psychological factors, so, too, is the revolution of scientific knowledge. Many of the major 'scientific revolutions' are discoveries of a social-psychological nature. That 'man' as a species was not created separately from other species (Darwin); that the earth is no longer the centre of the universe (Copernicus); that what is in consciousness is finite in relation to the unconscious (Freud); that space and time are not independent dimensions (Einstein). Furthermore, they all involve a change in the relationship between the knower and the known. The transformation of scientific knowledge is not dependent upon logic nor pure observation any more than it is upon common-sense. Kuhn, like Moscovici, emphasizes the interdependence of individuals, the scientific community, their paradigms and the environment in which they work.

Despite these fundamental similarities, Kuhn's writings proclaim a special regard for science which distinguishes normal and revolutionary science from pre-science and, for that matter, from common-sense. The main distinguishing characteristic of normal science is that a single paradigm guides and coordinates the activities of scientists. It provides a single framework for communication and interaction within the community of scientists, who share the same world
view. Alternative paradigms emerge only once a crisis is well established. This contrasts with pre-science in which different and incommensurate world views proliferate, hindering communication and coordinated research activity. Given the primacy of a single paradigm in normal science, extraordinary or revolutionary science is conceived of in terms of a dramatic and discontinuous event. Firstly, this separates tradition from innovation into successive periods in the growth of scientific knowledge. This is clearly at odds with my account of the transformation of social representations in which tradition and innovation are inextricably interwoven in a continuous and gradual process (see Chapter 4). Secondly, Kuhn's account fails to give any clear idea of how alternative world views are created. While Moscovici left the construction of the unfamiliar to science, Kuhn leaves the construction of new paradigms to individual scientists who mystically achieve an alternative world view. Thirdly, other philosophers of science, most notably Lakatos (1970) and Feyerabend (1970), have argued that Kuhn's account is at odds with the history of science which cannot be divided into successive periods of tenacity and proliferation.

These problems are overcome if we consider the prescriptive and conventional aspects of science in continuous interaction with the creative and innovatory aspects of science. Alternative paradigms do not emerge only after a crisis is established. Rather, they are always present and play an important part in the growth of scientific knowledge. It is not the central paradigm that alone determines the problem-solving activities of scientists, but also the clash of ideas between alternative views. These may come from within the discipline or from other fields, sustaining critical discussion and argument as a normal part of scientific activity. This adjustment to Kuhn's original thesis integrates the role of tradition and innovation in the growth of scientific knowledge and further emphasizes the similarities between paradigms and social representations.
5.2.7 The process of science: a social constructionist philosophy of science

The writings of philosophers such as Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend have encouraged the development of a new approach in the philosophy of science. This approach focuses on the processes of science from the perspective of the scientist in an historical and evolutionary framework. Rather than restricting philosophy to the 'context of justification' this approach also embraces 'the context of discovery', with all its historical and psychological concomitants (Nersessian, 1987b). It is concerned not only with the products of science but also with how knowledge is produced (Shapero, 1987). Such a philosophy requires both an historical overview and a detailed analysis of the development and transformation of science (Nersessian, 1987b; Kuhn, 1988). Only then can philosophers understand the processes by which problems are structured, theories formulated and solutions accepted or rejected by the community. Only then can philosophers understand the processes by which meanings are established and changed. Furthermore, within this approach, reality is conceived of in terms of relative objectivity or historical realism, a conception comparable to social constructionism. It thus becomes apparent that the theory of social representations is applicable in the realm of science and provides a social-psychological framework in which to examine the transformation of science.

In his more recent work, Kuhn (1988) has identified two aspects of historical analysis both of which are essential to the philosopher. Historical narratives of changes in scientific knowledge provide a source of data from which philosophers construct an understanding of science. However, prior to this, it is necessary to 'regain the past', to re-establish the meanings and concerns confronting the scientists involved. In other words, it is necessary to adopt the perspective of the scientist to re-discover the intellectual tradition, to reconstruct the contradictions or problems, and to research the scientists's solutions.

Nersessian (1987a), Shapero(1987), Giere (1987) and others have argued similarly that philosophers have tended
to contrast former conceptualization with later versions without analysing the periods of transition between theories. In order to understand the transformation of science, it is necessary to examine how new concepts emerge and are subsequently altered, raising new problems to be resolved, in a gradual process of theory change. The creation of a scientific concept takes place within frameworks of beliefs in response to specific problems which are theoretical, experimental, methodological and metaphysical. The meaning of a new concept is thus always founded in the meaning of its predecessors and is better understood in the dynamics of meaning-change and its context of use rather than in the necessary and sufficient conditions of a static definition. This evolutionary approach applies both to the substantive issues addressed by a particular theory and to the broader notions of observation, explanation, criteria for evaluation, methodology and the goals of a scientific discipline.

By including the scientist in the process of science and by focusing on beliefs, meaning and creativity, these philosophers narrow the gap between our understanding of science and our understanding of cognition, and the achievement of knowledge, more generally. To quote Nersessian the cognitive mechanisms at work in the meaning-making dimensions of science cannot be fundamentally different i.e. different in kind, from those we employ in non-scientific and science-learning contexts .... any adequate science of cognition must also take the data from the analysis of science into account in its formulation and this has not been done to any significant extent (Nersessian, 1987a, p.164).

Science is conceived of as a human endeavour in which individuals, who have internalized the language and beliefs of their community, contribute to and evaluate knowledge. Science, like any other activity, is a culturally and historically situated activity which is ongoing and open-ended, always open to revision and change. This does not imply an extreme relativism or extreme social constructionism. Such a position could not explain the
phenomenal success of the sciences, nor could it explain the transformation of science. Rather, it expresses a reality which is founded in the organism/environment/culture system. This is expressed in the philosophical writings by terms such as 'historical realism', 'contextual objectivity', 'evolutionary naturalism', 'relative objectivity' etc. It is a human reality founded in the biological and cultural inheritance of the species: a reality which does not separate the internal, subjective world from the external objective world. The cultural environment is not distinct from the natural environment, nor the mental from the material world. It is a form of social reality that embeds the individual in culture; the scientist, like any other individual, is a personification of nature through participation in, and an expression of, a culture

(Grene, 1987, p. 73).

The conception of science as a cultural phenomenon makes it no less real. What it does do is to include the scientist and the scientific community in that reality.

In conclusion, it can be seen that science should be conceived of as a human endeavour and, far from being a reified universe, it is a culturally and historically situated activity. Scientists, as scientists, are both the product and the producers of science just as individuals are both the product and the producers of culture. Thus, the theory of social representations, as an expression of the social constructionist paradigm, can be applied to the realm of science. In short, all that is true of the 'consensual universe' is also true of science.

5.3 THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Parallel developments in the sociology of knowledge similarly suggest that the theory of social representations is applicable to science. In general terms, this field is concerned with 'the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises' (Berger and Luckmann, 1984, p. 16 (1st edition, 1966)). It addresses the variety of knowledge in different societies and the processes by which knowledge is socially established as real. This
section is not intended to provide an overview of the diverse approaches which have been adopted or to debate the various perspectives on the social construction of science. However, reading the theoretical and research papers in the sociology of knowledge convinced me that science could be legitimately characterized in terms of social representations. I also believe that the theory of social representations would provide a useful framework for the integration of at least some of this material.

This section commences by looking briefly at the overlap between social representations studies and the sociology of knowledge. This is followed by a discussion of the social processes involved in the construction of scientific knowledge, including the influence of institutions and society more generally; the socialization of novices into the scientific community; and the processes by which scientific knowledge is transformed and diffused within the community. Finally, it is argued that reification is the final stage in the social construction of reality and does not differentiate science from society. Furthermore, it is suggested that the similarities between science and other cultural enterprises far outweigh their differences.

One of the most important books in the sociology of knowledge has been *The Social Construction of Reality* by Berger and Luckmann (1966). This treatise is concerned explicitly with the social construction of reality in everyday life and shares many features with the general approach expounded by Moscovici in his theory of social representations. Farr (1987b) even suggests that several studies within the field of social representations are themselves empirical contributions to the literature on the sociology of knowledge. For example, in *La Psychanalyse* (1961), Moscovici traces the diffusion and transformation of an existing body of scientific psychology into French culture. Similarly, in *The Age of the Crowd* (1985) he examines the use of Le Bon's Mass Psychology by political leaders such as Hitler and Stalin. In so far as these leaders acted on the basis of Le Bon's ideas, his mass psychology was a science which 'created history', transforming the nature of
the world in which we live. Furthermore, Moscovici has not been interested exclusively in the diffusion and transformation of scientific psychology as it becomes part of common-sense understanding. He has also examined the origins and impact of theories within science. For example, in *The Age of the Crowd*, Moscovici analyses Le Bon's influence on the development of Freud's second, more social psychology. Similarly, in the preface to *La Psychanalyse*, Lagache notes that Moscovici was interested in the origins and diffusion of psychoanalysis within the community of psychoanalysts. It was only due to their lack of cooperation that this aspect of the problem was not studied. Some studies, in particular the work of Restivo (1984) and Trasweek (1984) have actually employed the concept of representations in studying the dialectic relationships between scientific knowledge and the social environment. Farr (1984) has also argued that the proper place to look for social representations in laboratory studies is at the level of the scientific community. For example, Behaviourism, as a social representation, affects the layout of psychology laboratories and structures the social interactions within the research process.

Moscovici himself does not attempt to integrate this work on science with the theory of social representations. This is possibly due to the fact that he wishes to maintain the distinction between the reified and consensual universes. For him, studies of science examine the reified universe whereas studies of common-sense understanding of science fall within the consensual universe. However, studies in the sociology of knowledge discussed below make it clear that these are part of the same enterprise.

Rather than entering into the debate on the proper research programme for the sociology of knowledge or the various approaches which have been used, I shall focus on those studies which illuminate the social construction of scientific knowledge. Many of these studies were inspired by the writings of Kuhn as well as historians of science. A central assumption is that social truths cannot be contrasted with objective rational truth; that culture is not separate from nature; and that science is not, in some way, a-social.
or a-historical. The sociology of scientific knowledge, for most of its proponents, is not simply trying to demonstrate the social influences on objective knowledge but, rather, that scientific knowledge is a social construction.

By rejecting the traditional distinction between social and scientific knowledge the role of convention, of the social processes of negotiation and argumentation and of the influence of society are shown to be inherent aspects of science. The world of science is also a world of meaning and social significance, dependent on the collaboration of scientists and some degree of consensus with regard to theory, subject matter, problem formulation, methods of investigation and interpretation. Science is fundamentally a social activity, situated in a cultural and historical context; the roles of tradition and innovation are as important in the transformation of knowledge within the sciences as they are in the transformation of common-sense understandings.

Perhaps the first and most traditional approach in the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the influence of society in general and social institutions in particular upon the development of scientific ideas. For example, the work of McKenzie (1981) and Restivo (1984) discussed at the beginning of this chapter demonstrate the influence of social goals on the creation and acceptance of scientific theories.

......social interests affect (scientific knowledge) at the organisational level, as well as at the most basic level of the development and evaluation of theories and techniques. Scientific knowledge is constitutively social because science is goal-oriented and because the goals of science are socially sustained.

(Restivo, 1984, p. 73, emphases in original).

Others have focused on the institutional and organizational influences on the development of scientific knowledge. For example, Ben-David and Collins (1966) investigated the social factors in the origins of psychology as a new scientific discipline. The fundamental ideas for experimental psychology had been available in Germany and elsewhere for some time. However, it's development did not occur until there was both
an intellectual interest and the potential for gaining intellectual identity. As a physiologist, Wundt was unable to achieve recognition and, accepting the philosophy chair in Leipzig, integrated the methods of physiology with the problems of philosophy.

The sociology of knowledge has not restricted its interest to the influence of society on science. More recently, there has been an increasing focus on the social processes by which scientific knowledge is constructed (eg. Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Barnes and Edge, 1982; Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983). Much of this work adopts a similar approach to that adopted in the theory of social representations. Scientific knowledge is portrayed as systems of representations which are products of, sustained by and embody social practices. These practices

inteigrate psychological and biological states and processes, social relations and activities, and material things and processes (Restivo, 1984, p. 86).

In other words, scientific knowledge is a product of the organism/culture/environment system. For example, Traweek (1984) indicates how physicists' conceptions of time and space are interdependent with their social realities, from the mechanical functioning of the detectors, to the social relations and beliefs in the scientific community and on to the wider cultural and physical environment.

The organism/culture/environment system is also evident in discussions of socialization into the scientific community. This is emphasized by Barnes (1983) in his writings on the conventional character of knowledge. Socialization involves interacting with competent members of the community and the environment, in both formal and informal settings. Meanings and conceptual networks are established through communication with authoritative teachers in conjunction with the indications of experience in the physical environment. For example, a learner classifies an object or event as C, whereas the teacher classifies it as C2, a concept not yet available to the learner. Through instances of object or event A and the corresponding
indications of the teacher, the learner comes to distinguish between C and C2. In this way, the learner is introduced to the conventions of the community and is taught how to make original contributions within the limits of its cognitive, technical and social norms (representations).

Furthermore, socialization is a dynamic and an ongoing process which continues to be effective throughout a scientist's career. This is evident from studies which have approached science as a social system. These focus on the social relations and social norms which structure scientific activity (Hagstrom, 1965; Mulkay, 1972). Scientific behaviour is seen in terms of gifts or social exchange in return for recognition. Scientists present papers at conferences, send them to colleagues, publish articles in journals and write books as a means of communication and diffusion of their work. This is done in order to receive recognition from the relevant scientific bodies through citations, invitations to lecture, (invitations to edit journals), honorary degrees, society membership, prizes and eponymy (Merton, 1957). Recognition is allocated in accordance with the evaluated quality of the research which, in turn, is dependent upon the representations shared by the community. This encourages the selection of problems, methods and solutions which conform to the status quo.

The transformation of scientific knowledge similarly depends upon social processes in the scientific community. Innovation, negotiation and communication depend upon the social relations amongst scientists in conjunction with their interactions in the environment. Hagstrom (1965) and Mulkay (1972) elaborate on Kuhn's framework by emphasizing the role of social exchange and recognition in both maintaining social control (conventional and prescriptive characteristics) and encouraging innovations. In particular, Mulkay argues that intellectual migration and modification of existing techniques and theories to different problem areas have brought about some of the most radical innovations in science. For example, the migration of Delbruck and others in physics, which lacked opportunities for development, into biology, led to the emergence of molecular biology, a
successful and innovative field, which encountered little opposition (Mullins, 1968).

Mulkay's account of the social process of innovation focuses on social control and social relations within and between scientific networks. In so doing, he underplays the role of the environmental context and the actual research process in the social construction of innovations and the transformation of scientific knowledge. Scientific research is an important aspect of innovation and is in many ways similar to socialization. Within the research process scientists indicate to others the problem and proposed solution, adjusting their representations to accommodate new relations with objects or events in the environment. However, in the frontiers of research the conventions have not been pre-established. Scientific observations, the conduct of research and theoretical interpretation must be negotiated through the rhetorical processes of argument and persuasion.

Consensus, at whatever level, is a social accomplishment (Knorr-Catina and Mulkay, 1983). For example, Collins (1982) identifies the disagreement and negotiations involved in the replication of experiments on gravity waves. The establishment of facts is only achieved through the linguistic, conceptual and social interactions of the scientists concerned. Similarly, Kuhn (1982) argues that measurement is not as precise as the textbooks suggest, but is dependent upon 'reasonable agreement' as to what is and is not acceptable. The rhetoric of science is perhaps more apparent at the level of theoretical and metatheoretical debate. Martin (1979) shows how the technical assumptions, selective use of evidence, selective use of results, and the style of reference are associated with the scientists' general perspective and presuppositions. These relate both to the scientific community itself and to the concerns of the wider society as a whole.

Negotiation takes place through the face-to-face interactions of scientists working together on research projects, at informal meetings and at lectures and conferences. Negotiation also occurs through the medium of written communications, be they letters, journal articles or
books. Such forms of communication are often described in terms of the diffusion of scientific knowledge. However 'diffusion' is not a simple process of contagion, whereby information is shared. Rather, it is part of the social construction process, in which meanings are negotiated and consensus continually challenged, established and reconfirmed (Knorr-Catina and Mulkay, 1983). In order to understand the growth of scientific knowledge some sociologists have focused on the use of scientific literature and the patterns of communication. An analysis of citations reveals the 'life' of papers and gives some indication of their impact on the community. In particular, innovations which have been accepted by the community can be identified and their history of diffusion analysed. Also, citation patterns reveal the structure of scientific communities; 'problem networks' (Mulkay, 1972) or 'invisible colleges' (Crane, 1972), and the extent of cross- fertilization between research groups, or between different fields. Crane (1972) adopted this approach in her study of 'invisible colleges' and found that the pattern of diffusion reflected the structure of the scientific community, the perspectives adopted by 'problem networks' and the social processes involved in the growth of scientific knowledge. Although, in itself, this method is extremely restricted, it provides a useful addition to the above mentioned qualitative studies which focus on the content of scientific knowledge and the social processes by which it is transformed.

These studies, taken together, illuminate the social construction of scientific knowledge. The influence of society, the processes of socialization, the role of convention, the social processes of exchange and negotiations are inherent aspects of science. The world of science is a dynamic world of meanings and social interactions, of consensus and disagreements, of tradition and innovation. In short, science is essentially cultural. It does not consist of a reified universe, divorced from history, culture and social beliefs. Science is carried out by scientists who are social beings interacting in, learning and creating a social world. There is only one sense in which science can be
considered to be reified and this is as the end product of social construction. Berger and Luckmann (1966) describe the reifications of social reality as

the apprehension of the products of human activity, as if they were something other than human products—such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world and, further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products, is lost to consciousness.

(Berger and Luckmann, 1984, p. 106, emphasis in original).

Moscovici has ironically reified this process of reification to create a universe. But this ignores the social construction of reality in science. Scientific facts are constructed through scientists' social activities. Even when scientists apprehend the world in reified terms they continue to produce it (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Moreover, reification is by no means a distinguishing characteristic of science. Reification exists in common-sense and is just as evident there as it is in science.

5.4 TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE

Both the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge suggest that science should be conceived of as a human and social endeavour in which knowledge is socially constructed. The growth of scientific knowledge is not characterized by the accumulation of facts through objective observation, the induction of universal laws and the deduction of testable hypotheses. In order to understand the transformation of paradigms, theories and research, it is necessary to adopt an historical and evolutionary approach which takes into account the sociological and psychological factors in the production of scientific knowledge. The work involved in science is carried out by people working in a scientific community which itself is located in a cultural and historical context. The products of science cannot be divorced from the producers nor can people, in their capacity as scientists, be divorced from the products of the scientific community. Scientists are social individuals who actively engage in the perpetuation and transformation of a
social reality which is at once prescriptive and dynamic. The world of the scientist is imbued with meanings which are learned, sustained and changed through social interaction and communications. Scientific knowledge is no more and no less than scientists' beliefs, which themselves are an expression of the ongoing interdependence between scientists, their cultural context and their environment.

The theory of social representations provides a social psychology of knowledge which is manifestly appropriate for the study of scientific knowledge. Social representations constitute a reality which is constructed through the social activities of individuals interacting and communicating within an historical and cultural context. This reality is essentially social and dynamic, both in its conventional and prescriptive character and in the origins and diffusion of innovations. Furthermore, social representations are not simply consensual beliefs about the world, rather they embrace individuals' beliefs, people's actions and interactions with the world, and the cultural products of those interactions.

It is worth summarizing our discussion concerning systems of social representations in Chapter 4. It will be remembered that the transformation of social reality involves three interdependent aspects: the established system of social representations which is both prescriptive and dynamic; the social construction of the unfamiliar out of this system of social representations; and the constructive accommodation of the system to form a changed social reality. These aspects are interdependent in that 'the familiar at once defines what is unfamiliar and is familiarized by it'. Simultaneously, the unfamiliar emerges out of the familiar and is familiarized by it' (Chapter 4, mine). The ongoing dynamism is sustained through the social processes of thinking, communicating and interacting in the organism/environment/culture system. Changing the relations or meaning of any one element will have repercussions for the whole system, creating novel associations and conflicts, and eventually restructuring the whole system of social representations.
The development of this theoretical framework has been necessitated by the need to account for the dynamics of scientific knowledge. This involves an understanding of the relationship between knowledge and the environment (i.e., the object of study); between the individual and his or her community; between different specializations or fields of research in science; and between common-sense and science. The theoretical framework can thus be further illuminated by taking a particular example of scientific creativity which has had a profound effect on contemporary reality. I refer, here, to Darwin's theory of evolution: to its origins in Western thought, to its creation by Darwin, to its subsequent transformation in scientific communities and to its diffusion into common-sense.

Gruber (1974) illuminates the origins and development of the Theory of Evolution in his highly readable book entitled 'Darwin on Man: a psychological study of scientific creativity'. In this book he specifically rejects two popular approaches to the explanations of innovation. The first focuses on the societal forces and objective conditions which bring about innovations. An individual's thoughts and actions are seen simply as a reflection of society. This approach externalizes and depersonalizes creativity such that the individual plays no active role, being wholly determined by the prevailing Zeitgeist. The second approach focuses on the individual and tends to attribute innovations to unconscious and non-rational thought. By ignoring the influences of society, this approach internalizes and desocializes creativity. In contrast, Gruber argues for an approach which integrates the societal and individual aspects of creativity. Throughout his study, Gruber reveals the interdependence between Darwin and his social and intellectual milieu. The creative process cannot always be conceived of in terms of a single act, a sudden insight or the solution to a single problem. Scientific creativity, more often than not, involves the gradual construction of an alternative perspective. Gruber shows how the theory of evolution emerged through the gradual development of a new perspective as Darwin continually adjusted and reconstructed his beliefs. It was
a person striving to construct a new synthesis, a new way of looking at many problems, a new point of view (Gruber, 1974, p. 4).

Furthermore, this creative process 'must be seen as rooted in its total human context' (Gruber, 1974, p. 6), in the relationship between the individual, the environment and the social and intellectual milieu.

Gruber schematizes Darwin's changing world view in terms of five stages shown in Gruber's diagram. This transformation of Darwin's evolutionary thought was related to the environment and to his intellectual and social context. Rather than giving a general historical survey, Gruber explores this in the personal terms of Darwin's life. In his adolescent years, he assimilated the 'family Weltenschaung' and, in particular, ideas from his grandfather, Erasmus. Those which were most significant refer to the conception of nature, struggle, adaptation and change; to the nature of scientific work, invention and education; and to social and ethical issues. These were elaborated upon through his education at Edinburgh and Cambridge where he was influenced by a number of teachers.

The gradual emergence of a new perspective was founded in the context of his family and University education, but required a further one and a half decades to reach publication. These years were taken up by the integration of his experiences on the Beagle Voyage and his observation in the archipelagos; the assimilation of Lyell's ideas on geology and, in particular, the conception of the physical world as continuously changing over a period of two million years; and the development of what Gruber refers to as the conservation schema and the equilibration schema. In particular, the conception of a changing world populated by well-adapted but unchanging organisms posed a dilemma which was not resolved until Darwin, inspired by the writings of Malthus (1826), transformed ideas of natural selection from a conservative to an evolutionary force. Darwin's active search and enquiry, his social and intellectual context and his experiences in the world all played an essential role in the creative process.
Gruber's Diagram

A. 1832 and before: The Creator has made an organic world (O) and a physical world (P); O is perfectly adapted to P.

B. 1832-1834: The physical world undergoes continuous change, governed by natural laws as summarized in Lyell's *Principles of Geology*. In other respects, B resembles A.

C. 1835: The activities of living organisms contribute to the evolution of the physical world, as exemplified by the action of the coral organism in making coral reefs. In other respects, C resembles B.

D. 1836-1837: Changes in the physical world imply changes in the organic world, if adaptation is to be maintained; the direct action of the physical milieu induces the appropriate biological adaptations. In other respects, D resembles C.

E. 1838 and after: The physical and organic worlds are both continuously evolving and interacting with each other. The Creator, if one exists, may have set the natural system in being, but He does not interfere with its operation, standing outside the system.

Darwin's changing world view.

(Copied from Gruber, 1974, p. 127).
The ideas of evolution and natural selection with which Darwin was working were well established, at least within his immediate circles. But, as Darwin searched, selected and re-organized his material, these ideas appeared and re-appeared in slightly different forms, taking on a new significance within the changing structure of his argument. That which is important is not so much an original idea, but the creative syntheses of various ideas into a coherent and intelligible system of representations.

Whilst his family and teachers played an important role in initiating the creative process there were other societal and personal factors which restrained the construction of a novel perspective. In particular, Darwin was aware that his ideas challenged religious orthodoxy and, from the experience of others who had violated the majority view of the world, had reason to fear persecution if his ideas on evolution became known. On the one hand, this repressed the free exploration and expression of his early evolutionary ideas; on the other hand, it also served to encourage the search for further materials to support his argument. Similarly, the difficulties encountered by Darwin in communicating a novel and ill-defined perspective encouraged the development of a coherent and justifiable theory.

Following the publication of The Origin of Species (1859), the diffusion of Darwin's evolutionary perspective gave rise to 'a revolution in every mode of thought and feeling'. It transformed our thinking about the animal and plant kingdoms, about the place of human beings in the world and about 'the scheme of things' in the cosmos. Oldroyd (1980) illuminates the breadth and depth of influence on intellectual thought in his comprehensive book entitled 'Darwinian Impacts: an introduction to the Darwinian Revolution'. In particular, he explores the consequences of 'Darwinism' from the public reception of 'The Origin of Species' to its diffusion into various spheres of thought. Not only has it radically changed biological theory but it has also transformed areas of sociology, politics, theology, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, literature and music.
Beyond this, the evolutionary perspective has entered into our common-sense understandings in many spheres of life. This refers not so much to lay knowledge of the theory of evolution, but to people's understanding of the natural world, of social and political phenomena and of how things change. As Farr has suggested (personal communication), the Darwinian Revolution is an apt subject for investigation within the framework of the theory of social representations.

The mistake which has been made in the theory of social representations, and which has frequently been made elsewhere, is the perpetuation of a distinction between the creative process and the diffusion of that which has been created. Rather, the creation of a theory and its subsequent diffusion are part and parcel of an ongoing process of transformation. In terms of Einstein's relativity theory the distinction depends upon one's point of reference in time/space. There is always a tendency to select points of radical and influential change as the node of creativity and then to conceive of any subsequent transformation in terms of that creation. However, just as Gruber argues that there is no one step which is more crucial than any other in the development of Darwin's evolutionary perspective, so too, there is no one point which can be selected out in a continual process of change, when we consider the transformation of social representations.

This can be illustrated by taking different points of reference within the Darwinian Revolution. If I select Darwin as my point of reference I would describe ideas on natural selection, evolution and the creation of the natural order in terms of social and intellectual influences. I would then go on to describe the influence of the theory of evolution in terms of its diffusion and subsequent transformation. However, if I take as my point of reference a later stage in the continual process of change, the world of Darwin becomes part of the social and intellectual influences. What is important to realise here is that those who are influenced by the theory of evolution are also creative in constructing new syntheses which assimilate and transform Darwin's ideas. Each individual, within and as a part of their environment, must
go through the creative process of breaking with what they know and reconstructing their perspective (Marková, 1987).

In some ways, this is precisely Moscovici's point when he emphasizes the creative and transformative character of social representations as the products of science diffuse into common-sense. What he fails to realize is that the psychologist or anthropologist or, for that matter, Darwin himself, are at least as creative as the lay person in the construction of a new perspective. Both Gruber (1973) and Piaget (foreword in Gruber, 1974) liken the creative process in science to the child's active construction and reconstruction of the social world. In both spheres, a new perspective is created through interacting with and changing the environment. The theory of social representations highlights the same constructive and transformative processes in the social world of the adult lay person.

With the insights provided by the work of Moscovici, on the one hand, and writings in the philosophy and sociology of science on the other, I have attempted to reveal the similarities between the adult's active reconstruction of the social world and the scientist's creation of a new perspective in science. Indeed, the theory of social representations illuminates the transformation of knowledge, which is the hallmark of science, whilst, simultaneously, studies in the transformation of scientific knowledge illuminate the theory of social representations.

The domain of social representations has been one of the major issues addressed in this thesis. For Moscovici, social representations are science made common. However, closer examination of the theory and associated research has shown this restriction to be ill-founded. In Chapter 2, it was argued that the theory applied to the dynamics of common-sense regardless of its association with science. Social representations of scientific theories or concepts cannot be distinguished from social representations of socially significant, non-scientific objects. This applies to their dynamic nature, to the roles of convention and experience, to the various modes of communication and to the processes of transformation. In this chapter, it has been
argued that the theory also applies to the dynamics of scientific knowledge. Science, like common-sense, constitutes a social reality that is constructed by social individuals in an historical and cultural context. The theory of social representations thus provides a social-psychology of knowledge which applies to the dynamics of both common-sense and science. Moreover, the interactions between science and common-sense can only be understood if they are conceived of in the same terms. This applies both to the influence of common-sense social representations in science and to the understanding of science in common-sense. Finally, the social constructionist paradigm and the theory of social representations provide a framework in which to study the social-psychology of science.

The understanding of science will necessarily require a multi-disciplinary approach including sociology, anthropology, psychology, history and philosophy. As yet, social psychology has made little contribution to such a science of science. However, the theory of social representations, as explicated above, provides us with the opportunity of making considerable progress in this direction.
CHAPTER SIX

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH: FROM EXPERIMENTS TO RESEARCH PROGRAMMES

6.1 METHODOLOGY AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF SCIENCE

6.2 RESEARCH METHODS FOR STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

6.3 THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME: ITS CONTENT AND STRUCTURE

6.3.1 The questionnaire
   6.3.1.1 Questionnaire sample and administration
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   6.3.2.1 The historical dimension
   6.3.2.2 The use of documents
   6.3.2.3 Constructing the past
   6.3.2.4 Problems with content analysis
   6.3.2.5 An historico-interpretative analysis

6.3.3 In-depth interviews

6.3.4 Analysis of citations

6.3.5 A critical review

In this chapter, the focus of discussion shifts from theoretical and meta-theoretical issues to issues of methodology and research practice. Although I here provide a separate chapter on methodology this does not imply that I consider it to be a separate domain of concern. Meta-theory and methodology, theory and method, are interdependent aspects of the scientific enterprise. In Chapter 1, I presented Moscovici's theory of social representations as a social form of social psychology. In Chapter 2, we examined research which has been conducted under the auspices of this theory and considered its implications for the definition of social representations. In Chapter 3, we distinguished between the Hegelian and the Cartesian paradigms. These have
been two major traditions of research in the history of psychology and social psychology. In Chapter 4, we explored how to overcome the contradictions and confusions within the theory, whilst emphasizing the role of the social individual in the dynamics and transformation of social representations. Finally, in Chapter 5, we challenged Moscovici's distinction between the reified and consensual universes by drawing on recent developments in both the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge. It will be seen that the contents of these chapters are all relevant to the present discussion regarding the most appropriate methodology and research practices for an examination of social representations.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I consider the contrasting methodological implications of the Cartesian and Hegelian paradigms. It will be argued that, whilst the Cartesian paradigm privileges the experimental method, the Hegelian paradigm demands other methods of research that take account of the relational, constructive and evolutionary character of social phenomena. In the second section, I examine the diverse research methods which have been used to study social representations. These include experimentation, questionnaires, an analysis of contents of the mass media and of interview transcripts, multi-dimensional scaling and factor analysis, observational techniques and ethnomethodology. It is argued that these are complementary methods, each of which can be employed to illuminate different aspects of social representations. Hence, it is important to develop research programmes that adopt a multi-method approach.

In the third section, I focus on my own research programme, emphasizing the rationale for an integration of the different methods employed. The primary aim of this research is to examine the dynamics and transformation of social representations in science. This requires an historical or evolutionary analysis of a scientist's contribution in relation to his/her scientific community and to the broader society. This is achieved through a qualitative analysis of published scientific texts, supplemented by a questionnaire, a number of interviews and
a quantitative analysis of citations. The unusual character of this research gives rise to a number of methodological and theoretical issues which are discussed more fully. They concern primarily the use of an historical/evolutionary analysis of texts and a focus on an individual's contribution to a particular field of science.

6.1 METHODOLOGY AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF SCIENCE

Since its early adoption as the primary method of investigation in the 1930's, experimental methodology has enjoyed an unrivalled hegemony in social psychology. Despite various critiques which have challenged this approach (see Chapter 3), it has remained the dominant mode of investigation. Chapters and books on methodology continue to focus on experimentation (e.g. Manstead and Semin, 1990; Greenberg and Folgar, 1988) and experimental reports dominate the most prestigious journals. Rather than adopting alternative methods of research which are now available many social psychologists have concentrated on developing new and more complex experimental designs in order to overcome problems associated with experimenter effects, demand characteristics, ecological validity and social or cultural context effects (e.g. Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest and Grove, 1966, 1981; Doise, 1986). A second, equally pervasive influence, has been the preference for quantitative, as opposed to qualitative, research. It is almost as though scientific research is synonymous with quantitative research (for example, see Lindzey and Aronson, 1985). In contrast, the theory of social representations does not privilege any particular method of research. It has encouraged the use of various research methods, ranging from experimentation to participant observation, and including both quantitative and qualitative techniques. These contrasting methodologies reflect the divergent perspectives offered by the Cartesian and Hegelian paradigms (see Chapter 3). Each paradigm endorses a particular world view which directs both the theoretical and methodological activities of scientists (see Chapter 5). Although these issues have been dealt with at length in previous chapters they will be discussed here in order to
illuminate the divergent implications of the Cartesian and Hegelian paradigms in regard to the formulation of research problems, the appropriate methods of research and the construction of acceptable solutions.

The methodological commitments of the Cartesian paradigm favour the experimental method of research. The manipulation of independent and dependent variables in a controlled environment depends on the conception of phenomena as discrete and independent entities. For example, attitudes are studied independently of perceptions, cognitions, beliefs or emotions, and message content is studied independently of other environmental variables. Of even greater significance is the duality which this methodology establishes between the individual and the environment. The individual is envisioned as a stable, inert entity influenced by environmental stimulation. Thus, the experimenter manipulates the environment and observes the response (S-R psychology). Furthermore, the independence of entities justifies a reductionist approach whereby the relations between phenomena can be reduced to their simplest form. In this way, the experimenter 'discovers' basic cause-effect relationships between the variables (determinism) and can postulate various intervening mechanisms (S-O-R psychology).

These methodological commitments cannot be accommodated within the Hegelian paradigm. Entities are not independent but are interdependent or dialectic, such that a single entity can only be considered in association with related entities. As these relationships change the essence of the entities involved also change. Thus, a people's attitudes are dependent upon their individual perceptions, cognitions, beliefs and emotions. Furthermore, there is a unity between the individual and the environment. The individual can only be understood as a purposefully functioning unity which embraces the environment. This unity is achieved through the individual's activity and participation within the environment. This requires a reconceptualization of the methodological commitments such that reductionist and mechanistic explanations are avoided. In general terms, there must be a commitment to structural and comparative analyses.
of phenomena that incorporate the historical and cultural milieu.

The Cartesian paradigm also favours data collection over theory construction. This is endorsed by the positivist-empiricist epistemology whereby the scientist is considered to be an objective observer of nature. This perspective on the process of science is rejected by the Hegelian paradigm. Science is a social activity in which scientists actively construct knowledge and, in so doing, transform both themselves and the world in which they live. Observation is an activity that depends upon theory and is effective within the system being studied. That is, both scientific knowledge and the phenomena being studied are essentially interactive - they are both active and reactive. This perspective takes into account the theory dependent nature of observation, indeterminacy and reactivity as discussed in Chapter 5. Theory construction thus plays a central role within the Hegelian paradigm.

Finally, the historical and evolutionary character of the Hegelian paradigm means that a new dimension must be taken into account in research - the dimension of time. This is not an important dimension within the Cartesian paradigm: as entities are stable and enduring, change is limited to quantitative redistribution. It is not surprising then that the methods of research adopted within the Cartesian paradigm are unsuitable for studying the transformation of phenomena over time. For example, experimentation only provides knowledge of temporarily truncated sequences of events. The length of experiments is reduced to a minimum in order to eliminate contaminating variables. If we wish to study the creation and development of new things and new ideas then we need to develop alternative methods of research.

The theoretical commitments discussed in the previous paragraphs have a number of implications for the research strategies and the methods of research adopted within each paradigm. Within the Cartesian paradigm the aim of science is to discover universal principles that exist in nature. This relies upon the quantitative analysis of stable relations between independent entities. Furthermore, there
are methodological commitments to prediction, hypothesis-testing, validity, replication and control. Within the Hegelian paradigm the aim of science is to construct understandings of a dynamic and open-ended system. This relies on the qualitative analysis of changing inter-relationships between interdependent entities. The meaning of concepts or the essence of things cannot be described in mathematical terms. Furthermore, the conventional criteria for trustworthiness are inappropriate within the Hegelian paradigm. Alternative criteria for the evaluation of research must be constructed. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability are more appropriate criteria. Alternatively, Gergen (1984) emphasizes the role of empirical research in the construction and development of theories. Research should clarify, demonstrate, illustrate and vivify theoretical statements.

In Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that the dominance of the Cartesian paradigm has resulted in a social psychology that is both individualistic and static. This applies to research as well as to theory. By relying on experimentation as the primary method of investigation social psychologists have produced a discipline that is both a-cultural and a-historical. We know a great deal about individuals behaving on their own in strange situations but very little about ongoing social activity within its natural context. This does not mean that we should abandon experimentation altogether as has been suggested by some social psychologists (e.g. Harré, 1979). In Chapter 2, I showed how experimental research on social representations can be interpreted within the Hegelian framework. Similarly, Marková (1982) describes experimental research on perception, cognition and mother-child interactions that is conducted within the Hegelian paradigm. Doise (1978) also shows how experimental studies of intergroup relations can incorporate cultural factors. However, in order to establish a social psychology based on the theoretical principles of the Hegelian paradigm we need not only to adapt traditional methods of research but also to develop new ones, especially with respect to the
historical dimension (Gergen and Gergen, 1984). These would include the scientist as an active participant in research. They would incorporate the historical, cultural and social context; deal with the qualitative or meaningful nature of phenomena; and examine the transformation or evolution of phenomena over time. Some possible options will be examined in the following section. However, it would be premature to specify the methodological commitments of the Hegelian paradigm. As Marková (1982) points out, the Cartesian paradigm has developed during the last three centuries and research methods in psychology within this paradigm have been continually refined for over a century. The current status of the Hegelian paradigm within social psychology suggests that we should continue to explore various methods of research while attempting to identify their relative strengths and weaknesses.

6.2 RESEARCH METHODS FOR STUDYING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

One of the distinguishing characteristics of research on social representations is the diversity of methods which have been employed. This has given rise to considerable debate within the research community (Breakwell and Cantor, 1990). Moscovici claims that 'the study of social representations requires that we revert to methods of observation', for the purpose of providing a careful description of their content, structure and evolution. Yet, in order to understand the evolution of social representations, it is also necessary to study the social-psychological processes of transformation. Description and explanation are both essential components of understanding. Parker (1987) argues that the social-constructivist orientation of the theory has been betrayed by the choice of individualistic methods. Farr (1990) similarly suggests that many of the methodological debates have arisen because British social psychologists have inappropriately applied positivistic (Cartesian) principles of research.

It is possible that the use of such diverse methods as experimentation and participant observation reflects a lack of consensus in regard to the meta-theoretical commitments
of the theory. Thus some researchers have continued to use Cartesian methods whilst others have adopted Hegelian methods. If this is so then I would wish to distinguish between those methods which are and those which are not appropriate for the investigation of social representations. However, in the light of the previous discussions (Chapter 2; Chapter 6, previous section) this is not the most constructive critical approach. The methodological commitments of the Hegelian paradigm do not dictate the use of particular methods to the exclusion of all others. Different methods of research provide the investigator with an array of tools that are more or less useful for different purposes. It will be argued here that an eclectic approach is advantageous as no single method is able to address all facets of social representations. Only by developing research programmes which adopt a multi-method approach can we provide descriptions of the content and form of social representations, examine their behavioural aspects, explore their association with groups, inspect their role in socialization and understand their dynamics and the processes by which they are transformed.

Much of the research conducted in the field of social representations was reviewed in Chapter 2. There the emphasis was on the meaning of the word 'social' as a qualifier of the word representation. The aim of the present discussion is to provide a summary which focuses on specific research methods in order to identify their particular strengths and weaknesses in the investigation of social representations. The following methods will be considered: experimentation, questionnaires, multi-dimensional scaling, observational studies, participant observation and content analysis of interview transcripts and media. Finally, the use of complimentary data sources and research methods in the study of social representations is discussed.

Experimental studies of social representations (eg. Abric, 1984; Codol, 1984; Flament, 1984) were discussed at length in Chapter 2 and the arguments presented in this previous context will not be repeated here. Most of the experimental investigations have focused on intra-individual
cognitive processes and the role of interpersonal communication in the construction of social representations. It was argued that these studies employed the traditional, Cartesian mode of experimentation. The adaptation of the experimental method to the Hegelian methodology is no easy task, but it is one which is worthwhile. As Marková points out

(laboratory experiments) are a necessary part of a psychological investigation because they enforce a specific and exact kind of human conduct which otherwise would not be available for investigation. One's experience is dependent upon one's relation to the world and laboratory techniques are traps in which individual experience can be tested against social reality in the amplified form (Marková, 1982, p.197).

Experiments conducted within the Hegelian paradigm would account for the use of language in the research context and the role of the researcher in construction of experimental situations and in the interpretation of events (Mackenzie, 1977). The experimental method provides a means by which to illuminate the relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal processes in the laboratory and social representations extant in the culture of society. For example, we could examine how individuals assimilate new information into their social representations; how interpersonal communications, arguments and debates facilitate or restrain their transformation; and how social roles and group memberships affect their reconstruction. Such studies cannot profitably be conducted in isolation for two, related, reasons. Firstly, other methods of investigation need to be employed in order to examine the content and form of social representations, the consensus and divergence which exists between and within groups, and the diffusion and evolution of social representations in society. Secondly, the Hegelian paradigm and the theory of social representations are committed to the "definitional sanctity of the whole" (Gergen, 1984). Individual objects or events derive their social meaning from their position within the whole over extended periods of time. Isolated fragments are significant only in relation to their extended context. Thus, it is
necessary to base experimental investigations on ideas that have emerged from research which addresses the social, cultural and historical aspects of social representations. Experimentation would no longer be used to generate foundational elements, rather it would be used to clarify, demonstrate, illustrate or vivify theoretical understandings which had been gained from studying social representations in all their complexity.

It might be thought that questionnaires constitute an ideal method by which to determine people's social representations before entering into the laboratory. However, although the questionnaire has been a popular method in social psychology, it has rarely been used within the field of social representations (Moscovici, 1961). This is because, within the Hegelian paradigm, there are a number of problems relating to the traditional modes of constructing and analysing questionnaires.

Typically, questionnaires are designed to elicit people's opinions or attitudes using various scaling techniques. Likert scaling is the least appropriate for the study of social representations. In constructing the questionnaire the research assumes that all respondents together with the researcher share a common representation of the objects being evaluated. Furthermore, although the correlations between response indicates the co-occurrence of evaluations associated with the social representation they do not reveal the content or the structural interdependence of elements in the social representation. Thurstone scaling is less problematic in that the procedures employed in constructing the questionnaire are dependent upon judges sharing a common representation (Thurstone, 1928; Jaspars and Fraser, 1984). However, this does not overcome the structural limitations. Questionnaires concerning the attributes of social objects frequently rely on data reduction techniques such as factor analysis. The emergent factors are dependent upon the limited set of attributes that were entered into the data set, the aggregation of data across respondents and the investigator's interpretation of the results. Thus the
apparent content, structure and consensus do not necessarily correspond to the respondents' social representations.

Open-ended or unstructured questionnaires are more appropriate as they give respondents greater freedom to express their beliefs. However, this requires alternative forms of data reduction and organization, most typically some form of content analysis (see below). Such questionnaires provide a means to assess the consensual aspects of social representation; their relationship with different groups of respondents; and their relationship with reported behaviour. However, they do not address the issues of communication and social interaction, nor do they illuminate the dynamics and evolution of social representations.

In comparison to questionnaires which employ quantitative methods of investigation and analysis, multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a more appropriate method for the exploration and description of social representations (Di Giacomo, 1980; Farr and Stockdale, 1987; Purkhardt and Stockdale, 1990). Although it suffers from some of the same limitations as questionnaires in regard to the processes of communication and social interaction, it is more appropriate than traditional scaling techniques, as it provides a descriptive, structural model of social representation. Rather than eliciting unidimensional, evaluational judgments on specified attributes of social objects, MDS does not specify the attributes or dimensions on which the social objects are judged. Judgments of similarity between the elements of a social representation are used to reveal its structure, typically in two, three or four dimensions. These dimensions are identified on the basis of respondents' judgments of the elements' attributes by using multiple regression analysis. Thus, MDS allows the quantifications and interpretation of the content and structure of social representations which are naturally circulating in society without manipulating or constraining respondents' judgments. Furthermore, it is not assumed that there is a consensual representation. The measure of goodness-of-fit between the group stimulus space and the respondents' judgments provides an indication of the degree of consensus within a group.
Also, if subject parameters are included in the MDS, variations in the representational structure between groups can be examined. Moreover, MDS can provide some insight into the transformation of social representations. By repeating a MDS analysis on different occasions changes both in the relationships among social objects and in the salience of the various dimensions can be revealed.

In contrast to multidimensional scaling, which focuses on the consensual aspects of both the content and structure of social representations and their association with different groups, observational techniques focus on the expression and development of social representations through peoples' social interactions with objects in their environment. Such studies are conducted both in the laboratory (Duveen and Lloyd, 1986) and in natural settings (Jodelet, 1983). Observational studies in the laboratory have been greatly facilitated by the use of video tapes which allow multiple viewings of sequences of interaction. As with experimentation, this method has conformed, typically, to Cartesian principles of research. In this case, the researcher divides the interactions into small fragments and then counts the frequency and length of their occurrence. These are then added together in order to reform the pattern of social interaction and communication. However, observational techniques in the laboratory can also be adapted to the Hegelian paradigm (Marková, 1982). In this case, the researcher focuses on the mutual structuring of communications and the natural components of interactions. This can be achieved by asking knowledgeable respondents to give a detailed description of the interactions. Alternatively, the researcher can repeatedly view the material until the appropriate categories or units of analysis emerge. These can be modified during the process of enquiry such that there is an ongoing dynamics with the object of investigation.

Participant observation is traditionally the research method of anthropologists and symbolic interactionists. However, as the theory of social representations falls within the Hegelian paradigm it has become an appropriate method of
investigation for social psychologists as well (Jodelet, 1983; Farr, 1990). Observations of interactions with the environment are made in their natural setting with the researcher being an active participant in those interactions. The research does not attempt to make detached, objective observations of the behaviour of others. By his or her involvement in the social interactions the researcher becomes aware of their significance or meaning within the relevant social representations. Thus, the interpretation of events does not occur as a postscript to objective observation of truncated sequences of behaviour; rather, interpretation and observation are integral aspects of the researcher's activities in ongoing sequences of interaction. However, due to the pragmatic drawbacks associated with this method of investigation, particularly with reference to the researcher's commitments and the time required, and to the difficulties of presenting the study in an accessible form, it has been only occasionally employed.

In contrast, content analysis is frequently used within the French tradition of research on social representations. It has been employed, in various forms, to analyse the contents of interviews (Herzlich, 1973; Jodelet, 1984; Emler and Dickinson, 1985; Marková and Wilkie, 1987), and of various media (Moscovici, 1961; Chombart-de-Lauwe, 1984; Milgram, 1984). The different forms of content analysis will be discussed in more detail in the following sections since they are pertinent to my own research.

In general terms content analysis is similar to the observational methods discussed in the previous paragraph. Instead of observing people's behaviour, the researcher observes or, more accurately, listens to what people say, reads what people write and views people's pictures or films. Interviews are usually semi-structured or unstructured in form as this avoids the researcher imposing his or her own representations on those of the informants during the interview. The various forms of the media, including books, articles, newspapers, magazines, films, comics, posters, drawings, radio and TV programmes, constitute an extensive 'non-reactive' archive of information on social
representations (Farr, 1990). Such material may be considered to be less reactive than the interviewing of people. However, it should be remembered that this material is usually produced for a particular audience. Furthermore, the investigator is always a participant in the research process. The social representation does not exist purely in the research object. Rather, in order to reveal the content, structure and dynamics of a social representation the research must continually interact with the object of investigation, be it through talking with people, or reading and re-reading texts.

Content analysis can be used to illuminate many aspects of social representations. More than any other method it takes seriously the role of language in the construction and communication of social representations. In this respect, it is similar to ethnomethodology: spoken and written accounts not only describe objects, actions, events or situations but are also a constitutive part of these actions or events (Harré and Secord, 1972; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Content analysis offers a means of studying the expression and communication of social representations through language and through cultural artefacts in the environment. It is also ideally suited to reveal the content and structure of social representations and the consensus and divergence within and between groups. Longitudinal (Jodelet, 1984) and historical (Chombart-de-Lauwe, 1984) studies using content analysis demonstrate how it can also be employed to illuminate the social construction and transformation of social representations across time.

So far, we have noted the strengths and weaknesses of various research methods which have been employed in the study of social representations. However, perhaps the most significant feature of the more substantial research projects is that the investigators have employed a number of complementary data sources and research methods in order to describe and explain the features of a particular social representation (Moscovici, 1961; Jodelet, 1983; Jodelet and Moscovici, 1975; Chombart-de-Lauwe, 1984). They involve the use of both qualitative and quantitative analyses to explore
the content of social representations, their evolution and transformation, their role in behaviour and social interactions and their relationship to social and cultural circumstances.

One of the earliest studies was carried out by Moscovici (1961) on the diffusion and transformation of psychoanalysis within France. This study employed the more traditional techniques of opinion polls and surveys, as well as structured and unstructured questionnaires, in order to determine the transformations that had been brought about during the social reconstruction of a scientific theory. These methods were complemented by a content analysis of media articles on psychoanalysis with particular reference to two distinct groups: the Catholic and the Marxist press. By this comparative study it was possible to show that anchoring and objectification of different aspects of the theory are directly related to social representations already prevalent in these two groups.

While this study primarily focuses on the content of a social representation other studies have attempted to relate the content and transformation of the relevant social representation to the social, cultural and economic circumstances, and also to explore the relationship between social representations and behaviour. For example, Jodelet (1983) explored the social representation of mental illness in French villages where the villagers acted as hosts to a number of mental patients. Through a variety of methods, including participant observations, interviews and questionnaires, she was able to show that social interactions with mental patients were directly related to the villagers' social representations of mental illness and its association with traditional representations of disease and contagion.

Jodelet also completed a comprehensive study of social representations of the body in conjunction with Moscovici (1975). By means of a longtitudinal design, in which a series of in-depth interviews were repeated with a fifteen year interval, it was possible to trace the evolution and transformation of the social representations of the body in relation to social and cultural changes, as well as their
relationship to actual or intended behaviour. A content analysis of the interview material, in which individual statements were re-grouped according to their thematic content and a-posteriori categories, was complemented by an analysis relating to the sources of information from which representations evolved. Both of these analyses allow statistical comparisons between groups and over time. These were then related to historical cultural changes and to the social circumstances of different groups and their changing roles in society. Other methods which were used in conjunction with the content analysis include a word-association task which explored the semantic field related to 'body' and a check list task by which subjects indicated the four circumstances in which they were most aware of their bodies. The results of these studies revealed changes in the content of representations of the body which related to people's experience of their own bodies and reflected differential cultural diffusion of information and its resultant transformations, in relation to people's social circumstances. This study clearly demonstrates the value of both qualitative and quantitative analyses in investigating the social and historical aspects of the theory of social representations. The use of a number of complementary methods highlights the central importance of culture in our understanding of socio-biological phenomena.

Similarly, Chombart-de-Lauwe (1984) also used a number of complementary approaches to investigate social representations of children, their transformation over time and their social transmission. Social representations of children in the imagination of adults were explored by thematic content analysis, semantic analysis and structural analyses of novels, autobiographies and films in which the central character is a child. The stability, changes and evolution of representations were determined by comparing material produced in pre-war, inter-war and contemporary literature. A further two studies focused on speeches, lectures, charters of and interviews with town planners in order to discover the implicit representations of children in the structuring of their physical environments. The second
study analysed novels, comics, films and biographies directed at the child, again adopting a longitudinal design. A quantitative content analysis revealed that these representations were not only divergent from those constructed for adults but also had evolved in relation to society.

In order to understand the social transmission of these representations to children a further study was carried out. Children aged nine to twelve years were asked to write essays on media characters who represented their ideal model and the model with whom they identified, and to compare these models with themselves. This revealed influences which differentiate children's representations from the models offered by adults. The results also show variations in relation to the socio-biological characteristics of the child (age and sex), their social situation and their status. By using a variety of sources and complementary methods, Chombart-de-Lauwe was able to explore the genesis of the social representations of children, their variations, their transformation from one historical period to another and their transmission to a new generation through a dialectic psycho-social process. Furthermore, this study illustrates the prescriptive nature of representations and the role of adults' social representations of children in shaping the child's reality.

Within the Cartesian paradigm the adoption of a multi-method approach might be justified in terms of the accumulation of knowledge from multiple data sources. A more sophisticated justification could be given in terms of triangulation, whereby the use of multiple data sources and various research methods offers the opportunity to validate findings by systematically comparing the research results (Fielding and Fielding, 1983). However, these justifications fail to take into account the process of research as defined by the Hegelian paradigm. Different methods are particular to specific research problems. Within a research programme complementary methods are employed to examine different aspects of the research object and to overcome the problems and limitations associated with any one particular method or data source. For example, it is not so much that an
An experimental study can be used to validate the results of a content analysis but, rather, that the results of one investigation are used to formulate research problems and to inform the design and interpretation of a complementary investigation. Furthermore, it is not possible to predetermine the structure and content of a research programme, for the very reason that it is not possible to predict the outcome of research. There is little point in carrying out research when we already know the answer. Rather, research focuses precisely on the unconfirmed, where there are contradictions and conflicts to be resolved. This is achieved through the meaningful and on-going interaction between the researcher and the object of his or her research. The research programme thus emerges and evolves during the process of research. It involves a set of complex and dynamic relations among theory construction and transformation, formulation of research problems, the design of research, the various sources of data and methods employed, the objects of investigation, the active participation in research, the negotiation of meanings and the interpretation of research findings, etc.

In the following section I describe my own research programme, making explicit the rationale behind research decisions, the coherence of the various methods adopted and the reformulation or modifications that were required in relation to the object of study. Frequent reference is given to the content of the research as this formed an essential component in the development of the research programme.

6.3 THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME: ITS CONTENT AND STRUCTURE

The aim of the research is to examine the dynamics and the transformation of social representations in science. This involves not only a description of a system of social representations and its diffusion within a specified community but also an analysis of the origins of change and the processes of transformation in the organism/environment/culture system. A detailed examination of the content, structure and evolution of scientific knowledge in a particular field should improve our understanding of both
the processes of science and the dynamics of social representations.

The theory of social representations has informed and guided this research with respect to the issues addressed and to the structure of the research. Two fundamental characteristics of the theory are the socio-psychological perspective (the social dimension) and its historical perspective. The former focuses on the relationship between the individual and his or her culture, whilst the latter emphasizes the evolutionary aspects of social representations in terms of their genesis, their diffusion and their transformation within a particular social context. Both these dimensions need to be taken into account by the research. For this reason, it was decided to conduct an historical analysis of the transformation of social representations in a specified field of study, focusing on the contributions of an influential scientist in relation both to the scientific community and to the broader society.

In particular, the research focuses on Henri Tajfel's contribution to the psychology of groups in relation to the community of social psychologists, social scientists and the broader society in order to understand the transformation of social representations in this field of study. A number of alternative research strategies were considered but rejected on theoretical grounds. For example, a comparison of the similarities and differences between various social representations of the group presented by different theories in time/space would not, of itself, achieve an understanding of the dynamics of social representations. In order to address how and why social representations emerge and evolve it is necessary to trace the continuities and discontinuities over time within particular intellectual and social contexts. Furthermore, the transformation of the social representations of the group in social psychology cannot be considered in isolation from social representations of the individual, the conventions of social psychology, of methodology etc. Consequently, the research cannot simply focus on the social representations of the group but must
consider a whole system of interrelated social representations of which the former is a part.

Two aspects of Tajfel's contribution need to be considered; the construction and the diffusion of his theory of intergroup relations. Moscovici's original study examined the diffusion of psychoanalysis within French culture. Likewise, my research involves establishing an in-depth understanding of the theory's structure and content and then tracing its diffusion and transformation within the community of social scientists, identifying and explaining the differences that emerge in various sections of that community. That one should examine the diffusion and transformation of social representations within the scientific community is justified by arguments presented in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 5. Social representations are transformed not only by the diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense, but also by the diffusion of social representations within a community. This applies equally to both the 'folk' community and the 'scientific' community. The same arguments, along with those presented in Chapter 4, show that it is also pertinent to examine the construction of social representations; in this case, the origins and evolution of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. The spiral of transformation demonstrates that the construction and diffusion of social representations are but two aspects or views of the continual ongoing dynamics of transformation. This was illustrated with reference to Darwin's theory of evolution (1859) in the previous chapter. With reference to Tajfel's work, examining the construction of the theory focuses on the assimilation and accommodation of social representations into an inter-connected and coherent system. Examining the diffusion of Tajfel's work focuses on the assimilation of elements from Tajfel's theory into other systems of social representations, for example those relating to intragroup behaviour. In order to understand the significance of Tajfel's contribution in transforming social representations within the psychology of groups it is necessary to look at both aspects.
It might be argued that this research strategy is in danger of individualizing social representations: by focusing on the contribution of a single scientist the research endorses a 'Great Man' theory of science. This would be an over-simplistic interpretation of the research strategy and antithetical to my thesis. In Chapter 4, it was argued that the re-socialization of the individual is equivalent to a de-individualization of the social. The individual scientist is here as an essentially social being in a particular social and historical context. Furthermore, in order to be consistent with the social-psychological thesis it is essential that a study of the transformation of social representations goes beyond a 'history of meanings'. It is thus inefficient to examine changes in the psychology of groups without reference to the contributions of individual scientists. The study must deal explicitly with the socialization of the individual and the creativity of individuals; with the influence of society on the individual and the influence of the individual on society; in sum, with the dialectics of the individual and his/her culture.

This is indeed Tajfel's own thesis:

social psychology can and must include in its theoretical and research preoccupations a direct concern with the relationship between human psychological functioning and the large-scale social processes and events which shape this functioning and are shaped by it.

(Tajfel,1981a,p.7)

It might be argued, also, that a study focusing on the contribution of a single scientist, in a particular field of study, will tell us little about the processes of science or the processes of social representations. Such a critique, however, is founded on the Cartesian principles of universals, particulars and generalization (Marková, 1982). Generalizations are universal, unrestricted and stable scientific laws which ignore particular variations. However, within the Hegelian paradigm particulars are expressions of universals, and generalizations are always indeterminate, unstable and relative to the social and historical context. For this reason, it is appropriate to conduct a detailed case
study which examines the interdependent relationships among the elements of a system of social representations within a particular social and historical context and their transformation over time. Emergent generalizations would be those that engender understanding within the theoretical framework. Comparative studies with the dynamics of social representations in other sciences and in common-sense would show how far these generalizations are transferable to other contexts. Such comparative studies are outside the scope of this project. They require the coordinated activity of scientists working within the same general framework and would be the product of the research community.

The decision as to which science to examine is an important one. Few researchers in the field of social representations elaborate on the reasons underlying their own particular studies. There are a number of theoretical and methodological considerations which suggest that psychology constitutes a suitable discipline for empirical investigation.

Firstly, social representations are most accessible for investigation during periods of conflict and change. The history of psychology has seen frequent and heated debates between alternative perspectives (see Chapter 3). These have taken many forms, with regard to the most appropriate paradigms, theories and methods for the study of human behaviour. For example, there have been shifts in perspective from empiricism, to rationalism, to constructivist approaches; debates about the relationship between psychology and common-sense; disagreements regarding the most appropriate way to deal with the reactive nature of psychological research - these are but a few examples. Such conflicts are reflected in the construction of theories and the conduct of research. Thus, the discipline of psychology offers excellent material for a study which focuses on the transformation of social representations.

Secondly, psychology is relatively accessible to me as a research student, both in terms of data sources and in terms of understanding its concepts and its methods. As a participant in the research process it is advantageous to be
able to draw on implicit knowledge of and my experience within the community of psychologists. Furthermore, it provides an opportunity to further my interest in conflicts and alternative perspectives within the discipline of psychology.

Thirdly, few in-depth investigations of psychology have been carried out. The philosophy of science has notoriously selected illustrative examples from the natural sciences, and in particular from physics. Similarly, the vast majority of studies in the sociology of knowledge have focused on the natural sciences, and it is only recently that the biological sciences have attracted increasing attention. While there have been a number of 'internal histories' of psychology (eg. Boring, 1950; Miller, 1986; Hearnshaw, 1987), books on the history of behaviouristic (Mackenzie, 1977) and cognitive approaches (Gardner, 1985) and numerous reviews of particular fields, there are few studies which present a detailed analysis of the transformation of a psychological theory and its related fields of research. Miller's book on the obedience experiments (1986) and Cartwright's analysis of the risky-shift experiments are two exceptions, although both focus on research controversies. Historians and philosophers of science are beginning to take an increasing interest in the human sciences, including psychology (Ash, 1983; Mackenzie, 1977; O'Donnell, 1979; Shotter, 1975). Furthermore, psychologists are becoming more aware of their own past. The celebration of psychology's centenary in 1979 instigated a look-back into the role of psychology in the past and speculation about its possible futures. An increased awareness of where psychology has been, its successes and its limitations, provides guidance and direction for the future development of the discipline.

The methods of research which might be used to study the transformation of social representations in psychology were not immediately apparent. It was a continuous struggle to avoid falling back on the safety of conventional and formalized methods. However, these would have been inappropriate as they neither address the central research issues nor reflect Hegelian methodological commitments.
Whilst the influence of conventional approaches is apparent, especially in the early phases of the research, a commitment to the theoretical questions meant that the methods of research had to emerge directly from the research problems in relation to the phenomena being investigated. It was of constant concern, in the initial phases of the research, that these methods of investigation lacked formalization and did not conform to conventional means of analysis and presentation. These difficulties diminished as I became more involved in the research and realized that the methods I was using allowed me to construct important and interesting ideas on the transformation of social representations. Formalized procedures and conventions of research can only be established through the social process of science over time. By presenting an explicit account of the research procedures, why they were used and how they were reformulated within an evolving research programme, this research forms part of that process.

The first research problem was to select a field of study within psychology and, within that, to identify a limited period of significant development. Rather than examining broad-ranging transformations in the history of psychology, the demarcation of a specific field and a limited period of research which has undergone substantial change permits a more detailed analysis of the dynamic interrelationships within the organism/environment/culture system and the transformation of social representations. Rather than making an arbitrary selection myself I decided to draw on the social representations within the community of psychologists. The significance of a contribution is largely dependent upon its successful communication and the reaction of others to that contribution. A number of data sources could have been used including citation counts, review articles and interviews with psychologists. However, I decided that a questionnaire was the most suitable method as this would provide both quantitative and qualitative information on influential contributions in particular fields of psychology. On the basis of this questionnaire I decided
to focus on Henri Tajfel's contribution to the psychology of groups.

The second research problem was to describe the content and structure of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations and to analyse the transformations of social representations involved in its construction. This was achieved by conducting a detailed historical analysis of his publications and by conducting interviews with Tajfel's colleagues who had been directly involved in the theory's development. Both these methods of investigation will be described in more detail below.

The third research problem was to assess the impact of Tajfel's work in the community of social scientists. An analysis of the Social Science Citation Index was used to indicate the frequency with which Tajfel's publications were cited. However, in order to examine the transformation of social representations, it was also necessary to review qualitative changes in the structure and content of the work of others in the psychology of groups, and in social psychology more generally. Due to the expansive scope of such an endeavour this was done in the form of a critical review, examining historical developments in the psychology of groups, general texts on social psychology, specific texts on group psychology and subsequent developments which have emerged directly from Tajfel's work.

6.3.1 The questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed to sample the views of psychologists concerning the most influential contributors in two fields of research in each of cognitive and social psychology: memory and problem-solving in cognitive psychology and attitudes and groups in social psychology. It included a series of semi-structured and open-ended questions regarding influential figures in the historical and in the contemporary eras of the specified field, the content of their contributions and the consequences of their contributions (see appendix 6.1).

The design, administration and analysis of the questionnaire reflects the original research plans which have been changed subsequently. Firstly, it was intended to
conduct a comparative study of two contrasting fields in psychology. However, gaining the depth of knowledge required to understand just one field takes considerable time and effort. Although focusing my energies on a single case study forfeits the advantage of a comparison across fields it avoids the disadvantages of conducting a relatively superficial analysis. Secondly, I considered that the results of the questionnaire would allow me to examine and compare psychologists' social representations of their own field of study. In accordance with this, the original report of this study constituted an independent chapter. However, while it was possible to assess the consensus of opinion (or lack thereof) in the two eras of the different fields, with regard to both who had been influential and the substance and consequence of their contributions, it was not possible to gain a clear understanding of psychologists' social representations. This may, in part, be due to the design of the questionnaire and its location within the research programme. In order to explore social representations (the original intention) it was important to avoid imposing my own ideas on the respondents. Moreover, respondents would be more knowledgeable about their own fields of study than I could possibly hope to be. For these reasons, I adopted a relatively unstructured questionnaire design. This not only created problems for the analysis of the questionnaire but, in some respects, also restricted the usefulness of the information gained. On reflection, questionnaires are not a good instrument for making initial explorations of social representations, even if they are unstructured in their format.

Despite its limitations, the questionnaire still plays an important part in the research programme. In particular, it formed the basis upon which the work of Henri Tajfel in the field of group psychology was selected for further investigation. The results also supported the thesis that the theory of social representations could be applied profitably to the development of scientific knowledge.

6.3.1.1 Questionnaire sample and administration: One of the notorious problems posed by postal questionnaires is their
poor response rate. The sampling procedure and the administration of the questionnaire were aimed at maximizing the rate of return. Respondents needed to be reasonably well informed with regard to the specified fields of interest within cognitive and social psychology. Rather than distributing the questionnaire through psychology departments in universities and colleges it was decided that there were a number of advantages in using membership of the two major psychological societies as the basis for selecting the sample. Firstly, it allowed the selection of psychologists with an expressed interest and knowledge in cognitive or social psychology. Secondly, it was possible to send the questionnaires addressed personally to the members. All questionnaires were accompanied by an introductory letter and a stamped addressed envelope. Questionnaires concerned with social psychology were sent to all members of the social section of the BPS (668 members). Questionnaires concerned with cognitive psychology were sent to all members of the cognitive section of the BPS (480 members) and to all members of the Experimental Psychological Society (432 members). The latter were included as they form an important part of the psychological community and may reflect different concerns from those of the members of the BPS (see Table 1). BPS questionnaires were included in the regular BPS mailing packages sent to section members. Questionnaires were sent independently to members of the E.P.S..

6.3.1.2 Questionnaire design: The questionnaire consisted of two sections: Section A focused on the biographical details of the respondents and Section B aimed to elicit respondents' representations of influential contributions in specified fields of research. For our present purposes it is only necessary to outline the structure of Section B for the social psychologists.

Respondents first selected either the field of attitudes or the field of groups. They were then asked to list, in rank order, who they considered to be the five most influential figures in the history of their specified field; to outline what they considered to have been the major contribution of the person identified as the most influential; and to state
the major consequences of this contribution. Similar questions were asked with regard to contemporary research in the same field. Finally, respondents were asked to state the methods of research which they considered to be the most profitable, and to indicate publications which they considered to have been of particular importance. 'Influence' is taken to be understood in its common usage, meaning to direct, to affect, or to have power over something. Thus, in this case, an influential figure is someone who has directed or affected the specified field of interest.

6.3.1.3. Analysis 1: Identifying influential contributors by ranks: A separate list of all the names of influential figures who were mentioned by at least one respondent was compiled both for attitudes and for groups. In terms of individual respondents the first-named contributor is considered to be the most influential. Taking the sample as a whole, the level of influence that a contributor is perceived to have had in the field is associated with the level of consensus among respondents. Consensus for each contributor can be directly assessed by the percentage of respondents who mention a particular contributor (regardless of the rank order specified by individual respondents). The contributor can be considered to be more influential in the field if the level of consensus is higher rather than lower.

Three methods of calculation were used to assess the level of influence. Frequency of mentions as the most influential (method a), frequency of mentions (method b) and weighted ranks (method c). Results using methods b and c were very similar so only methods a and b will be described here.

Method (a): Frequency of ranked mentions
The frequency of mentions was calculated separately for each of the five rank positions, using procedure univariates in SCSS. Further analysis, based on method (a), was restricted to the first rank order, that is, those figures mentioned as the most influential by respondents. This analysis was important as all the written responses and the content analysis is with reference to those figures who are considered to be the most influential by the individual respondents. (The phrase 'most influential' is used in the
text with reference to perceptions, both of individual respondents and of groups of respondents. Where 'most' is underlined, the former is indicated).

Method (b): Frequency of mentions

Level of influence was calculated purely on the basis of the frequency of mentions without taking into account the rank order. The percentage of respondents who mentioned each contributor was then calculated for each field.

6.3.1.4 Analysis 2: Identifying influential contributions by content analysis: Content analysis was employed to examine the written responses about the contributions of influential figures and their consequences or implications. Content analysis is considered to be a systematic, objective and quantitative method for the observation and measurement of variables of communication (Kerlinger, 1986); for making reliable and valid inferences from texts in the context of communication (Krippendorf, 1980; Weber, 1985). Its supposed advantages over other methods are that it is unobtrusive, the measurement itself is non-reactive, it allows both qualitative and quantitative examination of material and it is sensitive to the context of communication. Although this method attempts to deal with the symbolic meaning of communications with the framework of sender, message, receiver, it can be seen that it is largely designed to fulfil the methodological commitments of the Cartesian paradigm. It was not until I had used content analysis and had attempted to examine transformations in social representations, using this method, that I became aware of its limitations (these are discussed with reference to the historico-interpretative text analysis).

This having been said, the basic procedures of content analysis are used here in order to organize and summarize the written responses to the questionnaire. As part of this procedure, it is necessary to devise a coding frame that provides a rigorous means of data reduction. This can be done, either on the basis of theoretical or practical concerns and constructed, a priori, before examining the material to be analysed, or constructed on the basis of the material itself. In this case, the latter method was
employed. The universe of the content to be analysed consisted of psychologists' written responses. For this study, the unit of analysis was defined in terms of words, phrases, or sentences expressing a single meaning. The coding frame, which must consist of mutually exclusive categories, had a hierarchical structure such that major categories are divided into a number of sub-categories.

The initial coding frame was based on a subset of responses selected from the whole sample. These responses were used to construct a single coding frame which could be applied to all three fields involved in the analysis (memory, attitudes and groups). The construction of a coding frame was hampered by both the diversity and the similarity contained in the responses. On the one hand, the material was extremely diverse, containing a huge range of both objects and descriptors. On the other hand, there was a noticeable similarity in descriptive terms and phrases.

The coding frame and subsequent analysis was simplified by listing theories or objects of research, separately from the main analysis. This strategy still permits the particular contributions of the influential figures to be identified whilst simultaneously allowing a meaningful coding frame to be constructed. The coding frame (see appendix 6.2) consists of 18 major categories with up to eight sub-categories, there being a total of 46 coding categories. The same coding frame was used to analyse the contributions for both the historical and contemporary eras in each of the three fields, memory, attitudes and groups. The frequency of occurrence for a particular sub-category represents the number of respondents who mention that category concept. Thus, the data within each concept category is independent, but is related across concept categories and also across questions. Given the final role of the questionnaire within the research programme a simpler content analysis would probably have sufficed. But the difficulties encountered in constructing the coding frame and interpreting the relations between mutually exclusive categories proved to be a significant factor in the remainder of the research programme.
6.3.2 Historico-interpretative document analysis of Tajfel's work

The historico-interpretative analysis of Tajfel's work constitutes a major part of the research programme. This method of analysis is rarely used in social psychology and differs, in important respects, from the forms of content analysis previously employed in research on social representations. In the present discussions the value of an historical analysis of published documents is considered within the theoretical framework of social representations and related issues previously discussed in this thesis. It is argued that content analysis does not provide a suitable instrument by which to investigate the dynamics and evolution of social representations in this research. In order to examine the changing structure of relations in a system of social representations it is necessary to develop an interpretative or qualitative style of analysis. Because this lacks formalized rules of procedure the development of the analysis and the form of presentation are described in some detail.

6.3.2.1 The historical dimension: Throughout this thesis we have emphasized the significance of the historical dimension. The theory of social representations epitomizes the social construction and evolution of knowledge. It provides a conceptual framework for understanding the emergence of traditions and innovations in an ongoing dynamics between stability and change (see Chapters 1 and 4). The historical dimension is implicit in any theory which addresses evolution and change. This is an essential component of the Hegelian paradigm and the constructivist perspective in the social sciences (see Chapter 3). It is also central to the growth of scientific knowledge and the process of science. Scientific knowledge is the product of continuous human activity in its cultural and historical context (see Chapter 5). The historical dimension must therefore be included in the study of social representations. This can be achieved in two ways: by conducting a longitudinal study, observing the expressions and development of social representations as they occur; or by conducting an historical study, in which the
researcher reconstructs the continuity of development from available material.

The latter approach offered pragmatic advantages in the context of this research. Firstly, and most importantly, the time period recommended for the completion of Ph.D.'s is relatively limited (three to four years). By adopting the historical approach the time period which could be studied was considerably extended. Secondly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to recognize substantial contributions as they are actually occurring. It might be possible to identify an emergent controversy but it is impossible to predict its outcome. By adopting the historical approach it was possible to select a contribution which had a profound impact on the changing structure and content of the relevant system of social representations.

6.3.2.2 The use of documents: Publications in scientific journals and books constitute excellent documentary material for such an historical approach. Furthermore, the theory of social representations explicitly incorporates the cultural products of human activity within its theoretical framework. Social representations are expressed not only in what people say or do but also in what people write or produce. Moreover, the articles, chapters and books which scientists write form an essential component in the social process of science. They constitute one of the most important forms of creativity, communication and social interaction within the community.

Within social psychology, methods of documentary research are rarely discussed in any detail. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing interest in content analysis (Chapman, 1989) and discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) within the discipline. It is frequently suggested that the advantages of studying documents is that it is an unobtrusive and non-reactive form of research. However, these are not the only advantages, if they should be considered advantages at all. Bailey (1978) lists several other advantages including the availability of material on inaccessible subjects, the possibility of historically sequenced studies, the high quality of social communication and the relatively low costs of such research. Both Bailey
(1978) and Platt (1981) elaborate on the difficulties associated with documentary research. These involve authenticity and availability of material, sampling, truth status, interpretation, comparability and presentation. Within the context of the current research scientific publications provide a primary (as opposed to secondary) source of documentary material which is authentic, available, historically sequenced and of high quality. As such, these written accounts permit a detailed examination of the stability and change over extended periods of time. This makes possible a study of the dynamics of social representations, elucidating the content and process of change, within the confines of a Ph.D. thesis.

Documentary research does have its limitations. Firstly, it is necessarily restricted to an analysis of verbal communication. There is thus no direct observation of the activities of scientists actually doing research even though a written account of these activities is frequently given. Secondly, publications are formalized, public forms of communication which do not necessarily reflect the oral sub-culture of the research community. Conventions of publication and the assumptions of authors about their readership will affect the structure and content of their written accounts. However, within the theoretical context of social representations, this is not as problematic as it might at first appear. The reactivity of an author's account to their social context is part of the social process of science and the changing style and content of publications, including the arguments and justifications presented, provide highly relevant information about the transformation of social representations.

Problems associated with sampling, interpretation and presentation will be considered in relation to the research procedures discussed below. But, before moving on, it is worth considering the truth status of such research. Documents are frequently used as a source of data on the matters about which the author is writing (Platt, 1981). In fact, this is the usual way in which scientific publications are treated, in reviews of a particular field of study.
Within the context of this research, I might focus on whether or not what is written tells us the truth about intergroup relations. Alternatively, documents can be used to make inferences about matters which are not directly addressed (Platt, 1981). I might make inferences about the context in which publications are produced and the conventions of the scientific community. Although these appear to be distinctive approaches in documentary research neither position accords with the theory of social representations or accurately describes the approach adopted here. This point can be elaborated upon with reference to discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), an increasingly popular, sociological, approach in social psychology which has also been used in the study of science (Potter and Mulkay, 1982; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984).

Discourse analysis exemplifies the second, inferential, approach to the study of spoken or written accounts. It focuses on the context, variability and constitution of accounts and the role of language or 'linguistic repertoires' in the active construction of diverse social worlds. For example, in the study of science discourse analysts do not seek to describe and explain the nature of scientific action and belief. Rather, they focus on how the accounts of scientists are organized to portray their actions and beliefs in contextually appropriate ways (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). In other words, the account itself is the object of study and they do not attempt to describe the reality beyond it. While this approach takes accounts seriously, it inadvertently reflects the Cartesian dualism between mind (language) and reality, in this case adopting a behaviouristic or positivistic perspective on language! This appears to me to be a peculiar perversion. Discourse analysis separates what scientists say or write from that which they are talking or writing about, and focuses on the former. But, if discourse is active in constructing social worlds and in social interaction, then it must refer to objects, events, situations and actions in reality. Indeed, this is what language is for. Meaning is not simply dependent upon systems of relations within language but on relations within the
organism/environment/culture system (see Chapter 4). This is particularly important when we wish to understand and explain transformations of social representations. Changes in meaning and language usage do not occur through rhetoric alone, but through interactions with the physical, social and cultural environment. Within the theoretical context of social representations the form and content of scientists' written or oral accounts cannot be separated from the scientists' actions and beliefs relating to the object of study.

6.3.2.3 Reconstructing the past: Before attempting to conduct an historical analysis of successive transformations in a system of social representations, it is first necessary to become intimately familiar with the contents of the documents that constitute the empirical data for the study. A complete listing of Tajfel's publications was compiled by searching the Social Science Citation Index, the Psychological Abstracts, and the reference listings in Tajfel's own publications, as well as the more recent publications of others, closely associated with his work (see Appendix 6.3). I then collected copies of nearly all the articles, chapters and books which had been written or edited by Tajfel and which had been published in the English language. While several of Tajfel's articles were published in journals employing foreign languages, the vast majority of these are versions of articles published in English. Where articles or chapters had been published in more than one location, the publication which had received most citations was selected. I then organized and read most of the publications in chronological order. This was an important research decision. Rather than first reading Tajfel's publications on the theory of intergroup relations, his retrospective accounts of the development of his work, and the account of his work by others, it was important to become familiar with his earlier work in its own right. This assisted in regaining the perspective of the scientists involved at the time in which the research was carried out. Furthermore, it was important to avoid the Whig fallacy, by which the past is reconstructed in terms of the victorious outcome. In the case of this research, it was important to become aware of the
discontinuities and contradictions as well as the continuities in the development of the theory of intergroup relations.

All publications dated before 1979, which have been cited (see section 6.3.4), were included in the subsequent analysis. However, on the basis of the first reading it was apparent that this selection did not include a number of publications which contained important developments in Tajfel's work. For obvious reasons, these were also included in the analysis (see Appendix 6.3). These publications were then reread, making brief notes on their content. While these notes assisted in organizing and structuring the material the original publications were always examined at every step of the analysis. Following this, I attempt to list, in chronological sequence, the first mention of a particular idea and the major themes of each article. This served to give me a feel for the transformations in Tajfel's work, but it was not taken further, not least because it is difficult to pinpoint when a concept first emerged, or at what point a new concept can be differentiated from its predecessor.

I attempted to devise a way in which the analysis could be carried out in terms of the processes of transformation specified by Moscovici in the theory of social representations. In many respects, this has been a neglected issue in past research. The role of anchoring and objectification is rarely explicated in research on the transformation of social representations. The inadequacy of their theoretical specification is, no doubt, in part to blame. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the current research would be structured around these concepts as they stand. It might be possible to select particular examples which illustrate each process but this would not provide an understanding of the changing structure of interrelationships within the system of social representations (see Chapter 4). Similarly, I had thought that it would be possible to identify conventions and innovations, or to identify and trace the development of central concepts such as social identity and the social mobility-social change continuum, or to trace the emergence
and transformation of ideas about social psychology as a discipline. However, such an approach would again do an injustice to the complexity and interdependence of their evolution. The main problem was to find some way of structuring the research that was true to the material itself, to the research goals and to the theoretical framework.

6.3.2.4 Problems with content analysis: It was suggested previously that content analysis reflects the methodological commitments of the Cartesian paradigm. It provides a technique for analysing documents which conform to the traditional methodological criteria of quantification and hypothesis testing. As such, it is an unsuitable method for a detailed analysis of the transformation of social representations. This can be illustrated by examining some of the difficulties I encountered in my research. The major task in content analysis is designing a suitable coding frame. This could have been developed in terms of themes in a cyclical process, moving between the construction of a coding frame and the material being analysed. By doing this on the basis of a subset of the publications and then applying it to the remainder the reliability of the analysis could be evaluated. I could then count the frequency with which each theme occurred and also the lines or pages devoted to each theme. However, it became apparent that such a procedure would not enable me to meet my research goals. Firstly, a content analysis would violate the content and structure of the publications. Themes are not dealt with as separate units in the text. Counting frequencies of occurrence would not reveal the meaning or functional significance of the themes or categories. At this stage, it was far more important to understand the interdependent relations between categories within a complex whole, than to conform to the methodological rigour of an established and accepted technique (Holway, 1989). Secondly, a content analysis would not illuminate the processes by which social representations are transformed. A single coding frame used to compare the content of publications at different times relies on purely quantitative changes. It fails to realize the qualitative
significance of changes in structure and content within a complex whole. Even the use of different coding frames, which is problematic, would not illuminate the continuous development and evolution of social representations, or the processes of assimilations and accommodation involved in their transformation. Thirdly, selecting a subset of publications to test reliability would only serve to leave gaps in the social construction of social representations and would violate the ongoing processes involved in their transformation.

6.3.2.5 A historico-interpretative analysis: In order to understand the transformation of social representations the analysis of the documentary material must preserve the integrity of the system of social representations and the interdependent transformation of elements within that system. This can only be achieved by adopting a qualitative or interpretative approach. Unlike other research methods in social psychology, there are no formalized procedures which can be followed step-by-step. Kuhn (1962/1970) and Bailey (1978) liken the research process to the ethnographer studying alien cultures. Perhaps the most famous study of this kind is the classic study by Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) who carried out an interpretive analysis of personal letters written by or to Polish immigrants in the U.S.A. Such an interpretative analysis requires reading and rereading of the publications, moving backwards and forwards through the articles, following up initially vague ideas, dropping those that do not work, and continually structuring and restructuring the material.

The content and structure of the social representations, the changing patterns of relationships and the significance of components within the system as a whole only emerge gradually. Potter and Wetherell (1987) identify two closely related phases in this process. Firstly, there is a search for pattern in the data. Gradually, the consistency or shared features of accounts and the variability or differences in the content and form of accounts can be explicitly structured. In this research, this amounts to examining the continuities and discontinuities across time. Secondly, the
functions and the consequences are analysed. This is interpreted slightly differently from Potter and Wetherell whose focus remains on the accounts themselves. Here, we are concerned with the functions and consequences of components in the changing structure of relationships within the social representations. This includes the emergence of problems, the construction of solutions and the social and intellectual influences in the transformation of social representations.

The aim of this analysis is to construct a legitimate and fruitful account of the way in which components fit together in the changing pattern of the whole. Such a model describes and explains, not by the invocation of general laws, but by the construction of a coherent understanding which is internally consistent with and takes account of the available data, in all its richness and variability.

The presentation and validation of the 'results' is intimately associated with the research process. The presentation must allow the reader to assess the researcher's interpretations. This requires the inclusion of quotations and a detailed description of the material, followed by a natural history of the conclusions and an account of the processes of inference and interpretation. In some cases it is possible to shorten the report by explicating the theoretical principles and then presenting illustrative examples. However, in this research, the material constitutes the topic itself and the theoretical principles emerged from the analysis. Furthermore, in order to present a coherent account of the types and processes of transformation, it was necessary to follow through the sequence of development in detail.

The validation of the analysis depends, firstly, on the coherence of the constructed account regarding the transformation in the content and structure of the system of social representations. This, in turn, is dependent on the material itself, the ability to identify continuities and discontinuities, the extent to which the account can explain emergent problems and the construction of new solutions. Secondly, Tajfel's retrospective accounts, the interviews with relevant participants (see section 6.3.3) and the
summaries of Tajfel's work presented in chapters or books on integroup relations (see section 6.3.5) provide alternative sources of data. These must be assessed with respect to the research account. Compatibility with the alternative data lends support to the research account. Divergences with the alternative data must either be assimilated into or explained by the research account. Thirdly, the validity of the account can be assessed in terms of its fruitfulness. The account should be able to generate fresh solutions to problems in the field of social representations. Finally, these solutions should assist in the analysis of other systems of social representations. Whilst the research programme as a whole addresses these various forms of validation the degree to which the account is able to generate theoretical solutions which can then be employed successfully in the analysis of other systems of social representations can only be assessed in the light of future developments in the field.

The historico-interpretative documentary analysis of Tajfel's work is presented in four stages. These are, in reality, inseparable but they provide an essential structure for the purposes of analysis and presentation. The first stage presents and examines the content and structure of the system of social representations at successive phases in its development. The second identifies the major continuities and discontinuities which are evident in the changing system of social representations. The third stage elaborates on this analysis, tracing the emergence of problems and the construction of solutions which constitute transformations in the various social representations relevant to the psychology of groups. Finally, in the fourth stage, the intellectual, social and cultural components involved in the construction of a theory of intergroup relations are examined.

6.3.3 In-depth interviews

We have already seen that the in-depth interview is a research method frequently employed in the study of social representations. There is also a long tradition of interviewing in social studies of science (eg. Merton, 1956; Hagstrom, 1965; Collins, 1975; Cohen, 1977; Mackenzie and Barnes, 1979). Interviews are employed as an instrument for
assessing features of scientists' interactions and understandings in a particular field of research. In order to deal with the complexity of the social processes involved in scientific research, interviews are typically unstructured or open-ended, providing complex accounts from which the investigator can reconstruct past events.

In this study, interviews were conducted with social psychologists who were colleagues of Tajfel and who were directly involved in the construction of the theory of intergroup relations. John C. Turner, Rupert Brown and Michael Billig were selected on the basis of their collaboration with Henri Tajfel, their subsequent work relating to the field of groups and their accessibility. Although it would have been ideal to interview Henri Tajfel himself, this was, sadly, no longer possible.

The interviews were conducted in the later stages of the documentary analysis of Tajfel's publications. Individual interview schedules were designed on the basis of this analysis in conjunction with a reading of the interviewees' more recent work. Questions addressed the nature of group psychology before Tajfel's work, the development of Tajfel's work in collaboration with his colleagues, the direction of their own research and the assimilation of Tajfel's work into the broader community of social psychologists (see Appendix 6.4). The schedules were employed as a flexible framework for the interviews which lasted from one to two hours. Each interview was taped and then transcribed verbatim. It was originally intended to analyse these interview transcripts independently from the documentary analysis of Tajfel's publications. However, it was decided that this was inappropriate as the interviews were based on and informed the latter analysis. The interview material is thus presented in conjunction with the historico-interpretative analysis of Tajfel's publications, using quotations to justify inferences and to illustrate interpretations regarding the transformation of social representations. Furthermore, the interview material proved to be especially informative with regard to the role and functioning of the social community in the construction of a theory of intergroup relations.
Potter and Mulkay (1982) have recently criticized this form of analysis, emphasizing the variability in scientists' accounts which is largely dependent on the social context of the interview itself. While my analysis goes beyond the interview context to make inferences about the activities and beliefs of scientists (see discussion in previous section) no attempt is made to create a spurious consensus. As Potter and Mulkay suggest, there is variability both within and between accounts. This variability is a significant part of the social process of science and must be reflected in the analysis.

6.3.4 Analysis of citations

The analysis of citations has been one of the traditional methods employed in the social study of science. In particular, the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) provides an invaluable source of quantitative data on the impact and diffusion of publications in the social sciences. As Garfield, the editor of the SSCI, claims:

Science historians, or anyone interested in tracking the genesis and development of a theory, a discovery or a general area of research, will find the new cumulation to be an indispensable resource (Garfield, 1988, Current Contents, vol. 20, no. 27).

The recent initiative by the University Grants Committee to assess research on the basis of citation counts has given rise to considerable debate regarding their use, validity and limitations (Furnham, 1989; Chapman, 1989; Newstead, 1989; Rushton, 1984; Rushton and Endler, 1979). Many of the criticisms focus on the issue of research quality which fails to be reflected by citation counts. While research quality is a major concern of this research programme taken as a whole, no attempt is made to make inferences about the quality of Tajfel's research on the basis of citation counts. Rather, the citation analysis in this research indicates the importance or impact of Tajfel's various publications. The reasons for this impact and the quality of research can only be evaluated with reference to the content of both the cited and citing publications.
Other limitations which have been elaborated on are more pertinent. Many citations of Tajfel's publications are in books but these are not included in the SCCI. Also, some journals are not included in the SSCI. Citations are listed under the first-name author only; publications in which Tajfel was not the primary author are thus not included in the analysis. A single citation denotes a cursory mention as well as repeated references to a single publication. All these factors lead to an underestimation of the impact of Tajfel's work. The authors' decision to include a particular reference in their articles reflect complex social processes. Well known publications may be cited with little more than a superficial knowledge of the contents. Informal contact and research networks may influence the author's decision to include one rather than another reference. An author may cite more recent research which was directly influenced by Tajfel's work without accrediting Tajfel's publications. Again, these may positively or negatively affect the citation counts.

Other problems relate to the structure of the SSCI. Authors' names are often listed with varying initials or spellings. Fortunately, this was not the case with Henri Tajfel. However, cited publications are frequently entered in a variety of forms. This is particularly true of abbreviations of journal and book titles. There are also occasional errors of entry regarding the year, volume number and page numbers. On the basis of a knowledge of Tajfel's publications these problems can be overcome by scanning neighbouring lines of the index and summing the citation counts appropriately.

Despite its limitations the data base contains information which is pertinent to many research issues. In particular, Garfield (1986) suggests that it can be used to trace the development of a theory and its subsequent extensions. Although citation counts using the SSCI appears to be a relatively simple way to assess the impact of research this was not found to be the case. Restrictions in the access to the data base make any detailed research extremely difficult. Firstly, the costs incurred in
conducting on-line searches severely constrains the time that can be spent exploring the data base. Secondly, variations in data entry means that the data base must be thoroughly examined before any operations are carried out. Thirdly, the operational capacity of the on-line SSCI is very limited. For example, it is not possible to 'simply ask' how many times Tajfel has been cited, which authors cite Tajfel most frequently or which journals have the highest frequency of citations.

In view of these problems it was decided to conduct an informative but relatively simple analysis of citations. This was carried out at an early stage in the historico-interpretative documentary analysis. The on-line SSCI was used to:

1. Determine the total number of articles published between 1972 and 1988 which have cited one or more of Tajfel's publications (first-author only). It should be noted that the summing procedure does not count the total frequency of citations.
2. Determine the number of citing articles per year.
3. Determine the citation count for each cited publication. (This refers to the number of articles which cite a single publication one or more times).
4. Determine the immediacy or latency of impact for eight frequently cited publications.

The published SSCI was used to:
5. Identify the journals in which Tajfel's publications are cited and determine the citation count for each journal during the 1981-1985 period.
6. Examine the distribution of citations for the eleven most frequently cited publications in the three journals which contained the highest number of citations.

The results from this analysis are interpreted by drawing on a detailed knowledge of Tajfel's publications.

6.3.5 A critical review

A critical review is rarely, if ever, considered a method of research in social psychology. While I do not wish to argue that it is a research method as such, it does constitute a valuable component in the social process of
science. Within the context of this research I shall employ this approach to locate Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations within its broader historical and theoretical context. This simultaneously provides both a qualitative analysis of the assimilation and diffusion of Tajfel's work within the community of social psychologists and an examination of Tajfel's influence on the transformation of social representations in the psychology of groups.

Before continuing to outline the form of this critical review, it is important to clarify a point of terminology. Throughout this and subsequent chapters I refer frequently to Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. This is not meant to imply that Tajfel developed and established this theory alone. On the contrary, the historico-interpretative analysis shows that it was a collaborative affair, dependent upon the coordinated social activity of a group of social psychologists working together, on various forms of communication and interaction within and between fields of study and various disciplines in the social sciences, and on the wider cultural and historical context. However, I needed some way of identifying the body of work which has been the central focus of this research. 'A theory of intergroup relations' is too vague, especially as other theories, which have attempted to address the problems of intergroup relations, enter into the analysis. The conventional forms in which this body of work is identified are also unsatisfactory. The label 'Social Identity Theory' emphasizes a single theoretical principle at the expense of other theoretical principles and reflects subsequent developments of the theory. The theory must also be distinguished from earlier stages in its development. In view of this, it is important to adopt a label which explicitly refers to intergroup relations. While I have some misgivings about calling it 'Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations' it served to distinguish this body of work from its earlier and subsequent developments as well as other theories in the field.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of theoretical utility is the degree to which others incorporate, adopt or
apply the theoretical principles in the course of their scientific activities. In this research, the manner in which Tajfel's work has been incorporated into the work of others is assessed by examining the content of books and chapters on the psychology of groups and in social psychology more generally. Obviously, some form of selection is required. This is based on the theoretical concerns of the research and dependent, to a large extent, on direct references to Tajfel's work. A variety of books were included in the review. First of all, the transformation of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations is evaluated by examining books and chapters which have been written by those social psychologists who were directly involved in the theory's earlier development. These include publications on intergroup relations, on group processes more generally, on social cognition and on the social psychology of language. These are closely associated with books and chapters written by 'second-generation' authors which are also included in the review. Secondly, there are a number of specialist texts on group psychology which are not included in the above category. These are examined to explore the assimilation of Tajfel's work by other social psychologists. Thirdly, general texts in social psychology are examined to inspect the treatment of intergroup relations as a topic and the assimilation of Tajfel's theoretical principles into other fields of study.

Finally, the influence of Tajfel's work on the changing content and structure of group psychology as a whole is assessed. This requires looking at the historical development of group psychology before Tajfel and his collaborators developed the theory of intergroup relations. In contrast to the earlier qualitative analyses this draws on secondary as well as primary sources. Other social psychologists have been involved in and concerned with the study of groups for many more years than myself and I cannot hope to acquire their depth of knowledge about the historical development of this field in a short space of time. Furthermore, the history of group psychology is intimately involved with the development of social psychology as a whole. The aim of this section of
the review is to identify the general trends of development in the psychology of groups and to demonstrate how these trends have been influenced by Tajfel's work.

In this chapter we have considered what should be studied and how the research should be conducted in relation to the theory of social representations and the methodological commitments of the Hegelian paradigm. In the third section of the Chapter I have outlined the development of the research programme and described the methods of research which are employed. It is hoped that the difficulties encountered in designing and presenting the research will guide and assist the development of research methods which can be used to explore the various aspects of social representations. The research itself has played a significant part in the development of the theoretical arguments already presented in previous chapters. It also provides the inspiration for further developments which are discussed in the final chapter of the thesis.
PART 2

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7.4 THE IMPACT OF TAJFEL'S WORK

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7.1. SELECTING INFLUENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN A FIELD OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The first research problem was to select a field of study in social psychology and to identify a significant period of theorizing and research which had brought about substantial developments in the field. The selection of the work of Henri Tajfel and his collaborators in the field of group psychology was primarily based on the results of the questionnaire, but was also influenced by a number of pragmatic decisions which will be discussed below. The rationale, design and analysis of the questionnaire was presented in Chapter 6. The purpose of this section is to summarize the results of the questionnaire and to highlight the reasons for the final selection. These include the
relative response rates for the fields of group psychology and attitude research; the level of consensus in the respondents representations of each field; and the perceived content of the influential contributions.

Who do social psychologists consider to be the most influential figures in the past and present fields of group psychology and attitude research? What is the perceived nature of these respective contributions to social psychology? It will be remembered that respondents listed, in rank order, those psychologists whom they considered to be the five most influential figures in the history of the field; outlined what they considered to be the major contribution of the person identified as the most influential; and stated the major consequences of this contribution. Similar questions were also answered in regard to contemporary research in the same field. Of the sixty-three members of the BPS Social Psychological Section who completed the questionnaire, twenty-seven (43%) chose attitude research and thirty-six (57%) chose group psychology.

The quantitative and qualitative analyses on responses regarding influential figures and their contributions will be presented together for each field, before making any comparisons. It should be borne in mind that all statements regarding the influence of particular contributors refer to their influence as perceived by the respondents. Similarly, the analysis of contributions and their consequences is always with reference to respondents' representations of those contributions. This is not always stated explicitly in the text, as it is too cumbersome to refer continually to influential figures as perceived by the respondents. Each section identifies the most influential figures in either the historical or the contemporary era, on the basis of the two rank-order analyses. This is followed, in each case, by a presentation of the content analysis, identifying the major contributions to, the consequences of, or implications for, the field.
7.1.1 The field of attitude research

Influential historical figures: Festinger and G.W. Allport are perceived as being the most influential figures in the history of the field of attitudes. Festinger is mentioned by 52% of respondents and Allport by 49%, followed by Likert, Thurstone, Fishbein and Azjen, and Hovland (Histogram 7.1). Respondents are also more likely to select Allport (6) and Festinger (5) as the most influential figure, followed by Thurstone and Likert (3 and 2) (Appendix 7.1).

Historical contributions and their consequences: All four main contributors are seen as initiators of research, although their contributions were very different. G.W. Allport provided a definition of attitudes which formed the foundations for American experimental social psychology. Thurstone and Likert initiated and developed methods for the measurement of attitudes. Festinger provided an integrative theory which both renewed and dominated experimental psychology. However, the contributions of Allport, Thurstone and Likert, although influential, are also seen as having had negative consequences, supporting an overly individualistic and restrictive approach in attitude theory and research. In contrast, Festinger is presented in a positive vein throughout, having developed and broadened the field.

Influential contemporary figures: Fishbein (41%), McGuire (37%) and Ajzen (30%) are the most frequently mentioned figures in the contemporary field of attitudes, followed by Moscovici (19%) and Eiser (15%) (Histogram 7.2). Fishbein (6.5) and Ajzen (3.5) are also more likely to be selected as the most influential figures. It is interesting to note that, although McGuire is frequently mentioned (method b), not one respondent selected him as the most influential (method a). This contrasts with Moscovici where 4 out of the 5 respondents selected him as being the most influential contemporary figure in the field of attitudes (Appendix 7.2).

Contemporary contributions and their implications: Fishbein and Ajzen and Moscovici are represented as two contrasting streams in the contemporary field of attitudes. Fishbein and Ajzen's influence is associated with the construction of a testable model which allows behaviour to
Histogram 7.1:
INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN THE HISTORY OF ATTITUDES

[Bar chart showing the number of mentions for various figures including Festinger, Allport, L. Kert, Thurstone, Fishbein, Hovland, Heider, and Lewin.]

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Histogram 7.2:

INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN THE CONTEMPORARY FIELD OF ATTITUDES

[Bar graph showing mentions of various names: Fishbein, McGuire, Ajzen, Moscovici, Eiser, Petty, Bem]

No. of mentions

names
be predicted from attitudes. In contrast, Moscovici's contribution is seen in much broader terms, with reference to a reconception of attitudes and a re-orientation of the whole field towards a more social framework. The contribution of McGuire, which is never selected as the most influential, appears to be his comprehensive reviews of the field rather than the establishment of a model or a reorientation of the field.

7.1.2 The field of groups

Influential historical figures in groups: M. Sherif (75%), Lewin (58%), Tajfel (50%) and Asch (44%) are all considered to have been influential figures in the history of group psychology, with at least 40% of respondents mentioning each of them (Histogram 7.3). After these four figures, the percentage of respondents mentioning particular influential figures drops by half to below 20%, for Bales, Festinger and Turner. With this in mind, it is surprising that Sherif is only named by three respondents as the most influential figure (Appendix 7.3). Tajfel (9) and Lewin (8) are more frequently named as the most influential figures in the history of group psychology, even though Sherif is the most frequently mentioned contributor.

Historical contributions and their consequences: Although Lewin is associated with Field Theory and Tajfel with Social Identity Theory, both are considered to have laid the foundations for a reorientation in group psychology and to have inspired further research in the area. Lewin's influence is considered to be more far-reaching, providing the foundations for the majority of subsequent developments in social psychology, including Tajfel's work. Tajfel is more clearly associated with a European tradition of social psychology. Both focused on the relationship between the individual and the group and, in general, are considered to have advocated a more social, group-oriented approach.

Influential contemporary figures: There are three contributors who stand out as the most influential figures in the contemporary field of group psychology. These are Turner (47%), Moscovici (44%) and Tajfel (39%) (Histogram 7.4). Following these, with a considerable decrease in the
Histogram 7.3:

INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN THE HISTORY OF GROUPS

Sherif
Lewin
Tajfel
Asch
Bales
Festinger
Turner
Bion
Moscovici
Homans

No. of mentions

names
Histogram 7.4:

INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN THE CONTEMPORARY FIELD OF GROUPS

Names:

- Turner
- Moscovici
- Tajfel
- Billig
- Brown
- Reichert
- Doise
- Giles
- Bales
- Davis
- Mugny

No. of mentions

%
frequency of mentions, are Billig (22%), Rupert Brown (16%), Reicher (14%), Bales (8%) and Mugny (8%). Of those contributors named as the most influential, Tajfel (7), Turner (6) and Moscovici (6), are the only ones named by more than one respondent (Appendix 7.4).

Contemporary contributions and their implications: The contributions of Tajfel and Turner are closely associated, relating to Social Identity Theory, self-categorization and intergroup relations. Turner is primarily credited for developing the work initiated by Tajfel. However, it is not clear what association or dissociation there is between Moscovici and Tajfel or Turner, even though Moscovici is considered to have inspired and re-orientated the same field of research. Notably, there is little mention of the individual in Moscovici's work which focuses on minority influence in relation to the majority. In contrast, the individual-social dualism appears to be a central theme in the work of Tajfel and Turner.

7.1.3 Comparing Attitude Research and Group Psychology

Overall, respondents showed a preference for group psychology as opposed to attitudes. This may reflect the level of interest in each field within the community and suggests that group psychology is alive and well, at least in Great Britain.

There is a notable difference in the level of consensus between these two fields of social psychology. Responses regarding group psychology exhibit far greater agreement. This is reflected both by the percentage of respondents in each field who mention the most influential figures and also the percentage of contributors named by one respondent. Although the number of contributors who stand out as being highly influential in each era are equivalent, there is a greater consensus for groups than for attitudes. This is shown by the percentage of respondents who mention the most influential figures, being 15-25% higher for groups in the historical eras and 5-10% higher for groups in the contemporary eras. The greater variability for attitudes is also reflected in the percentage of contributors named by one respondent, which indicates a lower level of agreement among
attitude respondents for both the historical (Attitudes 38, Groups 26) and contemporary (Attitudes 36, Groups 31) eras. This is despite the fact that the total number of named contributors is not substantially different. The written responses also indicate that there is a more coherent body of work in group psychology than in attitude research, reflecting differences in representations of the distant and recent history of these two fields.

The content analysis also reveals a number of important similarities and differences between psychologists' representations of the two fields. In attitudes research, influential figures are seen as laying the foundations for subsequent development. In group psychology, influential figures both establish and maintain important bodies of work and inspire further research in the area. A re-orientation or re-focusing of the field is commonly mentioned in both attitudes and groups, but is more common in the latter. Both fields contain mentions of cognitive perspectives and both show a high level of concern for research and research related issues, especially with reference to the historical contributions. Furthermore, contributions in both fields are associated with theory and practice in applied psychology.

There are also a number of notable differences in the major concerns of the two fields. Attitude research still appears to be dominated by American social psychology, whereas contemporary influences in group psychology have a distinctively European character. Representations of attitude research portray an increasing concern for science-related issues such as definition, model construction and predictability. In contrast, representations of group psychology focus on the relationship between the individual and the social and are more concerned with an integration between the sub-discipline of psychology and the development of an inter-disciplinary approach.

Finally, group psychology and attitude research are not completely distinct fields of research. This applies not only to the historical contributions, which might be expected to have diffused more widely, but also to contemporary
contributions, which have influenced and integrated aspects of both fields.

7.1.4 Past and Present

The demarcation between the historical and the contemporary eras in group psychology and attitude research is far from clear. Firstly, figures mentioned in one era are frequently mentioned, by the same or different respondents, in the other era. The decision to select a contributor as an historical or as a contemporary influence may depend on the respondents' relevant points of reference. The choice will depend on how far back the history of a field is seen to extend, on how recently the contemporary figures have been influential and the relationship between the two. Secondly, the central issues presented in respect of historical contributions are often the same issues which emerge in contemporary contributions. For example, in attitude research, the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is of great significance, while in group psychology one of the central themes is the relationship between the individual and the group.

The past influences the present in as far as historical contributions demarcate the boundaries of a field and establish the central issues which shape subsequent developments. This is so even when those developments are in direct opposition to those contributions, for example the reaction against individualism in group psychology. Equally, the present influences the past. Psychologists' representations of the past are dynamic reconstructions that are influenced by current developments and concerns. This is reflected both in the selection of influential figures and in the descriptions of their contributions. The past cannot be divorced from the present.

The results also lend further support to the thesis that the theory of social representations can be profitably applied to the development of scientific knowledge. In general terms, contributions are influential because they have re-orientated the field or because they have provided the foundations for subsequent research. This underlines two central issues in the dynamics of social representations. Firstly, the
development of scientific knowledge is not presented in terms of discourses about reality but rather in terms of the social processes of science. The significance of a contribution depends upon the reaction of the scientific community. Secondly, the dynamics of scientific knowledge is presented in terms of change and stability. On the one hand, the influential contributions are those that have brought about a change of focus within the field, which have provided a new perspective on an old problem or have re-formulated the problem; and have inspired research and introduced novel methods of exploration. On the other hand, influential contributions are those which bring stability; which provide a framework within which other psychologists collaborate; and which meet the standards of the research community.

7.1.5 Selecting Henri Tajfel's Contribution in the Field of Group Psychology

The psychology of groups offered a more promising field of social psychology for investigating the transformation of social representations. With reference to the questionnaire results, the respondents showed a preference for group psychology. There is also a greater consensus amongst respondents regarding the influential contributors in both the historical and the contemporary eras. Furthermore, the content analysis reveals a greater coherence in respondents' representations of group psychology in which there has been a consistent endeavour to re-orientate the field. The selection of group psychology was also based on the relative merits of specific contributors. On the strength of the contemporary contributions mentioned, it would have been possible to select the work of Fishbein and Ajzen on attitudes and on the prediction of behaviour, especially as Fishbein is also mentioned frequently in the historical era. However, a stronger case can be made for selecting the contribution of Tajfel on Social Identity Theory and intergroup relations. Firstly, Tajfel ranks in the first three most frequently mentioned contributors, for both the historical and the contemporary eras. Secondly, he is selected by respondents as the most influential contributor in both eras. Thirdly, the most frequently mentioned
contributor in the contemporary era is Turner, who is seen as further developing the work of Tajfel.

There were also practical and theoretical reasons for this selection. Firstly, although Tajfel was Polish, most of his academic years were spent in Britain. Furthermore, many of his colleagues are currently working in British Universities. This meant that it would be possible to interview those who had worked with him or had been personal friends of his.

Secondly, from the questionnaire results, it was clear that his work was relevant not only to group psychology but also to other areas of social psychology, including perception, attitudes, attributions and social cognition more generally as well as to social comparison, social identity and social influence. Thirdly, he had been an influential figure in European social psychology and, coupled with his recent death, it is possible that other social psychologists would be interested in the evolution and development of his work. Fourthly, there appeared to be at least some connections between the theoretical interests of this thesis and the work of Tajfel, especially with reference to the relationship between the individual and the social. While this is not an 'objective' reason for selecting Tajfel, I am sure it had at least some influence in my choice of research material.

It should be remembered that, at this stage, I had little knowledge of Tajfel's work but, in retrospect, I believe it to have been a fortunate choice. Most of his publications were reasonably accessible and a few of his writings offered retrospective accounts of his career as a social psychologist. Furthermore, his life before entering into academia and his intellectual career in psychology have been quite dramatic. He started his research by studying individuals' perceptions of the sizes of coins and ended up developing a theory of large-scale intergroup relations. Moreover, in collaboration with others, including Moscovici, he played a central role in establishing an alternative, European tradition of social psychology.
7.2. 'WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE GROUP IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?'
FIFTEEN YEARS ON

We now appear to be passing through a period of transition during which both the content and methodology of past research are being reevaluated, and from which new trends are likely to emerge......It is suggested that social psychologists are responsive to the mood of the times, and that recent social and political upheavals presage a revival of the collectivistic approach.

(Steiner, 1974, p. 94)

In 1973 Ivan Steiner gave the first annual Katz-Newcomb lecture at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and published a revised version in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology in 1974, under the title which I have borrowed to head this section. In this article, he contrasts a 'group' approach with an individualistic approach. In the 'group' approach the individual is seen as an element in a larger system and causes are located in the collective actions of others. In the individualistic orientation the individual is seen as a system in his or her own right and causes are located within the individual. In the terms of this thesis these reflect the Hegelian and Cartesian paradigms respectively (see Chapter 3).

Steiner's argument was that social psychology in the 40's had looked both to the individual and to the group for explanations of human behaviour but that by the 60's it had become less concerned for larger social systems and increasingly individualistic in orientation. He suggests, optimistically, that by the late 70's the group will rise again, in response both to changes in society and to the crisis in social psychology. Fifteen years on, Steiner's original prediction was correct, but the return of the group in social psychology happened not in the U.S.A. but in Europe. In particular, the social group returned with the work of Henri Tajfel and his associates in the form of a theory of intergroup relations, more commonly known as Social Identity Theory.
7.2.1 Four levels of explanation in social psychology

In Chapter 3, it was argued that the division between the individual and culture was inherent in the very foundation of psychology as a scientific discipline in the contrast between Wundt's experimental psychophysics and his Volkerpsychologie. Moreover, the conflict between the individual and the social, between the Cartesian and the Hegelian paradigms, has been endemic in social psychology throughout its history. This is as true of the psychology of groups as it is of any field in social psychology.

Doise (1978, 1986) has articulated this dilemma in terms of four levels of explanation in social psychology. The intrapersonal level of analysis (Level 1) focuses on the internal mechanisms by which the individual organizes his or her perceptions, evaluations and behaviour. The interpersonal and situational level (Level 2) examines the dynamics of the relations between individuals in a given situation at a particular moment. The positional level (Level 3) makes explicit the effect of differences in social positions or social states which exist prior to a particular interaction. The ideological level (Level 4) deals with a society's systems of beliefs and representations, values and norms, which validate and maintain the social order. Doise (1973) first elaborated on these four levels with reference to the psychology of groups and they will be used here as a framework for examining the historical transformation of group psychology.

However, it should be noted that they do not represent four distinct levels of psychological or social functioning. They are, rather, levels of articulation adopted by different social psychologists. In the past, there has been a tendency to differentiate individual and social approaches. For example, Hearnshaw (1987) makes a distinction between the influence of others on the behaviour of an individual and the socialization of the individual. Similarly, Hogg and Abrams (1988) distinguish between the individual in the group and the group in the individual. Social psychological research tends to focus on one or two levels and theories tend to be articulated at a particular level. Instead, Doise argues that
the dominant trend in American social psychology has been to provide explanations at Levels 1 and 2 whereas the distinguishing characteristic of trends in European social psychology has been the introduction of Levels 3 and 4 into its theories and research. There is always the danger that Doise's framework will lead to the separation of the intrapersonal from the interpersonal and the positional from the ideological. But this is not its intention and Doise is quite explicit about this. All four levels are continuously and simultaneously expressed in social life.

It should be clear from the arguments presented in Chapter 3 that the Hegelian paradigm provides a better framework than the Cartesian paradigm for the articulation of all four levels. It should also be clear, from the arguments presented in Chapters 1 and 4, that social representations are not confined to Level 4 but, rather, operate also at the interpersonal and positional levels.

7.2.2 The rise and fall of group psychology

In the years leading up to World War II social psychology was dominated by research on attitude measurement (McGuire, 1986). This having been said, group psychology still prospered during the 1920's and 1930's, but was largely restricted to the interpersonal level of analysis. Two main strands of research can be identified. Research on social facilitation examined how the presence of others affected an individual's performance (eg. Allport, 1924; Moede, 1920; Dashiel, 1935). Studies on problem-solving and decision-making examined the differences between individuals working alone and individuals working together in dynamically interacting groups (Bechterer, 1932). Steiner (1974) points out that these studies focused on the decisions or products generated by small ad hoc groups. The study of large-scale social groups was left, on the whole, to sociologists who focused on particular ethnic groups, describing the group's historical development, its cultural traditions and its changing political and economic relations with other groups (ie. Doise's Levels 3 and 4).

In the years following World War II the Great Depression gave rise to an increased interest in group processes and a
The burgeoning field of research in group dynamics. The atrocities of the war needed to be understood by those who had survived them. Inflation, unemployment and poverty in a deteriorating economy, along with nationalistic and class antagonisms, shifted the focus of the social psychology community from attitude measurement to the study of groups (McGuire, 1986). As a result, the 40's and 50's saw a tenfold increase in the publication of research on groups (McGrath and Altman, 1966). The area of group dynamics was inspired, largely, by Kurt Lewin and his associates. Lewin's work reflects his sustained ambition to integrate individual and social approaches in social psychology and to bring theory and practice closer together. It was not sufficient to look at individuals alone or groups alone; it was necessary to see individuals as members of social groups.

His influence in the field of group psychology is reflected in the results of the questionnaire (above). Furthermore, it will be seen that many of Tajfel's concerns were similar to those of Lewin. Lewin's academic career started in cognitive and developmental psychology but shifted to social psychology when he was forced to emigrate from Germany to the U.S.A. In 1935 he published an article entitled 'Psychosociological problems of minority groups' in which he examined the relationships between Jews and non-Jews in different social contexts. Throughout the rest of his career he addressed problems of cultural change, of conflicts in face-to-face groups and of intergroup conflicts on a larger scale. As Director of the Research Centre for Group Dynamics at M.I.T. he attracted a large group of collaborators who subsequently became extremely influential in their own right. Notably, these included Bavelas, Cartwright, Deutsch, Festinger, Kelley, Lippet, Schachter and Thibaut.

Although many of Lewin's ideas could be located at the positional and ideological levels of analysis much of the research in group dynamics was conducted, in effect, at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of analysis. Firstly, Lewin's field theory emphasized the individual's life space, focusing on the individual's perspective in the group and
changes in the individual's attitudes, knowledge and skills in relation to other members of the group. Secondly, the Lewinians demonstrated that group phenomena could be studied in the laboratory. But, in so doing, they legitimated and popularized the study of ad hoc groups in artificially controlled conditions which led to the ignoring of positional and ideological factors. Little attention was given to sequences of collective actions, or to the creativity of individuals in groups.

The individualistic tendencies of group dynamics is further demonstrated by the research undertaken by Lewin's colleagues. Festinger offers a particular case in point. At an early stage in his career he studied the informal processes of communications within groups (1950); he subsequently developed his theory of social comparisons at the interpersonal level (1954); and then went on to focus on the intrapersonal processes of cognitive dissonance (1957). Similarly, Game Theory and work on the Prisoner's Dilemma (Deutsch, 1949), Social Exchange Theory and studies of interpersonal power relations (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) reduced the study of groups to the study of dyads with little or no reference to the social context.

The tradition of small group research continued during the 50's and early 60's, but by now it was thoroughly immersed in individualistic social psychology. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) published a book entitled The Social Psychology of Groups in which nine of the fourteen chapters describe research on dyadic relationships. This is justified in terms which are reminiscent of Allport's reductionist arguments. Because the existence of the group is based solely upon the participation and satisfaction of the individuals comprising it, the group functionalism becomes an individual functionalism. The ultimate analysis then is in terms of the vicissitudes of individuals as they try out various adaptations to the problems confronting them.

(Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, p. 5)

The analysis of complex relations is thus based on their understanding of the dyad without ever articulating the
positional and ideological levels in their theoretical framework.

*We assume that if we can achieve a clear understanding of the dyad we can subsequently extend our understanding to encompass the problems of larger and more complex social relations.*

(Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, p. 6)

Cartwright and Zander's volumes on *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (1953, 1960, 1968) include sections on groups and group memberships, pressures to uniformity in groups, power and influence in groups, leadership and performance of group functions, motivational processes in groups and structural properties of groups, all of which deal with intragroup or interpersonal and intrapersonal processes. This was not atypical. The many reviews of small group research tell very much the same story (e.g., Thibaut and Kelley, 1954; Riecken and Homans, 1954; Hare, 1962; Hare, Borgatta and Bales, 1955; McGrath and Altman, 1966). Experimental studies either explored group phenomena from the perspective of the group member (i.e., the subject) in the Lewinian tradition or examined the reciprocal interpersonal interactions in the group from the perspective of an observer (i.e., the scientist). In effect, they were studies, either of the individual in social situations, or of the group as a system of (interpersonal) social interaction (Hare et al., 1966). The relative positions of groups in society or the ideologies and social representations extant in society were not considered.

By the 1960's group psychology was on the decline as a result of both 'internal' and 'external' factors (McGuire, 1986). The early years of the group dynamics movement were characterized by its integration of theory, research, and practice, but by the 1960's small group research was dominated by sophisticated empirical studies lacking any unifying theory (McGrath and Altman, 1966). Furthermore, the relative tranquility of the Eisenhower years combined with an increased focus of attention on individuals. Individuals, rather than groups, appeared to be the active units of society and attitudes, dissonance and individualistic
approaches to social perception were the vogue topics of research. Group psychology did not disappear. Blumberg et al. were able to publish a two-volume work on *Small Groups and Social Interactions* (Blumberg, Hare, Kent and Davies, 1983). Topics such as the risky shift and group polarization attracted a lot of attention, not least because it demonstrated that the group was more than the sum of the individual parts (Cartwright, 1971). But, overall, the study of group phenomena did not prosper.

7.2.3 Group psychology at the crossroads?

During the same period in which group dynamics prospered Muzafer Sherif, like Lewin, was attempting to integrate psychological and sociological approaches to group phenomena. Much of his research efforts focused on the problems of intergroup relations and, in so doing, he moved against the current of mainstream social psychology which stressed the importance of individual and interpersonal relations. Intergroup relations had distinctive properties which differentiated them from processes at the inter-personal and intra-personal levels. In his many publications on intergroup relations (eg. Sherif and Wilson, 1953; Sherif and Sherif, 1953; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif, 1961; Sherif, 1967) and in his volumes on social psychology (eg. Sherif and Sherif, 1948, 1956, 1969; Rohrer and Sherif, 1951; Sherif and Wilson, 1957) Sherif argued consistently for an interdisciplinary approach which could integrate internal factors such as motives, past experience and organismic state, with external factors such as groups, culture and cultural products, within a single framework for the study of social behaviour. Towards the end of his career he also showed an increasing interest in change, with reference to conflicting groups, minority groups and social movements. Social phenomena had to be studied within an interdisciplinary framework that addressed the individual and interpersonal levels as well as the social context.

This having been said, much of the experimental research conducted by Sherif and his colleagues is articulated at the interpersonal level. These will be discussed in more detail
in a later chapter, in relation to the development of Tajfel's work. But it is worth noting here that, in general terms, they deal with interactions between individuals belonging to different groups but not necessarily occupying different positions in society. Furthermore, Sherif's approach to the study of groups had little impact, at the time, on general trends in social psychology. If Sherif was right to entitle two of his books as *Social Psychology at the Crossroads* (1951) and *Group Relations at the Crossroads* (1953) it appears that most social psychologists travelled straight ahead.

### 7.2.4 The re-emergence of group psychology

McGuire (1986) argues that, during the 1965-1985 period, social psychology was dominated by social cognition and more recently that studies on the structure within systems of attitudes has been flourishing. Similarly, Jones (1985) gives little indication of the re-emergence of group psychology. So, we are still left wondering whatever happened to the group, in the '70's and the '80's.

Was Steiner right in forecasting that

> social psychology in the late '70's is going to look a lot like social psychology in the late '40's, better of course, but groupy once more

(Steiner, 1974, p.106).

Although in a more recent article Steiner suggests that the group has not returned (Steiner, 1983), I believe the answer to be yes. While this might seem overly optimistic, there are reasons to believe that group psychology and the social dimension are alive and well, at least, in Europe.

Two strands of group psychology, Moscovici's work on minority influence (1985c) and Tajfel's work on intergroup relations (1982a) are flourishing. As was mentioned in a previous chapter, the work on minority influence was a reaction against a bias towards conformity in small group research. This has been usefully extended by Mugny and others to consider the influence of minorities in society. However, for reasons explained earlier with reference to the results of the questionnaire study, I shall focus my attention here
on the work relating to intergroup relations and Social Identity Theory.

The re-emergence of the social group in social psychology has been, predominantly, a European affair. As we already know, Moscovici and most of his colleagues are based in France. Tajfel and his associates, for the most part, worked in Britain. Both were highly influential in establishing a European tradition in social psychology (Moscovici, 1972; Tajfel, 1972a, 1979a, 1981a). The waxing and waning of research interests is associated frequently with the mood of the times (Steiner, 1974; Jones, 1985; McGuire, 1986). The flowering of group psychology in Europe can be associated with the mood of nations. Both Moscovici (1972) and Tajfel (1976a, 1979b) articulate this in terms of social mobility and social change. The ideology of social mobility has been a powerful force in American society, supporting the belief that individuals are not constrained by their group memberships and can move freely through the various structures of society. American social psychology, in consequence, has provided explanations of social behaviour at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. In contrast, European societies show a greater predominance of a social change ideology. If individuals want to change their position in society they can only do so as members of their social groups. Class differentials, minority groups and social movements are expressly the ideology of social change. Thus, European social psychologists have begun to pay greater attention to positional and ideological levels of explanation.

7.3. TAJFEL'S THEORY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS: A SUMMARY

The re-emergence of concern for large-scale social phenomena was already occurring in the late 60's. But this work did not provide a framework for integrating the four levels. For example, Moore's chapter in the 1969 edition of the Handbook of Social Psychology (Aronson and Lindzey) on social structure and social behaviour deals with the psychological and sociological aspects of social behaviour as dependent and independent variables. Milgram and Toch's chapter on collective behaviour in the same volume does
address social movements but most of the chapter is dedicated to an examination of the physical characteristics of crowds and a description of psychological or sociological theories of crowd behaviour. One of the major strengths of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations is that it addresses all four levels of explanation, from the intrapersonal and interpersonal to the positional and ideological in an integrative framework.

Indeed, Doise first developed his ideas about four levels of explanation in social psychology on the basis of the work on intergroup relations and category differentiation that was inspired by Tajfel (Doise, 1978). The fact that Tajfel wrote the foreword to the English editions of Doise's work and Moscovici wrote the preface to the original French edition gives some indication of the interdependence between Doise's, Tajfel's and Moscovici's contributions to social psychology.

Tajfel emigrated to England in 1951 and began his academic career with experimental studies in the psychophysics of perception. He soon began to apply the same principles to issues in social perception and, in particular, to the study of social stereotypes. This led, in turn, to an examination of the cognitive objects of prejudice in the context of large-scale intergroup relations and the study of nationalism and its development in children. Tajfel then returned to the laboratory in order to conduct his, now famous, experiments on the role of categorization in intergroup behaviour. From this basis in social cognition Tajfel, in collaboration with his colleagues, who included Billig, Turner, Brown, Breakwell, Giles and Bourhis, developed a theory of intergroup relations which addressed the social psychological aspects of intergroup conflict and social change.

Tajfel believed firmly that it was the job of social psychologists to address issues arising in the social realities of the contemporary world and that it could only achieve this by adopting levels of enquiry and explanation that went beyond the intra-personal and inter-personal levels.
Social psychology can and must include in its theoretical and research preoccupations a direct concern with the relationship between human psychological functioning and the large-scale social processes and events which shape this functioning and are shaped by it.

(Tajfel, 1981a, p. 7)

Tajfel achieved this integration of the psychological functioning and large-scale social processes in his theory of intergroup relations. While Doise explicates the articulation of the four levels in experimental research on intergroup behaviour, I shall describe how they are articulated and integrated in Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations.

The intrapersonal level of explanation is expressed in Tajfel's definition of group membership from the perspective of the actors or participants. An individual is a member of a group because she categorizes, evaluates and identifies herself as a member of a group. However, these intrapersonal components cannot stand on their own. Firstly, they are dependent upon a consensus, both within groups and between groups, for their development and maintenance (Level 4). Secondly, the expression of subjective group membership is interdependent with the social situation. Social situations which force group behaviour will enhance the significance of group membership and group membership will influence the meaning or perception of different social situations (Level 2).

The interpersonal and situational level of explanation is emphasized in a number of theoretical components. We have just noted that group membership is interdependent with various social situations. This is also related to the interpersonal-intergroup continuum which distinguishes social interactions between individuals as individuals from social interactions between individuals as members of the same or different groups. While 'intergroup' appears to denote a different level of analysis, in itself, it does not refer to positional and ideological factors. Ideally, Doise's interpersonal level should also encompass the dynamics of relations established by individuals as members of a group in
a given situation. It will be seen, however, that this continuum is closely associated with the social mobility-social change continuum (Level 4).

The social-psychological processes of group differentiation are also articulated at the interpersonal level. Social identity refers to those aspects of an individual's self-image which derive from his/her group membership. These are constructed and maintained by making social comparisons of one's own group with other relevant groups. This process is dependent upon the social categorization of people into different groups. Differences between the groups are either created or accentuated in order to gain a positive social identity. While categorization might be considered to be a cognitive, intrapersonal process, the interdependent processes of social categorization, social identity and social comparison locate individuals in society in relation to their own and other groups (Level 2).

The positional level of explanation is elaborated by considering the functioning of group membership and of the social-psychological processes of group differentiation in the context of intergroup relations in society. Tajfel describes how consensually superior groups preserve and enhance their socio-psychological distinctiveness and how consensually inferior groups gain consensually valued attributes, re-evaluate attributes of their own group or create new attributes in order to achieve a positively valued distinctiveness. These processes are exemplified in the genesis and functioning of relative deprivation.

The ideological level of explanation is included within the theoretical framework in terms of the consensual beliefs extant in society. These consensual beliefs play an essential role in intergroup relations. Firstly, we have already seen that group membership is dependent on the consensual categorization and evaluation of different groups in society. Secondly, consensual beliefs about the structure of society will affect the occurrence and the type of intergroup relations. This is expressed in terms of the social mobility-social change continuum described above. Intergroup relations depend upon an ideology of social change in which
people believe that they can only change their position in society as a member of their group. Furthermore, the particular forms of intergroup behaviour and social change depend upon consensual beliefs about the legitimacy or illegitimacy and the stability or instability of the relations between their group and other groups.

This brief summary does not do justice to the integrative character of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. Nor does it do justice to Tajfel's collaborators and associates. It's primary aim is to demonstrate that the intrapersonal, interpersonal, positional and ideological levels of explanation are articulated within a single framework. A more detailed presentation of the theory will be given when we turn to an examination of Tajfel's thinking and its development (in particular, see Chapter 8, Phase VI); and the contributions of his colleagues will be described in Chapters 9 and 10.

7.4. THE IMPACT OF TAJFEL'S WORK

What impact has Tajfel's work had in social psychology? In particular, has group psychology re-emerged as an important field of study and, if so, what form does it take? Which of Tajfel's ideas have successfully diffused and been assimilated by the wider community of social psychologists? To answer these questions I shall resort, firstly, to the safety of numbers. An analysis of the Social Science Citation Index provides some indication of the impact of Tajfel's work. Which publications have been cited most frequently? When and where have they had their largest effect? I shall then examine the development of Tajfel's theory in the work of his associates and other social psychologists. To what extent do these developments articulate all four levels of explanation? Finally, I shall comment on the present status of intergroup relations as a field of study and assess the place of the social dimension in social psychology.

7.4.1 A quantitative analysis using the Social Science Citation Index

Tajfel's work has received considerable attention in the community of social scientists. Between 1972 and 1988, 884 articles cited one or more of Tajfel's publications.
(This refers to articles and books for which Tajfel was the first author or editor). During this period there was a general increase in the frequency of citations, indicating a growing awareness of his work (see Graph 7.1). This could be explained, in part, by an increase in the number of articles, chapters and books which were published by Tajfel. By 1972 he had written 25 articles, 5 chapters and one book; by 1988 there were 46 articles, 16 chapters and 6 books (where Tajfel is first-named author/editor only). However, there is a higher rate of increase in the citation count between 1981 and 1985, which may well be due to the impact of a few particular publications.

In order to analyse the citation count in more detail the frequencies of citation for each article were obtained. Table 7.1 presents a list of publications which have been cited in descending order of citation counts. Of the first fifteen publications in this list eleven were published since 1970 (inclusive) and are concerned directly with the development of a theory of intergroup relations. The notable exceptions are three articles on social perception and Tajfel's chapter on cognitive aspects of prejudice. Tajfel's early work on psycho-physics (total of 113 citations) and issues in social perception (total of 157 citations) has received notable acclaim. This, I believe, is largely in relation to the functioning of classification and value in the accentuation of differences between groups of stimuli and their role in the formation and maintenance of social stereotypes (see Chapter 8, Phases I and II). It will be seen that this work is articulated largely at the intrapersonal level of explanation. Tajfel's chapter on 'Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice' (total of 79 citations), published in three separate locations, is, perhaps, even more notable, being a single work of interest. By this time, the theoretical principles are articulated at the interpersonal level, although some reference is given to positional and ideological factors (see Chapter 8, Phase III).

It is surprising to me that Tajfel's writing on the development of national attitudes in children has received little attention (total of 27 citations) even though he was,
Table 7.1: Citation counts for Tajfel's cited publications

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title of Publication</th>
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<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Tajfel (ed.)</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td><strong>Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>Tajfel &amp; Turner</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>An integrative theory of intergroup conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>Tajfel, Flament, Billig, Bundy</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Social categorisation and intergroup behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Experiments in intergroup discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td><strong>Human groups &amp; social categories: studies in social psychology</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Social identity &amp; intergroup behaviour</td>
</tr>
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<td>64</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Cognitive aspects of prejudice</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Experiments in a Vacuum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Social psychology of intergroup relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Tajfel &amp; Wilkes</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Classification and quantitative judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>La categorisation sociale</td>
</tr>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>Familiarity and categorisation in intergroup behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Value and the perceptual judgment of magnitude</td>
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Table 7.1 cont.

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<td>22</td>
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<td>Content of stereotypes &amp; the influence of similarity between members of stereotyped groups</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Social stereotypes &amp; social groups</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tajfel &amp; Fraser</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Introducing social psychology</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Individuals &amp; groups in social psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tajfel &amp; Jahoda</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Development in children of concepts &amp; attitudes about their own &amp; other nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tajfel, Jahoda, Nemeth, Rin, Johnson</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Devaluation by children of their own national &amp; ethnic group: two case studies</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>The anchoring effects of value in a scale of judgments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tajfel &amp; Dawson(eds.)</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Disappointed guests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tajfel &amp; Wilkes</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Salience of attributes &amp; commitment to extreme judgments in the perception of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>A note on Lambert's Evaluation Reactions to Spoken Language</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Tajfel, Richardson, Everstine</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Individual consistencies in categorizing: a study of judgmental behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Cognitive aspects of prejudice</td>
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309
Table 7.1 cont.

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</tr>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>The formation of national attitudes: a socio-psychological perspective</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Aspects of national &amp; ethnic loyalty</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Some developments in European Social Psychology</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Intergroup behaviour, social comparisons &amp; social change</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>The exit of social mobility &amp; the voice of social change: notes on the social psychology of intergroup relations</td>
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<td>Tajfel &amp; Cawasjee</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Value and the accentuation of judged differences</td>
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<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Human intergroup conflict: useful &amp; less useful forms of analysis</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Tajfel</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Psychological conception of equity; the present &amp; the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tajfel &amp; Winter</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>The interdependence of size, number and value in young children's estimates of magnitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tajfel, Richardson, Everstine</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Individual judgement consistencies in conditions of risk taking</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Bruner &amp; Tajfel</td>
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<td>Cognitive risk &amp; environmental change</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Tajfel, Nometh, Jahoda, Campbell, Johnson</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>The development of children's preference for their own country: a cross-national study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tajfel &amp; Moscovici</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Renaissance of old myths in social psychology: peculiar misnomers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
by this time, an eminent figure in social psychology (see Chapter 8, Phase IV). In particular, his chapter on the formation of national attitudes, published in an interdisciplinary volume which was edited by Sherif (1969), has been cited only four times. This is surprising in that it is the first occasion on which Tajfel argues for a social-psychological perspective that goes beyond the inter-personal level of explanation (see Chapter 9).

The publications which have received by far the most recognition, however, focus on the study of intergroup relations. This can be divided into two phases; the experimental studies on the role of categorization in intergroup behaviour (see Chapter 8, Phase V) and the subsequent development of a theory of intergroup relations (see Chapter 8, Phase VI). The first series of experimental studies, in what has come to be known as the 'minimal group paradigm', were published in similar form in Scientific American (Tajfel, 1970a) and the European Journal of Social Psychology (Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy, 1971). These studies had a huge impact in the field of group psychology and elsewhere (114 and 139 citations respectively). Part of the reason for this influence was the unexpected nature of the experimental results. The experiments purported to show that categorization alone could produce intergroup differentiation. This was explained in terms of a generic group norm. Thus, at this stage, the explanation of the experimental results was expressed in terms of intrapersonal cognitive processes and ideological norms. The actual results were neither anticipated by the researchers nor in accord with the ideas of others about why groups discriminate against other groups. They challenged accepted ideas about intergroup behaviour and, as such, they spawned a whole series of studies that attempted to replicate, refute and develop the research. A further reason for their 'success' was that they provided a clear demonstration of the role of cognitive processes in group behaviour and, for this reason, are often referred to in the literature on social cognition. Finally, they are associated closely with the subsequent

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development of Social Identity Theory and are referred to frequently as the initial impetus for these developments.

The total number of citations to Tajfel's writings focusing specifically on these and related experiments is 296. However, this is an underestimation of their impact. Firstly, directly related experiments were conducted and reported on by Tajfel's colleagues. Secondly, a number of Tajfel's publications on the theory of intergroup relations give a detailed account of the experiments and psychologists who cite these latter publications frequently make reference to these experiments.

The two publications which have received most attention give a full account of the theory of intergroup relations. 'Differentiations Between Social Groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations' (203 citations) is an edited volume. The first part consists of three chapters, in which Tajfel presents a detailed account of the theory and its perspective. Only 25 citations refer directly to these chapters. However, citations of other chapters are not included in the citation count. Furthermore, unlike many edited volumes, the chapters in this book reflect a common approach and most of them derive from a common theoretical framework. Thus, the extremely high number of citations of this volume, clearly indicate the impact of Tajfel's theory and general approach. This is also supported by the high citation count of Tajfel and Turner's chapter (1979) which focuses exclusively on the theory of intergroup relations (142 citations). If one takes all of Tajfel's publications which present the theory and related research (between 1972 and 1982) the citation count is even more impressive (total of 708 citations). (This does not include 88 citations to Tajfel's book on 'Human Groups and Social Categories' as this presents a compilation of previously published material throughout his career).

Clearly, the work of Tajfel and his associates has had considerable impact in the social sciences. The form of this impact, however, is still unclear. Some indication is given by the relative differences in citation counts for those publications which emphasize the social dimension in group

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psychology (and social psychology more generally) and those publications which focus on the theory and research. Only 16.5% of citations refer to the former category and of these 64 (9%) refer to Tajfel's chapter on 'Experiments in a Vacuum' (1972). Other publications in this category, including 'Exit and voice in intergroup relations' (1976) and 'The Social Psychology of Minorities' (1978) have received very little attention. On the other hand, Tajfel's most recently edited volume - The Social Dimensions: Europe's developments in social psychology (1984) has already received some acclaim (21 citations). Further comment on the fate of the positional and ideological levels of explanation must wait until we look at the content of more recent developments.

The Social Science Citation Index can also give us some idea of when and where the theory of intergroup relations had had an influence. Graphs 7.2 and 7.3 present the citation counts for eight publications from 1972 to 1989 bi-annually. These were selected from the fifteen most frequently cited publications with a view to representing most phases of Tajfel's academic career. On the basis of these publications, it can be seen that his early work on social perception and his chapter on the cognitive aspects of prejudice had had a relatively low but continuing impact in social psychology (Graph 7.2). Citation profiles for the two articles reporting the experimental research on intergroup relations show that they had an immediate impact which was sustained at a higher level than his previous work throughout this period. However, the most dramatic citation profiles belong to the two most frequently cited publications - Differentiations between social groups (Tajfel,1978) and An integrative theory of intergroup conflict (Tajfel and Turner,1979). These had an immediate and impressive impact which increased steadily for six to eight years. It appears that the rapid increase in total citations to Tajfel's work between 1981 and 1985 is almost entirely due to these two publications. While the number of citations for these two publications has declined since 1985, this does not indicate a decline of interest in the research, theory or general approach. Rather, other
Graph 7.2

CITATION COUNTS FOR THREE PUBLICATIONS 1972-1989

- Tajfel & Wilkes 1963
- Tajfel 1959
- Tajfel 1969

Years

Frequency of citations
Graph 7.3
CITATION COUNTS FOR FIVE FREQUENTLY CITED PUBLICATIONS 1972-1989

- Experiments 1970
- Experiments 1971
- Tajfel 1978
- Tajfel & Turner 1979
- Tajfel 1982
related publications have become more popular. For example, Tajfel's 1982 chapter on the social psychology of intergroup relations has received notable attention during this latter period. Furthermore, the 1971 article reporting the experiments on intergroup relations has received increasing attention in recent years (Graph 7.3).

There are interesting comments to be made about the distribution of citations in different journals and hence the predominant media of diffusion. Tajfel's work is cited in over a hundred different journals, spanning a wide range of interests during the 1981-1986 period. Although the majority of citations occur in journals of psychology and social psychology there are also a significant number in the disciplines or field of human relations, linguistics, education, sociology, political science, anthropology and human geography (Table 7.2). It was suggested earlier that the re-emergence of the social group has been predominantly a European affair. This is supported partly by the distribution of citations. The two journals which contain the highest number of citations during this period are the European Journal of Social Psychology (EJSP) (93) and the British Journal of Social Psychology (BJSP) (67). However, the American Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP) (53), also contains a relatively high number of citations to Tajfel's work.

Further analyses were carried out in order to establish differences in the citation pattern for these three journals during the period 1966-1988. Differences in citation counts across the three journals for the eleven most frequently cited publications are presented in Table 7.3.
Table 7.2: Citation Counts in different journals for 1981-1985 period

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<td>European Journal of Social Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Journal of Social Psychology</td>
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<td>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</td>
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<td>Annual Review of Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australian Journal of Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journal of Social Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gruppendynamik-Zeitschrift fur Angewandte</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialwissenschaft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journal of Applied Social Psychology</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Relations</td>
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<td>Zeitschrift fur Socialpsychologie</td>
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<td>Social Science Information</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Psychologie</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>International Journal of the Sociology of Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic and Racial Studies</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulletin of British Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journal: Cross-culture</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour</td>
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<td>Annee Psychologique</td>
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<td>Journal of Psychology</td>
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<td>Advances in Experimental Social Psychology</td>
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<td>Anthropological Linguistics</td>
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</table>

| 3 Journals with 4                           | 12             |
| 10 Journals with 3                          | 30             |
| 26 Journals with 2                          | 52             |
| 50 Journals with 1                          | 50             |

Total number of citations 558
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<td>Tajfel 1982</td>
<td>5</td>
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Total citations: 110, 92, 195

It can be seen that Tajfel's work on social perception and prejudice had as much impact in the JPSP as it did in the EJSP. However, it should be borne in mind that this work was completed before 1971 which was the first year that the European Journal of Social Psychology was published. It is somewhat surprising, then, that the BJSP has relatively low citation counts for these papers. The American publications of the experimental research on intergroup differentiation (Tajfel, 1970a) has had an equal impact in the JPSP as in the EJSP. However, the European publication of these experiments has had twice as much impact in the EJSP, when compared with the JPSP. This trend is accentuated in the diffusion and assimilation of Tajfel's later work on the theory of intergroup relations. These later publications are cited more frequently in the European and British journals of social psychology than in the American JPSP. Furthermore, it is clear from the citation counts that the European Journal of
Social Psychology is the main medium for the diffusion and assimilation of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations.

The analysis of the SSCI shows that Tajfel's publications are frequently cited. His earlier work on social perception, stereotypes and prejudice continues to be referred to but it is his later work on intergroup relations which has had the largest impact, especially in Europe. However, in order to analyse the assimilation of Tajfel's ideas into the psychology of groups, it is necessary to examine the form and content of the work of other social psychologists. It will be seen that the study of intergroup relations has become an accepted field of study in social psychology. Furthermore, the approach which is advocated in the theory of intergroup relations has been applied to a number of other fields in social psychology. However, certain aspects of the theoretical framework have received greater attention than others. Whereas the intrapersonal and interpersonal processes postulated by Tajfel are frequently described and are developed within different theoretical contexts the positional and ideological levels still remain to be elaborated. This can be seen, both in the study of intergroup relations and in more recent developments of the social identity approach.

7.4.2 The assimilation of a social-psychological approach

During the 60's and 70's intergroup relations received scant attention in general texts on social psychology and, apart from Sherif's publications, specialist books on group psychology focused on small group research at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of explanation. In the late 70's and early 80's, Tajfel and his associates published a number of volumes which began to redress the balance. These include Billig's book on Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations (1976) and three edited volumes entitled Differentiation Between Social Groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations (Tajfel, 1978), Intergroup Behaviour (Turner and Giles, 1981) and Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Tajfel, 1982). Other books which appeared during this period include Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations (Giles, 1977), The Social Psychology
of Intergroup Relations (Austin and Worshel, 1979) and Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behaviour (Hamilton, 1981). These books presented theoretical approaches to and research on intergroup relations, much of which was associated with Tajfel's approach outlined above, and discussed in more detail in the following chapter. This work has diffused into the wider social psychology community, and is represented in the Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindzey and Aronson, 1985), books on group psychology and various introductory texts in social psychology.

In previous editions of the Handbook (Lindzey, 1954; Lindzey and Aronson, 1968/1969) the topic of intergroup relations had been dealt with in terms of the applied social psychology of prejudice and ethnic relations (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner and Chein, 1954, 1969). The authors claim that these chapters reflect the majority preoccupations of social-psychological research in this area. They focus on the development and determination of intergroup attitudes and prejudice, covering psychoanalysis, sociological, developmental and personality approaches. In effect, they present individualistic and sociological accounts of prejudice without considering the social psychology of interrelations between two or more groups or the role of social identification in intergroup relations.

This can be contrasted with Stephan's chapter on Intergroup Relations in the current edition of the Handbook (Lindzey and Aronson, 1985), which explicitly presents a social-psychological analysis.

Intergroup relations from the social psychological perspective consists of the systematic study of relations between individuals as they are affected by group membership.

(Stephan, 1985, p. 599)

Tajfel's work on categorization and intergroup relations is presented in a number of sections in the chapter. However, this is coloured by Stephan's emphasis on the cognitive approach to intergroup relations and laboratory and field experiments, focusing on the individual's cognition and information processing in intergroup situations. Categorization is first presented as an intrapersonal process.
whereby differences between groups and similarities within groups are accentuated with regard to characteristic traits associated with group stereotypes. The role of categorization in the production of 'ingroup-outgroup bias' is discussed with reference to Tajfel's experimental studies on minimal groups (Tajfel, 1970a) and it is suggested here that there are two classes of explanation. One is purely cognitive, focusing on categorization (Doise, 1976; Dion, 1979). The other incorporates motivational factors in terms of social identity (Tajfel, 1972a,b). Stephans presents a brief but clear description of the social psychological processes involved - social identity, social comparison and categorization - at the interpersonal level but fails to consider the positional and ideological aspects of the theory and related research. These would have been particularly relevant in the section on 'changing intergroup cognitions and behaviour' especially with reference to Tajfel's ideas on social creativity, groups of unequal status and minority groups. Furthermore, the concluding comments lament the lack of work on the role of social beliefs and the low ecological validity of research. It appears that Stephans failed to assimilate the important contributions that European research has made in illuminating the social and cultural content of intergroup relations. This omission not only reflects the traditions of the field but it is also detrimental to the diffusion of knowledge on the positional and ideological aspects of intergroup relations.

Unfortunately, this is not atypical. Hedy Brown's (1985) presentation of the theory focuses on the minimal group experiments and the explanation of results in terms of social identity and social comparison. She goes on to describe the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour, and personal and social identities but does not discuss their relationship with ideologies of social mobility and social change or the relative positions of groups in society. Mullen and Goethals (1987) do not include a chapter on social identity theory and intergroup relations in their edited volume on 'Theories of Group Behaviour'. However, Goethals and Darley's chapter on social comparison theory extend their discussion by considering social comparisons
across groups in terms of social identity. Again, they focus on the interpersonal level of explanation without elaborating when intergroup rather than interpersonal social comparison will be made, nor the various forms they might take. Similarly, Rijsman (1983) examines the links between Festinger's approach to personal social comparison (Festinger, 1954) and Tajfel's approach to categorical social comparison (Tajfel, 1978a), emphasizing the social psychological processes involved (Level 2). He even argues that Tajfel's analysis is inadequate as it does not consider the relative status of groups or the occasions when intergroup rather than interpersonal comparisons will be made. This is blatantly not the case; these problems are addressed at the positional and ideological levels in Tajfel's theory, but are not referred to by Rijsman.

Others have focused on the process of categorization, with reference both to intergroup behaviour and to social cognition. Doise et al. (1978) and Deschamps and Doise (1978) explain intergroup behaviour in terms of category differentiation without reference to social identity. Papastamous (1983) emphasizes the role of category differentiation in strategies of minority and majority influence without reference to Tajfel's elucidation of social change. Wilder (1986) focuses on how the members of groups categorize situations in intergroup encounters and how it affects their behaviour towards each other. Similarly, McGuire's chapter on attitude and attitude change and Markus and Zajonc's presentation of the cognitive perspective in social psychology (both in Lindzey and Aronson, 1985) describe categorization as an individual process without reference to its social concomitants.

The positional and ideological levels of explanation clearly have not become an integral part of social psychology taken as a whole. The conventional focus on the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of explanation has been maintained by selectively assimilating only those aspects of Tajfel's work which are articulated at these levels. But do not despair. The positional and ideological levels of explanation have been assimilated in some quarters of social psychology.
This applies both to American and European texts on social psychology and to specialist texts in group psychology.

7.4.3 The assimilation of the social dimensions of intergroup relations

It would be extremely surprising if Tajfel and Fraser's *Introducing Social Psychology* (1978) did not present a social perspective on group psychology. It would be less surprising if other introductory texts ignored the social dimensions. But happily this is not always the case. Roger Brown (1986) dedicates a whole chapter to Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations identifying it as a distinctively European product. He suggests that it is the only theory that can provide a satisfactory account of ethnocentricism and hostility. Furthermore, he gives a comprehensive and accurate presentation of the theory, embracing all four levels of analysis and their integration. While such a detailed account is rare, other social psychologists have also attempted to familiarize their students with the individual and the social aspects of the theory. Deaux and Wrightsman (1984) integrate the work of others on intergroup relations with that of Tajfel to include an analysis of people's perception of ingroups and outgroups, status differentials and social beliefs. Howitt et al.'s chapter on groups and intergroup relations (1989) emphasizes the socio-cultural factors in intergroup relations in terms of Tajfel's theory. It is somewhat surprising that, in the concluding chapter of this book, Tajfel's theory is categorized as having social referents, adopting a group perspective but elaborating on non-social concepts. The social psychological processes necessarily depend upon the individual, but they can only be properly understood with reference to the social context and, as such, they are social concepts.

Roger Brown (1986) and Deaux and Wrightsman (1984) are both popular American introductions to contemporary social psychology. Howitt et al. (1989) is a recent British publication which is more likely to be read by students on this side of the Atlantic than in the U.S.A.. Hewstone et al's *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1988) presents a more advanced text with a distinctively European flavour. The aim
of the editors was to provide a text for students and researchers in both Europe and America. The fact that Tajfel is cited in the author index more frequently than any other social psychologist is evidence of his impact within the European tradition. In particular, Rupert Brown's chapter on 'Intergroup Relations' offers a formidable review of the theoretical concepts, related research and its subsequent developments. Hopefully, this will serve to fill the gaps created by Stephan's restrictive social-psychological account of intergroup relations (see above). That intergroup relations is now an established field of study in European social psychology is also indicated by the contents of The Social Dimension: European developments in social psychology (Tajfel, 1984). Part VI is dedicated to intergroup relations, consisting of eight chapters dealing with such diverse topics as categorical differentiation, group perceptions, sex role stereotypes, similarity and attraction, political economy, bargaining and negotiation, second language acquisition and social justice.

A number of specialist texts on group psychology have also incorporated and developed Tajfel's work. These tend to be written or edited by Tajfel's immediate associates and their colleagues although there are some exceptions (eg. Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Pettigrew, 1989; Wilder, 1986; Ng, 1982). While some of this work has remained within the original framework, much of it has used Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations as a basis from which to develop new ways of addressing related fields in social psychology. Although there is a consensual goal to understand how intragroup and intergroup dynamics mutually influence each other there is a divergence in perspective as to how this can best be achieved.

One perspective is epitomized by the work of Rupert Brown. In his view, Tajfel's theory is useful for the study of intergroup relations but it does not provide a general theory of groups. The alternative approach is epitomized by Turner and his colleagues who have transformed Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations into the 'self-categorization' theory which deals explicitly with intragroup processes.
These developments which have emerged directly out of Tajfel's work will be examined below.

The first perspective is reflected in Brown's book entitled *Group Processes: Dynamics within and between groups* (1988). The contents of the book as a whole reflect Tajfel's general approach, emphasizing the dialectics between theory, research and practice on the one hand and individuals and their social context on the other. Similarly, much attention is given to the importance of social identity and social comparison processes. However, Brown adopts an eclectic approach drawing on diverse theoretical traditions to deal with various aspects of group processes. In particular, Tajfel's theory says little about processes going on in the group; for example, on leadership, on status relations within groups, and on social influence. Furthermore, Brown believes that students reading the book should be exposed to perspectives other than those of Tajfel. Thus, it is only in the final chapter that Brown explicitly focuses on Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations in all its dimensions. Much of this research was conducted by Brown and his associates (e.g. Brown and Wade, 1987; Brown and Abrams, 1986; Brown and Williams, 1984; Deschamps and Brown, 1983; Brown and Deschamps, 1980).

This research initially aimed to develop Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations by deriving hypotheses and conducting experimental and field research to test particular tenets and to refine the theory. For example, Turner and Brown (1978) experimentally manipulated beliefs about relative superiority and stability of reasoning skills for Arts and Science students. They found that low status groups only seek positive distinctiveness when their position was both unstable and illegitimate whereas high status groups seek positive distinctiveness when their position is unstable but legitimate. They then went on to examine the applicability of the theory in different social contexts, maintaining their focus on intergroup relations. For example, Oaker and Brown (1986) examined the intergroup relations between nurses in specialized or general fields of nursing and Brown and Williams (1984) examined the strength of social
identification in subgroups of workers in a bakery factory. Applying the theory in research on real social groups has encouraged the maintenance and articulation of the positional and ideological levels of explanation, extending our understanding of intergroup conflict and cooperation (see also Hewstone and Brown, 1986; Street, Kruglanski, Bar-Tal and Hewstone, 1986).

Unlike the early experimental studies in this tradition the more recent research has examined empirically the effects of status differentials and social beliefs in intergroup relations. Other social psychologists, in various locations, have similarly applied and developed the theory in the context of intergroup relations. For example, Van Knippenberg (1984) has also examined the effects of legitimacy and stability in intergroup relations involving unequal status. Where Dutch university and polytechnic students agreed that the former had higher 'scientific' status the groups developed evaluative dimensions which justified the inequality while simultaneously maintaining the subordinate group's positive social identities on the basis of different characteristics.

Ng has explored the effects of power and status differences between groups on social identity and intergroup discrimination (Ng, 1982, 1984). Whereas secure status reduces the need to discriminate against the outgroup, secure power enables the superior group to employ greater discriminations. This research has extended the theory to include the effects of equity as well as status, stability and legitimacy. Others have integrated aspects of Tajfel's work on intergroup relations with their own particular concerns. For example, Mugny (1982) has integrated ideas about social identification into his work on minority influence. Similarly, Pettigrew and Brewer have developed the links between social identification and relative deprivation. Also, Hewstone (1983, 1984) has incorporated these ideas into his extension of Attribution Theory. Finally, Schonbach (1981) employs the social identity approach in his study of education and intergroup relations.

In some respects this body of work, taken as a whole, is restrictive and in other respects it is expansive. It is
restrictive in that it largely confines the application of the theory to its original domain of intergroup relations. It is expansive in that it illuminates the integration of interpersonal processes with positional and ideological dimensions postulated in the theory. I will go on to argue that other developments of the theory show the reverse trends (see especially Turner, 1987; Hogg and Abrams, 1988). These developments are expansive in that they reconstruct the theory in order to apply it to other domains of social psychology and, in particular, to intragroup relations. However, they are restrictive in that they emphasize cognitive processes at the interpersonal level at the expense of positional and ideological considerations.

7.4.4 Other fields of application

The developments of Tajfel's theory which we have looked at so far have focused on the analysis of intergroup relations and social change, highlighting the means by which individuals achieve a positive social identity as members of their groups in relation to other groups. However, one of the hallmarks of the theory's contemporary standing is the vigour with which it has been extended into different areas of social psychology. These include psychological group formation, group cohesion, social attraction, social influence and conformity, social cooperation, group polarization, crowd behaviour, attribution theory and the social psychology of language.

Much of the excitement of the theory lies in the fact that it has proved so readily applicable to such a wide variety of problems and fields. Social identity processes are beginning to emerge as major and persuasive aspects of human social psychology, with a relevance that extends way beyond the conventional and artificial limits of intergroup behaviour or group interaction.

(Turner, p.xi-xii, in Hogg and Abrams, 1988)

These diverse developments have been brought together in an integrated and comprehensive exposition by Hogg and Abrams (1988). At the heart of this work lies the conviction that the concept of social identity can furnish social psychology with a better understanding of intra- and inter-
group processes. In each chapter Hogg and Abrams contrast traditional individualistic approaches to social phenomena, which emphasize the 'individual in the group', with the social identity approach which focuses on the 'group in the individual'.

The central tenet of this approach is that belonging to a group is largely a psychological state which is quite distinct from that of being a unique and separate individual, and that it confers social identity, or a shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave.

(Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p.3)

In Chapter 2, they present a comprehensive exposition of Tajfel's theory and the context in which it emerged. The exposition articulates all four levels of explanation in terms of categorization, social comparison, social identity and social structure in the integrative framework first developed by Tajfel. However, these are differentially emphasized in the theory's application to specific research areas in social psychology. While the chapters on intergroup behaviour and language, speech and communication reflect the theory in all its aspects the chapters on intragroup behaviour, stereotypes and ideology, social presence and social performance, collective behaviour, conformity and social influence do not achieve the same degree of integration. This is not surprising in as much as the authors, quite naturally, draw on the work of other social psychologists who have adapted the theory to suit their own interests. It will be seen below that many of these developments emphasize those aspects of the theory which are articulated at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. To rectify this bias the authors incorporate theoretical research work which focuses on the position and ideological levels of analysis. For example, social representations (Moscovici, 1984b) and ideology (Billig, 1982, 1984) are included in their discussion of stereotypes, and research on minority influence (Moscovici, 1976; Mugny, 1982) is included in their discussion of conformity and social influence. But this body of work has been relatively independent from the social identity approach in its evolution and Hogg and Abrams
do not achieve the unification of the intrapersonal, interpersonal, positional and ideological levels which characterizes the original theory.

There are two major developments of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations which have not yet been discussed in any detail. These are self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987) and the social psychology of language (Giles, 1984; Giles and Street, 1985). While both of these have emerged directly from the original theory they are now all established as independent areas of study. Furthermore, they are substantially different theories in terms of both the social-psychological perspective adopted and the problems which they address. Tajfel's primary concern was the study of intergroup relations and real social conflicts and his work was orientated towards the social-psychological aspects of large-scale social phenomena in relation to sociological, political and economic considerations. In contrast, self-categorization theory focuses on why and when individuals behave as group members and the cognitive processes involved in psychological group formation. Furthermore, this work has tended to look inwards to social psychology, addressing traditional research problems from a new perspective.

By applying the principle of the original theory to intragroup processes the proponents of self-categorization theory claim to have rediscovered the social group, elaborating a social-psychological theory of group behaviour. The theory attempts to integrate group psychology and social cognition, transcending the distinction between the group, as a particular realm of social behaviour, and the individual, as the basic unit of social interaction. By placing social identification at the heart of intragroup processes, self-categorization theory demonstrates how group processes are fundamental to self-perception, social cognition and social interaction. Social behaviour is conceived of as an emergent property of interdependent individuals and the group is seen as having both a socially and psychologically causal role. This perspective has provided a framework within which
to challenge conventional, individualistic approaches to intragroup behaviour.

The central difference between traditional and self-categorization approaches to group phenomena lies in the distinction between interpersonal and intragroup explanations. The former explains group processes in terms of the relation and products of interpersonal influence such that the group does not constitute a distinctive theoretical entity. In contrast, the latter argues that actions as group members are psychologically different from actions in terms of personal self. That is, the group constitutes a distinctive social-psychological process. Identification with the ingroup is achieved through self-categorization and is fundamental to the processes of social influence, social cohesion, social cooperation and group polarization.

Turner (Turner et al., 1987) argues that social influence is a psychologically distinctive intragroup process as opposed to an interpersonal process. Social norms and values are conceived of as emergent properties of psychological group formation. This is presented in terms of 'referent informational influence' as opposed to a trade-off balance between informational and normative influences (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; see also Hogg and Abrams, 1988). People first categorize and define themselves as members of a distinct social category. They then learn the stereotypic norm of that category and assign these norms to themselves. As their category membership becomes salient they conform to these group norms. Thus, an individual's group membership or self-categorization mediates the influence of other members of the group.

Hogg applies the same principles to psychological group formation. Hogg argues that group cohesiveness has traditionally been defined in terms of interpersonal attraction but that this fails to account for the distinctive social-psychological nature of group processes. Group formation primarily depends upon a process of self-categorization or social identification, such that group 'belongingness' is a cause rather than a product of group cohesion.
Oakes explores the problem of category salience and argues that perceiving individuals as group members is not due to an irrational bias of stereotyping, but, rather, is a function of the reality of groups and the identification of individuals with them. Similarly, Wetherell demonstrates that group polarization is a function of ingroup identification and of the relationship between the ingroup's initial distribution of opinions and the salience of ingroup-outgroup categorizations.

However, despite the apparent rediscovery of the social group, I would argue that self-categorization theory is still essentially individualistic. It not only fails to articulate positional and ideological factors which had become an integral part of Tajfel's social-psychological perspective but, in so doing, it also reduces the group to the cognitions of individuals. While its proponents do not necessarily lose sight of the social context in their research the theory itself is largely articulated at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of explanation (This, despite the fact that Turner laments the current reemergence of the traditional dichotomy between psychological reductionism and sociological reductionism (Turner, Interview)).

As Turner himself states,

self-categorization theory makes use of and develops two concepts taken from an earlier theory of intergroup behaviour developed by Tajfel and myself: the concept of social identity itself and the assumption of an interpersonal-intergroup 'continuum' of behaviour.  

(Turner, 1987, p.viii)

As can be seen from their earlier summary of Tajfel's theory in terms of Doise's four levels of explanation in social psychology, these two theoretical constructs emphasize the interpersonal level.

The central principle of self-categorization theory is the self-concept. This is conceived of as the cognitive representation of the self in terms of self-categorization at three levels of abstraction: human identity based on inter-species comparisons; social identity based on intergroup comparisons and personal identity based on
interpersonal or intragroup comparisons. In order to encompass all these aspects of identity self-categorization is defined as

cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as the same in contrast to some other class of stimuli

(Turner, 1987, p. 44).

While 'social identity' originally referred to an individual's self-image as a member of a group in relation both to other groups and to members of other groups' image of the individual's group, self-categorization refers to how individuals categorize themselves. This is a subtle but important distinction. Turner's emphasis on the individual's cognitive processes telescopes consensual beliefs about the structure of society (Level 4) and the relations between groups (Level 3) into the individual's cognitive system of social categories (Level 1) and processing information from relevant others (Level 2).

This places severe constraints on the 'social-psychological perspective' advanced by self-categorization theorists. For example, Reicher (Turner et al., 1987) shows how self-categorization theory can provide an explanation of crowd behaviour; behaviour which is a spontaneously collective, meaningful and complex reaction to unprecedented circumstances without overt directions. However, he also points out that the original 'social identity' theorists were committed to producing a social psychology of social change. With it's focus on intrapersonal and intragroup (interpersonal) processes, self-categorization theory does not provide a framework in which to conceptualize or understand social change. Although it stresses the interaction or interdependence between individual and group determinants of behaviour, it fails to consider the ideological representation of or consensual beliefs about the structure of society and about political and economic realities. As such, it fails to give an account of the historical evolution of (inter or intra) group relations or the social creativity of groups. Thus, self-categorization
theory fails to maintain the social- psychological perspective advocated by Tajfel.

In effect, self-categorization theory reinstates the division between intrapersonal and interpersonal explanations of social behaviour on the one hand and positional and ideological explanations on the other. This division is also reflected in the work of Billig, be it in the opposite direction. Ideology has received scant attention in social psychology, largely remaining within the confines of sociology and political science. Billig (Billig, 1984; 1988) has explored the social psychological aspects of ideology, which is seen as a product of social conflict and thus deeply rooted in intergroup relations. Like self-categorization theory this work originated in the study of intergroup relations, in association with Tajfel. Unlike Turner and his colleagues, Billig maintains Tajfel's multi-disciplinary orientation, drawing on the work of sociologists such as Mannheim and Marx. Not surprisingly, his analysis concentrates on the positional and ideological levels of explanation. Unfortunately, the study of ideology has become increasingly divorced from 'social identity' theory and, in some ways, is antagonistic to the more recent developments of self-categorization.

The final area of research which I shall examine is the social psychology of language. Like ideology, the study of language has largely been excluded from the province of social psychology. This is due, in part, to the individualistic or interpersonal orientation of the discipline. Speech and language are emergent properties of interactions which depend upon collective phenomena and cannot be understood in terms of independent individuals. The recent development of a social psychology of language is closely associated with the emergence of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. It explicitly deals with the mediation of motivations, beliefs and identity between social structure and individual language behaviour. Emphasis is placed on the social members rather than on the content of speech and language. In particular, language variation and speech styles convey information about the speakers' and listeners' social
status and social group membership in the specific context of communication. Furthermore, the existence and functions of social markers depends upon a framework of shared meanings and consensual beliefs.

Two related theories in the social psychology of language need to be discussed. These are 'ethnolinguistic identity theory' (Ball, Giles and Hewstone, 1984) and 'speech accommodation theory' (Giles, 1984). Ethnolinguistic identity theory employs the social identity perspective to integrate socio-structural factors of ethnic groups with actual language use. The relation between ethnolinguistic groups can be characterized in terms of status, demography and institutional support. The way in which members of ethnolinguistic groups strive for a positive social identity will depend upon their social beliefs about the nature of intergroup relations. Giles and his colleagues differentiate between beliefs in social mobility and social change, in order to account for the diversity of interethnic relations and the variety of language stratagems employed by different groups. For example, consensual beliefs in social mobility encourage 'linguistic assimilation' or 'language suicide'. The ingroup language gradually becomes redundant and perishes. Conversely, consensual beliefs in social change might encourage the resurrection of an ethnic language.

Speech accommodation theory focuses on communications between individuals from different groups rather than the role of language in the dynamics of large-scale intergroup relations. It might be expected that the positional and ideological factors would not feature so prominently in this analysis. However, speech accommodation fulfils an identity function and, in the context of an intergroup orientation, it will be influenced by the perceived social relations between the groups. Social mobility beliefs encourage convergent accommodation whereas social change encourages divergent accommodation between the speakers and listeners. Similar analyses have been made of second-language acquisitions and sex differences in speech. It is clear that these developments have maintained and developed an integrative
framework that incorporates all four levels of explanation in social psychology.

7.4.5 The group is alive and well

Social psychologists who were asked to identify and describe influential contributions to the psychology of groups suggested that Henri Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations laid the foundation for a reorientation in group psychology, advocating a more social, group-orientated approach, which inspired further research in the area. Our examination of historical and contemporary developments in the psychology of groups supports these claims. Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations provides a social-psychological perspective which goes beyond an intrapersonal and interpersonal analysis of group membership and social categorization, social identity and social comparison to incorporate positional and ideological aspects in terms of superior and inferior groups and consensual beliefs. His major theoretical achievement was to integrate explicitly the social-psychological processes of individuals with the social realities of society. The analysis of the Social Science Citation Index indicated the impact that this work has had, especially within the field of European social psychology. The study of group relations is now a burgeoning field of study in social psychology which, more often than not, is associated explicitly with the work of Tajfel. Furthermore, extensions of the theory have addressed various intragroup processes and the social psychology of language.

The qualitative analysis of this extensive body of research and theorizing reveals two distinctive forms of reorientation in the psychology of groups. This applies both to re-presentations of the theory and to its subsequent developments. Firstly, there has been an increased recognition of the group as a theoretically distinctive entity. The group provides individuals with a social identity which influences social behaviour in both intergroup and intragroup relations. This constitutes a major advance on the more traditional, individualistic, approaches to social phenomena. Secondly, the social dimensions of social psychology, relating to the positional and ideological levels
of explanation, have received greater attention in the study of intergroup relations and language.

In the history of group psychology, both Lewin and Sherif attempted to construct a framework which integrated psychological processes with social studies, such that individuals and society were conceived of as parts of an interdependent social system. However, the individualistic perspective in social psychology continued to dominate the study of groups. Tajfel's theory provides us with another opportunity to develop and sustain a social-psychological perspective which takes the social dimensions into account. The following chapters examine the development of Tajfel's work, illuminating how and why the social dimensions became an integral part of the social psychology of groups. This not only provides an opportunity to study, in detail, the transformation of social representations in social psychology, but also that the social dimensions constitute an essential component of social psychology.
CHAPTER 8
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAJFEL'S THINKING

8.1 PHASE I: PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENT 1957-1959

8.1.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.1.2 Description of the field: social perception
8.1.3 Theory: accentuation of differences
8.1.4 Domain of application

8.2 PHASE II: STEREOTYPES AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION
1959-1964

8.2.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.2.2 Description of the field: perception of people
8.2.3 Theory: polarization of judgments
8.2.4 Domain of application

8.3 PHASE III: PREJUDICE 1965-1969

8.3.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.3.2 Description of the field: Intergroup relations
8.3.3 Theory: categorization, assimilation and coherence
  8.3.3.1 The cognitive process of categorization in relation to the physical and social environment
  8.3.3.2 Assimilation of evaluations and social information
  8.3.3.3 Search for coherence

8.4 PHASE IV: NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT 1966-1972

8.4.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.4.2 Field
8.4.3 Theory: attitudes
8.4.4 Domain of application: experimental studies

8.5 PHASE V: INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 1970-1973

8.5.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.5.2 Description of the field: intergroup behaviour
8.5.3 Theory: social categorization and social norms
8.5.4 Domain of application: experimental studies
  8.5.4.1 Social categorization
  8.5.4.2 Generic group norm
  8.5.4.3 Fairness norm

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8.6 PHASE VI: INTERGROUP RELATIONS, SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1972-1979

8.6.1 Criteria for social psychology
8.6.2 Description of the field: intergroup relations
8.6.3 Theory

8.6.3.1 The definition of intergroup behaviour
8.6.3.2 The specification of four continua
8.6.3.3 The principles of explanation

8.6.4 Domain of application

8.6.4.1 Relative deprivation
8.6.4.2 The various forms of intergroup differentiation

8.7 PHASE IIB: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1961-1964

8.8 PHASE VII: REFLECTIONS AND REINTERPRETATIONS

In this chapter I shall present the content and structure of Tajfel's work during the various phases of its development. This provides a basis from which to examine the transformation of social representations involved in the emergence of a new perspective in social psychology.

Tajfel divides his intellectual career into three distinct periods (Cohen, 1977). In the first of these his concern was with problems of perception and judgment and, in particular, the effect of value and categorization on perceptual judgments of physical objects. During the second period, Tajfel focused on social perception and social judgment, applying the emergent theoretical principles to the problems associated with stereotypes and prejudice. The third and final period, by far the longest, and one which was sustained until the end of his career, centred on intergroup relations and the consideration of social psychology in general.

The division of Tajfel's intellectual career into these three periods is warranted, in some respects, by an examination of his published works. However, to provide a detailed explication of the development and transformation of his work, these divisions are far too broad. For the present purposes, I shall refer to six identifiable phases which are outlined below.
Phase I. Perceptual judgment: (1957-1959)
This phase is in line with Tajfel's first period concerning problems of perception and judgment of physical objects.

Phase II. Stereotypes and social perception: (1959-1964)
This demarcates the phase in which Tajfel applies the principles of accentuation of differences emerging from Phase I to social phenomena and in particular to social stereotypes.

Phase III. Prejudice: (1965-1969)
The work on social stereotypes is expanded with reference to prejudice. This can be considered a transition phase between social perception and intergroup relations.

Phase IV. National attitudes and their development: (1966-1972)
This body of research focuses on the formation of national attitudes in children and gives rise to many of the questions or problems addressed in Tajfel's subsequent work.

Phase V. Intergroup behaviour and social categorization: (1970-1973)
In the early stages of the development of a theory of intergroup relations, Tajfel examines the role of social categorization in producing differential intergroup behaviour.

Phase VI. Intergroup relations, social identity and social change: (1974-1979)
Tajfel explicates the significance of social identity in intergroup relations. This is developed and extended to encompass social beliefs concerning both the structure of society and the legitimacy and stability of intergroup relations in society.

These six phases are not intended to demarcate distinct periods in the historical development of Tajfel's work. Firstly, there is considerable chronological overlap between adjacent phases, both in terms of publication dates and the actual sequence in which the work was carried out. Secondly, and more importantly, there is continuity in the progressive development of concepts, principles and research which extends across phases. In this respect, it may be considered a mistake to impose any form of boundaries or markers on this
development. However, there are clear shifts in the focus of research and theorizing; the phenomena which are studied, the problems addressed, the concepts and principles employed to provide a theoretical understanding and the general approach adopted within social psychology. A delicate balance between the continuities and discontinuities in Tajfel's intellectual career is required. The identification of a number of phases not only facilitates the current research but also provides a convenient and necessary framework in which to present and explicate the development of Tajfel's work.

These six phases can be associated, loosely, with the dimension of time. The framework of analysis also employs a second dimension; that of tiers. The content of each phase will be structured in terms of four tiers. These can be conceived of as either tiers of inclusion or as tiers of abstraction. As tiers of inclusion they can be represented by a pyramid horizontally divided into four sections (Diagram 8.1). The metatheory subsumes a number of fields each of which contain a number of theories which, in turn, subsume a body of research.

Diagram 8.1: Tiers of Inclusion

Metatheory

Field

Theory

Research

Conversely, as tiers of abstraction they can be represented by an inverted pyramid. The design and interpretation of research assumes a body of theoretical knowledge which is made explicit at the higher level. The theory can be located in a field and each field within a meta-theory. The implicit frame of each tier is made explicit at a higher tier of abstraction, which is constituted by a broader or more far-reaching set of principles or concepts. The notion of
Tiers employed here is adopted from Humphrey et al.'s (1987) systems analysis. It provides an analytic tool by which to structure the material at each phase.

Tier 1 refers to the principles of social psychology: that is to the meta-theoretical assumptions which are either explicitly challenged or advocated in Tajfel's work. These concern the relationship between social psychology and other disciplines, the perspective or approach adopted within social psychology, and the conceptions of the individual in relation to society. Tier 2 consists of a description of the field, indicating the extent of its domain and the various theoretical approaches within it which have been advocated. Tier 3 focuses on theoretical statements which include a description of the phenomenon, principles of explanation and emergent hypotheses or predictions. Finally, Tier 4 refers to the domain of application; that is, the material to which the theory is applied. This material falls into three classes: Tajfel's own research, the research of others and social issues arising in society.

Four tiers of analysis
Tier 1: The principles of social psychology
Tier 2: Description of the field
Tier 3: Theory
Tier 4: Domain of application

The identification of a passage within a text with a particular tier is done with reference to the main theme of that passage. Where there are one or two sentences within a particular passage which may be construed in terms of a different tier, greater emphasis is placed on the context of use, rather than on the specific content of the sentences. This is justified by the assumption that the same issue can be expressed at different tiers. Although the issue may have implications for the content and structure of other tiers, in this initial phase of the analysis it is necessary to reflect the structure within the actual texts. A further point to consider is the relationship between the different tiers. In part, their ordering reflects the general structure of the chapters and articles themselves, although this is by no means true in all cases. More importantly, it reflects the
increasing breadth of concern in each tier from the domain of application, that deals with particular instances, to the principles of social psychology which are abstract.

8.1 PHASE I: PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENT 1957-1959

During Phase I, Tajfel's research focuses on the effects of value and categorization on perceptual judgments of physical objects. It is evident from the very earliest publications that this research is located within the field of social perception, being concerned with the impact of social factors on the perception and judgment of the physical environment. The following four publications are considered to fall within this phase of Tajfel's intellectual career:

1) Tajfel (1957): Value and the perceptual judgment of magnitude, *Psychological Review* 64, 192-204.


The contents and developmental relationships of these four articles will be discussed in later sections. For present purposes, the 1959(a) article will be presented as it provides the most complete and explicit depiction of Phase I. Furthermore, it also frames the transition from Phase I to Phase II.

8.1.1 Criteria for social psychology

The content of Tajfel's writings in Phase I have a number of implications concerning the principles of social psychology. In the first phase of Tajfel's work there is no explicit consideration of the principles of social psychology. That is, there is no mention of the proper content and function of social psychology or of the appropriate methodologies for research. Implications for this tier of concern can be drawn from the content of other tiers in this phase. These will be illuminated in the following chapters. For our current purposes, it is enough to note that
the principles of social psychology were not discussed by Tajfel in this phase.

8.1.2 Description of the field: social perception

The first section of the paper clearly situates Tajfel's research and theoretical framework within the field of social perception. At this level, Tajfel does not present a review of theories or research within this field. Rather, the main purpose of this section is to locate his own particular sphere of interest within a general description of the field. This is done in two successive stages.

Firstly, although Tajfel acknowledges that the main concern of the study of social perception is with the ways in which people perceive, judge, and interpret the social objects and events which together amount to what is called their 'social environment', he, himself, is more concerned with the effects of the social environment on the perception, judgment, and interpretation of the physical environment (p.16).

Secondly, within this, Tajfel delineates a body of research in which the shifts induced by social factors are not unidirectional and claims that these have not been satisfactorily explained within a wider theoretical context. Tajfel adopts and develops a theoretical framework which focuses on the 'general judgmental or perceptual processes' which can be considered 'independently of their social character' (p.17).

8.1.3 Theory: Accentuation of differences

The presentation of the theoretical framework involves the description of a particular phenomenon, the explication of theoretical principles and the use of two bodies of research as evidence of the phenomenon and justification for the principles. It should be noted that these three aspects of the theory are intricately interwoven. The description of the phenomenon depends upon the theoretical principles and the presentation of the evidence is essentially within the terms of the theoretical framework. Along with the explication of a series of predictions the major part of the paper falls within the tiers of theory (Tier 3) and the domain of application (Tier 4). Tajfel focuses on the
phenomenon of shifts in judgment and, in particular, shifts in judgments of the physical magnitude of stimuli which occur within a series— that is which are intraserial. Under certain conditions 'differences between the stimuli of a series will be perceived as larger than the objectively equivalent differences'. Tajfel draws on two distinct literatures of experimental research which demonstrate these phenomena and elaborates an explanation in terms of the accentuation of perceived differences.

In most of these experiments stimuli are presented individually such that perceptual and judgmental processes depend on the subject's construction of a series or system of categories against which the stimuli are judged. Shifts in judgment are therefore a function of the range and frequency of presentation of the various stimuli within a series, of their magnitudes, of points of anchor within a series and the perception of a stimulus belonging to that series. The crucial point is that judgment must be seen in terms of the relationships between stimuli rather than the relationship between the response and the individual stimuli.

Firstly, the accentuation of perceived differences accounts for the phenomenon of perceptual over-estimation, where value changes concurrently with the physical magnitude of the stimuli. For example, in a series of coins, larger coins are associated with a higher value and hence are 'seen' by subjects as larger than stimuli of the same size which are not associated with value. (cf. Tajfel 1957). Secondly, Secord, Bevan and Katz (1956) found that prejudiced subjects accentuated differences in skin colour between negroes and whites more than non-prejudiced subjects. Skin colour is a continuous physical dimension superimposed by a discontinuous classification, distinguishing whites from negroes. Furthermore, this classification has a greater emotional or value relevance for prejudiced subjects. Skin colour provides a cue to the valued classification - negro or white - and hence judgments exhibit shifts which accentuated the differences between the classes.

The over-estimation of the size of coins is not, in principle, different from the accentuation of differences in
skin colour between negroes and whites. For both, a physical attribute varies concurrently with value. This both permits and supports the integration of laboratory studies on the perceptual judgment of the physical characteristics of physical objects and of the physical characteristics of social objects. That is, perceptual over-estimation and perceptual stereotypes are integrated within the same theoretical framework, centring on the accentuation of differences. Tajfel provides a new perspective on the problem of the social perception of physical objects. Rather than focusing on the physical stimulus itself and its direct perception (S-R), he considers the physical dimension which describes a series of stimuli. The significance of value \( v \) related to this physical dimension is apparent from the experimental results on perceptual overestimation. Furthermore, the only difference between perceptual judgment of coins and of skin colour is that the former relates to individual stimuli whereas the latter relates to groups of stimuli. The influence of classification thus emerges from the experimental research on perceptual stereotypes.

Tajfel avoids pointedly the distinction between perception and cognition by juxtaposing consistently the two terms 'perception' and 'judgment'. Similarly, the distinction between physical perception and social perception is obviated by claiming that the general processes of perception and judgment are as applicable to social as they are to physical stimuli.

The series of predictions which emerge are presented in a highly formalized fashion, being both explicit and comprehensive. These predictions deal with all possible combinations of the three factors to emerge from the theoretical discussion:

i) physical dimension \( p \)
ii) value differential \( v \)
iii) classification \( c \)

Tajfel's Table, copied from Tajfel's article, lists and describes the various possible series.
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series</th>
<th>Characteristics of the series</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. $p$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. $pv$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with a change in value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. $pC_1$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension consistently related to a classification in terms of another attribute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. $pC_2$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension; a classification in terms of another attribute superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to the change in the physical dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. $(pv)c_1$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value; a classification in terms of another attribute consistently related to the change in the physical dimension is superimposed on the series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. $(pv)c_2$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value; a classification in terms of another attribute superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to the changes in physical dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. $p(c,v)$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension is consistently related to a classification in terms of another attribute; this classification is of inherent value or of emotional relevance to the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. $p(c,v)$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension; a classification in terms of another attribute superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to the change in the physical dimension; this classification is of inherent value or of emotional relevance to the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. $(pv)(c,v)$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value; a classification in terms of another attribute superimposed on the series is related to change in the physical dimension; this classification is of inherent value or of emotional relevance to the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. $(pv)(C,v)$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value; a classification in terms of another attribute superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to change in the physical dimension; this classification is of inherent value or of emotional relevance to the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. $(pv_1)(C_2)$</td>
<td>Ordered change in a physical dimension correlated with value in one class of stimuli, not correlated with value in another class; a classification in terms of another attribute superimposed on the series bears no consistent relationship to change in the physical dimension; this classification is of inherent value or of emotional relevance to the subject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Copied from Tajfel, 1959a, p. 22)
As an example 3.(pci) is more fully defined below.

When a classification in terms of an attribute other than the physical dimension which is being judged is superimposed on a series of stimuli in such a way that one part of the physical series tends to fall consistently into one class, and the other into the other class, judgments of physical magnitudes of the stimuli falling into the distinct classes will show a shift in the directions determined by the class membership of the stimuli, when compared with judgments of a series identical with respect to this physical dimension, on which such a classification is not superimposed

(p.20)

8.1.4 Domain of application

By identifying these three separate factors, Tajfel is able to develop a predictive framework which permits the explanation of a variety of previous research findings.

(2) The pv series: This series provides the explanation for positive results in Tajfel's own area of expertise, that of perceptual overestimation. Furthermore, conversion of the data from various studies (Bruner and Goodman, 1947; Carter and Schooler, 1949; Bruner and Rodrigues, 1953) show that relative increases in the perceived differences of size correspond to their differences in value.

(3) The pcl series: The findings of Secord et al. (1956) for non-prejudiced subjects are explained by the pcl series. Tajfel's main concern is to make clear that the physical dimension provides cues for assigning the stimuli to one class or the other, although it is not the primary basis for classification. Once the stimulus is identified with a class, this identification, in turn, serves as a cue to the judgment of physical magnitude. Thus a man, once classified as 'negro' or 'white', will be seen as more black or more white respectively.

Classification of people into ethnic, or sometimes other, groups often imply consistent differences between the groups in terms of some physical features.

(p.23)

(5.7 and 9) The (pv)cl.p(clv) and (pv)(clv) series: In these series there is an interaction between all three factors - physical dimensions, value and classification. Series 5 and 7 converge empirically towards a series in which value
differentials are associated with both the classification and the physical dimension series. This provides the framework of explanation for the prejudiced subjects in Secord et al.'s experiments (1956). The accentuation of differences between skin colour (physical dimension) of individuals identified as negro or white (classification) is greater for prejudiced subjects (value) than for non-prejudiced subjects. This facilitates the emotionally relevant discrimination between negroes and whites.

A second example cites the study of Pettigrew, Allport and Barnett (1959), conducted in South Africa. If it is assumed that Afrikaners are more prejudiced than the other groups Tajfel's scheme may be usefully applied to the results. For Afrikaners the classification ('white' and 'non-white') has greater value relevance and hence results in a greater accentuation of differences between the racial groups.

(8) The p(c2v) series: This should not differ from a p series. Tajfel's scheme explains some of the 'negative' results found in the perceptual over-estimation literature. For example, Klein, Schlesinger, and Meister (1951) compared judgments of size of disks bearing a swastika sign and judgments of disks bearing a 'neutral' sign. No overestimation of the swastika disk was found. Klein et al. concluded that this invalidated other results in this field. However, in that one would not expect the emotional relevance of a swastika to vary concurrently with its size these 'negative' results are to be expected. It should be noted that these explanations often involve the re-analysis and re-interpretation of the research of others within Tajfel's own theoretical framework.

The prediction series are also suggestive of further experimental research. The most obvious of these is a comparison between the c1 and the c2 series where the classification is or is not relevant to the physical dimensions respectively. For example, in the pc2 series, classification is not expected to have any effects on judgments of physical magnitudes. The classification of books into subject domain, (physics, biology, psychology) would not be expected to affect judgments of their size. Judgments on
a pc2 series should thus correspond to judgments on a simple p series. Similarly, the (pv)c2 series should not differ from a pv series as the classification has no relationship with the physical dimension.

Consideration of the various series also leads Tajfel to propose a number of theoretical and hypothetical extensions, which are open to experimental investigation. Firstly, shifts in judgments of stimuli at the end of a series should be less than shifts in the 'zone of uncertainty' when classification provides useful information in the judgment of ambiguous cases. This is conceptualized in terms of 'redundancy of information'.

A further hypothesis relates to past experience. pcl series and pc2 series can be seen as two extremes of a continuum running from perfect correlation between physical magnitude and classification to a complete lack of any such correlation. This correlation will be a function of the degree of consistency between (p) - physical magnitude and (c) - classification experienced in the past. Tajfel relates this to the general problem of stereotyping.

The fact that stereotypes are essentially consequences of sharpened or accentuated classifications has not been sufficiently exploited in the laboratory. Judgments of almost any aspects of objects which are stereotyped are not made in a vacuum, they are always comparative. (p.24)

What is important is not the stereotype per se, but the impact of the classification. Tajfel's formulation suggests a traceable relationship between the strength of a stereotype and the nature of past experience. This could be experimentally investigated by varying the correlations between the continuous dimensions and discontinuous classification, and also the consistency of this correlation.

Finally, the domain of application is extended within the same theoretical framework to consider judgments on abstract continua. The effects of classification and value should also apply to abstract judgments which imply the existence of a continuous attribute or dimension.
This kind of judgment can hardly be considered 'perceptual'; but there are no a priori grounds to assume that principles which are found helpful in the prediction of judgments made under certain conditions, and concerned with the physical aspects of stimuli, should not be capable of application to judgments of abstract attributes made under similar conditions.

For example, objects in the social environment are often rated along some quantitative abstract continuum such as beauty, pleasantness, intelligence etc; these are often correlated with value and may also be superimposed by a classification. Razran (1950), in an experiment on stereotypes, asked subjects to rate photographs of faces in terms of their pleasantness. Judgments of the same photograph, presented later with an ethnic label, tended to show displacements which would relate to a value classification. Tajfel points out that this example, like many others, relates to the preceding theoretical argument.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8.1 SUMMARY OF PHASE I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMAIN OF APPLICATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By examining Tajfel's article on Quantitative Judgment in Social Perception, we have seen how the theoretical principles involved in the accentuation of differences, which were first developed in the field of perceptual overestimation, are applied theoretically to physical stereotypes. In Phase II, Tajfel shifts the main orientation towards their application to social phenomena, that is, towards social stereotypes and abstract continua. This phase can be considered to encompass the following four articles:


The main article in this phase might be considered to be Tajfel and Wilkes (1963a). However, in many respects, this is a reiteration and direct application of the transitional article of Tajfel (1959a) which has already been presented. Furthermore, Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) and Tajfel, Sheikh and Gardner (1964) indicate more clearly the problems peculiar to the social perception of social objects. The examination of these articles has the added advantage of providing an opportunity to present an experimental report. The content and structure of the other articles will be considered when we examine the evolution of Tajfel's work in the following chapters.

8.2.1 Criteria for Social Psychology

As in Phase I, there is no discussion concerning the principles of social psychology.
8.2.2 Description of the Field: Perception of People

Phase II remains within the field of social perception but, in comparison to Phase I, Tajfel et al.* widen the span of concern to encompass the ways in which people perceive, judge and interpret social objects and events.

One of the continuing trends in the field of person perception has been the investigation of shifts and biases which occur in the assessment of individuals or specified groups of people. Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) apply the principles and hypotheses emerging from the field of quantitative psycho-physical judgment to problems associated with the 'perception' of people, supporting the argument that there are common principles underlying shifts and biases in both fields. The description of the field serves largely to justify the application of perceptual judgment principles to the field of person perception. In the previous phase this was done on grounds of the similarities between physical and social perception at the theoretical level (Tier 3). In Phase II, this is done in terms of the field of social perception (Tier 2).

The common characteristics between judgments regarding physical dimensions and the 'perception' of people are apparent when one considers the intermediate case in which subjects assess the physical attributes of other people. In each case, attributes are comparative rather than absolute; that is, a line is shorter or longer than other lines, just as a person is shorter or taller than other persons. A further justification refers to previous research in the field of social perception. Investigations of person perception frequently employed rating scales, a quantitative method comparable to the laws of quantitative judgment.

However, Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) recognize that research in this field is confronted by significant difficulties.

Experimental work on perception of people is beset with difficulties inherent in the nature of the problems studied.

(p.40)

* When 'Tajfel et al.' is used with a date it refers to a particular publication. Where the date is omitted it refers to all publications identified with a given phase.
The difficulty of identifying the relevant determining variables in real situations means that the generalizations and consequent predictions apply more successfully to other controlled situations rather than into natural phenomena. Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) acknowledge this problem and see the solution in increasing the number of experiments which relate to both 'general psychological theory' and direct applications regarding the naturally occurring phenomenon. No consideration is given to the use of other methods of research.

8.2.3 Theory: polarization of judgments

The 'accentuation of differences' employed in Phase I is frequently substituted by the term 'polarization'. When judgments of differences are made on dimensions which have acquired an emotional or value significance for the subject, (subject involvement) there will be a tendency to make more extreme judgments, towards the poles of the (continuous) dimension (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963b). This emphasizes the bidirectional nature of shifts in judgment as opposed to 'over-estimation' which is unidirectional. The effect of classification is more precisely defined in terms of minimization and maximization of differences. When judgments of differences are made on dimensions which are correlated with a classification differences between stimuli belonging to the same class will be minimized, whilst differences between stimuli belonging to different classes will be maximized (Tajfel et al., 1964). This theoretical framework is used to explain a variety of research findings in terms of general psychological principles applying to any kind of judgment. As in the previous phase, the description of the phenomena and the evidence are presented in terms of the theory. Tajfel and his collaborators draw on research carried out within Phase I as well as research literature relating to more social phenomena.

Firstly, Tajfel (1959b) showed that polarization occurred in the judgment of physical objects, in this case a series of weights, when the heaviest or lightest of the series were associated with a reward (value). Tajfel and Cawasjee (1959) found similar effects for judged differences
in the size of coins. Evidence for the maximization and minimization of differences is given by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) in which judgment of the length of lines was directly related to arbitrary labels associated with the shorter and longer lines in a series.

Secondly, Pettigrew, Allport and Barnett's study (1958) showed a polarization in the judgment of physical attributes of groups of people. Afrikaner subjects, who may be assumed to be more involved, make up a larger percentage of 'African' and a smaller percentage of 'Coloured' judgments than other groups, when identifying race in pairs of stereoscopically presented photographs. Also, both Hovland and Sherif (1952) and Manis (1960) found that subjects who were highly involved in a social issue tend to judge relevant statements to be more extreme.

Polarization is seen to occur wherever value is associated with a continuous dimension, be it a physical dimension of a physical object, a physical dimension of a social object or an abstract dimension of a social issue. This provides the context in which the same principles are applied to abstract dimensions (personal attributes) of social objects (people).

Tajfel et al.'s experimental research tests the prediction that

judgments of subjectively important attributes should tend to cluster more in the regions of extreme responses than judgments of attributes which are less important to the individual

(Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963b, p.42, my italics)

In the case where a classification exists, such as in stereotyped judgments

individuals of an ethnic group are perceived as being more similar with regard to traits which form a part of the stereotype concerning that group than with regard to traits which are not considered to be characteristic of that group.

(Tajfel et al., 1964, p.193)
8.2.4 Domain of application

We assess other people on a variety of attributes such as 'intelligence', 'kindness' or 'honesty' which can be conceived as continuous dimensions (e.g. honest - dishonest). However, these are considerably different from the physical dimensions dealt with in Phase I. For a physical dimension, such as weight, size or colour there is both a high degree of consensus regarding the relevant dimensions as well as objective measures of variations within a series. In contrast, for social dimensions, different attributes have different connotations and different subjective values for different individuals.

'True' or other such attributes cannot by definition be specified in a priori objective terms when one is concerned with the subjective aspects of their use, with the private connotations which determine the extent of their salience for an individual.

(Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963b, p.42)

Tajfel and his collaborators see this problem in terms of designing valid empirical tests which, in one case, are overcome by 'identifying and isolating for each subject an equal number of salient and non-salient attributes defined in his own terms' (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963b, p.43). They are extremely rigorous in the presentation of their experimental research. These articles often report more than one experiment, exploring assumptions which are made for the main experiment or an hypothesis emerging from the findings of previous experiments. The conventional report format is adopted with comprehensive and precise sections on experimental design and procedure, and analysis of results which constitute a major part of the article. It is not necessary here to present a detailed description of these reports. However, it is worth examining the summary and discussion of results. For this purpose, we will look at the Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) article. Although the particular content of the summary and conclusion are peculiar to this article its more general features, especially regarding style
and interpretation, are also found in other experimental reports.

The summary of results is both precise and clear and they are stated in terms of the experimental procedure rather than in terms of the theoretical principles and assumptions regarding subjective importance.

1. Attributes which appear early and which are repeated frequently in free descriptions of other people tend to be assigned more extreme ratings than attributes which have low frequency and priority.

2. This is an overall finding. It conceals the fact that a significantly higher frequency of such extreme ratings was found only for the distribution of the unfavourable judgments.

3. Attributes which have high ranks in terms of frequency and priority tend to be judged as 'more important in a person' than the low-ranking attribute.

4. The ratings made by our subjects show a consistent preponderance of favourable judgments about other people.

(Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963b, p.47)

Despite their 'pure' presentation, the interpretation of results is clearly framed by the theoretical principles. Although finding (1) is not quantitatively impressive it is taken to support the conclusion that attributes which are subjectively salient show greater polarization than attributes which are not. However, the preponderance of favourable ratings (4) and the minimal shift in favourable judgments for salient attributes (2) are explained in terms which lie outside the theoretical framework. Finding (4) is interpreted or explained in terms of the photographs themselves, their similarity to the subject group and the social acceptability of responses. Finding (2) is explained in terms of a skewness of extreme choices in relation to the subjects' own position, in line with findings reported by Hovland and Sherif (1952).

In no way is it suggested that these results challenge the theoretical principle of polarization. Despite discrepancies in the results and the problems associated with the subjectivity of person perception, Tajfel and Wilkes still claim that the results can be explained in terms of a general judgmental phenomenon.
TABLE 8.2 SUMMARY OF PHASE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIER</th>
<th>FOCUS</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>PSYCHOLOGY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD</td>
<td>Social perception</td>
<td>social factors in the perception and judgment of the social environment ie. people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Research-experimental research should be founded in psychological theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORY</td>
<td>Polarization</td>
<td>polarization of judgments on person attributes (social or abstract dimension) due to their associated subjective value and/or a superimposed discontinuous classification. Classification results in a maximization of differences between groups and a minimization of differences within groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMAIN OF</td>
<td>Physical dimensions of physical environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPLICATION</td>
<td>Physical attributes of social environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ie. people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social/Abstract attributes of people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3. PHASE III: PREJUDICE 1965-1969

This phase can be considered to be a transition between social perception and intergroup relations. In itself, it is not marked by a large number of publications or research projects but it comprises a vital phase in the re-orientation and expansion of Tajfel's intellectual career. The main article which will be summarized below is 'Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice' (Tajfel,1969b), which was published in four separate locii; The Journal of Social Issues; The Journal of Biosocial Sciences, a book edited by Harrison and Peel (1969), and in Tajfel,s own book Human Groups and Social Categories (1981). (Page numbers in the text below refer to
the latter publication.) Prior to the article, Tajfel had published a book with Dawson entitled *Disappointed Guests* (1965). This an informal analysis of essays written by foreign students in England on their experiences of prejudice.

### 8.3.1 Criteria for social psychology

For the first time, Tajfel presents an issue which relates directly to social psychology as a discipline. This concerns the implicit conception of the nature of man in the social environment.

Tajfel considers changes in the image of man evident in the writings of anthropologists and ethnobiologists from a belief in a 'primitive mind' to a belief in man as an exploring and rational being. However, this model has been applied only to individual human minds. Psychological theories of man in his social environment, and especially relations between large human groups, do not reflect any of the ideas of exploration, meaning, understanding or rational consistency.

We have a rational model for natural phenomena: we seem to have nothing but a blood-and-guts model for social phenomena

(p.128)

In contrast to the dominant approaches, Tajfel argues that the rational model of man adopted in individual psychology applies equally well to social phenomena and, in particular, to intergroup relations.

### 8.3.2 Description of the field: Intergroup relations

In contrast to Phases I and II, which were both concerned with social perception, Phase III addresses the field of intergroup relations.

The psychological aspects of intergroup relations include the study of behaviour in intergroup situations, of behaviour related to these situations, and of beliefs and attitudes concerning an individual's own group and various other groups which are relevant to him

(p.128)

These psychological aspects might, in part, be construed in terms of social perception. However, from their more detailed description at Tier 3, it will be seen that the
ground which they encompass has a much broader range than that which is covered in the two previous phases. Again, Tajfel does not attempt to provide a review of other theories and research within the field. Rather, they are mentioned in order to emphasize the distinctive features of Tajfel's own perspective.

Tajfel stresses the 'adaptive cognitive functioning' of man in intergroup situations. This is related closely to the argument for a rational model of man at Tier 1 and is consistently reflected throughout the theoretical presentation.

A psychological theory of intergroup relations must provide a two-way link between situations and behaviour, and it can do this through an analysis of the motivational and the cognitive structures which intervene between the two.

(p.129)

This perspective has a number of implications, both for the understanding of intergroup relations and for related research within social psychology. He suggests other theories within this field have often been conceptualized as no more than projections and rationalizations of powerful motivational forces. Little consideration has been given to cooperation between groups, or to the possibility that hostility may arise from attempts to explain to oneself the causal sequence of relations between groups. Extrapolations from animal behaviour to human behaviour in complex social situations and theories of unconscious motivations both deny the autonomy of cognitive functioning. But a person's understanding of the intergroup situation will influence the content and animosity of attitudes towards a particular group as well as his behaviour. Furthermore, modification of perception and understanding is the greatest adaptive advantage of the human species and this is equally so in intergroup situations.

Tajfel argues that this approach, in contrast to others within the field, has the scientific merits of 'economy, credibility and testability of explanation'. Furthermore, this approach also has a number of implications for social action. Inferences from ethnology and psycho-analysis have
diffused into society, and, along with the blood-and-guts image of social man, have influenced public opinion such that they 'buttress and justify certain political opinions and actions' (p.129). The acquisition of knowledge about intergroup relations is 'perhaps the most urgent and ominous task confronting us' (p.128). It is, moreover, 'patently obvious' that widespread beliefs and views about causes of social events are more easily accessible to change than motives, and may assist the management of conflicts, in conjunction with legislation preventing public forms of discrimination against minorities.

It is therefore important and useful, for the purposes of science as well as for those of the society at large, that a consideration of prejudice as a phenomenon in the minds rather than in the guts of people should take precedence over views which are, on the whole, not only untestable, but also useless in the planning of any form of relevant social change.

(p.142)

The descriptions of the field in Phases I and II are, no doubt, implicitly cognitive, since they were concerned with how people perceive, judge and interpret physical and social objects or events. We can see that, in Phase III, Tajfel makes the cognitive and functional perspective more explicit. An even more significant difference is apparent when we consider the role of social factors in Tajfel's thinking. Phases I and II are about social perception, the social factors involved in the perceptual judgment of physical and social objects. These social factors are conceived in terms of value and classification. Phase III is about intergroup relations and prejudice which are more obviously inherently social phenomena. Here, the emphasis is on the cognitive factors involved, although, as it will be seen in Tier 3, these are by no means a-social. Furthermore, unlike Phases I and II, Phase III explicitly and emphatically addresses social issues of the 'real world'. It is both informed by, and attempts to inform, the very real problems of intergroup conflict and discrimination.

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8.3.3 Theory

In comparison to Phase II, the theoretical framework is much more complex, covering a more extensive range of inter-related issues. Phase II concerned the polarization of judgments on social dimensions in relation to subjective value and classification or stereotyping. In Phase III, Tajfel discusses those cognitive aspects which shape and facilitate people's understanding of their social environment and, in particular, their understanding of intergroup relations. These are categorization, assimilation and the search for coherence.

The theory is not so much concerned with prejudice per se but rather with the etiology of prejudice in intergroup relations. Prejudice itself is not even mentioned until the autonomy of cognitive structures in the field of intergroup relations is established. Nor is the theoretical framework confined to the phenomenon of prejudice. Rather, a wide range of factors relating to intergroup attitudes and behaviour are considered as essential for a proper understanding of this phenomenon. Tajfel locates the phenomenon of prejudice firmly within the field of intergroup relations. An extensive quotation from Klineberg (1968) provides a general definition of prejudice as

an unsubstantiated prejudgment of an individual or group, favourable or unfavourable in character, tending to action in a consonant direction.

(Klineberg 1968, p.439 from Tajfel, p.131)

Tajfel focuses on the cognitive aspects of prejudice; on the constant readjustment of our understanding of changing relations between groups and on the constant causal attributions about why and how social conditions of life change.

8.3.3.1 The cognitive process of categorization in relation to the physical and social environment: In Phase II, Tajfel focused on the principle of classification which emerged from studies in psychophysical perception (Phase I) and applied it to the social phenomenon of stereotyping. In Phase III the emphasis is reversed. Tajfel considers first the nature of stereotypes and then broadens the discussion to
categorization in general. Stereotypes are here defined as 'the attribution of general psychological characteristics to large human groups' (p.132). The importance of stereotypes to be found is not so much in their content, originating in cultural traditions, but rather in their structure and function. In particular, they arise from a process of categorization which introduces simplicity and order (G. Allport, 1954). Tajfel describes stereotypes as a set of attributes which vary along continuous dimensions but are superimposed by discontinuous classifications.

Although the terms 'classification' and 'categorization' are, to some extent, interchangeable, the adoption of a different term, i.e. categorization, in Phase III serves to mark the difference between physical and social phenomena. It is also more in tune with the general cognitive literature. Tajfel identifies the similarities between physical and social classification but he then goes on to point out their essential differences. These are supported by three empirical statements based both on common experience and experimental evidence in social psychology.

Firstly, personal characteristics, such as intelligence or honesty, are empirically equivalent to physical dimensions such as height or weight. Both are dimensional, such that comparative judgments, rather than absolute statements, are made. Secondly, there is a tendency to exaggerate differences on relevant dimensions between items falling into distinct classes, and to minimize differences within classes. Thirdly, personal and cultural experience result in the subjective association of dimensions or attributes with classifications of people into groups. In the absence of specific knowledge about individuals the ambiguity of social situations means that it is always easier to find supporting evidence for these class characteristics. More importantly, 'confronted by the need to interpret behaviour en masse of members of a particular group', (p.133) there is rarely any clear negative feedback following the attribution of class characteristics.

In Phase II, Tajfel argued that the principles of perceptual judgment could be applied to social phenomena. In Phase III no such claim is made. Rather, he considers that
there are substantial differences between judgments of lines and judgments of people. The latter are much more rigid and resistant to contradictory information. This is, in part, because they are much more uncertain and ambiguous. But it is also due to the different consequences of incorrect judgments. Inaccurate judgments regarding physical properties of the environment can lead to dire consequences. In contrast, inaccurate judgments regarding people can be self-rewarding, preserving emotionally invested differentiations between one's own group and other groups. A spiral interplay of these two features can lead to the entrenchment of powerful social myths.

8.3.3.2 Assimilation of evaluations and social information:
In this section, Tajfel focuses on the preferences or social values held by different groups. However, rather than focusing on the effect of value on the judgment of social attributes, as in Phase II, he concentrates on the individual's assimilation of cultural evaluations. Tajfel examines two aspects of assimilation which indicate the autonomy of cognitive functioning in attitudes towards other groups (p.134). These are the learning of evaluations, preferences or social values and a balance between identification with one's own group and socially accepted notions about one's own and other groups, assimilated in early childhood.

Tajfel suggests that, unlike ordinary cognitive and moral developments, described by Piaget (1932), whereby the child learns to take, conceptually, the role of the other (conceptual reciprocity), in intergroup situations the child is exposed to only one source of information. As a consequence, group evaluations become 'incontrovertible statements of fact', much as judgments of an object's size. Furthermore, group identification should not be considered a universal process, irrespective of the social order. Children of groups assumed to be inferior by society will be exposed to a conflict between the acquisition of their own group identity, (affecting the formation of their own social self) and the ordering that is generally accepted by and socially transmitted within, that society.

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It can be seen that, by focusing on the assimilation of social values, greater attention is paid to the social context of prejudice and to the interrelationships between groups within the social order. Moreover, the social context is not conceived of purely in terms of social variables: rather, it's impact is conceived in terms of group identification. Thus, although 'assimilation' is concerned with values these are reconceptualized as social values emerging in a social context which have an impact through identification with groups.

Tajfel reviews, briefly, a number of studies which clearly indicate children's sensitivity to the social context. For example, Goodman's (1964) and Clark and Clark's (1947) studies showed American negro children's preference for whites. Norland (1966) and Vaughan (1964) found similar effects whereby children of low status groups expressed a greater preference for high status groups. The sensitivity of children to the context of social influence in which they live, despite identification with their own racial or ethnic group, forms an enduring basis for future prejudice and conflict. Furthermore, the psychological influence of socio-cultural factors on prejudice continues to be of importance in later life, as shown by Pettigrew's study (1958) carried out in South Africa and the U.S.A.

8.3.3.3 Search for coherence: Tajfel extends the discussion beyond the process of categorization and of assimilation to consider the search for coherence; that is, to consider how individuals understand and react to specific or changing intergroup situations. This opens up new theoretical territory which goes well beyond Phase II. An individual must make constant causal attributions and build a cognitive structure which fulfils two criteria. Firstly, it must provide a satisfactory explanation of the causes of change which appears consistent to the individual, while tending towards simplification. Secondly, it must preserve the individual's 'self-image' or 'personal integrity'.

This need to preserve the integrity or the self-image is the only motivational assumption that we need to make in order to understand the direction that the search for coherence will take. (p.137)
Tajfel focuses on social changes which relate to an individual's membership of different groups. Changes may be either intragroup - an individual's changing circumstances within her own group(s) - or intergroup - changing relations of her group(s) with other groups: these changes require causal attributions which explain the consequent increase or decrease in affiliation with the ingroup. Firstly, Tajfel argues that, in the face of complex social events, causal attributions made in terms of inherent group characteristics, offer greater cognitive simplicity. These attributions may be made to physical or situational causes, individual social agents or groups as social agents. It is already known that there is a tendency to make attributions to the stable characteristics of individuals as opposed to situational factors, as they provide greater simplicity and predictability. Causal attributions to characteristics of groups offer even greater simplification and, in that the feedback is more ambiguous and difficult to interpret, also offers predictability. As a consequence, groups become personalized in terms of attributes relevant to the situation and common to the group as a whole, ignoring individual differences between the members of a group.

Secondly, attributions to inherent characteristics of groups also shift the locus of responsibility for change either from the individual to the group, or from the ingroup to the outgroup. Causal group attributions are therefore more likely when other types of attribution either conflict with prevailing values or beliefs, or else threaten an individual's self-image. In such situations, changes in the structure of intergroup relations often give rise to the creation of inherent ideologies (group characteristics). In a situation of tension a search for a satisfactory and distinctive definition of the ingroup is vital, and leads to the creation of inherent group attributions, both relating to ingroups and outgroups, in order to preserve personal integrity.
An intensified affiliation with a group is only possible when the group is capable of supplying some satisfactory aspects of an individual's social identity.  

(p.140)

Thus, different solutions to intergroup situations may be found and used but Tajfel is at some pains to point out that the solutions that are found relate to the cognitive structures and personal integrity of group members.

TABLE 8.3 SUMMARY OF PHASE III

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIER</th>
<th>FOCUS</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY</td>
<td>Model of man</td>
<td>Man as rational in social environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adaptive cognitive functioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD</td>
<td>Intergroup relations &amp; Prejudice</td>
<td>Cognitive factors in the understanding of and behaviour in intergroup contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Economy, credibility and testability as criteria for theory should be applicable to real world, social issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>THEORY</td>
<td></td>
<td>The development of and maintenance of intergroup relations due to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>i) categorization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ii) assimilation of social values and group identification and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>iii) search for coherence involving causal attributions which provide satisfactory explanations of changing intergroup relations whilst simultaneously preserving personal integrity</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOMAIN OF</td>
<td>Social stereotypes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPLICATION</td>
<td>Intergroup attitudes and prejudice</td>
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</tbody>
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In conclusion, we can see that Tajfel's intellectual orientation has changed considerably between Phase II and Phase III. There are, certainly, a number of essential similarities but there are also important and distinctive differences. In Phase III, Tajfel is not so much concerned with the intricacies of social perception as with the social issues of the 'real world' which need to be addressed by social psychologists. As he examines the problems of intergroup relations he draws on empirical evidence from both experimental psychology and common experience. Furthermore, he is more concerned with the development of a comprehensive theory of intergroup relations than he is with the citation of evidence or the construction of precise predictions.

8.4 PHASE 4: NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT: 1966-1972

A number of Tajfel's publications report various sections of an international research programme which examined the development of children's preferences for and knowledge about their own and other nationalities. Below is a list of some of the relevant publications:


Tajfel and Jahoda (1966) was the first publication in this series, examining the relationship between preferential judgments and knowledge about other nations. The remaining experimental research report explored and further elaborated upon this relationship, focusing on the development of national preferences in children. In the presentation of this phase it is necessary to examine all the experimental reports as they portray different findings which are influential in the subsequent phases.

It should be borne in mind that Phases III and IV overlap in their chronological sequence. Although most of the articles identified with Phase IV were published in the early 1970's most of the research was actually conducted during the 1960's, coinciding with the writing of Tajfel's 1969 article on 'The Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice'.

Tajfel's chapter on the formation of national attitudes (1969c) is, in many respects, unrelated to the other articles. It is a theoretical chapter which introduces many of the notions developed later in Phase VI. This paper will be considered in more detail in the later chapters on the transformation of Tajfel's work.

8.4.1 Criteria for social psychology

In this phase the experimental reports give little evidence of reflections on the criteria for social psychology. In some respects this is surprising since a number of relevant issues had already emerged at the level of social psychology and theory in Phase III. Moreover, this research broke new ground within the field of national stereotypes and cross-cultural research. However, this phase predominantly consists of experimental reports, within a developing research programme and, in this respect, it is not surprising that the more abstract and higher order aspects are not elaborated.

8.4.2 Field

There is a distinct poverty of discussion relating the phenomenon of national stereotypes and their associated attitudes to any particular field of theorizing or research. This may well be due to the problem of identifying the field
in the first place. The lack of psychological theory which addresses large scale social phenomena, and in particular national attitudes, means that there is a dearth of material which might constitute the field.

8.4.3 Theory

The theoretical position presented in Phase IV is less elaborate than in Phase III. In the experimental reports there is little discussion of the phenomenon of national stereotypes and attitudes. Furthermore, in contrast to Phases I and III, the phenomenon which is examined is not located within a broader field of study.

In Phase III the various aspects of categorization and assimilation were considered in relationship to social phenomena and, in particular, to intergroup relations. Categorization focused on the classification of people into stereotyped groups along continuous dimensions. Assimilation focused on the learning of evaluation or preferences in relationship to one's own and others' groups. In Phase IV these two aspects of intergroup relations are translated into the cognitive and affective components of attitudes towards large-scale ingroups and outgroups. Furthermore, Tajfel et al. concentrate on the developmental relationship between these cognitive and affective components; that is, to consensual preferences and their relationship with the assimilation of factual information.

In brief, the main theoretical preoccupation of our research is the relation between development of affective and cognitive components of attitudes towards large-scale ingroups and outgroups.

(Tajfel and Jahoda, 1966; p. 207, Tajfel, 1981a)

The research suggests an interdependence between cognitive and affective components (Tajfel and Jahoda, 1966) and also that children develop preferences for their own country in comparison to others before they develop the relevant conceptual understanding regarding countries or nations, and other large-scale human groups. As a consequence, there is an increasing focus on the assimilation of social values or preferences.
In Phase III it was noted that Tajfel suggested that group evaluations become 'incontrovertible statements of facts'. Here he goes on to suggest that the early intervention of value judgments may result in a lack of conceptual flexibility and a failure to achieve 'cognitive empathy'; that is, the value judgments prevent the development of a capacity to decentralize one's own view and adopt the perspective of the outgroup (Tajfel and Jahoda, 1966).

Furthermore, that evaluations precede conceptual development appears to be true regardless of the presence or absence of clear-cut physical or behavioural cues facilitating discrimination (Tajfel, Nemeth et al., 1970b). Although not explicitly elaborated by Tajfel et al. it can be seen that this creates a distance between the social phenomena studied here and the classifications on physical dimensions studied in Phase II. Discrimination between classes occurs without 'direct perception' of the object and without any obvious distinguishing features or characteristics.

Finally, Tajfel et al. also consider the advantages and disadvantages of cross-cultural research. In order to be able to draw any general conclusions about attitudinal problems it is necessary to study them in a variety of social or cultural contexts. However, this creates methodological problems associated with controlling inter-cultural variables which permit differing interpretations of the same results.

It can be seen that there is little development of the theoretical framework directly associated with the research programme. Furthermore, there is little reference in Phase IV to the search for coherence and the significance of personal integrity.

The research programme explored a number of related hypotheses or predictions. A number of these will be reviewed below in order to explicate the structure and development of the research programme. It will be seen that, in the early stages of the programme, research problems were conceived in an open and exploratory fashion. The results of these studies
indicated a number of issues or phenomena which were then explored within a more precise and directive manner.

8.4.4 Domain of application: experimental studies

In all the experimental reports Tajfel et al. specify the method and results in a clear and precise form. However, there are particular features of the methodological procedures which contrast with those adopted in Phase II. Firstly, there is the obvious difference that most of the studies involve different groups of subjects from a variety of European cities. Secondly, in order to study the development of preferences and knowledge regarding various countries, children were always used as subjects. Thirdly, the developmental perspective demanded comparisons of different age groups ranging from ages six to twelve. It is clear that these studies, although still experimental, are comparative in nature. Furthermore, in order to examine the relationship between knowledge and preferences it was necessary to adopt different techniques.

The research reported in 1966 was an exploratory study of the development of consensus in knowledge about and the structure of preferences for foreign countries. The study conducted in Britain and Belgium found that polarization of evaluative judgments regarding foreign countries increases significantly as a function of age. Furthermore, differences between the two countries were found. In Britain, only, children learn which foreign countries are good or bad before they learn practically anything else about them


The Johnson et al. (1970) study explored further the relationship between knowledge and preferences using three age groups of English children only, and using England (ie. their own country) as well as foreign countries. This study found that there was roughly a U-shaped relationship between the cognitive and affective components suggesting that individual children know more about nations for which they have a strong liking or disliking. Although the results are congruent with the idea that preferences develop first, the causal relationship between the two components remained
unclear. Surprisingly, in the following study, Tajfel, Nemeth et al. (1970) suggest that the prior development of preferences has already been established by several studies. This study focuses entirely on the relationship between children's preferences for people (photos) from their own country in comparison to foreigners in six foreign countries. The findings of this study are described here in more detail as they show some unexpected features which indicated the impact of particular factors in the development of national attitudes.

The discussion of the general results is speculative and is mainly concerned with the various exceptions that were found. In general, children show a clear preference for their own national group, which decreases as the children get older. This is possibly due to younger children basing their preferences and nationality on the same affective criteria, whereas the older children start using separate cues or different criteria for the two tasks. There are some indications that older children develop physical national stereotypes. It is more probable that this is based on 'ideal' stereotypes assimilated from the mass media of communication such as comics, cinema, television, advertisements etc. rather than on the distillation of cues from the 'real' social environment.

The two main exceptions to these general trends were found in Glasgow and Louvain. In Glasgow there was hardly any relationship between preference and nationality assignments; in Louvain there was a considerable increase in correlations between preference and nationality assignment with age. These results required a detailed and complex interpretation. In Louvain confusion with national labels of Flemish and Belgian and the high salience of the country's bi-nationality may interfere with affective reactions of the younger children whereas national concepts, assignments and preferences may be more firmly established for the older children.

In Glasgow children failed to show a preference for their own national group. This may be due to the devaluation of ingroup found to exist for minority or underprivileged
groups. It 'exists in a rather unexpected context' as the Scots are not a minority in Scotland nor are there obvious tensions between the English and the Scottish.

Both exceptions were seen to indicate children's high degree of sensitivity to subtle aspects of social influence. The results of this study illuminated the subtle influence of social context on children's devaluation of their own group in non-conflictual intergroup situations, and was explored further by Tajfel et al. (1972). The study hypothesized that the absence of Scottish preference was due specifically to children's devaluation of Scottish identity in comparison with English identity. Similar studies were carried out in Britain and Israel, comparing English and Scottish, and European and Oriental groups, respectively. Both the studies showed that children assimilate negative ingroup evaluation even in conditions of low visibility of distinctiveness and in the absence of intense intergroup tension. These results indicate children's high sensitivity to the value systems of their societies.

The cross-cultural nature of the research was initially designed in order to allow generalizations across cultures or nations to be made. However, the unexpected finding that children devalue their own group, even in the absence of intergroup tension, served to highlight the influence of the social context and the impact of prevalent value systems in society on children's evaluations of their own and other groups.

We have already seen that the research programme was designed within a theoretical framework which addresses the cognitive and affective components of intergroup relations. However, the focus on the development of these components and the findings which emerged from the experimental research are not directly addressed by the theory. This applies, in particular, to the prior development of preferences and their impact on cognitive development, the high degree of children's sensitivity to the social context, and the devaluation of one's own group. These research findings require elaborate interpretations which are in terms other
than those of the theory. Furthermore, within Phase IV, no adequate explanation of these findings is presented.

**TABLE 8.4: SUMMARY OF PHASE IV:**

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<th>COMMENTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>PSYCHOLOGY</td>
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<td>FIELD</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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**THEORY**
The assimilation of consensual preferences for (effective component) and the cognitive differentiation between (cognitive component) nationalities by children

Cross-cultural research programme

**DOMAIN OF APPLICATION** Large-scale human groups

8.5 PHASE 5: INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 1970-1973

Phase III on prejudice and Phase IV on the development of national attitudes are seen to be closely related to, or even embedded in, the field of intergroup relations. Phase V focuses exclusively on the role of social categorization in intergroup behaviour. The relevant articles report a series of experiments which establish that social categorization is sufficient to produce intergroup behaviour.


(1) and (2) report the same set of experiments which are reviewed below and (3) reports an experiment which was designed to negate alternative interpretations of the results.

8.5.1 Criteria for social psychology

Again, there is little or no discussion regarding social psychology as a discipline. Tajfel and his collaborators do not elaborate on the approach adopted; on the conceptualization of the relationship between the individual and society or on the relationship between social psychology and other disciplines. Nor is there an explicit consideration of methodology. It should be borne in mind, however, that this does not imply that the issues are not considered, but rather that they are not elaborated with direct reference to social psychology as a discipline. As in Phase IV, this is related to the fact that Phase V focuses on an experimental research programme.

8.5.2 Description of the field: intergroup behaviour

In contrast to Phase IV there is an extensive research literature on phenomena associated with intergroup behaviour. However, as in previous phases, Tajfel and his colleagues refer only briefly to the various theoretical approaches in the field of intergroup behaviour, in order to establish and justify their approach. It is merely noted that intergroup behaviour has been studied in the context of variables deriving from conflict, competition, cooperation, the nature of personal interaction within and between groups, ingroup and outgoing structure, the position of individuals in groups, their personality etc.

(Tajfel, Flament, Billig, Bundy, 1971, pp. 150-151).

The literature is not explored in any more depth.

8.5.3 Theory: Social categorization and social norms

Having briefly referred to the field as a whole Tajfel et al. (1971) argue that social categorization is inherent in all of these contexts, and that this aspect of intergroup behaviour has often been taken for granted. The social environment is categorized in terms of social criteria forming divisions between ingroups and outgroups. In
comparison to Phases III and IV, Tajfel and his colleagues narrow the focus of their attention to the impact of social categorization per se and, to all intents and purposes, the role of value and assimilation are left in abeyance. However, the significance of the social context is not forgotten. This is reflected in the reconception of social categorization.

The role of social categorization in intergroup behaviour cannot be considered 'a priori' to be universal; rather, the principles of intergroup behaviour 'acquire meaning only against the social background which provides the canvas for their study' (p. 150). It is possible that, in certain societies, norms, values and expectations reinforce differentiation between ingroups and outgroups when it has no utilitarian value to the individual or group and even when the categorization has little meaning or emotional investment. This is supported by studies concerning the adaptive cognitive functions associated with categorization (Allport, 1954; Campbell, 1967; Tajfel, 1969).

Social conduct (i.e. intergroup behaviour) is guided by a conceptualization of social causality and by the subsequent inferences regarding various aspects of groups and of the individuals that comprise them. These inferences may be a direct consequence of objective determinants of intergroup conflicts (e.g. 'rational conflict', Coser, 1956) or they may be related to attitudes and behaviour towards outgroups which serve a 'psychological' function (e.g. Coser's 'irrational conflict'). However, the permanent feature of all intergroup relations is the articulation of the social world in terms of a network of intergroup categorizations. This guides social conduct in situations where alternative guidelines for action are unclear. Moreover, intergroup categorization provides a differentiated, coherent and ordered environment which enables individuals to act in a way that is socially sanctioned or appropriate in many other situations.

It can be seen that certain aspects of a 'search for coherence' (Phase III) are absorbed into this re-conceptualization of social categorization but also that there is no explicit reference to personal integrity or group identity. The focus of explanation is on social phenomena,
ie. 'norms'; and individual cognition, ie. categorization, as opposed to value systems or personal integrity.

A number of experimental studies on intergroup conflicts show that short-lived competitive situations create discriminatory behaviour and modify ingroup-outgroup perceptions. However, there are also indications that competition is not a necessary condition for intergroup discrimination (eg. Ferguson and Kelley, 1964). Tajfel, Flament, Billing and Bundy (1971) review experiments conducted by Rabbie and Wilkens (1968) and Rabbie and Horwitz (1969). These purported to show that anticipation of future interaction determined bias in subjects' evaluation of their own and of other groups. Results from the control condition, in which there was no anticipation of future interaction, were seen to suggest that 'Group classification per se appears to be insufficient to produce discriminatory evaluations' (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969, p.272). Tajfel et al. (1971) reinterpret the latter finding, suggesting that subjects in the control condition did not show intergroup differentiation because the experimental manipulations failed to make the quality of 'groupness' relevant to the situation. Subjects were asked to evaluate other unknown, live individuals solely on the basis of where they sat. In contrast to the 'interdependence of fate' conditions

Nothing occurred that made the situation pertinent in any way to the social and cultural norms that normally guide intergroup behaviour (p.152).

The predictions of Phase V are in some respects similar to, and in other respects very different from, those of Phase IV. In contrast to Phase IV, the research problem is much tighter, focusing on a specific, theoretically based, expectation which does not demand initial exploratory investigation. The research problem was to determine if the very act of social categorization, as far as it can be identified and isolated from other variables, (can) lead—under certain conditions—to intergroup behaviour which discriminates against the outgroup, and favours the ingroup. What are the baseline conditions in which this differential intergroup behaviour can be expected to occur?

(Tajfel et al. 1971, p.151)
Phases IV and V are also different in that the latter is in no way a comparative study. There is no comparison of different cultures or different groups and, in this respect, there is no exploration of the impact of social context. It should be remembered, however, that the significance of the social context was something which emerged from the studies in Phase IV rather than being an initial problem. Furthermore, it should also be borne in mind that the social context is not ignored in Phase V; as we have seen, it is fundamental to the theoretical principles of explanation. But, it is not a feature of the research design or of the experimental hypotheses. Phases IV and V are similar in that the various predictions are framed within a research programme. The results from the initial experiments form the basis and the rationale for subsequent experiments.

The experiment was designed to fulfil a number of conditions such that all of the other known variables of intergroup behaviour were eliminated. These include face-to-face interactions; previous hostility; an instrumental or a rational link between the criteria for intergroup categorization and the nature of the subjects' responses; and the utilitarian value of responses for the subject making them. Furthermore, the responses were made to appear important in terms of real decisions about the distribution of concrete rewards to others; and finally, responses in terms of maximum intergroup differentiation competed with other response strategies such as maximum benefit for all or maximum benefit for the ingroup.

8.5.4 Domain of application: Experimental studies

Tajfel et al. (1971) give a detailed account of the experimental design and procedure, the matrices employed and the analysis of the results. This is done in the conventional experimental report format as in all previous phases. However, in comparison to previous experiments, the design and the analysis of results is highly complex and tortuous to follow. This is, in part, due to the fact that Tajfel et al. (1971) attempt to explore the phenomenon of intergroup discrimination in competition with alternative response
strategies. A more 'rational' response strategy would lead to maximum profits for all subjects, regardless of their own group membership. This would indicate that social categorization alone does not lead to intergroup discrimination. Another alternative strategy would lead to maximum profit for the ingroup, regardless of profits gained by the outgroup. The experiment is designed to give subjects the opportunity to adopt any of these rival strategies.

In contrast to Phase IV, where intergroup categorizations were based on cultural groups relating to nationality, in this phase of his research the intergroup categorizations are based on relatively arbitrary criteria. Intergroup categorization was induced on the basis of subjects' preferences for paintings by two modern painters, Klee and Kandinsky.

In order to avoid confounding variables related to individual gain or group interaction, subjects were put in cubicles and they allotted rewards or penalties to other subjects who were identified only as being a member 'of your group' or 'of the other group'. Three different types of matrices were employed in order to assess the relative pull of different response strategies. These were:
1. Maximum joint payoff (MJP) being the matrix term which results in the greatest common benefit.
2. Maximum ingroup payoff (MIP) corresponding to the highest number of points awarded to the ingroup member.
3. Maximum difference in favour of the ingroup (MD) being the matrix term which results in the greatest possible difference between points awarded to the two individuals in favour of the ingroup member.

Subjects made 3 different types of choices:
1. Ingroup choices, where subjects were choosing for two members of their own group.
2. Outgroup choices, where subjects were choosing for two members of the out group.
3. Intergroup differential choices, where subjects were choosing for one member of their own group and one member of the other group.
The results showed that subjects act in terms of their ingroup membership and in terms of an intergroup categorization in situations devoid of other variables relating to intergroup behaviour. Subjects favour members of their own group despite the availability of an alternative strategy leading to the greatest common good (MJP). This occurs even though subjects' own individual benefit is not affected by their choice. Furthermore, even when MJP is combined with MIP subjects will sacrifice the advantages of maximum utilitarian gain in order to 'win'; that is, in order to create a maximum difference (MD) between the two groups. This gratuitous discrimination in favour of the ingroup is also shown by results in which ingroup choices are significantly closer to MJP than outgroup choices.

The discussion of the results is framed within the theoretical terms presented previously. Both sections consider the impact of social categorization in terms of a 'generic' outgroup attitude and social norms.

8.5.4.1 Social categorization:

The norm of groupness may be expected to operate when the social world of an individual (at least in our society) is clearly dichotomized into 'us' and 'them'.

(p.174-5)

Where there is no such classification superimposed on a continuous dimension there would be no discriminatory intergroup behaviour. A related process was found in the case of judgments of simple physical magnitudes (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963b), and also in intergroup behaviour (M. Deutsch, 1965). The perception and creation of such discontinuities is fundamental to the study of intergroup relations.

8.5.4.2 Generic group norm:

It will be clear that we interpret our results in terms of a 'generic' social norm of ingroup-outgroup behaviour which guided the subjects' choices. This was so because they classified the social situation in which they found themselves as one to which this norm was pertinent, in which social categorization ought to lead to discriminatory intergroup behaviour. This interpretation is consonant with an approach to intergroup behaviour recently presented elsewhere.

(Tajfel et al., 1971, p.174)
8.5.4.3 Fairness norm:

The experimental results also lead Tajfel et al. (1971) to extend the theoretical framework by the introduction of a new principle. Ingroup choices and outgroup choices, while still discriminating significantly in favour of the ingroup, remained near the point of maximum fairness. Furthermore, choices combining all benefits might have been expected to be more extreme. Rather than questioning the impact of social categorization, Tajfel et al. suggest that a second and opposing norm of fairness influences subjects' responses. This allows all choices to be seen as a compromise between fairness and other variables, namely, the generic groupness norm.

Tajfel and his colleagues bolster their interpretation of the findings in two ways. Firstly, they carry out complex analyses of the results and also include a brief analysis of the pilot study. Secondly, they consider potential alternative explanations of the findings and argue that these are inadequate.

The results, for example, might be explained in terms of the experimenter effect (Orne, 1962), whereby subjects conform to the expectations of the experimenter, based on his frequent use of the term 'group'. However, Tajfel et al. (1971) argue that this does not provide a theoretical alternative for the interpretation of their findings. The experimenter effect works only through the salience, for the subjects, of the relevant normative background and its consequent expectations ie. the subject effects. The theoretical problem as to why a few references to 'group' are sufficient to result in discrimination in favour of the ingroup, with the possibility of alternative strategies which are more rational, instrumental or utilitarian, is not satisfactorily explained by the experimenter effect.

Alternatively, the results might be explained in terms of the anticipation of future interactions. However Tajfel et al. (1971) argue that, in the experiment, this would only have had an effect if the 'groups' were expected to retain their meaning. Furthermore, in order for anticipation of
future interaction to be influential subjects' views of how they ought to have behaved in the experimental situation must also be considered.

The findings are considered to have far-reaching implications for social issues such as our modes of socialization and education. In line with Phase III, Tajfel and his colleagues also claim that the findings suggest that discriminatory intergroup behaviour cannot be understood fully in terms of either an 'objective' conflict of interests or deep-seated motives. The most parsimonious explanations of the results involve both normative and cognitive considerations; the relevant normative background of social conduct and its relation to the demands of a particular social situation, as seen by the individual.

TABLE 8.5 SUMMARY OF PHASE V

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<tr>
<th>TIER</th>
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<td>Social categorization as a necessary and sufficient condition for intergroup discrimination due to the social norms of 'groupness' and 'fairness'</td>
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<td>Socialization</td>
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8.6 PHASE VI: INTERGROUP RELATIONS, SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL BELIEFS 1972-1979

Phase VI constitutes the most significant achievement of Tajfel's intellectual career. He explicitly addresses issues relating to the discipline of social psychology in general and he develops a coherent theory of large scale intergroup phenomena which has come to be known as Social Identity Theory.

Tajfel extends the theoretical framework established in Phase III to address the theoretical problems which emerged from the research in Phases IV and V as well as the broader social issues associated with intergroup relations. He also addresses issues associated with the general perspective adopted in social psychological theorizing and research.

Several publications are identified with this phase:


Although Tajfel (1978a) is an edited volume, the introduction and the whole of Part I is written by Tajfel himself. This outlines the theoretical framework to which most of the other chapters in the book are directly related. Furthermore, Part I recapitulates and expands upon the content of the previously published articles in Phase VI. Tajfel's contribution comprises four chapters:
1. Introduction (Tajfel, 1978b).

These chapters focus on the development of an alternative theoretical and research approach to the social psychology of human groups in conflict. An examination of these chapters will provide the main source of material for the presentation of this Phase.

A wider coverage of the discipline is presented in Tajfel and Fraser's (1978a) Introducing Social Psychology and this source provides some of the material presented here, especially with regard to Tiers 1 and 2. Again, Tajfel's contribution to this edited volume comprises several chapters.

1. Social psychology as social science (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978c).
2. The structure of our views about society (Tajfel, 1978f).

Further publications reflect different emphases but deal with substantially the same issues. These include:


8.6.1 Criteria for social psychology

In Phase III, Tajfel propounded a rational, or cognitive approach to the study of man in the social environment. In Phases IV and V, which were largely concerned with research programmes, he did not allude to the principles
of social psychology. In contrast to all previous phases, in Phase VI Tajfel discusses in depth the issues surrounding the discipline of social psychology and presents a very clear conception of what social psychology is, or should be. He elaborates on the contemporary issues confronting social psychologists, the perspective that needs to be adopted and the relationship between social psychology and other disciplines.

Firstly, the discipline of social psychology must address issues arising in the social realities of the contemporary world. The issue which Tajfel selects for special attention is the diversification and differentiation between large-scale human groups. Furthermore, it is claimed that social psychology can provide important and indispensable insights into the world of real conflicts between real social groups.

Secondly, in order to achieve this, social psychology must adopt a level of enquiry and explanation that is directly related to the problems of social behaviour in intergroup contexts. This demands a social perspective which addresses

those aspects of the interaction between people and their social environments, which contribute to the social sharing of behaviour and experience, and of the meaning of both.

(Tajfel and Fraser, 1978b, p.13)

and

how the various social structures, social systems or groups affect an individual's way of viewing the world in which he lives and of acting in it: and how his 'nature' will in turn affect his functioning in groups and the relations between groups

(Tajfel and Fraser, 1978b, p.13).

In order to provide an understanding of the relationship between individuals and society, social psychological theories must not attempt to establish universal laws, nor be so specific as to fail to provide general principles. Rather, it must attempt to determine the relationship between the wider social and cultural context and certain 'basic' psychological processes which shape the individual's understanding of, and actions in, their social environment.
Thirdly, it is this perspective which distinguishes social psychology from other disciplines. The phenomenon of intergroup relations itself is the concern of many disciplines, from evolutionary biology and psychology to sociology, economics and social history. However, a social psychological perspective forms an indispensable part of the analysis of intergroup relations. The origins and contents of social beliefs cannot be conceived of outside the 'objective' social and economic conditions leading to intergroup conflicts. But, nor can they be conceived independently of the social psychological processes which intervene between 'objective' intergroup conflicts and the construction of widely diffused systems of beliefs about the respective ingroups and outgroups. Moreover, once established, these belief systems become causal factors in their own right. The aspects of intergroup relations and the particular problems which social psychology addresses cannot be reduced to any other discipline. Social psychology fills both the social void inherent in psychological perspectives and the psychological vacuum inherent in sociological or economic perspectives.

Tajfel also elaborates explicitly on the nature and role of experimental research in social psychology. Some issues relating to methodology have already been discussed by Tajfel in the previous phases of his work, but this is the first time that they are addressed at the level of social psychology. Furthermore, Tajfel expresses a different view of the role of experimentation in social psychology. Experimentation is considered to have a number of advantages over other methods, associated with the explicit identification of variables, of causal relationship and of predictions which can be tested. It also has a number of disadvantages in that the social sciences are concerned with the self-conscious and reactive nature of human beings. These disadvantages cannot be overcome by increasing experimental sophistication; rather, the solution lies in deriving experiments from clear theoretical principles and conceiving them as social situations. Experimental results cannot provide definitive answers, rather, they provide 'hints'
about social life which must be integrated into our theoretical knowledge. Finally, Tajfel adopts an eclectic perspective with regard to the use of other methods in social psychology, including survey research and participant observation.

The methodological strength and sophistication of social psychology lies not with any single method of research, but with the variety of differing methods available for use.

(Tajfel and Fraser, 1978b, p. 52)

8.6.2 Description of the field: intergroup relations

Tajfel has, by now, been working in the field of intergroup relations for several years. However, it is not until Phase VI that he examines the field as a whole to any great extent. His only concern in Phase III was to establish the legitimacy and importance of the cognitive aspects which intervene between the social situation and intergroup behaviour. In Phase VI, Tajfel develops a theoretical framework which redefines the boundaries of the field. This explicates the characteristics which distinguish interpersonal from intergroup behaviour and examines the social conditions in which individuals will act as members of a group (see Theory below). The field of intergroup relations is described within this framework, contrasting the approach advanced here with the more conventional approaches which dominate the field. Tajfel's main argument is that other theoretical perspectives tend towards the interindividual end of the continua described in the next section (Theory) and are limited to conditions of social mobility. Furthermore, they fail to portray the dialectic conception of the relationship between group membership and social situations propounded by Tajfel.

The individualistic perspectives which are examined most frequently by Tajfel include the work of Adorno et al. (1950) on the authoritarian personality and the frustration-aggression hypothesis of Dollard et al (1939), both of which find their roots in Freud's theory of intergroup behaviour. It should be made clear that Tajfel does not claim that the social context is ignored by these theories. However, it is
argued that they maintain an individualistic perspective in so far as explanations of intergroup behaviour are given in terms of general laws of psychological processes which apply to individuals 'tout court', operating independently of social interactions and their social context. For example, in the frustration-aggression literature, the emphasis is on the individual's motivational state and intergroup behaviour becomes no more than a collection of various individuals acting in synchrony due to the social situation. Similarly, much of the literature on prejudice provides an understanding of intergroup relations in terms of individual patterns of prejudice and the individual's ability to create intergroup distinctions.

Tajfel also reviews two chapters in *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (Lindzey and Aronson, 1969) on social movements and group problem solving and two, then recently published books, on intergroup prejudice and discrimination. Tajfel's review of Toch and Milgram's chapter (1969) on 'Collective behaviour: Crowds and Social Movements' illuminates the dearth of literature on the social psychology of social movements. Tajfel also notes that Kelley and Thibaut's chapter (1969) on group problem solving focuses on individuals within their own group, that is, intragroup problem solving. Again, the lack of an equivalent review on intergroup problem solving illuminates the distinct lack of literature concerned with the solving by social groups at large of the psychological problems set to them by their immersion in a social environment composed of other social groups

(Tajfel, 1978c, p. 48).

Ehrlich (1973) and Kidder and Stewart (1975) are similarly interpersonal, focusing on interaction between individuals in terms of general psychological processes. As such, they fail to provide any theoretical links with the antecedent conditions of prejudice and discrimination; that is, with the social conditions and the existence of various kinds of conflicts between large-scale social groups within a social system.
In comparison to Phase III, Tajfel's comments and review of the field are much more sophisticated and elaborate. As has already been noted, in the previous phase, Tajfel's prime concern was to establish that the cognitive aspects of intergroup relations constitute determining factors in the link between social situations and social behaviour. His critique of the field largely addressed the motivational theories which failed to take into account these cognitive determinants of intergroup behaviour. By Phase VI, the critique is developed such that it also addresses a number of cognitive theories of intergroup relations which have emerged. This critique is founded in a more detailed specification of the social-cognitive factors involved, of their role in intergroup relations, and of the essential features of a theory that purports to provide an understanding and explanation of intergroup phenomena.

Generally speaking, Tajfel maintains that dominant theoretical perspectives provide valid and fruitful approaches to the problems addressed. That is, they either provide useful explanations of individual and interindividual phenomena or they provide valuable insights into the individualistic aspects of intergroup phenomena. However, Tajfel's major concern is that the dominance of these individualistic perspectives in social psychology has led to the neglect of important aspects of intergroup relations. He argues cogently that these approaches, in and of themselves, are inadequate. They fail to address the essential characteristics of, and the problems associated with, the social psychological aspects of large-scale conflicts or social movements. They fail to consider the social psychological aspects of changes in intergroup relations and the long-term processes of positive feedback between social situations and subjective group membership. Furthermore, they fail to demarcate the particular form which intergroup behaviour will take, in both conflictual and non-hostile intergroup relations.

For Tajfel, in order to provide an adequate understanding of these phenomena, it is essential to develop a group (social) perspective which offers a theoretical
integration of the social conditions and the psychological processes involved in intergroup relations. Individuals must be considered as members of a group in a multi-group setting; that is, individual processes must be conceived directly in relation to the social and psychological interdependence within and between groups. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to consider the consensual interpretations of events, the social sharing of ideas about their social causation and the consensus regarding appropriate actions.

It can be seen that the social-psychological approach propounded by Tajfel (Tier 1) is consistently reflected in his analysis of the field. To reiterate; social psychology must address intergroup relations in the social reality of the contemporary world; in order to do this it is necessary to develop a social perspective which illuminates the interrelationships between the social conditions and the psychological processes involved. Tajfel argues that the various individualistic theories which dominate the field fail to fulfil these requirements.

8.6.3 Theory

The theoretical structure in Phase VI is elaborate and complex. In view of the stated requirements for an adequate theory of intergroup relations this is scarcely surprising, as it must not only describe the social context and the psychological processes but it must also provide a theoretical and explanatory integration of these 'social' and 'psychological' aspects. Furthermore, Tajfel's wider theoretical framework locates the present theory within, and yet distinguishes it from, the contemporary field of intergroup relations. It thus extends beyond the bounds of purely intergroup behaviour.

Some of the theoretical concepts presented in Phase VI find their antecedents in Phase III. Both phases address the phenomenon of intergroup relations and focus on people's understanding of changing relationships between groups. However, the research conducted in Phase IV on children's national attitudes raised a number of theoretical problems associated with children's high degree of sensitivity to the social context and to social values. Similarly, the results
of research in Phase V showed that social categorization was both necessary and sufficient to produce intergroup behaviour. This latter finding was interpreted, originally, in terms of social norms. More recently, Tajfel himself suggested that such a general explanation is theoretically inadequate. The theoretical concepts elaborated in Phase VI are founded on the ideas and problems which emerged in these previous phases. Together with the impact of other intellectual and social influences, Tajfel is able to establish a comprehensive and well-structured framework for the understanding of intergroup relations. In order to achieve this, it will be found that the cognitive theory advanced in previous phases is transformed into an explicitly social-psychological theory in every respect. The theory divides neatly into three sections: (A) definition of intergroup behaviour; (B) the specification of four continua; and (C) principles of explanation. The first section provides a social-psychological definition of group membership and explicates its dialectic relationship with the social context. The second section delineates the characteristics of and social conditions for interindividual behaviour in contrast to intergroup behaviour. The third section specifies the social-psychological processes which are involved in intergroup behaviour.

8.6.3.1 The definition of intergroup behaviour: Tajfel provides a social-psychological definition of group membership which, being both flexible and open, is applicable to large social categories as well as to small groups. As such, it is a definition which encompasses the whole field of intergroup relations, including both individualistic and social perspectives (Tier 2). In its simplest form, a group is a body of people who feel that they are a group; who categorize themselves with a high degree of consensus as a group, and who are consensually categorized by others in the same manner. It can be seen that this does not constitute a description of the phenomenon from the perspective of an observer, but rather, provides a phenomenological definition of group membership from the point of view of the actors or participants. In line with Tajfel's views concerning the
relationship between social psychology and other disciplines (Tier 1), the emphasis on social consensus is clearly a social psychological one. Historical, political, social and economic events are crucial in the establishment of the consensus and, once established, interact with it. But it is the social consensus which represents the social psychological aspects of social reality which, in turn, play a determining role in the fate of the group and its relations with other groups.

Furthermore, group membership may involve three components; a cognitive component referring to knowledge or awareness of belonging to a group; evaluative components referring to positive or negative value connotations of the group; and an emotional component directed towards one's own and other related groups. It should be noted that in order to be effective in producing social uniformities in intergroup relations the first component must be cognitive-social, that is, knowledge of belonging must be consensual. The spectre of tautology as a methodological problem that might arise from this definition is dealt with extensively by Tajfel. In brief, the identification of group membership can precede the analysis of social behaviour on the grounds of both internal and external criteria. Internal or 'subjective' criteria denote the self-identification with and the psychological reality of the group for its members. These can be related to external or 'objective' criteria of group membership as used by an outside observer. However, an outside observer, including a social scientist, who lacks sufficient knowledge of the culture, may use criteria for the purpose of social categorization which have no social significance, i.e. which are irrelevant to social behaviour (eg. eye colour). External criteria which are consistently used in relation to a particular group by other groups in a multi-group social organization are more likely to correspond to the internal criteria. Furthermore, consensus regarding internal criteria within a group may often originate from the external criteria used by other groups or from manipulations imposed by an experimenter.
Given this social-psychological definition of group membership, Tajfel's major concern is to conceptualize and to explicate the reciprocal or dialectic relationship between social situations and the expression of subjective group membership in social behaviour. As propounded at Tiers 1 and 2, it is not sufficient to consider the psychological processes and the social conditions as two independent entities. Rather, they are interdependent aspects of intergroup relations. Not all situations will lead to 'group' behaviour; nor do the characteristics of the situation alone determine whether or not it will lead to group behaviour. Similarly, an individual does not possess a stable group identification that is invariably expressed in behaviour. Rather the relationship is governed by three interdependent principles.

a) The number and variety of social situations which an individual will perceive as being relevant in some way to his group membership will increase as a function of the clarity or intensity of the cognitive, evaluative and affective components of his or her group memberships.

b) Some social situations will force most individuals involved to act in terms of their group membership, when their initial group identification is weak.

c) There is positive feedback between the first two principles. That is, social situations which force group behaviour will enhance the significance of, or even create, new group identifications. In turn, many people will perceive a greater number and variety of social situations as relevant to their group membership.

8.6.3.2 The specification of four continua: In this section of the theory, Tajfel attempts to establish the empirical and theoretical distinctions between social situations in which individuals behave towards each other as individuals and those in which they behave as members of separate groups which stand in certain kinds of relations towards each other

(Tajfel, 1978b, p.7).
This is done in terms of four continua, which describe and contrast interindividual behaviour with intergroup behaviour.

(a) Interpersonal-intergroup continuum:
Tajfel elaborates first on the distinction between social behaviour which is inter-individual and social behaviour which expresses an individual's group membership. Tajfel constructs a continuum running from 'purely' interpersonal to 'purely' intergroup. The interpersonal pole denotes social encounters between two or more people in which all interactions are determined by their personal relationships and individual characteristics. The extreme of this pole is a hypothetical absurdity in that no instance can conceivably be found in real life. The assigning of social categories, together with their associated expectations, will play a role in even the most personal relationship. The intergroup pole denotes any behaviour involving two or more people which is wholly determined by their membership of different social groups or categories. This pole corresponds to real life situations such as opposing armies in wartime which have had no personal contact. It also corresponds to the 'minimal' group experiments (Phase V) which, in terms of the continuum, might be considered a 'maximal' group in that the imposed anonymity of the outgroup enforced a depersonalization (or deindividualisation) of the outgroup members.

(b) Variability-uniformity continuum:
A second continuum, relating to the first, addresses the variability or uniformity of the attitudes and behaviour of the ingroup. Towards the interpersonal pole there will be greater variability of ingroup members' behaviour towards the outgroup. Conversely, towards the intergroup pole there will be greater uniformity.

(c) Individual-social category continuum:
A third continuum addresses the ingroup's conceptions and treatment of the outgroup members as distinct individuals or as undifferentiated items in a social category. This is simultaneously reflected in all three components of group membership, cognitive, evaluative and emotional.
(d) Social mobility-social change continuum:
The fourth continuum describes the social situations which are likely to promote intergroup behaviour in terms of the subjective structure of beliefs about or consensual interpretations of a particular social system. This continuum relates to Tajfel's earlier ideas concerning the role of cognitive structures in the search for coherence presented in Phase III. In Phase VI, Tajfel is less concerned with the attributions which individuals make in order to reach an understanding of the changing relationships between groups and more concerned with the role of consensual belief systems in relation to the structure of society in promoting social change. Furthermore, the notion of social creativity introduced in Phase III is developed extensively in relation to these belief systems. An analysis of the consensual beliefs is essential if Tajfel's aims, to provide a social-psychological theory which addresses the social conditions of intergroup behaviour, are to be fulfilled. (see Tiers 1 and 2).

In situations of 'social mobility' subjective conceptions of easy and flexible individual movement from one group to another promote interpersonal behaviour. In situations of 'social change' the boundaries between groups are sharply drawn and immutable, such that individual movements between groups are believed to be restricted or impossible, thus promoting intergroup behaviour. It can be seen that this continuum describes the social psychological conditions which have a causal function in relation to the other three. The structure of beliefs on the social mobility-social change continuum is a powerful determinant of acting towards members of outgroups on an interpersonal or intergroup basis respectively.

Other theories in the field of intergroup relations have failed to take these consensual beliefs into account and, as a reflection of their own American cultural context, have assumed the conditions of social mobility. Their relevance is thus restricted to interpersonal social behaviour and does not transfer to conditions of social change.
### Table 8.6: Summary of the principles of distinction

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<th>Interindividual Behaviour</th>
<th>Intergroup Behaviour</th>
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<td>Continuum 3:</td>
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<td>Dependent on shared ingroup affiliation of individuals and shared interpretation of relations between groups</td>
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<td>Continuum 4:</td>
<td>Social mobility (structure of beliefs promoting interpersonal behaviour)</td>
<td>Social Change/Social Movement (structure of beliefs promoting intergroup behaviour)</td>
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Drawing on the work of Heberle (1968), Toch (1965) and Goldhamer (1968), Tajfel elaborates on the social psychological characteristics of social change and social movements. In these situations individuals believe that they are restricted by the inflexible boundaries between social groups. In order to improve or change his/her social position or conditions of life, the individual must act together with his or her group as a whole. This gives rise to social movements which are defined in socio-psychological terms as
efforts by large numbers of people who define themselves and are also often defined by others as a group, to solve collectively a problem they feel they have in common; and which is perceived to arise from their relations with other groups (Tajfel, 1987c, p. 46).

Thus, wherever there are changes in the nature of relations between large scale groups there will also exist social movements aiming to promote or to restrict such change.

However, Tajfel does not leave the analysis of the structure of beliefs here. The structure of beliefs about the social system have at least two social psychological attributes that determine different forms of social behaviour. These refer to the perceived legitimacy-illegitimacy and the perceived stability-instability of the social system. Social movements will arise when the social system is perceived by one or more groups as illegitimate and/or unstable. These social movements will aim either to create or to prevent social change. For example, a society in which the rigid social stratifications are perceived as both illegitimate and unstable by some groups provides the conditions in which the 'social change' structure of beliefs will develop.

Tajfel also examines three other variants of social reality in which the 'social change' structure of beliefs develops and, as a consequence, leads to intergroup behaviour, as described above. Firstly, even when social mobility is possible, social groups, such as the Welsh nationalists, may create a social change structure of beliefs, such that their group membership becomes relevant to a greater variety of social situations. Secondly, when an individual's interests and way of life are threatened by an outgroup they may create clear-cut and impenetrable social dichotomies, as was the case in the conception and treatment of Jews in pre-war Germany. Both these situations involve a discrepancy between social reality and social beliefs and therefore demand a considerable degree of social creativity. Once these new ideologies are created they may well become established in social reality, forming a rigid
and objective social stratification. Thirdly, there may be an explicit conflict of interest between groups which does not relate to the social structure or to enduring differences between the groups, as is the case in competitive sport.

This application would not have been possible in terms of the rudimentary ideas presented in previous phases. This section of the theory constitutes a major development in Tajfel's thinking. The brief consideration of the differences between intragroup and intergroup behaviour in Phase III is elaborated to form a major part of the theoretical framework in Phase VI. It can be seen that these continua describe a space in which the various theories of intergroup behaviour can be located; they serve to describe the dimensions of the field as perceived by Tajfel. As previously discussed (Tier 2), the dominant theories in the field tend towards the interindividual poles of the continua. In contrast, Tajfel attempts to establish a theory which addresses the intergroup poles of the continua. Consequently, the emphasis throughout Phase VI is placed on the characteristics, social conditions and psychological processes of intergroup behaviour.

8.6.3.3 The principles of explanation: The previous section was concerned with the characteristics of, and the social conditions for, intergroup behaviour. In this section, the social-psychological processes pertaining to intergroup relations will be presented. This fulfils Tajfel's second criteria for an adequate theory of intergroup relations. It is also associated more closely with the theoretical concepts presented in the previous phases of Tajfel's work. In Phase VI, Tajfel integrates and develops extensively the theoretical framework which directly addresses problems emerging from research findings in Phases IV and V, as well as the social realities of the contemporary world. This is done in terms of four interlinked concepts: social categorization, social identity, social comparison and psychological distinctiveness.

In order to achieve a clear presentation of these concepts, it is necessary to look at each concept separately. It will then be possible to examine the interrelationships between social categorization and social identity, social
identity and social comparison, and finally the achievement of group differentiation.

(a) Social categorization:
This is here defined as
the ordering of (the) social environment in terms of groupings of persons in a manner which makes sense to the individual. It helps to structure the causal understanding of the social environment and thus it helps as a guide for action

(Tajfel, 1978d, p. 61).

The general cognitive mechanisms of categorization is used by individuals in order to systematize and simplify the social environment in much the same way as they do the physical environment. For example, the accentuation of perceived or judged differences between physical objects is equivalent to the general features of social stereotyping. However, categorizations of the social environment are more often related to value differentials. The cognitive and behavioural effects of social categorizations must be considered in relation to the socially derived values associated with the criteria for categorization. Positive or negative evaluations tend to enhance the subjective differences between categories and the subjective similarities within categories on certain dimensions. This is of particular importance in the context of intergroup relations in that social categorizations form distinctions between 'us' and 'them'.

(b) Social identity:
This is defined as
that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership

(Tajfel, 1978d, p. 63).

This concept is limited intentionally to those aspects of an individual's view of himself or herself which are constituted by the membership of certain social groups or categories and which are relevant to social behaviour in intergroup situations.
Tajfel uses Festinger's theory of social comparison processes (1954) as a starting point and he then proceeds to make explicit the differences and similarities between Festinger's use of the concept and his own use of the concept in the context of intergroup relations.

Tajfel does not elaborate on the actual process of social comparison beyond restating Festinger's hypotheses—that there exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his own opinions and abilities (which is done) by comparison respectively with the opinions and abilities of others (Tajfel, 1978d, p. 64-65).

His main concern is to argue that this comparative principle has a wider range of application than Festinger suggests and that it is fundamental to intergroup relations. Festinger limits the employment of social comparison processes to situations in which objective, non-social means of comparison are not available, and focuses his discussion on individuals comparing themselves with other individuals. The theory thus addresses within group effects of social comparison where no objective means of comparison are available. Furthermore, Festinger suggests that intergroup comparisons may be made on a phantasy level, but rarely in reality.

Tajfel takes issue with the assumptions and restrictions adopted by Festinger. Firstly, 'objective, non-social' means of comparison are social in that they only acquire significance in relation to their social setting. Secondly, social reality can be as objective as non-social reality. Objectivity cannot be defined in terms of 'social' or 'non-social'. Rather it is defined in terms of the awareness that alternatives exist or, conversely, that there is high social consensus concerning the nature of a phenomenon. Certainty is no doubt more easily attained through physical than through social means of testing. The latter, however, is not as subservient to the former as Festinger assumes. A high social consensus will often actually obviate the need for a physical means of testing. Thirdly, social comparisons with regard to group characteristics are made on the basis of an
'objective' social reality comprising a multi-group situation. The characteristics of any group achieve significance mostly in relation to perceived differences from other groups, and the value connotations of these differences.

d) Social categorization and social identity:
Given the above definition of social identity, social categorization serves
as a system or orientation which helps to create and define the individual's place in society.

(Tajfel, 1978d, p. 63)

Social Identity can only be defined through the effects of social categorizations which structure an individual's social environment into his own group and other groups. This conception of social categorization and social identity allows Tajfel to elaborate on several consequences of group membership. Individuals will maintain and seek membership of groups which contribute to the positive aspects of their social identity. Individuals will leave groups which do not contribute to the positive aspects of their social identity (in conditions of social mobility) unless leaving the group is impossible for 'objective' reasons or unless it conflicts with important values which are themselves an important part of the individual's self-image (ie. in conditions of social change). In these circumstances, individuals may change their interpretation of the attributes of the group and/or engage in social actions which would lead to desirable changes in the situation.

e) Social identity and social comparison:
Social comparison is the comparative principle which links social categorization with social identity. An individual's social identity, his or her reinterpretations and his social actions only acquire meaning in relation to, or in comparison with, other groups.

No group lives alone - all groups in society live in the midst of other groups.

(Tajfel, 1978d, p. 64)
The characteristics of one's own group as a whole nearly always acquire significance through comparison with other groups within the social system. Value connotations, positive or negative, of group membership can only be derived through comparisons with other relevant specific groups. Consequently, an individual's social identity is defined through the effects of social comparisons made between the individual's own group and other groups. And these groups are delineated by the system of social categorization employed to structure the social environment. This approach to social identity presents a dynamic conception which is derived, in a relational or comparative manner, from an individual's group membership within a multi-group social system.

f) Psychological group distinctiveness or group differentiation:
The concept of psychological group distinctiveness cannot be considered in isolation from social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In order for the social group to contribute to aspects of the individual's social identity which are valued positively, it is essential that positively valued psychological distinctions from other groups are either maintained or created. Social comparisons between groups focus on establishing this psychological distinctiveness. The social group must protect the social identity of its members by maintaining, creating or enhancing its positively valued distinctiveness from other groups.

Tajfel draws on evidence from both the 'minimal' intergroup experiments and from analyses of 'real' social contexts in order to establish the legitimacy and prevalence of psychological group distinctiveness. This reflects Tajfel's assertion, expressed at Tier 1, that psychological theory must relate both to experimental research and to social reality. His emphasis on experimental research, as opposed to research employing other methodological approaches, is a reflection of his own sphere of research. He reviews first the experiments reported in Phase V (Tajfel, Flament, Billing and Bundy, 1971), which found that the most significant form of intergroup behaviour was the achievement of a maximum difference in favour of the ingroup.
He also reviews subsequent experiments employing the same methodological paradigm (Billig, 1972; Billig and Tajfel, 1973). These demonstrated, further, that social categorization into groups, as opposed to interindividual similarity, result in intergroup behaviour which achieves positive differentiation in favour of the ingroup. Tajfel et al. (1971) originally explained these results in terms of social norms (Phase V). However, by Phase VI such an explanation is considered too general and lacking in heuristic value in that they could also 'explain' the adoption of different response strategies. The theoretical framework developed in Phase VI explains why these particular norms are chosen by subjects in this particular set of conditions to guide intergroup behaviour. Group differentiation constitutes, under some conditions, the major outcome of the sequence social categorization-social identity-social comparison.

The importance of group differentiation is also found in a variety of social situations. Tajfel examines the notions of race and, drawing on the work of Rex (1969), suggests that it is a shorthand expression which is used to create, reflect, enhance and perpetuate the perceived differences in value between human groups or individuals. It thus serves to increase the psychological distinctiveness of the relevant social categories. This establishment of psychological distinctiveness is also found in various other features of cultural and social relations. Fishman's (1968) analysis of language showed that 'ideological positions' can either magnify minor differences or minimize major differences in the realms of language, religion, culture, race etc. Similarly, nationalism, which has become one of the forces towards change, can be seen as the drive of smaller ethnic groups to establish a clear and distinctive social identity. Tajfel's theoretical framework argues that

the reasons for this cognitive, behavioural and evaluative intergroup differentiation is in the need that the individuals have to provide social meaning through social identity to the intergroup situation, experimental or any other; and that this need is fulfilled through the creation of intergroup differences when such differences do not in fact
exist, or the attribution of value to, and the enhancement of, whatever differences do exist.

(Tajfel, 1978e, p. 86)

In comparison to Phase V, Social Categorization continues to play an essential role in intergroup relations, but is re-integrated with the concepts of evaluation and personal integrity employed in Phases III and IV. This is done in terms of socially derived value differentials and social identity. An important development in Tajfel's thinking is the introduction of the concept of social comparison which provides the link between social categorization and social identity. The integration of these concepts provides a framework within which the function of psychological group distinctiveness can be explained and understood more clearly.

8.6.4 Domain of application

8.6.4.1: Relative deprivation: Having established the social-psychological conditions for intergroup behaviour, and the social-psychological processes involved, Tajfel integrates the various theoretical concepts by applying this theoretical framework to the issue of relative deprivation. This idea would not have been possible in terms of the rudimentary ideas presented during the previous phases.

This application offers a suitable exemplar as the conceptual problems encountered are also relevant to the more general problems of intergroup behaviour. In Tajfel's view, they require a social psychological theory of the social uniformities of intergroup behaviour. Tajfel draws heavily on the work of Gurr (1970), who offers a sociological perspective on relative deprivations, in order to elaborate on its social psychological aspects. In other social sciences the concept of relative deprivation often serves as an independent variable in the study of social processes and social movements. In accordance with Tajfel's views on the relationship between social psychology and other disciplines (Tier 1) it is the job of social psychology to reach an understanding of its genesis and functioning. This is done by linking the concepts of social identity and social
comparisons with the inter-individual-intergroup continuum.

a) The interindividual pole:
At the extremity of the individual end of the continuum relative deprivation is both interpersonal and intragroup. In this instance, Festinger's version of social comparison is directly relevant; individuals compare themselves with other individuals who are similar to themselves and hence are more likely to be members of their own group.

b) The transition between interindividual and intergroup:
Tajfel takes the middle of the interindividual-intergroup continuum to reiterate his criticisms of other theoretical perspectives on intergroup behaviour and to illuminate the social issues which his theory addresses (Tier 2). In the transition between largely interpersonal and largely intergroup relative deprivation, social comparisons which are interpersonal and intragroup can be assumed to serve as independent variables for intergroup behaviour. For example, interpersonal and intragroup social comparisons lead to certain forms of intergroup behaviour through the existence of assumed individual motivational states. Such an explanation of intergroup behaviour can be applied to some people who display hostile intergroup behaviour in a great variety of situations but is still open to the theoretical criticisms iterated in the earlier section (Tier 3). Moreover, this explanation has also been applied to intergroup behaviour involving large numbers of people over long periods of time; that is, to those conditions in which most people display hostile intergroup behaviour. Tajfel examines the work of L. Berkowitz (1972) in some detail in order to illuminate the difficulties encountered by this 'social mobility' explanation of intergroup behaviour and suggests that it has led to a narrowing of the focus of attention and to a restriction in the scope of social psychological theories concerned with large-scale problems of intergroup behaviour and social change.

c) The intergroup pole:
Tajfel examines the group extreme of the continuum in order to make explicit a theoretical alternative. At this extreme,
relative deprivation involves intergroup social comparisons leading to intergroup behaviour. This is illustrated using two very different examples in which the social conditions restrict individual mobility and which cannot be easily framed within an interindividual approach. The first refers to studies conducted in South Africa by K. Danziger (1963) and Geber (1972), on the aspirations of African boys. Both studies found that the awareness of a common group fate determined by race focused schoolboys' aspirations away from individual goals and interindividual comparisons towards group aspirations and intergroup comparisons. The second example refers to the Protestant-Catholic relationship in Northern Ireland. The social and political conditions are very different from the previous example in that the people of both groups are very similar. In this case, the salience of ingroup affiliations can only be explained with reference to comparisons made with the outgroup in their social and traditional context.

We have seen that in the case of interpersonal relative deprivation social comparisons are made with individuals who are subjectively similar. In the case of intergroup relative deprivation comparisons are more often made with groups which are highly dissimilar. This is necessary, in some conditions, in order to maintain or create a positive and distinctive image of the ingroup and hence a positive social identity.

Tajfel then relates these social comparisons at the group extreme of the continuum with the social conditions in which intergroup behaviour occurs. Where the perceived intergroup relations are perceived as legitimate and stable comparison groups will tend to be similar to the ingroup. Where intergroup relations start to be perceived as illegitimate and unstable new dimensions of comparability with highly dissimilar groups emerge. This demands a 'dynamic', as opposed to a 'static', view of similarity and comparability which depends upon shifting patterns of social conditions, contexts, influence, ideology, beliefs and attitudes in a constantly changing social environment (Tajfel, 1978d, p. 76).
These comparisons do not only exist at the phantasy level as Festinger claimed, but can be powerful determinants of intergroup behaviour and social action. Returning to the African studies, the development and diffusion of group oriented political ideologies become at one and the same time the social psychological process of 'social change' and a powerful determinant of 'objective' social change.

8.6.4.2 The various forms of intergroup differentiation:
Tajfel elaborates further on the various forms of intergroup behaviour which are likely to emerge in conditions of social change. Other theories in this field have not been able to provide a comprehensive framework that indicates the direction or mode of intergroup behaviour which will emerge, given certain conditions. Similarly, although Tajfel claimed that the forms of intergroup behaviour depend upon the cognitive structures and personal integrity of group members, these ideas were not developed sufficiently in Phase III to indicate the particular modes of intergroup behaviour that might occur. Within Tajfel's current theoretical framework in Phase VI it is possible to identify the particular psychological problems which confront social groups in their relations with other groups and to identify the possible psychological solutions which can be adopted by the individuals concerned. Although this is perhaps the weakest part of Tajfel's thinking, his theoretical framework provides some indications of the particular forms of social behaviour, which individuals and groups will adopt when it is applied to particular intergroup situations. In conditions of social mobility, if the group fails to provide a positive social identity, the individual will leave the group. In conditions of social change, in which the individual is aware that he or she cannot easily leave the group, a positive social identity can only be acquired by changing the relationships between groups or preserved by resisting such changes. In the former, an individual acts as an individual; in the latter, an individual acts as a member of the group.

This analysis becomes more complicated when Tajfel considers the differences in the psychological problems confronting consensually superior and consensually inferior
groups. In conditions of social change, however, there are various solutions which depend upon the groups relative status and the particular psychological problems which confront the group.

a) Consensually superior groups in conditions of social change:

Tajfel first considers the conditions in which the group's superior status is threatened by another group. In these circumstances, the superior group will intensify the existing distinctions and will attempt to create new conditions, which enable its group members to preserve and enhance their psychological distinctiveness. Secondly, the superior status of the group may also be threatened by a conflict of values; its superiority is seen by some members as being, in some ways, illegitimate. In this case, new justifications and ideologies must be created and diffused in order to maintain the status quo.

b) Consensually inferior groups in condition of social change:

Conditions of social change may be associated with psychological conflict of values inherent in leaving the group and/or fear of powerful social sanctions. In these conditions, the problems of social identity confronting the inferior group will only express themselves in social behaviour if there is some awareness that alternatives to the existing social structure are conceivable or attainable. Tajfel explores three possible solutions to these problems. Firstly, the inferior group may attempt to gain the consensually positively valued attributes of the superior group. This would involve actions and reinterpretations which break down the group differentiations in such a manner that the inferior group is assimilated into the superior group. If this is not possible, the inferior group may attempt to re-evaluate the inferior characteristics so that they contribute to a positive social identity. An example of this second type of solution is the re-evaluation of black as a negative attribute in terms of 'black is beautiful'. Thirdly, the inferior group may participate in social action that creates new ideologies and group characteristics with
positively valued distinctiveness. One recent example is the re-creation of a 'Welsh social identity'. As social identity is dependent upon social comparisons, these solutions will only be successful if the superior group accepts them. It is in these conditions that conflict between comparative social identities may lead to intense hostility in intergroup attitudes and intergroup discrimination.

TABLE 8.6: SUMMARY OF PHASE VI

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Address social realities of the contemporary world
Social level of inquiry and explanation which provides an understanding of the relationship between the social and cultural context and the psychological processes of the individual
The relationship between social psychology with other disciplines and the indispensable role of social psychology in the study of intergroup relations
The role of experimental research in relation to theoretical knowledge in social psychology

FIELD
Intergroup Relations:
The limitations of individualistic theories of intergroup behaviour
The requirements of a social-psychological theory of intergroup behaviour; integration of the social conditions and psychological processes involved in intergroup relations

THEORY
Group membership - a social psychological definition - dependent on subjective and objective social consensus which has cognitive, evaluative and emotional components
Dialectic relationship between social situations and subjective group membership

Characteristics of social behaviour:
- Interpersonal-Intergroup continuum
- Variability-Uniformity continuum
- Individual-Social category continuum

Conditions for social behaviour:
- Social mobility-Social change continuum of belief systems
- Legitimacy-illegitimacy continuum
- Stability-instability continuum

Forms of social behaviour:
- Individual movement-social movement
- Social creativity of new conditions, ideologies and group attributes
- Intensification and justification of group differentiations
- Reinterpretation and reevaluation of group attributes

Social psychological processes:
- Social categorization
- Social identity
- Social comparison
- Psychological group distinctiveness

DOMAIN OF APPLICATION
Relative deprivation
Social movements and intergroup conflict:
- Consensually superior groups
- Consensually inferior groups/minority groups
- Real world intergroup relations
8.7 PHASES IIB: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1961-1964

During the same period in which Tajfel was studying the role of classification and value in the perception of people he also conducted research which examined differences in the style of judgment adopted by individuals. The following three publications can be identified with this 'phase':-


The first paper published by Bruner and Tajfel (1961) distinguished between narrow categorizers and broad categorizers. This was also found to be associated with intelligence and led to the following two papers which examined correlations with personality.

Not surprisingly, some features of these papers display consistencies with the main body of Tajfel's work. It is also worth noting that categorization style was identified through subjects' responses to changes in the stimulus situation. However, the main purpose of this research reflects a transient concern with individual differences, personality and judgmental style. These issues were soon left to one side and subsequently dropped as Tajfel turned to address the more social and large-scale issues of prejudice and intergroup relations.

8.8 PHASE VII: REFLECTIONS AND REINTERPRETATIONS

During the period in which Tajfel establishes and consolidates the theory of intergroup relations following Phase VI some of his writings are also of a reflective nature. These illuminate the role of his personal experiences and professional associations in relation to his academic work. They also contain material regarding Tajfel's own reflections on the evolution of his thinking.
These tend to focus on the continuities which can be traced through the various phases of his intellectual career. The following publications can be included within this 'phase':


In 1977, Cohen published a series of interviews with eminent psychologists, which attempted to reveal the differences between and the assumptions underlying their different approaches and beliefs. He also wanted to relate these to the psychologists' personality. In his interview with Tajfel, the questions asked and, more importantly, Tajfel's responses, are highly germane to the present study. Furthermore, in later comments, Tajfel suggests that this interview initiated further reflections on the intellectual influences which had shaped his own work (Tajfel, 1980a, 1981a). The second article (Tajfel, 1980a) was published in an edited volume of essays in honour of J.S. Bruner. Tajfel here acknowledges his debt to Bruner and traces Bruner's influence, not only during the period of their early association, but also throughout his whole intellectual career. Tajfel highlights three main aspects of his approach in this respect; his functional and comparative or relativistic approach, the role of differentiation in 'physical' and 'social' perception, and the interrelationship between individuals and their social context.

In 1981(a), Tajfel published the only book for which he was the sole author. It comprises, very largely, previously published articles or chapters, the majority of which were easily accessible. Tajfel justifies the book on both personal and academic grounds as fulfilling three aims: to reflect and to make explicit the convergence of his personal experiences.
with the direction of his academic work; to expose the emerging unity and a widening of perspective that might be useful to others; and to locate this progression alongside parallel developments in European social psychology.

Not surprisingly, this book contains many of the most important articles written by Tajfel. However, there are some notable differences between the edited versions presented in the book and the original publications. Moreover, Tajfel does not arrange the material in chronological order. Rather, he sets the emergent perspective (1972a,1979a) on social psychology and social processes in Part 1. Part II is a selection of material published between 1957 and 1981, tracing the shift of emphasis from studies on perceptual judgment to studies of social stereotypes. Part III includes the experience of prejudice and studies on the attitudes of children. Finally, the emergent theory of intergroup relations is presented in Part IV. The organization of the material is based on both the subject matter and the chronological sequence of the publications. To some extent, it actually disguises important factors in the evolution of Tajfel's perspective by setting the goal and providing the solutions before asking the questions, and stating the initial problems from which this perspective emerged.

Furthermore, the book is necessarily a selection of articles covering twenty-five years of Tajfel's academic career. As such, it identifies major stages in the development of Tajfel's thinking, but does not always provide the links by which the development can be traced. It is, essentially, an incomplete picture, which both disguises the problems and omits the emergence of solutions. This having been said, Tajfel does give an introduction to each of the four parts which highlight the continuities in his work and which outline the background context in which the studies were conducted. The first chapter of the book—'The development of a perspective' also discusses some of the personal issues which influenced the direction of his research and theorizing as well as the emergence of the 'social dimension' in European social psychology.
The fourth article, 'social stereotypes and social groups' (1981b), examines the phenomenon of stereotypes and illuminates essential features of the changes in Tajfel's perspective. These changes, in Tajfel's own terms, represent a widening of perspective from a purely cognitive approach to an explicitly social one. The emergent social perspective offers a radical alternative to traditional approaches, while simultaneously incorporating the cognitive aspects of Tajfel's earlier framework.

These four publications contain material which shed light on the evolution and transformation of Tajfel's work. They refer to both the work itself and to the personal and intellectual influences which Tajfel thought to be important. They are germane, therefore, to the present analysis taken as a whole. As such, this material will be incorporated into the following chapters on the continuities and discontinuities, problems and solutions, and the cultural, social and intellectual influences in the development of Tajfel's thinking.
CHAPTER 9
CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES:
PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS

9.1 CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

9.1.1 Object of study
9.1.2 Method, theory and social reality
9.1.3 The comparative or relative perspective
9.1.4 The functional approach
9.1.5 The transition from psychological reductionism to social psychology
9.1.6 Objectivity and values in the social sciences
9.1.7 The locus of explanation
9.1.8 The cognitive component
9.1.9 The evaluative component
9.1.10 The motivational component

9.2 PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE

9.2.1 From perceptual over-estimation to the accentuation of differences (Phase I)
9.2.2 Social perception: From the physical to the social environment (The transition from phase I to phase II)
9.2.3 Maintaining a reductionist perspective (Phase II)
9.2.4 First steps towards a more social social psychology (Phase III)
9.2.5 From social perception towards intergroup relations (The transition from phase II to phase III)
9.2.6 New problems for a theory of intergroup relations (Phase IV)
9.2.7 Finding the base-line conditions for intergroup differentiation (Phase V)
9.2.8 Problems in search of a theory (The transition from phase V to phase VI)
9.2.9 Phase VI

9.2.9.1 Social categorization, social values and the psychological processes of intergroup behaviour
9.2.9.2 Social conditions and social beliefs
9.2.9.3 The discipline of social psychology and the field of intergroup behaviour

Studying the transformation of social representations is a complex affair. It involves, necessarily, a preoccupation with change, whilst simultaneously recognizing the importance of stability over time. In the current context, this involves studying the dynamic relationships
among the principles of social psychology, the field and object of study, the theoretical principles and their domain of application.

In the previous chapter, I presented a detailed account of the content of Tajfel's work in terms of six phases. In this Chapter, I shall identify the major continuities and discontinuities across these phases and go on to explore the problems and solutions that characterize the development of Tajfel's thinking. In Chapter 10, I shall examine the interdependence of these developments with the intellectual and social context of which Tajfel was a part.

A preliminary assessment of Tajfel's work may be constructed to stress either the continuity of themes on the one hand or the shifts in perspective on the other hand. This is illustrated by the quotations below, which are taken from the research interviews:

I don't know that there were any major changes....it was one thing he (Tajfel) often said, that there was an underlying question behind all his work and this was in the early work on social perception and later in intergroup relations. It is the same question, which is how is genocide possible? And so all of his work, I think, was in some way or other addressed to that problem—the problems of prejudice, the problems of the prejudice of one group, group members, against another group.

(Billig, Interview)

I think he always saw his work as social (and) therefore related to group processes.

(Turner, Interview)

He has always been very clear that he regarded a cognitive perspective as essential to social psychology, with an emphasis on the social; in order to understand the complexities of human social behaviour it had to be cognitive and, at the same time, stressing (it's) social determination.

(Turner, Interview)

First of all, (Tajfel's work) became more social. And the way it became more social was in the work on minimal categorization paradigm. And then, subsequently, it became concerned explicitly with intergroup phenomena, which was only implicit in the early work. He says in his '81 book that he can see strands in some of the major intergroup work in the
early experiments. But, if you actually read those things, they're really about individuals categorizing the world and even the stimuli are pretty asocial, the lines, the coins, etcetera. He did some stuff in the 60's on immigrants and so on, and perception of nationalities, but he really didn't get into what it means to be in a group and how that affects your behaviour towards other groups until those minimal categorization experiments.

(Brown, Interview)

Both Billig and Turner stress the continuity in Tajfel's work. Whilst Billig argues that a single question dominated all of Tajfel's work, Turner emphasizes the cognitive and social themes. In contrast, Brown stresses the discontinuities between Tajfel's early studies on social perception and his later work on intergroup relations, the latter being construed as more social.

However, in order to understand the transformation of social representations within Tajfel's work, it is necessary to construct a more detailed analysis that highlights and integrates both the continuities and discontinuities. This is facilitated by examining the similarities and differences between the six phases of research presented in Chapter 8. It will be recalled that, in Phase I, Tajfel focused on the accentuation of differences in the perceptual judgment of physical objects. In Phase II, he was explicitly concerned with stereotyping and with the role of categorization and value in the perceptual judgment of the social environment. In Phase III, Tajfel elaborated his framework with reference to prejudice, making the important transition between the study of social perception and the study of intergroup relations. In Phase IV he concentrated on the development of national attitudes in children. In Phase V, he and his collaborators examined the role of social categorization in producing a differential response to members of one's own group and to members of another group. Finally, in Phase VI, a comprehensive theory of intergroup relations is developed, which makes explicit the roles of social categorization, social identity and social comparisons in the context of social change, and which expands his initial framework to include social beliefs concerning both the structure of
society and the legitimacy and stability of intergroup relations in society.

In the first section of this Chapter I shall educe ten themes concerning stability and change in Tajfel's work across these six phases. The identification of continuities and discontinuities, however, is but one step in the analysis of how a theory is transformed. In order to construct an understanding of the evolution of a social representational system we must go beyond a disjointed or linear representation of change in which one set of statements is simply compared to another. In order to understand the transformation of social representations it is necessary to embrace a dynamic or spiral representation of change which allows one to examine the interdependent evolution of their content and structure. This is achieved by focusing on the problems addressed by Tajfel and the construction of their solutions. Thus, in the second part of this chapter, I examine the problems and provisional solutions which characterize each phase, together with the transitions between successive phases in the development of Tajfel's theory. It will be seen that the problems he tackled are not isolated tasks but, rather, that they are constructed within the system of social representations. Similarly, the solutions do not simply resolve the problem but, rather, they require the gradual reconstruction of the social representational system as a whole.

9.1 CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

In the first section of this Chapter I identify some general continuities and discontinuities in the development of Tajfel's thinking. This is presented in terms of ten themes which reflect both stability and change across the six phases. These include the object of study; the interrelationship between method, theory and social reality; the comparative or relative perspective; the functional approach; a transition from psychological reductionism to social psychology; objectivity and values in the social sciences; the locus of explanation; and the cognitive, evaluative and motivational components of intergroup relations.
These themes provide an overview of Tajfel's intellectual career and serve to indicate the central aspects of the various transformations which need to be explained. This requires not only an analysis of problems and their solutions but also an analysis of the intellectual and social influences in Tajfel's career.

9.1.1 Object of study

The most obvious series of changes concerns the phenomena which the various theories and research projects address. The object of study changes quite dramatically from the perceptual judgment of specific physical objects under tightly controlled laboratory conditions to various forms of intergroup behavior and social action that abound in society.

9.1.2 Method, theory and social reality

The change in the object of study is accompanied by a shift of emphasis in regard to the roles of method, theory and social reality in social psychology. Tajfel's early paper on the perceptual judgment of physical dimensions epitomizes the experimental tradition with little or no reference to either theory or social reality. It is followed shortly by a series of papers in which there is a greater emphasis on the importance of theory. In his study of person perception and stereotypes, for example, he advocates the need for good theory in both the design and the interpretation of experimental studies. By Phase III, he argues that social psychological theories of prejudice and large-scale intergroup phenomena should address, directly, the social issues that arise in modern society. Although the research programme on the development of national attitudes (Phase IV) is theoretically weak, the results highlight the significance of the social context in the study of psychological processes relating to large-scale phenomena. Such considerations are almost entirely absent in the experimental studies of Phase V, which attempt to determine the minimal condition for intergroup discrimination. These experiments are conducted in a societal vacuum of sorts. However, by Phase VI, Tajfel advocates the need for a social psychological theory that addresses the social realities of intergroup conflict and
social change. Furthermore, one of the strengths of social psychology is seen to be its methodological pluralism as opposed to an adherence to any single revered method of investigation such as the experiment.

9.1.3 The comparative or relative perspective

The comparative perspective which Tajfel adopted is one of the most significant features of his work and is evident in nearly every phase of his theorizing and research. The perception or judgment of a phenomenon, be it a physical object, an abstract attribute or a social group, is always relative to other phenomena. An object is not perceived in isolation or in any absolute sense; rather, it is perceived or judged in comparison to other relevant objects. This approach to the problems of social perception and intergroup relations is fundamental to the representation of the phenomena concerned and to the construction of theoretical explanations of the substantive issues involved.

The comparative perspective is evident in Tajfel's early publication on the role of value in perceptual judgments of magnitude (Tajfel, 1957).

Perceptual judgments of physical objects are affected... by the background of perceived relationships between a particular stimulus and all other stimuli in the same series.

(Tajfel, 1957, p.195)

The principle of 'accentuation of differences' developed in the field of perceptual overestimation (Phase I) is an essentially comparative criterion.

The application of this principle to the problems of social perception and stereotypes (Phase II) was justified on the grounds of their comparative nature. Furthermore, it provided a framework for their subsequent reinterpretation. Comparison begins to take on a new significance in the considerations of prejudice (Phase III) and national attitudes (Phase IV). Social categorization is dependent upon distinguishing between one's own group and another group. Similarly, preferential evaluations for one's own group are made relative to other groups.
It is somewhat surprising, then, that the significance of comparisons was not immediately apparent in the social categorization experiments (Phase V). The emphasis on the cognitive process of social categorization per se and the explanation of results in terms of social norms obviated the need for any theoretical principle of comparison. However, the comparative perspective re-emerges in Phase VI and, moreover, is recognised quite explicitly within the theoretical framework itself. The process of social comparison is described and constitutes an essential component of the structure of the theory of intergroup relations. It affords the integration of the psychological processes of social categorization and social identity, which together provide an understanding of the human potential for differentiating between groups. Furthermore, it facilitates identification of the distinguishing characteristics of interindividual and intergroup behaviour.

9.1.4 The functional approach

Another feature of Tajfel's work is the adoption of a functional perspective. This perspective considers the relationship between the organism and its environment as one in which the organism actively reconstructs the environment for its own purposes. Perception is thus an active interaction between the organism and its environment. Discriminating between physical objects or between social groups does not just happen; it serves to orientate individuals in their physical and social environments.

Neither the perceptual overestimation of size nor the behaviour of groups are considered, by Tajfel, to be maladaptive or irrational manifestations of individual needs and motivations. Shifts in the judgment of magnitude facilitate the ability to distinguish between coins of greater or lesser value (Phase I). Discrimination between groups of people (Phase II) is facilitated by accentuating differences in regard to some physical attribute such as skin colour. In both cases the physical attribute serves as a cue to distinguish between objects of greater or lesser value. The attributes acquire meaning only in the context of the
classifications to which they relate. This also applies to the studies in Phase II that use abstract continua.

The functional perspective is extrapolated when Tajfel considers prejudice and intergroup relations (Phase III). Firstly, social categorizations serve to organize and simplify the complexities of the social environment. Secondly, similarities and differences in the social environment are accentuated in order to serve current requirements of social adaptation and to preserve emotionally invested differentiations between one's own group and other groups. The causal attributions that individuals make in order to understand the constantly changing relationships between groups must fulfill these two functional requirements. They must provide simple and coherent explanations, and they must preserve an individual's personal integrity or system of values.

However, the research conducted in Phases IV and V was only minimally informed by a functionalist perspective. They clearly demonstrated discrimination both between large-scale groups (Phase IV) and experimental groups (Phase V). Social categorizations order the social environment whilst social norms serve to guide social conduct. The psychological functions of these respective discriminations, however, were not elucidated any further.

By contrast, Phase VI constitutes a functional theory of intergroup relations. The psychological processes are integrated by reference to their functional interdependence. Intergroup discriminations serve to create psychological distinctions which, in turn, provides a positive social identity. An individual's social identity locates him or her within society. The social group provides a positive social identity for its members. Social comparisons enable individuals to compare and evaluate themselves in relation to others. Group members distinguish their group from other groups along salient dimensions that have a clear value differential and, hence, which afford them a positive social identity. Furthermore, the psychological processes are functionally related both to the systems of belief and to their manifestations in social action and in social
movements. Social beliefs are related, on the one hand, to the psychological processes, and, on the other hand, to social reality, so that they both direct and sustain the social differentiation between groups and, in turn, are also created in order both to achieve and to maintain these differentiations. These systems of belief or group ideologies serve both to justify and to explain various social actions and social movements.

9.1.5 The transition from psychological reductionism to social psychology

Both the functional approach and the comparative perspective constitute continuous threads in the historical development of Tajfel's thinking. However, this having been said, there is a shift in his functional perspective away from individual functions such as the accentuation of differences, stereotypes or prejudice to an increasing emphasis on the social functions served by various aspects of intergroup relations. The comparative perspective shows a similar shift away from comparisons between physical objects, to comparisons between groups of people and, finally, to an emphasis on the relevance of these comparisons to the individual as a member of a group. These shifts are accompanied by a dramatic change in Tajfel's perspective concerning the role of psychological processes in the explanation of social phenomena.

Throughout Phases I and II Tajfel adopts a position of psychological reductionism whereby social phenomena can be explained in terms of general cognitive principles. This reductionist perspective is transformed in Phase III. The main thrust of this phase is that principles of cognition are needed to explain social phenomena. However, these principles are related to the broader issues of assimilation and to a search for coherence in regard to change in the relationships between groups. The alternative perspective is not fully achieved until Phase VI. Here, Tajfel advocates that social psychology must encompass an analysis of social phenomena over and above an analysis of individual cognitive processes. The latter are necessary but not sufficient for explaining and understanding social phenomena. It is also
necessary to include an analysis of social beliefs in relation to the social realities of intergroup relations.

9.1.6 Objectivity and values in the social sciences

The change of perspective described above is closely related to Tajfel's 'convictions' (1981, p. 7) about the nature of social psychology as a science. For the first decade of his intellectual career his publications maintain an aseptic aura of neutrality and objectivity. They are restricted to an analysis of the findings of experimental research and to the construction of theoretical explanations with little or no reference to issues relating to the discipline of social psychology. Phase III sees the emergence of an explicit and ardent concern for the relationship between social psychological theories and the crucial issues confronting modern societies. This is followed by an increasing awareness of the cultural values inherent in social psychological theorizing reflected in the social mobility-social change continuum.

9.1.7 The locus of explanation

These shifts and changes are reflected in, and accompanied by, a change in the locus of explanation. In Phases I and II, the explanation of social phenomena is located within the individual. In Phases III and V, explanations are given in terms of the individual located within a social context. However, the individual and social aspects of social psychological explanation are maintained in important respects as two juxtaposed, yet separate, domains of explanation. It is not until Phase VI that they are fully integrated into a truly social-psychological approach, which prescribes the interrelationship between individual and society as a dialectic one. These shifts and changes are developed through and related to transformations in the conception of the cognitive and evaluative components of social interactions.

9.1.8 The cognitive component

From the outset of his intellectual career, Tajfel expended considerable energy in determining and making explicit the role of cognition in various social phenomena. However, in Phases I and II, the individual cognitive
processes of classification and of the accentuation of differences were considered a necessary sufficient explanation of phenomena associated with the perceptions of both the physical and the social environment. In contrast, by Phase VI, the individual cognitive process of social categorization was considered to be insufficient to provide an explanation of social phenomena such as social stereotypes and intergroup relations; it was also necessary to examine the consensual systems of belief in relation to the social context. Furthermore, priority is given, during this phase, to social aspects of cognition. Social categorizations can only be properly understood in relation to differentiation between social groups within the context of widely diffused beliefs or understandings, and the justification of social actions and social movements as exemplified by ideologies.

This shift of emphasis can be traced through various intermediary phases. The study of large-scale social phenomena, such as nationalism, and widespread prejudice (Phase III) extended the cognitive component to include, not only the role of social categorization in the structuring of the environment but also, the nature of attributions regarding the causes of large-scale social events. However, the focus was still on individual cognitive processes. In the early research on the development of national attitudes (Phase IV), greater attention was given to the content of cognition, to knowledge and beliefs which were widely diffused within society. By contrast, the experimental research in Phase IV reverted to the earlier emphasis on individual cognition and to the process of social categorization. The influence of the social context on these individual cognitive processes was conceived in terms of social norms with the consequence that the individual and social aspects of intergroup relations were separated out into two distinct realms.

By Phase VI, developments associated with the specification of an interpersonal-intergroup continuum, along with an analysis of various forms of intergroup behaviour, led to the development of a theoretical framework in which individual cognitive processes were not conceived of as being
more fundamental or basic than the social variables which influenced them; rather, they were conceived of in terms of their dialectic interdependence with shared interpretations of social reality.

9.1.9 The evaluative component

The evaluative component undergoes a similar shift from the influence of an individual's values on social perception to social values which are widely diffused in society. Values associated with a physical dimension (Phase I) tend to be highly consensual. Values associated with a physical dimension (Phase I) or a social dimension (Phase II) cause an accentuation of differences which facilitate differentiation. Concern with the social phenomena of widespread prejudice (Phase III) and national preferences (Phase IV) led to an examination of the role of stereotypes and of prejudice in defending or preserving an individual's system of values. These aspects of intergroup relations are all but ignored in Phase V. However, by Phase VI, the evaluative component constituted an integral part of the theory of intergroup relations, at both the individual and the social levels. Evaluative aspects of the psychological processes were linked to the systems of values in a society relating to value differentiation between groups. Social change and intergroup conflict are to be understood in terms of the creation and preservation of positively-valued social identities.

It is worth noting here that Tajfel is often considered to be a cognitive social psychologist. However, this can be misleading. Firstly, it understates the central role of values in his theoretical understanding of social perceptual phenomena and of intergroup relations. Secondly, it underestimates the social aspects of cognition. The contents and processes of cognition involved in intergroup behaviour can only be understood with reference to the consensual systems of belief which pertain to social reality, i.e. what Moscovici would call social representations.

9.1.10 The motivational component

We have seen that the cognitive and evaluative components display a continuous yet changing significance within the various theoretical structures and constitute a
major part of those theories. The motivational component has a different history and plays a different role within the emergent theory of intergroup relations. In the studies of social perception, the motivational component was significant for not being included within the theoretical explanations. This allowed the development of a purely cognitive explanation of perceptual phenomena. Similarly, in Phase III, Tajfel argued against motivational explanations of prejudice. However, in order to understand both the direction and the contents of the search for coherence, it was necessary to postulate a need to preserve the self-image. This constitutes a motivational assumption, as opposed to an explanatory principle. By Phase VI, the need to preserve or to create a positive social identity provided the link by which the psychological processes were integrated with the subjective social realities of intergroup relations. In this respect, it constitutes a highly significant, if relatively simple, part of the theory.
Table 9.1 CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES: PHASES I, II & III

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<th>PHASE I</th>
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<td>perceptual judgement of social environment</td>
<td>intergroup relations and prejudice</td>
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<td>experimental research and good theory</td>
<td>theories should address issues in society</td>
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<td>comparisons between one's own group and other groups</td>
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<td>polarization facilitates discrimination of groups</td>
<td>causal attributions provide explanations and preserve personal integrity</td>
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<td>individual</td>
<td>individual and social context</td>
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<td>classification and polarization</td>
<td>social categorization and causal attribution</td>
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<td>Motivational component</td>
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<td>preservation of self-image</td>
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<td>PHASE IV</td>
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<td>relations using many methods</td>
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<td>(2) between individuals as group members</td>
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9.2. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE

The continuities and discontinuities identified above are related, in part, to the problems addressed by Tajfel and the construction of possible solutions. This is not a simple process of problem-solving, in its restricted psychological sense. Recognizing and taking up a problem crystallizes a long history of development; possible solutions emerge from perceiving and understanding the problem from a particular perspective. Furthermore, in the development of a new point of view, no one particular problem or solution can be said to be crucial; each plays its part in the evolution of an 'organic whole'. The assimilation of new ideas into a coherent framework is a constructive process which requires a delicate balance between generalization and differentiation, between conflict and integration. This becomes clear as we re-examine the problems and solutions that emerged during different phases in the development of Tajfel's thinking. The content and structure of each phase illuminates the interdependence of interpretative ideas; their interdependence with previous ideas which structure the problem and guide observation; and the modification of the system as a whole in response to changes at a single point in the structure.

9.2.1 From perceptual over-estimation to the accentuation of differences (Phase I)

In comparison to Tajfel's later contribution to the social psychology of intergroup relations, the first phase of his work is highly technical and rather orthodox, focusing, as it did, on detailed problems in the perceptual judgment of physical objects. Moreover, it was a late contribution to the field of perceptual overestimation, which had already passed its peak in the mid 50's with the controversy surrounding the 'New Look' in the study of perceptual phenomena. (Blake and Ramsey). By this time, many inconsistencies had appeared within the research literature. Some studies showed that the association of value with a physical object resulted in the over-estimation of the object's size in comparison to neutral stimuli or objective
measures. Others did not show this effect. Furthermore, the motivational explanation in terms of needs was inadequate.

By distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant dimensions of perceptual judgment and, more importantly, between interserial and intraserial comparisons, Tajfel (1957) was able to develop a functional and cognitive explanation in terms of the accentuation of differences which appeared to resolve the inconsistencies in previous research findings.

9.2.2 Social perception: From the physical to the social environment (The transition from Phase I to Phase II)

I think the shifts came about because he was looking for good ideas.

(Turner, Interview)

Q. (Was there anything that was innovatory about Tajfel's work?)
A. To start with, the importance of categorization in social perception. .... This was really Tajfel's discovery: he was the first to put it explicitly.

(Turner, Interview)

Q. (What do you consider the most important aspects of his work?)
A. Firstly, there is his early work on categorization.

(Brown, Interview)

Tajfel's innovation was to apply the general principles of perceptual judgment developed in Phase I to those aspects of social perception relating directly to the social phenomena of stereotypes and prejudice (Tajfel,1959). In order to do this, it was first necessary to establish the similarities between the social perception of physical and of social objects. Tajfel emphasizes the comparative or dimensional nature of both whilst dwelling on the transitional case where stereotypes are based on the physical features of people eg. colour. Furthermore, he adopts a reductionist stance, whereby the problems of social perceptions and prejudice are, in principle, reducible to the cognitive processes involved in perceiving the length of lines and sizes of coins. This is so, despite the fact that, initially, he draws on anthropological and cultural studies to establish the significance or social relevance of these
studies. Secondly, the inclusion of research on stereotypes and prejudice within the explanatory domain led to a much greater emphasis on classification.

The development of a predictive framework for accentuating differences which specified the impact of value and classification on the perceptual judgment of physical (or social) dimensions was a significant achievement. It provided a unified explanation for research findings on perceptual overestimation, perceptual stereotypes and prejudice. It also opened up avenues for further research, introduced a number of theoretical elaborations and suggested an extension to the study of abstract dimensions. Its theoretical elegance sustained its use as an explanatory framework in the face of subsequent research findings that did not clearly support its predictive hypotheses. With hindsight, the most significant aspect of this work was the theoretical specification of the cognitive processes involved in social perception.

9.2.3 Maintaining a reductionist perspective (Phase II)

He started off talking about the accentuation of judged differences. There was almost immediately an important development where he started to talk about the role of classification. He produced an accentuation of similarities and differences in the '83 article with Wilkes...He has already moved now from just the accentuation of differences of peripheral cues, to a specific idea of categorization: that was one shift,... As soon as he did that, ...he is already immediately thinking about the role of values in stereotyping. He has seen immediately the implications, so he is already moving in the social direction.

(Turner, Interview)

Turner identifies the shifts from the accentuation of judged differences and the role of classification in the perceptual judgment of physical objects to the idea of categorization and value in stereotyping. However, the shift was by no means immediate. The application of principles developed in Phase I, when applied to social objects of perception, presented its own particular problems. These were resolved, initially, by making minor adjustments in the systems of social representations.
The 'accentuation of differences' principle was developed, initially, in regard to stimuli lying on a continuous dimension that was associated with value. In Phase II, the study of the effects of a categorization superimposed on a continuous dimension led to the adoption of the term polarization. Classifications identified groups of stimuli that could be distinguished from each other. This requires differences between groups to be maximized and differences within groups to be minimized (i.e. similarities to be maximized) (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963a).

Tajfel and Wilkes continued to explore these predictions, as well as those relating to salience and past experience, by conducting experimental research on the perception of physical objects. Eventually, they studied perceptual judgments of social phenomena, i.e. people (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963b). At this stage, the cognitive theoretical framework established in Phase I persists alongside a reductionist approach to social perception. The similarity between perceptual judgments of physical and of social objects is justified, further, in terms of the quantitative research procedures applied to both domains. However, conducting research on perceptual judgments of the social attributes of people highlighted important differences between the two domains. Perceptual judgments of physical attributes are characterized by a high consensus and, furthermore, they can be compared to objective measures. In contrast, perceptual judgments of social attributes display a low consensus or greater subjective variability and it is thus more difficult to identify the variables concerned. Tajfel and Wilkes argue here that these problems can be overcome by the integration of experimental research with sound theory and methodological sophistication.

9.2.4 First steps towards a more social psychology (Phase III)

By the time Tajfel wrote his article on 'The Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice' (Tajfel, 1969a), greater priority is given to the social domain and much of the theoretical framework emphasizes its differences from the physical domain. Categorizations of the social environment are more
rigid and resistant to change. This is explained in terms of the paucity of clear negative feedback from social phenomena. Firstly, the social environment is more ambiguous. Secondly, and more importantly, the preservation of social categorizations is self-rewarding, as it maintains the associated value differentials between one's own and other groups.

This latter insight is an important one. Social categorizations not only simplify and organize the social environment. People are also members of those social categories. The implications of this are far-reaching and they are not fully developed until Phase VI. This being said, their initial exploration leads Tajfel to consider the assimilation of social values by children, as well as the identification of a child with his or her own group in a multi-group context. These ideas are barely more than mentioned. Much of the section on the attribution of social values reviews research whose findings demonstrate the child's devaluation of his or her own group. Conflict arises between the individual's identification with his or her own group and the social values which are prevalent and socially transmitted in society. This serves to emphasize the point that identification with one's own group is not a universal process, but rather is influenced by the wider social context.

If Tajfel had simply applied the cognitive and evaluative principles developed in the field of social perception to the social issue of prejudice, his theoretical analysis might very well have stopped here. But Tajfel explicitly locates the phenomenon of prejudice within the wider context of large-scale intergroup relations.

He started with a cognitive theory of prejudice but already in that article he is talking about things like the way we look out, the way we think, the way we categorize - the stereotype of others is a function of social realities. It's a function of large scale theories and attributions ....He's always thinking not only about the distinctive law of social psychology but acknowledging that there is something called society.

(Turner, Interview)
His theoretical focus shifts from the technical problems of social perception to the wider social realities and to an analysis of the conflicts apparent in various societies. His writings, here, reveal a passionate concern for intergroup prejudice in its various manifestations, both explicitly and also implicitly in the free use of examples drawn from the 'real world'. These include colonialism and slavery, social class, conflicts in South Africa, and prejudice in Nazi Germany. Moreover, these examples illustrate Tajfel's belief that social psychology can and should provide an understanding of these social issues (which, in turn, sustain new forms of social action). For Tajfel, in order to achieve this, it was essential to examine the role of people's beliefs and views about the causes of social events. How do individuals react to specific intergroup situations and how do they come to understand the continual changes in these situations? Individuals must continuously make constant causal attributions to account for the changes. The question then arises as to why these causal attributions are made in terms of the inherent and immutable characteristics of large-scale groups.

Tajfel addresses this problem by drawing on the well-established literature on attribution theory and transposing it to the level of the group, as opposed to the individual. Explanations in terms of groups not only provide greater simplicity. They also avoid conflict with prevailing values and beliefs and facilitate the preservation of personal integrity and the individual's self-image. In other words, in order to preserve their self-image and to avoid a conflict of values and beliefs, individuals will find or create explanations for social events in terms of the relations between groups.

So far, we have looked at the theoretical problems which Tajfel attempted to resolve during Phase III. However, further problems arose in relation to the traditional perspectives which dominated the field.

The most important (aspect of his work) is not so much what it argues for, but what it argues against. He was arguing against a psycho-dynamic or instinctual view of aggression and prejudice, which
was quite popular in the 50's and 60's ....(But) it wasn't just a refutation. It was putting up, if you want, a more cognitive, or a cultural, view of aggression and prejudice. (Turner, Interview)

Traditional explanations of prejudice and of intergroup phenomena stressed motivational and personality factors. By propounding an alternative perspective, Tajfel was forced to confront the conventions of the field. His adoption of a cognitive (and social) perspective needed to be justified. It was necessary, first, to establish the reality of a rational model of man in relation to the social environment and to establish the legitimacy of cognitive explanations of large-scale social phenomena. This he achieved in two ways. Firstly, Tajfel drew evidence from other fields in social psychology and also from anthropology in order to establish the legitimacy of a cognitive model of man. Secondly, its appropriations in this particular context is justified in terms of its scientific credibility and its application to social action. This having being said, Tajfel does not suggest that it provides a complete explanation of prejudice. Even the title of the article restricts its claims to a theoretical analysis of the Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice (emphasis added).

This phase of Tajfel's intellectual career marks a transition between his early work in psychophysics and his later work on intergroup relations.

The '69 article is a very good one, precisely because it looks to the past and points to the future; it's very much a transition article...(It) is actually completely firmly rooted in the first work, it is about accentuation....

(Turner, Interview)

And there you see also - I think you see the first glimmer of the social identity.

(Turner, Interview)

In the first phase, he developed a cognitive perspective in order to address problems within the study of the social perception of the physical environment. By the end of Phase II, he had established the role of value and of
categorization in perceptual judgments of both the physical and social environments. Addressing the phenomena of prejudice and of intergroup relations within this framework created a number of substantive problems associated with the explanation of uniformities in social behaviour.

9.2.5 From social perception towards intergroup relations: (The transition from phase II to phase III)

In 1969, Tajfel also published a chapter on Social and Cultural factors in Perception in the Handbook of Social Psychology (Aronson and Lindzey, 1969). The contents of this chapter give some indication of the broad range of research, including group research, which Tajfel considered relevant to social perception. Over three-quarters of the text focuses on the influence of social groups and cultural differences in perception. Of this, twenty-six pages are explicitly concerned with social groups as sources of information.

If you read it, you'll find that there are pages and pages on social influence. He saw research and conformity studies, basically ideas about social influence, as relevant to social perception. So, in fact, in that sense, I don't think he would have made too rigid a distinction.

(Turner, Interview)

From this, it is clear that, by 1969, Tajfel had gone some way towards integrating his work on social perception with others' research on group influence. But, constructing a coherent, theoretical integration of social perception and prejudice as a phenomenon of the relations between groups was more demanding. The incorporation of new phenomena within the original framework highlighted the differences between the perception of the physical and of the social environments. The most significant of these was the individual's identification with a social category. It also exposed the fundamental assumptions underlying conventional perspectives within the field. Furthermore, Tajfel's intellectual horizons now broadened to address the social issues and real world problems of various societies. It was necessary to consider how people understood changes in the relationships between groups within their own society. The assimilation of these problems into an established framework led to the emergence
of new solutions. These solutions involved the transformation and elaboration of the original framework. Classification becomes social categorization; values now include the assimilation of social values; and an individual's identification with a particular social category confers a new significance on both social categorization and value differentials. Also, new factors emerged that needed to be integrated within the overall theoretical framework. These include the form and content of causal attributions; the role of personal integrity or the individual's self-image; and the creation and maintenance of belief systems and social myths.

The new framework provided a novel understanding of the phenomena it addressed. Prejudice and intergroup behaviour were no longer simply due to an individual's motivations, either in terms of the unconscious or in terms of animal instincts and the evolutionary past of the species. Prejudice and intergroup behaviour can be conceived of as the products of rational and cognitive processes, influenced by the concepts, values and beliefs held by individuals and shared within a particular group or society at a given historical time. In this sense they are very similar to social representations.

These transformations took time. They did not form as soon as the original framework was applied to the new phenomena, nor, for that matter, were the problems which initiated these changes immediately apparent. This is seen most clearly in Phase II, where stereotypes and prejudice are anchored within a framework of the accentuation of differences. These phenomena are accommodated within the framework so that similarities in the perception of the physical and social environments are emphasized, and the structure of the framework is maintained. Firstly, the problems confronted in explaining social phenomena are located at the experimental or methodological levels, rather than at a theoretical or meta-theoretical level. Secondly, discrepancies in the research findings forced post hoc explanations involving elements from outside of the theoretical framework. This is how the reductionism, that characterised Tajfel's thinking during the early phases of
his work, remained unchallenged. Similarly, the inclusion of new factors within the framework does not result in an immediate restructuring of its form and content. Most of these concepts are only mentioned at this stage. It is not until Phase VI, some nine years later, that they are more fully elaborated and integrated within a comprehensive framework.

9.2.6 New problems for a theory of intergroup relations: (Phase IV)

During the 1960's, Tajfel was also involved prominently in a European research project that examined, in a number of European countries, the development of national stereotypes and attitudes. Its primary focus was to examine the developmental relationship between the affective component (i.e. evaluation) and the cognitive component (i.e. social categorizations and knowledge) of large-scale intergroup relations.

This research has received little public acclaim (see Chapter 7). In part, this is due to Tajfel's own disaffection with the research.

Then there was the period which in fact he described as his most mediocre and depressing work.... which was looking at things like ethnicity - sort of rather descriptive work -- things like cross-national comparisons between children in their sort of ethnic preferences.

(Turner, Interview)

Furthermore, Tajfel rarely refers to this research in his later work.

Despite this, it played an important part in the development of Tajfel's thinking. The research results presented a number of anomalies that had to be integrated into the general theoretical framework. The research findings suggested that consensual preferences for one's own nation develop before children possess any detailed knowledge about other nations or countries. Children differentiate between nations in the absence of contact with other nationalities as well as in the absence of physical or behavioural cues. This was referred to by Tajfel et al. in terms of 'nominal realism' in young children. Children differentiated between
nations on the basis of the countries' names. This also highlighted the essential role of assimilation, social influence and the mass media of communication. Children assimilated the social and cultural values prevailing in their own societies. Furthermore, even though evaluative differentials tended to decrease with age, preferences for one's own nation continued to be found in older children. Tajfel and his collaborators suggest that the early intervention of value judgments results in a lack of cognitive empathy with other large-scale groups.

A further set of problems to emerge concerned differences between cultures in the relationship between the cognitive and affective components of attitudes. This, in itself, indicated the significant role that the social context played in intergroup relations. Furthermore, the unexpected results in Louvain, where preferences for one's own nation increased with age, and in Glasgow, where children showed no preference for their own nationality, indicated children's high sensitivity to the social context.

It can be seen that many of the emergent problems and questions remained unanswered at this stage. Discussion of the results provide tentative generalizations as opposed to explanations derived from theory. It was still necessary to explain children's sensitivity to the social context and also variations in the findings across cultures; and to understand the assimilation of social values and the role of preferential differentiations in intergroup relations. Furthermore, the devaluation of one's own group in situations where there was no overt conflict remained a theoretical mystery. These were findings in search of a theory. Such a theory might illuminate the psychological processes involved in an individual's affiliation to a large-scale social group (such as a nation) in situations where there is no conflict, no direct contact with or even knowledge about other such groups.

The evolutionary background to the experiments conducted in Phase V, which later came to be known as the minimal group experiments, will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that the
theoretical framework of Phase III and the research findings of Phase IV triggered a search for the base-line conditions leading to a differentiation between groups. Research on the developmental relationship between the cognitive and affective components of attitudes suggested that categorization (nominal realism) and value (preferences) might be sufficient to produce intergroup differentiation in situations where there was no overt conflict. However, the nature of the experimental studies meant that many other variables were also involved in shaping the children's responses, not least the historical context of the relations between the relevant groups.

9.2.7 Finding the base-line conditions for intergroup differentiation: (Phase V)

The second major contribution was the minimal group paradigm, and that was essentially a methodological innovation and it led to a lot of interesting speculation. But it wasn't initially the springboard for Social Identity Theory ....they are not quite so closely connected as everyone seems to imply... It was just a clever idea.

(Brown, Interview)

While I agree that the minimal group paradigm and Social Identity Theory are not as closely interrelated as many people imply in their re-presentations of this work, the experiments were more than just a clever idea. The experimental results led, at least initially, to a greater emphasis on social categorization and to a withdrawal from 'value' as a distinct theoretical principle.

Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy designed a series of experiments which either controlled for or eliminated all variables other than social categorization. The experimental results showed that social categorization on its own was sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination. Subjects acted in favour of their own group in a situation where there was no benefit to the individual. Furthermore, their choices tended towards maximum differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup at the cost of forfeiting maximum gain for the ingroup. These results were totally unexpected. In the initial experiments (not described in 'Phase V' above) Tajfel had hypothesized that social categorization, on its own,
would not produce intergroup discrimination. Only in situations where the categorization was evaluative (e.g., more or less accurate estimators of the number of dots) would intergroup discrimination occur. Within the experimental design social categorization with an explicit evaluative condition formed the experimental conditions whilst social categorization alone constituted the control condition. In contrast to the hypothesis, it was found that subjects discriminated in favour of the ingroup in both conditions and that there was no significant difference between the two. The following experiments (described in detail in Phase V above) were designed to distinguish between three possible response strategies; maximising joint profit; maximising ingroup profit; and maximising the difference between groups.

Once again, the research posed a definite problem in terms of providing an adequate theoretical explanation. Why should subjects choose a strategy of maximum differentiation between their own group and groups of others purely on the basis of some arbitrary social categorizations? The 'post hoc' explanation (Tajfel, 1978b, p.10) presented at the time by Tajfel et al. 1971 was stated in terms of social norms. Social norms constituted the social context of intergroup behaviour, the influence of which had become plainly apparent from the research in Phase IV. The findings in Phase V were attributed to a generic norm of discrimination against outgroups. This alone, however, could not explain the particular pattern of the findings. It was also necessary to postulate a social norm of fairness that moderated the principle of creating a maximum differentiation between the ingroup and outgroup.

The results posed a further problem. Previous research by Rabbie and his colleagues had found that social categorization per se (control condition) was not sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination. A further condition required was anticipation of future interactions with the ingroup. The results from the control conditions conflicted with Tajfel et al.'s findings (1971). This required the reinterpretation of findings from the research of Rabbie and his collaborators. Tajfel et al. (1971) argued that, given
the particular features of the situation in the control condition, the group categorization was never made salient and consequently subjects did not employ the social norms appropriate to intergroup situations.

The unexpected nature of the results led Tajfel et al. (1971) to explore other possible interpretations. These included anticipation of future interaction, experimenter effects and subjects' expectations concerning the behaviour of other subjects. The two former interpretations were considered to be inadequate on both situational and theoretical grounds. The latter was explored in a further experiment which showed that subjects' expectations did not match subjects' behaviour in this intergroup situation (Doise, Tajfel and Billig, 1972).

9.2.8 Problems in search of a theory: The transition from phase V to phase VI

At the time, the inadequacy of alternative explanations for the experimental findings lent further support to a theoretical interpretation in terms of social norms. However, they still left some important questions unanswered. As Tajfel himself reflected:

Rather than providing answers to certain crucial problems of intergroup behaviour, they highlighted some crucial questions and suggested directions of future theorizing and research.

(Tajfel, 1978b, p.10).

Why should subjects choose the social norm of groupness in this particular situation in preference to any other? What are the psychological processes involved in intergroup discrimination on the basis of social categorization? These questions arose directly from the research conducted in Phase V. Furthermore, it still left unanswered many of the issues emerging during Phase IV.

The generic norm was a bit of a loose concept, and Tajfel withdrew from it very early on, because the generic norm suggested that there was a universal norm for ingroup favouritism. Why this was unsatisfactory is because of the evidence from, say, Dave Milner's work, and much earlier evidence that certain members of minority groups didn't favour their own groups.

(Billig, Interview)
While Billig points to the research of other people, the same questions are raised by the cross-national studies which Tajfel identifies in Phase IV. How are variations across cultures and the impact of the social context on personal preferences to be explained? What is the role of preferences and of differential evaluations in a situation of real intergroup conflict? Why do people devalue their own group in relation to other groups, even in situations where there is no obvious conflict?

Solutions to these problems emerge slowly in the form of an elaborate and comprehensive theory of intergroup relations. An initial outline of these developments was already in evidence by 1969, in both The Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice and Tajfel's theoretical chapter on The Formation of National Attitudes. The research findings of Phases IV and V, as well as a desire to understand conflicts between large-scale groups in society provided the stimulus for and directed the evolution of this framework. Both the form and the content of this evolving framework diverged from conventional theories and perspectives within the field of group psychology. This created further problems which could only be resolved by re-defining the boundaries of social psychology. However, these developments did not occur 'over night'. We have already seen that they are rooted in a substantial history of theorizing and research. Moreover, many of the subsequent experiments within the 'minimal group paradigm' continued to employ a social norms framework of explanation. It was only through the painstaking theoretical work undertaken during the early period of Phase VI that the theory of intergroup relations in all its complexity came to be established by 1978.

9.2.9 Phase VI

The form and content of this theory is shaped, not only by previous theoretical ideas and research, but also by an examination of various forms of intergroup relations extant in society. One of the striking characteristics of intergroup relations is their dynamic nature. This is reflected in a concern with social change. Social conflicts, social unrest,
social movements and social creativity are all salient features in today's society and require an analysis that goes beyond the level of individuals. Tajfel was not satisfied with the micro-psychology of intergroup behaviour. It was not sufficient to extrapolate from basic psychological processes to large-scale social interactions. Nor was it sufficient to look at the macro-structure of society and the objective conditions of intergroup relations. An absolutely essential feature of Tajfel's work, and one which is frequently underestimated or ignored, is the juxtaposition and integration of these two levels of enquiry. The social issues which Tajfel addressed demanded a social psychological approach, one which accounted for uniformities in social behaviour and widely diffused social beliefs concerning the characteristics of and relations between groups in society.

It can be seen from the presentation of Phase VI that, by 1978, the social psychological perspective and the various aspects of the theory are finally integrated to form a unified and comprehensive framework for the understanding of intergroup relations and social interactions. The general problem confronting Tajfel was to construct a social-psychological theory that provided an understanding of the evident realities of intergroup relations in society and the uniformities of intergroup behaviour. It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify any particular problems addressed by Tajfel and to extract their corresponding solutions from the framework as a whole. This reflects the actual nature of Tajfel's theoretical work. The various problems are not considered, nor are the solutions constructed, independently of each other. The interrelationships between the various problems and their resolutions play a crucial role in the construction of an elaborate and well-structured framework. This having been said, it is also necessary to identify the building blocks that constitute elements in the framework while remembering that their significance and meaning is defined by the role they play in the scheme as a whole. The presentation of Phase VI goes some way towards identifying the interrelationships between the parts. The following analysis attempts to elucidate these aspects further whilst
identifying, simultaneously, particular sets of problems and their corresponding solutions. This is done in three sections:

1. social categorization, social values and the psychological processes of intergroup behaviour;
2. social conditions and social beliefs;
3. the discipline of social psychology and the field of intergroup relations.

9.2.9.1 Social categorization, social values and the psychological processes of intergroup behaviour: One of the major problems confronting Tajfel, following the minimal group experiments, was why social categorization alone should lead to intergroup discrimination. As we have seen above, the original explanation of this phenomenon was in terms of social norms. In Phase VI, Tajfel argues that such an explanation fails to distinguish between different possible response strategies. Its generality fails to serve as a point of departure for new insights and new directions for research on intergroup processes. Whatever role the social norms were playing needs to be specified in terms of the psychological processes involved in intergroup situations. This applied equally well to assessing the impact of social values and preferences which was apparent from research undertaken in Phase IV, as it did to assessing the impact of social norms in the research of Phase V. The influence of the social context, social norms and social values needed to be translated into concepts that were directly relevant to the individual. Tajfel's single most significant innovation was to construct and to specify the role and dynamics of social identity in intergroup relations.

Social identity can be seen as the continuing process of self definition in society.

in any complex society an individual confronts from the beginning of his life a complex network of groupings which presents him with a network of relationships into which he must fit himself. One of the most important and durable problems that is posed to an individual by his insertion into society is to find, create and define his place in these networks.

(Tajfel, 1974b, p.67)
The problems of self-definition within society underlie the process of identification with a group or social category and, as a consequence, leads to intergroup discrimination. In order for the members of an ingroup to be able to hate or dislike an outgroup, or to discriminate against it, they must first have acquired a sense of belonging to a group which is clearly distinct from the one they hate, dislike or discriminate against.

(Tajfel, 1974b, p. 66)

The 'complex network of groupings' in society is directly comparable to the social categorizations within the experimental set-up. The principle of social categorization was already well established within the theoretical framework and is maintained in almost an identical form to Phase III. Social categorizations not only provide a system for organizing and simplifying the social environment, they also provide a system of orientation in which an individual locates and defines himself or herself. The significance of this, however, was not fully realized in the earlier Phase; nor was it applied or developed in Phase V. The possible reasons for this will be discussed later. Having realized its significance, the problem was to create a link between social categorization and social identity. Social categorization provided the framework for an individual's insertion in society and his or her self-definition. But this, alone, could not explain why people, having identified with a group, should engage in behaviour which differentiated between their own group and that of others. The theoretical principle which Tajfel adopted was the process of social comparison. This had already been well established in Festinger's Theory of Social Comparison (Festinger, 1954), which was similarly concerned with issues of self-image. An individual evaluated her attitudes, opinions and abilities by comparing herself with others. Schachter had also extended this theory to the study of emotions. However, the application of this theory within the context of intergroup relations presented its own problems.

Applying a well-developed theory to a new realm of phenomena gave rise to a number of difficulties. These were
associated with the differences between social comparisons involving individuals and social comparisons involving individuals as members of large-scale groups. Comparability in the former depends upon similarities between individuals (the focus of Festinger's theory) whereas in the latter it focuses on the differences between groups (the focus of Tajfel's theory). They were also associated with Festinger's specifications concerning the situations in which social comparisons are made. For him, they are only made when non-social, objective, criteria are unavailable. Tajfel could have accepted this limitation - there are rarely such objective criteria on which to make comparisons between large-scale social groups. However, there are also other situations where social comparisons between groups are not made; in which there is a high social consensus across groups about the specific characteristics of the intergroup relations. For this reason, objectivity had to be re-defined in social terms.

The interrelated concepts of social categorization, social identity and social comparison provides an integrated explanation of why individuals differentiate between their own group and other groups. Individuals acting in terms of their own group or social category will discriminate against the other group. This either maintains or creates a differentiation between their own group and other groups so that social comparisons afford a positive social identity. It also provides a framework within which the cognitive and affective components of the development of national attitudes can be integrated, and the sensitivity of children to their social context can be better understood. It specifies the psychological motivation for and the processes by which intergroup relations are established and maintained.

The psychological processes involved in intergroup behaviour demanded a definition of groups that focused on the individual's awareness of being a member of a group in relation to other groups rather than the 'objective' relationship between a number of people. It also had to encompass large-scale social groups, such as nations, which might have little or no direct contact with each other.
Tajfel's social psychological definition of group membership fulfilled these various requirements.

It should be pointed out that value no longer constitutes a separate principle. The role of preferences and evaluations is an integral part of the psychological processes. It is interesting to note that the significance of value first emerged in the study of perceptual judgments of physical objects (Phase I) and the effects of categorization became apparent from studies of stereotypes and social perception (Phase II). In Phase III, social categorization and the assimilation of social values are virtually treated as two distinct issues. Here the theoretical structure is altered radically. Social categorization becomes prominent, along with social identity and social comparison, whilst the role and significance of value becomes diffuse. Value differentials are nearly always associated with categorizations of the social environment. Evaluations are made through the process of social comparisons; and a positive social identity is derived from the value significance of the individual's membership of various groups and his or her psychological distinctiveness. All three aspects relate directly to the system of social values in society. Individuals, as members of a group, will attempt to claim, as their own, those characteristics which are valued positively by society.

9.2.9.2 Social conditions and social beliefs: The previous section looked at how the influence of the social context in regard to social norms and social values is explained in terms of the psychological processes involved in intergroup relations. Both common-sense and everyday experience make it obvious that not all social interactions are examples of intergroup behaviour. There are many occasions in which social interactions are not directed primarily by our social identities and group memberships. This also became apparent from a series of experimental studies conducted by Turner (Turner, 1975).

On the whole, I have not detailed the social and intellectual influences on Tajfel's work as these will be covered in Chapter 10. However, by this time, Turner's
contribution constitutes a major input into the development of a theory of intergroup relations and it is impossible to go further without considering his work.

I think it was very much John's collaboration with Henri, John asking very precise and direct questions about what was actually going on in these experiments, and that brought up the idea of trying to achieve some positivity. And it was out of these debates between him and John and the discussions, and then he gave the lectures and got the research proposal together. So I see it very much as a sort of collaboration between him and John Turner.

(Brown, Interview)

In the 1970-1971 experiments reported in Phase V the only means by which individuals could express their need to achieve a positively valued identity was in terms of their group, i.e., through their social identity. Turner designed a series of experiments which allowed individuals to express their ubiquitous tendency towards differentiation either through 'self' versus an anonymous 'other', or through a minimal ingroup versus a minimal outgroup.

The social categorization data was interesting and I was looking for something to do. I needed some experiments for my Ph.D. So we thought - what about having self and other? The main condition in the 1971 experiments was that you couldn't act in terms of self, but what if you could? So I did an experiment that had self-other as well as ingroup-outgroup.

(Turner, Interview)

Not all conditions lead to intergroup differentiations. In some conditions, individuals acted in terms of self as opposed to their group membership. In other conditions, subjects displayed a balance between individual gain and ingroup gain; that is, the bias towards self was moderated by their group membership/social identity. Thus, social categorization per se does not produce intergroup discrimination. It also depends on the particular situation, on the opportunity to gain positively valued differentiations from others in terms of either individuals or one's group, and on the balance between the two.

It was these experiments that led to the distinction between interpersonal behaviour and intergroup behaviour and,
in turn, was linked to the psychological processes in terms of a distinction between personal and social identity.

It (interpersonal-intergroup continuum) started out as in terms of group or self from my experiments, but went through a number of developments, depending on what we were doing. As it was applied to a different issue, it changed form slightly. It became the interpersonal-intergroup... I then sort of turned it round to personal identity and social identity to distinguish between when we behave as individuals and when we behave as a member of a group.

(Turner, Interview)

I suppose it was out of the stimulus provided by John... and John is a very tight and tough-minded experimentalist, gave a kind of methodological rigour to the thinking of what's going on in these studies, that Henri hadn't yet come to grips with. I think that is where the idea of the distinction between personal and social identity - all those things, started to come together.

(Brown, Interview)

The expression of social identity is thus, in part, dependent upon the conditions in which the social interactions occur. Again, this is consonant with the dialectic nature of intergroup behaviour emphasized by Tajfel. The expression of subjective group membership in social behaviour is interrelated with the social situation.

The experimental manipulation in Turner's studies indicates the conditions in which intergroup behaviour, as opposed to interpersonal behaviour, will occur. However, these relate only to the social vacuum of the minimal group paradigm in which groups are devoid of any history, social contact and the wider context of multi-group relations. If social psychology was to have any impact on the social issues confronting society it's theories must also take into account and be applicable to the social realities of the day. What are the social conditions in which individuals will behave in terms of their subjective group membership? When does an individual's social identity become the primary motivational force directing his or her social behaviour?

A preliminary requirement is obviously the construction of social categories, which has already been discussed in
some detail. But, in order to provide an answer to the above questions, two further interdependent propositions are required. Individuals may behave as members of a group when they believe that there is no possibility of their moving from one group to another and when the boundaries between groups are sharply drawn. These conditions restrict severely the possibility of achieving a positive self-image through interpersonal interactions. Instead, individuals will attempt to achieve a positive social identity by acting as a member of their group and by maintaining or creating positively valued differentiations from other groups.

The form of social interactions and its relation to the conditions in which it occurs is clarified by the construction of two related continua. An individual can act in terms of self, or purely in terms of their group membership or somewhere in-between. This is described by the interpersonal-intergroup continuum of social interaction. The social conditions are commensurately described by the social mobility-social change continuum. It is largely under conditions of social change that individuals will act in terms of their group membership in order to achieve a positive social identity.

However, this is only a partial answer. It establishes the potential for intergroup behaviour but it does not specify the conditions in which intergroup behaviour will actually occur nor does it distinguish between the various forms of intergroup behaviour to be found in society. Firstly, the 'objective' conditions of social change do not necessarily lead to social action in terms of group membership and social identity. For example, the ancient caste system in India constituted a social system in which individual mobility was impossible and group boundaries were well defined, but this did not, in itself, bring about social change. Social systems in which some groups exhibit ingroup devaluation and negative social identities can persist for a long time. Secondly, relations between consensually inferior and consensually superior groups can lead to a variety of forms of social action. These relate to the social realities of a particular society, to its economic, historical and
political structures. However, Tajfel was not prepared to leave these problems entirely in the realm of other disciplines. Already in 1969 he was concerned with how individuals come to understand the constantly changing relations between groups. At this stage, his analysis was limited to the attributional processes involved. However, in order to address social uniformities in intergroup behaviour and the dynamics of social change in society, it was necessary, first of all, to shift the analysis to a more societal level. This involves an analysis of systems of belief and the consensual interpretations of intergroup relations. The perception of the relations between groups as being capable or incapable of change and as having legitimate or illegitimate principles of social organization cannot be ignored. Similarly, the existence of shared cognitive alternatives is necessary for large-scale social action to be undertaken.

A combination of these shared interpretations of social reality with the location of social groups within the system as perceived by their members provides the possibility of formulating a number of hypotheses. (Tajfel, 1979a, p.187-189)

A knowledge of these social beliefs is essential for a social-psychological understanding of the various forms of intergroup behaviour and of social action found in society today. Furthermore, the interrelationship between these systems of belief and the psychological processes involved in the differentiation between groups goes some way towards an understanding of the construction and maintenance of such widely diffused beliefs about 'other' groups.

9.2.9.3 The discipline of social psychology and the field of intergroup relations: Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations had to be located within the field of group psychology whilst simultaneously bringing out its distinguishing features. It was not that Tajfel had found a new object of study. Many theories had been applied to the same general phenomenon. Rather, Tajfel had asked different questions and, in so doing, had developed and elaborated a new perspective. The primary focus of his theory was to explain large-scale
uniformities in intergroup behaviour and the existence of social movements and social change. To achieve this, it was necessary to examine not only the psychological processes involved in the construction of social groups but also their interrelationship with social reality and with systems of belief about the structure of society. This explicitly social perspective may well have been construed as falling outside the realm of social psychology. On the other hand, it may also have been construed as saying little more than theories which already existed in social psychology. In order to overcome this dilemma, Tajfel redefines the dimensions of social behaviour and simultaneously redefines the boundaries of group psychology. The interpersonal-intergroup continuum, constructed at the theoretical level to distinguish between social interactions which do and others which do not relate to group membership, is transposed to the level of the field as a whole.

It became the interpersonal-intergroup continuum because we were trying to explain it to the Americans and thinking of a way we might put it to people who had never really thought about it. (Turner, Interview)

This facilitates a re-description of the field such that the more conventional theories are located at the interpersonal pole and apply generally under conditions of social mobility. In contrast, Tajfel's theory transcends conventional theories focusing on the intergroup pole which applies more generally in conditions of social change. In effect, this creates a space for Social Identity Theory within the field, while establishing simultaneously the novelty of the approach. Furthermore, it does not deny the relevance of the more traditional perspectives in situations of social mobility.

Finally, the approach to intergroup relations developed here is legitimized by propounding a social psychology which addresses the inter-relationship between the individual and society. That is, a social psychology which encompasses the social and cultural context as well as the psychological processes and provides an understanding of their dialectic relationship.
CHAPTER 10

CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES

10.1 TAJFEL'S CULTURAL BACKGROUND
10.2 TAJFEL'S EDUCATION IN PSYCHOLOGY
10.3 THE TRANSITION TO A NEW PERSPECTIVE
10.3.1 Developments in European social psychology
10.3.2 The emergence of culture
10.4 A RETURN TO EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
10.5 THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
10.6 THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
10.7 A THEORY ESTABLISHED
10.8 A COLLABORATIVE AFFAIR

In the previous two chapters we have examined the content and structure of Tajfel's work, the continuities and discontinuities in its history of development and the problems and their solutions which characterize the transformations in the system of social representations. To date, there have only been cursory references to the historical context of this work and the cultural, social and intellectual influences which have shaped these transformations. In this chapter I shall demonstrate that these dialectical aspects are an integral part of the process by which social representations are transformed. Thus, they should neither be construed in terms of independent variables or as though they provided an appropriate context for the independent evolution of a new perspective in social psychology.

Much of the material for this chapter is drawn from Tajfel's own writings. This includes not only his research publications but also his retrospective accounts of his academic career. The interviews with his colleagues also illuminate many of the issues dealt with in this chapter.
Ideally, I should have liked to examine all the original sources employed by Tajfel but such a task would not only have been onerous but beyond the scope of a doctoral thesis. The boundaries of any study must be set in relation to its aims and its constraints. The aims of this research are to demonstrate that social representations permeate the whole of social psychology and to explain how social representations are transformed. A general overview of a vast literature or a detailed examination of a single influence would not have illuminatd the dynamics of social representations or the corresponding interrelationship between the individual and his/her culture.

The historical context and the cultural, social and intellectual influences refer to Tajfel's cultural history and to the various institutions with which he was associated; to the social and intellectual influences of other social psychologists, and to the influence of other theories in social psychology and the social sciences more generally. These are ultimately indistinguishable aspects in the transformation of social representations. For this reason, rather than presenting categorical examples of the various forms of influence, this chapter is presented in a narrative style (Zukier, 1986). This provides a more suitable vehicle by which to convey the diversity of 'contextual' influences on Tajfel's work and to reflect on their interdependence and concatenation.

10.1 TAJFEL'S SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Everyone's social background is relevant to what they do. That's trivial.

(Tajfel in Cohen, 1977, p.298)

We all have some kind of intellectual history. I know now that mine has been deeply enmeshed with the traumatic events of long ago.

(Tajfel, 1981a, p.3)

Tajfel had a wealth of social and cultural experiences before he ever came to psychology at more than thirty years of age. Born and brought up in Poland, he went to live and to study chemistry in France. As a member of the French Army,
he was taken prisoner in the 'great debacle' of June 1940, and spent the next five years as a prisoner-of-war in Austria and Germany. He was liberated in 1945 and spent the next six years working for various international organizations on the rehabilitation of children and adults after the War. This work took him to Paris, Brussels and North-West Germany. It was not until 1951 that Tajfel came to England for the express purpose of studying psychology at Birkbeck College. Working during the day and studying during the evening, he graduated with one of the two best First Class Degrees in the University of London that year before being appointed research assistant at the University of Durham in 1955.

During his early years in a semi-fascist Poland, Tajfel's life was shaped by his Jewish background. Although he was an agnostic from an early age, his experience as a member of an extremely discriminated-against minority stayed with him throughout his life. During his years as a prisoner-of-war the life-or-death significance of his Jewish identity was further pressed upon him: his life was in danger, not for anything that he, himself, believed or had done, but simply because he was a Jew. Liberated in 1945, he returned to Paris to find only four of his relations left alive.

The association between Tajfel's early life, in a particular social, political and historical context, and his later academic achievements in the field of intergroup relations, are obvious.

There was an underlying question behind all his work....It is the same question, which is how is genocide possible?

(Billig, Interview)

Intellectually, he was generally concerned to try and understand why members of different groups did such horrible things to each other. And I think that goes back to his own ethnic culture as an emigré Jew, coming from Eastern Europe.

(Brown, Interview)

My own observation would be that he was a very, very creative person, because he had an independent mind, and so he wasn't somebody who was completely immersed in, like, a North American social psychological culture. He came late and with a very
distinct cultural background. He came having seen several cultures, he was a marginal person, oh, yes, a marginal person.  

(Turner, Interview)

He was absolutely sincere about this, the idea that social psychological knowledge could make a new contribution to improving human life. He believed that, and so he thought there was a moral obligation to study social conflict, important to develop the theory of social conflict.  

(Turner, Interview)

His burning ambition was to understand the genocide of the war years and to ensure that it would never happen again; to find, and to remove, the causes underlying the discrimination against, and the persecution of, millions of people on the basis of their ethnic identity: and eventually to create a psychology of social conflict that addressed the social-psychological processes and the cultural and political conditions which produced such large-scale uniformities in social behaviour. His interests were in political phenomena, in social and cultural history, in the history of art and of political and social movements, but these interests did not enter, explicitly, into his social psychology until the mid-1970's (ie. during Phase VI). They were there, implicitly, in his study of Prejudice (ie.Phase III); in the examples of intergroup relations drawn from Jewish experience in various historical and cultural contexts; and in the shift from the study of social perception per se to the study of prejudice and intergroup relations. But it was not until Phase VI that Tajfel was able to integrate his profession as a psychologist, his interests in social and cultural phenomena and his life experience as a Jew before, during and after the war. This chapter traces the cultural, social and intellectual influences which both restrained, encouraged and shaped this integration.

Tajfel began first to nurture an interest in psychology during the years in which he was involved in the rehabilitation of children and adults, who had become refugees as a consequence of the War. He envisaged psychology mainly as an applied field of endeavour to do with helping
people - as do most of us as naive undergraduates - and took a 'certificat' at the Sorbonne and a diploma in educational sciences in Brussels before enrolling at Birkbeck College.

At the same time his involvement with international organizations gave him a multi-cultural experience, a broad European background, and a dedication to international cooperation. These factors, along with an ability to communicate in several European languages, played a highly significant role in the founding of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology. Furthermore, the establishment of a European Social Psychology was absolutely crucial; it provided the social and intellectual milieu in which a social social psychology could be constructed and a theory of intergroup relations could evolve.

10.2 Tajfel's Education in Psychology

Tajfel's formal education at Birkbeck is notable for three reasons. Firstly, during his years as an undergraduate he wrote an essay entitled 'Prejudice' which won an award from the Ministry of Education for a mature student scholarship. Secondly, he was influenced by one of his teachers, Richard Peters, the philosopher, who, together with Tajfel, wrote an article entitled 'Hobbes and Hull-metaphysicians of behaviour' (1957a). In it they argue against reductionism and against any hypothetico-deductive over-simplifications which attempt to reduce human action to motion, with no regard for the rules, conventions, criteria and canons of human social behaviour. Whilst physiological and mechanical principles may be necessary, they can never be sufficient to explain complex rule-following actions. The style of this critique, with its insistence on both the necessary and sufficient conditions for social action, and its anti-reductionist stance, along with an early academic interest in the topic of prejudice, are reflected in Tajfel's thinking from Phase III through to Phase VI. Thirdly, he developed an interest in cognition and perception, the field in which he immersed himself for the first few years of his academic career.

Given his social background, his interests and the influence of Peters, it is difficult to understand how Tajfel
became enmeshed in the highly technical and esoteric problems of perceptual judgment, and why he should have adopted such a reductionist stance on the issues of social perception (Phases I and II). Already in 1958/9 he was aware that his interests lay in 'the effects of social and cultural milieu in which an individual lives on the way in which he looks at the world.' (Tajfel in Cohen, 1977, p.297) and the need for a broader framework than cognitive psychology at that time supplied. Yet, despite this, it took ten years or so for these ideas to come to fruition in his professional publications.

This can only be explained in terms of the social difficulties Tajfel experienced in confronting the issue of genocide. These difficulties related both to the social context and to the intellectual context. Billig emphasizes the social constraints.

The major problem is one which faced so many people of his background, as a survivor of the holocaust. His whole thinking was marked, obviously, by the events of this period. But so deep were the scars of people of that generation that they couldn't speak openly.... Given that the question which concerned him arose directly out of those experiences, there was a constraint in looking at it directly. It was because of the pain, the intensity of the experience. So the question often had to be approached indirectly.

(Billig, Interview)

The delay in addressing directly the problems of intergroup relations can also be explained with reference to the established conventions and institutions of the academic psychology community.

The ivory towers, more solid that they are now, had a way of smothering one with their benevolent warmth and comfort. Very soon, first briefly in Durham and then in Oxford, I was talking a new language. I learned a new jargon and discovered 'problems' which I never knew existed. The academic psychology took full hold of me.

(Tajfel, 1981a, p.2).

Tajfel was socialized into a well-established culture with its own language and values, its sets of legitimate problems, its methods of research and its criteria for acceptable solutions. During his two years at Durham in the
fifties, Tajfel's interests focused on the relationship between motivation and perception and, as we have seen, on the issues of perceptual over-estimation. This was the vogue topic of research amongst the 'new look' perceptionists in America.

His earliest research adopted the standard experimental procedures and hypothetico-deductive rationale along with the canons of confirmation and refutation. It explored the established problem of the perceptual judgment of physical magnitude associated with value. Most typically, this involved the perception of the size of coins, in comparison to objects of similar size with no associated value. Other experiments had used weight, colour, number or brightness. Numerous psychologists had produced a substantial literature on the subject. Tajfel's 1957b article refers, explicitly, to no less than twenty articles which address, directly, the link between perception and value; these, in turn, refer to a broader literature including experimental research reports, theoretical explanations, reviews and critiques.

In 1947, Bruner and Goodman published a paper entitled 'Value and Need as Organizing Factors in Perception'. Tajfel (1980a), later describes this paper as the 'original white elephant' which initiated a new research endeavour that explored distortions in perception. The article itself did little more than demonstrate the existence of a then 'peculiar' phenomenon. But it was a crucial first step in the establishment of the 'New Look' in perception. In contrast to traditionalists who assumed an invariant relationship between stimulus and perception, this approach emphasized the role of motivation in perception. Distortion in perception tended to be associated with the subjective needs of individuals. This 'New Look' in perception was itself associated with a broad interest within social psychology in the social factors that influenced perception of the physical environment. With further examination and theorizing of these issues 'distortions' in perception were reinterpreted in terms of shifts and biases. However, there continued to be confusion in interpreting the variety of findings in the field. Furthermore, there was considerable
confusion surrounding the distinction between perception and judgment.

Both Carter and Schooler (1949) and Klein, Schlesinger and Meister (1951), amongst others, had found that the association of value with a physical object did not always lead to perceptual over-estimation. Without the discovery of these negative results it would not have been necessary to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant dimensions. Perceptual over-estimation only occurred when value was associated with the changes in the physical dimension, e.g., magnitude, on which the object was being judged. Larger coins tended to be associated with a larger value, but the size of a swastika (Klein et al., 1951) or the size of poker chips (Lambert, Solomon and Watson, 1949) made no difference to their value or significance.

The emergence of the distinction between intraserial and interserial perceptual judgments is more subtle. Carter and Schooler (1949) had already noted that larger coins were overestimated and smaller coins underestimated in size. Similarly, Bruner and Rodrigues (1953) had introduced the notion of 'relative increase in overestimation'. Furthermore, the original results from Bruner and Goodman's study showed that the perceived differences (extension of the scale of judgments) is much larger for coins than for neutral discs. The idea that it was not simply a 'mysterious' process of perceptual overestimation was already emerging from the experimental results of others and their interpretation of the data. Furthermore, Dukes and Bevan (1952) had included comparisons between stimuli within the value series as well as comparisons between the value and neutral series in their study.

Even at this early stage in his academic career, Tajfel exhibited an unusually clear understanding of the impact of experimental procedures as well as of subjects' prior experience on research results. Hochberg (1957) had noted that subjects responded in terms of dimensions that give the most information about a stimulus series, and not necessarily those expected by the experimenter. Tajfel applied this point to the field of perceptual over-estimation. Even when the
The experimenter's interest was confined to comparisons between the value and neutral series, relationships within the series would influence subjects' perceptual judgments. These relationships were made salient by the experimental manipulations themselves or by previous familiarity, as in the case of coins.

The confusion surrounding the distinction between perception and judgment was more easily overcome. Tajfel, in effect, circumvented this problem by employing the term perceptual judgment throughout his early publications. It was an issue which he was not to address directly until 1969 in his review of 'Social and Cultural Factors in Perception', for the Lindzey and Aronson *Handbook of Social Psychology* and even then the relationship between perception and cognition remained an uneasy one.

As far as I am aware, Tajfel was the first to coin the phrase 'accentuation of differences'. However, Dukes and Bevan (1952) had previously employed the term 'accentuation' to describe shifts in perceptual judgments. Moreover, the functional significance of these shifts in perception had already been illuminated by others in the field. Erikson and Hake (1955) had discussed its role in increasing the accuracy of discrimination; McCurdy (1956) had argued, in terms of schemata, that exaggerating differences between coins can be considered a 'good error'. Accuracy of perception *per se* was unimportant, what was important was the ability to distinguish between valued objects by sharpening their relevant distinctive features.

Tajfel made explicit what was already implicit in the work of others in this field. I am not suggesting, here, that the distinction between relevant and irrelevant dimensions, or between interserial and intraserial comparisons were simply a by-product or restatement of the work of others or that the functional significance of the accentuation of differences was obvious; Tajfel's work involved the imaginative and creative restructuring of elements in the field that resulted in a re-presentation of the central issues. Moreover, he provided labels or terms of distinction that identified significant features of the research problem.
and that characterized the emergent theoretical structures. These structures emphasized certain aspects of previous work at the expense of others. This transformation cannot be conceived of in terms of a simple cause and effect relationship, or even a series of such causes and effects. Nor is it conceived, accurately, in terms of a feedback loop, where A affects B, affects A. etc. Rather, there is a social dialectics of transformation, a set of independent dynamic relations between experimental research, interpretation and theory involving a whole community of psychologists who are interested in the same problems and who 'talk' the same language.

This applies also to the shifts from perceptual judgments in psychophysics to the study of social perception and stereotypes. Tajfel was not the only psychologist to extend the domain beyond the problem raised by the phenomenon of overestimation. For example, Hochberg (1957) argued that, although greater attention had been paid to social factors in perception (psychophysics) the same principles may also apply to the perception of the social environment (stereotype). Nor was this an unusual practice in psychology. In this specific context, Hochberg argued that the judgmental effects of value could be generalized to the perception of social objects and events. Prejudice and Stereotyping were no more than 'inescapable tendencies of the cognitive processes' (Hochberg, 1957, p.130). It is interesting to note that Tajfel selected a short passage on groups from Hochberg's article for quotation -

If a group of individuals is perceived as different from the non-group individuals the perceived differences between those within the group and those outside the group will automatically be sharpened, and the differences perceived between the members of the group (ie. intergroup differences), and between those outside the group will be lessened.

(Hochberg, p.130, quoted by Tajfel, 1957b, p.202)

Before moving on, a few more words need to be said about the influence of Jerome Bruner. We have seen already that Tajfel's early research on problems of perceptual judgment
followed directly from Bruner's work on the 'New Look' in perception.

He used to tell me that Bruner was an important influence ...certainly his first major publication, which was a psychology review article on social judgment, published in 1957, was shortly after Bruner's own article on a somewhat related topic. And certainly his early work on social cognition drew very heavily on the kind of 'New Look' psychology that Bruner was a dominant part of in the early 50's.

(Brown, Interview)

His first research was addressed to the problem that Bruner and his colleagues had created....He did actually contact Bruner in England, to talk about his work, to see what he thought about it. It was under Bruner's influence, I think, that he first published his review paper. He met Bruner through later years, and always regarded him very much as a friend, as an early influence.

(Turner, Interview)

But Bruner's influence extended well beyond this. Tajfel's first publication (1957b) on the subject owed much to the encouragement and advice given to him by Bruner. Tajfel visited Harvard, Cambridge (Massachusetts) in 1958-9 and worked, together with Bruner, on the use by individuals of 'broad' and 'narrow' categories. This led Tajfel, on his return to Oxford, into the research on individual differences, which has been discussed earlier in IIB. Despite the fact that, in this particular respect, Bruner's influence led to one of the major discontinuities in Tajfel's intellectual career, it is associated also with some of the major continuities. Firstly, Bruner was a functionalist-

I am a functionalist and I believe that there are autonomous psychological explanations that are neither biological nor cultural, though dependent upon both biological and cultural processes.

(Bruner, 1980, p.12)

This perspective is evident throughout Tajfel's works and is associated, closely, with the comparative or relative perspective. Secondly, Tajfel's understanding of categorization and differentiation owes much to Bruner's work on cue utilization and categorical identity. Thirdly,
Bruner's work emphasizes the social context in which cognitive mechanisms function - a theme which prevails throughout Tajfel's work.

(Tajfel) is always saying social psychology, and let's say social perceptions, is a matter of a distinctive social psychological contribution to perception....Bruner was and still is doing that....Well, he always was. When he says social perceptions he means social determination of perception, not just looking at social stimuli. I think that is the fundamental influence.

(Turner, Interview)

even Bruner, if you read his stuff, he always says that we mustn't forget that these real things determine and affect people.

(Brown, Interview)

The potential for extending the domain proposed in 1957(b) became the major focus of Tajfel's 1959 article on 'Quantitative judgment in social perception'. The development of such a comprehensive predictive framework would not have been possible without the methodological developments and research on social perception undertaken by other psychologists in the field. The development of experimental methods employing rating, ranking, and paired comparisons meant that it was not essential to know the physical dimensions which corresponded to the dimensions of experience as it had been in classical psychophysical methods. This allowed the quantification or metrication of stereotypes and the perception of social objects. These methods were employed by numerous research psychologists to examine problems of social perception. We have mentioned already the study by Secord, Bevan and Katz (1956). Another study by Pettigrew, Allport and Barnett (1958) employed a more complicated technique involving stereoscopic presentations of various South African races. Both studies highlighted the significance of classification (stereotype) and value (prejudice) in social perception. As discussed previously, the significance of classification emerged in part from these studies on social perception, as opposed to the traditional
research in psychophysics, or any research conducted by Tajfel himself.

Furthermore, the influence of past-experience was by no means new to the field. The 'New Look' in perception recognized explicitly the significance of memory and past experience in perception. It was also evident in the work of Tresalt (1948) on judgment of different weights by weight-lifters and watch-makers, and the influence of linguistic labels on the perception of colour or shape. Similarly, the application of these principles of judgment to abstract continua was grounded in the burgeoning body of research literature on shifts in judgment associated with stereotypes and prejudice.

In particular, the writings of Gordon Allport had had a major impact in this field, and on Tajfel's work. I don't know who influenced him, but I can remember one or two thinkers and writers whom he greatly respected—there was Gordon Allport, definitely, although he disagreed with large sections of the nature of prejudice, he did think it a work of great influence.

(Billig, Interview)

It can be seen that Tajfel's work in Phase I was embedded in, and dependent upon, a vast psychological literature with all its concomitants of general approach, theory, method and research findings. Tajfel's agenda was that of the community in which he was situated and the shift from psycho-physics to social perception reflected and embodied the general concerns of that community. This is accentuated further by the nature of the research conducted by Tajfel himself.

Tajfel's first published research examined the effect of value (experimentally manipulated using paper bonuses) on the perceptual judgment of weight (using a series of ten weights). These experiments were conducted whilst Tajfel was still at Durham and fell well within the conventional bounds of psychophysics. He was given a lectureship at Oxford in 1956 in the Department of Social and Administrative Studies. Despite the fact that Tajfel's interests broadened to encompass issues of social perception and the cognitive
processes involved in stereotyping, his research continued to use the traditional techniques of psychophysics. These included the study of value and the accentuation of judged differences using a series of coins (Tajfel and Cawasjee, 1959), and the study of classification and its effect on quantitative judgments using a series of lines varying in length (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). Although his theoretical framework relates these to social classification and stereotyping, Tajfel continued, until 1963, to examine the perceptual judgment of physical objects with limited social relevance. Furthermore, the format, style and language of his experimental reports were highly conventional, consisting generally of a brief introduction, followed by a detailed presentation of method and results, and a relatively brief discussion. One would not have expected anything else.

With reference to Tajfel's early work on social perception, Billig suggests that the publishing conventions themselves may have been a major factor in shaping Tajfel's published work.

I don't think it was actually that limited. The official publications of these may be limited but the thinking behind it, I cannot believe that.

(Billig, Interview)

From the current discussion, however, it can be seen that the impact of social convention in the academic community goes far beyond the restraints of publishing. Secure in the 'New Look' approach to the problems of perception, his work characterized an orthodox and reductionistic perspective. Whereas in 1957 the phenomenon of perceptual over-estimation was considered to be a special case of social perception, by 1959 the problems of social perception could be reduced to principles of perception of the physical environment - the simplest case. Furthermore, it met with the scientific canons of the Oxford community. Although the interests of this community were varied, there was considerable social pressure to conduct 'good science', such that psychology would be accepted by other disciplines as a 'bona fide' natural science. This kind of pressure placed some restrictions on the development of social
psychology and, in particular, the development of a more social approach to the problems of social perception and stereotyping.

If you look at the early work, it wasn't too different from other things going on, how people thought and perceived the work, the classic problem within psychology. And he published, remember, in the British Journal of Psychology, so it was very orthodox - methodologically, and so on. But I think, perhaps, given his position as a Professor there (in Bristol), he got a lot of research money in, he got a huge grant from the Ford Foundation, and the SSRC, and various other sources. He just then had the resources to mount big research projects.

(Brown, Interview)

Even when Tajfel addressed these problems, directly, in his experimental research (Phase II) he continued to maintain a 'scientific' reductionist stance. As in Phase I, Tajfel draws on research from other fields in social psychology to bolster the claim that the principles of classification and value are general cognitive principles which apply to the perception of social phenomena. This included the work of Sherif and Hovland (1961) on attitude change, Hovland and Sherif (1952) on personal involvement in social issues and Manis (1960) on the strength of views concerning college fraternities, all conducted in the U.S.A. Similarly, the research methodology employed by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963b) was by no means uncommon. Photographs of people were used frequently in social perception research to elicit descriptive categories and perceptual judgments. They draw also on work by Hastorf, Richardson and Dornsbusch (1958) to overcome the problems associated with the perception of social objects. This involved the use of frequency and sequence as measures of salience of the various descriptive attributes.

Tajfel's next piece of research was more unusual (Tajfel, Sheikh and Gardner, 1964). Although it involved the standard procedure of ratings on semantic differential scales, the 'stimuli' comprised of interviews conducted in front of the subjects. Furthermore, the experiment attempted to demonstrate that specific individuals of an ethnic group were actually attributed traits which form part of the
stereotype concerning that group. This hypothesis was commensurate with Tajfel's predictive framework. Moreover, this was the first time he had conducted research on social stereotypes. However, Tajfel did not make the transition on his own to studying groups in the social environment. The research was conducted on a visit to Ontario, Canada, and was associated closely with previous work conducted by Lambert, Sheikh and Gardner.

This was so, despite the fact that Tajfel had published previously a paper (1959c) presenting a reinterpretation of Lambert and Klineberg's findings (1960) on national stereotypes and group evaluations. Tajfel had employed his predictive framework concerning the accentuation of differences to explain the unexpected results of Lambert et al. They had found that English subjects evaluated English speakers more favourably than French speakers on seven of fourteen traits, as expected, but that French subjects favoured English speakers on ten traits. That is, they were not ethnocentric. Tajfel explained this in terms of value or relevance in situations of intergroup conflict such that attributes associated with socio-economic class were more highly valued by the French. This commentary on, and association with, Lambert and others was also significant in terms of its effect on the future direction of Tajfel's work. Lambert and his associates had been concerned with the origins and development of national stereotypes (1959) and with children's views of foreign peoples (1967), addressing issues and employing methodologies which Tajfel was later to adopt in Phase IV of his own work.

10.3 THE TRANSITION TO A NEW PERSPECTIVE

I think it wasn't until he was then a Professor in Social Psychology that he felt that he was in a sort of position to launch forth in rather a radical direction.

(Brown, Interview)

In 1968, Tajfel was appointed Professor of Social Psychology in the Department of Psychology, University of Bristol. By this time, his reputation was well established. He had published a series of articles in the field of social perception which had advanced the understanding of cognitive
processes and established a theory of social judgment which had initiated and stimulated a whole field of research. His standing in the field is confirmed, further, by the fact that he was asked to produce the review for *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (2nd Edition; Lindzey and Aronson (eds.)) on 'Social and Cultural Factors in Perception' (Tajfel, 1969b). With this security of status and with a change of working environment, Tajfel used his new-found freedom to address a range of issues and gradually to develop of a more explicitly social perspective.

However, it is highly unlikely that this, alone, could have radically transformed his whole approach. Two related events were also highly significant: these were the 'crisis' in social psychology and the establishment of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology. These two 'events' cannot be considered properly as 'factors' in, or even as the 'social context' of, developments in his thinking. The transformation of Tajfel's thinking, the broader 'crisis' in social psychology and the origins and characteristics of the European Association were all part and parcel of the same general movement in social psychology. Nor are these various changes divorced from changes within the wider society.

10.3.1 Developments in European Social Psychology

In the post-World War II period, European social psychology was dominated by the orientation, research problems, methods and theories developed and sustained in the United States of America. Although European countries had their own distinctive schools of psychology, the national and linguistic barriers severely restricted communication and cooperation within Europe. As a consequence, there was often a greater association with what was going on in American social psychology than with what was going on in neighbouring countries within Europe.

It was not until the early 1960's that cooperative attempts by both American and European social psychologists led to the establishment of a European 'centre' for the development of social psychology. Two separate initiatives in this direction joined forces in 1964. One was a small
group comprising two visiting Americans, J. Lanzetta and J. Thibaut, and three Europeans, M. Mulder (Utrecht), R. Pages (Sorbonne) and H. Tajfel (Oxford), who aimed to 'identify' social psychologists in Europe. The other was the American S.S.R.C. Committee on Transnational Social Psychology, headed by Leon Festinger, along with Keekebakker, Moscovici and Rommetveit, with the aim of developing and promoting international activities and communication. The latter, with the help of the Ford Foundation, provided funds for a series of 'unofficial meetings', exchange visits, seminars, summer schools and plenary conferences all over Europe. These led to and were facilitated by the establishment of the European Association for Experimental Social Psychology in 1966. The principle aim of the association was to encourage and investigate communication in Europe, to create a milieu of social psychologists which would become a breeding ground for more research, more training and more inventiveness in what was being done.

(Tajfel, 1972c, p.309)

The Association was not simply an organization: it involved the progressive creation of an actively interacting community of people; the creation of mutual contacts and awareness of an intellectual basis for social psychology in Europe; and the creation of new cross-currents of thought and controversy that stimulated a variety of new research developments. It was, in effect, a European community of social psychologists, however diverse in its social and political perspectives.

Tajfel was a highly prominent figure in this European Association. It seemed to me that one of his main priorities was to establish, and have some control over, the development of European social psychology. And that is what I mean by power. I mean he was instrumental in setting up the Association, in setting up the Journal, and he spent an awful lot of time going round different European centres and trying to get people doing work he thought was interesting....he talked a lot about it too, about the establishment of a European social psychology, and I think I mean that was really his major ambition in a way.

(Brown, Interview)
Eminently well qualified, given his European background, his facility with several European languages, and his prior experience in international cooperation, he was involved from its inception and he continued to play an extremely active role in its development. It was this European Association with which Tajfel identified, providing a network of friendships and communications, both personal and intellectual. Furthermore, the transforming of his own outlook and the emergence of a new perspective in social psychology was co-terminous with the emergence of a European Social Psychology community.

But, let us not push too far ahead of ourselves. We will return to further issues concerning the inter-dependence between Tajfel's work and the European Association. For now it provided a social milieu in which Tajfel was able to explore new issues in an imaginative and creative manner which broke with some of the conventional ideas prevalent at the time.

10.3.2 The emergence of culture

In 1965, Tajfel edited a volume with Dawson which contained a number of essays on 'the colour problem' written by African, Asian and West Indian students visiting Britain. These essays highlighted, for Tajfel, the very real effects of stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination. For the first time since his initiation into the academic world Tajfel 'stepped out' of the ivory towers to take on board the existence of problems in society at large. It also brought with it an awareness of the relationship between psychology and the social and economic factors in their historical and political context. Further, and for the first time in his academic career, he considered the possible role of institutional and social policy in alleviating at least some of these problems.

The insidious effects of national and cultural stereotypes was also evident from various studies of children's views of foreigners and children's lack of ethnocentricism in particular social contexts (Clark and Clark, 1947; Goodman, 1964; Vaughan, 1964; Morland, 1966).
Moreover, Tajfel's own experience in society as a member of a discriminated-against minority predisposed him towards the pursuit of an understanding of large-scale intergroup relations and of the etiology of intergroup conflict and hostility. These large-scale social problems had by no means diminished since the War. Confrontation between groups, the emergence of national identities, and the existence of minority groups in the minds of members of dominant groups were prevalent in the various societies of the world.

These issues had not been totally ignored by psychologists. Well-founded theories of inter-personal behaviour had been extrapolated to encompass large-scale social issues. But these tended to provide purely motivational explanations of stereotypes, prejudice and intergroup relations. They did not provide a means of understanding his own past experience as a Jew nor an understanding of genocide.

That was a sort of driving force... and I think he really did want to understand that and he really did genuinely feel that the kind of available models that, mainly coming out of the U.S., were just inadequate to understand this kind of phenomena.

(Brown, Interview)

Tajfel's previous work in the field of social perception provided the ground on which to explore the cognitive aspects of these social phenomena. His interest in politics and in social change brought him to consider the consequences and implications of social psychological theories. Examination of people's cognitions and beliefs was far more promising in planning any form of social change than attempting to alter their motivations.

Nor did Tajfel's work on cognitive aspects of prejudice and intergroup relations occur in an intellectual vacuum. Sherif and Sherif (1969) had devoted much of their academic careers to the problems of intergroup relations and social change. They were, in effect, well ahead of Tajfel in claiming this field to be part of the discipline of social psychology. Interest in the cognitive aspects of various
psychological and social psychological phenomena had come to dominate the general perspective in the discipline (Gardner, 1985). This was due, in the main, to the influence, in America, of the gestalt psychologists (Farr, ). Allport (1954), amongst others, had elaborated extensively on the role of stereotypes in simplifying and ordering the social environment. Bruner (Bruner, Postman and Rodrigues, 1951) and the 'New Look' had emphasized the greater ambiguity in the perception of people and social situations. Piaget had worked extensively on the cognitive process of assimilation. Furthermore, there was a growing theoretical belief in social psychology of the pivotal role played by personal consistency (Sherif and Sherif, 1969). Finally, Attribution Theory provided much of the material for understanding the search for coherence.

This, in no way, is intended to devalue Tajfel's imaginative and highly creative ability in drawing together diverse strands of his own experience and knowledge to address a particular problem or to describe a particular phenomenon. Billig highlights Tajfel's ability to integrate diverse strands of knowledge and experience with reference to his monograph on minority groups (1978) but it is also relevant here:

it ties together interesting social issues and prejudice of why reading about history and anthropology and the sufferings of different groups, integrated with a knowledge of social psychology and a creativity in social psychology.

(Billig, Interview)

But this would have been impossible without the social context, both of the wider society and of the European Social Psychology community, or without the intellectual context of which he was, himself, a part. The research programme on the development of national attitudes in children in several European countries was more obviously a collaborative affair.

The research programme was carried out in connection with a Summer School of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology. It involved a series of studies conducted in England, Scotland, Belgium, Italy,
Austria and Israel. Cross-cultural research on such a large scale would be almost impossible for any one social scientist to conduct. The research project itself was coordinated by Tajfel with the direct involvement of a least ten other European social psychologists including N.C. Barbiero, J.D. Campbell, G. Jahoda, J. Jaspars, N.B. Johnson, M.B. Middleton, C. Nemeth, Y.Rim, M.D. Simon and J.P. van de Geer. Such a venture required good communication and convergence of interests which were interdependent with the growing awareness of a European community of social psychologists and the establishment of the European Association. It also required a common theoretical framework. Value and categorization were translated into the dominant language of the three component model of attitudes, being consistently referred to as the effective and cognitive components. Moreover, it is unlikely that such research would have taken place outside Europe, with its plurality of nations and cultures. Tajfel also wrote the introduction to a book on national attitudes in children edited by N.B. Johnson, which was reprinted in Sherif and Sherif's edited volume on Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences (1969). The title of this chapter was 'The Formation of National Attitudes: A Social-Psychological Perspective'. Although this chapter is rarely cited (see Chapter 7), I believe it to be of great significance in the development of Tajfel's thinking and therefore I will discuss it here in some depth.

Various features of this development led to the asking of many new questions - no more than implicit at the time - about the psychological processes involved in the individual's affiliation with large-scale social groups and in the conflict between such groups.

(Tajfel, 1981a, p.4)

It is in this chapter that Tajfel elaborates on his theoretical framework to address the theoretical problems which had emerged from the cross-cultural research. And it is in this chapter that many of the ideas developed in Phase VI are first introduced and explored. Furthermore, its lack of recognition has resulted in an over-emphasis on the
minimal group experiments (Phase V), which are frequently given an over-stated significance as the foundation for the theory of intergroup relations (Social Identity Theory).

The first problem was to find an adequate definition of nationalism beyond its mere description as 'an attitude shared by millions of people in a large variety of cultural contexts' (Tajfel, 1969c, p.137), a description which ignores the complexity and important difficulties associated with nationalism. Tajfel examines a variety of definitions which have been used in sociology, history and political science as well as those adopted in psychology. Included are Zangwill (1917) and Doob (1964) in psychology; Pye (1962), Inkeles and Levinson (1954), and Inkeles (1963) on national character; Shafer (1955) and Kohn (1962) who were historians of national ideology; Emerson (1960) a political scientist, Rosenblatt (1964), and Klineberg (1964), who is a social psychologist. Tajfel draws together these various definitions and concludes that

nationalism is an attitude displayed by a body of people who are a nation because they feel that they are a nation. Nationalism as an attitude implies some conception of a nation of which one is a member; an emotional significance given to that membership; and the sharing of these conceptual and emotional identifications by large masses of people (Tajfel, 1969c, p.141).

This definition of nationalism is very similar to the definition of groups which Tajfel propounds in Phase VI. The point to be emphasized here is that this definition emerged from a wide reading of the literature on nationalism, not only in psychology, but also from the other social sciences. Furthermore, it was fundamental to the development of an alternative social-psychological perspective, and to his critique of traditional approaches to group phenomena in psychology.

Studies of nationalism in other social sciences had examined its historical determinants, its role as a causal factor in political action and the connection between various conditions for, and characteristics of, political movements. Tajfel was familiar with these writings, and it is here that
he begins to bring them to bear on social psychological issues.

My genuine interests have always been, well, in political phenomena, social history, cultural history. As I became more and more a social psychologist, - explicitly, as distinct from being a psychologist, I think I was seeking how to marry these various interests....What I am saying is that really the influences were cultural influences. I've also been interested in the history of art and the history of political movements. What is coming now is some attempt to bring it all together.

(Tajfel,in Cohen,1977,p.298)

He always liked to read history, historical works, and I know one work of history which he had a lot of respect for, and a lot of respect for the academic, Lang Poliatoff's history of anti-semitism. He also, as another historian of antisemitism, very much respected Norman Colmes, in 'A Warrant for Genocide', though he disagreed with the last chapter.

(Billig, Interview)

All these writings, in one form or another, referred to nationalism as an attitude shared by large masses of individuals, but remained highly speculative as to the social and psychological processes by which individuals came to identify with national groups. It was left to social psychologists to provide a description of these features; to consider the psychological functions of the cognitive and emotional components of nationalism in relation to their contextual social variables; and to examine the psychological and social pressures responsible for their wide-spread diffusion within society. Tajfel, more than any other social psychologist, took up this challenge. But the challenge was not set by psychologists; it was set by social scientists in general and by a desire, on his own part, to understand the large-scale social processes that had dominated his own life and which, more than ever before, were such a prominent feature of contemporary society.

Traditional, as well as more contemporary, approaches in psychology had attempted to grapple with the development of national attitudes; how an individual comes to identify with his national group and how these identifications become
the common property of large numbers of people in different countries. The understanding of nationalism, developed from the social sciences in general, gave Tajfel an alternative perspective from which to construct a critique of traditional psychological approaches to the topic. This critique does not simply expose the failings of other theories. It also serves to bring to light or to clarify outstanding questions; to identify useful and less useful concepts which are either modified or abandoned; and to provide a foundation on the basis of which a new account of large-scale social phenomena can be negotiated.

Biological and pseudo-biological approaches, which explain an individual's national affiliation in terms of instinct or inheritance, could be rapidly dismissed as neither tended to be taken very seriously by the academic community. Theories of personality functioning in relation to social structure presented more of a problem. Founded on the work of Freud (1922) they continued to be used by social scientists and to be developed by psychologists in an attempt to explain large-scale social phenomena. This includes a vast literature on national character (e.g. Erkison, 1953) used by political scientists (e.g. Greenstein, 1965; Pye, 1961, 1962), the work of Adorno et al. (1950) on the authoritarian personality and Campbell and LeVine's research (1961) on ethnocentrism. The main problem with these theories is that they assume, rather than explain, cultural uniformity and that they are too dependent upon outgroup hostility as the cause of social affiliation.

But other studies, including those by Pettigrew (1958) and Campbell (1965), as well as the combined studies on the development of national attitudes in children, showed that national identification was not limited to ethnocentrism or to situations of intergroup conflict. It was necessary, therefore, to look for other factors involved in group identification. Furthermore, Pettigrew was already developing a cultural theory of prejudice which challenged the psycho-dynamic approaches.

It was a theory addressed to why the ordinary person, the ordinary reasonable thinking moderate person, can behave immoderately and unreasonably.
In one sense, this was a continuation of some of the ideas of Pettigrew, with his cultural approach to prejudice, that's a criticism of psycho-dynamic approaches.

(Billig, Interview)

The tradition of research in group dynamics pitted the 'personality and social structure' school of thought against the study of small group processes. However, researchers in this tradition also adopted the orthodox position whereby nationalism or in-group affiliation arises as a result of outgroup hostility. In this case, the latter results from an individual's perception of a threat which applies directly to him and which is shared by other members of his group. Tajfel was not the only one to criticize these experimental studies. Others, such as Deutsch (1966), noted how the absence of any long-term unifying processes and a stable starting point of group integration created the need for outgroup hostility and artificially supported the 'crisis' version of nationalism.

Perhaps the most famous study in this field is Sherif's Robbers' Cave Experiment (1966).

Sherif, for example,- it is a classic case, in some ways. I don't think Tajfel could have mounted his whole theory had it not been for the work that Sherif had done before him. It was, as I said, the idea that groups' interests determine their mutual behaviour.

(Brown, Interview)

He had a lot of admiration for the Sherifs and their work. I think he was impressed by the field studies, but it was like a laboratory experiment to see group prejudices being created from nothing, to show how ordinary, non-hostile, non-psychoanalytically damaged individuals, could hate members of another group.

(Billig, Interview)

Without going into too much detail, this experimental field study of intergroup relations created real ethnocentrism, real stereotypes and real hostility between two 'camps' of eleven year old boys on a three week summer camp. Group affiliation was crucially intensified in the second week when the two groups were brought into direct competition with each other. However, even during the first week of the study, independent group activities resulted in
the formation of group affiliations. Tajfel suggested that groups with a long history of common goals, activities, norms, distinctive patterns of behaviour and sets of values developed and shared for a long time, may achieve strong group affiliation without any intervention of acute conflict with an out-group.

The large-scale issue of nationalism forced Tajfel to take his analysis beyond the individual cognitive mechanisms that had dominated his earlier work. Furthermore, Sherif's work on intergroup relations, by this time, was well known. It provided the background and legitimization, within social psychology, for Tajfel's own work on intergroup relations. This is evident in the frequent references to Sherif's work as well as in his re-analysis of the Robbers' Cave experiments. Tajfel's approach differed in that he was directly concerned with large-scale social phenomena and that he did not accept the high profile given to intergroup conflict and hostility. The traditional focus on motivational factors and outgroup hostility which intensify group affiliations had resulted in an ignorance of previously existing structures of beliefs and systems of values (cognition and preferences) in the creation of large-scale group affiliations. The significance of belief systems in intergroup relations was evident to Tajfel both from his own experience as a Jew in pre-war Poland and also from the research on the development of national attitudes in children. It was, therefore, also necessary to examine patterns of social communication and social influence which result in the social and cultural diffusion of national attitudes and beliefs. These were issues which were by no means ignored by other social psychologists or, for that matter, by Sherif. Moreover, Tajfel draws together the various aspects of social influence around the concept of identification. This builds on Sherif's definition of intergroup behaviour:

whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, culturally or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identification, we have an instance of intergroup behaviour.

(Sherif, 1966, p. 12)
There was a vast literature on social influences in small group research which had identified normative (motivational) and informational (cognitive) sets of factors. Festinger's theory of social comparison processes (1954) provided a synthesis of these two sets of factors. It is within this context that 'the drive for self-evaluation' emerged as a central theoretical construct. And it is here that Tajfel first introduces the role of social categories into the construction of social identity. Conditions determining national affiliations are found in systems of social communication; in their effectiveness in the processes of social influence; and in the acquisition of an individual's social identity which is national through the process of social comparison.

Tajfel develops this discussion in relation to the formation of the relevant cognitive structures and value systems, drawing on the work of Deutsch (1966) on social communication, Fishman (1968a) on linguistic categories, and Barbichon and Moscovici (1965) on simplification. It is also here that Tajfel first discusses group distinctiveness whereby differences are not only perceived, accentuated and generalized but also either manufactured or eliminated. These ideas by no means represent, at this stage, a coherent theoretical framework. But they helped to set the agenda and provided the roots from which a full-blown theory of intergroup relations is constructed in Phase VI.

10.4 A RETURN TO EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

The collaborative research on the development of national attitudes in children and Tajfel's theoretical analysis of nationalism, which, as we have just seen, drew on a wide literature in the social sciences, both posed the same question. What factors, other than intergroup conflict, would produce intergroup discrimination?

This question was also posed, in some respects, from the results of Sherif's field experiments.

There were already signs, as various people had pointed out, already in Sherif's own writings, you didn't actually need competitive goals, that the boys were only too ready to get stuck in there. And so the obvious methodological point is in fact; if
Sherif had been a better methodologist, in some ways he should have had a control condition, which would have anticipated, in some ways, the minimal group studies, where you just put people into two groups, and let's see what happens.

(Brown, Interview)

Tajfel then became aware of European research which was applicable to this question, most notably the experimental investigations by Rabbie (Rabbie and Wilkens, 1968; Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969; see also Rabbie and Wilkens, 1971). Rabbie had, in effect, already asked the same question and had conducted experimental research which attempted to identify factors other than intergroup conflict.

He just asked the fundamental questions which in fact....Rabbie, in some ways, had asked first. Rabbie had said - wait a moment-. What would happen if you didn't have the conflict there with competitive goals?

(Brown, Interview)

Rabbie and his collaborators had suggested that the mere anticipation of future interaction between and within groups was sufficient, in itself, to produce intergroup discrimination. It should be remembered that the control condition, in which the quality of groupness was not made relevant to the situation, did not produce intergroup discrimination.

Tajfel addressed the same research question, but rather than looking at social influence and interdependence as the cause of competition, he examined the roles of value and categorization.

And I think Tajfel saw that this could relate to his earlier ideas on categorization. If you categorize an object you cease to look at it in a neutral way. You've already made some sort of evaluation. And so he thought, well, if you just categorize people in groups, would this lead to a difference in the way they thought about members of their own group, and members of the other group?

(Billig, Interview)

It was just a clever idea and, in some ways, Rabbie had already, to some extent, initiated the idea of the minimal group in his study with Horwitz in '69. I mean , he and Rabbie are founder members of the European Association. (But) Tajfel was always in the limelight. He was a better kind of politist and a
better wheeler-dealer. And that is true in his experiments, too.

(Brown, Interview)

Rabbie did a study first, that was published in '69, wasn't it? They were doing it from a Lewinian point of view—common fate. They did a study where they got the wrong answer.

(Turner, Interview)

Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy together set out to create a base-line intergroup situation, from which all the usual 'reasons' for discrimination between the groups would be removed

(Tajfel, 1978b, p.10)

and then to assess the impact of other theoretically relevant variables on the development of discrimination (Phase V). I have discussed, previously, the development of these experiments (see Chapter 9) and the unexpected finding that social categorization, alone, produced intergroup discrimination. And I have discussed also the explanation of these results in terms of social norms. But why social norms? The theoretical discussions in Phases III and IV of Tajfel's work provided an explanatory framework much closer to that which was eventually developed in Phase VI, yet the notions of personal integrity or social identity, social comparison and differentiation are not used in Phase V.

The reasons for this are not completely clear but a combination of factors may be suggested. Firstly, the research was an experimental study which set up, explicitly, the minimal conditions for intergroup discrimination. This, on its own, created a gap between theory and research which proved difficult to bridge. Phase IV was, both theoretically and conceptually, far in advance of the actual research conducted in either Phases IV or V. Secondly, the fact that value associated with the group was not a necessary condition for intergroup discrimination further removed the experimental results from previous theoretical discussions. Thirdly, the unexpected results required a clear and definite response; Tajfel's theoretical ideas were not, as yet, well structured or integrated and would not have provided a convincing explanation. In contrast, the normative and
informational aspects of social norms were well established theoretical conceptions which had emerged out of small group research. Social norms provided a widely accepted conceptual framework and theoretical explanation for the research results. Furthermore, it was possible to anchor the research in Sherif's work on intergroup relations, while simultaneously highlighting the novelty of Tajfel's findings.

Given that here we had this data to be explained, social categorization data, and given, too, they seemed to be raising quite interesting questions and novel theoretical implications, you had to start looking at existing ideas....in fact, when you look at Sherif, we find that we have a very nice theory of intergroup behaviour, where you can draw a nice contrast between this realistic competition and what we then called social competition. So, it was really a way of just making a point and trying to show how what Henri had discovered was novel.

(Turner, Interview)

Furthermore, the discussion of alternative explanations in the 1971 paper, forms part of the negotiation of explanations. Tajfel et al. present, and then dismiss, both the experimenter effect, and the anticipation of future interactions as adequate theoretical explanations (Chapter 8). The possibility that 'expectation of reciprocity' produced intergroup discrimination was not so easily dismissed. Negotiation regarding the explanations actually required a further experiment to be conducted (Doise, Tajfel and Billig, 1972).

The process of negotiating an account of unexpected findings extends well beyond the original papers. Firstly, the results were replicated in a number of experimental studies both at Bristol and elsewhere (eg. Deutsch, Thomas and Garner, 1971; Doise and Sinclair, 1973). Secondly, experiments were designed to address alternative explanations presented by other social psychologists. For example, Billig and Tajfel (1973) designed an experiment which would separate out the effects of perceived similarity between group members from the effects of social categorization on intergroup discrimination. Similarly, Tajfel and Billig (1974) distinguished the effects of familiarity from social categorization. However, even as late as 1974, Gerard and
Hoyte attempted to explain discrimination in the minimal group situation as an experimental artefact in terms of demand characteristics. Thirdly, these subsequent studies were, themselves, a point of departure for further theoretical discussion regarding the role of social categorization in intergroup relations. The most significant of these was Turner's experiments on self versus group in social category situations (Turner, 1973) (see Chapter 9).

10.5 THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Then came the crisis. One became less and less satisfied, both intellectually and socially, with what social psychology was doing.

(Tajfel, in Cohen 1977, p. 299)

It is difficult to define and identify the various elements in the crisis. Frequently, it is referred to in inverted commas, denoting some uncertainty as to what it actually was, but also a common awareness of its existence. Here is not the place to explore the origins and development of this crisis, or its implications - this would constitute a thesis in its own right. But it is worth reviewing some of its most salient characteristics. Not least of these was the lack of confidence within the community as to the validity and social relevance of various endeavours. Research and theorizing were by no means paralysed but a considerable number of publications, both books and articles, posed questions about methodology and challenged the theoretical and philosophical assumptions governing research in social psychology. There was widespread debate regarding what social psychology was, or should be, about. Moreover, there was a common consensus that such debate was legitimate.

As early as 1963, Koch had expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the achievements of psychology in his epilogue to Psychology: A study of a Science. Nowhere was this more severely felt than in social psychology. Problems with the use of experimental methodology first emerged into public awareness with the publication of Orne's paper on demand characteristics (1962) and Rosenthal's book on the experimenter effect (1966). The initial response focused on methodology with the design of unobtrusive measures and
non-reactive research methods (for example, Webb et al., 1966). However, continued concern with the external validity and the triviality of much experimental research in both laboratory and field settings, as well as questions regarding the ethics of social research, shifted the focus of doubt to the whole 'enterprise' of social psychology (eg. Ring, 1967; Kelman, 1968; Smith, 1972).

Dissatisfaction with a positivistic science psychology was expressed in many critiques of and blueprints for social psychology, especially in Europe. These addressed not only issues of methodology but also the substance of social psychology; the problems and theories, its inherent values, the models of human kind adopted, and the nature of explanation (Mixon, 1971; Harré and Secord, 1972; Israel and Tajfel, 1972; Gergen, 1973; Shotter, 1975; Gauld and Shotter, 1977, etc.). Moreover, that this represented a major shift is evidenced by books such as ‘Reconstructing Social Psychology’ (Armistead, 1974) and ‘Social Psychology in Transition’ (Strickland et al., 1976).

It is likely that the 'crisis' within the community of social psychologists was associated with social movements in society and with developments in other disciplines. Kuhn's (1962) thesis on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and other critiques of positivistic and hypothetico-deductive philosophies of science have had, no doubt, an impact on the social sciences. Nor has Sociology been entirely free from some turbulence (eg. Gouldner, 1970). Moreover, the student movement of the late 1960's, changes in society's attitude towards science and general trends in the style of thought (Capra, 1983) constituted a wider social context amenable to the crisis within social psychology.

The European Association was closely involved in the articulation of the crisis. This is nowhere more clearly seen than in the contents of the second European Monograph in Social Psychology edited by Israel and Tajfel, with contributions from Moscovici, Tajfel, Israel, Rommetveit, Asplund, Janousek, Wiberg, Von Cranach, Flament, and Harré who were based in Scandinavia, France, Germany, England or Czechoslovakia. The book originated from the 1969 plenary
conference of the Association where a 'complex and conflicting collective state of mind' (Israel and Tajfel, 1972, p.2) became evident. The conflict was between a respect for the well-established traditions, ideas, theories and associated experimental research on the one hand and a general dissatisfaction with the social, scientific and philosophical assumptions on which these were based on the other. This raised questions as to the nature of theory, the adequacy of methods, the unstated assumptions, values and presuppositions, and the relevance of research in social psychology, and its relationship to the natural sciences. These issues were further discussed in a small working group and eventually were published under the title of 'The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment'.

This book has probably been highly influential in various strands of European Social Psychology and is still relevant to the continuing debate. But, even if this were not the case, it is an expression of the ideas and concerns which were prevalent in the European Social Psychology community during the early 1970's. Furthermore, Tajfel was intimately involved in these discussions and debates. His contribution to the volume entitled 'Experiments in a Vacuum' not only argues the case for experimental research in social psychology but also elaborates on a social psychology which goes beyond individual and interindividual behaviour.

The major preoccupation at that time, though, was more general than the theory, was the whole debate about social psychology, and all the debate around the context book of '72. He was still passionately engaged, wherever he went, and saying that this is what social psychology should be all about. And these experiments in a vacuum - the whole thing - and he was still really publicising those ideas, and engaging in a spirited way with what he saw as the overpowering dominance of American social psychology with its very limited methodological, theoretical perception of what people were and the kinds of things they did. And that's an irony, too, because, despite his wider concerns about social psychology, his actual own work is rather orthodox. His experiments are very traditional, and control variables and all that sort of thing were very vacuous in some ways.

(Brown, Interview)
While others, such as Harré and Secord (1972), were pronouncing that experimental methodology was not suited to the exploration of social psychological phenomena and could never provide the proper foundation for a science of social behaviour, Tajfel did not wish to abandon the experimental tradition. In some respects, this is not surprising. Throughout his academic career he had worked within the experimental tradition of social psychology. All the research with which he had been directly involved was experimental. In this respect, Tajfel remained an active proponent of the orthodox, and he remained unconvinced by arguments proclaiming the greater value of other methods.

This having being said, he was critical of experimenters who extrapolated from the behaviour of subjects in a laboratory context to social conduct in natural settings without an examination of the social context. The significance of the social context emerges, in part, from his research in Phases IV and V. Experimental situations can be considered to be caricatures of social reality. This means that an analysis of the social context of the experiment and the situations to which they apply must be made. Furthermore, features of the social context and their interaction with psychological processes must be tested experimentally. Good experimental research depends upon both good theory and good cultural analysis. This can either be of the sequence Theory-Experiment-Cultural analysis or, as in the case of the experiments on social categorization and intergroup behaviour, Experiment leads to Theory leads to Cultural Analysis. In this respect, Tajfel criticized a wide range of experimental research in social psychology. This included modelling experiments in Game Theory; simulation experiments, such as Sherif's on the emergence of social norms (autokinetic effect) and his own experiments on social judgment (Phase II); and some naturalistic experiments such as Argyle's work on dyads and small groups.

Tajfel's faith in the experimental tradition was not only evident in these theoretical debates. Firstly, during the formative years of the European Association there were heated discussions and disagreements over the most suitable
name for the association. Eventually, it was named the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, a name which Tajfel had advocated strongly. Secondly, Tajfel's own research had always been experimental, and this 'orthodoxy' proved to be very powerful. He had argued that experiments could never be conducted in a social vacuum and that it was also necessary to examine the social context. But, in his actual research, Tajfel himself never did so. Furthermore, in the 1972 chapter on 'Experiments in a vacuum' he mentions a number of open-ended individual interviews which supported the social norms interpretation of the social categorization experiments. He goes on to suggest that such interviews should be used more frequently in experimental research. But these interviews were never published as legitimate research findings. It was left to his students and collaborators to design and conduct research which examined the social context of social behaviour and intergroup relations.

While others were arguing that social psychology must adopt a model of 'homo' which recognizes the 'autonomy' of the individual (eg. Harré), and, as a consequence, that experimental methodology was untenable, Tajfel advocated the case for experimental research. He also advocated a social model of 'homo' which recognized the lack of individual autonomy and the lack of independence from social conditions and social norms. It was this latter aspect of his model which was responsible for large-scale uniformities in social behaviour.

In the context of the crisis, Tajfel, for the first time, explicates his view on the perspective of social psychology. He argues that questions about human social behaviour have been reduced to the biological, psychological or sociological levels in their research and analysis. Theories in social psychology are basically about individual or inter-individual behaviour since their explanations of social behaviour are founded in individual motives and cognitions. Theories of aggression, of interindividual and small group competition and cooperation, of judgments, stereotypes, attitudes and beliefs about ingroups and
outgroups, and of the genesis of prejudice (including Tajfel's own work in Phase II, and, in some respects, Phase III) reduce social behaviour to the presocial or asocial aspects of 'homo'. This approach is epitomized by Berkowitz (1962) in his statement that

Dealings between groups ultimately become problems of the psychology of the individual. Individuals decide to go to war; battles are fought by individuals; and peace is established by individuals... Ultimately it is the single person who attacks the feared and disliked ethnic minority group.

(Berkowitz, p. 167, quoted in Tajfel, 1972a, p. 95)

This passage, along with Harré's claim for the autonomy of individuals, must have incensed Tajfel in its denial of his own experience as a Jew and the experience of many other minority peoples. When it came to large-scale interrelations between groups such a view was clearly untenable. The psychology of the individual, or even of inter-individual behaviour, could not be simply extrapolated to explain the social uniformities. This required a different perspective on the relationship between the individual and the social. Individuals feel, think and behave in terms of their social identities which are determined, to a large extent, by the relations between the groups to which they belong. The social setting of intergroup relations contributes to making individuals what they are and they, in turn, produce the social setting in a symbiotic relationship of development and change.

It is here, also, that Tajfel begins to stress the importance of social change. 'Change is the fundamental characteristic of the social environment, and, as such, is the most basic problem presented by this environment to the human organism' (Tajfel, 1972a, p. 108). The crucial problem of social psychology, which requires thinking in terms of 'organizational wholes', is that of the relations between Man and social change. Social change includes large-scale social, political, economic and technological transformations as well as the everyday changes in an individual's life. We have already noted that Sherif had been concerned with social
change. So, too, was Moscovici. Tajfel was also influenced and supported by Piaget from whom he extended his understanding of the symbiotic relationship between the organism and its environment; between the individual and the social environment.

Indirectly, though I have not met him more than one or two times, Piaget must have been quite important. I'm not really conscious of it. But there is his influence.

(Tajfel, in Cohen, 1977, p. 297)

The individual must create change, resist it, adapt to it or prepare for it. The system of shared expectations, beliefs and evaluations must be changed, or the environment must be changed to preserve them.

It was also Piaget who introduced the notion of decentration adopted by Tajfel to emphasize the significance of shared beliefs and evaluations. This 'sharing' is defined in terms of an individual expectation about, and evaluation of, other people's behaviour as members of large-scale groups. In both these cases, Tajfel transposed the ideas of Piaget on cognitive development to the realm of social behaviour and large-scale inter-group relations.

It is because of the socially derived, shared, accepted and conflicting notions of appropriateness of conduct, because of the social definition of the situations to which they apply, and of the social origin of their manner of changing and of relating to one another, that individual and inter-individual psychology cannot be usefully considered as providing the bricks from which an adequate social psychology can be built. The derivations used to be in the opposite direction.

(Tajfel, 1972, p. 104)

This reflects a more sociological perspective, contrasting with traditional social psychology, and was no doubt influenced by Tajfel's cross-disciplinary reading, for example:-

He was also very impressed by Berger and Luckmann's 'Social Construction of Reality' which he considered a very, very important work. He had a lot of admiration, I can remember him, for Levi-Strauss's work.

(Billig, Interview)
Although this perspective was at odds with some of the social psychological community it was also in alignment with others. Most notable of these is Moscovici's discussion of society and social psychology (1972) and his work on social representations and minority influence, both of which were, by then, well established in France. Also, Rommetveit's perspective on social communication, meaning and language similarly stresses that social interaction requires an analysis that goes beyond individual behaviour. That other Europeans with whom Tajfel was in direct association, both academically and as friends, were thinking the same way and talking the same language was absolutely vital to the development of a new perspective in group psychology and social psychology in general. So, too, were the divergences in perspective, both with traditional social psychology and within the European community. These divergences gave rise to controversy and debate which stimulated and facilitated the exposition and clarification of particular issues.

Tajfel's emphasis on the social context not only applied to experiments conducted within social psychology. It also applied to the social context of the discipline as a whole. The establishment of a European Social Psychology almost inevitably brought with it a contrast with American Social Psychology. This was most explicitly proclaimed by Moscovici in his contribution to the 1972 volume entitled 'Society and Theory in Social Psychology'. American Social Psychology had implicitly been directed towards issues of its own society but these were not necessarily the most pressing issues in Europe. Both Moscovici and Tajfel, along with other social psychologists in Europe, emphasized the need to establish a second cultural base for social psychology, which addressed the issues confronting European societies, not least of which were the large-scale social phenomena associated with social change.

This was, in part, a recognition of the growing conviction that social psychology, along with the other social and human sciences, could never be value-free or independent from their cultural and social context. But Tajfel frequently reminded his readers that 'European' social
psychology did not set out to be in opposition to American social psychology (Tajfel, 1971; Tajfel, 1972c; Tajfel, in Cohen, 1977; Tajfel 1981a). In itself, it contained a diversity of social, political, cultural, and economic perspectives. But it was this pluralism, along with the communication networks and controversies, which created the most promising social milieu for the future development of social psychology.

10.6 THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

During the next four years, Tajfel worked with others on developing a social psychology of social change which addressed the relationship between the psychological processes and the social context of social interaction. This development had two interdependent strands—findings from experimental research led to the specification of intervening psychological processes and the continuum from interindividual to intergroup behaviour; readings in the political sciences and reference to intergroup relations in society facilitated the elaboration of the social context in terms of social change and social mobility.

It was previously mentioned that Turner's experimental studies on social categorization were highly significant in the development of the theoretical framework (Turner, 1973; 1975). These experiments were designed within the minimal group paradigm first used by Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy (1971), and were supplemented by a questionnaire designed to find out how subjects perceived their choices and the experimental situation. The major difference in the experimental design was that subjects were able to distribute money or 'points' directly to themselves or others as well as to other ingroup members and outgroup members and that the salience of the group was varied. In certain conditions subjects displayed self-favouritism, rather than ingroup-favouritism. These results showed that an explanation of intergroup discrimination purely in terms of social categorizations associated with a 'generic group attitude' was inadequate. Perception of an ingroup-outgroup dichotomy does not alone result in intergroup discrimination; that is,
social categorization per se does not promote social conflict.

This led to the whole issue of intergroup discrimination within a minimal group context being reappraised. Drawing on the theoretical ideas which had emerged in Phases III and IV a subject's behaviour was assumed to be an expression of his or her ubiquitous tendency towards self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954). Within the experimental situation individuals could act in terms of their intergroup categories or in terms of self in order to gain a positive self-evaluation. The former requires identification with the group and the achievement of a positively valued distinctiveness from the other group through the process of social comparison. In this way the group contributed to a member's positive self-image through the process of social comparison. Turner refers to this in terms of social competition between groups for positively valued attributes.

These experiments were also influenced by related theories of intergroup conflict and, in particular, realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 1967).

A phrase he used to me almost immediately in the first year was something like - we need a way of thinking about conflict or discrimination which distinguishes between competition and conflict in the sense of hostility. So he was already getting there- already there. That was my first article, was to make that distinction clear.

(Turner, Interview)

By using abstract dimensions of evaluation for social comparisons, as opposed to monetary rewards, Turner showed that intergroup differentiations were not dependent upon a conflict of group interests over monetary rewards, but were dependent on an individual's identification with a group. Social competition could be distinguished from economic or realistic competition. Turner also describes two situations in which social competition and realistic competition overlap. Firstly, the material reward can serve as a symbol of a value-differential associated with social comparison between groups. Secondly, social competition can give rise to a conflict of interest.
The experiments also illuminated the role of social conditions in determining the form of social interactions in which subjects engaged. In the previous chapter on problems and solutions we have already seen how this facilitated the conceptual creation of a continuum from interindividual to intergroup behaviour. We have also seen how this continuum was related to the continuum from social mobility to social change.

The interrelationships between social categorization, social identity, social comparison and psychological distinctiveness are elaborated on and explicated in Tajfel's publication entitled 'Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour' (1974). These ideas were first presented in the Katz-Newcomb lectures and Tajfel used this opportunity to develop a theoretical position.

- the idea of people's social identity being bound up in their group and the need for them to see the group in a positive light. And all these things started to come together and he really launched those ideas in the unlikely platform of the Katz-Newcomb lectures, where in a sense he was given a space to sort of speculate about the world. So he did.

(Brown, Interview)

But this cannot be construed as the intellectual achievement of Tajfel alone. It was rather the culmination of an intellectual and research community primarily based at Bristol University with close connections to other European centres of social psychological research.

The main point of departure from the traditional literature on intergroup relations was that identification with a group (group affiliation) occurs prior to any intergroup conflict. That is, an individual's sense of belonging to a group is acquired prior to the perception of threat or competition with an outgroup. The centrality of identification is expressed in the concept of Social Identity, by which an individual finds, creates and defines his or her place in society. It is in this article that Tajfel elaborates on the psychological processes with an extended discussion of social comparison and psychological distinctiveness, as presented in the exposition of Phase VI.
Furthermore, the interrelationships between social categorization, social identity, social comparison and psychological distinctiveness are explicated to create an integrated and coherent exposition of the psychological process and functions of social behaviour in intergroup relations.

This article also elaborates on the societal conditions in which intergroup behaviours will arise and the form which they will assume.

The other thing where this is distinctly European - he's always thinking, not only about the distinctive law of social psychology, but acknowledging that there is something called society, society proper; so he is always thinking about that, too.

(Turner, Interview)

It seemed in line with the semi-Marxist or left-wing ideology about class relationships and so on. And so, when I first read the social identity ideas, what Henri was suggesting was that people would be motivated to do things, good things, bad things, in the name of their group, for reasons other than just the group's material interests, things like the group's name or the language or its culture.

(Brown, Interview)

As we have seen in Phase VI, the societal conditions are considered in terms of the social mobility-social change continuum in relation to consensually superior and inferior groups. This contrast provided a structure in which to explore intergroup relations between consensually superior and inferior groups.

The ideas expressed by the social mobility-social change continuum developed slowly. Tajfel was concerned that theories in social psychology should address issues relating to social change and to large-scale social phenomena. Furthermore, from the above experiments it was clear that individuals acted in terms of their group membership when they couldn't achieve a positive self-image as an individual. These were related to the social conditions in society in which individuals could not move easily from one group to another. In order to achieve a positive self-image it was necessary to change the image, position or circumstances of
his or her group as a whole. Social change thus referred to the changes in relationships between groups and their associated expectations, intentions and actions. This was then contrasted with conditions of 'social mobility' in which individuals could move freely between groups and did not have to rely on their group membership in order to achieve a positive self-image.

This contrast provided a structure within which to explore intergroup relations between consensually superior and inferior groups. This appears to be a logical analysis of the implications of the psychological processes, given certain social conditions. Examples from intergroup relations in society are used to provide 'intuitive support' for this analysis of the various forms of intergroup behaviour, especially with regard to the actions of inferior groups under conditions of social change. These include American blacks and the emergence of 'black is beautiful', Negro music and dance, African traditions, accents and dialects, etc., as positively valued attributes; the emergence of new nationalisms such as the Welsh; and the reassessment of Jewish Identity. Other examples are drawn from social psychological research. For instance, Lemaire's field studies showed that the 'inferior' group of boys given less adequate materials for building a house engaged in social activities which created new criteria of comparison.

Although intergroup relations in general stimulated this discussion, the specific examples did not influence the general structure of the analysis. This relied entirely on the specification of the psychological processes, the distinction between conditions of social mobility and social change and the distinction between inferior groups in relation to superior groups and vice versa. What the examples did do was to promote a discussion of the various solutions that could be found, given the same social conditions. They also made apparent the importance of social creativity in the maintenance and creation of intergroup differentiation.

The style of this analysis can be contrasted with Tajfel's earlier work in Phases I and II. In the latter, the general discussion and theoretical structure revolved around
the findings of experimental research conducted within social psychology. This stands in contrast to Phase VI in which the theoretical discussion is extended to encompass examples drawn from society itself, in terms of general descriptions of intergroup relations and social identities.

These ideas were developed further by drawing on the work of Hirschman on *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (1970). Tajfel met Hirschman while visiting Harvard and realized the congruence between their ideas. Hirschman was himself an economist who had been influenced by theories in political science. His thesis focuses on the use of 'exit' - leaving an organization - and 'voice' - expressing dissatisfaction to management etc. - as ways of dealing with institutional problems. Hirschman's analysis related directly to social mobility and social change with some implications for the social psychology of intergroup relations. But it largely addressed an individual's exit or voice in organizations in response to decline. This had to be transposed to, or integrated with, the interindividual-intergroup continuum (Tajfel, 1976). Firstly, the contrast between social mobility and social change could be conceived of as a continuum which involved a transposition from individual exit to group voice. Secondly, the use of group voice could serve as a powerful force working towards the maintenance of the status quo as well as towards the implementation of change under conditions of social change.

It is also in this context that Tajfel defines the relationship between social psychology and other social sciences, as was presented in Phase VI. The juxtaposition of economics, political science and social psychology made it apparent that Tajfel was encroaching on the territory of these other disciplines. Furthermore, the inclusion of social conditions, traditionally the domain of sociology, into a social psychological theory needed to be justified. We have already seen how the influence of the social context (social variables) was translated into the process of social identity. We have also seen that the specification of the psychological processes alone does not provide an adequate understanding of the variety of forms of intergroup
behaviour. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to examine the consensual status of the groups and the social conditions in which intergroup behaviour occurred. These social conditions are shifted into the domain of social psychology in terms of systems of beliefs about the structure of society. Furthermore, these belief systems, once established, acquire an autonomous function in directing intergroup relations. This is also affected by the perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy of the structure of intergroup relations. The significance of perceived legitimacy had already been realized within the frustration-aggression literature. By introducing this conceptual construct into his analysis of intergroup relations, Tajfel was able to clarify the transition from acceptance to rejection of minority status and the creation of social change out of social stability (Tajfel, 1978i).

Thus a social psychology of intergroup relations and especially changing intergroup relations and social movements requires an analysis of systems of belief and their social diffusion through society; the perceived legitimacy of intergroup relations; as well as the psychological processes of social identity and social comparison.

The contrast between systems of belief in social mobility and social change was not only used by Tajfel as part of the theoretical framework of intergroup relations. It was also applied to the social context of social psychology as a discipline. In the section on problems and solutions, I discussed Tajfel's use of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum to redefine the boundaries of social psychology and to distinguish his approach from more traditional approaches which had originated predominantly within American social psychology. This focus on interindividual relations was related to the shared belief in social mobility within American culture. Hirschman pointed out that this was one of the most powerful images of the American myth. This myth of individual mobility within society was not so strong in European cultures. By creating a second cultural base for social psychology it was possible to develop a social psychology of intergroup relations and
social change, which was no longer restricted by the past dominance of American influence and tradition. The interpersonal-intergroup continuum also provided a means by which to present these ideas on intergroup relations, within the bounds of social psychology, to the academic community in the U.S.A.

10.7 A THEORY ESTABLISHED

The interdependent representations of the discipline of social psychology, of social behaviour and social change, of the psychological processes and social beliefs, and of the differentiation between social groups were brought together and integrated into a well structured theoretical framework in Tajfel's contribution to the 1978 volume on Differentiation between Social Groups. This theoretical framework extended from experimental data to societal realities; from psychological processes to consensual systems of belief, and from experimental research to the metatheory of social psychology. The difficulty encountered in presenting a summary of this theoretical framework in Phase VI was due, in large part, to the interdependence and integration of these various aspects. Furthermore, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to analyse the construction sequentially on the basis of these chapters alone. The strength of these writings is to be found in Tajfel's ability to relate a diverse literature to the large-scale social uniformities in intergroup relations and to explicate the relationships involved.

They provide a coherent set of interrelated ideas that have to do with a specific problem that you are concerned with.

(Tajfel in Cohen, 1977, p.303)

By the time Tajfel came to write his contribution in the 1978 volume on Differentiation between Social Groups much of the theoretical framework had already been constructed. The social-psychological definition of groups and of group membership was developed as early as 1969 in the article on the formation of national attitudes. Most of Chapter 4 on 'The Achievement of Group Differentiation' and a large section of Chapter 3 on 'Social Categorization, Social
Identity and Social Comparison' were taken directly from the 1974 text. Chapter 2 on 'Interindividual behaviour and Intergroup behaviour' draws largely on his previous work.

The distinction between interindividual and intergroup psychology was a well-established feature of Tajfel's writings by 1972 when he contributed to the volume on The Context of Social Psychology (Israel and Tajfel, 1972a). It is here, also, that the social psychological perspective was constructed and elaborated. The chapter on 'Categorization Sociale' (1972b), together with the article on 'Social Identity' (1974b), explicated the psychological processes involved in intergroup behaviour, drawing on earlier ideas first presented in 1969(a). The contrasting conceptions of social change and of social mobility were also evident by this time. The latter was further developed, in conjunction with Hirschman's notions of 'exit' and 'voice', in terms of consensual belief systems. Tajfel's concern with social movements, minority groups and social creativity also came to the fore during this period.

This having been said, there are a number of developments which further illuminate the social and intellectual influences on Tajfel's work. Firstly, Tajfel discusses extensively and argues against criticisms of different aspects of the theory advanced by other social psychologists. One of these relates to the so-called tautological or circular definition of groups. He overcomes this by considering the internal and external criteria of group membership. Internal criteria refer to the subjective, self-identification of group membership. External criteria refer to the identifications made by other groups or the experimenter and also to the observation of a consensus regarding the cognitive, affective and emotional components of group membership. Tajfel demonstrates the validity of these criteria by referring to experimental studies using natural groups, creating 'natural' groups (eg. Sherif, 1966), imposing the minimal conditions for groups (eg. Tajfel et al., 1971), or explicitly avoiding any imposition of groups (Ferguson and Kelley, 1964).
Another criticism involved the reinterpretation of the various experimental results in terms of 'experimenter effect' or 'demand characteristics' (Hornstein, 1972; Deutsch, 1971; Gerard and Hoyt, 1974). These were particularly relevant to the minimal group paradigm experiments which lacked any cross-validation from internal or external criteria of the experimentally manipulated behaviour. This criticism is countered both in terms of theoretical explanation and on the grounds of experimental research. Experimental results in Billig and Tajfel (1973) could not be parsimoniously explained in terms of 'demand characteristics'. Furthermore, the 'experimenter-effect' was itself a phenomenon that required a theoretical explanation in terms of 'subject effect' and shared beliefs or expectations.

Secondly, Tajfel places greater emphasis on social movements and extends the discussion of this phenomenon drawing on the work of Toch (1965) on The social psychology of social movements. For Toch, social movements are relatively enduring of collective behaviour, involving large groups of people, aimed at promoting or resisting change in society at large, in order to resolve, collectively, a problem they feel that they have in common and which is perceived to arise from their relations with other groups. Tajfel extends this discussion by emphasizing the role of shared systems of beliefs as described previously.

Thirdly, as described in Phase VI, Tajfel presents an extensive argument for the distinction between interindividual and intergroup behaviour and identifies the particular psychological processes involved in each of these with reference to relative deprivation. This is dependent, in certain respects, on the literature addressing relative deprivation in sociology and political science, and in particular Gurr's volume on Why Men Rebel (1970). Gurr provides a subjective or cognitive definition of relative deprivation and describes a continuum from personal to group relative deprivation. Tajfel adopts the continuum and considers the social psychological processes involved at the two poles and in the transition between personal and group
relative deprivation. He also draws on research by Danziger (1963) and Geber (1972), both psychologists, and Birrel (1972), a sociologist, to illustrate the intergroup pole.

Fourthly, certain aspects of the theory are less clear than others. The difficulties encountered in providing a clear specification of the various theoretical principles can be seen to be related to the wider social and intellectual context. In particular, the social psychological perspective and the psychological processes are clearly defined and well explicated. The comprehensive theoretical discussion is elaborated and clarified by exposing the weaknesses of other theoretical approaches and by drawing on experimental research within social psychology. In contrast, the discussion of the form, content and role of social beliefs systems, and of legitimacy does not achieve the same degree of lucidity. Similarly, there is little discussion concerning communication processes, social influence and the diffusion of these consensual beliefs systems. Furthermore, although the diverse forms of intergroup relations found in society can be located within the theoretical structure, it by no means provides a comprehensive or definitive framework for the specification of their distinguishing characteristics. This is due, in part, to the fact that these issues constitute the most recent developments in the evolution of the theoretical framework. It is also due to the lack of research and theoretical debate in social psychology which directly addresses these issues.

10.8 A COLLABORATIVE AFFAIR

I have discussed some of the social and intellectual influences on the evolution of a Theory of Intergroup Relations and on the emergence of a Social Psychological Perspective. One of the most important types of influence has been the collaboration with other social psychologists. Much of Tajfel's research and many of his publications involve the efforts of more than one person. Frequently, Tajfel's research was conducted with the assistance of his students or vice versa. Other research enterprises were conducted in collaboration with social psychologists who were eminent in their own right. This is particularly true of his
work with Bruner and the cross-cultural research on national attitudes. However, that the construction of theory and the conduct of research is a collaborative enterprise is nowhere more evident than in the construction of the theory of intergroup relations.

The main centre for research and theoretical discussion relating to these developments was at Bristol University, where Tajfel held his chair. Unlike many psychology departments in Britain, where there is only one social psychologist, in Bristol there was a group of people who had worked together for several years on the same problems; who exchanged ideas, discussed and debated relevant issues, designed, conducted and interpreted research and constructed a theory of intergroup relations together. As Tajfel commented in the Preface to the 1978 volume:

> it is very difficult (and also quite unimportant) to know at the end who was the initial 'owner' of one idea or another, who has been the first to formulate a useful hypothesis, or to push us in a new direction.

(Tajfel, 1978a, p. vii)

Tajfel moved to Bristol in 1968. He was shortly joined by Michael Billig and Dick Eiser and later by Jonathan Turner and Glynis Breakwell, who were initially Ph.D. students under his supervision. Billig had been involved in the experimental research social categorizations and intergroup differentiation (Phase V) and completed his thesis entitled *Social Categorization and Intergroup Relations* in 1972. Although he left Bristol and went to Birmingham in 1973, he continued to work in this area for a number of years. In 1976, he published his first book on *Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations*, which had initially been a joint project between Tajfel and himself. He then went on to study and publish a book on *Fascists: A Social Psychological View of the National Front*, which he also sees as being closely related to Tajfel's work.

My Ph.D. was running those experiments and I was centrally involved in them. And my book on Intergroup Relations arose out of that work quite directly, so that I owe much to Henri's influence, without which I would probably never have come into
academic life, if it had not been for his encouragement and his help.

(Billig, Interview)

..in a way the Fascists were related because, having said that, the central question behind Henri's question was how was genocide possible? It's the sort of question behind the work on Fascism, but, of course, I was looking at a very unimportant bump in European history, as opposed to what actually happened in the last War.

(Billig, Interview)

Eiser was also an early figure in the Bristol group, involved in research on social categorization. However, his work tended to focus on accentuation and the role of social categorization in social judgment and attitude formation, rather than intergroup relations per se, and, in 1972, he published a book with W. Stroebe on Categorization with Social Judgment. Breakwell, in contrast, focused on the mechanisms of social identity in intergroup behaviour, and completed her thesis in 1976. She went on to study, and publish, work on threatened identities and social movements.

Turner joined the research group at Bristol after the minimal group experiments had been completed. His thesis was on 'Social categorization and social comparison in intergroup relations' (1975) and, as we have seen, he played a highly prominent role in the development of the theory of intergroup relations.

We worked very closely together. Henri would have ideas that he told me and I would have ideas that I told him and we were very aware that it was difficult to say whose ideas were whose.

(Turner, Interview)

It was also Turner who coined many of the labels which are frequently associated with Tajfel's work. In his writings, Tajfel tended to express his ideas in a precise but verbose style. For example, he referred to the theory of intergroup relations, the experimental studies on intergroup behaviour, and to individuals' acting as members of a group. In some respects, this is an admirable discipline in that it reduces the possibility of misinterpretation and misrepresentation. On the other hand, Turner wanted a means
of identifying work in his Ph.D. without having to employ long and cumbersome descriptions. For this reason, he employed terms such as minimal group experiments, social competition, and, later on, Social Identity Theory, all of which have come to be adopted in the wider community.

In 1974 Tajfel submitted a successful research proposal on 'Social Identity, social categorization and social comparison in intergroup behaviour' to the Social Science Research Council (S.S.R.C.). The research grant was of paramount importance. Under the leadership of Tajfel, it provided the finances for a comprehensive research programme, attracting other psychologists to Bristol, and supporting exchange visits and conferences in Europe.

He got a lot of research money in, he got a huge grant from the Ford Foundation and the SSRC and various other sources. He just then had the resources to mount big research projects.

(Brown, Interview)

He got a research grant from the SSRC, and it was a lot of money, to do intergroup research on conflict. There was a lot of work done at Bristol and we had money to go abroad and invite others over.

(Turner, Interview)

Bill McGuire told me something of the background to the unusually large research grant. The National Science Foundation (NSF) supported most research in the U.S.A. Under the influence of the Marshall Plan, which encouraged international cooperation between North America and Western Europe, some of the research money was given to other countries, including the SSRC. Furthermore, rather than giving small amounts to a large number of people, it was decided to fund two or three excellent projects on a large scale. One of these was Tajfel's.

Other social psychologists were attracted to the 'Bristol School', as it was frequently referred to. In particular Rupert Brown, originally as a Ph.D. student, Howard Giles, a psychologist, and later on Jennifer Williams, joined the team. Others who were actively involved in research meetings and discussions included Anthony
Agathangelou, Richard Bourhis, Brian Caddick, Fred Ross, Suzanne Skevington and Philip Smith. Others who were directly involved included Donald Tyler from Canada and Graham Vaughan from Auckland who were long-term visitors.

It is impossible to get a feel for how a research group works from the publications that they produce. The only indication of this highly significant aspect of scientific life is given by the multiple authorship of articles and in the brief prefaces and acknowledgments in books. Indeed, many of those who worked with Tajfel frequently refer to the influence and encouragement of Henri Tajfel. For me, the most important thing which emerged from my interviews with John Turner, Rupert Brown and Mike Billig was at least some insight into the immediate social environment at Bristol.

Tajfel gathered a group of individual psychologists at Bristol University who together created an environment, not only to carry out research, but also to discuss, argue and debate about theoretical and meta-theoretical ideas.

He really did like this idea of providing an environment where all these people would come and talk about his ideas and, if they do produce an article, so much the better.

(Brown, Interview)

a lot of the development of any social scientific tradition is, in some ways, bound up with the kind of people and their relationships that were involved with it. (Tajfel) was passionately involved with issues that interested him and he was researching. And I think that kind of thing is important in influencing other people, and perhaps also in the generation, the momentum of things.

(Brown, Interview)

One example, which highlights the importance of these debates, is given by Brown and Taylor's article in 1979 *Towards a more social social psychology*. This arose directly out of discussions between Taylor and the post-graduate students at Bristol. In this paper, they suggest that the difficulty with social social psychology was more methodological than theoretical.

Don Taylor was visiting, as a visiting scholar, and he eventually spent the whole summer staying at Bristol. He's not the kind of person who can stay around people very long before engaging them in
discussion and debates and so on...and he just said one day 'look, it sounds like this is interesting work, we could try and put this together in an article'.

(Brown, Interview)

We wanted to point out to people that this kind of social psychology wasn't all that different from other kinds of social psychology.

(Brown, Interview)

Tajfel did not agree with their analysis and, after further discussions, he wrote a lengthy reply entitled Individuals and Groups in Social Psychology (1979a).

I spent a long time arguing and talking with (Tajfel) about it, and he was bothered by what he thought was this misunderstanding about the theory and how we misconceived it. So he wanted to put it right.

(Brown, Interview)

Tajfel was obviously a central figure in these discussions, both indirectly and directly, but perhaps his greatest strength lay in providing an environment which simultaneously focused and coordinated research and debate without imposing obtrusive restrictions. The focus was provided by his social social psychological perspective and the integration of theory and research to address societal issues. It was an approach which was explicitly anti-individualistic, and an approach which was intolerant of research without theory.

Personality was boring and we were both against individualism. We always assumed the individual was social. And, of course, we were both cognitivists.

(Turner, Interview)

the other big thing which I was most attracted to was that it essentially dispensed with most of the kind of individualistic ideas which I found very little sympathy with.

(Brown, Interview)

And he was manifestly impatient with people when we had seminars, people would come and give a seminar and when he thought that it was uninteresting, or just doing another type of American style research, he would make it very clear about this.

(Brown, Interview)

He still believed in general scientific theory - social scientific theories about human behaviour,
he believed that it was important to test those against reality.

(Brown, Interview)

He wanted very much to do work on fundamental theoretical ideas in empirical research: he was contemptuous of people that just did the odd study, here, there and everywhere - he thought that was complete and utter rubbish*.

(Turner, Interview)

He also coordinated the research on intergroup relations, but, while much of his own research had been within the orthodox experimental tradition, the research programme involved a variety of laboratory and field studies. The project was a major programme of research. There were four or five research workers employed in three years - that's big money, even nowadays. It was a major project and there was a sort of experimental half which John Turner and I were working on, then there was the field side which Suzanne Skevington and initially somebody like Tony Agathangelou and Richard Bourhis were associated with. But, at the same time, Richard and Howard Giles were doing their stuff on linguistic differentiation, some of which was in semi-field context.

(Brown, Interview)

Brown's own story is an interesting one. He had been employed as a research assistant in 1972 but left, only to return, two years later, to do his Ph.D. And I said that one of the things I was most disenchanted with was the idea that I was supposed to go and do three or four experiments for my Ph.D. And he said 'that's absolute rubbish. You could do anything'. It was just that I had picked out that as the way to do a Ph.D. All my role models around me were doing experiments....

(Brown, Interview)

I had some meetings over my research. And I just talked to him about going into this factory and it seemed all very interesting. He said 'oh, yes, go and do it'. He was very laissez-faire as a supervisor.

(Brown, Interview)

Billig similarly highlights the fact that Tajfel actively encouraged an open approach in his post-graduate students, with particular reference to cross-disciplinary reading.
Henri always encouraged all of his post-graduate students to read widely. He never had nit-picking view that you should only read social psychology. In fact, he wasn't very much interested in the majority of social psychology. I think he taught me good academic habits, in that respect. It did lead me away, obviously, from the experimental approach. (Billig, Interview)

Indeed, Billig's book on the social psychology of intergroup relations, reflects his reading of Marx and Mannheim on ideology. Similarly, his later work on rhetoric as an intellectual tradition arose out of his reading of Plato and Aristotle.

The community of social psychologists involved in the development of Tajfel's work extended well beyond Bristol. The Bristol group was associated closely with several other centres in Europe. Firstly, Tajfel spent some time at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, where he worked on and discussed his ideas with Moscovici and others. Secondly, ties with the Netherlands were established in some joint research on status differences, comparative relevance and intergroup relations by Ad van Knippenberg, John van de Geer and Henri Tajfel. Thirdly, brief exchange visits between Bristol (England), Paris (France), Geneva (Switzerland), and Gronigen (Netherlands), and three research conferences in Paris and Bristol, encouraged and facilitated the exploration of new ideas and new research departures. These were, in large measure, dependent on the administrative support and funding offered by the Fondation de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme together with the S.S.R.C.

Furthermore, the work at Bristol was closely related to research teams in Paris and Geneva, each with their own history of development. Moscovici and Paicheler (Paris) had been working on processes of identification; Lemaire, Kastersten and Personnaz (Paris) were working on social differentiation; and Deschamps, Doise and Meyer (Geneva) continued to work on social categorization and accentuation in intergroup relations. While these centres displayed their own distinctive style of research and divergences in their theoretical approach, many of the theoretical concepts and
research issues were closely related to the theory of intergroup relations of the 'Bristol School'.

The collaborative nature of this work is reflected in the books which Tajfel edited. The only book which Tajfel published as sole author is Human Groups and Social Categories: studies in social psychology (1981). This, it will be remembered, is a collection of Tajfel's previously published works, half of which were written in collaboration with other social psychologists. The other three major publications associated with Social Identity Theory were all edited volumes. Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations (1978) had sixteen contributors. The book is divided into five major sections. The first section was Tajfel's contribution, which presented the social psychological approach, the theory and research. The second section, on social categorization and intergroup differentiation, was written by Turner, Deschamps, Doise and Meyer. This is followed by contributions from Van Knippenberg, Turner, Brown, Moscovici and Paischeler on status, legitimacy and stability in intergroup relations. Lemaître, Kastersztein, Personnaz and Breakwell focused on differentiation and the final section, which explored different social context, is written by Vaughan, Giles, Brown and Williams.

The publication was followed, three years later, by Intergroup Behaviour, a volume edited by Turner and Giles (1981), and then by Tajfel's edited volume on Social Identity and Group Relations (1982), with no less than twenty-two contributors, eighteen of whom had not contributed to the first volume. By this time, the field of intergroup relations was well-established, and many social psychologists, from all over Europe, were working with the ideas which continued to be developed.

The Bristol centre and its connections with other centres in Europe was a part of the 'social milieu' endorsed and cultivated by the European Association. I have already discussed the role of the European Association in the development of the theory of intergroup relations. Its influence continued to be of importance in providing a
European community which engaged in conferences, working parties, and summer schools. Many of the papers were first presented at these conferences and reviewed in the light of the ensuing discussions and debates. Equally important was the establishment of The European Journal of Social Psychology, in April of 1971. This provided a new medium for the publication and communication of research and the development of theory. Similarly, the series of European Monographs provided another means by which to draw together, diffuse and stimulate developments in European Social Psychology. Together these became the main publishing outlets for work on intergroup relations.

A lot of the early seminal articles, particularly the minimal group studies and the more theoretical work, was actually published in the European Journal of .... in offshoots of the European Association, which he saw as an outlet for developing and promoting a different kind of social psychology.

(Brown, Interview)
In this concluding chapter, I shall assess the implications of my research on the origins and development of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations for the theory of social representations and, more generally, for the discipline of social psychology. Four complementary and general claims are made on the grounds of the material presented in this thesis.

Firstly, the dynamics of social reality can only be explained by reference to an organism/environment/culture system which takes account of interactions among social individuals, their material environments and their cultural context through time. An examination of the research in relation to the theory of social representations shows that the nature, functions and processes of social representations are evident in the transformation of knowledge within the scientific community. Secondly, the theoretical principles that specify the processes of transformation need to be revised. The transformation of social representations can only be understood by reference to both assimilation and accommodation within systems of social representations. Furthermore, changes in the structure and content of these systems involves not only the processes of anchoring and objectification but also the processes of discovery,
inclusion/exclusion and integration. The force of the thesis, however, goes beyond the immediate implications of the research for the theory of social representations.

The third claim is that the theory of social representations and Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations are both compatible with the Hegelian paradigm and their potential integration offers an opportunity to establish a firm basis on which to develop a social psychology of social change which takes account of both the cultural and historical dimensions.

Fourthly, and finally, the thesis challenges traditional distinctions between common-sense and science. Like common-sense understanding, scientific knowledge is constructed through human activity within particular historical and cultural contexts.

11.1 THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW

In Part One of this thesis I elaborated the historical, cultural and dynamic nature of social representations with particular reference to the role of social individuals in the construction of a social reality. The transformation of social representations depends upon the inter-relations within an organism/environment/culture system in which individuals participate actively in the maintenance, expression and creation of social reality. From the research presented in Part Two it can be seen that social representations are intrinsic, in all their aspects, to the psychology of groups. The development of Tajfel's work can only be explained with reference to his historical and cultural milieu, to the scientific community of which he was a part and to the object of study itself. Similarly, the dynamics of group psychology, as a field of study, can only be understood by reference to the particular object of study, to the activity and creativity of individuals and to the community of social psychologists as a whole.

Tajfel's work was shaped by his social background to an ever increasing extent throughout his academic career. His experiences as a member of the Jewish community, both during and after World War II, underlie the questions he addressed,
from the social factors in perception to the etiology of intergroup conflict. His disenchantment with purely motivational and individualistic accounts and his alacritous endeavour to address the cultural aspects of large-scale social phenomena, arose from a desire to remain true to the principles of social psychology while simultaneously remaining true to his own experiences (and those of others) in social life. His location within the historical and cultural milieu of Europe directed his creative energies towards the issues he addressed, the approach he adopted and the establishment of a European community of social psychologists. Tajfel's whole career epitomizes the meaning of 'social individual': an individual who is at once a product of his cultural environment and a creative force within that environment.

The dialectic relationship between the individual and culture is also manifested in the interdependence between Tajfel and the scientific community. The community of social psychologists reveals the dynamics of stability and change, serving as both a conventional and prescriptive force and an innovatory and creative force. The form and content of Tajfel's work, especially in the early phases of his career, demonstrates the effect of his initiation and socialization into the established community of social psychologists. Tajfel endorses the social reality which is expressed in the conventions of social psychological theory and research. This can be seen with regard to the problems which were investigated, the research which was conducted, the interpretation of his results and his style of reporting the studies. This is most apparent in his early work on social perception (Phases I and II) but is also true of the experimental research on national attitudes (Phase IV) and intergroup behaviour (Phase V). However, conventions are not only prescriptive: they also constitute the ground from which movement in a new direction emerges. For example, this can be seen in challenges to motivational accounts of prejudice (Phase III) and in the construction of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum which simultaneously differentiates and
integrates Tajfel's approach to intergroup relations with alternative perspectives in social psychology (Phase VI).

The scientific community also provides the milieu in which new perspectives are developed. In particular, the emergence of a European community of social psychologists, which voiced its dissent from traditional orientations in social psychology, provided the context in which Tajfel and his associates were able to develop and communicate alternative approaches to social-psychological phenomena. Furthermore, the European Association offered both a means by which to establish a social identity which distinguished the members from their American counterparts and a journal which provided them with an important medium of communication with each other. This, in turn, played a highly significant role in the growing emphasis on the social dimensions in European social psychology.

The collaborative enterprise involved in the construction of Tajfel's social-psychological perspective is nowhere more apparent than in the exploration and representation of intergroup relations. This extended beyond the group of social psychologists working together at Bristol University to other research centres in Europe. This having been said, the cooperation among social psychologists who were interested in the same issues is evident throughout Tajfel's career. For example, Tajfel adopted Bruner's functionalist approach to the study of social perception. This was developed, in association with Wilkes, Lambert and others, in the study of social stereotypes. Similarly, the research on national attitudes demanded the synergy of social psychologists from all over Europe. An individual scientist never works in a social vacuum and Tajfel's most creative ideas emerged through the active collaboration of scientists addressing the same research issues.

The role of communication and social interaction in the dynamics of social representations within the scientific community is revealed not only in the collaboration between Tajfel and his associates but also in the assimilation and diffusion of research and theoretical ideas through the medium of academic publications. This is evident both in the
assimilation of the ideas of others into Tajfel's work and in the communication of Tajfel's own perspective in relation to alternative approaches propounded within the community. One of the distinguishing characteristics of Tajfel's work is his consistent endeavour to read widely and his ability to integrate research and theory from diverse quarters. This not only provides support for his arguments but also encourages reorientations to the object of study and facilitates the elaboration of his theoretical perspective.

Firstly, Tajfel draws on the research and theoretical ideas developed by other social scientists working in the same field of study. For example, the role of past experience (Phase II), the function of the individual's self image in intergroup relations (Phase III), the explanatory power of social norms (Phase V) and the significance of perceived legitimacy (Phase VI) were concepts which were widely employed in their respective fields.

Secondly, Tajfel assimilates ideas developed in related fields of study in order to conceptualize and understand the particular phenomenon in which he is interested at the time. This serves to broaden his perspective and facilitates the transition from one phase to another. For example, the expansion of the theoretical framework in Phase III depends, to a large extent, on drawing together research and theoretical ideas relating to the cognitive simplification of the environment, the inherent ambiguity of social phenomena, the assimilation of social values and the role of causal attributions. Similarly, in Phase IV, Tajfel employs the conventional framework of attitude research but simultaneously incorporates the work of others concerning social influence and social communication. While the conventions of methodology, combined with his own research experience, led him back into the laboratory in order to determine the basic determinants of intergroup behaviour (Phase V), he then goes on to develop a theory which goes well beyond the bounds of purely experimental research.

Thirdly, Tajfel's interest in politics and social movements provides the basis on which he explores conceptions of nationalism, relative deprivation and social change as
these are elaborated in other social science disciplines. This liberates him from the conventional perspectives adopted within social psychology and provides the material with which to elaborate and communicate an alternative approach to the conceptualization of large-scale social phenomena.

The elaboration of Tajfel's social psychological perspective is also facilitated by explicating both the divergence from and the conflict with alternative approaches. For example, arguments for experimental research which takes account of cultural factors, for a perspective which gives priority neither to the individual nor to the culture, and for a social psychology that encompasses social change, emerged out of the meta-theoretical debates following the crisis in European social psychology. Similarly, the interpretation of research findings (Phase V) and the definition of group membership (Phase VI) had to be negotiated by examining and dismissing criticisms and options proposed by others.

On a broader scale, Tajfel indicates and emphasizes the significance of his own contribution by explicitly challenging the accepted representations within a given field of study. The latter provide frames of reference within which to address a particular issue and from which an alternative framework must be differentiated. This can be seen in Phases I-III in which Tajfel explicitly rejects motivational accounts of social perception and prejudice, in Phases IV and VI in which the inadequacies of purely individualistic explanations are emphasized; and, again, in Phase VI, where Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations is contrasted with realistic group conflict theory.

These examples demonstrate the dynamic interplay between the new and the old, between an emerging perspective and the established view, between accommodation of tradition and assimilation. At any point in the construction of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations, the transformation of social representations involves the dynamic interdependence of stability and change in the course of communication and interaction among individuals within particular cultural and historical situations.
These transformations are also dependent upon the cultural environment which constitutes the object of study. The concept of social identity, for example, is not simply the imaginative creation of a few social psychologists: it is a concept constructed through the observation of and interaction with the environment. This is shown by the significant role that research plays in the development of Tajfel's ideas. For example, the experimental research on social perception, on the development of national attitudes and on intergroup behaviour, play a decisive role in the transformation of social representations. The research is not only shaped by the theoretical framework but also confronts that framework with specific problems. These problems may either challenge central theoretical components of the framework or may highlight the significance of factors which lie at its periphery. In either case, the framework must be adapted to accommodate reality. For example, the experiments in Phase V showed that categorization alone was sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination and led to a reconception of the role of values in intergroup relations. Another example is offered by the research on national attitudes which emphasized the significance of the social context in intergroup relations and instigated an expansion and reformulation of the theoretical framework. Thus, research is not purely a rhetorical device for justifying theoretical claims but, rather, constitutes an essential component in the evolution and construction of social representations.

The object of study, however, not only exists in the laboratory. Examples of intergroup relations, the activities of minority groups and the emergence of social movements in society also played a formative part in the elaboration of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. This applies, in particular, to the specification of positional and ideological aspects of the theory. The analysis of interrelationships between superior and inferior groups, the role of legitimacy and stability and the various forms of social creativity are elaborated by reference to intergroup relations evident in society and not from laboratory research.
The conventional reliance on experimental evidence in social psychology tends to underestimate the value and significance of analysing naturally occurring events in the evolution of scientific knowledge. We cannot hope to set up a society in the laboratory just as natural scientists cannot auspicate the global system within the confines of a laboratory. While experimental research can serve as a means to evaluate particular issues in a controlled environment an examination of phenomena in all their complexity may reveal interrelations among components not yet considered and may serve as an important stimulus in the genesis and evolution of a comprehensive theory.

So far, we have focused on the dynamics of social representations in the construction and elaboration of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. It can be seen that the same processes are involved in the constructive assimilation of this theory into the psychology of groups. In particular, the research presented in Chapter 7 illustrates further the interdependence between tradition and innovation. On the one hand, group psychology has been radically transformed by the representations of the group as theoretically distinctive from purely individual processes and by the articulation of the positional and ideological levels of explanation. On the other hand, this transformation has been tempered by the established conventions of the field so that the theory of intergroup relations, established by Tajfel and his colleagues, has, itself, been transformed.

The interdependence of assimilation and accommodation is illustrated most clearly by the application of Tajfel's theory to the study of intragroup processes and the development of self-categorization theory. On the one hand, our understanding of intragroup processes has been transformed by giving priority to the process of self-categorization or social identification. While this approach still focuses on individual cognitive processes and the interaction between individuals it has introduced and established the significance of an individual's group membership in intragroup processes. On the other hand, self-categorization theory focuses on the conventional levels
of explanation, namely the intrapersonal process of categorization and the interpersonal process of social identity, and fails to maintain the more radical or novel aspects of Tajfel's theory, namely the role of consensual beliefs and the relative status of different groups.

This selective assimilation of the more conventional aspects of Tajfel's theory is also seen in the general literature on intergroup relations and group processes. Emphasis is placed on the social-psychological processes of social categorization, social identity and social comparison without reference to systems of belief or status relations amongst groups.

In contrast, those spheres of group psychology which have maintained the social-psychological perspective in all its aspects have been directly concerned with intergroup relations. For example, the application of the theory to conflicts between established groups within an historical and cultural context has encouraged the further elaboration of power and status relations among groups and of systems of beliefs about the structure of society. Similarly, in the social psychology of language, language use is conceived in terms of ethnolinguistic group members striving for a positive social identity in ways that are dependent upon their belief systems. This has required the accommodation of group psychology to include those aspects of social-psychological phenomena which are most apparent in the study of large-scale social realities.

These differences can be explained by reference to the established social representations in each specialization. The review of the historical development of group psychology showed that this field of study had been dominated by a perspective which focused on interactions between individuals and intragroup processes. In order to address those problems which have been consensually accepted as legitimate and worthy of study it was necessary to emphasize particular features of Tajfel's theory. In that the established research problems were defined within an individualistic framework it is not surprising that Turner and his associates focus on those social-psychological processes which are commensurate
with that approach. Thus, while self-categorization theory challenges individualistic theories of group processes it fails to provide an account of the historical evolution of groups, of the social creativity of groups or of the processes of social change.

Transformations which have occurred in the general literature on intergroup relations may be associated more closely with the conventions of legitimate evidence. Most of the experimental research focuses on intrapersonal and interpersonal aspects of intergroup relations and provides convincing evidence for the social psychological processes. Unfortunately, relatively little experimental research has been conducted on consensual beliefs and the relative position of groups in society and the wider community of social psychologists have not been convinced of their significance. Thus, in contrast to the processes involved in the construction of Tajfel's theory, research can be viewed primarily as a rhetorical implement in the communication and diffusion of the theory.

This can be contrasted with those social psychologists who have continued to employ Tajfel's theory in the study of intergroup relations. Although individualistic theories have been extrapolated in the past to explain large-scale social phenomena, the study of actual intergroup relations constitutes a relatively new departure within the field. This is also true of the social psychology of language. As emergent topics of interest within social psychology there is greater scope for defining new problems and adopting innovatory approaches. Moreover, the social dimensions have been formulated with specific reference to intergroup relations and thus provide a conceptual framework which is particularly suited to their analysis. The social dimensions of Tajfel's theory can thus be assimilated and sustained with relative ease.

From the research we can see that the nature of social representations, their functions in social life and the social processes by which they are transformed are all evident in the evolution and diffusion of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. The dynamics of social representations
in social psychology reveals their conventional and prescriptive nature as well as their changing and transforming nature. Furthermore, the form and content of social representations both structures and is, in turn, restructured by social communication and interaction. This refers to the collaboration amongst social psychologists, to such cultural artefacts of the community as academic publications and to the environment that constitutes the object of study. In particular, the research demonstrates the interdependence between the social individual and his or her historical and cultural milieu, with respect to both the expression and the maintenance of social representations and to their construction and transformation.

11.2 SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION

In the previous section, I provided a general description of the dynamics of social representations in social psychology. We have seen how social representations constitute a social environment of thought, interaction and communication which is characterized by the dynamics of stability and change within the organism/environment/culture system. In this section, I will show that the case study presented in this thesis supports a more detailed specification of the means by which social representations are transformed.

Firstly, the familiarization of the unfamiliar provides an over-simplistic and misleading conception of the dynamic interrelations within systems of social representations. In Chapter 4, I elaborated the problems associated with the conception of 'the unfamiliar'. Social representations constitute our social reality such that anything that is completely unfamiliar is not only meaningless but is also destined to remain so. Furthermore, the transformation of the unfamiliar into the familiar focuses attention on the processes of assimilation without reference to the complementary processes of accommodation. The inadequacy of this conception is borne out by the historico-interpretative analysis which shows that the transformation of social representations is not brought about by the familiarization
of the unfamiliar per se. Rather, it involves a continuous interplay between assimilation and accommodation as familiar, yet different, social representations are juxtaposed and adapted such that their contradictions and incongruities are minimized and their compatibilities and interconnectednesses are maximized.

This analysis shows, simultaneously, how the positional and ideological levels of explanation in social psychology (Doise, 1986) came to be articulated within a system of social representations which, initially, focused exclusively on the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of explanation. The system of social representations is extended gradually to include sociological as well as psychological aspects of large-scale intergroup relations and is integrated, creatively, in the construction of a social-psychological perspective.

Secondly, the processes of anchoring and objectification alone fail to provide a comprehensive explanation for the dynamics of assimilation and accommodation. In Chapter 4 I argued that, in order to understand the transformation of social representations, it was also necessary to elaborate the opposite processes of casting-off and de-objectification. However, changes in the content and structure of social representations in the construction and diffusion of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations cannot be accounted for fully within this extended framework. This has led to the specification of a number of other processes including discovery, inclusion/exclusion and integration. All these processes are involved in the social construction of reality through people's interactions with their environment and their communication with other people.

11.2.1 Assimilation and accommodation in systems of social representations

In Phase I, Tajfel explained experimental evidence on perceptual judgments of physical dimensions in functional terms of an accentuation of differences. Perceptual differences within a series of stimuli are accentuated due to their associated value and/or a superimposed discontinuous classification. This explanation was applied to both the
phenomenon of perceptual over-estimation as well as to stereotypes describing the physical characteristics of groups of people. In so doing, Tajfel emphasized the similarities between the social perception of the physical and the social environments. At the same time, the study of social stereotypes gave rise to an increased emphasis on classification. At this stage, there was little conflict with the traditions and conventions of social psychology. While accentuation of differences provides a cognitive, as opposed to a motivational, explanation of social perception it is articulated at an intrapersonal level.

Tajfel then applied the general principles of cognition to social stereotypes and abstract continua. The accentuation of differences is redescribed in terms of polarization whereby differences between groups are maximized and differences within groups are minimized on the relevant dimensions. Here, the intrapersonal perspective is maintained such that the individual's cognitive processes are considered to be both necessary and sufficient explanations of phenomena in social perception.

Having said this, the research conducted in Phase II introduced problems which could only be understood by reference to other levels of explanation. In particular, polarization only occurred on dimensions which formed part of a group's stereotype (Doise's level 4) and were influenced by the relative socio-economic positions of the different ethnic groups (Doise's level 3). At this point, however, these aspects were not elaborated within the theoretical framework itself. No explanation is given as to why particular dimensions are relevant, or as to why particular ethnic groups do or do not make ethnocentric perceptual judgments. Resolutions of these problems are constructed within the system of social representations in terms of developing more sophisticated experimental designs.

The general principles of cognition were then applied to the nature of prejudice in the context of intergroup relations (Phase III). On the one hand, social representations of prejudice were accommodated to the assimilated cognitive principles. On the other hand, the
cognitive principles were accommodated in order to assimilate prejudice into the system of social representations. Categorization is still described at the intrapersonal level, but greater attention is now paid to the differences between perception of the physical and perception of the social environment. Furthermore, categorization is no longer considered to take priority over higher-order levels of explanation. Firstly, the impact of the social context on an individual's propensity to categorize groups is explained in terms of identification with his or her own group (interpersonal level). Secondly, the assimilation of social values by individuals is dependent upon their social context and, in particular, upon the relative positions of groups within the structure of society (positional level). Thirdly, these processes are related to people's beliefs and views about the causes of social events (ideological level). However, the latter level of explanation is not explicitly articulated in this phase of Tajfel's research. The search for coherence is discussed in terms of causal attributions about changing situations in the relations among groups (intrapersonal and interpersonal levels).

Fourthly, conflict with established representations of large-scale social phenomena gives greater prominence to the social representation of the individual within the system as a whole. Tajfel propounds a rational model of human behaviour in contrast to motivational and individualistic accounts of intergroup relations. Furthermore, although it is apparent from Tajfel's work during this phase that all these processes are interdependent the precise nature of their interrelationships is not, as yet, fully elaborated. The incorporation of the social representations of intergroup relations created a tension between explanations which focus on individual processes and explanations which focus on the social context.

This tension was increased by the research on national attitudes (Phase IV). This research was not structured or initially interpreted within the system of social representations elaborated in Phase III. The principle of categorization and value were translated into the cognitive
and evaluative components of attitudes. However, an explicit attempt to explore the developmental and consensual nature of preferences and of cognitive differentiations indicates some degree of concern for ideological aspects of national attitudes. Furthermore, the results of these investigations emphasized that while intrapersonal and interpersonal principles may be necessary for an explanation of national attitudes they were by no means sufficient. Only then was it possible to explain children's sensitivity to their social context, the assimilation of social values and the devaluation of one's own group in situations which lacked overt conflict it was also necessary to include the creation and the diffusion of belief systems and of social values. These were integrated with the cognitive and affective components of national attitudes through processes of social influence and group identification. Their assimilation into the system of social representations required the accommodation of social psychological principles such that the concepts of categorization and value were socialized. Once again, this synthesis contradicted traditional representations that concentrated on motivation, personality or outgroup hostility. It also allowed Tajfel to claim that nationalism could not be explained purely in terms of social structures but required an understanding of the social-psychological processes involved. Although the social representations of social psychology as a scientific discipline were always on the periphery these conflicts brought it to the fore. Social psychology gradually emerged as an issue of concern in its own right. As such, it came to have a major influence on the structure and integration of the system of social representations as a whole. Furthermore, divergent perspectives within social psychology were explained in terms of the cultural values inherent in social psychological theories. Social psychology had to take into account not only the social context of the object of study but also the social context of the scientists themselves.

This system of social representations gave rise to the central question addressed in the experimental research on intergroup behaviour. However, the research itself is
dominated by social representations of experimental investigations focusing, as it does, on the minimal conditions sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination. Tajfel and his colleagues attempted to create a cultural and historical vacuum thus focusing on the cognitive processes of individuals in group situations (interpersonal level). The experimental results showed that social categorization, alone, produced maximum differentiation between groups. This was explained by reference to the social context and, in particular, by reference to a generic group norm and a social norm of fairness (ideological level). However, this explanation proved to be problematic and raised more questions than it answered. The lack of ethnocentricism shown by some minority groups (Phase IV) and Turner's experimental results, which showed that intergroup discrimination only occurred in situations where individuals could not act in terms of self, required a more elaborate explanation.

These problems were resolved by assimilating the research results to the system of social representations. Firstly, the influence of social values (positional and ideological levels) needed to be translated into concepts which were directly relevant to the individual (interpersonal and intrapersonal levels). This was achieved by transforming the notion of group identification and self-image into the process of social identity. The link between social identity and social categorization gave greater salience to the process of social comparison. In contrast to theories of realistic group conflict these social-psychological processes suggested that identification with one's own group occurs prior to, rather than in response to, intergroup conflict. This not only changed the social representation of the individual but also expanded the system of social representations. An individual's beliefs, actions and emotions could only be understood by reference to his or her social context.

The significance of the social context (positional and ideological levels), in which intergroup behaviour does or does not occur, needed to be defined in social-psychological terms (interpersonal level). This is served by the
description of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum and the distinction between personal and social identity. This, in turn, required greater precision in the definition of the social context. This is elaborated in terms of a continuum of belief systems from social mobility to social change (ideological level). Furthermore, the categorization of the social environment (intrapersonal level) is related to consensual beliefs about the structure of intergroup relations in society (ideological level).

By this time, transformations in the system of social representations were no longer instigated by incorporating related domains of concern. Rather, constructing links within the system itself became more prominent, such that the social-psychological processes, the relations between groups and beliefs about the structure of society were all interdependent aspects of intergroup relations.

Finally, the application of the system of social representations to various forms of intergroup relations in society not only preferred a new understanding of relative deprivation, minority groups and social movements but it also had an impact on the system itself. The role of consensual beliefs was elaborated in terms of the legitimacy and stability of intergroup relations. The various forms of social creativity in the context of social change were specified in relation to consensually inferior and superior groups. Also experimentation as a method of research was no longer conceived as the only means by which to test and develop theoretical propositions. Rather, experimental investigations provided hints about social life which must be integrated with theoretical knowledge and the use of other methods.

To summarize, the emergence of conflicts and contradictions within the system of social representations gives rise to shifts of emphasis and changes in meaning such that the content and structure of social reality is gradually transformed. This spiral of transformation is characterized by a dynamic balance between stability and change. For example, concepts such as value, classification/categorization and differentiation are maintained throughout
the development of Tajfel's thinking. At the same time their significance is changed as familiar representations are juxtaposed to and integrated with the system of social representations. This dynamic balance is facilitated by continuities in the underlying structure of the representations involved. For example, the comparative perspective is first applied to the perceptual judgment of objects on physical dimensions and is finally applied to the relations between members of one's own group and members of other groups. Similarly, the functional perspective illuminates the role of differentiation between valued objects through to the role of differentiation between groups. Other concepts which were first rejected are then re-integrated into the system. For example, motivational explanations of social perception and prejudice are dismissed in preference to cognitive explanations but then re-enter the system of representations in the form of a search for a positive social identity. Finally, concepts which, initially, lay at the periphery of the system gradually come to constitute central components of the system. On the theoretical level this is exemplified by the role of social identity and consensual beliefs. On the meta-theoretical level it includes conceptions of the individual and of social psychology.

Whilst it is apparent that various social representations are involved in the evolution of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations, including social representations of the individual, of the group, of social psychology and of science, their interdependence makes it impossible to identify and demarcate any particular social representation for special attention. Furthermore, in that the structure of relations within the system is continually changing, it is impossible to specify the particular content and form of a given social representation. To provide a precise definition of the object of study would require the imposition of boundaries that do not exist. Such ambiguity can feel uncomfortable but as we are concerned here with the construction of social representations, it is important that they are not objectified.
11.2.2 Identifying the various processes of transformation

It will be remembered that Moscovici defines anchoring in terms of classification and naming where classification may involve both generalization and particularization. All three processes of transformation are frequently found in the construction of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. The shifts between Phases I, II and III exemplifies generalization whereby the similarities among perceptual judgments of physical, social and abstract dimensions are emphasized such that the general principles of cognition can be applied to the social perception of the physical and social environments and to prejudice in the context of intergroup relations. Similarly, self-categorization theory generalizes the social-psychological processes of intergroup relations to intragroup processes. These shifts also involve particularization whereby the differences between each domain are accentuated. Particularization or differentiation is also used to construct the interpersonal-intergroup continuum and the social mobility-social change continuum; to identify divergences in consensual belief systems; and to contrast Tajfel's social-psychological approach from both individualistic theories in social psychology and other disciplines in the social sciences.

It can be seen that particularization is usually accompanied by naming or the use of new labels to identify those features in the social representation which have been differentiated. Generalization is more frequently associated with the re-naming of a particular concept or phenomenon. For example, perceptual over-estimation is renamed as accentuation of differences and subsequently as polarization; classification is renamed as categorization and later as social categorization; and self-image is renamed as social identity. Similarly, social identity is renamed as self-categorization in the theories application to intragroup processes. In each case, generalization and particularization change the meanings of concepts and the roles they play within the system of social representations. These changes in symbolic significance are stabilized and communicated, at least in part, by providing new labels or terms of reference.
Generalization, particularization and (re)namning also describe the processes of transformation which occur in 'casting-off'. In effect, 'anchoring' and 'casting-off' serve to locate the 'transformation' within a single social representation. However, following on from our previous discussion about systems of social representations such a move is often unwise as it undermines the interdependence among social representations and the reciprocity of their transformation.

The second process of transformation described by Moscovici is objectification. Objectification appears to be more apparent in the diffusion than in the construction of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. This can be seen both in the application of Tajfel's theory to intragroup processes and in the assimilation of Tajfel's theory into the general literature on intergroup relations. In both cases, social identity and group processes become objects of study in their own right, without reference to the wider social context in which they emerge. In contrast, the construction of Tajfel's theory is more frequently characterized by the de-objectification of phenomena. This is facilitated by the functional perspective such that groups and social structures are elaborated in terms of social-psychological processes. This de-objectification not only plays an essential role in the integration of the theory but also offers a means by which to understand the constructive processes of social change.

The processes of transformation discussed so far accurately describe at least some of the changes in the system of social representations which has been studied. However, they by no means provide a comprehensive account of the evolution of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. In order to achieve this, three other processes need to be elaborated. These are discovery, inclusion/exclusion and integration. These processes occur in various combinations with generalization, particularization and (re)namning in the transformation of social reality.

Discovery involves the identification of anomalies within and between systems of social representations.
Interactions with the environment create deviations which do not conform to accepted social representations. For example, the research on national attitudes and on intergroup behaviour resulted in the identification of phenomena that could not be explained in purely cognitive terms. Similarly, the juxtaposition of related but contradictory social representations reveals gaps or anomalies in their respective explanations of phenomena. For example, neither individualistic nor sociological representations of large-scale social phenomena accounted for the relationship between the social context and the individual's actions. These discoveries preceeded the explicit formulation of Tajfel's social-psychological perspective and its differentiation from other, more conventional, representations.

Following each case of discovery, the confrontation or contradiction is resolved by inclusion/exclusion and integration. Inclusion/exclusion involves expanding or restricting the system of social representations and its domain of application. In the early phases of the development of the theory Tajfel excludes unidirectional shifts in perceptual judgements as well as individual differences in social perception. In Phase III, the understanding of prejudice involved the inclusion of causal attributions and the assimilation of social values. Later on, the explanation of intergroup relations involved the inclusion of social comparisons and consensual beliefs. Again, the social representation of social psychology is expanded to include both the study of interpersonal behaviour and large-scale social phenomena.

The inclusion of new components into the system of social representations is followed by the gradual construction of links which intergrate the system of social representations. The most obvious example is the integration of social categorization with social identity through the process of social comparison, so that all the processes become interdependent in differentiating between groups. These social-psychological processes are integrated with other aspects of the theory. Social categorizations are derived from consensual beliefs and social identity is the
means by which the individual locates him or herself within the structure of society. Less obvious is the transposition of structuring conceptions from one sphere to another within the system. For example, the distinction between interpersonal and intergroup relations is transposed to describe the structure of society in terms of social mobility and of belief systems concerning social change. This is transposed, in turn, to describe alternative perspectives in the discipline of social psychology with reference to the values inherited from its cultural context.

The processes of discovery, inclusion and integration have been identified here with particular reference to the transformation of scientific knowledge. However, there is no reason to suggest that they are exclusive to the realm of science and that they do not also apply to the transformation of common-sense. For example, all three processes can be identified in the transformation of social representations of women. Through the active participation of women in sport and in society it was realised that women are capable of running marathons and that they are capable of engaging in a variety of professional careers. This resulted in the inclusion of elements from the social representations of men, including athleticism, intelligence and assertiveness, into the social representations of women. This has subsequently given rise to the integration of maleness and femaleness into the social representations which structure and are structured by people's social interactions. Ultimately, the justification of the claim that discovery, inclusion and integration are general processes which should be included in the theory of social representations depends upon future research that examines the transformation of social representations in other realms.

11.3 THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Despite the dominance of individualistic or Cartesian approaches in social psychology (Chapter 3) and, in particular, in the psychology of groups (Chapter 7), recent developments in Europe have seen the emergence of the social dimensions. In terms of Doise's framework these include the social-psychological concomitants of the structure of society
and the ideological or consensual belief systems extant in that society. The research shows how these social dimensions ascended as indispensable components in both the study and understanding of relations between large-scale groups. Similarly, the theory of social representations focuses on those aspects of social life which elude explanation purely in terms of individuals. In particular, it addresses the symbolic and cultural nature of people's knowledge about the world.

It should always be remembered that the 'personal' and social dimensions are interdependent. In this thesis, I have shown how the social dimensions are dependent upon the personal dimensions with regard to the dynamics of social representations. I have also shown, in the research on the study of intergroup relations, how the personal dimensions are dependent upon the social dimensions. For example, social representations are not autonomous from the expressive and creative activities of individuals and an individual's cognition cannot be considered independently from consensual beliefs in society.

Doise (1986) has shown how all four levels can be investigated using the experimental method of research. Although I do not disagree, I have argued in this thesis that other methods of research can be employed to advantage, especially with regard to the social dimensions (Chapter 6). Analyses of social-psychological phenomena in society can play an equally important part in developing theories which take account of the cultural aspects of social life.

Furthermore, the inclusion of the social dimensions in the discipline of social psychology has far-reaching implications which are not elaborated fully by Doise's analysis. It is not simply a matter of giving greater attention to the social context of the activities of individuals. The social dimensions must be integrated with the personal dimensions and this integration cannot be supported by maintaining traditional representations of the latter. In other words, individualistic perspectives in social psychology are fundamentally incompatible with social perspectives.
At the heart of this incompatibility is the social representation of the individual. The integration of the individual and cultural aspects of social life necessitates a representation of the individual as inherently social whereby culture is embodied in the individual (see Chapters 3 and 4). Such a representation excludes the possibility of purely intrapersonal phenomena. For example, there is no such thing as a purely individual representation, just as there is no such thing as a purely personal identity.

The emergence of the social or cultural dimensions in social psychology has been accompanied by the emergence of the historical dimension, a point that is not elaborated by Doise (1986), not least, I suspect, because this dimension cannot be investigated easily using experimental methods. The historical dimension is central to both Moscovici's theory of social representations and Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations. Both theories are concerned with the processes and forms of social change, with how we understand and how we create change. Moscovici focuses on the transformation of social representations, whilst Tajfel focuses on the emergence of intergroup conflict.

The compatibility of these two theories goes beyond their mutual concerns with the cultural and historical dimensions of social life. In some respects this is hardly surprising as Moscovici and Tajfel had strong links within the European community. Their theoretical frameworks show considerable overlap. Social representations are shared by groups and furnish individuals with a social identity. Social identity is dependent upon the social representations about relations between groups and about the structure of society. Furthermore, the social-psychological processes involved in the transformation of social representations and in the differentiation between groups are remarkably similar. These theories beg to be integrated not least because each theory is strong where the other theory is weak. The theory of social representations is strong on the communication and diffusion of belief systems yet tells us very little about how these representations are associated with groups or about the motivational and cognitive processes involved. The theory
of intergroup relations is strong on the social-psychological processes involved in intergroup relations but is relatively weak on the communication of social beliefs and the processes involved in social creativity. Their integration would furnish an understanding of how the transformation of social representations is related to people's group memberships and social identities. For example, the diffusion of knowledge about AIDS, changes in people's sexual behaviour and changes in the relationships between homosexual and heterosexual groups can only be understood fully within a theoretical framework that elaborates and integrates the social processes and functions associated with social identity and those associated with social representations (Stockdale, 1990).

A combination of Moscovici's theory of social representations and Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations provides an opportunity to establish and to develop the Hegelian paradigm in social psychology. Whilst there is still a danger that these theories will be desocialized by the community's conventional commitment to the Cartesian paradigm, this can be avoided by emphasising the interdependence of the individual and the cultural and by ascribing importance to the historical dimension.

11.4 TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE

The guiding motivation behind this thesis has been to apply the theory of social representations to the transformation of scientific knowledge. Despite contradictions with the original theory, the arguments presented in Part 1 and the material presented in Part 2 show that the social-psychological perspective, which has informed our understanding of common-sense, also enlightens our understanding of the processes of science.

In contrast to traditional positive-empiricist representations of science, this thesis elaborates the dialectics of scientific knowledge, the activities of scientists, the object of study and the cultural and historical milieu. Whilst this is commensurate with recent developments in the philosophy of science and the sociology of knowledge (Chapter 5) it also enhances our understanding
of the social-psychological processes involved in the transformation of scientific knowledge.

Scientific knowledge is a cultural and historical product which is transformed through the active participation and collaboration of scientists embedded in the organism/environment/culture system. Advances are not made by simply testing what we already know against reality but by re-structuring systems of social representations through the social processes of communication and interaction.

This understanding of the processes of science has two major implications. Firstly, greater attention should be given to the construction of theories, to the assumptions and values that are implicit in scientific paradigms and to the social processes inherent in the conduct of scientific enquiry. Secondly, if science is similar to rather than different from, common-sense then the communication and diffusion of scientific knowledge into common-sense should not be so onerous. Deposing the myth of science as 'un monde autre' will encourage and facilitate the important task of 'giving science away' to the general public.
APPENDIX 6.1

QUESTIONNAIRE

Thank-you for completing this questionnaire.

SECTION A:

1) Do you hold an appointment in an academic or research institution?
   YES Full-Time
   YES Part-Time
   NO

   IF NO GO TO QUESTION 4

2) Is your appointment in a
   University
   Polytechnic
   Research institute
   Other ....................
   (please specify)

3) What is your professional status?
   (Please tick the appropriate box.)
   Professor
   Reader
   Senior lecturer
   Lecturer
   Post-doctoral fellow
   Research assistant
   Other ....................
   (please specify)

   GO TO QUESTION 5

4) Please identify your occupation and professional status.

5) What is your B.P.S. membership status:
   Fellow
   Associate
   Graduate
   Student

6) Are you also a member of The Experimental Psychological Society?
   YES
   NO

7) When did you finish your first degree in psychology? 19..
8) Please state briefly your predominant field of interest in psychology.

SECTION B:

Please answer all the questions below with regard to one of the following:

ATTITUDES

GROUPS

(Tick as appropriate.)

1) Who do you consider to be the five most influential figures in the history of this field? (Please list them in rank order.)

most influential 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

2) What do you consider to have been the major contribution of the person identified as the most influential in question (1).

3) What were the major consequences of this contribution?

4) Who do you consider to be the five most influential figures in contemporary research in this field? (Please list them in rank order.)

most influential 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
5) What do you consider to be the major contribution of the person identified as the most influential in question (4).

6) What are the major implications of this contribution?

7) What methods of research do you consider to have been most profitable in this field?

8) Please indicate any articles or books which you consider to have been of particular importance in this field.

Please give your name unless you wish to remain anonymous.
APPENDIX 6.2

CODING FRAME

1. Social/Cognitive Psychology: 1.1 Established/Started
   1.2 Established/Maintained
   1.3 Developed
   1.4 Inspired
   1.5 Founded
   1.6 Reorientated/Refocused
   1.7 Broadened/Integrated
   1.8 Neglected/Inhibited

2. Physiology/Neuropsychology

3. Development of Computing and A.I.

4. Philosophy

5. Opposition to Traditional Approach

6. Theory/Framework: 6.1 General
   6.2 Started
   6.3 Developed
   6.4 Popularized/Established
   6.5 Integrated

7. Model: 7.1 Constructed/Started
   7.2 Developed
   7.3 Popularized/Established

8. Understanding/Explanation

9. Conception: 9.1 Definition/redefinition
   9.2 Conception

10. Individual-Social: 10.1 Individualistic
    10.2 Group
    10.3 Reconception/Social
    10.4 Focus on

11. Principle

12. Cognitive approach/aspects (Social fields only)

13. Research: 13.1 General
    13.2 Tradition
    13.3 Renewed/Inspired
    13.4 Changed/focused
    13.5 Started
    13.6 Methods:
       13.6.1 General
       13.6.2 Experimental
       13.6.3 Scales and Questionnaires
    13.7 Materials
    13.8 Findings

542
14. Scientific

15. Applied Psychology:  
   15.1 Theory and Practice  
   15.2 Research  
   15.3 Practice

16. Interdisciplinary

17. Inter sub-disciplinary

18. Publications:  
   18.1 Articles/Chapters/Books  
   18.2 Tradition

**Targets of Contributions in the field of Groups**

**Historical:**

LEWIN: (8)∗

- Field Theory
- Group Dynamics
- Leadership
- Social Interaction language

TAJFEL: (9)

- Social Identity Theory
- (Social) Groups
- Intergroup Relations
- Experimentation-minimal g.p.s.
- Theory
- Inter-disciplinary

**Contemporary:**

TAJFEL: (7)

- Social Identity Theory
- Intergroup Relations
- Self-categorization

TURNER: (6)

- Social identity theory
- Self-categorization theory:

MOSCOVICI: (6)

- Minority & majority influence
- Social change

∗ number of respondents viewing this contributor as the most important.
APPENDIX 6.3

TAJFEL'S PUBLICATIONS


544


*Tajfel, H. and Dawson (eds.) (1965) Disappointed Guests, O.U.P.


547


548


549


*Publications used in historico-interpretative documentary analysis
APPENDIX 6.4

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The questions follow an historical progression, looking at social psychology, and in particular the psychology of groups before Tajfel's work, then the development of Tajfel's work in conjunction with various collaborators, and finally the assimilation of ideas emerging out of this work.

Briefly,
What place did the psychology of groups have in social psychology in the 1960's and the early 1970's?
How was the psychology of groups conceived and what research was being done at this time?
Which individuals do you think influenced Tajfel before the 1970's and in what way?
Tajfel has acknowledged Bruner. What do you think are the main ideas that Tajfel adopts, if any?
Tajfel's work started off in the field of social perception with a particular view of psychology. Throughout his academic career his work changed considerably and he is more generally recognised for his work on intergroup behaviour.
In general terms, do you consider that there have been any major shifts in his work? Why did these come about?
Are there any major continuities in his work?
What were his major concerns and aims in his academic career?
How do you think these relate to his personal life, to Tajfel as a person?
What problems or difficulties did Tajfel face in developing his ideas?
What do you consider to be the most important aspects of his work?
Tracing the development of his work in more detail, it has been said that his early work in psychophysics, the notion of accentuation of differences and its application to stereotypes reflects a relatively restricted or traditional approach. By the time he wrote the 1969 article on Prejudice he seems to have expanded the framework considerably.
How did this come about?
What impact, if any, did the studies on children's national attitudes have?
What about the European Association?
Why do you think Tajfel came to focus on intergroup relations?
He often cites the research of Sherif and Sherif on intergroup conflict. What impact did these have on Tajfel? Why and in what way were they important?
His early work provides the foundations for Social Identity Theory, developed in collaboration with others, including yourself, at Bristol. He came to criticize his earlier work, and that of others, reflecting a change of perspective.
How do you see this change and what were the reasons for it?
Two of the most frequently cited articles are the social categorization experiments of 1970 and 1971, with which you were directly involved.
What was the background to these experiments?
Why do you think they were so influential?
How did the theory of social identity emerge out of this work?
Was there anything that was peculiar or innovatory about your collective approach at this time?
What do you consider to be the most important aspects of the theory?
What do you consider to have been its major strengths and major weaknesses?
Were there any major controversies with other social psychologists?
How do you see your work in relation to Tajfel's?
What were the positive influences Tajfel had on your work?
Were there any negative influences?

*In 1979 Tajfel outlines three aspects of the theory of intergroup relations:
the construction of social groups
their psychological effects
their relation to social reality
How do you see these three aspects in your work?

* These questions addressed issues directly relevant to the work of each interviewee.
Who else has been influenced directly by Tajfel?
What are the main features of their work?
What have been the reactions of other social psychologists?
What ideas have been assimilated by social psychology and the psychology of groups in general?
Why did these 'catch on'?
What role do you think the European Association and Journal played?
Which of his ideas have not been influential or readily accepted?
In what way has this whole school or tradition reshaped social psychology and our understanding of groups, and in what way has it not changed?
One of Tajfel's major concerns was that social psychologists should consider social reality and the social context as a necessary part of their field.
Do you think he has been successful in this?
What are the major legacies that Tajfel has left to those beginning psychology today?
Was there been any diffusion or impact in the U.S.A.?
Why?
What do you think about the current status or development of social psychology?
APPENDIX 7.1

The MOST Influential Figures in the History of Attitude Research

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APPENDIX 7.2

The MOST Influential Figures in Contemporary Attitude Research

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### APPENDIX 7.3

**The MOST Influential Figures in the History of Group Psychology**

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### APPENDIX 7.4

**The MOST Influential Figures in Contemporary Group Psychology**

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