SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRESENTATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
AND RACE RELATIONS IN SOME MAJOR BRITISH NEWS MEDIA

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ABSTRACT

Firstly, the social functions of mass media are analysed, with critical assessment of some significant sociological and psychological literature on mass communication and related topics. It is concluded they operate principally to maintain definitional social categories in the context of change and to sustain a given level of public discussion. Secondly, leading theories of race relations and industrial relations are analysed critically; it is concluded that different theoretical approaches, typically applying to different levels of analysis, tend to be mutually contributive, not exclusive. Both sets of relationships are then briefly compared and contrasted.

The nature of racial and industrial conflict in contemporary Britain is then surveyed, with reference to dominant perceptions of the situation and the objective character of these conflicts. Next, content analysis as a research technique is discussed, and the precise methods employed in this study are described.

Selected television and press coverage of the 1970 docks strike is then analysed, with a particular focus on levels of explanation, the degree of public participation in discussion, and the definitions provided of the situation. Certain related data are appended. The same task is subsequently performed in relation to immigration, domestic race relations, the sale of arms to South Africa, and some other topics. Certain related data are appended.

Finally, these data are placed in their sociological context in Britain, by integrating them with an analysis of the social construction of consensus in that society. After discussion of certain theories interrelating culture and social divisions, together with analysis of certain institutions bearing on the construction of consensus, the particular role of the British news
media, and the special functions of British ideologies of nationalism and objectivity, are surveyed. Conclusions for the relation between consensus and conflict in modern Britain are then stated.
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Chapter One: The role of the mass media in society

1.1 Introduction

The first step in this investigation is to attempt an assessment of the role of mass media in society. This is a more complex endeavour than the vast quantities of empirical media research would lead the observer to suppose; for most of it has been carried out without benefit of any overall theory of the social role of the media. There has been protracted analysis of the nature of propaganda (1); and leading from this, a very great deal of social-psychological research on the effects of communication in general, and of mass media communication in particular (2). Within this field, perhaps especial attention has been paid to the part played by mass media in political communication, especially election campaigns (3). And in the commercial field, market research has not unnaturally concentrated very hard on audience reaction to advertising (4).

All this is material which must be taken into account in the construction of a theory, even though it usually sorely lacks any theory itself. There is however a further question which is begged by the attempt to construct a theory of the mass media. Can there be a theory of mass communication which is not itself a deduction from a general theory of communication? Though logically the answer is negative, practically it need not be. Social science is very far from a general theory of communication (5); and in the meantime there is everything to be said for attempting to build toward such a general theory on a lower level.

Of what then does a theory of the social role of the mass media have to take account? It must first of all, as already stated, recognise that modern mass communication is only a category of total human communication. It is also only one of a number of specialised institutions of communication, for although print and electronic media are the most salient communication-institutions in modern societies,
they are not the only ones: public meetings and informal opinion-leadership are important examples of others. In earlier times, important communication-institutions were bound up with the roles of herald, priest and headman.

The communication of news and comment about public affairs is a further subdivision of general human communication (and it is with this particular subdivision that this research is concerned). It is also a subdivision of the specialised institutions of mass communication. It is necessary though to be careful to avoid an overly tidy definition of items of modern mass communication content as (let us say) news or entertainment. Another central question to be answered in this connection is the role that news plays in society.
1.ii General constraints on the operation of the mass media

An attempt at an analysis of these questions will be supplied later. For the moment, there remain several other important social factors to be taken into account in the construction of a theory of the mass media's social role. These social factors consist of the society's culture(s), including the degree of literacy; the nature of its economy; its polity, including the controllers of media organisations; and the particular technology of each medium.

The existence of separate cultures and even languages in a society, or of mass illiteracy, very obviously demonstrate the constraining force of culture on mass communication. Radio can surmount the problem of illiteracy, but not print. Conversely a more or less common culture naturally facilitates all communication greatly. It is easy to overlook the power of a common culture to shape the content of communication; there are important implications in this truism to which a mere nod in its direction does not do justice. Some of them will be considered later on.

There is one however which is worth pausing on for a moment now. It is, the implication of a common culture for the concepts of "balance", "neutrality" and "objectivity", all of which are important for UK and US media communicators. The implication is of course that balance only exists in terms of a particular culture. Thus, to take a very crude example, the Buddhist world-view (or perhaps views) is a symbolic universe (6) of enormous significance in the Far East, yet never figures in
the "balance" between opposing views institutionalised by the British media. In practice, "balance" and the rest are defined by the social distribution of knowledge in a particular society. No Buddhists, no Buddhism.

A different, but also interesting example is the treatment of communism by the UK media. In general, to use Berger and Luckmann's terms once more, the actions of communist countries whether internal or external are "nihilated" by the British media. That is to say, these actions are actively dismissed from the realm of those to be taken seriously in the province of reasonable and acceptable conduct. Arms limitation proposals by the USSR "must" be for purely tactical or strategic reasons (unlike Western proposals). The Marxist framework (if such it be) provided by communist countries for interpreting events in non-communist countries or in their own, is similarly given no space except on occasions when it appears risible to Western journalists. The same processes apply the other way round of course.

The existence of a set of interests among media commentators concerning communism (which cannot be said in relation to Buddhism) was demonstrated by the media treatment of Czechoslovakia during the first eight months of 1968. What was being offered by the media then concerning the affairs of a communist society was not nihilation but therapy (again utilising Berger's and Luckmann's terminology). Czechoslovakia, according to many English media commentators for whom liberal parliamentary democracy is the natural bent of man when left to himself, was moving very fast and unexpectedly toward the English parliamentary model. All Czechs suddenly became people.
They were encouraged to voice their doubts and questions about their political future in the UK media (as well as their own), in a way which implied throughout that they were moving toward being their real selves. At the same time the Soviet bloc attempts at therapy no doubt defined them not as returning to their real selves, but to their old selves.

The implications of these instances for the nature of cultural constraints on the media are as follows. It is to be expected that the social construction of reality provided by the media will exclude symbolic universes alien to the common culture of the society in which they operate, even when there is explicit adherence to an ethic of 'balance'. Coercion alone, if hypothesised as the cause of this phenomenon, could never achieve such an overall result. Without denying the importance of political considerations, the likelihood of media communicators being - like the majority in any society - relatively or completely culture-bound is high. Reinforcement of the dominant symbolic universe is therefore to be expected from the mass media.

This can be taken a stage further. R. P. Woolf (7) has noted the way views of American poverty characteristic only of small extreme-left political groups became common currency via the mass media within a few months following President Kennedy's endorsement of Michael Harrington's *The Other America*. He characterises the situation in the United States as consisting of a plateau on which certain definitions of social reality are acceptable, with very sheer sides which can make it *almost* impossible for deviant definitions of social reality to gain access and public credence. Although the instance he mentions
was triggered by a very significant political action, the role of the media in defining this plateau is even at first glance a fundamental one.

It is not to be expected therefore that media communicators will themselves act as independent innovators in the social definition of reality. Even if they attempt to do so there are constraints of a purely cultural kind which will stand in their way. The recipients must be able to grasp the meaning of their communications; and the audience will always have its own definition or definitions of social reality which will be resistant to other definitions perceived as contradictory. Much here depends on the significance of the symbolic universe which is being contradicted. If it is the core of the society’s symbolic universe, there will be that much more resistance than if it is the periphery. An instance in the 1960’s was the popularity of *That Was The Week That Was*, which reflected widespread impatience with certain superficial features of British society among younger age-groups in particular. It in no way attacked any fundamental features of British society (8).

The economic factors which must be taken into account in any theory of mass communication are various. An essential one is the amount of money available in a given society for the technology of mass communication (broadcasting stations, large printing presses, etc.), and in the case of television for its consumption. Thus the staple diet of much Third World television (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria, the Lebanon, Singapore, the Caribbean) is pre-packaged American soap-opera, because indigenous production is so expensive and trained personnel are relatively scarce. And even this material only goes out to a small number of people in most of those societies, because a television set is beyond the means of the majority. So too, quite apart from the illiteracy factor, newspapers often have minority circulations simply because of their price.
In more affluent societies economic factors also have an important impact on the role of the media. There are still limits to the available money, though much higher ones; but there is also the question of the source of the money. In virtually every case outside communist countries this source is advertising (the British Broadcasting Corporation being a notable exception). The constraints exerted on the media by advertisers are sometimes stated very crudely as though they were in the habit of telephoning editors or producers and threatening to cut off their source of funds unless they complied with the advertiser's political views. There is of course no need for them to do so, since in the vast majority of the national media in a society those in control are not actively opposed to the perspectives of the companies who buy their advertising space. Indeed they may quite easily be institutionally linked: many newspaper chains and broadcasting companies are part-owned or entirely owned by multi-product corporations (9).

It is nevertheless easily conceivable that in the unlikely event of a TV company or newspaper or radio station shifting its perspective to one which advertisers perceived as seriously threatening their operations, funds would dry up and the organ would be forced to close or to retract its new policy. This economic factor than acts as a boundary-constraint rather than as a constant supervisor (10).

Another important economic factor is the probable near-incompatibility between profit-making and serious national newspaper journalism. Most "quality" newspapers are - and have to be - satisfied to remain slightly more than solvent. Given that in economic terms newspaper organisations exist to sell blank space to advertisers, the pressure to rest content with much more popular journalism is very strong. Even in societies with the longest traditions of literacy and mass education the public for serious journalism is tiny in proportion to the whole and is consequently far too small to enable newspapers to sell advertising space for very much money even though this public is usually the most affluent sector, and so advertising rates are higher than in the popular press. In general, it is this
factor which has contributed more than anything else to the growth of newspaper and media monopolies, and to the decline in the numbers of newspapers (11).

This leads to the last of the relation between economy and media consideration, which in the view of this writer and others actually represents a delusory interpretation. The decline in the numbers of newspapers has been held to represent a threat to liberal democracy, in that the number of independent voices offering differing assessment of public affairs drops, and with it the public's ability to make up its own mind and be a well-informed electorate. Passing from theory to actuality, it is only too clear that the general social and political line of the English and American Press is not one of such variety that the disappearance of a particular organ or organs is likely to leave a very great lacuna. Clearly some newspapers would leave such a lacuna; but it cannot be said axiomatically of all newspapers (12).

As regards the polity and the controllers of media organisations, in one way or another it can safely be asserted that the two are never fundamentally out of step with each other. This is not to say that such a phenomenon is impossible; only that there is no case where it is known, and that it is highly unlikely. Naturally there are degrees of being in step. The main media in communist states are clear instances of virtually perfect correlation between polity and mass communication. A little down the line can be placed the situations in Nazi Germany and present-day South Africa. In the first, the internationally respected and independent Frankfurter Zeitung was allowed by Hitler to continue for most of his period in power for purposes of window-dressing. It did not however follow a policy-line diametrically opposed to the Third Reich, being always careful to avoid criticism which really attacked the foundations of Nazi rule. And it was of course only one voice in the mass of Nazi communication (13). A similar situation obtains with regard to the English-language press in the Republic of South Africa.
(though there are difficulties for the Nationalist Party in suppressing it which are not confined to the need for window-
dressing). The English-language press supports the United Party,
whose policy differs in no very significant respect from the
Nationalist Party's. Even then, it is only one section of the
press, with radio controlled directly by the Government.

Somewhat further down the line are the English and American
mass media. Without substantial formal Government controls over
output, it is truistic to point out that those in control of the
media are never likely to be appointed if they are known to be
profoundly at variance with the political and economic system of
either society. Conversely it is easily demonstrable that they do
in almost every case identify either with conservative and commercial
interests, or with an ethic of professional neutrality and balance.
There is a certain amount of "play" in the system, but only within
fairly carefully defined bounds (14).

Perhaps the nearest approach to a situation where the mass
media are fundamentally at variance with the polity is to be found
in present-day France or Italy, whose Communist Party newspapers
have moderate circulations. Here however it is important not to
be too easily swayed by appearances. Both parties are somewhat
suspect in much of the communist world for their accommodating
attitude to the political regimes under which they exist. In other
words, they fulfil a largely "social-democratic" rather than
revolutionary role. And once again, though powerful they are only
part of the total of mass communication. In both societies control
of the broadcast media is in strongly anti-communist hands, through
fairly overt Government control.

It is therefore the case that there is no instance on
record of a root-and-branch opposition to the polity in the national
mass media of a society. Nor, it must be recognised, is there likely
to be. (Small circulation newspapers and magazines catering for
minority readerships are a different matter entirely, though even these are subject to police raids in many societies.)

As regards the constraints imposed by the technologies of particular media, this is not a point to be stressed unduly. Nevertheless, it is not true to say that the technology of any mass medium allows it simply to reflect social reality pure and unalloyed. One instance is the impact that television camera-teams have on behaviour during social disturbances. There is evidence that police behaviour in 1967 and 1968 US civil disturbances improved considerably in the presence of camera-teams. Another instance is the extent to which election campaigning in the US and UK is tailored to suit the demands of television as a medium. A third instance has been noted by a former television reporter, that there are numbers of important economic or political events which cannot be (or are not allowed to be) televised (15). Also, any given medium is bound to convey certain phenomena better than others, because of its particular technology (16).

So far we have taken account of the fact that mass communication is a subdivision of general human communication, and also of the cultural, economic, political and technological constraints on mass communication. So far then, a framework has been established within which the media operate. There are two other dimensions to this framework, the historical and the psychological. Neither need detain us long. Obviously the history of a particular medium or organ in a particular society is likely to impinge on those who occupy roles in it today. For our present purposes it is the general patterns of media function, however, which are of more interest than the numerous small variations. Obviously too, psychological factors such as remembering, forgetting, attention, persuasibility, also act as constraints on the social role of the media. However, insofar as it is impossible as yet to generalise very successfully on the likely distribution in a society of many of these responses to the stimuli with this research is concerned,
they are inevitably beyond the boundary of this investigation. As will be seen shortly however there are elements of psychological theory which are useful in the construction of a theory of what the mass media do, rather than in the assessment of the boundaries within which they operate.
1.11 Complementary theoretical perspectives on the social roles of the mass media

There are several different angles, usually discussed in isolation from each other, from which it is possible to composite a theory of the role of mass media in society. One angle is the kind of social world(s) with which people identify their interest. A second is the role of informal opinion-leadership in society, and the social organisation of public opinion in general. A third is the role of communication in attitude-persistence and attitude-change. A fourth angle is secondary socialisation. A fifth is the nature of news, with which this research is especially concerned; and related to this fifth angle is the sixth question of the connection between cognitive and normative communication and its link with social action, and social roles.

(a) Realms of awareness and interest

The major debate on the kind of social world or worlds with which people identify their interests is that between the exponents of mass society theory (17) and its critics. In essence, as one of its major theorists has recently argued, the theory of mass society is the first half of Durkheim's theory of social development shorn of the second half: differentiation without reintegration. Alternatively it might be said to realise Durkheim's worst fears that reintegration would become increasingly difficult (18). It is a theory which uses the existence of mass media as one of its planks. They are, for instance, said to be the channel by which the charismatic leaders so beloved of mass publics project themselves and so gain their essential mass support. Mass society theory's
primary focus is the atomisation of social life, the reduction of every human being to a unit at equal distance from society's centre and ruling power. The existence of various associations within society is seen as simply a blurring of major realities, since a professional association for instance only engages a small section of most people's lives within it, and tends to be a nationwide association rendering communal contact impossible.

There is no scope here to engage in a full discussion of the theory of mass society. Its implications for the role of the mass media in modern society are nevertheless important. Standardised communications to huge masses of individuals sitting by their TV or radio, or reading their newspaper, have the effect (according to theory) of drawing people's attention away from their locality, their neighbourhood, their informal groupings, and funneling their entire orientation to the centre of society. As Kornhauser says, by mass communication mass arenas replace local arenas. Impersonal local relationships produce the desert that is watered by a charismatic national figure speaking in populist fashion to each individual personally, with warmth and passion. But the media may also be used by the centre in totalitarian fashion to control the masses; and in a variant on this, even in non-totalitarian societies the political will of the masses may be sapped by a constant diet of lulling entertainment.

There are three major flaws in this approach to a theory of the role of the mass media in modern society. The first is the assumption, which has already been noted as conceptually inadequate, that mass communication is the only form of communication in modern society, when it is actually only a subdivision of general human communication. The second flaw is the assumption that because a communication is standardised at its source, from the communicator(s), its perception is also standardised. The notorious inconsistencies of eye-witnesses are reason enough to consider this a highly contentious
proposition. The third flaw is the assumption that community is dead, in or out of conurbation existence. This is not to deny that feelings of powerlessness, replaceability, triviality and alienation are not present to some degree in many individuals in modern society; or even that the incidence of those feelings may not be higher in modern societies than in pre-modern ones (though the problems of any form of measurement for this proposition are acute). But to take these feelings as the explanatory key to modern society rather than as a dysfunction of it, requires more justification than is normally forthcoming.

Concentrating for the moment on this third assumption in mass society theory, what is the evidence that community is dead? It must be said that the kind of examples offered to demonstrate the truth of this proposition are not very convincing. Kornhäuser's dismissal of the nationwide professional association as evidence appears to assume that such organisations have no local chapters, and that whatever communal body a person is involved in must involve them totally for them not to be simply an atom in society. Coser's instance of community studies demonstrating the powerful links between local communities and the wider society is hardly a revolution, and certainly does not demonstrate the validity of the mass society hypothesis. Even the assumption that villages in pre-modern Asia represented a conglomeration of closed social systems has been shown to be false (19); so why links between metropolitan and local life in today's world should be evidence for the mass society thesis is hard to see.

Conversely, the evidence for the persistence of community in modern society is abundant. Nor is such evidence limited to recent urban migrants from rural and/or culturally distinct areas, who might be expected to remain in close association with each other in the early stages of adjustment to city life for purposes of mutual protection and emotional support. Gans' study of Levittown (20) demonstrated a wealth of communal activity in American suburbia. Janowitz' study of the local press in Chicago indicated that local newspapers initiated purely for commercial
advertising quickly became important and popular in local areas as vehicles of community information and integration. He underlines the fact that they acted to facilitate, but not to create, the development of local community awareness and activity (21).

Often there is a confusion engendered by the assumption that the impossibility of face-to-face relationships with everyone in a large city means the total absence of face-to-face relationships in such a milieu. Janowitz' finding that families with small children were those with the highest stake in the local community is important in this connection, because it points the way to a more sophisticated assessment of the varying degrees of local community involvement in cities. Professionals, students, single transient migrant workers, are all examples of people with weak tendencies to involvement. The families Janowitz pointed to are at the other end of the continuum.

On the other hand, it is fair to say that the social worlds with which people identify their interests in conurbations are likely to be more in number and wider ranging than in rural areas (aside from long-distance urban commuters). To a certain extent this expanded definition of relevant social worlds may be ascribed to the greater differentiation of roles characteristic of conurbation existence (22), which is likely to bring with it a greater awareness by people of the vast range of factors affecting their interests. There is though a limit for most purposes on the expansion of those horizons, and that limit tends to be the geographical boundaries of one's own society. Inclusion of foreign affairs within one's horizon is probably directly related to length of formal education, in most cases. A prominent exception is when a war is involved, which naturally brings the enemy society sharply into the sphere of interest. Everyone knows someone's son who is away fighting. Vietnam for the United States, Germany for the United Kingdom, are examples. Such inclusion of the outside world, or a part of it, in the area of interest is still likely to be a very restricted affair.
concerned solely with how threatening the enemy is. Nothing else about the newly included society is of real interest.

In contradistinction therefore to the mass society perspective on the social world with which people identify their interest, a different model is proposed here. It is one of concentric rings, beginning with primary groups and the self in the centre, and broadening out through local community to the social world of the town or city district; from there to the provincial or metropolitan centre; from there to the society as a whole. For the majority, as already noted, this will be the cut-off point. But from inclusion of prominent enemies in times of crisis (or of allies), it is possible in principle to go on to include the whole world. Some people do, although the problems of coping with the relevant information must become extremely difficult.

The model is not an elegant one (and will be refined a little in a moment), but it serves to pinpoint the kind of horizons possible for people in modern society. These horizons are defined by the way people see their interests. The model should not be taken as offering a complete or rounded picture. It is not intended to imply by it that people accumulate layers of interest in the sense that someone interested in foreign affairs is bound to have the same (or any) interest in local community affairs as well. Clearly there is only so much capacity for active interest in anything, although it will differ from person to person.

The model gains from being related to Lerner's study of Islamic society and its modernisation (23). Although his work has serious deficiencies, it also has its moments of insight. One of the factors Lerner picked out as being fundamental to successful modernisation was what he called "empathy", and in a later piece of writing "psychic mobility" (24). In a much-quoted instance, he described the reaction of a typical Turkish peasant to being asked what he would do if President of the nation. The peasant stuttered:

"My God! How can you ask such a thing? How can I.... I cannot....president of Turkey....master of the whole wide world?" (25)
For this man, empathy or psychic mobility with events and life outside his very local experience was quite impossible.

Now the question as to the relative priority of empathy in the process of modernisation does not concern us here. It is sufficient to recognise that Lerner isolated a variable of great significance, which provides a clear distinction between modern and pre-modern social perspectives: the capacity to extend one's horizon to new experience and second-hand experience; the massive expansion of ability to take the role of the other; the readiness for continual social change. Lerner attributes a crucial role in this process of increasing empathy to the mass media, which describes as "the mobility multiplier". By obviating the need for physical travel, they have enabled exposure to situations and perspectives otherwise completely inaccessible to the people using them. Printing, mass literacy, radio, and finally films and television have all enabled the psychic mobility characteristic of modern industrial society. (In earlier societies that confined literacy to their elites, printed communication was used as a tool for social control, very often via religious institutions (26)).

Naturally, as Lerner is careful to stress, the media have not performed this role in isolation from industrialisation, urbanisation, and other social and economic developments. Further, as some other studies have demonstrated, the media have been only minimally effective in rapid modernisation unless supported by local cadres who were able to reinforce the mass communication with their own words and to load discussions on the practical local implications of the mass message (27). (We shall return to this point again shortly.)

Nevertheless, the role of the media in opening up the world, in increasing people's awareness of the ways in which their interests are bound up with social worlds beyond their immediate experience, is a very important one. Clearly, in modern societies with a considerable history of exposure to mass communication the media do not have quite the same revelatory impact that they can be seen to have
in societies where they are new. Still, they can at the very least be said to enable the continuing high level of empathy (relative to some other societies) characteristic of modern society, and to offer the possibility of expanding it still further depending on the way communications are organized. This is not of course to portray a modern internationalist culture as against a traditional village culture, for as we have seen the majority of people even in modern urban society pay little attention to foreign affairs. There is certainly still a tendency to be more at home the nearer home you get.

It is also undoubtedly the case that national issues vary enormously in the extent to which they penetrate all social worlds. Some issues never really filter down to the local level even though they are not in the realm of foreign affairs. Governmental reform (parliamentary, local, civil service) is an example. Others, like race relations and industrial relations, permeate all levels of a society.

Having granted all this, it is still true that the proportion of "cosmopolitans" to "locals" (28) is much higher in modern urban society than ever before; and cosmopolitans, as will be seen in a moment more fully, have a mutually contributive relation with mass communication messages. They derive and develop their empathic capacity from them, and in turn provide the demand for them to continue.

The concentric rings model can also be refined by reference to various studies of the way different segments of society use the media. J. W. C. Johnstone (29) argues in a rather similar vein that people respond to influence on four levels: the mass, the social aggregate, secondary groups and primary groups. Froidson in two articles (30) argues that national audiences are in fact made up of local ones, and that in most cases people still use the media in the company of others. In one of the studies, he found that media
use in isolation from others was a peculiar feature of a stage in adolescence. White and Riley (31) found that the way children responded to television violence was largely related to their integration in a peer-group (or lack of it). A study by Schramm, Lyle and Parker, and another by Steiner, showed that education - which of course correlates strongly with social class - influenced very powerfully the way people use television (32). Schramm and his associates distinguished between reality-viewing and fantasy-viewing, and said the latter grew in strength the further down the social scale people were. Steiner found that dissatisfaction with the adequacy of information on television grew with increased education. He also found that interest in informational programmes increased with age. Gerson (33) found that black and white teenagers use the mass media differently in the US. Whereas the whites, increasingly with age, used mass communications to reinforce their already existing beliefs, the blacks used them to absorb norms and beliefs current among the white majority. Once again, this material demonstrates the superficiality of the mass society thesis at one of its key points, mass communication. The material also indicates that the "concentric social worlds" model is only part of the story; it is at least necessary also to see how a combination of social influences (age, class, ethnic status, education, peer-group integration) define the social world(s) with which people identify at any one point in their lives.

(b) The social organisation of public debate

The second angle from which it is possible to view the role of the mass media in modern society is the so-called "two-step flow of communication". Merton's distinction between locals and cosmopolitans, already cited, was the first step in this direction. The approach received its major thrust however in a study by Katz and Lazarsfeld published in 1955 (34). They discovered that mass media transmissions were only the first step in the influence of any particular communication. The second step was equally vital,
which was the transmission of the message by local "influentials" to others, who so to speak represented the influentials' clienteles. The other major finding of the study was that influentials were relatively more exposed to media communications than were their clienteles. (Influentials only existed in relation to specified issues, such as public affairs or fashion.)

This recalls the important role of the village cadres with relation to mass communication in "modernising" societies referred earlier. It also constitutes a further blow to the mass society perspective, for it clearly shows the importance of other forms of communication beside mass communication - indeed the dependence of mass communication on informal communication for its full effect. There have been numerous other studies of the social diffusion of general or mass communications, which have all demonstrated the irreplaceable role of informal social networks in their successful transmission (35).

This means therefore that it is possible to see the media as initiators of a process of communication and diffusion, rather than simply as leaving a highly perishable message with however many million human atoms the audience-ratings may indicate (36). On the other hand, the fact that people already have their own perspectives on events and their own symbolic universe(s) means that the second step in this communication-flow may act as a blunting process on information that challenges existing definitions of reality. This is not necessarily true; it is conceivable that a particularly sharply edged message may push the influentials toward assigning high status to it in their diffusion of it even if it conflicts with some of their previously held presuppositions, and so may "amplify" it. But it is salutary to recall the comment in one study of the media's role in "modernisation" to the effect that the village commentator on a radio broadcast could just as easily nullify its message as ram it home (37). This is not to say he would always do so as a conscious action, but simply that unless a trained cadre he would tend to adapt it to harmonise with his village's prevailing
values and norms. The predispositions of the cosmopolitans/influentials are therefore very important in assessing the role of the media in society.

A very important complementary perspective, on the social organisation of public opinion, has been put forward by Habermas (38). Habermas traces the origins and development of the concept 'public opinion', and of the operation of the public domain, relating them to liberal economic and political philosophy and to the role of literature and journalism in western European societies over the last three centuries. The essence of his argument is that what at the outset of the period was a participative exercise in the construction of political policies via public debate, has been transformed into a massive invasion of the private realm by manipulative one-way media communications - with the only participation offered the public being simplified responses to sedulously devised opinion polls. He describes this as the shift from heated public debate of culture, to the public as passive consumers of culture.

There is no need to follow Habermas in his subsequent adoption of the mass society concepts already rejected in this chapter, in order to recognise nonetheless that the quantity and quality of public debate is highly dependent on the mass media; and that the style of functioning of political democracy in turn hangs crucially on their role. By overstating, the mass society theorists effectively discourage serious analysis of the very real limits to public debate that a narrow spectrum media system establishes. In Mertonian terms, who will teach the cosmopolitans? And more specifically still, on what principles? The very character and texture of public social life, rather than particular opinions, is heavily determined by the modus operandi of the mass media.

(c) Communication and attitude change

The third angle from which to assess the social role of the media is via the relation between communication, the persistence or change of attitudes, and the persistence or change of patterns of
social action. It is as well to begin with two preliminary observations. First, there is a considerable disjunction between the results of laboratory-tests of this relation, and the results of field-tests. Second, it has generally been assumed that attitudes are more malleable than social action, when in fact the reverse is quite probably the case.

Laboratory-studies on the relative effectiveness of one-sided versus two-sided presentation, of a particular order of presentation, of the communicator's credibility, of the importance of persuasibility as a characteristic of the recipient, have all shown that there can be some change made in people's attitudes by a communication or set of communications. On the other hand, there are certain atypicalities involved in the laboratory situation which suggest caution in accepting these results. Normally effects of communications are observed directly after the communication. The subjects are generally college students, who are not a random sample of the population at large and are highly motivated to take part. There is no opportunity in the laboratory for group-discussion to "blunt" the edge of the communication. And in the laboratory situation issues are often chosen for communication which do not latch on to deeply held beliefs of the test-subjects (39).

All these factors are very important in explaining the extraordinary lack of impact from media communications discovered by social surveys (40). Many of these surveys have concentrated on the effects of political communication, and have adopted an experimental "before-after" design in surveying their respondents. However, because of the numbers involved it is impossible to measure effects directly after the communication. The result is that the passage of time and discussion with others appear to produce a flattening effect on the original communication. And of course surveys do deal with the population at large, and often with issues on which people's attitudes may be deeply ingrained. Voting behaviour is an obvious example.
The result is that research has generally concluded that the media serve to reinforce already existing beliefs and attitudes, and that this is the total of their effect (41). However, it is important not to leave the matter there. McQuail (42) notes that it is easy to overlook the obvious in the assessment of media effects, and cites the heavy use of the media for leisure purposes, the great speed and volume of information-flow which they enable, their stimulus to consumption via advertising. Certainly this last was very much in the minds of the lobby for commercial television in the early fifties in the UK, who saw its advent as fostering a consumer society, and thereby an essentially conservative-commercial-capitalist society (43).

Often the implicit model in studies of media-effects has been as follows. The first survey's results (in before-after studies) have been taken to represent "the-situation-held-constant". A single new variable (I) was then introduced; attitudes were re-examined; and (hopefully) consequent patterns of social action were predicted. This is of course a quite unrealistic model of social reality. It may be applicable in certain situations, such as the study of the development of enthusiasm for some product by market researchers; but in relation to the complexities of human attitudes and behaviour, it is sadly lacking. Situations are not constant, variables are not introduced one at a time, attitude-measurement is still conceptually unclear, and prediction of behaviour from it is extremely hazardous.

Fishbein (44) for instance argues (against much current social-psychological theory) that affect, cognition, behavioural intention and actual behaviour are distinct phenomena, which naturally may be in line with each other but empirically often are not. He further argues that attitude measurement simply taps the strength or weakness of a learned predisposition to respond to any object in a consistently favourable or unfavourable way. He also comments that the failure to predict behaviour successfully from attitude-surveys has often arisen from two failures, one methodological and the other conceptual. The methodological failure was
to ask people their reaction to a stimulus-object which was insufficiently differentiated, so that (for instance) respondents would be questioned about their attitude to tax-increases rather than tax-increases related to specific government policies. The conceptual failure was the treatment of situational constraints on behaviour as "noise in the system", rather than as equally important predictors of behaviour along with attitudes.

In fact behaviour probably is more malleable than attitudes. Much of the research carried out by the cognitive dissonance theorists demonstrates that behaviour which is changed out of line with existing attitudes can pull those attitudes along after it to be consistent with it (45).

All this social-psychological material is not quoted in order to prove that the media may change people's behaviour before they change their attitudes. The intention has been to demonstrate the great complexity of what has been attempted in the endeavour to measure media effects. In particular, there are two aspects of that endeavour which could predict its lack of success in discovering any substantial effects (especially changes).

The first is the question of the relative salience of affect, cognition, behavioural intention and group-pressures in any given situation. If they are congruent, whether weak or strong, the impact of communication is likely to be commensurate with that congruence. As soon though as these four factors are incongruent with each other, the whole business of measurement becomes extremely complex and, currently, virtually impossible. Since too some people's congruence between a particular value and a particular pattern of social action may be other people's incongruence, the potential occurrence of incongruence is likely to increase this difficulty.

The second aspect of the endeavour to discover media-effects which may help to explain its unsatisfactory results is the absence of consideration given over to the effects of prolonged exposure to the media. The cumulative influence of a protracted
series of communications, going beyond simply an election campaign, has never so far been assessed for the simple reason of its enormous practical difficulty. And yet this is what actually happens in the real world. The media no more cease to convey messages than do parents cease to communicate with their children, or friends with their friends. It is therefore this continual interaction between mass media content and the members of society which research into media-effects has attempted to capture. Whether in the laboratory or at large, such research has been bound to consist of occasional stabs at a vast, cumulative and ongoing process.

(d) Socialisation and the social construction of reality

This brings us naturally to a discussion of the media and their social role seen from the fourth angle of socialisation. Mostly the discussion will focus on the media as agents of secondary socialisation; but it should not be forgotten that children are introduced to television and radio in many societies from birth, and to print from a very early age (46). Halloran (47) notes the following fields of enquiry on this very point:

"...the media as (a) possible teachers of norms, status positions and institutional functions, (b) presenting models of behaviour, (c) providing information which extends far beyond the child's immediate experience, (d) giving the child a wider range of role-taking models than he would otherwise have available, (e) being used in some way as a reference group, (f) reducing the opportunity for interpersonal exchanges within the family and in relation to other agents in the socialisation process..." etc.

Furthermore, whatever social role(s) the mass media may play, children are socialised in their concepts of that role by their parents' own attitude to and use of the media.

It is in the nature of secondary socialisation to be concerned with "an already formed self and an already internalised world" (48). This means that it must in most cases build on the symbolic universe which people already hold, since too great a
disjunction between its message and the contents of primary socialisation will make its acceptance very problematic. ("Alternation" by the media alone - to use Berger and Luckmann's terminology - is almost unimaginable.) Further, secondary socialisation as compared with primary socialisation does not send down nearly such deep roots. Berger and Luckmann suggest that secondary socialisation is characteristically important in complex societies where the differentiation of roles produces numerous knowledge-specialisms into each of which an individual needs induction in order to cope with their related roles, and which are too numerous in their totality to be known by everyone.

In secondary socialisation, mass communication has an important role. It is a general role, not the specific inductive role just referred to. But in their continuing presentation of reality within the terms of the core symbolic universe of a society, the mass media serve to maintain subjective reality and also to legitimate the existing institutional order. They could in theory fulfil a different role, which would be to highlight contradictions and problems within the existing order; and to some extent this does happen in occasional plays and documentaries and news stories and articles. But mostly, the media are part of the "chorus" that Berger and Luckmann describe as serving to maintain the individual's sense of reality (49); they are part of his significant others, though obviously not occupying the affective role of marriage partner or friends. And insofar as the media constantly work within and utilise a particular core symbolic universe, they help to maintain its legitimation. In fact rather as the Church in medieval England was the key organisation for the maintenance of the dominant symbolic universe, so are the mass media today, in conjunction with the educational system.

It is often accepted that to appear on or in the mass media confers status on people; and that this status more or less
corresponds to the number of people who will be exposed to the communication. What is more seldom recognised, if at all, is the status conferred on ideas, perspectives and orientations by being treated, explicitly or implicitly, in the mass media. It is not simply a question of who is a person in the public eye, but much more significantly it is a question of what are the definitions of reality that are granted public significance by their repeated presentation in the media. This recalls what was said earlier in this chapter about the "cultural system" as a constraint on the mass media, and the discussion a moment ago about the media as legitimators of existing institutions and sustainers of the core symbolic universe of a society. From the subjective point of view, the media are on a far higher level of significance than the rest of the chorus outside the individual's primary groups; and it may well be that for certain purposes they are as significant as the individual's primary groups. There are to be sure no points at which they will independently provide the same compound of emotion and information; but they will service the individual's primary groups at the same time as the individual. In practice, it is far less a case of weighing the impact of primary groups against the impact of the mass media, than of studying the ways in which they intermash. The most obvious instance to hand is their presentation of areas of social life about which recipients know little or nothing - classically, foreign affairs, but also it may be argued other people's strikes and other ethnic groups (50).

And concluding this section on socialisation as a perspective from which to understand the social role of the media, it may well be that once again their most powerful form of influence is a two-stage one. For in affluent societies, children are now growing up whose parents themselves grew up in the presence of television - a phenomenon long present in the case of press, radio and film. This means that whatever may be the socialising role that the mass media have had on the previous generation of parents by way of secondary socialisation is more than likely to be transmitted to their children by way of
primary socialisation. Insofar as primary socialisation does send
down far deeper roots than secondary socialisation, it may be
paradoxically the case that the influence of the media actually
grows by this means.

(c) News and social change

Fully to understand the significance of the media as agents
of socialisation, it is necessary to appreciate their role in relation
to news. This is the fifth angle on the social role of the media.
For it is precisely the problems posed to the institutional order
and to the individual's ability to maintain his subjective reality,
by the rapid social change characteristic of today's world, which
give news its enormous contemporary significance and the mass media
a vital role in transmitting it. The news media act to mediate the
processes of change in an assimilable form (51).

Naturally the method by which this gradual appropriation
of social change is offered the public consists of "placing"
ocurrences within the already existing core symbolic universe of
society. One might compare the famous American columnist Walter
Lippmann, who said that he saw his writing

"as an effort to keep contemporary events in such
perspective that his readers would have no occasion
to be surprised when something happened" (52).

Whatever happens then is likely to be presented as "more of the same"
or as "another form of the same"; although it does offer the possi-
bility, perhaps imperceptibly, of gradually shifting cultural emphases,
and of juxtaposing values which conflict but normally belong to
different spheres of behaviour (the treatment of blacks, and justice
for "all", for instance). But these last possibilities are much less
likely in practice than the integration of new information into an
already existing symbolic universe. As R. E. Park noted, there must
be "a body of tradition and common understanding in terms of which
events are ordinarily interpreted" (53).
The role of news in modern society is given further illumination by two other considerations. The first arises from a suggestive piece of research by Kay (54), who found that a major motivation for news-reading was the desire to reduce anxiety. This implies that the psychological strains of rapid social change are considerable for many people, and that its integration into an already existing symbolic universe fulfills very much the kind of functions suggested above. In this connection we may compare what Katz (55) says about the "knowledge-function" of attitudes (the function being a psychological one motivating the individual to hold a particular attitude or set of attitudes). By this is not signified a thirst for "facts" but a need for orientation and pattern in a very confusing world. Out of this need are born stereotypes, which are attempts to organise experience coherently (whether accurately or inaccurately). Once these orderings of social reality have become established as satisfactory for the individual, they require considerable injections of dissonant information in order to alter or destroy them. For they are no longer simply categories, but categories with a history of psychological usefulness. Their importance for this study is not merely their ordering of previous experience, but their role in ordering and accommodating new information. This matches the role of the communicators in offering social change in an assimilable form: it could be semi-seriously characterised as a double exercise (by communicator and recipient) in pain-killing!

The role of news as offering the gradual appropriation of social change is also illuminated by Shibutani's study of rumour (56), which is itself an important form of news in certain circumstances. Rumour is a form of news which comes into its own precisely when a crisis occurs which no official or authoritative source is available to explain. This is a very clear indication by implication of the fundamental importance of the media as news-channels in modern society. Shibutani quotes incidents following the San Francisco
In 19X1, when the three city newspapers produced a common edition and those selling it were greeted with more enthusiasm and urgency than people bringing bread or blankets. The instance nicely illuminates, admittedly in extreme circumstances, the role of news in general in a rapidly changing social scene, and the importance of mass media as the authoritative source of news. Rumour acts as a makeshift in the absence of anything more authoritative (57).

A theoretical perspective which has interesting points of contact with these observations in the phenomenological viewpoint. Schutz’s (58) discussion of the importance of everyday definitions of social reality for the maintenance of social relations, of the social stock of knowledge at hand imbibed from parents and teachers, not only permeates the work of Berger and Luckmann which is frequently referred to in this chapter, but also is quite reminiscent of Katz’s discussion of the knowledge function of attitudes. Some of Schutz’s insightful comments on the texture of everyday life are very suggestive within the present context of analysis of the media’s social role.

This is true, despite the fact that neither he nor the other writers discuss the role of the media in creating people’s “vivid present”, or in maintaining what he describes as the natural attitude which suspends “the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him” (59).

A study of the British media coverage of a large demonstration in London in 1968 (60), for instance, indicates that the event was pre-defined by journalists as extremely threatening to public law and order. Despite the relative tranquility of the actual march, this definitional category was still maintained in TV coverage during the demonstration and in the Press subsequently. A similar study of media definitions of General MacArthur’s return to the United States after the end of his Korean command, found the same shortfall between televised and actual reality, and underlines the role of the media in creating everyday definitions which make ‘sense’ of but do not accurately portray social reality (61).
This represents one illustration of how social change is cast in particular categories, which do not necessarily mute its conflictual qualities, (indeed they may enhance them), but serve to appropriate it by means of already existing definitions. (It could be argued that a study of the media is exactly the kind of attempt to relate phenomenological analysis to the processes of social change, that is often claimed to be antithetical to phenomenology by its critics.)

It is from this perspective on news that the customary division between news, comment and entertainment characteristic of the media should be viewed. The distinction between comment (which includes articles, editorials, public affairs TV discussions, documentaries) and news is obviously of limited value, and simply refers to different styles of presenting the same thing and fulfilling the same role. But there is also a considerable amount of "news" in what is officially designated as entertainment (62).

Clearly the amount of "appropriation of social change" (news) embedded in entertainment is generally less than in programmes or journals officially dedicated to it. But it would be quite mistaken to assume that the clean divisions made between news and entertainment by media organisations reflect the reality of what they are doing. It may well be that in news bulletins or news stories a conscious attempt is made to present "straight" news, with any comment being balanced among the various disputants. But this is largely a difference of style; for "balance", as has already been argued in this chapter, does not exist in a social vacuum. Interpretation is implied in many cases more strongly by what is left out than by the actual discussion which takes place. Facts are only sacred within a particular symbolic universe, to adapt the famous saying of a famous British newspaperman (63).

Conversely, neither "entertainment" or "fantasy" are remote from the business of offering the appropriation of social change. The same perspectives on social reality that news programmes (in the organisational sense) convey may be equally powerfully conveyed and
perhaps more so by the relaxing world of popular entertainment. It is not intended to overstate this point and relegate news programmes to a subsidiary category of light entertainment, but merely to indicate that the two are not separated by the gulf that some practitioners claim. The mass communication of news as such is a particular, and particularly important, facet of the mass communication of socially constructed changing reality. But it also finds its place in material not formally defined as news, which may communicate intensively certain perspectives with a strong bearing on the meaning of contemporary events and social patterns. Instances might be the importance of science implied by science-fiction entertainment, the dangers of communism implied by spy-series, and so on.

In other words, given this sociological definition of news, much of the output of the mass media could be defined as news. News itself, in the organisational sense, is the most important part of this output, for it is in "news" that the tension between actual social change and the existing order is at its most explicit. Naturally though, the integration of social change that takes place in the media may be delusive in view of the actual bearing of events. Of this, more in a moment; but let it be noted in conclusion that it is partly the relation of the media to news (in the fullest sense of the term) which gives the mass media their key role in modern society.

(f) The relation between cognitive and normative communication

The last angle on the social role of the media proceeds directly from all that has already been said. It is the relation of cognitive to normative communication, and to actual patterns of social action. This has been expressed in a highly distilled form by the American broadcaster F. W. Friendly, as "What we don't know can kill us".

Proceeding more formally, it is first of all clear that cognitive and normative material cannot possibly be separated from each other. Normative considerations govern the selection of
cognitive material, which naturally in turn reinforces existing norms, in most instances. This is why the simple recognition that the media may not determine what we think, but what we think about, is not so straightforward as it looks (64). If Tunstall's approach to the social role of the media (65) is examined, this becomes clearer.

Tunstall suggests that map-making, focusing and ranking are three key functions of the media. All three are cognitive terms, and express the way in which the media act to give us knowledge and a picture of events and their relative significance which is inaccessible to most of us from any other source. But what happens when the map, the focus and rank are inaccurate? Instances come mostly from the political sphere. President Kennedy's suppression of news concerning the attempted invasion of Cuba in 1962 is one example (66). The whole complex of events surrounding the Korean War of 1949-53 is another (67). A third is suggested by the recent work of Hartmann and husband on the impact of British media on racial attitudes among whites. Accepting that the media define social reality rather than creating views on it, they nonetheless suggest that a definition of black people as problems is most unlikely to lead to their acceptance, and may sustain high levels of tolerance for their oppression (68).

In all those cases it is quite clear that what people are given to think about is immensely important in determining their reactions and patterns of social action. Other examples could easily be multiplied on a purely speculative basis. If people are presented continually with national perspectives rather than class perspectives, or white perspectives rather than multi-racial perspectives, or secular perspectives rather than religious perspectives, it is blindness to suppose these will have no impact on patterns of social action and the persistence of certain social norms rather than others. Insofar as the media are such an important filter for perspectives and symbols they necessarily play an important role in shaping the patterns of social action. By emphasising certain definitions they will underpin and reinforce certain key values which are crucial for the continuation of the society in which they operate in its present
form; for those values inform myriads of interactions between members of the society. The selection and presentation of cognitive material implics and feeds value-systems. (Conversely, in a "free-market" media situation there is much more scope for the encouragement of change.)

Further to this, it has been almost consistently the case that the literature on the impact of the mass media on social action has neglected an extremely important component of sociological analysis: role theory. Even the most sophisticated analyses of the impact of media output - as in the "uses-and-gratifications" model - have operated in terms of whole individuals or groups. The fact that individuals occupy a complex set of roles which determine their actions - or at least the boundaries of their choice between actions - should have directed sociological investigation to the relation between standard role-sets and media output. (The closest point reached to this has been the "uses-and-gratifications" model.) In particular, the categorisation of roles in recent work by Gerhardt (69) suggests that very fruitful analyses might be produced along these lines.

She provides three categories of role: status-roles, position-roles, and situation-roles. By status-roles are meant roles associated with social stratum, ethnic group, age, sex, religion, citizenship, nationality, etc. By position-roles she denotes occupations in the labour-market. The term situation-roles is in principle self-explanatory: she draws a distinction however between specific situation-roles with a clearly defined environmental context (spectator, pedestrian, golf-player), and diffuse situation-roles bound up with particular individuals in a variety of contexts (friend, neighbour, neophyte).

Gerhardt's discussion is very detailed, and goes naturally far beyond this sketch of her argument; but consideration of the function of the media in relation to these different roles, rather than to role-less individuals taken in the round, suggests illuminatingly how media output may penetrate through to social action.
The fact that the media produce role-related information, typifications and fantasies, necessarily spanning most roles over time, explains further why 'before-after' studies are so unhelpful: they leave the complexity of role-sets out of account. If on the other hand, particular sections of media output were related to particular roles, while bearing in mind the interaction of the latter with other major roles, a useful step forward might be made in the analysis of mass communication effects.

An illustration could be the relation between Gerhardt's status-roles, media output, and behaviour in actual situations (in or out of situation-roles properly so called). If the status-role of citizen of a nation-state is taken as the example, then it can easily be seen that media output which implicitly ("balance") or explicitly (international competition in science, trade or sport) supports/reiterates/extends the importance of the nation for the individual goes much further than underpinning an abstract concept. If membership of the nation is a strongly supported role, then it follows that a fundamental norm of that role is loyalty to the nation. If workers of other nationalities are then focussed on in terms of the point of their entry into the nation (immigration); or if the nation's economy is presented as threatened by strikes and wage-settlements; then the role of national citizen will require loyalty to the nation. In the case of migrant workers, loyalty to the national role may imply they have lesser rights since their nationality is different; and/or threaten the social identity given by that collectivity-role to the individual. The more strongly and widely diffused the ideology of nationalism, the greater the adhesion to the national role, and correspondingly the greater may be the perceived threat to social identity. In the case of strikes and labour militancy, the national role may imply disloyalty on the part of trade unions and workers in a dispute to the interests of the nation.

These implications of the role of national citizen may overflow into certain situational roles (such as voter) but not into others (helping someone taken ill in the street). They may be
challenged in practice by the implications of certain positional roles (union solidarity in a plant) or may outweigh such roles (once again, union solidarity). The complexity of these role-relationships and conflicts clearly demonstrates once more why simplistic assertions about the strength or weakness of media influence, miss the point.
Conclusions

The position has now been reached where it is possible to review the various approaches to the social role of the mass media and to assess the extent to which together they assist the construction of a theory of that role. The framework of constraints within which the media operate was first discussed - cultural, economic, political and technological. Six ways of understanding the actual process of mass communication were then examined. (1) The role of the media in expanding and maintaining once expanded, the social worlds with which people identify their interests. (2) The initiating role of the media in the diffusion of communications via "influentials" or "cosmopolitans" to a much larger public, and the role of public debate in democracies. (3) The cumulative impact of exposure to mass communication over prolonged periods. (4) The media in the socialisation process, acting as (a) secondary socialisers of a general significance only less than that of the primary group; (b) supplementary primary socialisers; (c) legitimators of the core symbolic universe of the society. (5) The media as drawing much of their significance from their role as transmitters and assimilators of rapid social change; that is, their reproduction of "news". (6) The media's cognitive material as crucially related to values and norms and their persistence, and to the organisation of social relations in terms of complex role-sets.

Given the see-saw in media research over the decades between predictions of "alternation" via the media to the virtual denial to them of any significant social role, these six perspectives are very important. They demonstrate that many of the questions asked about the social role of the media were bound to come up with negative answers because they were the wrong questions. Certainly, from the discussion so far it might easily have been predicted on purely theoretical grounds that the media would be highly unlikely
to act as an independent revolutionary force in society. The
interests of the polity, the perspectives of the controllers, the
fact that the media utilise and work within a particular culture,
their cumulative expression of that culture together with the
continued status they confer on it, the crucial role of informal
opinion-leadership in mediating mass communication, the resilience
of stereotypes: all these elements in the situation are weighted
heavily in the direction of socio-cultural integration. Even rapid
social change is made assimilable through its integration into the
core symbolic universe.

Paradoxically, the media may perform this role even by
legitimating permissible degrees of pluralism. In Holland, the most
salient social divisions are probably still those between Catholic,
Calvinist and liberal secularist. They are institutionalised not only
by separate political parties and other institutions, but even by the
division of control of the media into each segment's hands (though
one other such segment is the Labour Party). The slow development
of class (and perhaps even ethnic) divisions in Holland may be
partly attributable to the strengthening of these plural divisions
by separate media (70).

Given however a dissonant community with a sharply defined
contraculture (say a religious sect), the media do not have the
power by themselves to reintegrate that community by dissolving its
contraculture. (Though even here it might be hypothesised that the
frequently observed "blunting of the edges" over time in such sects
could be partly attributable to prolonged exposure to the society's
countervalues, given high status in the media.) The point remains
though that people with a clearly defined counterculture will tend
to use the media selectively in most instances, accepting material
which confirms their viewpoint and rejecting material which challenges
it. The media may not encourage dissonance, but they cannot prevent
it. Rather, they are likely to slow it down.
To say they do not encourage dissonance is itself subject of course to two qualifications. The first is that the occurrences which the media filter have a life of their own. Society moves, social change happens, independently of the media. It may be surmised fairly confidently that even societies which tightly control their media systems cannot forever keep major social events from their public. Clearly it is easier to do so with many international events than with national ones; and clearly too there is considerable scope for determining the significance given to the event in question ("ranking" in Tunstall's terms). The true significance of the British bombing of Dresden is an instance of the way the meaning of an event only trickled out very slowly many years after its shock-value - maybe greater than Hiroshima, since Europeans were the victims - had diminished considerably.

Nevertheless, despite many such instances of news-management that could be cited, social change does exist in a basically asymmetrical relationship with the media. This means therefore that the media have an ambivalent relation to it: on the one hand they help people to appropriate it in terms of their already existing symbolic universe; on the other hand, there are social occurrences which "imperceptibly" over time serve to shift emphases in the symbolic universe so that after, say, five years it is no longer entirely what it was five years before. As Berger and Luckmann point out, every symbolic universe is inherently problematic, and all the more so given current rates of social change. It is therefore possible and even probable that over a period the media may facilitate a further shift in the social construction of reality by reflecting a change in that reality. To this extent then they may be said to encourage dissonance.

It naturally follows from this that (some of) those involved in the production of mass communication may attempt to push the process along. From published press reports, it appears that this is precisely what did happen in the Czech media in the first eight
months of 1968. Obviously at a point like this - though the
Czech case is an extreme one - the media are contributing as
powerfully to social change as they are able. In other circum-
stances it is more likely to be individual writers or producers
who as a minority attempt to push the process along. Their
impact is correspondingly much slighter.

On balance then the media may be said (i) to act as
significant socialisers, in all the different senses analysed in
this chapter; and (ii) to exist as potential stimulators of public
discussion. Their actual impact is primarily integrative even -
and precisely - in situations of social change. In this respect
they may be seen, with the educational system, as modern analogues
of the medieval Church in western Europe. If then they contribute
in this way to cohesion and stability, a critical question is how
they cope with the conflicts considered endemic in race relations
and industrial relations, and what the result of their handling
of these issues is likely to be: the rest of this research is
dedicated to providing an answer to these questions.
Footnotes to chapter 1

(1) See for instance D. Katz (et al.): *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (Henry Holt & Co., NY, 1954), especially chs. 6, 8, 9, 12.


(4) E.g. S. H. Britton: *Consumer Behavior and the Behavioral Sciences* (Wiley 1966), especially Parts VIII and IX.

(5) The two attempts to provide one which currently exist are extremely embryonic. C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1966), concentrates on the most general structural features of thought and myth at a level of abstraction that effectively deprives it of value for this analysis. In contrast, the ethnomethodological style in sociology focuses on the immediate with precisely the same single-mindedness. See for instance H. P. Dreitzel, *Recent Sociology 2* (Collier-MacMillan, 1970), particularly the contributions by Cicourel, Emerson and Daniola. At least on its own, it is equally unhelpful for present purposes.

(6) The term comes from P. Berger & T. Luckmann: *The Social Construction of Reality* (Allen Lane 1967). At frequent points in this chapter the discussion will allude to the arguments of this book.


(8) Some empirical work has been carried out on this particular point. W. Breed (*Mass Communication and Socio-cultural Integration*; in L. A. Dexter & D. M. White: *People, Society and Mass Communications*, Free Press 1964) argues that certain roles are given favoured treatment by the media: judges, mothers, doctors, business leaders, and others; and that this does much to maintain consensus. Structural flaws are passed over in most cases, and these representatives of certain institutions are not criticised precisely because their shortcomings would be seen as reflecting back on their institutions. C. Gerbner (*Ideological Perspectives and Political Tendencies in News Reporting*, Journalism Quarterly 44.4 (Autumn 1964) pp. 495-508) found in a particular instance in the French Press that it made no particular difference whether the right-wing party press or the commercial press reported an incident: it emerged in very much the same light. Y. 0. Key makes very much the same point for the United States' mass media (in *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, Knopf, 1961, ch. 15),
that they are either commercial-conservative in bias, or neutral. C. D. MacDougall made very much the same point about the American press and the US presidential election of 1948, when the Democratic candidate won with the Press almost without exception supporting the Republican side; the object of real vituperation in the Press was not the Democratic front-runner, but the socialist third-party candidate Wallace (International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research III.2 (Summer 1949), pp. 251-62: "The American Press's Influence on Public Opinion"). And in a study of press coverage of civil disorder in 1967, D. L. Paletz and R. Dunn found a very strong tendency to play the riot down. Partly this was to avoid professional and even Congressional criticism; but partly too "consciously or not, many of the media act to maintain socio-cultural consensus by presenting appropriate behaviour and omitting items that might jeopardise it. The result is to protect power and class in the social structure. When riots occur they are viewed as disruptions of consensus and threats to the community. All may not be well in the society, but this is no way to change the situation.... Blacks lose because their self-assertion is not fully represented; whites are deceived as to the extent and nature of black discontent."

(Public Opinion Quarterly 35.3 (Fall 1969), pp. 328-45.)

(9) In the UK the Reid-IPC Group is one example; and commercial TV is another. See H. J. Skornia: Television and Society (McGraw-Hill 1965) for a trenchant examination of corporation influence in American TV; and F. W. Friendly: Due to Circumstances Beyond Our Control (MacGibbon & Kee 1967) for a personal account of CBS, with these factors very much in mind.


(16) This is about the most that can be said for McLuhan's arguments. For the sources of the instances quoted in the paragraph earlier, see T. Whiteside "Corridor of Mirrors", Columbia Journalism Review VII.4 (Winter 1968), pp. 35-54; C. Seymour-Ure, op. cit., p. 450; J. McGinniss: The Selling of the President (Ande Deutsch 1969).

(18) Lornhauser, in ISSS.


(22) R. Frankenburg: Communities in Britain (Penguin 1966) chs. 9-11.


(26) See the articles by K. Gough and I. M. Lewis in J. Goody; op. cit.


(37) See note 27.
(38) J. Haberman, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Luchterhand, 1968, 4th ed.).


(41) Compare the oft-quoted sentence of J. T. Klapper: "Communication research strongly indicates that persuasive mass communication is in general more likely to reinforce the existing opinions of its audience than it is to change opinion" (The Effects of Mass Communication (Free Press 1960) pp. 49-50).


(51) Cf. R. E. Park: "The function of news is to orient man and society in an actual world" (On Social Control and Collective Behavior (University of Chicago Press 1967) p. 50). Or T. Shibutani: "News is that more or less urgent information that men need in making adjustments to changed circumstances; it is sought even at great sacrifice because of the necessity of getting one's bearings in a rapidly changing world" Improvised News (Bobbs-Merrill 1966) p. 40.

(52) Quoted by B. C. Cohen: op. cit., p. 273 n. 6.

(53) "News and the Power of the Press", American Journal of Sociology 47.1 (July 1941) pp. 1-11. The quotation is from p. 11.


(56) T. Shibutani: op. cit, especially ch. 2.

(57) In one study of the processes of communication in the Soviet Union, based on rather imperfect data, it was found that tight control of the mass media produced considerable reliance on word-of-mouth communication for certain purposes. R. A. Bauer & D. E. Gleicher, "Word of Mouth Communication in the Soviet Union", in L. A. Dexter & D. H. White: op. cit.


(63) C. P. Scott, renowned editor of the then Manchester Guardian.

(64) C. Seymour-Ure, art. cit., p. 428.


(68) P. Hartmann and C. Husband, The Mass Media and Racial Attitudes (Davis-Poynter Ltd., 1973), chs. 5-6. Certainly the literature on race riots in East St. Louis (1917) and Chicago (1919) demonstrates that amongst the factors predisposing toward a racial conflict in both situations were Press campaigns against black labour immigration into these cities from the Southern States, which were conducted over a long period before the riots. See E. Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis, July 2, 1917 (Southern Illinois University Press 1964), passim; and A. Spear, Black Chicago (University of Chicago Press 1967), ch. 11.

(69) U. Gerhardt, Rollenanalyse als kritische Soziologie (Luchterhand 1972) especially ch. 5.

Chapter Two: Theories of race relations and industrial relations

2.1 The theoretical analysis of race relations

(a) Delineation of the subject-area

What are "race relations"? Many definitions take it for granted that conflict is inbuilt:

"...a race may be thought of as simply any group of people that is generally believed to be, and generally accepted as, a race in any given area of ethnic competition. Moreover, by race relations we do not mean all social contacts between persons of different 'races', but only those contacts the social characteristics of which are determined by a consciousness of 'racial' differences." (1)

Shibutani and Kwan define race relations in terms of identification and identity, following the symbolic-interactionist tradition:

"...an ethnic group consists of those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others" (2).

Blalock simply talks in terms of 'minority groups' (3).

All these terms are obviously open to certain criticisms. 'Minority groups' was criticised by Myrdal (4) for failing "to make explicit a distinction between the temporary social disabilities of recent white immigrants and the permanent disabilities of Negroes and other coloured people". A more general criticism, apart from having to use the word in its reverse sense in discussing a society such as Rhodesia or South Africa, is that it lays most of the emphasis on one side of the relation: how far does the minority "relate" to the status quo? The definition by Shibutani and Kwan is ingenious, but omits a situation like that of Nazi Germany where people of Jewish ancestry might literally be unaware of the fact until faced with the evidence. Cox's definition assumes that conflict is a necessary ingredient in race relations, so that without it they are no longer race relations. This is very nearly
true, but not completely so. Much depends on the scope of the concept 'conflict'; but at least the absence of overt conflict in interactions between people who define each other as belonging to different 'races' also needs explaining. There are many more situations where this occurs than simply the well-known one where rage is merely simmering below the surface. Not all racial groups are in competition, for instance.

Much of the difficulty in definition stems from the lack of real connection between physical racial differences and social differences on the one hand, and the key social role of physical differences as cues for social response on the other hand. People do not behave in a particular way because they are black or yellow, but because of the social significance of blackness or yellowness in their culture and society. For instance, whites have certain patterns of social action regarding blacks, and vice-versa, because it is normal in their culture. Certain crucial aspects of social action within each ethnic group may also be affected by this normal polarity.

Instances of this last dimension of race relations have generally been taken from the subordinate group. Thus inferior educational performance and greater marital instability and higher murder-rates of American blacks (all controlled for "class") have been noted as indices of the acute stress experienced by blacks in an oppressive white society (5). But an equally important example is the frequently noted warmth and courtesy of members of a dominant minority (the ante-bellum South, South Africa) to visitors of the dominant group. Such cohesion betokens the necessary solidarity of an elite in the face of the masses. And while this courtesy may not be so much in evidence among the lower members of the elite group (e.g. the poor whites), their aggressiveness on occasion is often prompted precisely by the incongruence between their deference-position as elite-members, and their lack of material resources,
which is not only uncomfortable in economic terms but also very threatening to their deference-position.

It is then the social role of physical differences as cues for behaviour according to the culture of a particular society, which is the only social or psychological reality in physical differences. To this extent, physical differences are analogous to tribal, linguistic and religious differences as cues for patterns of social response (although "passing" is possible with those latter cases in a way it very rarely is with physical differences). But these cues "explain" nothing: they merely act to mediate and focus an already existing set of norms and values which themselves originate in a particular social structure and cultural tradition. In order to understand the social origins of race relations, it is this social structure and cultural tradition which must be investigated.

This demonstrates the importance of the assertion above, that the non-existence of conflict between physically different groups also needs explanation; for this explanation will also lie in the culture and social structure in which the groups co-exist. The fact that most sociology has concentrated on the conflict-element in race relations, and that empirically racial groups certainly appear to be more often in conflict than not, does not alter the theoretical importance of this observation. The field is therefore defined as embracing all situations in which physically different strata co-exist.

This does not exclude situations in which their relations are organised in terms of national states. In other words, the relations between South African whites and Tanzanian blacks are part of the subject area, as are "aid"-programmes from Europe to Africa or Asia. The situation of the Chinese in South East Asia is another example of the validity of this approach, for their relation to the mainland People's Republic is an important element in that situation. Furthermore, given the essential tenet of traditional
racist ideology that physical differences determine social behavior (6), the political difficulties of black countries can easily be slotted into the ideology of "violence-prone children". Extra-national events can and do contribute to the maintenance of racist ideology even when those events have no impact otherwise. An example was the Congo, is Haiti.

Having then defined the field and indicated that it is in culture and social structure that explanations are to be looked for, what are the main cultural and social-structural explanations available? Assessment of their adequacy must be related to their treatment of a) the emergence of racial stratification; b) the different patterns of racial stratification; and c) the persistence of racial stratification.

Explanations tend to be of three general types. The first is what might be labelled social-psychological, or micro-structural; the second, Marxist; and the third non-Marxist, but institutional and structural.

(b) Social-psychological and micro-structural approaches

The social-psychological approach is characteristically an 'immediate' one. Examples are the work of Adorno (7), Bettelheim and Janowitz (8), and G. W. Allport (9); not to mention innumerable attitude-surveys essentially inspired by this perspective. However, this approach is also to be found in the work of sociologists such as Shibutani and Kwan who utilise the symbolic-interactionist perspective; and also Banton (10) who proposes six 'orders of race relations', consisting of peripheral contact, institutionalised contact, acculturation, domination, paternalism and integration. (Actually, he adds pluralism as a seventh.)

The focus of this approach is on the "immediate"; on what goes into day-to-day relations between representatives of racial groups. The basic question that this approach asks is how do they see each other and why in those particular ways?
Adorno and his associates, for instance, with the example of Nazi Germany before their eyes, concentrated on the mechanisms by which fascism and authoritarianism could become respectable in a society. The existence of a particular personality-type peculiarly prone to any authoritarian propaganda was their discovery and explanation. The link-threads they offer with other social forces are only occasional: a reference here to the virtual identity of the socio-economic and psychological aspects of "pseudo-conservatism" in Nazi Germany, a reference there to the role of powerful economic interests in using racist propaganda to maintain their dominance (11). This is very much a theory which concentrates on the emergence of racial stratification, but nothing else. And its explanation is essentially in terms of the distribution of this particular personality-type and its proclivities through all ranks of society (12).

Bettelheim and Janowitz studied the relation of ethnic hostility to inadequate ego-controls and downward social mobility. In their work, the whole problem of attitude-measurement and prediction of behaviour comes up yet again. For instance, out of their sixty or so "tolerant" respondents, in the case of less than 25\% could their tolerance be attributed to fully or partly internalised ego-controls (13). In other words, the vast majority even of the "tolerant" on their own showing would not find it difficult to alter their views to suit a racially hostile situation. As is so often pointed out, concentration on hostile attitudes (or favourable ones) focuses attention on a variable which is itself determined by many changing forces (14). But if to hold a particular attitude is both a poor predictor of one's behaviour, and is itself the result of more than merely internal psychological factors, then its use as explanation is impossible. For it presumes that the core-factor in race relations is the ingrained personal antipathies of individuals, which is a demonstrably weak account.

In actuality, attitudes are a mediating factor in race relations. It does not assist illumination to dismiss attitudes as irrelevant, as a particular style of Marxist analysis prefers.
On the other hand, it is important to limit the attitudinal focus to its proper place in the explanation of race relations. It cannot be said that either Shibutani and Kwan, or Banton, score any more highly in this endeavour. Banton's theoretical focus is all the time on modes of contact, reminiscent of his earlier theory of black migrants in Britain as "archetypal strangers" (15). Although one or two of his modes imply a stratificational base (paternalism, dominance), his theory relates almost entirely to the social texture of day-to-day relations between various types of racial division. But how did these types emerge, and how do they persist? Banton's only attempts to answer these questions are by reference to by-products of industrialisation (he instances urban residential segregation) and continuing widespread tolerance of inequality. The implication seems to be that different kinds of racial contact just "happen", and that many at least are maintained by quite casual factors. Without claiming the reverse of the latter statement to be true, it is still the case that Banton's approach has very little explanatory power; and this is because it tends to concentrate on the surface elements of race relations.

Shibutani and Kwan concentrate explicitly on "the kinds of distinctions men make on the basis of traits believed to be inherited" (16). Here again, the implicit focus is on day-to-day and face-to-face relations. Although these are not irrelevant to the understanding and explanation of racial stratification, a more significant issue is what lies behind them. To be fair to Shibutani and Kwan, their book does discuss these underlying factors - but only in very piecemeal fashion, and with the symbolic-interactionist perspective acting as the unifying thread on its own.

The "immediate" focus concentrates on variables and topics such as migration, culture contact, the extent of racial hostility and tolerance, the psycho-dynamics of prejudice, the role of mutual definition in social interaction, the face-to-face and day-to-day interactions of racial groups, the frequency of discrimination,
the likelihood of the disappearance of awkward ethnic relations in the future. These are all real issues, not simply epiphenomenal; and yet they are in need of more explanation than the studies so far reviewed have been able to offer. Their inadequacy in this respect is demonstrated very clearly by one range of excellent social-psychological studies which points repeatedly to the fundamental importance of structural and cultural factors in explaining the actual day-to-day behaviour on which the "immediate" theories concentrate.

According to R. M. Williams (17), the existence of considerable racial prejudice among people with no personality pathology shows clearly that prejudice is to be explained mainly by the cultural norms and social structure of its milieu. This conclusion is reinforced by quite different levels of prejudice that were discovered (using the same research instrument) in the different communities studied.

(o) Marxist approaches

Marxist approaches to the explanations of racial stratification represent the most thorough-going endeavour to produce a macro-structural theory of the phenomenon very far removed from the "immediate" focus which has just been surveyed. They originate largely with Marx's observations on the relations of Irish and English workers, and other scattered observations; and with Lenin's imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism. The latter saw mature capitalism as ineluctably driven to expand its operations overseas and to carve up the world for exploitation. In pursuit of this end, it would establish formal or informal control over those activities of the countries it dominated that were relevant to its interests. If formal control, then the territory would become a colony; if informal control, then the territory's resources would be exploited with the tolerant acquiescence of the continuing indigenous elite (examples being China and large parts of Latin America). In early capitalist development this expansion took place, but with a much greater element of choice attached to it; in the final stages of capitalism, the choice was removed. It had to expand territorially to survive.
The Marxist perspective sees racial stratification as an outgrowth of these developments innate in capitalism itself. In order to justify colonial expropriation and slavery, an ideology of the inherent inferiority of non-white people was developed, as was an ideology of the civilising mission of the whites. Further, the very juxtaposition of white, black, brown and yellow people in virtually every part of the world from Australasia through Africa to the New World is to be attributed to one aspect or another of imperial expansion.

As regards the relations of black and white workers, the Marxist approach stresses two fundamental points. First, the appeal of racist ideology to the proletariat of the metropolitan country. The attractiveness of belonging to the ruling nation and its enhancement of status meant that the white worker tended to identify with his white overlords rather than with his fellows in oppression. It was another form of the mechanism which led the labour aristocracy to disdain the less skilled workers within the metropolitan country. Second, Marxist analysis emphasises the deliberate use of labour migration to create a bulging labour market and so to reduce the aggressiveness with which workers would combat their grievances. This led inevitably to a situation of intense competition for employment, and often for reasonable accommodation as well; and further, to strike-breaking and similar phenomena. The hostility which exists between black and white workers, and the lack of identification of interests between the workers in the metropolitan country and their colonised fellows overseas, were all to be explained by recourse to these factors. (16).

The implications of these considerations for the study of race relations are as follows. The only real differences between the life-situation of black and white proletarians is the existence of racist ideologies concerning the former. This does not mean that black workers' miseries may not in many instances be even greater than the miseries of white workers. But they are all in essentially
the same relationship to capital, and this necessarily overshadows everything else. Race relations are therefore epiphenomenal, however bitter current racial antagonisms may be; for in fighting each other for scarce resources (including status), black and white workers are leaving the owners of capital free to enjoy abundant resources. A particular instance of the equality of all workers before the law of capital is that the same mechanisms (of the labour-market) attract workers from the areas underdeveloped by capitalism - Pakistan, Ireland, southern Italy, the Caribbean - to areas of fast economic growth. Instances would be England in the late 1950's, West Germany in the fifties and sixties, and the United States from 1840 to 1920. The hard experiences of nearly all migrant workers are then explained primarily by reference to the capitalist labour-market.

A major exposition of the Marxist orientation is to be found in the work of O. C. Cox (19). He argues that "all racial antagonisms can be traced to the policies and attitudes of the leading capitalist people, the white people of Europe and America", and that "racial exploitation is merely one aspect of the proletarianisation of labour". He defines racial prejudice as "a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatising some group as inferior, so that the exploitation of the group itself or its resources or both may be justified" (20). Following on from this approach, Cox differentiates anti-Semitism from black-white hostility. The former, he argues, is a form of social intolerance that would be resolved by the cultural assimilation of Jews; the cultural assimilation of blacks would not be allowed to alter their exploited status. The main underlying reason preventing racial intermarriage, according to Cox, is that if it became widespread it would make it impossible to distinguish clearly whom to exploit. The future, he concludes, is for blacks and whites to form together into a "political class" which will spell the end of capitalist oppression.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Marxist approach to race relations? First, the strengths, which are particularly evident where the "immediate" focus is weak. The Marxist approach is able to point to European imperialist expansion as the major source of the juxtaposition of racial blocs in today's world. In other words, it offers an explanation for the emergence of racial stratification. It is able to show how racist beliefs and ideologies arose out of colonialist expansion; and of course in some Marxist analyses, an ideology once born has a life of its own and can certainly be adopted by people whose real interests it attacks. The historical source of these beliefs, together with the emphasis on objective competition in certain situations by blacks and whites against each other for scarce resources, means that hostility no longer has to be explained on the basis of some internal psychological disposition of uncertain non-psychological rationality. Race conflict is not necessarily unrealistic in certain circumstances, even though the Marxist would claim that it is ultimately unrealistic. The Marxist approach is not so hypnotised by the cue-factor in race relations that it fails to see the very real analogies that exist between the experiences of nearly all migrant workers entering an expanding economy at the bottom. And in Cox's analysis of anti-Semitism as a phenomenon which is not isomorphic with black-white relations, there lies the seed of differentiation between different patterns of racial stratification - though it must be said that his analysis of anti-Semitism and its potential for dissolution through cultural assimilation look very weak when applied to Nazi Germany.

The strengths then are the provision of a unifying theory, and a macro-theory at that, so avoiding the plethora of low-level factors (housing, education, etc.) which are the focus of so much writing about the subject. The weaknesses are partly the weaknesses of Marxism as such, and partly the particular failures of the Marxist approach to account satisfactorily for certain phenomena specific to race relations.
It is empirically doubtful for instance whether imperialist expansion is an inevitable feature of the development of mature monopoly capitalism (21). This is not to say that capital markets have not expanded into virtually every corner of the world - a denial would be absurd. But to assert that capitalism had to do this in order not to stagnate is a much larger claim.

Another inevitability, this time of capitalism engendering its own destruction as an economic system through forging unity and revolution among the oppressed, is also open to question (and not merely because it still remains in the future). It is not at all clear that the disappearance of capitalism would serve the objective interests of the labour "aristocracy" (which means quite a large section of the proletariat in affluent societies). What pauperisation means is not what this sector of the labour-force is experiencing; and this is not restricted to a narrowly economic definition of pauperisation. It is perfectly conceivable that this large section of the proletariat will continue to see its interests as coinciding with the persistence of capitalism; rather more so than that it should elect to throw in its lot with its weaker fellows. Many demands which in the past were considered irreconcilable with efficient capitalism (such as the demand for participation in factory or urban planning decisions) are gradually being conceded. The problem of prediction with relation to the greater diffusion of wealth and power is no greater than the problem of predicting the necessity of pauperisation. This may have implications even for the mass of people in the Third World, though their conditions are objectively incomparably worse, and their revolutionary inclination currently much more real.

The specific weaknesses of Marxism regarding race relations are their failure to avoid reductionism, and to explain the persistence of the phenomenon at all satisfactorily. The tenacity of "primordial" ties of nation, race, culture, religion, community is only disregarded by cramming it into an alien mould. Merely labelling it as a
disagreeable throwback to capitalist society when class identification should be all, is moralism not science, and does nothing to explain popular anti-Semitism in the USSR and Poland, or the attitude of European Russians to their Muslim minorities or to the Chinese (even before the Sino-Soviet split developed). Granted the USSR's claim to be an example of real Marxism in practice is disputed among Marxists, but even so, the persistence of non-class social divisions in present-day Russia where they are mostly officially disavowed, should guard against dismissing them as evanescent. Debray's contrast of the success of Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions which were able to harness nationalist feeling to socialist revolution, with the problems of Latin American peasant revolution, is an unusual recognition of this reality (22).

Really, it is the accuracy with which people's rational interests are analysed, and the prediction of their rational action in accordance with that definition of their interests, that is the weak point of Marxist analysis of race relations. It is an analysis which of course springs from the distinctively Marxist attribution of a unique and overriding role to capital in modern society. Given the space available here for argument, it seems that this attribution is misplaced (at least in this form).

(d) Structural approaches

The third type of explanation of race relations is non-Marxist, but institutional and cultural. There are four variants which will be reviewed here. The first is the "caste" approach, discussed amongst others by Myrdal. This discussion will concentrate on Myrdal's presentation of the argument for using 'caste' as a comparative and interpretive category for understanding race relations.

Myrdal says he prefers the term 'caste' for three reasons. 'Race' has spurious biological overtones; 'class' implies the possibility of individual mobility out of one stratum into another; and
'minority group' or 'minority status' obliterates the distinctions between recent white immigrants to the US and black Americans (for instance), in terms of their long-term disabilities in the social system. For Myrdal, the North American black-white relation is defined precisely by the impossibility of social mobility from either racial stratum into the other except by the process of "passing". No other attribute of intelligence, wealth, goodness, athletic prowess or even subservience (or any of these taken together) was able to overbalance the single defining attribute of being black. This means of course that the two strata are endogenous. Myrdal accepted that within each 'caste' there could be variation in status. The origins of this caste-system are identified by Myrdal as "tradition and, more specifically ....the traditions of slavery society" (23).

The basic focus of this application of the term 'caste' to blacks in the United States (especially the southern States) is then the virtual impossibility of social mobility. Its use has implications too for the practice of endogamy, and the low status of the blacks. It also carries overtones of the mutual repulsion of castes by the pollution-mechanisms. (And it probably also has an apologetic undertone: we are no better than the Hindus!)

There is however far more to the Hindu caste-system than this. First and foremost there is the relatively far higher consensus in the Hindu system, which is integrated with a belief-system more or less common to all castes (in the US the black church was the earliest and has been the longest focus of dissent). The absence of continuous overt conflict in the southern States and the evidence for inter-caste tensions in India should not be allowed to obscure this basic consensus in the latter society. Secondly, in the southern States there is nothing approaching the jajmani-system of hereditary division of labour, beyond the single division into masters and servants, rulers
and ruled. As Sinha points out, a Hindu villager in the southern States of the US would find that within his racial category "his social status is guided mainly by his personal attainments in wealth, occupation, education and the like, and not by the ascribed status of his extended kin or jati group. Racial stratification has no feel for such micro-stylisation" (24).

In other words, the comparative use of 'caste' tends to select certain variables within each social system for comparison, but does not compare both social systems as articulated wholes. To this extent the application of the term 'caste' outside India is likely to be confusing without careful prior definition of the precise areas of comparison. It would be fair to compare the difficulties of Harijans in India, Eta in Japan and blacks in white societies; but this does not demand the initial labelling of each stratum as a 'caste'.

The second variant on the non-Marxist structural approach is also well exemplified by Myrdal. It is what might be called the "abundant-multitude-of-low-level-factors" style of analysis. Myrdal quite specifically attacks the attempt to explain race relations by "one predominant factor, a 'basic factor'". It may well be that he was motivated to make this attack by the dangers of oversimplifying the needs of black Americans. What emerges from this however is a re-casting of monetary equilibrium theory; for he defines the black American's "plane of living" as consisting of "employment, wages, housing, nutrition, clothing, health, education, family stability, manners, cleanliness, orderliness, trustworthiness, law observance, loyalty to society and criminality". He then hypothesises that "on the whole, a rise in any single one of the Negro variables will tend to raise all the other Negro variables, and thus, indirectly as well as directly, result in a cumulatively enforced effect on white prejudice....the variables are assumed to be interlocked in such a causal mechanism that a change of any one causes the others to change in the same direction, with a secondary effect on the first variable, and so on....." (25)
Racial prejudice and the social position of black Americans are here conceived to be in balance, so that a change in the social status of blacks would entail a change in white prejudice, so much so that should the original term of the equation occur in the black stratum, the original white term might not. Lyrdal refines this model a little, acknowledging that prejudice does vary among whites, especially as related to the "class"-position of blacks; and also that the expectation of change in the black "plane of living" may well increase white hostility. He adds, in a rather delphic fashion, that the "actual pushes go in both directions, thus often turning the system round as it is rolling" (26).

Much of this discredits sociology and sociological analysis: the identification of manners, cleanliness and loyalty to society as important elements is the situation simply reflects conventional rationales for racist feelings, and time has disproved the contention that an advance in one of these factors in the "black plane of living" makes much impression if indeed any at all. But its essential inadequacy is its concentration on a plethora of mutually contributing low-level factors, without offering an explanation of how these things came to be. Admittedly, housing, education, employment, are three key mediating mechanisms in the persistence of black inequality; but they cannot be explained simply in terms of themselves. In fact, this approach of Lyrdal's is an example of much popular administrative thinking - but suffers from its deficiencies too.

A rather better version of a multi-factor structural approach is provided by Blalock (27). (This is the third variant under discussion.) Blalock is careful to state that he is only attempting to encourage more systematic sociological thinking in this field, and is not putting forward an integrated theory himself. He proceeds to discuss status, competition, power and the role of the numerical
proportion of a particular racial stratum, in determining patterns of race relations. Here at least are more general dimensions than Myrdal's approach offers. Competition, for instance, is extended by Blalock to examine frontier-contact situations, "middleman" minorities (such as the Chinese in South East Asia or the Indians in East Africa), the ambivalent attitude of American trade unions to black labour, and the "permissible" competition of blacks with whites in American sport.

The two considerable merits of Blalock's discussion are firstly that he begins to give appropriate weight to the various patterns of race relations (including some existing outside the US). Secondly, he stresses power as a crucial variable in the explanation of why various patterns of racial stratification persist. In doing so, he draws on Bierstedt's definition of power (28) as consisting of numbers, resources and mobilisation. The greater the power generated from these three factors by a racial stratum, the greater its chances of altering or maintaining the existing situation (depending on which stratum is able to generate more power). In fact, it is possible to take Blalock's analysis a little further still, and to see the competitive situations he analyses as essentially power-struggles except for sport where victory is only of marginal symbolic significance in most contexts. Competition is a power-struggle for access to scarce and valued resources, including power itself. What is missing from Blalock's analysis is any explanation of how racial stratification emerges.

The final variant to be reviewed among non-Marxist structural approaches to race is the theory (or theories) of pluralism. A hitherto rather unsatisfactory debate around pluralism as applied to race was stimulated by a more solid contribution in the form of essays edited by L. Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism in Africa (29). Discussion of pluralism as a tool in the explanation of race relations will be limited to that particular contribution. The authors of the various essays in it are very far from presenting a unified theoretical orientation to pluralism: the nearest they get to agreement is
acceptance that "non-class" social divisions are an important focus for social theory and research. Davidson, in an essay on Zambia before independence, argues that whites and blacks there were only members of one society because the whites had a monopoly on the means of violence; Gluckman, in an essay on the Republic of South Africa, argues that blacks in that society have over a period defined their situation as one in which various valued objects (education, medicine, internal peace) have been the products of contact with whites, and that this has bred an equilibrium and consensus for a time.

However, the most organised discussion of pluralism is to be found in M. G. Smith's paper at the end of the volume. There he distinguishes between three kinds of pluralism: cultural, social and structural. Cultural pluralism would define the situation of the Jews in New York, who share equally in the city's public life but who maintain certain distinct ethnic/religious practices in the private sphere of social existence. Cultural pluralism by itself neither implies necessarily inequality of status nor incorporation into the society. Social and structural pluralism are essentially less and more rigid forms of what Smith calls "differential incorporation". By this term he denotes unequal access to resources and status. Instances he quotes of structural pluralism are English society before the extension of the franchise, or various African pre-colonial societies (e.g. Ruanda-Burundi), or racially stratified societies such as the old southern States, the Republic of South Africa, and so on. Social pluralism in this sense refers to the northern states of the US, modern England, Brazil, where differential incorporation is not maintained by official legal and institutional structures.

The merits and demerits of this approach are to a certain extent the merits and demerits of all typologies. Every typology has a certain degree of explanatory power, for if Society A belongs to Category 1, there are certain predictions that can be made about its
forms of social organisation. On the other hand, typologies only really present the groundwork for further sociological analysis and explanation. Smith's approach is useful insofar as it encourages a comparative framework for the analysis of any mechanisms of differential incorporation. Power, the methods of social mobility, marriage-rules, are among the means of perpetuating the status quo characteristic of all socially or structurally plural societies. Racial cues are only one kind of cue in this respect. On the other hand Smith's approach does offer the possibility of avoiding the reduction of racial stratification to a subtype of class-exploitation, or any other obliteration of those aspects of being black that are qualitatively different from other forms of stratification.

What then do all the approaches to race relations contribute to understanding the emergence, variety and persistence of patterns of racial stratification? First, the emergence of racial stratification. Here the Marxist approach is at its strongest, in its identification of capitalist imperial expansion as the connecting thread in the juxtaposition of racial groups almost everywhere (and even of groups not normally considered racial, such as the Ibo minority in northern Nigeria). The Marxist approach also offers a convincing explanation of the origins of racist ideology in that expansion: a more satisfying explanation than the psychological focus on internal mechanisms of individual prejudice offers on its own. All the other approaches to race relations more or less disregard the emergence of patterns of racial stratification, and simply treat it as a "given". This is a facet of the academic division of sociology and psychology from history which seriously obscures real understanding of the phenomenon of race relations.

Variation in patterns of race relations is barely touched on by any of the theories discussed; indeed some of them, like the 'caste' approach, quite explicitly only discuss one pattern, that of the southern United States. Shibutani and Kwan discuss the variations, but without producing any general explanations of them. Perhaps a
combination of Blalock's types of power- and competition- and minority percentage-variables with Smith's introductory typology of pluralism offers the best prospect so far for the development of explanation of the various patterns that do exist. A real synthesis of them still remains to be worked out; but whatever its result it will still have to mesh closely with the explanation of how patterns of racial stratification persist, which is the third question to be answered.

It is a question which can equally well be reversed, for no explanation of persistence which does not account for the persistence of all the patterns of racial stratification can be held to be a very satisfactory explanation. It is in the explanation of persistence that the Marxist approach is at its weakest - the only contribution it makes is the existence of realistic competition between black and white workers for scarce resources. This is not a negligible contribution, either in itself, or its encouragement to social science to look for the realistic factors in racial conflict. But it is by itself an insufficient explanation; and its ultimate theory of development of social stratification rests on strongly disputed analytical foundations.

Any full explanation of the persistence of patterns of race relations must take account of at least four other basic insights in social science beside the Marxist-competitive analysis. Lyrdal's multi-factor approach is important in terms of understanding the numerous micro-structural mechanisms which maintain the relative position of racial strata to each other. The social-psychological perspective - which has been labelled "immediate" - is necessary in order to understand how racist ideology is transmitted, as well as the personal needs it serves for many individuals. The acquisition of countless racist responses for countless situations is precisely the area that social psychology is best fitted to explain.

The other two basic insights are as follows. Blalock's insistence on power as a crucial variable in the persistence of any particular pattern of race relations is in this writer's view
fundamental, particularly in the sense of the absence of power in an oppressed racial stratum as leaving the way clear for the continuance of its oppression. But it is also valuable for the analysis of Malay-Chinese relations in Malaysia and Indonesia, where what has been at stake for decades is a struggle for power between one stratum with economic resources and another with political resources (30).

The final insight amounts to a revaluation of the importance of the cue as enabling mechanisms in racial stratification. What marks out racial stratification from other forms is partly the experience of continuous definition in all forms of social interaction and human existence as the member of a stigmatised or honorific group. From one angle this consideration is subjective; yet the writer would argue that such a total subjective experience shared by a collectivity must have some impact (in most cases a considerable impact) on reactions, responses, social action, social organisation, and definitions of the situation. It is a question of being unable to escape not merely from inequality or oppression (though these are obviously fundamental to the situation), but from an attribute which acts as a master-programmer overriding all other programmes of human interaction which would normally operate (31). The salience and persistence of racial cues also enable "institutional" patterns of race relations (such as racial discrimination) to persist tenaciously.

Before concluding this section, it is as well to clarify the negative implications of the theoretical position taken up here for certain popular explanations of race relations. Explanations of race relations in terms of "the archetypal stranger" (32) or in terms of culture conflict or in terms of a strongly prejudiced minority of a population or in terms of the internal psychological functions of prejudice, are all entirely inadequate and even very misleading, especially if presented by themselves. There are no doubt elements of sociological truth in all of them; but they are traces rather than anything more.
2.11 The theoretical analysis of industrial relations

Answering the question "What are industrial relations?" is on the face of it much more straightforward than attempting to define race relations. "Relations between employers and employed, those who give orders and those who carry out orders concerned with work", is simple enough. And on one level, the explanation of the existence of industrial relations is simple too: the process of division of labour, greatly accelerated by industrialisation, has made most work industrial, in the technological and/or bureaucratic sense.

Assessment of the significance of industrial relations is much more complex a matter than accounting for its emergence or persistence. Popularly it is equated almost entirely with strikes and wage-negotiation of one kind or another; and certainly in the media this is what the term comes to mean. However, it does not require empirical research to establish that overt conflict is only one small part of the continuing process of industrial relations. The basic question to date in sociology has been how far, and in what sense, this relatively small amount of overt conflict represented and expressed the entire process.

(a) Marxist approaches

The answer to this question that inevitably dominates any debate on it, is the Marxist one - partly because of its existence as a widespread belief system, partly because of the considerable weight of Marxist literature, partly because out of all the 19th century sociologies that raised the issue it did so in the sharpest form. Therefore it is as well to begin by assessing it.

Industrial relations are particularly significant for Marxist social analysis, not because they are industrial nearly so much as because they presuppose an advanced form of capitalism. What the economic system of capitalism does to the work-process is to separate its final product or result from the control and often use
of its producer, the worker (unlike historically earlier forms of work). Characteristically, the worker in a capitalist economy does not own his tools or machinery or his products. Divorced from them, the only thing he owns is his capacity to work; and this he sells to an owner of capital in order to buy necessary products for his livelihood (which may quite conceivably include the product of his own labour). The only sector of society which is not alienated in this way from the process of production is the capitalist class, which owns the technology, the workers' labour-power, and the finished product.

The result is that for the worker the entire work-process becomes a purely instrumental activity in order to stay alive. There is nothing in the work process which confers any dignity or interest or pleasure. These are things which the worker must seek in his non-work time. Further, the enormous expansion of the division of labour in the development of industrial capitalism means the increasing reduction of men to more and more specialised occupations utilising an ever-decreasing fraction of their innate capacities.

Trade union activity is able to ameliorate some of the worst surface features of this process, particularly such things as very low wages, very long hours, very bad working conditions. But since this alienation is a necessary outgrowth of capitalism, trade unionism cannot remove it without removing its root cause.

Work relations in Marxist sociology are thus fundamental in the actual operation of capitalist society. The implication must be that tension in these relations is perpetually latent, and that industrial disputes are merely manifest symptoms of this tension (however little they may contribute to removing it for once and all) (33).

As in the Marxist analysis of race relations, so here the connecting thread is the nature of capitalism. It is not necessary however to attribute universally benign features to capitalist economic processes in order to deny that as an economic system it has a single
uniform and all-pervading logic, as a kind of maleficent demigurge. Further, the analysis of the nature of work in capitalist society, although very suggestive in many respects, contains assumptions about man's true nature as producer which are at once impossible to verify and also are not possessed of completely compelling logic. They moreover imply an attitude to the division of labour which if taken in a fundamentalist sense would make the operation of any modern industrial society completely impossible.

The literature on industrial relations contains only one systematic attempt to subject the Marxist schema on industrial relations to empirical test, in Banks' work on the British steel industry (34). The endeavour is very interesting, although it ultimately founders. Banks selected the British steel industry as a critical case study of the Marxist thesis that the more advanced the technology and the more spatially concentrated the labour-force in production, the greater the class consciousness of the proletariat. From the historical evidence of this particular British industrial sector, he is able to conclude that a very major question-mark is to be placed against this Marxist hypothesis.

An important problem in Banks' discussion is, however, that he does not succeed in keeping certain concepts constant. One illustration is the way he specifies "the conversion of capitalist enterprise into state, municipal or co-operative enterprise" as the essence of trade unionist or revolutionary aims, and nationalisation as "the end of capitalist ownership" (pp. 55, 105), at certain points in his argument; yet elsewhere he accepts the view that nationalisation is simply a State form of capitalism (pp. 148-9). This has significant implications for his assessment of the degree to which the steel-workers have attained proletarian objectives: both definitions cannot be true simultaneously.

Another problem is the way he accepts the particularly leninist distinction between trade union class consciousness and political class consciousness, without reference to the latter's
necessary concomitant in that strain of Marxist thought, the revolutionary political party.

Yet another difficulty in his mode of procedure is his tendency to treat British steel workers as though historically they had existed in a social vacuum filled only by advanced technology and the experience of working in large factories. The origin of this assumption may very well lie in the highly unschematic nature of Marx's writings, which do not usually assemble testable propositions in a single coherent order. Banks himself notes this problem in principle when he tries to assess Marx's analysis of trade unions (p. 77). But it is very hard to suppose Marx or any other thinking person would seriously argue a case on the presumption of this social vacuum. Banks' work effectively come to grief on his failure to analyse sufficiently the sources of consciousness, whether of class or of other social phenomena. A rigorous empirical testing of Marx's work in relation to industrial relations would have to try to assemble a series of propositions on that score from his writings - an instance might be the role of political parties, as discussed in his 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. However, that work remains to be done.

(b) Structural approaches

Non-Marxist macro-structural approaches to industrial relations, which will now be reviewed, all owe something to Marx, which underlines the value of placing his analysis first. Three such approaches will be briefly assessed.

The first is what might be called the subjective use of "alienation". For Marx himself, the term was concrete and precise, and denoted an actual separation and divorce between the worker and his product. He strenuously attacked those who reduced the concept to refer to a generalised Weltanschauung. Nevertheless, it has been used rather in that way by some sociologists, sometimes with particular reference to the boring and unsatisfying nature of work in modern industrial society. The archetypal alienated worker is the one who
gloomily screws a tiny part into a machine moving along an assembly-line. (For some writers, this appears to be the only industrial process which exists!) The relatively high propensity to strike among car-workers the world over is sometimes explained by reference to this element of their work-process.

The best example of this approach is the work of Robert Blauner (35), who avoids several of the pitfalls that other writers on alienation have fallen into. He argues that there are four elements in the work-process which will affect the extent of subjective alienation. One is the prestige of the work, a second is the amount of control over the work-process, a third is the extent to which work is performed by closely integrated teams, and the fourth is the presence or absence of an occupational community within which people spend their non-work time. In studying various types of industrial production which exemplified these four features in varying ways, Blauner came to the conclusion that the more a particular work-process was marked by the absence of these four elements the less satisfying it was. The implication for the study of industrial relations is that various forms of industrial conflict may especially originate in particular kinds of work; and conversely that the absence or low incidence of industrial conflict in certain industries may be primarily attributable to the way work is structured within them.

In its absolute form this hypothesis must be modified to take account of other studies of various forms of industrial production that have not confirmed Blauner's predictions to the letter. There is in fact no perfect or necessary relation between Blauner's variables and job-satisfaction and industrial conflict (36). On the other hand, it seems altogether reasonable to assert that job-satisfaction or -dissatisfaction may be a contributory underlying cause of industrial peace or industrial conflict. It is the relation between job-satisfaction and the absence of industrial conflict which seems much weaker than its opposite.

A second macro-structural perspective on industrial relations is offered by Dahrendorf (37). His approach is also a variation on Marx, but this time demythologised. Conflict between those in positions
of authority and those in subordinate positions is, he argues, an inevitable feature of modern societies in all institutional spheres. It is not a polarisation induced by the development of capitalism, but simply a continuing friction of interests. Since there is no prospect of this friction being removed by the development of new forms of social organisation, it is quite simply a permanent feature of all societies. Similarly, Aron (38) points to conflict between management and workers in the Soviet Union as evidence for the perpetual likelihood of such conflict in any social system, even in a non-capitalist one.

Fox (39) has argued in a similar but more differentiated fashion that there are three forms of relationship in work: acceptance of managerial authority, rejection of that authority, and a "pluralistic" negotiating stance between authority and workers. In his analysis, these positions are in turn strongly influenced by the cumulative impact of labour movement development on social and political institutions, and vice versa. His "pluralistic" alternative clearly resembles Dahrendorf's position.

The third macro-structural approach to industrial relations is to be found in the recent work of Goldthorpe and his associates on affluence and the British class structure (40). The main contribution of this research to the sociology of industrial relations lies in its emphasis on what workers bring to the workplace in terms of attitudes to work, as a crucial determinant of their behaviour while at work. Goldthorpe's particular area of interest lay in the role of factors outside the work-experience itself in influencing work-behaviour. Characteristically the affluent workers of Goldthorpe's survey adopted a strongly instrumental attitude to work because of their desire for a higher standard of domestic consumption. Work that was less attractive than many of his respondents had previously known was nevertheless sought because of its high financial rewards. It is instructive to contrast the work-orientation of the traditional white-collar worker, who in most cases was prepared to accept low financial rewards for higher status and security (41).
Goldthorpe has also suggested elsewhere (42) that the existence of a clearly unequal distribution of wealth in British society (or in any society), combined with the absence of a consensually based method of its distribution, may be the most important factor in the explanation of industrial disputes (especially pay-disputes). There is a vacuum where values might exist that would restrain wage-demands and industrial action to support them. This argument concentrates on the disputes in industrial relations, which as noted may or may not be symptoms of continuing latent conflict in those relations.

In answer then to the question "What is the social import of industrial relations?" there are these three non-Marxist macrostructural approaches. One defines them in terms of the nature of work; another in terms of authority relations; and the last in terms of their own connections with the world outside work, and the influence of that world upon them. Only in the second of these three approaches is conflict considered to be built into the situation.

(c) Micro-structural approaches

There are also a number of micro-structural approaches. Here the focus is largely policy-oriented, and so dispute-oriented. The kinds of area chosen for examination include the structure of the particular union(s) involved in a dispute, the differing propensities to strike in various industries, the particular bargaining procedures in operation, the reasons for unofficial strikes, demarcation-disputes, the history of labour relations in particular plants, and factors of a similar order. Such an approach would often take account too the standard focuses of organisational sociology: communications, decision-making, authority-patterns, career-patterns, are all instances (43).

The various perspectives on industrial relations that have been reviewed rather more clearly need each other than do the various perspectives on race relations. Even the Marxist approach, which it
is here argued makes unnecessary philosophical assumptions, turns up again in partial and bastardised form in the macro-structural approaches of Blauner and Dahrendorf. The deficiency in all these approaches is that they tend to concentrate on what appears to be the problematic aspect of industrial relations, industrial tension, and often deduce it from other aspects of the work-situation. This is very far from being illegitimate, and is on the contrary quite essential. But there is always the tendency, inherited perhaps from the Marxist perspective, to assume all industrial relations are at least potentially stressful; that they are conflict relations.

The central question to be answered before proceeding any further is therefore how far this may be held to be true. Very often a model of the following kind is proposed, which implies that it is true: "Employees want more money, employers need as large profit-margins as possible (for reinvestment, shareholders, personal consumption)." Once again, a demythologised version of the Marxist perspective; but a very incomplete definition of the situation even in purely economic terms. After all, profit-margins may be large enough to meet all actual demands without difficulty; far from all work-situations (e.g. governmental bureaucracies) are structured in terms of profit-maximisation; and wage-demands may even act as a spur to rationalisation or investment in more productive technology, or both. Without an initial assumption about conflict (on the part of sociologist, workers or management) there is every reason to believe that such conflict is less significant than the underlying consensus about the desirability (1) of the enterprise's survival as a source of employment and even (2) of the continuance of "professional management" (as a legitimate form of occupational specialisation which is beyond the worker's horizon and competence, even though certain decisions relating to the workforce may be questioned or opposed). It is quite credible that such a consensus could sustain a relatively high level of conflict with actual management policies. The rarity of "political" definitions of the situation by most
workers in Britain or most other advanced capitalist countries is well known; yet their virtual absence indicates that most people will stop well short of pushing an enterprise out of existence in order to realise their demands. Quite simply, they are only too aware that for their demands to be met, it must continue in existence.

It is therefore argued here that the central dimension of industrial relations is the secure provision of wants that work supplies. Production is directly related to the need for security that consumption-demands will be met. To this extent, work in pre-modern and modern societies is very much the same phenomenon. The nature of this security rests primarily on the assurance of continued provision of material needs for self and dependants. Hence the almost universal disturbances at the onset of capitalism in a society, when it was usually precisely that security which was dissolved (44).

Beside this central dimension of work, the form of organisation of work (peasant small-holdings, giant factories), the nature of authority relations (in general or in particular), the inherent (dis)satisfactions of certain kinds of work, are lesser though still important variables. Even strong religious or political legitimation for particular kinds of work serves as an extra reward for work rather than as its central interest. The appeal of Marxism to particular groups of workers within capitalist societies may lie largely in its analysis of capitalist society as unable to guarantee precisely this security and as tending normally to guarantee the opposite.

Industrial relations are therefore to be understood first and foremost in the light of their relation to this essential security that work gives. As already noted, job-satisfaction, the experience of authority, and other factors mentioned earlier, are all also relevant. But only the overriding interest in security explains why people will continue in unsatisfying work, or indeed like Goldthorpe's affluent workers will seek it out in preference to more satisfying
work to meet securely their particular wants - for the definition of wants naturally varies. This also explains the perpetual spiral of wage-demands, especially in response to price-inflation. Workers rarely demand therefore a larger slice of the cake in real terms; and statistics of income-distribution over the years in the UK and the US for instance show that they do not get it either (45). And, as already argued, in nearly all cases this overriding concern for security will not allow the escalation of industrial conflict past the point where the employing agent ceases to be able to employ. Only where the situation is defined as intrinsically insecure (as in Marxism), or in the very isolated cases where insufficient information leads employees' representatives to force unawares an impossible pay-demand, does industrial conflict pass this point. Whatever the dissatisfactions of job or authority, however dispute-prone the industry or plant, this concern for the secure provision of wants dominates, modifying the extent to which discontent on all these scores is translated into action. It is probably the case that even the awareness of discontent itself is often much less than it could be, because of the need to accommodate oneself in practice to the shadow-side of an activity which securely supplies wants.

This is not an absolute assertion, for obviously if this shadow-side means a less secure provision of wants overall than is obtainable from another known/acceptable/accessible employing agent then people will change employment. There are numerous qualifying factors of this kind which need not detain us here, such as the near-certainty that workers will enjoy less than perfect knowledge of available pay and conditions elsewhere, may mistakenly change their job with a view to improving their situation, may be inhibited from improving their situation by affective ties in a particular neighbourhood, and so on.

What is essentially at issue for present purposes is the assertion that industrial relations are conflict relations; that conflict is the unifying thread running through all industrial
relations whether or not it becomes manifest. Against this it is argued here that although conflict is built into many industrial relations situations it is not the unifying thread running through them. It is very much a variable; whereas the desire for the secure provision of wants is the central attribute of all work. It is therefore argued that apart from certain specified situations the consensual basis of industrial relations is more powerful than conflict-issues which may arise in them. This is not to say that the conflict is unrealistic; only that it has bounds defined by the underlying consensus.

While it is true therefore that industrial conflict can be explained largely by one (or a combination) of the macro- and micro-structural approaches outlined above, it will only be properly explained with reference to this consensus. Anticipating a little, it may be said that the almost exclusive focus on the conflictual aspect of industrial relations in the main English news media echoes this very partial treatment of the subject by most sociology (46). In some ways the replacement of the term 'industrial relations' by the term 'work relations', although seemingly rather trivial, has something to commend it. 'Industrial relations' almost inevitably evokes conflict and problems and factories. 'Work relations' draws no hard-and-fast distinction between pre-industrial, technological and bureaucratic work, and suggests neither conflict nor consensus. It also leaves it open whether it is the nature of the work or the nature of authority which is the focus of attention; it does not exclude lateral work relationships as a focus of interest; and it has no particular overtones that would imply work relations exist in a vacuum.
Comparisons and contrasts between the social impacts of both sets of relationships

In this research the treatment of race relations and work relations by the main English news media is compared and contrasted. It is as well therefore to establish the sociological continuities and discontinuities between these two areas of social life to start with. There is a point of course at which they overlap, in that racially heterogeneous societies involve different racial strata in work relations of one kind and another, and that the position of black migrant workers in the labour market is a very depressed one. It is argued here that race relations and work relations do for most purposes nevertheless constitute two separate dimensions of social existence. People of different races relate to each other in almost every sphere of life (housing, education, the legal system, sport, politics, employment), whereas work relations although not insulated from non-work relations nevertheless are more partial and limited.

This begs the Marxist question about the unity of employers, owners of land and property, and the authority of the state. From this perspective, the workers at work are only facing one manifestation of an exploiting hydra, albeit the most definitive in their alienation. Work relations also largely define the forms of social life outside the workplace, not only in the restricted sense of constraining leisure- and consumer-choices, but in the much wider sense of preventing workers from realising their full humanity.

Without accepting the (to the writer) dubious philosophical- anthropological assumptions in this perspective, it is still valuable to have a corrective to the over-isolation of work relations from the rest of social life implicit in much industrial sociology, which tends to treat the workplace as a closed system (47). Clearly, particular kinds of work offer particular economic and status rewards which are very important in non-work spheres of life. Workers may also in certain cases share in occupational subcultures of a kind that flow out into their non-work social relations (48).
Race however impacts at every turn. At work and in leisure, in the search for accommodation, in the experience of the legal system and the educational system, blackness travels with you. It does so in a way which overrides other forms of social inequality, so that the higher the job-qualifications the harder it is to get a suitable job (49); so that any black person is as likely to encounter random racial hostility in the streets as any other. As argued earlier, it is this virtual impossibility of escape from the situation which distinguishes the experience of blackness in a white-dominated society and its concrete manifestations in housing, employment and so on, from the experience of work and its ramifications. As noted particularly in the discussion of the Marxist perspective on race relations earlier on, checking off the isomorphisms that do exist between workers of all racial strata by no means exhausts the full reality of racial stratification.

Perhaps the most important discontinuity lies in the characteristic European ideology of racism (50). This has several forms, but its essence is to deny real humanity to black (or brown or yellow) people. It is of course not primarily a coherently organised set of propositions (although Gobineau and others have endeavoured to present it in a systematic form), but a social definition of reality informing everyday decisions and attitudes of people in all kinds of roles and in all kinds of situations. It is, certainly, not absolutely discontinuous with ideologies concerning the poor - in the UK for instance, the black stratum may well suffer from being defined as both black and poor. Once again, though, non-blacks however poor characteristically share this ideology about blacks (with perhaps the exception of some social marginals at the bottom end of society). The choice between wealthy whites and black poor as reference groups for the white poor is classically resolved in favour of race rather than poverty. This has already been noted in the discussion earlier of the relation of white workers in metropolitan society with colonised blacks - a disjunction seen at its very sharpest always among working class white settlers in a colonised territory.
This ideology and its manifestations in racialist social action are then far more pervasive than any elitist ideology concerning the working class or the poor. The discontinuity may well have been less in an earlier epoch such as late eighteenth century England, and no doubt in late twentieth century England there remain considerable areas of ambiguity concerning the extent to which the white working class actually is an equal segment of British society. Common attitudes to industrial conflict and working class affluence reflect a major area of such ambiguity. But by contrast with the black segment of British society, the white working class segment is very securely ensconced within the pale of equals as defined by the dominant ideology. Outside for many purposes are non-whites, whether nationally or internationally.

The international dimension of racist ideology is especially important, because what any person of a particular race does anywhere in the world tends to be fitted in to a particular stereotype of how people of that race behave. This is not true of the actions of a worker anywhere in the world. The political and economic difficulties of newly independent black states are a very important case in point, where in England and elsewhere these problems are popularly attributed to racial inadequacies rather than structural causes. The political and economic stability of the Republic of South Africa is held to be significant for the same "reason".

There are one or two important implications which still need to be drawn out from this disjunction between work relations and race relations. In this discussion these will be related specifically to British society, though no doubt there are parallels elsewhere. In work relations, power tends to be the formal and fairly well defined property of certain individuals in managerial roles who are fairly few in number. The workers also have considerable informal power, but it is power which takes its origin from their numbers and not from property ownership, or legal entitlements (apart from a few on safety, etc.). Most significantly, it is a power which is confined to setting limits and establishing vetoes rather than a power to initiate.
By contrast, in British race relations the asymmetry of power is infinitely greater. There power is informally diffused throughout the dominant white majority to act against the interests of the black minority when it so chooses. Discrimination against blacks in their search for housing, employment, promotion, and other valued objects, involves whites in what amounts to the policing of their own superior social position. Discrimination in these crucial areas is therefore an act of power by the powerful white majority.

Related to this disjunction is the differential "organisation" of industrial relations and race relations in the UK. Workers and employers are both organised to a fairly large extent, especially if staff associations are taken into account along with trade unions. There are also the TUC and CBI which act as umbrella organisations to represent at least some of their members' overall concerns. Political parties at national and local level represent certain interests of employers and workers, though there is considerable dispute as to the actual details at this point. Conversely, the black minority is poorly organised for a number of reasons, and is "spoken for" by upper-middle class whites in leading roles in certain official and Governmental bodies (Race Relations Board, the Community Relations Commission).

The gap between spokesmen and those spoken for is consequently far wider than it is even in industrial relations, where union leaders are often found to be out of touch with their rank and file. Even so, it is only with the protracted strike which is refused union recognition that the two situations begin to resemble each other in this respect. "Unofficial" strikers in a lengthy dispute often find their lack of status as a tiny minority, which is implied by their lack of official representation, together with the absence of formal organisation or resources for strike-pay, combine to form a considerable handicap in coping with their problems. At this point the power-situations in both cases do converge. Nevertheless the work relations power-situation is temporary, whereas the race relations power-situation continues.
Another disjunction between work relations and race relations is that in the case of the former, public concern is related to the prevalence of disputes and large-scale pay-awards. In the case of the latter, the concern of many whites is over the actual presence of black minorities in Britain. In other words, conflict arises over actions in the case of work relations, and over people in the case of race relations. The contrast is not absolute: objections by whites to blacks are sometimes restricted to particular actions by individual blacks, though this is relatively rare; and in industrial conflict the focus of attack is quite often on certain persons (Communists, Trotskyites) who are defined as omnipresent fomenters of disturbances, rather than seeing the origins of the conflict as ordinary people acting to redress a specific and limited grievance on this more or less isolated occasion.

In general however it is the physical presence of black people that is blamed by many whites for certain grievances rather than any particular action or set of actions on their part. Similarly, although there is still a much stronger tendency among the black minority than among the white majority to assess people of the other racial stratum on their individual actions, such a tendency seems to be currently sharply on the decline. More and more it is the white majority as such, with a few exceptions who must prove their integrity, who are defined as the source of grievances. Conversely strikers - at least when they are white - are thought of as erring members of the same society rather than as a continuous threat. The emphasis of the distinction is once again on the total nature of race relations as against the partial nature of work relations. As already noted, this is the case whether structural realities are at issue, or phenomenological realities. It is the task of the next chapter to analyse both sets of realities in contemporary Britain.


14. See ch. 1, n. 43.


19. See n. 1 above.


27. See n. 3 above.


(30) For recent discussions of the best framework for race relations analysis that share much with this one, see J. Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1970), and R. Schornerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations (Random House 1970).


(32) M. Banton, White and Coloured (Cape 1959); S. Patterson, Dark Strangers (Penguin 1962); and T. B. Rees, in Race XI.4 (April 1970) pp. 481-90.


(34) J. A. Banks, Marxist Sociology in Action (Faber 1970).


(40) J. H. Goldthorpe (et al), op. cit.; also, their The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (C.U.P., 1969).

(41) D. Lockwood, The Black-coated Worker (Allen & Unwin 1958)


(46) This observation is in no way intended to bolster up the unitary ideology of management described by A. Fox: *Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations* (Donovan research paper no. 3, HMSO 1966). It in no way disperses the real areas of conflict in industrial organisations to recognise that there is a certain consensus which runs deeper still. E. de Kadt has noted that it was quite possible for a peasant to experience genuine loyalty to his feudal lord, yet still to act in ways inimical to his interest ("Conflict and Power in Society", *International Social Science Journal* 17.3 (1965), p. 468. There are many such combinations of conflict and consensus outside the sterile polemics of conflict-theory as against functionalist theory.


(48) E.g. E. C. Hughes, *Men And Their Work* (Free Press 1958)


(50) See n. 6 above; and also H. Schuman, "Americans and Race: free will or determinism", *New Society* 401 (4,6,70), pp. 959-61.
Chapter Three: Racial and industrial conflict in contemporary Britain: perceptions and realities

In order to analyse phenomenological and structural features of race and industrial relations in present-day Britain, the discussion will be divided into three sections, the white majority perception of blacks, the standard perception of work relations, and the extent to which conflicts in these areas actually do threaten the current patterns of the British social order. Relatively little attention will be paid to perceptions of whites by blacks, since the research literature on this subject is negligible; the fact remains that this question is of paramount importance even though this study is forced to neglect it.
3.1 Contemporary perceptions of blacks by whites in Britain

As regards race relations in British society and its culture, there are three main sources of information. The first source is the numerous evidences of Britain's racist culture derived from the experience of Empire (1). As a general factor, this has been noted in chapter 2. It is important to recall that the racist perspectives originating in Britain's imperial past do not have to manifest themselves in precise views concerning biological inferiority (2), or even in expressions of regret at the loss of the Empire, but can persist in myriad forms in everyday assumptions and social intercourse. There is no necessity for a person to possess a fully articulated ideology about the inferiority of blacks in order to treat blacks as worthy of less respect and attention, or of more resentment and hostility, than whites.

The mechanisms of transmission of these imperial perspectives are chiefly primary socialisation, together with children's reading matter which presents blacks as insignificant, uninventive, primitive or comic (3). These mechanisms operate in conjunction with two continuing external stimuli. One is the links, past and present, of many British parents with the former colonial territories. This may be through military service overseas, or through friends and relatives still living in Africa, the Caribbean or Asia. But undoubtedly the most important stimulus since 1950 has been the introduction to the lowest end of the labour market of a minority of people of Caribbean, Asian and African descent who have consequently almost all occupied a place at the bottom of Britain's stratification hierarchy. Personal experience of blacks as normally in socially inferior positions and occupations is probably (given standard understandings of the reasons for this pattern) the most powerful socialising force of all. The structural and the cultural position of blacks in white society reinforce each other to reproduce racist definitions.
The second source of information about the core British perspective on race, or the main perspectives, are the various attitude-surveys of racial prejudice that have been undertaken (4). There has already been occasion to comment cautiously on the nature of attitude-surveys (5); and certainly it is difficult to know precisely what a survey of racial prejudice really reveals, given the situational and other constraints on social action that exist. It might perhaps be taken as an index of the strength of appeal at any one time of Britain's racist cultural perspective at the expense of other cultural perspectives on the nature of justice, human dignity, and so on.

The problem of assessing the value of these surveys is unfortunately compounded by the poor design and/or slender sampling frame of the great majority of them. In number they have mostly been of the opinion-poll kind, which is really not geared to explore any of the complexities associated with race relations, quite apart from their normal use of quota-sampling methods. One of the few that have been based on a reasonably long questionnaire and random sampling was the attitude-survey in Colour and Citizenship. Regrettably, its method of scoring replies almost certainly gave a totally confused picture of the "extent"/"depth" of racial hostility among whites - it claimed that "only" 10% of the British population could be labelled extremely prejudiced, for instance, though this is entirely based on the method of scoring (6).

An exception to this rule whose results have been made available only very recently is the survey by Hartmann and Husband of racial prejudice among teenagers and their parents in three kinds of area in Britain. The areas were those of high black concentration, low black concentration and no black concentration; and the teenagers were further divided into those at schools with a large proportion of black pupils and with a low proportion of black pupils (in the first two sets of areas). They discovered a strong positive correlation between black concentration in areas and the existence of white
hostility in Britain, which they explain by reference to the response of traditional racist hostility to the presence of black people, and also to disdain for the subordinate roles performed by the majority of black workers. Their results, at least in this respect, confirm the analysis of this study.

"Harder" than these attitudinal studies is the third source of information, which relates to actual behaviour by whites toward blacks. Here a famous study by Political and Economic Planning (7) is of value, for it indicates to a considerable degree the incidence of actual racial discrimination in Britain; in other words, the extent to which white members of the society were prepared to translate their racism into action. There was little investigation of why they should do so, which lay outside the terms of the investigation; although the finding that people tended to attribute their own acts of discrimination to the hostility of others around them may be a further pointer to the widespread grip of racist feeling and ideology in British society. But the frequency of discrimination in employment, housing, credit services and insurance was index enough of the normality of racist behaviour in key areas of social life.

In some ways the most significant index of all of the persistence of England's racist culture may be governmental policies on black immigration from the Commonwealth pursued from the early 1960's, together with their grateful acceptance by the mass of whites. The restriction of Commonwealth immigration in 1962 and numerically much more sharply in 1965, in the absence of similar controls over Irish and European immigrants, was the expression in law of the view that black migrants were less desirable (for whatever reason) than white migrants. The extension of immigration curbs in one parliamentary week in March 1968 to East African Asians of British citizenship represented an extraordinary and dramatic further concession in this direction. The events surrounding the expulsion of Asians with British citizenship from Uganda in 1972-73, were a further index of the mutually contributing and accumulating
definitions of black people by Government and white population.

The justification for these policies in almost every case was the conviction that racial hostility in Britain had reached a point where conflict between racial groups shortly would become overt and violent, whites being seen normally as the initiators of such violence. The legislation may be taken therefore as both an index of racial hostility, and as its encouragement by appeasement. Each appeasement in turn proved insufficient, especially given the attack against black immigration spearheaded by the MP Enoch Powell and a number of very active parliamentary supporters. Each "defusing" of the issue apparently lighted yet more fuses (8).

While all this evidence is tribute to the tenacity of racist ideology in British culture, it needs also to be understood in structural terms. The socialising impact of the structural position of blacks in Britain's stratification has already been referred to above; but the hostility of whites needs to be explained also by reference to their perception of blacks as having created a competitive situation for valued resources through their migration here, as in certain ways lowering the attractiveness of British society, and as being the potential for interminable and destructive conflict on the pattern of the US in the 1960's and since. The distinction between cultural and structural factors is naturally largely analytical; on the other hand, it is important not to fall into the trap of viewing white hostility as unrelated to "rational" factors. Rather, it is related to factors of limited rationality, or perhaps to a particular order of "rationality" in which an alien stratum is seen as the origin of actual and imagined ills, often enlarged by rumour. In this situation, actual competition for a house or job or girl becomes invested with far more than individual significance (9). In other words, the "rationality" consists of the logic of particular forms of social action granted certain premises (which are themselves irrational), and of the fact that in certain circumstances scarce resources (e.g. council houses) do go to blacks
before all whites' needs have been met for those resources. Hostility to this is both "racial"/"irrational" (why not priority if a particular black family's needs are greater?) and "rational" (the council house was needed and wanted). So too, for instance, the fear that Britain's racial conflict will develop to American proportions is a rational thing to fear even though the usual "theory" behind it (racial groups "naturally" conflict) is quite irrational.
3.ii Contemporary perceptions of industrial conflict in Britain

In the case of industrial relations, the picture is a little more confused. On the one hand there has been traditionally opposition to most or all union activity in the middle and upper classes of British society ever since unions became a feature of that society. This opposition cannot of course be divorced from the anxieties of those strata concerning the direction of development of the working class, and their continuing ambivalence about the incorporation of that stratum into "the nation". The distanciation until very recent times of white-collar workers and professionals from union membership has largely reflected the extent to which people in such occupations have consciously modelled their behaviour on traditional upper-class patterns. In general alignment with this lack of enthusiasm concerning unions and everything associated with them, there has also been some very influential academic thinking on the subject. Economists, as noted later in this chapter, often link together wage-increases, cost-inflation, and damage to Britain's international trading position. Some sociologists have demonstrated the slender involvement of the rank and file in union activity, and the poor communications between leaders and members - a picture which could easily imply that the unions are only of real relevance to their officials' and militants' interests. Public and media discussions often allude to these comments by social scientists. Finally, there are the numerous opinion-polls that have shown widespread enthusiasm for the views that the unions are out of date, too powerful, and require legal curbs - although a question-mark has been raised against these poll-findings by some of the research carried out under the auspices of the Donovan Commission (10), which demonstrates a local attachment to trade union branches.

There is then in British society a strongly held and widely distributed view that much and perhaps most activity to secure higher wages, especially industrial action, is reprehensible and "sectional" (i.e. against the national interest). Inter-union disputes and
demarcation disputes which result in stoppages are only the crowning
evidence of irrationality and irresponsibility. It goes without
saying that for adherents of this view, the suggestion of any actual
political motivation in industrial action, whether merely to embarrass
the government or actually to topple it, is not only abhorrent but is
often slightingly attributed to the strikers or the union in an
industrial conflict.

The evidence for a contrary viewpoint concerning norms in
industrial relations is very difficult to assess. Only about 42% of
the British labour-force is unionised (11); on the other hand, British
white-collar workers in the late 1960's began to shed their traditional
reluctance to join a union, and professionals have also grown much more
militant in pursuance of their interests. (Nor can it be assumed that
workers outside unions are there by choice.) And the survey conducted
under the auspices of the Donovan Commission (referred to a moment ago)
found that not only workers but substantial sections of the management
interviewed thought the union in their place of employment was con-
ducting itself reasonably (12).

What is really very clear is that the vast majority of
workers do not join unions for political ends, and do not use their
unions for political ends. Throughout the history of British trade
unionism (13) the accent has always been on local and economic
objectives. National organisation and mobilisation has rarely been
at all easy; and in many periods the trade unions have co-operated
to a great extent with the Government of the day.

Recognition of this explains why members of unions can be
favourably disposed to their own union, yet rarely if ever attend its
branch meetings; it is left to be a watchdog over their interests, in
a form of division of labour. It also explains how large numbers of
people can be found who will express agreement with the view that
"something ought to be done about strikes" without its appearing to
them to imply any particular curtailment of their own union's activity
in their own interests. Industrial action in general is not seen as
having any real connection with any local industrial action that they themselves might feel impelled to take. Given the empirical data on the relative infrequency of strikes - the average manager being faced by one not more than once in twenty years - the feeling that one's own case is unique is all the more possible (14). Certainly the absence of interest in workers' control (15) and the readiness to concede to management a specialist role in the organisation of the firm, are indications of the passivity of most British workers. The national leadership of the unions has also been in almost every case either in the hands of "right-wing" officials, or of officials who did not match their militant words with militant actions.

In effect then the attitudes of those who adhered to unions and of those who distanced themselves from them have not been all that far removed from each other in the majority of cases. What disagreement there has been has centred on local and economic issues, not national and political ones. It can be argued then that there is a core perspective on industrial relations in British society, in the negative sense at any rate that industrial relations are not seen by the vast majority as a key area for the development of political power for workers. Conversely, industrial peace is very highly valued by virtually everyone in the society: it is very rarely (if ever, for most of the participants) broken for its own sake. Even the twenty-four hours' "shot-across-the-bows" stoppage is generally designed to avoid a more protracted test of strength in the future.

In fact, Fox's pluralistic model of industrial relations (16) is a more coherent version of a fairly familiar perspective, Hoggart's "Us" and "Them" (17). The implications of this view for action are that although "We" don't want to become "Them" or take over "Their" positions or even use "Our" power to alter the structure of the relationship, "We" do have our proper sphere on which "They" should not encroach. If "They" do, they are likely to retire temporarily hurt. This orientation is again akin to that described by Gramsci as
"economic-corporative" (see ch. 7). There is nothing in this very
familiar perspective which denies the general merit of industrial
pace, or which guarantees peace under all circumstances. But it is
a posture of legitimate self-defence, not of aggressive principled
attack; it will be rather more likely to respond to a decrease in
security in the provision of wants, than to initiate a demand for
more security in the provision of wants.

Media content then, not existing in a cultural vacuum, is
perceived in these contexts. Whatever the media say about race
relations and work relations is to a large extent bound to be under-
stood within the standard range of images, stereotypes, and prescriptive
axioms offered by a culture which defines non-whites as something less
than human, and industrial peace as a prime value. These values may
naturally on occasion come into conflict with other values, such as
"justice for all" or a man's duty to provide for his family. In such
cases, there is naturally scope for the former values to be modified
a little to accommodate the latter values (18). But the main focus of
interest in this study's content analysis is the extent to which media
material challenges these core cultural perspectives, especially given
the fact that being already "established" only prolonged exposure to
clearly dissonant material, well produced, would be likely to dent
them at all.
3.111 The extent to which conflicts in these relations are threatening to the social order in Britain

This leads directly to the remaining question for our present purposes, which is the implication of industrial conflict and racial conflict for British society as a whole. How far do conflicts in both relationships genuinely challenge the social cohesion and consensus of British society? In terms of the role of the media in society, which has already been defined as essentially an integrative one, this question is extremely important. How do the media define these conflicts and how do they handle them—and what relation does their treatment of them bear to the realities of the situation?

Certainly these conflicts appear to bite more deeply than any others into the consciousness of British people. There are many other continuing areas of conflict which figured largely in the mass media in 1970: the Israeli-Arab war, the situation in northern Ireland, the fighting in South East Asia, international Communism, crime and controversial ethical issues such as abortion, drugs, homosexuality, non-marital sex. The first four however are defined by the vast majority of the population as not particularly affecting them, as being more or less beyond their personal horizon. Crime is rather different, since the controversy really centres on what society's practical response should be to it by way of detection and sanctions and rehabilitation of offenders, rather than on crime itself which is almost universally defined as undesirable. The ethical issues referred to are conflicts over private morality, and only occasionally veer toward conflict between definable groups (in this case, generations).

The only remaining conflict which might stand comparison with industrial and racial conflict in British society is student unrest. This is perceived by most people in the UK as an amalgam of other issues: youth versus experience and age; disorder versus law; privileged inactivity versus hard work; deviance versus conformity; in many instances, communism versus the status quo; and perhaps also
sexual freedom versus sexual restraint. Although the overloading of issues involved in student conflict explains the heat frequently engendered by the issue, it still does not "bite" to quite the same extent as industrial or racial conflict.

For one thing, the role of student is inherently transitional, and is very much akin to the transitional status of youth. For another, student unrest is relatively new to the UK, at least as a widespread phenomenon. Both these considerations probably imply to many people that student conflict may be a passing phase. Also, the isolation of students as a group means they can be regarded as an annoying but manageable eruption. They have not yet succeeded in articulating and bringing to a head an important popular discontent, like the students at Chinese universities in 1919. Student agitation is therefore still something relatively insulated from other social relations.

This is not the case with industrial or racial conflict in the minds of most people in Britain (though sometimes for different reasons). Two national sample surveys in 1966 and 1970 found these two issues to be the ones which respondents mentioned spontaneously most frequently as troubling or worrying them (19). They are also both political issues, in that all political parties have a policy on them because they perceive the need to do so. Indeed, these two forms of conflict are probably more real to most people in the society than the conflict between the parties (20). It still remains to be decided, however, whether or not this perception of these two conflicts can be considered objectively accurate.

The presence of black minorities as a threat in itself to the interests and culture of white people is argued popularly on the following grounds. Immigrants, if they are black, must be shown to be an economic proposition. If they impose strain on the supply of housing, or of adequate education (viewed as an economic resource), they are uneconomic. A similar argument applies to the social and medical services. Not only are they a drain on those services, but
the competition they engender for those scarce resources will provoke undesirable racial violence. Another view is that the continuity of British culture may be threatened. Another still is that people of different races automatically clash with each other (the existence of racial conflict in many societies throughout the world is cited as proof of this), so that merely the presence of black people or another racial group is argued to create irreconcilable strife. Lastly, it is also argued that the concentration of black minorities in the urban centres of the UK will give them enormous power in the future, quite out of proportion to their numbers or rightful significance.

These views depend on the following indefensible assumptions. Black people must be defined in purely economic terms, and within those confines the economic terms must themselves be confined to the need for housing and for education (treated as an economic resource). The source of competition for scarce resources must not be defined as the political decision(s) which have allowed the resources to be scarce, but must instead be the advent of black migrants (who are consequently responsible for the hostility they engender). British culture must be defined as having attained an unapproachable summit from which no movement could be thought necessary or desirable. Racial cues must be thought to have a social role independent of the structures of power, privilege and poverty they symbolise and represent, and a socially explosive role at that. And power exercised by black minorities must be deemed necessarily threatening to the white stratum.

As is obvious, economics and 'folk'-sociology are being used in these arguments as thinly disguised tools for traditional racism. The definition of interests as purely economic, the exclusion from economic consideration of the contribution made by black migrant labour and tax-payments, the exclusion of the political origins of inelastic resources, the ethnocentric perspective on British culture, and the vacuity of the remaining assumptions, all demonstrate the wild fallacies of this perspective.
This is not to say however that Britain's black minorities do not present a challenge to the status quo. They do so in three ways. Firstly, their perspectives do not necessarily harmonise with British cultural perspectives. This applies especially to the racist elements in British culture, but also to other elements (which naturally vary with the original culture). To this extent, British society may pluralise its culture much more than at present.

Secondly, there are indications already that the presence of black minorities has highlighted a number of serious deficiencies in urban areas that until the early 1960’s were barely recognised at an official level. Very small-scale approaches to remedy these deficiencies have begun to be made (the Urban Programme, the Educational Priority Area programme). Although much more would have to be done in order to eliminate these deficiencies, it is true to say that the arrival of black migrants has sparked off the attempt to do so. In both these cases it would generally be accepted that any threat posed by Britain's black minorities is of a very positive and fruitful kind.

Thirdly, the wild fallacies in the racist perspective delineated above do not prevent it from exerting considerable sway over attitudes and social action in practice. The result could certainly be that the black segment of British society will respond to continued poverty and hostility with physical counter-violence. The processes by which discontent and protest come to be expressed in this way are as yet but dimly understood by sociologists (21). It is at least clear however that the unlikelihood of a small minority achieving its objectives by such means does not inhibit its members from translating their frustration into violence. In other words, action of this kind may still be engaged in, however unstrategic or untactical it may be. To this extent Britain's black minorities are a threat to the stability and cohesion of British society - but they are only so to the extent that white racism is allowed to prevail.

The question of how far industrial conflict actually challenges the status quo is primarily an economic one, though there
is a political dimension to it. The political aspect relates of course to the use of industrial action as a weapon for political ends, either by a section of the labour-force or by a smaller group harnessing a larger group's discontents to a broader political aim. Although this political dimension is a popular theme with the extreme Right and the extreme Left in British society, the actual evidence for it is surprisingly slight. Even the 1926 General Strike, which on the face of it is the nearest approach in English history to the syndicalist vision, was in actuality motivated by purely economic-industrial concerns for the vast majority of its participants (22). The political challenge represented by industrial conflict has to date then been very weak.

The economic mal-effects of industrial conflict are less easily assessed. Claims that industrial conflict damages British society centre on six assertions. First, that granting wage-demands produces or accelerates inflation. Second, that loss of production through strikes leads to cancellation of orders and loss of future trade both for individual firms in the first instance, and of a country's overseas customers and international export position in the second instance. Third, that strikes cost the firm considerable amounts of money in lost production. Fourth, that a firm may actually be destroyed through loss of production or through impossible wage-demands backed by unrelenting industrial action. Fifth, that strikes in particular industries or plants are especially damaging. Sixth, that the authority of properly constituted channels of negotiation is brought into question. In Britain in the late 1960's and early 1970's, these arguments were held to have quite especial potency, since a single economic sneeze was thought capable of bringing the entire economic structure and future crashing about the public's ears. The priority of national over sectional interest was the dominant popular theme.

In fact these claims have a treble focus: the right of the individual firm to stay in business; the needs of individual consumers;
and in the British context - the demands on Britain to export in order to live. The argument about inflation has two variants. One sees wage increases as forcing up the prices that firms charge for their products (cost inflation). Here, a large round of wage-increases could stimulate an inflationary spiral, where eventually prices rose to such an extent that further wage-demands would be generated, and British exports would eventually become uncompetitive in the international market. The other variant starts from a situation in which there is too much money chasing too few goods, consequently enabling higher and higher prices to be charged for those goods (demand inflation). If wage-increases are granted rapidly to match these price-increases, the situation returns to square one. In this second case, wages quickly following prices accelerate, rather than initiate, inflation (23).

Both models are of course enormously over-simplified accounts of reality. They assume a passivity in employers' accession to wage-demands and an aggressiveness in union pressure for wage-increases, which empirical study does not bear out. There is also the role of credit inflation and the expansion of the money supply to be taken into account in the explanation of any one inflationary spiral, together with the possible role of international corporations (24). And the damage done by inflation to an economy's trading position internationally depends entirely on comparative rates of inflation among rival producers of the same products. The failure of firms to reinvest profits adequately in more productive technology is yet another factor to be taken into consideration. In general then, considerable caution is needed before any axiomatic verdicts on wage-increases can be pronounced.

The second and third assertions belong together. Firstly, the cost to the firm in lost production. If this is calculated in terms of the profits that would have been made on the expected quantity of production during the period of the strike (or had all the labour-force been working at normal speeds throughout, to take
alternative forms of industrial conflict), then it is a fallacy. What the firm does not pay out in wages (generally far the largest item in production-costs) during the strike has to be set against this estimated loss. Further, it cannot simply be assumed that the market demand for production continues unchanged - on the contrary, some strikes have probably been provoked by management during periods of low demand in order to economise on the wage bill (25). On the other hand, go-slow's and absenteeism at a period of high demand involve a probable diminution of production without any substantial reduction in the wage-bill. Cancellation of orders is not an automatic consequence of strike-action; the volume of production and trade can often be made up by increased production after a strike or by stock-piling beforehand; and confidence in the ability of a firm, an industry or an economy to deliver orders on time rests on a complex of factors, of which comparative strike-rates are one, and individual knowledge of preferable alternatives another.

On the (third) question, that of comparative strike-rates, it has recently been demonstrated that the actual incidence of strike-action in Britain, as measured by any of the very imperfect indices that are available, is not nearly so staggeringly high as is often popularly claimed. On most indices, the British strike-record has never been anywhere near so high as it was in the period 1912-26. And the statistics available for comparative incidence of strikes are made very difficult to utilise because of their varying definitions of a strike. In terms of the impact of strikes on Britain's international trading position, it is actually very hard to make any assessment at all beyond the observation that by most criteria Britain's strike-record is better than that of most other industrial countries (26).

It must also be borne in mind that the impact of strikes and industrial action in the tertiary sector of the economy is extremely hard to assess. In the public sector of tertiary industry, increased labour-costs are generally passed on to the tax-payer; but
since wages in this sector notoriously lag behind wages in other sectors, the impact cannot be very great. Industrial action in medical and social services would certainly have a serious, though largely non-economic impact; such action in these sectors is however generally conspicuous by its rarity.

The fourth consequence of industrial action - the destruction of the firm - is rare, for reasons discussed earlier in this chapter. The strategic position of certain firms and industries in the economy, and the consequently heightened impact of any industrial action in them, is the fifth assertion, and is undeniable. Seamen, dockers, steel-workers, transport workers, and workers in key components factories, are all instances of sectors of the labour-force whose industrial action is likely to have much greater impact than average. This point is much more of a model for discussions of the genuine conflict and threat posed by industrial action: the conventional generalisations are highly misleading.

The sixth and last assertion, concerning a tendency in British society toward industrial anarchy, is associated with some leading industrialists and politicians, but has received academic expression in an article published in 1969 by Fox and Flanders (27). They claim that the spreading development of shopfloor bargaining in the UK is reducing the order so painfully constructed in British industrial relations over the decades, and is rendering the processes of industrial collective bargaining anomic (in the Durkheimian sense). This is a description of a trend in British labour relations that has been present for some time ("wage-drift"), although its full impact is only considered to have been experienced from about 1968 onwards. It is an explanation of the increase in industrial disputes in the UK since that time; but the explanation is only pitched at the level of a disintegration of the established mechanisms, not of the reason for that disintegration. A general explanation might be that of Goldthorpe cited earlier (28), that prevailing levels of inequality may reduce the legitimacy of appeals for restraint (29); this might be usefully
combined with recognition of the general upsurge of price-inflation in western economies from the second part of the 60's onwards (30).

In terms of the threat posed by these disturbances to the social order in Britain, it is at least arguable that discontent is better allowed to surface than forced to smoulder underground; and that short-term conflict is more conducive to stability than an artificially induced lull. After all, the focus so far in this discussion various forms of industrial conflict has been exclusively on how far it may be said to have mal-effects on the economy and society at large. This should in no way be taken to imply that industrial conflict itself has no basis in the mal-effects of existing industrial arrangements on industrial workers themselves. Price-inflation, the nature of their work, their experience of managerial authority, are all possible sources of realistic discontent that have already been noted. In other words, the emergence of conflict may well be a step forward for the people concerned in both the short term and the long term. It may even have the positive effect of forcing management to organise production more efficiently.

Both industrial relations and race relations then have a strong aura of conflict about them - only some of which can be shown to have any necessary basis in reality. The reality is, that the prevalence of racism and the experience of economic inequality - sometimes increasing with rapid price-inflation - are likely to provoke spontaneous outbursts of feeling among those affected. It is then these forces, rather than the outbursts themselves, which principally threaten disruption of the social order. The methods by which these major "conflict-areas" are processed by the English news media is therefore of considerable interest, for on that day-to-day processing significantly though not exclusively depends their developing definition within contemporary British society.
(1) See the reference cited in ch. 2, n. 6.
(2) See J. Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1971), ch. 6; and the article by Schuman cited in ch. 2, n. 50.
(5) See footnotes 39-45 in chapter 1, and the discussion to which they are appended.
(6) D. Lawrence, "How prejudiced are we?", Race Today 1.9 (September 1969); also his unpublished paper to a seminar of the British Sociological Association study group on race, January 6th 1970; and B. Hiro, Black British, White British (Penguin 1973), Appendix.
(7) See the fuller account of it in W. W. Daniel, Racial Discrimination in England (Penguin 1968)
(9) See the discussion of the concept of 'overdetermination' in R. H. Williams, Strangers Next Door (Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), pp. 349-50. Williams argues that there are often more forces at work in a racial conflict between groups or individuals than would be needed for there to be a conflict anyway. Amongst other things, this explanation accounts for the emotional heat situations of racial conflict often engender.
(11) Social Trends 3 (HMSO 1972), tables 20, 24(b).
(12) See n. 10; and also J. H. Goldthorpe (et al.), The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (C.U.P. 1969), pp. 165-70.

(15) Some testimony to this is provided by the relative slimness of sources in a recent reader on this subject relating to Britain; see D. Coates and T. Topham, *Workers' Control* (Panther 1976).


(18) See further the discussion on clashes of value in different strata in F. Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order* (Paladin 1971), ch. 5 (discussed further in ch. 7 of this thesis); and U. Hannerz, *Soulside* (Columbia U.P., 1969), cited ch. 2, n. 5.

(19) D. Butler and D. Stokes, *Political Chance in Britain* (MacMillan 1969), pp. 167-8, 349-54; and also in P. Hartmann and C. Husband, op. cit.; ch. 6 (pp. 110-111 in their SSRC Report version).

(20) See for instance R. T. Mackenzie, *British Political Parties* (Heinemann 1962, 2nd ed.).

(21) For a sample of attempts to analyze social violence, see H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr, *The History of Violence in America* (Prager 1969); the very variety indicates the embryonic nature of the state of social theory on this issue.

(22) K. Pelling, op. cit., pp. 172-80.


(28) In chapter 2, n. 42.

(29) These appeals have been a characteristic feature of Government pronouncements on industrial relations in Britain from the 1950s onwards. See W. Harris, *Competition and the Corporate Society* (Methuen 1972), especially chs. 7, 11.

Chapter Four: Methods of content analysis

4.1 The methods and presuppositions of content analysis

Content analysis of the English news media is the obvious first step if their presentation of work relations and race relations is to be assessed. Content analysis itself is the subject of some dispute, however; so it is initially necessary to clarify the principles on which it rests. A leading exponent of one approach to this method of research is Berelson (1), who is concerned with three main principles in content analysis. These were that the data should not be selectively analysed simply in order to demonstrate what was already believed; the analyst must leave open the possibility that his hypotheses will be refuted by an actual survey of the material. Secondly, the categories used for analysis must be sufficiently clear and explicit for other trained social scientists to be able to apply them to the data and arrive at comparable conclusions. Lastly, the analysis should also attempt maximum scientific objectivity through the quantification of its results, thus avoiding subjective impressions and even opening the way to statistical handling of the data.

Obviously the dominant concern here is to escape the charge of subjectivity. The more implicit a meaning, the more likely that people would overlook it in practice, and that the hypersensitive content analyst would overestimate its true significance. An instance in this particular piece of research was the writer's initial impression that television interviewers and newscasters very frequently indicated their attitude to an item by means of a raised eyebrow, a glint of amusement in their eyes, pulling down the corners of their mouth, or their particular tone of voice. In the course of actual research it was discovered that although this does happen, it occurs not nearly so frequently as first expected.

However, in his desire to protect the content analyst and the technique of content analysis from criticism, Berelson completely overlooked certain fundamental aspects of communication that virtually any content analysis must take into account (2). The most obvious is
the impossibility of equating manifest content (Berelson's rather question-begging term) with the intention of communicators and perception of recipients. This is not to say there is no content at all between these three "moments" in the communication-process, for obviously in a more or less common symbolic universe communication can and does take place successfully! But to argue from "manifest content" to audience effect without reference to the perception of the recipients of the communication has already been shown to be empirically unjustifiable (in chapter 1). People often appropriate media material in accordance with their own already existing perspectives, and may well "bend" a message to suit their preconceptions.

A classical instance in the literature of media effects is the impact of a film intended to promote "democracy" as against "fascism". The intended message largely failed to register, because "fascism" was presented as dynamic and its protagonist as personally attractive, whereas "democracy" scored low on both these counts (3). The actual argument, the precise words, were of only secondary importance.

This is not to say that whatever came across in mass communication would be irrelevant, because whatever happened everyone would go on thinking in exactly the same way. Such a conclusion omits the pressure of actual events both as directly experienced and as indirectly experienced through the mass media - mass communication being only a part of general human communication. What is undoubtedly the case however is that if any predictions of audience-effect are to be made from media content they must meet two important criteria.

First, the relevant audience's already existing perspectives on the matter(s) in hand must be known. Where the relevant audience (say the British public) is so large that there are likely to be differing perspectives, their distribution should be known. In other words, cultural or subcultural orientations to the subject-matter must first be studied and charted, at least to some extent, if any prediction is to be made from content to effect. The better the charting, probably the more accurate also will be the prediction.
Second, the further removed the message is from market research and advertising presuppositions, the more essential it is to take into account the overall social structure within which communication occurs. The point about market research and advertising is not a blind side-swipe, but an acknowledgment of the way the very limited sphere of product-marketing has influenced thinking on the content-audience relationship in a highly oversimplified manner. If the message communicated is not about ice-cream or beer or toothpaste, but is about a vastly more complex matter (such as work relations or race relations), then the opportunity for insulating the message from all kinds of other influences has gone. Perspiration - ice-cream, thirst - beer, pure breath - lots of sex, are reasonably precise stimuli not requiring involved decisions about appropriate responses. In the sphere of race relations on the other hand, not only what recipients already think about race but the numerous interconnections between race and other aspects of their lives are involved. The question of role-structures raised toward the end of chapter 1, is clearly fundamental to this discussion; yet as noted there, such considerations are usually conspicuous by their absence.

The example of the propaganda film quoted above is an instance of other variables being involved with what was thought of as a single, direct message. Another instance is the advertising context of media content on commercial television. This varies in importance according to the advertising regulations of the country concerned. It may be thought to have a greater impact in the US where breaks for advertising are more frequent and where non-commercial television barely exists, than in the UK. And in general, media content not directly related to any topic can nonetheless have powerful implications for it. In an analysis of American magazine fiction, it was found that numerous stereotypes concerning non-WASP's were supported by this branch of American mass communication (4). The analysis of a film intended to combat racial prejudice found that the film's failure lay quite simply in the fact that it communicated only within the confines of an operationally racist society (5).
All this only serves to underline the conclusions on the social role of the mass media in chapter 1. The media do not normally challenge existing social institutions or symbolic universes, at least systematically; and even if they should, the chances are that the predispositions of the audience, both first- and second-stage, will draw their sting. Inevitably though, Berelson's approach is thrown into question by this. His desire for scientific objectivity led him to overlook the many possibilities in the transmission of "manifest content". Not only his equation of "manifest content" with audience effect is questionable; his methods by which objectivity is to be assured are also rather doubtful.

For instance, the establishment of well-defined categories for content analysis is in practice very often on the lines of "Favourable-neutral-unfavourable". The terms are clear enough; but just how an item is to be assessed in this way with the audience in mind is not really discussed. Further, the real significance that can be attached to any statistical manipulation of data sorted on such an uncertain basis is extremely unclear. The whole question of quantification in content analysis needs to be handled very carefully. If the intention is simply to avoid casual and fleeting impressions, by establishing the actual distribution of a particular unit of analysis, then quantification can be useful. It can establish a profile or contours of certain units or features of communications. It can also summarise in assimilable form what would otherwise be a vast mass of data. That is thoroughly mistaken, however, is to treat quantification as though it imparted additional scientific validity to the technique of content analysis. Certainly if the categories, however neat, bear no relation to the actual processes of communication, any conversion of them into numerical form is simply an exercise in mystification. An example from this research might be to count the number of times all the causes of racial conflict were mentioned in a TV current affairs item, as though frequency of mention in one item meant that the audience would automatically take one cause more
seriously because it was more frequently mentioned. Without reference to the nature of the discussion, which speaker identifies with which viewpoint, who the speakers are, and no doubt other variables as well, such a conclusion would be unjustified. Hypothetically, the discussion might centre on a subsidiary cause after general agreement as to the major cause; or an impressive and respected public figure might identify with a particular cause, thus outweighing several attempts by an unimpressive "unknown" to draw attention to another cause. All this is without regard to the already existing perspective of the audience on the subject under discussion; and also without regard to the improbability of causes being analysed in news media output, as the succeeding analysis in chapters 5 and 6 makes plain.

The nearest Berelson comes to admitting this problem is when he accepts that quantification should not be performed if the material is "impossibly irregular"; but far from being a deviant situation this "impossible irregularity" is quite usual, just as the dividing line between manifest and latent content is impossible to establish by any criteria that Berelson offers.
4.11 Content analysis and the cultural context of communication

The implications of these methodological considerations for content analysis of national news media items on race relations and work relations, are various. First, it has to be recognised that a particular content C may in fact end up in the audience as Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd,...,Cn. In practice of course, a very few of these views will be distributed throughout the vast majority of the population, with the remainder to be found only in a tiny minority.

An instance would be the subject of strikes. It may for the moment be posited that A% of the population is against all strikes; that B% is against all strikes by people in service occupations (police, teachers, nurses), and that C% broadly tolerates all strikes. No doubt there are also small percentages of the population who interpret strikes as one and all steps on the road to proletarian consciousness, or who only sympathise with a strike which promises to better their own lot. A news item about a strike therefore will possess content Ca, Cb, Cc for most of the population, and Cd,...,Cn for the remaining minority.

However, as already implied in the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, it is possible to go further than simply positing a general "uses-and-gratifications" model for content analysis. For given a set of cultural norms and values which are very dominant in the society as a whole (say the general undesirability of strikes) and given certain stereotypes (say that workers and/or unions initiate strikes), only a very sustained and carefully argued presentation of any given is likely to challenge those values and norms. Therefore even for those who for one reason or another do not cling wholeheartedly to the dominant values and norms, there is every encouragement not to veer too sharply away from them. There is an obvious world of difference between broadly tolerating strikes and actively supporting them. Only for those with a clearly articulated and divergent definition of social reality (intellectuals, radicals) are dominant norms and values definitely unappealing. Pluralism has its bounds.
An important illustration of this hegemony of dominant norms is provided by the background to the "black-is-beautiful" movement in the US. Media material in the US till very recently never expressed this value, with the result that it was possible for beauty norms and values of the white majority to go unchallenged and even to be required of fashion-conscious American blacks. Widespread advertisements for skin-lighteners and hair-straighteners produced enormous sales in the black American market. It has required an enormous drive to encourage a minority stratum to reject those definitions, values, and norms which its members more than anyone else could recognise downgraded themselves. As discussed further in chapters 1, 3 and 7, the existence of varying perspectives in a society as a whole does not mean either that members of the society are unaware of the other perspectives existing in the society or that if there is a dominant view they will not be likely to stay within hailing distance of it (6). The need for the "black-is-beautiful" movement in the US is a tribute to the penetrative power of dominant values; and its relative success, to the hierarchy of elasticity of those values.

The charting of the dominance and tenacity of definitions, values and norms in British society is a daunting task, both in scope and methodology. For the purposes of this investigation only those definitions relating most closely to race relations and work relations that have already been researched and presented in the sociological literature will be utilised. The previous chapter has outlined the main findings of this research; in the analysis of the impact of the content on news media consumers, those findings will be taken to be as accurate a picture as is currently attainable of contemporary social definitions. The content will be "read" in terms of its most likely form of integration into those dominant definitions, or if appropriate in terms of the degree to which it challenges them.
4.111 Content analysis in this research study

The remainder of this chapter will detail the particular units and methods of content analysis employed in this research.

The year chosen was 1970. News media and items were chosen out of total media output because they related most directly to work relations and race relations, particularly the former. Undoubtedly entertainment media are also very important, especially for race relations, many magazines and broadcast entertainment have a racial bias which is all the more important for being implicit in material which people consume with their "guard down". As the argument in chapter 1 showed, there is no tidy division between entertainment and news when it comes to forming people's map of the world. But news items are the point at which the media most consciously and systematically present social events and social reality.

The news media chosen for 1970 were selected for having the widest possible coverage (except in one case). This meant television and the press. Under the television heading, all the major news programmes (BBC 1: 8.50 p.m. News; BBC 2: Newsroom; ITN: News at Ten) from Monday to Friday were watched, as were all relevant current affairs and documentary programmes (24 Hours, Panorama, World in Action), Tuesday's Documentary (BBC), Late Night Documentary (ITV, Tuesdays), Man Alive, The Money Programme, This Week). As regards the Press, the newspapers were the Daily Mirror, the Daily Express, and the Daily Telegraph.

Random sampling of discrete units was naturally attractive in order to reduce this vast mass of material. However, the difficulty in using random sampling in this way was that both industrial relations and race relations tend to appear and disappear in the news. If the level of explanation of any particular episode was to be an important consideration (see below), random sampling could easily lead to false conclusions through arbitrarily ceasing or starting to analyse a particular item part-way through its media-life.
Reluctantly, it was decided to analyse the entire output. An additional and fundamental advantage of doing so however was that it now became possible to measure the frequency of incidence of certain features of reporting on both issues. This in its turn meant that some index of cumulative effect on those exposed to the media could be hypothesised from the measured incidence of media habits of presenting items on race and industry. Admittedly a loose index, but still an index; especially if 1970 itself is taken as a random year.

Naturally, not every TV programme among those listed could actually be watched. Clashes between programmes (Panorama and World in Action always clashed), together with human frailty, made this inevitable. The proportion of programmes missed is noted in chapters 5 and 6. The method of analysing television material was to take very rough notes on the visual content while running a tape recorder. After the programme, the spoken content of the programme would be analysed from the tape.

In order to record items systematically, standard data-sheets were drawn up. So far as possible these sheets were made identical for Press and TV analysis, the differences being confined to indices of salience. It is important to state from the outset that the questions asked, although very general, were not designed to find a place for every single statement or action in the media content. On the other hand, due to the pressures of actual analysis, the tendency was to include as much as possible of the item simply because fine decisions about what might be seen to be relevant at a later date when the pressure was diminished, could not be made satisfactorily. It would bear no relation to the actual analysis to suggest that the researcher only used material which confirmed any hypotheses he had in mind. This will be obvious when the actual form of the questions is presented in a moment.

The indices of salience mentioned a moment ago are important in assessing as precisely as possible cumulative effect. It would obviously be unwise to take every item, however minute, as having the
same "weight" as every other item. Therefore in TV, the length of the item was recorded, and in a news bulletin, whether it was the first item. For the Press, salience was taken as whether the item was on the outside or inside pages, and its size (greater or less than five column-inches).

The main area of the data-sheet was given over to a number of standard and fairly general questions. These questions concerned (1) the level of explanation offered for the events reported or discussed; (2) the image presented of the event(s) or people concerned; (3) issues related to "balance". Clearly all three headings are the major constituents of the map that the media draw for the British public. The questions in every case were framed as open-endedly as possible, in order to leave scope for further analysis of the data once collected.

Questions on the level of explanation offered were simply on the causes mentioned for the event in question (if any), and the implications mentioned (if any). What kinds of explanations, what depth of explanation, what adequacy of explanation, are available for the media public for happenings in race relations and work relations? It has already been seen (in chapter 2) that any industrial dispute is likely to have a complex of macro-factors behind it, as well as the particular grievance which touched it off. Race relations situations are often charged with such emotion because they are "overdetermined" (7). How far are these two conflict-areas genuinely explained; or conversely, how far are they only semi-comprehensible?

A sub-question on the level of explanation recorded by whom any particular cause or implication was mentioned. As already noted, the opinions of some people carry more weight than others, or are more easily discounted. Also, it may be that in any given item the proponents of one perspective receive a very disproportionate amount of attention. The sub-question is one way of checking on this.

As regards the image presented of the events or people concerned in a particular work relations or race relations situation, there were seven aspects of this that the data-sheet attempted to tap.
This is not to say, of course, that the level of explanation offered, and by whom, is not closely related to the image question. But inevitably, the question of image is much more blurred, less easy to verify, than the adequacy of a particular kind of explanation.

The first of these seven aspects was what the participants were presented as doing at that time. The italicised words are important, for there was no attempt to assess the implications of what they were doing. Are, say, students expressing opposition to apartheid presented as struggling with serried ranks of policemen, or explaining in a sustained way the reasons for their opposition to it? Law and order; or moral repugnance? This question was more important for press analysis than for TV analysis, where it largely overlapped with a later one on the visual content of the item.

The next question concerned the extent to which, and the ways in which, participants in the event in question were internally differentiated. Very often one "side" in a conflict is actually a coalition of interests, and the fact that it is so becomes important at a particular stage in the development of the conflict. How far was this factor ever given attention; and how far was the particular divide between moderate and militant highlighted? In many cases this related back to the questions about the level of explanation, in that disputes and disturbances are often attributed in whole or in part to a militant minority. Also, a particular "wing" of a particular "side" is sometimes presented as dangerous or ludicrous. How often, and to whom, did this apply?

The next question concerned the extent to which any particular stereotype (of blacks, of whites, of industrial relations) could be reinforced or attached, verbally or implicitly, by an item or a part of an item. Once again, a particular kind of explanation would naturally play a part in this reinforcement or attack. This question is strongly related to the argument earlier in this chapter that not only does media content not exist in a vacuum, but that also there is a reasonable amount of knowledge about the context in which it does operate and within which it is understood. If then the only material
about Afro-Asian countries relates to violent riots and coups-d'etat, this powerfully reinforces the white stereotype that black people cannot manage their own affairs (to take but one example).

A closely related question recorded whether any particular prescriptive axiom would be reinforced or attacked, verbally or implicitly, by an item or part of an item. Axioms of this kind go hand in hand with stereotypes: if strikes are ruining the country, then for many it follows that legal curbs should be placed on strikers. Cognitive and normative dimensions, as noted in chapter 1, feed each other. In this question, as in the previous two, a sub-question relating to the source of any particular statement was added.

Specific instances of white stereotypes concerning whites and blacks are as follows: blacks have low intelligence, poor hygiene, greater sexuality, are more troublesome, are competitors for scarce resources, are overcrowding the country, live crammed together by choice, are unable to run their own affairs in their own countries, cause violent civil strife, desire and prepare to dominate whites. Whites are patient, tolerant, did much unsolicited and unthanked good in imperial days, are still really necessary to blacks to show them correct lines of behaviour, have numerous justifiable grievances in housing, employment, education and other areas against blacks, and are wise to be afraid for their future in a society with a black minority. Instances of the stereotypes concerning strikes and industrial relations are as follows: strikes are initiated by workers and/or unions, whose motivation is greed, who have no responsibility to the society as a whole, who endanger the country's economy, and make it impossible for firms to manage. Britain is also thought to be peculiarly plagued by them.

The kind of prescriptive axioms that exist in the field of race include: immigration should be stopped, immigrants and blacks ought to conform to British mores, tolerance and commonsense will solve everything, blacks should be sent home, should be the last on every list. In the field of industrial relations they include: unofficial strikes should be curbed, the unions should be hampered,
Another question relating to the image presented is directed at the overall impression of the event, unrelated to the particular topic. Is the overall impression one of conflict/threat/complaint/problem/positive/good news/other? This question is derived from the frequent observation that only bad news is news, and is especially important in determining how far certain areas of social life such as work relations and race relations are commonly conceived of only as nuisances. The question is only related to the manner of presentation of the item: thus a ballot to end a strike might be greeted with enthusiasm by management and media, but with rather less enthusiasm by substantial sections of the labour-force involved. It is how the media present it that determines its assessment here.

The sixth aspect of the image presented is tapped by the question: who speaks or is quoted on the issue, and in what role? The question integrates with five out of the seven questions already asked, where the source of any explanation was always recorded. It has also a secondary purpose, which was to ask how often black people are asked to comment on any issue that concerns them, and how often strikers are given opportunity to explain their view of the situation. It was hypothesised that particularly in the case of blacks, others would speak for them.

The final aspect of the image presented was noted by a question which recorded whether support or condemnation was forthcoming from any source not directly engaged in the event. This again would be an important factor in "mapping" the event.

The remaining questions, relating to "balance", arose from a threefold interest in the practical implications of the ethic of balance in news-presentation and discussion. First, the obvious question as to how far it is actually maintained, consciously or unconsciously (8).
The second area of interest was how far the ethic of presenting news impartially and the definition of newsworthiness combine to allow the media to be exploited by a particular propagandist. In the US a classical instance of the manipulation of the media in just this way was Senator Joseph McCarthy. Once McCarthy had established himself as a newsmaker, he was able to use this ethic to convey effortlessly what he wanted at any stage of his campaign (9). Was there any evidence of the media being used in this way in England in relation to work relations or race relations?

The third area of interest in the neutrality ethic is its implication for the maintenance of consensus, particularly when conflict is involved. Does the fact that the TV interviewer to a large extent, and the newspaper journalist to a lesser extent, stands in the middle between opposing viewpoints imply that the conflict, any conflict, is between two extremes; and that consequently the interviewer standing in the middle represents "the same community"? Does the institutionalisation of neutrality in this way imply that negotiation and compromise are of the essence of conflict, almost more than truth versus untruth (10)?

It became clear in practice that content analysis of the press absorbed far more time than content analysis of television. The number of words in a leading story, even in the Mirror, would correspond to a very substantial tract of air time; also, the sample of the press output was a 100% one. In order to reduce the volume of content analysis, both in terms of collection and presentation, the following method was utilised. It was simply to concentrate on the analysis of editorials, and headlines (which are reproduced in the appendix to this chapter, in capitals for outside page items, and in lower case for inside page items).

The rationale behind the adoption of this method is that there exists evidence that the headline has considerable influence on the way readers interpret the story underneath it (11); and also that it may consequently have a greater impact on the memory. Many readers,
too, may often skim news headlines and then concentrate on the sports pages. As regards editorials, there is also evidence that newsmen read their own paper's editorials carefully as one means of discovering the editorial policy on issues (12). Subsequently, they are able to write their stories not only in the house-style, but in conformity with the newspaper's outlook. In the case of the Mirror and Express, it is generally recognised, over and above what has been said, that sub-editing plays a very vital role in their production; and in the case of the Telegraph, it is generally recognised to be a tightly controlled newspaper internally. Certainly there are some featurewriters for each paper who are allowed to deviate from editorial norms, but who are also less likely to be scanned than the main stories. With these three papers therefore, it is reasonable to predict that although many readers may not read the editorials, the output will be presented in considerable conformity to the editorial line, and that headlines will also be written accordingly (with a consequent impact on the overall impression of the news information related underneath them).

The sampling method for the Press was therefore a three-stage one: first, a period out of the 1970 output (constituting the frame) was randomly selected; second, a 100% sample was drawn from the three dailies; third, a 100% sample of editorials and headlines was analysed. The last stage might be described, in line with the classification of metaphors, as synecdoche sampling.

The last range of operational decisions which have to be made concern what was, and what was not, included under the heading of race relations and industrial relations for the purposes of this study. Under the heading of industrial relations: anything to do with trade unions; industrial disputes; the Government, CBI or TUC, insofar as they played any role in industrial relations; productivity-deals, wage-demands and wage-negotiations, incomes policy, the Prices and Incomes Board, wages as a factor in inflation; workers' participation, profit-sharing, control; redundancy, unemployment, new industry in depressed areas. Excluded were agricultural workers, the armed forces, students, and others in non-industrial roles.
Under the heading of race relations: immigration, repatriation, minority rights, blacks in the educational process, housing, employment, health and hygiene, fertility, the police, race relations legislation, the various statutory and voluntary bodies in the race relations "industry"; the National Front and similar organisations; the policies of parties and central and local government; southern Africa, Britain's relations with black countries, the political and economic affairs of black countries, their relations with South Africa, racial strata in any part of the world. Excluded are blacks presented as doing something normal, though a count was kept; natural disasters involving black people; relations with Communist China and the South-East Asian war, both because of the complicating factor of communism; and the Israeli-Arab war.

Some of these last exceptions may seem odd, since there are aspects of the Vietnam war (at least in the attitudes of US troops to Vietnamese of any political complexion) which are clearly racist; and in the Israeli-Arab war, for some the Arabs are Hitler's successors, while for others the Jews of Israel are building a state founded on racial exclusiveness. (For others again, they both are Semitic, so their division is irrelevant.) There is considerable logic in the view that the failure to depict these situations as racist by the media is part of the map they drew of the world. This research nevertheless uses deliberately an absolutely minimal definition of race relations, since it is concerned with the way that situations considered by the British public as unambiguously racial are presented to it by the media.


7. See chapter 3, n. 9.

8. See R. B. Smith, "They will write it white", *Columbia Journalism Review* VIII.1 (Spring 1969). He observes that the US editorial point of view always assumes that we whites are talking to you whites about them (= blacks); never that we (editors) are talking to you (whites and blacks).


10. Compare the discussion by Herbert Passin on the commitment to truth he describes as characteristic of many writers in Third World societies, which he contrasts with the commitment to objectivity characteristic of what he calls "lower temperature" societies (i.e. those with institutionalised governmental oppositions). It may well be, however, that this represents commitment to only one kind of objectivity. H. Passin, "Writer and journalist in the transitional society", in L. Fye (ed), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton U.P. 1963), especially pp. 121-23.


Chapter Five: The coverage of industrial relations

Out of the mass of material collected on industrial relations during 1970, the national docks strike was selected as evidence of the treatment of work relations in the main British news media. Ideally, two or three such disputes would have been selected for analysis; but to do so would have necessitated an extremely lengthy presentation. One of the hazards intrinsic to qualitative content analysis is that in order to carry conviction substantial quantities of the original data need to be cited; for even if Berelson's solutions to the problem of subjective interpretation are unsatisfactory, the problem still remains. One way out might have been to select certain days or weeks at random; but as indicated in the previous chapter, the difficulty with this approach is the way it fails to account for the continued presentation of a particular media story over time. Since this research is particularly concerned with the depth of explanation and the kind of explanation in news output, only analysis of continuous coverage will suffice.

Before commencing this analysis, some outline of the background to the 1970 docks strike and of its main sequence of events is necessary (1). The background has a number of components, which vary with the perspectives of the major participants and protagonists. From the employers' perspective, the amount of time and labour needed to unload and reload a ship was the key to profitability; labour intensive production and restrictive practices were therefore their principal target for change. More generally, they were anxious about the degree of wage-inflation over the previous 12 months. From the dock employees' perspective, the components numbered the history of casual employment, fluctuating and uncertain earnings, the increase in redundancy, the absence of successful representation of their interests by the Transport and General Workers' Union, and - conversely to the employers - the development of price-inflation. From the government's perspective, docks disputes were perpetually contributing to difficulties in
Britain's export position; from this concern stemmed the 1965 Devlin Report (2) which recommended the end of casual employment (Phase 1), and the negotiation of productivity bargains to end restrictive practices (Phase 2).

The perspectives of the employers, and of the government, are reasonably straightforward; the perspectives of the employees require a little further elaboration. Casual employment (3) had been a feature of dockwork for well over a hundred years. It meant that even in 1965 the great majority of dockers had to present themselves for hiring twice a day, morning and afternoon, generally in gangs. This bred immediate insecurity, and also a longer term insecurity based on age, since the older dockers were progressively less likely to be hired. Although this system was abolished in 1966, the attitudes it had generated toward the employers were unlikely to evaporate overnight; especially since official and unofficial reports condemning the system had come and gone since the Victorian era without the employers apparently taking any notice.

The disappearance of militancy among dockers was rendered even less likely by the other components in the dispute, which continued as strongly in evidence as ever after decasualisation. The fluctuating and uncertain earnings (4) were due to a very low basic rate, which on dead days meant very poor earnings (amounting to just over £11.00 per week); and also to an enormously complicated payments system. Piecework was calculated on the basis of the particular cargo, together with its weight and type of packaging; on weather delays; on delays through mechanical failure; on overtime; on the particular firm; and on the particular gang (fast gangs earned more). Several hundred rates were generated in this way; and it is significant that in practically every strike occurring between decasualisation and the national strike in the Port of London Authority area, piecework was the central issue (5).

The third component was the progressive loss of jobs; restrictive practices, aimed at sharing the workload more evenly in the face of these endemic fluctuations, had an additional effect of
employing more labour than operationally necessary. Part of the productivity bargains involved redundancy payments for older dockers; but the development of capital-intensive cargo-handling in the form of containerisation also made for a dramatic decline in the need for labour. Certain employers went further still, and deliberately contravened the letter of the productivity agreements by employing unregistered labour at much lower rates to handle cargo away from the quayside, a development made feasible by containerisation. This too had an obvious effect on the declining demand for labour. Between 1967 and 1969 there was a 25% decline in the number of registered dock workers (6).

Insecurity, therefore, was only partially tackled by decasualising the labour force; and as noted in chapter 2 section ii, the most fundamental component of work is the secure provision of wants. This insecurity was alleviated to no appreciable extent by the main union, the Transport and General Workers' Union, whose totally inadequate performance in the docks (7) created the vacuum to which the militant National Association of Stevedores and Dockers was one response.

During the three years preceding the strike, negotiations on Phase 2 productivity bargains had been continuing slowly, but by 1970 were within sight of conclusion. (In the period of the strike, these agreements were collectively referred to as "modernisation."). However, repeated attempts by the union during the same period to raise the low national basic rate had met with repeated rebuffs. By spring 1970, it became apparent that the employers' original hope that these latter negotiations might be rendered obsolete by the achievement of agreement on the former ones, was not destined to be realised. Given the lack of speed in the productivity negotiations, the employers' intention boomeranged, for a number of dockers realised that they could use frustration at the delay to bid up the price of the productivity bargains: if the basic rate were raised at once, then the price of the new bargains would in turn have to be raised in order to make it worthwhile for the dockers to drop their restrictive practices. Raising
the basic rate would also benefit the 7000 dockers in the smaller ports who were not involved in, and who would not benefit by, the productivity agreements.

From the employers' perspective, this bidding-up made the price of the productivity agreements much less attractive. It would also have had a rapid impact on wage-demands in a range of associated industrial sectors, including 50,000 ports ancillary workers, which made it unattractive to the new government which was bent on curbing wage-inflation, and doubly unattractive to the employers. Explicit disavowals by the unions of any intention to push up piece-rates as well was not therefore received with any warmth by the employers; indeed the latter accused then of secretly planning to apply pressure to piece-rates immediately following any upward settlement.

In immediate terms, the ball was set rolling by a unanimous vote by the dockers' delegate conference toward the end of June for two weeks' strike notice to be given the employers. Shortly before this period expired, the employers offered the unions £20.00 guaranteed wage rather than the £20.00 basic wage that had been demanded, together with an extra pound on the productivity agreement once it was in force. The two officials of the Transport and General Workers' Union most involved, its general secretary Jack Jones, and its ports officer Tim O'Leary, endeavoured to call the strike off by recalling the delegate conference to vote on the offer. Their attempt was defeated by a massive show of feeling in the ports, and subsequently by the delegate conference vote. The Government then suggested an arbitration panel, but this was rejected by the unions and dockers on the ground that its findings would bind them. Then a court enquiry was set up headed by Lord Pearson, a high court judge. The employers, whose spokesman was Mr. Bill Tonge, chairman of the National Association of Port Employers, refused to negotiate in any way during the strike. A State of Emergency was declared by the government. The question of rising prices was very much to the fore, with the Government repeatedly threatening the use of troops to shift perishable cargoes. The union leadership handed
the onus for decisions on moving perishables back to the local leadership in the various ports. The court concluded, and both sides accepted its verdict and award.
(1) The television news coverage

The sample of news bulletin items from the three longest programmes on the three channels (Newsroom BBC2, News at 9 p.m. BBC1, News At Ten ITN) amounted to 70% of their weekday output from the 24th June to the 3rd August. This sample was not randomly drawn, but is sufficiently large for this not to be of any significance (since no statistical computation will be based on it).

Within this sample, coverage of the dock strike amounted to 17% of total output on each BBC bulletin, and 13% on News At Ten; a total of 5 hours 58 minutes. The percentages are of course arithmetic means, with some bulletins devoting over 50% of their output to the strike, and others far less. Nevertheless, this very substantial allocation of air time does mean that the rather crude criticism sometimes levelled against television news, that it trivialises events by skating too rapidly over them, cannot be upheld in this case.

What does emerge from an analysis of the presentation however, is the extraordinarily low incidence of explanation of the strike. It would be no exaggeration to say that beyond the recognition that the dockers had initiated the strike, and caused it in that sense, the television audience was most often left to imagine the causes of the strike for themselves. As Table 5.1 shows, only 16 causes were ever mentioned. The last five of these can barely be called 'causes': a strike does not begin solely because of a unanimous vote for two weeks' strike notice, nor does it start on the grounds that it is not affected by the (recent) election of a Conservative Government! Of the remaining explanations, a few more represent the dockers' case than the employers'; but since the employers' case rested very heavily on what they claimed to be the implications of conceding the wage demand, their position was given very full coverage under the heading of Implications (see below). Also, three quite important elements in the explanation (the danger
of the work, the already raised productivity, the mortgage-problem) were on Newsroom (21.7.70) which was of course the least watched of the three bulletins. Even though this was not a 100% sample, there were nevertheless many bulletins within the sample which offered no explanation for the strike at all. This does mean the British public was given only the thinnest and most occasional account of why this particular wage-demand was leading to this particular form of confrontation. Had there even been a heavy concentration of explanation toward the beginning of the strike, this could have been taken for granted or alluded to later. Such was not the case.

The effects of the strike, as noted by news bulletins, can most conveniently be divided into (a) impact on the domestic economy; (b) impact on the consuming public; (c) impact on particular interests; (d) employers' views on the financial implications they would face if they accepted the dockers' claim; (e) responses to the strike, in terms of breaches in it; (f) the response of the State to the crisis. A glance at the contents of tables 5.ii a - f shows the huge disproportion between the attention given on news bulletins to effects, and the attention given to causes! Since clearly the strike was having the most far-reaching effects, the vacuum in explanation of why the dock workers had decided to be so disruptive could only be filled by ad hoc explanations in the viewing public's mind. These explanations would be most likely to be of the kind already present in the culture of the society (8), and reiterated in much of the Press, as the third section of this chapter shows. Interpretations along the lines of selfish and mindless militancy were enabled, though not compelled, by the absence of any explanation in broadcast news.

The vast majority of the effects of the strike that were mentioned were negative, either in the direct sense that they could clearly be seen to affect somebody or some interest adversely, or in the indirect sense that they seemed generally undesirable.
Apples or bananas rotting in some ship's hold might not be visualised very easily as something one would necessarily have eaten oneself, but there could be no doubt that to have them rotting was in general undesirable and wasteful. Insofar as the reasons for their rotting (once again) were only occasionally presented, undesirable consequences could be seen to flow from uncomprehended causes. Uncomprehended, not in general terms that people strike for more money, but to the extent that this particular set of demands was not understood, and not able to be understood, from the media of mass communication in broadcasting.

The impact of the strike on the consuming public in the form of higher prices was a question which came to occupy more of the centre of the stage as the strike continued than did the dispute itself, (see Table 5.ii b). It was raised in three forms: why are prices rising (and by how much)? Should there be price controls? Should troops be used to shift perishable cargoes? The Minister of Agriculture denied repeatedly that wholesalers or retailers were hoarding or profiteering, and as repeatedly attributed any price rises to the law of supply and demand, or to wage-demands. The wholesalers and retailers argued likewise on the occasions they were asked about price-rises. He and the Home Secretary also promised several times to institute price-controls over food if they thought it necessary; but in fact, as the demands for controls became more insistent, the Government turned increasingly to threatening the use of troops to shift perishable cargoes if the dockers persisted in refusing to do so themselves (see Table 5.ii f(2)).

This had the undoubted impact of shifting attention to those responsible for public hardship from wholesalers and retailers (especially the first), on to the dockers who were on strike. Whereas wholesalers and retailers - and clearly the first group is more significant than the second - were presented without question as subjected to the law of supply and demand, the dockers were presented as voluntary agents. So a direct link between scarcity and higher prices was presented as the responsibility of the strikers rather than as the combined effect of the strike on the one hand, and decisions by wholesalers that they
safely could raise their prices (with obvious effect on retail prices) on the other hand. There was also some hoarding by wholesalers, but this was only ventilated briefly in the media (mostly the Press).

In fact, the Government must have known the use of troops was impracticable, not so much because of any violent confrontations between dockers and troops and their consequences, but because market porters in the TGWU were beginning to state their opposition to handling any perishables moved by troops, and because of the complicated and dangerous nature of non-containerised docking procedures. The fact that this latter problem was never so much as mentioned raises an important point about the operation of the British news media: the extent to which they are uncritical, despite the occupational self-image of their staff as detached observers. The only rational ground for omitting reference to this problem would be ignorance of it, though this would reflect badly on the efficiency of newsgathering procedures; if this problem was realised, the only conceivable reason for not mentioning it can have been not to embarrass the Government at a strategic point.

The economic implications of the dockers' claim were frequently referred to, and as noted already constituted an important explanation for the employers' refusal to concede the claim or to negotiate about it. (See Table 5.ii.c.) They were noted to be at the top of the manual workers' pay "league", and to be guilty of demanding an astronomical number of percentage points (which were variously calculated). The highest was 80%, which 'represented' the increase in the basic rate from eleven to twenty pounds; that the percentage increase was accepted as a viable expression of the claim in the news media at times, suggests a serious lack of critical attention to presentation. They were also labelled as threatening the ruin of Dutch, Cypriot and Jamaican farmers, yet to be augmenting the competitive strength of the port of Antwerp; a rather contradictory set of accusations, although hypothetically compatible with each other in economic terms. Whether they were accurate in economic terms is rather more obscure.

However, the dominant implication mentioned was that by their
strike they would injure the 'modernisation' scheme for the ports planned under phase 2 of the Devlin Report, and on the verge of implementation. (See Table 5.ii.d) In actual fact there were many small ports which were not going to be affected by the scheme. It must also be questioned, precisely what 'injury' were the employers' panel representatives talking about? Was this an implicit threat that the new pay-scales negotiated for the greater productivity of the new scheme would be thrown back into the melting pot? This seems unlikely, since the cooperation of the unions was essential for the operation of such a scheme; and further, since the scheme necessarily involved an ever-increasing number of redundancies, it meant the overall wage-bill would be lower. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the very positive symbol of 'modernisation' was being utilised by the employers in a manner which disguised the fact that the larger the award from the current dispute, the less the economic advantage from the new productivity scheme as a whole. This impression is reinforced by an examination of the precise content of the 'modernisation' scheme, one important part of which consisted of the introduction of a two-shift system of working. Another element, just referred to, was the severance of large sections of the labour-force. This could only with some ingenuity be described as the white heat of technological change; yet the term 'modernisation' has distinct connotations of that kind.

The question of breaches in the strike was a fairly confused one. (See Table 5.ii.e.) A refusal to make exceptions for any cargoes might seem absurd intransigence on the part of the dockers; the extent to which the strike was breached by private initiative might be seen as an instance of the verve and determination of those who had succeeded in doing so. The complications are increased by the fact that some ports did make exceptions for some cargoes. Nevertheless, the arguments for not making exceptions were never heard; and only those responsible for breaching the strike were interviewed about it. Thus, to take
two instances referred to in Table 5.ii.e, the public heard a Liverpool housewife (who also featured prominently in certain sections of the Press) say someone had telephoned to offer to drop her in the Mersey; and it saw the little ships setting off from Ulster and then unloading at the tiny Portpatrick harbour. It also heard about carloads of dockers setting off to tip produce into the harbour in Ulster, and to picket the Scottish harbour. Whether these actions were or were not justifiable was left to the public to decide without reference to the arguments of the other side for keeping the stoppage watertight.

The last set of effects of the strike that was treated by the news media was the actual and potential response by the State to the strike. This took various forms: the declaration of the State of Emergency, the offer of an arbitration-panel, the eventual Court of Enquiry, the threatened utilisation of the Army to move cargoes, and the relevance of a new industrial relations law (see Table 5.ii.f).

The theme which ran throughout all reference to the role of the State in the dispute was the core assumption of its neutrality. This showed itself in various ways. A State of Emergency, for instance, in Britain involves the assumption of very wide and sweeping powers (9), involving the utilisation of troops, the right to requisition all kinds of material, and so on. Clearly its adoption in peace-time has important implications for democratic rights and civil liberties, and there was something of a pother about it in the House of Commons, with a number of left wing Labour MP's criticising its adoption; but even this challenge was only fleetingly reported. It was quite simply accepted that it had been introduced for the single purpose of protecting essential supplies. On the one hand, it can certainly be argued that the lack of questioning about the State of Emergency accurately reflected the degree of consensus between the leaderships of both major political parties; but on the other hand, the corresponding omission of debate in the media reflects the extent to which fundamental issues about British society may not be subjected to adequate public discussion.

The chairmanship of the Court of Enquiry that was eventually set up was another point at which some very basic social assumptions
wore taken for granted. The general secretary of the TUC, Mr. Victor Feather, was briefly floated as the possible chairman, but was quickly dropped because of his trade union involvement. Instead, a High Court judge was chosen as the most neutral person available. In actuality, the moderation and distaste for confrontation of Mr. Feather was a matter of public record, and could barely have been questioned even in governmental circles. Conversely, the record of the Bench in court cases involving trade union affairs in Britain, is historically not one of unblemished impartiality; so little so, that in practice it has been normal for Trade Unions in Britain either to conduct their dispute outside court procedures if at all possible, or if court procedures were unavoidable, to enter upon them in all circumstances with a very low expectation indeed of a decision in their favour (1C).

The role of the Army as protector of the public, national interest was also taken absolutely for granted, in that its utilisation was presented simply in terms of avoiding the waste of foodstuffs together with action to control the rise in prices. The relief of hunger, the avoidance of waste, concern for the housewife's domestic budget, were certainly humanitarian concerns for which the Army could act as instrument; but the additional consideration, of the extent to which the Army might be seen as the State breaking the strike at its strongest bargaining point was barely referred to, and only then in terms of the expression of opposition to the use of troops by dockers and market porters. The conceptual framework for interpreting this opposition, especially in the absence of any real explanation of the tactical realities of a strike, was already present: the dockers and their allies were expressing their sectional interest, as against the national, public interest. And this last might have to be 'met' by the action of the Army.

There were, lastly, not many references to the Government's intention to enact new industrial relations legislation, compared to the Press treatment of the subject; but the four references that were made uniformly stressed the relevance of 'reforming' the current legal
position concerning industrial disputes. Once again, the State was presented as operating neutrally on behalf of a harassed public.

Part of the map of the docks dispute which was very important was the degree of support or condemnation the strikers were seen to receive from outside the ranks of those involved or implicated in either 'side'. (See Table 5.iii). In explicit terms, apart from a statement by the Prime Minister that the strike should not take place, and appeals by the Minister for Employment for them to return to work, most expressions of attitude to the strike as a whole (as distinct from the question of perishables, and other particular aspects of it) were favourable. Not that there were very many, for the number of statements only just reaches double figures; and certainly no attempt was made to conduct an exhaustive investigation of social attitudes to the dispute.

However, the degree of imbalance just noted must itself be balanced against two other considerations. First, there was a very high level of reference to the negative implications and consequences of the strike, which has also been noted. An enumeration of expressions of explicit support would be misleading taken out of relation to this fundamental trend in the treatment of the dispute. Second, that the treatment of one dimension of support for the strike was surprisingly thin. This dimension was the solidarity of West European port workers in Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden and France, and in the containerised English port of Felixstowe, with the dockers in London, Liverpool, Hull and elsewhere. This solidarity had been earlier predicted to be highly unlikely by news reporters, in the European case because of lack of identification with a foreign strike, in Felixstowe's because of its very high wage-levels and the absence of strikes there over the previous two years or so. When the reversal of this prediction occurred, it was noted in all three bulletins and then dropped. It was an instance of an important form of inter-European cooperation, with perhaps significant implications for the future pattern of development of the EEC; yet presumably it did not fit into the
definitions of the new Europe current among newsman.

The last part of the map of the dispute which I wish to
discuss concerns the kind of people, and the kind of roles they fill,
who are called upon to speak. (See Table 5.iv.) In my sample there
was a very slight preponderance of speakers who occupied a role or
took a position that would be known to be against the strike without
their necessarily having to spell it out in so many words. However,
this may be due to the sample, and in any case there is little point
in the assessment of fractions of "balance". What was concretely the
case, however, was that there was only highly equivocal support from
Labour Party spokesmen, their activity being confined - at least in
the media - to criticism of the Conservative Government's handling of
the strike. It will be recalled that the Transport and General Workers'
Union had never been particularly effective in its representation of
the dockers; and that its leaders (Jones and O'Leary) began by endeaour-
ing to call the strike off. O'Leary said at a press conference at the
time:

"I confess that I must have slipped up to be in
the situation I am in now. I am more to the Right
of any other dock leader since 1926, and yet it
falls to me to lead a national strike." (11).

Even then those who in the official spectrum of British politics speak
for the trade unions and the workers, were very weak in their advocacy
on their behalf; and an objective assessment of the situation of the
dockers, as supplied by Kellish and Wilson, leaves little room for
counterposing a hypothetical sanity of the officials to a misguided
ferocity on the part of the dockers. This raises the important
question, which will be discussed more fully in chapter 7, of how the
adoption of "balance" in broadcasting can lead to the identification
of formal opposition with significant opposition, and consequently to
omission of the case for significant opposition.

Equally important was the relative lack of opportunity given
to ordinary workers or trade unionists in the docks to express their
views to the general mass of British workers and trade unionists.
Under a third of the appearances on the dockers' "side" were by rank
and file members of the unions or the labour force; and similarly there was no opportunity at all offered to workers and trade unionists in other industries to comment on the strike or to address the dockers. The news media were used as vehicles for (sometimes conflicting) elite groups to speak to the general public and sometimes to each other. They were never used as means for ordinary members of the public to communicate with each other, or only rarely and very briefly.

Having established how the television news media drew the contours of the docks strike, it is now important to move on to examine the particular role played by news reporters in mediating the events of the dispute to the public. The subjects of their questions, together with a sample of the precise wording of their questions, is reproduced in Tables 5.a and b. The sample consists of 40% of the news bulletins in the overall sample. Questions common to the BBC1 and BBC2 bulletins are taken together, except for July 13th when news of the strike's projected postponement became available between the 7.30 p.m. and 8.50 p.m. bulletins. The importance of these questions is two fold. First, they reveal the news reporters' own definition of their role; second, they had some general influence on determining the "map" of the strike, insofar as most people can only be as good as the questions they are asked allow them to be.

What emerges with great clarity from the subjects and wording of the questions asked is that news reporters, together with current affairs presenters as will be seen, interpret their role as neutral between the two sides. This parallels the standard definition of the role of the Government in industrial disputes by industrial correspondents, which is seen as "trying to umpire the disputes" (12). Given that both sides, but especially the strikers, are seen as sectional interests, this "balance" effectively means that the reporters end up by asking questions which for them reflect the national interest; if they represent anyone, it is the nation, the general public. To this extent, their role and the questioning proper to it become part of the map of the strike itself. The strike becomes defined in terms of a
loose triad of interests, of which the most important and most
affronted is the general national interest, of which the State and
the news media are the paramount guardians.

Evidence for this is seen in the way such a high proportion
of questions are devoted to how long the strike may be expected to last,
arbitration and the court of enquiry as possible methods of settling
it, the chance of its postponement or of a return to work, the damage
to the economy, and whether the troops would be seen as hostile to the
dockers' interests or acting under orders for the public good. The
proportion of questions relating to what might be described as "industrial
peace for the national good" is nearly 80% of the sample. This is an
important confirmation of standard cultural definitions of industrial
conflict, noted in chapter 3, and an interesting illustration of the
thesis advanced in chapter 7 that the practice of "balance" acts as a
conductor for nationalist ideology.

On the other hand, there is a hierarchical dimension to the
triad, with the most hostile questions being addressed to the strikers,
and with the employers receiving very few hostile questions together
with plenty of scope to state their case and condemn the dockers from
the working of the questions put to them. Inevitably this is a somewhat
subjective judgment, and it is only possible to refer to the questions
for any verification of its reasonableness. In Table 5.4.5, the questions
the writer considers implicitly hostile to the dockers' or unions' case
have been asterisked, as have those which presented a favourable opening
to the employers to condemn the dockers or unions. Questions marked
with a double exclamation mark are in the writer's view hostile to the
employers' case.

It is nonetheless hard to find questions to employers with
quite the ring of "Aren't your dockers concerned at all, Mr. O'Leary,
about the damage that will be done to the country's economy?", or to
trade unionists with quite the deference of "But someone like Mr. Vic
Feather or another prominent trade unionist presumably wouldn't be
acceptable to you as arbitrator?"
The television current affairs coverage

News bulletins, whatever their length, are often claimed by news media practitioners (13) to be their headlines, in press terms; and correspondingly, current affairs and documentary programmes are claimed to be the broadcast media equivalent of the newspapers' inside pages and feature articles. This contention has important implications for the question of explanation, which has already been stressed in the content analysis of news bulletins on the docks strike. It is therefore important to go on to analyse the current affairs content on the strike, in order to discover how well the claim reflects the reality. Since each current affairs item is more of an entire entity than news items, the content of each of the seven surveyed will be given a separate precis in turn.

A short *24 Hours* item on June 24th looked at the possibility of a national dock strike, and interviewed an industrial correspondent from the *Sunday Telegraph*. He explained the strike move in terms of normal militancy and volatility of British dockers; their chagrin at the discontinuation by the new Conservative government of the previous government's ports nationalisation scheme; and the view that the Left was spoiling for a fight "with anyone", but were dependent on the rank and file to translate their own truculence into action. He too argued that the productivity deals would be ruined if the claim were not, that many dockers would not benefit from concession of the present claim, and that this militancy would only be used as evidence for the need of new industrial relations legislation by the Conservative government. It should be noted that there is here no criticism of the employers, or of the precise work-situation and experience of dockers; but that the strike is explained in terms of customary attitudes among dockers seizing in a rather haphazard fashion on to a particular pay claim, combined with the dockers' ignorance or insouciance of its real implications.

By July 9th, it was clear the strike was on. That evening, *24 Hours* mounted a studio discussion between O'Leary, Tonge, Jack Jones,
John Davie (recently of the CBI, still at that point a backbench MP), and Ian Mikardo (Labour Party ports' spokesman). O'Leary dwelt on the constant delays in negotiations for a better basic rate which had dragged on since they had been initially promised by the employers in 1966, four years previously. Most of the rest of the programme went over ground made very familiar by news bulletins (the threat to productivity, the dockers' already high rates of pay, the swingeing percentage increase the claim involved). Everyone agreed the Government should not interfere, but there was a clash between Davies and Mikardo. The former claimed that wage-inflation was playing havoc with costs, that the issue must be faced squarely, and that the country was running itself into the ground. The picture drawn was dismissed by Mikardo as vaguely argued gloom, and he went on to say that the Conservative Government's principled hostility to nationalisation was no substitute for a rational policy for the ports. Apart from the revelation of reasonably predictable contrary positions by some of the notables involved, only O'Leary's point went any way toward emphasising an important element in the strike-proneness of the dockers at that point in time. As explanation and illumination, as distinct from rapid sequences of assertion and counter-assertion, this item provided very little.

On the eve of the strike, it was temporarily postponed. The 24 Hours presenter said, "Good evening. And I do mean good" as he introduced the programme - an interesting instance of the instinctive self-identification with the image of the national good characteristic of the profession. There followed however the fullest analysis of the strike available in the sample. It took the form of a historical introduction, in the first place, with the reporter recalling Ben Tillett and the 1889 docks strike, and the background of bad labour relations in the ports, together with the instinctive class solidarity of dockers. He then interviewed a delegate to the present national strike conference. In the interview the extreme insecurity of work before decasualisation in 1966 was discussed, together with the much
more recent factors heightening insecurity among dockers about their employment prospects. In the latter question, the delegate instanced the way the company boards owning many of the inner London docks from Tower Bridge to Millwall were enthusiastically running down their docks and negotiating property development schemes on the disused sites (Tonge, chairman of the Employers' Panel, being himself involved in one such scheme as managing director of Hay's Wharf by Tower Bridge). Other factors underlying insecurity were, according to the delegate, the development of containerisation, which required far less labour intensive methods than traditional handling; the planned reduction in the labour force over the next few years; and the tendency for employers to use non-registered labour against the specific provisions of the containerisation agreements. The delegate concluded the interview by arguing that in his view these considerations constituted abundant evidence for the need to nationalise the ports and to institute workers' control.

A studio discussion between Ian Mikardo and Nicholas Scott (Conservative Party ports' spokesman) followed, in which Mikardo claimed that nationalisation of the ports could be argued to be necessary on technical grounds alone. Scott said vital exports were always being threatened by docks disputes, and a very detailed look needed to be taken at the industry as a whole to try to avoid the repetition of this pattern in future years. The reporter ended the item by saying that the men's real hope, which he defined as 'modernisation', was being threatened by their strike-decision. It could reasonably be said that this item did serve to illuminate the dockers' perspectives on the strike, though far less the employers'.

The next 24 hours treatment of the subject consisted mostly of a port-by-port account of the strike's impact. It went on however to illustrate in the clearest way the universal acceptance of the 'national interest' position. On the one hand, a studio discussion between Jack Jones and Tonge had the former attacking the latter for behaving irresponsibly toward the national interest: a reversal of
the more usual use of the symbol. Jones was arguing that the strikers had now a stronger case than the employers, because the employers were being intransigent in a way which damaged the national interest. The whole argument was grounded on the common acceptance of the symbol. And at the same time, the interviewer's questions presented an especially explicit definition of the presenter's role, as vocalist for the national interest, even extending to the plea they fix an appointment to see each other for talks there and then on the air! (See the first of the two transcripts in Table 5.vi.).

Two days later, July 10th, there was a short 24 Hours piece by the presenter alone on the strike. It was mostly about the state of emergency that the Government had declared that day, but it argued in unison with the Government that it was only declared in order to protect the essentials of life, and furthermore that its provisions were one and all discretionary. All this was certainly one view; but the lack of any analysis of the potential misuse of that discretion enabled by the declaration of a state of emergency may be some indication of the extent to which the British news media do not necessarily encourage open debate on the operation of the State. The TGWU secretary, Jack Jones, was claimed in his absence to be the factor above all behind the deadlock: "the centre and crux". Explanation was again rather thin in this item.

The final 24 Hours item in the sample was cast again very much in the mould of "embattled giants vs. the public good". It interviewed one of the highest paid dockers, at £50 a week, and verified continuing solidarity of the men and their wives. It then interviewed a shipping magnate (Sir Nicholas Cayzer) in his elegant and scrupulous home, and noted the evident confidence of the shipowners in their future. The reporter then concluded his film by noting how the public was put to great inconvenience and hardship while solidly organised labour and solidly organised capital hammered at each other. The message was once again one of identification by the reporter with 'the public good'; with the further implication that the dockers had the
same resources for conflict that the shipowners had. This impression
was powerfully reinforced by the selection of one of the highest paid
dockers for interview, along with his wife who explained during the
course of it that they were having to go without their usual standard
of living, such as steak, etc. The mass of dockers in the small ports
in England, together with the majority in most other ports, were nowhere
near the income-level of the interviewee.

On the 18th of July, This Week also organised a confrontation
between Jack Jones (TGWU), Lewis (chairman of the London Port Employers),
the Sunday Telegraph industrial correspondent who had previously appeared
on 24 Hours, and a studio chairman. As an explanation of the strike,
the item contained a particularly strange and confusing moment: this
came after the industrial correspondent had been asked to set the ball
rolling by giving his account of the background to the strike. He did
so with considerable lucidity, bringing the story right up to the
present. He was then questioned about the immediate factors which had
generated the present strike, and suddenly the lucidity vanished: he
stated that he did not know what it was about, but that it was totally
irrelevant to many dockers. It is reasonable to surmise that this
abrupt shift from confidence to confusion had the effect of largely
cancelling out the degree of comprehension of the strike that had
been built up for viewers of the programme by his initial presentation,
in that he appeared to be stating the virtual irrelevance of the data
in it for understanding the current dispute. In addition, his shift
served to reinforce the stereotype of the irrationality of the dockers
(and perhaps even of strikes in general).

The debate which followed between the four participants
achieved relatively little else by way of illumination. Jones managed
to explain the dockers' case a little, in terms of the rate of price-
inflation, their repeated inability to get the employers to negotiate
a new basic rate over the previous four years, and the more highly
paid dockers' solidaristic concern for dockers in smaller ports who
would not benefit from the new pay scales under the productivity plans
shortly to be introduced in large ports. The studio chairman, as
can be seen from the questions in the Appendix, once again cast
himself in what is now the familiar television role of public watch-
dog, though in this case it would be fair to say he attacked each
side with equal vigour.

As depth-investigations of the dispute, it cannot be said
that these current affairs items - with one exception - took viewers
significantly further in their understanding of its causes than the
News bulletins. The extent to which the greater time and latitude
available in current affairs television is actually utilised in
practice to perform the role officially assigned to it, is therefore
open to serious question, at least on the basis of these data.
iii. Press coverage

(a) The Daily Mirror. Moving on now to Press coverage, and beginning with the Daily Mirror, the editorial position on the docks strike will be analysed first. There were five editorials on the dock strike, on the 15th, 17th, 24th, 28th and 30th of July. The first was headed: "The Docks: Peace or Disaster?", and laid heavy stress on the "fragile" nature of Britain's economic recovery. It stated that every export, every ship that can be turned around, and "every last ounce of productivity", were vital. Modernisation was claimed as the major objective for the industry itself, and was defined (simply) as a fair day's work for a fair day's pay. Interestingly, the technological overtones of 'modernisation' were absent from its definition. Robert Carr, secretary of State for Employment, was complimented on having passed his first test as a new minister with flying colours; this was a reference to the temporary delay in commencement of the strike.

The editorial on the 17th was headed "The Docks: A Way Out?" It strongly commended the "impartial" court of enquiry as a way for both sides to see reality. It argued it was a wrong strike for wrong reasons, and pointed out that both sides were in disagreement about the cost of the claim being met. "Modernisation" would solve these problems according to the editorial, and was what ought to be the subject of discussion. In any case, talking was the civilised procedure in disputes. The editorial went on to refer to the wages jungle and lingering insecurity in the docks; to argue that the claim would mean an increase of 50% on real earnings (the employers' estimate); and to note the degree of intransigence in the employers' refusal to negotiate during the strike.

On July 24th, the editorial concerned itself with the impact of the strike on food prices. It briefly stated that profiteering was not justified, that it (the Daily Mirror) was watching prices along with the housewife; and that the Government should keep control of prices and be prepared to act firmly if necessary.
On the 28th, it commented on the award from the Pearson enquiry. Headed "The strike: hustle - and hope", it pronounced the terms very fair, with the lower paid benefiting most, and with the inflationary time-rates that would have imperilled 'modernisation' not conceded. 'Modernisation' was once again declared to be the crucial goal. It complimented Lord Pearson, Carr, the employers and Jack Jones on the speed with which they had moved in the enquiry, and publicly hoped for a quick end "to the strike that nobody wants".

On the 30th, when the dockers had accepted the Court of Enquiry award, the Mirror was full of praise for all parties to the dispute. "Dock Strike - The Mirror's Honours List 1970" was the heading. It noted gravely that the UK's "fragile economic recovery" had been dented, but insisted that the strike could have lasted much longer had Lord Pearson not been so speedy and impartial, had Carr not acted fast and worked hard, had Jack Jones not mixed reasonableness with toughness, had the dockers not "fought fair" and shifted certain vital cargoes, had Tonge (for the employers) not dwelt on the paramount need for 'modernisation'. The settlement was in the Mirror's view a credit to everyone concerned, but it lamented that everyone couldn't "use their loaf" like that more often with the result we should all be far happier and more prosperous. The editorial finally commented on how important it was for the impartiality of the judiciary never to be debased by politicians wishing to harness them for a particular purpose.

In many ways, the Daily Mirror's editorial stance was quite akin to the TV News position: one of reproach for both sides on behalf of the 'nation'; one of overwhelming stress on the merits of 'modernisation'; one of continuing emphasis on the value of peace, of the orderly resolution of conflict, of setting limits to the degree of provocation engaged in by either side. The advice to the Government to act resolutely about rising prices of course fell outside the brief of broadcast news; but in every other respect, especially the linkage 'productivity-nation-peace', it was very similar to TV News, and Current Affairs presenters' arguments. While not attacking the dockers
(at any rate in isolation from the employers) it of course did not back them or the employers. It might be argued however that since the 'modernisation' scheme involved a substantial reduction in the labour force, the Mirror's stress on it implicitly favoured the employers' interests to some degree.

Three things stand out about the headlines (see Appendix). The first is the repeated use of the two words 'threat' and 'crisis'; the second is that out of 64 headlines, 14 were about food prices; and the third is that another 8 were concerned with the use of troops to shift perishable cargoes. The constant use of the terms 'threat' and 'crisis' is symptomatic of the rest of the presentation, and is of course a traditional source of some amusement in certain circles about the tendency of the Press to sensationalise everything. To an extent, therefore, it might be right to assume that there are standard cultural understandings which rob these dramatic expressions of some of their impact. Nonetheless, the words do make it quite clear that we, the nation, are threatened, that our economy is in crisis as a result of the dispute, and therefore that we should be extremely concerned about its outcome and the demeanour of those most directly involved. It is thus presented as an event with no implications for anyone beyond the general economic implications of any strike, particularly a major bottleneck in the ports. No one is asked to identify with employers or dockers, but rather to see them as two sectional interests at loggerheads, in a sense split off and insulated from the majority of the population, both by their intransigence and by their readiness to cause everyone else discomfort. The extent to which strikers cause themselves discomfort is rarely if ever brought out in media presentations of industrial disputes.

The third of all items concerned with food prices and with troops gives an indication of how as the strike moved on the focus of the debate became more the principal effect of the strike than anything else. Explanation of the background of the strike was no more likely in the Daily Mirror than in television news and current affairs. Even
the one occasion on July 17th when there was a large item on the outside pages headed "What the dispute is about - and why", the explanation was reduced to the disagreement between employers and dockers about the financial implications of the claim.

(b) The Daily Express. The Daily Express editorial position was stated more frequently than the Mirror's, but more briefly (Express editorials are short by comparison): on the 10th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 18th, 20th, 28th and 30th of July. On the 10th, the editorial complimented Robert Carr for not embroiling himself in the dispute early on in the interventionist manner characteristic of the recently departed Labour Government. It went on to hope he could bring all sides together on the docks questions, and that this would presage a major tripartite co-operation between Government, employers and unions on the new industrial relations legislation promised by the incoming Conservative Government.

On the 13th the editorial commented briefly that the dispute should be taken to arbitration since the way it was dragging out was damaging everyone's best interests. (Arbitration, of course, would have been binding.) When the next day the dispute was temporarily postponed, the headline to the leader said "Now - build for tranquillity". It congratulated the participants rather prematurely on the way their good sense had prevailed, and then went on to argue the whole episode demonstrated the need for new industrial relations law so that such a breakdown could not recur. It added that the nation looked forward to this legal change with some anticipation.

On the 16th of July, under the heading "The Crisis - and the Cure", the editorial commended Carr, Feather and even Jack Jones, for their efforts to avert the stoppage which had now erupted into full life. The answer to the problem was stated to be independent arbitration - once again the fact that this would have been binding was not referred to. The editorial went on to argue how clearly the whole
episode revealed the need for industrial relations legislation, especially for secret ballots and a cooling off period. Had there been on this occasion a secret ballot independently supervised, the nation could "at least" be sure the strike-decision was "a democratic decision, democratically arrived at". This implied strongly that there was considerable doubt about the democratic nature of the 80-strong delegate conference which had rejected Jack Jones' personal attempt to avert the strike by recalling the conference to vote on the offer of £20 guaranteed wage - as though Jones' own decision was to be deemed more 'democratic' than theirs. No reason was offered for this contrast.

On the 18th of July, there was a short first leader saying there was no justification for higher prices because of the dock strike. On the 20th the Express headed its first leader "Time To Settle It Now", and argued since there was bound to be a settlement some time it might as well be now before everyone's standard of living fell. 'Modernisation' - which was not defined - was claimed to be in everyone's interests; so "the fresh view, free of prejudice" of Lord Pearson's Court of Enquiry should be allowed to point the way to the solution. One of the fundamental assumptions always hidden in the 'balanced view' ideology is that every dispute can be reduced to something with the formal properties of a certain amount of right and a certain amount of wrong on 'each' side so that it should be settled by compromise rather than in terms of one side on occasion simply being right and deserving to win (though not necessarily to win the absolute zero-sum sense).

In its editorial on the Pearson Court's award on the 28th of July, the Express hailed the award as a sensible compromise, noting that Jones thought it a significant advance and that it was also accepted by the employers. There being no longer any purpose in the strike continuing, the men should get back to work quickly as that would be the best way to finance the award. The heading was "The Way to Peace In The Docks".

In its final thoughts on the subject on July 30th, under the heading of "The Race For The Future", the Express congratulated
everyone as did the Mirror: Carr, Jones, Feather and Pearson, for their cool and sensible approach; the dockers, for resisting the militant minority in their ranks. There was a favourable contrast to be drawn with the melodrama characteristic of the previous Labour government's handling of major disputes. The future was in Felixstowe, containerisation, and 'modernisation'.

The characteristic themes of the Express editorials were the welcome nature of the new Conservative Government's approach to intervention in industrial disputes, the need for a new industrial relations law to avoid industrial disorder, the undesirability of strikes and the excellence of industrial peace and harmony. 'Modernisation' was also stressed, though not with quite the insistence of the Mirror.

The main points to note about the Daily Express headlines are that as against the Mirror there were only 36 items (from the 19th of June to the 31st of July). Words like 'threat' and 'peace' were very predominant in the headlines. Out of the 36, 14 were about food and its price, and 4 about the use of troops to shift perishables; once again, a heavy emphasis on the effects of the strike rather than its causes. The Express also took the opportunity on occasion to utilise the matter in hand to make a somewhat different point which its editorial position normally defined as important. For instance, "Housewives Force Food Prices Down" (July 24th), or "Customer Power Forces Prices Down" (July 28th), or "MP: I Told My Soldier Sons To Disobey Orders" (a Labour MP with two sons in the Army, who said he had written to them urging them not to shift perishables), or "A reluctant dock striker: 'I believe unions should keep their word'": both represented themes dear to the Express's heart, the balancing forces of a free market and the strong tendency to national disloyalty characteristic of the Labour Party and the trade unions. (This conscription of issues to illustrate other issues is a tendency for which the Daily Express is of course popularly fairly well renowned.)

The emphasis in the Daily Express editorials on industrial 'tranquillity' is effectively represented in the headlines. Essentially
what happens in both the Mirror and the Express is that the conflict is formalised into an "argy-bargy bad", "tranquility good" inferential structure. The whole drift of the presentation becomes "How can this conflict be ended?" rather than "What is it about?" Within this format of course, some parties may be blamed more for its continuation than others, and the Express certainly tends to place more blame on the trade union side in the dispute than does the Mirror, and correspondingly less blame (if any at all) on the employers. But it is important to recognise that the Express strategy regarding labour and the trade unions is not one of constant vitriolic tirades (approximately 50% of its readership is manual stratum so this is hardly possible), but rather of the encouragement of rational collaboration between the interests of Government, employers and unions. It is only when this partnership is absent or threatened that the Express attacks the unions. In practice then, with little or no exposure to the full background to the strike from the workers' or the employers' perspectives, the Express reader is presented with a most undesirable conflict which disrupts that harmony which ought to exist between reasonable members of the national community. When reason returns - with the ending of the strike - the editorial is quick to congratulate, amongst others, the bulk of the dock workers for having resisted the 'militant minority' who wanted further industrial action/unreason.

A further dimension is offered by the Express's two items on attempted strike breaking: the Portpatrick harbour incident, and the Liverpool housewife (Mrs. Burrell) affair. The headline for the first was "Row Sizzles Over 'Bacon and Egg' Run", and for the second was "Boss Burrell gets set up to send in her 'dolly dockers': 500 wives sign up to get food unloaded." Certainly both breaches in the strike - the second never actually took place - were exceedingly minor affairs. On the other hand, through presenting them as simultaneously admirable and amusing the Express managed to imply strongly once again that the principles involved in the strike from the dockers' side were not sufficiently serious or admirable to justify the inconvenience and damage to the economy they were causing.
The Daily Telegraph. The Daily Telegraph produced editorials on the dock strike on June 19th and 25th, and on July 10th, 14th, 16th, 21st, 28th and 30th. The day after the General Election, in its third leader headed "Dockers and Doctors", the Telegraph warned that a dock strike was impending, along with pay claims from doctors, and unrest in the motor industry and British Rail. "The same old sharks are swimming balefully around" it claimed, (presumably a reference to the national economic difficulties), and the dock strike in particular could lead to a threat to the balance of payments, reminiscent of a few years previously when Ray Gunter (then Minister of Labour) had talked about "Communist conspiracies" and Wilson about the economy having blown off course. "Is this really a picture of a well-ordered society?", concluded the editorial.

The first leader on June 25th, headed "Dockers' Ditch", hinted the timing of the dispute was not entirely unconnected with the change of Government, but went on to make the point that the legacy of insecure dock employment and even some rather anachronistic employers, were partly responsible for the volatility of the dockers. The position had been greatly improved under the new productivity scheme and the containerisation development; these advances were threatened by the strike and therefore, said the Telegraph, this stoppage must be resisted by the employers. Wage-inflation at 12-14% could not be allowed to continue; and the whole episode showed the urgency of new industrial relations law. "The prize - faster economic growth and much higher living standards - is enormous."

On July 10th, when the strike was first called, the first editorial was headed "Dock Challenge". It said the first national dock strike since 1926 would be a grave threat to the economy and a challenge to the new Government. It would wreck the modernisation schemes, damage British docks' competitiveness and inflate shipping costs. To avoid wage-inflation, to protect 'modernisation', the
Government should be ready to use troops for essential supplies and should hasten to reform industrial relations.

On the 14th when the strike appeared to have been called off, the Telegraph's first leader congratulated the Government on avoiding its predecessor's interventionist approach to industrial disputes as a method of reducing union intransigence. The proffered settlement (by the employers) was presented as being absolutely as far as they could possibly have gone; to have increased basic rate would have "messed up" the progress toward a sensible pay structure by "jacking up" all the rates; to have held entirely firm would have been to risk "literally inmeasurable" damage to the economy, "with innumerable orders lost in the future".

By the 16th of July the strike was back on again. Under the heading "Emergency in the Docks", the first leader outlined the sharp refusal of the strike delegate conference to reassemble until the employers had raised the basic rate. The Telegraph noted that the employers refused to do this because of its impact on every other pay-rate; and claimed that the dockers, as second most highly paid manual workers in the UK, had no pay grievance. Already earning averagely £35 a week, a £20 basic rate would give them £50 a week. The strike was to be explained partly in terms of the past bad labour relations, partly in terms of poor negotiating procedures. But it could not be justified: the failure of the unions to control their members would receive little sympathy from the trade union world, and still less from the public. A long strike would damage the docks and the economy; and an inflationary surrender would have even more damaging long-term consequences. The Government and the employers were right not to budge: "Now is the time to stand firm".

Discussing the introduction of a State of Emergency, the second leader on July 21st labelled it "Reserve Powers Only", and said it was of course to be hoped that troops would not have to be used because of their effect on strikers' determination, and in any case because the strikers might still agree to shift food and medical supplies. Nevertheless, it was right to arm oneself against an
emergency. The editorial went on to castigate Mrs. Castle, the previous Secretary of State for Employment, for herself castigating in Parliament those who were looking for a showdown - "(whatever that means)", said the Telegraph - with the dockers. The Telegraph claimed there was widespread public support for employers who stood up to "indefensible" wage claims; wage claims were in the long run more "expensive" than a damaging strike, and the assumption of emergency powers by the Government was a tangible indication that it realised this truth.

When the TGWU national leadership decided to recommend to local ports that they decide for themselves whether or not to shift perishable cargoes, the Telegraph first leader (July 23rd) stated "Dockers Relent". It noted that individual ports might still decide otherwise, and that the decision was taken in the "wake of Mr. Hands' ultimatum", but also reaffirmed its view that the use of troops would harden attitudes. On the other hand, against this last consideration was to be weighed the impact of the strike's continuation on the balance of payments, Britain's export position, and on EEC opinion. It concluded that both the EEC negotiators in Brussels and the pro-Conservative voters at the recent election, would be united in anticipation of State measures to prevent powerful unions from holding "the rest of the community, including other unions, to ransom".

After the Pearson Court of Enquiry had produced its conclusions, and the day before the strike delegate conference reconvened, the Telegraph's first leader greeted the Pearson recommendations with considerable reserve. The dockers, it said, "have not gained as much as they hoped, but more than they could reasonably expect": they were to receive a 50% bonus in advance of 'modernisation', when they were already £10 a week ahead of the national average for manual workers. There was insufficient evidence of productivity in the docks to match this, said the leader-writer. "Or to put it in the vernacular, should the 46,000 dockers on strike repeatedly be allowed to have both the penny and the bun?" Much of the trade lost in the previous two weeks
had probably gone for good; invisible exports like marine insurance had suffered; and all for a settlement which looked as though it was only buying a temporary respite in exchange for more trouble later on. This was on July 28th.

On July 30th, even though it bargained with the possibility that individual ports might maintain unofficial action, the first leader expressed relief that the strike seemed to be over. It noted again that dockers earned £10 a week more than the national manual workers' average. But it still stressed the ambiguity it thought inherent in the settlement: either it was an end to the feelings of insecurity of employment, and to that extent a good foundation for 'modernisation'; or it might turn out to have been "yet another milestone in the long appeasement of substantial wage claims for which there is offered no specific quid pro quo."

The same secular theology and demonology characteristic of the Daily Express is also to be found in the Daily Telegraph editorials on the docks strike, only perhaps even more so. 'Modernisation' and productivity are the ultimate goals, threatened by the intransigence of the dockers, and even by the flableness of the employers and the Government; though this last point was made in a reasonably muted style. The whole episode the Telegraph held to be proof positive for the desperate need of an industrial relations law to avoid such disasters in future. There was also to be found skulking in the shadows the sinister influence of the Left, far more dangerous than the mere turgiversations and incompetence of the Labour Parliamentary opposition. Since the dockers were already earning well over the national average for British manual workers, they did not need any more money, and therefore apart from their industrial strength there was no reason to pay them more - particularly in view of their low advances in productivity. The only reason for not using troops till the very last moment was the adverse effect this could have on the dockers' attitudes to their employers and to the strike.
The editorial position of the Daily Telegraph may therefore be characterised as being quite unequivocally pro-employer and pro-Government, especially insofar as in the particular instance of the docks strike they were prepared to blazon their new badge of courage as a signal for the rest of industry to stand firm and to hold the line. The only concessions made to the dockers' case were either tactical (e.g. the utilisation of troops) or historical (the tradition of insecure employment). The social class readership of the Telegraph perhaps renders the degree of 'balance' achieved even by the Express not really necessary. At the same time of course its arguments are more detailed and complex in its editorial columns, and to a more highly educated readership are therefore more satisfying on the grounds of representing a careful presentation, than the 'less serious' papers.

Headlines in the Telegraph are generally of a very sober variety, and at least on industrial relations tend not to have quite the barbed nature of some of the Telegraph's headlines on race that will be analysed in the next chapter. Out of 102 items with headlines, 22 of those headlines contained the familiar words 'threat', 'challenge', 'crisis', 'chaos', 'emergency' or 'peace'. 20 of them, increasingly as the strike proceeded, were about food supplies and prices. 8 were about the use of troops to shift perishable cargoes. What may be also of interest is the number of headlines where the dockers are presented as the people with the whip-hand over the situation, and therefore implicitly as responsible for its origination in isolation from any other factors. This was particularly true of the headlines to the editorials: "Dockers' Challenge", "Dockers' Ditch", "Dockers Relent", "Up to the Dockers", "The Dockers Accept". But essentially, the Telegraph headlines, like the Mirror and the Express, concentrate on the here-and-now of the dispute, or its day-to-day developments; and relatively little on its background. All too often, the mere recital of a pay-claim and its rejection (or concession only in part) are held sufficient to explain the situation referred to. So an atmosphere of
ultimately inexplicable crisis is developed, with an enormous vacuum increasingly generated where an explanation sufficient to the gravity of the occasion should be provided. In the case of TV programmes, the vacuum is never really filled at all; in the case of the Daily Telegraph it is filled to a greater extent, but by explanations which underline the irresponsibility of the strikers as the major cause of the stoppage.
(iv) Conclusions

Summing up then the results of this content analysis of the major media output on the 1970 national dock strike, perhaps the most important general conclusion is that the output demonstrated how the maps drawn of an industrial dispute vary between the centre and the right, in political terms. The tendency, even in the Daily Express to an extent, is more toward the centre in those media surveyed with the one exception of the Daily Telegraph. On the other hand, not only has the very considerable common area of discourse and coverage throughout the sampled media to be recognised, but also the implicit bias in this coverage and discourse against rigorously analysing the real implications of the 'modernisation' schemes so often referred to on the docks labour force. These implications, which were common currency among trade unionists with any connection with the ports industry in 1970, came to fruition in a very public manner in 1972 with another national docks strike precisely over the consequences of 'modernisation' and containerisation. Even members of the Government, including the new secretary of State for Employment at that time, went on public record as admitting the genuine grievances of the labour force in the docks.

Only the lack of knowledge and background characteristic of the coverage; only the ritual reassertion of the merit of 'modernisation'; only the inbuilt assumption that conflict is bad and should be avoided or terminated as speedily as possible; only these factors could make possible the huge flow of semi-informative information that poured out of the news media about the docks strike. It was information without an accurate core, but superficially impressive through its volume.

Certain major symbols or myths also spanned the entire coverage in this sample of news media output. Predominant among these was the ideology of 'the nation'. This turned up in various forms: in the
definition of the employers and the strikers as sectional interests; in the repeated appeal to the national interest, to the public, to the community at large; in the continual reference to the economy as a resource and a structure affecting every British person in the same way; in the definition of the State (troops, industrial relations law) as the instrument of 'the national interest'; and last but not least, in the visual ritual of the 'balanced' interviewer/presenter/newscaster/reporter (see chapter 7). It can also be argued, returning to the 'modernisation' discussion a moment ago, that the universal acceptance of 'modernisation' as the public good represents an operational decision in favour of the classic approach "What's good for General Motors is good for the USA" (14). Only the Telegraph quite unequivocally stated that the employers' own progress economically was coterminous with universal British economic progress; but the readiness to take the port employers' definition of the meaning of 'modernisation' at face value amounts to arriving at the same destination by uncritical means.

This raises the further point, about the extent to which the British news media encourage public debate about significant issues. There is little doubt that compared to the news media in many other societies, they do encourage public debate. At the same time, it is necessary to analyse this question in relation to the development of public knowledge in Britain, and not only relative to the development of the media in various societies. It would be possible for the British news media to claim they sufficiently encouraged public debate if a) their screens and columns were not dominated by elite figures; b) if it were not regarded as axiomatic by many journalists that formal structures of interest and opposition coincide with significant opposition; and c) if the level of explanation they provided were of a more meaningful character. These issues will be discussed more fully in chapter 7.
(3) See D. F. Wilson, op. cit., chapter 1, "The nature of casualism".
(4) M. Hellish, op. cit., chs. 3 and 4.
(6) Ibid., ch. 4.
(7) D. F. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 168-71, and ch. 10; M. Hellish, op. cit., ch. 20.
(8) See chapter 3, sections ii and iii.
(14) A famous statement by Charles E. Wilson, sometime president of General Motors, and first Secretary of Defence in the Eisenhower cabinet from 1952.
Appendix to chapter 5

(i) Television news coverage

Table 5.1.a - causes of the dock strike:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low basic hits smaller ports' dockers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th presentation of claim, and all procedures exhausted</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many different pay-scales in different ports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic rate too low for mortgage</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous and skilful work</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dockers had raised productivity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low pay-scales an indignity</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers had rejected claim for £20 basic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers sticking, because industry could not afford claim (= £53 average), and actual earnings were £35 average, and never under £16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanimous vote for 2 weeks' strike notice</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not the new Tory government</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 16 |

Table 5.1.b - explanations of later developments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jack Jones' summoning of delegate conference on eve of strike due to his anxiety about strike pay (Tilbury dockers' chairman)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers no right to keep present basic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision by dockers to reject £20 guaranteed (caused strike)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 4 |

Table 5.11.a - impact on domestic economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strike damaging/threatening economy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much trade lost for ever?</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of total strike still to be assessed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More damaging than 1966 seamen's strike, which 'caused' devaluation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on £</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shares fall</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shares have millions wiped off value</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss bankers gloomy about economy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England may as well put up shutters now (Swiss Banker)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
£250,000,000 a week held up
Strikes have by finish held up £750m
263 ships stranded
normalcy will take several weeks
Cars (= 1/6 U.K. exports) threatened by only
2 - 3 weeks' supplies of steel
30% of imports, 10 - 20% exports still move
Trade figures distorted for some time to come

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Food prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butcer unaffected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat about to rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food in general about to rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit about to rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas dumped at 8000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 million bananas dumped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 million do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch tomatoes, destined for UK, dumped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prices significantly up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(b) Need for price controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demanded by TGWU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible under Tories (Labour MP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price controls promised if necessary by Home Secretary and Agriculture Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want the public to be fed (Min. Agric.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. (Home Sec.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 recent price-rises due to wage demands (MA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price control = black market = poor suffer (MA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = implicitly not against dockers' strike-action.
Table 5.11.c - impact on particular interests

(1) General domestic commercial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Loss (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Damage in terms of steel and cars</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron, steel, paper, chemicals, cars</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£2,000,000 apples threatened</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas at £2lm threatened</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. at £750,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapes threatened, once at £300,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some importers facing ruin</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and exporters badly hit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hauliers losing £5m a week</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many haulage firms will collapse, have lay-offs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs of banana-packers threatened</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tough for wholesalers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesalers &amp; retailers have lost £2m</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Shipowners, employers and dockers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Loss (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shipowners losing £300,000 a day</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipowners lost £5m as result of strike</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers facing new wage-bill of £5m as result of settlement; TGWU paid out £5m in strike pay</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dockers may think modernisation + related pay-rates + employers' final offer worth more than strike (reporter on eve of strike)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why strike when shortly new pay-scales with modernisation-scheme? (Lord Pearson)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroying our savings (docker + wife) &amp;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike may last longer than thought thro' union wealth, tax relief, state benefits (reporter)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dockers enjoying new overtime rates as backlog cleared</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) External interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Loss (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antwerp port will gain</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad for Dutch farmers and smaller D. ports</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70,000 Jamaican banana-jobs at risk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Cyprus economy, where grapes are crucial export</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guernsey food supplies running out</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = implicitly not against dockers' strike-action.
Table 5.11.d - implications of dockers' claim, as defined by employers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implication</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat to productivity + modernisation scheme</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top of manual league, already £10 over av.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would = £50+ av. weekly, £40m annually</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnings already up 50% in 4 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involves 80% rise</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage-bill increase of 50% (employers); of 10% (unions) opposing views quoted by reporter</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 5.11.e - responses to the strike in terms of breaches in it

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islands and oil excepted by dockers</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-channel ferries continue (BR)</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newhaven handling Cyprus grapes</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull says perishables' price to be donated to a charity before they shift them</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry refuses to shift perishables</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool do.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avonmouth handling fuel oil for hospitals</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Shields handling fish</td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilbury handling perishables</td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton refuses to handle perishables</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portsmouth alone in supplying Guernsey</td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antwerp dockers will not show solidarity with British dockers (reporter)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster farmers shipping food in via Fortpatrick</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool housewife organising students and housewives to shift cargoes, in the spirit of World War II</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29

* = implicitly not against dockers' strike-action.
### Table 5.ii.f - the response of the State to the crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) State of emergency</td>
<td>It exists Sweeping powers, but electorally irresponsible to oppose them in circumstances (Callaghan) Prematurely enacted (Jack Jones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Potential use of troops</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence continuously revising its action plans Troops available 24-48 hrs. notice Will troops be used to clear perishables? Either dockers shift p's or troops do When Antwerp dockers last struck, Belgian govt. immediately drafted them into army and sent them back under military command Opposition to use of troops (unions, workers) Market porters won't handle troops' goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 1 9 3 2 5 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Court of enquiry</td>
<td>It exists Request to dockers to return to work (Pearson) Arbitration only way out now (reporter) Feather unsuitable as chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 1 2 1 + 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) General</td>
<td>Relevance of industrial relations law Employers should be leant on (Castle) Neutral, won't lean; will dockers please resume work (Carr) Jack Jones should recall delegate conference (to end the strike); we will not negotiate during it (Tonge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 1 1 5 7 18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.iii - condemnation and support for the dockers, from outside their own ranks.

| Should not strike (Heath) | 1 |
| Modernised Felixstowe is strike-free (reporter) | 1 |
| Employers inflexible & rigid (Tribuno MP's) | 2 |
| Won't handle goods shifted by troops (porters) | 2 |
| Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian, Swedish, French dockers refuse to handle diverted cargoes | 3 |
| Felixstowe joins in strike | 12 |

Table 5.iv - those called upon to speak.

In all, 54 different people, in a total of 142 appearances.

| Tonge | 17 |
| Agriculture Minister | 11 |
| Carr | 8 |
| Handling | 8 |
| Lewis (London Ports chairman) | 1 |
| Retailers, wholesalers, export executives, Liverpool housewife, etc. (23 people) | 28 |
| Other Conservative government representatives | 3 |
| Total no. of appearances: | 76 (= 31) |

| Jack Jones | 19 |
| O'Leary (TGWU) | 10 |
| Total no. of appearances: | 29 (= 2) |
| Other Labour Party spokesmen | 16 (= 7) |
| Rank and file workers and unionists | 21 (= 14) |
| Total no. of appearances: | 66 (= 23) |

Table 5.v.a - the subjects of the questions asked by media personnel.

| How long will the strike last? | 25 |
| Desirability of arbitration? | 10 |
| Court of enquiry? | 8 |
| Return to work during enquiry? | 7 |
| Temporary postponement of strike | 6 |
| Will Jones recall the delegates? | 5 |
| Permission to local ports to shift perishables | 6 |
| Degree of solidarity? | 4 |
| Condition of the negotiations? | 9 |
| Damage to economy? | 12 |
| Reaction to the use of troops? | 10 |
| Unreasonable nature of claim? | 7 |
| Miscellaneous remainder | 18 |
| Impact on ports' wage structure | 4 |
| Total | 131 |
Table 5.v.b - sample of the wording of these questions.

When asterisked ∗ the questions are in my view implicitly hostile to the dockers' or unions' case; or presented a favourable opening for the employers to condemn the dockers or unions. Questions marked with ! are in my view hostile to the employers' case.

July 9th BBC
(to O'Leary): ∗ "What is it that would enable you to call the strike off?" ∗ "But wages have been going up, and the employers say that dockers' earnings now average £35 a week, and that this application is really the hidden form of a large pay-rise?" ∗ "The employers do say that the basic rate has little bearing on earnings?" ∗ "Aren't your dockers concerned at all, Mr. O'Leary, about the damage that will be done to the country's economy?" ∗ "How long are you prepared to allow an all-out strike to continue?"

(to Tonge): "Mr. Tonge, the unions give the impression that a national dock strike is now inevitable; do you see it as bound to take place now?" "And once it gets under way, how long do you think it might last?" ∗ "Can you spell out just how damaging it might be?" "Can you say what shipping will still take place?" ∗ "The intervention of the DEP - you're going to see them tomorrow, both sides separately - can this provide some kind of solution, do you see arbitration as bound to take place?" (U,B: it is necessary to recall that decisions by an arbitration-panel would have been binding on the unions.)

July 9th ITN
(to O'Leary): "Is the strike now inevitable?" "Presumably the Government will now intervene in some way - do you think there's anything they can do?" ∗ "The employers say that if they gave in to your claim it would mean that the average docker would earn probably over £50 a week - do you agree with that?" "If the strike does go ahead and if after some days the Government moves troops in to move food-cargoes, how would your members react?"

July 10th ITN
(to O'Leary): "Is there any sign of a peace formula?" "But you're still hopeful are you that a dock strike can be avoided?" ∗ "What about the possibility of arbitration - is this a starter?" ∗ "But you wouldn't be bound by the findings of any arbitrator?"

(to Tonge): "And you're prepared are you to accept a trade union nominee as an arbitrator?" ∗ "But someone like Mr. Vic Feather or another prominent trade unionist presumably wouldn't be acceptable to you?" ∗ "If the unions didn't accept arbitration, can you see any other solution which will prevent a dock-strike next Tuesday?"
July 13th, BBC
(to Jack Jones): "Is the strike really postponed?" "Can you say what the offer is?" "Will you be recommending that the delegates accept the offer?" "Do you personally think it's a good one?" "If it seemed as though the employers refused to budge on the question of raising the time-rate, Mr. Jones, if they haven't done and you have some other solution, do you think it'll be enough to persuade the dockers that this is acceptable?" "Mr. Jones, this has been a long hard grind of negotiations - some people might allege it's been !! brinkmanship on the part of both sides - whether it's that or not, do you think that these negotiations might now lead to peace in the docks?" (to Tonge): "Is this a climb down?" "Was it really necessary to have this ?? hundred hour brinkmanship business?" (to Carr): "Would you say in any way that you've leaned on the employers to buy out this spot of trouble?" "Is this an inflationary offer - or will it not prevent modernisation in the docks from going ahead?"

July 16th, ITN
(strike back on)
(to Jack Jones): "Are you surprised at the men's decision?" "Unless the employers do increase the basic rate, is there any point at all in recalling the delegate conference to have a chance to call off the strike?" "And no other compromise would ???" "Do you think the strike could be a long one now?" (to Tonge): "Could this gap be bridged?" "Now Mr. Jones says there's no chance at all of the strike ending unless you're prepared to increase the time-rate: are you prepared to do this?"

July 18th, BBC
(to Jack Jones): "What about the not "condition", but good background to (the court enquiry), that the men should return to work?" "So the strike will go on while the enquiry meets?" "How about the prospect of troops moving into the docks?" "You feel that a state of emergency shouldn't have been declared either?" (to Tonge): "Mr. Tonge, what's the employers' reaction to a court of enquiry?" "Do you think it's a likely method of finding a solution?" "It does mean of course that the strike goes on in the mean time?" "You would have liked Mr. Jones to call another delegate conference and have asked the men to go back?"

July 18th, ITN
(to Jack Jones): "It's not worth recalling the delegate conference because of this?" "Are you opposed to the use of troops in the docks to move food cargoes?" "But you don't think there'll be any rough stuff do you in the docks if troops move in?" (to Tonge): "Mr. Tonge, what's your reaction to the setting up of a court of enquiry?" "The unions say okay to the court of enquiry, but they're not going to call off the strike in the mean time?" "The unions claim you're refusing to negotiate with them?" !!"Are you refusing to negotiate while the strike is on?" !!"Are you going to
stick to that, if the strike goes on for three weeks or so - are you going to stay in your office and refuse to negotiate?"

July 22nd, ITN

(to Jack Jones): "What exactly is an essential food - for instance are bananas or grapes or any fruit - are they essential foods?"

"How Southampton for instance have already unanimously decided not to handle perishable goods - do you hope they'll change their minds when they get your letter?" "Even if troops do unload perishable cargoes, would they be handled in the markets?" "In other words, even if troops were used to unload ships, they wouldn't get these goods sold in the markets, because they wouldn't be handled there?"

"Do you really regard this as as far as you could have gone, or could you have given a more definite lead to the port workers in the individual ports?"

July 29th, ITN

(to Jack Jones): "Was the effort worthwhile?" "And you don't think you'd have got this without a strike?" "Although you haven't quite achieved what you came out on strike for, do you think there'll be a united return to work?" "Even on Merseyside?"
(ii) Television current affairs coverage

Table 5. vi - a sample of two sustained interviews on the dock strike from current affairs programmes.

(1) 24 Hours, 15th July

"Have you made any progress Mr. Tonge?" "None at all?" "You said earlier today that now the strike is on we've got no one to negotiate with - as I said Mr. Tonge, Mr. Jones is here in the studio, and he's already said that he's going to ask the employers to sit down and negotiate further; so would you like to say something to him directly now?"

"A very fair offer Mr. Jones - what do you say to that?" "Could I put the question to you Mr. Jones which I've just put to Mr. Tonge: you've seen Mr. Robert Carr today and had long talks at the DEP - do you think that any advance was made toward a settlement?" "I'd like to come back to that in a moment, but you see you say you don't want to hurt the economy - you're bound to, this of course is your strength - is that not so?"

"Mr. Tonge, may I put this question to you; you see Mr. Jones finds you inflexible; he's said that you've said you won't continue negotiations with the unions till they call off the strike; you won't meet him tomorrow if the strike is on; isn't it in the national interest to go on talking?"

"Now Mr. Jones, I must put the question to you: the employers have said absolutely adamantly, firmly, there can be absolutely no negotiations until resumption of work; wouldn't it be more sensible to return to work and continue negotiations on the present offer - as you suggested at the delegates' meeting today?" "...but it wasn't your personal opinion this morning?"

"Do you deny completely Mr. Tonge Mr. Jones' accusation that you've been dragging your feet - I don't mean you personally, but your side?" "You deny this?"

"Well 'quick' wasn't the word you were using this morning, you said that you're prepared for a long strike if need be - how long is 'long'?" "But how many weeks might that be? How long can you stand it? - how long can Britain stand it? - how long can the economy stand it?"

"What do you say to that (Mr. Tonge)? - can you convince them?"

"Gentlemen, could I be presumptuous enough to make a suggestion that you do make an appointment to meet each other tomorrow? Mr. Tonge? Would you like to do it now - fix it up on the air?"

"Do either of you feel you've moved an inch tonight? In any direction? Do you Mr. Tonge?"

"Well, I do hope you'll make that telephone call tomorrow Mr. Jones."
"Would you accept that (the dockers have no case) Mr. Jones?"
"But the fact remains of course Mr. Jones that the majority of the dockers are not on £11 a week and that..." "But what is the average wage of the dockers?"

"Mr. Lewis, can I come to you for a moment; have you in fact refused to budge at all since 1967?"

"While we're on the subject, just for a moment, may I ask you Mr. Jones whether in fact you can confirm that an agreement has been signed as part of phase 2 of Devlin on this agreed rate of £34.10.0 in the London docks?" "So why are the London dockers on strike?" "Why do you have to use the sledgehammer of a national strike to deal with what is by your own admission a local problem?"

"Mr. Lewis, can I just put it to you for a moment; now picking up what Mr. Jones has said; now the dockers have submitted claims they say, seven times in the last 18 months to you, and they add that you have in fact offered them nothing. Now last Monday you came up with this offer: why the delay?"

"But the fact remains, do you see, that it seems to me that every time that there's a major change in the system of Britain's docks it has to take place in an atmosphere of crisis; now do you feel that by delaying your decision to make an offer till last Monday this was helping phase 2 of Devlin to go through?" "Do you not feel that you waited too long - that the patience of the dockers ran out?" "Mr. Lewis, what is your opinion of the dockers' case?"

"Gentlemen, can we go back to the docks for a moment, because if what matters Mr. Lewis is the modernisation programme, are you prepared to increase the basic time-rate of the dockers in those ports that won't benefit from the modernisation programme?"
Pay crisis threatens port plans (19.6). 'All Out' crisis at docks (24.6).
Dockers get a £20 a week peace offer (30.6). Ports warn dockers: £20
our best offer (1.7). TROOPS READY TO MOVE IN ON DOCK STRIKE (9.7).
DOCKS: MINISTER STEPS IN (10.7). DOCKS: LET ME TRY FOR PEACE; SAYS
FEATHER (11.7). DOCKS: MORE HOPEFUL. 2 AM PEACE MOVE DRAMA (13.7).
DOCKS: LAST GASP REFRIEVE (14.7). DOCKS STORM OVER 'WORK ON' PLEA (15.7).
DOCKS: CABINET ACTS ON FOOD TODAY. STRIKE OFFICIAL. STATE OF EMERGENCY
THIS WEEK? WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU (16.7). FOOD PRICES WARNING. 'WE'LL
ACT TO CURB DOCK STRIKE INFLATION', MINISTER. LABOUR ROW OVER CRISIS
POWERS (17.7). NO SHOP PANIC. 'SQUARE DEAL' PLEDGES ON FOOD. TROOPS
WAIT TILL MONDAY FOR DOCKS MOVE (18.7). ROW SIZZLES OVER 'BACON AND EGG'
RUN (20.7). HOARDING ROW GROWS. MP: I TOLD MY SOLDIER SONS TO DISOBEY
ORDERS. Mystery lorries at a lonely quay - but it's all business as
usual. (21.7). TROOPS - DECISION DAY. FOOD PLAN TO DOCKERS (22.7).
UNION PEACE MOVE ON FOOD SHIPS (23.7). HOUSEWIVES FORCXR FOOD PRICES
DOWN (24.7). DOCK STRIKE: PROBABLE RESULT 'ON MONDAY'; MEANWHILE
PRICES MARK TIME. A reluctant dock striker: 'I believe unions should
keep their word.' (25.7). GROCERS WARN: SOME STOCKS LOW (27.7). 82 MEN
MAY END THE DOCK STRIKE TOMORROW. CUSTOMER FURY FORCES PRICES DOWN
(28.7). FEATHER STEPS IN AS DOCKS HOPES RISE. Boss Burrell gets set
up to send in her 'dolly dockers'. 500 wives sign up to get food
unloaded (29.7). BATTLE TO SAVE THE FOOD. DOCKERS BACK ON MONDAY (30.7).

(c) Daily Telegraph

Strike chaos threaten to dockyards (19.6). Dockers and doctors (19.6).
NATIONAL DOCKS STRIKE CHALLENGE TO TORIES (24.6). Threat of first
national dock strike since 1926 (24.6). DOCKERS CHALLENGE (24.6).
Dockers' Ditch (25.6). Docks face dilemma over pay deal (27.6). 'Last
chance' move to find docks peace (30.6). £20 minimum offer may end
docks strike threat (1.7). Struggle for docks power (2.7). DOCK PEACE
MOVE BY PORT GROUP (3.7). DOCKERS' DEAL POSTPONED (4.7). Dock strike
warning of crippling cargo delays (7.7). DOCK STRIKE NEARER (8.7).
SOLDIER DOCKERS PLAN DISCUSSED (9.7). London docks plan at stake in
union talks (9.7). CRISIS TALKS TODAY ON DOCKS. £5 STRIKE PAY FOR
TRANSPORT MEN (10.7). Dock Challenge (10.7). TUC CHIEF IN DOCKS PEACE
MOVE. TALKS AT MINISTRY MALE NO PROGRESS (11.7). Good-tempered aid in
docks dispute (11.7). STRIKE WILL HIT EXPORTS (11.7). DOCK STRIKE PEACE
HOPIES FADING. DEADLINE PASSED IN MIDNIGHT TALKS (13.7). DOCKERS CALL
OFF STRIKE. VOTE TOMORROW ON PAY OFFER (14.7). Dock respite (14.7).
GLASGOW DOCKERS VOTE TO STRIKE (14.7). 29000 DEFY PEACE CALL IN DOCKS.
CRISIS TALKS TODAY: 159 SHIPS IDLE (15.7). STRIKE WILL MEAN STEEL
RATIONING (15.7). 5-WEEK STRIKE RISK IN DOCKS. 2000 TROOPS COMING
BACK FROM ULSTER (16.7). DEADLOCK COMPLETES (16.7). MEAT PRICES TO
RISE AFTER A WEEK (16.7). REPORT TO CABINET BY MAUDLING (16.7).
Chapter Six: The coverage of race relations

Following the last chapter's coverage of the 1970 national docks strike, this chapter will concentrate on the coverage of material under the general heading of 'race relations' over the same period: June 19th to July 31st, 1970. There is no single issue which dominated the news media output in the same way related to race, as there was to industry. Nevertheless, an analysis of the TV output over this period, as of the Press output (in the three newspapers selected), does show certain frequency patterns. The three issues which together took up most of the time and space devoted to race relations were immigration (which without exception meant black immigration), domestic race relations, and the debate about providing arms for South Africa's government. In the case of the Press, therefore, content analysis will be restricted to investigating the kinds of coverage these three areas received; in the case of television, the net will be cast a little wider. The television and press coverage of each topic will be taken together, and not separated as in the last chapter.
(1) 'Immigration

(a) Television coverage. As can be seen from Table 6.1 on TV coverage appended to this chapter, out of 37 items and 118 minutes of air time, on British race relations, 28 of the items and 79 minutes of the air time were devoted to black immigration, rather than to the relationship between racial groups as such in British society: 76% of the items, or 67% of the air time.

Beginning then with the questions of British internal race relations and black immigration, it is quite clear from this sample that for the TV news media the most important component of British race relations was the immigration question. Insofar as in this study interest is less in single acts of (mass) communication than on the continuous maps of social life drawn by the ongoing output of the news media, this heavy weighting in the material on Britain is very significant. It demonstrates that whatever the mode or modes of presentation of these items might have been, the effective definition of the area of most concern in British race relations was immigration. Whether you were "for" it or "against" it was a further question; but that it was the nub of the question, was not in doubt.

Hartmann and Husband found in their survey of the British Press between 1960 and 1969 an identical picture, that immigration was the major category of news about black people. They conclude that the Press has continued to project "an image of Britain as a white society, in which the coloured population is seen as some kind of aberration....rather than as "belonging" to the society" (1).

It may reasonably be argued that this characteristic of news presentation on television represented a very considerable victory for the view reiterated in one wing of British politics that when it came to "immigration" (that is, black people), "numbers are of the essence" (2). It raises the further question of how far Enoch Powell in particular has succeeded in grasping a similar relationship with the news media that Senator Joseph McCarthy managed to achieve in the United States (3). In other words, once it was clear following Powell's
speech on black immigration in Birmingham on April 20th 1968 that sections of the public were prepared to take overt action (stoppages, marches) for and against his position on this subject - that is to say, that he and it were undoubtedly "news" - then both he and other politicians expressing these views gained a place in the public political spectrum which they had not enjoyed previously (4).

Once again, the study by Hartmann and Husband elicited data which support this analysis. Even among schoolchildren they discovered a keener awareness of Powell than any other politician. In their newspaper survey, they found that over 1968-69 one-sixth of all newspaper items on British race relations had some reference to him. As they say,

"It seemed as though once Powell and his views became incorporated into the frame of reference within which race in Britain has come to be reported the press found it difficult to mention the subject without bringing Powell into it" (5).

The result has been arguably that despite the personal distancing of quite a number of journalists from Enoch Powell on this subject, the categories employed by both him and the news media have been virtually the same, with consequent powerful reinforcement of his definition of the situation. This is discussed further in chapter 7, section iii.

(b) Press coverage. The Daily Mirror had no editorials during this period on the subject of black immigration. It had 9 items, as against the Daily Express' 20 and the Daily Telegraph's 46. Five of the Mirror headlines (quoted in the Appendix) concerned illegal immigration, and apart from the first front page one which appeared to be presenting the illegal Indian immigrants as a form of contraband ("seized", "swoop"), the headlines seem fairly straightforward (6).

The Daily Express editorials on black immigration appeared on June 27th, July 3rd and 21st. On the first occasion the Express attacked what it labelled the "ploy" of British citizens of Asian descent living in East African countries to gain admittance by being
shuttled about the world's airports for a few weeks in the confident expectation the UK would eventually give way and let them in. It argued that travel firms and airlines carrying them should be warned they would be refused facilities in Britain if they continued to do so. This was certainly one interpretation of the plight of this virtually stateless category of persons created by the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act (7), though there was complete omission of consideration of their plight or of the impact of being in transit for weeks at a time.

On July 3rd, after 40 illegal immigrants from India had been found by police in a cellar in Bradford, the *Express* labelled the traffic slave trade and said it had nothing to do with policy on immigration one way or the other; that it was a humanitarian issue; that people should not be compelled to travel long and devious journeys at extortionate prices; and that the police of all countries should unite to end this exploitation. To claim the traffic had nothing to do with immigration policies was not entirely accurate, since in the presumptive absence of tight immigration control laws, they would not have had to enter by that route in the first place. Since they were also able to find work, it can hardly be claimed either that laws against black immigration reflected the particular labour needs of the economy at that period. The July 21st editorial, headed "The Real Quarry" sounded more or less the same note, stressing it was the organisers and not the immigrants who were being rightly hunted in a massive police operation. The traffic was again designated as a 20th century slave trade.

14 out of the 20 *Express* headlines were concerned with illegal immigration, and presented it in extremely dramatic terms: 'swoop', 'ghost ship hunt', 'smuggling racket', 'immigrant hunt swoop', 'migrant alert', 'Pakistani smuggling plot', 'police clamp on migrant coast' (my italics), 'channel police link to foil immigrants', 'CID "sailors" swoop on boatload'. There was also a reference on July 2nd to the 'Black Hole' in which the immigrants were found. Hartmann and Husband (8), rightly in this writer's view, comment on this headline that the
likely effect of such a headline is to encourage readers to link past colonial relationships to Indians, with present race relations in Britain. But perhaps the most alarmist headline of all was, "Illegal migrants pay with drugs". To unite illegal black immigration with the much-feared and little-understood phenomenon of the spread in Britain of dependence on dangerous drugs, seems heedless of the likely impact on public anxiety of such allegations.

The two Daily Telegraph editorials on black immigration appeared on June 29th and July 7th. The June 29th one was the fourth leader, and was entitled "Sense About Immigration". It was by way of an authoritative notice of a series of essays published by the Institute of Economic Affairs, called Economic Issues in Immigration. The editorial began by noting that "cant and bigotry" of many varieties had characterised the British discussion of immigration into Britain. It instanced the backfiring of the Alf Garnett character-series on BBC TV as a spur to racial tolerance, and the uselessness of supposing that without open discussion the issues will disappear, as failures of liberal attitudes on the race question. It therefore welcomed the book as a "dispassionate" study of the economic impact of "mass immigration" (my italics). It noted that the theory of labour shortage was kicked downstairs by one author as a total fallacy, and that this calm study concluded the net effect of immigration "was not encouraging". It found the "most impressive" arguments to be in one chapter, which argued that compensation to East African Asians refused the admission guaranteed by their passports should be debited against aid to the East African country in question: "hardly more than justice, surely", claimed the editorial. It also noted that "the general theme seemed to be that we had acquired a large migrant population in a fit of absent-mindedness", and that one of the economists had argued for the reconstruction of Britain's citizenship laws.

This very last point raises most sharply of course the whole tenor of the editorial, which seemed to argue that on a rational view the admission of black migrant workers had been most ill-advised.
(an implication being perhaps that it ought to be rectified). Why
the premises of particular economists should be assumed "dispassionate",
and in particular how citizenship law could properly be handled by an
economic model, was left unstated. It was possibly significant that
another book on the economics of immigration published about the same
time did not receive the same treatment, although referred to briefly
on the inside pages of the Telegraph (July 2nd), which conversely
argued that immigrants had made a once-for-all positive contribution
to the British economy. What should not be overlooked, however, was
the general assumption that economic arguments were a legitimate level
at which to place an overall minus-sign or plus-sign against the presence
of black people in British society.

The July 7th editorial concerned itself with illegal immigra-
tion, and was headed "Gatecrashers". It estimated on the basis that
one hundred illegal migrants had been discovered in the previous six
months, that detection for most crimes was a little under 50%, and
that it was likely to be lower than average for this particular offence,
that perhaps 6000 people had illegally entered over the previous decade.
The numbers did not matter, said the editorial; but the profit made out
of extortion, the threat of blackmail, the loss of citizenship rights,
should be stopped. "They are our new helots", said the Telegraph.

There appears to be a disjunction between this position of
editorial rectitude and humanitarian horror, on the one hand, and the
definition of the subject in the columns on the other. The heading
alone - "Gatecrashers" - tells quite a different story; and if all 46
headlines of the Telegraph in the sample are analysed, the discrepancy
becomes still clearer. "Asian queue-jumpers", 'police seize "smuggled
Indians" boat', 'international gang', 'police step up hunt', 'European
check on Asians', 'monaced by blackmail', 'protection link', '2000
Indians smuggled in', 'migrants plot' (my italics) 'immigration controls
"inefficient"', '68 more', '3000-a-year illegal entry', 'world ring',
'stronger action on immigrants', 'police talk of migrant register',
'doubt cast on migrant figures', 'coast blockade for immigrants'
(my emphasis), '4 countries tackle immigrants', 'Indian "tourists" flooding into Bavaria', 'Bavarians and Indian "invasion"' (my emphasis), and finally 'Big increase in Special'.

It is clear from this what a wafer-thin gap exists between condemnation of exploitation of illegal immigrants, and concern at the efficiency of an international operation in increasing the numbers of black 'invaders'. In the Telegraph as in the Express the headlines betray a drift into a laager or siege mentality. 36 out of 46 Telegraph headlines are about illegal immigration, either via smuggling or by shuttlecocked East African Asians. The whole focus, despite one disavowal in the editorial in each paper, is on the migrants themselves. The significance of this focus, and its relation to the ideology of the nation, is something which will be discussed further on.

However, it is worth making one remark now, before proceeding to the next section on domestic race relations. It might be argued that the volume of material on (black) immigration was generated by a sudden wave of illegal immigration; and that consequently the weighting toward this topic in the treatment of British race relations by the news media was accidental or occasional. This view is effectively contradicted by two considerations. Firstly, the findings of Hartmann and Husband, cited on page 176. Second, by the astonishing ratio between the amount of attention and the numbers actually involved: as already noted, the Daily Telegraph was active in its condemnation of illegal immigration, yet estimated that perhaps 6000 people had illegally entered over the previous decade (amounting to 0.0001% of a population of 50 millions). If any index were needed of the importance of black immigration in the dominant media analysis of British race relations, it is this ratio of media space to immigrant numbers.
ii. Domestic race relations

(a) Television coverage. Moving on to the coverage of domestic race relations that did not deal with black immigration - the minority remainder - it is most convenient to concentrate on just five topics. (Those included along with items on external race relations under the heading Miscellaneous in Table 6.1 were subjects like a 10 second shot of Prince Charles talking to some Africans at the Commonwealth Secretariat, some English Jews doubting Soviet Russian promises, the threat to the life of a Kenyan athlete (source uncertain) competing at the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh, and so on.) The five significant topics were three items in the News on the shock of the new Conservative minister of housing at finding 32 West Indian tenants in a single Brixton house, on the annual report of the Community Relations Commission, and on a march by West Indians on Caledonian Road police station in London; together with two current affairs items, one on racial discrimination by private employment agencies, the other on the difficulties suddenly encountered by a white man whose skin had been darkened by a kidney ailment. In their various ways, all these items were important tests of the presentation of race relations in the British news media: housing, employment and the police are all key institutions in British race relations; the Community Relations Commission is one of the two major administrative agencies sponsored by Government in the race relations area; and the opportunities for a white person to experience English life as a black person, without the escape-route afforded by temporary pigmentation, are virtually non-existent.

The three news items were extremely short, occurring on 7 different bulletins and taking up only 10 minutes of air time between them. (The contrast with the time allocated to black immigration is once again inescapable.) The presentation given to Peter Walker, at that stage the new Conservative Minister of Housing, as he expressed shock and anger that people could be forced to live in such cramped conditions, fell into the category of relaying without questioning.
In other words, virtually any person who had any experience at all of housing in inner London boroughs over the previous 20 years (quite apart from any earlier period), knew that such conditions existed and in certain wards were commonplace. To have condemned the conditions (as he did) was one thing; but surprise ill became the Minister of Housing. This information had been made available intermittently in the news media for a decade or more; and his own officials could have given it to him from the Hilmer Holland Report or the Cullingworth Report (9). Neither on the News nor elsewhere on television was there evidence of the independent questioning role that for most journalists represents the perceived stock-in-trade of their profession.

The annual report of the Community Relations Commission was discussed on TV News by its then chairman Frank Cousins, who was soon to retire from his post. He enunciated one standard view on the nature of British race relations. In this case the component elements of the definition of the situation were as follows: the real race problem in Britain consisted of those politicians who like Enoch Powell inflamed people's prejudices; the link between violent attacks on Pakistanis and the 'skinhead' phenomenon was unfair to the 'skinheads', since it was only a minority of hooligans within that group of young people who were actually guilty of these assaults; and the alienation between black people and the British police force could be ascribed to the fact that only a tiny proportion of black people actually entered the force.

Now one of the most standard characteristics of a situation of racial conflict is that there are at least two definitions of every situation. In this instance, commonplace views which diverged from the above included the view that Powell was helpful by ventilating a live issue which had been 'swept under the carpet', or that he was only able to have his effect because of the virulence of British racism in the first place. Some people denied that the phenomenon of 'Paki-bashing' was only to be connected with 'skinhead' assaults; rather that there were assaults, some of them by 'skinheads', on Pakistanis. Views on the relation between the police force and black people also included
one that no problem existed at all and that qualified black applicants never presented themselves; and alternatively, that black policemen and policewomen would be treated as renegades by their reference groups. None of these alternative interpretations was presented to the public; and further, no black person was asked to speak about any of the three points raised. In the same way that the coverage of the docks strike gave little prominence to the views of ordinary people as compared to the various elite figures involved, so here there was the spectacle of the white head of a government agency in charge of 'community relations' speaking on behalf of black people in an apparently authoritative manner.

Certainly the reporter's questions gave no hint that what was being discussed was hotly contested in the country among the people referred to (10); on the alienation of the black population from the police, he asked "This view of the police is obviously something you'll have to tackle - how do you propose to do it?" The whole drift of the question presupposed, not that there was any truth in the allegations of harassment and worse common among black people in Britain, but that it was a view which had to be tackled. There are strong implications in the phrasing of the question of irrationality to be conquered. It may be said then that the reporter on this occasion was very much a party to the impression of the bulletin-item that disagreement on these components of race relations was confined to Powellite politicians, 'skinhead'-haters, and anyone who could not understand the value of having "several hundred" black policemen and policewomen (Cousins). Given that this item was so rare an opportunity for the British public to understand more about the real complexities of British race relations, its limitations were considerable.

The two bulletins (BBC and ITN) which covered the march by West Indians on the police station in Caledonian Road, Islington, were quite different in style. News At Ten simply rehearsed the charges against some of the participants in the march: obstruction, abusive words, wilful damage, assault on a police officer. It added that in
the courtroom there had been shouts from the gallery of "fascist pig", and some Black Power salutes. The bulletin offered no explanation of why the march had taken place, nor were any of the participants interviewed for their versions.

By contrast, the BBC at least had a relatively well-informed white journalist who lived locally and had some contact with the problems of the area, to present his view that a common pattern in the neighbourhood was for the general frustrations experienced by Blacks and Whites alike to be ventilated on each other, rather than on their real sources. This was not an explanation of the actual march, nor did it necessarily represent the local Blacks' views on the situation; but at least it offered some possible illumination on the general background to the occurrence, which was completely absent from the ITN account. It thus represents a departure from the more usual news items on race relations which have been surveyed so far.

The two current affairs items (both 24 Hours), on racial discrimination in private employment bureaux, and on a man in Poole, Dorset, whose skin had turned brown after a kidney disease, were both important because quite atypically for the news media as a whole they raised the question of whether the problem in British internal race relations is primarily constituted by black immigration or white racism. The piece on employment bureaux centred around the Conduit chain in London, where a group of former employees who had been dismissed for publicising the management's unofficial discrimination policy, confronted the Conduit managing director. It was an important item, because it became apparent that the management had even gone to the point of issuing a written and official statement of policy against racial discrimination, as a prophylactic against prosecution under the Race Relations Act. The ineffectiveness of that legislation to cope with the subtle and pervasive practice of discrimination in employment agencies was thoroughly ventilated, against the protests of the managing director.

The Poole man with the kidney complaint, George Tonkin, described how after his skin had changed to being brown strangers had
accosted him in the street and called him 'wog'; how in a club that he had entered to play snooker, a member refused to play against him; and how he suspected that combined with his kidney ailment, his new skin-colour was making it almost impossible for him to get a job after having recently left hospital. He and his wife (who was interviewed with him) admitted to going out together only in his car, in order to avoid the stares people gave to an apparently mixed-race couple. His wife, painfully, confessed to her own racial prejudice, and the personal torture that being identified as the wife of a black man inflicted upon her. Mr. Tonkin stated plainly that he had had not the slightest notion of how much racial prejudice was rife in English society, until his own involuntary change of colour. The very significant statement that was being made about British race relations was somewhat defused by the interviewer, who instead of developing those implications chose instead to ask them what they now thought of racial intermarriage. Given the great infrequency of racial intermarriage in Britain, its occurrence mostly in certain highly specific status categories, and its peripheral connection with the real fabric of British race relations, this question must stand as a clear instance of the misdirected redetermination of the course of a discussion by a presenter who had apparently little awareness of the social realities with which he was dealing. Nevertheless, those two items together constituted an unusual chance to understand race relations in Britain from a "non-immigration" perspective.

(b) Press coverage. Domestic racism was discussed in one Daily Mirror editorial on June 24th. Entitled "Colour Unconscious", it was a comment on the Annual Report of the Community Relations Commission (already mentioned in the TV analysis), and effectively accepted the CRC's definition of the racial situation. It argued that what was needed to overcome racism was "colour-blindness", and claimed that the solution lay in the hands of black and white young people, who were mostly free of colour prejudice. Attacks by 'skinheads' were explained in terms
of their proclivity for assaulting anyone defenceless. The grounds of racial prejudice were stated to be the feeling by Whites that their jobs and living standards were threatened, or the feeling by Blacks that they didn't have a fair chance. Schools and community relations councils were declared to be vital agencies in combating both prejudice and the enoch powells who would always be with us. If they did not manage to fulfil this role, violent conflict would plague British society.

Precisely the kind of liberalism which would enrage the Daily Telegraph's leader writers, this definition resembled the BBC item on the Report in owing very little to the realities of life either among the young (black and white), or in schools or community relations councils. There was displayed in the editorial an inbuilt assumption that schools are islands of racial understanding and harmony, and that the community relations councils are effective in promoting that harmony further (11). And, with the CRC Report, the significance of attacks by 'skinheads' on Pakistanis was muted by the statement that vicious hooligans will exercise themselves on any target, and are not simply racialist. Why this should be a sign of hope for the future was not explained.

Out of 15 other items on domestic racism, it is hard to find a clear pattern. The three outside page items were about demonstrations against white South African participation in the Wimbledon tennis tournament, a white English policewoman marrying a Kenyan Asian constable, and the Caledonian Road police station demonstration. Two items on medical incompetence by Commonwealth doctors, a reference to the high cost of a murder case involving Pakistanis, and a report of a white businessman in court that he had been pilloried and threatened by Michael X and some of his associates, might be thought unfavourable elements in the map drawn of black members of the society. The headlines were favourable to the Community Relations Commission (2 references) and the Race Relations Board (1 reference).
It would be fair to say that the Mirror's position on race relations was one in favour of harmony and assimilation, and hostile to anything that threatened that harmony, whether Powell's speeches or the Caledonian Road police station demonstration. The item about the police marriage which received such prominence did so not only out of rarity value, but perhaps even more so for its significance as a potent symbol of assimilation at a particularly sensitive location in the social structure. The Mirror's capacity for explanation or critical comment (in the case of Peter Walker and the Brixton tenants, or the Caledonian Road affair) was however as weak as that of TV.

The Daily Express had no editorial at all on domestic racism; to a certain extent this analogue with the absence of a Mirror editorial on immigration during the period of the sample gives a clue to the difference in emphasis on race relations between the two papers, the Mirror being less concerned with black immigration and more interested in the internal situation, and the Express the reverse. However, these distinctions should not be made too much of: the Express had 25 items on domestic race relations, only one less than its items on black immigration.

The allocation of prominence was identical: the three front page items in the Express during the period were the Wimbledon tennis demonstration, the marriage of the two police force members, and the Caledonian Road affray. On the other hand, there was a markedly greater tendency to report highly unfavourable items in the Express. To the Michael X story and two references to the incompetence of foreign doctors, were added no fewer than 5 references to two murder cases involving Pakistanis (identified as such), 3 references to violent crime by black youth, and another one to the Caledonian Road episode. The Express approach to racial harmony may be gauged from two headlines: "Headmaster ends race hatred in the boxing ring", and "Learning English with an Eton accent". The map drawn for readers of the Express would be likely to serve to reinforce any hostile prejudices they already held against black people.
The *Daily Telegraph* editorials appeared on June 24th, and July 1st, 3rd and 20th. The first, headed "Tennis and the Demos", began with a nod in the direction of condemning harassment of black immigrants, but spent most of its space on Peter Hain and the threat of demonstrations against white South African participation in the Wimbledon tennis tournament. It argued that it had not been the merits of the case, which were "obscure and debatable", that forced cancellation of the South African cricket tour, but the threats of disruption. It argued that if the conspiracy laws were not sufficiently well framed to prevent this recurring, they should be reformed.

On July 1st, under the heading "Colour Obsession" the *Telegraph* attacked the annual report of the Race Relations Board. The Act itself, it stated, was to a great extent "silly and potentially mischievous"; and so was the latest Annual Report, which actually lamented the low number of complaints against discrimination that it received. In the view of the *Telegraph*, this could lead to a situation where "some official could go round bawling to every coloured immigrant that he should examine all his failures in life to see if colour may not be the cause." The ability of the Board to initiate its own complaints could well maintain colour consciousness beyond its natural life, complained the editorial, and "will contribute nothing to integration".

On July 3rd, under the heading "Walker Appalled" it commented on the Housing Minister's visit to a multi-occupied house in Brixton. The indignation expressed by Walker struck a different chord with the *Telegraph* to the theme of race relations. Indeed, it explicitly denied that this form of wretched accommodation was due to exploitation by landlords, black or white. The root cause of the problem, which a Conservative government would be ready to tackle at source, was "the general shortage and misallocation of houses". The answer to the problem lay not in rent restriction, itself a major contribution to the problem, but in "a freer market in housing, with subsidies more sensibly distributed." Effectively, the desire to defend landlords
against attack overrode the racial consideration of the story; the editorial even compared landlords and immigrants as people who could not win, either by being crammed together and tolerating it, or by evicting people, or by getting good housing (respectively).

On July 20th, the editorial surveyed racial exclusiveness around the world, with particular attention to Kenya, under the heading "Not so much race as ..." It argued that in Kenya, despite unpleasant and racialist overtones in the opposition to non-nationals, the desire of Kenyan nationals for a "place in the sun" when colonial rule had been over for some time, was entirely comprehensible and legitimate. It went on to argue that some "moral indignation" about the plight of those Asians who had their promises reneged on "(for whatever empirical reasons)" would be much more in place that protests against apartheid in South Africa about which we could do nothing.

Out of the Telegraph's 45 headlines on internal race relations, only two reached the outside pages, and then neither in very great prominence. The one was recording Powell's record majority in the General Election, the other the Caledonian Road affray. 4 items covered post-election arguments by defeated Labour MPs that Powellism had contributed to their defeat; and another 4 were on a murder case involving Pakistanis (already mentioned). The headlines on this last issue were quite unnecessarily race-related: 'No body murder QC tells of Pakistanis' lies', 'body in sea story by Pakistani', 'Pakistani bore no sign of torture, court told', 'Pakistani in plot to hide wife's body gets 10 years'. A further 13 headlines were related to the Community Relations Commission or the Race Relations Board, which clearly formed a topic-area of special interest for the Telegraph (and of special hostility as well). The Peter Simple column in particular specialised in biting attacks on the 'success story' of the race relations industry, as the one major growth area in the British economy. It also violently attacked the Race Relations Board for attempting to institute totalitarian thought control to prevent us thinking what (racist) thoughts we wished, and described the regret expressed in the RRB's Annual Report
at the low number of black people complaining against discrimination to it, as "Think Bigot!" Lastly, it was clear that the Telegraph on this and other counts, rejected any objections to Mr. Powell - especially to his right to state his views as and when he thought fit. The prominence given to his record majority by itself is no special indication of this, since other papers and TV bulletins did the same; but the next headline, quoted in the appendix to this chapter, is to a quotation from the New York Times accusing Powell of deliberately encouraging racialism, and Heath of failing to counter it: "Progress of a lie" (in the Way of the World column). And the sudden elevation of a member of an obscure immigrant association in Wolverhampton to a quite prominent and large placing on the inside pages calling for Powell to head a new "race ministry" seemed calculated to try to dampen the public image of the (obvious) reaction to Powell among black immigrants, as unfavourable. It seemed to be predicated on the argument that if one immigrant can be found to say he is wholeheartedly behind Enoch Powell, then the charge against the latter of being a racist is unfounded - presumably because the black population is divided on this issue.

In general, the stance of the Daily Telegraph on domestic racism was to oppose it in declaratory terms, while considering that any of the governmental actions against discrimination contributed directly to its persistence. The image of the world in these editorial columns and elsewhere is of one in which order and decency are perpetually being threatened and played havoc with by interference in standard social processes. The very existence of widespread racial discrimination was discounted in essence by the assumption that few complaints to the Race Relations Board meant that few people actually had grievances. It is an assumption of the most extraordinary complacency, and lack of contact with the reality of the situation: integration was defined as meaning no complaints. On the other hand, in the items on housing and Kenya the editorials did betray an awareness of some of the economic
and political realities which lay behind the stories in question. The fact that the issues were concerned with nationalism in the case of Kenya, and with the position of landlords in the case of housing, may well have helped toward the Telegraph's 'supra-racial' analysis.
iii. The sale of arms to the South African regime

(a) Television coverage. The nearest issue to the docks strike in terms of being a continuing saga was the final race-related topic: the question of whether the British government would or should sell arms to the South African government. This accounted for $\frac{3}{4}$ of all the items in this sample (of race-related items), and 28% of the air time given these items. A summary of the overwhelming impression given by the media items on South African arms would be one of vociferous opposition for no very clearly defined reason to a policy predicated on vital British self-interest.

The map of the opposing sides in this debate was drawn in the following way. African leaders and students were presented as opposed to the sale of arms on 21 separate occasions. The official Labour leadership was also noted on 15 occasions to oppose the deal, on the unelaborated grounds that the sale would put Britain the wrong side of the 'colour line', that it threatened the Commonwealth and the United Nations, and that it would damage Britain's political and economic interests. These reasons were presented rather as slogans than as articulated arguments. The public dissociation of the United States government from the British government's intention to sell arms was only referred to once.

By contrast, the bulletins were very full of reasons for the policy. The argument that the overriding consideration was defence of British trade-routes against Russian interference and even attack, was presented no less than 24 times. Over and above this, it was claimed several times that they would be used for external defence only - a sophisticated argument which took in the general argument against aiding a repressive regime to subdue internal opposition, and apparently met it. The Foreign Secretary went on record on one occasion as saying arms might be sold to South Africa with the proviso that they were only to be used externally; and on another occasion, as claiming that trade with South Africa enabled Britain to exert a christian civilising
influence on the policy of apartheid rather than seeing it disintegrate amid the shambles of a bloody and protracted racial civil war. Neither of these statements, despite their contentious nature, was questioned or challenged in the news media; yet it cannot be said it would have been difficult to find people to do so.

Other reasons mentioned in favour of the arms sale were that France already sold arms to South Africa, and on two occasions that her trading position on arms had been enabled by Britain's decision to discontinue arms sales in the early days of the 1964-70 Labour government. The implication was both that if France could defy UN resolutions so could Britain; and that if there was money to be made, why should Britain sit back and watch it go to her competitor?

Criticism of the premise that the British and South African navies, even if combined, would be able to act as successful deterrents to the Russian navy, was only voiced on two occasions; and the South African Government's use of some of the armaments most likely to be sold in recent counter-insurgency operations was never mentioned. Nor was the definition of Russian international policy questioned. It is fair to say therefore that although the opposition's existence was very frequently referred to in TV News Bulletins, the reasons for its existence were rarely and weakly presented - in contradistinction to the reasons for the policy, which were often presented and barely questioned. The 'Commonwealth', the United Nations, the 'colour line', undefined political and economic interests, were all sufficiently vague or frequently challenged (in the case of the first three) to be quite inadequate simply as assertions. Lastly, on the news bulletins, there was never any representative of any southern African liberation group asked to give their views on the sales: at this point there was a complete lack of 'balance'.

There were five current affairs items on the sale of arms, on Panorama (July 20th and 26th), and on 24 Hours (June 24th; July 20th and 22nd). The two Panorama presentations were very different. One was filmed in Zambia, a country whose government had declared itself
totally hostile to the sale of arms to South Africa. It had some
dramatic action shots of students marching to the British High
Commission, to protest and to pull down the Union Jack; together with
some shots of the Zambian police attacking one of the demonstration
leaders. (Subsequently they turned on the cameraman.) After this, a
spread of black and white Zambians, including students, businessmen
and church leaders, were interviewed, all of whom declared themselves
totally opposed to the sale. Their reasons varied from the threat to
multi-racial values, and the economically more prosperous proposition
that black Africa presented, to the threat South Africa constituted to
the countries to its north, and to its internal policies. All these
claims were, for better or worse, unsubstantiated, and therefore
remained assertions rather than cogent arguments.

The other Panorama item was a studio discussion between Lord
Caradon, Duncan Sandys MP and a professor of war studies. The presence
of the latter was indicative of the dominance of the defence aspect in
the organisation of the debate, although questions were only asked of
him first, before the discussion between Sandys and Caradon. The
professor took most pains to distinguish between the conventional view
of Russian interest in the Indian Ocean (the power to blockade the
West's oil supplies), and the actual Russian intention in expanding
its naval resources in that part of the world. In his view, as
regarded the African side of the question it was primarily the political
penetration of black Africa that interested the Russians. The discussion
of Soviet Russian foreign policy only took place on this one occasion;
during the rest of the presentations in this sample, it was either
taken for granted as threatening to Britain's interests; or it was
dismissed by the opposing position as of less weight and interest than
the support given to the South African regime by Britain.

In the discussion which followed, it cannot be said that this
early momentum was sustained. Sandys' arguments for selling arms to
the South African government were stereotypical, even though delivered
with much energy. Oil was at stake; Communism was menacing; the arms
would be used for external defence only. In addition, Sandys claimed there were no democratic African societies: on the contrary, they were violent, racially prejudiced against Indians and Arabs, and pro-Communist. He went on to claim that in general there were some people who would not allow it that Blacks were capable of any wrong, and that Britain was always being made to stand in the dock and was never allowed to point an accusing finger in return. He also insisted on his own principled opposition to apartheid.

Lord Caradon was in a weak position to speak against this policy, since it was known that the Labour government of 1964-70 had maintained the supply to the South African regime of spare parts for previous armaments, and that it had also been responsible for some joint defence contracts with the French government for helicopters and other strategic military material, for sale to South Africa. In addition, his response to Sandys' vigorous assault was merely dismissive, with no attempt either to meet Sandys on the latter's own ground, or to shift the ground. What was almost inexplicable, except within the confines of the British news media assumption that political reality is to be located somewhere along the spectrum of Conservative and Labour opinion, was the selection of Caradon as spokesman for the opposition to the sale of arms. In fact of course, it is a powerful illustration of that assumption at work.

A rather more serious contribution was made by the first of three 24 Hours items on the subject. On June 24th, there was a discussion between the Conservative MP Patrick Wall, fairly well known as a defender of the southern African political regimes, and Abdul Minty, general secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and a South African Indian by birth. Although a dialogue of the deaf, at least some fresh points were made in the discussion which could have increased the level of public information. Wall built his case on the Cape sea-route and the Russian threat; the fact that the UN resolution forbidding arms sales to South Africa was non-mandatory; that the arms which were
proposed for sale would be for external use only, and could be sold with that proviso; and that both France and Italy successfully sold arms to South Africa as well as trading with black Africa (hence negating the argument about economic interests north of the Zambezi).

Minty pointed to the illegal occupation of South West Africa (Namibia) by the South African government, to their substantial presence in the continuing British colony of Rhodesia, and to Vorster's public threat of military strikes against Zambia and Tanzania. He argued that the political significance of being a necessary link in a defence network was more desirable to white South Africans than the particular arms themselves, but was also able to quote the South African chief of staff's endorsement of the proposed weapons as suitable for counter-insurgency warfare. He claimed the sale would weaken the effectiveness of the UN as an international organisation, and that the confrontation building up in the whole of southern Africa would be likely to escalate eventually into a global affair, with many countries drawn in on either side. He noted lastly the close connections between the Conservative Party and British business firms with South African interests; an index being that these firms had contributed a quarter of a million pounds to the Conservative Party's 1970 Election fund.

The other two 24 Hours programmes (July 20th and 22nd) were interesting in different ways. Quite unusually and atypically they both had representatives of southern African liberation movements on to speak about the South African arms question. One was from the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), and the other was from the Pan African Congress (PAC); these two appearances made up 50% of all appearances of liberation movement spokesmen during the writer's entire survey of 1970. The SWAPO representative told the audience how South African planes had bombed his area in reprisal for guerrilla activity, which had clear implications for the argument that the arms would only be used externally. The PAC spokesman, on the other hand, was there to discuss a film he had made on the repression and exploitation of black South Africans, which again had implications for the
argument that arms sales would in various ways help to prop up the regime.

Once these spokesmen were on the air however, they faced rather misdirected questioning by the presenter. The questions to the PAC film director are reproduced in Table 6.11. They illustrate with great clarity the tendency for presenters to cast themselves in the role of impartial middleman between evenly balanced opposites, in the role of chairman of a properly conducted and reasoned debate in which the facts are presented in an orderly and peaceful fashion, and viewers are supposed not necessarily to have made up their minds beforehand on the ultimate merits of the case. When this cultural understanding is not realised, or breaks down, as it did on this programme, it is fascinating to observe the result. The presenter effectively defined the PAC spokesman, Mahomo, as a hopelessly incompetent proponent of his case, and so took over what he considered to be the real case against apartheid and expressed it in his own way, virtually excluding Mahomo from the discussion. On the other hand, it was necessary in arguing the black South African case in the presence of a black South African (who had made a film about it), to make some reference to his presence. The presenter therefore harnessed Mahomo to his argument about there being a global tendency to racial assimilation rather than apartheid, with the consequence that the South African regime was swimming against the secular tide; whereas the whole drift of Mahomo's film, *End of a Dialogue*, is contained in its title and was the flat opposite of what the presenter was saying. One might also instance this occasion as a demonstration of the incapacity of someone only at home in contemporary English culture to come to grips with the harsh divorce of South African political alignments as compared to the relatively muted clash between English political parties: the myth of neutrality and 'balance' is hard to sustain in these altered conditions.

In the case of the SWAPO interview, the questions were simply uncomprehending of the realities of the situation. Instead of focussing on the contradiction between South Africa's declaration of non-aggression
against her neighbours, and her occupation of South West Africa, the presenter asked why so little was heard of the southern African liberation movements. He went on to ask why all the 15 million Africans in South Africa could not do more to help themselves, and then to query whether SWAPO had any "dramatic plans" for the near future. The tone of the former question, and the unlikelihood that the latter would be answered, rendered this rare interview rather uninformative.

(b) Press coverage. The Daily Mirror came out unequivocally against the sale, in an editorial dated July 21st and headed "Midsummer Madness". It admitted that the sale of arms had been part of Conservative election policy, but argued that it flew in the face of the United Nations, that the USA was deeply concerned about it, that at least four East African countries were stunned and appalled, and that even 32 Conservative MPs were opposed to it. The editorial accused the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Hume, of being deliberately confusing by saying at different times that the decision was definite, that it was not finalised, that arms would be for maritime defence only, that consultations were continuing with all interested parties, and that the Government was in fundamental disagreement with the South African's regime's racial policies. It also warned that the policy amounted to a provocation, even an invitation, to young demonstrators, and that had it not been for this they were running short of issues about which to demonstrate. It said the pledge was a major political blunder, and should now be forgotten. An analysis of the Mirror's headlines shows an exceptionally clear correspondence between this editorial position and the stories on the subject.

The Daily Express carried two editorials directly on the South African arms issue, and another four closely related to it. On June 27th it simply pointed out that the Conservative government had a mandate from the electors on a clearly communicated pledge to sell arms to South Africa. On July 21st, the editorial stressed the vital nature of the Cape sea-route for Britain, and said both governments should define their terms and negotiate a sale. It added that the Foreign
Secretary had made it quite clear he would supply arms, but not to support apartheid.

Two of the four other editorials were concerned with Mauritius, one with Uganda and its then President Obote, and one with Labour Party policy on arms for South Africa. On July 17th, under the heading "Danger Signal", the Express noted the new arrangement by the Russians to be allowed facilities for fishing fleets in the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius. It stated that this was how the takeover of Egypt had begun, and said it lent added significance to Hume's warning about the Cape sea-route. On July 20th, it castigated Len Williams, former Labour Party general secretary and now governor of Mauritius, for letting the deal through, and said he should not be reappointed at the end of his term.

The editorial on Uganda was entitled "Influence!", and asked how Britain could possibly be influenced on the sale of arms to South Africa by this "savage, spiteful and preposterous" regime. It was commenting on a recent law which threatened jail for life for anyone throwing an egg at the President, and the repatriation of all UK citizens resident there if arms were sold to South Africa. The editorial on the Labour Party was entitled "Humbug!" and commented on their special correspondent Chapman Pincher's discovery that Labour had negotiated a 30% share in the production of a helicopter which was to be sold to South Africa, and which would be easily utilisable in counter-insurgency battles. The Express commented that it showed the hypocrisy of the Labour Party in trying to prevent Britain from defending its sea-routes.

The headlines make an interesting contrast with the Daily Mirror's on the same subject. Whereas the Mirror's tend strongly to quote opposition from various quarters to the arms deal, the Express headlines pay much more attention to Russia and Mauritius (5 items), to France as a trading competitor (3 items), and to the quality of the Labour Party's principles in opposing the sale (3 items). Opposition is only mentioned once from Africans ("Zambia mob tears down Union Jack") and once from UNO. (By and large Express readers know that its editorial policy on the United Nations Organisation is very unenthusiastic.).
Daily Telegraph editorials on the South Africa arms issue appeared on June 22nd, July 2nd, 11th, 21st and 24th. The first was a very general overview of the probable new directions of Conservative policy, but mentioned as part of this the fact that

"Ideological nonsense in our foreign diplomacy can now be dropped out and a clear view taken of British interests. There is no longer any need for a sham attitude towards South Africa and Rhodesia to placate new Commonwealth countries, some of whom are bent, it seems, on sequestrating British assets. Arms that will serve the strategic interests of Britain need no longer be withheld from the South African and Portuguese forces. Our foreign policy is no longer about some egalitarian theory of nation and race. It is about national safety and interests."

This decisive posture at the outset of the new Conservative administration was vigorously maintained. Under the heading "Arms and Africa" on July 2nd, the Telegraph claimed that the distinction between arms for external and internal use was valid, and that the Cape was a key area in the global conflict between Communist and non-Communist nations. Britain's consequent interest in its defence should not be obscured by "ritual" protests from black African leaders, especially when the possible loss of trade with black Africa is set against the fact that much of it is the product of foreign aid in the first place. Also, "Conservative disapproval of apartheid is a well-established fact." The Labour administration had pursued the alternative policy of refusing arms, but trading as intensively as possible.

The same heading was reproduced on July 11th. Here the American opposition to the sale of arms, for reasons connected with its black minority and its UNO position, was discussed. The editorial contrived to imply that this opposition was due to realpolitik rather than principle, and would not necessarily mean very much in practice. It also said that the negotiations should not be hurried over the arms sale, and that a revision of the letter of the Simonstown Agreement to match the original spirit in which it was framed (as demanded by the South African Minister of Defence) was desirable. The editorial concluded by reminding the readers that Rhodesia was highly relevant
to the whole business, presumably as part of a tight defence network in southern Africa.

On July 21st, the editorial commended Hume for moving slowly, saying the issue was becoming more important than it deserved. The Labour Party was presented as wanting something to attack, and rather regretful that its quarry was not clearly in view. If Tanzania and other countries left the Commonwealth, they would be the only losers. The argument of the former Defence Minister, Healey, that selling arms to South Africa would augment Russian influence in Africa was argued to be out of touch with the realities of African politics; African countries were said to be only too well aware of the implications of Russian military aid. The support of New Zealand and Australia, "two countries which care about sea communications", was noted. The firm intention to sell, combined with the delay in offering specific materiel while consultations took place, was accepted as reasonable.

But by July 24th, the Telegraph was becoming irritated with what it saw as the Government's vacillation and ambiguity on the arms question. It surmised angrily that Tanzania's decision to leave the Commonwealth if the deal went ahead was delaying it, and argued that it would clear the atmosphere if such a challenge was met. The South African government's desire to revise the Simonstown Agreement was not in its view sufficient to delay a firm announcement. It objected strenuously to the "mess", and hoped that if reports that Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania were setting up a "vetting group" were true, such an arrangement might provide a viable solution to the hitch. It headed the editorial "Fog over Africa".

The importance the Telegraph assigned the issue is indicated by the fact that 22 out of 53 of the items were on the outside pages; the Express, which took a similar position, had only 6 out of 23 of its items on the front page (the Mirror only had 11 items in all). 17 out of the 53 were about the opposition to the sale, from the Labour Party, African and other Commonwealth countries, the United States, some
Conservative MPs, the anti-apartheid movement and Peter Hain inside Britain, the Churches, and from the UK. There were only two references to French involvement, the first clearly focussing on the French competitors: "French ready for S. Africa arms 'duel' with Britain". Trade reasons were mentioned twice; Russian influence was mentioned four times, as well as twice in editorials.

The Express and the Telegraph shared a united position in strong support of the sale. The lack of emphasis both placed on the US government's public disapproval was an interesting reflection of their determination the arms sale should not be deflected if at all possible. In fact during this period, the Express simply did not mention the fact.

This is perhaps only one instance however of the major characteristic of discussions of the South African arms issue either on TV or in the Press (including the Mirror, which was opposed to the sale). That characteristic was the absence of most of the real questions: it was presented as national interest vs. humanitarian concern against apartheid. Nowhere was this more lucidly stated than by the presenter in the Panorama discussion between Sandys and Caradon: after the former's violent expostulation against opposition to the sale, he asked "Well even accepting Mr. Sandys' arguments shouldn't we as senior members of the Commonwealth listen to what the Commonwealth has to say?" And earlier he had asked, "Do defence and economic arguments outweigh the moral arguments against supporting an apartheid power?"

The strong economic bonds linking the UK with southern Africa (both directly, and at one remove through British domination of the economy of Portugal), and the overall relation of arms sales as part of the 'good will' between trading nations to this, was never brought out in the public discussions surveyed. Nor was the strong representation in the new Conservative Cabinet of British firms with South African interests, with several Cabinet Ministers having previously held a total of 32 such directorships between them. Only once, in the
24 Hours discussion between Minty and Wall, was the £3 million donated by such firms to the Conservative Party's election fund mentioned: an important index of the strength of the link. Yet all these data were available for any research assistant to discover (12).

Similarly, the planning that was beginning to take place to develop a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation to match NATO, in which South Africa and a number of Latin American countries would be major local participants, was never mentioned (13). As also, the foreign policy drive of the South African regime for international favour, and the great importance of Britain as a lever to recover a 'respectable' image, was left out of account; the degree of success in this latter attempt would in turn be important in negotiating South African interests in the United States, where it was well known that the State Department favoured good relations with black Africa while the Pentagon favoured good relations with South Africa.

Because of these lacunae, the Conservative Government's position was left virtually unchallenged, except by apparent emotion; the syllogism was "we all abhor apartheid; but communism is worse than even that; therefore we will supply arms for external activity only." The categorisation of news output on the docks strike as "semi-informative information" applies with equal force to its output on the South African arms issue.
iv. Various topics in the television coverage

The remainder of the television items are very diverse, and can be placed together only loosely in a category of 'external race relations'. There were 5 documentary or current affairs items (on Black Australians, Indian society, Biafra and mercenaries), and 5 news topics (riots in New Jersey, Rhodesia, MacLeod as Colonial Secretary, an alleged army massacre in Malaya, and a Canadian Indian chief's protest to the Queen). In terms of the self-understanding of the British, every one of these topics had its potential or actual contribution. Properly or badly handled, each topic was a component of the overall map of the world and of Britain's place in it, which was drawn for the British public by television during 1970. The centrality of some items is greater than others, but they all have a role.

In the case of the two documentaries on India, and the current affairs item on the former Biafra, the potential significance was related to the image of Indians and Africans living in Britain that white people hold. The British definition of who Indians and Africans are is partly related to their role here, partly to the historical traditions moulded from colonialism and slavery, but also partly to what little is known or supposed of the current condition of their countries of origin. In the case of Biafra, this last factor was of course further complicated by the presentation of Nigeria and the Civil War over the previous four years at very great length in terms fairly reminiscent of the Congo: the television treatment of the confusion and suffering in the aftermath of the war in early 1970 had been especially graphic (14).

The Panorama item on Biafra (July 1st) concerned itself with the efficiency with which relief supplies were being channelled through to Ibo areas; and with the fate of the Ibo leader who had negotiated and signed the surrender with General Gowon, a Major General Philip Effiong. The desperate situation in which many Ibos found themselves was portrayed by means of the writings of a pro-Federal Nigerian journalist, Tai Solarin, who had publicly attacked the Federal Government for its harshness and inefficiency in the administration of relief
programmes; by means of reports of relief workers, who claimed
supplies were being deliberately delayed; and a Catholic priest,
who said 2 million Ibos were on the edge of starvation. An Oxfam
director was also quoted as saying the situation was very dangerous.
Effiong's teenage daughters were interviewed in Britain concerning a
letter he had smuggled out to them from the prison in which he was
being held. Both were clearly not only upset, but also afraid for
their father's fate. Of its kind, this report was in many ways a
model of attacking journalism, even though the only solutions offered
were getting back the Catholic relief workers who had been expelled
from Iboland for their support for Biafra (the priest), and the lifting
of censorship by the Nigerian government (the reporter). (An unstated
implication could have been interpreted as the need to bring back some
Europeans.) But the programme had a tone and cutting edge to it,
certainly justified by the human suffering to which it drew attention,
which were very uncharacteristic of reporting about Britain from the
angle of vision of the oppressed. Additionally, a by-product of this
attack was that the item fitted fairly snugly into the social definition
of Africans as cruel, inefficient and deceitful which is both a part
of English cultural tradition historically, and is maintained to a
large extent by various media in present-day society (15). (It may
be necessary to add that this is not a covert way of saying Africans
never perpetrate cruelty, inefficiency and lies; but that the nature
of the stereotype is to imply Africans are culturally prone to these
forms of behaviour in a way Europeans are not.) It is very necessary
to recognise that a single item can communicate two distinct messages
on different levels (or more); in this case on a current information
level about Biafra in mid-1970, and on a more general stereotypical
level about 'African' culture and personality. It is also unproven,
but highly probable, that many English people have no very clear
differentiation between Africans and West Indians - the latter being
far and away a larger group within British society. To the extent
that this is so, items like this one on Biafra have an implication
that reaches beyond Africans in Britain.
The two documentaries on India in the sample came from quite different sources. The first, on June 24th, was scripted by the Indian poet Dom Moraes, who lives permanently in England. The documentary focussed exclusively on the various social divisions in Indian society. Religion was investigated, with special attention to the split between Hindus and Muslims; politics was discussed in terms of the fragmented Congress Party, and the fragmented communist parties. The North-South division was mentioned, along with regional and linguistic conflicts in general; and distinctions of caste, and the existence of various 'tribal' groupings were referred to as well. Naturally, it is no more possible to present India satisfactorily in a 50-minute documentary than it is to present Europe; it is still the case that as a single offering the exclusive focus on social divisions and fragmentation which characterised this documentary gave as grossly unbalanced a definition of India as the same approach would have provided if applied to Europe. Oddly, too, the one division which the programme never dwelt on was the very substantial cleavage between rich and poor in India. Certainly, the programme gave no impression at all that India (and so Indians) had anything to offer the world or Britain but a cockpit of warring groups. Interestingly, after the previous item on Biafra, Moraes' script claimed that India's troubles were "like those of any emergent African nation". Whether 'Third World chaos' is the best heuristic device for understanding Africa, Asia or Latin America, or whether it might not be best understood as a form of ingrained social contempt blurring accurate analysis of these societies, must remain an open question here.

The other documentary on India, on July 29th, was one in a series by the French film director Louis Malle, who had spent a very long period in India with the encouragement of the government filming Indian social life at length. (The Indian government later considered Malle's films highly undesirable, and the serial showing of them on BBC2 during the summer of 1970 led to a temporary rupture of relations between the BBC's Delhi office and the Indian government.) The film
will not here be judged in relation to the series of which it formed one part, but in its own terms; as the series was shown during the summer holiday months, many people may have seen only one or two of the series anyway.

The film was a very leisurely look at Indian religious commitments, depicting with some skill and sympathy the patterns of involvement and enthusiasm which could even carry Malle, the western atheist onlooker, along in their wake for a time. It then moved on to take a fascinating look at Indian drama and dance; at the various attempts at diffusion of contraceptive techniques; and at some of the components of the linguistic dispute between Tamil and Hindi. Although the upper middle class audience of BBC2 documentaries was probably not greatly illuminated in its understanding of the specific background of Indian migrant workers in Britain, there is no doubt that in terms of both time spent and sympathetic understanding, this Malle film was far superior to the Moraes' documentary.

The news bulletin items on Iain MacLeod's tenure at the British Colonial Office (following on his sudden death), on Rhodesia, and on an alleged massacre of Chinese villagers by British troops during the Malayan Emergency, were all important in terms of the linkages between Britain's colonial past and present and their implications for racial cultural perspectives. All the items were very short, and so must do duty as samples or indices of how the British news media would handle a wider range of issues concerning colonialism which did not happen to emerge during the period of the sample.

When MacLeod died, the TV News bulletins carried television film of his political career. Certainly the aspect of it which had drawn most party political debate in the past, had been his period in office as Colonial Secretary after the 1959 General Election, at the time of Harold MacMillan's "Winds of Change" speech in South Africa. His and MacMillan's success in getting under way a huge programme of rapid decolonisation against the opposition of the majority of the Conservative Party (16) was certainly the policy with which he was
most associated. It had coincided with the debacle in the Congo, and was associated also in the public mind with the general image of Africans as demanding independence, Britain conceding it against her better judgment, and the Africans not knowing what to do with it once they had been given it. (The extent to which decolonisation was a recognition that Britain could not afford the colonial administration, and did not want the embarrassment of being publicly ejected from colony after colony, has never really penetrated public consciousness in Britain.)

The presentation of his role in decolonisation did nothing to assist a fuller understanding of the processes which led up to it. For instance, the Zambian High Commissioner in London appeared to declare what a good negotiator MacLeod had proved himself to be during his own country's independence-talks. Lord Butler appeared on Newsroom, and argued that as events had turned out, one of MacLeod's most controversial administrative actions during his tenure (the release from prison of the Malawian nationalist leader, Dr. Hastings Banda) had been clearly justified. Given the warm relations then existing between the Malawian and South African governments, and the correspondingly frigid relations between the Malawian and other African governments, this view could in no sense be said to be universally accepted. The reporter in the News At Ten item said MacLeod had helped to put an end to white domination in Africa, presumably referring to colonial domination; in so doing, he was necessarily glossing over the continuing and developing European and American economic hegemony in Africa (17). The generally bland nature of the item was crowned by a clip in News At Ten, which showed MacLeod at a Conservative Party conference declaiming on the subject of the brotherhood of man....a powerful indication of the interpretation of decolonisation in terms of British 'niceness'.

The six news items on Rhodesia were extremely short, and only two points need be made about them, though both are important. They reflected the 1970 television output on Rhodesia closely in that no black Rhodesian, certainly not from any nationalist liberation group,
appeared on then. (In my survey of 1970 as a whole, as already noted, representatives of southern African liberation movements appeared precisely four times.) The other point was that in two (BBC and ITN) bulletins on June 19th the political implications of the Conservative victory for Rhodesia were briefly assessed. The BBC bulletin quoted Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Front premier, as saying the election was essentially irrelevant to Rhodesia and there would be no more Fearless-style talks on independence. The ITN bulletin quoted the Rhodesia Herald, organ of the more pro-Commonwealth section of white Rhodesian opinion, as editorialising about the "elation" that there would no longer be need for the spectre of an independent Rhodesia, given the change in the British government. The corollary of never (or hardly ever) asking black Rhodesians for their views on the progress and future of their country, is items like these which also assume (without having to state it explicitly) that the only Rhodesian opinion which matters is white Rhodesian opinion. The majority's opinion or opinions in that society are implicitly discounted; another instance of a gloss over a highly significant rift.

The "Malayan massacre" as it came to be labelled in the Press, concerned the alleged shooting in cold blood of about 20 Chinese villagers (including women) in Malaya by British troops during the communist insurgency from 1948. The story had first come to prominence in The People earlier in 1970, and was based on the sworn affidavits of four of the soldiers involved. There was also still living a Chinese man who had miraculously survived, although wounded. Earlier news bulletins in 1970 had interviewed the man, and filmed him pointing to the spot just outside the village where the shooting had taken place. This story 'broke' at the same time as the story of the My Lai massacre by US troops in Vietnam, and other similar events in the Vietnam war. It therefore raised the question - though none of the news media did so - of the character of the Malayan Emergency operation by the British army, and the kinds of behaviour actually characteristic of British troops in colonial situations. The issue was referred to
the Director of Public Prosecutions to decide whether there should be a trial of those involved. The items which fell into this sample all recorded that the DPP had produced a negative verdict. Although some protest was raised by some backbench MPs in the House of Commons against the decision to waive a trial of those involved, this did not find its way into the television news accounts of the DPP verdict. This instance serves as another example of the relatively uncritical stance of the British news media vis-à-vis at least certain institutions such as the military, and certain features of British history, such as recent colonial history. The US media, at least in certain cases, present a much less uncritical front.

The reporting of black disturbances in US cities during 1967 and 1968, which in general simply utilised American film of the incidents, was strongly criticised in the USA by the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (18). In particular, the Report of the Commission attacked the de facto communication of the events as black-white confrontations rather than as black social protest against their social conditions: a classical instance of the news media assuming that pictures of rioters v. police explained themselves. The fairly heavy utilisation of American film of these disturbances during 1967 and 1968 certainly had a considerable impact in Britain on public consciousness about 'race': Roy Jenkins, at that time Home Secretary, introduced the second Race Relations Bill to the House of Commons at the time of the massive Detroit disturbance which devastated large areas of the city, and pointed precisely to that devastation as the principal argument in favour of the Bill (the Conservative opposition at that stage was opposing the Bill). And Powell, in a speech in Eastbourne in November 1968 which received wide publicity, predicted that by the year 2000 "there would be several Washingtons in England....With the lapse of a generation or so we shall at last have succeeded - to the benefit of nobody - in reproducing in England's 'green and pleasant land' the haunting tragedy of the United States" (19). (Washington had been the scene of a fierce outbreak of protest earlier that year following the assassination of Martin Luther King.) The tendency,
following the coverage, was to identify the presence of Blacks in a white community or society, with likely violence and disruption - the correlation was conceived in almost chemical terms, as though the two physiognomies found themselves reacting against each other independently of their will. In this context, the two short news bulletin items on one such disturbance in New Jersey were very much an unreflective and unconstructed continuation of the same line. There was simply footage of a street confrontation, without even an explanation of its immediate origination, let alone its general background.

The relation of the news items on the Canadian Indian chief, and of the documentary on Aboriginal Australians, was clearly not so central to British perspectives on British race relations as the items which have already been examined. Nevertheless, the extent of racism in the white Commonwealth, the treatment by Canadians and Australians of the descendants of the original inhabitants (as it happens, non-white) of their territories, does have a bearing on the interpretation of Britain's place in the world. Since most of Canada and Australia has been settled by British migrants who have retained substantial economic and cultural links with Britain, their oppression of indigenous minorities might be thought to throw some light on British colonising traditions and not merely on themselves as an aggregate of individuals.

This bearing was not brought out by any of the items under consideration: the fact that the Canadian Indian chief used the Queen's formal visit to embarrass the Canadian government for its severe neglect of the Indian minority was presented very much in terms of a disruption of protocol involving the Queen. And the plight of Black Australians (the title of the documentary) was seen as the result of white Australian complacency and lack of concern; though in many respects as a documentary, it was a well-produced piece of work. It was timed to coincide with the celebrations of the first landing of Captain Cook, which the Queen attended; but that initial link was the nearest the programme reached to a connection between the Australians and the British. It might seem that the lacuna which is being discussed falls
fairly into the category of one of the many things a documentary producer might or might not have chosen to cover; and certainly from one perspective such a judgment is correct. It is mentioned here less in relation to this particular documentary than in relation to the way this documentary was in line with so much else in British television in that it does not enable the British public to comprehend the full significance of their colonial history for their own present (20).

The last item to be briefly discussed before moving on to the major continuing story of the sale of arms to the South African government, is the item on white mercenaries (24 Hours, July 30th). The relevance of this item lay in its treatment of a role which in many situations is viewed with contempt, which became particularly controversial during the Congo crisis, but which also may be invested with an aura of tough daring. Essentially, the item was an interview with "Colonel" Mike Hoare, living in South Africa at that stage, who had been a prominent figure in the Congo conflict. The drift of the interview was to try to discover the kind of personal qualities which lay behind an internationally famous mercenary. This in turn determined the questions, which were in no way abrasive; and only some of the stills flashed on the screen of scenes from the Congo fighting, while Hoare was talking, gave any lie to his straightforward, bluff, realpolitik presentation of the function of white mercenaries in contemporary African politics. This explanation was along the following lines: Ojukwu couldn't afford me; we saved the Congo; there were lootings and summary court-martials followed by executions, but no atrocities; we were fighting against 'savages' mostly; those artificial frontiers have to be maintained for future prosperity; many Africans see us as a quick way of staging a coup. The stills by themselves did very little to contradict what he was saying, but at the most questioned it. The opportunity for white British people to understand the role of white mercenaries in Africa, and their actual behaviour, could not be said to have been taken.
v. Conclusions

It is more difficult to sum up the basic patterns of reporting on race relations, since only the South African arms issue was anything like a continuing saga, and the data are more fragmented and occasional than the docks strike. Taking however the three main questions raised at the end of the last chapter, on the quality of information and explanation, on the role of the ideology of the 'nation', and on the function of the media as a forum for significant public debate, the following points may be made.

The material on the South African arms sale has already been criticised for its concentration on a very few points, and its omission of many important aspects of the affair. Given that of all the items on race relations it was the most extended, this criticism is a very serious one: there should easily have been scope for treatment in the necessary depth in terms of its allocation of air time alone. After this, it is no longer possible to excuse some of the other items' weakness in this regard simply in terms of their brevity - and in any case, brevity or length in column-inches or air-time represent a particular decision or series of decisions about the importance of a topic.

As prime examples, the riots in New Jersey, the Housing Minister's 'shock' at West Indian multiple occupation, and the fracas at the police station in Caledonian Road, all lacked the necessary explanation and information to make any sense of them, beyond explanations already conventional in the culture of British society. Any real analysis of racism in British society began and ended in this TV sample with the two items on the Conduit employment agencies, and George Tonkin (though in the case of the latter it has already been seen how the opportunities of the item were missed by the presenter). Items on the Community Relations Commission, the Malayan massacre, Rhodesia, MacLeod, were extremely bland and presented no real hint of the sharp divergence of views existing on these topics.

In the Press, the Express and Telegraph and Mirror offered no more explanation of the background to these events than television,
despite the greater number of words available to them in that medium. Naturally, being much freer in principle to express their own editorial positions, they did so in the presentation of news items. This presentation obviously had a material effect on the kind of information and explanation available to their readers. The Mirror might be said in general to have a relatively 'liberal' approach to the issue of race relations, being against the sale of arms to the South African government, and giving much less prominence to black immigration as an issue than the other two newspapers. The Express and Telegraph combined total support for the arms sale with an extreme emphasis on black immigration, and items on internal race relations which put black people in an unfavourable light. Yet on an issue like the Caldonian Road police station march, the headlines of all three papers give a remarkably similar impression of the occurrence. 'Black Power' Ken Storm Police. Injuries As Demonstrators Mount 'Siege' Over Arrests At Funfair (the Express). Michael X In Police Siege (the Telegraph). Mob Raid Police HQ - 11 Held. Pc's Hurt In London Battle. 'Siege After A Funfair Swoop' (the Mirror). Only the Mirror did not make it immediately clear that this was a race-related item; but all three papers, in using the word 'siege' alone (apart from other terms like 'storm police', 'injuries', 'mob raid', 'pc's hurt', 'swoop', and the references to Black Power and Michael X, the latter only marginally involved), fell into the familiar pattern of 'all the action, none of the explanation'. Precisely because all three papers thought the confrontation so significant (the Telegraph the least of the three), the absence of a real explanation for the confrontation was all the more stark.

The Telegraph, of course, having some claim to be a serious paper, tended on a number of issues to offer more detailed analyses and explanations than the other two. The analysis of the housing shortage and multiple occupation, and of africanisation policies in Kenya, were examples. Yet by and large, these explanations were tied entirely to a particular political position on the right wing of the
British Conservative Party. They did not however form merely one among several voices in a pluralistic and competitive free market in ideas. On the contrary, of those members of the British public who read a serious type of newspaper in 1970 the Telegraph accounted for rather more than half of the dailies (taking the Times, Financial Times, and Guardian as the other serious dailies (21). Where there was anything like detailed explanation to be had, therefore, in the main British news media, it was most likely to be culled from the Daily Telegraph.

The ideology of the 'nation' appeared in two main forms in this sample of material: on black immigration, and on the South African arms issue. Since both were predominant among the race-related items, the appearance of the ideology of the 'nation' at this point was especially significant. The prominence given to black immigration in the discussion of domestic race relations was founded on and imbued with an essentially nationalist perspective. This is at its very clearest in the headlines characteristic of the Express and Telegraph treatments of the subject: words like 'invasion' and 'blockade' are symptomatic of the whole style, and imply a nation faced with aggressors, with a foreign threat. But the overall tendency to define what is worth talking about vis-a-vis race relations in Britain as black immigration was characteristic of the television treatment as well as the sections of the Press surveyed; and this again implies strongly that it is the point of entry which is significant. Once again, foreignness, the "large alien wedge" (22), the moment at which it is clearest that black people in Britain are not part of British society, the fulcrum indeed of the powellite presentation of the issue, itself a fundamentally nationalist one (23), is the dimension of British race relations which receives far and away the heaviest emphasis. Questions of racial justice and discrimination, of racist cultural traditions derived from a colonial history, of the labour needs of the British economy, scarcely if ever emerged.
Similarly, the South African arms issue was presented primarily in terms of Britain's national self-interest in defence, and to a lesser extent in recovering some of her foreign trade with South Africa from France. The national self-interest of the black African states who opposed it was barely mentioned, quite apart from the other gaps in presentation already noted.

As regards the public debate role of the news media, much the same points made about the coverage of industrial relations can be made about the coverage of race relations; primarily, the absence is notable of ordinary people's expression of their views, as in the dominance of elite figures' views. The interview with Frank Cousins, the white head of the CRC, talking about and on behalf of black people in Britain, without much accuracy and most importantly without their personal representation, was a clear case in point. The absence of spokesmen for southern African liberation groups on the TV bulletin items about the arms sale, their treatment on the two current affairs items where they did appear, and the utilisation of Lord Caradon as spokesman against the sale, were other cases in point. Their absence from the Caledonian Road items was yet another, without mentioning their absence from the whole of the presentation of black immigration except as the subjects of photographs. And even the Daily Mirror, which certainly set out consciously to be 'fair' to black people in Britain, and to be hostile to discrimination and other attacks on them, in no sense acted as a vehicle for them to communicate their various views and opinions to the white majority. This meant that a vital element in the public form of debate was completely missing, which rendered the debate on race relations a debate about, rather than with, the black subjects.


(3) "But though they feared him, it was not intimidation that caused the press to serve as the instrument for McCarthy's rise. Rather it was the inherent vulnerabilities - the frozen patterns of the press - which McCarthy discovered and played upon with unerring skill. "Straight" news, the absolute commandment of most mass media journalism, had become a strait jacket to crush the initiative and independence of the reporter... McCarthyism demonstrated that public opinion when incessantly nagged by the instantaneous communications of the mass media and prodded by the pollsters is not capable of rendering sure verdicts on matters of great complexity. Rather it is a bastardisation of the democratic process to imagine that what captures the public interest because it is repeatedly and distractingly called to its attention must be considered the mandate of the public will." D. Cater, *The Fourth Branch of Government*, (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), pp. 73-74.

(4) From an interview conducted with a television journalist, at that time a member of the BBC TV news staff, it is clear that the then head of TV News, John Grist, argued exactly in this manner.


(6) Do., pp. 24-25; also in Race XI, "The mass media and racial conflict", pp. 272-3.


(8) Loc. cit.


(12) A detailed analysis of the economic links between Britain and South Africa was produced in the *Sunday Times Business Review* by Peter Kellner and Denis Herstein, on April 18th 1971; a further expose by Adam Raphael in *The Guardian* of low wages paid by British firms to African employees in South Africa appeared in March 1973. Work was also being done which culminated in the publication of *The South African Connection*, by R. First, J. Steele and C. Gurney (Temple-Smith 1972). The first two writers are practising journalists.
For a detailed and documented analysis, see A. Minty, *South Africa's Defence Strategy* (Anti-Apartheid, 89 Charlotte Street, W1, 1969).

One television news reporter with extensive experience in this field, interviewed by the writer, stated: "...one tends only to gather the stories one knows the office will like. And these fall into very simple patterns. They like disasters wherever they occur; they like particularly wars showing that anyone whose skin is not white is capable of irretrievable savagery."

See oh. 2, n. 6; and oh. 3, n. 3.


See B. Smithies and P. Piddick, *op. cit.*; pp. 73-77.

Unfortunately, the BBC-Time Life series, "The British Empire", was not part of the sample. It is not the writer's judgment that if it had been, this verdict would have been altered.

W. Fletcher, "Britain's National Media Pattern", in J. Tunstall (ed), *Media Sociology* (Constable 1970), pp. 79-91, Table II.

Quoted from a public speech by Lord Radcliffe, "Immigration and settlement: some general considerations", printed in *Race XI* 1 (July 1969). The words quoted occur on p. 39, and have been widely diffused by Enoch Powell amongst others.

Appendix to chapter 6

Table 6.1 - the coverage of race-related items on television, June 19th - July 30th, 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Time Allotted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) 'Immigration'</td>
<td>News 26(\times) 28, Curr 2(\times) 29m</td>
<td>1 hr 19m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Domestic race relations (Conduit, Tonkin)</td>
<td>Curr 2</td>
<td>29m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Domestic race relations (Walker, CRC, police)</td>
<td>News 7</td>
<td>10m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1ii) Arms for South Africa</td>
<td>News 34(\times) 39, Curr 5(\times) 84m</td>
<td>2 hrs 11m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv) India</td>
<td>Docu 2</td>
<td>1 hr 40m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Australians</td>
<td>Docu 1</td>
<td>50m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv) External race relations (Biafra, mercenaries)</td>
<td>Curr 2</td>
<td>32m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External race relations (McClood, Rhodesia, Malaya, US riot, Canadian chief)</td>
<td>News 18</td>
<td>15m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>7 hrs 26m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>7 hrs 36m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.11 - the interviewer's questions

24 Hours, 22nd July on apartheid in South Africa, in relation to the mooted arms sale.

"Mr. Mahomo, I just want to ask you very briefly: do you stand by that extract from that film and everything we heard in it?" "Good, fine..."

"Dr. de Villiers, you've seen that extract from the film; now is there anything you would like to question in it which you...?" (de Villiers talks about 'you boys').

"Mr. Mahomo, would you accept Mr. de Villiers' apology to you - he has apologised to you for that - would you accept that so we can get on with the argument about the film?" "Do you want to answer that Mr. Mahomo?"

"I think you've made your point Mr. Mahomo - could you let Mr. de Villiers go on?"

(Mahomo quotes infant mortality statistics)

"Is the statement true or not true?" "Could I just read you this statistic, which is from the South African Institute of Race Relations - you've got that? - Professor John Reid, professor of physiology at Natal University, says that almost 50% of black children born in South Africa die before the age of five; this is a fact?" "Mr. Mahomo, we're talking about facts at the moment; no, you're talking about opinions - and I must ask Mr. de Villiers - I'm sorry, but time is - it's very interesting, and I must ask Mr. de Villiers if there are any more things that he feels are basically untrue about the film that we saw?"

"I don't think anything was said about housing - oh it was, about houses, slum conditions, yes..." "Gentlemen, I don't think that over these particular facts we're going to get any greater agreement between you two; could I therefore pass on to some things which, Mr. de Villiers, a lot of people in this country do find incomprehensible about apartheid; for instance the pass laws. I understand that all blacks have passes, and that they have - as was noted in the film - to carry a pass-book showing work, status, tribal origin, police-record and tax-receipt. So why do these people have to have passes wherever they go, and why are they arrested if they don't have them? Why cannot black people in South Africa join a trade union and why can't they have the right to strike?" "But Mr. de Villiers, surely you've seen enough in that film; surely you know enough of what is happening in world opinion about South Africa, to make you realise why the world takes the view of apartheid that it does?"

"Will you let Mr. de Villiers answer that?" "The point I think Mr. Mahomo is making here is that you are perhaps living on borrowed time; and I think the point he's making which a lot of people do feel is that the tide of history at the moment is working perhaps in a shrinking world towards a greater mingling of the races; and are you not possibly
in South Africa going against the tide of history?" "They don't have sovereign power though do they (in the Transkei)?" "Let me ask you this lastly Mr. de Villiers: if you abandoned apartheid tomorrow and all that it implies and many things that I haven't had time to mention here, it would really surely be a matter of time would it not before the blacks of South Africa really took over everything?"
The Daily Mirror

40 INDIANS SEIZED IN CID SWOOP ON CELLAR. HUNT FOR SMUGGLERS AFTER SECRET LANDING (2.7). Immigrants smuggled by world gang, court told (3.7). Immigrants will be put on probation (4.7). 'I took migrants to Britain,' says skipper (7.7). Well here's one solution: trespassers will not be prosecuted (8.7). Pilot says, I was asked to smuggle Pakistanis at £500 each (11.7). Drive to halt the immigrant 'slave trade' (23.7). Coming: your friendly local immigration officer (30.7). Tories plead for Asians in Kenya (27.7).

The Daily Express


The Daily Telegraph

Domestic race relations:

**The Daily Mirror**

Powell storms in. Enoch routs his rivals - and his majority is doubled (19.6). POLICE GUARD ON THE CENTRE COURT. Man was led by a slave collar. Businessman tells court: coloured men mocked me at Michael X house (23.6). Colour unconscious. Race report accuses MP's who whip up hostility (24.6). A daft speech (Benn). The evolutionary stakes (the race board needn't worry: it's just a lesson in biology) (26.6). Sacked: the doctors who could not speak English. BMA backs a tougher exam rule (27.6). Race board bid to end sneers. 'Let us bar silly complaints' (1.7). Shock for a minister - 32 people in 7 rooms (2.7). POLICE GIRL CYNTHIA WEDS FC FROM KENYA (10.7). Doctor is quizzed on 'hit and miss' medicine (11.7). The £200,000 cost of hunt for the 'no body' killer. Husband sent to jail for ten years (23.7). George goes sick - and runs into a colour bar (24.7). Mob raid police HQ - 11 held. FC's hurt in London battle. 'SIEGE AFTER A FUNFAIR SWOOP' (28.7).

**The Daily Express**


**The Daily Telegraph**

Arms for South Africa:

The Daily Mirror

The Daily Express

The Daily Telegraph
SOLE TORY DOUBTS ON ARMS SALE (17.7)  AFRICANS DEMAND TOTAL PRETORIA ARMS BAN (18.7) S. AFRICA ARMS FOR NAVY ONLY. HAIN THREATENS A BIGGER CAMPAIGN (20.7) SIR ALEC UNDER FIRE (20.7) VORSTER IS CONFIDENT OF DEAL (20.7) 'BAN THE ARMS' RALLIES (20.7) PRESSURE GROWS AGAINST LIFTING OF ARMS BAN (20.7) ARMS TALKS WITH S. AFRICA TO LAST ALL SUMMER (21.7) BRITAIN PUTS CASE TO UN (21.7) SIR ALEC'S COMMONWEALTH CONSULTATIONS ON S. AFRICAN ARMS (21.7) SIR ALEC MOVES GENTLY (21.7) VORSTER PLEDGES PEACE WITH BLACK AFRICA (21.7) 'SECRET' LETTER BY HEATH ON ARMS SALES (22.7) ZAMBIANS RIP UNION JACK (22.7) 11 COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES OPPOSE S. AFRICA ARMS (22.7) SIR ALEC IN ANGRY ARMS ROW (23.7) INQUIRY INTO HEATH ARMS LETTER LEAK (23.7) TOTAL ARMS BAN IN UN (23.7) SIR ALEC CALLS WILSON 'PRIME HUMBUG' IN ANGRY CLASH ON S. AFRICAN ARMS (23.7) US CRITICISES BRITAIN'S ARMS DECISION (23.7) STUDENTS BURN UNION JACK IN ARMS PROTEST (24.7) 'SPIES' PLAN TO PREVENT ARMS SALES (24.7) TRADE REASONS FOR BRITISH ARMS SALES (24.7) AFRICANS SEEKING ARMS VETO POWER (24.7) MINISTER DENIES SOUTH AFRICAN WEAPON HUNGER (24.7) FOG OVER AFRICA (24.7) UGANDAN THREAT ON ARMS (25.7) BRITAIN UNABLE TO STOP SALE OF HELICOPTERS (25.7) S. AFRICA'S GLOOMY VIEW OVER ARMS (25.7) 'HUNT THE SUBS' EXERCISE OFF CAPE (25.7) CHURCHES ASKED TO OPPOSE ARMS (25.7) S. AFRICA DELAYS ARMS PLEA TO TAKE HEAT OFF HEATH (31.7) CLOSE STUDY OF RUSSIAN FISHING FLEET (31.7).
Chapter Seven: The contribution of the media toward the social construction of political consensus in modern Britain

In a purely empirical sense, the delineation of the ways race relations and work relations are presented in the main British news media has been accomplished. Yet sociologically, the information provided in answer to that empirical question cannot be allowed to float suspended in a vacuum. It is necessary to proceed to analyse the impact of this media output on British society.

It is the argument of this concluding chapter that as critical instances of the handling of social conflicts, the data presented powerfully underpin the conclusion in chapter 1, and by other social theorists, that the media contribute toward the social construction of political consensus - in this case, in contemporary Britain. In order to present this case in any way satisfactorily, the argument must proceed by first examining some varied theoretical explanations of the role of ideas in situations of social division and conflict; specifically, ideology-as-hegemony, ideology-as-suture, ideology-as-confrontation, and ideology-as-negotiation. As a sub-section of this discussion, a particular set of data from anthropological research, which bears illuminatingly on this area, will be noted. Next, the network of social institutions which arguably combine to forgo a degree of social consensus in British society, and as an element of which the media themselves operate, will be rapidly surveyed. The media do not function in isolation, and any discussion of their function in a particular society must attempt to clarify the extent to which they mesh with other institutions. And lastly, the analysis of two ideologies (nationalism and objectivity) in British society and the British news media, will lead directly into the concluding statement of this research on the social roles of the mass media as socialising agents and as potential stimulators of public discussion.
i. Cultural constructs and social division

(a) Theoretical analyses of their inter-relation.

In examining theoretical understandings of the relationship between ideology and social division, certain representatives of three styles in sociological theory (phenomenology/interactionism, functionalism, conflict-theory) will be assessed for the illumination they are able to offer on that relationship. The writers in question are Berger and Luckmann (1), together with Berger (2), and Holzner (3); then Cramsoi (4) and Barthes (5); then Geertz (6); and finally Converse (7), Parkin (8) and Mann (9), whose work belongs rather more to the middle range of theory than the others.

Berger's work on religion in a pluralistic society, and Holzner's work on the social construction of reality (which largely parallels Berger and Luckmann's book), only deal with the relation between culture (10) and social division from two perspectives. One is the extent to which a particular dominant legitimation of the existing social order tends to rule out alternative explanations and interpretations of that social order. By implication, dissident analyses carry less weight, less conviction.

The other perspective is that of the problems encountered by certain members of a pluralistic society in maintaining their own reality construct against competition from others. An instance would be the problems of the members of a puritanical sect, faced with the daily barrage of sexually loaded advertising for alcohol, or with the frequency of "blasphemy" and "obscenity" in everyday conversation. Holzner's interest is rather in the differing reality constructs which proliferate in modern societies as a result of the dizzy expansion in the division of labour (ch. IX), which also generates many layers of authority requiring varying ideological legitimations (ch. X).

Both these perspectives, especially Berger's, tend to
stress pluralistic divisions and conflicts to the exclusion of "horizontal" industrial and racial conflicts; yet it is certainly the case that the significance of these latter cleavages for the stability of a society may be far greater. The categories of competing definitions of reality which they discuss are therefore of only limited utility in the present context of trying to understand how societies cope culturally with significant rifts in their composition. To be fair to Holzner, he does offer (ch. X) a descriptive typology of loyalistic radicalism (e.g. Nazism), alienative radicalism (e.g. socialism), and accommodative and escapist sectarianisms (i.e. the previous pair of responses on a minority level of organisation), which in principle encompasses conflict and change. But he sees these ideological responses explicitly (p. 159) as (i) typically competing with and even moulding each other, and (ii) as reflecting the increasing differentiation and complexity of modern societies. While quite possibly accurate, this analysis de-emphasises the necessity of explaining the conditions which favour the origination, the development or the diminution of any one response. The tendency to timelocess in phenomenological analysis is evident once more.

The same may be said of the first perspective: that in its failure to analyse how deviant and dissident definitions emerge and sometimes even overwhelm the dominant construction of social reality, it does represent in many ways an argument presupposing inertia; and modern British society, to take but one example, is far from being inert. The particular importance of the news media, as noted in chapter 1, in mediating social change by assimilating it to existing cultural categories which are themselves in turn modified by this process, is one instance only of how these broadly phenomenological analyses need to be supplemented.

It is precisely at this point that some of Gramsci’s social analyses are of considerable help. In his discussion of the ideological hegemony of ruling groups in societies, and of the ways in which intellectuals and the educational system sustain and develop this
hegemony, he is arguing in a way that resembles at first glance the Berger and Luckmann, and Holznier, positions. In fact, of course, his argument is different even at this point in two major respects: first, his linking of the definition of everyday life with the dominance of a particular social group, rather than with some more 'democratic' 'spontaneous' origins. Second, the way in which these definitions also act as a suture, binding classes together and overlaying their conflicting economic and political interests.

However, Gramsci also analyses the way in which emergent groups develop their own ideological definitions and analyses which conflict with the ideological hegemony of the still existing ruling group. In time, as they wrest power by one means or another from the existing ruling group, their development of their own ideological position is both vital to their success and guarantees the hegemony of that ideology to match their new economic and political hegemony. An instance from the past would be the historical rise to power of the bourgeoisie in Europe. Gramsci was of course aware that the precise content of this ideological hegemony would vary from society to society, including the strong possibility that elements from earlier epochs would continue to play a role in that hegemony. An instance of this which he cites, is the decision by Croce to reintroduce Catholic religious instruction in Italian schools because of his own view, shared by other members of the Italian bourgeoisie, that religion was necessary for the masses though not to the dominant group.

A further interesting point made by Gramsci relates to the correspondence between liberal definitions of the economic market in a capitalist society, and the typical tasks adopted by trade unions. In the pursuance of their own economic interest in the marketplace, trade unions effectively set themselves a permanent target, which would always be renewed by market forces. Their existence, although it could certainly make life more difficult for employers than their absence, represented in the end only a more advanced and organised form of participation in the market - in this case, the market for
labour. Their existence at loggerheads with employers could never be transcended, because in the final analysis their self-definition, albeit one of conflict, was taken from the definition of the economic organisation of society that belonged to the dominant group.

The importance of Gramsci's analyses is that they introduce a diachronic and conflictual perspective into the purely synchronic perspectives of the authors discussed so far; and further, that they sketch out the complex articulation between intellectuals, the educational system, the dominant ideological perspectives, the form of social stratification, and the processes of social change. Ideology-as-suture, ideology-as-negotiation, ideology-as-confrontation and ideology-as-hegemony are all present in his analysis. Furthermore, Gramsci's perspective avoids the subtle trap of commencing the analysis of ideology/socialisation/communication/role-expectations/exchange from the apparently simple notional base of two actors, Alter and Ego (11). Such simplicity ends by being more confusing, since the primary base for socialisation is the macro-social sphere; the shape that communication and ideology take is not the product of two individuals meeting as tabulae rasae in a fictitious jungle clearing, but the product of the complex of stratified roles that make up a society, with due emphasis being given to dominant groups and the oppositions they may arouse.

Barthes, writing as Gramsci from the marxist tradition of analysis, discusses the relation between culture and social class on a much more immediate level. His use of the term 'myth' is almost identical to one meaning of the term 'ideology', as the following quotation makes plain:

"Myth hides nothing and flaunts nothing; it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession; it is an inflexion." (12).

However, what Barthes has to say about myth/ideology is primarily concerned with how ideology achieves its effect, with certain of its particular communicative characteristics, with ideology-as-suture;
and especially with the sign-form that ideology may take in a capitalist society, which in his view renders it enormously seductive and telling.

A clear instance of what he means is a picture he cites from a cover of Paris-Match, which shows an immaculately turned out African soldier, eyes aloft, saluting the French flag. Barthès' comments on this are several, but he especially notes two dimensions of the ideological meaning of the photograph-as-sign. First, that words are unnecessary: the juxtaposition of saluting black soldier and French flag proclaims the living, vital present of French "imperiality" (Barthès' term), and consequently its future too. Second, that myth does not pretend certain facts do not exist:

"Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact. If I state the fact of French imperialiy without explaining it, I am very near to finding it is natural and goes without saying." (13)

Of additional interest and importance is Barthès' recognition that the richness of allusion of a sign or symbol may easily be in inverse ratio to its own simplicity and directness. He encapsulates this observation in the recognition that myth is quantitatively far less than its potentially numerous signs, but qualitatively far greater: there are strong points of overlap here with Sapir's analysis of "condensation symbols", noted in sub-section (b) (14).

In general, Barthès' concern is with the myriad tiny elements of the texture of everyday life in society, which establish and support the ideological hegemony of the dominant group. So slight individually, and so pervasive in the mass, they easily go unnoticed and unquestioned even by political militants and disdained professional intellectuals. He argues that typically dominant group norms impact on non-dominant classes through a series of progressively looser approximations down the social scale. Even when for various reasons (e.g. insufficient wealth) norms cannot be fulfilled exactly, the test then becomes one
of how closely they can be followed within existing constraints. This analysis is similar to Fallers' 'trickle effect' (15) model; but it has the added implication (not noted by Barthes) that as norms become attenuated further down the social hierarchy, so there emerges more 'space' for ambivalence and alternatives. Hammers' dissection of lower class cultural variants in Washington DC is an instance of precisely this phenomenon (16).

Barthes' particular contribution to the present discussion is to fill out the contributions so far summarised on the relation between culture and social cleavage. Operating on a more immediate level of analysis than Gramsci and the other writers, he enables understanding of some of the day-to-day forms of the cultural hegemony of socially dominant groups. His focus is exclusively an ideology-as-culture, however, and ideology-as-hegemony; its negotiational and confrontational aspects are not discussed by him.

The importance of Geertz's analysis of ideology for the present discussion is twofold. First, his critique of functionalist analyses of ideology is sufficiently telling to allow them to be bypassed - although he concludes by producing a more sophisticated version of the same theoretical position. Second, is his distinction between science (as critical diagnosis) and ideology (as committed justification), while accepting that both endeavour to provide guides to the comprehension of reality.

The manner in which standard functionalist arguments relate ideology to social division is to claim that the very production of ideologies is a response to social strains in an insufficiently equilibrated society; and that in turn they contribute toward forging a new social equilibrium. Geertz's attack is not directed to the genesis aspect of the theory, which he considers much more convincing than the argument that ideologies are generated by "interests", but to the supposition that by its very emergence an ideology contributes to the resolution of the strain's general psychological impact and so to a new form of social balance. He points out how the emergence of an
ideology may easily have the opposite effect of intensifying social strains rather than muting their impact (ideology-as-confrontation). However, his definition of ideologies (whether conservative or radical) as the cultural product of rapid social change - he instances the disruption of the settled Hindu world view in late medieval Indonesia - is very arbitrary. It assumes the defining characteristic of a conservative ideology vis-a-vis a traditional world view to be simply one of greater articulateness, almost of having a sharper and more controversial nature. But why should not the traditional world view also be ideological? He draws attention to an interesting dimension of ideological formation, rather than to the nature of all ideology as such. It may be that he is still subtly influenced by the pejorative sense of the word 'ideology'.

In fact, his analysis of ideology as an essentially committed definition of reality (as against scientific analysis), contrasts oddly with his earlier near-dismissal of interest-theories of the generation of ideology. The question of how "committed" people are who share an ideology is actually a very open one; but the extent to which the dominance and weakness of certain ideologies must be related at least synchronically and in some manner to the power-position of various social interests seems highly uncontroversial. It may be that the tendency to respond to the marxist tradition of social science in terms of the aphorisms of the Communist Manifesto, or certain famous single sentences ("ruling ideas...ruling class"), rather than in the broadcloth, is responsible for Geertz' ambivalence at this point. It is also pertinent to ask, which neither Geertz nor the functionalist analysts he criticises do, whether social strains are not often themselves the product of the clash of interests. Despite the accuracy of his attack on the standard functionalist position, then, it cannot be said that Geertz takes the discussion of culture and social division much further; and if he does not do so, still less could be attributed to other functionalists.

The differing levels of penetration of political information,
which has important implications for the character of ideological hegemony and its relation to social divisions, is the subject of Converse' essay in the same volume. His argument is as follows. Empirical evidence demonstrates that there is a very wide gulf in information about public issues between the top 10-15% of US society and the remaining 85-90%, even though in this as other respects this majority is not an undifferentiated bloc. More specifically, items which form natural clusters of political opinion are in no way instinctively associated among the mass of people; and further, the tendency to cluster items of public policy in any form is much more likely to be associated for most Americans with generalised attitudes to clearly identifiable groups (Converse instances black Americans and policies with an effect on reducing their disadvantage). In other words, while Americans in the mass know what they think very often about black Americans, but not about the propriety or otherwise of State intervention in the economy. People tend to be much more stable over time on issues such as the former, than they do with regard to the latter. Converse hypothesises that a society is in fact composed of several different "issue publics", which to a certain extent may overlap, but only to any great extent within the most informed 10-15%. He cites two historical examples as prima facie evidence for his case: the northern United States immediately before the Civil War, and Nazi Germany from 1920-33. In both cases, he argues there are strong indications that the supposedly most salient issue (Abolition, Nazism) did not penetrate the consciousness of the vast mass of the public. If ideological clarity is effectively an upper-class preserve, the implication would seem to be that mass publics are mobilised by less rational factors; and that social divisions persist in an ideological fog.

Though very carefully argued, Converse' analysis appears open to criticism on three counts: his relatively unreflexive interpretation of "natural" clusters of issues; his partial conclusions from his two historical examples; and his omission of any discussion
as to why the gap in information to which he draws attention exists in the first place.

Essentially, what Converse defines as a "natural" cluster of issues tends to be the group of policies associated with either "pole" in the North American conservative-liberal spectrum (which of course reflects the political spectrum in similar polities elsewhere). From the relative irrelevance of these positions to the general public in the USA Converse deduces a colossal lack of information and ignorance about real issues. His interpretation, to make any sense, must be redefined and separated out into three separate questions. First, are real issues (such as employment) outside people's awareness in the mass? Converse' own data indicate they are not (fig. 3, p. 240). Second, does the extent of variation in government policies in the USA make a very substantial difference either way to a high proportion of Americans? Who determines the criterion of a "natural" cluster of policies: the public, or the leadership elites of the major parties? Third, is the undoubted misinformation that exists not more properly attributable to yet other factors, rather than ingrained and instinctive political lethargy (see below)?

The lack of connection between the American Civil War and Abolition in the minds of most Northern State Americans is almost certainly an accurate historical verdict. Yet Converse slips from a revisionist interpretation of its meaning (as against the liberal legend) to arguing that only the American elite were fighting the war for abolitionist ends, rather than that the war was fought for a variety of ends by all concerned, of which Abolition and traditionalist hostility to certain values of urban industrial capitalism were only perhaps the most respectable. Similarly in the German instance, Converse' stress on the marginal nature of the Nazi vote in 1930 (accounting for perhaps 2 million out of 5 million voters for the National Socialist Party) omits any consideration of who the other 3 million were, and why. It also leaves undiscussed the respective roles of the Versailles Treaty, the Army, leading industrialists, Social Democratic Party, and
Communist Party, together with the experience of mass unemployment and runaway inflation, in producing considerable tolerance for the Nazi rise to power. Undoubtedly these factors and this ensuing tolerance were as significant as active support for Nazism. What too is the meaning of successful ideological hegemony if not the paralysis of opponents and the absorption of neutrals as well as allies?

Thirdly, Converse fails to discuss the role of schools and the mass media in relation to this gap in information, but presents the gap rather as a stubborn fact of life which persists despite these informational agencies rather than in some measure because of them. He certainly establishes that there may be a gap between the few and the many in terms of political information and discourse; but he fails successfully to analyse its constituent parts or social origins.

This task is rather better performed, in general terms, by Parkin, and also by Mann. Parkin distinguishes three "meaning-systems" characteristic of the stratification of Western societies: the dominant value system, the subordinate value system, and the radical value system. Either deference or aspiration are characteristic patterns of acceptance of the dominant value-system. The subordinate value-system corresponds in some ways to Gramsci's analysis of trade unionism as a response to the dominant class: that is, a defensive and even fatalistic form of opposition to the status quo, with no real impetus or perspective to transcend it. Parkin describes it (pp. 91-92) as an uneasy position between rejection and endorsement of the status quo; or alternatively as a negotiated version of the dominant values.

Here he makes a number of points of great importance for the present discussion. He argues that characteristically the negotiated version produces adherence to dominant values in the abstract, but to a substantially reduced version of those values in existential situations (a similar analysis to Barthes and Hannerz). He instances the high job-aspirations of young workers when asked temporarily to jettison the reality of their lives, and their actual aspirations; or the generalised
condemnation of trade union power and other people's strikes, while supporting one's own union (and strike); or the upgrading of one's own (manual) occupation while accepting the low grading of manual work in general. Clearly, the impact of these ambivalent attitudes may in many instances be the further consolidation of the status quo, in that certain relatively harmless forms of opposition are not crushed (a kind of Marcusean repressive tolerance). On the other hand, the possibility exists that almost without realising it these attitudes may lead to very considerable disruption, as some analyses of contemporary Britain claim. Goldthorpe, as already noted, argues that industrial unrest is the inevitable outcome of a social situation where differentials in wealth are extreme and not legitimated (17). As noted in chapter 3, it has been argued that this unrest led to an anomie situation, and the severe loss of profits, in Britain in the late 60's and early 70's (18).

Parkin also analyses the radical value system, and its crystallisation in and development by, the radical political party, as one result of the emergence of the urban industrial working class. Once again, the analyses of Gramsci are quite similar. Clearly the absence of such a focus in the shape of a political party has a very considerable impact on the relation between culture and social division.

The last discussion to be taken into account is that of Michael Mann. He surveys, insofar as the very different research methodologies utilised will allow him, a range of American and British studies bearing on values, consensus and social class. His survey is extraordinarily useful, summarising as it does a whole collection of empirical studies from two societies. His results indicated that two types of deviant values tend to be widely endorsed by manual stratum respondents. First were concrete values in line with everyday reality (similar to Parkin's subordinate values); and second were highly generalised divisions of society into rich and poor, Us and Them.

However, Mann argues that what characterises ideological consciousness in the British and American manual stratum is not its harmonisation with the ideology of dominant groups, nor its
active participation in the social consensus, but precisely its own confusion and lack of consensus in opposition to the status quo. Politics and political values in particular seem to be typically confused and/or conservative at an abstract level and/or only marginally important anyway. The participation of the working class in the status quo appears to be pragmatic and local, rather than genuinely normative (19).

Mann points to empirical evidence to support his contention that the prime agency in this ideological confusion and ambivalence is the educational system, which rather than providing formal indoctrination in the dominant value system provides absolutely nothing on the clash between dominant and deviant values. The social order is presented generally, or is alluded to, as benevolent; and where the recognition of social conflict cannot be avoided, it is presented as a phenomenon without any attempt at explanation. He concludes:

"Thus the most common form of manipulative socialisation by the liberal democratic state does not seek to change values, but rather to perpetuate values that do not aid the working class to interpret the reality it actually experiences. These values merely deny the existence of group and class conflict within the nation-state society and therefore, are demonstrably false." (20)

Mann's insights usefully complement the other contributions surveyed; to the vacuum left by the absence of an organised focus for radical values, is added only the "silence" of the school system (in conjunction, we may add, with characteristic forms of media output).

To summarise the theoretical understanding so far achieved on the relation between ideology and social divisions, the following assertions can be made. (1) Certain social definitions have intellectual and general prestige. (2) These social definitions are associated with dominant social groups. (3) Dominant definitions are mediated in a myriad ways. (4) They can face two types of opposition from subordinate groups, subordinate/negotiatory and radical. (5) The
subordinate value system is ambivalent, confused, local. (6) The radical value system is not only much more intractable and highly organised, but under certain conditions may be developed from subordinate values. (7) Every ideology, dominant or subordinate or radical, must have roles or institutions to "carry" it. (8) The only real focus for radical values is the radical political party, in modern industrial societies.

(This analysis of ideologies is highly schematic, especially in its second assumption above of a 1:1 correspondence between a particular dominant social group and a particular ideology; an ideology may be characteristic only of a particular section of a dominant group and may be hotly contested by a different ideology belonging to a different section. In British terms, on the two subject-areas of this study, one might instance the ideological foundation of policies of attacking the unions versus attacking them; or of strict immigration control versus free movement of labour.)

(b) The analysis of ritual functions in some anthropological research

At much less length, certain social anthropological data on the relation between culture and social division will now be examined. There is of course a whole literature on the subject, dealing with witchcraft accusations and social strains, with feuds and judicial processes, with myths as etiologies of endemic conflict, and pre-eminently with religion as providing the fabric of social cohesion. Here the discussion will dwell on a particular aspect of this last point, namely, the role of ritual in assuaging endemic social conflicts.

Without being able to enter upon a discussion of the theory of ritual in non-western societies, it is sufficient to recognise that by and large anthropologists seem agreed that ritual reflects myth and often is an enactment of it. In turn, both ritual and myth reflect the society from which they emanate, even though this correspondence is usually not a simple one. The classical example is rites of passage, which embody the social organisation of the
society together with the social significance attributed to death, birth, sex, and so on. In addition - and this is of special interest for the present discussion - there is evidence that ritual in certain societies may serve to express and mediate social conflict in the lives of the participants in ways which may reduce its disruptive potential (21).

Three examples have been located in the literature, from social groups in Java (22), Mexico (23) and Zambia (24). In the first two cases the conflicts were related to the problems and traumas of social change produced by the impact of the wider society on peasants of rural or recently rural origins. In Java theatrical dramas, and in Mexico ritual dramas, served to express the ambivalences of transition, and to establish the new roles and their accompanying mores. In Zambia, the conflict arose out of a fundamental structural disjunction in the social organisation of kinship roles, but the ritual was similarly reconstitutive of social order. A particular feature of the rituals, in all three cases, was the utilisation of "condensation symbols" (Sapir) (25); that is, symbols which are pregnant with allusions to emotive past events and powerful appeals to people's desires and hopes.

According to Gluckman (26), such rituals act as instruments of legitimate release of emotion which otherwise is defined as illegitimate, rather like the medieval All Fools' Day in Europe. This position is akin to the functionalist analyses criticised by Geertz, and is beset by the problem that there is no means of checking whether it contains any truth, however plausible it may appear to be.

The interpretation of the function of these rituals in managing social conflict that will be adopted here is that of the three writers concerned, which is well summarised by Mary Douglas:

(The ritual functions) "in modifying experience. Often it works retroactively. Officiants may solemnly deny the quarrels and misconduct which are the actual occasion of a sacrifice....The object of the ritual is not to deceive God, but to re-formulate past experience. By ritual and speech what has passed is restated so that what ought to have been prevails over what is." (27)
In other words, ritual acts to re-define social reality in the minds of the participants, and in this way draws the sting from conflicts. It need not automatically/magically succeed; but it is a very potent influence.

The importance of these comparative data for present purposes is that they are highly suggestive of part of an interpretation of how the news media operate in British society. The discussion of how they do so must wait a little; but in general it would be a great mistake to assume that the decline in the public significance of religion (28) has evaporated the role of symbols, myth and ritual in public life. The use of symbol and ritual in modern American politics has been examined by Edelman (29), particularly to explain the successful blurring of the disjunction between theory and actuality in the tradition of US liberal democracy: the contradiction between the vaunted power of the public to have their wishes translated into policy, and the real problems of government. Amongst the topics he studies are the ambiguity of symbolic appeals in political campaigns, and the primarily legitimating role of elections. We shall see in a moment how secular ideologies of nationalism and objectivity are also repeatedly enacted in rituals that themselves constitute potent condensation symbols, in modern British society.
ii. Social institutions and the construction of consensus in Britain.

It is now time to turn to the analysis of certain specific institutions of British society which share with the mass media a function of ideological definition and diffusion, and (potentially) of stimulating public discussion. It is essential, if the role of the mass media in the social construction of political consensus in British society is to be properly conceived, to realise they do not operate in a (consensual) vacuum, and to attempt to understand how they articulate with other major sources of consensus, stability and cohesion. The institutions in question are notably the two main political parties, the Civil Service, the trade unions, and the educational system. Other potent sources of consensual definitions, though not stimulators of public discussion, are the social welfare system, and the organisation of career and professional work. This list, though significant, does not pretend to be exhaustive: the complexities of primary socialisation and family structure are omitted, for instance, as are the churches. A substantial or original analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, which is necessarily confined to an argument rather than a definitive conclusion.

(a) The two major political parties are the fairly standard north-west European type of conservative and social democratic, except that the Labour Party's marxist antecedents are confined to a very small fringe of people. Clearly, political parties act as major agencies for the definition of social reality, both for their adherents and for the society at large. In practice in the UK, through the requirement of political balance in broadcasting (by tradition in the BBC, by law in the IBA), they exert an extremely important influence over the definition of the proper boundaries of political discourse.

This being the case, the historic ideological positions of the Conservative and Labour Parties, and their relation to each other, are of very great influence. It is impossible in this compass even to refer to all these positions, as also to argue the case on the precise extent of their assimilation the one to the other. It can only be
noted that the two leading analysts of the major British parties are in no disagreement about the fact of their rapprochement over the decades, but only about its degree (30). On the Conservative Party it may be argued that the pressures of the form of economic development in Britain have led it to adopt an increasingly interventionist role in the economy (31). On the Labour Party it may be argued that the drive for parliamentary success, the centralisation of the economy, and the growing hegemony of middle class administrative perspectives within the Party's grassroots and at its head, have brought it to its present position as aspiring leader of a non-confrontation society with a mixed economy (32). This trend appears to be a characteristic of social democratic parties (33). Whatever the reasons, the similarity is there, and embracing.

Certainly both parties have increasingly adopted extremely similar policies vis-à-vis industrial and race relations. Wage freezes, voluntary and statutory incomes restraint, attempts to involve trade unions with government, legislation for industrial disputes, have characterised both parties since the end of World War II (the attachment of the unions dates particularly from the war years).

A pro-colonial policy was shared by both parties between the wars, with Labour's divergence being restricted largely to questions of styles of administration, and speed of "preparation for independence". During the 50's again, the Fabian Colonial Bureau, which was at the centre of Labour Party colonial policy-formation, took a very similar position in favour of moderate and gradual decolonisation. Under MacMillan and Macleod, by means of a lightning programme from 1959, it was the Conservative Party which eventually dismantled the bulk of the colonial structure (34). But it was the Labour Party in power which committed British troops to preserve Aden (till 1967), yet which offered the white UDI regime in Rhodesia almost continuous temporisation. Internally, policies to control black immigration (1962; 1965; 1968; 1971) have been enacted in an increasingly stringent manner by both parties in power. Similarly, though not without some revolt on the Conservative side, both parties backed the second Race Relations
Act 1968), which was designed to combat racial discrimination in a piecemeal fashion with weak enforcement procedures.

Fundamentally, both parties have always claimed to be, or striven to be, national parties— in the ideological, as well as the purely geographical sense. This has always been an extremely important component of the Conservative Party’s self-image (35), and never more so than in its attacks on the Labour Party for being sectional and disloyal (this last tradition continues in the Conservative national press). In response to this attack, and in the effort to capture the middle ground of voters, the Labour Party has developed more and more its endeavour to present itself as a national party rather than as the parliamentary representative of a sectional interest (the labour movement). As well as its overall importance, this nationalist posture has a particular application to industrial and race relations, which will be discussed in a little while.

(b) The Civil Service (36), nationally and locally, is of course a key structural expression of political consensus. The fact that the mass of its members do readily serve the alternating political parties is due primarily to three factors: the relatively short political distance between the parties, the attraction of public office, and the usual grip of career employment. Without this administrative reflection of the relatively narrow party-political spectrum in Britain there would ensue a massive breakdown in the organisation of social and economic life; thus the Civil Service represents a very active as well as passive expression of political consensus in Britain. In this context it is also important to recall the increasing utilisation of outside experts from industry and the universities both as committee-members, and occasionally as semi-permanent officials, in policy-making in Britain; this contributes further legitimacy to government.

Secondly, it is of considerable importance for this analysis that the British civil service has a notable preoccupation with secrecy, and distaste for public discussion, by comparison with the civil service in many other societies (such as the United States). Insofar as it
managed to be successful in curtailing the public flow of information, it follows as a truism that public ignorance is sustained. Where this information might exacerbate tensions of a "horizontal" kind, its retention clearly contributes to the maintenance of consensus; except that in situations where this proclivity for secrecy itself becomes the object of attention, consensus can be ruptured. (An instance might well be the successful attack by right-wing MP's on the statistical basis by which the numbers of black people in Britain were enumerated by the authorities.) In general however, the level of public debate in British society is undoubtedly negatively influenced by Civil Service concern for classifying information.

(c) As noted in oh. 3.11, the British trade union movement by and large fits Gramsci's analysis of corporatist ideology as a response to dominant groups: the view by workers that they are a bloc within society with their interests, and there are other blocs with other interests, and that when these blocs clash it is the various blocs' task to realise their respective interests to the greatest possible extent (37). During the later 60's and early 70's, partly in response to the continued assimilation of the Labour Party to the centre, and partly in response to the increasingly hostile economic and political environment, the trade union movement in Britain became considerably more active and in some cases radicalised than it had been since World War II and before. Yet it is important to see this development in its full context, and not only in relation to some supposed 'norm' of minimal union militancy characteristic of much of the 30's, 40's and 50's in Britain.

The full context includes the following factors. (i) The 'space' for a certain degree of trade union activity within existing arrangements without upsetting those arrangements (Gramsci, Parkin). (ii) The ambivalent development of 'white collar' unionism, due in most part to their encouragement by the State in the public sector rather than to any widespread spontaneous militancy; even the growth of A.S.T.U.R.S., the most militant of the white-collar unions, is
characterised by reluctance in its new recruits (38). (iii) The ever-growing involvement of trade unionists in State committees and consultations (39). (iv) The continuing presence of accommodating trade unionists at the head of several large unions. (v) Particularly, the negligible extent to which trade union leaders attempt to politicise their members (let alone the infrequency with which trade union magazines and journals are read). It would appear therefore that the profits squeeze analysed by Glyn and Sutcliffe (40) is more likely to be the result of a plethora of local decisions taken independently, than a real index of the upsurge of a radical value system in British society. Since in default of a major radical political party, only the trade union movement could conceivably act as any kind of carrier of such values, the current condition of the British trade union movement means that the dominant value system of British society is not significantly opposed. As Mann puts it:

(There is) "a lack of consensus in the crucial area where concrete experiences and vague populism might be translated into radical politics." (41)

(d) Despite education and social class being the topic par excellence of British empirical sociological research, the ideological and consensual content of British education has only recently begun to be analysed. There is consequently very little material with which to produce any real analysis of the role of the educational system as a centre of ideological diffusion in relation to social divisions within British society. (Its particular pattern of relationship with the media as such will be analysed further later in this chapter.)

A number of general points may be made however. Firstly, it is clear that educational knowledge is organised in the same way as educational establishments, to reproduce the entire range of categories of worker (from labourer to professional); this takes place via the definition and demarcation of "types of child", and also through the tendency to inculcate a strong work-ethos in classroom teaching (42).
Secondly, although in popular educational thinking there is supposed to be no connection between politics and education, the processes of control of British education are evidently sufficiently "political" to make them officially subject to a surprising degree of secrecy: this offers a good illustration of the point made already about the Civil Service (43). Third, the universities exert very considerable influence over secondary school curricula because of the need of secondary school teaching staff to ensure their pupils will be fitted for placements in tertiary education. Fourth, the increasing dominance of business finance as the only source of significant expansion in universities, together with the official State definition of the proper function of polytechnics as centres of applied and not original knowledge, draw the whole area of intellectual production further into the orbit of the dominant groups in the society.

As well as these major structural features of the British educational system, there are two analyses of the content of secondary school courses with particular relevance to work relations and race relations. Abrams (44) has noted that industrial disputes and strikes, if mentioned at all, are presented without comment or explanation; and that politics is presented as a set of technical processes rather than as a struggle for resources. Other studies of the racial content of school textbooks (45) discovered a wide diffusion of racist stereotypes in them; and conversely, very little that was effectively anti-racist. It appears therefore that the British educational system produces what might be predicted, given its relationship to other dominant social institutions: that is, a legitimation by various means, overt or latent, of the existing social order.

(e) The recognition that the organisation of social welfare has an important bearing on the social construction of consensus does not necessarily involve the view that welfare measures represent a machiavellian scheme by dominant groups to bolster up their position (46). There are two aspects of welfare in Britain which contribute
to social and political consensus. One is the orientation of at least the older generation of professional social workers, which relies heavily on psychological explanations of human problems encountered in casework. This can mean for instance the translation of a problem of low pay into a problem of personal inadequacy, and of a desire to rebel against certain forms of authority into inadequate parental socialisation. While not necessarily successful in 'treating' their cases, it is certainly true that this approach can often be disastrously misplaced to meet people's real needs, and at the same time not help them to identify the real source of their difficulties (47).

The second consensual aspect of social welfare is quite simply its veiling of social misery from the public. No better comment on this can be made than is made in "A Tribute" at the outset of Professor John Grove's study on homelessness in London, which could be replicated for every major population centre in Britain:

"It is also right that we should offer tribute to the work of thousands of people in the statutory and voluntary social services - administrators and social workers, volunteers as well as professionals, the trained and the untrained, and the committee members who back them up and help to make the vital resources available. The total contribution made by all these people is enormous. Without it London would be stricken by an avalanche of social problems of catastrophic proportions. Even relatively modest reductions in social service efforts in some fields - notably housing, welfare, child care and health - would quickly reveal deprivation and suffering in forms and on a scale unimaginod by the majority not at present affected by them. And one predictable result would be outcry from a scandalised public." (48)

(f) The final major area of social organisation with a potent influence on social consensus, is the form of organisation of much non-manual work as careers and professions. The especial significance
of these occupations for the present analysis is that (i) they collectively constitute that subsidiary category of authority-roles without which dominant groups could not achieve the execution of their policies, so that the adhesion of the occupants of these roles to the existing order is critical; and (ii) they provide a continuing high-status destination for children of parents in this category, together with an anticipatory reference group for aspirants to upward mobility from other parts of the society. Thus this stratum - of which the Executive Class of the Civil Service is one part - is the major repository and vehicle for the "trickle-effect" analysed by Fallers and Barthes, and discussed in section i(a) of this chapter.

Historically in Britain, the emergence of the occupation of clerk (49), as of the traditional professional occupations (50), was associated for different reasons with strong adherence to the status quo. This has been subsequently dented a little by the developing "proletarisation" of some clerkly work (Lockwood particularly instances railway clerks), and a little more by the recruitment by one union, the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff, in the late 60's and early 70's into new areas of employment such as insurance workers. It is important to recall though that the major expansion of white collar trade unionism in Britain is due to Government encouragement in the state sector rather than grassroots militancy. It is also the appeal of ASTMS as apparently possessing wizardry in the economic sphere, to workers whose real incomes have been steadily eroded by inflation, which has forcibly attracted small weak staff associations to coalesce with the union. In turn this has provided ASTMS with a once-for-all straightforward series of bloc increments in membership. Such economic pressures by themselves have naturally nothing about them which innately leads to a rejection of the dominant value-system: indeed it may be a situation of dissonance with that value-system which simply leads to a desire that it should be properly observed (why should dockers earn more than we do?). If Conservative Party allegiance at general elections among these strata is any guide,
then it is important to isolate economic discontent among white collar workers, and not to treat it as an index of their endorsement of even a subordinate value-system (51).

In terms of professionals, and the considerable development in modern societies not only of occupations claiming the cachet of professional status, but also the particular attributes of the career, further links are established between the occupants of these roles and the existing social order. (This is despite the fact that the traditional ideology of the professionals as non-competitive gentlemen, which still has considerable currency, was counterposed to certain values of urban industrial capitalism (52). On the one hand, the visibility of a ladder of positions, each with increasing income and status, acts as a powerful method of imposing self-restraint on the people involved. None of them would wish to jeopardise their chances of stable movement up the hierarchy, especially when there are generally examples of some older workers being left behind and repeatedly bypassed by younger and less experienced entrants. This is specially true, of course, of a career bureaucracy, which is increasingly the major location of professional practice.

Further instances of the impact on consciousness of professional work-organisation include the Pahls’ study of industrial managers and their wives (53). The managers, the Pahls note drily, were under the impression that their companies were looking after their interests very well; their wives very frequently resented the huge inroads made by their work into their husbands’ and their private lives. This strongly illustrates the degree of commitment generated to the established order among these industrial professionals, even to the extent of distorting their relationship with their wives. Another instance, noted by Frandy (54), is the way that professional associations are utilised as institutions to aid personal advancement, by professionals attached to organisations, rather than as organisations for corporate defence and advance (such as trade unions). Such an orientation to the conditions of work betokens an unusually secure work environment, in turn producing positive attitudes to the status quo.
Major institutions involved in the generation of social and political consensus in modern British society (55) have now been surveyed: the main political parties, the Civil Service, the trade unions, the educational system, the organisation of social welfare, and the organisation of career and professional work. It has been clear from the analysis that the consensus spoken of is in no way a monochrome or 'flat' state of affairs, with everyone a harmoniously functioning robot. It is constructed very importantly out of a series of partial conflicts, and out of a series of interests which are distinct yet coincide. All these institutions both contribute to the ongoing maintenance of societal life, and at the same time convey a set of understandings of the society which help to legitimate it and so produce a degree of political consensus. Except within a narrow party-political spectrum, public discussion is not greatly stimulated; and those who espouse a radical value-system within or without these institutions are a small minority with negligible influence. What then is the role of the British media within this context?
iii. **Master-ideologies and the news media in the construction of consensus**

(a) The news media as socialising agents. Over and above these particular institutions, two ideologies have particular importance for the current study. They are the ideologies of nationalism, and objectivity; the first is extremely important in British society at large, and also in the media system; the second is important especially in the media system. Both make a very important contribution to the construction of consensus in Britain; therefore their main constituents will be analysed first.

The particular form that nationalist ideology takes in Britain is attributable to the society's imperial history, to the two World Wars, to the Cold War, and to the sequence: decline of colonialism - entry into the EEC. Naturally the various agencies of socialisation which have been reviewed have been very important as definers of these events; but the actual processes and events themselves have been crucial. Some form of nationalist ideology or sense of national identity is characteristic of most western societies; but equally obviously, this identity need not have the same components in each society. There is no full-length study of British nationalist ideology, nor any individual intellectual who has dominated nationalist thinking (though Churchill's best-diffused speeches, and Powell's speeches, would loosely approximate the latter phenomenon). So what follows is necessarily a combination of common sense and personal projection.

The British Empire, whose legend lived on long after its secular decline had begun (on some views from about 1870, but certainly from the 1920's), almost certainly gave a great proportion of British people the feeling that however lowly they might be in Britain, in world terms they were a part of the largest exercise of dominion ever known in history (and moreover, of one which was generally justified as being conducted in the natives' best interest). Those who travelled out in various roles could actually see this structure of power with their own eyes, and in turn could transmit it
to families and friends, write it in newspapers and magazines, and embed it in novelettes and novels. *Ind. Imp.* even found its way on to the coinage. The specifically colonial phase of the Empire, from the latter half of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century, involved of course a far greater complex of roles than more indirect forms of domination that preceded and succeeded it: no doubt this is the major sociological factor in the importance of the British Empire in British public consciousness. This assurance of being pre-eminently part of the action on the global stage interpenetrated and underlay ideologies of racial supremacy and inferiority, as outlined in chapter 2; so that from the outset, racism and nationalism were closely allied in British culture.

Social chauvinism vis-à-vis other imperial rivals (not to mention the Boers and the Irish) was also strong, and was fanned to white heat by both the experience and even more the propaganda of World War I. The second World War, with its new experience of aerial bombardment on home territory, and with the unexpected exemption of the British Isles from invasion while the rest of Europe was almost entirely dominated by Germany, offered fuel to propaganda both about German vulgarity and about British heroism (compared with France, etc.).

The Cold War with the communist states that succeeded the second World War drew on traditions of anti-communist propaganda that went back over a hundred years (the mob, anarchists), but which were obviously given an immense fillip by the Russian Bolshevik revolution and even more stimulus by the Stalin era in the USSR. Once again, the Red menace (aided and abetted from 1949 by the Yellow Peril in the form of the new Communist regime in China) produced an arms race that was repeatedly justified in terms of the determination of communist elites for world domination at any cost. Britain was also involved in a "hot" part of the Cold War, the conflict in Korea. Insofar as Britain needed constantly to arm herself for defence and survival, including the development of the hydrogen bomb, it was once again apparent that the *British as such* were under threat - irrespective, as in the two previous "live" wars, of class or religion or region.
Although hesitant attempts to de-escalate the Cold War began from the late 50's, this coincided in time with the traumas of decolonisation. These numbered the Suez crisis, when the United States not only stood aloof from Britain, but publicly condemned the venture; the episodes of Indian partition, Mau Mau, and the Congo, which were made to show that blacks were everything racist ideology had always defined them as being (European wars were different); and the repeated defiance of Britain by Nkrumah. All these occurrences were disturbing or humiliating to the British sense of imperial national identity. If the subject peoples were incapable, why not continue to dominate them? Why were the British publicly attacked by the USA? Why could Nkrumah's assaults on British property and expatriates be carried out unscathed? Indeed, why were the colonised natives so careless of the benefits and even sacrifices made by missionaries, soldiers and civil servants from Britain?

From 1947-67, India to Aden, Britain ceded almost all her formal colonies. But also from 1962 on Britain was supplicating to enter the EEC; a position wounding enough to imperially formed sensibilities, but doubly so in view of the dual rebuff by France, and trebly so in view of the cession of certain formal attributes of national sovereignty that successful entry would involve. As for the general traditions of ignorance and suspicion of foreigners, these were at best only dormant and waiting to be resuscitated. The Labour Party, particularly from 1970, joined the traditionalist Tory right wing in playing upon precisely these fears (56).

The development of British nationalism was also significantly inter-related with industrial and racial conflicts. The greater and greater dislocation of the British economy after World War II, whose origins lie very deep (57), was increasingly seen as affected by the incidence of strikes. Trade unions and strikers, in the dominant ideology of nationalism, were seen as acting sectionally and disloyally to disrupt and injure the national economy, and so to attack the national interest. Whether this analysis is accurate is quite another
matter (58); but it was both drawn from and contributed further to, the specific features of British nationalism.

Also, from about 1949, in common with other western European countries (59), Britain was enabling its economic recovery and expansion by the admission of increasing numbers of migrant workers. Hostility in previous decades against the traditional pool of labour (the Irish), as against special migrants such as Jews at the turn of the century, and Poles after World War II, had been quite considerable, mostly in terms of competition for jobs and housing. The new migrant workers came mostly from the Caribbean or south Asia. They were subjects of recently colonial territories, they had dark skins: both were stigmatised in British culture. By and large they stayed, and of course stayed visible (unlike other migrants who had had the potential option of merging.) In terms of the traditional British ideology of nationalism, quite apart from their definition as the most illegitimate of competitors for scarce urban resources, their very presence posed a problem to those British people who adhered to some form of ideology: what was it now to be British? Racism and nationalism fused: it might almost be said that Powellism would have had to be invented (60).

As the preceding analysis of this thesis demonstrates, there are many other elements in the formation in British society of fertile conditions for Powellism beside the internal drift of this ideology; but the co-existence in one articulate public individual of pro-colonialist, anti-communist, anti-EEC, anti-immigrant deductions from an essentially nationalist and patriotic ideology could hardly have come at a more receptive period in the public mood of uncertainty about the nature of British national identity. Powellism is a ferocious re-assertion of traditional nationalist ideology at the time when the desire for a national identity is urgent, but the sense of what it is has slipped away. It is vital to understand that Powellism has erupted into a vacuum, but not as an alien wedge: it has been and is only possible due to the major historical occurrences noted, to the historical traditions of British racist nationalism, and to the presence
of a chorus of other contemporary voices and institutions which convey the entity of the British nation-state as the most important collectivity with which any inhabitant of these islands should identify. The importance of British nationalist ideology for race relations and work relations in the UK has been noted in chapters 5 and 6, and can hardly be over-estimated; for it provides a very strong consensus-base for their definition and explanation. This will be discussed further shortly.

The ideology of objectivity also has no proper history written of it, and so what is said about it here is necessarily subject to the same caveat as the preceding analysis of British nationalism. It may be reasonably surmised that the positivist and empiricist tradition in British universities, especially in history and philosophy but also in social science, together with the image of scientific rigour that such enormously influential writers as Bertrand Russell employed as a weapon against obscurantism and reaction, have enabled detachment and objectivity to be enthroned as major secular intellectual values. These values clearly have their roots in Victorian England and behind that in the Enlightenment, although one of the extraordinary contradictions of the Victorian period was the disjunction between the weakness of actual scientific institutions, and the high prestige of scientific analysis among the intellectuals, such as Darwin, T. H. Huxley, Matthew Arnold, and many others (61). Equally paradoxically, the general conservative ideology which identifies the ideal with the real (62) has probably provided a diffuse form of support for those values. For while on one level these values opposed the uncritical justification of the status quo, the tendency has been extremely strong for "Science" itself to be accepted as the new absolute; and generally it has been the image of "Science" rather than the logics of Science to which deference has been accorded. An unscientific definition of science has consequently furnished an ideal but illusory standard on which activities in quite distinct fields have tended to be modelled.

One such field in which these secular values have become institutionalised is in the British broadcast media, and to an
increasing extent by the Press as well. The factors influencing this development have been at least as political as intellectual, of course. In a micro-context, Tuchman (63) has noted how 'objectivity' serves as a routine defensive strategy for newsmen to shield them from accusations of bias in their reporting (and further how certain specific devices are habitually utilised for this purpose). Expanding this insight from the micro-level to the development of the British broadcast media, it is clear that only the unswerving commitment by Reith to 'objectivity' enabled broadcast news to be permitted at all. Such activity had been excluded until his instantaneous decision to broadcast news during the General Strike (which had of course closed down the Press).

It is of course well known that Reith did so because of his view that public order would be better enabled to persist by the diffusion of accurate information than it would through hopeful but inaccurate propaganda by the Government (64). Nevertheless, if the broadcast media had given the slightest hint of political partiality within the contemporary political spectrum, the forces within the Government that were always eyeing the development of radio news and talks with suspicion would have been quick to have them muzzled. There was a continuing controversy during those years about who, and whose views, should be allowed access to the air-waves at any juncture, let alone in news bulletins.

An interesting, if guarded, exposition of his broadcasting philosophy occurs in an essay published by Reith two years before the General Strike. It is entitled "Striking a Balance"; and in it he begins by quoting Matthew Arnold:

"... the search for truth, however unattainable, is the highest function of man: 'To try to approach truth on one side after another; not to strive or cry, not to persist in pressing forward on one side with violence and self-will; it is only thus, it seems to me, that mortals may hope to gain any vision of the mysterious goddess whom we shall never see except in outline, but only thus even in outline.'
"We cannot help feeling at times that after all there are no competent, impartial and established judges to whom we may finally submit our efforts for approval or condemnation. There is so much that is, and always will be, contradictory in evidence. We are driven back on ourselves." (writer's italics) (65).

This statement, and the essay, are important on several grounds. First, it is clear that Reith knew exactly what he wanted to do with broadcasting in the field of news and discussion: he wanted it to fulfil this function of 'balanced', 'scientific', 'professional' investigation and presentation, almost analogous to the liberal ideal of the university, though operating in its own specific fashion. Second, he managed to stamp the BBC with this ideology to a quite remarkable extent right up to the present time (though the extent to which personal views corresponded with the other intellectual values already outlined must have contributed greatly to his success).

This momentum carried over into British commercial broadcasting: thus the 'balance' requirement in political and other items is required under the law for the IBA, whereas it is only a matter of custom inside the BBC. The similarity between the two agencies in the news and current affairs areas is notable. The example of broadcasting in Britain has also coincided in time with other pressures on the Press to pay at least lip-service to the ideology of objectivity: the growth of the news agencies, with their standardised product, and the need to appeal to heterogeneous mass audiences, has meant a certain blunting of the "violence and self-will" in communication noted and abhorred by Reith (66).

Having traced in this way the components and development of the ideology of nationalism in British society at large, and of the ideology of objectivity in the British media (especially in broadcasting), the relation of these ideologies to the social construction of political consensus in Britain must be reviewed. In fact, the second — institutionalised in the media practice of 'balance' or 'fairness' — acts as
conductor for the first, as well as making its own contribution. That specific contribution will be discussed first, and subsequently the conductor-relationship will be analysed.

It is in discussing the specific contribution of the practice of 'balance' to the construction of political consensus that the anthropological data outlined earlier in this chapter (i.e.) are particularly illuminating. For in the British broadcast media there is actually a standard ritual which daily and even hourly enacts the myth of objectivity-as-balance in millions of situations at home and at work. It is bound up with the roles of newscaster, presenter, reporter, interviewer, and link-man; and in television is a visual as well as an aural ritual. The official definition of these roles, which only marginally differ from each other, precludes editorialising of any significance (at least by comparison with American practice). It is then a peculiarly British phenomenon.

In their reading of the news, chairing of discussions, descriptive analyses of an event, or interviewing, their obligation is always to maintain 'balance'. They are, while fulfilling their roles, the living speaking personification of the principles of objectivity and neutrality, embodying them and continually diffusing them. The ritual is a secular analogue of the religious and dramatic rituals discussed earlier, which served to reproduce consensus in situations of continuing conflict. They did so, it will be recalled, by redefining the situation. This ritual operates in the same way, by tending to redefine each conflict in terms of a proper and natural position being one of compromise and negotiation rather than insistence on truth and rights. This tendency has been vividly observed in the data on this ritual role in situations of industrial and racial conflict in chapters 5 and 6.

This ritual is also illuminated by Barthes' analysis of the qualitative richness of a single sign, and Sapir's category of "condensation symbols". For this single, simple ritual certainly conveys a wealth of meaning, and does so - at least analytically -
in a way which is even distinct from the particular words uttered by the occupants of the ritual role. Effectively, if the constant in any situation is the balanced mediator, if every conflict of every kind is placed in relation to an uncommitted broker, then social reality is defined as something which it is pre-eminently possible to be balanced about: this is the inferential structure within which broadcast communication takes place. Anticipating a little the discussion of nationalism in media output, it may be said further that the ritual is a constant reminder to the myth-consumers (Barthes) that the conflicts which exist are to be interpreted as on a lesser level of social significance than the nation. The primacy of the nation interlocks with compromise as the high ground from which conflicts are to be viewed.

The operation of this secular ritual of balance/fairness in broadcasting is very likely to ramify into a habit of thought, a standard method of cognitive categorisation which may be extended to issues quite unprompted by exposure to a particular broadcast on them. It is therefore one of the most important contributions by the media to the production of political consensus in Britain.

(There is no such ritual in the Press. However, two remarks should be made on this point. The Daily Mirror does operate with a rather similar ideology of balance, compromise, fairness, and reasonableness, as has been empirically established in chapters 5 and 6; so that at least one major national newspaper more or less reflects the broadcast style in this respect. The Daily Express and Daily Telegraph would almost certainly lay claim to objectivity, maybe in line with a leading contemporary Conservative (Amery) who is quoted as claiming to be "not so much Right as right". This leads to the second remark, which is that there is a tendency in Britain for people to trust the broadcast media news output more than the Press (67); while no doubt reflecting the greater angularity of these sections of the Press, it also underpins the enormous significance of the broadcast ritual as analysed above.)
Before proceeding to the discussion of how this ritual leads directly to the reproduction of nationalist ideology, it is important to pause for a brief discussion of how this ritual is interpreted inside the media organisation, since the assertion that it is such a ritual with such functions might well be disputed by some media personnel involved; and while it is always possible for participants to be unaware of the full import of their activity, the disjunction should at least be made comprehensible by the sociologist.

Part of the legitimation of this role among journalists consists of the ideology of public service (68), an alternative expression for service to the nation. The various conflicts which exist within the nation are therefore properly to be presented to the nation "as they are", for the nation to make up its mind on them. 'Balance' is therefore what a journalist owes the nation, and what by his professional training he is able to offer the nation: the scientific principle of the equivalence of trained observers is subtly redefined here as the equivalence of English-trained journalists. "We are driven back on ourselves", as Reith put it. Professionalism is then thought to guarantee accuracy in disputed situations, rather than the production of yet another view which may or may not be accurate. BBC Television newsmen pride themselves (69) on their corporate ability to mask their own views in the production of news stories.

This perspective of course takes it for granted that the nation is the final court of appeal, which in turn assumes that no conflict will emerge that is sufficiently deeply grounded and justified to supersede this primary loyalty and relegate the nation to second place. Such naivete about internal power and conflict is characteristic of nationalist ideologies, but has inevitably been questioned by the development of the conflict in northern Ireland in which first the minority wished to jettison its British national status, and then the majority found itself in conflict with the British State in its determination to maintain its British nationality.
The problems this created for the consensual presuppositions of the newsroom have been interestingly discussed by a former current affairs editor (70).

A second, unofficial component of this role-definition is the ideology of "tribune of the people". (This is outside the discretion of the newscaster in most cases.) It is important in lending a little edge to the rather colourless concept of balance, and so in making these ritual roles more interesting and acceptable to those who fill them. On purely impressionistic evidence, it is a latitude which tends to be utilised mostly against such targets as local bureaucracies, pollution, "juggernaut" lorries; other kinds of potential target do not seem to feature in the same way. The weak populism of this unofficial role-definition is also based on nationalist premises, ultimately, since the "people" and the nation are more or less coterminous in conventional thinking. There is certainly no notion inherent in it of any division which might override national identity.

The other component in the role-definition which helps to legitimate and strengthen it is the admission of exceptions to its operation, or alternatively its revamping as an ideal rather than something perfectly realisable in practice. Naturally, if the balance-requirement were to be imposed with absolute rigour the ritual role would collapse through its conflict with other strongly internalised cultural norms. The exceptions give it a resilience, particularly since they tend to be on the plane of individual morality: the loathsome nature of sexual assault on children is clearly not a subject on which newsmen would find themselves balanced, and it is precisely this kind of exception to the rule which is uppermost in their thinking on the subject. Once again, only a conflict transcending these presuppositions, as in northern Ireland, can challenge the practice of balance seriously. Stating balance as an ideal is of course a perfect device for avoiding the analysis of its problems on any level but a casual one.
In essence, then, the internal definition of the balance ritual is only sustainable in the media because no overt conflicts challenging the primacy of national identity currently arise inside British territory. (Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party wax and wane only as minority movements.) Given the absence of such overt conflict, it is possible for newsmen to legitimate this ritual in terms of service to the nation.

Already, even before the analysis of the way in which the ritual acts as conductor for nationalist ideology, it is clear that there are links between the two in the form of newsmen's own justification of their role, and in the assumption that compromise is the essence of the appropriate response to conflict. The primacy of the nation is the premise in both cases. However, there is still more to be stated in this connection, both in relation to the media as amplifiers of the national culture, and in relation to racial and industrial conflict.

Objectivity, enshrined in the daily ritual of balance, establishes as the main criterion for inclusion and prominence in the broadcast media, the numerical representation of ideas among social groups in the society. In so doing, it redefines itself as contemporary national culture. There is no longer anything substantial to connect the principle of objectivity with a search for the accurate investigation and interpretation of social, political or economic reality. As noted already in chapter 1, if there are no Buddhists, there will be no Buddhism on the media. By contrast, attempts at objective analysis of molecular structure and interaction would never be confined to the views on the subject of British scientific researchers. The additional role of the objectivity ritual is then to act as amplifier for the current national culture. In itself, this does not relay nationalism except as a general presupposition that is never actually stated. It does however provide a peculiarly favourable opportunity for ideologists of nationalism to diffuse their definitions of race relations and work relations, as will now be seen.
The definition of industrial disputes as injurious to the national interest or the public good or the country's economy has already been noted in chapter 3 as a very frequent interpretive category. It was additionally noted there how newsmen (especially on the broadcast media, and the Mirror) tended to identify in their questions both with the national interest, and with the Government as guardian of that interest and presumptive umpire in the dispute on the nation's behalf. In this way, the objectivity ritual acts as conductor for nationalist definitions of the meaning of industrial disputes.

In turn, this has one notable effect: every conflict is declared sectional, and consequently localised. This applies, as was seen, to both employees and employers, although the former had far less explanation of their case offered than the latter. It means, correspondingly, that any generalised basis of industrial conflict is unlikely to be put forward: it is those employees who have this (partly comprehensible) dispute with those employers. The impact of a period of rapid price-inflation, that denies people the secure provision of wants that work normally supplies, was certainly not mentioned by the newsmen during the docks strike, though it was a general factor with some impact on that situation.

Another example from chapter 5 of the tendency not to generalise is the way the sympathy action of dockers in Western European ports and at Felixstowe was de-emphasised. Further examples from this research, though not part of the sample analysed in chapter 5, are the uncompromising condemnation and alarm at the emergence of "flying pickets" in the Yorkshire coalfields, and at the occurrence of political strikes against the then-imminent Industrial Relations Act in December 1970.

Similarly, in coverage of national conferences of the TUC, the stance of the trade unions toward incomes policies or wage-claims is usually defined as a scatter of views, more or less militant than the previous year, rather than as a series of responses to a continuing and shared problem. Should some overwhelming unity on tactics be achieved, then organised labour is likely to find itself defined in
response simply as a large sectional interest; at this point the families of trade unionists are generally separated from them and counted with the "majority" (which is vital if it is to be a majority). An alternative is to label the active trade unionists as being out of step with their membership. It is unusual to find these categories being imposed on either employers or the government in its capacity as employer.

The result of these nationalist categorisations is then to draw the sting from industrial conflict by firmly localising it, and evacuating it of all generalised explanation or implication. In so doing, the minority involved is encouraged to see themselves as deviants who should endeavour to get back into step as soon as possible. The majority is encouraged to define them in the same way, without identifying any commonality in their own life-situation. This is a very powerful contribution to the construction of social consensus, especially given the generalised enthronement of compromise by means of the balance-ritual.

Nationalist definitions of race relations are also given substantial amplification by the British news media, although in this case the precise way in which the objectivity ritual acted as conductor has been different. As already noted in chapter 6.1.a, the response to Powell's 1968 Birmingham speech on black immigration lodged him securely as part of the national culture; and as noted in the present section of this chapter, his definition of race relations is a distinctively nationalist one. Logically, this combination leads straight to the point where the vast majority of news about domestic race relations is about immigration: precisely the point at which the foreign-ness of black people, their "unprecedented invasion of the body politic" (Powell), their defined essence as "alien wedge" (Radcliffe), is apparently most visible.

Conversely, in exactly the same way as Powell never addresses himself to the issue of racism in British society, so the media analysis of racial discrimination and other forms of racialism is quite negligible.
Likewise, on the question of selling arms to the South African regime, the national interest was enthroned as one of the two fundamental principles involved in the debate. As with industrial conflict, so the nationalist categories imposed on racial conflict effectively drew attention from the case of the black immigrants and their families, and their oppressed position inside the society, and defined them as entrants. The word "immigration", unless otherwise stated, always meant black immigration both on TV and in the Press during this period. In other words, the focus was on them as people who did not belong to the nation; their deviance was defined in terms of them themselves, not as in the case of strikers in terms of their actions. Given the permanence of skin-colour, and its role as culturally defined cue for discrimination, together with their status as a 2-3½ minority, this meant that a consensus was being produced about them from which they had no escape, either through assimilation or through effective countervailing power. The consensus in question defined them as undesirable people, and was relatively silent about the discrimination they faced. The extent to which their experience represented a radical condemnation of the social structure and culture of British society was thus totally bypassed.

The essence of the argument of the preceding pages has been that the intensive commitment to the categories of nationalism and objectivity in broadcast media and the Press, with the objectivity/balance ritual acting as effective conductor for nationalist ideology, has defined industrial and racial conflict in such a way as to rob them of their most disruptive and challenging meanings. The various forms that this commitment takes have been analysed; but whatever the form, these categories consequently penetrate all strata of British society and ceaselessly reiterate a fundamental axis for interpreting industrial and racial conflicts (and perhaps others as well). During the late 60's and early 70's, this placed news media output in a particular symbiotic relationship with powellite definitions of black members of British society, of a very close kind; definitions of
industrial conflict that imply every such dispute is local in character and has no basis in the general structural conditions of work-organisation, had always had a peculiarly strong relation with the ritual role of interviewer, reporter, etc., as representing the national interest and the supreme validity of compromise. This should not be read as stating that every form of nationalism would produce such definitions, or even that every facet of British nationalism produces such definitions; but the main conclusion must be that the British news media enable British nationalism to redefine these two conflicts in a way which makes them both much less damaging to the existing consensus in the society.

(b) The media as stimulators of public discussion.

So far the analysis has concentrated on the ideological definitions which are built into the organisation and presentation of news in Britain. The other key dimension in discussing the relation of the news media to the social construction of political consensus is the extent to which they act as a forum for public discussion of public issues (71). There are essentially two (mutually compatible) methods by which media organisations may pursue this role. One is the inclusion of adequate explanations of the events they present. The other is the opportunity given to members of the society to express their views competitively on issues that affect them.

It was evident from the material gathered that the British news media used neither of these methods sufficiently. Through their lack of explanation, the social origins of the situations which they convey "go without saying" (72): a major contribution to an uncritical consensus, just as is the tendency to provide media access to a particular spectrum of definitions and interpretations of reality. It appears that the media have a significant role in the discussion from informed public debate in modern British society, particularly when their heavy utilisation of elite figures is taken into account. It was noted in chapters 5 and 6 how the leaders of the Transport and General Workers' Union were intensively interviewed, despite the
well-known failures of that union to represent its docker members anywhere near as efficiently as many of its other members; how Frank Cousins and Lord Caradon were both interviewed to speak for the black interest; how unusual it was in programmes on white-dominated southern Africa to ask representatives of African national liberation movements for their views; how in the Caledonian Road police-station affray no black person was asked for their account of the incident; and how only when dealing with Nigeria and its internal strife were blacks invited to criticise the social situation there. The question as to why there is this underdevelopment of the British news media as a public forum must therefore be investigated, in relation to both explanation and access.

The answer to this question is complex, but relates in essence to certain aspects of the organisation of the news media, and to certain aspects of their articulation with the educational system. The weakness of explanation is due to the organisational division of news, the stratification of knowledge by programme, and the types of education and professional socialisation and security of the journalists. The limits on access are due to the dilemmas of semi-expert skilled communicators, the southern and London bias of national journalism, the definition of particular linguistic codes as inappropriate for the public domain of broadcasting, and what can only be described as a policy of "instinctive omission". Further comments on each of these points in turn is obviously necessary.

The only reason for the organisational division of broadcast news into News, Current Affairs and Documentaries is the gradually evolving attempt to expand broadcast journalism's freedom of coverage. As noted, News itself was highly suspect at first; and so only by the creation of additional departments has any form of expanded coverage or opportunity for the expression of divergent views been made possible. The institutional separation of presentation of events (News) from analysis and interpretation (Current Affairs), and of the latter again from detailed analysis (Documentaries), represents then merely one
phase in the contest between State interference and the struggle for relative independence by professional broadcast journalists. It does not represent the most suitable organisational form for enabling explanation and understanding of important issues, especially given the majority audience for News, and the minority audience for the other divisions. It means that even where the News division has the time (as in the docks strike, or the South Africa arms issue) it tends not to utilise it for proper explanation.

The stratification of knowledge by programme has close parallels with the stratification of educational knowledge by social class destination into curricula (73). The reference here is to the level of communication itself, rather than the degree of depth of explanation. This stratification of media knowledge runs from the elitist weight of Panorama and The Times, through the human interest stories of the popular Press and local broadcasting, to instant news flashes amidst continuous pop music. Given however that the level of explanation almost must vary with the level of communication, it appears that the media are content to reflect and reinforce rather than alter the levels of public discussion institutionalised by the educational system.

As regards the educational and professional background of national journalists, the following points should be made (74). The great majority of journalists in broadcast News, and on the three newspapers studied, are presently recruited from other ranks of broadcast or Press journalism, and tend to have entered journalism straight from school. Certain journalists in the Press (typically Political and Foreign Correspondents), and journalists in broadcast Current Affairs, are much more likely to have had a university education before entering journalism.

This divergence in the likely capacity for in-depth explanation among the journalists in the media studied, some of whom have been very intensively socialised in the normal practices of British journalism, others of whom may have been exposed to the degree of reflexive questioning encouraged in some university departments, is in practice
reduced by the occupational position of either set. The television News journalists are in the most favoured location, at the summit of the profession of general journalism, with full security and excellent pay. The same is practically true of the journalists on the three major nationals that have been studied. Television journalism in Current Affairs is however a much less secure occupation, with short contracts for most of those involved, and heavily under scrutiny in Parliament and other places of influence. The capacity for in-depth analysis may well be somewhat inhibited by these factors, since there can be little doubt that detailed explanations are much more likely to reveal latent conflicts of a number of kinds than rapid presentations. This is always assuming that Current Affairs broadcasting is dominated by editors who prefer in-depth analysis to heated studio discussions, which empirically is often not the case (75).

Further, when it comes to issues involving economics or sociology or one of the social sciences, it need not be the case that university-trained journalists are qualified in one of these subjects. Full knowledge of a particular topic could often lead to a much bolder and more effective journalistic handling of it than occurs (76); as it is, topics are sometimes thought to be much more incomprehensible and difficult to communicate to the non-specialist audience than they really are. At this point, it is the lack of grasp in the production-unit of the nature of the topic which is at the root of the problem of explanation, not the putative level of attention or understanding of the programme's audience. It may at least be hypothesised that the constraint on production that is often accepted without question in the media, namely that items must be sufficiently entertaining to keep people's attention, has imposed a quite unnecessary degree of caution about the depth to which it was appropriate to take a discussion or presentation.

These aspects of the organisation of the news media, and of their interaction with aspects of the educational system, go some way toward explaining the weakness of explanation that has been noted in
news media output. The under-utilisation of the news media as public forum is now the remaining question that has to be answered.

The dilemmas of the semi-expert, who nonetheless may be an expert communicator, have been analysed by Elliott (77) in relation to television production. In planning a television production the programme has often to be created virtually ex nihilo, with the production-unit familiarising itself as rapidly as possible both with the nature of the topic, and the possible outside participants. Basic to this process is the construction of a working view of the topic, but ambivalence in relation to outside participants in terms of their potential disruption of that working view. A second criterion of outside participants, which often becomes merged with the first, is their likely ability to communicate quickly and clearly to non-specialists. The essence of the situation then is that semi-experts, with considerable experience and expertise in communication, need to be able to wield discreet but effective control over experts.

This dilemma breeds standard responses. One such response is demonstrated in the definite preference of producers for participants who are already known personally, since this reduces the anxiety and uncertainty characteristic of the situation. A high premium is placed at early planning meetings on networks of contacts from which members of the production-unit can draw; addresses and telephone numbers are especially valuable at this stage. Clearly, this practice tends to restrict access rather than expand it.

A similar response, in many ways derivative from the first, is the strong tendency to utilise accessible London-based spokesmen of particular interests, to the exclusion of more immediately involved spokesmen. Given the professional experience in the South of England of the majority of national journalists; the further consequence that their network of personal contacts will be strongly regionally weighted; and the extent to which industrial correspondents, for instance, define their main work as covering national negotiations in London with only the rarest of trips outside (usually to Party or TUC conferences) (78);
it becomes more comprehensible why the two TGWU leaders were so intensively utilised during the docks strike. Once again, access tends to be restricted rather than expanded.

The last aspect of the news media that is relevant to their under-utilisation as public forum has not been discussed elsewhere to the writer's knowledge. It is the extent to which particular linguistic codes are defined as inappropriate for use in the public domain of broadcasting. As in schools and universities, so in the news media, certain linguistic codes are graded high or low. One of the criteria for access is the ability to utilise acceptable linguistic codes, which are in general those ranked high in the educational system and thought to be characterised by fluency and articulateness. Nothing, on the face of it, would be more unproductive in broadcasting than participants who could not make themselves clear.

However, evidence is beginning to be accumulated that the assumed correlation between high ranking linguistic codes and articulateness is a spurious one. Experimental work by Labov (79) suggests that the apparent correlation between social class and verbal articulateness observed by Bernstein (80) and others, may be a product of the test-situation. Labov's own analysis of Non-standard English as spoken in a context where the subject felt entirely at ease and not expected to produce sentences in Standard English, indicated that Non-standard English was capable of being utilised with just as great precision, logic and fluency as Standard English. He suggests further that the presumptive articulateness of middle-class linguistic codes may often cloak confusion under verbosity, and that verbal flow need not necessarily be coterminous with clarity.

In the context of access to the news media, these findings indicate that a particular definition of communicative competence (81) tends to hold sway among media personnel. It would be assumed that only Standard English could be communicated in nationally, and that it would at least be necessary for someone to be able to switch to this code even if they did not use it habitually. This indicates the hegemony of middle-class experience and perspectives in the media, of course,
since Labov's findings would only come as a real surprise to researchers with no personal experience of the vividness and fluency of non-standard codes. The linguistic code deemed appropriate for the public domain does nonetheless have the effect of screening out large numbers of people from participation in broadcast media output. It may be too that the association of broadcasting with a particular code means that a picket, presented with a microphone, will be likely to see it as symbolising a demand that he be fluent in a code not his own; and consequently, that in such situations people are far less fluent than they might be in a different situation. In other words, their poor response may be due to factors that are similar to the impact of the test-situation as analysed by Labov. Since also the development of writing skills varies noticeably between strata, access to newspaper columns is also limited - quite apart from journalistic restrictions on non-journalist contributors.

The net result of these linguistic criteria is that access is once again screened off to a great number of people, even though it may be many dockers could have explained the conditions of their work entirely lucidly during the coverage of the docks strike. Since virtually no one else explained it, it can hardly be claimed that the acceptable verbal code is a sufficient guarantee of clarity. Given the huge variety of situations and experiences characteristic of complex modern societies, it is entirely predictable that only those who know many of them will be able to explain them and discuss them adequately, at least as regards their concrete details. If however their communicative competence is downgraded, it will be impossible for them to explain these situations to a wider audience. Re-examination of this criterion might lead to a very different and greatly expanded use of the media as a public forum. At present, because of this linguistic criterion, it is greatly contracted.

None of the factors discussed so far would fully account for the omission of black spokesmen in situations of racial conflict, although they might go some way toward explaining their absence. In
the writer's view, this can only be explained by positing a policy of "instinctive omission" among media personnel; that is to say, that traditional English culture has been so devoid of references to asking black people their views, at least with any intention of acting upon them, that when it comes to situations affecting them they are instinctively omitted, and passed over in preference for white spokesmen supposedly articulating their interests. Only so, in the writer's view, can the virtual absence of African liberation organisations' spokesmen during 1970 be explained, in items on South Africa or Rhodesia; only so can the selection of Cousins and Caradon be explained; only so can the silence of ITN, and BBC's utilisation of a white spokesman, be explained in the context of the Caledonian Road police station affray. It is recognised that this is at present a hypothesis which applies a characteristic white response to blacks to the particular circumstances of the news media; but otherwise the situations described seem practically inexplicable.

It can then be concluded that the relative absence of explanation in situations of industrial conflict and racial conflict, together with the restricted access allowed to members of the public, are factors grounded in certain features of the organisation of the media, and in aspects of the articulation between the media and the educational system. In practice, the social construction of political consensus is dependent therefore on semi-informative information and a restricted spectrum of participants. The news media act as a relatively weak political forum, without actually ceasing altogether to operate in that fashion. Were they to do so altogether the degree of social and political consensus might conceivably even be impaired. The result of this lack of stimulation of public debate and discussion from its major potential source is consequently the existence of relative apathy and disinterest in British society about public issues - including those issues such as industrial and racial conflict which might otherwise be considerably more explosive.
iv. Conclusions

This study has attempted to investigate the complex links between social conflict and social consensus by examining a particular integrative institution in a particular society whose most significant conflicts are polarised around race and work relations. First, a model of the social role of the mass media was developed which placed their operation within the context of role complexity, pluralism, conflict and change. Subsequently, the social origins and components of race relations and work relations were analysed, both theoretically and in their empirical British context. The results of the primary research task of the study, which was the content analysis of TV and Press news output on these two sets of relationships, was then presented. The contribution of that output on these conflict-areas to the social construction of political consensus was then discussed in the context of other major sources of consensus in British society, after a prior assessment of certain characteristic theoretical interpretations of the role of ideas in divisive (macro-)social situations.

The conclusion reached was that through the following channels the disruptive potential of those conflicts was effectively dissipated, namely (i) the definitional categories of British nationalist ideology; (ii) the mediating roles of the objectivity/balance ritual in the signally important news media; (iii) the virtual absence of explanation of particular conflict-situations in work relations and race relations; (iv) the utilisation of a relatively narrow spectrum of views in media debates of the issues. As socialising agents and as public forum the media consequently contributed to the continuing construction of political consensus in British society.

There are three general observations to be made in concluding this study. First, on the nature of social consensus. Second, on the relation between socialisation and social initiatives. Third, the link between political theory and sociological theory in the context of this study.
What is without doubt clear from this research is the complex composition of social and political consensus. Both Durkheim and the mass society theorists do scant justice to this complexity, although in both cases certain aspects of the composition of consensus are accurately identified: the interdependence generated by the development of the division of labour, and the emasculated nature of public debate in modern societies. It is clear that all kinds of conflict and change are compatible with stability, provided they are not generalised. At the root of the localisation of conflicts and changes in society, at least as related to the topics of this study, appears to be their inadequate explanation, and their definition as being on a lesser level of significance than the collectivity of the nation.

If Weber was right to argue that legitimacy is the key to authority, then it has nonetheless to be recognised that legitimacy on these issues is not so much rule-based (though that may be an element in the situation) as based on a zone of indifference stimulated by the major social sources of definitions and discussion: education and the media, in interaction with the other institutions specified in section ii of this chapter. That is to say, this indifference is argued here, against Schutz (82), not to be an equilibrium condition of the natural man, but to be socially produced. To the same extent that the lack of "psychic mobility" of Lerner's Turkish peasant (83) was socially produced by his milieu, so the relative apathy and indifference characteristic of public life in contemporary Britain is socially produced.

Its production is not founded on the premise of Marcuse's "repressive tolerance" (84), but on the existence of channels of expression and communication which redefine conflicts and changes in ways that so far as possible both preserve their latency (in the case of conflict) and emphasise their elements of continuity (in the case of change). In the absence of any major focus of radical challenge or opposition, there is no reason why the conflicts and changes of modern societies should not successfully be redefined in these ways. The "repressive tolerance" argument rests on a combination of the
"safety-valve" and "super-power" versions of protest and authority, taking it for granted that opposition is always pure, and authority always serenely confident. The argument here is that opposition is always constructed within and therefore shaped by its social context, and that what confidence authority possesses is based on its competence in managing aspects of that context. The developing utilisation of opinion polls in the practice of government, as analysed by Habermas (85) is one important illustration of the way authority is not so serenely confident as Marcuse would have it.

This leads directly to the second observation, on the relation between socialisation and social initiatives. It could be claimed that this study has by implication argued for an "oversocialised" view of men (86); that members of media audiences are incapable of responding to definitions that contradict media definitions, for instance, or of confronting the media as untrustworthy.

Against this, it should be noted firstly, that most of the discussion after chapter 1 has concentrated on the particular role of the media within contemporary British society; in chapter 1.ii the rather different roles of the media within other societies were noted. In Britain, there is no doubt that the media, especially the broadcast media, enjoy a higher degree of public confidence at the time of writing than in many other societies.

Secondly, "undersocialisation" is rather the theme of this study than "oversocialisation". That is to say, following Kann's statement cited in section 1(a) of this chapter (87), that values are perpetuated which do not aid people to interpret adequately the reality they experience, and that the news media do not utilise the scope in principle available to them to operate as public forum.

Thirdly, this study has taken into account the complexities of social attitudes and consciousness, whether the immediate-abstract rupture in values noted by Parkin (88), or trade union conflict as part of the liberal economy as noted by Gramsci (89), or the hazards of attitude-measurement as noted by Fishbein (90). What is fully
stated in this study is the very substantial degree of opposition and conflict which can exist within a consensually ordered society. It may be that British society is almost a limiting case in this regard, comparatively speaking, for certainly some societies have regimes which violently repress conflict very readily. Nonetheless, a sociological theory of the construction of consensus must be capable of encompassing the degree of opposition that is possible without the dissolution of social order.

This leads to the third and final observation, which is concerned with the inter-relation this study posits for political theory and sociological theory. At a number of points in the study this relationship has been implicit, though not discussed. Those points are the degree of tolerance of opposition that a liberal democratic polity can allow and yet survive; the proper representation of interests by elite (sometimes elected) representatives; and the general question of how interests are defined prior to their political articulation, which clearly is critical for the mode of their articulation.

As a limiting case, it is obvious that despite liberal definitions there are situations which a liberal democratic polity cannot permit. Benn and Peters (91) instance the emergence to popularity of a political party whose platform proposes the abolition of liberal democracy. In general, it would be accurate to draw a distinction between the scope for debate and the scope for action in a liberal democratic polity, which is considerable in the case of the former but much more hedged about in the case of the latter.

The question of the proper representation of interests by elite spokesmen seems by contrast to be a relatively pragmatic issue in principle, and a quite normal part of democratic theory. That is to say, that the adequacy of representation is an empirical problem; and no theory of democracy has ever offered a guarantee that every representative would perform adequately - indeed the possibility that this will not be the case is perhaps the principal rationale for
elections. In some of the concrete instances of this study, Caradon and Cousins spoke for black interests without having been elected, and ineffectively. Jones and O'Leary spoke for dockers, the former having been elected but by a much larger constituency, and they spoke against an established background of abysmal TGWU efficiency in its ports operation. It is implied that since the news media also have an investigative role they might at least have indicated there were disparities between the perspectives of the representatives and the represented.

As regards social influence on the way political interests are articulated, it is arguable that there is a ratio of sorts between the degree and kind of awareness of interests and the maximisation of developmental (92) powers in a democratic society. Insofar as interests are misdefined, or not defined at all, then democratic dimensions of modern societies are rendered incapable of significant further evolution. Again, concretely, in terms of the particular focus of this study it is the case that the treatment of work relations and race relations by the British news media did not contribute toward the development of the powers of the main actors involved, because of the ways their interests were defined and articulated. It was argued that, in interaction with other major institutions of British society, this would tend to interfere with the extent to which those interests would be accurately articulated, and thus to leave them unmet to a degree that was not necessitated by the requirements of British society for stability and order.
(4) A. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (Lawrence & Wishart 1971), especially pp. 3-205.
(6) C. Goetz, "Ideology as a cultural system", in D. Apter (ed), Ideology and Discontent (Free Press, 1964), pp. 47-76.
(8) F. Parkin, Class Inequality and the Political Order (MacGibbon & Kee 1971), ch. 3.
(10) In this chapter, the terms 'ideology', 'culture', 'value-system' and 'social perspective' are used almost interchangeably to refer to all forms of meaning, interpretation, definition and belief.
(11) See for instance, Berge/Luckmann, op. cit., ch. 1.2; G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (University of Chicago Press, 1934);
(14) P. 120; and see n. 25.
(18) For an analysis of British industrial relations in this period as anomie, see A. Fox, A Sociology of Work in Industry (Collier-MacMillan 1971) pp. 176-81; and on the profits squeeze, see A. Glyn & B. Sutcliffe, British Capitalism, Workers, and the Profits Squeeze (Penguin Special 1972).
(19) It is in this light that the findings of Runciman should probably be most usefully interpreted, that people tend to take the most visible and accessible members of society as their reference group for defining their awareness of poverty and inequality. W. G. Run-
(21) E. Norbeck, "African rituals of conflict", _American Anthropologist_ 65 (1963), pp. 1254-79, claims that his survey of the literature on a great number of such rituals in Africa indicates they all serve this function.

(22) J. L. Peacock, _Rites of Modernization_ (University of Chicago Press 1968).


(26) M. Gluckman, _Custom and Conflict in Africa_ (Blackwell, 1969), ch. V.


(31) R. Harris, _Competition and the Corporate Society_ (Macmillan 1972).

(32) A. Hill, _Parliamentary Socialism_ (Merlin Press 1972, 2nd ed);

(33) B. Hindess, _The Decline of Working Class Politics_ (Merlin Press 1971).

(34) F. Parkin, _op. cit._, ch. 4.


(36) R. T. Mckenzie & A. Silver, _Angels in Marble_ (Heinemann 1968), ch. 1.


(40) V. L. Allen, _Militant Trade Unionism_, p. 51.

(41) Cited footnote 18.

(42) M. F. D. Young (ed), _Knowledge and Control_ (Collier-Macmillan 1971), chs. 1, 2, 3, 5; and G. Murdoch, "Pop goes the classroom", paper read to British Sociological Association's study group on Mass Communication, 1972.
A recent Marxist analysis, for instance, rejects the categorisation of State activity as repressive or ideological, and argues that welfare is one of a number of institutions "which have a *conformative* role, which contain, incorporate and moderate the conflicts inside capitalist society". M. Barratt Brown, "The Welfare State in Britain", in R. Miliband & J. Saville, *Socialist Register 1971* ( Merlin Press), pp. 185-223. The quotation is from p. 186.

A similar account is to be found in R. Rose, *Politics in England* (Paber 1964), chs. 2-3. The problem faced in handling these accounts is that the writer considers they are in neither case very illuminating, but that in both cases there is a great deal of material which would require considerable space to criticise properly. They present the problem of being carefully argued, and containing some interesting passages and insights, without adding up to a coherent sociological explanation of the construction of consensus. The tendency in both is for perspectives and theories to be thrown together in a rather *ad hoc* manner, for the concepts of the Princeton school of political analysis to be used as dredging nets, and for historical data to be produced as necessarily influential in the present. The objective of both works seems to be to try to discover the magical secret of political stability, and to take Britain as a master-example. The whole governing perspective is very much pre-Barrington Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Allen Lane, 1966); social violence is defined as simply repugnant, and its presence or absence is the result of various cultural "mixes" (which is true but tautologous).
(59) S. Castles and G. Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (OUP 1973).
(62) See N. Harris, Beliefs in Society (Penguin Books 1971), ch. 4, on British conservative thought.
(64) A. Briggs, The Birth of Broadcasting (OUP 1961), pp. 363-5.
(69) This and other observations in succeeding paragraphs on the perceptions of their work by media personnel are based on a series of interviews conducted by the writer with BBC TV News staff in 1972.

(72) See n. 13.

(73) M. F. D. Young, cited n. 40.


(75) Personal communication from Udi Eichler, current affairs director with Thames Television.

(76) Personal communication from Christie Davies, Lecturer in Sociology, University of Reading; formerly involved in BBC Current Affairs output.


(78) J. Tunstall, Journalists At Work, pp. 62-3, 153, 155, 163.

(79) W. Labov, "The logic of non-standard English", in P. P. Giglioli (ed), Language and Social Context (Penguin 1972), ch. 9, and the references cited at the end of that article to his other research.


(81) The concepts of domain, code and communicative competence are derived from current work in sociolinguistics. See the articles by Fishman, Gumperz, Hymes, Cazden and Henderson in J. Pride and J. Holmes (eds), Sociolinguistics (Penguin 1972).

(82) See ch. 1, nn. 58-59.

(83) See ch. 1, nn. 23-25.


(85) J. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society (Heinemann Educational Books, 1971), ch. 5: "The scientization of politics and public opinion".


(87) See n. 20.

(88) F. Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order, pp. 91-92.

(89) A. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, pp. 158-68.

(90) See ch. 1, n. 44.


(92) This refers to a useful distinction made by MacPherson between extractive power (= power over and against others), and developmental power (= capacity for self-development), in the context of decreasing economic scarcity. See C. MacPherson, Democratic Theory (OUP 1973), ch. III.