THE DYNAMICS OF MINORITY RULE: INTRA-PARTY
POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN
WESTERN EUROPE'

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to provide a theoretical and empirical explanation of the question: How do conflicts within a party affect its coalitional behaviour insofar as such conflicts may influence the bargaining power of party elites in the parliamentary arena? There are three major themes around which the theoretical explanation is organized. The first theme is that 'party institutionalization' and the nature of intra-party conflicts are important factors in shaping the ability of the party elites to neutralize internal conflicts. The second theme - a particular application of the first - is that the strength of a party in the parliamentary bargaining plane (i.e. its relative bargaining power) lies in its organization weakness. The third theme reveals that political parties, which are characterized by the existence of heterogeneous and diffused mechanisms for internal dissent, can handle internal conflicts in a variety of ways without forcing members to leave the party.

Based upon a comparative analysis of intra-party conflicts and minority governments in Denmark, Norway, France, Italy and the U.K., the study suggests that weakly institutionalized parties can enter into conflict inducing coalition negotiations without risking their hold on their membership, whereas inter-party negotiations can lead to disintegration of highly institutionalized parties as members may be forced to leave the party as their primary mechanism for expression of discontent.

A major implication of this study is that in multi-party systems in which minority situations occur, the most attractive strategy (i.e. in terms of bargaining power) for highly institutionalized parties occupying a governmental position is the formation of informal minority governments, whereas the most attractive strategy for weakly institutionalized parties is the formation of formal minority governments.
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III
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION: THE LACUNA OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 The Study of Minority Governments: Formation and Performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Intra-party Politics and Coalitional Behaviour</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The Concept of 'Party Institutionalization' and The Dynamics of Minority Rule</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. THE RESEARCH STRATEGY</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 The Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 Basic Assumptions</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 The Bargaining Problem</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3 The Process of Coalitional Behaviour: The Relevancy of 'Party Institutionalization'</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4 The Paradox</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5 Factors Influencing Bargaining Power: A Typology</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 A Sample of West European Party Systems</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 A Survey of Elites</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Party Strength and Constitutional Context</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 SD Elites between Party Follower's Hostility and Decisive Preferences of 'Economic Recovery' and 'Government Stability', 1975-1982</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.1 The Development of the SD’s Alliance Strategy .......................... 70
3.2.2 The Intra-Party Consequences of the SD’s Alliance Strategy ....... 76

3.3 Are Intra-Elite Conflicts Bound to Lower a Party’s Bargaining Power?: The RV’s Case, 1988-1990 ................................. 86

3.4 Conclusions ................................................. 95

4. INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN NORWAY, 1976-1990 ......................................................... 97

4.1 Party Strength and Constitutional Context ......................... 100

4.2 The Highly Institutionalized DNA: A Tale of an Unchanged Strategy of Informal Alliances .................. 107

4.2.1 The Position of Odvar Nordli (1976-1981) and Gro Harlem Brundtland (1986-1989) within the DNA ........................................... 107

4.2.2 The DNA Alliance Strategy and its Intra-Party Consequences ........ 110

4.3 Coping with Conflicts within one of the Coalition Partners: The Advantage of Kare Willoch’s Dominant Position within the Conservative Party, 1981-83, 1985-86 .......................... 117

4.4 SP Cabinet Members between Government Solidarity and Parliamentary Group Hostility, 1989-90 .............................................. 128

4.5 Conclusions .................................................. 138

5. THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE, ITALY, 1976-1979 ......................... 140

5.1 Party Strength and Constitutional Context ........................ 143

5.2 A Compromise at any Price: Towards the Breaking Up of PCI’s ‘Conventio ad Excludendum’ ........................................ 150

5.3 PCI Elites between Party Follower’s Hostility and DC’s Elite Adaptation ........................................ 162

5.4 The Wages of Bargaining Power: DC’s Strategy of Confrontation during 1976-1979 .......................... 171
FIGURES

Fig. 2.1 The Process of Coalitional Behaviour - - - - - - 42
Fig. 2.2 A Typology: Factors Influencing Bargaining Power - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 46
Fig. 8.1 Patterns of Intra-Party Conflicts, Party Institutionalization and Bargaining Power - - 263
Fig. 8.2 Bargaining Power of Highly Institutionalized Parties during Coalitional Behaviour - - - - 267
Fig. 8.3 Bargaining Power of Weakly Institutionalized Parties during Coalitional Behaviour - - - - 268

TABLES

Tab. 2.1 Indicators of Organizational Decline Following Intra-Party Conflicts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 37
Tab. 2.2 A Sample of Minority Governments - - - - - - - - 57
Tab. 2.3 A Sample of Elites: Size, Dates of Field Research and Period under Investigation - - - - 59
Tab. 3.1 List of Events in Denmark, 1975-1989 - - - - 72
Tab. 4.1 List of Events in Norway, 1975-1990 - - - - 105
Tab. 5.1 List of Events in Italy, 1972-1979 - - - - 153
Tab. 6.1 List of Events in the U.K., 1974-1979 - - - - 188
Tab. 7.1 List of Events in France, 1988-1990 - - - - 232
ABBREVIATIONS

BP Bargaining Power
CD Centrum Democraterne
CERES Centre d’études, de recherches et d’éducation socialiste
CDS Centre des Démocrates-Sociaux
CDU Christlich-Demokratische Union
CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
CGT Confédération Générale du Travail
CP Høyre (Conservative Party, Norway)
CPP Det Konservative Folkeparti
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union
DC Democrazia Cristiana
DNA Det Norske Arbeiderparti
EEA European Economic Area
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Area
EMS European Monetary System
EP European Parliament
FLM Federazione dei Lavoratori Metallurgia (federation of metalworkers)
FN Front National
FrP Fremskridtspartiet (Denmark)
FrP Fremskrittspartiet (Norway)
IMF International Monetary Fund
KrF Kristelig Folkeparti (Denmark)
KrF Kristelig Folkeparti (Norway)
LO Landsorganisationen i Danmark (Danish Federation of Trade Unions)
MP Member of Parliament
MRG Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche
MSI-DN Movimento Sociale Italiano - Destra Nazionale
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCF Parti Communiste Français
PCI Partito Comunista Italiana
PLI Partito Liberale Italiano
PLP Parliamentary Labour Party
PR Proportional Representation
PRI Partito Repubblicano Italiano
PS Parti Socialiste
PSD Parti Social Demcrate
PSDI Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano
PSI Partito Socialista Italiano
PTT Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones
RPR Rassemblement pour la République
RV Det Radikale Venstre
SD  Socialdemokratiet
SF  Socialistisk Folkeparti
SID Specialarbejderforbundet i Denemark (General Workers’ Union in Denmark)
SP  Senterpartiet
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SV Socialistisk Venstreparti (Norway)
TUC Trades Union Congress
UDC Union du Centre
UDF Union pour la Démocratie Française
V  Venstre
VS Venstresocialisterne (Denmark)
THE DYNAMICS OF MINORITY RULE: INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
1. INTRODUCTION: THE LACUNA OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR

There is a serious shortcoming in the study of coalitional behaviour. At a time when a prolific output of worthwhile scholarly enterprises continues, one must surely be struck by the fact that even the finest works have often neglected the role of intra-party politics. The aim of the thesis is to provide a theoretical and empirical explanation to the query which may be formulated as follows: How do conflicts within a party affect its coalitional behaviour insofar as such conflicts may influence the bargaining power of party elites in the parliamentary arena? Acute intra-party conflicts seem most likely to occur when the governmental parties control less than half of the seats in parliament (i.e. minority situations), due to the complexity of securing a parliamentary majority and the need to cooperate with untraditional partners. Therefore, a comparative analysis of minority governments in five West European party systems will be undertaken.

The pace of electoral change in most of the West European countries during the last decade and the frequent occurrence of minority governments has been such as to make this subject important for a theoretical and empirical investigation. At the same time, there is a traditional
sense in which minority governments are not worth specific analysis because of their ineffectiveness and short-lived characteristics. One of the appraisals, lessening minority government’s importance, comes from Giovanni Sartori and is worthy of quotation above all because it recalls the lack of motivation toward research of this topic:

[...] minority single party governments do materialize, but they do so either as a result of miscalculated Indian wrestlings, or on the basis of a precise calculus (such as shedding unpopular, if necessary, policies), and otherwise as disguised coalitions and transitional caretaker governments. In any case, minority single party governments are - in the context of limited and moderate pluralism - ‘feeble’ governments, even though they may not be shortlived.

Clearly, such a statement has not always coincided with the high incidence of minority governments in west European party systems. Minority governments (or Cabinets) are governments formed by either one or few parties that together control less than half of the seats in the national legislature or, operationally, the lower house of bicameral legislature.

Daalder’s inspection of over 250 cabinets during 1918-1969 illustrates that 36.5 per cent of the governments held office as a minority. Next to Taylor and Laver’s study of 132 governments in 12 parliamentary democracies which shows 34.1 per cent to be minority governments, Herman and Pope’s examination of 207 administrations in 12 western democracies reports 35.8 per cent of this cabinet type. Added to these findings, Lijphart reports 30.7 per cent of
minority governments in 20 countries over the period from 1945 to 1980, whilst Luebbert's data on 12 parliamentary democracies yield a frequency of 37.2 per cent. In more recent surveys, Strom found that, during 1945-1987, the incidence of minority governments in 15 democracies is as high as 35.1 per cent, whilst Laver and Schofield's study of twelve European systems from 1945 to 1987 shows 33 per cent of minority governments.

While the frequency of minority governments is often acknowledged, the full implication of their rule within the framework of parliamentary and semi-presidential systems have yet to be properly explored. The existing literature, which will be thoroughly analysed in the first two sections of this chapter, may be considered in three categories. The first and by far the largest category consists of works which have been considered minority governments to be a deviant case in the field of coalitional behaviour. Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that the topic has been neglected and that it has never been considered as the subject of a study. The second category contains a number of generally more recent studies of particular themes some of which have a bearing on the phenomenon of minority governments. Many of them are very close to the topic in question and few, if any, present an interesting view of these situations. The third category is made up of a small number of works on certain aspects or phases of minority situations, including mainly a
few studies of minority government formation and performance which grew out from a rational point of view. Apart from these few volumes, the topic has received little attention from political scholars and there is as yet no inductive study of west European minority governments as a whole.

There are two reasons why the comparative analysis of minority governments in Western Europe should be considered as one entity. First, these governments represent, in the last two decades, the longest period of continuous minority rule in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and for a short term, in Italy, the U.K., France and Portugal. This alone is worthy of attention in academic and political realms in which minority governments are held in low esteem and are generally regarded as exceptions to the normal practice of politics. The second reason is that during minority rule far-reaching patterns of intra-party conflicts and parliamentary co-operations are being evolved. A substantial part of the following thesis examines the visible and tangible evidence of these trends.

The key objective of this chapter is to explore the lacuna of coalitional behaviour. Firstly, the theoretical context of minority governments is specified by reviewing the most widely suggested conditions favouring their formation and performance. The second section reviews what coalitional theory has had to say on what happens if parties are not 'unitary actors'. Finally, the main argument of the
thesis and the research strategy are presented.

1.2 THE STUDY OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS: FORMATION, AND PERFORMANCE

Following the traditional sense in which minority governments are not worthy of a specific analysis because of their ineffectiveness and short-lived characteristics, the first priority is to specify the theoretical context of the topic.

Understanding minority governments as reflections of severe systemic crisis, Ernst Friesenhahn argued that the formation of a minority government can be no more than an emergency measure and indicates a crisis situation. Similarly, Klaus von Beyme concurs that, 'According to the basic rules of the parliamentary system, every minority cabinet is an unwanted crisis symptom'. An additional crisis-oriented explanation by Michael Taylor and Valentine Herman, evaluated minority governments as coalition frictions in otherwise stable party systems. The importance of these arguments can hardly be over emphasized as neither the locus nor the magnitude of a crisis under which minority governments are most likely to form is examined. As minority cabinets could either be equated with severe systemic instability, such as riots and strikes, as well as a result of cabinet instability, students of politics are left with a vague description of the topic.
Other explanations have emphasized the structural properties of the party system. Associating minority governments with irrationality and miscalculation, Giovanni Sartori claimed that party system fractionalization (i.e. the probability that two members drawn at random from the universe belong to different parties) enhances minority government formation.\textsuperscript{11} 'Moderate pluralism', Sartori argued, was the type of party system in which minority cabinets are most likely to form. Such an argument seems reasonable as the larger the number of parties, the more difficult it may be to build a parliamentary majority, and the greater the probability of minority government formation. Conversely, the number of minority cabinets should decline as one approaches a pure two-party system.\textsuperscript{12}

Further explanations have tended away from the mono-casual strategy towards a more complex observation. Based on the ideological character of the political parties and their interaction in multi-party systems, Dodd has suggested that cabinet coalitional status and cabinet durability are determined by the interaction of three party system variable: cleavage conflict, fractionalization and instability.\textsuperscript{13} Whereas the former is relevant as a constraint on the \textit{a priori} willingness of parties to negotiate, the latter two are important due to their influence on certainty of information in the parliamentary arena.

Incremental changes in the above-mentioned variables
influence minority government formation as follows: (i) in conditions of high cleavage conflict, parties should show a less generalized *a priori* willingness to bargain and thus minimum winning and minority cabinets are formed, and (ii) in conditions of high cleavage conflict, cabinets in fractionalized and unstable party systems are non-durable minority governments. Dodd concluded that minority governments are particularly probable solutions when party systems suddenly become more fractionalized.

Dodd's argument is supported by Powell who posited that extremist systems, in terms of majority producing and linkages between groups and parties, have less durable executives and more frequent minority governments. An average 15 per cent vote for extremist parties during 1965-1975, which characterized extremist systems, indicates the strength of such parties as the major explicator of executive instability.

At the opposite extreme from the conflict-based view of minority government formation, another category emphasizes the relevancy of political culture and heritage. Linking minority government formation to macro-political regime characteristics, Gregory Luebbert reported that this type of cabinet is most common in consensual regimes (i.e. those with high legitimacy and consensus-building) and virtually absent in competitive regimes (i.e. those which lack high degree of legitimacy and consensus-building). This was due to the
absence of the parties' need for government co-operation in consensual regimes, whilst, in conflictual regimes, minority governments result from the inability of the parties to co-operate.

Emphasizing consensus relationships in the parliamentary party system, Hans Daalder proposed an approach which is complemented by a repertoire of responsible parliamentary government vis-à-vis crises of political development or other historical legacies. Such an approach developed mainly in Norway, Denmark and Sweden where responsible government resulted from a process of mass mobilization of counter-establishment forces. As parliament became a strong 'democratic' forum, a belief in majority principles was developed, tempered by a judicious appreciation of the need for executive government. In minority situations, therefore, minority cabinets and ad hoc coalition arrangements for specific policy goals were preferred over the theoretical alternative of proportional-based cabinets.

The final explanation which will be considered focuses on the proximate conditions of government formation. According to this view, minority governments form only when all other options have been exhausted, or when no other options exist. Such cabinets will tend to be formed under conditions that are often tied to the negotiation process itself, such as limited choice, failure of negotiation and lower-order preferences.
At this stage, the critique of the above survey is of relevance. There is evidently minimal support for any of the above explanations of minority governments.\textsuperscript{19} Nor do these accounts commend themselves in terms of clarity, generality, or parsimony. Such theories, thus, would have only modest predictive power. By associating minority government with unstable and conflictual party systems, these studies established the conventional view of the topic.

Whatever the merits and deficiencies in these early undertakings, indisputably it is Kaare Strom's research of minority government formation which today remains the single scholarly advance on the topic. Based on the assumptions that the underlying motivation of parties is to influence policy-making in the national assembly and that parties seek to maximize their long-term as well as short-term utilities, Strom presents a rational choice theory of minority government formation.\textsuperscript{20} Basically, Strom explains minority governments as the result of rational choices made by party leaders under certain structural constraints. More than anything else, he claimed, it is the anticipation of future elections that predisposes party leaders to opt for minority governments. Consequently, under-sized governments are most likely to form in political systems where elections are competitive and decisive (i.e. in terms of the cost of governing) for coalitional bargaining power. Furthermore, minority governments are promoted by institutions that
enhance the power of the parliamentary opposition vis-à-vis the government.\textsuperscript{21}

The availability of formal institutional structures that allow the opposition to influence policy seems to help account for the frequency of minority governments in Norway, France, Italy, and Sweden. Yet, the way Strom measures the influence of the parliamentary opposition does not help to account for the endemic nature of minority government in Denmark, or its frequency in Finland. Both systems in which, according to Strom, the opposition is accorded only moderate influence over policy.\textsuperscript{22} Following Strom, academic observers might be led to expect a greater role for minority cabinets in Belgium, Iceland and Portugal, all systems which he scores high on opposition influence but which do not in practice have numerous minority governments.

Added to the above-mentioned explanations concerning minority government formation, questions regarding the performance of such cabinets were raised. Studies on such topics have generally revolved around two criteria, namely, stability (i.e. viability) and legislative effectiveness.\textsuperscript{23} For the former, several studies show that minority governments tend to be the least durable cabinet type.\textsuperscript{24} The importance of such arguments can hardly be over emphasized as the main problem of quantitative duration studies is that the result is dependent substantially on the rules by which governments are counted. Regarding the
legislative effectiveness, minority governments are conventionally portrayed as governments of lowered effectiveness, and ones that may result in decisional paralysis and passiveness in policy formation. Not surprisingly, a pervasive erosion of political responsibility may result, together with a possible loss of control over crucial decision-making processes.

Beyond the above-mentioned negative assessments was the problem of how minority governments attain legislative coalition. Herman and Pope distinguished between supported and unsupported minority governments and found the former category to account for a majority of their cases. Hans Daalder raised the question of whether minority cabinets are in reality majority cabinets 'in disguise' but found little supporting evidence. Debate about the pervasiveness of support agreements was due to the lack of an operational definition of what a support agreement is. Surely, if government coalition should be thought of as including the external support parties, as well as those which receive portfolios, then there would be no minority governments requiring special explanation.

With regard to this problem, Ian Budge suggested a differentiation between minority governments and support parties. He argued that policy considerations provide good reasons for some excluded parties supporting minority governments whenever the existing government offers a better
chance of the supporting party’s policies being put into effect than any of the other likely alternatives. Additionally, where government’s policy is only marginally better, the costs involved in a governmental crisis may well induce it to maintain support at critical junctures.

An even less rigorous explanation of how minority governments function directs our attention to the effective decision point in legislatures. A near majority, Herman and Pope claimed, is in many cases as good as a real majority.\(^29\) Still, the question of the proportion of seats required by a minority government for it to be 'winning', remains vague. Taylor and Laver’s study,\(^30\) which analyzed government coalitions which include support parties, suggested two ways of dealing with this question:

The first was to treat the threshold (the proportion of seats required by a coalition for it to be 'winning') as a parameter, which may vary from country to country and from one theory to another. This entails, of course, a certain loss of generality in the theories, and does not in any case lead to dramatic improvements in most of them. The second approach is to abandon general explanation entirely, and treat the minority governments as 'deviant cases', to be 'explained' by special ad hoc factors (such as the presence of a near-majority party, or immobilisme, or the need for a caretaker administration).

Replacing the majority winning criterion with a viability criterion, Ian Budge and Michael Laver have recently looked at the way in which particular legislative strategies may be used to force the government’s hand over
policy. A protocoalition \( V \), they claimed, 'will form a government if there is no alternative coalition \( A \) which is supported by parties controlling more legislative votes than those supporting \( V \) and which all supporters of \( A \) prefer to form rather than \( V \'). \(^{33}\) Expressed in these very general terms, minority governments are viable if they cannot be defeated on the basis of patterns of support in the legislature. Clearly, however, such a general criterion of government viability is too vague to be of any real empirical use.

The most comprehensive study of minority governments' performance was conducted by Kaare Strom. As the government's objective is to purchase support for its legislation at the lowest possible cost, Strom argued, 'Everything else being equal, minority governments would prefer purely ad hoc coalitions'. \(^{34}\) The reasoning behind this conclusion lies in the ad-hoc nature of the negotiations during which a minority government can in each case select the least 'expensive' coalition partner available. Although minority governments can choose between a variety of strategies when building legislative coalitions, their strategy choices depend on institutional conditions, the objectives of the parties both in government and opposition, and their relative bargaining power.

The critique of Strom's study strikes upon the very nature of the assumption that the party is a 'unitary
actor' (i.e. a single bargaining entity). By adopting a rather tough operational definition, Strom managed to avoid the trade-off, faced by party elites, between party strategy and cohesion. Consequently, his research was confined to the inputs and outputs of coalition bargaining and lacked a detailed analysis of the intra-party forces which affect this process. However, the key fact in studying parties' behaviour is that they are complex organizations comprised of many individuals, each with his or her own agenda. 'A party', Katz and Mair state, 'is itself a political system'.

Internal conflicts seem most likely to occur as a result of parliamentary co-operation due, among other factors, to the uneven distribution of the benefits of office within a party. Furthermore, acute intra-party conflicts are most likely to occur in minority situations as a result of the complexity of securing a parliamentary majority and the probable need to co-operate with untraditional partners. Strom's analysis, therefore, fails to break free from one of the shackles of conventional coalition theory that has proved most irksome to specialists in the politics of the European coalition system.

Having accurately specified the lacuna of coalitional behaviour, the next aim is to present a serious shortcoming in the study of intra-party politics and coalition theory. In other words, what has coalition theory had to say on what
happens if parties are not unitary actors?. It will be shown that with the exception of the works of Gregory Luebbert, Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, coalition theory has had little to say on the above question. The expansion of the coalitional behaviour lacuna to the study of intra-party politics thereof enhances a greater understanding of the existing theoretical and empirical gap.

1.2 INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR

Our claims on behalf of intra-party forces may well have been determined by our proximity to the European context. Yet, Strom clearly encounters problems in integrating the influence of the opposition into his general scheme and prefers to adopt a rather tough operational definition concerning intra-party politics, for which his inventive view is not a convincing solution. The reader will notice, however, that in isolating this shortcoming of Strom’s work, the thesis simultaneously hints at an alternative route of explaining majority building by minority governments.

The sheer ambition of publications aspiring to contribute to a construction of a coalition theory, and the conceptual abstraction inherent in the task, has surprisingly produced only a narrow range of studies concerning the impact of intra-party politics on coalitional behaviour. Gregory Luebbert was first to devote exclusive attention to this
topic by proposing a theory of coalitional behaviour which was based fundamentally upon the assumption that party leaders are motivated above all by the desire to remain party leaders. This assumption means that party leaders will always strive to minimize party disunity by attempting to set the party's attitude toward participation in a coalition on preferences that produce the least disunity. From this perspective,

[...] the leaders' task is to insist on preferences that are sufficiently focused that they generate the widest possible support within the party, but sufficiently vague and opaque that they do not engage in government formation disagreements that are a constant feature of any party.

Therefore, preferences that embody contested principles of policy or programme direction, rather than those that concern timing, amounts, rates of change, and contingencies, are decisive in government formation. The reason for this lies in their impact of minimizing disunity by being derived from the most widely shared values within a party and because they directly engage the party's most basic sense of purpose. As the thesis shares Luebbert's assumption, the consequences concerning the nature of decisive preferences provide insightful guidelines.

A refreshing improvement in studying the topic is illustrated by Laver and Shepsle's approach to modelling government formation. Two innovative ideas were raised by the authors: first, treating government coalitions as
being governments as well as coalitions; second, considering the credibility of policy proposals made during coalition bargaining. These two important matters are linked by a common concern with the qualitative allocation of cabinet portfolios among parties, as the latter may be taken to imply a credible commitment to implement the ideal policy of the parties in the relevant policy jurisdiction. In other words, the policy promises that are made when governments are formed are limited to those that can be implemented by placing portfolios in the hands of those politicians who have private incentives to carry them out; no other policy promises are credible.

Elsewhere, precisely this has been the nature of explanations of minority government formation. Once again, for a proposal to replace a status quo it must be a credible contender. 'While a proposal can contend against the status quo only if it is preferred by a legislative majority', Laver and Shepsle claimed, 'this in no sense requires that the participants in the proposal themselves constitute a legislative majority'. On this matter, minority governments, which both authors define as 'governments whose participants do not constitute a legislative majority', are treated in the same way as any other government.

Laver and Shapsle's approach focuses on the period of government formation during which party discipline reaches a
maximum. After this stage, however, intra-party conflicts may evolve, undermining the 'credebility' of a proposal by exerting pressures on Cabinet members. As each alliance partner re-commits itself to parliamentary co-operation by voting in favour of the coalition over critical divisions, the 'credibility' of a proposal can be continuously evaluated. In other words, a partner's strategy will be dependent on the extent of promises' implementation. Theoretically, therefore, an approach that views coalition maintenance as a continuous process of alliance formations can effectively capture the notion of a 'proposal credibility' and intra-party dynamics. As the thesis' interest lies in the latter, it examines the intra-party consequences of alliance politics by considering coalition maintenance as a continuous process of alliance formations.

Finally, the leap required in shifting from the more formal works cited above and inductive-based comparative studies is what today defines the lacuna of coalitional behaviour. There is a yawning gap between specialised and detailed enquiry into individual party organizations with an appropriate theoretical conceptualization and the broad sweep of surveys involving a large number of cases. Where there surely ought to be a stock of middle-level, cross-national comparison of party organizations over a limited and logical selected sample of party systems, there is very little at all.
1.3 THE CONCEPT OF 'PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION' AND THE DYNAMICS OF MINORITY RULE

A substantial reason for the lack of studies concerning party institutionalization lies in the obsession of political scientists to analyse parties as existing social and political phenomena rather than being concerned with the actual transformation of social and political forces into institutionalized structures. Institutionalization, that is, 'the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability', was approached in the 1950s and 1960s by Maurice Duverger and Samuel P. Huntington, respectively. Whereas the former outlined two models of party development, internally and externally generated parties, the latter presented a similar view by dividing the process of party system development into four phases: factionalism, polarization, expansion and institutionalization.

Undoubtedly, it was Angelo Panebianco's Political Parties which shed new light on the role of party institutionalization in party behaviour. Party institutionalization, according to Panebianco, can be measured on two scales: (1) the organization's degree of autonomy vis-à-vis its environment, that is, the extent to which the party is free from the influence of external or extra-party organizations, and (2) the organization's degree of
systemness, that is, the degree of interdependence of its different internal sectors. For the former, a party is autonomous whenever it is in a position to 'directly control' the exchanges with its environment, i.e. when it does not dependent on external organizations for the maintenance of its electoral and parliamentary activities. The converse position, dependency, being characteristic of parties whose 'indispensable resources are in part controlled by other organizations'. For the degree of systemness, when an organization system allows its internal sub-groups a good deal of autonomy, its degree of systemness is low, and vice versa. The two dimensions of institutionalization are related, for a low degree of systemness often implies little autonomy vis-à-vis the environment, and vice versa.

Two 'ideal' types of parties were examined in Panebianco's comprehensive analysis, namely, highly and weakly institutionalized parties. Whereas a weakly institutionalized party is characterized by a low degree of autonomy and a low degree of interdependence among the subgroups, a highly institutionalized one is characterized by a high degree of control over its environment and a high degree of interdependence among the subgroups.

Operationally, the difference between the two types is based on five indicators of party institutionalization. Firstly, the degree of development of the central extra-parliamentary organization. The rule here is that a highly
institutionalized party possesses a developed central bureaucracy whereas in a weakly institutionalized party the central bureaucratic apparatus is weak and embryonic. A highly institutionalized party is thus both more bureaucratized and centralized than a weakly institutionalized party. Secondly, the degree of homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level. In highly institutionalized organizations, for example, the local associations tend to be organized in the same way throughout the national territory whilst in the weakly institutionalized ones the local associations are likely to be quite heterogeneous. Thirdly, the method of finance. The more highly institutionalized the party, the more probable that it has at its disposal a revenue system based on a regular flow of contributions from a plurality of sources. The less institutionalized, the less continuous and regular its flow of funds, and the less diversified its financial sources. Fourthly, relations with the external collateral organizations. A highly institutionalized party dominates its external organizations (such as trade unions) whilst a weakly institutionalized party is dependent on external organizations. A weakly institutionalized party can be also characterized by either no relations with external institutions, only precarious ones, or the collateral organizations are weak and not vital. And finally, fifth, the degree of correspondence between a party's statutory
norms and its actual power structure. Such a correspondence tends to be greater in highly institutionalized parties. Hence, people, groups or associations formally outside a highly institutionalized party cannot play leading roles within the organization.

The Dynamics of Minority Rule accepts Panebianco’s classification without delving into the theoretical and practical problems which complicate his approaches. The thesis, for example, does not share Panebianco’s conception that political parties are characteristically/historically weakly or highly institutionalized. Instead, it defines ‘party institutionalization’ very loosely as the ways political authority and the instruments of control over internal uncertainty are distributed within a party. Based on this definition, the above-mentioned indicators will determine whether a party is weakly or highly institutionalized during a given period.

The nature of the structural context in which party elites operate as a variable in coalitional politics has been raised by few scholars. Sven Groennings, a pioneer in this field, has argued that the more centralized parties are, the stronger they are as coalition actors. He suggested that,

[...] the more centralized the party structure, the easier it is for the party to remain in the coalition. The a priori hypothesis that a party weakened by factional dispute will find it difficult to formulate a coalition policy leads quickly to the hypothesis that the greater the organized dissensus within a party, the
lesser is the tendency to coalesce, even if the dissensus has nothing to do with coalition policy. It should be noted, furthermore, that it is easier for a party with loose central control to coalesce with another party of the same character than one with tight discipline, because a highly centralised party can present a threat to a loosely structured party.

A similar conclusion has been reached by Panebianco - that alliances amongst parties inevitably destabilise the less institutionalized organizations.

A logical problem is created here: Why are highly institutionalized parties considered to be effective coalitional actors if they lack the internal flexibility necessary to adjust to dissent among their members? At the outset, one might expect that highly institutionalized parties would possess more defences with respect to internal challenges, as their instruments of control over such uncertainties are concentrated in the hands of the party elites. Such parties, however, lack mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent such as dissensions in parliament and factions within the party. The absence of these mechanisms does not allow them to handle internal dissatisfaction in a variety of manageable ways. Such parties are, therefore, at a disadvantage when they enter parliamentary negotiations.

The above-mentioned applications of party institutionalization to coalition politics, therefore, raise a paradox. Literally formulated, the strength of a party in the parliamentary bargaining plane, that is, its relative bargaining power, lies in its organizational weakness. Based
on this paradox, the thesis suggests that organizational weakness, that is, the existence of heterogenous and diffused mechanisms for internal dissent, allows the party to cope with internal dissatisfaction in a variety of manageable ways without forcing members to resign or leave the party. As a result, weakly institutionalized parties can enter into conflict inducing coalition negotiations with other parties without risking their hold on the elites' members and the party followers. Highly institutionalized parties, on the other hand, lack the internal fluidity necessary to adjust to dissent among its members. When inter-party negotiations induce conflict and dissent among the party's membership, members may be forced to leave the party as their primary mechanism for expression of dissent. The lack of organizational fluidity, therefore, can lead to party disintegration when it enters serious coalition negotiations with other parties.

In describing this interplay of 'challenging' intra-party environment and 'adopting' elites, the intent is not to depreciate the nature of the inter-party conflict itself. On the contrary, precisely because political parties can be seen as actually divided into competing sub-groups the nature of intra-party conflict retains a fundamental role in the elites' ability to cope with internal conflict. Top party elites (i.e. cabinet ministers and/or party leader) differ in the extent they control intra-elite (e.g. within the
parliamentary group) and elite-follower conflicts. The fact that parliamentary group members are interested primarily in 'selective incentives' emphasizes their dependency on the top party leadership. This, in turn, enhances the elites' ability to control their behaviour. Less influence can be exerted on party followers, however, as they are primarily interested in 'collective incentives'. Consequently, the elites' ability to cope with dissenting behaviour of parliamentarians is likely to be greater than their ability to cope with hostility of party followers.

The two explanatory variables namely, party institutionalization and the type of intra-party conflicts are considered critical factors in shaping the bargaining power of participants in political coalitions. The model is based on the assumption that party elites are motivated above all by the desire to remain party leaders. In other words, the central features of party policy are selected by leaders so as to minimize dissent within the various sections of the party. The model, broadly speaking, is driven by policy-based, rather than office-based preferences.

The thesis suggests that in multi-party systems in which a minority situation occurs, the most attractive strategy, that is, in terms of bargaining power, for highly institutionalized parties, occupying a governmental position, is the formation of informal minority governments. The most attractive strategy for weakly institutionalized parties, on
the other hand, is the formation of formal minority cabinets. To support this hypothesis, a comparative analysis of minority governments in Denmark (1975-1990), Norway (1976-1990), Italy (1976-1979), the U.K. (1977-1978) and France (1988-1990), will be undertaken.

The fundamental methodological premise of the inquiry is that the best way to study intra-party processes and coalition bargaining is to talk with party elites systematically and listen carefully. From May 1989, through October 1990, I talked with 143 members of party elites in Denmark, Norway, France, Italy and the U.K. in open interviews lasting somewhat more than half an hour each. The systematic analysis of these interviews provides the basis for the discussion presented in this thesis.

Finally, the study's format is comprised of five empirically-based chapters, which follow the next chapter in which the theoretical framework is formulated. The third and the fourth chapters cover the Danish case during 1975-1982 and 1988-1990, and the Norwegian one during 1976-1990. They present the intra-party consequences of the following alliances: (i) informal minority governments involving highly institutionalized parties in a governmental position, (ii) formal minority governments involving highly and weakly institutionalized parties, and (iii) formal minority governments involving weakly institutionalized parties. Whereas no intra-party conflicts were evident in the former, the
dominant mode of internal conflict, evident in the two latter cases, was an intra-elite one.

The fifth chapter examines the intra-party consequences of the 'historic compromise' in the Italian polity during 1976-1979. It covers the evolution of elite-follower and intra-elite conflicts within highly and weakly institutionalized parties, respectively. The sixth chapter focuses on the intra-party consequences of the Lib-Lab Pact in the British polity during 1977-1978. It examines intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts within weakly institutionalized partners. An examination of the thesis' main argument in the semi-presidential French system during 1988-1990 is presented in the seventh chapter. It investigates intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts within weakly and highly institutionalized partners, respectively. The concluding chapter discusses the argument of the thesis and its implication for the study of coalitional behaviour.
This chapter presents a theoretical explanation to the query which may be formulated as follows: How do conflicts within a party affect its coalitional behaviour insofar as such conflicts may influence the bargaining power of party elites in the parliamentary arena? Undoubtedly, intra-party politics is extremely complex. At a sufficiently detailed level, every party is unique, with its own organizational form arrived at on its own evolutionary track. Each stage of coalitional behaviour does not resemble any other as the 'bargaining setting' normally differs. The approach, however, is to emphasize similarities amongst patterns of internal conflicts and coalition behaviour rather than differences.

The first section addresses on theoretical terms the role of intra-party politics in coalitional behaviour. By raising a paradox in Groennings and Panebianco's applications of party institutionalization to coalitional behaviour, it suggests that the strength of a party in the parliamentary bargaining plane, that is, its relative bargaining power, lies in its organizational weakness. It hypothesizes, thereafter, that in multi-party systems within which minority situations occur, a formation of formal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for weakly institution-
alized parties whereas a formation of informal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for a highly institutionalized parties which occupies a governmental position.

To examine and explain the above hypothesis naturally requires data. The second section thus presents the sampling strategy - the 'most different system' design - upon which the Danish, Norwegian, Italian, British and the French party systems were selected. The variables that were chosen to differentiate between the systems, are those which Strom found to be the most significant explanatory factors of minority government formation - the potential influence of the parliamentary opposition and the decisiveness of the election for coalitional bargaining power.

Obviously, once one begins to think seriously about gathering information from such an heterogeneous selection of party systems, one is struck by the degree to which such data, to the extent to which it exists, is in one way or another noncomparable from one country to another, or even from one party to another within the same country. Even for so rudimentary a question as intra-party conflicts, the data are often unavailable, and when available are even more often based on journalistic interpretations that are neither constructive nor specific. As a result, the final goal of this chapter is to present the main method of data collection, namely, elite interviewing.
2.1 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Precisely because party elites and members can be seen not as a unitary actor, but as divided into competing sub-groups, party politics retains the fundamental role in alliance politics of being the basic element for the distribution of intra-party power. In this sense, one can see different subgroups or individuals having somewhat different attitudes to the party’s coalitional behaviour. Such difference of attitudes within a party illustrate very clearly the ‘bargaining problem’ faced by party elites.

After presenting the basic assumptions which underline the model, the intent of the second sub-section is to explain the notion of ‘bargaining problem’. According to Sjöblom, it refers to the need for party elites to reach some settlement in parliament, but, at the same time, the wish to settle on terms favourable to themselves. The purpose thereafter is to present its two components, namely, the interaction problem, which goes from the extreme of intra-party disagreement to the opposite extreme of conflict, and the bargaining power, which implies the power of a party to bind itself.

A substantial part of the third sub-section incorporates ‘intra-party conflict’ and ‘bargaining power’ into the process of coalitional behaviour whilst establishing the
relevancy of party institutionalization as an intervening variable in the relationships between the two. The fourth sub-section, presents the paradox in the application of party institutionalization to coalitional behaviour. Based on the paradox, the last sub-section suggests the typology which schematizes the interaction between the type of intra-party conflicts and the level of party institutionalization.

2.1.1 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

While Schelling's concept of 'bargaining power' suggests that parties are necessary and important in determining who governs, it does not follow that parties are equally important in determining what governments do. Two basic assumptions must be made if parties are expected to make policy in a governmental or oppositional position: (i) parties have policy intentions, and (ii) it is possible to identify which 'part' of a party determines its policies.

From the perspective of practical analysis of political parties, it is necessary to assume that parties are more or less motivated by the strength of their policy preferences. A substantial reason for this lies in the inability of party elites to attract enough adherents (i.e. to create an effective organization) on the basis of office as an end in itself. Some party members can be enticed by the hope of
future office or by the pleasures of association with men close to power. But incentives must be offered to attract activists, financial contributors and volunteers. Policy, which is an end in itself, provides the necessary inducement.

Additionally, by assuming that parties aim at achieving policy objective, the extent to which those outside government can effect policy can be evaluated. Legislative strategies, such as defeating governmental bills or providing an external support in critical division, can force the government to change its policy outputs. Of course, a party's ability to make such moves depends upon the extent to which it is pivotal in the legislature. If a party is pivotal, given its parliamentary strength in terms of seats, then it will be pivotal whether it is in or out of government. If it is not pivotal, then government membership can make no difference to its legislative voting power.

The model also assumes that it is possible to identify which 'part' of a party determines its policies. A substantial reason for this lies in the fact that party behaviour grows out of the independence of party elites as bargaining actors. Parties have to be regarded as independent bargaining actors in two significant respects. Firstly, they are strategic actors, that is, the special position they occupy in the political system enables them to initiate party system change as well as to alter its direction to their own advantage. They are also 'adaptive
actors', i.e. they have to be able to adapt if they are to cope with changing circumstances. In all these respects, party elites play a decisive part.

A third assumption which concerns the motivation of party elites is also of prime importance. The model assumes that party elites are motivated above all by the desire to remain party leaders. In other words, for party leaders in office, it is more important to remain party leaders than to remain in office. If intra-party conflicts threatens their positions, rather than stay in government they will leave office to remain party leaders. One can hardly expect a party leader to be thrown out of office following a miscalculation of the trade-off between party cohesion and strategy. Rather, it is reasonable to expect a gradual erosion in the leader's position within the party following such circumstances.

To sum up, the model is based on the assumptions that parties have policy intentions, and it is possible to identify which 'part' of a party determines its policy. Additionally, it assumes that party leaders are motivated above all by the desire to remain party leaders. These assumptions provide the context within which the notion of 'winning' in the intra- and inter-party arenas can be defined.
2.1.2 THE BARGAINING PROBLEM

The basic perspective guiding this analysis is the presumption that most political conflict situations are to be seen essentially as bargaining situations, that is to say, situations in which the ability of a party to gain its ends is, to a significant degree, dependent upon the choices or decisions made by other parties. When two or more parties experience conflicts of opinion, they will decide to bargain because they wish to resolve their differences in a mutually beneficial way. Each party comes to the bargaining table with a certain power base, with alternatives upon which it will be willing to concede or refuse any conditions desired by its opponents. The bargaining process is thus shaped by the tactics which parties use to gain their desired ends. In this case, according to Schelling, winning

 [...] does not have a strictly competitive meaning; it is not winning relative to one’s adversary. It means gaining relative to one’s value system; and this may be done by bargaining, by mutual accommodation, and by avoidance of mutually damaging behaviour [...].

Viewing conflict behaviour as a bargaining process provides us with an image of the bargaining problems which party elites may face. In multi-party systems, a ‘bargaining problem’ refers to situations in which there is a need for party elites to reach some settlement in parliament, but, at the same time, they wish to settle on terms favourable to themselves. The bargaining problem can be divided into
two components: (i) the interaction problem within a party, and, (ii) the bargaining power of a party.

An interaction problem within a party may vary from mere disagreements on the one hand to extreme internal conflicts on the other. For the purpose of this thesis, in which the focus is on the latter extreme, intra-party conflict is taken to signify intra-elite (e.g. within parliamentary group) and elite-follower (e.g. elite contra party members) conflicts, following an alliance, which result in a deterioration of the party's stability and cohesion, respectively.\textsuperscript{11} Operational criteria, both of which are necessary to designate an internal dispute as an intra-party conflict, include: (i) party elites' perception of the intra-party strife as an attempt to change their coalitional behaviour,\textsuperscript{12} and, (ii) patterns of organizational decline, i.e. exit and voice by party members.

To resort to voice, rather than exit, signifies an attempt to change the coalitional behaviour of the party elites. Voice is defined, according to Hirschman, as 'any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from an objectionable state of affairs [...]'.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, voice can be graduated all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of one's critical opinions rather than 'cumbrous' exit, defection or resignation.

We have at our disposal at least seven indicators of organizational decline which are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1  Indicators of Organizational Decline following Intra-Party Conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>level of intra-party conflict</th>
<th>intra-elite</th>
<th>elite-follower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>patterns of EXIT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intra-elite</td>
<td>resignation of elite member/s</td>
<td>decline in party membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voice</td>
<td>*dissensions in parliament *petition *appeal to party elites with the intention of forcing a change in party strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decline</td>
<td>*demonstrations *petition *appeal to party elites with the intention of forcing a change in party strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intra-elite conflicts may be manifested by the pursuit of the exit option, namely, resignation of elite members, and/or the voice option, namely, dissensions in parliament, petition, and an appeal to party elites with the intention of forcing a change in party strategy. Elite-follower conflicts may be manifested by the pursuit of the exit option, namely, a decline in party membership, or/and the voice option, namely, demonstrations of party activists, petitions, and an appeal to party elites with the intention of forcing a change in party strategy.

Bargaining power refers to the power of a party to bind itself. Self binding is closely related to the credibility of threat which depends on how visible to the threatened party is the inability of the threatening party to
rationalize its way into or out of its commitment. From an intra-party point of view, the credibility of a party’s threat is significantly affected by the ability of party elites to cope with internal conflicts. In the parliamentary arena, both voice and exit are costly in terms of a party’s bargaining power. The cost of devoting even a modicum of elites’ time and resources to resolve internal conflict undermines their bargaining power. Elites’ perception of credibility of threats can provide an accurate picture of intra- and inter-party dynamics. For operational purposes, therefore, bargaining power will be defined as the power of a party to commit itself to parliamentary co-operation over its ’decisive preference’ as perceived by the party and the competitor elites.

According to Bacharach and Lawler, three assumptions are in order:

(i) Power is the essence of bargaining - it is assumed that bargaining power pervades all aspects of bargaining and is the key to an integrative analysis of context, process and outcome. It is the major construct by which party elites organizes its experience in bargaining. The concept of power adopted here is therefore a tactical approach to power.

(ii) Bargaining is a process of tactical action - a tactical approach to power accepts the distinction between potential and actual power, but discerns a third dimension - the use of power. This approach views potential power in terms of power tactics, thus the focus is on the use and effectiveness of specific tactics. Party elites select tactics from a relatively wide range of options in order to improve their power position. The tactics deal with different dimensions of bargaining power, and therefore, party elites will use different dimensions of bargaining power to evaluate and make decisions about different tactics.
Bargaining power is subjective power - bargainers continuously process information imperfectly, and this information forms the basis for their tactical action. Parties can only estimate the resources or commitments of their opponents. Perceptions are a crucial mean in such relations.

Bargaining power, therefore, must always be expressed relative to another's bargaining power, that it has no meaning as applied to a political party. Once a party's decisive preference is perceived as being accomplished by the actors involved in an alliance, we can conclude that the party possesses a relatively high level of bargaining power in the relevant arena.

As noted earlier, voice and exit are likely to be active mechanisms primarily with respect to the more substantial inter-party relationships. Elite and party members will ordinarily base their decision on past experience of elite reaction to dissenting behaviour. As a result, one might expect constant evolution of new directions of expressing dissatisfaction, especially with regard to the voice option. Yet, the central point of Hirschman's analysis was that the presence of the exit alternative can tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice. The existence of the exit option in the realm of party politics, thus, indicates that our indicators of organizational decline cover the range of alternatives to internal opposition.

So far it was argued that party elites which face intra-party conflicts function largely as a negotiation organ for
the various member or groups even before the party declares its bargaining position. Each bargaining position reflects the elites' trade-off between party cohesion and its alliance strategy. Each position therefore is a product of internal compromise which might effect the bargaining power of the party. Attention now turns to an intra-party perspective of coalitional behaviour.

2.1.3 THE PROCESS OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR: THE RELEVANCY OF 'PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION'

Constructing legislative majorities can be considered the aim of any party which has policy intentions. For participants in minority governments, the problem of constructing legislative majorities differs from those operating in majority situations. Multi-party competition in a majority situation offers a party two alternatives: government or opposition. Minority governments, on the other hand, direct their strategy towards 'externally supported' type of government (i.e. explicit or implicit understanding that the parties in question will support the government). A variation of 'externally supported' minority government occurs when there is an understanding, possibly formal, that the party in question will abstain on critical divisions. 'Formal' refers to prior negotiation between the government and the party supporting it, which results in an explicit, comprehensive and more than short-term contract.
It was already argued that the central elements of bargaining are the tactical moves and countermoves (e.g. alliance strategy) by which parties attempt to resolve the bargaining problems. There are different ways that the idea of inter-party commitments may be applied to bargaining relations in minority situations. Strom differentiates between formal and informal minority governments.\textsuperscript{17} Whereas the former refers to an administration whose legislative support is negotiated prior to formation of the government through explicit, comprehensive, and more than a short-term contract, the latter lacks the above-mentioned features. In the Strom's categorization, therefore, the relationships between the government and the party supporting it were the only ones which were taken into consideration.

From an intra-party point of view, the importance of the formal relationship amongst coalition partners is as relevant as the formal relationship between the government and the party supporting it. Both sets of relationships share the same pattern of potential evolution of conflicts (e.g. internal conflicts seem most likely to occur following a formal alliance than an informal one). As a formal alliance in minority situations can be traced in the relationship amongst coalition partners as well as the relationship between the government and the party supporting it, it is reasonable to classify both sets of relations under 'formal minority government'.

41
In minority situations, party elites which continuously face conflictual situations, will use tactical moves and counter­moves in the parliamentary arena in an attempt to resolve the bargaining problem. They will have to commit the party to co-operative relationships in such a way as to ensure party cohesion. This brings out very clearly - as Figure 2.1 shows - the significance of intra-party conflicts and their consequences with respect to coalitional behaviour.

Figure 2.1 indicates that the fundamental relationships considered here are those pertaining to a party's leadership, linkages between the leadership and the party base, and the effect of these considerations on the party's coalitional behaviour. Internal relationships are not only a matter of democracy, but also a matter of manageability. Under these circumstances, party institutionalization, which effects the elites' ability to cope with internal conflicts, becomes an intervening variable in the relationship between intra-party conflicts and bargaining power.18

**Figure 2.1** The Process of Coalitional Behaviour

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Intra-Party → Bargaining Power → Coalition Behaviour

Intervening Variable:
Party Institutionalization

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By raising a paradox in Groennings and Panebianco's applications of party institutionalization to alliance strategy - in the next section - the factors that influence bargaining power of party elites in the parliamentary arena will be identified.

2.1.4 THE PARADOX

As noted earlier, the nature of party institutionalization as a variable in coalition politics has been raised by Groennings who maintained that the more centralised they are, the stronger parties are as coalition actors. A similar view is presented by Panebianco who concluded that alliances amongst parties inevitably destabilize the less institutionalized organizations.

A logical problem is created here: Why are highly institutionalized parties considered to be effective coalitional actors if they lack the internal fluidity necessary to adjust to dissent among their members? At the outset, students of politics might expect that highly institutionalized parties would possess more defences with respect to internal challenges, as their instruments of control over such uncertainties are concentrated in the hands of the party elites. Such parties, however, lack mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent, such as dissension in parliament and factions within the party. In contrast, it is
the weakly institutionalized parties that are characterized by mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent, as well as the ability to establish new mechanisms, such as the formation of new factions.

The above-mentioned applications of party institutionalization to coalition politics, therefore, raise a paradox. Literally formulated, the strength of a party in the parliamentary bargaining plane, that is, its relative bargaining power, lies in its organizational weakness. The mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent allow the party to handle internal dissent in a variety of manageable ways without forcing members to leave the party. As a result, the weakly institutionalized party can enter into conflict inducing coalition negotiations with other parties without risking its hold on its own elite and party members. The highly institutionalized party, on the other hand, lacks the internal fluidity necessary to adjust to dissent among its members, and therefore is at a disadvantage when it enters parliamentary negotiations. When inter-party negotiations induce internal conflicts, members may be forced to leave the party as their primary mechanism for the expression of dissent. In other words, a highly institutionalized organization can lead to party disintegration when such a party enters serious coalition negotiations with other parties.

As noted earlier, top party elites (i.e. cabinet ministers and/or party leader) differ in the extent they
control intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts. The fact that parliamentary group members are interested primarily in 'selective incentives' emphasizes their dependency on the top party leadership. This, in turn, enhances the elites' ability to control their behaviour. Less influence can be exerted on party followers, however, as they are primarily interested in 'collective incentives'. Consequently, the elites' ability to cope with dissenting behaviour of parliamentarians is likely to be greater than their ability to cope with hostility of party followers. Given the above-mentioned paradox, such an evaluation seems to be manifested acutely in an highly institutionalized context.

The main questions that follow are: (i) How do intra-elite and elite-follower conflict, which evolve during a coalition's life-span, interact with the degree of party institutionalization? and, (ii) How does the relationship between internal conflicts and the level of party institutionalization affect the party's bargaining power in the parliamentary arena? These questions will be addressed in the following section.

2.1.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING BARGAINING POWER: A TYPOLOGY

Intra-party conflicts and party institutionalization can be considered separately from one another, so that different degrees of institutionalization need not affect the evolution
of intra-party conflicts, nor need the latter alter institutionalization. The relationship between internal conflicts and the level of party institutionalization is shown in Figure 2.2.

To begin with, all four cases represent party elites which face intra-party conflicts. The cases are not exclusive because intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts can occur within a party at the same time. It is reasonable to suggest, however, that in the case of any one particular party, either intra-elite or elite-follower will ordinarily be the dominant conflict mode. The subsidiary conflict is then likely to manifests itself to such a limited degree that it will never become destructive for the simple reason that, if the decrease in the degree of cohesion and/or

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**Figure 2.2 A Typology: Factors Influencing Bargaining Power**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Institutionalization</th>
<th>high</th>
<th>weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Intra-Party Conflict</td>
<td>intra-elite</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intra-elite</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elite-follower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
stability proceed, the job of destruction is accomplished single-handedly by the dominant conflict mode.

Generally speaking, a highly institutionalized party drastically limits its internal actors’ margin of manoeuvrability. When intra-elite conflicts occur within a highly institutionalized party as a result of its coalitional behaviour (i.e. case 1), resignation of elite members probably seem to be the main alternative of expressing dissatisfaction. This is mainly because no dissenting activities in parliament and decision-making bodies within the party are allowed by the organization. Similarly, when elite-follower conflicts evolve within a highly institutionalized party due to its coalitional behaviour (i.e. case 3), activists and militants might leave the party or express their dissatisfaction by extremist actions outside the party (riots and violent demonstrations, for example) due to the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent.

On the other hand, when intra-elite or elite-follower conflicts occur within a weakly institutionalized party, following an alliance (i.e. cases 2 and 4), it is reasonable to expect dissenting voices, rather than exit. As one can express his/her disagreement from the party line within the party, there is no immediate need for exit. From the elites’ point of view, it can mobilize dissatisfaction through the internal network, controlling the evolution and the direction of the conflict.
With regard to neutralizing different types of internal conflicts, it is important to note that top party elites tend to exert greater influence on elite members than on party activists, as the former are primarily interested in selective incentives, that is, benefits that the organization distributes only to some of the participants and in varying amounts. Consequently, the elites' ability to cope with dissenting behaviour of their members is most likely to be greater than their ability to cope with followers' hostility. This evaluation seems relevant to weakly, as well as, highly institutionalized parties.

The ability of party elites to deal with internal conflicts affect the party's bargaining power in the parliamentary arena. The advantage of the weakly institutionalized party in pacifying intra-elite dissatisfaction is translated into a superior position in the parliamentary bargaining plane. It is reasonable also to expect a similar translation, although to a lesser extent, with regard to followers' hostility. On the other hand, the disadvantage of the highly institutionalized party in pacifying internal opposition is translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary bargaining arena. Such a pattern is most likely to be acutely manifested when followers' hostility emerges.

The above discussion brings out very clearly the following set of hypotheses:
1. If intra-elite or elite-follower conflicts occur within a weakly institutionalized party, as a result of its coalitional behaviour, the party elites tend to possess a relatively high level of bargaining power.

2. If intra-elite conflicts occur within a highly institutionalized party, as a result of its coalitional behaviour, the party elites tend to possess a relatively low level of bargaining power (i.e. as they are most likely to modify their coalitional behaviour after failing to neutralize such conflicts).

3. If elite-follower conflicts occur within a highly institutionalized party, as a result of its coalitional behaviour, the party elites tend to possess an extremely low level of bargaining power and/or modify their coalitional behaviour immediately after such conflicts emerge.

In order to capture the complexity of bargaining power, cases in which internal conflicts do not occur should be taken into account. Two additional factors are of relevance. Firstly, intra-party conflicts are most likely to evolve as a result of a formal, rather than an informal alliance, as the former is more binding and visible than the latter. Secondly, a governmental position gives an advantage to the party\ies occupying it in terms of control over policy formation and implementation. The final hypothesis can now be formulated as follows:

4. As long as a highly institutionalized party which occupies a governmental position forms informal alliances, it tends to avoid intra-party conflicts and, thus, possesses a relatively high level of bargaining power.
The reasoning behind hypotheses 1 and 2 lies in the nature of the internal conflicts and the existence of heterogeneous and diffused mechanisms for internal dissent. As noted earlier, internal opposition within weakly institutionalized parties tends to pursue the voice option, whereas internal opposition within highly institutionalized parties tends to pursue the exit and the voice (mainly outside the party) options. A substantial reason beyond this lies in the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent within the latter type of parties. Exit and/or dissenting voices outside these parties appear to be the only option for the expression of dissent. On the other hand, internal dissatisfaction within weakly institutionalized parties can be expressed via dissenting activities within the internal network.

Elites within weakly institutionalized parties therefore tend to resolve internal conflict without having to modify their coalitional behaviour. Elites within highly institutionalized parties, on the other hand, tend to resolve internal conflicts by modifying their coalitional strategy. The flexibility of the former parties, in terms of their ability to pacify internal opposition is immediately translated into a superior position in the parliamentary bargaining plane. The disadvantage of the highly institutionalized party is translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary arena.
Hypothesis 3 is based on the relatively greater control of party elites on their members, compared with the control they possess over their followers. Thus, intra-elite conflicts tend to be less difficult to cope with, compared to elite-followers conflicts. In other words, we can expect varying measures to be implemented by party elites in order to cope with different types of internal conflicts.

Within weakly institutionalized parties, dissatisfaction of parliamentary group members is most likely to be neutralized by the elites' acceptance of dissenting activities and the formation of new factions. Hostility of party followers may require a resignation threat by the leader in addition to the above-mentioned measures. Within highly institutionalized parties, dissatisfaction of parliamentary group members may require imposing structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government (before modifying the party's alliance strategy). Followers' hostility may require an 'articulation of ends', as well as a change in the party's alliance strategy. A weakly institutionalized party can take advantage of its mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent in order to deal with both types of internal conflicts. It seems reasonable to expect, therefore, that the difference between the elites' control over its members and the party followers will be acutely manifested in an highly institutionalized context (hypothesis 3).
With regard to hypothesis 4, highly institutionalized parties which occupy a governmental position can minimize the possibility of intra-party conflicts by forming only informal alliances. Highly institutionalized parties which adopt such a strategy tend to possess a relatively high level of bargaining power in the parliamentary bargaining plane. By negotiating each issue separately and on ad-hoc basis, such parties can in each case select the least 'expensive' coalition partner available. 'Expensive' refers to a partner's ability to threaten the stability and cohesion of the party under study. Clearly, a strategy of ad hoc coalitions is especially profitable if there are many feasible coalition partners.

The object of the these arguments in no way implies a general theory of minority governments. The modest objective is rather to study the impact of intra-party conflicts on parliamentary co-operation in minority situations. It seeks no less but no more than to show that, over cases observed and within the period designated, intra-party conflicts faced by party elites bore a direct impact on the party's alliance strategy.

2.2 A SAMPLE OF WEST EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS

The above hypotheses clearly indicate that systemic factors are not given any special place among the possible
predictors of party behaviour in the parliamentary arena. Rather, the strategy focuses on the variation in coalitional behaviour at a level lower than the party system, namely, the level of political parties. Consequently, the 'most different systems' design was adopted as the sampling method.22 Such a strategy eliminates factors differentiating between political systems by formulating hypotheses that are valid regardless of the systems within which the observations were made. Still, the goal remains the obvious aim in any comparative analysis, to account for, in casual terms, the observed patterns in an accurate, general and parsimonious way.23

As we seek maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, the first step is to identify the factors which signify differentiation between party systems. Given the thesis' definition of coalition maintenance, it is necessary to consider systemic variables which explain majority building in minority situations. Strom's explanatory variables - the potential influence of the parliamentary opposition and the decisiveness of elections for coalitional bargaining power - spring immediately to mind.24 This is not to say that factors other than the above are less useful in differentiating amongst party systems. It is rather to stress that the sampling method follows the logic of coalitional behaviour processes which was outlined in the theoretical framework.
The potential influence of the parliamentary opposition, which measures the benefits of governing, represents the structural opportunities for legislative influence open to opposition. The greater the potential influence of the opposition, Strom claims, the lower the relative benefits of governing, and the higher the probability of minority government. In line with this argument, a five-point index of the potential influence for oppositional influence, based on the properties of parliamentary committees, was constructed. The index aggregates the following indicators: the number of standing committees, whether the standing committees have fixed areas of specialization, whether such jurisdiction correspond to ministerial departments, whether there are any restrictions on the number of committee assignments per legislator, and finally, whether committee chairs are proportionally distributed among the parliamentary parties. Each government’s score - shown in Appendix 2.1 - is simply the sum of positive values; thus the hypothetical range is from 0 to 5.

Whilst the potential influence of the parliamentary opposition, measures the policy costs of being in opposition, the decisiveness of election taps costs of governing in future elections. As oppositional influence and electoral decisiveness increase, Strom predicts, the parliamentary bases of the governments formed should diminish, and the likelihood of minority government formation increase.
The latter variable has four components operationalized as follows: the identifiability of viable government alternatives, electoral competitiveness or volatility, electoral responsiveness (i.e. governments be formed by parties that have gained rather than lost seats in the election), and finally proximity (i.e. government be formed in close proximity to general elections). A summary of electoral decisiveness scores by country - shown in Appendix 2.2 - presents all four component variables.

Consequently, Denmark, Norway, France, Italy and the U.K. were chosen as the focus of research since they were found to be 'different' with respect to the above-mentioned variables. With regard to the potential influence of the opposition (Appendix 2.1), whilst the U.K. is characterized by a low influence of opposition (scored only 1), Norway can be considered a classic example of high oppositional influence (scored 5). Additionally, Italy, France and Denmark, which scored 4, 4 and 3 respectively, can, to a lesser extent, be included in the latter group. With regard to electoral decisiveness (Appendix 2.2), the above five party systems vary along all four component variables. The U.K. is characterized by the highest level of electoral decisiveness whilst high levels were also recorded in the Danish and Norwagian systems. Italy and France, on the other hand, are characterized by relatively low levels of electoral decisiveness.
Having reduced the sample of minority governments under study to those operating within five different political systems enables a greater measure of analytical depth. The particular combination of Denmark, Norway, Italy, France, and the U.K., furthermore, recommends itself for three reasons. Firstly, it captures a possibly extreme leap in patterns of coalitional behaviour, found within the European context in moving, for example, from the Mediterranean to the Scandinavian arena. Secondly, precisely because all cases represent numerous examples of minority government. Lastly, the fact that all countries chosen have illustrated both short- and long-lived minority governments, enhances the validity of any generalization.

With the countries under examination identified, attention now turns to the types of minority governments chosen. As noted earlier, two main types of inter-party commitments in minority situations can be traced - formal and informal minority governments. Table 2.2 presents the inter-party relationships in minority situations which fall in the scope of our study. The effort is therefore invested in trying to shed light on elites' ability to cope with internal conflicts and the derived consequences in the parliamentary arena. Such an undertaking, it should be stressed, is exceedingly ambitious, for it means that party elites within a specific type of party organization have the same mechanisms to cope with intra-party conflicts.
Given the type of party organization and the nature of internal conflicts, therefore, coalitional behaviour in minority situations could be effected at the same way across political systems.

Table 2.2  
A Sample of Minority Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Formation date</th>
<th>Demission date</th>
<th>Governmental Parties</th>
<th>Type of Min. Gov.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordli I</td>
<td>Jan 76</td>
<td>Sep 77</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordli II</td>
<td>Sep 77</td>
<td>Jan 81</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brundtland I</td>
<td>Feb 81</td>
<td>Oct 81</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willoch I</td>
<td>Oct 81</td>
<td>Jun 83</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willoch III</td>
<td>Sep 85</td>
<td>May 86</td>
<td>CP,KrF,SP</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brundtland II</td>
<td>May 86</td>
<td>Oct 89</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syse</td>
<td>Oct 89</td>
<td>Nov 90</td>
<td>CP,KrF,SP</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorgensen II</td>
<td>Feb 75</td>
<td>Feb 77</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorgensen III</td>
<td>Feb 77</td>
<td>Aug 78</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorgensen IV</td>
<td>Aug 78</td>
<td>Sep 79</td>
<td>SD,V</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorgensen V</td>
<td>Oct 79</td>
<td>Dec 81</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorgensen VI</td>
<td>Dec 81</td>
<td>Sep 82</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schluter IV</td>
<td>Jun 88</td>
<td>Dec 90</td>
<td>CPP,V,RV</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocard</td>
<td>Jun 88</td>
<td>May 91</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreotti III</td>
<td>Jul 76</td>
<td>Jul 77</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreotti IV</td>
<td>Mar 78</td>
<td>Jan 79</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callaghan</td>
<td>Mar 77</td>
<td>Jul 78</td>
<td>Lab.</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To sum up, the fundamental purpose is to explain why coalitional behaviour varies across political systems. By concentrating on the level of political parties, the sampling net was targeted to catch party elites in five different political systems. To be able to assess what lies beneath different alliance strategies, factors commonly measured but varying in their levels, were explicitly built into the research design. These factors are being thoroughly investigated in numerous cases across political systems.

2.3 A SURVEY OF ELITES

The best way to learn about the impact of intra-party politics on coalitional behaviour is to explore the attitudes and perceptions of party elites across political systems. The inquiry thus lies at the juncture of two important approaches to the study of politics, namely, elite theory and political culture. The former offers two related, but distinct, propositions. The first is that in any political system some actors are more important than others and merit closer scrutiny from academic observers. The second is that they constitute a relatively unified and autonomous group. The major premise of the political culture approach is that the character and development of a political system is conditioned by the elites' perceptions and
As shown in table 2.3, 143 members of party elites in Denmark, Norway, Italy, France and the U.K. were interviewed during 1988-1990 (see list in Appendix 2.3). Those politicians were chosen according to three criteria: (i) formal position in the party hierarchy, (ii) evaluation of local academics, and (iii) recommendation of local politicians. The sampling net thus was targeted to catch politicians at the top of government and party hierarchy, such as prime ministers, ministers, party leaders and the leaders of parliamentary groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party System</th>
<th>Period under investigation</th>
<th>Period of field research</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1975-1990</td>
<td>May, 1989</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>Oct, 1989</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to probe the formal and informal nuances of intra-party politics and coalitional behaviour, an open-ended un-structured interview instrument was employed. The reason for this lies in the fact that the open-ended questions have the virtue of greater response validity. The interviews were recorded and all the interviewees were told at the beginning that the interview will be an attributional one.
At the end of each interview, an informal un-recorded discussion was conducted especially in order to elicit sensitive data concerning intra-party power struggles and conflicts. Additionally, in order to increase the reliability of the data gathered during the interview, a twofold strategy was implemented. Firstly, any interviewee's perception of intra-party conflict was confirmed by at least another elite member. Secondly, attitudes of at least three elite members concerning aspects of coalitional behaviour were taken to signify the party's view on this matter.

Naturally, the actual value of elite interviewing depends on whether they offer a central or secondary means of fulfilling a research project, and this depends first and foremost on the kind of problems being examined, but also on the availability and quality of alternative sources. This general remark applies particularly to political parties in liberal democracies as a field of study. Since parties are relatively open institutions they are usually reported on in detail in the press and their own documentation may be reasonably available to researchers. Given the need of controlling for memory or political bias or situational problems in interviews, secondary sources, such as official statistics and newspapers, provide a useful basis for corroborating interview material.

A comparative study like the present one obviously runs risks because methodological difficulties rise geometrically
with the number of countries studied. These difficulties alert us to the need for constant sensitivity to the genuine peculiarities of each country. But if we are to understand the full complexity of intra-party conflicts and their impact on coalitional behaviour, the benefits of explicit cross-national comparison far outweigh the perils.
The aim of this chapter first of all is to demonstrate that the formation of informal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for highly institutionalized parties. When such parties form formal minority governments, elites' members may be forced to resign as their the primary mechanism for the expression of dissent. When weakly institutionalized parties enter into formal agreements, however, internal dissatisfaction tends to be absorbed internally, through the network which allows for dissenting behaviour.

Secondly, its purpose is to establish that both highly and weakly institutionalized parties tend to insist on decisive preferences that are sufficiently focused to generate the widest possible support within the party. In the case of highly institutionalized parties, however, the elites tend to impose structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government (such as, the establishment of an inner cabinet and a principle of mutual veto in decision-making processes). Due to the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent, those parties are forced to modify their coalitional strategy in order to maintain party stability.

With regard to the impact of intra-party conflicts on parties' bargaining power, it will be shown that as long as a highly institutionalized party in a governmental position form informal minority governments, it tends to avoid
internal conflicts and, thus possesses a relatively high level of bargaining power. However, once such a party forms a formal minority government, its disadvantage in mobilizing internal dissatisfaction is translated into a relatively inferior position in the bargaining arena. On the other hand, the flexibility of the weakly institutionalized party in neutralizing internal opposition is translated into a relatively superior position in the bargaining arena.

To support hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, this chapter examines the formation, maintenance and collapse of Danish minority governments during 1975-1982 and 1988-1990. The objective is to explain majority building strategies by highly and weakly institutionalized parties and their intra-party consequences. The chapter begins with an introductory section which provides the data concerning trends in Danish politics in the early 1970s.

The second section seeks to establish that the fundamental reason for the formation of the SD-V government in 1978 was the desire to form a stable co-operation which could adhere to a long-term economic policy which could bring about economic recovery. It will be shown that in the months following the coalition agreement, a conflict within the party's parliamentary group was recorded. The leader of the SD group in parliament, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, resigned following the conclusion of the SD-V accord. It will be demonstrated that in an attempt to pacify the intra-elite conflicts, the SD leader imposed structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the coalition government. It
will be argued that the failure of the SD elites to neutralize the internal opposition - highlighted by the break-up of the coalition government - was translated into an inferior position in the bargaining plane. With regard to the SD's relative bargaining power during 1975-1978 and 1979-1982, it will be shown that as long as the SD elites had formed informal alliances, the party avoided internal conflicts and, therefore, possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power.

The third section examines the conflicts between the RV parliamentary group and members of the cabinet over the formation of the CPP-V-RV government coalition during 1988-1989. It will be shown that in order to pacify internal opposition, the RV elites acquiesced and allowed decisions against government policy to be taken by party bodies. Dissatisfaction was, furthermore, neutralized by a confidential agreement concerning the coalition strategy over potentially controversial issues, and the establishment of a special committee in parliament which enhanced discussions over foreign and security matters with the main opposition party, the SD. Due to the successful resolution of the intra-elite conflict, the analysis concludes that the bargaining power of the RV was not undermined. Perhaps, it can be argued, the RV's bargaining power increased as it took advantage of the conflict which evolved within its elite, demanding more concessions from its coalition partners in order to pacify its internal opposition.
3.1 PARTY STRENGTH AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Danish politics, from the 1970s onwards, grew out of a major realignment which was manifested nation-wide in the 1973 elections. It must be conceded, however, that from the 1920s the wider political system was characterized by stability in terms of voter support, legislative policy-making, a high predictability of cabinet formations and fairly long durations of governments in office.¹ A partial explanation for the unique long-term stability can be derived from the description of the Danish political system as a 'consensus system',² which facilitated the development of a 'working multiparty system',³ within a 'homogeneous and secularized' political culture.⁴

From its beginning, the parliamentary party system contained a core of four 'old' parties, namely the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Agrarian Liberals and the Conservatives, which could trace their history back to the nineteenth century. Additionally, a small and changing number of other parties, such as the Communist and the Justice party, were represented in the Folketing from 1932 to 1960, and from 1926 to 1960, respectively. Following World War II, the four parties commanded almost 90 per cent of the seats, dominating the Folketing.⁵ However, the long-term trend of declining popularity for the 'old' parties may be partially explained by the shrinking support for the Liberal party due to the narrowing of the party's traditional supporting group of farmers.⁶
Before going any further, it is appropriate to clarify the factors that contributed to the defeat of five incumbent parties in a single election. Among the most frequent cited long-term factors of change was the rapid shift to a 'service society'. This process bore a direct impact on the relationships amongst voter - social class - party, toward deteriorating bonds between the voter and the party 'in a way the old parties are suspended in the air, representing something which no longer exists'.

Equally important, are a number of relatively shorter-term factors operating in Danish politics during the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as tax reform, municipal reform, the liberalization of pornography and abortion rights. These reforms met with heavy criticism from many sectors of the population, thus increasing polarization among the parties in parliament and among voters and politicians. The defection of Erhard Jakobsen, the right-wing Social Democrat, furthermore, led the Prime Minister to dissolve the Folketing; and the defector to form the Center Democrats. Additionally, the formation of the Progress Party by Mogens Glistrup raised the need for change while intensifying the wave of political protest.

Yet, even among the parties riding the wave of political protest and social unrest, few old-timers - the Communist and the Justice Parties - had succeeded in entering into the party system due to their principled and unrelenting opposition to European integration and to Denmark joining the EEC. Beside the new Christian People's Party which was
formed with the main purpose of objecting to 'moral decay and cultural nihilism',

two new parties entered parliament representing a new party type. The CD cast itself as a new party without a traditional programme, aimed mainly at defending private property without rejecting the basic principles of the Welfare state and giving more emphasis to cultural issues. The Progress Party positioned itself as a popular movement operating against the 'old' parties.\\footnote{10}

The major realignment, however, did not preclude the formation of subsequent minority governments in the Danish polity. Understanding Danish post-war politics requires an explanation for the frequent occurrence of minority governments. Only three of 27 governments during 1945-1991 have not been minority cabinets.\\footnote{11} A partial explanation can be found in the Danish Constitution which does not elaborate much on the process of government formation. In a parliament as fragmented as the Folketing this leaves ample room for manoeuvre. Consequently, a gradual development of informal rules have filled the vacuum left by the Constitution.\\footnote{12} Again, those rules can make the process of government formation rather complicated. A recent study, however, concluded that three factors (namely, strongly organized and future-oriented parties, decentralized and relatively nonhierarchical parliaments where opposition parties can be influential, and finally, highly competitive elections) account for the predominance of the minority type by inducing political parties to 'defer the gratification of holding office'.\\footnote{13}
Of primary relevance here is the classification of Danish parties according to degrees of institutionalization. As demonstrated in Appendix 3.1, whilst the SD and the SF can be classified as highly institutionalized parties, the KrF, the CD, the CPP, the V, and the RV can be considered weakly institutionalized parties. Additionally, the Progress Party is considered a deviant case due to the overwhelming, dominating presence of its founder, namely Mogens Glistrup. It is characterized by the existence of a cohesive dominant coalition despite the absence of institutionalization.

Logically, one can expect sharp differences in the willingness of MPs to follow the party line in votes in parliament. However, in the Danish case, as in other Scandinavian political systems, legislation is generally initiated by the presentation of the report of a royal commission representing all interested sections of opinion. It is then tendered for comment to the relevant interest groups, and is decided on by the deliberations of a parliamentary committee, whose major aim is to produce proposals which can be unanimously agreed by the plenary body. Differences of opinions and power struggles which occur within the parties are usually settled in party group meetings. Additionally, decisions are considered binding upon all the MPs of the party and non-compliance in important matters is met with sanctions. Not surprisingly, parties are disciplined in their legislative voting behaviour and function as relatively cohesive actors in final divisions.

In the mid-70s, Denmark faced very serious economic
problems which were triggered off by the first oil price increases during October-December 1973. Additionally, following the 1975 general elections, political difficulties were created as the Danish political parties had to face a minority situation. Whereas the Liberal Party almost doubled its representation in the Folketing, the loss of support experienced by the RV, KrF, CPP and CD, together with the increase in the seats of the SF, C, and LV, had the effect of perpetuating the pre-election absence of a majority for either of the two traditional blocs of the Danish spectrum (see Appendix 3.2). Following the subsequent resignation of the Liberals' minority government led by Poul Hartling, the parties had to confront another minority situation. This parliamentary situation provides the starting point for the analysis. How did it influence tactical considerations of party elites? What were the new patterns of government formation, maintenance and collapse which evolved from 1975 to 1989? These questions will be investigated in light of the rich material which was furnished by the Danish case.

3.2 SD ELITES BETWEEN FOLLOWERS' HOSTILITY AND DECISIVE PREFERENCES OF 'ECONOMIC RECOVERY' AND 'GOVERNMENT STABILITY', 1975-1982

The SD alliance strategy during 1975-1982 grew out of Anker Jørgensen's desire to form a stable co-operation which could adhere to a long-term economic policy which could bring about economic recovery. The adoption of the decisive preference of 'economic recovery' by the Liberal Party led to a visible convergence of opinion with the SD which enabled a
shift of the latter strategy from informal alliances during 1975-1978 to a formal alliance during 1978-1979. In the months following the coalition agreement, a conflict within the SD’s parliamentary group was recorded. The leader of the SD group in parliament, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, resigned following the conclusion of the coalition accord. As a result of the conflict, the SD elites imposed structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government, and, finally, modify their alliance strategy by further pursuing informal alliances during 1979-1982. The development of the SD’s coalitional behaviour and its intra-party consequences are the focus of the following subsections.

3.2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SD’S ALLIANCE STRATEGY

The position of Anker Jørgensen within the SD and the decisive preferences of his alliance strategy are critical factors in the development of inter-party co-operation during 1975-1982. At the outset, Jørgensen’s position during 1972-1977 seemed relatively restricted as he was elected in a way more reminiscent of a ‘coup’. According to his memoirs, he was hand picked mainly by Jens Otto Krag, Erling Dinesen and K.B. Andersen. The 1975 and 1977 elections, however, gradually strengthened his position. Additionally, his experience as the former President of Denmark’s largest trade-union federation (the National Union of General workers) combined with ten years parliamentary experience and
two years as a prime minister contributed to the dominant position he enjoyed during 1977-1982. A substantial reason for the overall support he enjoyed at the level of the party organization is suggested by the editor of the SD’s newspaper Aktuelt, Bent Hansen:

He became Prime Minister at a time when the Danish Social Democratic Party needed a popular leader with social engagement and reared in the type of environment that the Social Democratic Party represents politically. His two immediate predecessors had an academic background, and notwithstanding their great qualifications there was a political-psychological need for a leader who had his origin in the midst of the Social Democratic Party’s electorate. On top of that, Anker Jørgensen was given the difficult task of unifying the Danish labour movement after the question of Danish membership of the EEC had divided the movement [...] Both in his capacity as trade union president and prime minister he was authoritative and reserved. These were however qualities that were closely bound up with these taxing functions, and they were offset by a both humane and personal openness in all other relations whether on a high intellectual level or down to earth.

At the level of the party organization, therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that Jørgensen enjoyed a dominant position.

In addition to the position of Jørgensen, another crucial factor in explaining the development of the SD’s coalitional behaviour during 1975-1982 were the decisive preferences upon which alliances were formed. Given the serious economic problems, triggered off by the first oil price increase, and the political difficulties created by the 1973 ‘electoral earthquake’, it is hardly surprising that the main reason for the formation of the SD’s alliances during
Table 3.1 List of Events in Denmark, 1975-1989

9\1\75 General elections.
13\2\75 Formation of Jørgensen’s II minority government.
11\3\75 A statutory two-year income policy passed.
22\1\77 Dissolution of the Folketing.
15\2\77 General elections.
25\2\77 Formation of Jørgensen’s III minority government.
15\4\77 Collective agreement for two-year period passed.
17\2\78 Mogens Glistrup found guilty of tax fraud.
28\8\78 The formation of Jørgensen’s IV minority SD-V gov.
28\9\79 The SD-V minority government collapses.
09\79 Dissension within the FrP. FrP Congress endorses Glistrup’s approach ruling out any co-operation.
23\10\79 General elections.
26\10\79 The formation of Jørgensen’s V minority government.
12\11\81 The rejection of the government’s economic programme.
8\12\81 General elections.
30\12\81 The formation of Jørgensen’s VI minority government.
23\11\81 Four-year goal sentence imposed on Glistrup.
3\9\82 Resignation of Jørgensen’s VI minority government.
10\9\82 Formation of Poul Schlüter’s I minority government.
7\12\82 The government defeated over defence issue.
16\10\82 The main provisions of the 1983 budget passed.
5\1\83 The government defeated over defence issue.
2\6\83 The government survives a vote of no-confidence.
3\11\83 SD proposal enjoining the government to work ‘actively’ to halt the arms race was passed.
1\12\83 A SD proposal passed instructing the government to refuse to take any responsibility for deployment.
15\12\83 Resignation of Schlüter’s I minority government after being defeated over the 1984 budget.
10\1\84 General elections, formation of Schlüter’s II gov.
23\2\84 The 1984 Budget passed by 79 votes to 27.
05\84 The government defeated over defence issues.
29\6\84 An agreement on defence budget for 1986-1989.
11\3\85 Glistrup released from prison.
29\3\85 The government’s energy plan defeated.
14\11\85 The government defeated over defence issue.
19\11\85 Local elections.
12\85 The 1986 Budget passed in the Folketing.
21\1\86 Schlüter’s government unable to sign the ‘Single European Act’ following lack of Folketing’s support.
27\2\86 A referendum over the ‘Single European Act’, 56% in favour and 43% against.
20\5\86 The government defeated over defence issues.
12\86 Adoption of the 1987 Budget.
8\9\87 General elections, formation of Schluter’s III gov.
10\9\87 Resignation of Anker Jørgensen as SD leader.
10\87 Appointment of Svend Auken as SD leader.
14\4\88 Government defeat over nuclear weapon policy.
10\5\88 General elections.
3\6\88 Formation of Schlüter’s IV minority government.

1975-1979 was the desire to form a stable government which could adhere to a long-term economic policy which could bring about economic recovery. As the Liberal Party has also adopted 'economic recovery' as its decisive preference, a visible convergence of opinion with the SD caused a shift of the latter's strategy from informal minority governments during 1975-78 to a formal one during 1978-79.

The idea of using an economic umbrella as the central energiser of the SD-V coalition was suppose to generate the widest possible support within both parties. However, the coalition agreement, which provided for the implementation of an economic stabilization plan to tackle the adverse economic conditions, was not sufficiently vague and opaque to minimize party disunity. The accord reached between the parties involved an understanding that three economic policy proposals strongly supported by the trade-unions would not be pursued. These proposals were: (1) a tax reform, (2) housing reform and (3) the introduction of wage-earner co-ownership of industry ('economic democracy').

Not surprisingly, in the months following the coalition agreement a strife between the party and the trade-unions was recorded, as well as a conflict within the SD parliamentary group. Consequently, a change in Jørgensen's decisive preference was evident during 1979-1982. In addition to 'economic recovery', 'economic democracy' became a decisive preference upon which informal minority governments were formed during this period. Given the extent of the economic crisis in this period and the toughest measures
necessary to combat it, the preference of 'economic recovery' remained of utmost relevance. Economic democracy, on the other hand, was taken-up in order to heal the breach within the SD parliamentary group and between the party and the LO.

The above discussion concerning the position of Anker Jorgensen within the SD and the decisive preferences of his alliance strategy provided the background for the development of the SD alliance strategy during 1975-1982. Due to the fact that the SD and the parties to its left lacked a majority, the SD entered into informal alliances with the CPP, KrF, CD and the RV during 1975-1978. A classic example was the agreement between the SD and these parties over the passage of the 1976 budget which provided for the introduction of heavier penalties for breaches of current collective wage agreements and a complete wage and price freeze. Although Jørgensen went back on the first part of this agreement, following the strong opposition from the LO, the four above-mentioned parties voted with the SD on December 1975 over wage and price freeze proposals.22

Given the ad-hoc nature of informal minority governments, the SD elites could select the least 'expensive' partner available. Two examples concerning the inclusion of the RV in some of the 1977 alliances and its exclusion from others spring to mind. In April, co-operation between the SD, RV, V and the CPP resulted in the adoption of an emergency bill giving legislative effect to the collective agreement for a two-year period.23 Similarly, on September 6, 1977, the government which was supported by these
parties secured parliamentary approval for a package of increases in indirect taxes on petrol, tobacco and spirits. On the other hand, the RV was excluded from the agreement amongst the SD, V, KrF, CPP, and the CD over a four-year extension of the defence budget in March 1977. Obviously, as there were many feasible partners, the SD elites could oppose the demands of the RV and the extreme left-wing parties without risking its legislation over this issue.

The above pattern of ongoing and relatively successful SD informal alliances was modified during 1978-1979 towards a formal minority government with the Liberal Party. As noted earlier, in the year following the 'historical experiment', trade union opposition became increasingly militant. In addition, conflicts evolved within the SD elites. As a result, the SD elite was forced to modify both its alliance strategy and decisive preferences in order to maintain its stability. Based on the decisive preferences of 'economic recovery' and 'economic democracy', a shift from a formal minority government to informal ones was evident during 1979-1982. In November 1979, for example, few bills, which were described in a Financial Times' report as Denmark's 'toughest price and wage freeze since wartime emergency measures', were adopted by large ad-hoc majorities whilst narrow majorities were recorded for other bills.

Perhaps the most important question that should be raised at this stage concerns the intra-party consequences of the SD alliance strategy which the analysis now turns to.
In fact, during the period in which informal minority governments were formed, i.e. 1975-1978 and 1979-1982, no intra-party conflicts were recorded. However, differences of opinion between Jørgensen and parliamentary group members, with regard to preferable parliamentary partners, were recorded during the former period. Whilst Jørgensen preferred to co-operate with the Liberal Party, members of the parliamentary group found it much easier to co-operate with the Conservatives. As Svend Jakobsen recalled:

The Prime Minister, Anker Jørgensen, was more in favour of co-operation with the Venstre than the Conservatives. He saw the Conservatives as the party to the right [...] Some of us were discussing the situation already in the middle of the 70's because in concrete discussions it was much easier to negotiate with the Conservatives than with the Venstre. 28

The reasoning by certain members of the SD's elite to prefer the CPP rather than the Liberal Party as a partner for parliamentary co-operation, probably, lay in their perception of the CPP profile as closer to the SD line. Bent Hansen, who was at that time a chief editor of the Social Democratic's newspaper, 'Aktuelt', explained:

In a way, I think that the Conservative Party compared with the Venstre, is more close to us [...] We have more interests in common because, we want full employment and we want the industry and the economic life to have good conditions. First of all employment and secondly, to enhance the possibilities of increase standards of living and making social reforms. And I think that the Conservative Party which has its roots in the urban-bourgeoisie circle, has some idea in common with us, they also want standards of living increasing [...] the Venstre is a very reactionary party.
The importance of the above difference between Anker Jørgensen and some elite members can hardly be overemphasized. After all, the SD alliance strategy involved mainly informal alliances with the CPP together with other centre-right parties. The participation of the Liberal Party in some of the SD legislative alliances during 1977, moreover, was only on an informal, ad-hoc basis which did not antagonize centre-right elements within the party elites.

However, it was due to the shift in party strategy from informal minority governments to a formal one during 1978-1979 that the above difference within the party elites (which also reflected the difference between the party line and the trade unions's approach) resulted in intra-party conflicts. At the outset, the fact that the LO is strongly involved in SD politics and there is reciprocal representation on the executive committees of LO and the SD meant that any conflict between the two would be reflected within both elites. Furthermore, it was from the beginning of the negotiations between the SD and the V that Anker Jørgensen could have expected a conflict to evolve within the SD elites, as well as, between the party and the LO. As Karl Hjortnaes recalled:

There have been very important negotiations over the weekend between the leaders of the Liberal Party and the leadership of the Social Democratic Party. By the end of the negotiations there was a very important meeting between Mr. Anker Jørgensen, the chairman of the Labour movement, Thomas Nielsen and Jens Risgaard Knudsen, the chairman of the Social Democratic parliamentary group. Thomas Nielsen and Risgaard Knudsen told Anker Jørgensen that they were against the majority government between the two political parties. They advised him that he should not go inside and form such a majority government.
For Thomas Nielsen it was very important to have a deal about 'economic democracy'. And he knew that it was impossible to have economic democratization in our firms so long as the Liberal Party was inside the government. I think this was the reason why he was against.

Added to the dissatisfaction of Thomas Nielsen and Risgaard Knudsen was the coalition agreement that was concluded in August 1978. Based on the decisive preference of 'economic recovery', Anker Jørgensen signed an accord which provided for the implementation of an economic stabilization plan designed to consolidate the limited progress made by the 1977 minority government. As previously stressed, the agreement involved an understanding that three economic policy proposals strongly supported by the LO would not be pursued throughout the SD-V co-operation. The accord, however, was not sufficiently vague to minimize party disunity.

In the months following the coalition agreement strong opposition was evident within the party. At the SD Congress in December 1978, an open dispute took place between Anker Jørgensen and Thomas Nielsen. According to Jørgensen's memoirs, whilst the Prime Minister thought that there was no alternative to the SD-V government, the LO chairman hoped that the government would not survive the next 100 days. Thomas Nielsen, furthermore, criticized the way the government formation process had taken place and called it a 'coup'. He thus demanded a 'public apology' from Anker Jørgensen. The latter, on the contrary, did not think he owed an apology, only an explanation. In the following days,
[...] the strifes continue both internally and externally. The previous Minister of Finance, Henry Grünbaum, and George Poulsen, the new chairman of the Metal Workers Federation, urged a change of [party] chairman. But other leading figures within the party and the trade-unions went the opposite way and called for calm and ending the strife.

Yet, whatever the reason for the strife between the SD and the LO (i.e. matters of principles or the personal relationships between the two leaders), it was the conflict within the SD parliamentary group which was characterized by an unprecedented form of vociferous internal dissension. According to Svend Jakobsen, the Fisheries Minister in the SD-V government:

[...] I don't think we can say there was a leader, it was not organized inside the party. [...] Inside the party group, I think Mr. Jens Risgaard Knudsen was the major opponent. Maybe there was a relation...he was former Secretary in LO, he was very strongly against. [...] When ministers came to the group it was many times very difficult for [them] to have the support from the group because [members of the group] often said [the item] was influenced by the Liberals. I would say [that] if ministers, as members of a Social Democratic minority government, would come with the same position, it would have been much easier to get the support from the group then when they come from the coalition government. At that way you saw opposition in the parliamentary group.

In addition, the leader of the SD parliamentary group, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, resigned during the first meeting of the SD parliamentary group subsequent to the conclusion of the SD-V accord.

Knudsen, however, made no formal effort to organize those MPs who opposed the SD-V accord. On the contrary,

I have not heard about Risgaard Knudsen position and his advice [before the meeting of the parliamentary group]. He could have phoned me or other persons in the
Social Democratic parliamentary group but he made the choice that he would not contact any person. A substantial reason for Knudsen's inability or unwillingness to formally mobilize internal dissatisfaction within the SD involves a discussion not only of 'attitudes', as disembodied sets of ideas and values, but also of the organizational context in which party politics is rooted.

A highly institutionalized party, Panebianco claims, channels strategies of internal actors into specific and obligatory paths, thus, neutralizing any attempt to challenge the elite strategy. Given the discipline record of the SD parliamentary group, it was clear to Knudsen that any formal attempt to mobilize support for its cause was doomed to failure although 'inside the parliamentary group many people were against the new government'. Besides, differences of opinions also emerged within the LO. Whilst the chairman, Thomas Nielsen, opposed the SD-V government, Poul Christensen, the SID chairman, favoured it. As a result, a cohesive internal opposition could not have been formed.

The instances of the internal disagreement within the Liberal Party are of equal relevance. Within the parliamentary group only Iver Hansen was against the formation of the SD-V accord 'because he was more ideological, liberal and tended to be against socialism'. However, the importance of his opposition can hardly be over emphasized because after the coalition agreement was signed Hansen's dissatisfaction was neutralized by allocating him
the portfolio of Public Works. It must be conceded, moreover, that neither patterns of voice or exit were evident within the Liberal Party. Hence, intra-party conflict did not evolve within this party.

However mutable the strength of the opposition within the SD may have been during 1978-1979, it prompted determined action from Anker Jørgensen to deal with the internal dissatisfaction. Basically, a three-fold strategy was implemented. Firstly, Jørgensen insisted on the decisive preference of ‘economic recovery’. Secondly, he imposed structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the coalition government. And, thirdly, he modified the SD alliance strategy. As the former strategy has already been dealt with earlier in this section, attention is focused on the latter two.

At the heart of Jørgensen’s strategy to cope with the intra-elite conflict lay the notion that imposing structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the coalition government might ensure SD control over most governmental decisions, thus, pacifying opposition within the SD elites. Beyond maintaining the prime ministership and key ministerial portfolios (such as, Finance and Education) with the SD, a co-ordination committee (i.e. inner cabinet) was formed and the principle of ‘mutual veto’ in the governmental decision-making process was established. The co-ordination committee, which was comprised of four Social Democrats and three Liberal ministers, discussed issues before the ministers were allowed to publicize their opinion. The
principle of 'mutual veto' was operationalized by establishing a system of 'contact ministers'. SD ministers had to contact Liberal ministers in order to get approval for proposals they wished to promote, and vice versa.

The constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government had an immediate impact on the process of governmental decision-making. According to Jakobsen,

It was near disaster because the government was not well prepared. There were so many differences between the two parties. Also, the major issues where written partly on a paper [...] and all new items, all new cases, all new proposals were difficult to agree upon. The internal meetings in the government were very, very long. We discussed in the group of ministers [and] we discussed between the contact ministers. In the last part of the government's life the coordination committee discussed everything [including] smallest things to place on the agenda.

Added to these difficulties in the day-to-day operation of the government, inherent in its structure, was the failure of the two parties to agree on how to implement a price and incomes policy. Not surprisingly, thus, neither the SD nor the Liberal Party were able to embrace their views fully without offending one another.

No matter how effective were the structural constraints on the day to day operation of the government, they failed to neutralize the dissatisfaction within the SD parliamentary group. As a result, Jørgensen had to break up the formal alliance with the Liberal Party in order to maintain SD stability. In 1979, therefore, a shift in the SD strategy from a formal alliance to informal alliances was recorded.

The above discussion concerning Jørgensen's strategy to
deal with the intra-elite conflicts provides a necessary background for an evaluation of the relative bargaining power possessed by each actor. Basically, the failure of the highly institutionalized SD to mobilize and thus control the internal opposition, was immediately translated to an inferior position in the coalition bargaining plane. As Svend Jakobsen explained,

The major price was that we could not start economic democratization in Denmark. We had it as an important part of the package and also, in relation to the Labour unions, it was a very important thing [...] Therefore, there was a crash between Anker Jørgensen and Thomas Nielsen after the package. Only because of this we could not make a majority for establishing the first step on a way to economic democratization.

Therefore, the bargaining power in this context was manifested by the ability of one party to block the initiative of its counterpart. In this respect, the Liberal Party had succeeded in blocking the SD's main proposals of 'economic democratization', tax and housing reform which were strongly supported by the LO.

Added to these influences was the fact that since only seven portfolios were allocated to the Liberal Party, each minister from that party controlled two SD ministers. This, in turn, contributed to the superior position of the Liberal Party in the bargaining arena. This was confirmed by Knud Engaard (Liberal), the Minister of Interior:

We had the double task and the double influence. We could stop everything that we did not like [...] That is a problem with a coalition government between two parties of very different principles, that is, you cannot always have a compromise between principles and if you do not reach a compromise [...] then such a
government would have to stay away from legislation in such areas.

It is however somewhat misleading to contend that the inferior position of the SD during 1978-1979 reflects its bargaining power during 1975-1978 and 1979-1982. On the contrary, as long as informal alliances were formed by the SD elites, the party possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power. A classic example is the 1976 agreement reached amongst the SD, RV, KrF, CD and the CPP which provided for the introduction of heavier penalties for breaches of collective wage agreements and a complete wage and price freeze. In the face of strong opposition from the LO the government on November 1976 went back on the first part of this agreement. Still, the four above-mentioned parties voted with the SD over the first part of their agreement.

Against this background, the RV represents a deviant case with regard to inter-party co-operation, mainly because of the long tradition of SD-RV co-operations. As Svend Jakobsen elaborated,

I think [that] because we were in that time co-operating very close to the Radical Venstre [...] it was that party that influenced the most [...] Our closest relation, closest contacts [when] preparing and also when we were on action was with the Radical Venstre. I think on 1977 the Venstre had a part of influence because there were some contacts between the Social Democrats and Venstre.

Clearly, the long tradition of parliamentary co-operation between these two parties highlights the relatively high
level of bargaining power enjoyed by the RV during 1975-1978 and 1979-1982, compared with the rest of the SD's partners.

Thus, Lindblom's observation, that all affected interests can have at least some influence in the policy-making process, appears to be valid. The bargaining power of the RV and the rest of the SD's partners did not lie in their ability to affect the outcome. Rather, some outcomes were designed with consideration of their position.

If, as Strom claims, 'everything else being equal, minority governments would prefer purely ad hoc coalitions', a substantial reason underlying this lies in the consequences, in terms of intra-party conflict and bargaining power, of the SD alliance strategy. As long as the SD elites formed informal minority governments (i.e. during 1975-1978 and 1979-1982) no intra-party conflict developed and, therefore, the party possessed a relatively high degree of bargaining power. Once the pattern of ongoing and successful informal minority governments was modified by a formal alliance with the Liberal Party during 1978-1979, intra-elite conflict evolved. Due to the inability of the SD elites to pacify the internal dissatisfaction, which was mainly manifested by the resignation of the leader of the parliamentary group, the bargaining power of the party in the coalition bargaining plane was considerably undermined.

To conclude, the importance of a decisive preference is not restricted to the stage of coalition formation. The examples mentioned above and the overall analysis indicate that the key for the survival of a minority government is
probably the decisive preference upon which it is formed. Such a preference has an important role during processes of government formation - to generate the widest possible support within the party. Similarly, a decisive preference has a critical role during processes of government maintenance - to enable government coalition partners and members of legislative coalitions to vote over the non-decisive issues according to the party programme rather than the coalition discipline. The net effect seems to be working in a direction of reducing the probability for the evolution of internal conflicts.


To understand why the intra-elite conflicts evolved within the RV it is necessary to appreciate the parliamentary situation which developed after the 1988 elections. A dispute over how to react to possible visits of nuclear warships to Danish ports led to a wider dispute concerning Denmark's NATO and security policy. After having been defeated in no less than 22 motions on security policy by an 'alternative majority' comprised of the SD, RV and the SF, the government reacted by calling a new election over the issue. The main result of the May 1988 election was a drop in the Conservatives' vote from 23 to 19 per cent (see Appendix 3.2). Nevertheless, Poul Schlüter began negotiating with the RV over a formation of a formal alliance.
Clearly, the evidence and arguments presented by a large number of commentators suggest that Schlüter's aim was to put an end to the alternative majority. A formal minority government with the RV, CD and the KrF, however, imposed certain constraints on the former. According to the KrF leader, Flemming Kofod-Svendsen:

As far as I know, the Radical Venstre would not like there to be two great parties and three small parties in government. They wanted there to be only three parties because they hoped they could profile themselves better [...]. But Schluter mentioned that he had to choose a government between the four parties [namely], the Conservatives, the Venstre, the Radical Venstre and the Centre Democrats, and the three [i.e. the Conservatives, the Venstre and the Radical Venstre].

Additionally, one of the main factors which enhanced the formation of the CPP-V-RV coalition was the consensus-oriented alliance strategy of the CD, and probably also the KrF, which were excluded from the government. This strategy is well described by the CD founder, Erhard Jacobsen:

For the moment, for instance, we do not have a great sympathy or great admiration for the government but we just have to realize that nobody else could form a government, and therefore, we will not do anything to harm the government. But, of course, if the government put forward a proposal directly against what we think is right [...] we will vote against it and they know that [...] We are not part of the government background but, on the other hand, we will guarantee that we will never take part in an action against the government with the intention of overthrowing the government because who would form another government?

As it was probably reasonable to assume that the KrF strategy would not deviate significantly from that of the CD, Schluter could consider both parties as 'sleeping partners'. This
does not imply that the support of these parties was always forthcoming. Rather, it is to be stressed that the government could take for granted the CD and KrF's support over critical divisions, as defined by the government.

The CPP-V-RV coalition had still no majority in the Folketing. The government, therefore, had to form an informal minority government either with the SD or the FrP. The RV's elites, therefore, faced a dilemma over the former's strategy. As a governmental party it could not, of course, vote against government lines. Yet, the party’s views concerning security and foreign matters were much more closer to the SD than to its coalitional partners. This dilemma was a major factor which contributed to the evolution of intra-elite conflicts within the RV. Jorgen Estrup, a member of the RV’s parliamentary group who informally led the internal opposition, explained:

The only really major split I can think of at the moment is the one we had last May or June just after the election, when there were discussions about forming the present government [...]. I was part of the reason for the split because I did not think it was a very good idea to form the present government, because [...] there was not any formal agreement between the three parties. So, I was a bit frightened that [we would have] too many cleavages and there would be too many problems that would have to be solved in that way and it would not be possible to follow a straight track to solve the rather big economic problem.

A debate as to whether to cooperate with the CPP and the V surfaced, therefore, between the RV’s prospective ministers, namely, Niels Helveg Petersen, Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen, Ole Vig Jensen and Lone Dybkjaer, and the party’s parliamentary group, most notably, Jorgen Estrup, Elizabeth
Arnold and, to a lesser extent, the leader of the group, Marianne Jelved. The attitudes of the latter group had a number of dimensions, or 'cleavages' as Estrup termed, but these basically added up to controversial questions concerning security and foreign affairs and the mechanism which would enable their successful resolution.

As a partial explanation of the evolution of the intra-elite conflict along the above-mentioned lines, reference to Appendix 3.1, in which the weakly institutionalized features of the RV are described, provides a convenient starting point. A weakly institutionalized party, according to Panebianco, is one in which the actors have more autonomy in order to compete with each other. Consequently, rather than applying the exit option, internal dissatisfaction is most likely to be expressed internally by the voice option. Given the seriousness of the discussions over the formation of the CPP-V-RV formal alliance, it is hardly surprising that the voice option was taken-up; members of the RV's parliamentary group had appealed to the prospective members of cabinet with the aim of changing their intention to cooperate with the CPP and the Liberal Party.

However, '[...] for voice to function properly it is necessary that individuals possess reserves of political influence which they can bring into play when they are sufficiently aroused'. This argument can be used to explain the further appeal of the parliamentary group to RV party activists and the mobilization of the activists' support to enhance the former's objectives. One political
editor reviewed an attempt of the parliamentary group's leader in mid-1989 to mobilize the activists' support towards accepting decisions against the party lines as follows:

I guess the Radical Left has a number of more serious problems with their roots or even with the organs in the party. They just had a meeting [in their] main body with some 200 members [in which] they put forward a programme for an economic [policy] which on two essential points is quite opposite to what the government wants [...]. They put forward a programme which said they wanted a new pension [plan] which the government does not [want], and it was part of the agreement, when the Radical Left entered the government, that they could not put forward proposals on a new pension [plan]. And they [members of the parliamentary group] do not want to flatten out the taxes [whilst] the government wants to make them more flat, to take away [the] progressive [element]. So it is quite different from what the party stands for in the government. This proposal was put forward in the meeting by the leader of the parliamentary group, Marienna Jelved, and it was agreed by the vast majority.

The successful mobilization of the RV's activists against the party's positions does not imply that an elite-follower conflict evolved. It is simply a manifestation of the parliamentary group's ability to mobilize support of party members (against the elites' line) through mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent.

However inconsistent the strength of the RV's parliamentary group may have been throughout 1989-1990, it prompted determined action from the RV's cabinet members mainly at the stage of the alliance formation. A twofold strategy was implemented in order to neutralize and pacify the intra-elite dissatisfaction. A confidential agreement, signed between the RV's Minister of Environment, Lone Dybkjaer, and the V's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe
Ellemann-Jensen, contained two key elements. Firstly,

There was actually a list of all those decisions of the parliament where the government had been in minority and it was an agreement about what could happen in the coming period for the new government if those items were brought up again. Would they cause trouble or could we somehow manage with them.

Besides this document, in which 23 controversial matters and the preferable strategy to tackle them were specified, there was also an accord which introduced a mechanism of cooperation between the government and the SD over security and foreign policy matters. According to Jørgen Estrup,

There was a document spelling out what could be done with respect to forming the future decisions on foreign policy, so that you could be sure that there would be a majority backing them. Since the new government would have been a minority government, it would need to have at least the Social Democrats to accept its policy, and that was one of the crucial things for my party that you could make a formal instrument to secure that the Social Democrats would be backing the foreign policy. There was a document specifying that you could form some kind of a committee, or at least a body, that would make an expert analysis on foreign policy, security policy, which would support the discussion in parliament and be an instrument for forming, thus, consensus decisions.

It should be obvious from the content of the confidential agreement that the main objective of the RV in joining the government was to develop a broad co-operation with the CPP and the Liberal Party on the one hand and, over foreign affairs and security policy, with the SD on the other. To illustrate whether this aim has been realized, however, requires an evaluation of the co-operation with the SD.

Logically, one can expect that the break up of the alternative majority would be immediately manifested by a
decrease in the SD's participation in the winning sides in final votes. However, a recent analysis of the final votes in the Folketing suggests that the SD participation on the winning side dropped marginally from 68 per cent in the first session of 1987-1988 to 64 per cent in the second session. Given the fact that the SD position on the winning side remained almost unchanged (during the period examined in the above analysis) although the alternative majority was broken up following the inclusion of the RV in the government, we can conclude that some forms of co-operation between the RV and the SD had evolved.

It is difficult however to answer the question concerning the extent of the co-operation between the SD and the RV throughout the period in which the latter held governmental positions. This is mainly due to the fact that the parliamentary forum (which was mentioned in the Dybkjaer - Ellemann-Jensen agreement), was established in November 1988 whilst our interviews were conducted in May 1989. Some insight for a reasonable answer can be gained through the following description of Jørgen Estrup:

We have not had any real trouble in parliament with foreign policy because we had the possibility to discuss it with the Social Democrats in the committee.

It is therefore reasonable to argue that the parliamentary forum which was established as a result of the Dybkjaer - Ellemann-Jensen agreement was a critical factor in maintaining a relatively high level of co-operation between the two parties.
To show what this conclusion actually entails, however, requires a detailed analysis of the RV’s relative bargaining power. As noted earlier, a weakly institutionalized party can mobilize internal dissatisfaction through mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent. In other words, intra-party conflicts, which evolve within a weakly institutionalized party, can be mobilized internally, i.e. without other parties being affected. However, the fact that in the RV’s case external channels (as well as internal ones) were used to pacify the internal opposition suggests that intra-party conflicts within the RV may have been used as an excuse to gain concessions from the coalition partners. The Dybkjaer – Ellemann-Jensen agreement exemplifies this argument. There is reason to believe that the RV probably possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power compared with its coalition partners. However, such an evaluation requires some degree of reservation.

Naturally, the fact that the Dybkjaer – Ellemann-Jensen agreement was a confidential one (even members of the RV’s parliamentary group were not allowed to see the agreement) calls into question the importance of the CPP and V’s concessions. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the Schluter-led government changed its attitude, evident from 1982 to 1988, towards the importance of foreign affairs and security policy for its survival. Economic issues still seemed to prevail over all other issues. The fact that general elections were called in December 1990 over
the issue of a tax reform illustrates this point. To be on the safe side, therefore, the analysis concludes that the RV’s relative bargaining power was not undermined by the intra-elite conflicts due to their successful resolution. Perhaps, it can be argued, the RV possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power as the intra-party conflict, which could have been resolved internally, was used as an instrument to gain concessions from the coalition partners.

To sum up, intra-elite conflicts within the RV, following a formal minority government with the CPP and the V, were neutralized through both internal and external channels. Regarding the former, decisions against the government line did not trigger off reactions of the RV’s cabinet members although they were approved unanimously in a party forum. Regarding the latter, a confidential agreement was signed amongst the coalition partners. Following the successful mobilization of the internal dissatisfaction by the RV elites, it is reasonable to conclude that the party’s bargaining power was not undermined. Perhaps, it can be the RV possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power as the intra-party conflict, which could have been resolved internally, was used as an instrument to gain concessions from the coalition partners.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS

The Danish case seems to support the argument that the formation of informal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for a highly institutionalized party. It was demonstrated that due to the formation of a formal minority government with the Liberal Party, a conflict within the SD parliamentary group developed. The leader of the SD group in parliament, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, resigned following the conclusion of the SD-V accord. It was furthermore shown that the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent within the SD forced Jørgensen to impose structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government. It was concluded that the failure of the party elites to neutralize the internal opposition - highlighted by the break-up of the coalition government by the SD - was translated into an inferior position in the bargaining plane. However, as long as the SD elites had formed informal alliances (i.e. 1975-1978, 1979-1982), no internal conflicts occurred. Consequently, the party possessed relatively high level of bargaining power during the periods in which informal minority governments were formed.

With regard to weakly institutionalized parties, it was demonstrated that a conflict between the RV parliamentary group and members of the cabinet over the formation of the CPP-V-RV government coalition evolved during 1988-1989. In order to pacify the internal opposition, the RV members of cabinet acquiesced and allowed decisions against government
policy to be taken by party bodies. Dissatisfaction was, furthermore, neutralized by a confidential agreement concerning the coalition strategy over potentially controversial issues. As a result of the successful resolution of the intra-elite conflict, the analysis concluded that the bargaining power of the RV was not undermined. Furthermore, it was argued that party elites can take advantage of the intra-elite conflicts following a formation of a formal minority government, demanding more concessions from its coalition partners in order to pacify the internal opposition. Such a tactic seems most likely to result in a relatively high level of bargaining power.
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate firstly that the formation of informal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for highly institutionalized parties. By negotiating each issue separately and on an ad-hoc basis, such parties can select the least 'expensive' partner available, minimising the threat it poses to their stability. Such considerations are especially relevant when the party leader faces internal difficulties capable of undermining his position within the party.

Secondly, it demonstrates that an informal minority government whose support is provided by one set of parties cannot be maintained in the long run. The partners realise that they provide external support whilst the governmental party enjoys policy influence and electoral benefits. Party elites may therefore face a demand to form a formal minority government. The purpose thereafter is to show that a weakly institutionalized party can shift its strategy from informal to formal alliances without having to face internal conflicts. With regard to highly institutionalized parties, this chapter reveals that elites within highly institutionalized parties tend to impose structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government and modify their alliance strategy in order to maintain their stability.

The effectiveness of the elites' ability to control internal dissatisfaction tends to affect their relative bargaining power in coalition negotiations. As long as
highly institutionalized parties form informal minority governments, they tend to avoid intra-party conflicts and, thus, possess a relatively high level of bargaining power. However, once they form formal minority governments, the emergence of internal dissatisfaction is translated into a relatively inferior position in the bargaining arena.

To support hypotheses 2 and 4, this chapter examines the formation, maintenance and collapse of Norwegian minority governments during 1976-1990. This period was chosen in order to capture both Odvar Nordli and J.P. Syse’s terms in office. The objective is to explain the different coalition building strategies by highly and weakly institutionalized parties and their intra-party consequences. The chapter begins with an introductory section which provides the data concerning trends in Norwegian politics. Significant changes in the party system and political parties are presented in the context of changes within Norwegian society.

The first sub-section analyses the positions of the party leaders, Odvar Nordli and Gro Harlem Brundtland, within the DNA during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989, respectively. It will be shown that whereas Nordli’s position was undermined following a personal strife with Reuif Steen, the party chairman, Brundtland enjoyed a dominant position within the party. Against this background, it will be shown that the party leaders’ position is not a relevant factor once a highly institutionalized party form informal minority governments. The second sub-section examines the DNA
alliance strategy and its intra-party consequences. It will be shown that the DNA successfully avoided formal alliances, thus, no intra-party conflicts were evident during the period under examination. As a result, the DNA possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989.

The third section examines the intra-party consequences of the co-operation between the CP, the SP and the KrF, during 1985-1986 (note that during 1983-1985, a majority coalition amongst these parties was formed). It will be demonstrated that the formal minority government which was formed by these parties during 1983-1986 caused intra-elite conflicts within the highly institutionalized SP. By taking the prominent members of the SP in his Cabinet, together with accepting some constraints over the government’s day-to-day operation, Kare Willoch, the Conservative Prime Minister, was able to neutralize, to some extent, the internal dissatisfaction within the SP. However, the continuation of the internal dissatisfaction within the SP forced the party’s cabinet members to modify their alliance strategy. After the government was defeated in parliament, instead of cooperating with the CP in opposition, the SP formed an informal minority government with the DNA.

The fourth section analyses the worsening intra-elite conflicts within the highly institutionalized SP during 1989-1990, which led to the collapse of J.P. Syse’s government. It will be shown that the SP cabinet members faced a trade-off between government solidarity and parliamentary group
hostility, which was aggravated by the activities of the leaders of the parliamentary group and the party organization. This conflict forced SP cabinet members to adopt a two-fold strategy. Firstly, the establishment of a decision-making 'troika' which was comprised of the party leader, the leader of the parliamentary group and the party secretary. Secondly, the modification of the SP alliance strategy, i.e. break-up of the SP-CP-KrF formal minority coalition. As this strategy indicates a failure of the SP elites to pacify the internal dissatisfaction, the analysis concludes that the failure of the SP to neutralize internal opposition was the main factor which contributed to the relatively high level of bargaining power possessed by the CP.

4.1 PARTY STRENGTH AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Norway has a multi-party system where most parties are strongly linked to distinct social groups,\(^1\) thus, although it is a unitary state the political system is relatively decentralized.\(^2\) The system consists of seven parties, which are, from left to right: the Socialist Left Party (SV), the Labour Party (DNA), the Liberals (V), the Christian People's Party (KrF), the Centre Party (SP), the Conservative Party (CP), and the Progress Party (FrP). Whereas the oldest parties are the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Labour Party, which were formed in the 1880s, all the other parties emerged in the twentieth century.
Electorally, there have been a number of major changes during the post-war period. Whereas during 1945-1961 the Labour Party enjoyed a predominant position in the Norwegian polity, it did not gain a parliamentary majority during 1961-1973 due to the erosion of support on its left (by the emergence of the Socialist People's Party), and on its right (by the strengthening of the non-socialist parties). The Labour Party, for example, obtained around 46 per cent of popular support during 1961-1969 elections, but its share declined to 35 percent in the 1973 election. The SP and KrF, on the other hand, increased their share of the popular vote from 9 per cent and 8 per cent, in 1965, to 11 per cent and 12 per cent in 1973, respectively. The Socialist Left, moreover, gained 11 percent of popular support in the 1973 election (see Appendix 4.1).

It was, however, the EC referendum in 1972 which was the catalyst for the 'political earthquake' which manifested itself by short-term swings of popular support and long-term party system changes. The debacle, sustained in the 1972 referendum by those who advocated EC membership, was further reflected in the 1973 election when the DNA's strength was reduced from 46 per cent in 1969 to 35 per cent. The DNA regained this ground in 1977 but that election also saw the CP gathering strength within the non-socialist bloc, from 17 percent of popular support to 24 percent (see Appendix 4.1). Evidence of long-term party system changes were seen by increased fragmentation, volatility and polarization. The starting point of the analysis is, therefore,
characterized by the substantial weakening of the DNA, the growth of the extreme left and right, the Conservatives' resurgence and the atrophy of the non-socialist centre.⁵

Among the most frequently cited factors which contributed to the party system changes is the Norwegian cleavage structure. Six social cleavages, which are only partly cross-cut, have been identified as significant bases for the modern Norwegian party system.⁶ Firstly, a territorial cleavage between the centre and the periphery.⁷ Secondly, a socio-cultural cleavage between the defenders of the two different versions of the Norwegian language. Thirdly, a moral cleavage that primarily concerns the production and consumption of alcohol. Fourthly, a religious cleavage between fundamentalist groups on the one hand and more liberal or secular groups on the other. Fifthly, a sectoral cleavage between the primary sector of the economy, (agriculture and fisheries) and other industries. Finally, a class cleavage between unionized workers and private employers.

From the beginning, these cleavages have been politicized successively and formed a cumulative pattern of party conflict. However, there have been a number of major changes during the post-war period. Of the old cleavages, the language division is no longer an important determinant of political preference, and the other cultural divisions are relatively less important than they were.⁸ Additionally, the political individuality of the Southern and Western Norwegian periphery is generally less distinct, although it
still manifests itself by overall preference for the centre-right parties. Moreover, whereas the area around Oslo has shown a marked evolution to the right, the inner east of the North have retained a strong preference for the left.\(^9\)

It is however misleading to exaggerate the saliency of the old divisions. Norway, in some respects, is a rather homogeneous country. Consensus orientation is reflected in the political and the public spheres.\(^{10}\) Indeed, the lack of wide policy differences between the main political parties on such key issues as the maintenance of the welfare state, foreign policy and Norway’s membership in NATO, emphasizes that inter-party differences tended to be more over means than ends. Yet, the assertion of Laegreid and Olsen that ‘there is a striking contrast between this willingness to cooperate within the Storting and the unwillingness to make cooperation formal to signal it to the environment’,\(^{11}\) raises a central question, addressed in this chapter, regarding the scarcity of formal coalitions at the governmental level.

In fact, more than two-thirds of all Norwegian cabinets (during 1907-1987) have been undersized.\(^{12}\) Of the 39 cabinets formed in minority situations, 32 have been one-party minority governments, more than 82 percent.\(^{13}\) Whereas Strom argues that the frequency of minority government in Scandinavia can be explained as a rational response to a peculiar set of institutional conditions,\(^{14}\) Bo Särlvik lays much stress on the impact of ‘two-bloc’ politics.\(^{15}\) The latter creates a situation analogous in some ways to two-party politics and provides a considerable
inducement for the parties not to split. In other words, it pits a governmental bloc with one set of incentives against an informal oppositional bloc with another, all of which are unlikely to change during an inter-election period. Two-bloc competition is furthermore a major factor in explaining the limited permutations of government formation. Firstly, the Labour Party has eschewed coalition not only with non-socialist parties but also with any of the smaller parties to its left. Secondly, the non-socialist governments have tended to be coalitions.16

Undoubtedly, the Norwegian electoral system is a critical factor in the maintenance of 'two-bloc' politics. Since elections are by the Sainte Laaüe system of proportional representation, the overall effect of the Norwegian electoral system is not strictly proportional. According to Rokkan, the electoral formula had a three-fold effect: it strengthened the middle-sized non-socialist parties by reducing the overall representation of the Social Democrats, it reduced the pay-offs of mergers within the opposition, and finally, it helped the established parties by discouraging the formation of splinter groups and new parties.17 Moreover, the fact that the Storting has a fixed election term of four years, combined with the existence of constituencies with few members, have been generally disadvantageous for the smaller parties.18

Of utmost relevance is the classification of Norwegian parties according to the degree of institutionalization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-23/4\75</td>
<td>DNA Congress elected Reiulf Steen as party chairman and designated Odvar Nordli as PM candidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-16/5\75</td>
<td>The parties of the left-wing Socialist Election Alliance formally decided to transform themselves into the SF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21\1\76</td>
<td>The formation of Nordli’s minority government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12/7\77</td>
<td>General elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17\9\79</td>
<td>Local Elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3\2\81</td>
<td>Gro Harlem Brundtland was unanimously designated as PM candidate by Labour’s leadership bodies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4\2\81</td>
<td>Gro Harlem Brundtland took office as PM following Nordli’s resignation for health reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4\81</td>
<td>Harlem Brundtland elected chairwoman of the DNA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14\9\81</td>
<td>General Elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14\10\81</td>
<td>Kare Willoch took office as PM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8\5\83</td>
<td>Formation of CP-KrF-SP coalition led by Willoch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16\6\83</td>
<td>A proposal in the Storting to debate the question of the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe was defeated by a margin of one vote.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12\9\83</td>
<td>Local Elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9\9\85</td>
<td>General Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-25\4\86</td>
<td>Industrial disputes over wage increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-15\4\86</td>
<td>Industrial disputes over wage increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2\5\86</td>
<td>Kare Willoch resign following his government’s defeat of no-confidence motion by 79 to 78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2\5\86</td>
<td>Gro Harlem Brundtland formed a Labour minority government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22\5-5\6\86</td>
<td>Selective strikes of local government workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17\6\86</td>
<td>Austerity measures approved by Storting after an agreement with the KrF and SP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9\86</td>
<td>Willoch resigned as the Conservative’s candidate for PM and was replaced by Rolf Presthus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16\12\86</td>
<td>The 1987 Budget was approved after the government secured the support of the SP and KrF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12\6\87</td>
<td>Two motions of no-confidence presented by right-wing and centre-parties had failed to unset the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14\9\87</td>
<td>Local Elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18\12\87</td>
<td>The 1988 Budget approved with the support of SP and KrF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-24\1\88</td>
<td>J.P. Syse was elected unopposed as leader of the Conservative Party in succession to Presthus who died in January.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12\4\88</td>
<td>The Storting passed legislation effectively freezing wages which was supported by the SP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6\6\88</td>
<td>Storting approved a new law regulating the Oslo stock exchange supported by the SP and KrF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11\9\89</td>
<td>General Elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16\10\89</td>
<td>J.P. Syse formed a CP-SP-KrF minority government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9\90</td>
<td>J.P. Syse resigned as PM.</td>
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Sources: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1975-1990.
during the period under study. As demonstrated in Appendix 3.1, whilst the DNA, the SV and the SP can be classified as highly institutionalized parties, the CP and the KrF can be considered weakly institutionalized parties. Additionally, the FrP is considered a deviant case due to the overwhelming, dominant presence of its leader, Carl Hagen. It is therefore characterized by the existence of a cohesive elite despite a relatively low degree of institutionalization.

Logically, one can expect sharp differences amongst members of Storting in terms of their voting behaviour on final divisions. The impact of 'two-bloc' politics however provides a considerable inducement for the parties not to split, Strom emphasized the 'high degree of control' that leaders exercise over their parties. Fitzmaurice furthermore emphasizes the 'iron party discipline in Parliament'. A different explanation for the relatively unitary action of Norwegian parties in Storting was raised by Henry Valen. His observation that party elites are not in a position to force their will by explicit threats, led him to conclude that the cohesion of the Norwegian parties arises because legislators accept the norm of party discipline.

After the 1977 elections, Norway's parties had to face a minority situation due to the Storting ending up without one party or a bloc controlling more than 50% of the seats. Whereas the DNA gained 76 seats, the CP, SP and KrF had obtained 41, 12 and 22 seats respectively (see Appendix 4.1). This parliamentary situation provides the starting point to the analysis. How did it influence the tactical
considerations of the party elites? What were the new patterns of government formation, maintenance and collapse which evolved during 1976-1990? These questions will be investigated throughout the following sections.

4.2 THE HIGHLY INSTITUTIONALIZED DNA: A TALE OF AN UNCHANGED STRATEGY OF INFORMAL ALLIANCES, 1976-81, 1986-89

At the heart of this section lies the notion that the highly institutionalized DNA successfully avoided any formal alliances during 1976-1990. Instead, the DNA’s elites formed informal minority governments. Such a strategy was especially profitable when Odvar Nordli was facing a personal strife with the party chairman, Reuilf Steen, which undermined his position within the party. By negotiating each issue separately and on an ad-hoc basis, the DNA selected the least ‘expensive’ partner available, in terms of the perceived and actual threat it posed to its stability and cohesion. The analysis begins with examining the positions of Odvar Nordli and Gro Harlem Brundtland within the DNA during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989, respectively. It thereafter analyzes the DNA coalitional behaviour and its intra-party consequences.

4.2.1 The Position of Odvar Nordli (1976-81) and Gro Harlem Brundtland (1986-1989) within the DNA

Whereas Gro Harlem Brundtland enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the DNA, Nordli’s position was significantly undermined by a personal strife with the party chairman. The
dominant position of the former was confirmed by all DNA MPs who were interviewed. Bjørn Tore Godal, for example, noted that:

She is a very thorough-working person, very democratic but also very firm when it comes to decisions. She, I think, is generally accepted, not only in the Labour Party but also among political observers and the general public, without discussion, the strongest political leader in the present Norway.22

A different picture, derived from an unusual leadership structure, is evident in the Nordli’s case. It was at the DNA congress in 1975 that the traditional practice of combining the party chairmanship and, when in government, the premiership, was modified. Whereas Reiulf Steen became party chairman, Odvar Nordli was elected the party’s candidate for the premiership. The reason for such a modification lies in the EEC issue which was the divisive issue of the 1975 party congress. This issue was extraordinarily divisive in Norway, reawakening the old centre-periphery cleavage in a way that significantly damaged the social democratic movement.23 Since debate over the EEC issue continued among Labour’s leaders and members, even after the referendum of 1972, the congress had to look for a compromise in order to maintain party cohesion. The election of a party chairman and the Prime Ministerial candidate blocked further potentially damaging discussions over this issue. Odvar Nordli summarised the reasons for the establishment of such an unusual leadership structure:

The congress in 1975 was afraid that the discussion perhaps could do some damage to the party organization [...] If, at that time, the Congress would usually elect
the party leader, quite sure it would be a divided Congress and I am afraid that this problem was enough to damage the organization in the party and in the trade-union. The other [reason] was that I represented the rural districts and Steen the typical Oslo district.

In the years following the 1975 Congress and especially after the 1977 election, Nordli’s position within the party was unchallenged. The height of success was clearly the 1977 election in which the Labour Party obtained 42 percent of the vote which gave it and the SV an aggregate majority of one seat over the four non-socialist parties (see Appendix 4.1). Clearly, this victory was credited to the Prime Minister, Odvar Nordli, and enhanced his strong standing within the party.

It is interesting to note the rapid decline of Nordli’s position. The municipal elections in 1979 already pointed to a decline in the popularity of the Prime Minister. In the election, the DNA’s share of the vote fell to 36 per cent compared with 38 per cent in the corresponding elections in 1975, whilst that of the Conservatives increased to 29 per cent from 22 per cent in 1975. In the period following the municipal election, the unusual institutional arrangement for the party leadership began effecting the decision-making processes. As Nordli recalled,

To begin with, we had no problem at all, but after some years, we saw that this construction was very very difficult to handle. I think in 1979, more and more, we saw that it was impossible for us to take care of a situation where you have a party leader outside the government and a Prime Minister inside the government. From time to time we had some open discussions between the party leader and the Prime Minister, especially when we discussed economic policy. But I cannot say he was an opponent [...] he had no organized body behind him.
[It was] a personal conflict because Steen and I are very different as persons; Steen is an ideological political leader whilst I have a more pragmatic way in working with political questions. [At the end of 1979] he asked me to enter the government and in that way we tried to stop the discussions in the newspapers about the very very dangerous conflict between Steen and I [...]. It was successful but it was too late.

Actually, there was no intrinsic rivalry between the government and the party. The lack of a specific issue over which internal opposition could evolve blocked any possibility of organizing a body to appeal to the DNA elites with the intention of forcing a change in its strategy. Yet within the highly institutionalized context of the DNA, one witnessed striking variation in party members perceptions of the strife's consequences. Whereas at the elite level the main effect of this personal strife appeared to be a regrettable nuisance, the grass-roots was affected as the disagreement between the two leaders was fought out in the media. To ordinary members, this created the impression of a party in the midst of a turbulent storm. It can be concluded, therefore, that whereas Brundtland enjoyed a dominant position within the DNA, Nordli's position was undermined by a personality strife with the party chairman.

4.2.2. The DNA's alliance strategy and its intra-party consequences

During Nordli's and Harlem Brundtland's terms in office, the DNA formed informal minority governments. This strategy reduced potential negative 'influences' stemming from the party's alliance strategy. Therefore, the internal
opposition, especially during Nordli's period, could not rally itself over the issue of alliance strategy since the party committed itself to the least binding inter-party cooperation. This direction is confirmed by Labour MP, Bjorn Tore Godal,

There has been strong tendency in the Labour Party to avoid any organized co-operation with anybody in a formal agreement. Not since the 1930s has our party gone into a formal agreement with any other party. Its really the basic belief that we are strong enough in our own right. 27

This legislative strategy was duly implemented during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989. For the former period, potential alliance partners were mainly the SP, which lost 9 seats (42 per cent of its share) in the 1977 election, the SV, which lost 14 seats (87 per cent of its share), and the Liberal Party, which maintained its 2 seats in the Storting (see Appendix 4.1). For the latter period, potential alliance partners were mainly the SP, which increased its share of the seats from 11 to 12 in the 1981 and 1985 elections, the KrF, which improved its share of the seats from 15 to 16, and the SV, which improved its share of the seats from 15 to 16, during the same elections (see Appendix 4.1).

The SP's external support was clearly expected during the astounding redistribution of wealth in favour of the rural population which began in 1976. During 1986-89, however, its support, which was usually accompanied by the KrF support, was also evident firstly on June 1986 when the government's austerity measures were approved by the Storting after an agreement with the SP and KrF. 28 Similarly, the
1987 budget was approved in revised form in December 1986, the government having secured the support of the SP and KrF. In December 1987, the 1988 budget was also approved with support from the SP and KrF. Additionally, in April, 1988, the Storting passed legislation effectively freezing wages and dividends, which had been proposed by the government and was supported by the SP. Finally, in June, 1988, the parliament approved a new law regulating the Oslo stock exchange, which had been proposed by the government and supported by the SP.

The SV, unlike the SP and KrF, gradually developed its alliance strategy towards the DNA throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, following changes in the composition of its elite. During 1976-1979, a democracy-communism cleavage, which had emerged within the SV following a partial merger with the Communist Party in March 1975, led to a sharp decline in its parliamentary strength (see Appendix 4.1). Consequently, neither the DNA nor the SV intensively looked for cooperation opportunities with each other during 1976-1979. During 1979-1989, on the other hand, informal alliances between the DNA and SV were formed mainly due to the ascendancy of Hanna Kvanmo as the dominant SV leader.

In fact, this is an understatement. One must look very carefully into Hanna Kvanmo's style of leadership and position within the SV in order to understand the party's alliance strategy. Theo Koritzinski, the SV chairman during 1983-1987, has described the above as follows:

112
In many instances she would function in an authoritarian sense [...]. She had so much charisma and status outside the party, so, in any conflict within the party when it was evident that it is Hanna Kvanmo on the one side and other people on the other side, the media and most of the voters would, as a sort of an instinct, have the sympathy on Hanna Kvanmo's side.

Hanna Kvanmo, therefore, took advantage of her position in order to enhance DNA-SV informal alliances. Politically, it was no surprise that a co-operation was formed as both parties were ideologically on the same side. Yet, according to Kvanmo, there were views within the SV against co-operation with the DNA,

[...] but I decided. The younger people were so afraid off being accused of not being independent so they often tried to break compromises that we had reached. But I always said: if we can get a little further then we take the compromise, if it is impossible to do anything we can [...] tell the public that we go [our way] but with the flag on the top.

In spite of internal disagreement concerning the issue, the development of co-operation opportunities did continue. A proposal for close co-operation with the DNA, which was suggested by the party chairman, Berge Furre at the meeting of the National Board in Spring 1982, was rejected. However, a proposal by Theo Koritzinski to form an electoral pact amongst the SV, DNA and the Left Liberals in the 1985 elections was accepted by SV's decision-making bodies but rejected by the DNA. At the SV's 1987 convention, the issue of formal co-operation between the DNA and the SV was discussed and a few months later an eight point program was prepared to be put forward to the DNA. Finally, the 1989 SV's convention under the new leadership, clearly,
signalled its willingness to enter a formal agreement.

The relationships between the oppositional parties also contributed to the relatively secure position of the Labour minority governments during 1976-1979 and 1986-1989. During the former period, the CP elites followed a clear and coherent alliance strategy towards the non-socialist parties demanding that the CP views should be accepted as the prevailing non-socialist views (a detailed analysis of the CP strategy is provided in the next section). In other words, the CP aimed at establishing a necessity for a non-socialist co-operation on the basis of its own manifesto. Not surprisingly, therefore, CP co-operation with the SP and the KrF was rejected by the latter two.

During 1986-1988, internal disagreement surfaced between Rolf Presthus and Jan P. Syse (the CP chairman and the leader of the CP parliamentary group, respectively), on the one hand, and Kare Willoch and Jo Benkow (the former Prime Minister and former party chairman, respectively) on the other. Whereas the former leaders were in favour of forming a formal alliance with the SP and the KrF, the latter opposed such a move. According to a Conservative MP, Per-Kristian Foss,

The mistake was made in the years 1986-1988 and it was a shifting strategy whether to be an opposition party or to be a coalition partner in the government. This strategy, I think, shifted too often and that reflect the disagreement in the leadership [...]. This conflict was not a question of left or right wing, so, the ideological question, I think, has been very little discussed in the party leadership. There has been a broad agreement on the political position but in question of tactical manoueveres you will find this disagreement.
Probably as a result of the internal disagreements, the CP lost ground both in the parliamentary and the electoral arenas. In the Storting, two motions of no-confidence, presented by the right-wing and centre parties on June 12, 1987, failed to unseat the government because of divisions within the oppositional parties. Tabled by the Conservative Party, SP and KrF, the first motion in protest against the government's plan to reduce subsidies for the agricultural sector failed to gain the FrP support which objected to all forms of state subsidy in principle. The second motion, on the government's overall economic policy, was supported by the FrP, but not by the SP. In the electoral arena, moreover, the Conservatives obtained only 22 per cent of the votes in the 1989 elections, compared with 30 per cent in the 1985 election (see Appendix 4.1). To conclude, due to the insistence of the Conservative elites on a dominant position for their views within a potential centre-right alliance during 1977-1981, and the internal disagreement within the Conservative Party concerning alliance strategy during 1986-1989, the DNA minority governments during these periods could act securely.

With this in mind, we can now turn to an evaluation of the relative bargaining power of the DNA during the periods under study. The bargaining power of the highly institutionalized DNA during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989 grew out of its alliance strategy - the formation of informal minority governments. That the DNA possessed relatively more bargaining power than its alliance partners is doubtful. By
negotiating each issue separately and on an ad hoc basis, the DNA selected the least 'expensive' partner available, i.e. the one which would not threaten its internal stability and cohesion.

For the former period, the Prime Minister, Odvar Nordli could summarize the DNA's bargaining power as follows:

You cannot co-operate with different parties without giving something, but I could give those gifts from the programme of the Labour Party. If you find it at the right time, it's all right. So, I must say, in the five years I was Prime Minister of a minority government, I had no great problems in the parliament.

The dominant policy influence of the DNA was evident following the wave of economic democratization reforms in the 1970s which included improvement of working conditions, enhancing industrial democracy and the decentralization of banking exemplifies the relative high level of bargaining power possessed by the DNA.

Minor concessions to the alliance partners - namely the SP and KrF - were also evident during 1986-1989. From the perspective of the DNA elites, the SP could be considered as being the most co-operative party. As Einar Forde, the leader of the DNA parliamentary group, put it:

By far, the easiest party to negotiate with is the Centre Party for a very pure and simple reason: that is because this is an extreme degree [of] a pragmatic-oriented party, oriented towards their own interests. They will always make a deal on the judgment of what they get. There was very little ideology in it and it was very clear a case of take-and-give relations.

Clearly, this is not to say that the SP and KrF had no impact on the policy process and its outcomes. It is rather to
stress that Lindblom's observation that all affected interests can have at least some influence in the policy making process appears to be valid.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, the SP and KrF's bargaining power did not lie in the ability to affect outcome, but rather some outcomes were designed with consideration of their position.

In conclusion, the DNA successfully avoided any formal alliances during 1976-1990. Instead, it's elites formed informal minority governments. By negotiating each issue separately and on an ad-hoc basis, the DNA selected the least 'expensive' partner available, in terms of the threat it posed to the DNA stability and cohesion. The fact that no intra-party conflicts were recorded during the period under examination significantly contributed to the relatively high level of bargaining power possessed by the the DNA during the period under study.


As a partial explanation for the evolution of the cooperation between the CP, the SP and the KrF, during 1981-83 and 1985-1986, the position of Kåre Willoch within the CP provides a convenient starting point. Undoubtedly, Willoch could be considered a very experienced politician, having being elected a member of the Storting in 1957, becoming parliamentary leader in 1970, and between 1970-1974, also serving as Chairman of the party.\textsuperscript{44} His leadership style
and position within the CP are well described by Lars Roar Langsleth, the party ideologist, as follows:

Willoch is, in my eyes, a high-ranking leader with a very impressive grasp for all branches of political life, and very energetic in argumentation [...]. He was very different in government, especially, when that government was enlarged [...]. He had an intuitive feeling of where the ground for a compromise might be and was very sensitive for this. In his own party, he had always been much tougher, in a way, claiming to have the right position himself in every question but he was really a mediator and was highly respective, always loyal as a Prime Minister [...]. His traditional background has of course been economic. He has, from time to time, been accused of being always only concerned with economic problems. [...] His position was unquestionable.

Willoch's position was further enhanced by the party's performance in three consecutive elections under his chairmanship. Whereas in the 1973 election the Conservatives gained 17 per cent of the vote, in the 1977 and 1981 elections, the party gained 24 per cent and 31 per cent of the vote, respectively (see Appendix 4.1).

The CP alliance strategy during the 1970s and the early 1980s grew out of Willoch's agenda of creating the necessity for non-socialist co-operation on the basis of the CP programme. According to Willoch,

We had reasonably good contacts [with the non-socialist parties], but, admittedly, the Conservatives at that time followed their strategy in the direction that we wanted; that our view should be more or less accepted as the prevailing non-socialist view and we wanted to establish a necessity for a non-socialist co-operation on the basis of Conservatives' ideas which is a contradiction in terms but it was successful, it worked.

Not surprisingly, both the SP and the KrF refused to enter a government coalition which would have been dominated by the
CP in policy and personalities.

Still, the very nature of Willoch's skills enabled him to form the informal alliance during 1981-1983. A substantial reason for this lay in Willoch's decisive preference of 'fighting inflation' which was adopted by the SP and the KrF in order to establish some visible convergence of opinion with the CP. Given the adverse economic trends which were apparent from 1980 (such as, falling competitiveness in the non-oil industrial sectors, rising inflation and increasing unemployment), it is hardly surprising that the preference of 'fighting inflation' did not alienate the non-socialist elites and party members. It was sufficiently focused to generate the widest possible support within the parties involved.

In 1983, however, both the SP and KrF demanded a direct participation in the government. From the CP point of view, as the Prime Minister noted,

There was a discussion whether the smallest parties would be invited to participate in the government, but, in reality, there was no choice [for further excluding them]. Of course there would not be a majority in Parliament without their support and they would probably not support it for long if they were not invited to participate [...]. There was no choice. Reality was, I think, that the two small parties were tired of supporting a government. They thought that the effect was that the government took the praise and they took the blame [...]. This is very much simplified, of course, but there was a tendency to feel like that.

Clearly, this does not mean that the CP had to considerably modify their alliance strategy following the SP and KrF's demand to participate in the government. Rather, it is to stress that the SP and KrF entered a coalition which was
dominated by the CP in policy and personalities. The fact that the 1983 cabinet comprised 11 Conservatives, all retaining their previous positions including the four major posts of Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence, with four new KrF ministers and three from the SP, suffices to underline the argument.

The source of the intra-elite conflict within the SP was basically an organizational one, namely, whether the focus of intra-party power should lie in the parliamentary group or the cabinet members. As elected representatives, SP members of the parliamentary group refused to serve as a 'rubber stamp' for governmental decisions. In fact, this is an understatement. Anne Enger Lahnstein, the deputy leader of the SP parliamentary group during 1983-1986, explained the principals of the group’s strategy:

That is the way we behave in my party [...] I can not remember another way of behaviour of the group. Of course, we are here elected from the people to take care of special issues. So our people in the government negotiate with the other parties and must make a compromise, and then we have to do something with it inside the parliament. Of course we are not only providing votes for the government. We also have to think by our own and we have responsibility for what we are doing. That is my basic attitude to this. For them [SP cabinet members], this was a problem.

Clearly, the demand of the SP parliamentary group to have a 'say' in policy formation meant that SP cabinet members were not able to embrace policy fully without causing offence to the group.

Less acute intra-elite conflicts surfaced between KrF Cabinet members and the KrF parliamentary group, mainly due
to the conciliatory position taken by the latter. A partial explanation to the evolving intra-elite conflict within the KrF was due to the lack of information possessed by the parliamentary group, rather than matters of principal. According to the head of the KrF Secretariat, Arne Synnes:

Looking on the question from different position, I think the tension was there from the very beginning; it was on the taxation system, privatization questions, subsidies to the different sectors. It was partly a question of a lack of information because they [members of the parliamentary group] did not know the reason why they [cabinet members] have compromised. There is always the question were they fighting hard enough, or have they just been absent from the discussion or didn’t push. It was also the question that the Centre Party and the Christian People’s Party had 10 of 19 ministers but it seemed the Conservatives that arranged the economic policy as a whole. 52

It is indeed hardly surprising that in the years following the formal alliance, the SP, and to a lesser extent, the KrF parliamentary groups militantly opposed numerous items. Eight days after the coalition was formed, for example, a proposal was made, by SV, SP and Liberal MPs, that the Storting should again debate the question of the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe before their deployment went into effect. The proposal was only defeated by a margin of one vote, with only handful of KrF and SP’s MPs voting with the Government. 53

The discussion up to now is not to suggest that the CP was unaffected by the formation of the 1983 formal alliance with the SP and the KrF. Local elections held on September 1983, in which the CP’s losses were evident, 54 were interpreted in the party as a reaction towards the extension
of the government. Additionally, frustration within the party organization had evolved 'towards all the compromises within the coalition'. The internal dissatisfaction, which was expressed within the party organization primarily by two regional leaders, Per-Hysing Dahl and Lars Lefdal, was mainly channeled against Jo Benkow. The latter, at that time, held both the party chairmanship and leadership. According to Benkow,

In fact, quite a few of the grass-root were dissatisfied with [the] Prime Minister's politics [and] with the work of the government, and they decided to take it out [on] someone. They could not take it out on the Prime Minister [...]. I think Mr. Willoch had a part in it because in his view I made promises in the 1981 election campaign concerning the taxes which [he] found too large in extent.

Following the internal pressures, Benkow resigned as party chairman and was succeeded by Erling Norvik. The above-mentioned internal difficulties did not challenge party strategy as they were channeled against Benkow, rather than Kåre Willoch. Again, the dominant position of Willoch within the CP seemed to be a relevant explanation for this process. Additionally, the strife was not perceived as conflict by the party elite. The fact that Jo Benkow resigned without any (leadership) election having taken place exemplifies this point. To sum up, whereas the SP and the KrF elites faced intra-elite conflict following the 1983 formal alliance, the CP elites faced internal difficulties which were resolved internally. We now turn to the strategy adopted by the SP and KrF elites in order to neutralize the internal dissatisfaction of their respective parliamentary groups.
However mutable the parliamentary groups' strength may have been during 1985-1986, it prompted determined action from the SP and KrF cabinet members aimed at neutralizing the internal dissatisfaction. Basically, the government had to accept a pattern of two-stage compromise of governmental decision. Firstly, a compromise was reached at the government level. Secondly, the compromise that was reached in the first stage was re-negotiated and amended within the SP and the KrF parliamentary groups. As the Prime Minister, Kare Willoch, noted,

In reality, members of government would consult with members of parliament when government was discussing controversial issues and sometimes the government postponed decisions in order that members [of government] might consult with their members in parliament. What should have been respected to a greater degree was that members of government should have authority to negotiate compromise which members of parliament should accept. Their signs should be given in advance so that there might be negotiations leading to a result. But what gradually developed was a system through which compromises should be adjusted and always in the same direction, that means always in the direction of greater expenditure. Because the two smallest parties are, what I called, 'Expenditure Parties'. Their basis is an ability to get more government revenue for the [...] particular interests of their voters.

The SP and KrF parliamentary groups, therefore, have established themselves as necessary, not merely relevant actors, in the governmental decision-making process. This, in turn, undermined the effectiveness of the decision-making process and content. Much more time had to be spent on discussions between the government and both the SP and KrF parliamentary groups producing results which meant
increasing government expenditure.

The internal opposition within the SP and the KrF did not undermine the solidarity amongst the cabinet members. In spite of the intra-elite conflicts within these parties, an atmosphere of solidarity continued within the government. \(^{59}\) As part of the government, SP and KrF cabinet members could not, of course, militantly oppose legislation without being excluded from the coalition. Yet, the very nature of their skills enabled them to keep their cabinet positions whilst maintaining the two-stage compromise of governmental decisions. It should be remembered that their strategy to cope with the internal dissatisfaction should be evaluated not so much according to the ‘how’ governmental decision were actually taken, as to the extent of the pressures that were exerted on the government. This was, of course, a function of the intensity of the conflict within the SP and the KrF.

From the beginning of the formal alliance, Willoch formed his government in a way which significantly neutralized the impact of potential opposition within his two partners. Clearly, Willoch was aware of the potential risks of a formal alliance with two heterogeneous parties. ‘Particularly the SP’, Willoch claims, ‘has always been known for its lack of internal loyalty’. \(^{60}\) Consequently, Willoch’s strategy to cope with potential internal problems within his chosen partners focused on the informal structure of the government and the careful allocation of portfolios. Minor adjustments in the government’s informal structure had to be made in order to establish methods and practices to
reconcile differences of opinions between the three parties. Firstly, an informal inner-cabinet was formed, including the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and the leaders of the two coalition partners. These informal mechanisms were additional to the meetings between members of government and their own parliamentary group, and between Ministers and the coalition MPs from the relevant parliamentary committee. Secondly, the leaders of the parliamentary groups were invited to informal meetings of the government such as, lunches.

With regard to the composition of the cabinet, Willoch noted that he had a clear reasoning in the allocation of the portfolios. The reasoning was as follows:

I wanted their leading personalities in the government. It was my demand that their party leaders should be in government because I did not want to strengthen the other centers which would be in Parliament [...]. That was my absolute condition for having three parties in government.

Indirectly, therefore, the SP and the KrF’s parliamentary groups were to some extent neutralized, although not totally pacified, by the allocation of their prominent leaders in governmental positions, and, at the same time, the incorporation of their less prominent parliamentary leaders into the informal structure of the government.

Of primary importance here are the consequences of the intra-elite conflicts within the SP and KrF. At the outset, it should be clear from the above discussion that the compromises made by the government following the pressures
from the SP and KrF parliamentary groups did not undermine the CP's bargaining power. The dominant position of the CP in the government, having controlled 11 portfolios out of 18 in the 1983 government, and 10 out of 18 in 1985, and retaining the four major posts of Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence, exemplifies this argument.62

Perhaps most important was the solidarity within the government which indirectly enabled the CP to take advantage of its dominant position within the government. Compromises were easily reached at the first stage of decision making in government. As the various parliamentary groups lacked dominant leaders due to the incorporation of their most prominent members into the government, modifications of governmental decisions at the second stage were incremental rather than substantial. The main consequence of the parliamentary groups' activity was the frequent delays in the governmental decision-making process which meant increasing government expenditure.

However, as a result of the continuation of the dissatisfaction within the SP parliamentary group, the SP cabinet members were forced to modify their coalitional behaviour in order to maintain party stability. This change occurred in April 1986 following the defeat of the government by 79 votes to 78 in the Storting.63 Although the SP voted with the government, the DNA, the SV and two FrP members were able to secure a majority for the opposition. Immediately after Willoch's resignation, however, both the SP and the KrF elites modified their coalitional behaviour, forming an
informal minority government with the DNA. It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, that the internal conflicts within the SP contributed significantly to its elites' decision to break-up the co-operation (i.e. in government or in opposition) with the Conservative Party.

To sum up, an informal minority government amongst the CP, SP and the KrF during 1981-1983, which was based on the decisive preference of 'fighting inflation', was not further extended as the two latter partners realised they provided external support whilst the CP enjoyed dominant policy influence. However, a formal minority government which was maintained by these parties during 1985-1986 resulted in intra-elite conflicts within the SP and the KrF. By taking the prominent members of the SP and the KrF to his Cabinet together with accepting minor constraints over the government day-to-day operation, Willoch had neutralized, to some extent, the internal dissatisfaction within the two partners. Yet, as a result of the continuation of the dissatisfaction within the SP parliamentary group, the SP cabinet members were forced to modify their coalitional behaviour in order to maintain party stability. It was concluded that that the internal conflicts within the SP contributed significantly to its elites' decision to break-up the co-operation (i.e. in government or in opposition) with the Conservative Party.

Turning to the changes within the SP elites during the late 1980s, our first concern is to demonstrate just what Hirschman claims, that, ' [... ] for voice to function properly it is necessary that individuals possess reserves of political influence which they can bring into play when they are sufficiently aroused' . This involves a discussion not only of 'attitudes', as disembodied sets of ideas and values, but also of the varying organizational contexts in which party politics take place.

In the previous section it was shown that intra-elite conflicts, which evolved within the SP especially during 1985-1986, were successfully neutralized by Kare Willoch mainly through the allocation of SP and KrF's prominent leaders in governmental positions and the incorporation of their parliamentary leaders in the informal structure of the government. As time passed, however, the leaders of the SP parliamentary group established their position within the party. Most notably, Anne Enger Lahnstein, who served as deputy leader of the SP parliamentary group during 1983-1989, was elected the group leader in 1989. Her views on alliance strategy effectively represented these of the parliamentary group:

We are a little bit special party [...]. We are now only 11 [members] in Parliament but we are always seeking power, and, we are always taking responsibility.
Following the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary group, evident during the 1985-86 formal alliance with the CP and the KrF, the need to strengthen its power emerged. It is therefore hardly surprising that Lahnstein incorporated her 'reserves of political influence' into the SP bargaining plane by collaborating with the party secretary, John Dale. This is not to say that the parliamentary group and the party secretary established a united front against the cabinet members. It is rather to stress that a cooperative channel of communications were established between the two.

The political influence of John Dale grew out of two sources: (i) the control over party members, and, (ii) the divergence between the cabinet members and the party organization. Dale controlled and managed political activities which involved 49000 members in 1989. Although a gradual decline in the SP membership was evident throughout the 1970s and the 1980s (for example, 63000 members in 1969, 52000 members in 1981, and 49000 members in 1989), one could not blame the party secretary. Almost all Norwegian parties faced similar trends throughout this period. According to Hirschman,

[...]

When a uniform decline hits simultaneously all firms of an industry, each firm would garner in some of the disgruntled customers to its competitors. In these circumstances the exit option is ineffective in alerting management to its failings [...].

The decline in the SP membership, therefore, did not undermine Dale's position within the party. Recent research, furthermore, suggests that the political influence of the SP
secretary is considered 'strong' by 47 per cent of both top and middle-level party elites.\textsuperscript{70}

The divergence between the cabinet members and the party organization, which was evident throughout the 1989-90 formal alliance with the CP and the KrF, was both organizational and ideological. Being in the government, cabinet members were exposed to a different set of political interactions which made solidarity at the governmental level inevitable. A widening ideological difference between SP cabinet members and SP activists further enhanced the co-operation of the latter with the parliamentary group.

Consequently, the SP cabinet members faced a trade-off between government solidarity and parliamentary group hostility during 1989-1990. According to John Dale,

This is a classical conflict because you have negotiations in the government and you have negotiation here [...] . Yet] the question you posed is surprising. You asked what is the parliamentary group allowed to do. This is not the question. The question is what are the cabinet ministers allowed to do, because, in our system the parliamentary group has got a 'say'. They are the people that must take responsibility here in the Storting by their voting [...] . They [cabinet members] cannot come to the parliamentary group and say 'listen, we demand from you', its more the other way around.

Because of the intensity of the intra-elite conflict, therefore, the SP cabinet members were unable to embrace policy fully without offending the leader of the parliamentary group and the party secretary.

A classic example is the inter-party negotiation over the 1990 budget. Probably following the intra-elite conflicts, the SP acted inconsistently during these
negotiations; breaking-up the negotiations following the FrP participation, but, in the end, signing the agreement. Given the FrP's strategy shift in 1989, seeking co-operation with the non-socialist government, it is hardly surprising that the party was considered a relevant partner for an informal alliance over the Budget. However, whilst the KrF and the CP agreed to form such an alliance with the FrP, the SP parliamentary group bitterly opposed.

Two days after the pre-negotiations over the 1990 budget had started, that is, the negotiations whether to negotiate, the SP parliamentary group refused to co-operate with the FrP and broke-up the discussions. According to FrP member in the Finance Committee, Tor Mikkel Wara,

For two days, nights and days, we negotiated with the three parties whether we are going to negotiate about the Budget. The result was that we were going to do it. The Centre Party did not like to have this budget co-operation with us [...]. So, when we were going to [...] get it through, to have a balance, they said that they would like to negotiate both with the Labour Party and the Progress Party. We said 'no chance, you have to make a decision, either the Labour Party or the Progress Party' [...]. The result was that all the media and press wrote that the Progress Party won these negotiations because the Centre Party had to chose the Progress Party as their co-operation partner to get the budget through.

An additional cause of the dissatisfaction of the SP parliamentary group were the direct negotiations between the Prime Minister, Jan P. Syse, and the FrP leader, Carl Hagen. According to the latter,

The Prime Minister and me settled the 1990 budget in a meeting in his office. It was following the negotiations we already had and we made some minor adjustments to bridge the gap from the meetings between the parliamentary leaders. [...] We made a binding
agreement that we will cut expenditure during the revised Budget in May [1990], 450 million Krones [...] .

Following the governmental co-operation with the FrP, the conflict between the SP parliamentary group and Cabinet members intensified to an overt hostility.

The interesting question that the analysis now turns to is: How did the SP cabinet ministers resolve the conflict? Basically, a two-fold strategy was implemented by Johan J. Jakobsen (the SP leader and Minister of Local Government and Labour). Firstly, a decision-making ‘troika’, responsible for shaping party strategy, was established. Not surprisingly, it comprised of Johan Jakobsen, Anne Enger Lahnstein and John Dale. Secondly, the SP alliance strategy was modified, that is, the SP-CP-KrF formal alliance had collapsed following the refusal of the former to support the Government policy over the issue of ‘European Economic Area’. To understand how the modification of the SP alliance strategy was an inevitable consequence of the establishment of the ‘troika’ requires a more detailed examination. The discussion, concerning the evolution of the SP strategy over the ‘European Economic Area’, begins with the fall of Gro Harlem Brundtland’s minority government in 1989.

A partial explanation for the fall of Gro Harlem Brundtland’s government in 1989, is provided by a newspaper interview with John Dale. In the newspaper interview, Dale expressed the view that Labour’s EEC policy was one of the main reasons why the SP wanted a change in government. 75
Whilst the SP tried to start a debate on Norway’s and EFTA’s adaptation to the single market of the EEC during the 1989 electoral campaign, Gro Harlem Brundtland did not want to divulge to the public the government strategy in the EFTA negotiations on EEC adaptation. Immediately after the election, Gro Harlem Brundtland drafted a series of memos on adaptation substantiating the SP arguments that the final aim of the DNA was to make the question of EEC membership a mere formality.\(^7^6\)

In 1990, the SP’s bargaining position over a similar issue contributed to a governmental collapse. As the SP was strongly opposed to membership of the EC or even a full customs union of the EC and the EFTA for all products, a commitment to a ‘broader trade agreement’ with the EC was a necessary part of the 1989 coalition agreement.\(^7^7\) The governmental crisis, however, surfaced over the question of forming a free internal market in Western Europe, ‘European Economic Area’, between the EFTA, of which Norway is a member, and the EEC. Whilst the SP insisted that Norway would refuse to abandon its concessionary laws which impede foreign ownership of property, financial institutions and industrial enterprises in the country, the CP adopted a more conciliatory position. To understand how the SP position over the above-mentioned issue was formulated, however, it is necessary to appreciate the role of Lahnstein and Dale in the ‘troika’.

From its beginning, the SP strategy over this issue grew out of the views held by both Dale and Lahnstein, According
to Ole Gabriel Ueland, SP member of parliament,

Our tough leaders are represented in the parliament, in the government and in the administration. You have a 'troika' there of Jakobsen, Lahnstein and Dale, they are all in the centre of the discussions [...]. But the person that without any doubt had used most time and has had most interest for this question during the last year was John Dale.

As party secretary, Dale could not initiate a governmental crisis without the firm backing of party members, nor could he and Lahnstien act without the approval of the parliamentary group. Their political skill, however, enabled them to establish an informal support base within the party organization and the group in parliament. Within the party organization, Dale met SP leaders at the local level and probably won their support. Discussions in the parliamentary group had taken place approximately 2-3 weeks before the actual crisis. In both cases, Dale and Lahnstien did not seek the formal approval of the various party bodies for his strategy. To sum up, the 'troika', dominated by Lahnstein and Dale, had acted independently with respect to the issue in question.

The above-mentioned process and the disapproval of almost half of the parliamentary group to the 'troika' strategy were confirmed by Ole Gabriel Ueland:

I think that after we have been discussing it now for 2-3 weeks, really every day, there are more differences in the group still. But, we had a meeting 2-3 weeks ago with the members of the party from all parts of the country, such as the leaders of every county, and then, I guess, our party leaders got the backing they needed to go on with the process [...]. It is not possible to speak about stable party relations [...]. John Dale has been travelling around the whole country and told the people about this. And they are only a small part of it
[i.e. the party]. But it easy to tell people, who don’t know too much about the question, what’s wrong [...] [Besides] we are doing more in directing the policy as a member of the government even if we not a part of the majority [over the EEA issue] [...] I think more than half [share my view]. Normally, perhaps one or two of the parliamentary group would prefer to be free and out of the government. [Another problem] is to be in the parliament and don’t always know what’s going on at the top.

Clearly, the decision taken by the ‘troika’ to bring down the government over the issue of a ‘European Economic Area’, was taken without any approval, in voting terms, of the parliamentary group and the party organization. Neither was it taken after the parliamentary group had been informed about the negotiations with the government.

The discussion up to now has covered the internal politics of the SP during 1989-1990. Justifiably, one can raise a question concerning the involvement of the Prime Minister, J.P. Syse in neutralizing the internal dissatisfaction within the SP. A substantial reason for the minor role Syse had in pacifying the internal opposition lay in his weak position within the CP, compared to Willoch’s position during 1981-1986. At the outset, the latter was much more experienced than the former; whereas Willoch served eight years as party leader and five years as a Prime Minister, Syse was party leader for approximately two years and Prime Minister for one year. Additionally, in the 1989 general elections, the CP, led by Syse, suffered its worst result since 1973, losing 8 per cent of the vote and 13 seats (see Appendix 4.1). Not surprisingly,
Since Mr. Willoch, in a sense, step aside, we had Mr. [Rolf] Presthus, Mr. [J.P.] Syse, Mr. [Erling] Norvik in the background, and there was never one real obvious leader with total authority. We [therefore] tended to be a little spread out and the party was gradually loosing authority [...].

Contrary to Willoch’s strategy to cope with the internal situation within the SP, Syse could not initiate CP’s concessions without risking internal opposition within his own party. Thus, politically, the minor involvement of the Prime Minister in the resolution of the internal conflicts within the SP was a derived consequence of his weak position within the CP, as well as the existence of the ‘troika’.

The above discussion, concerning the two-fold strategy adopted by the SP leader in order to neutralize the internal opposition and the uninvolvment of the Prime Minister in the matter, brings the analysis to the stage of evaluating the relative bargaining power possessed by the parties involved during 1989-1990. A substantial reason for the relatively high level of bargaining power possessed by the CP lay in the failure of Johan Jakobsen to pacify the parliamentary group’s dissatisfaction by the formation of the ‘troika’. The failure was later manifested by Jakobsen’s acceptance of Lahnstein and Dale’s attitude in the 1990 governmental crisis.

The relatively minor concessions made by the Conservatives during the period under examination were a major source of irritation to other party elites. For the KrF, during the negotiations over the 1990 budget it was decided that 10000 Krones would be given to every child under
five years old, together with a governmental commitment to formulate a plan aimed at reducing the number of abortions. Additionally, the CP had promised the KrF that the issues of Gene Technology and opening hours of shops during religious holidays would not be dealt with by the government. Concessions to the SP were made during the negotiation over the 1990 budget when it was decided to lower value added tax for milk, and to increase the amount of money towards environmental protection. The relatively low level of the SP bargaining power was confirmed by John Dale in an interview which was conducted two hours before the CP-led government collapsed:

The Conservatives do not respect our attitudes. They have thought that this is a small party and, therefore, they could be the bosses. And we, as a small party, we should only obey them. It was wrong. Their mistake was that they thought they could more or less force us to obey them instead of respecting us and respecting our programme, our own right to decide our policy [...] [They] try to use all kind of force, threats, year by year; [for example, they said] 'if you do not obey us we shall crush you'. This is their big mistake.

Based on the SP experience during 1989-1990, it is indeed hardly surprising that in the crisis over the 'European Economic Area' the SP militantly opposed Syse's position, forcing the resignation of his government.

To sum up, the emergence of the SP parliamentary group's leader, Anne Enger Lahnstein, as the prominent figure in the party, and her close co-operation with the party secretary, John Dale, were critical factors in the worsening intra-elite conflicts within the SP during 1989-1990.
to neutralize the internal opposition, the SP leader, Johan J. Jakobsen, established a decision-making 'troika', comprised of Lahnstein, Dale and himself, which was responsible for the formulation of the party strategy. However, after failing to pacify the internal opposition, Jakobsen modified the SP alliance strategy, that is, broke up the CP-SP-KrF formal alliance, in order to maintain party stability. It can be concluded that the CP enjoyed relatively a high level of bargaining power following the failure of Johan Jakobsen to pacify the internal opposition by the formation of the 'troika'. The failure was later manifested by Jakobsen's acceptance of Lahnstein and Dale's attitude in the 1990 governmental crisis.

4.5 CONCLUSIONS

The Norwegian case seems to support the argument that the formation of informal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for highly institutionalized parties. It also supports the contention that weakly institutionalized parties do not necessarily have to face internal conflicts when they shift alliance strategy. The experience of the highly institutionalized DNA during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989 indicates that as long as the party avoided formal alliances, no intra-party conflicts evolved. Such a strategy was especially profitable when its leader, Odvar Nordli, was facing internal difficulties which undermined his position within the party. For the weakly institutionalized party,
the experience of the CP indicates that a shift from an informal minority government to a formal one does not necessarily cause internal conflicts.

With regard to highly institutionalized parties which form formal minority governments, this chapter reveals that such parties tend to impose structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government, and modify their alliance strategy in order to maintain their stability. The SP's experience during 1989-1990 immediately springs to mind.

As clearly demonstrated in this chapter, the elites' ability to control internal dissatisfaction affect the relative bargaining power of the party. It was shown that as long as the highly institutionalized parties pursue informal minority governments, they possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power. Once a formal alliance between weakly and highly institutionalized parties was formed, such as the SP-CP-KrF case in 1985-1986 and 1989-1990, the disadvantage of the former in mobilizing internal dissatisfaction was translated into a relatively inferior position in the bargaining arena, forcing the party elites to modify their alliance strategy on both occasions.

Consequently, by formally coalescing with the highly institutionalized party, the weakly institutionalized party risks the stability of co-operation. Once internal conflicts evolve within the highly institutionalized partner, it probably would have to modify its alliance strategy in order to maintain stability as it lacks heterogeneous and diffused mechanisms for internal dissent.
This chapter has three major goals. First, and most broadly, it shows that elite-follower conflicts are most likely to evolve within a highly institutionalized party as it moves aggressively to break out of long period in the political wilderness. In the Italian case, the formation of an informal minority government, as well as a formal one later on, exacerbated the strains within party organization. At the same time, the elites within the weakly institutionalized partner, which were deeply affected by the inter-party alliances, underwent excessive strains.

Secondly, it demonstrates how each aspect of the alliance strategy formulated by the highly institutionalized party was grounded not simply, in the party’s response to external forces and stimuli, which were numerous and powerful, to be sure, but in the organizational limits of the party. Violent demonstrations of militants and activists erupted outside the framework of the party due to the lack of diffused mechanisms for internal dissent. On the other hand, intra-elite dissatisfaction within the weakly institutionalized party was manifested and resolved within the party.

Finally, this chapter is required as a national context against which the relative bargaining power of the main actors need to be assessed. It intends to demonstrate that the failure of the highly institutionalized party to mobilize, and thus, control its followers’ dissatisfaction
forced its elites to modify their alliance strategy. Those modifications significantly contributed to the inferior position of the party in the parliamentary bargaining plane. In contrast, the success of the weakly institutionalized party to pacify its internal opposition was translated into a superior position in the bargaining plane.

To support hypotheses 1 and 3, this chapter analyses the formation, maintenance and collapse of the 'historic compromise' during 1976-1979. The chapter examines the informal minority government amongst the DC, PCI, PSI, PRI, and the PLI which was formulated in July 1976. It thereafter investigates the formal minority government amongst the above-mentioned parties (except the PLI) which was formulated in July 1977, and was maintained by the Communists abstention and external support until January 1978 and January 1979, respectively. The first section is an introduction which provides the data concerning trends in Italian politics prior to the period under study.

The intent of the second section is to establish the decisive preferences of the DC and the PCI which led to the formation of the historic compromise. Its purpose thereafter is to describe the parties' tactics during the actual bargaining over the alliance formation. With regard to the former aim, it will be shown that the historic compromise grew out of Enrico Berlinguer's decisive preference for 'the defence of democracy' and 'obtaining PCI's full legitimation as a governing partner', combined with Aldo Moro's decisive preferences for 'economic and institutional recovery' and
'the continuation in power of the DC and the wearing out of the PCI'. Obviously, both leaders adopted 'economic and institutional recovery' as their visible decisive preference in order to minimize party disunity and establish some visible convergence of opinion.

The third section analyses the evolution of elite-follower and intra-elite conflicts within the PCI and the DC, respectively. Its aim, thereafter, is to investigate the strategies adopted by the PCI and the DC elites in order to cope with the internal opposition. It will be demonstrated that whereas the PCI elites initiated an 'articulation of ends' and was later on forced to modify its alliance strategy in order to cope with militants' actions, the DC elites accepted the formation of new factions, petitions and appeals with the intention of changing the party's alliance strategy.

A substantial part of the fourth section is devoted to an analysis of Lange's claim that 'the DC seemed increasingly ready to risk confrontation rather than to make any more concessions to the PCI'. This section examines the inter-party relationships in the parliamentary bargaining arena, in light of the PCI failure and the DC success in neutralizing the internal opposition. It will be shown how the DC elites took advantage of the PCI's relatively low bargaining power, due to the failure of the latter elites to control internal dissatisfaction, and converted the PCI fragility into a superior position in the parliamentary bargaining plane.
5.1 ELECTORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Multi-party representation, based on the almost complete proportionality achieved by the electoral system of preferential vote, \(^2\) together with the strong heterogeneity of Italian coalitions, \(^3\) has characterized Italian post-war politics. Until the mid-1970s, furthermore, two unique political actors distinguished the Italian party system from the others; on the one hand, the uninterrupted dominance of the DC which has not been out of power since 1945, and, on the other hand, the role played by the PCI as the main opposition party. The PCI has been operated within the system but has not shared control of the national government since May 1947. \(^4\) During 1958 and 1972, where electoral stability and partisan continuity characterized the Italian political system, DC's strength in the Italian Parliament ranged between 42 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, while the PCI received between 22 and 27 per cent of the total votes, respectively (see Appendix 5.1).

The dominance of the DC, however, did not preclude the possibilities of changes in the composition of the Italian government coalitions. Since the end of the war, these government coalitions followed in succession; 'centre' coalitions, during the fifties, in which the partners of the DC were the small centre parties, the Republican, the Liberals and Social-Democrats; and centre-left coalitions, during the sixties and seventies in which the Socialists became part of the DC dominated government. While 'over-
sized' cabinets have predominated, there have also been intermittent minority governments, such as, the DC minority governments during 1957-1963 and Aldo Moro's minority governments during 1974-1976. A partial explanation for the formation of minority governments in Italy focuses on the absence of an established coalition formula, that is, when parties have not been over-constrained by any specific coalition formula. The eight and two minority governments which were formed during 1953-1962 and 1972-1976, respectively, exemplify this tendency (see Appendix 5.2).

By the early 1970s, however, the DC's share of the vote declined whilst the PCI's electoral strength became increasingly evident. The PCI's potential for sharing power arose from the declining dominance of the DC. Electorally, it was first demonstrated by the latter's defeat in the 1974 'divorce referendum' (40 per cent in favour of repealing the law, 59 per cent against).\(^5\) Politically, it was evident following the DC's declining ability to retain the allegiance of alliance partners.

Three reasons are usually given for the evidence of such processes. Firstly, there was the establishment of the regions in 1970, that is, the intermediate level between the central state and local government. Secondly, the electoral victory of the PCI in the regional and administrative elections of 1975 in which it gained an outstanding 32.5 per cent of the total vote and which provided it with the control of many local and regional administrations.\(^6\) And, thirdly, the electoral growth of the PCI at the general election of
in which it received 34 per cent of the vote (see Appendix 5.1).

At the electoral level, moreover, the PCI's vote became more evenly distributed in the different geographic zones of the country than at any time previously. At the level of party system on a left-right dimension, the DC constituted 76 per cent and 74 per cent of the total strength of the centrist forces in 1946 and 1976, respectively. But the PCI, which constituted only 45 per cent of the combined left percentage in 1946, had by 1976 climbed to an impressive 73 per cent. This, in turn, suggests that a process of polarization had occurred. Beyond the PCI's gain of control in several regions and municipalities where it had been absent earlier, it was the involvement in broader coalitions which emphasized the PCI's position as a political force, compact and disciplined enough to assume the responsibility of governing.

The success of the PCI in the 1975 and 1976 elections is attributed mainly to the votes of the young with the lowering of the voting age in 1975. Other studies suggest that the electoral shifts among large sections of young voters had already began in 1968 producing their first effect in the elections of 1972. A more comprehensive study, however, argues that two distinct factors attributed to the PCI electoral victories in 1975 and 1976: social movements of the previous years and the policy of the historic compromise which was launched by the PCI in 1973. The former accounts for the increase in the percentage of
young people and workers who voted PCI in 1975-76, while the latter accounts for sections of the middle-class, mainly clerks and craftsmen, moving towards the PCI.  

As one might question the conclusiveness of the electoral trends during the 1970's, attention should be also focused on the cleavage structures of Italian polity. Basically, it is the left-right dimension in the Italian society along which one finds a few strong cleavages, namely, capitalism versus socialism, democracy versus fascism, proletariat versus bourgeoisie, reform or revolution versus reaction and church versus state. Consequently, the dynamics of formal and tacit inter-party alliances have been influenced by the fact that a number of the important socio-economic cleavages - such as, developed versus underdeveloped areas, city versus periphery, agriculture versus industry and workers versus owners - run through the DC rather than separating it from the other parties in the political spectrum. Both the PCI and PSI also represent mass parties through which such socio-economic cleavages run. The national stances that DC, PCI and PSI assumed in the post-war period, their multi-class recruitment and their common legacy of anti-fascism have been advanced as explanations of their diverse composition.

However, even though all the mass parties are to a great extent inter-class in nature, the leftist parties differ significantly from the DC. Notably there are distinct patterns of associations that are part of the subcultures which support the PCI and PSI. Whereas, to a great extent,
the Communist and Socialists grew out of the same Marxist subculture or community, the DC partook of the Catholic subculture. Not surprisingly, 'Italian Communist politicians are radical, programmatic and ideologically committed Marxists', but at the same time, '[...] they are sensitive to the need to bargain and compromise [...].'

These restraints did not damage the DC advantage over other parties since the party is also rooted in the international arena. Beyond the DC's electoral strength lies the unqualified support of the U.S.A. which identified in the DC the party that could guarantee political stability and, thus, favoured the eventual success of the DC. However, among the most cited factors which predict the DC's eventual decline are the centrifugal drives which dominated the Italian multi-party system.

The DC's occupation of the centre of the party system makes the centrifugal drive towards the extreme ends of the political spectrum predominant over the centripetal drive:

In other terms, the very existence of a center party (or parties) discourages 'centrality', i.e., the centripetal drives of the political system. And the centripetal drives are precisely the moderating drives. This is why this type is center-fleeing, or centrifugal, and thereby conductive to immoderate or extremist politics.

According to Sartori, the long term consequence for the DC of the centrifugal drive is the erosion of its voting base, as voters move away from the centre towards the extremes. However, major factors which could minimize the effect of the centrifugal drives are the movement forwards 'clientelistic politics', and the colonisation of the state apparatus,
These trends, together with the intensive competition derived from the nature of the party system, opened the way to what is called the partitocrazia.

Specifically, partitocrazia is distinguished by two different, but related factors. First, the 'penetration' of political parties to state organs, bureaucracy, judiciary system, public firms, and other crucial sectors of social life, such as, mass media. Second, the absence of clear lines of separation between majority and opposition, namely, the invisible and visible levels of co-operation, which is called in Italy trasformismo for historical reasons. No traditional party, of course, could deal with the partitocrazia issues because all the traditional actors were involved in this system. As a result, the governmental parties, especially the DC, expanded their own sphere of influence within the state, contributing to the 'degeneration' of a party-based democratic regime where parties no longer becoming responsible for their actions before the citizens.

Of utmost relevance is the classification of Italian parties according to degrees of institutionalization. During the 1970s, the DC and the PSI could be classified as weakly institutionalized parties whereas the PCI could be considered a highly institutionalized party. This classification is most visible especially with regard to the existence of factions within the 'weak' parties. Their existence was enhanced mainly by the 'preference vote' (i.e.
the mechanism by which voters are able to cast preferences for particular candidates on their party list thus determining which are actually elected). Consequently, coalition stability was affected since factional alliances act as 'extra' parties in parliament.24

Since fluidity is still the predominant characteristic of factional alignment, in structural terms, the DC remains unwilling and incapable of formulating a long-term strategy. However, a classic example of the PCI's ability to establish a long term strategy was the formulation of the Historic Compromise. In simple terms, it was a long-term strategy put forward by the PCI which argued that profound changes in Italian society would only be possible if serious political polarization were avoided. And the only way to guarantee against such polarization was an alliance between the major political forces in the country, that is, the DC, PCI and the PSI.

From the very beginning, however, this proposal was framed with reference to very pressing short-term problems. The extent of political terrorism, scandals and adverse economic conditions challenged the traditional patterns of inter-party co-operation during the mid-1970s.25 What was the effect of the PCI's initiative on the internal arena of the main parties? How did it influence patterns of coalitional behaviour? The following section, therefore, examines the formation of the 'programmatic agreement'.

149
To understand the logic behind the development of the DC and the PCI alliance strategies it is necessary to appreciate the organizational trends during the 1970s and the elite structure within both parties. At the organizational level, the PCI elites faced a new phase in relation to the Italian community.\(^{26}\) Firstly, a 20 per cent increase in party membership was recorded during 1968-1976. Additionally, the adherence rate (i.e. the percentage of party members as a ratio of the total electorate) rose from 4 per cent to 6 per cent during 1968-1977 (see Appendix 5.3). Secondly, after 1968, the territorial differences in membership distribution diminished across voters categories, i.e. men, women and young people. Thirdly, the percentage of new recruits has increased, attaining in 1972, 1975 and 1976 higher level than before, whilst a decline in the percentage of non-renewals was recorded (see Appendix 5.3). Fourthly, the number of sections increased, suggesting there was an improvement in the stability of the organizational base. Fifthly, the tendency amongst communists members to support their party financially was distinctly strengthened between 1974 and 1977. Finally, a decline in the age of the party leadership was recorded from the beginning of the 1970s. Consequently, the links between the PCI and the community were strengthened and the general instability of the party organization was reduced considerably.\(^{27}\)

Perhaps the most important trend that evolved within the
DC was a decline in party membership. DC membership dropped during 1973-77, with the decline totalling nearly 580,000; the bulk of this fall occurred in 1976 (see Appendix 5.4). Given the very limited number of the DC sections' activities, the low level of both participation in party life and the influence of mass membership on party policy, it is hardly surprising that the DC's image deteriorated significantly. Consequently, the major issue within the DC, prior to the historic compromise, was the revitalization (rifondazione) of the party. The saliency of the rifondazione lies, naturally, on the view that DC could no longer base its political fortunes on the anti-communism issues or the links to the Catholic church. Additionally, the decline in membership during 1975-1976 raised a call for ending the regime of the correnti which had resulted by the defenestration of Fanfani from the DC Secretaryship and his replacement by the 'reformer', Zaccagnini. The latter approach, consequently, was to mobilize a strong movement within the DC for the reorganization process against an opposition of the party's centre and right.

At the elite level, the highly cohesive PCI elites included seven-member secretariat under the leadership of Berlinguer, whereas the DC elites included seven factions under the leadership of Moro, namely, Forze Nuove (13%), Base (10%), Morotei (10%), Rumor-Gullotti (9%), Colombo (7%), Dorotei (23%) and Fanfani (12%). Note, however, that the distribution of posts within the DC—mentioned above in brackets—did not accurately reflect the internal balance
of power. At the outset, whereas Moro was elected as DC’s President by a 165 majority of the 183 votes cast in the party’s national council, the more powerful post of party secretary was held by Zaccagnini, who had been re-elected, in the 1976 party congress, by 51 per cent against 48 per cent. Further limitations to Zaccagnini role, beyond the narrow majority he won in the Congress, was the election of Senator Fanfani as the chairman of the party’s national council and 21 of his supporters as the executive committee members. Additionally, the prime ministership was given to the most right-wing leader with governmental experience, namely, Giulio Andreotti.

Yet, however mutable Zaccagnini and Fanfani strengths may have been, it was Moro who possessed the major influence within DC. According to the leader of the DC’s parliamentary group, Flaminio Piccoli:

Moro was the leader of the Left within the DC after being the leader of the Center in the DC, and in that moment, the position between Mr. Moro and Fanfani began to diversified. Even if Mr. Zaccagnini was the Secretary General of the party, at that moment, the real leader was Moro. Thus, from this reason I saw Moro and Fanfani and not Zaccagnini and Fanfani [as opponents] even if Zaccagnini was a real cultural and sensitive man. But the real leader of the party was Moro. So, if we can speak about discussions between two persons we should speak about those between Moro and Fanfani. Zaccagnini interpreted Moro, and I say this not as to be offensive against Zaccagnini. Moro was intelectually superior and he had a really high prestige among all parties.

Thus, it was Moro who enjoyed a dominant position within the DC in the mid-1970s.
Table 5.1 List of Events in Italy, 1972-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17/2/72</td>
<td>Formation of Andreotti's I government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/2/72</td>
<td>Government collapse after a vote of no-confidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/6/72</td>
<td>Formation of Andreotti's II government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/9/72</td>
<td>Publication of three articles by Berlinguer in Rinascita: The emergence of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historic Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/10/72</td>
<td>Resignation of Andreotti's II government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/6/73</td>
<td>Formation of Rumor IV government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3/74</td>
<td>Resignation of Rumor IV government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/3/74</td>
<td>Formation of Rumor V government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/10/74</td>
<td>Resignation of Rumor V government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/11/74</td>
<td>Formation of Moro IV government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-16/6/75</td>
<td>Regional, Provincial and Municipal Elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/7/75</td>
<td>B. Zaccagnini elected as DC’s party secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/75</td>
<td>Right and left wing incidents, kidnappings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/76</td>
<td>Resignation of Moro IV government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/2/76</td>
<td>Formation of Moro V government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-7/3/76</td>
<td>PSI’s 14th Congress-the endorsement of ‘the alternative of the left’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18/3/76</td>
<td>DC’s 13th Congress- B. Zaccagnini reelected as party secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/4/76</td>
<td>A. Fanfani elected chairman of the DC’s National Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-21/6/76</td>
<td>General Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/7/76</td>
<td>F. De Martino, PSI’s party secretary, resigned.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16/7/76</td>
<td>B. Craxi becomes PSI’s party secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/7/76</td>
<td>Formation of Andreotti’s III government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10/76</td>
<td>Moro elected as DC’s President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/10/76</td>
<td>First austerity package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12/11/76</td>
<td>Second austerity package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/77</td>
<td>Student disturbance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/77</td>
<td>Political terrorism, kidnappings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/4/77</td>
<td>Third austerity package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/4/77</td>
<td>Approved of IMF loan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15/7/77</td>
<td>Formal policy agreement between the DC, PCI, PSI,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRI, PLI, PSDI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/1/78</td>
<td>Collapse of Andreotti’s III government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/3/78</td>
<td>Formation of Andreotti IV government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/3/78</td>
<td>Moro’s kidnapping by the Red Brigades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/5/78</td>
<td>Moro’s death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15/5/78</td>
<td>Partial Municipal and Provincial elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/1/79</td>
<td>Resignation of Andreotti IV government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4/79</td>
<td>President Pertini dissolved Parliament and called an election for June 3-4.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Undoubtedly, the main issue on the PCI’s agenda from September 1972 was the ‘historic compromise’. According to Chiaromonte, ‘[...] the reasoning of the secretary of the PCI moved within the ambits of the great political ideas of Palmiro Togliatti’. Thus, the ‘historic compromise’ was presented as a continuation of the immediate postwar strategy of broad co-operation between political forces including those representing the middle strata. Clearly, such a presentation throughout the exploration of the Compromise was aimed at preparing the party’s base for the actual co-operation.

Added to this pattern of presentation was the step-by-step evolution of the PCI’s strategy through the course of events. Clarification of the PCI’s strategy occurred after the following events: (1) the disturbing swing to the Right following the MSI gains in 1970, 1971 and 1972, (2) the Chile 1973’s experience, (3) the erosion of the Catholic subculture as evident in the 1974 referendum, (4) the movement to the left of important sectors of the middle strata in the administrative election of 1975, and (5) the impressive PCI’s gains in the 1976 general election. During these events, to mention only one example, the PCI position concerning NATO and its existing bases on Italian territory was modified.

However, conclusive the above-mentioned trends may have been, it was the PCI decisive preferences of ‘obtaining full legitimation as a governing partner’ and ‘the defence of democracy’ which shadowed any short-term aims. As Berlinguer explained:
The struggle to democratize the State is an essential condition in order to fulfil a revolutionary policy, which, to be revolutionary, must always aim at destroying the class limits which are so strong in our country, in spite of the importance of the struggles and strength of the popular and worker's movement. Without this struggle it is impossible to get closer to our historical target, which is to fulfil a complete democracy and the coming of the working class and of its allies to the direction of the State.

The decisive preference of overcoming the PCI's legitimacy barrier meant that patterns of government formation were to be considered as intermediate targets, during a process aiming at deeply changing the Italian's political spectrum. Such a strategy should take place by bringing the PCI inside a 'government of democratic change', and, consequently, preventing a shift of the middle strata towards the Right.

Perhaps most important of all was the economic and institutional crisis which provided the issue upon which a visible convergence between the DC, PCI, PRI, PLI, PSDI, and PSI was reached. For the PCI, the crisis, which worsened dramatically in the mid-1970s, was considered an element aiding the historic compromise. The fact that major economic decisions of national necessity were agreed upon by large part of the bourgeoisie, could justify co-operation amongst the working class and the socialist movement in order to widen their action to a national level. For the DC, on the other hand, the economic and institutional crisis was a matter of government and party survival. Pridham's finding, that 'the DC emerges as [...] a power-motivated party prepared at almost all costs to preserve its role in the
emphasizes choosing a consensus-based aim as DC's decisive preference.

This observation is undeniably appropriate to the cases of DC, PSI, PRI, PLI, and PSDI. Yet, it cannot capture the whole complexity of the PCI elites' efforts to cope with the increasing dissatisfaction of party base during inter-party negotiations. The fact that the PCI's decision in 1976 to enter into bargaining with the DC was taken by the elite collectively and unanimously significantly reduced potential dissatisfaction at the elite level. According to the chairman of the PCI's parliamentary group, Alessandro Natta:

I have spoken about doubts in the body of the party. The choices [that] were made in that period were accepted by all the leadership of the party, by all the Central Committee of the party. There was no contrast, no division within the leadership at the top of the party [...] I can add that comrade Longo expressed some riserva about the idea of historic compromise. Sometimes he said; I don't like this term 'historic compromise'. I would prefer that people will use the term which was used by Gramsci 'new social political bloc' which means that he had some doubts not only about this strategy but also about the solution like the government of abstention.

However, at the organizational level, the PCI elites faced potential opposition to their strategy. At the outset, the PCI elites had to implement their strategy in light of two sources of instability; (1) the 20 per cent rise in the party membership which was recorded during 1968-1976, and (2) the fact that the most important decision-making bodies within the party were only afterwards informed of the decision to launch the policy. For a time it appeared that the internal conflicts aggravated by heterogeneity and
the negative aspect of 'democratic centralism' were costs the leadership was willing to pay. Surprisingly, moreover, the 'doubts' in the body of the party were perceived by PCI elites as only concerned with the economic and institutional crisis. As the PCI economic spokesman, Giorgio Napolitano, put it:

[...]

I want to emphasize the awareness which was represented in our rank-and-file people of the seriousness of the national situation from two fundamental aspects; inflation and terrorism. So, the idea that it was necessary to put together all democratic forces in our country to fight these two threats was accepted [...]. At that moment we had to decide without delay. We could not engage our party and other parties in months of discussion in a possible common programme. A government had to be formed also because those two threats were really pressing.

In order to cope with the potential followers' opposition, the PCI elites decided to initiate 'explanatory pedagogy' through public meetings. They also decided to abstain over no-confidence motions during August 1976 to July 1977. Behind the former tactic lay the assumption that the party strategy was meaningful only insofar as it could be implemented at the grass roots. This required the establishment of certain norms, that is, the belief that the strategy chosen by the party elites is good for the followers and the application of sanctions against deviations from the norms. Through public meetings and the lengthening of the process of forming a formal alliance, the PCI elites translated the strategy into action at the grass-roots level. Further elements which served to minimize potential disunity were the fairly general government programme over the
decisive preference of 'economic recovery' and the absence of joint consultation amongst the parties.

According to Luebbert, it is wrong to assume that because inter-party negotiations take a long time very much is being negotiated among the parties. Rather, most negotiations actually take place between leaders and their followers and among rival factions within parties. The transitional period, thus, created an image of long, difficult and complex PCI-DC negotiations. This, in turn, was intended to satisfy elites' members and party followers whose orientations were still largely attuned to the ideological aspect of the co-operation.

The above-mentioned pattern of bilateral discussions, informal inter-party meetings, telephone calls and private conversations is crucial to explaining both the November proposals concerning the government economic strategy and the formation of a formal alliance later in the early 1977. Clearly, it was during the transitional period (i.e. from August 1976 to July 1977) that the PCI had produced, and brought up to date, alternative policies to those followed by successive governments throughout its period in opposition. Furthermore, in the months following the informal alliance, Napolitano, who led the PCI's economic team, co-operated both with Stammati, who was a DC technical expert brought in to strengthen the quality of economic advice, and the Prime Minister.

The PCI's strategic line was also dependent on a more or less contemporaneous convergence between the strategies of
several different parties. Since no formal agreement was signed, during the transitional period, one could not expect to find strong internal disagreement within the different parties. Within the DC, for example, it was mainly Fanfanians who argued against deepening the co-operation with the PCI. They stated that although the DC was open to 'dialogue' with the PCI there must be no confusion of roles between government and opposition. For the small parties, whereas the vast majority of the PRI favoured the 'no no-confidence' formula, the PSI elites seemed to have no option out to support it.

It is important to note that the PSI, at that time, faced a period of transition, from the dominance of the centre faction led by De Martino towards the succession of the Craxi-Signorile group to win a majority in the Central Committee. The resignation of the PSI's secretary, following the 1976 election results, furthermore, reflected the uncertainty within the PSI. As Silvano Labriola, a PSI member of Parliament, put it:

I'll be very honest. After the general election in 1976 there was a sort of shock in the PSI because at that time we reached our historical minimum, the lowest level of the party. Hence, in the leadership of the party came out the wish to found out new ways, new paths, so as to enhance a little bit the people's feeling vis-à-vis our party.

Not surprisingly, Craxi was left with no choice other than to participate in the six-party alliance.

The nuances of Andreotti's tactics are of equal
relevance. A classic example was the decision that the PCI's member Pietro Ingrao, considered a potential rival to Berlinguer, would be elected President of the Chamber while Amitore Fanfani, considered an opponent to any DC's cooperation with the Communists, would be re-elected President of the Senate. Beyond the fact that this decision had been taken at a joint session of the six parties lies a clear indication that Andreotti aimed at minimizing the DC's disunity as well as the PC's disunity. Moreover, in order to minimize DC's disunity, a total of 47 under-secretaries, adherents of the main correnti, were appointed. This was an increase of eight on the number in the outgoing Government.

Added to these tactics was Andreotti's attempt to cover his exposed right flank following the PCI's hope to shift the balance within the DC to a degree sufficient to permit the formation of a coalition. Perhaps following external pressures from the right-wing factions within the DC, a break-up within the MSI-DN parliamentary group occurred in December 1976. According to MSI's member, Raffaele Valensise:

In 1976, there were those who left the MSI who thought it was possible to cover the manœuvre of Signor Andreotti, who had already obtained the abstention of the Communist Party, by getting also the abstention of at least some members of the MSI [...]. I think this was the main cause of the break, a sort of temptation into which some of our members fell to cover the manœuvre of Andreotti with the assistance of the Communist Party.

Given that almost half the deputies in the MSI-DN
parliamentary group left the party over the issue of abstention in parliament, it is hardly surprising that the DC obtained a 'sleeping partner'. The DN-DC informal cooperation, aimed at voting out the Abortion Bill in the early 1977 in the Senate, suffices to underline this point.\(^5\)

The formal minority government, formed in July 1977, signalled a new stage of inter-party co-operation in the Italian party system. Marradi claims that '[...]' the DC is aware that it can accede to many of its partners' requests in the program drafting stage, since it retains an almost absolute control upon which policy measures to take, to block, and which to subvert'.\(^5\) Consequently, a substantial reason for the formation of the formal alliance was due to the DC acceptance of some PCI's elements of planning in the agreement. According to Giorgio Napolitano, the head of the PCI's economic team,

> We tried to agree on some elements of planning in order to correct some traditional imbalances in our economy and our society. Particularly, we focused on some Bills to be adopted in Parliament. First, for industrial policy, industrial planning. The idea, approved by other parties, including the DC, was that all incentives should be given on the basis of sector plans [...][according to] some goals, such as, the reduction of the imbalances between north and south or as the reduction of structural weaknesses in our industrial system. Second, a similar mould for agriculture. Third, a plan for public housing. These three Bills put together could represent a new framework for public intervention in economic development.

Clearly, these three conditions did not embarrass the Government because its [monocolore] position implied no real possibility for the PCI to control the implementation of these reforms. The fact that one finds almost exactly the
same items in the official programme of past DC’s governments, reveals Andreotti’s tactic of forming a formal alliance whilst conceding much less in return.

The agreement was, in that case, presented in the Chamber of Deputies as a motion signed by the six parties and approved section by section by a large majority. The vote on the final motion was 442 in favour, 87 against, 16 abstaining and 85 absent. Although the total strength of the parties officially opposing the programmatic accord was only 45, possibly more than 100 out of 263 DC’s deputies either voted against it, abstained or were intentionally absent as a sign of their disapproval of the new commitment. The evolution of intra-elite conflicts within the DC, which were first evident in the above-mentioned vote, and the followers’ dissatisfaction within the PCI, which was worsened following the formation of the formal alliance, are our next concern.

5.3 PCI ELITES BETWEEN FOLLOWERS’ HOSTILITY AND DC’S ELITES ADAPTATION

To explain the way in which the internal dissatisfaction within the PCI and the DC was manifested following the formation of the formal minority government, requires specification of the parties’ strategic model designed to mediate between their internal life and their political behaviour. For the PCI, the internal difficulties faced by the party elites during the implementation of the historic compromise had two mutually reinforcing dimensions. The first was the lack of members and militants’ support for the party line. The second dimension was the absence of
mediator role in the PCI structure.

From its beginning, the PCI's strategy revealed open hostility in the grass-roots level. Those hostile attitudes were recorded, during the 'explanatory pedagogy' involving over 11000 public meetings in the first three month of 1977. Even within the highly institutional context of the PCI one finds striking cross-party variation over the issue of supporting the party line. According to Barbagli and Corbetta's research, dissent from the party line was greater among the members than among the section secretaries, at least during the period 1976-78. According to data from members of the Bologna federation at the beginning of 1978 and from section secretaries collected in the second half of the same year, 20 per cent of PCI members were explicitly against the party policy and almost all the section secretaries were in favour of collaboration with the DC in the political circumstances at that time. During this period, it could be said that the positions of the elites and that of the followers moved steadily apart after the formation of each government.

Perhaps most important feature was the 1.3 per cent loss of party membership which was evident during 1977-1978 (see Appendix 5.3). A 2 per cent decrease in the membership figure, a 21 per cent decrease in the new recruits, and a 3 per cent decline in the non-renewals, were also recorded during the same period (see Appendix 5.3). These trends implied that the PCI elites were not able to embrace its strategy fully without offending the members' ideological
heritage. The limitations of the PCI's strategy are well described in the draft theses for the Fifteenth PCI Congress, in December 1978:

[...] there has been a disparity between the efforts devoted to work in the institutions and relations among the political forces, on the one hand, and initiative to promote united movements involving broad masses around concrete goals and problems, on the other hand. This has led to difficulties in maintaining and strengthening the party's relations with various strata of the working population at all times and in all phases of the struggle, in organically linking our presence and action in society with our activity in the institutions and in exercising our government functions in the most effective manner.

A clear change in the position of the section secretaries was recorded following the experience of the Andreotti governments from 1978 onwards. Almost all those interviewed in Barbagli and Corbetta's research still thought that 'the most possible, most realistic government' would be based on an alliance between their party and the DC. However, the preference of the relative majority of those interviewed was in favour of a government of the left.

An additional factor which contributed to the worsening of the follower's dissatisfaction was the absence of formal groups within the party who could serve as mediators. At a time when the elite-follower conflicts emerged, the PCI structure, in which a strong apparatus confronted the party's intermediate and peripheral associations, risks losing the control over the intermediate position between the members and the apparatus (i.e. the militants). The rank-and-file hostility, on the one side, and the apparatus' efforts to get them to accept the party line, on the other, resulted
The PCI followers militantly opposed the official party's line. The climax of the militants' activities was reached late in 1977, when the militant metalworkers' union (FLM) precipitated a governmental crisis against the PCI's wishes. As Napolitano noted:

There was an alarm with some partial election already in spring 1978. [...] But, another very dramatic moment was a general strike of metal workers at the end of 1977. I think that this was the reason for the Cabinet crisis of January 1978 because we felt that there was dissatisfaction among the workers from the economic policy of the government we were supporting.

The presence of approximately 200,000 workers in the streets forced the PCI to modify its alliance strategy. Additionally, the party elites were forced to initiate an 'articulation of ends' in order to pacify the followers' dissatisfaction, which was increased by the government's economic policy of 'austerity'.

Debate as to whether to accept the government's austerity policy, which called for sacrifices by the workers, continued within the PCI and between the PCI and the union throughout the period of formal co-operation with the DC. Clearly, both the PCI elites and the followers recognized that increasing conflict over the austerity issue would result in a disastrous outcome. At the same time, the pragmatic co-operation with the DC and the support of the austerity policy did not coincide with the PCI's ideology. Thus, the collective identity of the PCI followers was put at risk as
the official goal of revolution was constantly evoked.

In order to cope with the above-mentioned gap, the CGIL leader, Luciano Lama, suggested the immediate target of reducing unemployment as a justification for the workers' sacrifices. The PCI elites, however, decided to demonstrate that the party's long-range goals had not been abandoned. In a speech to the PCI Conference of Intellectuals, on January 1977, Berlinguer specified that:

A policy of austerity is not a policy that tends to level everyone towards indigence, nor can it be pursued with the aim of enabling an economic and social system now in crisis to survive. A policy of austerity must instead have as its aim the establishment of justice, efficiency, order and, I would add, a new morality; and it is precisely for this reason that it can and must be adopted by the workers' movement. Seen in this way, while it does involve giving up certain things and making certain sacrifices, a policy of austerity acquires meaning as renewal and becomes, in effect, a liberating act for broad masses long kept in position of subjection and pushed to the sidelines of society: it creates new forms of solidarity and, thus, rallying growing consensus becomes a broad democratic movement, at the service of social transformation [...].

In Theodore Lowi's terms, a process of 'articulation of ends' was initiated by the PCI elites. Thus, the party's official aim of 'social transformation' was not abandoned, nor did it become a mere 'facade'. Rather, the party's official aim was adapted to the organizational need.

Not surprisingly, a substantial part of the section secretaries in 1978 accepted the position of the party elites on wage restriction and argued for it in line with the elites' view. After 1978, when the section secretaries abandoned the line of the historic compromise, they inevitably concluded by also rejecting the 'austerity'
policy. This was shown by the 51 per cent rise in the share of section secretaries opposed to the limitation on wage demands between 1978 and 1980.\(^{71}\) We can therefore conclude that the PCI elites failed to safeguard the section secretaries' sense of identity by constant and ritual references to the ideological goals, and by caution in their choice of alliances.

The inside story of the conflicts within the DC is completely different. It was from the PCI's call for 'a government of unity and national solidarity',\(^{72}\) following the FLM activities, that intra-elite conflict evolved within the DC. Debate as to whether to include Communist support for the new government on the vote of confidence was evident along ideological and factional lines. A classic example was the 'group of 100', consisted especially of the Dorotei and Fanfanian's deputies, which opposed any new steps in the cooperation with the PCI. Moreover, survey results indicated that 64 per cent of 205 DC's deputies asked were against the entrance of the PCI into the majority.\(^{73}\) Yet, it is misleading to contend that the party's decision-making bodies shared the approach of the 'group of 100'. On the contrary, the DC National Executive Committee, for example, had accepted a policy statement which favoured the inclusion of all the six parties in a 'parliamentary convergence'. This would involve a government programme, worked out in detail with the opposition, which would enjoy the active support of the Communists in Parliament.\(^{74}\)

However mutable the intra-elite opposition may have
been during 1978, it prompted determined action from Piccoli, the president of the DC’s parliamentary group, and Aldo Moro. As the former indicated:

Moro proposed to introduce the PCI into the majority [...] There were a lot of problems [and] questions on the Centre and Right of the party, a lot of perplexities [...] I was leading the parliamentary group of the DC, at that moment I decided to stop that and to support what the party was doing [...] Because Moro himself explained to us in a very famous speech his position and raised a lot of questions. First, he said the positive things, but, telling immediately after, all the risks that were and asking for the unity of the parliamentary group and the party, because, he said, only being together we could always go on. This was the feeling, the tone, of what really happened. The step he did was very hard. First, we were all waiting to see what was happening and then we all supported everything that he said. So that, if his aim could be reached we would have been all characters of the history of this country.

Thus, the DC elites mobilized the dissatisfaction through the diffused mechanisms whilst relying on Moro’s dominant position within the party as a ‘buffer’. Intra-elite conflicts, which evolved during the inclusion of the PCI into the majority, were thus neutralized without undermining the party’s alliance strategy.

The assassination of Moro by the Red Brigades opened a new era in the relationship between the DC and the PCI elites. Actually, the intra-elite conflicts within the DC, following the inclusion of the PCI into the majority, evolved before the kidnapping. Gerardo Bianco, a member of the DC elite, recalled that,

Tensions had already appeared during the formation of [the new] Andreotti government. As it is known, difficulties were overcome only after the speech of Aldo Moro to the parliamentary group. But the speech did not give immediate results as some historians have written.
Some signatures were gathered with which he was asked not to accept the vote of the Communists. There were long negotiation during the whole night, then, a document was drafted and presented to the Communist Party which approved it. This was the passage with many many resistance ranged from the center to the so called Sinistra Sociale by Donat Cattin who were against this kind of alliance.

It was during the long crisis of January-March 1978 (i.e. following the entry of the PCI into the majority) that a new dividing line emerged. This cleavage cut across various factions, especially Forze Nuove, Base and Dorotei. It separated those who were apparently inclined to work in the long-term direction of an agreement with the PCI and those who worked in the direction of re-establishing a privileged relationship with the PSI while isolating the Communists. Zaccagnini, Andreotti's supporters and Piccoli represented the former tendency. A less homogeneous group including Mario Segni, Mazzotta, De Carolis, the Dorotei led by Bisaglia and his supporters together with Donat Cattin, represented the latter direction.

As noted earlier, at the heart of DC's strategy lay Moro's position within his party and, thus, his ability to win the support of the party's parliamentary group. However, it was after he was murdered that factional activities reached a new climax. In spite of Zaccagnini's effort towards the revitalization of the party, new forces were institutionalized within the DC during 1978-9. Whereas two new factions, namely, Iniziativa Democratica and Proposta, grew out of the anti-communist subculture, a technocratically oriented group associated with Umberto Agnelli emerged.
Furthermore, a student movement of approximately 100,000 members, namely, Communion and Liberation, grew out of the Catholic subculture and concentrated its activities in that direction. Although Zaccagnini had been given new legitimacy by his direct election as Secretary by the 1976 Congress, the absence of both a firm power base and strong environmental pressure contributed to his inability to implement a significant organizational change within the DC.

'It is necessary to deepen the internal crisis of the Christian Democratic party', writes Berlinguer, 'in order to determine a change in its position [...]'. At face value this statement is not incorrect. However, in its concern to choose between factions with respect to their attitude towards DC-PCI co-operation rather than to consider seriously the interaction between the factions, it is misleading. Beyond Berlinguer's attitude towards a deep change in the internal equilibrium within the DC lies the assumption that the DC's internal inequalities tend to be at least in part exogenous, i.e. externally imposed. Alliance with the PCI could, therefore, destabilize the DC by putting additional de-institutionalizing pressures on it, thus increasing its internal tension. Yet, when intra-elite conflicts occurred within the DC they were contained within the party. Since the DC elites accepted the formation of new factions, it became clear that as long as dissatisfaction could be expressed through the diffused mechanisms no change in the elites' strategy would be required. Not surprisingly, the successful resolution of the conflicts within the DC
positively affected the party's position in the bargaining plane.

If, as Lange claims, 'the DC seemed increasingly ready to risk confrontation rather than to make any more concessions to the PCI', a substantial reason for this lies in the DC's control over its internal opposition. The following section, thus, assesses Lange's argument and examines the relative bargaining power of the main alliance partners. Attention is focused on the nature of the inter-party relationships in the parliamentary bargaining plane.

5.4 THE WAGES OF BARGAINING POWER: DC'S STRATEGY OF CONFRONTATION DURING 1976-1979

The successful resolution of the intra-elite conflicts within the DC was translated immediately into a superior position in the parliamentary bargaining arena. In contrast, the inability of the PCI elites to control their followers' dissatisfaction was translated into a relatively low level of bargaining power. This observation is undeniably appropriate in respect of the periods of the informal alliance, from August 1976 to July 1977, and the formal alliance, from July 1977 to January 1979. Consequently, the DC elites implemented a strategy of confrontation towards the PCI in the bargaining arena, which was sometimes diffused to the electoral arena.

For a time it appeared that the PCI had gained extensive policy influence due to the formal consultation with the government over major issues following the 'programmatic
agreement' (accordo programmatico). Furthermore, the 'institutional agreement' (accordo istituzionale) in 1976 provided the PCI with the Presidency of the Chamber and also four committee chairmanships. It is somewhat misleading to insinuate, as Heilman does, that in the period of 'National Unity' during 1976 and 1979, the Communists were granted extensive influence and eventually everything short of cabinet positions in the government.\textsuperscript{81} There is on the contrary conclusive evidence that the DC's government controlled the inter-party relationships within the alliance.

Firstly, the DC dominance during the historic compromise was demonstrated by its control of all ministerial portfolios compared with its 38.7 per cent strength in the Chamber of Deputies.\textsuperscript{82} A single-party (monocolore) cabinet provided the DC with a total influence over policy implementation. Thus, consultations with the other parties appeared to be a 'visible price' that was not translated to actual policy concessions. This direction was confirmed by the PCI economic spokesman, Giorgio Napolitano:

\begin{quote}
The main difficulty was not to be inside the Cabinet, to have an all-DC government without the possibility to control day by day the implementation of the common programme and the Bills which had been adopted by Parliament.
\end{quote}

The DC elites, for example, did not take into consideration the views of the PCI and the trade unions in drafting their three years economic plan, nor did they initiate changes in
the agrarian policy, pension policy and university reform.\textsuperscript{84} Furthermore, Andreotti’s refusal, in September 1977, to dismiss Signor Vito Lattanzio, the Minister of Defence, together with the Prime Minister’s ignoring of Communist views on the nomination of new chairmen to various state bodies,\textsuperscript{85} exemplify this argument.

This does not mean that the PCI had no impact on the policy process and its outcomes. Lindblom’s observation,\textsuperscript{86} that all affected interests can have at least some influence in the policy-making process, is valid. However, the PCI’s bargaining power did not lie in the ability to affect the outcome. But rather some outcomes were designed with consideration of the position or objection of the Communists. The delegation of powers and functions to the new regional governments, the implementation of a major reform in the tax system, and the complicated \textit{equo cenone} (fair rent) law which was passed by Parliament in 1977, suffice to underline this point.

Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the PCI into the majority (\textit{nella maggioranza}) did not constitute a change in the party’s position. According to the leader of the PCI’s parliamentary group, Alessandro Natta:

[...] The most relevant political concession was the fact that in 1978, following the reproposal of the Andreotti’s government, we moved from an ambiguous and even equivocal formula [...] towards a constitution of a true and proper parliamentary majority in which the PCI took part. I don’t know if you can call this a concession, but certainly, it was the acknowledgement that the PCI was a legitimate governing force in our country.\textsuperscript{87}
The distinction which was drawn between 'political majority', i.e. formal coalition majority, and 'parliamentary (programme) majority', created a bridge between the different ideologies. But, at the same time, it committed the Communist to the discipline of the majority. This raises an inevitable question concerning the PCI's insistence on maintaining the formal alliance.

As a partial explanation for the PCI's position, reference to the visible decisive preference of 'economic and institutional recovery' provides a starting point. The PCI's room for manoeuvre was heavily restricted when its elites decided to form an informal alliance in 1976 over the time-consuming preference of 'recovery'. According to Gerardo Chiaromonte:

We did not have other choices besides those which we had to actually choose. Once we had started a certain party with the abstention in August 1976, we were in a certain sense obliged to continue towards that unitary government of emergency that we thought was necessary for the country and for the democratic regime.

Following the DC-PCI agreement concerning the need to promote economic recovery, ordinary voters would naturally expect the alliance to last at least until some improvement in the Italian economy and institutions became evident.

For the PCI, furthermore, the time-consuming preference of economic recovery coincided with the period of time sufficient to obtain full legitimacy as a governing partner. However, although both preferences were crucial to the formation of the formal alliance, the visible preference of 'recovery' was the only issue over which the alliance could
be broken up. A break-up of the alliance, over issues other than economic recovery, could 'promote confusion in the conduct of the election campaign'.

Given that the PCI was subordinated to the DC and clearly received an unfair rate of exchange, one would ordinarily expect inter-party conflict to be endemic, or at least that the dominant patterns would require the repeated resort to naked power. However, the assertion of the leader of the DC parliamentary group that until Moro was kidnapped 'there were no dramatic problems and questions' suggested a much more relaxed inter-party atmosphere. A substantial reason for this evaluation lies in the PCI's search for legitimacy which served to maintain the formal alliance. Actually, this preference made the commitment enforceable because it provided the PCI with the recognition of future opportunities for governmental co-operation that will be eliminated if the commitment is not maintained.

We can thus conclude that whereas the decisive preferences of 'legitimacy' and 'recovery' took priority over demands to break the commitment, the elite-follower conflicts (and especially the militants) dictated the evolution of the PCI-DC co-operation. In other words, the organizational inadequacies, which forced the PCI's elite to create governmental crisis in 1977 and 1978, emphasized the loss of the PCI elites' initiative.

The nuances of the intra-alliance politics which involved other partners, besides the DC and the PCI, are of equal relevance. For the PSI, the disappointing 1976
electoral results undermined its position as a third party. The fact the PSI elites felt squeezed following the DC-PCI co-operation is often used to account for the inconsistent tactics during the historic compromise.\textsuperscript{93} The PSI's surprising break with the inter-party solidarity during the Moro kidnapping and its reluctance in 1977 to sign the 'programmatic agreement' are relevant examples. Added to the PSI's marginal strategic position during 1976-1979 was the reluctance of the new leadership to implement incisive changes. This direction is confirmed by Hine, who argues that Craxi needed a period in which the main centre of power in the party would remain the party organization and not the ministries and para state agencies.\textsuperscript{94} This was mainly because the ministers and the para state agencies offered a reservoir of patronage through which individual leaders could obtain members' support independently of the apparatus.

Given the PCI's orientation towards co-operation with the DC and the PSI's weak position, it is hardly surprising that difficulties in the PSI-PCI relationships developed. As Labriola put it:

There were very bad relations because in that framework we have always blamed the PCI for a couple of things. First, there was a certain trend to establish a kind of regime together with the DC, and second, they [the PCI] had also the attitude to act as a fireman, a saver, in solving existing social tension [...] The Communists had always preferred the DC rather than the Socialist side and I think this was a sort of an historical mistake by Mr. Berlinguer. They had not developed, during the period of the National Unity, any real contacts, Communists and Socialists. Berlinguer had rather preferred to establish a sort of direct link between Botteghe Oscure and Piazza del Gesù.
Consequently, the PSI ran a campaign in 1979 that was evasive and disturbing to the PCI. The PSI edged back toward direct co-operation with the DC, emphasizing the political isolation of the PCI.

If, as Napolitano claims, '[...] we had good relations in almost all fields with the Republican Party and with Ugo La Malfa', a substantial reason for this lies in the 'bad' relationships between the PCI and PSI during the period of the historic compromise. It was mainly at the Congress of Turin in 1978, where the Socialist Plan for a Left Alternative was accepted (thus, consecrating Craxi's leadership), that the Socialists became engaged in bitter controversy with the PCI. The reason was that the former opposed the historic compromise and tried to create a left-wing alliance. The PRI, therefore, could act effectively as a third party while taking advantage of its past experience of co-operation with the DC.

Beyond its 3.1 per cent parliamentary strength (see Appendix 5.1), the PRI took advantage of few factors which mostly characterized the party. As Giorgio La Malfa argues:

The Republican Party is considered to be, firstly, an extremely steady organization in terms of the stability of views [...] Second, it is considered to be extremely loyal, [i.e.] people know that we keep the agreements. And thirdly, the quality of the people is considered to be higher than generally speaking [...] If we suggest a solution to a problem they tend to think that we are right and they are wrong [...] [Furthermore] my father was the leader of the party and he commanded a great respect.'

Probably, the PRI acted as a mediator between the PCI and the DC, limiting the use of extreme bargaining tactics and
regulating the nature and intensity of the bargaining. Of course, other parties, such as the PSI, PSDI and the PLI (in the earlier period), with interests somewhat different from those of the main alliance parties may have been drawn into the bargaining frays at varying points in time. Still, there were three parties whose strategic considerations mainly formed the relevant bargaining arena during the historic compromise, namely, the DC, PCI and the PRI.

Beyond the PCI's loss of the initiative following the party's elite-follower conflicts and its inability to control policy implementation, was the negative DC attitude towards the PCI in the electoral arena. According to Napolitano:

> There were some Ministers who had a negative attitude to us, for example, Donat Cattin who was in charge of Industry and who was supposed to implement that important Bill on industrial policy. According to us, he was more or less openly sabotaging it. But independently from some ministers, the question was the attitude of the DC as a whole. For instance, while we were so much committed to the struggle against terrorism during the period of Moro imprisonment, there was a partial local election campaign in Spring 1978 [...] and we were really struck by the behaviour of so many DC candidates, national leaders who were campaigning against us. So, we thought that there was a heavy ambivalence in the DC, particularly, after Moro death because Moro had been able to put in evidence the necessity of loyal relationships with our party.

Whether the DC's attitude towards the PCI were disembodied sets of hostile ideas and values or the consequences of intra-party conflicts within the DC, Napolitano's perception of the DC's negative attitude provides us with a convenient point of departure in discussing the collapse of the historic compromise.

It was after the alliance successfully re-established
the international stability of the Italian currency, reduced inflation and induced employment-creating investment, that the break up of the commitment was initiated over the issue of Italy membership in the EMS. Following the PRI’s threat that it would withdraw its support unless Italy joined the EMS, a resolution in favour of membership was carried in the Chamber, with the Communists voting against and the Socialists abstaining. A further reason for the government’s victory over this issue, was the crucial MSI vote in favour of membership. This is not to say that tacit co-operation developed between the DC and the MSI elites. According to members of the MSI elite, namely, Raffaele Valensise and Francesco Baghino, the party’s approach towards supporting Andreotti’s government was not a result of formal or tacit request from the DC. Valensise, furthermore, adds that:

I did the speech explaining why we were going to vote in favour of Italy joining into the EMS because there were some national reasons for us. And I remember Signor Andreotti turning towards me and really gazing at me with very open eyes.

It was, rather, the voting of DC, PRI and the MSI in favour of membership which provided the PCI with an argument salient enough to be labelled as decisive to the break up of the historic compromise. Besides, the timing of the alliance break up coincided with the PCI’s both decisive preferences of ‘economic and institutional recovery’ and ‘obtaining full legitimacy as a governing partner’.

If, as Strom claims, ‘everything else being equal,
minority governments would prefer purely ad hoc coalitions', a substantial reason which restricts his conclusion to highly institutionalized parties lies in the DC experience during 1976-1979. Although a formal alliance was formed, the successful resolution of the intra-elite conflicts within the DC was translated into a superior position in the parliamenary bargaining arena. The failure of the PCI elites to pacify their followers, in contrast, undermined significantly the bargaining power of the party. Moreover, the PCI elites was far more concerned with breaking up the conventio ad excludendum than they were in respect of any policies which the alliance might implement. Since the inter-party relations were limited to joint consultation, no major concessions were achieved by the PCI by means of substantive bargaining. Chiaromonte's evaluation that the historic compromise was a 'losing experience', together with Paggi and D'Angelillo's assertion that it '[...]' opened a crisis in the political programmatic identity of the PCI [...]', summarized the PCI's experience.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS

If we recall the weakly institutionalized features of the DC as a source of strength, it will come as no surprise to learn that the party's alliance strategy was not undermined following the evolution of intra-elite conflicts during the historic compromise. On the contrary, intra-elite dissatisfaction was manifested and resolved internally.

180
The strongest indication of the relative weak position of the PCI during the historic compromise, came, naturally enough, with regard to its highly institutionalized features and the general dissatisfaction of its followers following the formal alliance with the DC. As it moved aggressively to break out of nearly thirty years in the political wilderness, strains within party organization were exacerbated. Not surprisingly, each aspect of the alliance strategy formulated by the PCI elites was grounded not simply in the party's response to external forces and stimuli, which were numerous and powerful, to be sure, but in the inherent limits of the party. Violent demonstrations of militants and activists erupted outside the party due to the lack of diffused mechanisms for internal dissent.

Regarding the strategy of the highly institutionalized PCI to neutralize the internal opposition, it was demonstrated that the party elites insisted on a transitional period in which the party's policies were updated and party members were approached by the members of the parliamentary group who explained the reasoning for the party's coalitional behaviour. Additionally, the party elites initiated an 'articulation of ends' in order to cope with the followers' hostility. Finally, the failure of the highly institutionalized party to control its followers' dissatisfaction forced its elites to modify the party's alliance strategy.

These modifications, in turn, reflect the inferior position of the party in the parliamentary bargaining arena. It was shown that the DC dominance during the historic
compromise was demonstrated by its control of all ministerial portfolios. The DC did not take into account the views of the PCI in drafting its three-year economic plan, nor did it initiate changes in agrarian policy, pension policy and university reform. It was furthermore evident that Andreotti ignored the PCI's views on the nomination of new chairmen to various state bodies. In contrast, the success of the weakly institutionalized party to pacify its internal opposition, was translated to a superior position in the bargaining plane. The fact that the DC implemented a strategy of confrontation in both the parliamentary and electoral arenas exemplifies this point.
The previous chapters have dealt with parliamentary alliances in minority situations which involved highly and weakly institutionalized parties. This chapter examines the intra-party consequences of formal minority government amongst weakly institutionalized parties. Its aim is to demonstrate that this type of alliance is likely to be relatively stable. It will be shown that a substantial reason for this lies in the decisive preferences which were chosen by the parties involved and their ability to neutralize internal dissent without modifying alliance strategy.

Regarding the former aspect, it will be shown that the rationale behind the formation of a formal minority government between a party which lacks governmental experience and a party which regularly controls ministerial portfolios may lie in the former’s decisive preference of ‘obtaining governmental experience’ (regierungsfähig). As the visible decisive preference should reflect a convergence of opinion between the alliance partners, ‘economic recovery’ seems an appropriate preference. The unexperienced party, thus, might be willing to support the governmental party without having ministerial portfolios, as well as, conceding over the visible decisive preference, in order to gain its invisible decisive preference.

Regarding the partners’ ability to pacify internal dissatisfaction, it will be demonstrated that intra-elite and
elite-follower conflicts which emerged within both partners were successfully neutralized. Thus, instead of being enforced to modify alliance strategy, both partners maintain the formal minority government. Finally, with respect to the consequences of the successful resolution of the conflicts within both partners, it will be shown that each partner possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power over its basic decisive preference.

To support hypothesis 1, this chapter examines the formation, maintenance and collapse of the Lib-Lab pact during March 1977 - July 1978. Not only is the pact a rare example of a parliamentary alliance in the British polity, its formal aspect is sufficient for designating it as a relevant case for our research. The objective is to explain majority building by weakly institutionalized parties and its intra-party consequences. The chapter begins with an introductory section which provides contextual data concerning trends in British politics.

The intent of the second section is to demonstrate that the Lib-Lab Pact was the product of bargaining between David Steel, the Liberal Party's leader, and James Callaghan, the Labour Party's leader. Whereas, for Steel, 'obtaining governmental experience' was a decisive preference to the formation of the pact, for Callaghan, 'economic recovery' was the decisive preference. Obviously, both leaders adopted 'economic recovery' as their decisive preference in order to minimize party disunity and establish some visible convergence of opinion.
The third section examines the worsening of the intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party and the evolution of elite-follower conflicts within the Liberal Party. Whereas the former were manifest by massive dissensions in parliamentary divisions, the latter were evident after the Liberal executive called a special assembly of the party in order to discuss the pact's renewal. It will be shown that the intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party were pacified mainly by the government’s acceptance of numerous defeats in parliament. On the other hand, the elite-follower conflicts within the Liberal Party were neutralized by Steel’s resignation threats.

The fourth section reveals that the Labour Party enjoyed dominant policy influence over economic issues, whereas the Liberal Party obtained governmental experience. The former superior position was mainly due to the structure of the formal alliance, which did not provide the Liberals with ministerial portfolios. The latter position, on the other hand, was enhanced by the extensive consultation with Labour ministers and the successful mobilization of follower’s dissatisfaction.

6.1 PARTY STRENGTH AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

For much of the post-war period, Britain has been described as having a two party system. Britain’s party system exhibited a two party 'format' since the existence of third parties 'did not prevent the two major parties from
governing alone', and it satisfied the conditions for 'twopartism'.
Electorally, the Conservatives and the Labour party gained 87 percent of the vote in 1945, and 96 percent in 1951. In the 1960s, the two parties' shares fluctuated and tended to fall. But, at the three elections between 1964 and 1970 the two parties received between seven-eighths and nine-tenths of the total vote. Between 1945 and 1970, the decline in one party's share was matched in the main part by an increase in the vote for the other, for example, where the Labour share of the vote fell by 4 percent, whilst the Conservative share rose by 6 percent.

It was in this context of two-party dominance that four minority governments were formed. Whereas from 1910 to 1915 a minority Liberal government was dependent upon the support of the Labour and the Irish Nationalist for its parliamentary majority, two Labour governments were in a minority position in 1924 and 1929. A partial explanation for the prevalence of these minority governments rather than coalition in Britain lies in the conventions associated with the processes of government formation and dissolution. Regarding the former stage, after a general election in which no party has been able to gain an overall majority, the Sovereign is not required to nominate a Prime Minister who can secure a majority in the Commons, but rather one who can survive as leader of the largest (or in 1924 the second largest) minority party. For the dissolution, if defeated on the Address, the prevailing assumption is that the Prime Minister of the minority government can secure a dissolution of
Parliament. Both conventions, therefore, make it likely that minority government rather than coalition will be the result of a hung parliament.5

By the 1970s, however, both the Conservative and Labour parties' share of the vote declined. The decline in dominance by both parties may be evidenced by their falling combined share of the total vote: from 80 percent in 1951, through 74 percent in 1959, to 56 percent in October 1974.6 Yet, this decline in the two-parties combined vote was hardly reflected in their parliamentary representation - the total seats of Liberals at Westminster during the period from 1951 to 1975 ranged from six, during the three elections in the 1950's, to fourteen in February 1974 (see Appendix 6.1). It was, however, the total parliamentary representation for all parties other than the major two that rose from the range of zero to six during 1951-1970, to twenty-three and twenty-six in the elections of February and October 1974, respectively (see Appendix 6.1). Looking more closely at this development, it becomes apparent that the two-party system strictly existed if at all only at the parliamentary level, with the electoral system as the remaining key determinant, and even the parliamentary two-party system has come under great challenge.7

To understand the context in which the Lib-Lab pact was formulated it is necessary to appreciate the parliamentary situation prior to March 1977. In October 1974 Labour succeeded in gaining a small overall majority, but this was
Figure 6.1 List of Events in the U.K., 1974-1979

10/10/74 General Election (Lab. 319, Con. 277, Lib. 13).
11/2/75 Margaret Thatcher elected as Con. leader.
26/6/75 Labour lose Woolwich West by-election.
18/1/76 Formation of the Scottish Labour Party (2 MPs)
16/3/76 Wilson announced resignation.
5/4/76 Callaghan becomes Prime Minister.
10/5/76 Jeremy Thorpe resigns as Liberal leader.
7/7/78 Steel elected Liberal Leader.
9/9/76 Unemployment reaches 1588000.
28/9/76 Callaghan speech demanding financial prudence.
21/10/76 M. Foot elected Deputy leader of the Labour Party.
27/10/76. Pound reaches its lowest level ($1.56).
4/11/76 Labour lose Workington and Walsall North by-elections
15/12/76 Healey announced letter of intent for IMF loan and drastic cuts.
21/2/77 David Owen becomes Foreign Secretary.
22/2/77 Government defeated on devolution guillotine.
17/3/77 Aircraft and Shipbuilding Act finally passed.
31/3/77 Labour lose Stechford by-election.
5/5/77 Labour lose Greater London Council and other local election contests.
15/7/77 Healey outlines Phase III of incomes policy.
08/77 Unemployment peaks at 1636000.
13/12/77 PR for European Elections rejected by Commons.
26/1/78 Special Liberal Assembly conditionally endorsed Pact.
23/1/78 Government defeat on Green Pound devaluation.
2/3/78 Labour lose Ilford by-election.
25/5/78 Announcement of forthcoming termination of the Pact.
31/5/78 Labour wins Hamilton by-election.
7/9/78 Prime Minister announced 'No election'.
21/9/78 Ford Strike against 5% offer begins.
21/10/78 Labour conference rejects 5% wage limit.
26/10/78 Swing to Labour in Berwick and East Lothian by-elections
13/12/78 Commons vote 285-283 against government sanctions on employers breaking the 5% pay policy.
1/3/79 Devolution referendum in Scotland and Wales.
29/3/79 Election announced for May 3.

gradually eroded through by-election defeats and defections, so that by April 1976 the party found itself in a minority again. The immediate consequences were twenty nine governmental defeats in the House of Commons during June 1974 to March 1977, during which time the Lib-Lab Pact was formulated. Moreover, the Parliament witnessed the first 'mass' use of the Guillotine which has been described as 'the most drastic method of curtailing debate known to procedure' and 'the extreme limit to which procedure goes in affirming the rights of the majority at the expense of the minorities of the House'. On July 20, 1976, for example, the government carried three guillotine motions on five Bills; one motion for the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill, a second for the Rent (Agriculture) Bill and the Education Bill, and a third for the Health Services Bill and the Dock Regulation Bill. Clearly, from the view point of the government, it achieved the orderly dispatch of their business, but this was not without cost. To be forced to rely on the naked force of the guillotine gave an advantage to the opposition in terms of their prestige.

Adding to the difficulties of the minority Labour administration was the internal situation within the party. In February 1977, the Labour government achieved the distinction of being the first government to be defeated on a guillotine motion, mainly due to dissent by vote or abstention, of the government backbenchers. The government struggled with the Scotland and Wales Bill through ten Committee days but it finally decided that the question could
not be postponed. As the Guardian reported:

[... ] what Mr. Foot and his more timid colleagues in the Cabinet have decided to take a gamble on is that enough of the rebels will back down on the night when they are brought face to face with the disastrous consequences of an effective backbench rebellion [...] The Cabinet decision follows weeks of intense activity by the Labour whips as they sought to assess the scale of any possible backbench revolt and to identify the possible weak links among the rebels. They appear to have confirmed Mr. Foot's view that the earlier the motion was tabled the better in terms of the number of rebels. For ministers recognise that the longer the timetable is delayed the more stringent it will have to be, and therefore, the greater the indignation among its opponents.11

When the decision was made, the government was defeated by twenty-nine votes; twenty-two Labour MPs voted against the government and fifteen abstained.12 Such governmental defeats due to Labour's rebels, occurred over eight divisions during January 1975 to March 1977, emphasized the weak position of the Labour government.13

The above-mentioned situation within the Labour Party is indicative of its weakly institutionalized character. According to Panebianco, whereas the Labour Party can be classified as a weakly institutionalized party, the Conservative Party can be classified as a highly institutionalized.14 With regard to the Liberal Party, the evidence and arguments presented by a large number of scholars suggest that it can be classified as a weakly institutionalized party. Since the 1930s, the Liberal Party organization had been small, weak and poorly financed. It was dependent significantly on its main financial backer, the Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust Ltd.15 Besides, the party was created by a federation of existing groups, namely,
the Whigs, Radicals and Peelites, through a process of diffusion.\textsuperscript{16} It is therefore hardly surprising that the organization institutionalized in a weak manner.

Added to the minority situation in which the Labour Party found itself in April 1976 and its weak parliamentary position, were the influences of the economic crisis. By 1976, the financial and economic crisis was such that the IMF could dictate terms to the Labour Government in return for international support for Britain.\textsuperscript{17} The starting point of the analysis, however, is March 1977, when the Lib-Lab Pact was formed. How did it influence tactical considerations of party elites? What were the new patterns of alliance formation, maintenance and collapse which evolved during 1977-1978? These questions will be investigated in light of the rich material which was furnished by the British case.

6.2 THE PRODUCT OF BARGAINING BETWEEN TWO PARTY LEADERS

To understand the tactics which were implemented by David Steel and James Callaghan, i.e. the Liberal and the Labour leaders, respectively, it is first necessary to appreciate both positions within their parties. Prior to the Pact, both the Labour and the Liberal parties had elected new party leaders. Under the multi-ballot system in which the successful candidate would have to obtain an overall majority of the total electorate of 317 Labour MPs, Callaghan was elected leader of the PLP on the third ballot by a majority of 39 MPs.\textsuperscript{18} David Steel, on the other hand,
contested his election under new rules which provided for an electoral college composed of constituency representatives, and was elected by a majority of 5509 out of 19573 voters.\textsuperscript{19}

These results eliminated any further challenges to leadership within those parties. Whereas, in the Labour Party, 'Michael Foot accepted the result without any difficulty and worked as deputy leader with James Callaghan and gave him one-hundred and fifty per cent support',\textsuperscript{20} in the Liberal Party, John Pardoe told Steel that 'the party could have only one leader and one strategy'.\textsuperscript{21} Both leaders, therefore, enjoyed a dominant position within their respective parties.

Since the leader is at a centre of a range of internal forces which he must seek to pacify or neutralise, the style of leadership becomes of particular importance. Style of leadership, which common sense suggests is influenced heavily by past experience, provides us with the nuances of leader-elite communications within the parties. According to Tom MacNally, the private secretary of the Prime Minister, James Callaghan was considered to be:

\begin{quote}
Very relaxed, very much as chairman of the board, head of a team. I think he brought to the prime-ministership a lot of his experience of his early youth as a trade-union negotiator and also by the time he became PM almost a decade as a senior colleague of Harold Wilson, so, he had seen the advantages and the disadvantages of Harold Wilson's Style. I think he consciously tried to have a more open relationship with his colleagues and because he was at the autumn of his political career, I think, he had a more relaxed and philosophical attitude about Cabinet government. He saw it as an opportunity to allow individual Ministers to develop their ideas rather than trying to be the head of every initiative
\end{quote}
That David Steel had a completely different leadership style and political background is undoubted, as described by John Pardoe, his competitor in the leadership election and the informal deputy leader during the Pact:

David Steel [...] is passionately interested [...] in the mechanics of politics. It is politics that interested him, not political ideas [...] And the game of politics was not communication with people, it wasn't even creating power, it was just being there. He loved every minute of it, he loved manipulating politicians, he loved manipulating beyond the scene. And he had never done anything else; he gone out of University's student union, student's politics, straight from that into what was a research or organization job with the Liberal Party in Scotland and then he joined the Parliament in an early by-election.

At face value these statements are not incorrect. However, in our concern to explain the main variables operating during the formation of the Pact, it is more relevant to consider the interaction of these two party leaders during the actual bargaining rather than limit our discussion to their position within the confines of their respective parties. Both factors will provide a starting point to the following discussion concerning the decisive preferences for the formation of the Lib-Lab pact.

The preferences that embody contested principles of policy or program direction (i.e. the decisive preferences in government formation), Luebbert argues, were due to their impact in minimizing party disunity. The logic behind this argument lay in the principles' nature of deriving from the most widely shared values within a party and because they
directly engage the party's most basic sense of purpose. Undoubtedly, it was the preference of 'economic recovery' which serves as a visible point of departure in the bargaining between Callaghan and Steel (see Appendix 6.2).

The idea of using an economic umbrella as the central energiser of the Pact was sufficiently focused that it generated the widest possible support within both parties. Furthermore, since no policy concessions over this issue were explicitly mentioned in the Pact, it was sufficiently vague and opaque that it did not initiate intra-party disagreement. It was seen as a decisive point that the Liberals, by forming the Pact, supported a broad target, namely, 'work with the government in the pursuit of economic recovery' (Appendix 6.2), that is convergent with their respective preference.

As potential coalitional partners, both parties could limit themselves to one visible decisive preference as a basis for all government activity. This was especially relevant to the Liberal MPs who insisted on PR to the European Election as a precondition to any formal alliance with the Labour Party. In order to capture the actual bargaining between Steel and Callaghan over this issue we must examine the bargaining position of both actors.

The Labour cabinet had, prior to the loss of the government's majority and any discussion of a pact, already accepted a version of the Finnish regional system of PR, which the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, had suggested for the election to the European Parliament. As David Owen recalled:

194
It was a cabinet decision. It was discussed twice in Cabinet. The first time I raised it as a possibility and then we took it away and came back with a paper on it, so, that it was a formal majority decision [...] It was a clear majority in the Cabinet, I mean, we didn’t vote. Callaghan summed up and said that we agree [...] When I knew that these discussions [over the Pact] were going on [...] Jeremy Thorpe was then shadowing the Foreign Affairs, [...] I did actually tell him that the Cabinet had decided that there would be PR [...] The attempt was to stiffen his arm on the issue.

Given that there was a cabinet decision over PR to the European Election which was known to a key Liberal MP, it was very surprising that Steel did not insist that the Liberals’ support could not possibly continue if the Cabinet’s advocacy of this issue was not carried on to the statute book. During the final inter-party negotiations, the issue which worried the Liberal MPs most was the European Elections and PR for those elections; ‘they insisted that the Government should be bound to legislate for the election in the present session of Parliament, and that they should be pledged to introduce PR’.27

Debate in the Labour Party as to whether PR for the European Election should be introduced was due mainly to the fear that it might be the harbinger of a similar system for the British elections. The observation of Lord Donoughue that ‘It was not an issue that Mr. Callaghan ever wished to raise to a high profile because it would have divided the party just as the EEC divided the party’,28 gave rise to Callaghan’s proposal in which he agreed to offer a choice of electoral systems, between the regional list system of PR and the ‘first past the post’ system and promised to take account
of the Liberals' views on the subject while giving a private assurance that he himself would vote for PR.\(^29\) By forming the Pact, therefore, Callaghan's party was not obligated to support a policy that was at variance with its respective preference. In other words, the Liberal's preference for PR to the European Election might have been a basis for a divergent relationship. However, since both leaders preferred a formal alliance, they formulated the Pact in such way that no party commitment was formalised over an issue which was at variance with each parties' respective preferences.

There is, nevertheless, general agreement that for David Steel, 'obtaining governmental experience' was a decisive preference. According to his political adviser, Richard Holme,

For Steel, the main price was not the condition of the arrangement but the arrangement itself. For Steel, the price, the victory [...] was the arrangement that a marginal party had become part of the process of public policy determination, become more governmental [...] [For him], it seemed almost the ideal compromise that he could both get involved in government but not commit his party which [would] not have been willing to formal coalition.\(^30\)

Given such view, it is hardly surprising that the major part of the Pact dealt with the institutionalization of Labour-Liberal regular contacts. A joint consultive committee which met regularly under the chairmanship of Michael Foot, the leader of the House of Commons, was set up. Yet, in order to minimize disunity within both parties it was stated that 'the existence of this committee will not commit the Government to
accepting views of the Liberal Party, or the Liberal Party to
supporting the Government on any issue' (Appendix 6.2).

Additionally, there would have to be an immediate
meeting between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the
Liberal Party's economic spokesman before the Pact was
finalised, to confirm that there was agreement upon an
economic strategy based on a prices and income policy and
reductions in personal taxation. Furthermore, a regular
consultation was suppose to take place between Labour's
minister and the appropriate Liberal's spokesmen along with
meetings between the Prime Minister and the Liberal leader as
necessary. Finally, the terms of the agreement were to be
published as a formal exchange of letters (Appendix 6.2).

Attention now turns to the immediate response of the
Liberal party to the pact. At the outset, the major part of
the negotiations over the Pact took place between Callaghan
and Steel. However, whereas Liberal MPs were aware of the
nature of the discussions, most people within the PLP were
not informed about the negotiation. In other words, the
latter were not aware what concessions were being made by
James Callaghan.\textsuperscript{31} Not surprisingly, whilst no conflicts
within the Liberal Party were recorded immediately after the
formation of the pact, intra-elite conflicts were evident
within the Labour Party. The very few Liberals MPs who
argued against the Pact (namely, Jo Grimond and David
Penhaligon) have agreed to act upon the majority
decision.\textsuperscript{32}

A basic question still remains unanswered; How did Steel
manage to sign a Pact which had no commitment by Labour to legislate the issue of PR to the European Election?. In other words, how did Steel act contrary to his MPs overwhelming concern?. The answer lies in Steel's idea of 'realignment of the left' which was demonstrated by him on at least three public occasions; at the end of June 1974 as a chief Whip, in May 1975 as a candidate to the Party leadership, and finally, in September 1975 as party leader. In the latter occasion, televised live, Steel argued:

We must be bold enough to deploy the coalition case positively. We must go all out to attack the other parties for wanting power exclusively to themselves no matter on how small a percentage of public support. If people want a more broadly based government they must vote Liberal to get it. And if they vote Liberal we must be ready to help provide it.

Logically, the fact that the leadership election took place under a more representative system then the previous election (the new rules included an electoral college composed of constituency representatives), provided Steel with wider support for his ideas of 'realignment of the left'. The long process of preparing the Liberal party to the idea of 'realignment of the left' clearly served to minimize disunity within the party. Consequently, the issue of PR for the European elections and the views of the opponents to the 'realignment of the left' were altogether subordinated to Steel's decisive preference of 'obtaining governmental experience'. It must be conceded that however influential were the opponents to the Pact, it was the
preference of 'économie recovery' which generated the widest support of Liberal MPs, rank-and-file and voters.

Attention now turns to the immediate response of the Labour Party to the Pact. At the outset, '[...] the mood of the majority of the PLP was to accept it because it would at least make certain that we would remain in command of the Commons for another year'. Yet, it is somewhat misleading to contend that harmony existed within the Cabinet and the PLP. A motion by 48 left-wing Labour backbenchers suggested that they did not regard themselves as bound to implement the Pact. Moreover, in the Cabinet, four members — namely, Stanley Orme, Albert Booth, Tony Benn and Bruce Millan — argued against the Pact. Not surprisingly, most of the members, both in Cabinet and in the PLP, who expressed their objection to the Pact were organized in the left-wing faction, namely, the Tribune group. It was only after the Prime Minister reaffirmed that neither he nor Michael Foot would have recommended the Pact if it in any way damaged the integrity of the Labour Party that the left-wing cabinet members, who objected to the idea of the Pact, agreed to continue in office.

However mutable the left-wing strength may have been in the mid-1970s, it did not prompt determined action from Callaghan because he assumed that Labour MPs would support the party over no-confidence motions and, perhaps, over other critical divisions in the House. Moreover, Callaghan assumed that the TUC leaders would prefer to keep Labour in power despite the Pact with the Liberal Party rather than having an
Finally, based on these assumptions, the Pact was presented to Parliament on 23 March 1977 and helped Labour overcome a no-confidence motion by 322 votes to 298, the government being supported by the 13 Liberals and assisted by three Ulster Unionist abstentions.

To sum up, the Lib-Lab Pact was the product of bargaining between David Steel and James Callaghan. Whereas, for Steel, 'obtaining governmental experience' was a decisive preference to the formation of the pact, for James Callaghan, 'economic recovery' was the decisive preference. Obviously, both leaders adopted 'economic recovery' as their decisive preference in order to minimize party disunity and establish some visible convergence of opinion which enabled the formation of the formal alliance. Additionally, it was demonstrated that intra-elite conflicts which evolved within the Labour Party, were neutralized mainly through the elite's acceptance of appeals, petition and dissension in the Cabinet which challenged the party's alliance strategy.

6.3 COPING WITH INTRA-ELITE AND ELITE-FOLLOWER CONFLICTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE WEAKLY INSTITUTIONALIZED LABOUR AND LIBERAL PARTIES

To describe the extent of the internal dissatisfaction within the Labour and the Liberal parties, requires specification of the 'voices' which were recorded throughout the pact. Rather than support for the Lib-Lab pact, the orientation of large sectors of the Labour elite and the
Liberal base was most expressed by dissenting voices, challenging the alliance strategy of the respective party elites. These developments were stimulated and reinforced by the ability of the opposition within both parties to demonstrate their attitudes in the party arena as well as the parliamentary one.

For the Labour Party, a significant increase of intra-party dissent was demonstrated by votes in the House of Commons' division lobbies during the Pact. Whereas, 14.5 and 16.5 per cent of divisions (expressed as a proportion of non-free divisions in each session) witnessed one or more dissenting votes by Labour members during 1974-5 and 1975-6 respectively, dissent by Labour backbenchers during 1976-7, 1977-8 and 1978-9 were 30, 36 and 45 per cent respectively. Not only did Labour members vote against their own party in more divisions than before, there was also greater willingness to enter the Conservative lobby, thus, government backbenchers were prepared to vote in the Opposition lobby on some occasions in which the government had no overall majority.

The result was 22 government defeats in the lobbies during the Pact, most of which it accepted. Of the 22, 9 were attributable to opposition parties combining against a minority government (or to confusion in the lobbies or miscalculation by the whips), and 13 to Labour members combining with Opposition members to defeat their own side. However, whereas several of the defeats took place on important items of government legislation or policy it was
not until defeated on a vote of confidence that Callaghan requested a dissolution.

Perhaps most important of all was the activity of the Tribune Group within the Labour Party. As the source of the separation within the Labour Party was both ideological and organizational, cross-voting or abstention by members of the Group resulted in numerous governmental defeats. The defeat of the government on the Expenditure White Paper in March 1976, the loss of clause 40 of the Scotland Bill, the defeat on an amendment to the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Bill in February 1979, and finally, a number of the defeats suffered by the government in Standing Committee, suffice to underline this point.\textsuperscript{44}

Undoubtedly, the issue which caused the most serious intra-elite conflict within the Labour Party was the devolution of certain powers to elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales. The assertion of one author that 'The issue of devolution was one which could not be seen in terms of left or right wing attitude, at least not solely so',\textsuperscript{45} represents the difficulties faced by Labour elites. According to the Liberal chief whip, Alan Beith,

People had talked about the devolution debate as a revolving door; as soon as you [Labour government] improved the Bill someway so that we [the Liberals] were happier and the SNP were happier, more of Labour own supporters are going out at the same door because they were opponents of devolution.\textsuperscript{46}

The existence of a 'revolving door' combined with incremental improvements in the Bills are crucial in
explaining the tactics of the Conservatives. At the outset, it is worth mentioning that whereas cross-voting and abstention by the Tribune members caused the loss of clause 40 of the Scotland Bill, votes by other political wings and groupings within the PLP caused various defeats on the Scotland Bill, three of the four defeats on the Wales Bill and the loss of the guillotine motion for the original Scotland and Wales Bill.47

The intra-elite conflicts over the devolution issue did not evolve only at the visible sphere of Labour's party politics. Given that various political wings and groupings within the PLP were divided, it is hardly surprising that cooperation between Labour and Conservatives MPs evolved. George Gardiner, the organizing secretary of a Conservative group, namely the Union Flag, confirmed this direction:

I had a regular liaison with Tam Dalyell and George Cunningham [...] and also with Enoch Powell and the Ulster Unionists because we often needed them to help us with some philibustering. And there was coordination too in the drafting of certain amendments [...] and there was a lot of consultation, of course, over the amendment, that in the end, on the first Bill, enforced a referendum anyway, and certainly discussions and contacts over the second Bill beyond George Cunningham’s amendment which brought the 40 per cent threshold.48

Additionally, at the level of the Conservative’s shadow cabinet, Mr. Teddy Taylor, the Scottish spokesman, had ' [...] total and complete cooperation’ with Tam Dalyell, George Cunningham, Betty Harvie Anderson and Tom Galbraith.

The above tendencies emphasize that a strife over the devolution issue evolved within the Conservative Party. This rift was extremely visible because the pro-devolutionists
were an important minority, and included Edward Heath and the Shadow Scottish Secretary, Alec Buchanan-Smith. In the division on the Second Reading of the Scotland and Wales Bill, for example, five Conservatives cross-voted to support the measure and an additional 29, including Mr. Heath, abstained from voting. Furthermore, the standing within the party of some of the Conservative dissidents, the resignation of Mr. Buchanan-Smith, and the refusal of the Conservative Front Bench speakers to offer any alternatives to the Government proposals in the debate reflected the serious division within the Conservative ranks. To sum up, it was the fact that the issue of devolution was generally one which did not split into clear cut left or right wing that enhanced internal conflicts within the major British parties.

The nuances of the elite-follower conflicts within the Liberal Party are of equal relevance. If, as Healey claims 'it was never easy working with the Liberals, since David Steel was unable to control his tiny flock', one should expect to see numerous Liberal dissents. Surprisingly, the Liberal parliamentary group did not succeed in concerted opposition to the Pact although there was a gap between Steel and most of the group as the latter wanted tangible achievement whereas Steel was more interested in the agreement itself.

A substantial reason for the lack of intra-elite conflicts within the Liberal Party lies in the inability of Liberal MPs to organize their opposition to the Pact.
According to John Pardoe, a substantial reason for this lay in the fact that,

We did not agree on the reasons why we didn't like the Pact. And, frankly, it was some doubt in Penhaligon's phrase about 'turkeys voting for Christmas' because, basically, most of my parliamentary colleagues were scared stiff of fighting an election at that time. They thought they were going to loss their seats.

The arguments presented by a large number of Liberal MPs suggest another reason. As Lord Hooson put it:

I also took the view that for one member to resign would undermine the whole object of it [the Pact]. The Liberals have always been accused on never being able to agree on anything, and if one individual, which I did consider doing, resigned half way through the Pact, [he will] probably, be followed by two or three more. If I would have resigned, Cyril Smith would have resigned and David Penhaligon would have done, and Richard Wainwright would have done.

Given that the Liberals were so concerned with electoral performance, it is hardly surprising that Steel's view of the Pact as an opportunity to bring the Liberals into association with government for the first time, served to eliminate internal dissatisfaction within the parliamentary group.

At the opposing extreme, however, were the party followers who called a Special Assembly to discuss the renewal of the Pact. Despite the Liberal MPs insistence on the importance of PR to the European Parliament, Steel refused to make it a point at which he was prepared to bring down the government. A party council which met in mid-November 1977 passed a resolution demanding a special assembly if Labour failed to deliver PR to the European
Elections. The assembly was suppose to consider the future of the pact and to discuss questions of electoral strategy.

Additionally, in a meeting of the standing committee prior to the gathering of the assembly, a direct challenge to Steel’s alliance strategy was recorded. According to the latter, it was his worst meeting with the Party Executive ever. He wrote in his diary:

An appalling meeting with the Executive which at one point is a shouting match. Several say the party is disintegrated, and I listen to worthy verbal essays about ‘participating democracy’ etc. Towards the end one member actually mentioned inflation. I leave angry and depressed [...].

Note, however, that the elite-follower conflicts were not evident in the Scottish Liberal Party or in the Welsh Party Council. A substantial reason for this lies, of course, in the favourable position of the party over the devolution issue.

Given that internal conflicts have evolved within the pact’s partners, it is hardly surprising that the respective elites had to respond in order to maintain stability and cohesion. At the outset, the intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party and the elite-follower conflicts within the Liberal Party were resolved internally. Yet, even within the weakly institutionalized context one confronts striking variation in the strategy adopted to cope with the conflicts.

Elected as a leader while Labour was in power, Callaghan faced two alternatives; whether to follow the guiding principle of the PLP’s organization, namely, intra-party
democracy, or to modify this line of behaviour in response to other principles. Undoubtedly, the former alternative was chosen by Callaghan, and was implemented both in the level of Cabinet and the PLP. Within the Cabinet, dissidents over the Pact's agreement were Tony Benn, Peter Shore, Albert Booth, Stanley Orme and Bruce Millan. The reason for the modest political significance of this intra-cabinet opposition had two dimensions. The first lay in the 'The harmlessness of the Pact'. According to Tom MacNally,

The individual MPs and Peers designated to deal with ministers on particular areas were no more than lobbies with good access because they didn't have the back up. [...] So, it was a most unequal relationship, anyway, and on the top, as I said, there was no sign that the Liberal Party has thought its way through, it had no shopping list, it had no clear objectives, and this meant that as far as Callaghan was concerned it was a relatively comfortable one because, on the one hand, it cushioned him from the pressure of his left [...] because he could say I can't do this because the Liberals won't let me, and on the other hand, there was no great shopping list of Liberal demands that he had to sell to his own party.

Yet, even within the 'harmlessness' context of the Pact, Callaghan confronted some variation within the members of his Cabinet; most notably, Tony Benn. David Owen summarized this problem:

Even with Benn, he [Callaghan] clearly had a very difficult relationship. He tried to lean over backwards to give him a hearing in Cabinet, to let him feel he had an opportunity to express his views and to isolate Benn by being seen effectively to have let him display the fact that he was in minority, so, not to shut him up. [...] He wanted to give people like Albert Booth, Stanley Orme [...] Michael Foot, [...] a forum [...] And again, he would give Michael his hand, let him listen, let him feel he had a case to argue, but he was always able to mobilize a majority of the Cabinet to
his point of view.

Added to these intra-cabinet difficulties which were successfully managed by Callaghan, was the factional nature of much of the PLP dissent. As previously stressed, what constituted significant difficulties were the large number of divisions witnessing dissenting votes, the size of the dissenting lobbies, and finally, the willingness of MPs to enter a whipped opposition lobby and deprive the government of a majority. For the government, it was both politically and managerially a difficult parliament. Assuming in each case that the views of the dissenters coincided roughly with those of the opposition or sufficient opposition members to mould a majority in the lobby, there was always the danger of a motion or legislative provision being defeated if it ran into opposition from left wing MPs, on its right wing, or from a cross-section of the parliamentary party. Furthermore, there was always the danger of a defeat by a combination of the official opposition and the minor parties in the House.

A substantial part of Callaghan's and the Whip's strategy lay in their perception of the nature of the internal conflicts and its derived consequences. According to William Rodgers, the Transport Minister,

The question [is] what do they do at a crucial time; do they bring down the government? Now, the assumption which Mr. Callaghan would have made was that in the end my people are not going to bring down the government. But equally, the rebels have to consider how far can we get this change or amendment without bringing down the government. It's a very delicate relationship.
Indirectly, dissentions by Labour MPs resulted in the government's final defeat. On 28 March 1979, the House debated a motion of no-confidence which had been tabled in the wake of the March referendum in Scotland and Wales in neither of which was the forty per cent threshold requirement achieved. This requirement existed because Labour backbenchers had voted with opposition members to impose it upon an unwilling government. Indeed, had it not been for the threat of dissent, there would not have been the decision to hold a referendum. Consequently, the government was defeated by 311 votes to 310, after which Callaghan had requested a dissolution.62

At the opposing extreme was Steel's strategy to cope with the follower's dissatisfaction which evolved in late 1977. By threatening his own resignation, he had managed to persuade the Party Executive to hold the assembly as late as possible after the PR vote in the Commons, so that tempers had cooled. But most important of all, according to Michie and Hoggart, was the fact that the Liberal activists were still a minority in the party.63 Hence, when the assembly met, the silent majority wanted to reaffirm their loyalty by voting for Steel. In the end, Steel won by 1727 votes to 520, and the pact had been renewed again.64

To sum up, we examined the worsening of the intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party and the evolution of elite-follower conflicts within the Liberal Party. Whereas the former were mainly manifested by a massive dissensions in parliament, the latter were evident after the Liberal
executive called a special assembly of the party in order to discuss the pact's renewal. It was shown that the intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party were pacified mainly by the government's acceptance of numerous defeats in parliament. On the other hand, the elite-follower conflicts within the Liberal Party were neutralized by Steel's resignation's threat.

6.4 THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS: ONE WAY TO GAIN A BARGAINING POWER

As a partial explanation for the modest Liberals' influence over policy, on the one hand, and their achievement in obtaining 'governmental experience', on the other hand, reference to an essay by Alan Beith, provides a convenient point of departure. 'Many of the most valuable policy achievements of the agreement', the Liberal's chief whip claims, 'were [...] gained through the process of negotiation'. The attitude, notes the author, had a number of dimensions but these basically added up to an extensive consultation on legislative priorities, access to privileged Whitehall documents, and after the Pact's renewal in July 1977, the ability to discuss government legislation with ministers prior to the Cabinet taking a final decision on its commitments for the coming year.

The above-mentioned observation is undeniably appropriate to the case of Liberal's Economic Spokesman, John Pardoe, who helped re-write that part of the legislation dealing with tax incentives for worker co-
ownership schemes. This observation, however, cannot be applied to his Liberal colleagues. Basically, all the Liberal MPs shared the same background in terms of policy preparation during bargaining with Labour ministers. According to the Liberal’s economic spokesmen, John Pardoe,

Very few of our policies had been worked out, probably, because after all the party hadn’t been in power for so long and it never looked like being in power, so, it hadn’t actually had to prepare its policies for power. It didn’t think about writing its manifesto as though it was a programme for power. It was a programme for opposition [...] Our policies were underresearched, we had too small a research department, we never had the resources to do the job properly and we came into the Pact frankly with policies that were hopelessly underworked.

This preliminary situation, shared by most Liberal MPs during the consultation with Labour ministers, did not preclude the possibility of some Liberal influence over policies, nor did it prevent Liberals acting against Labour policies. Its importance concerns not so much the question ‘how’ bargaining took place but ‘what’ was the nature of the government’s concessions.

Given that the preference of ‘economic recovery’ was decisive to the Pact’s formation, together with the unequal position of both parties in terms of office control and policy preparation, it is hardly surprising to discover that frequent difficulties existed in the Pardoe-Healey relationship – as described by the former:

I think, [...] my negotiations were probably much more detailed, and if you like, much tougher and rougher than my colleagues, because economics was the centre ground of the whole thing [...] [thus] Healey and I had to fight. The only way which the respectibility of the
The Liberal Party could be maintained was if Healey and I had a fight and would be seen to be fighting all the time. The trouble was that the only way in which the Labour Party could maintain that Liberals weren't having too much influence was for Healey also to be seen fighting. So, whether we would have fought because we were that kind of people or not, we were more or less set up to fight. It was a battle ground from the start.

At the time when the budget of 1977 came it was only six days after the Pact had been finalized, therefore, Pardoe had to commit the Liberal Party to support the government in return for only a modification over petrol tax.

However, as previously stressed, the Liberals could not bring down the government over the economic issue until some improvements had occurred. As the government's negotiations with the TUC for the third stage of the policy of income restraint broke down, for example, the Liberals supported Healey's pay policy while arguing that 'We will stay with it for as long as the Government resolve in the battle against inflation holds, but we remain with it for one purpose only — to bolster that resolve'. Moreover, the nomination of Harold Lever to investigate the problems of small businesses without any credit given to the Liberals who were pressing for special attention to the subject, together with Healey's refusal to accept the Liberal's principal demand over the Spring 1978 budget, namely, income tax cuts, demonstrated that the Liberal Party was clearly subordinated to the Labour Party over the economic issue and was obviously receiving an unequal rate of exchange.

This is not to say that Pardoe did not achieve important
concessions. The new low tax-rate band of 25 per cent on the first 750 pounds of taxable income exemplifies this point. However, the government concessions on economic issues were not of critical importance to the Labour's economic policy. Indeed, the government had lost a budget resolution on income tax due to the Liberals voting with the Conservatives, and the surcharge on employers national insurance contributions was passed by the House only by the Liberals abstention. So, the extensive consultation with the Labour minister provided Pardoe, to some extent, with governmental experience.

From the Labour Party point of view, the above concessions cannot be over emphasized. The 'harmless' nature of the bargaining was confirmed by the Liberal shadow spokesman for Employment, Prices and Consumer Protection, Baroness Seear, who co-operated with Roy Hattersley and Albert Booth:

We were never really very well supplied with information except the information we got from our opposite numbers [...] The thing I remember very vividly was that we were very opposed to the Dock Work Regulation Act and we managed to hold up the laying of the regulation which brought them into force. That was the kind of way we could operate. We could modify certain things they did [...] We could get individual things [...] and that was really but all we could do. If we pushed much further than that the Pact would just have been broken. 

For a time it appeared that the Liberal's refusal to support the Labour government over the Dock Labour Scheme, levels of
income tax, National Insurance contributions and the devaluation of the green pound, might damage the co-operation between the two parties, but after the Liberals had accepted minor modifications to legislation as the upper limit of government concessions, their loyalty could be assumed.

A classic example of the 'weak' position of the Liberals is provided by the negotiations over the devolution issue. The fact that the Liberals had opposed the guillotine on the Scotland and Wales Bill in order to secure two improvements of the Bill, namely, proportional representation and revenue-raising powers, did not preclude the possibility of Liberal support to the guillotine motion for the Second Reading of the Bill. Furthermore, whereas the Pact's negotiations between Steel and Callaghan revealed that there was no commitment from the PLP to support PR to the European Elections, on revenue-raising powers, the government was adamant in refusing to make any concessions.

As for the importance of these improvements for the Liberals, a question should be asked; Did the Liberals have a point at which they were prepared to bring down the government? According to Russell Johnston, the answer was

No. That made the whole negotiations very weak. I participated in the negotiation over the devolution issue. We had 17 meetings, John Smith and I. In the end, the problem was that although [the issue] was very important, nevertheless, there was nothing so important, [...] that we would have been prepared to pull the plug because that would effect the main political reason for entering the Pact [...] [namely] inflation. And therefore, we were in a very weak negotiating position.
The weak 'negotiating position' of the Liberals resulted in a significant concession on revenue-raising powers by Steel as evidenced in a speech made to the annual conference of the Scottish Liberal Party on 19 June 1977. Moreover, since the Liberals lacked a researched policy paper on the issue they used a paper entitled 'Scotland and Wales Bill: Conditions for the Resurrection' written by the Outer Circle Policy Unit. The author of the paper, Prof. James Cornford, confirmed the weak position of the Liberals during the negotiation:

Russell Johnston and I [...] went into negotiation [with] Joel Barnett, John Smith and 20 officials [...] At the end, Joel Barnett said; I cannot get this Bill through my backbenchers, my backbenchers will not support this Bill [concerning revenue-raising powers]. And Russell Johnston said; well, if they won't they won't, and he didn't even go outside and said what are we going to do about it. He just gave way.

Given the Liberals weak 'negotiation position', it is hardly surprising that they were handicapped throughout the negotiations. At the end, '[...] the only thing that was in the Bill that wouldn't be in the Bill otherwise [...] was the provision for judicial review on the issue of the competence of the Assemblies'.

Up to now it was shown that the Labour Party possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power with respect to the major issues in the bargaining plane. Yet, it is somewhat misleading to contend that the Liberal Party possessed a relatively low level of bargaining power in all the aspects of the pact. On the contrary, Steel's decisive preference of 'obtaining governmental experience', combined with the fact
that the party was not forced to modify its alliance strategy following the elite-follower conflicts, call into question any total under-estimation of the Liberal's bargaining power.

To understand the way in which David Steel gained a relatively high level of bargaining power over the decisive preference of 'obtaining governmental experience', it is necessary to appreciate the importance of the extensive consultation with Labour Ministers and the successful mobilization of the followers' dissatisfaction. At the heart of Steel's strategy were the electoral considerations of the 'realignment of the left'. In order to enhance this idea, he had to obtain governmental experience. Not surprisingly, the major part of the pact dealt with the institutionalization of Labour-Liberal regular contacts. The formation of a joint consultive committee, combined with the regular consultation between Labour ministers and Liberals MPs created an image of Liberals MPs involvement in the day-to-day operation of the government. The fact that the terms of the agreement were published furthermore contributed to this aim.

Perhaps one of the factors which enhanced Steel's aim was the fact that the alliance strategy of the Labour government was continuously challenged by Labour backbenchers through massive dissension in parliament, whereas opposition to the renewal of the pact within the Liberal Party was immediately neutralized. In other words, the Liberal leader could renew the pact without offence to any incumbent ideological heritage. The government defeats, caused by members of the left-wing faction, furthermore, gave a basic
tactical advantage to the government’s partner. Because of the left-wing rebels, Callaghan’s Cabinet was not able to embrace economic issues fully without offending the left-wing faction. This strengthened the Liberal’s image within the alliance:

Steel regarded that as an advantage. Steel did not want to be associated with the left-wing of the Labour Party. Politically, the fact that the Labour left-wing voted against it [Lib-Lab matters] was an advantage because it positioned Steel as making a Labour Government respond to him rather than respond to its own left-wing.

Hence, the Liberal’s image and the intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party associated with the left-wing faction were mutually reinforcing. The greater the extent of the internal conflict within the Labour Party, the stronger was Steel’s motivation to support the government in order to improve his Party’s positioning in the political map. Additionally, Bogdanor’s argument that the Pact was not an agreement between the PLP and the Liberal Party but between the parliamentary Liberal Party and the Cabinet, proved to be of some advantage to the Liberals since it prepared the ground for left-wing dissensions.

It is at this stage of the analysis that a question concerning the collapse of the Pact should be asked. Given that both party leaders successfully neutralized the dissatisfaction of large sections within their parties, why, eventually, did the Pact collapse?. The answer to this question lies within the context of the principles which directed the formation of the Pact. After all, the decisive preference of ‘economic recovery’ was the only convergent
principle between the two partners which was formalized in
the Pact, thus, naturally, it should have been the potential
issue at which one of the partners might bring down the
government. Other preferences could not have been as
significant as the economic preference to cause the collapse
of the Pact. This logic is well explained by the Employment
Minister, Albert Booth,

> Whether or not legislation runs, even complex measures
does depend, quite a bit, on what will be the electoral
consequences. And that's why I think it was possible
for the Labour government to carry a lot of very
difficult legislation because being brought down on it
in circumstances where you haven't governmental majority
means you can go to the country on that measure. So,
suppose we had been defeated on important Employment
Protection Act, it would become an election issue,
wouldn't it?

Debate within the Liberal Party as to whether they
should make the distinction between Labour proposals which
had an electorate mandate and those which did not have, was
intensified due to their inability to impose upon the PLP a
commitment for PR to the European Elections. However, since
Labour governments tended to implement the major and/or
controversial issues at the beginning of their life-span, it
was obvious that the Liberals did not have any of those
controversial issues over which they could bring down the
government. As Russell Johnston put it:

> We weren't entering a new period of government, and
saying this is how the government should run. We were
propping up a dying government and we were taking over
policies [...] which were already engrained and trying
to do something about things which were already
established.
Indeed, prior to the Pact, substantial elements of the Social Contract (which were a range of policies formulated between the Labour Party and the TUC in 1972 and 1973), were already implemented. The Industrial Relations Act, for example, was repealed, the Employment Protection Act was introduced, improvements in pensions and other assistance were given to the retired and the disabled, child benefits were brought in, control of food prices and rents was established and steps were taken to nationalize the shipbuilding and aircraft industries.\(^{81}\) The observation of Coats, that the pact was not the cause of the Labour Party’s inability to pursue the more radical elements in its policy but was one important extra factor for Labour ministers to bear in mind,\(^ {82}\) clearly confirms our view regarding the minor Liberal influence. Moreover, it seemed that Callaghan did not want to pursue the more radical aspects of Labour policies and, as previously stressed, the Pact had provided a convenient excuse.

Following the successful resolution of the internal conflicts within both partners they were not enforced to modify their alliance strategies. In this context, it is important to demonstrate how the personal relationships between Callaghan and Steel influenced the subsequent political experience of each party during the termination of the agreement. This involves, first of all, the observation that both leaders coordinated their tactical moves concerning the election to come. Although the final date of the election was determined basically by the Government’s defeat
in the House of Commons in March 1979, it was in August 1978 that Callaghan decided he should not call a general election in the following autumn. As Lord Donoughue recalled,

Of course, the most important discussion was the one in 1978 when they agreed to break-off the negotiation [...] In summer 1978, Callaghan advised them to break the Pact because we probably will have a general election in the Autumn and he said again, in fatherly way, to Steel, you must not come in to an election with us, you must have an independent electoral position, therefore you must get out of the Pact in advance of the election.

For Steel, the end of the Pact over the preference of 'economic recovery' was in line with his decisive preference of 'obtaining governmental experience'. Whereas Liberals MPs were interested in policy gains, Steel wanted 'to be able to argue the case for a better way of running Britain and illustrate it as we've never been able to before by pointing to a successful period of political co-operation'. Thus, for Steel, the pact's collapse coincided with the period considered sufficient to establish his decisive preferences, namely, 'economic recovery' and the invaluable experience of cooperation with the government. For the decisive preference of 'economic recovery', the period from March 1977 to the end of May 1978 was crucial to achieving it. Hence, one could expect the collapse of the Pact once the visible (formalized) decisive preferences had been achieved. In other words, the end of the Pact can be seen as a 'natural collapse' considering one can identify the visible decisive preferences which led to its formation.

To sum up, section it was revealed that the Labour Party enjoyed dominant policy influence over economic issues,
whereas the Liberal Party obtained governmental experience. The former superior position was mainly due to the structure of the formal alliance, which did not provide the Liberals with ministerial portfolios. The latter position, on the other hand, was enhanced by the extensive consultation with Labour ministers and the successful mobilization of follower's dissatisfaction.

6.5 CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this chapter it was demonstrated that the Lib-Lab Pact was the product of bargaining between David Steel and James Callaghan. Whereas, for Steel, 'obtaining governmental experience' was a decisive preference to the formation of the pact, for Callaghan, 'economic recovery' was the decisive preference. Both leaders adopted 'economic recovery' as their decisive preference in order to minimize party disunity and establish some visible convergence of opinion.

Regarding the evolution of internal conflicts, it was shown that intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts evolved within the Labour Party and the Liberal Party, respectively. Whereas the former were manifest by massive dissensions in parliamentary divisions, the latter were evident after the Liberal executive called a special assembly of the party in order to discuss the pact's renewal. It was shown that the intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party were pacified mainly by the government's acceptance of numerous defeats in
parliament. On the other hand, the elite-follower conflicts within the Liberal Party were neutralized by Steel’s resignation threats.

Consequently, it was shown that a successful resolution of internal conflicts is a critical factor in obtaining a relatively high level of bargaining power. In the case examined, each partner possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power over its basic decisive preference. It was demonstrated that the Labour Party enjoyed dominant policy influence over economic issues, whereas the Liberal Party obtained governmental experience. The former superior position was mainly due to the structure of the formal alliance, which did not provide the Liberals with ministerial portfolios. The latter position, on the other hand, was enhanced by the extensive consultation with Labour ministers and the successful mobilization of follower’s dissatisfaction.

Finally, this chapter demonstrated that a formal minority government amongst weakly institutionalized parties is most likely to be relatively stable. A substantial reason for this lies in the partners’ ability to pacify internal dissatisfaction. Instead of being forced to modify alliance strategy, both partners can maintain the parliamentary co-operation without a threat to their stability or cohesion.
8. ROCARD'S MINORITY GOVERNMENT, FRANCE, 1988-1990

All the previous chapters were confined to parliamentary governments, the predominant form of government among the democracies of Western Europe and the Commonwealth. Additionally, the study covered formal and informal minority governments which involved highly institutionalized parties occupying governmental and external support positions. It now turns to examine the research question in semi-presidential systems, i.e. where the President has the de facto ability to intervene in the formation and the day-to-day operation of the government. It also assesses the intra-party consequences of an informal alliance involving a highly institutionalized party which occupies the external support position.

This chapter demonstrates the advantage of the weakly institutionalized party in terms of its ability to control internal conflicts as a result of a formation of an informal minority government. Such control is immediately translated into a dominant position in the bargaining arena. It also illustrates the disadvantage of the highly institutionalized party in terms of its inability to control followers' hostility which is manifested outside the party (i.e. violent demonstrations). Such difficulties are immediately translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary bargaining arena.

To support hypotheses 1 and 4, the chapter analyses the formation and the maintenance of the Rocard's 1988 minority
government. Its objective is to explain majority building by highly and weakly institutionalized parties and its intra-party consequences. To gain insight into the impact of intra-party politics on the alliance strategies of the French parties, during the first minority situation in the Fifth Republic, elite interviews were conducted in May 1990. The analysis, therefore, covers mainly the period May 1988–May 1990. The chapter begins with an introductory section which provides contextual data concerning trends in French politics during the period under examination.

The second section analyses the position of Rocard within the PS. Its purpose thereafter is to examine the presidential factor in minority government formation. With regard to the former aim, it will be shown that Rocard possessed a relatively weak position within the PS although he enjoyed the President’s endorsement, as well as popular support. With regard to the presidential determinant, it will be demonstrated that the informal minority government amongst the PS, the PCF, and the UDC parliamentary group was the product of Mitterrand’s strategy during the May 1988 Presidential election. It will be furthermore shown that it was Mitterrand’s theme of ouverture which determined Rocard’s decisive preference of ‘unity’.

The third section presents the evolution of intra-elite conflicts within the PS and the UDC parliamentary group, and the development of elite-follower conflicts within the PCF, as a result of the informal minority government. Its aim, thereafter, is to investigate the strategies adopted by the
PS, the UDC parliamentary group and the PCF elites in order to cope with the internal opposition. It will be demonstrated that whereas the PS elites allowed dissenting voices to be raised within the PS parliamentary group, as well as the formation of new factions, the PCF elites were enforced to modify their alliance strategy in order to cope with militants' protest outside the party. Additionally, the UDC parliamentary group was forced to modify its alliance strategy and to reaffirm its position with the opposition in order to maintain its stability.

A substantial part of the fourth section is devoted to an analysis of the inter-party relationships in the bargaining plane in light of the PCF failure and the PS success in neutralizing the internal opposition. It will be shown that the successful resolution of the intra-elite conflicts within the PS was translated into a superior position in the parliamentary bargaining plane. On the other hand, the failure of the PCF to resolve the elite-follower conflicts internally was translated into an inferior position in the bargaining plane. Special attention is given to the use of Article 49-3 which shapes the bargaining between the government and the National Assembly.

7.1 PARTY STRENGTH AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The most significant changes in the French party system from 1981 to 1988 were the transformation of the Socialist Party into a mainstream social-democratic government party,
the continuing and accelerating decline of the Communist Party, the weakening of the Socialist-Communist alliance, and finally, the emergence as an important force of the National Front.

The major constraint on the Socialist Party during the 1970s was the need for an alliance with the Communist Party. Moreover, the existence of a large pro-Moscow Communist Party loyal to the dogmas of Marxism and Leninism served to hinder the Socialist Party from developing into a 'catch-all' party able to rally the centre and middle class vote which is essential to any election victory and successful government. Since 1981, however, the French Communist Party has been subjected to a process of degradation in all aspects: a series of electoral failures, loss of positions of local power, fall in membership and drop in militant activity, and unfavourable development of its image in public opinion. Regarding national legislative elections, in 1978 the Communists won 20.7 per cent of the poll, 16.1 per cent in 1981 and 9.8 per cent in 1986 (see Appendix 7.1)

Clearly, the main beneficiaries of the Communist collapse were the Socialists since the steady decline of the Communist vote eliminated the Communist Party as a major force on the left. In 1978, this process contributed to the actual break up of the alliance with the Socialists. Strategically, the political game changed from being one of trying to maintain an alliance with the Communists to that of wooing voters away from the Right with an appeal to the traditional virtues of patriotism, administrative efficiency
and change within continuity, packaged as 'modernizing' socialism.\(^3\)

It was from the larger structural changes taking place within the French party system, particularly the slow but steady decline of the Communist Party, that the National Front emerged as a political force.\(^4\) Based on domestic issues such as immigration and security, the National Front had attracted between 8-11 per cent support during the period 1983-1986 in four very different elections: local elections in 1983, European elections in 1984, departmental elections in 1985 and legislative elections in March 1986.\(^5\)

The electoral breakthrough of the extreme Right in France since 1983 was enhanced by the political situation of a left which has proved disappointing in power, the political exploitation of the immigration issue and the capacity for turning the hostility of the media to its advantage.\(^6\) Logically, the political weaknesses of the National Front were related to its strength, namely issue voting. Following the gap between Le Pen's commitments to traditional values of the past and the basically non-traditional commitments of the largest group of its supporters, the leadership of the National Front failed to augment the latter group,\(^7\) as was manifested by the poor 1988s election results.\(^8\)

To explain the context in which Rocard's 1988 minority government operated, it is also necessary to appreciate how a particular French legislative institution, called the Article 49-3, shapes bargaining between the Government and the National Assembly. This Article is perhaps the most
potent of many Fifth Republic legislative institutions designed to restrict the legislative role of the parliament.\textsuperscript{9} According to the Article, when the government engages its own responsibility on a text, the Bill in question is considered to be passed unless a motion of censure is lodged and voted by an overall majority. In other words, in the vote of censure, both votes in favour and abstentions are considered favourable to the government. If the government fails to reach an absolute majority of the 577 deputies, under Article 49-3 the government is brought down. The Article, then, forces the National Assembly to choose between accepting the government's version of a bill and throwing the government out of office.

Of relevance here is the classification of French parties according to degrees of institutionalization. According to Panebianco, whereas the PS can be classified as a weakly institutionalized party, the PCF can be considered a highly institutionalized one.\textsuperscript{10} This classification is most visible with regard to the existence of factions within the PS. According to Cole, throughout the 1970s, there have been four major factions: Mitterrand, Mauroy, \textit{CERES}, and after October 1974 Rocard.\textsuperscript{11} The first two represent intra-party groups whose main strength lies within some aspect of the party organization. The latter two, in contrast, refer to those groups which maintain a high level of independent factional organization, in parallel to the party's official structure.\textsuperscript{12}

The rivalries between potential PS presidential
candidates is often considered the cause of the intra-party conflicts within the party. Yet, factionalism within the PS was not only subordinated by presidentialization. During the 1980s it was further mitigated by the ideological and sociological heterogeneity of the currents themselves, the factions lacking clear enough boundaries to pose a threat to the leadership.

In the June 1988 legislative elections no party obtained a majority in the National Assembly. The PS, who obtained 275 of the 577 seats, formed the first minority government in the history of the Fifth Republic. Theoretically, potential partners were the Gaullists (RPR, 130 seats), the UDF (90 seats), and the Centre (UDC, 41 seats) - as well as the Communists with 25 seats (see Appendix 7.1). This parliamentary situation provides a starting point to the analysis. How did it influence tactical consideration of party elites operating in a presidential system? What were the new patterns of government formation and maintenance which evolved during May 1988-May 1990? These questions will be investigated throughout the following sections.

7.2 THE PRESIDENTIAL FACTOR IN MINORITY GOVERNMENT FORMATION

To understand Rocard's alliance strategy during 1988-1990, it is necessary to appreciate his position within the PS, as well as Mitterrand's strategy in the 1988 Presidential elections. For the former, Rocard was clearly Mitterrand's choice as Prime Minister, rather than that of the PS.
Although Rocard enjoyed a relatively high level of popular support, he lacked the immediate support of his own party. His relatively small faction suffices to underline this argument. The Economist, furthermore, concludes that:

As a rebel of the most irritating sort (one whom time, in certain respects, has proved right), Mr. Rocard was never going to become a party darling just by becoming prime minister. Though popular with the public, his following among Socialists is small. His harping on politicians' failure to represent 'civil society', his insistence on giving opposition parties their due, his courtship of centre-right politicians - none of this is calculated to win the hearts of party workhorses.

Since Rocard was at the centre of a range of internal forces which had to be pacified or neutralised, his style of leadership becomes of particular importance. According to Machin, a shared leadership pattern had evolved between Rocard and Mitterrand, replacing the previous pattern of 'imperial presidency'. The solution of the crisis in the New Caledonia, for example, was clearly Rocard's work and most domestic policy choices appeared to have been worked out with little presidential intervention. The President did not publicly weigh in on the dispute between the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister about the rates for a reimposed wealth tax. Additionally, Mitterrand did not intervene when Rocard over-ruled his Justice Minister over a proposal to house those convicted of political violence with other prisoners.

Undoubtedly, Rocard's style of leadership was a critical factor which contributed to the shift towards a shared-leadership. According to Dominique Strauss-Kahn, PS member
of the National Assembly and the President of the Finance Committee,

Rocard tries to manage a form of consensus. I am not quite sure this is linked to the minority situation of the government. I think even if the Socialists had a huge majority, Rocard, for personal reasons, would have this kind of leadership. He is more a man of consensus than a man of a conflict. Of course, in the situation today, when the Socialists have no majority in the parliament, it is not only a question of taste, it is also a question of necessity.

Given Rocard’s relatively weak position within the PS, it is hardly surprising that a consensus-oriented strategy was implemented in the party arena. Yet, in order to have a complete picture of PS politics in late 1990 it is also necessary to appreciate Mitterrand’s strategy in the 1988 presidential elections.

La France Unie was the essential spirit of Mitterrand’s campaign strategy in the May 1988 Presidential election. He called for an opening of the new presidential majority to the centre and centre-right politicians, implicitly refusing the old Fifth Republic pattern of bipolarization between the Left and the Right. Additionally, he had rejected any parliamentary pact which might reduce his image as a candidate who could offer a synthesis of the various policies that had been adopted, under Left and Right, during his first seven-year presidency.

Additionally, throughout the campaign Mitterrand was careful not to call for a formal alliance. He promised implicitly that his election would be followed by a political realignment, and that a new presidential majority backing
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>24\4\88-08\5\88</td>
<td>F. Mitterrand elected as France’s President.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12\5\88</td>
<td>M. Rocard announced his minority Cabinet list.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14\5\88</td>
<td>F. Mitterrand dissolved the National Assembly and announced the first round of legislative election.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14\5\88</td>
<td>P. Mauroy elected as PS secretary by 63 votes to 54 votes for M. Fabius, who was supported by Mitterrand.</td>
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<td>05\6\88</td>
<td>legislative election</td>
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<td>12\6\88</td>
<td>P. Mehaignerie announced the formation of the UDC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23\6\88</td>
<td>M. Fabius elected as President of the Parliament.</td>
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<td>28\6\88</td>
<td>M. Rocard announced his enlarged Cabinet list.</td>
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<td>20\8\88</td>
<td>Signing of the New Caledonian Agreement.</td>
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<td>10\88-</td>
<td>Public sector strikes.</td>
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<td>06\11\88</td>
<td>National referendum on New Caledonian.</td>
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<td>09\12\88</td>
<td>A motion of censure against the government failed to win the necessary support.</td>
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<td>22\12\88</td>
<td>The 1989 budget aimed to reduce the budgetary deficit was adopted.</td>
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<td>12\88</td>
<td>First attempt by senior PCF members to circulate a dissident publication inside the party.</td>
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<td>12\3\89-</td>
<td>Local elections, the PS won control over an increased number of large towns.</td>
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<td>19\3\89</td>
<td>Threat to opposition leadership led by P. Seguin and M. Noir.</td>
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<td>4\89</td>
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<tr>
<td>15\6\89-</td>
<td>Election to the European Parliament with separate UDC list.</td>
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<td>18\6\89</td>
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<tr>
<td>25\9\89</td>
<td>C. Millon elected as parliamentary UDF leader.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11\2\90</td>
<td>RPR National Congress in which J. Chirac was re-elected unanimously as the RPR leader while leadership challenge continues.</td>
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<td>3\90</td>
<td>PS party congress at Rennes.</td>
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**Source:** Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1988-1990.

Mitterrand would have to be comprised of those centre and centre-right politicians who were willing to support the new President. Mitterrand’s view, however, did not preclude an alliance with the PCF. The PS gesture of reducing the number of seats required to form a parliamentary group, from 30 to 25, in order to institutionalize the PCF’s position within parliament as a potential partner, exemplifies this point.
As a partial explanation for the above strategy, reference to Mitterrand’s *Letter to all the French People*, provides a starting point. National unity was needed, Mitterrand claimed, due to the importance of the completion of the 1992 EC internal market. Special issues concerning France’s preparation for this step, such as educational training and poverty problems, were needed to be tackled peacefully by ‘a sort of dialogue’. However, a different explanation to the implementation of Mitterrand’s strategy suggests that the importance of the above-mentioned economic challenges can hardly be over emphasized. According to Cole, the ‘national unity’ slogan can be considered as an attempt to respond to the large consensus in French society on most aspects of policy prevailing amongst two-thirds of French voters after the contrasting experience of the 1981-86 Socialists and 1986-1988 Conservative governments.

The preferences that embody contested principles of policy or program direction (i.e. the decisive preference in alliance formation), Luebbert argues, were due to their impact in minimizing party disunity. Given Mitterrand’s 1988 campaign slogan, ‘La France Unie’, and the relatively weak position of Rocard within the PS, it is hardly surprising that ‘unity’ was adopted as the decisive preference in the bargaining towards the formation of the 1988 alliance. Such a preference implied that the PS would not form a formal alliance, as such a commitment opposes the essence of ‘solidarity’. Clearly, this broad aim would not have alienated any group within the PS and was sufficiently
focused to generate the widest possible support within the
PS, as well as, within its partners.

To understand why Rocard seriously took into account a
potential emergence of dissatisfaction within the PS, it is
necessary to appreciate the attitudes of large sections in
the party to any co-operation with the PCF or the Centrists.
The reluctance of these sections resulted from the alliance
strategy implemented by both the PCF and the Centre
throughout the 1970s. At the heart of the PCF alliance
strategy throughout the 1970s lay a certain ideological
affinity shared with the PS. After all, during this period
the two parties have, to a greater or lesser extent, co-
operated in the opposition as well as in government (1981-
1984). Clearly this does not mean that no conflict emerged
between the two parties. It does mean, however, that
relationships were easily manageable, not only as a result of
the ideological affinity, but also due to the PCF’s
dependence on Socialist support for the election of its
deputies and municipal councillors. The ideological
affinity, however, gave rise to a fear within the PS elite
when intra-party implications were examined. As Jean-Pierre
Worms argues,

From 1988 onward, the fear of a lot of Socialist rank-
and-file members or leaders is that the Communist Party
may cultivate a certain amount of discontent within the
salaried classes and could gain a new strength. This is
a sort of ideological blackmail or pressure which the
Communist Party can [exert] on the French Socialist
Party, especially on the rank-and-file members. So,
there is a pressure not to go far away from the
Communist Party. [Yet], the fact that the Communist
party apparatus now is very much old-style Stalinist
position makes co-operation with the Communist Party
very difficult [...]. Officially, the very strong opposition to certain type of Communists thinking is the Rocard group, but very deeply I would say that most of the leaders of the Socialist Party today are conscious of the necessity to separate [the party] clearly from the old-style [Communist] party but most of them do not dare to say it publicly.

This is not to say that the PC would unconditionally support the government nor did it mean that the PS government would likely to have such type of PCF support. It is rather to stress that beyond the Presidential constraints upon Rocard's alliance strategy, there was a reluctance within the PS to engage in formal co-operation with the PCF.

The UDC, which was led by Pierre Méhaignerie, represented the other possible partner for the government. As members of the CDS, the centrists could not dissociate themselves from the UDF. Yet, the very nature of Méhaignerie's skill enable them to disassociate themselves, at least temporarily, from their traditional right-wing allies. This was done by the establishment of a separate centrist group in the National Assembly, namely, the UDC, whose stated aim was to form a constructive opposition to the government. Not surprisingly, the formation of the UDC was strongly opposed by UDF leaders, such as Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Leotard. However, in spite of the criticism, the group consisted of 34 deputies with seven others allied to it, including Raymond Barre. The latter, in turn, stated that he would support the Socialist government whenever it was necessary in the interests of the country.

The group's position was partly inspired by the presence
of a small number of centrist and right-wing ministers in Rocard's government. These figures included the Labour Minister, Jean-Pierre Soisson (ex-UDF), the Minister of Overseas Trade, Jean-Marie Rausch (CDS), the Minister for Tourism, Olivier Stirn (ex-UDF), and the Secretary of State responsible for economic planning, Lionel Stoleru (ex-UDF). Their presence in the government meant that if the UDC censured the government, then it would also be censuring members of its own party and former colleagues. Moreover, it must also be noted that the centrists possessed a certain affinity for Rocard. He, therefore, was the person in the PS with whom the centrists felt that they were most able to do business.  

However conclusive such affinity has been, there were still attitudes which opposed co-operation with the Centrists, shared by the majority of the PS elite and the grass-roots. As Jean-Pierre Worms explains,

> There is a strong ideological reticence towards any form of agreement with the Centrist group or with politicians who come originally from the Centrist group [...] Even a man like the present Minister of Work and Employment, Jean-Pierre Soisson, who comes from the Barrist - Raymond Barre supporters- is still considered by a large fraction of the Socialist party members as somebody rather suspicious who cannot be trusted inspite of the fact that he is one of the best ministers in this government.

These factors indicated that Rocard's tactical moves, such as the 'opening' of his government to the centre-right politicians, have cleared the way to PS-UDC co-operation on grounds other than the formal one.

Given the internal constraints upon Rocard's strategy,
it is hardly surprising that he 'took great care in not being prisoner of any configuration'. An informal alliance, comprised of the PCF, the UDC and individuals MPs, was therefore formed on the basis of 'unity' in light of the 1991 EC's single economic market. By negotiating each issue separately and on an ad-hoc basis, the PS elites could pick the least 'expensive' alliance partners available, i.e. the one which does not pose a threat to the PS stability. This direction was confirmed by Rocard's legislative adviser, Guy Carcassone.

Among the 19 independents, 12 have already joined the 'presidential majority' and will never vote against Rocard. Thus, we just need to find 6 or 7 abstentions in the opposition if ever the Communists voted the dismissal. This may be quite easy as far more than 6 or 7 deputies would refuse to join their vote with those of the Communists, in an artificial majority without any future. We naturally know who can easily be convinced.

In addition to the above-mentioned informal alliance, Rocard could rely on Article 49-3. Two advantages of the Article were evident: (i) the government's dismissal would need a common vote of right and left-wing oppositions (129 RPR + 91 UDF + 41 UDC + 26 PCF + at least 2 of the 18 independents) in order to reach the absolute majority (289), and (ii) the government does not need a positive majority vote, i.e. it just needs 16 of the 305 'non-socialists' deputies to refrain from voting against it. Not surprisingly, thus, the government position in mid-1988 could be considered relatively secured.

To sum up, given the relatively weak position of Rocard within the PS combined with Mitterrand's theme of ouverture
in the 1988 presidential elections, it is hardly surprising that the former adopted 'unity' as his decisive preference in the bargaining over the alliance formation. We argued that Rocard seriously took into account a potential emergence of dissatisfaction within the PS as he was aware of the objection of large sections to any co-operation with the PCF or the Centrists. Thus, based on the decisive preference of 'unity', Rocard decided to form an informal alliance, comprised of the PCF, the UDC, and individual MPs, in order to minimize party disunity.

7.3 COPING WITH INTRA-ELITE AND ELITE-FOLLOWER CONFLICTS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PS'S INTERNAL FLUIDITY AND THE PCF'S STRUCTURAL RIGIDITY

To describe the extent of the internal dissatisfaction within the PS, the PCF and the UDC parliamentary group, requires specification of the voices which were recorded during 1989-1990. For the PS, intra-elite conflicts were particularly apparent between the parliamentary group and the government. The PS group saw itself as being relegated in importance behind the PCF and the UDC, with the government taking its support for granted. Additionally, there was a division between centrist factions, led by Rocard, and more leftist factions, due primarily to the negative reaction of many Socialist deputies to the government's effort to co-operate with the UDC in 1988. A partial explanation of this division is provided by Jean-Pierre Worms,

In my opinion, within the party, the only organized group which publicly opposed any sort of co-operation
with the Centrist would be the ex-Trotskyist, Julian Dray group. I would explain that, very cynically, by the fact that it is the only 'tendance' within the PS which is not represented in the government. [However], this is a very popular angle of attack on the government within the Socialist Party which was widely manifested during the preparation of the last Congress.

In the months following the passage of the 1989 Budget, therefore, the PS parliamentary group featured a militant disposition. The vote on the 10th Plan in March 1989, where the government had to use Article 49-3 in order to force dissident PS deputies into line, examplies this argument.

Perhaps most importantly was the effect of the preparation for the 1990 Party Congress in Rennes, where delegates, elected by the local federations, were supposed to debate policy and to elect the Comite Directeur, which determines the composition of the Executive Bureau. Whereas for much of the 1970s and 1980s the party consensus on Mitterrand's leadership enabled the party to escape internal divisions, in 1989 the various groups that formerly supported Mitterrand began to oppose each other as the party searched for a new First Secretary.

Before, as well as during the party Congress at Rennes in March 1990, numerous Socialists kept criticizing Rocard's government either because they did not accept the nature of the PS inter-party strategy or because they wanted to enhance their visibility. The division was marked primarily by a conflict between three individuals, namely, Lionel Jospin (Minister of Education), Laurent Fabius President of the National Assembly), and Louis Mermaz (President of the PS
According to The Times, the conflict reached a climax in the Party Congress.

For the first time since President Mitterrand took over the leadership of the Socialists in 1971, a party congress has ended in disarray. Hundreds of delegates at the congress in Rennes hissed and yelled at M. Louis Mermaz, a senior official, as he stood on the platform yesterday to announce that their leaders had failed to reach a consensus [...] Rivalry has consistently been a feature of these party congress, but, amid much brinkmanship those concerned have previously managed to produce a late compromise. This year’s failure to do the same puts the Socialists in the same boat as the deeply divided right-wing opposition and the Communists.

Dissatisfaction from Rocard’s alliance strategy was manifested also within the party base. Leftist militants, for example, called for a repositioning of the party to the left after the disappointing returns in many districts in the May 1989 Municipal elections. However, the dominant mode of the conflicts within the PS was, undoubtedly, an intra-elite one.

Intra-elite conflict emerged also within the UDC parliamentary group. Division surfaced between Pierre Méhaignerie, who wished the UDC to cooperate with the opposition, and Jacques Barrot, who favoured co-operation with the government. As a new parliamentary group, the lack of institutional mechanisms of conflict resolution together with the uninstitutionalised relationships between the group and the CDS contributed to the continuation of the internal conflict. Added to the negative influences of the above-mentioned division, were the June 1989 elections to the European Parliament in which the Centre list received only
8.4 per cent of the vote (see Appendix 7.2). Altogether, this led large sections of the parliamentary group to realize that they failed to achieve their objective, namely, a 'constructive opposition' to the PS minority government.

Contrary to the types of conflict which emerged within the PS and the UDC parliamentary group, elite-follower conflicts emerged within the PCF. The ex-Ministers, Anicet Le Pors and Andre Lajoinie, were notably more favourable to co-operation with the government, whilst militants from the Communist-led CGT wished the party to oppose the government’s economic policy. This conflict was recorded especially during the public strikes in October-November 1988. According to The Times, the October 20 strike was the first since 1968 that saw the leaders of the CGT marching in the same protest with those of the moderate Force Ouvrière. Moreover, violent demonstrations were conducted outside the Hotel Matignon, on November 23, by miners from the impoverished eastern region of Lorraine.

Whereas all the union federations accepted the government’s offer of two catch-up pay raises, militant workers from the CGT, did not want to follow the calls of the PCF elites for a compromise. Such a compromise was considered necessary in order to form a pact with the reluctant Socialist elites for the local elections which were due in the spring of 1989. Unless they did compromise, they risked losing some of their few remaining sources of power and patronage in France’s big towns. Additionally, the PCF elites assumed they had some tacit support from left-wing
Socialists unhappy with Rocard's government. This was especially significant in light of the latter's fear of losing touch with the party base in the public sector and teachers' unions, because, of 275 Socialist deputies, 115 have a background in teaching.32

Dissenting voices were also recorded inside the party. In the first attempt by senior party members in more than 60 years to circulate a dissident publication inside the PC, a new magazine - 'Reconstruction Communiste' - published in December 1988, attacked the secretary-general, George Marchais.33 This is not to say that those attacks were simply the result of cooperation with Rocard's government. It is rather to stress that the events in Eastern Europe and the public sector unrest in France throughout the winter and spring of 1988-1989 - a sector where the CGT is particularly strong - were equally if not more important.

Perhaps of equal importance is the evolution of intra-elite conflicts within the right-wing opposition parties. Given that numerous right-wing members, most notably, Raymond Barre, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Francois Leotard and Jacques Chirac, considered themselves candidates for the Presidency, it was hardly surprising that a division between the right-wing had evolved. The source of this division, organizational as well as ideological, manifested itself mainly as follows: (1) a break-away group from the centre-right, namely, the UDC, (2) a split in the UDF between Valery Giscard d'Estaing who aimed at leading the centre-right in 'constructive opposition' to Rocard, and Francois Leotard who
favoured alliance with the neo-Gaullists Jacque Chirac.

During 1988-1990, therefore, new and existing factions within the right-wing opposition parties had featured a militant disposition. Firstly, in April 1989 a group of young deputies, namely, the Renovateurs, emerged to challenge the established leadership of the right-wing elites by calling upon Giscard d'Estaing to relinquish his position at the head of a joint UDF/RPR list for the June 1989 election to the European Parliament. The faction failed to achieve its goal but support for the Renovators had grown to include 42 deputies and three senators.34

Secondly, in February 1990 a faction in the RPR, led by Charles Pasqua, and the Renovator faction, led by Philip Seguin, challenged the RPR leadership by putting forward their own joint motion which obtained 31.4 per cent of the national congress vote.35 This motion advocated a revival of nationalist Gaullist tradition to distinguish the RPR electorally from other right-wing parties and called for more party independence. Additionally, these dissenting RPR factions opposed the creation of the so-called Union Pour la France in November 1990, which was an umbrella organization for the RPR, UDF, and UDC designed to organise the opposition's electoral strategy for the regional elections in 1992 and the legislative elections in 1993.

Attention now turns to the resolution of the above-mentioned internal conflicts. At the outset, Rocard's major goal was, naturally, to control the legislative's policy output. In other words, he was motivated to maximize the PS
cohesion only to the extent that he could establish and maintain control over his party in Parliament. Cohesion at the price of control, therefore, defeated his purpose. Twofold strategy was, therefore, adopted in order to pacify the internal opposition within the PS. Firstly, dissenting voices which were raised within the parliamentary group did not trigger off a reaction from Rocard. Secondly, new factions were formed.

It was during such conflict situations that Rocard's style of leadership, negotiated consensus, became of the utmost importance in the resolution of the intra-elite conflict. Guy Carcassone, Rocard's legislative adviser, highlighted the first aspect of Rocard's strategy:

Naturally, some Socialists hardly accepted this new situation. But from time to time we let them present their own propositions without interfering. Generally they discover their inability to obtain a majority and call the government in rescue. This is certainly the best evidence of the fact that is we deal with other groups, it is not by pleasure or strategy but by mathematical necessity. However, it is true that Rocard has always been suspected of preferring a coalition with the Centrists to a coalition with the Communists (in fact, he would prefer no coalition at all if the PS were strong enough [...] ) The reasonably good relations we have with the first ones feed the suspicious. Yet, the PS cannot but see that we also have reasonably good relations with the Communists and that we keep the balance [...] And to any Socialist who would attack us on that matter, we would just ask for a better solution. 36

Clearly, Rocard assumed that the different factions would prefer to keep the Socialist Party in power despite the informal alliance with the Communists and the Centrists, rather than having a right-wing government.
The second aspect of Rocard’s strategy was the acceptance of the activities of new factions. As noted earlier, no consensus within the elite was reached in the party congress at Rennes. The battle was fuelled by Laurent Fabius and Lionel Jospin’s personal ambition to be the best placed to step into President Mitterrand’s shoes if and when, in the middle distance, he should step down. Division, thus, surfaced between the two which resulted in the break-up of the Mitterrand faction into two clear factions. First, Mermaz, Jospin and Mauroy coluded in order to form the M.J.M. faction. Second, the Fabius’s grouping which enjoyed Mitterrand’s support throughout the party Congress, and the Poperen’s grouping, remained within Mitterrand’s faction but were operating independently. Of course, all the new and established factions were still operating alongside the other factions, namely, Rocard, Chevenement and Julian Dray’s factions. Finally, after the factional split, a new list of deputies was drawn up in which each grouping had a fair share of the jobs.

Contrary to the successful resolution of the intra-elite conflicts within the PS, were the failures of both the UDC parliamentary group and the PCF to neutralize their internal opposition. For the former, the group leader, Pierre Mehaignerie, began shifting the UDC gradually back towards the RPR and the UDF, though this was not surprising in that it was already dependent upon them for the election of most of its deputies and councillors. Consequently, the ties
between the Centrists and their right-wing allies were institutionalised by the creation of the RPR/UDF/UDC parliamentary intergroup, the Opposition Coordinating Committee, the appointment of Shadow Spokesmen on different policy areas and the special opposition debates on particular issues such as education, immigration and decentralisation.

For the Communists, the strikes at Finance, a strong movement at the PTT, the dissatisfaction among the teachers and the strike at Peugeot indicated an increasing popular discontent. As the party lacked internal channels through which it could mobilize the internal dissatisfaction, its elites were forced to modify the party's alliance strategy, i.e. to break-up the informal alliance with the PS.

To sum up, whereas intra-elite conflicts evolved within the PS and the UDC parliamentary group, elite-follower conflicts emerged within the PCF. Taking advantage of the weakly institutionalized features of his party, Rocard adopted a twofold strategy in order to pacify the internal opposition within the PS. Firstly, dissenting voices which were raised within the parliamentary group did not trigger off a reaction from Rocard. Secondly, new factions were formed. The UDC and the PCF elites, on the other hand, were forced to modify their alliance strategy in order to neutralize their internal dissatisfaction. The former, furthermore, formally cooperated with the right-wing opposition parties, namely, the UDF and the RPR.
To understand the relatively high level of bargaining power possessed by the PS during 1988-1990, it is necessary to analyse the inter-party relationships in the bargaining plane. The passage of the 1989 and the 1990 Budgets provides an appropriate example. In France, there is not simply a single vote on the budget as a whole. Instead, there is a series of votes which determine the expenditure limits of each Ministry, as well as votes on the income component of the budget and on the overall equilibrium level.

The passage of the 1989 budget is a classic example of a government’s reliance on informal alliances. Negotiating each issue separately and on an ad hoc basis with the UDC and the PCF enabled the PS government to enjoy three advantages. Firstly, it could pick the least ‘expensive’ alliance partner available in policy terms. Secondly, it was able to escape any threats to its stability which might have followed a formal alliance. Thirdly, it avoided the use of Article 49-3 because it won the support on each vote of either the PCF or the UDC.

The government profited from this situation wherever possible by gaining the support of the PCF, or the UDC. As long as the Bills were politically moderate, either the PCF or the UDC (or even both RPR and the UDF) found themselves in situations where a mere refusal would be difficult to justify. Then, the government just had to deal with a few amendments which enabled the external support parties to
argue that they have obtained some concessions improving the Bill. Afterwards, either they voted for the text or they refrained from voting, which was enough. Communist abstention, for example, was reached over the education part of the Budget in which increased expenditures was manifested, while the UDC support was obtained for the employment part of the budget as the Minister concerned, Jean-Pierre Soisson, was an ouverture Minister. The government just had to keep a constant balance between the two possibilities and was doubly pleased to cooperate with these groups as it avoided using Article 49-3. Guy Carcasson, thus, even summarized this experience as a new sport in France, namely, ‘the parliamentary slalom’.

A comprehensive examination of the 1988 budget’s negotiation, conducted by John Huber, reveals four central features of the bargaining amongst the government and its informal partners: (i) there was no bargaining before the bill was presented by the Government to the National Assembly; (ii) there was no bargaining or compromise in the Finance Committee; (iii) the Government used the rules of legislative procedure to limit the importance of formal amendment activity and debate on the floor, as well as to shape voter perceptions of who should receive credit for particular policy outcomes; and (iv) the only forum for negotiating policy concessions was secret meetings between the Government and the leaders of the ‘pivot’ parties after debate of the bill on the floor had began.

Undoubtedly, features i, ii, and iv were adopted because
of the intra-party preoccupations of both the PS, the UDC parliamentary group and the PCF. The strategy of secrecy in the bargaining process, the reduction in the number of participants in the negotiation to the level of parliamentary group leaders, and the contraction of the bargaining plane (i.e. following the elimination of the Finance Committee as a bargaining arena), clearly suggest that the relevant elites aimed at minimizing internal dissatisfaction.

Such intra-party preoccupations were, of course, combined with electoral consideration. The PS, for example, could establish a public image of legislative independence whilst avoiding the cost of dividing the party by calming the fears of its deputies since the budget would not be voted strictly with the UDC. The latter, which was unsure how its strategy of 'constructive opposition' would play for the voters, could escape a deterioration of its image. Furthermore, as its deputies were elected through cooperation with the UDF, the RPR and the UDC, it could avoid problems with the latter parties. 39

In any event, it seems that the definition of the bargaining plane, as well as, the inter-party relationships over the 1989 budget, were dominated by the PS. The minor concessions which were recorded in that period exemplifies the argument. The income side of the 1989 budget, for example, was passed by the National Assembly by a vote of 274 to 229, with the Centrists grouping and the Communists abstaining. 40 Whereas the support of the Centrists was won by an agreement to cut the top rate of value added tax to 28
per cent from 33 per cent and a reduction in the *taxe professionelle*, the abstention of the Communists was won by reducing the housing tax on low-income families.

Any attempt to overemphasize the importance of these concessions is bound to be undermined. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the President of the Finance Committee, explains the nature of the inter-party relationships in the bargaining arena as follows:

I don't think the government had to pay something, but sometimes it accepted amendments which were not in contradiction with what the government wanted. For instance, [in 1988] the government decided itself to decrease the taxe *professionelle*, it was my own proposal [...] So it's not really a price to pay. It's just a kind of good manners. With the Communist [however] we had more difficult negotiation. Probably, you pay less price to the Centrists because they are less homogeneous than the Communists.\(^{41}\)

Clearly, this is not to say that the PCF and the UDC had no impact on the policy process and its outcomes. It is rather to stress that Lindblom's observation that all affected interests can have at least some influence in the policy making process is valid.\(^{42}\) Therefore, the relative bargaining power of the PCF and the UDC parliamentary group did not lie in the ability to affect the outcome, but rather some outcomes were designed with consideration of their position or objection.

Attention now turns to the inter-party relationships over the 1990 budget. Given the extent of the intra-elite conflicts within the PS and the UDC parliamentary group, and the elite-follower conflicts within the PCF, it was hardly surprising that the government did not face the same options
as it did in 1988. Both the PC and UDC groups made it clear before even the first budgetary vote in September 1989 that they were unwilling to support the government, thus forcing the use of Article 49-3. For a time it appeared that the gap might be bridged by conducting informal negotiation with the Communists, but after a short period it was clear that the concessions upon which the PCF insisted were unacceptable and were designed to be so as not be seen to support the government on such an important text.

Added to the negative influences of the elite-follower conflicts within the PCF, was the UDC strategy of a formal alliance with their right-wing allies. Not surprisingly, it could also not be seen to support the government on such a critical division. Yet, since the UDC lost their impact as a single bargaining entity, following the intra-elite conflicts, one could expect dissensions over critical divisions. Indeed, this was the case on the first two occasions where Article 49-3 was used to pass the Budget because several UDC deputies, notably, Raymond Barre, refused to censure the government. Consequently, on the other two occasions no censure motion was lodged by the opposition, thus avoiding any vote and any further embarrassing dissensions.

It is however misleading to contend that the break-up of the informal alliance undermined the PS bargaining power. At the outset, Rocard continued to use the two sides of his 'majorité stéréo', the PCF and the UDC, but, the use of Article 49-3 became more frequent. Whereas in the first year
this article was used only three times, in the parliamentary session of October-December 1989 it was used to pass four different Bills. In order to adopt to the lack of forthcoming external support, a three fold strategy was initiated. Firstly, an attempt to weaken the internal dissatisfaction during the passage of the 1990 Budget was recorded on several important fiscal issues, including an increase in the wealth tax where pressure from the PS group forced the government to accept amendments which it would not otherwise have done. Secondly, new electoral movement was launched. Thirdly, the government developed its contact with the 19 independent deputies in an attempt to enlarge its support base.

With regard to the second aspect, the government had taken the first steps towards constructing a new alliance. The launching of La France Unie, an electoral movement founded by Jean-Pierre Soisson, was an attempt to build upon ouverture and create a formal alliance with the centreground of French politics. According to one of its members, Jean-Marie Daillet,

He [Jean-Pierre Soisson] phoned me and told me; would you come along with me and try to organize the left-wing of the centre in order to counter balance the Socialists ?. The Socialists are in the middle of a big crisis [...] they need a partner [...] We started with some 30 people; we have a list of MPs which are not very happy inside the party group which they belong to now; they could provide us with parliamentarians who could built up a new group right in the middle of the Assembly. It would be a very peculiar one. It will be very heterodox, almost incoherent. Still, there is a common line for everyone; freedom of speech, freedom of vote [...].
Since it was a government initiative one might expect that the actual institutionalization of the movement as a parliamentary group or a political party would take place to ensure the government's survival should the need arise. By June 1990, for example, the few Senators and Deputies who rallied to this movement were sufficient to keep the government alive. Yet, as previously stressed, the stable position of the government during the period examined suggests that it intended to accelerate the institutionalization of the movement in the run up to a general election.

Additionally, the government developed its contact with the 19 independent deputies in an attempt to enlarge its support base. Whereas some of them, such as Bernard Tapie, were elected under the banner of the Presidential majority and rarely voted against the government, others had to be negotiated with and thus concessions had to be made in order to ensure the governmental majority over critical divisions.

Beyond the government's strategy to strengthen its parliamentary position, Article 49-3 and the political situation in which the Article operated also contributed to the relatively high level of bargaining power possessed by the PS. For the former, the government was able to legislate even though it lacked parliamentary majority. For the latter, it was clear that both the PCF and the UDC parliamentary group were unwilling to fight a general election as they sensed a poor performance. Thus, they were unwilling to join forces to bring the government down.
Finally, one might argue, of course, that there was also a price to pay for the frequent use of Article 49-3 in terms of the weakness of the government and its majority. However, the government's electoral cost of invoking this Article can hardly be over emphasized since the PCF and the UDC refused to enter serious negotiations with the government. In fact, this is an understatement. Both parties decided to make ideological and non-credible proposals in 1989. As the electoral costs of invoking the Article were already quite low, following the strategy of the opposition parties, the PS decided that the electoral benefits of avoiding an appearance of disunity outweighed the electoral costs of using the Article.

To sum up, the successful resolution of the intra-elite conflicts within the PS, Article 49-3 and the political situation in which the Article operated contributed to the superior position of the party in the parliamentary bargaining plane. On the other hand, the failure of the PCF to resolve the elite-follower conflicts internally was translated into an inferior position in the bargaining plane. During the period under examination, it was furthermore shown that the UDC parliamentary group could hardly be considered a single bargaining entity. The group was fragmented member by member, with very small groupings revolving around the few key ones. In light of these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the failure of the UDC parliamentary group to pacify the internal opposition was translated to an inferior position in the bargaining plane.
7.5 CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this chapter it was shown that the informal minority government amongst the PS, the PCF, and the UDC parliamentary group was the product of Mitterrand’s strategy during the May 1988 Presidential election. It furthermore demonstrated that it was Mitterrand’s theme of ouverture which determined Rocard’s decisive preference of ‘unity’. Indirectly, the type of the alliance and its participants were also a derived consequence of adopting ‘unity’ as a decisive preference.

Regarding the evolution of internal conflicts, it was shown that intra-elite conflicts evolved within the PS and the UDC parliamentary group whereas elite-follower conflicts developed within the PCF, as a result of the informal minority government. It was demonstrated that in order to deal with these conflicts, the PS elites allowed dissenting voices to be raised within the PS parliamentary group, as well as the formation of new factions. The PCF elites, on the other hand, were forced to modify their alliance strategy in order to cope with militants’ protest outside the party. Additionally, the UDC parliamentary group was forced to modify its alliance strategy and to reaffirm its position with the opposition in order to maintain its stability.

Finally, it was demonstrated that the successful resolution of the intra-elite conflicts within the weakly institutionalized party, Article 49-3 and the political
situation in which the Article operated, were critical factors in obtaining a relatively high level of bargaining power. On the other hand, the failure of the highly institutionalized party to neutralize followers' hostility was translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary bargaining plane. It can be concluded, therefore, that an informal minority government, involving a highly institutionalized party which face internal conflicts, is bound to be relatively unstable as its party elites must modify their alliance strategy in order to maintain party cohesion.
The comparative study of minority governments in west European party systems has attempted to demonstrate that, although it is tempting to conclude, as Strom does, that minority governments would prefer purely ad hoc coalitions, the case cannot be made for an equivalent comparison when one breaks free from the assumption that a party is a unitary actor. It is instead a study of the impact of intra-party politics on a party’s alliance strategy which provides a testable model suggesting that a formation of formal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for weakly institutionalized parties. The account of intra-party politics and minority governments in five west European party systems, furthermore, bears out this argument in detail. But, an extended view can emphasize the fact that our conclusion bore a direct impact on the study of coalition stability. Properly, the first priority must be to anticipate possible criticisms of the theoretical framework and to answer these with a restatement of its logic.

There are two varieties deserving particular attention. The first is the objection that the study focuses on intra-party conflicts which emerge following an alliance. Other sources of conflicts, such as personal or opposition of principal, thus, are being neglected. A second claim concerns two assumptions – namely, minimal size and minimal number of alliance’s members – which are needed to be incorporated into the theoretical framework.
For the former, intra-party conflict was strictly defined in the context of coalitional behaviour mainly because the focus of the thesis was on internal conflicts which emerge as a result of a party’s coalitional behaviour. This is not to say that other sources of internal conflicts are less important. It is rather to stress that the organizational characteristics which significantly effect the elites’ ability to neutralize internal dissatisfaction do not depend on the conflict’s source. The arguments developed here and summarized in the first section of this chapter, thus, are valid whatever the source of the internal conflict is.

The second objection should be similarly evaluated in light of the thesis’s logic. The advantage of loosely organized parties in pacifying internal dissatisfaction combined with the disadvantage of the rigid parties to perform the same task, seem relevant whatever the size of a coalition is. The size of an alliance (i.e. whether minority or majority status), however, might effect the likelihood of such conflicts, as well as their intensity and extent. Yet, the analysis does not aim at predicting the evolution of internal conflicts. On the contrary, all the hypotheses (except of the conclusion concerning a highly institutionalized party which occupy a governmental position) are conditioned by the evolution of intra-party conflicts. Once such conflicts occur, whatever the size of the coalition, one can rely on the insight of the thesis in order to predict a party’s bargaining power.
A classic example of the applicability of our model to majority coalitions is the Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD during 1966-1969 in the West German polity. Given the highly institutionalized features of the latter party,² it is hardly surprising that elite-follower conflicts which emerged were manifested by dissenting voices outside the party. According to Padgett and Burkett,

A storm of protest followed. The party headquarter was deluged by telegrams, street demonstrations abounded as disgruntled voters asked Brandt to give them back their votes, and Gunter Grass warned that radicals would turn elsewhere for their protest. Where they turned was to the NPD on the right and to the 'APO' [extraparliamentary opposition] on the streets. During the next three years there were scenes reminiscent of Weimar as the young, the radical and the dissident left took to the streets [...].

The inability of the SPD to neutralize its followers' hostility was translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary bargaining arena. The SPD Minister of Economic Affairs launched Keynesian pump-priming programme to rescue the economy, rather than any socialist program of income distribution or nationalization of industry.⁴ The fact that the Grand Coalition lasted for only three years whereas coalitions of one of the big parties with the FDP have prevailed, furthermore, emphasizes the uneasy alliance of the SPD with the CDU/CSU.

The objection concerning the second assumption (namely, minimal number of coalition members), on the other hand, is of utmost relevancy in the discussion concerning the institutional determinant of coalition stability presented in the second section. This assumption provides the basis
upon which it can be argued that a coalition which involves highly and weakly institutionalized partners is most likely to be relatively unstable, whereas a formal alliance comprised of weakly institutionalized parties or an informal alliance which involves a highly institutionalized party which occupy a governmental position, are most likely to be relatively stable. To begin with a summary of the thesis's arguments is the first business.

8.1 THE DYNAMICS OF MINORITY RULE

The concern of the preceding chapters has been to deal with political parties as complex organizations and to strike a middle course, between non-comparison and overabstraction, by applying a theoretical model to a relatively large number of cases in different party systems. Political conflicts, it was argued, are to be seen essentially as bargaining situations. Political parties in multi-party systems face a bargaining problem which refers to the need for party elites to reach some settlement in parliament, but, at the same time, the wish to settle on terms favourable to themselves.

The bargaining problem indicates that the fundamental relationships considered here are those between intra-party conflict and a party's bargaining power, and their effect on the party's alliance strategy. With a practicable political context for the formation of alliance strategy, it was further argued that party institutionalization is an intervening variable, as intra-party relationships are mainly
matters of manageability, rather than solely a matter of democracy. In other words, party institutionalization and the nature of intra-party conflict affect the party's bargaining power in the parliamentary arena.

Intuitively, it is tempting to accept Groenning and Panebianco's argument that the more centralized parties are, the stronger they are as coalition actors. However, the thesis suggested that the value of the institutional mechanisms to mobilize internal dissatisfaction have been underestimated by both scholars. At the heart of the dissertation's strategy lies the notion that it is the weakly institutionalized parties that are characterized by diffused mechanisms for internal dissent, as well as the ability to establish new mechanisms. Therefore, as long as dissenting activities take place within those channels, the weakly institutionalized parties tend to possess more defences with respect to internal challenges than highly institutionalized parties.

It is important at this point to reiterate the status of those explanatory generalizations about to be made. They do not claim, nor are they designed to imply, a general theory of European minority governments. They are de facto generalizations, to be assumed as relevant mainly to the cases examined here within the period chosen. It is, furthermore, an addition to the modest stock of systematic middle-level observations with appropriate theoretical formulations.

The central de facto generalization pursued over the
foregoing pages, 'the dynamics of minority rule', the thesis of which now merits a recapitulation: that in multi-party systems within which minority situations occur, a formation of formal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for a weakly institutionalized party whereas a formation of informal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for a highly institutionalized party which occupies a governmental position. But is, in fact, the case made? Is the generalization valid which claims that the bargaining power of the party elites in the parliamentary arena is a function of their ability to neutralize internal opposition?

An affirmative answer begins with a return to the arguments, presented in the empirical-based sections. Table 8.1 presents four groupings of parties which differ in the way intra-party conflicts were manifested and resolved, as well as, the derived consequences in terms of bargaining power. Whereas intra-elite opposition within the weakly institutionalized parties pursued only the voice option within party bodies and the parliament, such an opposition within highly institutionalized parties adopted the exit option, as well as the voice mode within party bodies. Additionally, whereas followers' hostility within weakly institutionalized parties adopted the voice option, such an opposition within highly institutionalized parties pursued the exit option, as well as, the voice alternative outside the party.
Additionally, the argument that top party elites tend to exert greater influence on elite members than on party activists was especially visible in the highly institutionalized context. In this setting, whereas voices were manifested internally in cases of intra-elite conflicts, this option was evident outside the party in cases of elite-follower conflicts. In other words, the party elites found it perhaps impossible to control followers' dissatisfaction due to the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent.

In the weakly institutionalized setting, the above argument is not valid because the thesis investigated only one case of elite-follower conflict. Still, voices were manifested internally whatever the type of the conflict was.
It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that within a weakly institutionalized context, the control of the party elites on their members and followers was dependent to a large extent on their ability to mobilize internal dissatisfaction through the internal network, rather than their control on the distribution of 'selective incentives'. Within a highly institutionalized context, an opposite trend seems to be the case.

With regard to the elites' ability to neutralize internal dissatisfaction it was shown that whereas weakly institutionalized parties had resolved the conflict internally without having to modify their alliance strategy, highly institutionalized parties failed to pacify internal opposition without changing their coalitional behaviour. The existence of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent seems a critical factor which contributed to the above process. Dissenting activities within weakly institutionalized parties did not trigger off elites' reaction. Party elites could rely on the assumption that the support of their members over critical divisions is forthcoming.

A different picture was evident in the case of highly institutionalized parties. In order to cope with intra-party dissatisfaction, party elites adopted a multi-stage strategy. Firstly, structural constraints were imposed on the day-to-day operation of the government. The Danish case (SD, 1977-78) and the Norwegian one (SP, 1985-86, 1989-90) spring immediately to mind. Different tactics were adopted by the Italian Communist Party. It established a transitional
period before a formal alliance was formed, as well as initiating an 'explanatory pedagogy' and an 'articulation of ends'. Secondly, all the highly institutionalized parties under investigation finally modified their alliance strategy in order to maintain party cohesion and stability. In other words, these elites failed to pacify the internal dissatisfaction without changing their alliance strategy.

Attention now turns to the relative bargaining power possessed by the parties in the different groupings. It will be recalled that the advantage of the weakly institutionalized parties was rooted in their organizational weakness. The existence of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent significantly improved their ability to cope with internal challenges. Not surprisingly, their advantage was translated into a superior position in the parliamentary bargaining plane.

The highly institutionalized parties, on the other hand, were significantly affected by the lack of such mechanisms. Their inability to pacify internal dissatisfaction was translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary bargaining plane. This is not to say that these parties lacked impact on the policy process and its outcomes. On the contrary, Lindblom's observation, that all affected interests can have at least some influence in the policy-making process, appears to be valid. However, the bargaining power of those parties did not lie in their ability to effect the outcome. Rather, some outcomes were designed with consideration of their positions.
An additional constraint on the operation of such parties was the evolution of followers' dissatisfaction which was manifested mainly outside the party. Highly institutionalized parties which faced such an opposition had to change their alliance strategy immediately. The general strike of the metal workers at the end of 1977, as a result of the co-operation of the PCI with the DC, and the violent demonstration by CGT members, as a result of the co-operation between the PCF and the PS over the 1989 Budget, contributed to the decision of the PCI and the PCF to modify their alliance strategy. The immediate change in PCF and the PCI's alliance strategy indicates the extremely low level of bargaining power possessed by the party elites.

A different presentation of the above-mentioned conclusions, provides a better insight on the preferable strategies of parties in minority situations. Table 8.2 presents four groupings of highly institutionalized parties according to two dimensions; their parliamentary position and the type of alliance they pursued. A comparison amongst the four groups reveals that highly institutionalized parties in a governmental position which form informal minority governments tend to possess a relatively high level of bargaining power. On the other hand, whenever such parties form formal minority governments, they tend to possess a relatively low level of bargaining power.

A substantial reason behind this conclusion probably lies in the fact that intra-party conflicts seem less likely
to occur as a result of informal alliances and the control of the highly institutionalized parties over ministerial portfolios (i.e. policy formation and implementation). By avoiding formal alliances, such parties minimize potential conflicts, as well as maximize their policy gains. Negotiating each issue separately and on an ad hoc basis enables highly institutionalized parties to select the least 'expensive' alliance partner available. 'Expensive' refers to both the threat a partner might pose to their stability, and to its policy demands.

With regard to the relative bargaining power possessed by the weakly institutionalized parties under examination, Table 8.3 presents three groupings over the same dimensions presented above. At the outset, no cases of weakly institutionalized parties which provide an informal external
Figure 8.3  Bargaining Power of Weakly Institutionalized Parties during coalitional Behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary Position</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>External Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CP (Nor.)</td>
<td>Lib. (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>1977-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>BP +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lab(U.K.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DC (Ita.)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976-79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RV (Den.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988-90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BP +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informal</td>
<td>PS (Fra.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988-90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BP +</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

support were examined. Only one case was examined in each of the following categories: informal alliance/external support and formal alliance/government. However, a comparison of the three groups reveals no clear differences in terms of the relative bargaining power possessed by those parties. All the weakly institutionalized parties under investigation possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power over, at least, one of their decisive preferences.

A substantial reason behind this conclusion lies in the flexibility of such parties in terms of their ability to pacify and neutralize internal dissatisfaction without modifying their alliance strategy. The source of this flexibility seems to be primarily structural. The existence of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent enables the party elites to mobilize and control internal opposition. Such an
advantage is immediately translated into a superior position in the parliamentary bargaining arena.

The above-mentioned conclusions raise two basic questions, as follows: (i) Why do some highly institutionalized parties form formal alliances?, and (ii) Why do some weakly institutionalized parties form informal alliances?. For the former, highly institutionalized anti-system or protest parties might seek legitimacy through a formal alliance with a governmental party (PCI, 1976-1979). Additionally, a highly institutionalized party which occupies a governmental position might be willing to commit itself to formal co-operation in order to 'share' the 'burden' of economic crisis (SD, 1978-1979).

Regarding weakly institutionalized parties, an informal alliance might be the plausible strategy to be implemented by a new party which would like to avoid being identified (in ideological terms) with a governmental party. A classic example is the informal alliance between the new Democratic Renewal Party and the Social Democratic Party in Portugal during 1985-1987. Additionally, a 'bad' past experience of co-operation might lead to the formation of an informal alliance. This reason seems most relevant in the case of the external support provided by the Socialist Party to the Social Democrats in Portugal during 1985-1987, as a result of the 'turbulent' co-operation amongst both parties during 1983-1985. Another case is when a parliamentary situation enables a weakly institutionalized party to take for granted the external support of other weakly institutionalized
parties. A classic example is the relationship between the CPP-V-RV government and the external support parties, CD and the KrF, in Denmark during 1989-1990.

Up to now, the thesis has established that intra-party conflicts bore a direct impact on a party's alliance strategy in minority situations. The interesting question is what this conclusion really entails? Is it restricted to the realm of minority governments or does it bear an impact on other aspects of coalition behaviour? In the next section, the thesis demonstrates the relevancy of its findings to the study of coalition stability by comparing the duration of the minority governments under study according to their composition and the degree of formality.

8.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANT OF COALITION STABILITY

The idea this study raises at the final stage of the analysis is that there is a need for scholars of cabinet durability to concern themselves with party attributes. Cabinet durability - the length of time an incumbent cabinet government survives in office without an election, government's resignation and changes in party membership of cabinet or Prime Minister - has long being viewed as a critical indicator of coalition maintenance. Several approaches have been suggested as factors affecting cabinet durability.

The 'regime attributes' approach has concentrated on the relationship between cabinet stability and a number of
features of the political system in general, such as the 'size' or fragmentation of the party system. Another tradition, the 'coalition attributes' approach, looks at properties of particular coalitions that might contribute to their stability, the most obvious of which is majority status. A third possibility is to look at the structure of the bargaining system within which coalitions must exist. A more recent attempt, the 'events' approach, takes into account the fact that the actual downfall of a cabinet is typically the product of a particular 'critical' or 'terminal' event that is liable to occur at any time during its life.

Undoubtedly, it was Paul Warwick's study of cabinet durability which has achieved the most interesting result. Warwick reported that approximately 50 per cent of the variance in cabinet duration is explained by the conjunction of the independent variable; cabinet majority status, number of governing parties, minimal winning cabinet status, and an index of ideological cleavage among cabinet actors. However, a large number of above-mentioned models, which are based on structural variables, failed to improve upon prediction of cabinet duration. This, in turn, leads to the assertion that while such factors may contribute substantially to some coalition processes of formation and payoffs allocation, they should not be expected to significantly affect cabinet durability.

At this stage, the thesis suggests an alternative explanation for cabinet durability, namely 'party
attributes'. To understand how party attributes affect coalition stability, it is necessary to assume a minimal number of members in political coalitions. Arguing along this basic assumption, any change in a party's alliance strategy should affect the status of the coalition.

As noted in the first section, two types of alliances, involving different mixture of party attributes, were found to be relatively immunized against the negative influences of internal conflicts (i.e., in terms of the need of party elites to modify alliance strategy). Firstly, formal alliances amongst weakly institutionalized parties were found to be relatively effective in minimizing party disunity. Secondly, informal alliances which involved highly institutionalized parties occupying a governmental position were found to be relatively effective in deterring internal conflicts.

At the opposing extreme, formal alliances amongst weakly and highly institutionalized parties were found to be much less effective in minimizing party disunity. In fact, this is an understatement. All the case studies under examination, which involved such alliances, were bound to destabilize the highly institutionalized partner. The failure of all those party elites to neutralize internal dissatisfaction, finally, led to a modification of the party's alliance strategy.

Further research can therefore examine the following set of hypotheses: (i) informal alliances which involve highly institutionalized parties occupying a governmental position, as well as formal alliances amongst weakly institutionalized
parties are most likely to be relatively durable, and (ii) formal alliances between highly and weakly institutionalized parties are most likely to be short-lived co-operations.

These hypotheses derive from the thesis' conclusion which contradicts a well-known theory of minority government which suggests that formal external support agreements are the least attractive legislative strategy for minority governments that want to maximize their policy influence. This theory is based on the assumption that a party is a unitary actor. Viewing a party as a complex organization, however, reveals a different picture. The preceeding chapters demonstrated that Strom's theory cannot be applied to cases which involves weakly institutionalized parties. Weakly institutionalized parties which coalesced formally were proved to be able to pacify internal dissatisfaction, and at the same time, to possess a relatively high level of bargaining power.

At this stage one may raise the following question: Does 'ideology' matter in coalition stability? Some theorists have identified the degree of preference agreement among some set of actors as decisive in determining the outcome of coalition stability. The basic notion of 'closed coalition', i.e. that coalition is predicted to form which is winning and in which all members are adjacent on some dimension of preference, has been raised by De Swaan. Perhaps the most important variation which has been imposed upon this basic concept is Axelrod's notion of the 'Minimal
This is a coalition which meets the following criteria: (1) winning, (2) connected, in the sense that all members are adjacent on an affinity (policy) scale, and (3) minimal in the sense that it contains no more members than are necessary for a closed coalition to win.

A contradictory argument concerning the ideological-incompatibility amongst coalition members, was suggested by Panebianco. Based on the view that an environment with competitors (i.e. ideologically similar) is complex and therefore unpredictable, he argued that an alliance between two competing parties is likely to threaten both parties' identity. The paradoxical effect - contradicting Axelrod and De Swaan's theory of coalitions - is that the most stable alliance take place among opponents (i.e. ideologically distant) while the least stable takes place among competitors.

Throughout the proceeding chapters, 'ideology' was taken to signify an issue which is a target for activity by intra-party opposition. 'Ideology', therefore, was analysed as a mean in the power struggle within a party. By raising an ideological issue, one could expect dissatisfied party members to organize themselves around the matter. Party elites and members could use or take advantage of 'ideology' so as to improve both the degree and efficiency of the mobilization effort, as well as to consolidate their own power positions. Not surprisingly, the thesis found out that most of the internal conflicts under investigation had been
evolved over matters of 'ideology'.

With regard to ideological compatibility/incompatibility of alliance members, it is important to recognize that this factor may depend upon the circumstances. In a given time, a party's decisive preference may be compatible with its partner's decisive preference, although both are diverging with respect to all other policies. The PCI-DC alliance during 1976-79 in the Italian polity and the SD-V alliance during 1978-79 in the Danish polity suffice to underline this point. Therefore, one must not think - as Axelrod and Panebianco do - of ideological incompatibility in an absolute or fixed sense.

Other explanation of governmental stability have focused on the presence of anti-system or other 'extreme' parties. Powell's comprehensive study, for example, suggested that the strength of extremist parties is the major explanation of executive instability. It plays the major role in linking ethnicity and electoral law to executive instability. Similarly, Sartori argued that the presence of extremist parties has a destabilizing effect on the overall political system.

In light of the thesis, the above observations deserve modification. Destabilizing effects within the extremist party, as well as the party system, are most likely to occur under the following conditions: (i) the party is characterized by highly institutionalized features, (ii) the party does not occupy a governmental position, and (iii) the party forms formal or informal alliances. The PCI strategy
and its intra- and inter-party consequences during 1976-1979 in the Italian polity springs to mind. Another example of a highly institutionalized party which disintegrated as a result of its coalitional behaviour - the SF - was recorded in Denmark during 1966-1968. Any change in these conditions however is less likely to be manifested in executive stability and destabilizing effects in the party systems. The Eshkol IV government during 1967-1969 in the Israeli polity, which comprised of an highly institutionalized, anti-system party (namely, Gahal) is a classic example of a relatively stable government in Israeli terms.

Finally, the above discussion of the institutional determinants in coalition stability leaves us with a surprisingly favourable impression of specific types of alliances. To be sure, minority situations tend to cause internal conflicts due to the complex process of constructing legislative majorities and the probable co-operation with untraditional partners. Yet, weakly institutionalized parties which form formal alliances and highly institutionalized parties which form informal alliances whilst occupying a governmental position enjoy substantial advantages in terms of bargaining power and are likely to maintain a relatively stable alliance. Clearly, other alliances are in most respects inferior to the above-mentioned alliances.
8.3 CLOSING THE LACUNA OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR

During the late 1980s, a 'revolution' in the study of minority governments and intra-party politics was evident. Such a revolution just leaves us with a new beginning - it has to be followed up and made to bear fruit. The aim of this thesis was to raise new promises and to backed them with an appropriate theoretical framework. Furthermore, the use of a cross-national perspective was fundamental to the thesis' strategy. Beyond the genuine interest in the relationships between intra-party politics and coalitional behaviour, the choice of the Danish, Norwegian, Italian, British and the French cases was motivated by the desire to demonstrate the utility of middle-level comparison.

The dynamics of minority rule is therefore a generalization of resolutely modest ambition; it is not presumed to apply to parties beyond its geographic and temporal limits. Yet a determination to delimit the thesis' conclusions does not eliminate the possibility that its approach would be equally illuminating when applied to another cross-national assortment of cases. The conclusions, which aim at contributing to the field of coalitional behaviour, were formulated in general terms. The attempt to close the lacuna of coalitional behaviour, in fact, might well be helped by the core argument developed here which was examined by a core method (i.e. cross-national comparison). The thesis, therefore, tries to avoid the sterile abstraction inherent in universal comparison in search of
law-like generalizations, without simultaneously accepting the chaos of a comparative school consisting primarily of one-nation expertise.

In all of these studies far greater stress could be placed on parties as complex organizations. Ultimately, it is absurd to explain the behaviour of any party by abstracting it from the changing social reality in which it operates. However, it is equally important for the student of parties to appropriate a measure of autonomy from the society around it. A substantial view underlying this study was that although parties are constrained constitutionally and socially by popular sentiment and cleavage structure, they are regularly able to exercise a significant degree of political independence. The thesis also accepts the notion that party behaviour stems from the independence of its elites as bargaining actors.

A focus on political parties as organizations in the study of coalitional behaviour, which deemphasizes the 'rational actor' assumptions still so prevalent in the field, would discard their continued characterisation as office-seeking players. It would judge the internal dynamics of political parties as themselves influential to the outcome of political processes. While it would not of necessity have to proceed from the standpoint of party institutionalization, a detailed knowledge of any party elites' perception of their political mandate over time and their emphasis on certain political goods over others could contribute to a more subtle understanding of these dynamics. Plausible explanations
concerning why parties do not appear to respond to certain coalition pressures, despite the penalties that apparent passiveness entails, and yet exhibit remarkable sensitivity to other demands, regardless of their limited policy benefits, might well result from the effort.

Lastly, in carrying through this project, the principal intention has not been to present only another study of coalitions in Western Europe but rather to attempt something more ambitious by taking a fresh look at coalition politics from an intra-party perspective. Inevitably, in view of the complexities of the subject, such an approach has to be inductive in its methodological design. The reliance on the method of elite interviewing has enabled us to relate internal conflict, which were manifested formally, as well as strifes which occurred behind 'closed doors', to coalitional behaviour. Yet, the logic of inquiry was deductive in nature. After the model was constructed, the field research began. If one takes into consideration this research strategy, as well as the scope of the analysis, one must first of all adjust to the loneliness of the undertaking.
NOTES

Introduction

1. For the traditional argument that minority governments are short-lived, see:


For the traditional argument that minority governments are ineffective, see:


For the uni-casual explanation, see:

Von Beyme, K. Political Parties in Western Democracies.


See also:


Warwick, P. 'The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 11, no. 4, January 1979, pp. 465-98.


See also:


36. Luebbert, G.M. Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel. (New-York:


Internally generated parties develop in a three-stage process. First, groups of parliamentarians are formed. Second, local election committees are formed in the electorate. Third, some kind of connection between the two first stages is established. The externally generated parties follow the same pattern, but instead of groupings of parliamentarians, Duverger mentions the activity of non-political organizations, such as the trade-unions in the development of socialist parties, as independent factors in the first stage.


Factionalism is defined as a situation where politics is dominated only by few people within unorganized and unstable groupings. This is identical to the first stage in Duverger's model of internally generated parties. Polarization is the stage where politics has broken out of its clique character to become linked to social forces, and where participation is expanding. The political leaders will try to bind the polarized masses into effective organizations in the expansion phase, while with an established party systems institutionalization, phase four, is reached.


Chapter Two


see also:


11. The degree of stability is related to horizontal exchanges (elite-elite exchanges), and, in particular,
to the character of compromises (whether stable or precarious) at the organizations' upper echelons. The degree of cohesion, on the other hand, is based upon the extent to which vertical exchanges (the elite-follower exchanges) are concentrated in the hands of the few, or are dispersed amongst numerous leaders [Panebianco, A. Political Parties: Organization and Power. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 39].

12. No matter what the extent of the organizational decline, exit and voice could fail to alert the elites if they are not perceived by them as an attempt to change their strategy. One can actually think of a situation in which this seemingly quite unlikely event would come to pass: when a decline in party membership hits simultaneously most parties in a party system, each party would garner in some of the disgruntled members of the other forms while losing some of its previous members to its competitors. In these circumstances the exit option (i.e. the decline in party membership) is ineffective in alerting the party elite to its failings. Clearly, therefore, elites must perceive internal conflict as an attempt to change their strategy, and identify patterns of organizational decline related to their party.


For a different definition of inter-party commitments in minority situations, see:

Maor, M. 'The Dynamics of Minority Rule: A Bargaining Based Theoretical Framework', Paper presented at the
Joint Sessions of Workshops of the ECPR, Bochum, April, 1990.


29. For examples of elite interviewing, see:


32. Sidney Verba has noted that a particular advantage of open-ended questions in cross-national survey research lies in the potentially different meaning that respondents in different cultures attach to a similar-sounding items.


12. Six such rules have been summarized by Erik Damgaard (1990) on the basis of Tage Kaarsted's (1988) work: (a) If uncertainty about the appointment of a new government arises, the parties will have to give their advise to the Crown. (b) If these advises unambiguously point towards a
majority government or a minority government supported by a majority, the Crown has to follow these advises. (c) If no majority can be found, the most viable minority must be found. (d) The interpretation of the advises of the parties is the responsibility of the acting Prime Minister, not of the Crown. (e) During the opening phases of the process, an informateur might be appointed. (f) The advises given by the parties are not subject to specific rules or norms as regards their framing or their wording.

See:


See also:


44. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1975, p. 28269.


Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1988, p. 36050.


The confidentiality of the agreement is confirmed by:

Lone Dybkjaer, interview with the author, May, 1989.

Chapter four


18. For a theoretical and empirical application of the concept see:


34. Hanna Kvanmo, interview with the author, October, 1990.

For Kvanmo’s position in the mid-1970s, see:


38. Per-Kristian Foss, interview with the author, October, 1990.
42. Einar Forde, interview with the author, October, 1990.
45. Lars Roar Langslet, interview with the author, October, 1990.
   See also,
52. Arne Synnes, interview with the author, October, 1990.

60. Kare Willoch, interview with the author, October, 1990.


73. Tor Mikkel Wara, interview with the author, October, 1990.
74. Carl Hagen, interview with the author, October, 1990.
75. Nationen, 6.10.89, p. 2.
78. Ole Gabriel Ueland, interview with the author, October, 1990.
80. Per Ditlev-Simonsen, interview with the author, October, 1990.
82. Per Ditlev-Simonsen, interview with the author, October, 1990.
Chapter five


4. Surprisingly, extremely dynamics socio-economic system did not encouraged alternation of parties in power as has occured in the other major countries in Western Europe - such as, the U.K., France and West Germany. It, thus, represents the continuous and successful adaptation of a complex organizational structures to environmental changes and political challenges. For this conclusion, see: Pasquino, G. 'Italian Christian Democracy: A Party for all Seasons', West European Politics, vol. 2, no. 3, October 1979, p. 88.


For the structure of DC factions, see,


37. Graziano, for example, argues that in Italy, political convergence is likely to occur, if at all, through a struggle for hegemony and would result in a pattern of politics both more participatory and dynamic than classic consociational democracy. See, Graziano, M. 'The Historic Compromise and Consociational Democracy: Toward a New Democracy?', International Political Science Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 1980, pp. 345-368.


41. Alessandro Natta, interview with the author, October 1989.


44. Giorgio Napolitano, interview with the author, October 1989.

45. Luebbert, G.M. Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel. (New-York:

47. Giorgio La Malfa, interview with the author, October 1989.


59. Tarrow, S. 'Historic Compromise or Bourgeois Majority:

60. Cervetti, G. 'A Mass Debate on the Party, the Movement and the Political Picture', The Italian Communists, no. 2, April-June, 1977, pp. 119-128.


70. Lowi, T.J. The Politics of Disorder. (New-York: Norton


75. Flaminio Piccoli, interview with the author, October 1989.


86. Lindblom, C.E. *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision*


95. Silvano Labriola, interview with the author, October 1989.


97. Giorgio La Malfa, interview with the author, October 1989.


100. Raffaele Valensise, interview with the author, October 1989.

Francesco Giulio Baghino, interview with the author, October 1989.


Chapter six


3. Class voting patterns were given credit for the relatively stable levels of popularity between elections and the inability of a third party to make any inroad into the two party's respective vote. See, for example,


7. The notion of 'a decade of dealignment' to describe the process that had set in during the 1970's, Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt claim, was due to the revelation of an
apparent decline over time in the relationship between partisan support and social class (Crewe, et al, op. cit.). Therefore, none of the major occupational groups in the 1970’s provides the same degree of solid and consistent support for the two major parties as was the case in the earlier post-war era (see, Sarlvik, B. and I. Crewe, Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). An alternative explanation which focuses on the housing and transport markets, suggests that people involved in ‘collective’ modes of consumption, such as council tenants and public transport users are, as a result of their own distinctive interests more likely to incline to the left than people involved in more ‘individual’ modes of consumption such as home-owners and car-owners. It has been further argued that since consumption processes are at least partially independent of occupational class, the spread of home-ownership and car-ownership in the post-war period may help to account for the declining electoral influence of occupational class (see, Dunleavy, P. ‘The Urban Basis of Political Alignment’ British Journal of Political Science, vol. 9, part 4, October 1979, pp. 409-444).


On the Usage of guillotine during 1974-1979, see


33. Steel, D. *A House Divided: The Lib-Lab Pact and the


For the discussion in the Cabinet over the Pact's formation, see:


38. For the TUC, the pact actually meant that:

[... ] the Labour government, of course, could not proceed with the sort of things that we had in mind. From our point of view, the idea of commitment to the Liberals meant that things like child benefits, general improvements of working-class standards, more improvements in the Labour legislation would not proceed because the government was dependent upon the Liberals. So, in fact, the Social Contract was virtually at an end (Jack Jones, an interview with the author, March 1990).


46. Beith Alan, interview with the author, February 1990.
54. Lord Hooson, interview with the author, February 1990.
59. Tom MacNally, interview with the author, February 1990.
60. David Owen, interview with the author, March 1990.
64. Steel, D. Against Goliath: David Steel’s Story. (London:


70. Baroness Seear, interview with the author, February 1990.


75. James Cornford, interview with the author, February 1990.

76. James Cornford, interview with the author, February 1990.

77. Richard Holme, interview with the author, February 1990.


82. Coats, D. Labour in Power?: A Study of the Labour
83. A letter, dated 31.5.90., from Lord Callaghan to the author.

84. Lord Donoughue, interview with the author, March 1990.

Chapter seven


8. It should be obvious from these recent tendencies in French politics that changes within French society had occurred. Perhaps most important of all changes in the cleavage structure is the rapid religious decline occurring in a political context strongly constrained by religion [Berger, S. 'Religious Transformation and the Future of Politics', In: Maier C.S. (ed.) Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance Between the State and Society, Public and Privet in Europe. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 112]. Beyond the electoral advantages to the Left of the rapid collapse of religious structures over the past two decades, the real significance lies in an increased capacity for mobilization and the enlarged organizational resources that accrue to the Left due to the Catholics that have shifted massively to the Left. Recent research suggests, moreover, that ideology came first in importance, religion second, class third and region fourth [Lewis-Beck, M. S. 'France:The Stalled Electorate', In: Dalton, R. J. Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck, Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 443]. Undoubtedly, the largest beneficiary from these
processes was the Socialist Party as it moved to the centre in mid 1980's.


23. See the remarks by Mehaignerie in *Le Monde*, 3.7.90: 'There is less difference between the centre-left and the centre-right than between, on the one hand, the Right and the centre-right and, on the other hand, the left and the centre-left'.


25. Guy Carcassone, letter sent to the author dated 5.7.90.

26. Guy Carcassone, letter sent to the author dated 5.7.90.


36. Guy Carcassone, letter sent to the author dated 5.7.90.

37. Guy Carcassone, letter sent to the author dated 5.7.90.


44. Guy Carcassone, letter sent to the author dated 5.7.90.


Chapter eight


For the weakly institutionalized features of the CDU during the 1960s, see p. 257.


Strom,K. ‘Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Political Science

320


Appendix 2.1

Oppositional influence by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of committees</th>
<th>Specialization</th>
<th>Correspondence</th>
<th>Membership Chairs</th>
<th>Overall value</th>
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<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

Appendix 2.2

Electoral decisiveness by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Identifiability</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
<th>Responsiveness</th>
<th>Proximity</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.68</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>.83</td>
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<td>.69</td>
<td>.52</td>
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<td>.56</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.45</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2.3

List of elite interviewing

Italy

1. Alessandro Natta, PCI, President of the parliamentary group.
2. Giorgio Napolitano, PCI, Member of Parliament.
3. Gianni Cervetty, PCI, Member of Parliament.
4. Giovanni Berlinguer, PCI, Member of Parliament.
5. Flaminio Piccoli, DC, President of the Parliamentary group.
6. Gerardo Bianco, DC, Member of Parliament.
8. Mario Segni, DC, Member of Parliament.
9. Raffaele Valensis, MSI, Member of Parliament.
10. Francesco Giulio Baghino, MSI, Member of Parliament.
11. Giovanni Malagodi, PLI, Member of Parliament.
12. Luigi Preti, PSDI, President of the parliamentary group.
13. Alberto Ciampaglia, PSDI, Member of Parliament.
14. Matteo Matteotti, PSDI, Member of Parliament.
15. Silvano Labriola, PSI, Member of Parliament.
16. Giorgio La Malfa, PRI, Member of Parliament.

Norway

2. Ragnhild Queseth Haarstad, SP, Member of Storting.
4. Tor Mikkel Wara, FrP, Member of Storting.
6. Oddrun Pettersen, DNA, Member of Storting.
7. Bjørn Tore Godal, DNA, Member of Storting.
11. Jen Simonsen, FrP, Member of Storting.
15. Hans J. Rosjorde, FrP, Member of Storting.
16. Tora A. Houg, SV, Member of Storting.
18. Jon Lilletun, KrF, Member of Storting.
20. Jo Benkow, CP, President of the Storting.
22. Anders Aune, FFF, Member of Storting.
23. Ole Gabriel Ueland, SP, Member of Storting.
24. Theo Koritzinski, SV, Member of Storting.
25. Arne Synnes, KrF, head of parliamentary Secretariat.
27. Thor E. Gulbrandsen, DNA, Member of Storting.
29. Fridtjof F. Gundersen, FrP Member of Storting.
30. Per-Kristian Foss, CP, Member of Parliament.
32. Oddmund H. Hammerstad, CP, Member of Storting.
33. Lise Enger Gjørv, DNA, Member of Storting.
35. Inge Staldvik, DNA, Member of Storting.
38. Royseland Borghild, KrF Member of Storting.

The U.K.

2. Harold Laver, Lab., Member of the House of Lords.
3. John Smith, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
4. Lord Mackie, Lib., Member of the House of Lords.
5. John Frazer, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
6. Russell Johnston, Lib., Member of the House of Commons.
7. Teddy Taylor, Con., Member of the House of Commons.
10. John Morris, Cons., Member of the House of Commons.
13. Merlyn Rees, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
14. Lord Hooson, Lib., Member of the House of Lords.
15. George Robertson, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
16. Tom McNally, Lab, Callaghan's privat secretary.
17. Denis Howell, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
20. Timothy Raison, Con., Member of the House of Commons.
22. James Gardiner, Con., Member of the House of Commons.
24. Baroness Sear, Lib., Member of the House of Lords.
25. David Owen, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
26. James Prior, Con., Member of the House of Lords.
27. James Lamond, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
28. Lord Donoghou, Head of Labour's thinktank.
1. Ahm Agner, Political Editor, 'Politiken'.
2. Benke Kim, FrP, Member of Folketing.
4. Bukst A. Jacob, SD, head of the economic research department.
7. Dybkjaer Lone, RV, minister of environment, 1988-
8. Elizabeth Arnold, RV, member of Folketing.
9. Elmquist Bjorn, V, head of the economic research department.
12. Estrup Jørgan, RV, member of Folketing.
13. Frandsen Aage, SF, member of Folketing.
14. Gade Steen, SF, member of Folketing.
16. Glonborg Knud, KrF, member of Folketing.
20. Hansen Jens Kristian, SD, former minister of public works, 1982
22. Herman Leif, SF, member of Folketing.
27. Kent Kirk, CPP, member of Folketing.
31. Nyrrup Rasmussen Poul, SD, member of Folketing.
32. Pedersen Thor, V, former minister of housing, 1986-1987,
minister of interior, 1987-
33. Petersen Gert, SF, leader.
34. Pundic Herbert, editor,' Politiken'.
35. Rahbeck Moller Kjeld, SF, Member of Folketing.
36. Stilling Pedersen Inger, KrF, Member of Folketing.
37. Strange Ebba, SF, member of Folketing.
38. Voigt Pelle, SF, member of Folketing.

France
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1. Jean Auroux, PS, member of the National Assembly.
2. Raymond Barre, UDC, member of the National Assembly.
3. Dominique Boudis, UDC, member of the National Assembly.
4. Jean-Michel Belorgey, PS, President of the Cultural and Social Affair committee.
5. Huguette Bouchardeau, PS, member of the National Assembly.
6. Jean-Christophe Cambadelis, PS, member of the National Assembly.
7. Michel Cointat, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
8. Jean-Marie Daillet, UDC, member of the National Assembly.
9. Jean-Louis Debre, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
10. Francois Fillon, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
11. Yves Freville, UDC, member of the National Assembly.
12. Claude Labbe, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
13. Alain Lamassoure, UDF, member of the National Assembly.
14. Didier Mathus, PS, member of the National Assembly.
15. Michel Pezet, PS, member of the National Assembly.
16. Yann Piat, UDF, member of the National Assembly.
17. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, PS, President of the finance and economic committee.
18. Jean-Pierre Worms, PS, member of the National Assembly.
19. Gabriel Kaspereit, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
20. Gerard Longuet, UDF, member of the National Assembly.
A Classification of Political Parties in Denmark and Norway According to Degrees of Institutionalization

A classification of the Danish and Norwegian political parties, according to degrees of institutionalization, is the aim of the following Appendix. The classification is not the result of empirical research; rather, it is a historically-based analysis to describe some of the basic indicators explaining party institutionalization in the Danish and Norwegian context.

A twofold strategy is adopted. Firstly, the analysis examines the parties in question mainly according to three indicators of party institutionalization — namely, (1) the degree of development of the central extra-parliamentary organization, (2) the degree of homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level, and (3) the relations with external collateral organizations. Secondly, the relations between the above-mentioned factors and the genetic models of party institutionalization (namely, the type of organizational development, the presence or absence of an external sponsoring organization, and personal charisma of the party leader) are examined. Any misfit between the two will be highlighted rather than investigated.

It will be established in the following analysis that the socialist parties (SD, DNA), left-socialist parties (SF, SV) and the Norwegian rural party (SP) can be classified as highly institutionalized parties. The Christian People's Party in both countries, the Conservative parties (CPP, CP), and the Danish Liberal (RV, CD) and rural (V) parties can be considered weakly institutionalized parties. The Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties can be considered deviant cases due to the overwhelming, dominating presence of their founders. They can be therefore characterized by the existence of a cohesive dominant coalition despite the absence of institutionalization in the Danish case, and to a lesser extent in the Norwegian one.

The reasoning for choosing three out of Panfbianco's five indicators of party institutionalization is of prime importance. As noted earlier, we have at our disposal five indicators of the different degrees of institutionalization in parties — namely (1) the degree of development of the central extra-parliamentary organization, (2) the degree of homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level, (3) the method of finance, (4) relations with the external collateral organizations, and (5) the degree of correspondence between a party's statutory norms and its 'actual power structure'.

Considering the finance method, the provision of state subventions for parties in Norway (1970) and Denmark (1965—parliamentary groups; 1987—party organizations) accounts for
50-60 per cent of Norwegian parties' income and up to 94 per cent of some Danish party income. It is therefore incorrect to rely heavily on such a factor as a determinate of institutionalization in the Scandinavian case studies. Additionally, due to the difficulty of identifying the 'actual power structure' as a result of the reluctance of parties to provide data concerning the issue, it is difficult to substantiate factor 5 in the relevant context. As it is reasonable to assume that relations with the external collateral organizations significantly affect both the party's finance method and the degree of correspondence between a party's statutory norms and its 'actual power structure', the following examination focuses on factors 1, 2 and 3.

Based on the above factors, the socialist parties in Denmark and Norway, namely, SD and DNA, can be classified as highly institutionalized parties. For the former, party and trade-unions are relatively separated. There is not even the collective affiliation of local trade unions which is practised in the DNA. The constitution of the DNA moreover specifies that 'the Labour Party and the Federation of Labour each recognize the independence of the other'. Similar structural separation is evident also in the Norwegian case. Knut Heidar's description of the Norwegian reality seems to have a general applicability to the Danish case:

The relationship between the two most important sections of the labour movement - party and trade unions - has for most of the time been 'one body, two arms': the separation was much clearer in organizational structure than organizational practice.

Thus, structurally, the two organizations are in both cases relatively autonomous. An 'organizational chart' would reveal very few formal connections between them, for the basis of their intimate cooperation and co-ordination is primarily informal.

An exception to the informal party-union relationships is the Norwegian Joint Committee which allows for co-ordination of policy-making by those most directly involved in decision-making. The existence of the extensive party-union co-ordination does not mean that the decisive policy-making process takes place outside the party. Its importance concerns not so much the 'if' of union influence as the 'how' it influences. This point is well elaborated by Francis Castles who claims that 'in so far [as] the unions feel themselves to be part of a unified labour movement they must accept restraint on their actions in a whole variety of ways'. In other words, as long as the post-war strategy of the Danish and Norwegian socialist parties centred around the need to guarantee full employment and prevent wage restrictions, which were the trade unions' chief demands, trade unions' conformity seemed to be ensured.

The absence of any form of collective affiliation in Denmark with the existence of this linkage at the grass roots
level of the union branch in Norway constitutes an additional difference between the two parties. The importance of the collective membership, however, can hardly be overemphasized. The DNA has no idea who the collective affiliated members are, and they cannot contact them with a membership mailing because the required names and addresses are unavailable under the anonymous subscription of the collective-membership arrangement. Moreover, collective affiliated union locals have been criticized by party secretaries for their lack of political activity. Therefore, the autonomy of the DNA is not eroded by its external collateral organization.

The source of the SD and DNA's highly institutionalized organizations can be attributed to the relatively high degree of development of the central extra-parliamentary organization and the homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level. The above characteristics, together with party dominance in the Danish case and balanced relationships in the Norwegian one, call into question the linkage - proposed by Panebianco - between different parties' genetic models and degrees of institutionalization.12 The organizational development of both parties was characterized by a simultaneous diffusion (i.e. local elites constructing party associations which were only later integrated into the national organization) and penetration (i.e. when the 'centre' control, stimulates, or directs the constitution of local and intermediate party associations).13 Furthermore, both parties benefited from an external 'sponsor' institution, i.e. the trade unions.14 When 'mixed' types of organizational development prevail, Panebianco argues, development initially takes place through territorial diffusion. According to Panebianco, therefore, an initial development through diffusion, along with the existence of a sponsoring organization impedes the formation of strong organizational loyalties (i.e. a highly institutionalized party). The above discussion concerning the degree of institutionalization of the SD and DNA, however, significantly undermines Panebianco's prediction. It can be concluded that the socialist parties in Denmark and Norway, namely, SD and DNA, can be classified as highly institutionalized parties.

Similar institutionalization is evident in the Danish SF and the Norwegian SV. Whilst the former was founded by Aksel Larsen in 1959 as a result of a split within the Danish Communist Party, the latter was established in 1961 by left-wing dissidents from the Labour Party and by independent socialists who were critical of Norway's membership of NATO. In other words, both parties are characterized by a similar pattern of organizational development, this pattern is a parliamentary elite which built the organization through territorial penetration. This process resulted in a strong institution.15

Not surprisingly, the Danish SF and the Norwegian SV are characterized by relatively high degrees of development of the central extra-parliamentary organization and the degree
of homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level. Furthermore, their organization is particularly characterized by the tighter accountability of their parliamentary group to the national party organization than in most other Danish and Norwegian parties. Their parliamentary groups have to follow the guidelines laid down in by annual conference and have an obligation to report to the party's central committee or executive committee before voting on important political matters. The Danish SF’s organization also has a greater say over the order in which the party’s Folketing candidates are elected. At times this has seriously limited the room for manoeuvre of the parliamentary leadership. It can be concluded that the left socialist parties in Denmark and Norway can be clearly classified as highly institutionalized parties.

The Norwegian Centre Party can also be classified as a highly institutionalized party. The organizational development of the SP was predominantly due to territorial penetration which was accompanied by the existence of a sponsoring organization. The party was founded in 1920 at the instigation of the Norsk Landmandsforbund (Norwegian Farmers Union). Although the actual division of tasks and responsibilities between the two organizations has varied over time, the basic premise of a unified and integrated farmer’s ‘movement’ has never been seriously questioned by those involved. One can, therefore, consider the two organizations as relatively autonomous. This is not to say that members of the farmers’ union cannot influence party strategy. Rather, it is to stress that the union representatives have an intimate relationship with the party through informal channels.

The high degree of the SP institutionalization is also manifested by the relatively high degree of homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level. The SP has around 480 local branches within 19 county organizations and it is the only party which has been consistent in developing ward organizations in the communes in which it has a local chapter. With regard to the election of delegates to the party’s national convention, moreover, the delegation is membership-skewed. In other words, delegates are elected, to a larger extent, from within the party organization. It can be concluded that the SP can be classified as a highly institutionalized party.

A classic example of the existence of a cohesive dominant coalition despite the absence of a process of organizational institutionalization can be found in the Danish Progress Party, and to a lesser extent (with respect to the above-mentioned process) also in the Norwegian Progress Party. This is due to the personal charisma of their respective leaders, namely Mogens Glistrop and Carl Hagen. The Danish Progress Party explicitly rejects traditional forms of organization. Not surprisingly, it had developed a formal organizational structure two years after its foundation, i.e. in 1974. At the opposing extreme, the Norwegian Progress Party adopted a relatively articulate
organizational structure. Still, both parties’ organizational structure reflects the overwhelming, dominating presence of the founders and undisputed leaders of the parties. Although local branches, county organizations and party bodies were initially formed, the concentration of control over the 'zones of organizational uncertainty' remained in the leaders' hands. The Danish Progress Party's organization both inside and outside the Folketing remained loose, whilst the Norwegian counterpart still has no central registration of its members despite its organizational institutionalization. It can be concluded that both parties are characterized by the existence of a cohesive dominant coalition due to the impact of their charismatic leaders.

The analysis discussed up to now the characteristics of party institutionalization in the Danish and Norwegian cases studied considering those parties classified as highly institutionalized. Attention now turns to discuss the characteristics of parties which can be considered weakly institutionalized. The relevance of this group derives from the inevitable comparison with the highly institutionalized parties in the same political arena. A classic example to the inevitable comparison between the two groups of parties is suggested by Henry Valen and Daniel Katz:

The knowledge of the development of party organizations in Norway is scanty. There are, however, reasons to believe that from the beginning Labour differed in character from the two older parties. The Liberal Party and the Conservative Party had relatively weak organizations. The policies of the respective parties were mainly decided in the party caucuses in the Storting. The Labour Party, on the other hand, developed as a grass roots movement with a strong and active organization and with a relatively large dues-paying membership.

Clearly this does not mean that the Conservative and Liberal Parties lack an articulate organizational structure. On the contrary, the Conservatives greatly strengthened their organizational structure during the 1970s and increased their membership from under 100,000 in 1973 to 178,000 by 1983. It is rather to stress that the organizational developments which occurred during the 1970s did not change the focus of power within the party (i.e. the parliamentary group). The fact that the resolutions of the party’s annual national congress are still not binding on the Conservatives' parliamentary group suffices to underline this point. Additionally, the delegation of the party’s national convention based on electoral success rather than party membership.

A similar structure is evident in the Danish case. Although the Danish Conservative People’s Party has broad and relatively homogeneous geographical coverage, the party organization remains weak compared to the SD. Most
visible is the decisive process of decision-making which usually takes place within the parliamentary group. At national level, moreover, the resolutions of the annual national congress (Landsradet) are not binding on the Conservative parliamentary group, which therefore enjoys great freedom of manoeuvre. Even within the top party elite, leadership has rested with the chairman of the Conservative parliamentary group, elected by its members, rather than with the national chairman who is elected by the representative assembly.

The course of the organizational development of the Conservative parties in Denmark and Norway comes close to territorial penetration, the linkage - proposed by Panebianco - between different parties' genetic models and degrees of institutionalization is called into question. According to Panebianco, such a process of organizational development results in a strong institution. However, the above discussion concerning the degree of institutionalization of both parties significantly undermines Panebianco's prediction. It can be concluded that the Conservative Parties in Denmark and Norway can be classified as weakly institutionalized parties.

The Danish rural Liberal Party (Venstre) can be considered a weakly institutionalized party. At the outset, the Venstre organization is similar to that of the SD, i.e. based on strong local units and on its parliamentary groups. It has the largest number of local branches (957) of any Danish party. Still, some observers feel that it is still weaker vis-a-vis the local organizations than are other parties' national units.

From its beginning, Venstre's territorial spread was characterized by a simultaneous diffusion and penetration together with the absence of an external sponsoring organization. Based on Lars Svasand's argument, that establishment of some kind of national body normally will cause a shift from diffusion to penetration, the linkage - proposed by Panebianco - between different parties' genetic models and degrees of institutionalization is again called into question. According to Panebianco, such a process of organizational development results in a strong institution. Viewing, for example, the relationships between the rural party and the farmers' organizations reveals a different picture. Although Venstre has no formal links with farmers' organizations, there is a good deal of overlapping membership - a characteristic of a weakly institutionalized party. Based on the above discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that the Venstre can be classified as a weak organization.

By contrast with the Venstre, the Radical Liberals are a small party with a low ratio of members to voters and few local councillors. They rely heavily on the parliamentary group and on the ability of their leaders to make an effective impact through the mass-media. The low degree of their organizational structure's homogeneity is evident in the several combining of a constituency
association which form the county level organization. The county level organization may comprise constituency delegates or a county assembly. Local associations may also operate below constituency level, so that the RV can operate very flexibly in response to a variation in the number of local members.

Added to the relatively low degree of homogeneity of organizational structures is the relationships between the extra-parliamentary organizations and the parliamentary group. Basically, the party's parliamentary group chooses its own chairman, who is normally the political leader of the party (unless its political leader is a government minister). The RV parliamentary group, furthermore, is given great freedom of manoeuvre by the national party organization, which cannot bind its decisions in any way.

The RV organizational development calls into question the linkage - proposed by Panebianco - between different parties' genetic models and degrees of institutionalization. Primarily, the RV represents what Duverger terms 'internally created' parties. The parliamentary group which lacks an external sponsoring organization builds the party organization through territorial penetration. Such a process, according to Panebianco, results in a strong institution. The above discussion concerning the level of RV institutionalization, however, suggests that the RV can be clearly classified as a weakly institutionalized party.

Among the most frequently cited factors according to which the Danish Centre Democrats can be considered as weakly institutionalized is its leaders' belief that political power should be left with the voters and the elected parliamentarians rather than with the party activists. Consequently, a relatively low degree of development of the central extra-parliamentary organization is evident. An additional indirect consequence of the CD leaders' belief is the relatively low degree of homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level. Where the party is stronger it is organized in individual communes and where weaker in the wider electoral constituencies, but in either case there is only one tier of local organization to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy.

In the CD case, it seems reasonable to apply Panebianco's argument that personal charisma can be associated with strong resistance to institutionalization. The CD leader, Erhard Jakobsen, has no interest in organizational reinforcement which would inevitably set the stage for the party 'emancipation' from his control. We can thus conclude, as Panebianco would have, that the CD can be classified as a weakly institutionalized party, but, still, characterized by a cohesive elite.

A number of factors have contributed to the classification of the Danish and Norwegian Christian People's Parties as weakly institutionalized organizations. Most important in the Norwegian case is the KrF transition from a regional party to a national party in 1945. The diffused character of the party spread was furthermore
manifested by the party collaboration with a small but important group whose identification with the Christianfolk had not previously been accepted on either side, i.e. the 'Moral Rearmament'.

The Danish KrF, unlike its Norwegian counterpart, was founded in April 1970 in reaction against what they saw as growing permissiveness in Danish society. However, as leaders and followers of the party were a mixed bag, they found it difficult to formulate a general, which is to say secular, political platform. Internal factional conflicts deprived the party of electoral support and representation in 1971, but in 1973 it gained a modest hold. Mogens H. Pedersen's description of the Danish new comers (except of the Communist and the Justice Party) of the 1973 election is of utmost relevance to the organizational structure of the KrF (as it is also applicable to the CD case):

[...] They were not able to organize and create a membership base to the same extent as the older parties. During the first years, co-optation into leadership positions was a common practice. The national leadership tried to control nominations, but often found it difficult to do so. Local activists formed committees that financed and carried out campaigns, and these local 'notables' often wanted more autonomy than the national leaders and the parliamentary groups were willing to concede. The new parties had many of the characteristics of the cadre party described by Maurice Duverger.

Given the relatively powerful position of local activists at the stage of the KrF formation, it is reasonable to argue that its organizational spread was characterized by patterns of diffusion. Not surprisingly, the Danish KrF, as well as the Norwegian one, developed weakly institutionalized features. We can conclude that both parties would have been classified also by Panebianco as weakly institutionalized parties.

Finally, it is important to note that the fact that a party is highly institutionalized is no guarantee that deinstitutionalization and loss of autonomy vis-a-vis the environment will not take place when its environment undergoes radical changes. Nor is a weakly institutionalized party necessarily condemned to always remain the same. According to Panebianco, however, the way that institutionalization has taken place generally continues to condition the party's internal competition system for decades. The classification of parties according to degrees of institutionalization and their genetic model in the Scandinavian setting highlighted the misfit between the two. The analysis, therefore, does not share the historical conception of Panebianco's 'party institutionalization'.
Notes (appendix 3.1)

1. For a general classification of political parties, see:


4. For the Danish case, data was provided by Lars Bille.

For the Norwegian case, see:


6. Cited in:


9. For an accurate description of party-trade unions relationships in the Danish and Norwegian context, see:


11. For the Norwegian case, see:


For the Danish case, see:


13. For the Danish case, see:


For the Norwegian case, see:


14. For the Danish case:


For the Norwegian case:


18. For the Danish case, see:


For the Norwegian case, see:


19. For the Norwegian case, see:

For the Danish case, see:


24. For the Danish case, see:


For the Norwegian case, see:


25. For the Danish case, see:


For the Norwegian case, see:


32. For the Danish case, see:


For the Norwegian case, see:


37. For the [Danish] Venstre’s territorial spread, see:

For the [Norwegian] Venstre's territorial spread, see:


47. For a general assessment of the CD organizational weakness, see:


## Appendix 3.2

### Party Composition of the Folketing, 1953-1988

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Appendix 3.3

**Party Composition of Danish Governments, 1971-1991**

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1. Percentages are calculated on the basis of all 179 members of the Folketing, i.e. including the two MP's from Greenland and the two from the Faroe Islands.
2. The Prime Minister's party is given first in the case of coalition governments.

**Source:** Keesing Contemporary Archives, 1971-1991.
## Appendix 4.1

### Party Composition of the Storting, 1945-1985

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*Figures include minority share that individual parties won when they participated in joint lists in some constituencies.

*Second results in 1981 are accounted for by a re-run election in the constituencies of Troms and Bankerland. Figures quoted are final corrected figures after the re-run caused by voting irregularities for the first time around.

# Appendix 4.2

## Party Composition of Norwegian Governments, 1945-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Parties (seats)</th>
<th>Per cent of seats in parliament held by parties in government</th>
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**Source:** *Keesing Contemporary Archives, 1945-1989.*
## Appendix 5.1

### Party Composition of the Chamber of Deputies, 1948-1987

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<th>DC</th>
<th>Christian Democrats</th>
<th>PCI</th>
<th>(Communists)</th>
<th>PSI</th>
<th>(Socialists)</th>
<th>PSDI</th>
<th>(Social Democrats)</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>(Republicans)</th>
<th>PLI</th>
<th>(Liberals)</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>(Radicals)</th>
<th>MSI</th>
<th>(Italian Social Movement)</th>
<th>Monarchists</th>
<th>(Proletarian Democracy)</th>
<th>Verdi</th>
<th>(Green)</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<td>9.6%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
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<td>1983</td>
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### Appendix 5.2

**Party Composition of Italian Governments, 1946-1979.**

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<th>Per cent of seats in parliament held by parties in government</th>
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**Source:** Strom, K. *Minority Governments and Majority Rule.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 260-1.

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<th>Membership total (in 1000s)</th>
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<th>Non-renewals (in 1000s)</th>
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1. The adherence rate measures the percentage of party members as a ratio of the total electorate, 21 years and older.

Appendix 5.4


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* Figures for these six years are estimated because of missing membership data from one or more provinces.

Appendix 6.1

Party Composition of the House of Commons, 1955-1987

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<td>49.7%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
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<td>46.4%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>301</td>
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<td></td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.7%</td>
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<td>8.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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Appendix 6.2

The Lib-Lab Pact: A Joint Statement by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Liberal Party

We agreed today the basis on which the Liberal Party would work with the government in the pursuit of economic recovery.

We will set up a joint consultive Committee under the Chairmanship of the Leader of the House, which will meet regularly. The Committee will examine Government policy and other issues prior to their coming before the House, and Liberal policy proposals.

The existence of this Committee will not commit the Government to accepting the views of the Liberal Party, or the Liberal Party to supporting the Government on any issue.

We agree to initiate regular meetings between the Chancellor and the Liberal Party economic spokesman, such meetings to begin at once. In addition, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Liberal Party will meet as necessary.

We agree that legislation for Direct Elections to the European Assembly in 1978 will be presented to Parliament in this Session. The Liberal Party re-affirm their strong conviction that a proportional system should be used as the method of election. The Government is publishing next week a White Paper on Direct Elections to the European Assembly which sets out the choices among different electoral systems, but which makes no recommendation. There will now be consultation between us on the method to be adopted and the Government's final recommendation will take full account of the Liberal Party's commitment. The recommendation will be subject to a free vote of both Houses.

We agree that progress must be made on legislation for devolution, and to this end consultations will begin on the detailed memorandum submitted by the Liberal Party today. In any future debate on proportional representation for the devolved Assemblies there will be a free vote.

We agree that the Government will provide the extra time necessary to secure the passage of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Bill, and that the Local Authorities (Works) Bill will now be confined to provisions to protect the existing activities of Direct Labour Organizations in the light of local government reorganization.

We agree that this arrangement between us should last until the end of the present Parliamentary Session, when both Parties would consider whether the experiment has been of sufficient benefit to the country to be continued.

We also agree that this understanding should be made public.

10 Downing Street
23 March 1977

Appendix 7.1


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Appendix 7.2


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