

Interest Groups, Professions and Public Policy Change

The Case of Paris Transport - 1968 - 1976

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| | |
|--|-----|
| Abstract | 5 |
| Preface | 9 |
| Chapter 1 : Origins of Policy Change | 13 |
| PART 1 : Policy History | 44 |
| Chapter 2 : The evolution of transport policy making in Paris | 45 |
| 2.1 : Continuity in travel patterns | 47 |
| 2.2 : The regulatory framework | 54 |
| 2.3 : Sustained professional power - the <i>Corps des Ponts et Chaussées</i> | 60 |
| 2.4 : Administrative Reform | 67 |
| 2.5 : The <i>Schéma Directeur</i> | 71 |
| PART 2 : New Strategic Directions | 78 |
| Chapter 3 : Strategic policy changes 1969 - 1973 | 79 |
| 3.1 : Government interference in regional planning | 80 |
| 3.2 : Regional co-ordination struggles with professional specialisation. | 83 |
| 3.3 : The legitimacy of the <i>Schéma Directeur</i> | 88 |
| 3.4 : Local politics in Paris | 98 |
| 3.5 : Professions' spheres of influence | 104 |
| 3.6 : The relationship between producers and consumers | 109 |
| 3.7 : The <i>Plan Global</i> of 1972 | 122 |
| Chapter 4 : Making employers pay - economic dimensions of policy change | 127 |
| 4.1 : New resources - the <i>Versements transports</i> | 130 |
| 4.2 : New management and planning systems | 147 |
| 4.3 : Towards contract based planning | 159 |

| | | |
|--------------|---|-----|
| PART 3 | : Policy Implementation | 163 |
| Chapter 5 | : Back to municipal politics: the extension of <i>Métro 13bis</i> | 164 |
| 5.1 | : What kind of area would the new line serve? | 164 |
| 5.2 | : Why was there no <i>Métro</i> already? | 167 |
| 5.3 | : The overall priority of <i>Métro</i> extension schemes | 170 |
| 5.4 | : The relative priority of <i>Métro</i> extensions schemes | 175 |
| 5.5 | : Quality of service and environmental impact | 178 |
| 5.6 | : Transport users' participation in implementation | 188 |
| 5.7 | : Full circle for the <i>Ponts et Chaussées</i> | 189 |
| Chapter 6 | : Building the central section of the RER | 191 |
| 6.1 | : The case for a new regional transport infrastructure | 192 |
| 6.2 | : Spoke or spanner in the <i>Schéma Directeur</i> | 199 |
| 6.3 | : Did Paris really need an RER system? | 203 |
| 6.4 | : Where to start building an RER? | 206 |
| 6.5 | : Who paid for the RER? | 210 |
| 6.6 | : The distribution of new travel opportunities | 211 |
| Chapter 7 | : The dynamics of policy change | 217 |
| 7.1 | : Pluralist explanations revisited | 220 |
| 7.2 | : State centred explanations | 227 |
| 7.3 | : The dynamics of policy networks | 236 |
| Appendix 1. | | 259 |
| Bibliography | | 265 |

Figures

| | | |
|--------------|---|-----|
| Figure 2.1 : | Relocation of Major Firms HQs | 52 |
| Figure 2.2 : | The <i>Schéma Directeur</i> 1965 | 75 |
| Figure 3.1 : | Composition of the Paris Municipal Council 1971 | 102 |
| Figure 3.2 : | RATP Operating Deficits | 110 |

Multi-criteria Planning System - application to Paris *Métro*

| | | |
|--------------|--|-----|
| Figure 4.1 : | <i>Métro</i> Extensions Under Consideration | 152 |
| Figure 4.2 : | Characteristics of Proposed Schemes | 153 |
| Figure 4.3 : | Orders of Preference by Criterion | 154 |
| Figure 4.4 : | Pair by Pair Comparison | 154 |
| Figure 4.5 : | Graphical Representation of Pairs | 155 |
| Figure 4.6 : | Classification of Schemes | 156 |
| Figure 4.7 : | Final Order of Preference | 156 |
| Figure 5.1 : | Origins and Destinations of Commuters - North West Paris | 166 |
| Figure 6.1 : | Growth of Population and Urban Area in Twentieth Century | 194 |
| Figure 7.1 : | Origins of Policy Change | 219 |
| Figure 7.2 : | Phases of Policy Development | 228 |
| Figure 7.3 : | Policy Dilemmas and Network Characteristics | 235 |

ABSTRACT

The thesis examines theories of policy change by applying them to the specific problem of understanding a striking and apparently contradictory shift in Paris Transport policy in the early 1970s. The existing literature, which applies ecological and marxist theories of policy development to urban policy in France is reviewed, and several recent theorisations of pluralist policy making, and state centred theories of policy development are introduced. Previous work on urban policy and transport issues is criticised for an over reliance on functional explanations and contextual evidence. The introduction concludes by comparing state centred approaches to explaining policy change and draws together a number of hypotheses about the specific case of Parisian urban policy making from the models developed in Britain and the USA for applying pluralist, intergovernmental relations and policy networks models to policy analysis.

The main body of the thesis is then divided into three parts. Part 1 sketches out the historical backcloth to the regional plan adopted in the late 1960s, and identifies the forces generating social conflict around regional development, and a fiscal crisis within the transport services themselves. In this context the remarkable continuity of policy dilemmas and the power and influence of professions contrast with the political and administrative instability of the Paris region over the last two hundred years. Part 2 analyses the rapid changes in professional thinking on regional development, and transport programmes in particular and shows how this technical re-appraisal of objectives and management undermined the Regional Plan. The argument analyses changes in ideology among key engineers

and managers in the context of the explosion of public discontent about transport services in the region which occurred in 1970. The collapse of public and professional confidence in the Regional Plan's solutions led directly: to new strategic priorities favouring public transport over road construction; to new management with greater autonomy from Government in the public transport companies; to the adoption of new planning techniques; to formal consumer participation in transport planning and most importantly to reduced fares for consumers and increased taxes for employers. The remarkable fact of a Conservative Government undertaking so clear and perceptible a redistribution away from capital to labour points to the significance of the policy change which took place. Part 3 switches attention from strategy to policy implementation. Two contrasting projects are described in detail from conception to operation, revealing the variety of local political processes which emerged from strategic policy change, and illustrating the increased capacity of consumer organisations to secure changes in public services. The extension of the *Métro* to Asnières-Gennevilliers demonstrates that municipal politics had re-emerged, in alliance with consumerism and community politics, to create a new decentralised local policy making arena more consistent with the provincial conservatism of Giscard and the pluralist socialism of Mitterrand in the late 1970s. However, the continuing role of national political forces in regional development emerges strongly from a consideration of the construction of the central section of the RER.

The thesis concludes that while pluralist explanations, especially the 'broker' state model have much to offer in understanding the political processes in the period concerned, they are unable to cope with the overdetermination of outcomes. Empirically, it is not possible to

distinguish between a 'broker' state and more state centred models of policy change. This proves particularly difficult in the disaggregated and rapidly changing policy process which emerged in the latter part of the period in question. Theories of 'professionalised policy networks' are judged to have greatest explanatory power in this case. However, the static nature of policy networks approaches presents difficulties when analysing policy fields which are characterised by high levels of competition, policy stress and rapid changes in professional thinking and inter-agency relationships. The study therefore concludes with some reflections on the dynamics of policy networks and suggests ways in which the approach might be refined for the analysis of change.

To Julie

PREFACE

The origin of this thesis is a curious political paradox. Why did a Conservative Government with a massive parliamentary majority, committed to policies of fiscal rigour and commercial efficiency in public services, preside over a significant increase in the public subsidy of Paris transport? Equally why did it choose to raise the necessary revenue by taxing employers? Finally, why should it adopt a planning and management system for public transport which eroded the Government's ability to control the deployment of public funds and gave its opponents an unprecedented role in policy development?

Such major shifts in policy and policy making systems are rare. When they occur they can illuminate the forces which shape public policy and public service organisation particularly clearly. Understanding the interaction between consumers and producers of public services at times of stress and change will tell us something about the essential components of effective public services, and of policy making in modern professionalised Government services. Conflict about either the quantity or quality of public services takes up the larger part of the political agenda in many liberal democratic societies. Increasingly arguments about quality weigh more heavily than those concerning quantity, and the disputes described at the centre of this thesis were the first steps in France away from "progress through quantity" to "happiness through quality" in the public sector.

Transport services in a major city proved a particularly appropriate case study for these kinds of issues. Transport is a primary collective good which requires large amounts of revenue funding day to day, but also needs long term planning and huge capital investment. It is technically extremely complex, involving highly skilled design, engineering and management. Transport policy is an important consideration in most other public policy decisions. The value of land, the supply of labour, access to markets, access to public welfare services, the quality of the environment and the value of time itself, are all affected by the ease with which people can get from one place to another. It is not surprising, therefore, that transport policy in France spanned four national ministries, regional, district and communal councils and involved several specialist institutes, professional associations, private companies and a welter of pressure groups. Since the purpose of a transport system is to facilitate movement around as large a network of interconnecting services as possible, questions about boundaries assume even greater significance than in most public policy fields.

Transport policy was under great strain during the sixties and seventies. Economic changes brought with them demands for greater specialisation of land use. Construction, retailing, financial services and mass production manufacturing all demanded new large sites with good access to markets and labour. The leap of scale from small shop to hypermarket, from city centre workshop to purpose built factories in new towns, from small brokers' offices to tower blocks for multinational banks meant wholesale changes in the demands on the transport systems in a major international city like Paris. Population growth brought with it new towns, huge new housing estates and sheer numbers of potential travellers which the road network and public transport infrastructure were simply not designed to

accommodate. Making Paris an economic success and a civilised place to live depended in part on getting transport right. For twenty years after the second world war all eyes turned to the USA: the private car would be the saviour. This thesis looks at how the planners unlearned that myth in the midst of the resulting nightmare of social unrest, escalating financial problems and painful professional doubt. The measures taken in response brought about rapid change in policy and in the systems by which policy was determined.

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the support and assistance which many people have given me. In the course of field research I was greatly assisted by the librarians and staff of the Regional Prefecture, the *Bibliothèque Administrative* at the *Hotel de Ville*, the *Institut d'Urbanisme* at *Université de Paris XII* and the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques* all in Paris and at the British Library of Political and Economic Science in London and the University Library in Cambridge. Many planners, engineers and research staff at the RATP, the Regional Prefecture, the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens*, the APUR, the *Mairies* of Clichy and Paris and several consumer organisations and transport campaigns gave their time and knowledge generously. I am indebted to my supervisors Patrick Dunleavy and Howard Machin for their patient guidance throughout and for many pertinent and constructive criticisms.

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CHAPTER 1 : ORIGINS OF POLICY CHANGE

Broadly there are two approaches to explaining policy development: those founded on external structural imperatives of an ecological or societal nature and those founded on an analysis of the beliefs and behaviour of key individual actors who make up the state or decision making groups in society, for example politicians, or non-political elites of some kind - often professions. This introduction will compare these approaches, illustrating how they have been applied to urban policy change, particularly in the Paris region, and will argue that explanations based on the purposive actions of elites within the state offer the most defensible framework for analysing policy change. It concludes with a series of hypotheses about the role of policy networks which provide the theoretical framework for the succeeding evidence on transport policy development in the Paris Region.

1.1 External explanations of policy change

Ecological/Economic Imperatives

A large body of theory has attempted to explain the evolution of urban and regional planning policy in terms of ecological or economic imperatives, which place irresistible pressures on public authorities to change rules, and private interests to adjust their behaviour. Such explanations fall broadly into two camps: explanations founded on the spatial constraints and opportunities in a given area (1), for example central place and locational theories (2), and explanations rooted in an analysis of the development of

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

the modern industrial economy, for example analyses of the growth of multinational business, large scale manufacturing processes and the changing organisation of economic activity (3).

The starting point of ecological explanations is a set of assumptions about the relationship between man and the environment. These are that space is the object of competition between people or groups, that the nature of the competition is regulated by interdependency between people or groups, that the costs of distance generate a universal tendency towards concentration of symbiotic activities and that there is a natural tendency to equilibrium in the size and organisation of settlements. From these basic assumptions theories about the nature of change and distribution of opportunities in cities have been deduced. It is common to all of these that city growth, and the resulting pressure on the organisation and management of public services is an automatic process of competition and selection. Early ecological theorists (4) identified natural areas of space or habitation as the object of their attention: basins, peninsulas, ghettos, ribbons along key lines of communication, travel time zones. Within these they identified population density as the distinguishing feature of urban society and the factor which transformed human relations, behaviour and organisation. Density, they argued, created the capacity to make partial commitments to activities and relationships and created the opportunity to apply the principles of economic maximisation to social activity and location. It is this capacity which creates an urban culture. The existence of specifically urban areas creates specifically urban social, political and economic issues.

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

The second generation of ecological theorists concentrated on empirical analysis of urban areas and the pattern of social, economic and political activity which occurred in them. Hawley (5) introduced the concept of a 'key function' arguing that the dominant social activity within a society, the type of differentiation of social groups and the interdependence of social groups would be closely associated with one another. By empirical investigation he described how business, which was the key activity in north american cities in the 1950s, dominated the development of the urban form by controlling decisions about the differentiation of space at a political level, dominated the physical use of space in the central areas by ensuring its ownership and use of central sites and dominated the relation of space and time in cities by organising the cycle of activity to suit business purposes.

There are close parallels between this approach to studying cities and functional sociology (6). Its explanations are founded on an analysis of how society adapts to external pressures which uses a series of transhistorical norms which are givens within any specific society. Individual values and motivation are of no relevance to explanation, it is a morphology of natural adaptation. The norms themselves militate against substantial changes in human organisation, and the notion of a tendency to equilibrium introduces the idea of some natural 'balance' in the environment. Such arguments underpin much professional planning and public policy (7), for their deep conservatism suggests inevitable and unchallengeable qualities in the solutions offered.

An ecological theoretical view supported the formal planning activity of the *District de la Région Parisienne*, especially the *Schéma Directeur* of

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

1965 (8). The task facing public authorities and their private or social partners in the *concertation* (9) represented by the planning system, was to adapt the internal organisation of the Paris Region to external, autonomous and inevitable pressures. Formal planning was confined by natural areas, its scope extended only to the Paris Region, a space defined administratively and geologically, but with no basis in economic or social organisation. Pressure for change came from three directions: population growth, technological change and international competition; all three were beyond the scope of planning and public policy. The plan made clear that the problems were specifically urban ones, and policy makers were anxious to present the issues and solutions as unique to a conurbation at the centre of a new urban society in which traditional social patterns, behaviour and organisation had been transformed. In 1968 Maurice Doublet (10) summed up the policy questions facing the review of the *Schéma Directeur* as "Paris must choose between respect for the past and preparation for the future" (11). Later he spelt out the role of the planner as "Not to stop or slow down growth but to re-organise and co-ordinate it" (12). This official culture of adaptation was echoed in the highest political authorities, in a celebrated quote President Pompidou expressed his view that "adapting towns for cars is the task for the seventies" (13). In 1970 the *Commissariat Général du Plan* published *Les Villes - La Société Urbaine* (14) in which is set out the specifically ecological theory which informed the work of the *Commission des Villes* in drawing up the sixth plan:

"the basis of urban society lies in the grouping of a collectivity of a certain size and density, which implies a more or less rigorous division of activities and functions and makes necessary exchanges between the sub groups endowed with a status which is proper to them: to be differentiated is to be linked" (15)

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

Hawley's innovation of the 'key function' not only enabled more quantitative approaches to urban ecology to be developed but also introduced a specifically economic imperative into the functional logic of the theory. From a general theory of inter-dependence and competition for space it is possible to generate a more testable and historically specific explanation of urban policy based on changes in the scale and organisation of business. The key function of modern societies is industry, and the optimal economic location of industrial activity will determine the changing use of space. During the early phase of industrial development, the location of industry was largely determined by natural factors, access to power, access to raw materials, access to natural routes of communication. Technological change, in transport and communication have made the organisation of industry and of markets the primary determinants of location of activity.

In cities, still defined as natural areas, these changes are manifested in the relocation of manufacturing activity on new sites outside the city which allow integrated mass production and the emergence of a new sector of employment and land use concerned exclusively with management, direction, marketing and trade. It is these four aspects of the industrial economy which are based in cities, and which require, functionally, close proximity to one another in a central business district. Urban planning policy, in this context, is adapting the city to new economic imperatives, in order to maintain overall economic efficiency, and competitiveness. Economic maximisation by firms seeking new locations for their management and trading functions, will produce fewer larger cities with denser central business districts connected to one another through international transport and

communications. The overall context to the changing demands of firms is an international one associated with the growth of multi-national firms and the creation of larger European markets after France joined the European Economic Community in 1956.

The competitiveness of the Paris region as a location for international business headquarters and the associated financial and service activities was certainly of paramount importance in the plans for the Paris region drawn in the 1960s (16). The phenomenon of 'tertiarisation': the emergence of the service sector as the dominant source of employment in the Paris region has been the subject of volumes of turgid analysis and explanation (17). J. Gajer (18) exemplifies this approach: "the urbanisation of the Paris Region has responded to three imperatives: demographic growth, housing the population and property speculation". Gajer argues that the RER, as a transport development, was essential to releasing land and improving access to labour when the concentric zones (19) which had been the basis of previous land use plans became untenable. Gajer concludes:

"If, at first, the state and the large private companies responded to the needs of industrialisation, and gave priority to goods transport, they had, later on, to take on the issue of getting people to and from work. Urban transport routes were determined by this simple economic imperative" (20)

1.2 Urban Social Movements

Where ecological explanations derive from a universal tendency to equilibrium in social organisation, based on a posited relationship between people and the environment, marxist explanations of urban policy derive from

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

a basic assumption of social conflict leading to a revolutionary change in social organisation. The various marxist analyses of urban society (21) can be gathered together under the banner of urban social movements. As in the ecological perspective it is important at the outset to establish what constitutes the specifically spatial or urban dimension of marxist theory. The most thoroughgoing theorisation of the urban within a marxist framework is the work of Castells. Starting from a structuralist epistemology which denies the validity of explanations based on individual human action, or subject centred explanations (22) Castells attempts an analysis of the 'urban structure' which will provide a 'scientific' urban object as opposed to the ideological statements hitherto accepted as urban sociology. Castells, in his search for a real social form which corresponds to a genuine spatial form (these being the only two categories of social phenomena which warrant scientific investigation within the structuralist perspective) alights on units of 'collective consumption'. Consumption is defined as the process of reproducing labour power, it is collective where it involves organisation and management (implicitly) by public/political institutions.

It is doubtful if it would be possible to identify collective consumption units in the way Castells does if he were genuinely adopting a rigorous structuralist approach (23). Nevertheless he has identified a new field of empirical study and social conflict which it was important to analyse within marxist view of social change: protest over non-production issues in cities. Castells and his followers (24) in the empirical examination of collective consumption retain the structuralist categories for the analysis of the total system, of which spatial units of collective

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

consumption form a part. The urban system has, therefore, economic, political and ideological levels. The economic level is broken down into the traditional categories of production, consumption and exchange. The urban system refers directly to the consumption element, in that its main function is to reproduce labour power through the organisation of housing, transport, leisure etc. In the longer term it also ensures the regeneration of the workforce through health services, education, childcare, social services and so on. Castells argues (rather similarly to Wirth) that advanced capitalism is increasing the concentration of collective consumption in more densely populated cities and that this requires greater management and hence a larger role for the state. As consumption becomes more collectivised it becomes more politicised and the capacity for a crisis in which production, dominated by exchange values, fails to produce the resources for collective consumption becomes greater. In this way political action over collective consumption can have revolutionary potential. Given the increasing dependence of the bourgeoisie, especially the new petit bourgeoisie (25), on collectively provided services, such political action offers scope to build cross class alliances. Urban social movements are alliances which carry the embryo of an alternative order within them, they have the capacity to effect substantial shifts in the balance of power within capitalist societies.

The greater part of the empirical studies, and political analyses of the transport users movement and their impact on urban policy in Paris in the 1970s, has been written in an attempt to apply Castells' theory to a case which, on the surface, offers a quintessential example of an urban social movement. In the process, all the authors depart, as Castells himself has, from the strict theoretical framework set out in (1972) *La Question*

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

Urbaine. The most important examples are **Cherki E.** and **Mehl D.** (1979) *Les Nouveaux Embarras de Paris* and **Lojkine J.** (1973) *La Politique Urbaine dans la Région Parisienne*. There are also numerous reports commissioned by the Ministry of Transport and Urban Affairs in the mid to late 1970s under the auspices of the *Action Thematique Programmé - Socio-economie des Transports* which describe urban politics and transport protest in a marxist framework derived from Castells' theory of Urban Social Movements.

Empirically, the major tasks undertaken by these studies are their efforts to document the social composition of transport protest groups, the nature of their demands, the impact of these demands on the state and on large businesses and role of transport and urban protest in the creation of a new left politics in France. They seek to demonstrate that the groups constituted a new form of cross class alliance, that the demands were 'transitional' in the sense that they sought a substantial shift in power and resources which threatened the social domination of large businesses in cities and in the urbanised society, that these demands had a measurable and lasting effect on state policy and that the groups were the foundation of a new style of communist and socialist politics which embraced consumption issues as well as more traditional industrial issues.

There is a substantial body of evidence that the transport users movements were representative of a wide range of social groups, though Cherki and Mehl conclude "working class people were almost non-existent in local committees (which were) largely made up of middle class people and students" (26). Nevertheless a wide range of travellers, organised as travellers rather than as workers or residents or students, participated in

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

meetings, events and demonstrations in 1970. It can also be effectively argued that the transport users groups were part of a shift in left politics towards consumption issues, though it is clear from the literature and from the press that it was the political parties, especially the Communist Party, which took the initiative. Rather than responding to spontaneous local action, the Communist Party positively set out to create an organisation to address consumption issues on a cross class basis in 1970. The Socialist Party and the Union of the Left adopted the attitudes, rhetoric and policies of the users' groups in their urban programmes in 1974.

It is less obvious that the demands articulated by the users' groups were 'transitional' or indeed had any impact at all on state policy. No amount of documenting the expressed wishes and practical actions of transport protest committees, and showing how these entered the vocabulary of opposition politics can solve the basic theoretical weakness that the Urban Social Movements explanation fails to offer any transmission system between external pressure and the purposive actions of the 'relatively autonomous state'. Two kinds of transmission context are developed in these accounts: first that the state's role in regulating competition between developers and monopolies leads it to adopt certain apparently anti-monopoly policies (27), second that the legitimacy of the social order is sufficiently threatened in some struggles against urban social movements that concessions are necessary sacrifices (28). Lojkin argues that "it is the level and the nature of the contradictions between the dominant class and the dominated class, as between the fractions or individual agents of the dominant class, which determine in the last instance the form and content of state intervention"(29). He describes the transport users

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

movement as "a social movement in favour of public transport interpreted by state power as a direct menace to the hegemony of the ruling class"(30).

However, these are only contexts and the external explanations, based on social (class?) conflict about the organisation of consumption, the quality and price of transport services, the division of activity between zones in the city, about the vision of city life itself, can only be functionally related to outcomes. Just as ecological accounts are descriptions of adaptation to natural tendencies and circumstances, so urban social movements are descriptions of outcomes associated with, but not explainable by, social conflict. Neither structural imperative is an intentioned cause of policy change.

There are other weaknesses in functional explanations of policy change. It is possible for policy makers to be perverse. Functional policy changes do not always take place even when they are recognised to be functional by policy makers. More arcane and flexible variants of the legitimation or social equilibrium explanations might accommodate this problem with some assertion of long run patterns of social conflict, or internal malfunctions of dominant groups which will ultimately correct themselves. It is difficult, nonetheless to provide a defensible functional explanation of the present British Government policy toward public transport investment in central London. Its own studies of the situation suggest that substantial investment in new infrastructure, through public intervention is required. The dominant interests within business and the City argue that such investment is essential. The effectiveness of private enterprise, urban renewal and other public services in London will be substantially impaired

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

by failure to improve the public transport infrastructure. The Government minister responsible himself admits that the case for public investment in new infrastructure is overwhelming, yet the policy he espouses is not to undertake significant new public investment.

Functional explanations offer no basis for understanding the relative priority attached to different dimensions of functional outcomes, or the different responses to different structural imperatives acting on the state with equal force. To take the example of the Regional Express Metro (RER) in the Paris region. Government policy sought to achieve balanced, distributed development across the region by establishing a new network of high speed transport links, this would alleviate population and transport pressures in the existing unbalanced system. Why then, was the outcome to construct one section of the RER which positively accentuated the imbalance and transport pressures in the region, when the imperatives acting on policy would have suggested that higher priority should be accorded to other sections of the overall network. The answer must lie in Lojkine's small chink - "interpreted by State Power as ..." . How does such interpretation take place and what impact does it have on policy choice?

In addition to the common failing of functionality, each type of external explanation suffers from a particular drawback in the case of Paris transport. The ecological explanation can offer no rationale for deducing changes in fiscal policy, its basis in the spatial specificity of cities and the activities which are pursued within them does not extend to financial relationships between different social groups and the state. Yet the centrepiece of the policy change on public transport was the redistribution

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

of costs between social groups and the imposition of new taxes on the 'dominant activity' or 'key function'. Ecological theory can inform us as to the pressures to make investments, or develop new services, it cannot offer an explanation of how it is determined who will pay for them.

There is a difficulty of multiple causation in the case of the Urban Social Movements approach. Paris was a ferment of social conflict in the period 1968 to 1976 (31). A multiplicity of groups were active on a wide range of social issues ranging from environmental protection, to housing, to sexual politics, to military service to mention only a few. It is not possible to disentangle effective protest from ineffective protest, threatening from innocuous opposition to Government policy. Moreover, research on internal policy discussions within the Government reveals that a great deal of conflict was around issues which had been determined in favour of the opposition, but policy change had not been actioned or made public for some reason. This was true, for example over the RER, which was the focus of great protest in 1970, although the Government had decided privately in 1969 that it would be built along the route that transport users were demanding (32).

In summary, neither ecological nor modern marxist accounts of policy change address the crucial area of the mechanism by which structural imperatives lead to changes in state intervention or behaviour. Both types of explanation are purely functional and each has specific weaknesses when applied in the case of transport policy in the Paris region in the relevant period. It follows, therefore, that this study will be framed within internal, state centred explanations of policy change.

1.2. Pluralist explanations

The explanations considered so far have been explicitly society centred, locating the sources of changes in public policy completely outside the governmental apparatus itself. Pluralist accounts provide a bridge between this kind of approach and the explicitly state centred accounts considered in section 3 below. A recent survey distinguishes three basic variants of the pluralist approach, all of which are consistent with the theory's fundamental premiss of the state's neutrality vis-a-vis competing social interests, but which differ in the ways in which this neutrality is specified (33).

In the 'weathervane' model (34), the governmental system is pictured as a cypher which responds inertly to the balance of competing social and political forces acting upon it. The state is represented as neutral because the governmental system has no particular political commitments of its own. Public policies, in this view, will faithfully reproduce inequalities of political influence and resources, such as votes, argument, control of economic power which exist in society as a whole. An underlying pessimism about the polity is offset, however, by the characteristic pluralist convictions that democratic societies provide relatively open and permeable structures for political mobilisation; that the development of market economies creates a high degree of fragmentation of spheres of influence between multiple, complex social interests; that 'countervailing powers' are often created producing a balancing effect in response to the emergence of large scale or broad gauge power centres; and that no single interest or

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

coalition of interests will be able to dominate more than a few policy areas at once, or a single policy area in perpetuity.

In the Parisian case the competing political pressures stemmed from conflicts about access to places of work, about the price of different modes of transport, about development of new centres of employment, retailing and leisure, about the value of the existing environment and architectural heritage of the City, and about the place of Paris within France, the European Community and the international economy. Within these broad strategic issues, a whole gamut of specific interests achieved high political salience at particular times or in specific localities. For example, trade unions began to articulate members demands for higher quality public services, and better transport to and from work, in addition to more traditional claims for better wages and conditions. Groups of civil engineers, and the construction companies who retained them pressed for investment in new systems of transport, new types of roads, opportunities to experiment with traffic controls and engineering techniques. The balance between these altered as the international economy fluctuated, people's perceptions of the value of cars, the environment and their employment altered, as the relative efficiency of different transport modes shifted according to congestion, city design, economic development and so on. Some groups of people made explicit efforts to mobilise political opinion in their favour. Car manufacturers promulgated a fashion for driving and for personal independence, road builders advertised the technical superiority of the new roads and claimed improved travelling conditions, political parties and campaigns representing poor neighbourhoods, public transport users and environmentalists gathered in demonstrations to demand more and cheaper

public transport. The relative weight of pressure was reflected in votes, but also in intellectual and social fashions, in professional practice and press comment.

In the 'equalising' force variant (35), the political system is pictured instead as intervening to redress imbalances in social and economic allocations. The fact that all citizens, even the most disadvantaged in terms of income, resources, life situations have a vote is seen as skewing the political system towards the amelioration of injustices and the protection of social interests which might otherwise go unregarded. Politicians motivation for promoting such equalising interventions may range from altruism or socialist ideology at one end of the spectrum, through a concern to maximise system legitimacy or social efficiency, to purely self interested calculations of vote losses if ameliorative action is not taken. But the end result of a complex of such processes is to bring the governmental system down on the side of equalising up social interests, vis-a-vis the situation which would otherwise apply in a pure market society.

Pictured in this light the evolution of Paris transport policy in the 1968-1972 period becomes less surprising and apparently paradoxical. The policies were framed in an atmosphere of uncertainty following the events of May 1968 which had generated a crisis of confidence among political leaders at all levels in the country. It may also be the case that the re-appraisal of social values which took place among many groups of citizens, and by individual opinion formers, in the country lead to a particular sensitivity to providing defensible, high quality public services, with the consequence that evidence from research and experts to the effect that previous policies

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

had had undesirable effects would lead to a questioning of previous decisions and a willingness to pursue alternatives.

There was particular political concern about the power of protest movements which could have caused an amplified anticipated reaction in this instance. Politicians who were concerned to maintain social efficiency or the fragile legitimacy of the governmental system might be anxious to avoid major social upheavals, or the circulation of political arguments which weakened the attachment of key citizens, especially the comparatively affluent service sector employees, to the system's institutions and the solutions they proposed. In other words, the transport users movement did not force concessions from a state concerned to protect monopoly interests as the marxist account above would hypothesise, rather the state so feared the political impact of discontent from a group of citizens with non-economic powers that they were prepared to adopt policies which equalised the balance on interest in their favour.

The equalising state might also have an impact on the style of solution the state sought to transport problems. The orthodoxy of the 1960s, that road construction, allied to increasing car ownership would expand travel opportunities and choices most rapidly was openly challenged by citizens whose travel conditions were deteriorating in the late 1960s. The road based solution could very easily have been undermined in professional and political circles by a growing awareness that it generated injustices which were leading to political tensions and social conflict. This might also go some way to explaining the decision to adopt a distinctly redistributive funding device: a payroll tax on businesses. In such an account of policy

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

change the role of businesspeople will merit close scrutiny. Their interests had dominated urban policy up to 1968 and yet businesspeople met the financial costs of policy changes by accepting new taxation. Intuitively this seems to be against their interests, one would hypothesise that most people would prefer not to pay new taxes if they could persuade politicians to raise funds in another way, or to reduce expenditure so that new tax revenues were not needed. What sort of anticipated reaction to conflict over transport policy made politicians willing to act against the interests of business, and why were businesspeople prepared to accept such actions? These issues will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 4 below.

The third 'broker' variant of the pluralist position (36 recognises that the state or governmental system itself has strong interests in the resolution of policy problems in particular ways. The state may be 'neutral' in respect of competing social interests, but bureaucrats and politicians are not disinterested in their behaviour when the governmental system has a clear stake in an issue. Bureaucrats will, essentially, defend the interests of their agency or part of the governmental apparatus, safeguarding its survival, maintaining its current position and influence, promoting the growth of its budget and broadening the scope of its activities. Politicians will want to promote policies as vehicles for their own careers and electoral success, or because they have become socialised into an organisationally committed role during their incumbency in office or in their role as legislator of political representative. How bureaucrats and politicians respond to emerging policy problems and available policy choices will be conditioned most critically by the administrative and political stakes they have in the issues' resolution, as well as by their assessment

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

of the balance of political forces acting upon government.

The broker model suggests a much more balanced judgement of the importance of external social and internal political/administrative factors in shaping the development of Parisian transport policy. While the pressures acting upon the governmental system are seen in much the same light as in previous pluralist variants, this account places much more stress upon the motives, interests and behaviour of actors inside the governmental system itself and directly involved in handling transport issues. The principal actors concerned with governmental intervention in transport policy in the Paris region comprise representatives of several administrative *Corps*, research planning and policy advice staff, local elected politicians and other groups co-opted into the central planning systems within the framework of *concertation*. The most significant group by far are the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*, a professional body of civil engineers concerned with the greater part of urban and regional planning, public infrastructure construction and management and the development of both road based and public transport policies. Unlike their counterparts in Britain, the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* are strongly interested and established in public transport and road construction; they have a correspondingly wider planning role, and many debates about policy options are internal to the profession. The *Corps* dominates the central Ministries of Transport and Public Infrastructure, the local planning agencies for infrastructure, the management of public transport companies and the main consultancies in private transport enterprise. Within the ambit of the *Ponts et Chaussées*, smaller professional groupings, specifically the *Corps de Construction* and the *Ingénieurs des Travaux Publics de l'Etat*, exert more practical influence

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

on policy implementation. The major competitor to the *Ponts et Chaussées* for local influence and central control of public policy, within the governmental apparatus are Prefects, who have a co-ordinating responsibility for all government services in the *Département* including planning, policing, economic development and land use controls. The Prefects oversee local political activity and are accountable to the Minister of the Interior. Financial influence rests with the Ministry of Finance, specifically with the bureaucrats who administer development funds and public loan funds; their interests are articulated by the *Corps de Comptes* and the local *Tresoriers Payeurs Généraux*. Expertise in planning and research in urban questions was collected in the *Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne*, and the *Atelier Public d'Urbanisme* of the *Mairie de Paris*. Some consumer and worker representatives, alongside some businesspeople participated in Planning Commissions drawing up the Regional Plan felt obliged to defend of the solutions proposed in the National Plans.

Among politicians local Maires and certain central Government Ministers had substantial investment in particular resolutions of transport policy issues. The Maires of inner suburbs, or of major provincial cities were the key local political actors, while the importance attached to urban planning by leading Gaullists lead to a close identification of the President and the Prime Minister with current transport and urban development policies. In addition some 'backbench' right wing politicians held trusted positions in the tamed regional institutions and were clearly associated with their programmes.

Moving beyond traditional pluralist assumptions, there is a large body

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

of work examining the nature of administrative practice and intra-governmental politics (37). The greater part of this literature is concerned with two kinds of issue: the relationship between the organisation of state agencies and the quality or style of service they offer the public and secondly the ability of public officials to frustrate, modify or distort the expressed wishes of political leaders. Explanations of policy change have been based on a synthesis of elements of both literatures reformulated either as a theory of 'intergovernmental relations' or as a theory of 'policy networks'. Both approaches stress the important role played by public officials in policy development, and the significance of informal contacts within the government system. Equally neither approach adopts strict boundaries between 'centre' and 'periphery'. In each account a functionally defined 'centre' plays a central role in setting rules, structuring debate and determining the style and level of involvement of various actors. However the centre cannot be territorially or administratively defined, and as a corollary, neither can the 'periphery'.

This body of theory posits a specific autonomy of the actors which make up the networks (the state)(38) from the political will of a democratic society. The state is able to act according to its own wishes and priorities, although its behaviour will differ depending on the degree of consensus between political preferences and state officials' intentions. Where the state's intentions and political preferences co-incide there will be a strongly political policy making system for example controlling the import of heroin into the country. Where public political preferences are strongly divided or indifferent, professionalised policy making, based on technical norms will predominate for example security policy in Northern

Ireland. Where the public's political preferences are strongly at odds with the state's intentions the state will frame issues or decision making processes so as to frustrate political preferences for example the issue of capital punishment for murdering police officers. Each of the examples illustrate that the state is not a unified body of officials, there are sub networks within the bureaucracy which, for example, strongly disagree with current law on capital punishment or controlled drugs, but the outcome of inter-network competition is the current set of policies.

1.3. Intergovernmental relations theory

Originally developed by writers analysing the agencies which managed federal welfare, education and energy programmes in the United States (39) which they characterised as professional bureaucratic complexes, intergovernmental relations theory has its parallels in French political sociology (40). These professional bureaucratic complexes are not the caricature technocracy so frequently ascribed to French public life under de Gaulle and Pompidou by their polemical critics (41), but more subtle networks in which local politicians, for example provincial Maires, and professional experts collaborate in solving problems to political and administrative advantage.

The result of this political-bureaucratic collaboration is a network of relationships which serve to undermine the independence of any particular governmental organisation, to frustrate strictly rational policy making and to encourage the development of professionalised policy systems. It also offers an explanation of the apparent contradiction of a strong

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

centralisation of policy content, alongside an evident decentralisation of policy implementation and management. The policy networks can be territorial or issue based, but tend, in line with the professionalisation inherent in the model to be issue based. **J-C Thoenig** in *L'Ere des Technocrates - le cas des Ponts et Chaussées* has made a detailed account of the role of the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* in creating a professional bureaucratic complex of transport and planning policy making in France in the 1960s. Thoenig concentrates on describing the internal struggles within the *Corps* over redefining its world view and adopting a new set of values and ambitions centred on urban renewal and regional planning underpinned by a range of new techniques for interpreting problems and defining solutions. Essential to Thoenig's theory of technocracy is the interdependency and competition between the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* and other professional and political groups within the administrative system. French administration in the 1960s operated a set of rules, and a system of exchange between professions and politicians to which the world view of the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* was almost perfectly adapted, and the leadership of the *Corps* deployed their resources of technique and personnel effectively to achieve domination over transport policy development. The centre determined rules of exchange and interaction, and set agendas, which promoted the power of the *Ponts et Chaussées* and the strategy adopted by the *Corps* vis-a-vis other networks enabled them to depoliticise policy issues, to accommodate losing organisations, to promote the centre's authority and right to govern (which was essential to the Gaullist credo) and to generate a consensus on the underlying values which made up the *Corp's* world view.

There are certain obvious difficulties when applying Thoenig's approach

to a situation of rapid policy change. All the essential characteristics suggest stable, permanent relationships making slow incremental adjustment the normal evolutionary process. This problem reflects the underlying weaknesses of the intergovernmental relations approach: it has too narrow and too specific a view of resources and strategies, tending to accept internal values of one profession as valid across the whole government system, it has a weak account of the role of the 'centre' and pays little attention to variations between policy areas (42). In the context of French public policy in the late 60s and early 70s, its greatest weakness is its inability to assimilate the impact of the 1968 Events and the emergence of a political arena outside established local and national political structures.

It would be necessary, therefore, to adapt Thoenig's analysis to produce a defensible intergovernmental relations account of the policy changes in the early 1970s in Paris transport. Specifically, a model of interaction between the professional bureaucratic complex and the protest movements is essential to an explanation of an unpredictable policy change. It can be hypothesised that collaboration between representative local politicians (notables) and accepted professional expertise (the *Ponts et Chaussées*) was weakened by gradually diminishing political legitimacy of gerrymandered regional institutions (43) and the associated increasing power of expertise in policy making. This might result in more private, secretive and hence politically vulnerable solutions being adopted, as the professional advice of one group became institutionalised in Government and the bureaucracy. Rapid policy change might then take place when the professional bureaucratic complex perceived a serious threat to its influence from a change either in political priorities or because of the

emergence of an alternative professional bureaucratic complex which would enable the centre to bypass them in finding an acceptable solution to a problem.

1.4. Policy networks

A broader, less political, explanation of policy making which integrates professional practice, expert opinion and government priorities is the concept of a Policy Network (44). The essence of the concept is that it does not prescribe a particular set of relationships or style of interaction between actors, nor does it define a specific group of actors. Policy networks are complexes of organisations dependent upon one another's resources and distinguished from one other by the distinctions within the overall structure of resources recognised by the 'centre' or generated by external pressures. Rhodes (45) argues that networks can be described using five dimensions: the 'constellation of interests', that is who participates and what their common features are; the balance of membership in terms of providers, users, public and private interests; the degree of 'vertical interdependence', that is the extent to which people within the network are dependent on one another; the degree of 'horizontal interdependence', in other words the extent to which the network is dependent on other networks and finally on the overall distribution of resources in terms of who controls what and how the relative value of resources is defined and changes over time.

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

Rhodes' work, and the majority of the sources (46) on which he draws in defining a range of policy networks, focuses on Britain and on British institutions, especially the local government system and major public services such as energy supply and the National Health Service (47). Notwithstanding the anglocentrism of the policy networks literature, it is possible, as with the pluralist and intergovernmental relations models developed in the United States, to develop models of policy networks which are applicable to transport policy development in France. It is arguable that several variants of policy networks could have exercised dominant influence in policy making in the Paris region between 1968 and 1976. Rhodes identifies five variants all of which have features which are empirically testable in a study of transport policy making: policy communities, issue networks, professionalised networks, intergovernmental networks and producer networks.

A stable policy community would comprise a continuous, highly restrictive membership, based on providing direct services to users and comparatively independent of other policy communities. Thoenig's description of the *Ponts et Chaussées* could offer a starting point for building a model of a policy community in which other permanent members of a constellation of transport interests, or of Parisian interests, retained close control of key resources for drawing up a defensible regional plan on the basis of their direct control of the regional transport infrastructure. Sfez (48) argues in his account of the development of the RER that the key actors were the managers of transport services that appeared likely to fail in the face of demands imposed by urban renewal programmes, and that it was their deployment of public anxiety that broke the log jam of approval for new rail

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

systems in the city of Paris. Gajer (49) also argues that a close community of professional engineers, architects and builders exercised a continuous influence on policy development on the basis of their capacity to deliver new uses of space, and new travel options. The more polemical critiques of urban planning policy suggest a closed, secretive community of key actors responsible for hatching elaborate plans and foisting them on an unwilling populace (50). This group was closed, independent, linked local management of development with access to the top of the political system and was unconcerned with other public policy issues. As with the intergovernmental relations approach, there is a difficulty on the matter of stability. The interesting feature of Paris transport policy in the period was its volatility and this is problematic to a policy community model which stresses the insularity and independence of policy. In addition, there is strong evidence that the public finance policy networks had a strong influence on policy decisions and a significant interest in policy development (51). Again, therefore, a policy community explanation would be grounded in a hypothesis about perceived, or actual, risks of being bypassed by some higher authority seeking an urgent solution outside established policy frameworks. More plausibly, it can be argued that the stability of transport policy since 1972 is founded on the emergence of a policy community following the turbulence of the previous decade.

To be defensible, a policy community explanation would require a precise account of the boundaries of the constellation, the restrictions on membership. Stability alone suggests Rhodes' second variant, the 'issue network' which is an atomistic collection of interests, comparatively independent of one another, whose primary goal is stability and continuity.

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

The focus of such a network would be broader than the issue of Paris transport and might be linked to wider environmental concerns. It is certainly true that a wide defensive network, concerned with the preservation of historic sites and open space in the Paris region emerged in the 1970s (52), and that this had no special professional or service delivery base. At the risk of repetition, this model too suffers from a poor capacity to explain volatility and rapid shifts in policy, and it is this feature which will be most valuable when addressing public transport policy in the early 1970s.

Cherki and Mehl (53) argue that the result of the political crisis in the late 1960s and early 1970s (which they analyse in marxist terms as an Urban Social Movement - see above) was an intergovernmental network, in which local representative organisations, specifically municipal councils, Maires and associations of Maires played a central role in the determination of policy priorities. These actors provided the transmission system through which a varied and extensive constellation of local and 'non-centre' interests influenced decisions on resources and priorities in urban renewal and transport. Ribeill and May (54) explain this as a municipalisation of urban protest, whilst Cherki and Mehl (55) present a model of constrained pluralism, in which essentially pluralist local politics interact, through the network, with central government priorities in public finance and regional development. These arguments have clear parallels with the dual state model which Saunders (56) has used to analyse collective consumption in Britain. Without the network dimension, they suffer from the same essential weaknesses as the dual state approach; a basic empirical confusion about which activities perform which functions, and an unresolvable tension

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

between functional definitions of policy fields and a non functional explanation of agents' actions (57). It will be possible to measure the extent to which an intergovernmental network operated in transport policy, and its importance in policy making, by directly addressing the role of municipalities and Maires in policy development. These questions are examined in Chapter 5.

The ascendent role of the providers, the RATP and the SNCF, in the transport planning system post 1972 (58) provides some evidence for a producer network, of the kind which has been used to analyse nationalised industries, and areas of public policy where private interests have a substantial role. However, several characteristics ascribed to producer networks (59) are difficult to identify in the case of Paris transport. The RATP and SNCF were essentially dependent on one another, the effectiveness and profitability of transport operations depends greatly on the facility with which people can move between services, and this was greatly improved by new infrastructure and ticketing systems in the 1970s. There is little evidence, of a non-functional nature, to suggest that economic interests predominated in policy decisions and the membership of the network was absolutely stable. New producer interests have emerged since the 1986 privatisations of parts of bus network, but in the 1970s it is more plausible to see the RATP and SNCF Suburban division as professionalised public services than private businesses.

The fact that the *Corps* play such a leading role in French public administration immediately suggests a professionalised network. Theonig's account of the *Ponts et Chaussées* would seem to confirm that one class of

participant - the professional engineer - was pre-eminent in policy making and that the centre, in the shape of the Ministry and its various divisions, was highly dependent on professional advice. Rhodes argues that a truly professionalised network is independent of other networks. He cites studies of water engineers, medical consultants and architects as evidence for this. Thoenig, however, describes the significance of interaction with other networks and *Corps* in explaining the behaviour and status of the *Ponts et Chaussées*. It is possible that this apparently higher level of interdependence does not militate against a professionalised network explanation, if it can be shown that the professional opinion of civil engineers exercised an ideological domination over policy making, extending into the activities of other networks and other interests within the professionalised transport policy network. This would, however, be a substantial adaptation of Thoenig's view of the role of the *Ponts et Chaussées* which stresses their key positional role, and high level of authority, rather than their ideological dominance. On the other hand, ideological dominance is better adapted to explaining volatility in policy, since the options available and their respective merits tend to follow professional fashions based on practice rather than stable political interdependencies.

1.5. Summary

This overview has distinguished two fundamental approaches. While not denying the contextual importance of structural imperatives, of either environmental or economic origin, it has stressed that the primary basis for explaining policy change must be an account of the way in which actors

Introduction : Origins of Policy Change

within the 'state' changed their behaviour, opinions and priorities. Structuralist and functionalist accounts of policy change have, therefore, been rejected in favour of explanations based on either political mediation or on the sociology of administration and public services. Contemporary accounts of policy development, political argument and professional thinking have been placed either within a broad framework of pluralist political analysis, or a general discussion of the role of policy networks. In both cases it has been necessary to detach these accounts from a specific normative or polemical purpose, and to make cross national comparisons of the applicability of arguments formulated outside France.

The state centred frameworks for analysing policy have provided a basis from which several hypotheses have been generated which may illuminate the case of Paris transport between 1968 and 1976. The ability to explain episodic volatility and rapid shifts in policy, and subsequent stability, will be a key test of these various approaches.

PART 1 - POLICY HISTORY

CHAPTER 2 - The Evolution of Transport Policy Making in Paris

There has been publicly organised transport of one kind or another trundling over or under the streets of Paris since 1661 (60). Despite the immense changes which the city, the surrounding countryside and the political life of its people, have undergone since then some strong common threads run through the history of transport policy. They set the stage for the policy changes which are the focus of this study.

Of course, the shape of Paris has been transformed. There are new bridges across the Seine, new routes into and across the city, a massive sprawl of suburbs and several totally new settlements in the city's hinterland. Tower blocks reach high above the city and railway lines plough deep below the river bed. Great swathes have been cut through the old districts to bring commuters into the city centre on new roads and railways. The economic life of the city is based upon international trade, Government and public administration, finance and modern industrial manufacturing. Many old trades have long since disappeared, and the importance of the river as the principal trading route in France has declined(61). Paris remains the seat of Government and the administrative structures set in place in the 1660s are recognisable today. The Government which oversees them is the product of two empires and five republics and symbolises a further effort to establish stable effective democratic republicanism. The powers and responsibilities of Government have extended into many spheres of life. One of the themes of this resume will be the way

that Governments have developed new approaches to the organisation of public services.

Three major continuities are evident in the history of urban planning and transport policy. The travel patterns which exist today emerged early in the processes of urbanisation and have been consistently reinforced by economic pressures and public policy. The intervention of the state, while using different means in different periods, has always been aimed at securing a balance of public utility and private costs which will not disturb either public order or the city's principal financial and industrial interests. The profession which dominates policy development and service management has remained in control throughout the period, skillfully extending its role and developing new techniques which preserve its influence (62).

Against the backcloth of these continuities there have been shifts in the scope and role of transport planning. In the twentieth century a regional dimension to state intervention has emerged, characterised by fierce disputes between existing levels of public administration and disputes between professional groups within public service. The Fifth Republic has seen the creation of a new level of administration in the region and the creation of new *Départements* (63). Alongside these administrative re-organisations, public transport has come to play a more important role in the overall design for regional development: partly as a result of dominant professional thinking and partly through new approaches to coping with population growth and the international post war economy.

The following sections draw out these five themes looking first at continuities and then at major changes.

2.1 : Continuity in travel patterns

The travel patterns evident in Paris today can be traced back over three hundred years. The great changes in planning, architecture, economic life and technology have all served to re-inforce a set of traffic flows which are determined partly through geography, but as much through the steady re-inforcement of established behaviour by public policy and private development. The first omnibuses in 1661 established the basic criss-cross pattern of city centre travel, crossing at Place du Chatelet, as does the present day tunnel(64). Likewise the buses were sanctioned by central Government although they offered what was basically a local service (65). The experiment foundered against criticism of its impact on class distinctions - the buses made travel too easy for the poorer classes - and was shortlived. (66).

The old, densely populated *quartiers* of Paris, crucible of the revolutionary mobs, were impenetrable to public transport and routes grew up along the major routes leading into the central religious, business and Government buildings and, of course, to and from major river crossings. The street pattern was the main target of Haussmann's reconstruction of central Paris - he created the diagonal and circular boulevards which are the basic map of Paris today (67). His aim was not to improve transport but to combat poor public hygiene by cutting great swathes through the slums and opening

up huge areas of central Paris for redevelopment and new uses. Major improvements to drainage and sanitation were two of the greatest benefits of this radical and traumatic programme. Whole *quartiers* (68) disappeared as the city's debts mounted and the developers profits increased. However, public health did improve and public order was easier to maintain (69).

More significantly for this study, the fabric of economic activity was changed by the reconstruction and set into a pattern which would endure for over a century as employment moved westward and residential areas grew up in the east (70). The single greatest travel demand has always been for access to places of work in the west. The new streets added to the congestion in central areas of the city by increasing the specialisation of land uses and by ignoring the worst blockages in *Les Halles* (71) and in the *Marais* (72). New public transport links to the west of the city enabled more people to arrive more swiftly at the principal interchanges and most popular destinations.

Congestion in the late nineteenth century was compounded by four factors: the growth in population, the archaic routing of regulated public transport, the great international exhibitions and the obstructions placed before railway construction in Paris. As the population grew it became more segregated. Public health measures had moved many industrial activities away from their traditional locations and areas of work became increasingly segregated from areas where people lived. As commuting increased the central residential districts developed concentrations of the very rich who could afford decent property in the city and the very poor who could not afford to escape the slums. The routes followed by buses and trams were regulated by a

monopoly agreement for fifty years granted to the *Compagnie Général des Omnibuses* (73) by Haussmann. These routes were not renegotiated to reflect changes in population distribution and as a result travel became more and more difficult and the financial situation of the CGO deteriorated. Efforts to revise the agreed routes were entangled in rows about railway construction and all sides became increasingly frustrated by the apparent impossibility of adjusting the network to meet new demands (see below for a fuller description of the arguments over railway development). The International Exhibitions (74) brought huge numbers of visitors to the city and created, in the longer term, new attractions for visitors (75). In 1889 the transport system proved quite unable to support the demand for travel between exhibit sites (76) and this greatly improved the case being advanced for a new underground railway. The major provincial railway operators wanted to link their Paris termini (77). Such a change would greatly benefit through travellers, international travel and the profits of the provincial companies but at the expense of Parisians whose environment would be damaged in order to provide a service which was not for local needs. For twenty years the Municipal Council succeeded in blocking the rail companies proposals and in 1895 seized the opportunity to build the *Métro* instead (78). While the *Métro* was the single largest addition to Paris transport capacity ever, it too reinforced established travel patterns by serving the same routes as the *grand boulevards*. Indeed it had been constructed immediately below or above the *grands boulevards* precisely to avoid the tricky and potentially divisive issue of whether people who had tunnels dug beneath their homes were entitled to any kind of compensation.

By 1914 the city had constructed 120 kilometers of *Métro* at a cost of

620mF. The number of passengers had grown from 16m in 1900 to 254m in 1909 (79). Like Haussmann's boulevards, the *Métro* just got more people to popular bottlenecks more quickly. It enhanced the attractions of commuting, further deepening the segregation of activities in the city. This problem is exemplified by the decision to make the *Gare St. Lazare* the focus of the first network. St. Lazare was already the major entry point for commuters working in the west of the city; as early as 1869 St. Lazare carried 13m of Paris' 20m annual train arrivals and departures and five sixths of these were to suburban destinations (80).

The uncontrolled suburban growth of the inter-war years shows the symbiotic relationship between the railway system and urban development. The mutual advantage to builders and railway companies accentuated the circle of transport-generated developments which in turn added to stresses in the transport system itself. The rapid growth of housing in the hinterland of the city, swallowing old villages and towns closely followed the routes of the provincial railways. Swift access to the city was a primary consideration in the selection of building plots (81). Public intervention to control the development of the district was paralysed by conflict between the central Government and the *Département de la Seine* and by court rulings which weakened local planning powers established by legislation in 1919 (82).

Despite its radical/socialist politics (83) the *Département* was supported by many local industrialists in its efforts to regulate development to ensure an even balance of industrial and residential investment and an equitable distribution of employment. Industry would


benefit from such policies by their tendency to increase access to local labour markets and through the public support they offered to housing, education, welfare and leisure programmes which hitherto many firms had run for themselves in what were effectively company towns (84). The central Government was more closely associated with the banking and financial interests which viewed such initiatives with suspicion and anticipated inflationary pressures and restrictions on free movement of capital as a consequence. Throughout the twenties and thirties central Government, in co-operation with the now right wing municipal council (85), frustrated the ambitions of the General Council of the *Département de la Seine* by establishing special commissions to oversee planning and redevelopment in the Paris area and by vetoing capital funding which the *Département* needed to carry out its policies (86). The origins of the competing professional networks, based respectively on the *Ponts et Chaussées* and the *Cour de Comptes* can be seen clearly in the debates in the inter-war years.

The consequence was that only small developments could be achieved and that those tended to be the ones which least challenged the status quo. The *Metro* was extended to a number of peripheral communes, extending the pool of labour available to businesses located at the centre of the network and improving access to the grands boulevards. New towns were built close to the main rail routes to the north (at *La Courneuve*) and the south (at *Rungis*)(87). The *Ligne de Sceaux* was taken over by the *Département*, mainly because its limited length made it an unattractive prospect for the ambitious provincial rail manager; it failed to go beyond the Paris basin. On the roads the trams were replaced with motorbuses as the motor lobby grew in influence. The *Département* accepted without hesitation the arguments put

forward by *Renault* and the *Société des Carburants* (88). A more important aspect of the road lobby was the growing pre-eminence of roads as a means of promoting private car travel. Regional plans drawn up in the 1930s extended the routes set down by Haussmann into a multi spoked wheel of *autoroutes* emanating from the *quartier de l'Opéra*. Only one road was completed in the pre-war years and the first three lane highway in France opened in Paris in 1941.

Unlike many cities Paris was scarcely damaged in the second world war and while its buses disappeared for combat duties, public transport was maintained by the *Métro*. After the initial period of recovery which was devoted to re-establishing the bus, *Métro* and rail distribution systems, roads began to play an increasing role in transport plans. However the roads were designed to support the existing travel pattern by moving through traffic away to ring roads, thereby speeding up local travel. In the late fifties and early sixties road building programmes increased the imbalance of the district. Manufacturing started to move to greenfield sites and the major firms relocated their offices to new complexes in the western suburbs (89).

Figure 2.1 : Relocation of Major Firms' HQs.



Source: Haghe T. (1973)

These alterations to the physical structure of the region reflected changing economic pressures resulting from France's entry into the European Economic Community in 1956 and from the emergence of massive multi-national firms based outside France. The Paris offices of provincial industries became international headquarters directing business strategy, marketing products, raising capital and lobbying central Government. Private banks became the linchpin of the international corporate sector in Paris and the city's western financial business district assumed the same functions as London, Rotterdam or Brussels. The IAURP observed in its resume of Regional Planning:

"ninety per cent of bank head offices are in the Paris Region, together with seventy per cent of insurance company head offices. Three hundred and eighty eight of France's top five hundred companies and all the state's central administrative bodies have their head office in the Paris Region" (90)

Despite the opportunities presented by such a massive wave of development demand, these changes in economic structure again reinforced the existing travel patterns. New transport services supplied these western centres of employment with ready access from the south and east but did very little to improve transport around the suburbs themselves. The *Schéma Directeur* (see below for a full examination of the Regional Plan) relied on private travel by road to overcome the increasing rigidity of the travel opportunities imposed by the now vicious circle of transport infrastructure-led development. Car ownership was increasing very swiftly in the 1950s and 1960s and unprecedented funds were committed to road construction but the road programme identified in the plan was as utopian as the dream of universal access to private cars. Only 24% of women had

drivers' licenses in 1968 and only a minority of them had access to continual use of a vehicle (91). Most people remained dependent, at least indirectly, on the public transport infrastructure which determined work opportunities and travel times. The growing dislocation between a fixed travel pattern and new uses for land in the region led to greater and greater distances (in time) between work and home for many people (92). Such pressures were beneath the wave of protest which engulfed the Government in 1970 and were the basis for major changes in professional thinking and planning priorities in the early seventies.

2.2 : The regulatory framework

Throughout its history public transport in Paris has been organised and managed by Government sanctioned monopolies. The scope of monopoly power and the machinery of regulation have changed as Governments have developed new means of intervening in the economy but the basic elements of the process have remained the same. This section describes the evolution of state regulation and examines the durability of the public monopoly as a system of management.

The first omnibuses were not really a commercial venture, more an experiment aimed at changing the way people travelled and at extending the possibility of travelling across the city to more people. As we have seen the second motive proved the project's downfall (93). The buses were organised by a private firm which had been granted a licence by the crown. Indeed a royal decree was required to establish any new form of trade.

Although buses disappeared for a century and a half thereafter, they were licensed and controlled in exactly the same manner when they returned in 1828. The *Compagnie Général de Omnibuses* was granted licenses to operate twelve routes in Paris. Other bus companies established competing services but not along the same routes. The principle of designating a route, comprising termini and set stopping places was built into the system very early on. This may seem obvious, but recent research (94) suggests that freely hailed buses are much more efficient and therefore the desire for regulations to control the impact of public transport on streets and open space has impaired efficiency for most of the system's history.

In 1855 responsibility for licensing was taken on by the *Département* (95) and the Prefect, Haussmann, agreed a new set of routes with the CGO which was granted a monopoly on them for thirty years. In 1860 the period of monopoly was increased to fifty years (96). Competition between different bus companies had been eliminated within the city but quickly re-emerged in the form of trams. In 1855 the city council agreed monopoly controls with two firms for tram routes around the city. The area was divided by the river with *Tramways Nord* operating to the north and *Tramways Sud* to the south. The separation of licensing authorities meant that it was no one's responsibility to check that buses and trams complemented one another. In the city centre buses and trams frequently plied the same routes, generally along the *grands boulevards* obstructing one another and vying for passengers. Secondly the tram network extended into the suburbs in an incremental and unplanned way as operators pared off slices of profitable bus business. These difficulties were exacerbated by the unruliness of the confederations of small operators who made up the two large tram companies

and who frequently altered their timetables or link ups without following agreed licence procedures (97).

The underlying cause of the disruption was the greater efficiency of trams. More money could be made running a tram than a bus. The monopoly agreements obstructed rational market behaviour. The tram companies wanted faster expansion and greater flexibility than the regulations allowed. The CGO which had enjoyed protection before the emergence of trams now wished to escape the straitjacket of its fifty year monopoly and diversify its activities by linking buses and trams into complementary routes. Renegotiation of the agreements was in the interests of all parties but was blocked by the city and the prefecture because of a related but separate dispute about railway building. The CGO made several attempts to loosen the bonds in the 1880s, all unsuccessful. In 1883 it prevailed on sympathetic municipal councillors to propose a reorganisation of trams involving substantial fare increases (98). The council responded, however, by demanding that the CGO create twelve new routes in order to retain its existing monopolies and refused to recommend any change in the organisation of tram services. The CGO refused and a five year stand off ensued until in 1888 (99) when the CGO, in desperation at mounting losses, unilaterally altered its timetables. In 1889 the public transport for visitors to the Great Exhibition proved embarrassingly inadequate (100) and the Government demanded changes in bus timetables, routes and the re-organisation of the tram operators into two new, more disciplined, federations: the *Compagnie Général de Tramways de Paris et du Département de la Seine* and the *Compagnie Général Parisien des Tramways* which complemented the CGO.

The rail companies were anxious to link their Paris termini, but the city council succeeded in persuading the Government that such a development was undesirable and that alternative systems should be explored for the city. The impending debacle of a second Great Exhibition pushed the Government into accepting the case for a *Métro* (101). The new service was licensed by the city council and the arrangements for its construction and management were endorsed by Parliament. The confusion of planning responsibilities increased with the city responsible for the *Métro* and its buses and the *Département de la Seine* responsible for licensing buses, trams and railways in its territory.

This confusing arrangement persisted until 1921 when the *Département* assumed lead responsibility for public transport (102). All the bus and tram operations were merged into a single monopoly firm: the *Société des Transports en Commun de la Région Parisienne*. The two *Métro* companies were merged at the same time to form the *Compagnie du Métropolitain*. Suburban railways continued to be managed, and largely neglected, by the provincial railway companies. The Département made efforts to transfer suburban lines to the *Compagnie du Métropolitain* but only succeeded in the case of the *Ligne de Sceaux*, which was neither a branch line nor a mainline service and hence held few rewards for the company or the ambitious rail manager. This situation persisted after the creation of the *Syndicat National des Chemins de Fer* (SNCF) in 1937, since the nationalised company preserved the rivalries and prejudices of the former operators.

These efforts by the *Département de la Seine* were the beginning of a significant change in the style of public monopolies and the nature of their

relationship to Government. The elimination of inter-modal competition, together with the virtual disappearance of trams in the inter-war years, removed the commercial pressures on the companies. They themselves began to put together more comprehensive policies and plans for the transport system and engineers from the *Compagnie du Métropolitain* were at the forefront of the *Départements* work on regional planning. The companies also increased their in-house engineering and maintenance services. Their professional employees were members of the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* which included key staff in the ministry and the prefecture. While the monopoly agreement with a private operator still technically governed relationships between state and transport company, in practice the companies were absorbed into the public sector.

Vichy created a new regulatory body as an intermediary between the companies and the ministry. The *Office Régional des Transports Parisien* (ORTP) supervised the overall organisation, planning and funding of public transport in the Paris area. The intermediary grew in usefulness as the level of subsidy and degree of commandeering increased during the war. In 1948 the Government merged the remaining transport operators into the *Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens* (RATP)(103) and it is this public corporation which manages public transport in the city today. Some elements of regulated private enterprise remain on the periphery of the main operation as it contracts out some suburban routes to private bus operators. Rail services remained under SNCF management. All *Métro* services, the *Ligne de Sceaux* and the overwhelming majority of buses are run by the RATP. The ORTP (later the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens* or STP) was retained as a regulatory body, not least to provide a forum for several ministries,

departements and major municipal councils to contribute to the priorities of the RATP whilst not being formally represented on the board which is appointed by the Minister of Transport.

With the advent of effective public ownership of the largest transport monopoly the techniques of intervention have changed. Whereas previously influence had been exerted by limiting the scope of the operation, the choice of operator and the level of profit, in the post war era the main powers have been appointments to the board and most important of all, the level of Government investment and revenue support. Determination of investment programmes was built into the national planning machinery established in the early 1950s by Monnet (104). Revenue support is an annual budget item for the Ministry of Transport acting on the advice of the STP. Clearly the main determinant of revenue required is the level of fares. It is also possible for the Government to earmark investment funds for particular projects and the overwhelming majority of funds allocated in the post war period have been towards the cost of the new *Réseau Express Régional* (RER) system.

The impact of Government intervention was apparent by the sixties. The funds allocated for public transport investment were separately identified in plans and the level of fares was a direct consequence of decisions by the ministry of finance. What then was the point of a separate organisation - why not run the system directly from the Ministry of Transport? This question was high in the minds of civil engineers who avoided employment with so lowly an enterprise if they possibly could (105). The value seems to lie in retaining a specialism, in separating day-to-day management from

strategy and budgeting and in providing purpose for a regional forum: the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens* (106). The RATP also offered a sheltered and inconspicuous corner in which to work up potentially controversial projects like the RER.

The public monopoly survived because it offered politicians making difficult decisions a degree of distance from the consequences and because there is still a clearly commercial aspect to running a public transport system. The useful distance steadily reduced over the 150 years before 1970 and was scarcely distinguishable when the crisis broke. The later part of this thesis will look at how relationships changed during and after the transport crisis of the early seventies and at the emergence of a new approach to public sector management in the RATP in the mid seventies.

2.3 : Sustained professional power - the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*

The *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* (107) predate Napoleonic times, but like the other public service *Corps* their strength derives from the institutions, administrative law and ethic of public service developed during the first empire. As the name suggests they are the state's civil engineers and they originate from the absolute necessity of good communications to maintain a strong economy and defensible borders. Nowadays, of course, there is much more to communications than roads and bridges. The *Corps* has adapted its organisation, deployment and skills to encompass each technological advance, economic doctrine or political reform with remarkable facility. It has evolved from a pillar of conservative rural

France to become the driving force behind urban and regional planning in the great conurbations of the late twentieth century. En route Paris and its region have presented particular opportunities and challenges to the *Corps*, both physically and politically and these are the focus of this section

The first great challenge in Paris was railways. The Haussmann reconstruction work was largely undertaken by the Prefecture and local staff but the Ministry's engineering advisors were at the heart of the debate about rail proposals in the 1870s. For the most part the Ministry staff backed their rural and railway company colleagues and enthusiastically supported wide gauge railways along the lines of London's Metropolitan Line (108). Slowly however, events began to soften their opposition to the City's proposals for a narrow gauge underground tram system. First, the *Corps* was particularly distressed by the inability of transport systems to cope with the traffic at the great exhibitions since this reflected poorly on them in international professional circles, more so than other professions or producers at the exhibitions. Secondly after almost twenty years of lobbying, the prospect of breaking down the city's opposition to wide gauge railways and getting a measure through parliament to permit them was becoming too remote to be sustained. Thirdly there was very little other civil engineering work around because the city was paralysed by a debt crisis occasioned by repayments on the loans for work carried out during the great Haussmann reconstructions and after the Commune (109). Engineers relied heavily on commissions from contracts undertaken and the funds which would supply these seemed likely to dry up in the absence of a prestige project like the *Métro*.

The profile of the *Corps de Ponts et Chaussées* increased in the early twenties when the STCRP was set up and the *Département de la Seine* began to look seriously at regional planning. The senior planning posts in the STCRP were held by members of the *Corps* (110), as were the top jobs in the *Compagnie du Métropolitain* (111). In collaboration with colleagues in the Ministry of Transport they helped to keep ambitious development proposals alive while the President and the Ministry of Finance attempted to scotch local initiatives. M. E. Jayot, Director of the STCRP, drafted the first regional transport plan in a special report commissioned by the *Département* in 1932 (112). Two of his colleagues, Ruhlmann and Langevin, later implemented a number of the projects he proposed in the 1950s (113), and carried some of the schemes right through into the 1965 *Schéma Directeur*. Jayot's plan epitomised the skill with which the profession negotiated its way through the minefield of conflicting interests in regional planning. It proposed extending the *Métro*, removing trams from the city but enhancing their role in the suburbs, building express railways to outer suburbs and setting up high technology services for the new airports. Gajer says of it:

"The Plan Jayot is a compromise between the main recommendations of the *Conseil Supérieur des Chemins de Fer*, the elected assemblies of the region and the main private companies. As such it remains ambiguous" (114)

To resolve this ambiguity Jayot recommended that a priority order of investments be drawn up by all parties involved. This was never formally done but one emerged as certain *Métro* lines were extended and some suburban rail routes were electrified.

In fact Paris was a minor sideshow for the *Corps* in the thirties. In provincial France their status and responsibilities were growing apace. They

took control of nearly all categories of public works including hospitals, schools, airports, sewers and drains as well as their traditional metier of road building (115). Their work was at the centre of the programmes sponsored by almost every major ministry, all the prefectures and most communes. Only a few large urban communes retained their own specialist services (116). In the course of their work local engineers formed close relationships with prefects, maires, local financiers and politicians, becoming key figures in the public life of rural communities and earning rich rewards from commissions on public projects. In 1941 they reached the climax of their imperialism when they took over control of local road maintenance from the communes and were therefore responsible for every level of communication. J.C. Thoenig aptly summarises:

"The absorption of local services marked (the *Corp's*) apogee and assured its territorial network almost total control of civil engineering" (117)

This influence was founded on the incrementalism and clientelism of Third Republic politics and soon came under threat after the liberation. The most apparent threat was the first liberation Government's decision to abolish commissions (118). This shattered the basis of much local bargaining and the *Corps* lost control of substantial railway investment programmes in the post war reconstruction. The *Corps* succeeded in getting commissions restored when the Government coalition changed in 1947 but they were still pegged to a fixed proportion of salary. Gradually the *Corps* managed to get commissions increased at least for the most senior engineers and the rules were formally changed in 1953 to allow a higher maximum commission (119). However the rules about proportion of salary remained and thus the differentials within the profession widened leading to disaffection among

lower ranking staff.

A stealthier, but more dangerous threat, emanated from the changes envisaged by senior ministers for the management of key state agencies and public development programmes. The new group of *Enarques* - graduates of the *Ecole National d'Administration* (120) rivalled the *Ponts et Chaussées* in two senses; they sought appointment to the senior posts in national and provincial administration which were traditionally the territory of the older *Corps* and secondly they promoted a style of Government and decision making which undermined the approach so successfully pursued by the *Ponts et Chaussées* in the Third Republic. Overall the climate was deteriorating for the conservative rural engineers. France was becoming an urban country faster than its European neighbours (121). The tax base was shifting to the cities (122) and so were the problems which caught public attention. Politicians' eyes turned to overcrowded slums, high crime rates, shanty towns and chaotic transport networks neglecting the depopulating agricultural areas. France was establishing an urban culture for itself in the 1950s around the motor car, the high rise block and the nuclear family. The quaint comfort of the Third Republic was out of fashion.

Some far sighted members of the *Ponts et Chaussées* argued that changes were essential to counter these pressures on their power base, but the inertia of contented success resisted calls for new skills to be taught at the *Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées* (123) and for a new image to rival the vanguard of *ENA* and national planning. Workloads started to decline in the well staffed *Services Départementales* and younger, more ambitious engineers grew restive as promotion prospects dwindled. Decolonisation was the straw

that broke the camel's back. Several thousand engineers returned from postings overseas in the mid fifties and simply could not be accommodated within the existing, now rigid, organisation of the *Ponts et Chaussées*.

By the late fifties an alternative view of the profession's role emphasising town planning, traffic modelling and a scientific approach had emerged among the younger staff who had been trained in the USA or had read widely in the American planning literature. They gained leadership of the profession in 1963 when Georges Pebereau secured the presidency of the *Corps*. He was the first *Ingénieur Ordinaire* (124) to gain the top office and, symbolically, his greatest professional achievement was the *Bagnolet* interchange on the *Boulevard Périphérique* around Paris. He ensured that new courses in economics, mathematical techniques, traffic forecasting and urban planning were introduced at the *Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées*. He secured approval for plans to widen the membership of the *Corps* into private firms, non-statutory agencies and research institutes. Managerial, research and planning posts became the profession's key targets in the reorganisation of urban planning bodies undertaken by the new Gaullist regime.

The massive changes to planning law, and the agencies which oversaw urban planning policy, undertaken by the Gaullists (125) in the mid sixties had a profound effect on the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* and presented them with their greatest opportunity to seal the transformation sought by Pebereau and his colleagues. The pilot for these reforms was the new support services set up for the *District de Paris* which employed recent graduates trained in the latest forecasting and planning techniques developed in the major US schools of urban planning. Crucially they espoused the ambitious

and modernising creed which accorded with Pompidou's and de Gaulle's vision of a glittering twentieth century city. In 1967 the *Loi d'Orientation Foncière* placed the new agencies at the centre of all planning decisions by prefectures and introduced approaches to development on a scale not previously imagined. The reorganisation of the Ministries of Housing, Transport and Local Development into a single Ministry of *Equipement*, which was divided into local *Directions Départementales d'Equipement* (DDEs) brought the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*' old rural remit into an urban setting.

At first there was doubt that the *Corps* had the capacity to seize control of the new DDEs and become a town planning profession in the more comprehensive style required. Indeed many local staff resisted diluting the specialism which they felt to be their expertise and rationale. Other *Corps*, notably the *Corps des Ingénieurs des Travaux Publics d'Etat* resisted coming under the direct managerial control of members of the *Ponts et Chaussées*. The *Ponts et Chaussées* had to cede some ground, and many junior posts, to the *Travaux Publics d'Etat* making arrangements for easier promotion from the lower *Corps* to the *Ponts et Chaussées*. Nevertheless, by 1967 seventy two of the ninety five *Départemental* directorships were held by members of the *Ponts et Chaussées* (126). The central research and planning agencies which had the Government's close attention were also staffed by members of the *Corps*. By the late sixties the urban and regional planning system in France was an extension of the civil engineering profession and the most important decisions on public and private developments depended on the vision it had created for senior politicians and the recommendations its members made to local administrations.

2.4 : Administrative reform

The Paris urban area has consistently outgrown the administrative convenience of successive Governments, and each effort to rationalise the organisation of Government in the city and its environs has conspicuously failed. From the start Paris has been different: originally ruled by Kings, its revolutionary fervour lost it the rights of a commune and it became a running anomaly troubling the neat minds of rational administrators. Since the mid nineteenth century Paris has had its own unique municipal council, whose relationship to both the surrounding *Département de la Seine* and with national ministries remained hazy. Except for a brief period in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century when the municipal council was a leading force for reform it has made little serious impact on town planning and transport policy. The construction of the *Métro* crowned the achievements of municipal radicalism and created the political will in the General Council of the *Département de la Seine* to tackle district wide issues. As Cottereau says:

"The initiative of the *Métro* contained the germ of a whole historical process involving social movements and the introduction of modern urban planning" (127)

Haussmann had maintained control of a massive redevelopment programme by strictly adhering to set design principles and rules about priorities, contracts and costs (128). Regardless almost of opposition and economic conditions the Baron had moved step by step towards his design of a new city of Paris. From this effective, but rigid and alienating process, emerged the flexibility and pragmatism of municipal socialism. This was not the

trenchant orthodoxy of the Commune but a liberal practicality concerned to promote public health, safe streets, good housing and profitable employment. It did not pit architects against commerce or bureaucrats against builders but drew on all interests to develop a popular and consensual image of the future for a growing metropolis. This process was greatly assisted by the change in quality of city councillor and city official in the late nineteenth century. Although many members retained several public offices the city council ceased to be purely an alternative chamber for Parisian parliamentarians to chalk up debating points (129). By the early twentieth century the council had become a national focus for radical urbanism encompassing the municipal housing movement, campaigns for pollution control and parks protection, eugenics enthusiasts and a host of other causes. Ebenezer Howard's Garden City ideals were keenly supported in these circles (130).

Even then, however, the unchecked urbanisation of the unplanned periphery of Paris was undoing what was essentially a bourgeois philosophy of urban life (131). As Paris itself became cleaner, safer and healthier its suburbs sank deeper into degradation and the radical bourgeois basis of enlightened urbanism paled before the massive scale of industrial development and the new political forces it brought to the fore. Organised Labour, and the Socialist/Communist municipalities and General Council of the *Département de la Seine* which they supported became the key movers in urban affairs in the inter war years. As the focus of debate shifted from public health towards land use, development control and economic planning the central Government ceased indulging local ambitions and ideas. In the twenties and thirties the central Government acted directly to frustrate the

plans of the *Département* and some Socialist communes, and was aided in this by the municipal council in Paris.

In the early twenties the *Département* of the Seine adopted a development strategy based on strict land-use controls and direct public development of new towns (132). Both dimensions were blocked: the land use controls were declared advisory by the courts and the planning powers were returned to central Government acting through the Prefect; and the Ministry of Finance refused to grant loan sanctions for the new town projects. The inability of the council to control private development weakened the impact of the efforts it made to structure new investment along key transport links and resulted in the highest rates of urban growth in the history of the region (133). The legitimacy of the *Département's* plans was continually undermined by central Government intervention in planning (134). The most important intervention was a "Commission on the Future of the Paris Region" established by the President of the Republic in 1929; a specialist quango comprising representatives of central ministries and local councils nominated in such a way as to ensure that the central Government could gain a favourable report. The Commission's brief was to draw up a regional plan. The result was the *Plan "Prost"* (135) published in 1936, but not approved as a basis for action until 1939 and never implemented during the Third Republic.

The power and legitimacy of local authorities was further undermined during Vichy when control of development and planning was handed over to a Government appointed commission: the *Comité d'Aménagement Régional Parisien*(CARP). The officers supporting its work were also drawn together

into a new organisation; the *Service d'Aménagement Regional Parisien*(SARP)(136). The Liberation Government retained both bodies to oversee reconstruction and prevented the General Council of the *Departement* resuming its former leading role in planning. In 1948 the Government explicitly forbade the General Council funding the refurbishment and electrification of an SNCF railway into Paris (137). Throughout the Fourth Republic overall planning was dominated by the national plans and the SARP while local authorities sought room to act on their own initiative on an ad hoc basis. Formal relationships between centre and periphery remained unchanged.

The first Government of the Fifth Republic set about creating a regional administration capable of building the international city which the Gaullists dreamed of. Any fundamental change to the role and responsibilities of the communes or the *départements* was deemed impossible since the rights established in the first republic were so deeply entrenched. The Debre Government, therefore, took two measures aimed at improving co-ordination between local authorities: a permissive power enabling communes to create syndicates for several purposes rather than single joint service agreements (138) and secondly a directive forcing all local authorities in Paris to seek central Government endorsement of land use plans and development decisions. The Senate vetoed the directive, ruling it to be a change in *tutelage* and the Government, therefore, sought less clumsy means to assert control of Paris Regional Government.

The favoured solution was to create another unique institution; the *District de la Région Parisienne*. In common with the Presidential Commission

in the thirties the *District's Conseil Administratif* was drawn from members of local authorities and nominees of central Government ministries. Its responsibilities and management capacity went far further though. The *Conseil Administratif* was serviced by a new senior civil servant called the *Délégué Général au District de la Région Parisienne*. The *Délégué* had equivalent rank to a Secretary of State and reported directly to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. The *Délégué* also chaired the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens*. M. Paul Delouvrier, formerly General de Gaulle's personal representative in Algeria, accepted the post of *Délégué Général* on condition that he had the same discretion that Haussmann had enjoyed in the Second Empire (139). In 1963 the *Conseil Administratif* was complemented by a *Conseil Consultatif Economique et Social* which co-opted representatives of industry and commerce to comment directly on policy for the Paris Region. The *Conseil Administratif* was supported in urban affairs by a specialist research and planning institute: the *Institut d'Aménagement et de l'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne*. By 1963 the Governments of de Gaulle, Debre and Pompidou had explicitly recreated the dominance of Parisian affairs that Haussmann had enjoyed. The instruments of this control were more sophisticated, wider in scope and better integrated into the machinery of central Government than ever before.

2.5 : The *Schéma Directeur*

The *Schéma Directeur* was an effort to make a decisive break with the planning of the past hundred years and to establish a regional system which was balanced, economically competitive and able to absorb unprecedented rates of development and population growth. This section looks briefly at

the place of transport infrastructure in the history of regional planning before going on to analyse the first *Schéma Directeur* published in 1965.

All urban and regional planning is directed at altering the balance of pressures generated by uncontrolled economic and demographic trends to secure more or better distributed social goods. Within this general aim different priorities can obviously be adopted both as to ends and as to means: some public health measures reduce the level of employment, whilst others reduce the quality of the environment. Equally, to reduce the time spent travelling one might either promote new transport links or alternatively try to locate new employment closer to major residential areas. As the Government's role in transport policy evolved from regulator to manager so the transport infrastructure assumed a more significant position in urban planning. This trend was reinforced by the civil engineering, and particularly road building, backgrounds of the people who prepared the new town plans in France in the sixties.

Streets were central to Haussmann's plans for Paris, but not because they improved the circulation of traffic. If those had been the aims, the reconstruction failed as it left the worst blackspots untouched. The main purpose of the new streets was to restructure the space in which people lived; to get rid of the dense courtyards, alleys and labyrinths of old Paris. It is true that the new streets made it easier for the militia to get around, but mostly they brought light, air and sewers to the stinking, darker corners of poor Paris. Accidentally, the simplistic notion that light and sanitation would defeat TB and cholera proved correct. The ideas that TB lurked and cholera hovered in dark alleys were scientifically dubious, but sunlight killed TB bacteria and clean water was the best defence against

gastric illness. Incidence of both diseases diminished rapidly in the late nineteenth century (140).

The municipal council's plans too, centred on the places people lived, and the desirability of improving the physical condition of property and relieving overcrowding. The municipal housing programmes of the 1890s and 1900s made no provision for where people worked, though they took into account the amount people earned by charging low rents. Much of the new housing replaced old mixed city neighbourhoods where people shared their streets with workshops and warehouses. The lower density of housing contributed to suburbanisation (141) and increased the importance of travelling to work, but again this was a by-product of the main purpose.


The *Département's* plans in the inter war years accentuated this trend in two respects: stronger public health regulations increased the segregation of activities removing many hazardous, noisy or polluting industries from residential areas and secondly, new residential areas were deliberately located on the routes of suburban railways, strung along in ribbons permitting maximum access to rail services (142). The company towns which had surrounded major centres of employment became a thing of the past as the public infrastructure provided housing, leisure, transport, health and welfare in one location and a *Métro* or railway or new road along which people could travel to and from their daily work. Planners took transport infrastructure explicitly into account when making decisions about new land uses or when preparing scenarios for the future shape of the region. Roads, as transport links, became the flexible web which strained and bent to hold together the economic and demographic pressures generated by rapid growth.

By 1936 *autoroutes* had become the panacea, the means by which a centralised city based structure for the region could be sustained. The *Plan "Prost"* revolved around a spoked wheel of *autoroute* class roads. This pattern was retained and refined in the plans produced in the fifties, culminating in the *Plan d'Aménagement et d'Organisation General (PADOG)*(143) approved in 1960. This added new technologies of public transport to the road system, notably high speed rail links for the airports. Transport was not the top priority for planners in the fifties however; the shanty towns, slums and overcrowding made housing the focal point, and system built redevelopment of the slum areas drew most funds (144).

The first priority of the *Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne* was to draw up a new regional plan to give the Gaullist administration a vision of the new Paris. The resulting *Schéma Directeur* was the first decisive break from planning based on a single focus of the central business area of the city. The plan sets three primary objectives; improved living standards, enhanced economic performance and better preservation of the environment. These goals are set by international standards; the plan aims to make Paris the wealthiest, most important city in Europe, a capital for the European Community. The *Schéma Directeur* did not aim to restrain growth, but accepted dramatic increases in population and economic activity as desirable and aimed to direct them towards the betterment of the country's standing in the world. To make room for Paris' international role the region needed to be planned to accommodate domestic pressures. These two processes were distinct, though sometimes the same infrastructure proposals contributed to both aims. Domestic development was to be focussed on two "axes of growth" - one to the north of the city and

one to the south and both following the river from east to west. Each axis would include four new towns which would be self supporting communities with their own employment, social services, retailing, health and welfare and leisure facilities, distinct from the city of Paris. The new settlements would be linked to one another and to the city centre by a new regional transport infrastructure comprising 260km of express railways and 960km of *autoroutes*(see figure).

Figure 2.2 : The *Schéma Directeur* 1965



The new railways and roads would also serve two international airports and the new development at La Defense which included a new national exhibition centre; the *Centre National d'Industrie et Technique* (CNIT). The central theme of the plan is movement across and around a region between poles of activity which are segregated by open space but not by purpose or activity.

The *Schéma Directeur* is particularly interesting for what it leaves out. First of all it ignores the rest of France; its vision extends to the edge of the Paris Basin and then lifts to London, Brussels and New York conveniently missing the grimy industry and extensive agriculture in between. Secondly no-one ever worked out how much it would cost. Three rail tunnels under the city centre, 960km of *autoroutes*, some of them through built up areas, an international airport and eight new towns do not come cheap. The whole plan was certainly beyond the capacity of the country's resources, yet the plan offered no guidance on priorities. This is more significant when one starts exploring the interdependency of many proposals; can one really build a new airport without a rail link to Paris? Who would buy an office complex with no roads to the places its employees lived for any reason other than speculative investment of the kind the plan sought to discourage? Which of any two projects would be, in the long run, better value for money? The end result is a random shopping list, not a plan.

The preparation of the *Schéma Directeur* is a revealing insight into the arrogance and imperiousness of Gaullist political practice. The first draft of the plan was prepared by a special team in the IAURP and was issued by the *Délégué Général* to over a thousand organisations for comment. Many

offered serious and intelligent critiques, not least the professional associations whose members would be building the roads, railways and new towns. Nevertheless, the final document scarcely differed from the original draft and was adopted unamended by the *Conseil Administratif* and the central Government (145). The rest of this study will be concerned with the managers and politicians' efforts to make some realistic programme of action out of a grand, inspiring but ill-organised vision.

The transport infrastructure, travel patterns, political pressures and administrative arrangements which created the *Schéma Directeur* and were, therefore, in part the continuation of long established trends in Parisian planning. The leaders of key professions and holders of public offices sought to break free from some of these patterns and build upon the changes already achieved in the organisation of Government and techniques of regional planning. The Gaullists had set up a powerful administrative machine, the *Ponts et Chaussées* was a dynamic group of highly trained public servants anxious to extend their role, the state and major industrial and commercial ventures were united in their aim to establish Paris as a centre of European business and rapid economic growth offered the means to do this as well as inspiring public optimism and political stability of a kind unknown for decades. Into this promising scene stalked public protest, policy reversal and political upset. Why and how did so swift a change in fortunes transpire?

PART 2 - NEW STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS

CHAPTER 3 : Strategic Policy Changes 1969 - 1973

The *Schéma Directeur* certainly offered a vision of what Paris might look like at the end of the century, but it would be quite wrong to see it as a strategic policy. The crucial questions of strategy revolve around who will be responsible for what and who will pay how much. These real issues were addressed by politicians, professionals and consumers in the early seventies and the outcome of the process was a substantial change in managerial responsibilities and financial burdens. Of course, questions about money, professional power and political accountability are always inextricably linked and any division will be artificial, but for ease of explanation and presentation this chapter will concentrate on questions of political and professional responsibility, and in particular at the emergence of a consumer voice as an important participant in the policy making process. The next chapter will look at the economic aspects of shifts in strategy and relate these to the changing balance of political and professional influence.

In order to decide priorities within the programmes envisaged by the *Schéma Directeur* it was necessary to establish systems for routinely controlling transport investment, overseeing the operations of public transport operators, ensuring some coherence between the activities of several agencies involved in transport planning and traffic management and reviewing opportunities for developments not previously identified. Institutions with these formal responsibilities already existed, most

obviously the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens* and the *Institut d'Aménagement et de l'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne*, but neither of them offered a decision making forum capable of crossing the boundaries inherent in the structure of local Government and the various professions' spheres of interest. The inability of established processes to generate solutions to the financial and political problems emerging in transport policy in the Paris region raised three fundamental issues: how should local administration of transport policy and operations be organised, what were the legitimate spheres of interest and control of the various public sector professions involved in transport policy and thirdly what sort of relationship should exist between the producers and consumers of transport services?

3.1 : Government interference in regional planning

In the ten years of the Fifth Republic before 1968 the Gaullist Governments had taken several significant initiatives aimed at changing the direction of urban planning in the Paris Region. They had created a regional tier of Government - the *District de la Région Parisienne* headed up by a Regional Prefect. The *Département de la Seine* had been broken up and replaced by a completely new set of suburban *Départements* (146). Transport co-ordination for the whole region was allocated to an interministerial, inter-agency body - the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens*. The *Institut d'Aménagement et de l'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne*(IAURP) gathered regional planning expertise and experience in a single institute. Finally the *Conseil Consultatif Economique et Social* provided a forum for eliciting the views of the region's most important business interests. The local

reorganisation was mirrored across the country by the new *Ministère de l'Équipement* and the local *Directions Départementales d'Équipement* (147). The leading managers in these new institutions had seized the initiative from the older less formal urban policy making system with a combination of a new vision of the purpose of regional planning and a new set of techniques by which to achieve these aims. The ethos was one of rational multi-agency planning and this informed the system adopted to control transport policy and investment in the late sixties and early seventies. However the ambition of the new breed of regional planners occupying high offices in the *District*, the STP and the IAURP was not matched by professional legitimacy. Amongst local politicians and the general public the new cost/benefit and traffic management systems were insufficiently accepted to provide the new institutions with consistent public confidence. Neither could the *District* claim any direct electoral legitimacy as the gerrymandering of its membership to suit the Government's purpose was too transparent to anyone who watched the percentages polled by parties in contests for *Mairies* and *Conseils Généraux* (148). The authority of the regional institutions and of the policies they developed came from central Government, specifically from the President and the Prime Minister who were closely associated with the vision they espoused and approach they adopted. The involvement of the highest offices in the Government was not merely symbolic; the doubts about the technical basis of recommendations emanating from the regional planning system meant that conflicts between professions or projects were arbitrated at national level in interministerial committees convened by the President or Prime Minister. Electoral challenges which would undermine the *District's* claim to representativeness were looming in the form of the 1971 municipal elections. The inauguration of the new regional councils throughout the

rest of France would further highlight the anomalies of local Government in and around the capital (149).

Nor was the existing system capable of grappling with the immediate local transport issues which remained firmly within their remit. The Paris municipal council was generally sympathetic to the Government as sufficient centrist members normally voted with the Gaullists and *Républicains Indépendents*. This arrangement broke down, however, when the Prefect proposed the introduction of parking charges throughout the city centre in February 1970. During the 1969 Presidential election the centrist members had broken into four groups each supporting a different candidate and the largest of these, led by Frederic-Dupont voted against the parking charges in alliance with the Communists and Socialists (150).

The arrival of new planning philosophies and institutions did not eliminate the need for older established forms of brokerage and the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens* and Regional Prefecture became bargaining tables for the national ministries most closely involved in regional development. The language altered to suit the new ideologies but the underlying aims of professions and localities stayed the same. Overall policy co-ordination was also undermined by the creation of the new *Ministère de l'Équipement* whose local services, the DDEs, were powerful specialist establishments with a more defensible claim to expertise in the practicalities of urban and regional development. The people who headed the DDEs were skilled manipulators of the older political structures which were threatened by the Gaullist reforms and constituted an important counterweight to the Regional Prefect's efforts to claim an overreaching responsibility for local

administration.

There were then three issues within the debate about how local administration should be organised; the desirability of overall co-ordination by a single agent of regional development, the legitimacy of the rational planning techniques underlying the *Schéma Directeur* and the autonomy of local institutions from national political control.

3.2 : Regional co-ordination struggles with professional specialisation

The *Schéma Directeur* was revised in 1969(151) to take account of reduced population forecasts, lower than anticipated rates of economic growth and as part of a first attempt to set an order of priorities for development. The highest priorities were the *Réseau Express Régional* and an extension of *Métro* line no. 5 to Orly Airport. These priorities were not set by the commission revising the plan but by an ad hoc group of ministers (see below in Chapter 6 for a full account of this process in the context of the decision to build the central section of the RER). In presenting the new *Schéma Directeur* to the public (152) Maurice Doublet, Regional Prefect, argued that the absence of a clear plan for transport development was a direct result of the multiplicity of institutions and services involved in transport policy and that a new administrative structure should be established. Specifically he advocated a directly elected regional council with responsibility for transport planning, for the day to day supervision of the RATP and SNCF suburban services, for the budget which subsidised public transport and for the direct management of designated principal

transport links within all companies systems. Doublet clearly envisaged a substantial shift in power away from the transport companies towards regional administrators and politicians. He wanted to increase massively the importance of the STP which oversaw almost 80% of the *District's* annual expenditure and yet had no control over the national ministries and transport companies represented on its board. Orselli sums up the STP as follows:

"At first sight it is an institution of enormous significance administratively and financially. In reality one must realise that the STP represents little more than an administrative channel ... in practice its decisions are prepared in advance in informal interministerial conferences in which each representative disposes of a kind of veto." (153)

Doublet allied this demand for a different administrative structure to one for additional resources with which to attack the problems. The failure to secure support for additional charges for parking or for increased fares made raising local revenues almost impossible. Doublet looked to the national Government to extend special borrowing rights to the *District*, which was not a normal commune or region, in order to free it to make swift increases in investments in roads and public transport (154). The Ministry of Finance had always refused additional funds, and continued to do so despite a positive recommendation by the relevant sub committee of the allocation board of the *Fonds de Développement Economique et Social* (155). The regional co-ordination systems in place were, therefore, unable to secure the necessary resources to back their preferred programmes because of opposition from the Ministry of Finance to any disruption of traditional interdepartmental bargaining arrangements.

Other senior officials involved in regional development echoed Doublet's demands. At the *Colloque de Tours* in March 1970 (156) M. Gabriel Palliez, President of the *Commission des Villes* of the Sixth Plan and an *Inspecteur des Finances* proposed a complete reorganisation of responsibility for public transport and traffic management. He suggested:

"A single authority at the level of each conurbation responsible for all traffic and transport matters"(157)

Palliez also proposed that the specific grants for service subsidies and investments disbursed by national ministries should be replaced by a block grant system to these new multi-purpose local institutions. The most important feature of the new bodies would be their ability to address all the relevant issues in a single agenda and budgetary process. It was, he underlined:

"essential that all the different powers involve themselves fully in the deliberations of the body and feel themselves bound by the policies agreed - this applies especially to the central State"(158)

Alongside these efforts by the Prefects and Ministers to institutionalise co-ordination and break down irrational budgetary distinctions, the transport companies and the new *Directions Départementales d'Équipement* were working to bolster the role of specialist services in transport policy. They focussed on developing new techniques of planning, priority setting and project appraisal, and on fostering a new management style at the RATP and in the Suburban division of the SNCF. In 1970 the RATP strengthened its Research and Strategic Planning (159) services and reformed the management structure to give greater weight to central policy divisions which these services supported. At the same time they introduced a new financial planning system based on *Rationalisation des Choix Budgétaires*

which was the French equivalent of the American Programme Planning Budgeting System pioneered in the Pentagon (160).

The basic principle of these approaches is childishly simple, but revolutionary in large scale incrementalist bureaucracies. Instead of allocating just additional funds over and above the historical base budgets of each function of the organisation, the RCB or PPBS system examines all activities against a priority scale and simultaneously allocates new funds and redistributes base budgets. RCB, therefore, attempts to build up a programme based budget in each and every annual budget. The effect of adopting this approach was to move the RATP out of a sleepy backwater into the fast stream of public administration in France, for they became a pilot for an approach which the President and senior ministers wished to see widely adopted. The adoption of a radical new approach helped the RATP to forge links with the key policy advisors in other institutions, notably the *Service Régional d'Équipement* and the IAURP and to gain allies on the STP and other interministerial commissions. As the RATP itself said:

"RCB provided a means of establishing a common language between technicians and decision makers and a common scale of measurement for both groups" (161)

The RATP management actively sought a new image for their product and spent significant sums in 1970 promoting public transport. The overall effect of a better public image and a growing reputation for sophisticated planning and management was a marked improvement in the number and quality of recruits to the construction, planning and financial branches of the organisation, and an enhanced ability to take on a major role in the development of new public transport services.

Like the RATP, the SNCF suburban services had always been a low prestige retreat for the unambitious railway manager. They were neglected, run of the mill services which the company had been happy to divest in the past (162). The prospect of regional control of the suburban services stirred fears in the senior SNCF management however. They may not have cared to run the service much themselves, but to lose control of a significant proportion of the traffic into the Paris termini threatened control of national and international timetables, and would reduce the overall size of the network in their control very significantly (163). Moreover, another group of managers might look more favourably on the suburban service and could argue, from outside, for increased resources and improved support services. Finally, commuters provided a ready source of income and were the most captive market available to the company. In 1971, therefore, the SNCF set up a Suburban Division with one manager responsible for suburban services into and out of Paris (164).

The DDEs were settling down after the conflicts surrounding their creation in 1968 (165) and were now producing land use plans for the communes within their areas, as required by the new law of 1967. Not surprisingly the land use plans closely resembled the road plans which the majority of senior staff in the DDEs were more accustomed to preparing (166). Clearly the DDEs were both a specialist service accountable to the *Ministère de l'Équipement* and a nascent inter-departmental land use planning and urban development body. The Ministry saw them as the latter and sought to widen their professional base and to reduce their dependence on road construction. Specialisation was, therefore, a defence against the regional prefecture, and against their own masters for the staff in the DDEs.

3.3 : The legitimacy of the *Schéma Directeur*

The *Schéma Directeur* was an experts' plan, not a popular political strategy. It had been drawn up secretly and had been accepted, on a superficial basis, by all the authorities which were consulted about its contents. Its impact was based not on a widespread belief that it offered the means to a better society, but on fear of the consequences of stagnating in past approaches. The themes of unparalleled population increases, the challenge to the economy from international trends and the need to respond to the prospect of spiralling congestion and chaos were endlessly repeated as the plan's rationale. Equally important was the belief that the plan was a significant departure from past practice. Never mind that its vision of the Paris region bore a striking similarity to those drawn up in the 1920s, the *Schéma Directeur* was part of the brave new world in which rational planning, scientific investigation and a common ideology of progress produced universally accepted solutions to the problems of competing in the world.

In the same way that the institutions of planning excluded the pluralism of local politics and sought to mask the rivalries of different elements within the administrative system, so the ideology of the *Schéma Directeur* denied the necessity of detailed negotiation over the precise path of progress, the exact division of spoils or detailed breakdown of costs. There was in the late sixties no rival plan, no statement of an alternative view, though public life reverberated with the rejection of urbanised, industrialised lifestyles. Nowhere can one say "here is the impact of the

May 1968 events on urban planning" yet the doubt and insecurity which followed the demonstrations and general strike ate away at the foundations of the Gaullist ideal of modern urban living.

On the surface, the keenest supporters of *autoroutes*, high rise blocks, concrete and glass extravaganzas of private offices and public utilities had every reason for confidence. President Pompidou was evangelical in his support for redevelopment and especially for private motor cars - "the task of the seventies is to better adapt the town to the car" he said (167). His supporters had been elected in droves in the 1968 Parliamentary elections and in the Presidential election itself the Left had failed to mount a serious challenge with the Communist candidate achieving 23% of the poll and the Socialist Candidate a miserable 5%. Yet the echoes of 1968 still haunted them, and the frequent clashes between rival groups and the police on the streets of Paris, the growing squatters' movement, the new community politics emerging around a vague, naive rejection of an international urban culture re-inforced the fear that the stability so quickly restored after May 1968 might be illusory. The mystique of the events of May 1968 was not confined to the *gauchiste* groups who yearned to re-enact them, as R. W. Johnson puts it:

"The events of 1968 had been so sudden and shaking, and yet so causeless that it was feared they could return as quickly, rather as the plague had paid recurrent fearsome visits to medieval cities"(168)

The air of uncertainty had more practical effect among local politicians and administrators anxious to find more secure bases for action than the general ideology of the *Schéma Directeur*, and more defensible schemes than the grandiose but unproven projects which filled the pages of the *Cahiers de*

l'IAURP. Several issues were capable of splintering the superficial unanimity surrounding the proposals in the Government's programme. Among these were car parking, road construction through historic quarters of the city, road construction through ancient parkland on the outskirts of the city, the level of fares, the reliability of buses and trains, above all the cost in time and discomfort entailed by living in a new town and working in a new office complex. Because the systems underpinning the *Schéma Directeur* could offer no positive reassurance to concerned groups on any of these issues, and because the established political processes for seeking favour and reassurance from Government were bypassed by the priority setting methods of the *District* and the interministerial committees it was difficult to divide and rule opposition to developments. A global plan invited global opposition.

The aspect of the *Schéma Directeur* which was most directly challenged was its dependence on new transport links, especially roads. The plan had been drawn up using forecasts of future car ownership and travel demand based on models prepared in the United States. By 1970 these models were openly questioned by the leading researchers and practitioners in civil engineering (169). The *Colloque de Tours* was the start of an alternative approach to transport policy within regional development, lead by the Minister of Transport himself. Opening the conference he said " the larger towns have more need of Fulgence Bienvenue than of Baron Haussmann" (170). He went on to say:

"the natural development of individual means of transport leads to the asphyxiation of city functions and imposes ceaseless road investment burdens which are beyond our financial means. ... moreover the free movement of private cars presupposes the existence of public transport in sufficient quantity and of

satisfactory quality" (171)

In his address to the meeting, the Director of Land Transport from the Ministry, the most senior civil servant in transport policy drew the following conclusion:

"it seems evident that individual car ownership, even if it is matched by a sufficient development of roads will not resolve the growing transport needs of town dwellers in a satisfactory way."
(172)

The greatest unmet needs in towns, he argued, were those of commuters and they could only be addressed by tackling four key issues: how to organise new systems of transport in a way that was more efficient than buses but cheaper than light railways; how to improve traffic management; how to create physically separated routes for public transport vehicles and how to measure and increase public transport productivity.

While the contributions from the Ministry established a climate of reform, the intellectual basis for tackling the new agenda was set out by Michel Frybourg of the newly created *Institut de Recherches de Transport* (IRT). He suggested that the proper basis for judging relative priorities in public investment programmes would comprise a traditional cost benefit analysis, indicators of wider social impacts and a clear representation of the value of different aspects of schemes to politicians. He defended this extension of the older purely technical basis for assessing value by arguing that:

"taking account of the social criteria as distinct from the economic effects it gives greater consideration to the competing claims of the different social groups affected by the proposal and, therefore, ensures better application of the democratic principle of equality of opportunity irrespective of relative incomes or geographical locations"(173)

Frybourg dubbed this approach "multicriteria analysis" and as will be

described in detail below in Chapter 4 this became the basis of the RATP's planning system in the mid '70s and was keenly debated in professional circles throughout the period of rapid growth in public transport investment. Frybourg went on to introduce the concept which did most to advance the cause of public transport, and which became a key element in the ideology of consumerism that is "transport captivity".

"Captives" are travellers who are denied a choice of transport modes for essential journeys. The most captive transport users were people who relied on one means of public transport for their journey to work but this section of the population would also include many women, many young people, a significant proportion of disabled people and most old people. Frybourg estimated that such people constituted at least a third of the population. Moreover, Frybourg argued, captives subsidise other travellers by bearing a disproportionate amount of the total social cost of transport. This cross subsidisation was at the root of the most pressing problems, not least traffic congestion and the huge costs of wasted fuel, pollution and idle time. Furthermore, the existing approaches to transport planning exacerbated the wasteful allocation of resources by failing to measure the true costs of various transport options. He, therefore, proposed:

"a system of pricing the use of cars at marginal cost as the best means of optimising the use of roads and financing the necessary infrastructure" (174)

Such a policy would require non market forces to impose the true prices but would:

"imply a discernible improvement in the quality of public transport so as to offer a viable alternative to car drivers"
(175)

Essentially, Frybourg's case was that the ideological attachment to car

driving, and the political weight which car owners therefore held, caused market failure in the overall transport market leading to an excessive expenditure of total resources on private travel. The planning systems used, for example, in the *Schema Directeur* re-inforced the problem by regarding traffic flows as the problem, rather than trying to promote the maximum travel opportunities for all people, including car owners. The main outcome of this process was an ever more pernicious spiral of traffic congestion which drew attention away from lateral solutions. Cities could only break out of this vicious circle by accepting a permanent and increased role for public transport and by adopting a policy of deliberately extending choice of travel modes to the largest possible number of travellers. The simplest way to devise a satisfactory plan was to attribute the full social cost of private travel to private car drivers. The unstated, but inevitable conclusion to such an approach is to introduce road pricing on urban roads.

Public transport operators at the conference emphasised that their productivity and profitability were severely constrained by road congestion. Michel Robin, speaking on behalf of the *Union des Transporteurs Publics Urbains et Régionaux* (UPTUR), suggested that the concept of productivity should be subdivided when applied to transport operators. The internal productivity of the firms should be measured according to industrial criteria, but the degree to which they could deliver their product to the consumer should be viewed in the context of road conditions which lay beyond their control. He concluded:

"the first and foremost way to make public transport competitive is to accord it priority within traffic management systems"(176)

In a minor, but interesting contribution to the debate, Paul Josse, Vice

President of the STP suggested that efficient public transport services to city centres can only be developed if they are combined with traffic control policies which give them special privileges and if roadside parking is actively discouraged.

Simultaneously, commissions of selected experts, political nominees and business representatives were drawing up proposals for the Paris Region for inclusion in the Sixth National Plan (177). The Regional Prefect selected the following principal issues for the plan in an initial report in 1969: the increasing imbalance of development between east and west in the Paris Region, the depopulation of the city centre, the ageing of the region's population and the rapid transfer of economic activity from manufacturing to services. All of these contributed, the report emphasised, to the congestion in the city and surrounding district and the pressure on commuter transport links (178). The report produced by the Planning Commission for consideration by the *Conseil Consultatif Economique et Social* (CCES) in September 1970 elevated the issue of commuting to a principal theme, alongside the changing distribution of economic activity and the ageing population. The challenges posed by an aging population were linked to commuting, for they were most acute in the central city districts which had been vacated by younger workers in favour of new suburban settlement from which they now had to travel to work. At the same time the socioeconomic composition of the city's population had altered dramatically with a 16% decline in the number engaged in industrial or commercial occupations and a 5% increase in managerial and professional people. The surplus of jobs over available workforce had increased by 8% each year between 1962 and 1968 in the west of the region while staying almost the same in the eastern areas.

The commission found that the number of people working in the city of Paris but living elsewhere had increased by over 15% between 1962 and 1968 and that nearly 1 million people would commute into the twenty *arrondissements* every day by 1975. Over the same period the RATP had experienced a decline in traffic. The proportion of people travelling by bus had fallen 37% and that using the *Métro* by 6%. The report suggested that the average proportion of household income devoted to private transport had increased significantly but did not quantify this. The number of people owning cars had increased 46% in the period 1962 to 1968 and traffic forecasts suggested that overall commuter traffic would double before 1985. The Commission estimated the additional road space required by such an increase to be of the order of fifteen six lane *autoroutes*. Parking would also be a growing problem; even assuming some modest recovery in public transport services the report estimated that the authorities would need to build 25,000 spaces every year just to keep up with demand. Overall the report concluded;

"the two major problems which emerge from this diagnosis concern on the one hand public transport and on the other the location of employment. Their solutions are to a considerable extent related"
(179)

The Commission felt that the powers available to the *District* and to local authorities to control development were grossly inadequate and proposed that developers should be forced to meet a higher proportion of the cost of public infrastructure both directly by including public utilities in plans as a condition of securing authorisation for construction, and indirectly through increased taxes on development land. Public authorities should also be granted increased rights to intervene in the property market and the wider powers to pre-empt properties where this was desirable for

public infrastructure development. On the specific transport issues which they raised the Commission recommended much stricter controls on parking including charges for parking in the city centre, a programme of car park construction and special encouragement to private development of car parks. So far as public transport was concerned they supported constructing the central section of the RER, proposed joining *Méτρο* lines 13 and 14 and recommended extending the *Ligne de Sceaux*. The commission concluded as follows:

"up till now the policy for Paris transport has been geared towards individual means of transport to the detriment of public transport, the operating conditions and general standards of which have seriously deteriorated. A reversal of this trend is now unavoidable and it seems indispensable that the sixth plan should emphasise the attractions of such a policy reversal"(180)

Addressing the *Conseil Administratif*, Maurice Doublet underlined this general point "if an effort is not made to improve public transport, we are heading for a catastrophe" he said (181).

The car lobby began to see the writing on the wall, and in March 1970 the *Chambre Syndicale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles* wrote to the national planning commission on traffic and towns dissociating themselves from the local commission's conclusions and urging an alternative policy:

"We contest the general orientation of the report ... (ie) that the solution to the difficulties encountered by public transport lies in the restriction of the use of private cars ... (we) repeat that employment/residence should be addressed and the principal problem is the disparity between the rush hours and the rest of the day. It should be recognised that the respective demands of public and private travel are often non-transferable ... even in city centre the comfort and speed of public transport count for little against the flexibility of the private car. We hope that solutions to the problem of traffic congestion are based on needs ie. based on the most profitable solutions. The question of profitability has been neglected in the report and (we) regret that it does not take account of the arguments advanced in favour of express urban *autoroutes*" (182)

The final content of the national plan was determined by an Inter-Ministerial Committee chaired by President Pompidou in October 1970. The Committee adopted three basic principles: priority for public transport in the inner areas, priority for roads in the outer areas and better access to new towns and airports. Top priority was assigned to the RER, and a series of other projects were awarded high priority. In the city these comprised completing the *Boulevard Périphérique*, starting the Left Bank Expressway, modernising two unspecified *Métro* routes improving public transport rolling stock and increasing the number of escalators at junctions. The majority of priority schemes in the suburbs were *autoroutes* designed to increase access to the *Périphérique* from the west and to complete most of the outer ring road. Two public transport projects were specified: a new railway to the new town of Cergy Pontoise and extending *Métro* no.8 to Creteil. These priority schemes accounted for half the projected investment budget available for the duration of the plan, and the remainder was available to be allocated by the *Conseil Administratif* of the *District*.

While the plan clearly devotes huge sums to major road schemes and continued with the road programme of the *Schema Directeur*, the importance ascribed to public transport and the commitment to a priority for public transport schemes in the city testify to the progress that the alternative approaches promoted at the *Colloque de Tours* had made in so short a time. Strategic policy increasingly favoured alternatives to *autoroutes* and private transport as Part 3 will demonstrate in detail.

3.4 : Local politics in Paris

The degree to which Parisians should control their own affairs has always been problematic for French Governments. A major theme in the historical backcloth to the strategic policy changes was the recapture of almost complete control of the formal machinery of policy making by central appointees under the Fifth Republic. The foundations for this temporary victory started to slip as urban politics and local democracy became the touchstones of new political forces emerging after 1968. Foremost among these were the *Groupes d'Action Municipale* and the reformed *Parti Socialiste*. The *Parti Communiste* too was emerging from its bastions in the *Couronne Rouge* - a ring of suburban communes which had remained faithful to their Communist municipal councils for up to fifty years (183). As part of this strategy the Communist Party played a major role in organising protests against fare increases and transport policies in 1970 and 1971 which will be fully analysed below. In parallel with policy content, the centralism of political control was actively questioned by people within the bureaucratic and political establishment as they reflected on the effectiveness of Pompidolean policy making.

In his address to the *Colloque de Tours* Raymond Mondon reflected on the weakness of past practice saying that transport policy and regulation was such a complex area that:

"it cannot be the affair solely of a few specialists. The elected officials of local authorities, especially in the large towns, must also contribute the fruits of their experience" (184)

Palliez's contribution to the *Colloque* echoed this theme, especially his proposal that there should be elected multi-purpose authorities for all

major urban areas. He also proposed that the specific grants paid to local services by the various ministries should be combined into a block grant paid by the Ministry of the Interior. The Regional Commissions preparing the National Plan had also emphasised that the key to securing control of the development of the Paris basin, and starting to redress the imbalance of development, was to extend control of infrastructure and of planning permissions to more local bodies with greater teeth.

Such suggestions ran counter to the growing centralisation of decision making as the dilemmas facing policy makers grew more acute. The major issues of investment priorities and of the level of fares were highly charged. Not only were they the object of intense political activity by opposition groups, but they divided the professional and local decision makers. Increasingly, therefore, major policy decisions, and even minor issues which were linked to larger matters of principle, were referred to inter-ministerial committees for decision by ministers or by the President of the Republic. It was widely recognised that the level of fares was set at the Elysee, not by the RATP or STP (185). The deficit which resulted from the fares charged failing to cover the total cost of running the RATP was not met solely from national budgets however. The Local Authorities in the area served by the RATP were obliged to pay nearly two thirds of the deficit in one way or another. In practice half their contribution came from the contribution they made to the *District de la Région Parisienne* and the other half directly from their local budgets. The *Conseils Généraux* of the new *Départements* resented this taxation without representation and in February 1970 they all voted not to hand over their proportion of the funds unless satisfactory improvements in service were forthcoming (186). The most

important investment decisions were also being made outside the formal planning and consultative forums. For example, the decision to allocate highest priority to the RER in the sixth plan was made by an ad hoc commission reporting to the Prime Minister, and members of the CCES and the *Conseil Administratif du District* were informed later of the outcomes.

Ideological factors emphasised the appearance of central control. The development of Paris as an international centre of trade and culture was an important part of the future France which Gaullists relied upon to cement together the contradictory strands of *concertation* and strong leadership which were their distinctive appeal to conservative voters. New urban design was integral to the picture of better, cleaner, more wholesome cities which Pompidou and his followers wished to offer the French people. In this context the national Government could not neglect the environment in which it was located and the districts in which the vast majority of its members and servants lived and worked. Even if ministers did not initiate proposals to redevelop an area of Paris, or to relocate major industrial and commercial activities to sites outside the city centre, they were obliged by their own beliefs to offer an opinion or criticism and therefore they began to assume ownership of more local or more simply commercial projects in which the central Government need not necessarily participate in any way. As the cohesion of local policy networks was eroded by their inability to cope with the challenges of large scale development, so attention came to focus on the rules governing their role, and the central Government agencies and politicians which determined the rules.

The capacity of local political institutions was further diminished by

the forthcoming municipal elections which offered the first opportunity since the 1969 Presidential election to test the parties respective strengths. French politics, nationally, was at the beginning of the realignment which brought the Socialist Party of Francois Mitterrand and the *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF) of Valery Giscard d'Estaing to the fore later in the 1970s, eclipsing the older formations of the UDR and the Communist Party which had dominated political life in the first decade of the Fifth Republic. The fluidity of the political blocs from which the new parties emerged was reflected in the multiplicity of lists presenting themselves in the municipal election in the Paris area. This was most evident on the municipal council of the city itself. In 1969 the centrist bloc on the Council, which normally voted with the UDR had split, ostensibly over the issue of Alain Poher's candidacy for the Presidency. Poher was the leading centrist member of the Council and the centrist bloc at first broke into two groups, one loyal to Poher and the other comprising members who supported the Government and were led by Frederic-DuPont.

In the 1971 elections however, there were four centrist lists, those led by Poher and Frederic-DuPont, a new grouping led by Jean Lecanuet and an independent list which was allied with a community action group contesting the elections under the banner "Paris pour les Parisiens". All of these currents would eventually become part of the UDF. Within the *Majorité* lists of Government supporters there was an increased proportion of *Républicains Indépendants* who were followers of M. Valery Giscard d'Estaing (187). The 1971 municipal elections were the first occasion in which the Union of the Left electoral pact which eventually brought the Socialists to power was pursued in a disciplined fashion. The new Socialist Party agreed that it

would only make agreement about withdrawals from ballots with the Communist Party and the *Confédérations des Institutions Républicaines* which was led by Francois Mitterrand. Some Socialists were subsequently expelled for making agreements with Lecanuet's centrists (188).

Figure 3.1 : Composition of Paris Municipal Council

Majorite : 39 - Comprising 37 *UDR* and 2 *Républicains Indépendents*

Opposition : 38 - Comprising 26 Communists, 9 Socialists, 2 Radicals

1 *Parti Sociliste Unifié* and 1 independent

Centrists : 13 - Comprising 9 Centrists and 4 *Union du Centre* (189)

Despite the clamour for attention by small gauchiste and fascist groups who clashed frequently at poorly policed meeting throughout the campaign (190), the main themes of the election were about local autonomy and the development of the city. The *Majorité* campaign concentrated on their plans to develop the city to cope with increased population and the infrastructure proposals set out in the sixth plan. They emphasised that they saw these plans being achieved by a combination of competent administration at all levels and by clear understandings between national and local Government. The underlying message defended the status quo so far as local Government was concerned and this is hardly surprising given the scale of the reforms which the Gaullists had already sponsored since 1961. The centrist groupings all made issues of competence and accountability central to their campaigns. They argued that the limitations on local power in force reduced the incentive to make informed and responsible choices, weakening the quality of local administration and bringing the political

system into disrepute. In his election address Jean Lecanuet said that he believed that "given the opportunity to make unrestrained choices ... the electors of Paris would choose men of dynamism, wisdom, responsibility and power" (191). Centrist manifestos stressed an apolitical, rational approach to solving problems, committing themselves to look dispassionately and intelligently at the facts and make proposals accordingly. This approach had the convenient effect of avoiding the questions of detail on which the groups were divided or simply undecided.

The *Union Démocratique*, which was the label under which the Socialists, Communists and their smaller allies, were running called for local democratic control of services, increased resources to carry out public transport and public housing programmes in the city and campaigned against the redevelopment of city centre districts. They made great efforts to capture the centrist vote and called for the widest possible alliance behind the strategy of the left. The Communist Party waxed lyrical on the themes of democracy and pluralism:

"Finding solutions to the ever more complex problems of municipal Government, especially to gaining more central Government money, demand a wider, more direct and more continuous participation of the governed in the life of their city. ... In town or village, just as the country as a whole, a better life is inseparable from the progress of democracy. We do not wish to dominate as the UDR claim, ascribing to us their own designs, but rather we wish to create the widest possible union of workers and democrats" (192)

The Right made substantial gains in the City of Paris in the elections. Five Communists, three Socialists and the PSU members were defeated. The left made some compensating gains with one independent socialist and two CIR candidates securing election. The centre retained

thirteen seats but within them the balance shifted towards those inclined to support the Government. Overall the *Majorité* increased its number of seats by seven, and three of the new members were *Républicains Indépendents*. It appeared that the electors had predominantly followed parochial local concerns and in so far as any message about the autonomy of the council can be discerned it was that voters wanted more local control but not by the left.

In the suburbs the centrist groups were less important and the campaign boiled down to a straight argument between the Government's supporters and the opposition, except in a few communes where local notables were especially influential, for example Creteil where the *Maire* was a wartime commander with de Gaulle and stood as a *Gaulliste de Gauche*. The results in the suburbs were the opposite of those in the city. The Left made significant gains and consolidated its hold in its traditional areas. The UDR too made some gains, continuing to pick up communes which had traditionally supported independent conservative administrations (193). In the country as a whole the left made significant gains, foreshadowing the 1973 legislative elections in which the Union of the Left would shake the Gaullists hold on national as well as local political office (194).

3.5 : Professions' spheres of influence

The extent of a professional grouping's natural or legitimate field of interest and control is an issue between groups and within them. The emergence of new policy priorities or types of activity generates competition between professions which can claim some legitimate expertise or

ownership. At the same time the development of new areas of work disturbs the internal balance within an established profession and threatens the elite group which controls accreditation and upholds standards. Both of these phenomena accompanied the development of regional planning in Paris, and the resulting difficulties besetting the transport system in the district. This section explores the rivalry between the *Ponts et Chaussées* and other public sector grouping over control of strategic policy development and examines the impact of this on the internal organisation of the *Corps*.

The onset of acute professional instability was precipitated by the appointment of M. Albin Chalandon as Minister of *Equipement* in 1969 by the incoming President Pompidou. Chalandon had entered politics as a successful businessman; he was head of a major supermarket chain in France (195), and he wished to bring the organisational culture of big business into the ministry with him. His approach to decision making, appointments and the internal structure of the ministry showed little tolerance of the niceties of professional statutes and conventions. The reform which most incensed the senior members of the *Ponts et Chaussées* was his proposal to abolish the convention of promotion by seniority and replace it with open competition for posts among applicants from several *corps*. Defending his proposal Chalandon argued that a Minister should have the power to "put the right man in the right place" (196) and that this would create a new spirit in the administration which promoted "questioning, doubt and perpetual re-adjustment" (197) and so improved the quality of decision making. Quite apart from the threat to the basic rules of professional privilege embodied in these proposals, Chalandon underlined his determination to break the

mould of the Ministry by appointing a Prefect, and well known critic of the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* as his *Chef du Cabinet* (198). Chalandon made clear that his aim was dramatically to increase political authority over the day to day management of the ministry:

each civil servant considers that he owns his job. In a company the boss gives the orders. A minister, however, is obliged to persuade and convince his own managers. The result is an administrative totalitarianism which renders the political authorities quite impotent" (199)

The *Ponts et Chaussees* were threatened by increases in prefectural control at a local level as well. Doublet was co-ordinating the preparation of the sixth plan in the Paris Region and was a key member of the national commissions which distributed the development funds which would finance major infrastructure proposals (200). There was therefore, a new force in regional planning opposed to control remaining within the Ministry of *Equipement* at the same time as they were saddled with a minister who seemed unlikely to take a parochial sectional view of the interests of the staff in the civil engineering and planning professions. The effect of this was to weaken the aggressive, expansionist group which had lead the *Corps* through the 1960s and assured its members of a dominant position in the local institutions and the new Ministry established during that period. The organisation's primary need now was for defence of its longer established bastions and the conventions which underpinned them. More conservative forces asserted themselves in the elections for top professional posts and in 1969 M. Paul Josse became President of the *Corps*, backed by a range of more senior engineers than had held the senior posts when Pebereau was President (201).

The *Corp's* General Assembly in April 1970 (202) agreed major organisational changes to help defend its members position within public administration, in face of a hostile minister, and more generally in face of challenges from the Regional Prefects and the graduates of ENA who were increasingly occupying the highest civil offices. The assembly agreed to create a separate association to promote the interests of civil engineers which would be open to a wider membership than the Corps itself. In this way the Corps would be able to expand the number of politicians, senior public servants, bankers and businessmen who had an interest and an affinity for the profession much more quickly than by increasing the number of graduates of the *Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées* and without the associated threats to incomes involved in increasing the number of recognised practitioners. This would leave the *Corps* with more time and resources to pursue the narrower role of defending members' professional interests. The renewed conservatism also increased the stress placed on the power of the profession in the provinces and on the desirability of decentralised administration.

Faced with these protests and the prospect of major disruption to the work of the Ministry, Chalandon withdrew the original proposals on professional statutes and proposed a pilot scheme for open application and promotion in seven DDEs. He also replaced his *Chef du Cabinet* with an engineer who was widely respected in the profession, M. Jean Chapon (203). He did not let up on his efforts to introduce a more businesslike approach within the service, however, and several major contracts for road construction in the provinces were placed wholly with private companies, taking them beyond the supervision of the local *Ponts et Chaussées*. As one local engineer described the situation;

" the *Départemental Directors*, already suffering formidable pressures from the public sector in the urban areas, dared not speak out for fear of displeasing" (204)

Having experimented with the new statutes in seven *Départements*, the Minister proposed to phase them in in the remaining DDEs. This reassured the more conservative engineers that the purpose of the exercise was not just to drive out unsympathetic staff, or that if it was it would be some time before the Minister's attention turned to them. The *Corps* was also divided over the proposals, some younger, more ambitious engineers stuck at lower grades welcomed the freeing up of promotion opportunities. In October 1971 the new statutes came into force with the blessing of the *Ponts et Chaussées* provided that:

"this must be a real liberalisation of the administration; there are presently too many constraints limiting the actions of *départemental* directors. ... We are ready to play the game and accept the challenges but everyone must accept all the consequences and give the practical means to *departemental* directors to exercise the responsibility which they are expected to bear. ... There has never been any question of the bureaucracy, whatever their views or position, replacing the power of the Minister in policy making. Certainly when one has detailed knowledge of the technical issues there is a risk of one's own interest as the general one, but the general interest is constantly redefined in a dialogue bringing together critiques from all sides, accommodating financial constraints, taking account of basic technical constraints...if judgments are ultimately needed then it is definitely the political authorities which are qualified to make them." (205)

The challenge by non-professionals and by alternative professions in regional planning had, therefore, been reasonably successfully parried.

3.6 : The relationship between producers and consumers

The essence of a publicly regulated monopoly is that the relationship between the supplier of a service and its customers is governed by more than the price. The deliberate exclusion of competition necessitates regulation of prices and of supply systems in order to protect consumers. Regulatory bodies accountable to politicians had been set up to oversee the transport companies and to monitor the quality of service. They also made controversial pricing decisions based on demand for transport and the costs of the public transport operators. In 1970 and 1971 public confidence in these mechanisms declined to the extent that consumers resorted to the streets to put their demands for improved services and lower fares and the long term consequence of this dramatic breakdown in confidence was significant reform of the regulation and funding of public transport operations in the Paris Region.

The reforms in administration, and especially to the STP had left the national ministries, and senior national politicians with the task of protecting the public interest in the management of Paris transport services and it was they who had to grapple with the accelerating deficit of the RATP. The deficit had two underlying causes: buses were becoming unacceptably slow because of the increased congestion on the roads caused by increased private car ownership (206) and the *Méïro* was becoming more expensive to run as the rolling stock and track aged and struggled to carry more passengers in busier peak hours (207). The buses were the worst of the two problems; they accounted for only a third of the passengers carried yet generated two thirds of the company's deficit (208). Bus users were the

least able to bear increases in fares even if they could be introduced solely for buses. To bring in a different fare structure on the buses would break up one of the cardinal operating principles of the system - that one ticket paid for one journey on either mode.

Figure 3.2 : RATP Operating Deficit (mF)

| | | | |
|------|-------|------|-------|
| 1959 | 49.6 | 1964 | 394.5 |
| 1960 | 50.0 | 1965 | 475.2 |
| 1961 | 68.0 | 1966 | 602.9 |
| 1962 | 149.3 | 1967 | 511.3 |
| 1963 | 243.1 | 1968 | 563.3 |
| | | 1969 | 760.2 |
| | | 1970 | 768.6 |

As the table above suggests, fares were almost doubled in 1967, but the effect of this fell out in less than a year. Fares were held steady between 1960 and 1967 as part of a national counter inflation policy pursued by the Ministry of Finance under the direction of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The accumulated deficit, and the difficulty of rectifying the position was, therefore, largely of the central Government's making. They had refused to allow the RATP to increase prices in line with costs. However, policies towards public sector enterprises were changing as their deficits became an increasing burden on the national budget. In 1968 the *Rapport Nora* (209) on the future of public sector industry and services, commissioned by the Prime Minister, was published. This concluded that public sector enterprises should operate on a more contractual basis and be expected to break even unless they had explicit agreements for subsidies to particular activities. There was no clear contract between those who subsidised the RATP and the

managers who decided the precise pattern of services. It was not at all clear what the public were getting for their 700mF.

In 1969 the Ministry of Finance indicated that it had changed policy and expected the STP to set out a programme for reducing the deficit on the RATP's existing operations (210). The Government had effectively decided upon significant fare increases. In February 1970 the first in a programme of fare increases was announced, increasing the price of a journey to seventy centimes. The STP signalled the Government's intention to increase fares by ten per cent every six months until the deficit of the RATP was brought under control. It was this programme of price increases that brought consumers onto the streets, and into committee rooms, to oppose the Government's transport priorities. The peak of discontent was in the summer and autumn of 1970 when the campaigning groups, organising protests by transport users, mounted three major regional demonstrations and peppered the press with statements, petitions and letters of protest at the fare increases and the intolerable conditions on the buses, *Metro* and trains. Transport policy was certainly the most resonant local political issue of the year (211).

There were two organisational foci for the campaign: the *Cartel* and the *Fédération des Comités d'Usagers de Transports en Commun de la Région Parisienne* (FCU). Each represented one of the two major strands in opposition politics at the time; the *Cartel* was an initiative by the Communist Party and the major union confederations to create a popular alliance around their new strategy of the Union of the Left and the FCU was an alternative, local campaign organised by two far left groups, the *Parti*

Socialiste Unifié (PSU) and the Trotskyist *Lutte Ouvrière* (LO). The *Cartel* was supported by the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT) and *Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail* (CFDT), the *Convention des Institutions Républicaines* (CIR) and two political clubs: *Jeune République* and *Objectif 72*. For a short time the PSU was affiliated to both campaigns but it quit the *Cartel* in June 1970 when the Communist Party refused to sanction local activists committees (212). In practice the *Cartel's* politics and strategy were determined by the Communist Party. Although the FCU was initiated and generally organised by activists from LO and the PSU it did gather together a number of non-aligned local committees with parochial concerns. These two currents of transport policy campaigning, one linked to national opposition politics and the other to local service delivery would continue long after the peak of protest activity in 1970.

Despite the deep antipathy between the founding organisations the two campaigns complemented one another well. The *Cartel* offered strong links with the resources of opposition political parties and trade unions, and brought the organisations representing employees into the campaign. The FCU provided a forum for users to articulate local grievances in their own terms and located the campaign firmly within an alternative view of urban and social development which was gaining popularity among the victims of the high rise housing and poorly serviced new towns. The unifying issue was that of fares. The slogans which mobilised a great mass of supporters were "*Non à la hausse*" (Say no to fare increases) and "*Pour la carte unique de transports*" (District wide travel passes for all) (213). The *Cartel* argued, and this policy was supported by all participants in the Campaign, that the

cost of travelling to work should be met by employers. In fact employers did already pay a weighting allowance of 23F a week for transport for all employees in the Paris area, but this did not cover most peoples' costs. The *Cartel* suggested that all employees in the Paris area should receive a free season ticket and that employers should pay a tax to meet the costs. The emphasis on commuting to work indicates that working men were the key supporters of the campaign; the free travel card scheme would not help women out of formal employment, students, the unemployed or pensioners.

The *Cartel* accepted that the existing public transport infrastructure could not cope with the extra demand which free commuting would generate (214). Its opposition to fare increases was, therefore, linked to a call for massive increases in investment, especially in the RER and for a new form of project appraisal which would favour public transport over road construction. It emphasised however, that it did not envisage reducing investment in roads, simply increasing the level of funding to public transport. The *Cartel* estimated that its programme of priority investments in ring roads, *Métro* extensions, RER construction, rail electrification and general modernisation of buses would require double the funding allocated for the sixth plan. Again, these are traditional trade union demands. An important part of the CGT's support for the campaign stemmed from the increased orders for rolling stock and construction equipment which such a programme would generate for its members in depressed industrial districts in northern and eastern France. However, the Union had started to adopt a more radical approach to workers interests, seeing them as both producers and consumers of public services. In 1971 the Paris District of the CGT produced a report on transport conditions (215) which within a familiar

marxist critique of policy development adopted a more explicitly political approach to improving consumers' rights. The CGT identified two underlying causes for the crisis in transport policy: the overaccumulation of capital which resulted in excessive and irrational investment in urban development and secondly the organisation of transport services according to profit rather than need. The CGT emphasised that the traffic congestion which beset car drivers was as much a product of these forces as the high cost and poor quality of public transport. This state of affairs was not irredeemable in the CGT's estimation. The state chose to support the private monopolies which ran urban development and public transport against the interests of consumer and could act differently. The Union therefore identified four key demands on which the state should act: infrastructure investment should be increased so that everyone's needs could be addressed, new investments should be publicly funded so that they were not distorted by property prices and money markets, employers should be taxed to pay for transport and all employees should receive a free travel card for journeys to work.

The Communist Party was the leading force in the transport users' campaign and it had by far the most comprehensive and detailed programme of alternative policies (216). They were alternatives of scale however, rather than radically different approaches to urban planning and transport priorities. The Party supported the existing road programme, and proposed that the public transport investment programme should be accelerated so that new RER routes, rail electrification and *Méto* extensions could begin as soon as possible. The Communists believed that the Government's investment programme was too small rather than wrongly directed. The Party strongly supported car production, reflecting the strength of its membership in the

factories. For them the crisis was not the result of some so called consumer or industrial society, nor was it wrong for every Frenchman to enjoy driving his own car, the real problem was that the state had made insufficient provision to facilitate new styles of living. The Party's own policy on fares differed slightly from the simple demands made by the *Cartel*. It favoured extending the range of concessionary fares, and subsidising travel to work, while maintaining a realistic full fare so that the services covered their day to day running costs. In other words, the Communist Party wanted to write off the accumulated deficit, but thereafter favoured keeping the RATP to a break even budget. The CGT and the Communist Party were conservative in organisational terms as well as in policy matters. They refused to sanction local committees which directly involved users and ran the campaign through a district wide co-ordinating committee (217). All the major actions were marshalled and directed by the party's *service d'ordre* and key positions in front organisations like the *Groupe d'Action sur l'Amélioration de la Circulation et des Transports* were held by Party nominees (218).

Not all the groups who supported the *Cartel* were as conservative as the leading elements. Both the CFDT and the Socialist Party had a more radical approach to controlling cars in city centres. The effect of transport policy on the environment was much more important to both these groups. The CFDT was strongest in its critique of the impact of cars on the urban environment. In 1971 it too published a report on Paris Transport (219) which placed the blame for the deterioration in journey times and public transport conditions squarely on the increase in private car traffic. The Union proposed an alternative model of the city in which many central areas

were reserved for pedestrians and buses, in which the normal mode of travel was free public transport on dedicated routes, insulated from private cars, and in which car drivers paid tolls for access to inner city districts. The Socialist Party echoed this vision in its 1972 programme:

"Today, the citizen is all too often forced to use their own car for travel into town. This is presented to them as progress. In fact, real progress consists in giving citizens the means to buy a car if they wish, but not to oblige them to do so in order to get about ... that is the tyranny of the car. It affects people and the towns in which they live. The result is that quiet streets are destroyed, parks ruined, pavements narrowed and the overall quality of life is degraded" (220)

Transport strategy was part of the democratisation of city Government which was the central plank of Socialist Party politics in the early 1970s. The party's objectives were summarised at the *Assises de Socialisme* in 1974. First of all it aimed to replace central Government control of transport policy with local management by accountable, participatory bodies. This would be assisted by a range of central measures to reduce pressure on local administration including freezing land prices, stopping any more office development in the city centre, increasing the amount of low cost public sector housing under construction, reducing car access to central districts and promoting community associations in all neighbourhoods. The *Assises* identified four urgently required policy changes: there must be tighter restrictions on parking, no more car parks should be built in the city centre, all new buildings should be obliged to supply sufficient car parking spaces for their needs and a major programme of pedestrianisation should be embarked upon.

The *Cartel's* underlying conservatism was a great asset for it enabled it to appeal to the average commuter living in a new town or suburb who

would not wish to associate with the street politics of the far left, but found the conditions of travel and the increased costs intolerable. These people were the backbone of the campaign, and the key to its success. An opinion poll taken for the Government in the summer of 1970 showed that 88% of people questioned felt that transport conditions had deteriorated, 54% thought that public transport had got worse, 86% approved in principle of restricting the use of cars, but 80% were against increased fines for traffic offences and 67% opposed introducing parking charges (221). The *Cartel* organised three major actions. The first in July 1970 comprised demonstrations of various kinds at the main rail stations and *Métro* interchanges, ranging from sit down protests to leafletting passers by. Opposition from Government supporters, and from influential members of local authorities was sufficient to persuade the Government to announce that it would defer the forthcoming price increase pending the outcome of discussions on future plans. Within two months however, protest reached new heights when the STP announced that journeys which crossed the city boundary and went outside the twenty central arrondissements would cost two tickets instead of the normal one. This incensed commuters on two counts, first of all it removed the advantage of making a journey on one mode and secondly it meant that they would be making a much larger contribution to the much vaunted improvements in the service than they had previously believed. There was much sense to the proposed new fare structure from the RATP's point of view. If *Métro* extensions could not be used to increase revenue per kilometre they would simply increase congestion on the central routes and reduce the profitability of the RER. At this point the campaign began to attract open support from members of the *Majorité*. Commenting on the decision M. Alain Grioterray, a leading *Républicain Indépendant* and

Rapporteur du Budget of the District de la Région Parisienne said:

"we see here another example of a measure decided and announced in a quite unacceptable and irresponsible way. I recently condemned the suggestion by some technocrats that tolls should be introduced on urban roads, an idea which alarms many people. Today suburban residents have been given a further example of such behaviour without so much as an explanation of the objectives behind the scheme which many people rightly oppose. My friends are already petitioning in protest and with good reason." (222)

The situation deteriorated further when the Government announced that the fare increase would come into effect at the same time, on January 1st 1971 (223). The *Cartel* called a regional demonstration through the centre of Paris in protest. In November 1970 30,000 people marched from Les Halles to Opera along the route of the proposed central section of the RER (224). This large mobilisation of otherwise non-political citizens impressed the organisers and the Government. The *Cartel* followed it up with a further day of action in all the major transport termini in December 1970 (225). Once again the Government retreated and postponed the proposed fare increase mindful of the forthcoming municipal elections and anxious to develop a strategy for transport development which would provide better justification for further fare increases (226).

Dissatisfaction with transport policy had by now spread to the heart of the Gaullist administration. The *Conseil Administratif du District de la Région Parisienne* referred back the transport section of the draft plan in February 1970 calling for further investment and greater priority for public transport (227). The newly elected President of the Paris Chamber of Commerce called for action to redress the transport crisis saying:

"If in the next few years a serious effort is not made in transport investment the Paris Region will endure a severe crisis." (228)

In March 1971 the users campaign won. The Government announced that it would introduce a tax on all employers in the Paris Region to pay for transport investment and published revised investment programmes (for a detailed description of the new measures see below . The *Cartel* was not fully satisfied and called a further demonstration against any fare increases and for better services which, despite the campaign's overwhelming success on its major points still attracted 18,000 people (229). In August 1971 the Government introduced a ten per cent fare increase and the two ticket system for suburban journeys on new routes. The *Cartel* called for a day of action, but the response was muted and in September 1971 the *Cartel* formally disbanded and the constituent groups went their separate ways each sponsoring a transport users' group of far greater numbers and importance than they could have imagined two years previously (230).

The FCU participated in the regional mobilisations, but its primary interest was in local users' committees which it sponsored and supported in many localities. At the height of discontent in November 1970 there were sixty active neighbourhood transport users' committees (231). These local foci for discontent complemented the regional dimension of the *Cartel*. Many of the problems were not about fares, or overall investment, but about the routing, organisation and timetabling of local services. The *Cartel* could not offer support to groups wishing to pursue these kinds of grievance, indeed routine systems for consulting about local services were woefully inadequate. The FCU provided a group to bring together like minded, aggrieved local citizens and also a means of collecting together such evidence into an impressive account of the travails of travelling on a daily

basis which was published in September 1970 as the *Livre Noir des Transports Parisiens*. The FCU gave greater prominence to issues surrounding the contracting out of suburban bus services to private operators and the inadequacy of links between suburban centres. While the operational style of the leaders of the FCU was classically Trotskyist, based on cell organisation, strong leadership and transitional demands, the coalition offered a space for groups of less political or non-aligned campaigners to air their views and ideas. The FCU was the origin of some influential ecologist groups which were important during the implementation phase of projects within the new plans announced in March 1971 (see part 3). The FCU was much more middle class than the *Cartel* and was most active in traditional mixed inner city communities. Following an analysis of participation in the local committees Cherki and Mehl concluded:

"while locally the social strata affected by (transport) issues were usually mainly workers, or simply a mixture of social classes, the campaigning force was almost completely dominated by the salaried middle class." (232)

This reflects an important weakness of the FCU as a single issue campaign; it sought to mobilise people according to locality as much as according to their experience of travel, and this confused the simple messages which generated greatest support. The *Cartel* laboured under no similar handicap; it appealed to people simply as transport users, wherever they came from, whatever they did, whatever they sought elsewhere in life. Once deprived of the mobilising issue of fares and investment funding by the March 1971 climbdown, the FCU also suffered a demise (233). The rationale for confederal action was weakened, as local issues became more important and more integrated in general municipal politics. As transport politics became more parochial the distinctions between local committees increased, and they

ceased to be such fertile ground for the activists of LO and the PSU who moved elsewhere to seek recruits and supporters.

The users' campaign had its individual leaders outside the formal organisations, the most important of whom was Brigitte Gros, *Maire* of Meulan, a town to the south-west of Paris and author of an influential account of the appalling transport facilities facing her electors entitled "*Quatre Heures de Transport par Jour*". Mme Gros was a centrist politician and focussed discontent on the institutional arrangements for representing consumers in the region. In May 1971 she called for a new regional authority (234). This was to become an important theme once the financial reforms (see below) had been put in place.

The period from 1972 to 1975 was the zenith of community politics in France, as local action groups multiplied around issues of housing, environmental protection, transport, leisure and security (235). The membership of these groups overlapped and particular interests coalesced or conflicted as decisions were made incrementally about urban development. The age of grand plans and broad brush implementation was over and a new sensitivity to local concerns and consumer rights pervaded urban planning and public service management. The pattern set by the FCU and their equivalents in provincial cities was the basis for a new style of politics and a new agenda of issues. Questions of quality and of locality became more important than the great international trends and quantitative models which had dominated the sixties. Political debate centred more on consumption and distribution and less on production and productivity. The theme of the "*cadre de vie*" (quality of life) took pride of place in the decentralist

democracy of the ascendent Socialist party and pastoral conservatism of Giscard.

3.7 : The *Plan Global* of 1972

Grand strategy might be dead, but the bureaucracy still needed a plan as a basis for local negotiation, management accountability and progress measurement. In March 1971 the Government accepted the need for a new set of priorities in the Paris Region and for a stable set of arrangements to oversee the implementation of the new policies. If employers were going to pay large sums into the budget then they must be satisfied that it would be well spent. Maurice Doublet was commissioned to produce a Plan, covering the three dimensions of the problem examined in this chapter namely: who should be responsible for policy implementation, what should they do first and how should users be involved in decision making? The inter - ministerial committee which had agreed to introduce the tax on employers also set down other policy guidelines for the Regional Prefect. Parking charges and fines for illegal parking were to be phased in throughout the city; ministers wished to see further examination of the possible benefits of new technology in public transport especially the Aerotrain project to Cergy Pontoise (236); the Government wished to pursue actively the idea of negotiating a contract with the RATP and finally the Government would welcome proposals for a new transport authority for the region.

The first draft of the new plan, setting out guiding principles, was

published in January 1972. The authors set out the following remit:

"The solution to the problem of transport and traffic demands a global and coherent policy on investment and on regulation as well as on public transport tariffs. ... insufficient emphasis has been placed on public transport and in particular on the improvement of the existing means of transport and the extension of *Metro* lines" (237)

The report identified three aspects of planning: technical questions like demographic forecasts, psychological aspects including the extent of public involvement and understanding and judicial/political issues which concerned bringing together the "diverse tendencies and actors" which could implement an agreed plan. The Plan then set out the full measure of the problem. The accumulated deficit of the RATP was 1370mF. Receipts from ticket sales and other miscellaneous sources only covered 50% of the costs of running the firm. The bus network represented 30% of the operation but caused over 60% of the deficit. There was no coherent leadership and responsibility in policy making

"the STP does not dispose of the independence in decision making which is desirable in order to ensure ... the co-ordination of diverse interests and pressures. A different organisation allowing the state, local councils and the transport companies to better exercise their respective roles must be created." (238)

The principles for future plans were based on an acceptance that an effective transport policy:

"implies a profound revision of the role of the car in urban areas and demands in certain circumstances priority for public transport." (239)

Following from this shift in the underlying principles of transport planning the report outlined a proposed charter for transport, as a basis for a new contract between consumers, public authorities and the transport companies. The main points were as follows: in the city centre and inner suburbs public transport should meet 80-90% of rush hour travel demand and

60% of all demand at other times; each square meter of *Métro* or train carriage should be occupied by less than four standing passengers; buses should run at a guaranteed minimum speed of 15 kilometers per hour; 100,000 on street parking spaces should be abolished; traffic flow should be at a minimum speed (unspecified); 60-80% of journeys in the outer suburbs would take place in cars; it should be possible to park within 200 meters of any destination; everyone should be within 800 meters of a transport service to the city centre. The short run priorities suggested in the draft plan were: establishing a single transport authority with greater powers to intervene in public and private transport management; increasing investment in existing systems; giving special priority to suburban roads in ZUPs; improving budgetary control and accounting systems; increasing the managerial autonomy of transport companies within the context of the contracts with the new authority; setting up new appraisal systems for future investment proposals. The report envisaged institutional reform as the key change and elucidated the various options in some detail.

One set of options was based on extending the role of the STP. This involved making it an institution of equal status to the *District*, making the Presidency an elected office and electing local representatives to the board in direct regional elections. The central Government would continue to be represented by nominees from interested ministries and the new body would be serviced by the Regional Prefect. The STP's powers over parking and traffic management would have to be increased. The second set of options were based on changing the role of the *District de la Région Parisienne*. The first of these would be to decentralise transport policy entirely to the *District*, giving the regional prefect tutelage over the RATP and the SNCF-B

subject to supervision by the *Conseil Administratif du District*. The second possibility was to continue the joint responsibility then in force but to transfer the STP's functions to the *District*, the central Government would continue to control the companies but through a single regional authority rather than a specialist institution. The third possibility was to retain the existing arrangements but to devolve the central Government's interests in the STP to the Regional Prefect, thereby creating a local joint board in the STP. The plan also suggested that the *District* should be given direct representation on the board of the RATP. The common feature of all the schemes is that they increase the scope of prefectural control at the expense of either the national Government or the transport companies. Doublet wanted to remove the possibility of the two colluding against him, but was indifferent as to which he had to negotiate with in a two way situation (240).

The final plan says absolutely nothing about institutional arrangements for managing transport policy. A powerful combination of the *Ponts et Chaussées* and the Government's reluctance to broach further administrative reforms on the eve of the legislative elections combined to remove all such proposals from active consideration until the Regional reform was extended to Paris in 1976. Robert Franc comments:

"His (Doublet's) plan is strangely silent on one essential point; which body will implement this transport plan. Logically it should be an elected regional assembly but the Government does not wish to hear talk of such things. Power and responsibility, as far it is concerned, are things which it will never share" (241)

The priorities had changed but they became the property of the Minister of Transport, the DDEs and the Transport Companies. No longer was regional co-ordination by the Prefect and national involvement by President and Prime

Ministers the right way to direct policy. Transport became a specialist preserve again, operating to different criteria and in a different political culture, but separate from the grand plans of the regional strategists.

The specific content, in transport terms, of the plan had been well signalled in the draft but is a remarkable shift from the *Schéma Directeur* and the original sixth plan nonetheless. The priority order of services was set out as follows: public transport, safety and emergency services, goods deliveries, general traffic circulation, parking policy. The plan insisted that the social costs of proposed plans should be fully measured and compared before judgments about the relative value of possible developments were made. Some specific measures were included in the plan including parking bans on all main roads in the city, a re-organisation of the bus network and approval for the concept of bus lanes, a programme of *Méto* extensions and further development of the RER. There was no mention of the big road projects like the Left Bank Expressway and the A86 ring roads which had been top of the priority list in 1970. Overall strategy had shifted dramatically towards public transport, and responsibility for development was firmly in the grasp of the specialist engineers who had challenged the legitimacy of the *Schéma Directeur* and the institutions which had prepared it.

CHAPTER 4 : Making Employers Pay - Economic Dimensions of Policy Change

The most striking feature of the strategic policy changes was the Government's decision to tax employers in the Paris region in order to raise more revenue and avoid further fare increases. The central point of the transport users' arguments against fare increases had been that employers were the main beneficiaries of commuter transport systems, and that the location of employment was the major cause of congestion and inefficiency and, therefore, that if more revenue was required employers should make an increased contribution. This argument went to the heart of public policy: the determination of the relative costs of public goods to different social groups. The basic rationale for public intervention and regulation in transport services must be that, left to its own devices, the market would generate irresponsible monopoly power, unnecessarily high overall costs and an unreasonable level of fares for the consumer. The transport users' campaigns claimed that the Government was no longer protecting the consumer sufficiently and that the proposed programme of fare increases was an unreasonable subsidy of costs which should properly be borne by other beneficiaries. Underlying this argument is a basic issue about the boundary between work and leisure - does work start when the employee leaves his/her home or when s/he arrives at work? Who should pay the costs involved in the segregation of work and leisure necessitated by mass production of goods, services and homes?

Throughout the sixties, urban policy and transport investment

increasingly imposed this cost on employees. As their workplaces moved away from the city centre, out of the old networks and generally further from the main new residential developments so employees had to buy cars, buy more expensive season tickets, get up earlier and arrive home later. Increased commuting time had a straightforward economic cost associated with fuel, parking, ticket prices and lost time; it also had an unquantified cost in terms of loss of contact with families, stress and diminution of community life. Not for nothing were new towns often described as dormitory towns. Bridgitte Gros summed up the effect on the community of which she was *Maire* with the apt title "*Quatre Heures de Transport par Jour*". These people were the pioneers of a new culture which Gaullism and modern town planning espoused, but they were also its victims. They did not all own a small, efficient, cheap Renault or Citroen and they did not enjoy the freedom of traffic free new highways to their workplace. They couldn't afford the car, they needed two anyway if they were going to go shopping as well, and the highways had not been built. Reality was an old, inefficient, uncomfortable railway or a slow crawl through dense traffic. There was no joy for them in the journey to work, the gain was all the employers.

Public policy makers went some way to accepting the employee's view of things. All employees in the Paris region received a weighting allowance for travel (the *Prime de Transports*) which in 1970 was 23F per week. However, this amount was substantially below the costs incurred by many longer distance commuters (242), or people who had to change modes of public transport to make their journey. The unions' demands were no longer for increases in the weighting allowance, but a more radical proposal that all employees should be provided with a card enabling them to travel to work

free (243). This card should be paid for by the employer. The transport users' campaigns recognised that free travel cards for employees would only benefit a particular group of transport users and they argued as well for concessionary fares for pensioners, students and war veterans (244). Equally they saw that changing the cost of existing transport would not solve long term problems and they called for greater public subsidy of investments in new services and improvements to the existing infrastructure.

Clearly the revenue and capital components of transport policy are different in their impacts on budgets, and in their methods of financing, even if closely interconnected in outcomes for consumers. The policy options in each area were different as well. This chapter looks first at the proposals adopted by the Government to generate more resources for the transport system as a whole and then examines the plans which determined the distribution of benefits from deploying these new resources. It concludes by arguing that the outcome was a dramatic change in the distribution of benefits, and equally in the system which planned future transport developments.

4.1 : New resources - the *versements transports*

The notion of taxes on employers to increase resources had been achieving growing credibility in professional argument since 1969. This process had accelerated rapidly as the transport users' campaign demonstrated the depth of opposition to fare increases. The tax could be justified within the prevailing ethos of "true prices" for social goods. The *Rapport Nora* (245) had established an orthodoxy that public bodies should cover their costs when producing traded goods and services; in other words subsidy should be in the form of income support rather than artificially cheap goods which led to high deficits in nationalised industries. The fare increases to which the Government was committed flowed from this approach; the RATP should charge a commercial rate for its services. However, a broader view of "true prices" suggested that this approach was an unjustifiable subsidy to employers, whose sole contribution remained the *prime de transports*. Genuinely true prices should, therefore, reflect the benefits enjoyed by employers as well as the service offered to transport users.

The PCF incorporated the idea of a tax on employers in its campaign on transport policy from the very early stages (246). They drafted legislation (247) which suggested a graduated tax on all firms with more than 100 employees in the Paris region and a special tax on the profits of the large department stores in central Paris. As we saw in Chapter 3 above the free travel card was a key demand in the users' campaign and was promoted strongly by both the CGT and CFDT. In their *Plan d'Urgence* in June 1970 the

PCF proposed to spread the burden still further by introducing taxes on property development and by diverting extra funds from the national road fund. Brigitte Gros echoed these proposals in an open letter to the President of the Republic; she called for three essential measures:

"First, lightening the burden of fares - that is why it is crucial to proceed towards a fairer distribution of subsidies and why we propose that *Comités d'Entreprises* should be able to issue free travel cards to employees wherever they live. Secondly we call for the re-imposition of an infrastructure tax on firms to pay for the costs of transport and thirdly we urge the Government to introduce an effective property tax on urban development." (248)

Sympathy for the idea of taxing property developers and new industries was widespread as resentment against their quick profits and deleterious effect on architecture and city life grew among the middle classes and intelligentsia of Paris. A special tax for transport costs was also attractive to the *Ponts et Chaussées*, for it would give them a guaranteed resource for public transport analogous to the *Fonds Special d'Investissement Routière* (FSIR) for roads, and insulate them from the budgetary discipline imposed by the Ministry of Finance. If taxes were to be increased a regional payroll tax was an attractive option politically since it would alienate few voters and would leave the level of taxation in the hands of the central Government rather than some opposition controlled local authority.

How did employers react to the proposal that they should bear a larger share of the burden of funding Paris transport? One might expect that businesses would protest vigorously against a direct increase in their costs, which would, arguably, reduce competitiveness and weaken the valuable new financial discipline being imposed on inefficient public utilities. In practice reaction was muted and ineffectual, there was no

significant counter argument to the users' demand for new taxes from any quarter and the decision to introduce the tax and the debate over the precise details of how much it would cost and how it would be collected revealed a broad consensus throughout the Region and across the political spectrum for the users' proposals. There seem to have been four factors which impeded effective mobilisation of business interests; first the business community was divided over urban policy and taxation, secondly there was a long history of the government leadership of business responses to external pressures for change, thirdly key elements of the business community were integrated into public policy making and had been colonised by civil servants and finally fear of civil disorder and opposition political success inhibited political action by business leaders. In each case it is instructive to look briefly at the evolution of business participation in public policy making in order to more fully understand the forces which opened the way for a radical redistribution of resources.

First, business attitudes to urban planning and transport policy differed depending on the size of the firm, the location of its primary base and according the nature of the firm's activity (249). Small employers had favoured general improvements in infrastructure which maximised the range of travel and investment opportunities and offered them a wide choice of locations. Medium sized firms had been the primary sponsors of the *Centre National d'Industries et Techniques*, which was the original development project at La Defense, in order to provide a new location for traditional Paris based skilled manufacturing which could provide better common services compared with their existing bases scattered around the city and inner suburbs. Large employers on the other hand had sought larger sites,

either in greenfield locations further from the city, or through renovation of substantial city plots. Their interest in the transport network was for dedicated services to enable their employees and customers to reach their new headquarters in large enough numbers. Paris based companies such as the older established manufacturers and the national banks were looking to locate their whole activity on a new site, or to improve the existing support services for their largest centre of operations. However, many of the largest businesses in the region were expanding from bases abroad or in provincial France, and were more concerned with international communication than with their role in Paris and its surrounding districts.

There were clear differences in the demands made by manufacturers and those made by the financial sector. The former was looking for greenfield sites, or for smaller bases in integrated communities with ready access to labour and markets, and was especially supportive of the new towns (250). The financial sector promoted the concept of the *cite financière*: a small close knit district dominated by financial institutions with easy communication and rapid direct exchange of market information (251). A further factor dividing businesses was that some of the leading companies in the region had a clear interest in road construction and private motoring: two major car manufacturers dominated the manufacturing sector and had exercised strong influence on transport policy in the past (252). In addition the largest newcomers were oil companies who were keen to expand their sales in France.

Effective business intervention, either at the level of individual lobbying, or through ad hoc associations to promote specific developments,

required alliances across the different elements of the business community. La Defense represented a compromise between the small businesses seeking facilities for common marketing and promotion through the *CNIT* and big multinational business prospecting for sites for French headquarters offices. Local businesses' anxieties over the scale of the new development, and the way in which major foreign companies came to dominate its management and construction, were allayed by the preferential treatment given to landowners and displaced firms (253). These accommodations enabled the project at La Defense to proceed rapidly, and to secure essential public investment in the necessary rail infrastructure (254). However, the proposals for a new Commercial Centre in Les Halles were opposed by small businesses (255) and this made it more difficult to secure the necessary political endorsements to undertake such a radical project. In the debates in the municipal council on the future of Les Halles, the centrist members, who represented traditional small businesspeople succeeded in placing strict restrictions on the size and purpose of redevelopment (256).

There is some evidence that businesses were divided over the specific transport issues involved, as well as over the broader issues of urban redevelopment. The financial sector, especially banks and insurance companies sponsoring the concept of a *cite financière* were in favour of the RER, of restrictions on road use and parking, and of subsidised travel for employees into the centre of Paris. Lojkin cites evidence from an interview with a leader of the *Fédération Française des Sociétés Assurances* who supported parking restrictions and fare subsidies in the late 1960s (257). He also quotes, as supporting evidence, an article in the journal *Banque* which advocates pedestrianised financial districts in major cities (258).

The Consortium advocating a Commercial Centre in Les Halles argued that the RER junction should be at Les Halles and that this should form the centre of the Parisian transport system (259). It is also clear that the major department stores stood to gain from their direct access to the RER system through the Auber station, and that parking restrictions and traffic regulations would harm their business much less than the smaller stores in the same locality. A survey of shopkeepers in the vicinity of Auber in 1971 found that 56% of them felt the new RER service would be an advantage to trade (260).

Small companies, and especially local manufacturers and traders, still based in city centre locations were opposed to the restrictions and the specialisation of transport services implied in the RER and the traffic restriction proposals. They were also opposed to the principle of contributing towards the deficit of transport utilities, since the immediate payback was difficult to identify and local taxation figured more prominently in their balance sheets (261). The most vocal political opponents of the tax (see below for a detailed account of the Political debate in Parliament) were the same centrists who has defended small businesses against the proposals for redevelopment of Les Halles. Against this ideological opposition to non-commercial public services and a desire to be free of local tax burdens must be weighed the pragmatic point that over four fifths of the businesses in the Paris region did not have to pay the *Versement Transports* because they had less than 10 employees (262).

Overall therefore, business attitudes were split between a conditional willingness to accept higher taxation on the part of financial institutions,

a general indifference on the part of international corporations and a weak opposition on the part of small local industry and commerce. In these circumstances the capacity of peak organisations to make substantive contributions to policy development was diminished (263). The Chamber of Commerce was disinclined to make specific recommendations without a clearer consensus among its members. The President's remarks at the height of the transport crisis emphasise the Chamber's concern, urge increased public funding but fail to specify any priorities for transport development though it does suggest a preferred source of additional resources:

"if in the next few years a serious investment programme in transport infrastructure is not undertaken, then the Paris Region is in danger of reaching an insoluble crisis - the vital financial commitments involved should not be borne by one generation alone, the time frame for bearing the financial burdens will be long and loans should be forthcoming"(264)

The second factor weakening business participation was a culture of deference to Government in many policy areas. Throughout the twentieth century French business had attempted to secure Government assistance in facing major external challenges which required restructuring, re-investment or significant reforms in commercial practice. This was manifested in, for example, the protectionist reaction by many businesses to the formation of the European Economic Community in 1956 (265) and, in the Paris region, by the demand for preferential treatment for local companies when major developments such as La Defense (266) were planned. In this context, initiatives such as the *Versements Transports* can be seen as helpful interventions by the state, enabling business to find collective solutions to the problems of financing necessary infrastructure, which individual firms were unable to address either alone or through their associations.

State organisation of funding mechanisms for transport, to the advantage of key businesses, was not a new phenomenon in France. The road building and motor industry had benefited from the FSIR, which placed a tax burden on all car owners in order to generate adequate funds to build and maintain roads. However, the major public transport operators, for example SNCF, had been hampered by their close association with the Government, and by a crippling dependence on the state for investment funds, which were provided almost exclusively through the national planning machinery. The transport utilities' relationships with Government had been characterised by greater dependence than industry as a whole, and by a more specific bilateral arrangements for planning and managing services. The utilities were therefore not in a position to lobby very effectively for tax revenues despite the importance of new transport infrastructure for the profitability of urban development.

To a degree, this weakness vis a vis Government strategy was replicated in the regional planning system which drew up priorities for the sixth plan. The relationship between the Government and business in the planning commissions reflects the willingness of businesses to defer to the expertise of civil servants and professional advisors. The key role of *Rapporteur* and the crucial research, report preparation and data gathering tasks were all undertaken by the Regional Prefects nominees. The manufacturers, especially the car manufacturers, whose objectives differed from the emerging professional consensus in support of public transport based solution were ineffective dissidents in the planning commissions on transport and on towns. Their objections to the draft proposals for inclusion in the sixth

plan, especially the priority ascribed to the RER and Métro extensions ahead of the A86/7 outer ring road were politely noted, but ignored (267).

On bigger issues, for example the redevelopment of Les Halles, the plans promoted by the Consortium (268) were rapidly brought within the public sphere, and the Regional Prefect established a commission comprising representatives of leading public and private sector parties with an interest in the development. However, other efforts by businesses to organise alternative planning forums, or to promote alternative plans which were not sympathetically viewed by the Prefect, the Minister or leading professionals were generally ineffective. A good example of this phenomenon was the fruitless efforts by the consortium *Urbanisme-Aménagement-Transports* to promote the idea of a private toll road to double the capacity of the *Périphérique* in 1973. Although the project for a second deck on the *Périphérique*, a *Super-périphérique*, was backed by the Chamber of Commerce, and had the personal sympathy of the ailing President Pompidou, the project was never even considered by the formal public planning bodies. The proposal to introduce tolls was a fundamental shift towards private responsibility for the costs of motoring. The Chamber of Commerce estimated that tolls might raise 2.7 million Francs (1973 prices) by 1980 and that this would be sufficient to fund the entire programme of roads set out in the *Schéma Directeur*. However, the idea was regarded as politically too dangerous despite the intellectual support it commanded among transport planners and economists (269).

Thirdly, some of the most important businesses were closely involved with public policy making by other routes than peak organisations. The areas

in which business representative were most influential, for example in the development of Les Halles, and in the latter stages of the development at La Defense, were those dominated by financial companies, especially banks. Many of the largest customers for new office space on the big redevelopments were banks (270). The same banks were frequently the financiers for the development companies constructing and letting the new premisses. Lojkin describes the period from 1967 onwards as a third phase in business participation in urban policy in which financial organisations became the leading representatives of business, following earlier periods in the fifties when local manufacturing played a leading part before being displaced by international industrial complexes in the mid 1960s. Public sector banks were a powerful and changing influence in the financial sector, and played a central role in reshaping the means by which business influenced decisions on urban planning and transport.

In the late 1960s the financial system in France was liberalised introducing greater competition between public and private banks (271). A proportion of the expansion of financial institutions and their office requirements in Paris can be attributed to banks gearing themselves up to take on a wider role in a more competitive market. However, the liberalisation of the financial market did not break the close links between nationalised banks and central government ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance. The banks' role in financing infrastructure investment also ensured close involvement with urban and regional planning through the Regional Prefecture and the Ministry of *Equipement*. Therefore the primary demanders and financiers of new infrastructure had a direct bilateral relationship with key policy makers on, for example, committees of the *Fonds*

de Développement Economique et Sociale and in the Regional Prefect's office. Peak organisations were, therefore, isolated from the forums where these decisions were made, and the capacity of other sectors of business to influence them was correspondingly weakened.

The final factor influencing businesses' willingness to take issue with the *versement transports* was, of course, the public protest which is the principal subject of this study. The vehemence of consumers' dissatisfaction was communicated to businesses directly by their employees through lateness, absenteeism, recruitment problems and the impact of the protests on places of employment. The potential consequences of widespread public discontent were not lost on businesses who had recently made substantial concessions through the *Grenelle* agreements to restore political and economic order after the events of May 1968 (272). Furthermore, the RATP and other transport providers drew attention to the possible consequences of continuing unhappiness on the part of transport users (273). Employers themselves accepted the underlying argument that they too benefited from an infrastructure which provided good transport conditions for their employees. Some could intervene directly to ensure good access for their particular sites, but there remained a strong general interest in effective regional networks, and in general public confidence in the system. Business required, and to an extent, welcomed, the Government's initiative to resolve the funding and investment problems which beset the region's transport system and thereby undermined the redevelopment programmes on which their future markets and profitability might depend.

By early 1971 members and supporters of the Government began to

indicate their support for the idea of a payroll tax; in February 1971 Paul Delouvrier indicated that he backed the suggestion (274) and in his press briefing before the Interministerial Meeting of March 25th the Minister of Transport, Jean Chamant, made it clear that the ministry had supported the proposal in discussions with the President and the Prime Minister (275). At the Interministerial Council the Government resolved to introduce legislation immediately to institute a tax on all firms with more than nine employees in the Paris region. In legal terms the tax was on the same basis as the Social Security levy and was titled a "*versement*". The maximum rate was set at 2% of total salaries of employees working in the Paris Region. The primary objective was to raise funds for infrastructure investment, and the second aim to promote managerial reform in the RATP. The Bill was introduced in Parliament in May. Article II of the Bill stated explicitly that:

"the employers are the primary beneficiaries of the existence of a large labour market, especially in Paris and in the three *départements* on its periphery, the essential feature of which is the fluidity facilitated by a large public transport network."
(276)

As well as the main aims, the funds generated could also be used for relieving the burden of public transport subsidies on the budgets of public authorities in the Paris region and to fund the re-organisation of Paris transport. The role of collecting and disbursing the funds was given to the STP.

The Parliamentary Commission which examined the Bill clause by clause, before the detailed debate in Parliament as a whole, emphasised the growing deficit of the RATP as the main rationale for the measure. The Commission found that the Government was bound to act to meet the crisis occasioned by

the deficit and judged the bill according to its probable effectiveness in redressing the situation. The Commission estimated that the gross revenue collected would be 1170 million Francs in the first year and it praised the ease with which funds could be collected through the existing social security machinery. The Commission considered the alternatives of additional public expenditure from general tax revenues and of further increases in fares. It rejected both on the grounds that neither would relieve "the excessive burden on public finance at a time when investment needs to increase quickly" and both would "risk being a further cause of increases in wages and prices which would have repercussions throughout the national economy". It recommended that the Government should use the revenue to achieve some immediate short term goals including better services on existing systems, better productivity and reducing the level of direct Government subsidy. It also emphasised that the Government should programme a tariff policy which would help to reduce the deficit, should give two years guaranteed investment funding and should stop interfering in the day to day management of the RATP.

In the longer term the Commission argued that the tax would be most effective in the context of substantial institutional reforms which would decentralise control of Paris Transport to a regional body. Equally the tax was commended for the long term benefit in helping to reduce the deleterious effects of land use policies and development strategies which rely on high levels of long distance commuting. The *Rapporteur* from the commission recommended two amendments exempting firms locating in new towns and establishing concentric bands so that the tax was less the further from Paris a firm was based. Both of these were accepted by the Government.

In the debate itself, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Transport skirted around the specific aspects of the measure and concentrated on the wider issues of economic development in the Paris Region and the need to improve the balance of activity across the district. Nevertheless a right wing Prime Minister did say:

"Today, the Government proposes to you to demand of the employers who benefit directly from the existence of these transport facilities that they assume part of the cost. In this way it will be possible to minimise future fare increases and from this year on, if you adopt the principle of an employers' contribution, not to raise the cost of weekly season tickets." (277)

Chaban Delmas was speaking directly to the most important part of the transport users' campaign and giving commuters the assurance on travel costs they sought from the Government. More specifically he cited three justifications for the Bill. First to relieve the state budget of an excessive burden, straightforwardly to obviate the need for direct tax increases on all citizens. Secondly, to "better divide the costs between employers and employees so as to resolve the stresses placed on the RATP and the SNCF by the current arrangements; this objective was to be achieved "without insupportable increases in fares for the travelling population and most especially the workers" (278). Thirdly to attack, at its roots, the crisis which beset the Paris region as a result of unbalanced redevelopment and uncontrolled growth. The Minister of Transport stressed the plans set out in the Sixth Plan to improve the transport infrastructure and emphasised the managerial reforms taking place in the RATP and SNCF. The Government had agreed a contract with the RATP in which it would guarantee stable fares and steady investment finance, devolve financial control and exempt the RATP from VAT in return for a freeze on recruitment and a commitment to reduce

employee numbers through automation. M. Chamant showed the Government's priorities when he said:

"In the course of this year the Government will almost certainly have to increase the basic fare but it does not want wage earners holding season tickets to suffer the consequences of this extra charge." (279)

The main opposition parties supported the measure and simply sought reassurances that the Government seriously meant to rethink its urban strategy. Speaking for the opposition parties M. Bouulloche said; "We ask ourselves if you are really on the way to solving the problems of urban transport". He suggested that there were two models of urban development: the American and the European. France, he argued, simply did not have the space to accommodate fashionable American town planning ideas. The PCF moved a symbolic amendment to retitile the levy a "*taxe*" but this was rejected.

Serious opposition to the measure came only from a small group of *Républicains Indépendents* who represented constituencies in the Paris region. One of these, M. Paul Stehlin argued that the bill was:

"an expedient destined to produce revenues which would disappear into the cavernous operating deficits of the transport operators. (280)"

He accepted the Government's case for reorganising the system but believed that the tax was "hurriedly prepared and rushed before Parliament and should be opposed on three grounds". First it was contrary to the basic principles of French law on financial responsibility in that there was no direct link between the benefits gained by the employers of the region from an extended labour market and the inefficiency of the RATP and SNCF. Secondly the law placed an unjustified and arbitrary burden on one of the elements in the community which benefited from the transport system, namely the employers,

and others should share in meeting the costs. Thirdly the proposal ran counter to the Government's declared policy of simplifying the structure of taxation which in other spheres had been achieved by replacing specific taxes with VAT. Overall, Stehlin argued, the tax would be a disincentive to enterprise and would inhibit small and medium sized firms which the country looked to win valuable export markets in the future. Overall the tax:

"will not solve the problem of the transport deficit anymore than an aspirin, in temporarily bringing down a fever, cures the disease." (281)

Other opponents of the measure took up the theme that it should only be approved in the context of more fundamental changes to the transport system which would eliminate the transport companies' dependence on deficit funding. The key figures opposing the measure were M. Christian de la Malene and M. Pierre Bas, both of whom were centrist members of the Paris Municipal Council as well as Deputies for constituencies in the Paris region. In their view the bill was a simple transfer of debt burden from employees to employers and would do nothing to guarantee improved services or productivity by the operators. M. de la Malene spelt out bluntly what the bill was about:

"the object of the bill is to avoid increasing the price of weekly season tickets and to find from the employers the means to make up the difference" (282)

The Government would retain the capacity to set the service levels through the new contracts it planned to agree with the RATP and SNCF, but was imposing on other groups, who did not enjoy such influence, the costs of meeting the service levels which resulted. They, therefore, posed the arguments about accountability to financiers against the democratic commitment to improve accountability to political control whilst freeing the

firm from day to day interference in non-political planning and management.

The Bill passed without significant amendment, and in 1972 the new tax came into force. Firms in Paris paid 1.7 per cent of pay roll, whilst those in the inner suburbs paid 1.3 per cent of pay roll and in the outer suburbs 1 per cent. Firms relocating to new towns were exempt. Immediately after the bill became law the Government announced a fare increase on basic ticket prices, exempting season tickets (283). The users' groups called for protests but the demonstration in August 1971 was but a faint echo of the tumult of November 1970 (284), and could not bring to life the fears of 1968. A satisfactory compromise on revenue funding had been achieved.

Political stability and consumer satisfaction on the issue of fares was maintained throughout the 1970s by a skillful distribution of the burdens of funding new transport initiatives and by continuing increases in the contribution made by employers toward the overall cost of the system. Between 1972 and 1982 the proportion of revenue costs met by the central Government and by local authorities remained constant at twenty two per cent and ten per cent respectively. The contribution made by customers through fares fell from forty five per cent to thirty five per cent and that made by employers through the *versement transports* increased from seventeen per cent to twenty eight per cent. Despite the emphasis on commercialism the income from contracts and advertising fell from eight per cent of total cost to seven per cent (285).

4.2 : New management and planning systems

The new tax had important managerial consequences, in addition to the political benefits which inspired its swift promulgation. Public transport budgets in Paris now enjoyed similar status to road budgets across the whole country. The FSIR, which reserved road tax revenue for highway construction and maintenance, had safeguarded the road engineers' budgets through many fiscal crises. Public transport policy in Paris now enjoyed analogous protection. This freed the managers of the RATP and the SNCF to think through more radical plans, and to devise their own programmes, based on realistic forecasts of future resources. The influence of politicians, finance ministry officials and the prefecture was correspondingly reduced. The secure resource base of the transport enterprises combined with the new managerial culture to produce a new approach to transport planning, option appraisal and public consultation. The high level concertation of Gaullist planning was superseded by a local managerial strategy based on building alliances with local people and politicians on the basis of formula planning modified to meet specific local circumstances. This section will look at the new plans and the new project appraisal system for assessing the comparative value of projects included within the strategy which was adopted. Part three will look in depth at the policy implementation process which flowed from this new style of planning and management.

The *Plan Global* (286) set the scene for planning new investments and priorities but it offered no clear guidance on respective responsibilities of agencies, or on the relative priority of schemes listed as desirable. Plans which put the principles adopted in 1972, and which lay beneath the

tax reforms, needed to be drawn up. In the economic sphere the most important concept was that of "true prices". This notion that planning and management in the public sector should be based on the economic costs such as would be reflected in a market price which would eliminate the necessity for public subsidy had been the basis for a project of commercialisation of public enterprises in the early 1970s (287). In the case of public transport in Paris, this impact was combined with an extension of the range of goods to which true prices applied. The most obvious application of true prices is to sell the goods supplied by a public utility at a price which ensures a given return to capital. This approach makes the good which is sold direct to the customer the only product with a clear value which can contribute to the rate of return. For example, the only factor contributing to the rate of return on public capital invested in Renault cars is the income from selling the cars. By extension then, the best transport investments in Paris would be those which yielded greatest income from ticket sales or tolls per franc invested.

The difficulty with this approach, in its pure market form, is that most transport goods are not traded; they have an average cost, but there is little or no marginal cost to the consumer. This is most obviously true of roads where, having invested in a vehicle, maintained it and filled it with fuel, all routes have the same marginal cost so far as road consumption is concerned. If one wished to plan public and private transport simultaneously, or in any co-ordinated way, one has, therefore, to make assumptions about the value of roads since no market information is available. Given the high historic cost of public transport infrastructure, and the comparatively small contribution to overall costs made by consumers,

market information on the value of public transport goods is equally imperfect. It is, however, theoretically possible to devise a price structure which would achieve break even point for a public transport enterprise and devise market based rates of return. The first draft of the *Plan Global* floated the possibility of road pricing as a solution to the dilemma of non-comparability of competing investment opportunities. This represented an effort to improve the market signals generated by transport users, but was politically unacceptable and the final plan made no reference to the idea of introducing tolls on urban roads. To this day, *autoroutes* within conurbations are toll free, despite the comparatively high tolls on inter-urban *autoroutes* in France. Road pricing was rejected because, despite its intellectual coherence and supporters in the professional establishment, it was vehemently opposed by both Pompidou and leading Communist politicians and could find no effective political constituency (288).

Multicriteria Planning

In the absence of clear commercial data about the true costs of potential investments planners sought to increase the sophistication with which they measured the non-market value of potential capital expenditure. In effect they turned to the opposite side of the equation, the cost of a scheme was established and the true price was assessed by measuring the benefits of a project across a range of non-market criteria. This is analogous to moving from a simple cost efficiency measure to a social cost benefit analysis model. The significance of this change in approach is two-fold. First the criteria used were much wider than those taken into account when preparing the *Schéma Directeur* or the *Plan Global*. Secondly

responsibility for assessing the relative priority of schemes moved from ad hoc commissions of ministers and senior officials to the senior engineers and planners in the RATP who ran the cost-benefit analysis system, and carried out the detailed negotiations with local interests directly.

This approach was dubbed "multicriteria planning" (289). In essence this was a politicised cost/benefit calculation and, therefore, incorporated political priorities into a formally neutral planning tool; Frybourg was stating an ideal rather than a reality when he suggested that:


"Multicriteria analysis does not offer a substitute for economic calculation, nor for political decision, but a supplementary illumination to facilitate the making of a decision." (290)

In order to see the effect of multi-criteria analysis on transport priorities this section concentrates on the system's application to *Métro* extension proposals by the RATP in the early 1970s. The RATP adopted six criteria: resident population and number of employees served per kilometre of line; forecast traffic and number of stations per kilometre of line; cost per kilometre of line; internal rate of return on a purely economic basis; the effect of the extension on the structure of the *Métro* system as a whole and the effect of the scheme on the overall urban/regional structure. The innovative elements are clearly the criteria which attempt to link the value of the scheme itself, as determined by the internal rate of return, to the overall effect on the transport system and on the urban/regional structure. The effect on the overall transport system is measured in relative terms according to the number of interconnections with buses, trains and other *Métros* on the new route and by estimating the schemes impact on the accessibility of other parts of the network to new users. The effect on the overall urban structure was determined by models developed by the *Institut*

d'Amenagement et de l'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne which forecast the impact of new transport links on traffic levels, on land prices, property prices, rates of development and distribution of population (291).

Having scored all the potential schemes the second phase was to determine comparability and preferences. This was achieved in four stages. First a margin of error was attached to each score. Secondly two thresholds were established for each criterion: a threshold at which the system was indifferent between two schemes ie. a level of significance for differences between schemes' scores and a threshold of absolute preference: a point at which the difference on one criteria was so great as to outweigh any other basis for choice. Thirdly, a pair by pair comparison of scores was carried out to indicate which schemes were superior one to another and whether they were superior on the same or different criteria. Finally a classification of comparable and non-comparable schemes was drawn up. Figure 4.1 is a map of the schemes under consideration. The scores of each of the twelve proposals under consideration are summarised in table 4.2. Figure 4.3 shows the order of preference which each individual criterion would generate and figure 4.4 the pair by pair comparison of schemes. Figure 4.5 is a graphical representation of the pair by pair comparisons. The overall classification is set out in figures 4.6 and 4.7.

Figure 4.1 - Métro extensions under consideration



Source : RATP

Figure 4.2 - Characteristics of proposed *Mé*tro extensions (292)

| Criteria | 1 Pop. and employment served per km of new line 1975 | 2 Forecast number of new pass- engers per km. | 3 Cost per km in mF 1978 prices | 4 Internal Rate of Return | 5 Organisat- ion of overall network | 6 Effect on urban structure |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|---|------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| to La Defense* | 145990 | 26500 | 270 | 8.7 | 1 | 1 |
| to Petit Bagneux | 32800 | 11600 | 180 | 6.4 | 9 | 9 |
| to Bobigny | 12500 | 7100 | 110 | 4.6 | 2 | 2 |
| to La Corneuve (7II) | 33100 | 11500 | 140 | 14.1 | 3 | 7 |
| to Villejuif (7S) | 24000 | 11200 | 160 | 12.0 | 8 | 5 |
| to Créteil Parc Regional* | 17100 | 4000 | 40 | 11.8 | 12 | 3 |
| to Rogny Bois Perrier | 14200 | 3700 | 130 | 3.9 | 7 | 10 |
| to Boulogne | 29200 | 7500 | 120 | 6.0 | 11 | 12 |
| to Romainville | 24600 | 7200 | 160 | 3.7 | 10 | 11 |
| to Asnières - Gennévilliers (13b) | 37650 | 10400 | 130 | 12.2 | 3 | 8 |
| to Stains-Moulin- euf (13N) | 17400 | 4600 | 170 | 3.7 | 5 | 6 |
| to Vélizy (13S) | 14000 | 3000 | 90 | 5.8 | 6 | 4 |

assuming that the full development programme was achieved.

figures based on 1978 data.

figures are proxies - not the actual IRR numbers generated by calculation.

criteria 5 and 6 are a descending order classification from 1 to 12.

Source Hugonnard and Roy

Figure 4.3 - Orders of preference generated by each criterion

No sign = Indifferent // = frontier between subgroups
 > = Weak preference - = equally placed
 >> = Strong preference

| Criterion | Order |
|--|--|
| Pop. and employment served per km of new line 1975 | 1 >> 13b > TN 4 > 10 > 11 TS >> 13N 3 >> 9 13S > 5 |
| Forecast number of new passengers per km. | 1 >> 4 TN TS 13b >> 10 11 5 >> 13N 3 9 > 13S |
| Cost per km in 1973 prices | 3 >> 13S > 5 10 13b - 9 TN > TS - 11 13N 4 >> 1 |
| Internal Rate of Return | TN > 13b TS 3 >> 1 > 4 10 13S >> 5 9 11 - 13N |
| Organisation of overall network | 1 5 13b TN >> 13N 13S 3 > TS 4 11 > 10 3 |
| Effect on urban structure | 1 5 // 3 > 13S TS 13N > TN 13b 4 > 9 11 10 |

Source : Hugonnard et Roy

Figure 4.4 - Pair by Pair comparison of schemes

| Project | 1 | 4 | 5 | 7n | 7s | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 13b | 13n | 13s |
|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---|----|----|-----|-----|-----|
| | | 11 | 9 | 4 | 9 | | | 11 | 9 | 4 | 9 | 9 |
| Strong superiority | | | 13s | 7s | 11 | | | | | 7n | | |
| | | | | 9 | 13n | | | | | 7s | | |
| | | | | 10 | | | | | | 9 | | |
| | | | | 11 | | | | | | 10 | | |
| | | | | 13b | | | | | | 11 | | |
| | | | | 13n | | | | | | 13n | | |
| weak superiority | 4 | 13n | 13n | 5 | 10 | 9 | | | 10 | 5 | | |
| | 11 | | | 13s | 13s | 13s | | | | | | |
| | 13n | | | | | | | | | | | |

Source : Hugonnard and Roy

Figure 4.5 - Graphical representation of pair by pair comparison




Figure 4.6 - Classification of schemes

Descending order

7N, 13b 7S 5 4 10, 13N, 13S 11 8 1, 9

X--->---X--->---X--->---X--->---X--->---X--->---X


Ascending order

1, 7N, 8, 13b 5 13S 4, 7S 10 13N 11 9

X----->---X->---X->---X->---X->---X->---X->---X

Source : Hugonnard and Roy

Figure 4.7 - Final order of preference



Source : Hugonnard and Roy

The overall result, giving highest priority to lines 7 to the north and 13bis also to the north would have been the same had only the internal rate of return been used to assess relative values. The three lines of descending priority below these two schemes in Figure 3.7 are not comparable one with another- there is no basis for claiming that line 5 is superior to line 7 to the south, only that it is preferable to line 4. Lines 8 and 1 are ascribed priority solely because they are contributions to other major plans - the new town of Créteil and the office development at La Défense. Their value is, therefore, interdependent with the financing of other public sector investments and with the extent to which public promotion of new development is backed by private capital. It is questionable whether the RATP can, within this system, reasonably be asked to take on funding the extensions to these areas within its own allocation of capital. The only line which secures a substantially higher rating than it would on a strict internal rate of return is line 5 to Bobigny.

Overall it must be concluded that the addition of qualitative criteria has had little impact beyond securing questionable bases for continuing schemes which would not be a priority for the RATP, viz the extensions to Créteil and La Défense. This suggests that multicriteria analysis is not the answer to market failure its proponents hoped it would be. In a long and complex critique of the approach Comte and Quercy conclude with the following straightforward argument:

"We would insist that the aggregated multicriteria analysis presents the same fundamental inadequacy as the classical cost benefit analysis ... the fact that the conclusion of the study is presented as a unique outcome on the one hand masks inter group conflicts which exist and on the other hand over simplifies

decision making" (293)

Similar arguments led Pierre Merlin to urge caution in the application of multicriteria analysis and to argue that it could only be seen as a supplement to quantitative measurement of the internal rate of return of any scheme (294).

Given such limitations what did the system contribute to prioritising the public transport plans developed in the 1970s? The most important contribution was that of establishing a legitimate set of options for investment in public transport. The process of comparative evaluation made all the schemes for extending the *Métro* real practical possibilities rather than pipe dreams of outside campaigners. The method of analysis demanded a programme within which to assess relative priorities and the establishment of a credible programme of improvements and developments made the *Métro* a serious contender for public funds. Secondly the evaluation provided a range of justifications for a variety of possible schemes so that compromises which secured political support from a sufficiently wide spectrum could be rationally defended in the national planning system. Thirdly it gave the RATP a defensible system for working out overall priorities meaning that it could make its relationships with Government more contractual. This reduced the necessity for direct ad hoc political initiatives to settle planning priorities and placed transport budget setting on a similar footing to other ministries. The end result was that the RATP was funded and its plans supported, rather than the RATP being employed to carry out the Government's plans.

4.3 : Towards contract-based planning

In the three years from 1972 to 1975 the locus of planning and development moved from the *District* lead by the Regional Prefect to the RATP lead by a politically-appointed Director. This reflected a shift in financial accountability for investment and budget management. Following the adoption of the *Plan Global* in 1972 responsibility for detailed planning and priority setting was quickly assumed by the Ministry of Transport. It seems very likely that the Prefecture was severely weakened by the inability of an ailing President Pompidou to maintain the administrative discipline which had ensured that the Ministry of Transport's powers were always curtailed by inter-ministerial and special commissions which combined local and national interests (295).

Successive plans became known by the names of the Ministers who announced them. In January 1973 Roger Galley, Minister of Transport unveiled a new plan for developments in the bus network in the city. The reason for adopting buses as a priority was transparently political in the run up to elections in 1973; it was essential for the Government to make some clearly visible efforts to show that all the planning was making a real difference to the service. Buses were the quickest and cheapest way of achieving the illusion of improvements. The programme included ten dedicated bus lanes, new buses and a set of express cross city bus routes. The plan affirmed that the *Métro* would be extended to Chatillon and St. Denis by 1976. Additional funding for these projects was made available to the RATP as a loan, on the basis that future fare revenues would repay the cost. The opposition was scathing on this point: "M. Galley has merely launched an electoral

diversion" said the Communist party (296).

Specialist budgeting and management continued its advance after the parliamentary elections when the Prime Minister requested a report from the new Minister of Transport M. Yves Gueny:

"I believe it necessary that all the reforms undertaken should be put before the interministerial commission and that it agrees forthwith measures which will assure better management of transport and clearer relations between the administration and the public bodies concerned. ... I request that you commission the Secretary of State for Transport, M. Billecoq to review all the relevant questions and propose the necessary steps within your field of responsibility in co-operation with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Tourism." (297)

M. Billecoq's report recommended that responsibility for transport management should be assumed by an interministerial committee responsible to and convened by the Ministry of Transport. This created a forum for interministerial decisions at national level and abrogated the role largely assumed hitherto by the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens*. The power of agenda setting had been removed from the Regional Prefect and assumed by the Ministry of Transport. The power to recommend budget allocations, fare levels and capital programmes was also in effect taken over by the national ministry. The Report also recommended changes to the financial arrangements under which the RATP and the SNCF operated. The declared objective was no longer overall self financing of transport operations, but simply that fare revenue should meet day to day operating costs; the immediate link between cost efficiency and investment programmes, which the doctrine of true prices had sought to introduce was, therefore, formally denied. Investment decisions were separated from revenue costs and would thereafter be met by direct Government subventions or loans against the revenue generated by the

versement transports. With the influence of the corporatist lobby in Government at its lowest ebb as the President's terminal illness reduced his participation in day to day affairs, these recommendations were adopted and the national Ministry of Transport assumed a role it had not held since the reforms of 1948.

Transport planning now revolved around the relationship between the Ministry of Transport and the transport companies, principally the RATP. The shackles of regional co-ordination were broken and the professional engineers in the companies became able to negotiate directly with sympathetic paymasters, who had at their disposal a dedicated tax revenue to protect the budget from the predations of the Ministry of Finances. Public transport in Paris had achieved a protected status equivalent to that previously enjoyed only by the national road programme. The new planning and financial allocation system reflected the professionalisation and specialisation of the policy area.

The main tool for determining future programmes became the RATP's annual five year forward plan which provided an account of progress towards agreed targets and a series of projected developments (298). The main user groups and worker representatives were involved in planning through direct consultation by the RATP. It presented the report direct to the Ministry for decision, and published it to other agencies for information. The annual subvention to the RATP's revenue account, and the release of capital allocations for new schemes became contingent on the Ministry's satisfaction with the annual plan, as opposed to dependent on the Prefect's urban/regional planning priorities or on interministerial bargaining. In

practice the RATP did the bulk of negotiation and compromising on future programmes direct with local groups who acted principally through established municipal political channels. The RATP still could not be mistaken for a private company - for a start its senior executives were all political appointees and it had no private capital, but its approach to selling its product, communicating with customers and contractors and organising its activities was one of a commercial enterprise. The big increases in service levels were at least partly funded by loans and by increases in revenue from passengers. Its political success can be measured by the fact that while its income from passengers rose substantially, this amount reduced as a proportion of overall revenue. In 1977 the Government increased the rates of the *versements transports* by roughly seventy per cent. The RATP had gained the power to implement its own programmes. The RATP's contract extended beyond the business of running the existing system, which had dominated its affairs for the twenty years up to 1975, and took on the planning and political management tasks previously carried out by the *District* and the Regional Prefect. It is this political management of the development of new transport links which is the subject of Part 3.

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

PART 3 - POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

CHAPTER 5 : Back to Municipal Politics - The extension of *Métro 13bis*

What difference did these bold shifts in philosophy and secure new funds make to local transport planning? How did the *Maires*, councillors, engineers and managers adapt to the new priorities they were expected to follow? To find out, this chapter follows one project, the extension of a *Métro* line in north western Paris to examine the political and social questions it raised and to measure their effect on the management style and professional practice of the RATP's engineers and managers. Clichy was not a typical commune, but part of the problem of *Métro* extension in inner suburbs was that there was no typical place, typical problem and typical solution. How adaptable and pragmatic were the policy implementors when challenged to turn a rational set of priorities into a publicly acceptable service?

5.1 : What kind of area would the new line serve?

The ambiguity of the area around Clichy and its northern neighbours was summed up by its description in the *Schéma Directeur* as a "zone of transition". The six communes which made up the area were a diverse mixture of waterfront bustle in the Port on the Seine, tranquil suburbs in the northern residential areas, newer light industry in the centre of an established nineteenth century community in Clichy, and crumbling decaying areas on the edge of the *Périphérique* awaiting the bulldozers and system construction in *Zones d'Aménagement Concerté*. The district straddled the

divide between the "working city" and the "residential suburb". Overall there was a surplus of jobs over economically active residents. These jobs were concentrated in the more traditional working class occupations in the docks and in industry; there was little local labour available for the newer, growing commercial and service sectors.

The pattern of travel into and out of the area is complex. Tables 5.1 to 5.4 illustrate the origins and destinations of in commuters and out commuters (299). There is no predominant direction of flow and commuting to and from Paris is significant in most of the communes. The main transport links bordered the area; it was bounded to the east and west by mainline railways into Paris termini (300) which served outer suburbs as well. Within the area the primary public transport service was the bus network operated by the RATP which focussed on the *Méto* termini at Porte d'Ouen and Porte de Clichy (301). Local travel needs were more important than in other peripheral communes which depended on the city centre for their services.

The political characteristics of the communes reflected their ambiguous position in the structure of the conurbation. Situated between the bourgeois conservatism of north west Paris and the robust pioneering communism of St. Denis the political history of the communes was varied and idiosyncratic. Clichy itself was a Socialist commune ruled paternally by the M. Levillain who had been *Maire* since 1944, a traditionalist oblivious of the upheavals of the 1960s and *autogestionnaire* fashions of the 1970s. Gennevilliers was part of the Communist "*Couronne Rouge*". Bois-Colombes and Asnieres were Gaullist and had recently been joined by Villeneuve-La-Garenne which had given up a long history of centrist independence in 1971 when it



elected a Gaullist Municipal Council (302).

Figures 5.1 - 5.4 : Origins and Destinations of Commuters

| Place of Residence (Commune) | Number of economically active | Place of Employment (Département) | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------|-------------|
| | | Paris | Hauts de Seine | Seine Saint Denis | Val d'Oise | Other Areas |
| | | % | % | % | % | % |
| Asnières | 39250 | 29 | 61 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| Clichy | 26750 | 32 | 57 | 6 | 1 | 4 |
| Gennevilliers | 28650 | 15 | 74 | 5 | 2 | 4 |
| Argenteuil | 50250 | 24 | 24 | 3 | 44 | 5 |
| Bois Colombes | 13600 | 37 | 53 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Colombes | 40850 | 27 | 62 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Epinay | 22850 | 33 | 18 | 37 | 8 | 4 |
| Villeneuve la Garenne | 11400 | 25 | 56 | 14 | 2 | 3 |

| Place of Employment (Commune) | Number of economically active | Place of Residence (Département) | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------|-------------|
| | | Paris | Hauts de Seine | Seine Saint Denis | Val d'Oise | Other Areas |
| | | % | % | % | % | % |
| Asnières | 39250 | 9 | 62 | 8 | 13 | 8 |
| Clichy | 26750 | 18 | 47 | 14 | 9 | 12 |
| Gennevilliers | 28650 | 9 | 49 | 16 | 18 | 8 |
| Argenteuil | 50250 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 72 | 11 |
| Bois Colombes | 13600 | 6 | 67 | 4 | 13 | 10 |
| Colombes | 40850 | 7 | 62 | 3 | 17 | 11 |
| Epinay | 22850 | 5 | 3 | 64 | 24 | 4 |
| Villeneuve la Garenne | 11400 | 7 | 52 | 18 | 14 | 9 |

Data from 1975 census



The Clichy-Asnieres-Gennevilliers area was not a product of post war planning, and the communes in the area maintained political traditions which predated the Fifth Republic and the *District*. It was not a candidate for wholesale approach of the Schema Directeur. The structure and character of the area evolved more gently and would require greater political sensitivity than the radical urban planners had yet demonstrated. This chapter looks at the backcloth to the *Métro*'s imminent passage across the neighbourhoods of the north western suburbs and goes on to examine the issues raised by the controversy which surrounded the project's implementation.

5.2 : Why was there no *Métro* already?

Clichy was the only commune immediately bordering the *Périphérique* not to benefit from the *Métro* extension programme planned in the late 1920s (303). The *Métro* line 13 had only been extended as far as Porte d'Ouen. Line 13 started at Gare St. Lazare and ran northward along the Avenue de Clichy through the seventeenth arrondissement of the city to a junction called La Fourche (304) where it divided into line 13 which continued to Porte d'Ouen and line 13bis (305) which extended as far as Porte de Clichy on the edge of the city. The 1928 *Plan Jayot* proposed to extend the *Métro* into most inner suburban districts including Clichy as part of a general programme for eliminating the tram network which was the main service in these areas at the time, but increasingly came into conflict with private motor cars and public motor buses (306). In the west of the region the plan was, effectively, to extend all the existing *Métro* lines as far as the major

bridges across the river Seine. Line 9 was extended to Pont de Sèvres in 1934. In 1937 extensions of line 1 to Pont de Neuilly and line 3 to Pont de Levallois were opened. The remaining extension to the bridge in Clichy was never completed. Line 13*bis* never went beyond Porte de Clichy and line 13 itself was extended as far as Carrefour in St. Ouen after the war in 1952 when some projects which had been left in abeyance at the commencement of hostilities were picked up again in the first plan (307). The proposed project was a victim of delay: by the time the scheme reached its place at the head of the queue the rationale for extending the *Métro* had been buried by the growing obsession with private motoring in the 1950s and the desire to plough funds into road construction (308). Alongside the rest of the *Métro* system line 13*bis* embarked on two decades of neglect in the early 1950s. Its particular misfortune was to have been neglected for three decades before that.

The Municipal council did not relent in its hopes for a *Métro* line and continued to press for the planning permission granted in 1929 to be exploited by the RATP (309). Prospects for reviving the scheme came from the unlikely source of the RER. The original plan for the RER set out in the 1965 *Schéma Directeur* proposed two North-South routes. In 1969 the *Schéma Directeur* was revised to take account of the lower population projections and more modest funds available than forecast in 1965 (310). One of the main revisions was a suggestion that the more westerly of the two north-south links should be achieved by joining lines 13 and 14 of the *Métro* together by a new tunnel under the Seine running from Champs Elysee to Invalides with extensions to St. Denis in the north and Chatillon in the south. The RATP responded to this proposal by pointing out that it would be sensible to

include the old established plan to extend line 13*bis* within this package (311). This idea did not meet with the approval of the ad hoc ministerial committee established in 1969 to prioritise schemes within the draft sixth plan. Their view was that the overall cost of 340mF was still too high and that extending line 5 to Orly would offer greater benefits (312).

The major policy changes of 1970/1 did not fully restore the fortunes of the scheme which now had a shelf life of over forty years. The *Plan Global* in 1972 proposed that there should be an experimental "*Mini-Métro*" in Clichy (313). This would be a new type of automated light railway of the kind which now operates in Lille and the London Docklands, but was unprecedented in 1972. In the event the much vaunted experimental system met with strong local resistance from politicians who demanded their right to a "proper underground service" (314). The "*Mini-Métro*" remained a glossy photo-montage in "*Transports Nouvelles*" (315) and the RATP sought other ways of economising on the project through Clichy. By now though they were working in the context of a major programme of *Métro* extensions adopted within the company's forward plan, and justified through the multicriteria planning techniques employed by the *Bureau d'Etudes*. In this context there were three main issues surrounding plans to extend the line: the overall priority of *Métro* extensions in the RATP's programme; the relative priority of each potential *Métro* extension and finally the quality of service offered and environmental impact of the new line.

5.3 : The overall priority of *Métro* extensions in the RATP programme

The approach to planning which was described at the end of the previous chapter compared *Métro* extension schemes one with another - it did not look at the relative value of say *Métro* projects and dedicated bus lanes on the *grands boulevards*. The inter - ministerial committee which had set the priorities in the sixth plan, and later adopted the *Plan Global* had included some *Métro* extension schemes, to Orly, Creteil and La Defense in its list of specified approved schemes, but substantial funds were allocated to unspecified improvements in the public transport infrastructure and it was these which the RATP was planning to spend. In 1970 the *Métro* had a poor image. It offered a sub standard service in outdated rolling stock. It was infrequent, poorly managed and unreliable. Equally importantly, it was an inner city service, crowded with local travellers going short distances across and around the city. Interchanges between routes were inefficient, slow and confusing. The *Métro* was an unattractive prospect for the longer distance commuter. Suburban *Métro* systems had to offer a qualitatively different service which could transport people quickly and predictably from more widely spread origins to city centre destinations. As the distance between stops and routes necessarily increased with a wider network, and travel times increased the comparison was less between *Métro* and bus services. Increasingly the *Métro* was seen as an alternative to railways or the RER.

The *Schéma Directeur* saw the RER as the main public transport system for the suburbs, but regarded private motoring as the most important means of travel outside the city centre. The critical policy change so far as

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

Métro development was concerned was, therefore, the acceptance in the 1972 *Plan Global* that public transport should have priority in the inner suburbs. The RATP then had a choice of potential systems to improve public transport in the areas immediately bordering the inner city. As Jayot had recognised fifty years before (316), the *Métro* had significant advantages over other options for these kinds of journey. It was faster and more comfortable than buses, and placed fewer obstructions in the way of private car travel, indeed by taking drivers and buses off the roads it reduced traffic congestion for business users and people who had no alternative but to use private vehicles. Equally *Métros* were cheaper, quicker to construct and more easily linked to the existing transport infrastructure than the RER which had only one established route across the city centre and was still hampered by the need for passengers to change modes to effect most journeys. Once the central sections of the RER were completed it would become a strategic network for the outer suburbs and for rail users; the more local, high speed service would be offered by the *Métro*.

The general idea of extending *Métro* lines won widespread support from localities for reasons of straightforward self interest. For a local politician a *Métro* line was far more likely to secure a quick payback than the drawn out process of building an experimental scheme or a major construction project like the RER. The *Métro* was popular with consumers since it was well established and, most importantly, a cheap form of public transport. These decisions were being made before the days of universal travel cards and the *Métro* was significantly cheaper per journey than the RER, and could take a passenger further for one ticket than the bus system. Neither was the *Métro* associated with negative images of wholesale

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

redevelopment and high technology of the kind which surrounded the increasingly discredited schemes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The *Métro* was part of the romantic old Paris serving tradition rather than the *grand ensembles* and high rise office blocks which rose around RER stations.

On a broader national scene *Métro* systems were fashionable and received strong support from several influential provincial *Maires* who were seeking *Metro* systems in their own cities; the best examples were Lille, Lyon and Marseilles all of whom were canvassing proposals with national ministries (317). With influential national politicians backing such systems, there was greater incentive for municipalities around the capital to associate themselves with the general case for this type of public transport infrastructure. Generally speaking the demand for *Métro* services to peripheral communes preserved the coalition which had so successfully overturned Government policy in 1970. The commuters who had no access to swift car travel and who depended on poor public transport services could all support the case for an general extension of *Métro* lines. Equally all the local groups campaigning on local transport issues could back one another, since if any were successful a precedent for a new public transport service to their kinds of area would be established. The national political parties who had co-ordinated the cartel had strong motives for carrying on a campaign for a wider network of *Métro* routes, and for the general model of service. They were chasing possible political gains in these sort of areas, consolidating their hold on some and encroaching on opposition territory in others, through their espousal of local issues and at the same time bringing together Parisian and provincial interests and thereby strengthening their already strong argument that the parties which ran local Government in the

greater proportion of the country were fit for national office (318).

A programme of *Métro* extensions also had attractions for the engineers in the RATP, many of whom had been schooled in the design and construction of such systems but had never had the opportunity to practice their talents in France. Through its external consultancy the RATP was involved in constructing *Métro* systems in some third world countries (319), but no *Métros* had been built in France itself for twenty years. No self respecting railway engineer could really get excited about bus lanes and the RER was a prestige project dominated by a specialist team. The major suppliers of rolling stock, control equipment and ticket machinery saw great advantage in such a programme as well. It was clear to them that improvements in these areas would not be confined to the new lengths of track but would be adopted across the entire network as new rolling stock spread through the routes. There was, therefore, a long term, stable and lucrative market at stake for them in decisions which were apparently at the margin of the existing infrastructure.

The effort to establish a new type of *Métro* was part of a wider initiative to change the style and quality of service offered by the RATP. The most dramatic part of this, given the background of consumer protest around the issue, was a new fares structure. The zones which had been arbitrarily set up when the *Métro* first extended beyond the walls of Paris became the foundation of a multi-mode travel card system - the *Carte Orange*. Instead of charging people for a journey, or for the same journey every day for a given period, as the previous system had done, the *Carte Orange* enabled its holder to take as many journeys as they liked within a

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

designated zone on all the public transport services available until the card expired. This system had many advantages for the RATP. It simplified fare collection enormously since the majority of journeys were paid for in advance and revenue from weekly, monthly or annual cards was easily predicted; this helped with cash flow management as well.

The *Carte Orange* overcame the problems of comparative inefficiency of services which only plied short routes, particularly buses. There was no marginal cost to the card holder in jumping on a bus to go a few streets to connect with a rail or *Métro* service. The *Carte Orange* unified the RATP and SNCF networks in a far more effective way than any amount of capital investment in interchanges; passengers could now plan multi-mode journeys on the basis of one piece of price information, the cost of a *Carte Orange* to the relevant zone. The RATP had, therefore, created a single, more flexible transport network, and simplified, indeed automated, much of its revenue collection in one simple policy change. The results were striking. Bus usage increased by fifty per cent, overall traffic by over twenty five per cent (320). Because passengers were buying a new product - the right to universal travel - resistance to fare increases was greatly diminished. The RATP increased the price of the *Carte Orange* by twenty per cent in each of the first four years it was available, while increasing the individual ticket price to keep up only with inflation. There was no resistance to these increases and sales of the card increased every year (321).

5.4 : The relative priority of *Métro* extension schemes

Where the general issue of priority for the *Métro* programme could unite natural enemies, dividing the cake among potential beneficiaries could divide natural friends; so it proved in Clichy and in the users' campaigns more generally. The outcomes of multi-criteria planning, however theoretically defensible, were certain to be politically contentious in at least two ways. First of all some groups argued that they favoured some areas unfairly and secondly some interested parties argued that other, more significant criteria had not been taken into account.

The case of Clichy illustrates two types of allegations of unreasonable favoritism in the setting of priorities. The local transport campaigning groups in Clichy argued that other areas, notably St. Cloud and Creteil were unreasonably favoured in the allocation of funds for *Métro* construction. They suggested that close political associations between the *Maires* of these communes and the Government had unduly influenced the decision. The *Maire* of St. Cloud was M. Fourcade was also Minister of Finance at the time which gave the accusation some circumstantial credibility. The Communist Senator who led the local *Comité pour l'Amélioration des Transport et de la Circulation à Clichy* (CATCC) put the argument bluntly;

"We demand that the *Métro* in Clichy be constructed like that in St. Cloud" (322)

Campaigners in Clichy also argued, naturally, that as their claim was the oldest it should be settled first. The *Métro* had been extended to Pont de Sèvres in the direction of St. Cloud in 1937; the people in Clichy had no

improvement in service since the 1920s.

The issue of relative priorities reveals the degree to which traditional local politics reasserted themselves in urban planning in the seventies. The *Métro* was an issue within the municipality and between the municipality and higher levels of Government. The principal reason that the *Métro* became a major local issue in Clichy was the impending retirement of the *Maire*. Within the Union of the Left, both parties wished to secure the succession to M. Levillain. The local PCF, through its sponsored campaigns and in the figure of M. Schmauss - the locality's most senior politician - sought to outflank the Socialists on the municipal council by creating strong public pressure which would test the resolve of pragmatic Socialists who were minded to do a deal with the RATP on either the timing or the quality (see below) of the new service.

The attitude which local councillors adopted towards the *Métro* service became a key issue within the ruling group on the municipal council, and the council became a central actor in the policy arguments about the *Métro* service within Clichy and across the region as a whole. This changed the channels through which pressure was exerted to change policies or specific decisions. Whereas the regional bodies had made the key decisions in the sixties, it was the RATP and the Ministry of Transport which made the crucial decisions in the seventies. Local politicians no longer sought alliances at *District* or prefectural level, but dealt directly with the relevant RATP managers and sought to put pressure on Ministry officials by raising the issue directly with the Minister. The traditional ways of doing this were personal and party contacts and questions to the Minister in

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

Parliament (323). This development is part of a wider change taking place in the political culture of France at the time. The new Regional Administrations endorsed a provincial political culture without giving the central Government the means to undermine more firmly based local institutions. Professional groups like the *Ponts et Chaussées* had found new ways of maintaining power and independence within urban and regional development which depended directly on their traditional political skills rather than on an alliance with the few officials who had access to the top. The quality of this change was well summarised by Simon Nora speaking in 1975:

"Our elite system was a great asset until a few years ago - this is in the post war decades when our politics were unstable and France was modernising and industrialising. The technocrats then were a dedicated *clergé*, the secular priests of progress, pulling France forward with autocratic zeal. But that phase is over. Today France is largely modernised and what is needed is something else - the emergence of a more open and egalitarian society where ordinary people can participate more" (324)

The questions being addressed demanded this kind of approach. Clichy was not a greenfield site on which one could plant a *grand ensemble*, a hypermarket and an RER station. The kind of pioneer spirit and grand thinking which supported that approach denied the heritage and community which was strong even in a run down suburb led by dated Socialists and unsophisticated Communists. Each potential route for a *Métro* extension had its own peculiar history, its own special pleaders and its own local priorities. The delicate questions of priority and of implementation could be informed by the rationalism of multicriteria planning, and underpinned by a grand programme to transform the shape of the Paris region, but their day to day management and adjustment required a sensitivity and skill which only people with real stakes in the project - the consumers and the constructors

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

- possessed. In Clichy the disputes surrounding the detailed implementation of the *Metro* project focussed on the quality of service and on its impact on the local environment.

5.5 : Quality of Service and Environmental Impact

The proposal which had lain dormant on the drawing board for so long had been to continue Line 13*bis* underground as far as Asnières, including a new tunnel under the Seine in Clichy. In 1972 the RATP issued a new *Schéma de Principe* (325) which retained this design running underground through Clichy with two stations in Clichy, one in the centre and one on the bank of the Seine and a terminus in Asnières Gennevilliers. This was widely welcomed, and as the last chapter showed, it scored highly in the priority setting system. The detailed plan issued in 1974 differed in two crucial respects; the line would run above ground from the centre of Clichy out to the terminus and there would be only one station in Clichy. There was no doubt that the reason for the changes was the RATP's desire to reduce the costs of the project. Digging tunnels is very expensive, especially under rivers, and the number of new passengers per kilometre of tunnel steadily declined as the network extended. It was in the RATP's interest to construct lines on the surface wherever possible. An unsystematic look at the *Méto* systems of comparable cities suggests that overground services are indeed the norm in suburbs; the systems in London, New York and Chicago are but three examples. The RATP also argued that there were strong engineering grounds for constructing the new route on the surface; claiming that their last attempt to tunnel under the Seine in the north of the city had led to a serious accident and that the new tunnel would be geologically unstable

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

(326). The local council got the RATP to accept that a specially re-inforced tunnel was a possibility but the RATP argued that this would further increase the expense (327).

The real rationale for the surface construction was revealed by looking at the *Service des Ponts et Chaussées* road programme for the mid seventies. High on the list was a link road from the *Boulevard Périphérique* to the A86 ring road through Clichy and requiring a new road bridge across the Seine (328). Obviously it would help the engineers, and reduce the costs, if the two river crossing could be effected at the same time by constructing a new bridge. The decision to cross the river by bridge, rather than by tunnel, imposed a series of other very significant engineering constraints on the project. Trains do not go up and down slopes very well, meaning that it was desirable to have as great a proportion of the whole line at surface level as possible to minimise the ascent and descent from the bridge. This difficulty was accentuated by the proposed design of the bridge which placed the *Metro* lines above the road. The road scheme also disrupted the plans for a station on the river bank by proposing a change to the line of the river in order to eliminate two inconvenient islands and simplify the construction of the bridge.

Clearly there were many straightforward pragmatic reasons for adopting this kind of approach and in July 1974 the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens* adopted the revised plan. They did so having sounded out the *Maire* first who had let them know that his priority was to secure a *Méto* service for the commune before his retirement and that he would accept the compromise involved (329). In accepting the *Maire's* judgement the RATP was guilty of

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

taking insufficient account of other sounds emerging from Clichy politics.

The Communist party, and in particular M. Guy Schmauss and the CATCC were campaigning against the revised plan from as early as March 1974. The first stage of the campaign had been to canvass opinion on the Rue du Martre down which the now overground *Méto* was to pass. In a referendum residents were invited to choose between the original *Schéma de Principe* and the new scheme. The underground option received 3765 votes and the new scheme only 14 (330). The CATCC took this result along with them when they went to lobby the Director General of the RATP. M. Schmauss reported his conversation with M. Giraudet as follows:

"The Director General of the RATP replied to me in the course of the interview that an underground *Metro* in Clichy would be too slow, too difficult to construct and too expensive. However, I pointed out that the RATP's alternative is also unacceptable because it will generate too many ill effects: noise in an urban area between 5-30 am and 1-30 am, it will destroy an established area and will cut the town in two. Neither will it serve the needs of the local people. Not constructing the station at Pont de Clichy will deny a service to twelve thousand people including those who use the Beaujon Hospital, The Alsacienne Company and the National School of Radio-electronics." (331)

L'Humanité reported that until November 1973 the RATP had also favoured the original underground scheme but had been forced to submit a cheaper scheme to the inter - ministerial committee on Parisian transport in order to get the necessary financial backing to proceed with the idea at all. Even with the new scheme the RATP would now be forced to borrow most of the capital cost from a new regional loan fund to be established in the 1974 budget. The PCF, through the pages of L'Humanité, sought to widen this issue by suggesting:

"This new operation proves that they have no intention of treating the suburban services properly. The overground lines, which are less onerous on the budget are now likely to be adopted systematically for all the planned suburban extensions" (332)

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

Pressure was placed most directly on the *Maire* to change his view, both in order to protect the aggrieved residents of the Rue du Martre and to protect his party from appearing weak on a major policy conflict. In the event he bowed to pressure announcing that he would seek a compromise between the two sides saying: "I want the *Métro* here straight away, but you (the RATP) must reduce the environmental distress" (333). This was regarded as a very feeble position by M. Schmauss who increased the pressure directly on the RATP.

Despite the representations from local residents that they had never been consulted about the plans the RATP decided to proceed with work on the new scheme, arguing that all they had to do was consult on the principle of extending the *Métro* along the designated route. The details of implementation were their prerogative. In law they were quite correct; the political wisdom of this course was less clear. The RATP site office in Clichy became a focus for protestors and was continually vandalised and daubed with anti RATP graffiti (334). Several pieces of engineering equipment were damaged by protestors. Faced with a direct threat to their operational work the local RATP engineers took matters into their own hands and began local consultations in an effort to secure support for their efforts. They called a meeting in the site office for the leaders of the protest campaign in order to explain the way in which work would progress and the safety implications of tampering with civil engineering equipment (335). They also held meetings with local traders and residents groups. These were a mixed success; the attacks on RATP property ceased but at one meeting in the site office tempers became so frayed that the site engineers had to beat a hasty retreat through the window leaving the offices occupied

by protestors (336).

The CATCC decided that it was imperative to stop the work before it was so well advanced that there seemed no credible alternative. They adopted two separate tactics. They pressed the municipality to withdraw the co-operation of its own direct labour force and surveyors who were carrying out a great deal of the work for the RATP and who had detailed knowledge of the street plan, drainage, conduits etc. Simultaneously they sought a ruling from the *Commissaire d'Enquête d'Utilité Publique* (337) that the new project was qualitatively different from that approved at the time of the *Schéma de Principe* and should be subject to a further public inquiry.

Mounting evidence of opposition was provided by an independent opinion survey commissioned by the Municipal Council in February 1975 which showed that a majority of residents preferred to have a *Métro* which "preserved completely their environment even if this delayed completion by up to three years", fifty eight per cent of residents were either totally or relatively opposed to the overground scheme. In addition fifty nine per cent supported the idea of having a second station to serve the area around Pont de Clichy (338). In this context the *Maire* hardened his attitude and withdrew the co-operation of the Commune's staff from the RATP work. Problems multiplied for the RATP in March 1975 when the Commissioner ruled that the new scheme did not have a valid *Declaration d'Utilité Publique* and that the RATP should not have commenced work. The Commissioner found that one station in Clichy would be insufficient and that the long overground section of line would cause unacceptable noise pollution. He advised the RATP to include a further station and to include noise abatement measures in their design (339).

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

The Commissioner's report was simply advice to the Minister of Transport who could instruct the RATP to accept the Commissioner's advice and take the necessary measures or he could submit the plan to the *Conseil d'Etat* seeking authorisation to overrule the Commissioner. Both would involve a substantial delay, but the latter course obviated the need to renegotiate the financial package with the Ministry of Finance and seek a redefinition of the RATP's capital programme in the inter - ministerial committee. The Minister submitted the RATP's existing plan to the *Conseil d'Etat*. In the interim the CATCC pressed its case that the only grounds for the RATP putting forward the overground scheme was the parsimony of the Ministry of Finance. M. Schmauss argued at length:

"The RATP project in 1969 envisaged a tunnel under the Seine which would cost seventy million francs more than the present scheme, amounting to less than a twelfth of the money wasted on the new abattoirs at La Villette (340) ... Do they realise that such an investment will last more than a century ? Must our children suffer the distress of a noisy metro, cutting their neighbourhood in two because in one disgraceful year it was decided this way? The Government seems quite misguided; it swamps our TV screens with exhortations to save energy but by omitting a station at Pont de Clichy it will lose thousands of customers who will carry on using their cars. In a hundred years they will spend on petrol at least seven times what the Government claims to be saving. More fundamentally they have found the money "down there" at the other end of line to put a new tunnel under the Seine linking lines 13 and 14. It is true that down there are the "beaux quartiers" ... Clichy is, by contrast, an ordinary working suburb." (341)

Here we have the major issues set out in one ramble; is the *Métro* better value for money than road investment; should new services have to be constructed at a cost of serious environmental damage; why should the *Métro* be different in Clichy than in the centre of Paris? Is Clichy being badly treated in comparison with other communes? On this last point L'Humanité was in no doubt commenting:

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

"This affair places in relief the dramatic backlog in investment in Paris Transport. There remain twelve lines to be extended. ... To obstinately proceed with the overground extension in Clichy would be a grave error for the future. That is why we are hostile to this new project which is really just a cheap substitute. The residents of Clichy will be refused what has been so generously awarded to Saint Cloud, where the *Maire*, it is true, is the Minister of Finance" (342)

The issue of quality of service became the central one for the campaigners for Clichy and for the RATP. The RATP needed to make its case that suburban *Métros* should be judged by a different set of criteria to those which were planned for the city centre and that these did not amount to political or social class favoritism. The two sides cases were summed up in a Parliamentary exchange between a local Deputy and the Minister of Transport in June 1975. The Deputy, M. Alain Vivien asked:

"reminding the Secretary of State of the problems posed by the extension of Line 13bis... The Municipal Council in Clichy has carried out an opinion poll which demonstrates that the majority of the population of the commune wish to be served by two stations - at Clichy Centre and at Pont de Clichy. They demand an underground crossing of the Seine. However, the current project envisages only one station and an overground river crossing which will harm the local environment. This project meets with the hostility of local people and their elected representatives. I ask the Minister if he does not now judge that he must favour two stations in Clichy and underground construction throughout" (343)

The Minister replied summarising the RATP's case and offering a potential resolution of the dispute as follows:

"the creation of a second stop in Clichy would concern only a limited number of people, its effective service area would be restricted by the river and the numerous access points to the station at Clichy Centre. Against the advantage it would give to certain travellers in Clichy one must balance the increased travelling time entailed by an additional stop for those going further. In general the RATP has adopted greater distances between stops on suburban extensions than on existing routes in order to reduce journey times and to take greatest advantage of the very modern rolling stock which will run on these new lines. An underground crossing of the Seine would add considerable expense (around ninety million francs) and delay construction or compromise other similar projects. As far as the environment is concerned, architectural studies are in progress and in the

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

specific matter of noise pollution the RATP envisage a number of ameliorative measures including using the most modern rolling stock, special care in the positioning and maintenance of the track, use of heavy load bearing suspension, having no points on the elevated sections and installing baffle screens to dampen down noise. Finally the RATP are pursuing, at my request, research into ways of further reducing inconvenience at minimal cost" (344)

It is worth looking at this summary of the Government position in some detail. First of all the Minister has given an exceptionally full reply, he could quite easily have said the RATP were looking into problems and would report to him in due course. The level of detail on environmental protection suggested that the Government were taking these matters very seriously as befitted the image of the new President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. It is also clear that there is no room for compromise on the overall cost of the scheme, except at the direct expense of other *Métro* extension schemes. There is even an underlying suggestion that if the overground project were rejected then the extension scheme would be dropped altogether in favour of an area where the locals were more grateful and co-operative. The Government have clearly adopted the RATP's case that the suburbs must be treated separately; the Minister spells out the case for longer distances between stops on economic grounds, and in order to support outer lying communes. There are real political conflicts around such a set of priorities. If the prime purpose of extending the *Métro* is to serve communes on the outer edge of the built up area, that is to bring commuters into the city centre from dormitory areas; then areas on the edge of the city centre which have complex local transport networks, and clear local labour markets and transport needs, like Clichy, will get bypassed in favour of simpler, politically more sympathetic areas further out. The issue for Clichy has shifted from securing a better local transport service to protecting its residents from the environmental degradations involved in bringing commuters

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

through the area from Asnieres into the city centre. On this issue, though, the Government is willing to compromise.

This was the solution recommended by the *Conseil d'Etat* which accepted the revised RATP scheme on condition that it incorporated measures to reduce noise pollution (345). Specifically the RATP was required to install double glazing in all buildings within thirty metres of the *Metro* viaduct, to erect baffle screens, to use special points at junctions and most significant of all to reduce the elevated section to four hundred and eighty eight metres. This necessitated an unusually steep ascent and descent from the bridge and also constructing a special hood for the opening from which the underground section of line emerged. By adopting this position the Government remained vulnerable to charges of favouritism. If it was all right for suburban *Métros* to run overground at higher speeds between more widely spaced stations why did the extension of line 10 into St. Cloud resemble nothing more than a conventional underground city centre service (346). The PCF's argument that it was an advantage to have the Minister of Finance as *Maire* seems likely to be the underlying explanation for this mystery. Other evidence points to an unwillingness to help political enemies. In 1975 the *Maire* of Bobigny, a Communist stronghold and the only *départemental* administrative centre (347) not to be served by the *Métro* secured a written undertaking from the President of the Republic that an extension to Bobigny would have top priority (348); he was still waiting for the new service to start in 1985.

The CATCC moved to appeal against the decision of the *Conseil d'Etat* but was refused leave to do so. The RATP and the Government had improved

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

their judgement of local political opinion and once the environmental safeguards were announced support for the CATCC fell away. The project received a *Declaration d'Utilité Publique* on December 9th 1975 and the RATP was able to start work again on the project after a delay of almost two years. The *Maire* was able to offer support from the Municipality's technical services and work continued uninterrupted. In constructing the special hood and noise abatement measures the RATP went further than the *Conseil d'Etat* had recommended and improved access to shops by building a special bridge across the road and the *Métro* at Pont de Clichy. The area around the tunnel entrance was landscaped into a small park for local use. The engineers who carried out the work estimate that the environmental safeguards and improvements added about five per cent to the total cost of the *Métro* extension (349). The first train ran across the new viaduct and over the Seine in May 1980.

There were, therefore, two issues about quality; the quality of the transport service and the quality of the local environment. The RATP and the Government were prepared to compromise on environmental issues up to a certain level of cost, as were the local municipal politicians, and for them a new transport service was the highest priority. The local PCF's interest in the environmental issue was an opportunist alternative to their real concern which was to demonstrate the systematic bias against working people in urban planning and transport investment. The RATP retained absolute control of questions pertaining to transport. As their director made clear above - they were prepared to re-order their priorities within the *Métro* extension programme in order to ensure that the service it provided was a high speed alternative to rail and car users and distinctly different from

the tram service offered by the city centre *Métro* network.

5.6 : Transport users' participation in implementation

Although the issues are of a different order, there are some strong signs of continuity in the organisation and impact of transport consumers in the implementation of detailed projects. During the strategic policy changes users were predominantly organised on the initiative of the Communist Party and their impact was to create the climate in which professional innovation was attractive to the Government. Looking at developments in Clichy there are some basic similarities. The PCF was the mobilising force behind the main local committee, CATCC, and its leading local politician was the main spokesman for the campaign against the RATP's proposals. Other political groups, reluctant allies of the PCF, were drawn into the argument and had to negotiate publicly things they would have preferred to settle privately. It is in the role of these allies and of the professionals with whom they negotiated that the differences from the strategic campaign start to become apparent.

The Socialists, in this locality, occupied the controlling office of *Maire*, the most legitimate route by which to influence regional and national decisions. It was significant that it was M. Schmauss that went to lobby the RATP, not M. Levillain. The latter could have spoken for the whole commune rather than just for an aggrieved group of residents who had formed an ad hoc association. The fact that the *Maires* of competing communes gave their names to the *Métro* projects in those districts reveals the value of a

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

Maire with insider influence in Government circles when it comes to securing a modification in RATP strategy. The attacks on the RATP office and the trumpeting of complaints in the press were weaknesses not strengths. Despite their isolation from the inside circles of policy making the users' campaign in Clichy, locally rooted and gathered around a local politician did more to change the shape of the *Métro* extension programme than the federations of professional specialists who had accepted seats on the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens* or attended the academic conferences on the merits of automated signalling systems.

The users' campaign successfully challenged the RATP's legal right to proceed with the project and forced the RATP to clarify the issues which were the basis of its judgments about suitable extensions to suburbs and the price that it was reasonable to expect residents to pay for a *Métro*. The RATP also gave some ground to the most aggrieved residents who had their properties protected from the worst of the noise. No one can claim that the viaduct is not a blot on the Rue du Landy or that the new bridge improves the aspect of the Seine, but public action did get the plight of people neighbouring the route taken into account by the highest court in the land and some relief ordered from the highest level.

5.7 : Full circle for the *Ponts et Chaussées*

The role of the professionals in Clichy was more extensive than it had been in the strategic debate in the early seventies. They continued to advise the Minister; it was their rationalisations he offered in reply to M. Vivien, but they were there on the ground taking the brickbats from

protestors as well. There was a real building project at stake, not just a theoretical argument. This meant that a different kind of engineer was at the forefront of the business. In the early seventies the academic or researcher who could demonstrate through a defensible economic model that public transport investment was good value for money was the key actor. It was these intellectuals of the *Ponts et Chaussées* who secured the resource base which the *versement transports* guaranteed and who wrote the programmes which legitimised the new investment programmes.

The site engineers at Clichy were the people actually building the things. The theoretical foundations of the plan were of less interest than the commonsense of building two bridges at once and avoiding the trying hours of overtime and risk to staff involved in burrowing under the river. It might not have been the site engineer's place to go out and make peace with the local traders, but it was their equipment that was getting tampered with and their schedules which were falling behind with every occupation or sit down protest. Civil engineers seem unlikely practitioners of community politics, but their ability to tackle these local issues was the key to getting things done. It also had the effect of marginalising the theoretician so far as the concerned local resident or traveller was concerned. Local changes which preserved the value of a flat or the quality of a TV picture were more important than the relative claims of Clichy and Saint Cloud.

The *Ponts et Chaussées* had come full circle. By way of the *Schéma Directeur*, ministerial re-organisation, a new professional structure, radical planning and marxist economics they had arrived at community

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

politics in the inner city, just as they had practiced in deepest provincial France in the 1930s. They were working for a public company rather than a public service, and they were subject to a financial discipline the conservative engineer would not have recognised, but they were still the people who went out and got strategies converted into concrete and carried the local politicians, businessmen and other notables along with the process.

CHAPTER 6 : Building the central section of the Réseau Express Régional(RER)

The *Métro* extension programme brought new policy processes to the fore, drawing municipal politicians, citizens committees and middle management directly into major policy decisions. By contrast the RER remained a central Government preserve, dominated by the *Travaux Neufs* division of the RATP, its fate determined in the Elysee, away from the communities it might serve or damage. The RER was the flagship of the regional development proposals in the PADOG and the *Schéma Directeur*. Yet, without the central tunnels, it would be difficult to distinguish the RER from conventional rail systems seen in most large cities the world over. An analysis of how the central section of the first line came to be approved and constructed, and its impact on the communities which were directly affected will enable us to judge how the grander visions of urban renewal fared in the policy making systems emerging from the troubled years from 1968 to 1972.

6.1 : The case for a new regional transport infrastructure

The RER was not a revolutionary departure in transport policy. Its success had more to do with generating a myth than to do with any concrete development of the transport infrastructure. The myth is exemplified by the RATP's own account of the history of the RER:


" Its gestation has been very long, one can almost say it has lasted a century ... for, since the first consideration of railways as a way of radically improving Paris transport, around

1880, certain people have thought of a system bearing the characteristics of today's RER." (350)

The first major step towards establishing the reality of anything called a regional network, linking the RATP and SNCF, was taken in 1961 when the Government approved a proposal to construct a new wide gauge railway from Etoile to La Defense, and the improvement of an old SNCF line from Bastille to Vincennes. Both schemes were to be managed by the RATP. The projects were allocated special Government finance and made no call on the stretched revenue budgets of the RATP. Losing responsibility for an old and highly unreliable service was a bonus to the SNCF. This was a crucial decision and it is worth exploring the underlying causes for a move which created a new division of management responsibilities, a special financing arrangement, the first railway construction within the walls of Paris for over eighty years and most significant of all, launched a new concept of the future for Paris transport.

It was during the inter war years that leading planners like Jayot, Ruhlmann and Langevin established the intellectual credibility of a rail service conceived, constructed and organised outside the framework of the existing *Métro* and main line systems. The growth of the population and the ever increasing sprawl of urban areas remained the basic rationale for a new style of public transport service.


Figure 6.1 : Growth of population and urban area




| | 1921-46 | 1946-54 | 1954-62 | 1962-68 | 1968-75 |
|----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| in France (1) | 0.44 | 0.76 | 0.87 | 1.13 | 0.80 |
| in Ile-de-France (2) | 1.19 | 1.30 | 1.74 | 1.48 | 0.95 |
| (2) / (1) | 2.7 | 1.7 | 2 | 1.3 | 1.2 |

(1) - exponential

GROWTH OF THE URBANISED AREA



RELATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION AND OF THE BUILT-UP AREA FROM 1839 TO 1974



COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION AND OF THE URBANISED AREA GRAPHS (WHOLE BUILT UP AREA)



Indeed the population increased quickest relative to the rest of the country between 1921 and 1946 when large numbers of people migrated to the Paris area in search of work. The built up area expanded most rapidly in the same period; between 1919 and 1935 1800 hectares were built upon per year. The political will to grapple systematically with the demands of rapid urbanisation did not exist in the inter war years. However by the 1950s the inefficiency of uncontrolled development was recognised even though the rate of inward migration and urbanisation had eased off. Population densities and housing standards which had been acceptable hitherto were now regarded as intolerable and improvements to housing conditions and increases in population demanded relatively more space. The style and scale of industrial development also called for larger scale planning of urban and regional development. These factors persuaded the Government that it was essential to intervene directly in the development of the Paris region, especially in the field of housing.

The result was the designation by national ministries of a series of major schemes for which consortia of construction and finance companies were invited to tender. The schemes included 12,000 dwellings at Sarcelles, 3,600 dwellings at Bobigny, 9,900 dwelling at Créteil, 8,600 dwellings at Vitry and an incredible 25,400 dwellings at Aulnay-Sevran-Villepinte (351). The Government had accepted a leading role not simply in house construction but in creating new environments, new land uses and a new industry of huge scale urban development. Implicitly the Government had also accepted a leading role in planning and providing the infrastructure and support services which would turn these developments into practical and tolerable places to live.

The new Government led by Debre after the establishment of the Fifth Republic added major redevelopment schemes to the programme of construction in the Paris region. The largest single project was at La Defense where a special *Etablissement Public d'Aménagement de la Défense* (EPAD) was charged with constructing 1,650,000 square metres of offices, 16,200 dwellings and a new exhibition centre: the *Centre International d'Industries et Techniques* (CNIT) (352). This development placed both the RATP and the SNCF in a quandary, the solution to which brought the RER off the drawing board and into construction.

The nearest *Métro* line to the CNIT was the busiest, and the nearest suburban railway terminus at St. Lazare was the most crowded in the city and already over capacity. If population and traffic levels continued to grow at the pace they were growing in 1960 then neither the *Métro* or the Railway would be able to cope by 1965 (353). In fact, such a projection was highly improbable, given the density of development in the areas through which the existing routes passed, there was little scope for population increase. There were alternative solutions which would have been possible within the sphere of responsibility of one of the transport companies; the RATP could have doubled its *Métro* line no. 1, thus more than doubling capacity; alternatively the SNCF could have constructed a new suburban line to serve the CNIT. However the RATP was reluctant to take on the cost of a major investment while the SNCF did not wish to increase the burden of a suburban system which was already a managerial millstone for the necks of ambitious railway engineers (354).

Part 3 : Policy Implementation

The central Government had assumed a stronger position in regional planning bodies precisely to ensure that infrastructure kept pace with its schemes for new centres of international business and commerce, and to give Paris a new, modern image appropriate to a country emerging from the shadows of corruption, near civil war and colonial defeats. To promote these priorities the Government had created the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens* in 1959 to oversee transport strategy. In 1961 arrangements were being completed for a new *District de Paris* headed up by a high powered civil servant (355) which would give the President and Prime Minister leading roles in determining future policies and plans in the capital and surrounding *départements*. In this context the new route ceased to be unattractive to leading engineers in the RATP who saw the opportunity to develop a new prestige project, without prejudicing the activities of the company on its traditional services. Furthermore, working on a project with direct links to the planning commissions established by Delouvrier, and reporting to the inner cabinet of the President, offered a channel of influence to further their personal and professional ambitions.

From the outset the national/local alliance which promoted the RER was different from that promoting improvements to the *Méto*. The local supporters were large companies, the professional engineers and property developers on the outskirts of the built up area. The national supporters were those parts of the Government keenest to promote modern redevelopment of the city's business sector and to create an image of a revitalised country capable of leading the European Community. The *Méto*'s promoters were more traditional local politicians keen to reap benefits from bringing improved public services to their area, and consumers themselves who wanted

to escape the crowded, uncomfortable, unreliable service on which they now depended. For the national Government the *Métro* bought political peace, marginal gains in key suburban constituencies and polished the city's image for tourists and visitors.

Local reluctance to countenance the RER in the early 1960s flowed mainly from concern about the effect of such an expensive project on the already perilous finances of the RATP. This concern abated immediately the Government announced, in 1961, that special funding would be made available for the RER (356), and that the new route from Etoile to La Defense would be financed wholly by a special grant from the central Government. The Government also undertook to meet half the costs of upgrading the Bastille to Vincennes and the Defence to St. Germain en Laye route to RER standard. The other half of the cost was assumed by the *District* (357), and did not, therefore, impinge on the RATP's revenues. Indeed the RER would have a beneficial effect on the RATP's revenues because the system would operate a graduated fare structure (358). The flat rate fares in operation on the rest of the RATP's network were a major disincentive to extending the scope of the system. As the average length of journey increased the proportion of marginal cost met by the flat rate fare fell. The RER was a new product, and could, therefore, be sold in a new way. It is this dimension of the RER, as a diversification of the RATP's product range, which was, over the long term its most important impact.

To summarise the position reached by the mid 1960s: Essentially the central Government, through the autonomous *Travaux Neufs* (359) division of the RATP was engaged in a pilot scheme to assess the prospects of launching

a new wide gauge rail network under the management of the RATP. The bulk of the pilot scheme consisted of upgrading two old SNCF lines, which the SNCF had readily conceded control of in order to avoid the burden of carrying out necessary repairs themselves. The only new construction was a tunnel linking the main *Mé*tro exchange at Etoile to the new CNIT at La Defense. These initiatives had been embarked upon in a relatively unplanned fashion, to meet particular requirements for the CNIT and to improve access to labour markets for firms locating on the La Defense site. The name RER had been borrowed from previous plans and the allocation of management responsibility to the RATP was a pragmatic decision to smooth the path of a scheme mostly directed from the Elysee. The RER had evolved from being a traditional railway system, serving provincial travellers who needed to cross Paris, into a plan for how to serve suburban commuters into a pilot scheme to boost the prospects of a massive investment in offices to the west of Paris. The possibility that it might become a key element in the future shape of the region still hung in the balance.

6.2 : Spoke or spanner in the *Sché*ma Directeur?

The most important feature of the *Sché*ma Directeur was its attempt to restructure the Paris region around several new poles of development. These were the nine new towns planned in the outer suburbs. Their transport needs were to be met by *autoroute* class roads circling the city, and by RER rail routes linking them to one another across the city. This was the basic weakness of the *Sché*ma Directeur and the basic strength of the RER. By crossing the city the RER routes would make the new towns ideal residences for commuters, they would vastly expand the pool of labour available to

firms locating in the central districts served by the RER, at the same time, this would undermine the independence of the new towns; rather than becoming alternative attractions to the city centre, they would simply facilitate more intense city centre commercial development. The RER also enabled increased specialisation of land uses, contrary to the policies of the *Schéma Directeur* which sought to reduce segregation by planning integrated new towns (360).

The *Schéma Directeur* envisaged three routes crossing the city, one from east to west from Etoile to Nation (where the Bastille line terminated), one from Luxembourg to Gare du Nord and one from Invalides to Champs Elysée. Only a very small part of this work was underway - the tunnels from Etoile to Auber and from Vincennes to Nation. The rest of the development of the RER was the relaunch of old services under a new banner. Most of the planned RER network could be mixed and matched out of the old SNCF suburban services in this way and this would create a new-look service for the airports and new towns. This would leave the *Métro* to cope with the cross town travellers, and necessitate changes in mode to travel from a town like Torcy to La Defense. However, the central sections, as well as making the RER distinctive, would also make it fabulously expensive. This did not concern the planners who drafted the *Schéma Directeur* which was replete with fabulously expensive schemes for which no funding had yet been identified. It began to concern the Government and the engineers working on the pilot sections in the late 1960s. By then the new work was largely complete, and the new services were ready to open. Two questions had to be answered in the late 1960s: what kind of service was being launched - the first phase in a grand plan or a one off improvement to a lucky few; and secondly, what

provision in its future funding and management arrangements should the RATP make for possible future work on the RER?

Simultaneously the overall *Schéma Directeur* itself was under review. The demographic rationale for a radical re-organisation of the city and its suburbs was undermined by the 1968 census which showed a slower than anticipated rate of population growth (361). Combined with the caution engendered by the political upheavals of 1968 the new data curbed the ambitions of the region's planners. The nine new towns were cut to just five and one of the north - south RER routes was abandoned in the revised *Schéma Directeur* of 1969. The RER was clearly vulnerable to these kinds of shifts in ambitions, for it was the centrepiece of a plan which was now threatened by political caution, a growing cultural conservatism and by resource constraints. In this context several strands of opposition to the RER began to gain influence in central Government circles.

The Minister of Transport, M. Raymond Mondon, favoured *Métro* extensions, particularly to facilities like airports which he argued should be linked to the widest possible number of destinations in the city so that they would serve all users rather than give special treatment to business customers wanting to travel swiftly to a few destinations (362). *Métro* extensions were cheaper, could be constructed more quickly, did not involve extensive building work in the centre of Paris and would offer political advantages in the suburbs in the municipal elections in 1973. Several provincial *Maires* including M. Defferre in Marseilles and M. Pradel in Lyon argued that to devote such a large proportion of infrastructure development funds and effort to central Paris ran counter to the regional development

policies of the Government and that it was more important to develop provincial business by backing proposals for *Metro* systems in several major cities including Marseilles and Lyon, but also in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing and Grenoble. Leading participants in the national debate were sensitive to these regional viewpoints. The Prime Minister, M. Chaban Delmas, was also *Maire* of Bordeaux and the Regional Prefect, M. Doublet, had been Prefect in Grenoble during the city's redevelopment and preparation for the 1968 Winter Olympic Games (363).

The Minister of Finance and the management of the RATP were sceptical as to the affordability of future RER development. No-one really knew what it would cost to bore a tunnel deep under the centre of Paris, and engineers had nightmares about the potential pitfalls of the enterprise. The RATP certainly did not wish to embark on the venture without some guarantee of protection against the possible increase in costs. The central section of the RER was a prestige national project for which the local transport company and local population should not have to carry the can. The Ministry of Finance was unhappy with the suggestion that it should write a blank cheque for the RATP's engineers to go ahead with a risky idea. Their experience with other high technology projects like the Concorde aeroplane was an unhappy one. The sections of the RER which had so far been completed had come in a three and a half times the original budget (364).

The road lobby was also concerned about the impact of the RER on road construction in Paris. First of all it was actually easier to construct an RER service to the new towns than to build new roads because the railways were already there waiting to be modernised in many instances. They

presented no problems of planning permission, design, parking and so. Secondly railways were quieter, cleaner and safer than roads and would receive less opposition from the communes through which they would run. Thirdly if commuting could take place mainly on the RER then the case for arterial roads into the centre of Paris would be significantly reduced. Fourthly, at a more general level, the road lobby did not wish to lose the ownership of the top prestige projects in the city. The greatest marvel of civil engineering in Paris in 1969 was the *Boulevard Périphérique*, especially the tunnel being constructed under the Bois de Boulogne. If the RER outstripped this in technical wizardry, then the rival system would have gained academic and public attention and the probability of new funds being approved for road building would be correspondingly reduced.

There were then two fundamental decisions to be made in 1969: whether to continue pursuing the RER at all and secondly if so what sections to construct first.

6.3 : Did Paris really need an RER system?

The issue of priorities was at the heart of implementing the *Schéma Directeur* - the process of creating a new regional structure was quite different from painting a picture of the desired end product. Most of the forces and resources which would create a new regional market, new towns and new employment opportunities were outside the direct control of the planning and development agencies. It was particularly important for them to make appropriate interventions in the areas which were directly managed by public sector agencies. There was only a limited capital resource to allocate in

the period of the sixth plan, and the state needed to be relatively confident that the preferred investments would not lead to crippling revenue costs in the long run.

In October 1969 the Prime Minister appointed a special ad hoc commission to advise him on priorities for transport infrastructure development in the Paris region. This was charged with looking at priorities on the basis of four possible financial scenarios: continuing expenditure at the fifth plan level of eleven billion francs; uprating the fifth plan expenditure to current prices making a total of fourteen billion francs; increasing expenditure to sixteen billion francs and finally increasing expenditure to nineteen billion francs. All of these options necessitated deferring at least one of the major transport schemes until the seventh plan. The four candidates for deferral were the central section of the RER, the extension of the *Ligne de Sceaux* to Chatelet to make a link with the RER system, the extension of *Métro* No. 5 to Orly Airport and the construction of the first phase of the A86/7 outer ring road.

The commission included representatives of all the major ministries concerned: Interior, Finance, Transport and *Equipement* and was convened by the Regional Prefect. It was the first group to look at the full consequences of transport investments which included the Ministry of Finance (365). The commission was not empowered to question existing allocations of resources committed in advance during the fifth plan. This meant that the completion of the *Boulevard Périphérique* was protected from scrutiny. The commission's recommendation reflected the strength of the RER as a cornerstone of regional planning. The Commission recommended that

within any given level of resources the central section of the RER should have highest priority and the A86/7 outer ring road the lowest priority. They placed equal the *Métro* extension and the *Ligne de Sceaux*. The central section of the RER was assured favour because it was judged essential to the success of the new towns. This is a perverse outcome since of all the projects on offer the central section of the RER did most to re-inforce the tendencies to segregation and regional imbalance which the *Schéma Directeur* sought to correct.

The likelihood of the new towns developing independent economies was further weakened by the decision to place the roads which would have insulated them from pressure to serve the city centre at the bottom of the list. This conclusion was not made public knowledge but became a basis for the planning commissions of the sixth plan and the *Plan Global* of 1972. The transport users' campaign of 1970 worked on the assumption that the RER was not a fixed priority and that the Government might seek economies by not proceeding with the scheme, or by forcing the users to finance it through increased fares.

The RER was a central part of the *Cartel*'s campaign. They regarded the project as crucial to relieving overcrowding on the main commuter routes and as indicative of the priority the Government attached to public transport in its future plans. Where the *Cartel* clashed with the Government over fares and revenue support to the RATP, its concern on capital projects, especially the central section of the RER tended to re-inforce adopted policy. The PCF regarded the RER as the central plank of its programme for improving the Paris region and it published ever more grandiose plans for regional rail

systems. Significantly the *Cartel's* largest demonstration in November 1970 followed the projected route of the central section of the RER from Les Halles to Opera, and one of the organisers, M. Jean Gajer, laid a foundation stone at Les Halles for the new service. The *Cartel's* most significant members, the alternative engineering profession and the commuters whose places of work were moving to new locations in the west of the city saw the RER as the long run answer to regional transport problems. The users' campaigns were in no doubt that the region needed an RER, they did differ to a degree about relative priorities of sections of the RER.

6.4 : Where to start building the RER

If the new towns were the overwhelming justification for constructing the RER at all (366) then they could not be advanced as a justification for the central section. The majority of the settlements served by the east and west routes were very old towns, and the new towns to which the route would extend were in their infancy. The principal justification for starting with the central section was nothing to do with the outer suburbs; it was to do with the very heart of old Paris - Les Halles. Right from the start of the Fifth Republic it had been the Government's intention to do something about the area around the old Halles wholesale markets on the right bank just west of the Marais. They were surrounded by dense, dirty streets, the centre of the Paris underworld, jammed with traffic by day and crime by night. Retailing no longer demanded the city centre site which the existing markets occupied, and changes in the rest of Paris made Les Halles an attractive area for redevelopment. In 1963 the *District* had put forward a plan for the reconstruction of the whole sector north of Place du Chatelet

as far as Gare du Nord and Gare de l'Est (367). However, architectural and public opposition to the destruction of so many old and admired streets, the sole survivors of the Haussmann reconstruction of the 1860s, persuaded the *District* to withdraw the scheme. The issue remained on the agenda however, and became more pressing after new wholesale markets were opened at Rungis in the southern suburbs in 1969.

The vacant, cavernous archways of the old market halls, surrounded by steadily depopulating *quartiers* falling into dereliction drew attention to the waste of so valuable a city centre site. Some national ministries' eyes turned longingly to the site for their pet schemes. The Ministry of Finance sought permission to plan a new HQ on the site enabling them to vacate the wing of the Louvre they occupied. The *Ville de Paris* increased the pressure to make a decision by permitting some of the market pavillions to be demolished. The Regional Prefect mounted an exhibition of six outline ideas, none of which met with much approval (368). Finally in 1970 the City Council asked its own Urban Planning Workshop to propose a model for the future use of Les Halles. The workshop proposed a mixture of uses including a large shopping centre, a national centre for art and culture, some new housing and an office complex with space earmarked for the Ministry of Finance. This was published in 1970 and approved by the Council of Ministers considering the sixth plan in October of that year (369). The scheme was one of the largest and certainly the most valuable redevelopment proposals in France but its significance was wider still:

"Of all the renewal operations carried out in France it is among the most important. not only because of its extent and cost, but above all because of its location: to restructure the centre of Paris is obviously going to change the way of life of its inhabitants dramatically and, more profoundly, it will reorganise

directly the conditions in which the whole urban area functions and develops. It affects the national and international role of the capital city" (370)

The most significant aspect of the plan in regional development terms was that the RER was an integral part of it. In the outline plans a new RER station and interchange was quite literally the foundation of the new buildings. The activities located on the Les Halles site would be linked directly to major residential centres, to the Gare du Nord, Gare de Lyon and Gare Montparnasse, to the major airports and to La Défense by a high speed underground rail system. They would be at the hub of the city's local, national and international transport systems.

The effect of this decision was felt at two levels. First the RER became part of a much bigger project for Parisians and for the international business community. A major new development in the very centre of one of the world's top ten trading centres was of international economic significance. The central section of the RER wasn't about making life more comfortable for marginal voters in the Val de Marne; it was about getting a stake in a part of Paris that promised future prosperity and prestige. Secondly it took control of the future of Les Halles and of the RER away from the *Ville de Paris* and the engineers at the RATP. If the two schemes were bound together then their management would need co-ordinating as well. The RER was the deepest part of a major underground construction project, but the RATP could only build it if the rest of the plan was agreed. This meant that the initial phases of the Les Halles project were carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport.

It is not clear how it would improve the lives of residents of the new towns or the old towns who had been promised new rail services to put Les Halles at the top of the priority list. Those with local in the suburbs faced two major difficulties in making a case for a different order of priorities. Firstly the main umbrella groups of transport users wholeheartedly supported the RER and especially the central section, as did all the opposition parties. The central section was what made the RER different - distinguishing it from conventional railway systems and from the *Métro*. Its identity rested on this project - so none of its supporters would question the vast sums being expended tunnelling under the Seine and the centre of Paris. The second problem was that many of the areas which would benefit most from extensions to the suburban network of the RATP were new communities which had no real political identity and in some cases did not even have established political structures. In Clichy, the local council was a crucial channel for local people's concerns. In Noisel and Torcy, the organisations managing the new towns were *Etablissements Publiques* whose directors were accountable to the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing. Most of the day to day work was undertaken by the private consortia who managed the ZACs. It was these consortia who provided the only route for pressure on the Government to allocate funds, and their interests were clearly less legitimate politically than the *Maires* and Councillors who spoke for other causes. Only rarely did they make public statements, it is testimony to the crucial role the RER played in their calculations that in September 1970, as the priorities for the sixth plan were being set, the *Union des Constructeurs pour l'Aménagement du secteur de Noisel* said:

"If the decision to commit funds to the eastern branch of the RER to Fontenay sous Bois and Noisy le Grand could not come within the ambit of the sixth plan. The consequences could be disastrous for

the commencement of the new town of Marne la Vallee" (371)

The speakers for the central section had more weight. In the same month the *Conseil Administratif* of the *District* sent a deputation led by Pierre Bas, a *Deputé* for Paris, to impress on the President of the Republic the importance they collectively attached to the central section of the RER.

After the meeting M. Bas had this to say:

"Within Paris, we have told the President that we attach absolute priority to the central section of the RER between Auber and Nation with an intermediate station at Les Halles. We have also pointed out how useful a link between St. Lazare and Invalides would be." (372)

6.5 : Who paid for the RER?

The initial phases of RER construction were paid for entirely by the national Government, and thus drew on loan sanctions which might have been used anywhere in France. The cost of the debt incurred was met by the central Government. These were special funding arrangements for a public transport service. Normally public transport investment was partly a local responsibility and local charges began to be built into subsequent sections of the system. At first these local charges only fell onto the *District* and they remained really just a way of laundering central Government funds, for the *District* borrowed its capital on special terms from the central Government. However, the long run revenue costs of the second phase, which were fifty per cent funded by the *District*, ultimately fell onto the budgets of the *départements* which contributed to the *District's* budget.

The outer suburban lines which were the third phase of the RER after the central sections placed a direct financial burden on the passengers, for

the RATP had to find forty per cent of the cost of building them, and repay that, if it borrowed, through income from fares or from the *versements transports*. Through the *District's* thirty per cent contribution to financing these developments the Government was also reducing the burden both to itself and to the SNCF. If the lines had remained the responsibility of the SNCF then the cost of modernising them would have been borne by the Government and SNCF passengers through the national capital programme of the railway system. So while the central prestige sections of the RER enjoyed special financial regimes which protected local people and passengers from the full consequences of such expensive investments, the outer suburbs ended up paying more for their new services than would have been the case had the RER, and its management structure, not been in place.

6.6 : The distribution of new travel opportunities

There is little unambiguous evidence of the changes which resulted from the construction of the RER. The Paris Urban Workshop (APUR) did carry out a survey of the effects of the Auber RER station on the major stores in the Quartier de l'Opéra in 1971 which showed considerable passenger satisfaction with the service and a general belief among passengers and traders that the RER had improved prospects for the quartier and the big stores. Twenty four per cent of those who had travelled to the area to shop said that the RER had made it easier for them to do so, thirty one per cent of them said they would now travel to the quartier more frequently. The main advantages of the new line were cited, in order of importance, as: savings in time; improvements in reliability and improvements in comfort. Loyalty to the RER was highest for shopping and work, and fell for other purposes as customers

said they found cars preferable. Most RER customers had previously used the *Métro*. Of those surveyed sixty per cent had previously used the *Métro* for their journey, fifteen per cent an SNCF train, nine per cent the bus, seven per cent a car and one per cent a taxi. Of people who had come to shop fifty five per cent had previously used the *Métro*, twenty six per cent trains, nineteen per cent cars, seven per cent buses and two per cent taxis.

A parallel survey of shopkeepers and traders showed that fifty six per cent thought that the RER was an advantage to trade, eleven per cent thought it a disadvantage and thirty three per cent were indifferent. While the stores clearly felt the RER to be an advantage and had acted to secure good access to it when the station had been built, there is no direct evidence of them intervening to promote its construction. The main case for the Auber link seems to have been based on the need to provide good transport links from the city business district to the new sites at La Défense. The results of the APUR survey should be treated with some caution, one of the days they chose for their field interviews was the occasion of a national day of action by the two largest trade union confederations which would have affected workplaces in the district and the travel patterns of many transport users. Nevertheless the broad conclusions that many consumers and traders benefited, and that the RER was a popular alternative to the *Métro* and cars seem very reasonable.

A study commissioned by the IAURP in 1971 set out to assess the effects of the RER line from Nation to Boissy St. Leger (373). A sample of people in the communes around the new stations was polled, and a selected group interviewed to discover what impact the new service had had on their

travelling behaviour, and what they thought about the RER. Overall the poll showed a very high level of satisfaction with the new service. Eighty five per cent of those asked thought the new line was an improvement and only three per cent said it was definitely worse than the old SNCF service. Over sixty per cent said that the main factor which had improved was either the time journeys took, or the comfort of the trains. People were less happy with the transport links to the new stations, the choice of Nation as the new terminus in Paris and the higher graduated fares. In addition many people said they did not care for the automated ticket machines. Only thirty per cent mentioned cost as a factor which had improved.

Most users perceived employees to be the main beneficiaries of the new line, only a very small number of people identified students, local residents or pensioners as getting greatest benefit from the RER. The distance people lived from the new stations made no significant difference to their perception of the service. The most satisfied new users were in fact the public transport captives, women and non-working men who had no access to cars. Crucially about ten per cent of customers had previously travelled by car. It would seem, therefore, that the new service could make substantial differences to car use on specified routes and promote greater transport opportunities and satisfaction for disadvantaged groups.

In land use planning terms, and in strategic development terms, the effect of the RER on property values was obviously fundamental. Changes in property values are the basic signals to developers and landowners and increases in house prices and rents confer major benefits on property owners. The 1971 IAURP study tried to examine these signals by looking at

the volume of new construction in the communes along the new line, at land prices and rents and by polling people to discover whether the RER had affected their decision about where to live, when to move and how much to pay. The report of the survey accepted that:

"Altogether, such a study will remain descriptive ... we have preferred to offer, as a first step, a wide picture of the phenomena rather than to analyse in more detail the behaviour of particular urban actors, notably developers" (374)

The study looked at three aspects of development activity: construction of dwelling, location of firms and installation of public facilities. The research suggested that the RER had had little impact on major infrastructure decisions or indeed most very large investments, these had been planned over a longer period and were part of broader schemes which would not have taken the rail service into account. In addition the change in basic infrastructure resulting from the RER was minimal (unless one assumed that the still speculative central section would be built). In contrast the new service had had a significant impact on the construction of dwellings. In the area as a whole over eight thousand new dwellings were under construction and research among property developers and estate agents suggested that the RER made housing in the communes along the line more attractive to purchasers. To assess this effect in more detail the survey divided the twenty eight communes concerned into five sub sets: those with a good RER service, those with a poor RER service, those with a good *Métro* or SNCF service, those with a poor *Métro* or SNCF service and remote communes with little public transport. In the communes with a good RER service construction rates were substantially higher than elsewhere.

Prices rose steeply throughout the whole region in 1969-72. In the

twenty eight communes surveyed in the IAURP survey prices rose by an average of fifteen to twenty five per cent, and rents by an average of sixty per cent. Prices rose quickest in areas of new development and greater availability of land. In the densely developed communes close to the city land doubled in price in the three years, whereas in the outer rural communes served by the new rail route prices increased up to fivefold.

On average fifteen per cent of residents had moved into the area since the opening of the line and the poll concluded that since 1965, when the new route was approved, the prospect of an RER service had influenced people's decisions to move to the area. Fifteen per cent of people who moved in in 1965 cited it as a significant reason and twenty five per cent of those who moved in in 1969. An intriguing point is whether it was the opening of the new line in 1969 which made the difference or the increasing confidence among developers that the central section would be constructed. Is it the actual service which influences people's property purchase, or the hope of making a significant capital gain by buying in advance of a development which will significantly increase the desirability of their property? The IAURP study sheds no light on this question, though it suggests that those who bought in 1965 did indeed stand to make substantial gains as the new line neared completion and opened. Two years after opening price rises were back in line with the rest of the region. Overall there was, apparently, a powerful incentive for constructors and potential purchasers of housing to follow the RER routes under construction when making decisions about investment opportunities. The incentives to firms seem weaker, and the impact on public sector investment is minimal.

These factors underline the argument against proceeding with the eastern branch of the RER as the first phase of the project, for they increase the incentive to the market to further skew the pattern of development in the region along a single axis, the effect the *Schéma Directeur* expressly set out to counter. The IAURP study itself concludes:

"If the principle of constructing the RER is not in question, the preceding analysis shows that the choice of the eastern route to Boissy St. Leger as the first stage corresponded more to an historical inheritance than to a clearly determined planning option. ... It is regrettable that the idea of building an RER, the only real solution to the transport problems of the Paris region, has had to be mortgaged in this way by the choice of the first line to become a reality" (375)

CHAPTER 7 : The Dynamics of Policy Change

At the beginning of this study two modes of explaining policy changes were distinguished: accounts based on external imperatives and explanations founded on an analysis of the internal working of the state. State centred explanations were favoured on the grounds that external accounts failed to offer an adequate analysis of the means by which structural pressures were transmitted into purposive policy changes. This is not to deny the significance of external pressures on policy making in Paris in the period 1968 - 1976. As we have seen inexorable increases in population, economic activity and demand for land continued to tax the ingenuity of planners and politicians, and international events such as the commodity price boom in the early 1970s and the oil crisis of 1973/4 radically altered the parameters of regional development policy. The late 1960s and early 1970s also saw manifest social conflict around urban policy and living conditions involving the alienated residents of the new *grands ensembles* and, more significant, the new class of property owners who saw wholesale redevelopment of their neighbourhoods as a threat to the valuable environment of older quarters in the city centre. Transport infrastructure, and the costs of travelling, became one focal point of protest against the architectural and urban design fashions of the 1960s, and against a social order which increased the segregation of work, leisure and consumption, breaking up established communities and ways of life and creating new patterns of daily existence with high social and economic costs.

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

An air of crisis, partly a reprise of the events of May 1968, partly a sense of the failure of previous thinking about city development permeated political and professional thinking in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Violence on the *Métro*, citizens' campaigns and large demonstrations by hitherto restrained commuters underlined the dissatisfaction of ordinary people with the status quo. The professionals on the inside of policy development had their own dissatisfactions with past practice, with the way they were organised and managed, with the relationships between planners and the people who operated the transport systems; most of all with the resources at their disposal. Politicians found transport policy a worthy cause for concern and, according to their standpoint, saw possibilities for gaining or losing power in the solutions adopted.

There can be no doubt that the principal participants in policy development in the early 1970s perceived powerful external pressures of both an ecological and a social character. Figure 7.1 summarises the pressures perceived at a structural level, and suggests their progression into pressures operating in a political sphere or a professional/bureaucratic sphere. Nonetheless the evidence for such a progression remains contextual and nothing this account of the development of Paris Transport overcomes the objections to external explanations which ruled them out before. The essential functionality of such accounts whether they are based on an a priori structural logic or a consequentialist line of argument prevents them from offering demonstrable intentioned causes of the major policy changes for explanation is sought. The pluralist and policy network modes of explanation developed in the introduction are clearly more promising.




FIGURE 1
ORIGINS OF POLICY CHANGE

Figure 7.1 :

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

7.1 : Pluralist Explanations

The ease with which the state accomplished a substantial volte face on transport priorities and funding lends credence to the pluralist argument that the state itself is a neutral agent of the social and political competition in wider society. The complexity of the decision making process, and the large number of actors involved also suggests a comparatively open and permeable system in which any single interest would find it difficult to maintain continuous dominance. The underlying optimism of the pluralist approach is also vindicated by the political system's capacity to adapt to significant social and economic challenges and establish a fairer, more efficient distribution of transport opportunities, acceptable to most of the social interests involved.

In the 'weathervane' variant of pluralism, the state's neutrality is characterised as a faithful representation of the balance of social and political resources deployed by competing interests in society (376). During the late 1960s and early 1970s advocates of alternative policies promoting public transport and redistributing the burden of costs away from consumers mobilised direct public protests, a particularly potent intervention in policy making in the aftermath of 1968, and more so in this case because it was supported by traditionally conservative elements in the population. Rational argument also played a strong part in the campaign for change, and many politicians and public officials were persuaded of the impossibility of a road based transport plan. They doubted whether it was necessary in terms of demand for private travel; they feared it was not financially viable and

they were also anxious about its environmental impact. Of course, votes were a primary political resource, and it is evident that transport issues were part of a gamut of questions about local autonomy and conditions of urban life around which all the major parties in the 1971 municipal elections framed their programmes⁽³⁷⁷⁾. In the 1973 legislative elections the left re-emerged as a significant force in French politics and did so from its municipal bastions on a programme centred around the quality of life in cities⁽³⁷⁸⁾. Supporters of the proposed road based investments, and fare increases to raise revenue on a more commercial basis for public transport, also articulated doubts about the viability of continuing with the programme at the pace, and with the single-mindedness advocated in the earlier *Schémas Directeurs* and 5th Plan⁽³⁷⁹⁾. Local business interests, especially retailers, advocated some balance or trimming of the road programme, and had an interest in a less divisive means of funding public transport.

By the late 1960s the defenders of the road lobby and advocates of a more commercial approach to public transport had shifted from their earlier evangelism for the saviour of private motoring to a defensive posture emphasising the consequences of adopting alternative policies. These focussed on the possible impact on the motor industry, and the dangers of establishing a precedent by building alternative public transport infrastructures buttressed by subsidised fares. The Society of Motor Manufacturers⁽³⁸⁰⁾, was almost a lone voice advocating continued redevelopment of city centres to provide improved road networks, while engineers emphasised the probable expense of establishing comparable public transport systems to say, the RER, in provincial cities which had

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

outstanding claims for government support, notably Marsailles, Lille and Lyon - two of which had municipal councils lead by opposition parties (381). Political support for the road lobby was concentrated among a few high offices, most importantly road construction had the sympathies of President Pompidou. It is probable that without his personal endorsement fewer road schemes would have been included in the sixth plan than ultimately were. With Pompidou's demise, and the election of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, coinciding with the oil crisis of 1973/4, support for road building waned dramatically. Giscard cancelled several controversial projects soon after taking office, and by 1977 even erstwhile Pompidou loyalists like Jacques Chirac were seeking political advantage by cancelling road schemes in the City of Paris.

While the policies of the *Schéma Directeur* reflected the underlying dominance of urban policy by business and property development interests, allied to arguments about the necessity of establishing a competitive position in the international economy, the effects of these policies in the transport sector had created a strong countervailing influence of public protest, environmental concern and demands for social equity which pushed the balance strongly in favour of public transport based solutions and created the climate in which the state could reasonably extract additional resources from business to fund them.

The 'equalizing' variant of the pluralist argument places much more emphasis on the state responding to political resources claiming redress from economic injustices (382). As the studies carried out by the IAURP (383) demonstrate, the policies adopted in 1970-72, even the construction of

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

the RER, had a directly redistributive effect, reducing the financial burden on poorer consumers and increasing travel opportunities most for those groups which had previously been most 'captive' of inefficient public transport, or of expensive and inefficient car travel. The users' campaigns argued explicitly that employers made substantial gains from the existence of a public transport infrastructure while the costs of its inadequacy were bourn by employees who were asked to pay more for losing their leisure time. The simple fact of redistribution, crucial though it was to the policy change, does not suggest that an 'equalizing' state must inevitably adopt a public transport based solution. The Society of Motor Manufacturers, and the engineering and research consultancies promoting new roads, saw major opportunities to extend travel opportunities through cheaper cars, more roads and reduced taxation on fuel. As was evident when considering the interests of local businesspeople, it is not clear that adopting public transport based solutions was entirely an 'equalizing' intervention. Indeed it can be argued that the primary gain in terms of social efficiency was to businesses, for the *Versement Transports* provided a simple and effective way of pooling resources for beneficial collective action, at no administrative cost to the firms.

It is common to both these variants of a pluralist account that 'anticipated reactions' are of great importance. At no point did voters reject candidates explicitly because of their views on transport policy. Social order was never threatened during the demonstrations and direct action on the transport network. Most of the time the transport system worked tolerably safely and speedily, given the previous standards. The great fear was that these norms would cease to hold under the pressure of

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

increasing economic and structural changes in society, or because citizens' tolerance of the status quo could become exhausted. In the arguments put forward by consumers' groups, trade unions, businesspeople the emphasis was on what would happen if policy problems were acted upon in good time. However, neither the 'weathervane' nor the 'equalizing' variant of the pluralist explanation incorporates the energetic participation of professionals and bureaucrats in decision making on transport issues.

The importance of events like the *Colloque de Tours* in shaping policy options and developing a consensus among managers, professionals and politicians, suggests strongly the 'broker' variant of the pluralist model. Many of the most outspoken criticisms of the previous policy, and of the organisation of transport in the city came from employees of the state. The Regional Prefect, M. Doublet, played a central role in articulating the issues facing the state, and as a broker in preparing the Plan Global, which laid the foundations for future policy. In addition the role, and organisation, of the main professional bodies changed significantly over the period as a direct result of competition for political influence, and in response to models of management which politicians sought, unsuccessfully, to import into public service. Doublet's own description of the fierce battles within the bureaucracy over transport policy and management (384) suggests that brokerage was far from neutral and that the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*, the Prefects, and the Ministry of Finance, to name only three, had substantial direct interests in the outcomes of policy debates. As the focus shifted from strategic planning to operational management new groups of state employees, or contractors, came into the frame, and new rivalries within and between professions emerged. The greater part of policy

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

development was internal to the state and its agents. Wider social conflicts chiefly established a context which provided advocates of differing options evidence with which to support their case. The issue in determining the applicability of a pluralist account based on 'broker' model is the relative weight of external social and political pressures as against the influence of changes in professional thinking and the balance of power among competing professional and bureaucratic interests (see Figure 7.1 above). Such an account would have to show that social and political argument in society, through public campaigns, articulated business and employee interests and / or arguments advanced by political parties was the origin of demands for policy change, which then proceeded towards an outcome which had greater support in wider society and was acceptable to the major interests within the state.

The difficulty with this approach is twofold. First the issue is overdetermined. The causes identifiable are more than commensurate with the outcome of a radical shift in transport policy and funding, for a whole gamut of external pressures was acting on a unstable and divided constellation of policy makers: There was widespread social discontent, and fierce internal debate, plus tendencies to 'equalizing' intervention by a politically cautious Government and a general 'cultural' shift away from the ideology which underpinned policies up till 1968. Secondly how does one, empirically, distinguish between societal pressures and internal brokerage. One possibility is to follow a model of democratic elitism in which competing elites struggle for influence in a wider social and political context and circulate according to their ability to sustain political confidence. However, while there was competition about influence, the policy

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

making system in Paris in the late 1960s was closed and secretive, an intra-elite process which excluded political representatives and normal political discourse. The dilemma of characterising interventions within a closed elite system is neatly characterised by the fate of the Chamant's transport plans in 1970 (385). The character of an intervention in a policy argument is determined by more than the status of the group or individuals who advance it; the audience it is addressed to and the means by which it is communicated are of equal importance. When Chamant leaked his 6th Plan proposals to the Press in 1970 before they were rejected by the relevant Cabinet Committee was he seeking to influence their decision? Or was he dissenting from a decision with which he disagreed? Or was he simply mistaken about the probable outcome? Each possibility suggests a different audience and a different kind of intervention. The first would clearly be an internal intervention within the state's decision making, the second part of a wider social debate to establish that alternative options were available and the third an attempt to gain political credit for an outcome which he saw as popular. Even if it were unambiguous that Chamant was engaged in a wider social debate, his intervention might still impact more on deliberations which were internal to the state. Empirically, the fine divisions between political and bureaucratic activity are not easily identifiable, and would be impossible to maintain rigorously in an account of a policy change. This is particularly true in the case of Paris transport where forums and processes which consciously blurred such distinctions were the crucial agents of policy development such as the Planning Commissions for the Plan, the Committees of the CCES and the ad hoc *Colloques*.


7.2 : State Centred Explanations

A chronological account of policy development in the Paris Region between 1968 and 1976 can be established using the framework of the inter-governmental relations model and policy networks approaches described in the introduction. Two phases, and an intervening period of uncertainty and system change are summarised in Figure 7.2. The evolution of policy making is best characterised as a shift from a professionalised policy network towards a mixed model displaying the main features of an intergovernmental relations network. However, it is necessary to distinguish between sub-issues, within the overall field of transport policy, to build a full picture of the policy making system which emerged from the uncertainty of the early 1970s.

The *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* built up a professional policy network in the 1960s which ensured their domination of transport policy making. This domination is clearly evident in positional terms; three quarters of the senior posts in transport and civil engineering were held by members of the *Corps*, so too were all the senior technical, and a high proportion of the non-technical posts in the Ministry of *Equipement*. In the Paris region, the main planning agencies advising the Regional Prefect and the central government were staffed by the more energetic, visionary modernists of the *Corps*. Thoenig (386) has charted the skill and tenacity with which the *Corps* leadership adapted their organisation and professional approach to ensure their survival in the new circumstances of large scale urban redevelopment. He explains their success, and the pre-eminent influence on transport policy in terms of their ability to manage rivalries with other professional

FIGURE 2 - PHASES OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Figure 7.2 :



Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

groups and to secure their own position within a turbulent political environment. None of these factors suggest strongly a professionalised policy network, they point rather to a policy community in which a broader constellation of interests including Prefects, other professions, Ministers, local politicians and transport managers interacted in such a way as to vest particular positional authority in members of the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*. Sfez (387) argues that this was indeed the case in the mid 1960s when crucial decisions about the RER were being made.

The basis for a professionalised policy community is the ideological dominance which the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*, and its associated institutions, especially the *Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées* exercised over transport policy in the late 1960s. The conspiracy which Thoenig condemns in his study is not a manipulation of offices but of ideas. As such, it was much more volatile and vulnerable. Rhodes (388) argues that the truly professionalised policy network is independent of other networks, and that resource allocators and politicians are dependent on their advice for rationales for activity or change. Supporting this view he cites particular examples from medicine and architecture (389). Policy in these fields is especially influenced by professional fashions, for example for high rise buildings or hi-tech medicine.

Transport policy in Paris was equally a victim of professional fashion for large scale road building and the unachievable monumentalism of the *Schéma Directeur*. The debate about the relative priority of roads and public transport was enclosed within a small group of professionals who drew their reference points from other cities across the atlantic, from abstract

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

mathematical models and from a vision of Paris shared by few of its inhabitants. The effective policy network included several key political offices, notably those of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, but was essentially politically unaccountable. Recommendations on regional development and transport policy went before the *Conseil Administrative du District de la Région Parisienne* which was an artificial gathering of local notables with only tenuous claims to political representativeness (390). More representative local politicians, for example Maires of suburban communes, took no systematic part in policy formulation and could only be involved through personal or political favours. Consumer interests and trade unions took no part in the institutions which were permitted to endorse regional development plans.

The professionalised network had very broad ambitions, it concerns spread, as the *Corps'* always had, well beyond the confines of transport policy. Efforts to incorporate large areas of public policy from construction, to airports, to water supply, to architectural design, within a single framework also contributed to vulnerability and enhanced the professional rivalries with other groups who had similar ambitions. The Prefecture had some formal legitimate claim to a co-ordinating role in policy development and implementation and were naturally threatened by the networks built up by the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*. A commitment to a consistent and generalist approach to public administration was also at the centre of the world view of the growing group of graduates of the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* who held high offices in public service.

While the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* had successfully defended its

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

members positional authority within the network, it was unable to cope with the diminishing credibility among other groups, and its own ranks, of the fashion for road based massive redevelopment. This internal ideological doubt was compounded by the financial crisis afflicting public transport in the Paris Region. The fiscal regime under which the transport companies operated was strongly influenced by the ideological changes which were taking place within the public finance policy networks, and within key state offices charged with building a partnership between private industry and the state. This partnership called for a more businesslike approach from managers of public sector enterprises, and a reduction of the level of subsidy offered to public services. The efforts by the Ministry of Finance supported by leading members of the Prime Minister's personal cabinet, as well as influential figures outside the Government, to place the RATP and SNCF on a firmer financial footing invaded the policy space of the transport policy network. By 1969 there was a significant risk of the professional policy community being bypassed in crucial investment and financial decisions. The risk that this posed to the professional dominance of the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* was underlined by the decisions to increase fares and the creation of an ad hoc team to advise the Prime Minister on major investment priorities in the 6th Plan. Resolving the tension between public transport and road building solutions would require additional resources, and the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* saw that access to conventional forms of state funding would involve compromises over control of future policy making.

The instability of the policy community was increased by external protest from the users' campaigns in 1970. They introduced a political

dimension to policy formulation which had previously been conspicuously absent. In this context the closed professionalised policy community became unsustainable as a vehicle for devising alternative policies which could secure politically defensible transport plans. These circumstances lead both the Government and the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées* to countenance exceptional arrangements in order to preserve political and professional credibility.

The structural pressures acting on the region were re-interpreted through a series of revisions to the *Schéma Directeur* and the scale of transport developments within it. In particular the demographic forecasts were revised downward, and the projected levels of car ownership were reduced. Political aspects of the issues around transport priorities and funding services were opened up to wider debate involving users' organisations and local politicians. The Regional Prefect assumed a broker role, producing a variety of statements of the issues facing the region, and pulling together recommended solutions drawn from several competing planning agencies. Suggested solutions were strongly influenced by swift and dramatic changes in professional thinking and public opinion. Events like the *Colloque de Tours* provided an open forum in which a much wider constellation of interests formed a transitory policy community expressly to develop a consensus about new directions in policy.

The *versement transports* was the foundation for the less professionalised policy network which assumed the mantle of implementing the solutions advocated at the *Colloque* or detailed in the *Plan Global*. The *versement* provided earmarked funding for public transport investment and

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

therefore overcame the competition for resources between roads and public transport which had made the professional policy network so vulnerable to bypassing on financial issues. The revenue from the new tax insulated a new policy network from external threats and permitted a greater degree of political accountability than had been achievable in the 1960s. By 1973 a new policy network was fully established with a smaller specialist remit to manage the development and operation of public transport in the Paris region, leaving aside the broader questions of regional development and structural change. The network was still lead by the *Corps des Ponts et Chaussées*, but by the more local operational engineers whose focus was on policy implementation. At project level, as Metro extensions were built and railway improvements were planned local politicians provided a close link with users' interests and local user committees. Absolved of carrying Pompidou's grand strategy the professionals were able to be more responsive and sensitive to consumer interests. The key differences between the policy networks operating in each phase are summarised in figure 3.

Within the new policy network the precise constellation of interests, and the importance of the resources which they contributed clearly varied from project to project. There is a case to be made that each specific development generated its own special arrangements. It is not necessary to take the argument this far. The two cases examined in this thesis show a useful distinction between two areas of policy: strategic developments of national importance on the one hand and local transport systems on the other. As Chapter 6 described, national strategic developments like the RER system appear largely unaffected by the changes which took place in the between 1969 and 1972. In fact, the priority ascribed to the central section

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

of the RER was one of the first examples of ad hoc political bypassing of the professionalised policy community which dominated phase 1 of policy making. After that however, implementation of the project was dominated by professional interests because of the highly specialist skills required to complete a feat of innovative engineering, and because many of the organisations most concerned with the new railway were either very new or not politically represented. While the RER served a very wide area, the number of professional groups with a major interest in its implementation was small and the scope for affecting the course of the development was very limited by the recognised expertise of the group undertaking its construction. The RER was a response to external economic imperatives for better national transport links, better access for labour to new sites and adequate infrastructure for major new developments in the suburbs and the city centre. It was fundamentally a central initiative which engendered its own closed, professionalised policy community - so secretive that it did not interact even with sympathetic users groups or politicians.

In contrast the *Méto* extensions, described in Chapter 5 above, progressed through a series of local political decisions of an almost pluralist character, in which leading professionals negotiated directly with a wide range of articulated local interests and sought to achieve an optimum result within the bounds of the centrally determined resources. Local political arguments allowed scope for influence over implementation, and the detail of operation in that immediate neighbourhood; broader strategic matters concerning resource allocations, fares, network priorities were not negotiable. The process was politically grounded; municipal politicians were the key players, and provided the channel through which consumer interests

FIGURE 3 - POLICY DILEMMAS AND NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS

Origin of Policy Choice

Policy Dilemma

Network Characteristics

Meeting economic and demographic pressures on the region, especially new business interests.

Coping with increased segregation of work, leisure and consumption.

Opportunities for technical innovation.

Priorities among competing regional restructuring programmes.

Costs and securing sufficient new resources.

Distribution of benefits

Links with other issues in other networks.

Closed

Specific to issue

Professionalised

Secretive

Dependent on central initiative

Local political expectations

Technical/planning system innovations.

Environmental protection.

Rationing central resources between competing localities.

Negotiating tactics and judging political resources

Extent of environmental impact

Protecting established resource commitments.

Open

Political

Operational and managerial in style

Local

Figure 7.3 :

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

and neighbourhood issues could be raised with the RATP and SNCF. In the case of the extension of *Métro 13bis*, local political expectations and professional innovations in planning combined to produce taxing issues about relative priorities and good design which were resolved by a network of non-central politicians and notables and non-central professionals to mutual advantage in their relationship with central rule makers. The outcome is evidence of a new professional expertise in brokerage around rationing issues and public participation in implementing new projects.

7.3 : Dynamics of Policy Networks

The policy networks models used in this thesis, like those analysed by Rhodes (391) are limited by being static through time. Each type of network is derived from analysis of a particular policy field in a particular period. An underlying theme is that policy networks, of various types, are self-perpetuating; for example the constellation of interests involved in health policy planning remains restricted by the professional dominance of doctors. Changes in policy usually follow from some evolution within the network, or the balance of interests within them. In a predominantly professional network like health policy making in Britain, the change agent will typically be ideological since the existing professional and political relationships are very stable. The staticity of the individual networks focusses attention on categorising them, since useful predictions and policy analysis will require an accurate typology of policy fields and their associated policy networks.

The case of policy change in Paris transport suggests that networks can

Conclusion : Dynamics of Policy Change

be shortlived, serving explicit short run purposes and it is, therefore, important to track the shifting character of a policy network through time. In a comparatively short period (8 years), the style of policy making altered dramatically, and all of the elements of a policy network were transformed. The constellation of interests changed, becoming more focussed on specific projects, admitting local political and consumer interests and excluding planning strategists from outside the public transport field. Within this group, local politicians and operational managers assumed a far higher profile. The network became more 'vertically dependent', that is its members developed a closer reliance on one another for achieving their objectives, and simultaneously 'horizontal independence' increased as the policy field became more insulated from financial pressures. Resources within the network were not merely redistributed but redefined, as new tax revenues provided a secure basis for investment and local political accountability altered the balance of power in project implementation. The example of Paris transport policy indicates that it is clearly possible for policy networks to undergo rapid changes and that in professionalised policy fields exceptional arrangements which broaden access and increase political accountability are likely to be the vehicles for swift changes in ideology and policy.

One intriguing possibility is that policy networks themselves interact with the origins of policy choices (see Figures 7.1 and 7.3 above) and there may be, over the longer run, a life cycle of policy networks by which professional competition and non-central politics renew themselves. The exploration of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of a focussed study such as this but could contribute much to a broader theory of policy change.

Notes

1. Explanations based on spatial analyses fall within the broad school of Human Geography. Writers who have applied Human Geography explicitly to urban form and urban planning include **Harvey D.** (1969) *Explanation in Geography*, London: Edward Arnold, **J.H. Johnson** (1972) *Urban Geograpy*, London:, **Adler R., Adams J.S. and Gould P.R.**(1971) *Spatial Organisation*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. A short general survey of Urban Geography is offered by **Johnston R.J.**(1980) *City and Society*, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Powerful critiques of this approach are offered by **Castells M.**(1977) *The Urban Question*, London: Edward Arnold, **Harvey D.**(1973) *Social Justice and the City*, London: Edward Arnold, **Gregory D.**(1978) *Ideology, Science and Human Geography*, London: Hutchinson and **Pahl R.E.**(1970) *Patterns of Urban Life*, London: Longman and (1975) *Whose City?*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
2. Central place theory originates from a seminal text by **Christhaller W.**(1966) *Central Places in Southern Germany*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. For a general exposition of industrial location and city systems see **Smith D.M.**(1971) *Industrial Location*, New York: Wiley and **Bourne L.S. and Simmons J.W.**(1978) *Systems of Cities*, New York: OUP.
3. See for example **Vance J. E.**(1970) *The Merchants World, the Geography of Wholesaleing*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, or **Berry B.J.L.**(1967) *The Geography of Market Centres and Retail Distribution*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
4. **Park R.E., Burgess E.W. and McKenzie R.D.**(1925) *The City*, Chicago: is the founding text of urban ecology and the basis of the Chicago School of Human Ecology. Also of great significance is **Wirth L.**(1938) *Urbanism as a Way of Life*, American Journal of Sociology 44.
5. **Hawley A.**(1950) *Human Ecology*, New York: Ronald Press.
6. The work of Talcott Parsons is the foundation of functional sociology see for example **Parsons T.** (1951) *The Social System*, New York: Free Press.
7. For a critical analysis of Urban Planning practice see **Stretton H.** (1978) *Urban Planning*, London: OUP and **Kirk. G.** (1980) *Urban Planning in Capitalist Society*, London: Croom Helm.
8. See the *Schéma Directeur* and numerous supporting studies published in the *Cahiers de l'Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne*, IAURP, Paris, 1965. 1969 and quarterly.
9. For a general description of the French planning system and the concept of *concertation* see **Cohen S.** (1969) *Modern Capitalist Planning: the French Model*, Cambridge, Mass.
10. **Maurice Doublet** was Prefect of the Seine and subsequently Prefect of the Paris Region between 1965 and 1974. His experiences and opinions of the government of the Region in the period are set out in his book (1977) *Paris en Procès*, Paris: Hachette.

Footnotes

11. **Maurice Doublet** - *Conference aux "Ambassadeurs"*, April 1970
12. **Maurice Doublet** (1977)
13. **President Pompidou** quoted in **Napoleon and Ziv** (1981) *Les Transports Urbains - un enjeu pour les villes*, Paris: Dunod p.50
14. **Commissariat General du Plan** (1970) *Les villes et la Société Urbaine*, Paris.
15. **Commissariat General du Plan** - *Les Villes et La Société Urbaine* , 1970 p. 21 quoted in **Castells M.**(1977) p. 84.
16. See for example official publications such as **Albert M.** (1973) *Paris, Ville Internationale*, Paris: Documentation Francaise, and accounts of regional planning. Good, concise summaries are offered by **Cormona M.**(1975) *Les Plans d'Aménagement de la Région Parisienne*, Acta Geographica 23, Paris and **Aulduy J-P** (1979) *L'Aménagement de la Region de Paris entre 1930 et 1975*, Sociologie du Travail no. 2, Paris.
17. The most succinct summary of the data on the economic development of the region is in *Cahiers de l'IAURP No. 56/57* which draws together background data for the revision of the Regional Plans in the late 1970s.
18. **Gajer J.**(1980) *Le RER*, Paris: Universite de Paris, Maitrise.
19. see **Burgess et al.** (1925)
20. **Gajer J.** (1980) p.346
21. The most significant contributions to this school of thought are all French in origin. By far the most important is **Castells M.**(1971) *La Question Urbaine*, Paris: Maspero. Another trend in Marxist thought is represented by the work of **Henri Lefebvre** see for example (1968) *Le Droit à la Ville*, Paris: Anthropos, or (1974) *La Production de l'Espace*, Paris: Anthropos. Among many, often frustrating, efforts to apply the work of Castells and Lefebvre in an empirical study much the most useful are **Castells M et al** (1976) *Monopolville*, Paris: Mouton, and the work of **Jean Lojkine** in particular (1973) *La Politique Urbaine dans la Région Parisienne*, Paris: Mouton. One of the more curious aspects of French marxist urbanism is its successful colonisation of official research into urban problems in the country, hence a substantial body of marxist thought is published under the auspices of the *Action Thématique Programmé - Socio-Economie des transports*. The most interesting works in this programme were **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) *Crise des Transports, Politique d'Etat et Mouvements d'Usagers*, Paris: DGRST and **Ribeill G. and May N.** (1976) *Rapports sociaux dans les Transports Urbains et Mouvements Revendicatifs Transports*, Paris, Prospective et Aménagement.
22. **Park R.** (1925), **Hawley A.** (1950) and **Wirth L.** (1938)

Footnotes

23. There are many works which seek to develop Castells' theories or which criticise the fundamental theoretical inconsistency of his approach see for example **Saunders P.**(1982) *Social Theory and the Urban Question*, London: Hutchinson and (1979) *Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation*, London: Hutchinson, **Gregory D.** (1978), **Harloe M.** (1977) *Captive Cities*, London: John Wiley, **Pickvance C.** (1976) *Urban Sociology*, London: Tavistock and **Lowe S.** (1986) *Urban Social Movements: The City after Castells* (London: Macmillan)
24. For example see **Godard F.** (1972) *La Rénovation Urbaine en Région Parisienne* Paris: Mouton, **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) and (1979) *Les Nouveaux Embarras de Paris* Paris: Maspero, **Biarez S.** (1969) and **Lojkine J.** (1973).
25. Castells' and other draw heavily on the work of **Nicos Poulantzas**, see for example (1968) *Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales dans l'Etat Capitaliste*, Paris: Maspero.
26. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 55
27. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p.231
28. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 240
29. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 267
30. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 268
31. For a broad account of the transformation of French social, economic and political life in the 1970s see **Ardagh J.** (1977) *The New France*, London: Pelican.
32. *L'Express*, Paris, 15/07/72.
33. see **Dunleavy P. and O'Leary B.** (1987), *Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy* London:Macmillan, Chapter 2.
34. **Dunleavy P. and O'Leary B.** (1987) p. 43
35. **Dunleavy P. and O'Leary B.** (1987) p. 44
36. **Dunleavy P. and O'Leary B.** (1987) p. 47
37. In a British context much of this work runs alongside attempts to develop radical urban sociology. The most comprehensive summary is **Rhodes R.A.W.** (1988) *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall*, London: Unwin and Hyman. Other major contribution include **Saunders P.** (1979) and (1982), **Dunleavy P.** (1980) *Urban Political Analysis*, London: Macmillan, (1981) *The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain, 1945 - 75*, Oxford: OUP., *The Limits to Local Government* in **Boddy M. and Fudge C.**(1984) *Local Socialism?*, London: Macmillan and (1981) *Professions and Policy Change: notes towards a model of ideological corporatism*, Public Administration Bulletin No. 36. In France the most important contributions to this field of study are **Crozier M.** (1965) *La Phénomène Bureaucratique*, Paris: Seuil and (1970) *La Société*

Footnotes

- Bloquée*, Paris: Seuil, **Grémion P.** (1976) *Le Pouvoir Périphérique*, Paris: Seuil, **Thoenig J-C** (1973) *L'Ere des Technocrates*, Paris: Editions d'Organisations and (1983) *Sociologie de l'Administration Française*, Paris: A. Colin.
38. see especially **Nordlinger E.** (1981) *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*, Cambridge, Mass.
39. see for example **Beer S.H.** (1978) *Federalism, Nationalism and democracy in America*, American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, **Anderson W.** (1960) *Intergovernmental Relations in Review*, Minnesota, and **Wright D.S.** (1974) *intergovernmental relations: an analytical review*, The Annals, November 1974.
40. The most direct parallels are in the work of **Crozier M.** (1963), (1965), (1970) and (1974), **Grémion P.** (1976) and **Thoenig J-C.** (1973)
41. see for example *Ad...* **Ettienne M.** (1975) *Le Statut de Paris*, Paris: Berger Levrault.
42. see **Dunleavy P.**(1984) in **Boddy M. and Fudge C.** (1984).
43. See **Cornu M.** (1975) *Paris et le Pouvoir*, in *Espaces et Societes* no. 13 - 14, Paris, for a description of the extent of interference with representative democracy. The issues raised are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
44. See **Rhodes R.A.W.** (1988) for a very useful typology of Policy Networks from which the categories in this introduction are drawn.
45. **Rhodes R.A.W.** (1988)
46. **Rhodes R.A.W.** (1988) draws catholically on a vast range of studies of policy making, political systems, professional practice and administrative theory - his primary database is the ESRC database on central-local relations.
47. In these specific areas see for example **Dunleavy P.** *Quasi Governmental Sector professionalism: some implications for policy making in Britain*, in **Barker A.** (1982) *Quangos in Britain*, London, **Ham C.** (1981) *Policy making in the National Health Service*, London and (1985) *Health Policy in Britain*, London, **Webb A., Wistow G. and Hardy B.** (1986) *Structuring Local Policy Environments: Central Local Realties in Health and Personal Social Services*, London: ESRC.
48. **Sfez L.** (1972) *Quelques Décisions en Matière de transport; le RER*, Paris, AFCET, (1978) *Portrait d'une Décision, le RER*, Projet, Paris and (1973) *Critique de la Décision*, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques.
49. **Gajer J.** (1980).
50. see for example **Franc R.**(1975) *Le Scandale de Paris*, Paris.

Footnotes

51. It was widely believed that fares policy was determined by the Ministry of Finance, and capital allocations were certainly subject to a Ministry of Finance veto - see **Doublet M.** (1977).
52. see **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) for an account of environmental protest groups in the Paris Region.
53. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.**(1977).
54. **Ribeill G. and May N.** (1976)
55. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977)
56. **Suanders P.** (1979) and (1982).
57. See **Clegg T.**(1982) *Social consumption, Social investment and the dual state: the case of transport policy in the Paris region*, Paper to the annual conference of the PSA, University of Kent, and **Dunleavy P.** (1984).
58. see **Doublet M.** (1977) and **Hugonnard J-C and Roy B.**(1978) *Le Plan d'extension du Métro en banlieue Parisienne - un cas type d'application de l'analyse multicritère*, Paris: RATP)
59. see **Rhodes R.A.W.** (1988).
60. See **Evanson N.** (1979) *Paris - A Century of Change*, New Haven: **M. Poëte** (1931) *Une vie de cité : Paris de sa naissance à nos jours*, Paris: and **Napoelon C. and Ziv J-C.** (1981) p. 11
61. see **Braudel F. and Labrousse E.** (Eds) (1976) *Histoire Economique et Sociale de la France*, Paris: and **Lavedan P.** (1960) *Histoire de Paris*, Paris: PUF.
62. See **J-C Thoenig** (1973).
63. See **Dagnaud M.** (1979) *La Transformation des Institutions de Paris et sa Région entre 1958 et 1977*, Paris: Sociologie du Travail no. 2, **Doublet M.** (1977), **Franc M. and Leclerc J-P** (1977) *Les Institutions de la Région Parisienne - au District à l'Île de France*, Paris: Nouvelle Administration
64. The *Réseau Express Régional* is the newest transport system, a regional rail system extending to new towns to the north south east and west of the city and links the international airports to the newer business and cultural centres in the Beaubourg district. The bridge over the Seine provided the same kind of structure to the transport network in the seventeenth century as the present day tunnel offers.
65. The bus routes were scrutinised by the palace and granted a royal decree permitting their operation on certain conditions. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) *The Autumn of Central Paris - The Defeat of Town Planning 1850 -1970*, London: Edward Arnold, Chap. 1.

Footnotes

66. The buses were persistently overcrowded and there was much resentment at extending the ability to move between fashionable districts quickly - see **Evanson N.** (1979).
67. Most of the trams, and after them the Metro lines, follow the routes of the *grands boulevards* constructed by Hausmann.
68. The most significant redevelopment took place on the Ile de la Cite and in the Quartier de l'Opera - for a full analysis of this project see **Sutcliffe A.**(1970) p. 44 - 57
69. It is a popular view that the main reason for constructing the streets was to make it easier for the militia to move around the city and much harder for the people to construct barricades. It is undeniable that building a barricade across the Avenue de l'Opera would be a major problem for a revolutionary mob, but simpler economic motives make a far stronger case for redevelopment. See **Girard L.** (1952) *La Politique des Travaux Publics du Second Empire*, Paris
70. As the century has progressed more and more employment has been sited in the west. Public interventions have accentuated this trend. See the *Schema Directeur*, IAURP, 1965, the *Cahiers de l'IAURP* and **Lojkine J** (1973). The issues are succinctly summarised in *Cahiers de l'IAURIF* no. 56/7 Dec. 1979.
71. The central food markets for the whole city, located in the north east of the old city centre
72. The former royal quarter of the city, before the royal family moved to the Louvre, became a bourgeois residential district but then fell into decay with increasing housing density and large numbers of poor immigrants. It remains the main jewish quarter in the city.
73. The public monopoly was first granted to the firm for thirty years in 1855 and was extended to fifty years in 1860. The company operated buses and a few tram routes, its main concern was with the city centre horse drawn omnibus trade - see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 81 and **Merlin P.**(1967) *Les Transport Parisiens*, Paris: Masson.
74. There were two major exhibitions to display the products of french industry, commerce and imperialism in the late nineteenth century - one in 1889 and one in 1900 both held in Paris. See **Carter E. et al** (1976) *Enterprise and Entrepreneurs in Nineteenth Century France*, London:.
75. The best examples are the Eiffel Tower and the Grand Palais.
76. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 83
77. Each of the major stations in the city was the base for a network of provincial and international services and for the company which operated them. Railway companies were extremely powerful in nineteenth century France, holding the key to prosperity for many communities and industries. See **Girard L.** (1932).

Footnotes

78. see **Sutcliffe A.**(1981) *The Planned City*, London: Edward Arnold for a concise account of the post Haussmann developments in French urban planning and the pressures on the city of Paris. Also **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 85
79. See **RATP** (1981) *Le Métro*, Paris: RATP, **Merlin P.** (1967) and **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 85.
80. see **Merlin P.** (1967) and **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 155.
81. see **Merlin P.** (1967)
82. Parliament approved a law in 1918 which required all local authorities to draw and monitor land use plans for their area. In 1922 the Courts ruled that any such plans were advisory and that the right to approve plans remained with the Prefecture. See **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p.222 and 1981 and **Henri Derryke P.**(1979) *Economie et Planification Urbaine*, Paris: PUF,
83. see **Cottureau A.** (1970) *Le Début de la Planification urbaine dans l'agglomération Parisienne: le mouvement municipal Parisien*, Paris, *Sociologie du Travail* no. 4 p. 367 and (1969) *L'Apparition de l'urbanisme comme action collective, l'agglomération Parisienne au debut de siecle*, Paris, *Sociologie du Travail* no. 4 p. 360.
84. Many large companies in heavy manufacturing were in the process of divesting their responsibilities in Company services. See **Sutcliffe A.** (1970).
85. See **Cottureau A.** (1969) and (1970) p. 367
86. see **Cottureau A.** (1969) and (1970) p. 374 - 381.
87. see **Gajer J.**(1980). p. 110 - 132.
88. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) and **Napoleon C. and Ziv J-C** (1981) p. 12 - 16.
89. see **Lojkine J.** (1973).
90. see *Cahiers de l'IAURIF* no. 56/7 Dec. 1979 p. 121
91. see **Merlin P.**(1982) *Les Transports à Paris et en Ile de France*, Paris: Documentation Francaise, p. 108 - 109 and **Cherki e. and Mehl D.** (1977) p. 28.
92. The effects of this on the mythical suburban town of *Aubergenville* are graphically described by Bridgitte Gros (1970) in her polemical book *Quatre Heures de Transports par Jour*, Paris: Revue Politique et Parlementaire.
93. The driving force behind the scheme seems to have been the physicist Pascal - see **Evanson N.** (1979) and **Napoleon C. and Ziv J-C.** (1981) p. 11-12
94. See for example **White P.**(1980) *Planning for Public Transport*, London: Hutchinson, p. 111 - 115

Footnotes

95. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 80 and (1981).
96. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 80 and (1981)
97. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 81
98. see **Cottureau A.** (1969) p. 385
99. see **Cottureau A.** (1969) p. 359
100. see **Cottureau A.** (1969) p. 358
101. see **Cottureau A.** (1969) p.359 - 363
102. see **Cottureau A.** (1970) p. 377 and **Gajer J.** (1980) p. 92 - 108
103. see **Merlin P.** (1967) and **Sutcliffe A.** (1970)
104. see **Cohen S.** (1969) *Modern Capitalist Planning - The French Model*, Cambridge, Mass.
105. **Thoenig J-C.** (1973) p. 21 - p. 33 and p. 53 - 57
106. The STP superseded the ORTP in 1959 - see **Orselli J.** (1975) *Transports Individuels et Collectifs*, Paris
107. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973)
108. The ministry sent several engineers on a study visit to London in 1869 which reported very favourably on the Metropolitan Line - for further information see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 84 - 86 and **Gajer J.** (1980) p. 38 and p. 96 - 98
109. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 58
110. Promotion within the profession and within the companies was integrally linked, but the most important professional positions were held by Road Engineers and Railway Engineers. See **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 25
111. Although the *Corps* had been sceptical about the value of the *Métro* it was not likely to permit transport management to fall into the control of another group. See **Napoloen C. and Ziv J-C.** (1981) p. 6 and **Gajer J.** (1980) p. 159 - 163
112. see **Gajer J.** (1980) p. 147 - 158
113. see **Gajer J.** (1980) p. 169 - 172
114. **Gajer J.** (1980) p. 148
115. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 53 - 57

Footnotes

116. Among these were major towns which opposed Parisian projects like the Metro and the RER; for example Lille, Lyon and Marsailles.
117. **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 55
118. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 57
119. **Napoleon C. and Ziv J-C** (1981) p. 19
120. Many of the most influential figures in post war France are graduates of ENA - for example among contemporary politicians Jacques Chirac, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Michel Rocard all attended the School. For a detailed study of ENA and its influence see **Birnbaum P.** (1977) *Les Sommets de L'Etat* Paris, Editions du Seuil.
121. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 62 - 66 and Interview with **P. Josse** in *Le Figaro* 24/10/71
122. see *Cahiers de l'IAURIF* no. 56/7 Dec. 1979 p. 12 - 15
123. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 67 - 70
124. A third tier rank in the profession below *Ingenieur en Chef* and *Ingenieur Superieur*.
125. The Debre Government created the *District* and its supporting staff and in 1967 the *Loi d'Orientation Fonciere* completely revised the town planning system. See **Lojkine J.** (1973)
126. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 81
127. see **Cottereau A.** (1969) p. 344
128. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) and **Girard L.** (1932)
129. see **Cottereau A.** (1969) p.355 and (1970) p. 365
130. see **Howard E.**(1902) *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, London:.
131. For further data on the growth of the Paris Region see *Cahiers de l'IAURIF* no. 56/7 Dec. 1979. p. 82 - 97
132. see **Cottereau A.** (1970) p. 374- 381, **Gajer J.** (1980) p. 72 - 132 and **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 216 - 219
133. See *Cahiers de l'IAURIF* no. 56/7 1979 p. 31
134. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 222 - 227
135. Prost was appointed head of Planning for the *Département* of the Seine in 1934 and pulled together the many strands of work commissioned by the Ad Hoc Presidential Commission. See **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 222 and **Gajer J.** (1980) p. 124

Footnotes

136. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 224 - 225
137. see **Napoleon C. and Ziv J-C** (1981) p. 15
138. these are known as *Syndicats à Vocations Multiples(SIVOMs)* - many Communes in France are extremely small and can only deliver services economically in co-operation with their neighbours.
139. see **Dagnaud M.** (1977)
140. see **Sutcliffe A.** (1970) p. 110
141. see *Cahiers de l'IAURIF* no. 56/7 Dec. 1979. p. 46 - 51
142. see **J.P. Aulduy** (1979) *L'Aménagement de la Région de Paris entre 1930 et 1975: de la Planification à la Politique Urbaine*, Paris: Sociologie du Travail p. 167 - 171 and **Napoleon C. and Ziv J-C** (1981)
143. Ministry of Housing and Development 1956
144. The new housing programme was launched in 1958 by Pierre Sudreau and led to the construction of the *Grands Ensembles* see **Topalev C.** (1976) *La Politique Foncière en France*, Paris: Mouton.
145. see **Dagnaud M.** (1977) and **Aulduy M.** (1979) p. 173 - 183
146. see **Franc M. and Leclerc J-P** (1977) and **Dagnaud M.** (1977)
147. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 125 - 137
148. **Cornu M.** *Paris et le Pouvoir* in *Espaces et Sociétés* 1974-5 shows that in 1962 the *Département de la Seine* was represented on the *Conseil Administrative* of the *District de Paris* by 11 right wing councillors and 5 left wing councillors all nominated by central government ministries. In the previous elections to the *Conseil General de la Seine* the 5 left wing councillors had secured 1,658,000 votes and the 11 right wing councillors only 1,583,000.
149. The Regional Reform would come into effect in 1972, creating new administrative regions for the whole of France except the Paris Basin.
150. *Le Monde* 23/02/70
151. see *Cahiers de l'IAURIF* no. 56/7 Dec. 1979 and earlier editions of the *Schema Directeur*. The issues raised are discussed in **Aulduy M.** (1979)
152. *Le Figaro* 10/04/70
153. **Orselli J.** (1975)
154. *Le Figaro* 10/04/70

Footnotes

155. An interdepartmental commission responsible for recommending the allocation of capital funds earmarked for developments approved in the National Plan
156. The *Colloque de Tours* was an extremely significant conference in the development of transport policy, attended by most of the leading policy makers and officials. At the conference several key speakers outlined new approaches to urban transport policy and local administration which came to form the basis of a new system in the mid 1970s.
157. *Livre Vert - Equipement, Logement, Transport* - April 1970 p. 30. Paris.
158. *Livre Vert*, (1970) p.32
159. This shift was confirmed in interviews with **M. Doublet** and **C. Poulenat**
160. see *Bulletin Interministériel pour la RCB*, 1970, Paris.
161. *Bulletin Interministériel pour la RCB* 1970
162. Most importantly they had handed control of the RER programme to a specialist division in the RATP
163. Interview with **C. Poulenat**
164. see *Révue générale des Chemins de Fer* Sept. 1976 - Special issue on developments in Paris suburban railways.
165. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 107 - 136
166. see **Aulduy M.** (1979) p. 181 - 187
167. President Georges Pompidou quoted in **Napoleon and Ziv** (1981).
168. **Johnson R.W.** (1980) *The Long March of the French Left*, London: Macmillan p. 64
169. see *Livre Vert*,(1970), **Aulduy M.** (1979) and **Barbier M.** in *Cahiers de l'IAURP* no. 25 1971.
170. **Raymond Mondon**, Minister of Transport quoted in *Livre Vert* (1970) p. 8
171. *Livre Vert*, (1970) p.4.
172. *Livre Vert*, (1970) p.5
173. *Livre Vert*, (1970) p.15
174. *Livre Vert*, (1970) p.17
175. *Livre Vert*, (1970) p.18
176. *Livre Vert*, (1970) p.141

Footnotes

177. For a more detailed description of the Planning system and its application in Paris see **Documentation Francaise** (1971) *Le Sixième Plan* Paris: Documentataion Francaise and **Franc M. and Leclerc J-P** (1977)
178. see *Paris Projet*, (1969)
179. *Proposition du Commission du CCES* report to the *Conseil Administratif du District de la Région Parisienne*, 1970
180. *Propositions du Commission du CCES* - report to the *Conseil Administratif du District de la Région Parisienne*, 1970
181. *Conseil Administratif du District* Feb 1970 - confirmed in interviews with **M. Doublet**.
182. Letter from **M. Y. Aubin** to **M. M. Frybourg**, March 1970 - archived at the *Institut d'Urbanisme, Université de Paris XII*
183. The name given to a set of suburban communes in Paris which had been run by Communist Councils since the 1930s. They were part of the mythology of the french left and provided valuable moral and financial support to the national Communist party.
184. *Livre Vert*, (1970) p.4
185. This was widely voiced in the Press especially in commentaries by **R. Franc** in *L'Express* and was further re-inforced in interviews with **M. Doublet**, **T. Brehier**, **J-C Hugonnard** and **J. Gajer**.
186. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) and (1979)
187. *Le Monde* 09/03/71
188. *Le Monde* 09/03/71
189. *Le Monde* 09/03/71
190. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 37 - 40
191. *Le Monde* 09/03/71
192. **Georges Marchais** in *Le Monde* 09/03/71
193. see *Le Monde Dossier sur les Municipales* 1971 and **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979)
194. *Le Monde Dossier sur les Municipales* 1971
195. **Chalandon** was managing director of INNO S.A.
196. *Le Monde* 12/05/70
197. *Le Monde* 12/05/87

Footnotes

198. **Chalandon** appointed **M. Marcel Blanc** as his new *Chef du Cabinet* - *Le Monde* 12/05/70
199. *Le Monde* 12/05/70
200. Interview with **M. Doublet** confirmed that he regarded the *Ponts et Chaussées* as major rivals in this policy field and felt comparatively weak against them. He also makes this point in *Paris en Procès* (1976)
201. see **Thoenig J-C** (1973) p. 68
202. see interview with **Paul Josse** in *Le Figaro*, (1970)
203. *L'Express* 14/09/70
204. *L'Express* 14/09/70
205. **Paul Josse**, quoted in *Le Figaro* 24/10/71
206. *Cahiers de l'IAURP* no. 25 1971
207. **RATP** (1981) *Le Metro*, Paris: RATP.
208. see **Merlin P.** (1982) p. 155 - 162 and *Cahiers de l'IAURP* no. 25 1971
209. A report on the future of nationalised industries commissioned in 1968 by General de Gaulle from **M. Simon Nora** an *Inspecteur des Finances*, discussed in **Ardagh J.** (1977) p. 90
210. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 14 - 15
211. The impact of the transport users movement is discussed in great detail in **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) and in **Ribiell G. and May N.** (1976) *Rapports Sociaux dans les Mouvements Revendicatifs Transports*, Paris: Prospective et Aménagement.
212. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 19 and 1981 and *Nouvel Observateur* November 1970
213. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) and (1979) and interview with **J. Gajer**
214. *Plan d'Urgence* (1970), **PCF** (prepared by **Henri Fizbin**).
215. **Confederation Generale du Travail** (1971) *Un Programme de USRP-CGT pour l'Amélioration des Transports et de la Circulation en Région Parisienne*, Paris: CGT Paris District
216. *Plan d'Urgence* (1970), **PCF**
217. *Nouvel Observateur* November 1970
218. Interview with **J. Gajer**

Footnotes

219. **Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail** (1971) *Les Transports Parisiens - Vers l'Impasse*, Paris: CFDT.
220. Socialist Party Programme 1972 quoted in section 2 of **Ribeill G. and May N.** (1976).
221. **Ministère de l'Équipement** (1971) *Dossier des Transports de la Région Parisienne*, Paris:.
222. **Alain Griotteray** quoted in *Combat* 15/09/70.
223. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p.68 - 69
224. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 37 - 38 and interview with **J. Gajer**
225. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 38 - 41
226. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 39 and interview with **M. Doublet**
227. see **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) p. 127 - 129
228. see **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) p. 129
229. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 39
230. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) and (1979) p. 44 and interview with **J. Gajer**
231. *Nouvel Observateur*, November 1970
232. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 23
233. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) and (1979) p. 67 - 83
234. **B. Gros** (1971) *Lettre Ouverte au President de la République*, Paris: Revue Politique et Parlementaire
235. **Rebeill G. and May N.** (1976)
236. Researchers at the IAURP reported regularly on technological developments in Paris Transport through a supplement of their *Cahier* called *Transports Nouvelles*, great hopes were invested in innovations like magnetic levitation of trains and computerised driverless train systems. One of the less far fetched ideas was a hover train to the new town of Cergy Pontoise.
237. *Propositions pour un plan global de transport - Prefecture de la Région Parisienne*, 15/01/72
238. *Propositions pour un plan global de transports*, (1972)
239. *Propositions pour un plan global de transports*, (1972)
240. **Doublet M.** (1977) p. 171 - 177

Footnotes

241. *L'Express* 15/07/72
242. FCUTCRP (1970) *Livre Noir des Transports Parisiens*, Paris: FCUTCRP 1970 and Gajer J. (1980) p. 285
243. Gajer J. (1980) p. 285 - 287
244. Cherki E. and Mehl D. (1979) p. 58 - 65
245. A plan for the development of nationalised industries commissioned from M. Simon Nora, an *Inspecteurs des Finances*, by President de Gaulle in 1968
246. see PCF *Plan d'Urgence* (1970), Paris: PCF
247. *Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel*, 1970
248. B. Gros (1970)
249. see Lojkine J. (1973) p. 25 and p. 206
250. see for example the responses to the *Schéma Directeur* by the **Union des Organisations Patronales de la Région de Paris** (1965) and Lojkine J. (1973)
251. for an account of the financial institutions efforts to establish a new centre see the account of the working of the *Consortium pour l'Edification d'un Centre de Commerce International* in Lojkine j. (1973) p. 193 - p. 203.
252. **Renault's** founder **M. L. Renault** was a key figure on the Planning commission in the 1930s which had phased out trams and replaced them with motor buses. Some of the original **Renault** platform motor buses were still operating in the late 1960s.
253. The original *CNIT* proposals were subsumed within a much larger development after 1958, and a new form of public/private partnership - the *Etablissement Publique* was created to manage the project. This was empowered to compulsorily purchase all land needed for development, and did so at very advantageous prices, for the marginal small businesses operating in the area which was redeveloped. For a fuller account see Lojkine J. (1973), **Doublet M.** (1977).
254. see Chapter 6 below and Sfez L. (1972) and (1973)
255. see Godard F. (1972) p.85
256. see Lojkine J. (1973) p. 196
257. Lojkine J. (1973) p. 205
258. Lojkine J. (1973) p. 205-6
259. Lojkine J. (1973) p. 37-40. He does not give direct sources for this, but rather imputes the argument from papers issued by the Consortium and from an analysis of its membership.

Footnotes

260. **Boulet M.** (1974) *L'Influence des Infrastructures de Transport sur l'Urbanisation* Paris, Les Cahiers de l'IAURP Vol. 35.
261. see **Cozain M.** (1981) *Précis de Fiscalité des Entreprises* (Paris) for an account of the development of local taxation on businesses in France.
262. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 235
263. The long history of seeking quasi unanimity in business peak organisations is analysed in **Hayward J.E.S.** (1987) p. 67. The only real instance before 1970 of strong leadership in French business was in concluding the Grenelle agreements to bring the 1968 events to an end, and these circumstances were obviously exceptional.
264. **M. P. Laubard** quoted in *Le Monde* 31/1/71.
265. see **Hayward J.E.S.** (1987) p. 68
266. see **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 189 - p. 193
267. Correspondence between **M. Y. Aubin** of the **Chambre Syndicales des Constructeurs d'Automobiles** and **M. M. Frybourg** of the **Institut de Recherches des Transports** who was President of the **Commission de Villes** preparing key sections of the Sixth Plan. Dated 13th March 1970 and held in the archives of the **Institut de l'Urbanisme** at **Universite de Paris XII - Creteil**.
268. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 193
269. *Le Monde* 26/1/73 and *Le Figaro* 30/5/73
270. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 26 and **Lojkine J.** (1976)
271. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 36 - p. 41 and **Lojkine J.** (1976)
272. **M. Doublet** and **J. Gajer** identified this factor as crucial to the policy change in interviews with the author.
273. **Lojkine J.** (1973) p. 236
274. Interview with **M. Doublet**
275. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 69
276. *Rapport de Commission sur le Projet de Loi - Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel*, May 1971.
277. *Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel, Débats* - May 1971
278. *Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel, Débats* - May 1971
279. *Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel, Débats* - May 1971
280. *Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel, Débats* - May 1971

Footnotes

281. *Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel, Débats* - May 1971
282. *Assemblée Nationale, Journal Officiel, Débats* - May 1971
283. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1977) p. 130
284. **Cherki E. and Mehl D.** (1979) p. 65 - 83
285. **Merlin P.** (1982) p. 156 - 157
286. **IAURP** (1972) *Plan Global des Transport Parisiens*, Paris: IAURP.
287. see **Napoleon C. and Ziv J-C** (1981) p. 72 - 104
288. Interviews with **M. Doublet, J. Gajer and J-C Hugonnard.**
289. for an account of the gestation of the system see **Godard X.** (1973) *L'Analyse Multicritère*, L'Université d'Aix en Provence, These de 3ème Cycle.
290. *Livre Vert* (1970) p.16
291. **Hugonnard J-C et Roy B.** (1978) *Le plan d'extension du Métro en banlieue Parisienne* Paris: RATP
292. The description, and some of the tables in this section draw on a paper by the RATP engineers most closely involved: see **Hugonnard J-C et Roy B.** (1978) *Le Plan d'Extension du Métro en Banlieue Parisienne, un Cas Type d'Application de l'Analyse Multicritère*, Paris: RATP.
293. **Comte R. et Quercy M.** (1977) *L'évaluation des actions transports en région Parisienne: méthodes et procédures de décision* L'Université d'Aix en Provence: These de 3ème Cycle.
294. **Merlin P.** in *Livre Vert* (1971)
295. **Doublet** was **Pompidou's** appointment and his tenure of the Prefecture slipped with the demise of his mentor.
296. *L'Humanité* - 18th January 1973
297. *Le Monde* 15th June 1973
298. The RATP has produced a *Plan d'Entreprise* every year since 1975.
299. **RATP** (1973) *Schéma de Principe - Extension du Métro 13bis*, Paris: RATP
300. The lines into St. Lazare from Ermont Eaubonne via Porte d'Ouen which had been Paris' principal commuting routes since the mid nineteenth century
301. See Figure - source of data - RATP

Footnotes

302. See *Le Monde* March 1971 for full breakdown of results in the Municipal elections - for details of the campaign see above
303. The plans were set out in the *Plan Jayot* prepared by the Director of the *Compagnie Métropolitain* - see Chapter 2 above)
304. Aply named - it translates as The Fork
305. Bis means "Branch" - there are scarcely any branch lines in the Metro system - only line 13 and Line 7 to the twentieth Arrondissement have branches.
306. The trams all connected via a circular route on the main outlying boulevards of the city, and the replacement of key sections of the circle by Metros effectively destroyed the main routes on the tram network from suburb to suburb
307. **Napoleon C. and Ziv J-C** (1982) p. 14
308. **Merlin P.** (1982) and (1967)
309. The original approval was granted as part of Jayot's first programme of Metro extensions following the obstruction by Parliament of the *Département de la Seine's* grander plans for new town and railway construction.
310. **Aulduy M.** (1977) p 182 - 183
311. Interview with **J-C Hugonnard**
312. This committee was set up to advise the prime minister on which of the major transport infrastructure proposals in the *Schéma Directeur* should get priority for funding in the sixth plan.
313. *Plan Global* published by the Regional Prefecture in 1972/3 - for a full account see the previous chapter.
314. **Guy Schmauss** in *Le Monde* 13/04/74
315. A regular supplement to the *Cahiers de l'IAURP*
316. **Jayot M.** (1932) and **Gajer J.** (1980) - see Chapter 2 for fuller discussion of *Métro* extensions in the inter war period
317. **Napoleon C. and Ziv J-C** (1981) p. 178 - 186
318. Nearly 70% of local councillors in France in 1976 were from Union of the Left parties see **Johnson R.W.** (1980) p. 200
319. SOFRETU had contracts in Chile for Santiago and in Iraq for Baghdad
320. **Merlin P.** (1982) p. 173 - 190
321. **RATP** *Plan d'Entreprise* and *Annual Accounts*

Footnotes

322. **Le Monde** and **L'Humanité** 5/11/75
323. The local Deputy **M. Alain Vivien** raised the matter in Parliament in June 1975 - see *Assemblée Nationale - Journal Officiel*, 1975
324. **Simon Nora** *Inspecteur des Finances* quoted in **Ardagh J.** (1977) p. 56
325. A *Schema de Principe* is a general presentation of a development idea for public consultation setting out the level of service, general ideas about design and an estimate of costs and time before completion if approved. It is the principal means of public consultation on a scheme before detailed designs are produced and costed.
326. Interviews with **J-C Hugonnard**
327. Interviews with **J-C Hugonnard** and **H. Conte**
328. *VIème Plan, Documentation Française*, 1976
329. Interviews with **J-C Hugonnard** and **H. Conte**
330. *Le Monde* 13/4/74
331. *Le Monde* 13/4/74
332. *L'Humanité* April 1974
333. *Le Monde* 13/4/74
334. Interviews with site engineers
335. Interviews with site engineers
336. Interview with site engineers
337. Commissioner who advised the Government on the desirability of urban plans - roughly equivalent to a DoE commissioner in Great Britain.
338. Interviews with **T. Brehier** and **H. Conte**
339. *Le Monde* June 1975
340. La Villette was a notorious planning and management scandal which had been a serious embarrassment to the regional prefecture and the national government - see **Doublet M.** (1977) p. 25 - 29
341. *Le Monde* June 1975
342. *L'Humanité* 13/10/75
343. *Journal Officiel - Assemblée Nationale 2ème Séance* 6/6/75

Footnotes

344. *Journal Officiel - Assemblée Nationale 2ème Séance 6/6/75*
345. Interviews with **T. Brehier** and **J-C Hugonnard**
346. The extension to St. Cloud was entirely underground and had stops every 800 metres
347. Each of the other new administrative centres set up for the new Departements created in 1968 was served by the Metro or the RER
348. Interviews with **J-C Hugonnard**
349. Interviews with **J-C Hugonnard**
350. **Faillot B.** (1977) *La Génèse du RER*, Paris: RATP p. 1
351. *Cahiers de l'IAURP* no. 56/7 Dec. 1979
352. *Cahiers de l'IAURP* no. 56/7 Dec. 1979 p. 59 - 60
353. **Sfez L.** (1973) p. 362
354. **Sfez L.** (1973) offers an incomplete account of the factors influencing the incremental decision to build a new service in 1961.
355. see Chapter 2 for detailed account of the re-organisation of Parisian administration in the 1960s.
356. see **Sfez L.** (1973)
357. see **Merlin P.** (1982) p. 163 and **Orselli J.** (1975)
358. see **Merlin P.** (1982)
359. An engineering section established to work on the RER
360. For example the Tour Montparnasse and its surrounding buildings.
361. *Cahiers de l'IAURP*, Vol 56/7 Dec. 1979 p. 82 - 91
362. see *Livre Vert*, (1970)
363. see **Doublet M.** (1977) p. 12
364. **RATP** (1981) *Le RER*, Paris: RATP.
365. Interviews with **M. Doublet** and staff at the *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens*.
366. This is the view expressed by the majority interviewees in the course of research.
367. **Reynaud E.** and **Worms J-P** (1974) *L'Aménagement des Halles* Paris, Revue Française de Sociologie

Footnotes

368. **Raynaud E. and Worms J-P** (1974)
369. **Reynaud E. and Worms J-P** (1974)
370. **Reynaud E. and Worms J-P** (1974)
371. quoted in **Carmona M.** (1975)
372. *Le Monde* 10/9/70
373. **Boulet M.** (1974) *L'Influence des infrastructures de transport sur l'urbanisation*, Paris: Les Cahiers de l'IAURP vol. 35
374. **Boulet M.** (1974)
375. **Boulet M.** (1974)
376. see **Dunleavy P. and O'Leary B.** (1987)
377. see Chapter 3 'Strategic Policy Changes' for a full account of the 1971 municipal elections.
378. see **Johnson R.W.** (1980)
379. The most important contribution to this was clearly the speech by the incoming President of the Paris Chamber of Commerce in 1971 see Chapter 4 above.
380. Note the arguments put forward in their letter concerning the PLanning Commission for the 6th Plan see Chapters 3 and 4 above.
381. see *L'Express* 14/09/70
382. see **Dunleavy P. and O'Leary B.** (1987)
383. see **Boulet M.** (1974)
384. see **Doublet M.,** (1977)
385. see Chapter 3 : Strategic Policy Change for a detailed account of the Chamant Plan and the Interministerial Council meeting which determined the 6th Plan options in 1970.
386. **Thoenig J-C** (1973)
387. **Sfez L.** (1973)
388. **Rhodes R.A.W.** (1988)
389. see **Rhodes R.A.W.** (1988)
390. see **Cornu M.** (1975)
391. **Rhodes R.A.W.** (1988)

APPENDIX 1

Research Methods

The issue of Transport Policy change in Paris was selected after an initial trawl through the literature of urban planning and development in Paris, as it presented a startling political paradox and an ideal focus for illuminating issues of urban policy making, professional power, consumer protest and relations between local and national political systems. Within the overall remit the question of strategic shifts in policy priorities and the distribution of costs are the major indicators of the scale and significance of the outcomes of a period of serious political conflict. The durability and depth of the change in policy and management style were assessed by examining in detail the subsequent implementation of priority transport developments.

The majority of the research for the thesis was carried out in Paris using three principal types of evidence: primary material and press reporting of the events which form the focus of the policy changes analysed in the thesis; interviews with key participants and analysts of the transport planning process in the Paris Region and thirdly the existing literature on urban planning and professional politics.

The first major source was primary material produced by planning agencies, government ministries, political parties, campaigning groups and private consultancy firms. The majority of these were gleaned from the

Appendix 1

following archives:

- * The Prefecture of the Paris Region and *Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Région d'Ile de France* in Paris
- * The *Atelier Parisien d'Urbanisme* (APUR), Paris
- * *Centre de Recherches d'Urbanisme*, Paris
- * The *Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées*, Paris
- * The *Institut de Recherches de Transports*, Paris
- * the *Ministre de l'Équipement et de l'Aménagement du Territoire*, Paris
- * The *Service Régional d'Équipement d'Ile de France*, Paris
- * The *Syndicat des Transports Parisiens*, Paris
- * The *Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens* (RATP), Paris
- * the *Institut International d'Administration Publique*, Paris
- * *Prospective et Aménagement*, Montrouge, Paris
- * The *Service de Presse* at the *Institut d'Études Politiques*, Paris

During the fieldwork stage of the research a series of interviews, sometimes followed up by further inquiries, were held with a selection of key sources from within the transport planning agencies and regional administration at the time in question. The work benefited greatly from the evidence and helpful advice of staff at the IAURP and RATP, and from the time given up by administrative and professional staff in many agencies. The following people were interviewed:

M. P. Berney, Head of Planning and Development
(Transport) at the *Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Région d'Ile de France*

Appendix 1

- * M. G. Billon, Transport Officer at *Federation Generale des Transports et de l'Equipement*, CFDT, Paris
- * M. J.P. Blanc, *Direction des Collectivités Locales, Ministère de l'Intérieur*
- * M. T. Bréhier, Transport and Urban Planning Correspondent of *Le Monde*
- * M. de Calbiac, *Secrétaire- Adjoint, Syndicat des Transports Parisiens*
- * M. P. Cally, *Chef des Services Administratives et Financiers, Syndicat des Transports Parisiens*
- * M. H. Conte, *Adjoint au Maire, Ville de Clichy*
- * M. M. Doublet, Former Regional Prefect, Former Prefect of the Seine, at the time of research he was Head of the organisation responsible for planning and constructing car parks in the Paris area. Author of *Paris en Procès*
- * M. Frédéric-Dupont, *Deputé de Paris, Adjoint au Maire de Paris, Conseiller Régional d'Ile de France* and former President of the Paris Municipal Council.
- * M. Failliot, *Adjoint en Chef du Service du Plan de Transports et de lignes nouvelles*, RATP had direct managerial responsibility for Metro extension projects in the relevant period.
- * M. H. Fizbin, ex - *Parti Communiste Francais*, former head

Appendix 1

of the Paris Federation (deposed in 1977 for his views on internal party democracy), candidate for Maire of Paris and author in 1971 of the PCF's policy on transport in the Paris Region.

- * J.R. Fradin, *Chef du Département Politique des Transports, Direction Régionale de l'Équipement de l'Ile de France*
- * M. J. Gajer Former Chairman of the GEDACT, Former *Conseiller Général*, leading contributor to PCF policy on Transport Policy, leader of the November 1971 demonstrations by Transport Users, author of an MSC Thesis on the RER and at the time of research special advisor to the Minister of Urban Development.
- * Mlle Hazart, *Service des Relations Exterieures, RATP*
- * M. J-C Hugonnard, *Direction des Etudes, RATP* : worked on the development of the Multi-criteria planning systems, presented public evidence for inquiries on *Métro* extensions, author of RATP planning model in use in late 1970s.
- * M. Igielnik, *Service des Relations Exterieures, RATP*
- * M. Poulenat, *Charge de Mission, Syndicat des Transports Parisiens* - responsible for services to new towns, policy advice to the Regional Prefect and advisor on RER priorities in mid 1970s.

Appendix 1

- * M. B. Roy, *Direction des Etudes, RATP* – co-author with J-C Hugonnard of RATP planning model and researcher on Metro extensions and project evaluation.
- * Alain Vidalon, *Chef de Cabinet de M. Pierre Giraudet,*
Former Director General of the RATP

The interviews were based around a core of questions concerning the origins, consequences and rationale for strategic policy changes in the field of transport in the Paris Region, but were conducted on an unstructured basis and offered interviewees maximum opportunity to develop themes on which they wished to expand, or considered themselves particularly able to contribute to the research project. Evidence was placed within case studies of policy change and no explicit comparative or hypothetical framework of policy development was posited consistently throughout the collection of data and views. Interviewees were invited to offer their own explanations of events and to judge their importance to policy change within their own terms. The model of distinguishing clearly between the strategy issues and implementation issues emerged early in the fieldwork, and the study of the Metro extension was pursued with implementation issues in mind, several of the interviewees were directly involved in the planning and construction of Line 13bis.

A comprehensive literature survey was completed covering issues of urban development, planning, professional policy making, political institutions and processes in France, transport methods and economics, decision making and public sector management. Extensive searches of the catalogues of the following institutions were undertaken:

Appendix 1

- * The British Library of Political and Economic Science
- * The University Library, Cambridge
- * The *Bibliothèque* of the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques*, Paris
- * The *Bibliothèque Cujas*, Paris
- * The *Bibliothèque Administrative* at the *Hotel de Ville*, Paris
- * The *Bibliothèque of the Institut d'Urbanisme, Université de Paris XII* at Creteil
- * The *Bibliothèque* at the *Université de Paris X* at Nanterre
- * The *Bibliothèque* of the *Centre Georges Pompidou* in Paris

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