

1966

**CHINA'S ESTABLISHED INTELLECTUALS:  
A Sociological Study of Their Participation in  
Political Campaigns (1949-1976)**

**Thesis submitted to University of London for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy**

by

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at

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the participation of China's established intellectuals in political campaigns during the period 1949-1976. This involves a sociological analysis of the historical background and current situation of China's established intellectuals, a systematic examination of the whole process of the continual campaigns launched by the CCP and Mao Zedong to criticise intellectuals or their works, and some detailed case studies of four distinguished established intellectuals. Based on these, the thesis attempts to show that

- (1) China's established intellectuals do not belong to a specific class, nor do they form an independent stratum, but instead, they are members of different classes or strata;
- (2) which classes and strata they are members of hinges more on their social position and political experience than on their own choices;
- (3) under the specific system operating in China, intellectuals have to be passive if they do not obtain high posts in the state/Party organs. The higher and more numerous posts they occupy, the more active and influential they are; and
- (4) intellectuals within the establishment essentially cannot avoid conflicts between the roles of the intellectual and the official.

In brief, like other members of society, intellectuals are greatly tied to the social relations in which they are living and working, and their roles are largely decided by the social positions they obtain. In China, the fate of the intellectual in future will depend upon the development of society and changing social relations.

The method used in this research is mainly documentary analysis.



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## ABBREVIATIONS

### **Organisations:**

CCP: the Chinese Communist Party  
 CCY: the Chinese Communist Youth  
 CPPCC: the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference  
 KMT: Kuomintang, i.e., the Chinese Nationalist Party  
 NPC: National People's Congress of China  
 PLA: the People's Liberation Army  
 PRC: the People's Republic of China

### **Publications:**

BJGRRB: Peking Workers' Daily  
 DGB: Dagong Daily  
 GMRB: Guangming Daily  
 HQ: Red Flag  
 JFRB: Liberation Daily  
 MBYK: Monthly Enlightening  
 QS: Seeking for Truth  
 RMRB: People's Daily  
 RMWX: People's Literature  
 RW: Monthly Figures  
 SL: Monthly Book-forest  
 SZTQB: Shenzhen Special Zone Daily  
 WHB: Wenhui Daily  
 WHYK: Monthly Encounter  
 WYB: Literary Gazette  
 WYYJ: Literature & Art Research  
 XHWZ: Monthly New China Collected Articles  
 XHYB: Monthly New China  
 XJS: New Construction  
 XW: Quarterly New Literature Document  
 XX: Studying

## NOTES ON TRANSLATIONS

(1). In this thesis, all the translations of materials from original Chinese into English are my own, except where otherwise noted;

(2). I use Pingying System to translate names of provinces, cities, and places, except **Peking, Hong Kong ,and Canton;**

(3). I also translate persons' names according to Pingying System, but, because every character in Chinese has its special meaning, I write them like "**Zhou En-lai**" rather than "Zhou Enlai". Exceptionally, "**Dr Sun Yet-sen**" and "**Chiang Kai-shek**" remain as they were. The names of those persons who have published works in English will still be translated according to Pingying System while being noted, for instance, Mao's name is read as "Mao Ze-dong", and noted as "i.e., Mao Tse-tung" in Bibliography.

## CHAPTER 1:INTRODUCTION

The definitions of the "intellectual" are different, the theories of intellectuals are various, but the problems of intellectuals, which sociologists have been interested in and have debated for at least sixty years since Karl Mannheim published his *Ideologie und Utopie* in 1929, are more or less the same. These are: (1).Where are the social locations of the intellectual? (2).What is the relationship between their social locations and their political ideas? (3).Do they form a special class, or an independent classless stratum, or rather, do they belong to various classes? (4).Do their political ideas express or represent their own interests, or the interests of other classes separately, or rather, a complex of the interests of various classes?

Taking China as an example, this thesis will examine such problems by focussing on the participation of China's established intellectuals in the continual political campaigns from 1949 to 1976, launched by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to criticise either some of these established intellectuals or some of their intellectual works. This will not only, for the first time, show the whole process of the political campaigns systematically, but also, more significantly, continue to explore the way of resolving the sociological problem of intellectuals through an empirical study.



## I. Concepts of Intellectual and Intelligentsia

### (1). Intellectual

Terminologically, **intellectual** has been a widely-used but universally ambiguous concept, while sociologists have their own definitions and usages which are nevertheless various. Amongst these Edward Shils' statement is well-known:

Intellectuals are the aggregate of persons in any society who employ in their communication and expression, and with relatively higher frequency than most other members of their society, symbols of general scope and abstract reference, concerning man, society, nature, and the cosmos. <sup>1</sup>

According to Shils, not only those who produce intellectual works, who engage in their interpretation and transmission, who teach, annotate, or expound the contents of works, but also those who only "consume", for example, read intellectual works in large quantities, and who concern themselves receptively with works, are intellectuals. What is more, not only those engaged in the creation and reception of works of science, scholarship, philosophy, theology, literature, and art, but those involved in intellectual-executive roles as well are intellectuals.<sup>2</sup>

Shils' understanding of "intellectual" seems so wide that some other sociologists prefer to narrow down their definitions. For instance, Brym, following Lipset (who defines "intellectuals" as those who create, distribute, and apply culture, that is, the symbolic worlds of man, including art, science, and religion<sup>3</sup>), confers the title upon those people

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<sup>1</sup> E. Shils, 1973:22.

<sup>2</sup> E. Shils, 1968: 399; Cf., S. M. Lipset and A. Basu, 1976: 119.

<sup>3</sup> S.M. Lipset, 1960:311; 1976:119.

who get occupationally involved in the production of ideas, including "scholars, artists, reporters, performers in the arts, sciences, *etc.*, as well as students in post-secondary institutions, who are apprentices to these occupational roles".<sup>4</sup>

Other sociologists further emphasise that intellectuals should be more outstanding than ordinary educated people. In this sense, neither all academic persons nor all members of the professions are intellectuals. Max Weber limits them to those "who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be 'culture value', and who, therefore, usurp the leadership of a community."<sup>5</sup>

Weber's argument, however, is not beyond criticism. Since there have always been at least two kinds of outstanding cultural men, *i.e.*, the defenders of the *status quo* and the malcontents, and the latter could be frustrated with so-called 'culture value' and therefore be outside, or even at odds with, their contemporary cultural setting, should we treat these two similarly under the title of "intellectuals", or reserve the title only for those with a critical spirit? Coser claims that intellectuals, seeming never satisfied with things as they are, "question the truth of the moment in terms of higher and wider truth; they counter appeals to factuality by invoking the 'impractical ought'." In a word, "intellectuals live for rather than off ideas."<sup>6</sup>

But Coser's definition has, as Coser himself recognises, a tendency to idealise the portrait of intellectuals he draws. The same problem actually

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<sup>4</sup> R.J. Brym, 1980: 12.

<sup>5</sup> M. Weber, 1946: 17.

<sup>6</sup> Coser, 1965: VIII.

exists to some degree in many definitions of intellectuals. One example is Neumann's description, which is read as following: "The intellectual is, or ought to be, the critical conscience in each of its historical periods."<sup>7</sup> It is reasonable: the people who define or describe intellectuals are at the same time the intellectuals themselves, or more strictly, are considering themselves intellectuals. As Bauman points out, definitions of intellectuals, which are many and diverse, have one trait in common: they are all self-definitions.<sup>8</sup>

More important is the problem that if we construct a definition of "intellectuals" based merely on their psychological characteristics without taking account of their social positions within society we would be in danger of confusion. Can we simply name a manual worker with critical spirits a members of intellectual? Or should we say that all intellectuals must be critical while not all men with critical spirits are intellectuals? Theoretically and historically, the same or similar characteristics could be always found amongst various social members whilst the opposite ones would appear amongst the members from the same social class or stratum, thus we cannot find persons' social location merely according to their psychological characteristics.

To understand "intellectual" better, it is necessary to survey the origin and shift of the term. "Intellectual" was first used by Clemenceau in an article in *L'Aurore* on 23 January, 1898. As a consequence of the *Manifeste des Intellectuals* evoked by the Dreyfus Case, it was widely used then in France. The Right-wing anti-Dreyfusards satirised the cafe-

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<sup>7</sup> F. L. Neumann, 1976 : 423.

<sup>8</sup> Z. Bauman, 1987 : 8.

revolutionaries as "intellectuals". For example, Brunetiere used it derisively, referring to those artists, scientists and professors who presumed to represent the nation's conscience on basic political questions. To him it was quite illogical to deduce that an educated person who is remarkable in some specific subject, for instance, mathematics, or literature, should thus be justified to be the representative of a nation's conscience. Gradually in France the term of "intellectual" came to mean those educated people, for instance, artists, literary writers, who had broken with tradition, order, and the wisdom of the ages, and who exhibited strong political aspirations by directly seeking to be state rulers or indirectly influencing decision-making.<sup>9</sup>

In the United States, the first usage of "intellectual" in the 1890s was interestingly similar: it was a pejorative rather than honorific term. An intellectual at that time was regarded as a misfit of the *déclassé* : a working man who read more than a university graduate, or a gentleman who came from an upper class family but rejected his origin, or an educated person who failed to complete his study, who lacked discipline, who had intellect but not character, and so on. The scorned position of intellectuals did not change until the 1930s when social economists seemed to have the capability to lift American society out of the Great Depression. "Intellectual" became a rather positive word and was given to those social scientists, especially economists.<sup>10</sup>

In Britain, the situation was very different. Here educated persons historically conformed rather than criticised the social establishment.

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<sup>9</sup> Cf., R. Hofsadter, 1963 : 38-39; Kirk, 1960; and W. Martin, 1987: 65.

<sup>10</sup> Feuer, 1976: 48-52.

Swingewood points out that the peculiarities of English society and culture, such as profound conservatism, intellectual retardation, and hostility to social change, have effectively "created the conditions in which intellectuals function through the dominant discourses of the political and social structure."<sup>11</sup> British graduates not only prided themselves on their Oxbridge background which nurtured their minds with conservative attitudes towards reality, but also enjoyed special privileges. For example, they had the right to elect twelve members of Parliament, which continued until the 1950s. Because of the lack of critical spirits amongst them, many British graduates, who were nurtured on Plato and Aristotle, and who went out to work in the colonial service, to rule an empire as philosopher-kings, were scarcely to be regarded as "intellectuals", nor did they see themselves as such.<sup>12</sup>

According to Shils, who insists that every society, including primitive ones, contains intellectuals, however, there were intellectuals in Britain in the mid-1950s who fundamentally approved their own society. "Never has an intellectual class found its society and its culture so much to its satisfaction."<sup>13</sup> It seems that whether educated people are critical or not depends more on their traditional culture and their current conditions than on their intellectual levels.

Anderson, a Marxist who has written on intellectuals, argues that "a peculiarity of English history has been the tradition of a body of

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<sup>11</sup> A. Swingewood, 1987 : 87-90.

<sup>12</sup> For example, Bertrand Russell declared: " I have never called myself an intellectual, and nobody has ever dared to call me one in my presence." Cf., Kirk, 1960; and Feuer, 1976: 49-50.

<sup>13</sup> E. Shils, 1955: 6; 1968: 401; 1972: 3-4.

intellectuals which was at once homogeneous and cohesive and yet not a true intelligentsia."<sup>14</sup> This raises two questions: (1).Is there such a thing as "a true intelligentsia"? and (2). If there is, what is it?

## **(2). Intelligentsia**

As a term **intelligentsia** appeared first in the middle of the nineteenth century. It denoted "free professions". People remember that it was V.G. Belinsky and Peter Boborykin who first introduced the term "intelligentsia" into Russian literature in 1846 and 1860, but Aleksander Gella finds that the first reference had been made by the Poles Bronislaw Trentowski and Karol Libelt in 1844.<sup>15</sup> More importantly, social scientists have concerned themselves more with the social phenomenon itself than the concept of such a phenomenon, for "the coining of a new term by itself does not determine the existence of a new social stratum." They are more interested in knowing "when, where, and why the intelligentsia appeared".<sup>16</sup> They are generally in agreement that the classical "intelligentsia" appeared in late nineteen-century Russia and Poland. It included those educated people without or with little property, who received Western ideas, for example, liberalism, nationalism, and socialism, but who were isolated not only from the mass, but also, perhaps more profoundly, from the political and social regime. Their education would not necessarily give them great careers, they were educated but distinct from other educated members of the upper classes. And more significantly, they sought radical changes to their social and political structure, or at least had a critical attitude towards the established social system, hoping certain kind of social reform happening. They could be

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<sup>14</sup> P. Anderson, 1964: 42-43.

<sup>15</sup> A. Gella, 1976: 12, 20; and 1987<sup>a</sup>. Cf., M.E. Malia, 1961: 1.

<sup>16</sup> Gella, 1987<sup>a</sup>.

either Belinsky's "enlightened individuals", or Lavrov's "critically thinking individuals", or Lenin's "tribunes of the people". The intelligentsia could contain both admirers and critics of the West, both revolutionaries and reformers, but by no means an educated vested interest group or individual defenders of the established order, though most of them came from the families of the nobility and the urban bourgeoisie.<sup>17</sup> It was a special, or probably unique, phenomenon in the economically backward societies, like Russia in the nineteenth century, where Western ideas had already influenced some educated people who, however, were still ruled by totalitarian regimes.

This "true intelligentsia", however, had never constituted the majority of the educated people in Russian society, nor in others, but because of the classical usage of the term, many social scientists nowadays still differentiate intelligentsia from intellectuals. They used "intelligentsia" to cover those self-conscious educated people who are alienated from, or have even revolted against, the established order, and "intellectual" to classify educated individual who might be either critically opposed to, or conservatively in favour of, the establishment.<sup>18</sup>

The unresolved question is: if the intelligentsia or the "true intelligentsia" were united neither by an economic standard of life and income, nor by their education and professional competence, nor even by their intellectual accomplishment, but mainly by their common ideological bounds, *i.e.*, by their critical attitude towards the given society,<sup>19</sup> how

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<sup>17</sup> Cf., Gella, 1976: 9-27; 1987<sup>b</sup>; Malia, 1961: 1-18; Nahirny, 1983: 3-18; Seton-Watson, 1960; and W. Martin, 1987: 64-66.

<sup>18</sup> Cf., Gagnon, 1987: 5.

<sup>19</sup> Gella, 1976: 13; Nahirny, 1983: 8, 16.

should we explain such a social group? Should we treat intelligentsia a specific kind of intellectuals, instead of a class or a stratum? "No recognised system of social analysis, either those known to the intelligentsia itself or those elaborated since by modern sociology, makes provision for a 'class' held together only by the bond of 'consciousness', 'critical thought', or moral passion."<sup>20</sup>

Not all social scientists would adopt such differentiation in the usage of the term "intelligentsia" and "intellectual". Robert Michels for one makes no separation between the two terms; another example is Lipset, who makes a differentiation by taking "intelligentsia" to mean creators and distributors of culture, while "intellectuals" were a wider group including not only these creators and distributors, but the appliers of culture as well. Moreover, Mannheim considers the intelligentsia a "thoroughly organised stratum of intellectuals"; while on the contrary, Gouldner defines intellectuals as those whose intellectual interests "are primarily critical, emancipatory, hermetic and hence often political" but intelligentsia "are fundamentally 'technical'."<sup>21</sup>

It is inevitable that much controversy is generated by the lack of agreement about the definitions of the terms "intellectual" and "intelligentsia". It would be naive, however, as Coser says, to believe that once the terms have been properly defined and clarified, all differences will be automatically eliminated.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Malia, 1961: 5.

<sup>21</sup> R. Michels, 1932:118-126; Lipset, 1981: 333; Mannheim, 1940:11; and Gouldner, 1979: 48.

<sup>22</sup> Coser, 1965: 248.



## II. Sociological Approaches to the Problem of the Intellectual

Intellectual and intelligentsia cannot be merely interpreted as concepts through exploring the origins and usages of them. As mentioned above, social scientists are more interested in understanding social phenomena than playing with words. To understand the phenomena of intellectuals and intelligentsia, several theoretical models have been set up, which will be summarily analysed here.

### (1). Karl Mannheim's "Free-floating Intellectuals"

First is that employed by those who maintain that intellectuals are capable of distancing themselves from, or transcending, social relations and practical lives, and can thus be, at least relatively, free to think, choose, move, and locate. Parsons claims that intellectuals put cultural considerations before social ones; Shils asserts that intellectuals are those "persons with an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe, and the rules which govern their society."<sup>23</sup> Yet it is **Karl Mannheim** who elaborates why and how intellectuals could be socially classless, or at least relatively so. In his various writings Mannheim constantly used the words "free-floating intelligentsia" (*freischwebende Intelligenz*),<sup>24</sup> an expression borrowed from Albert Weber, to describe intellectuals' peculiarity. Mannheim maintains that intellectuals form "a social stratum which is to a large degree unattached to any social class." In

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<sup>23</sup> T. Parsons, 1969: 4; E. Shils, 1969: 25-26.

<sup>24</sup> Mannheim, 1982: 269; 1979: 137; 1956: 106.

other words, they form "a stratum with no roots, or at least few roots, to which no position of class or rank can be precisely imputed."<sup>25</sup>

Two significant characteristics of Mannheim's intellectuals can be seen in his *Ideology and Utopia*. One is political heterogeneity. Mannheim finds that intellectuals are politically heterogeneous to such a degree that they can find arguments in favour of any political cause they may happen to serve. Another is their homogeneity, for they are all educated people. Mannheim treats education as a unifying sociological bond between all groups of intellectuals which ties them together in a striking way and gives them the ability or power to attune or dynamically synthesize almost all political perspectives of various classes.

Mannheim's argumentation and exposition are so inspiring and controversial, that sociologists have been debating the problems he raised and advanced for sixty years, and Mannheim is therefore regarded as a pathbreaker in the sociology of intellectuals. There is, however, a contradiction of logic in Mannheim's argumentation, as Brym exposes: the combination of heterogeneity and homogeneity. Mannheim emphasizes that intellectuals are too heterogeneous in their political views to form a class by themselves, but at the same time he stresses their capacity to arrive at a relatively homogeneous synthesis of almost all viewpoints of various classes. "It clearly cannot be the case that the political attitudes of intellectuals are simultaneously heterogeneous and homogeneous."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Mannheim, 1979: 139; 1953: 127.

<sup>26</sup> Brym, 1980: 56.

In reality it is not possible for us to find Mannheim's political homogeneity amongst intellectuals. In 1929, for instance, when *Ideology and Utopia* was first published, there were many academics who supported the Nazis. Other radical intellectuals at Frankfurt's *Institut für Sozialforschung* were Marxists while some in Berlin's *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* were liberals. It is reasonable to assume that Mannheim's total synthesis of political perspectives by intellectuals is more a task that intellectuals ought to aim to fulfil than an accomplishment they have already achieved, more a hope than a fact, more an ideal than a reality. Mannheim really wishes that intellectuals, especially their "elites", could put themselves in a position to develop a total orientation and synthesis. But such a synthesis has not come to pass. On the contrary, as Bottomore points out, "the intellectual elites, in most countries and at most times, is one of the least homogeneous or cohesive of elites, and displays a considerable variety of opinion on cultural and political questions."<sup>27</sup>

As far as the heterogeneity of intellectuals is concerned, Mannheim thinks that intellectuals could voluntarily affiliate themselves with one or the other of the various antagonistic classes, for in fact intellectuals are to be found in the course of history in all camps. From here Mannheim correctly points out that intellectuals are politically heterogeneous. The question is: how could we draw the conclusion from such heterogeneity that intellectuals are thus socially free-floating? According to Mannheim, there are several possible reasons: first, intellectuals are "recruited from an increasingly inclusive area

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<sup>27</sup> T. B. Bottmore, 1966: 75.

of social life"; second, they can "attach themselves to classes to which they originally did not belong"; and third, unlike workers and entrepreneurs, who participate directly in the process of production and therefore are immediately bound by class affiliations, intellectuals "can adapt themselves to any viewpoint" and they alone are "in a position to choose their affiliation."<sup>28</sup>

At least two questionable points are left here. The first is: the term of **class** basically means less the family backgrounds people originally have than the social positions they are economically given. Though the former strongly influences the later in many cases, theoretically they can not be simply or confusedly mixed up. It does not matter whether a worker comes from an impoverished peasant family, or a bankrupt landlord family, or even a noble family, he is a worker if and only if he is employed by his employer in a capitalist society. Furthermore, neither his family background, nor his own experiences can entirely determine his current class position in theory. A magnate could have been a pedlar or a handicraftsman. Historically and logically each first generation of classes is recruited from others. It would be much clearer if we focus our attention on modern advanced society in which social mobility is getting more and more frequent. As a result, not only intellectuals but also the members of other groups may have their origins elsewhere. Thus neither the recruitment of intellectuals from an increasingly large area of social life, nor their affiliation to classes they originally did not belong to, can make intellectuals be exclusively privileged members of a free-floating stratum.

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<sup>28</sup> Mannheim, 1979: 138, 141.

The second point is: within the social structure, there are two kinds of people, *i.e.*, those who directly participate in the process of production and therefore form the basic socio-economic classes, and those who do not. The latter consists of not only Mannheim's intellectuals but also others, for instance, governmental ministers and bureaucrats, army officers and soldiers, policemen and judges. Why do intellectuals alone enjoy the privilege to be in a position to choose their affiliation? Mannheim argued that education here plays a significant part. Education is emphasized by Mannheim to such an extent that intellectuals'

participation in a common educational heritage progressively tends to suppress differences of birth, status, profession, and wealth, and to unite the individual educated people on the basis of education they received.<sup>29</sup>

The problem remains, however, since not only Mannheim's intellectuals, but politicians, army officers, judges, and many others are often highly educated as well. Further, not only those who do not participate in production, but also some of those who do participate in it, such as entrepreneurs and engineers, are in diverse degrees educated. Why, then, can intellectuals alone raise themselves above the attachment of class relations and float freely over society?

Mannheim himself recognises such problems, for he always uses "relatively" in italics to modify his term of "free-floating intellectuals". Unfortunately, we are never told the exact meaning of "relatively". Mannheim, too, finds it difficult to discover a concrete social group which correlates with his

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<sup>29</sup> Mannheim, 1979: 138.

conception of "free-floating intellectuals", and feels the necessity of analysing the relationship between their ideological orientations and patterns of social mobility only a few years after publishing his *Ideology and Utopia*. This can be clearly seen in Mannheim's *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*.<sup>30</sup>

## **(2). Alvin Gouldner's "New Class": Cultural Bourgeoisie**

The second approach toward locating social position of intellectuals is that shared by those sociologists who treat intellectuals as an independent class, although diverging from one another on their exact placing of intellectuals within the social structure. Generally there are two variants of this approach. One claims that intellectuals, especially the Western-educated radicals in economically underdeveloped or developing countries, form a "ruling class". The other asserts that in both the West and the East intellectuals are forming a "new class".<sup>31</sup>

The first variant, influenced by elite theorists such as Pareto and Robert Michels, declares that in economically underdeveloped or developing countries, twentieth-century Russia and China for example, the social upheavals that have been defined as revolutions were actually *coups*, and the Western-educated radical intellectuals and their elites became members of the ruling class after these so-called "intellectual *coups d'état*".<sup>32</sup>

This is a more historical than theoretical approach. No matter whether the so-called "revolution" in those underdeveloped societies are in fact

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<sup>30</sup> Mannheim, 1956: 142-149. Cf., Brym, 1980: 57; Remmling, 1975: 73.

<sup>31</sup> Cf., Gagnon, 1987: 7.

<sup>32</sup> H. Lasswell & D. Lerner, 1965: 80.

"intellectual coups" or not, it is necessary to remember that first, not all leaders of developing countries are intellectuals; and second, in countries such as Russia and China, where the leaders of revolution/"coup" are considered to be overwhelmingly intellectuals, what really happened is more complicated. Just as Kamal Sheel claims, a revolution "cannot be understood in terms of the wisdom of intellectuals only."<sup>33</sup> To a large degree we could say that, it is not the intellectuals who brought revolution/"coup" into being, but rather, it is the increasing social conflicts between various classes and political forces which resulted in the upheavals, and it is these social upheavals which created its own intellectual leaders. As Barrington Moore points out, intellectuals who, in spite of urban education and commitment to Marxism, were not totally alienated from their own traditional environment, "can do little unless they attach themselves to a massive form of discontent."<sup>34</sup>

This can be shown by taking top leaders of Russia and China as an example. Before they became professional revolutionaries, these individuals either did not go to university (Stalin and Mao, for instance), or could not complete their undergraduate studies (for example, Lenin and Zhou En-lai). Only after they joined in the masses of workers, peasants and discontented intellectuals in the long-term political and military struggle, did they learn to propagandise, mobilise, and organise the masses, and then gradually occupy the prominent leadership positions and became generally acknowledged.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> K. Sheel, 1989: XIV.

<sup>34</sup> B. Moore, 1966: 480.

<sup>35</sup> There will be more detailed discussions about China's intellectuals as leaders of the Revolution in following chapters. As far as Mao's early intellectual and revolutionary career is concerned, it is worthy here to mention L. N. Shaffer's *Mao Tse-tung and the*

Lacking such experience, the "real scholars" Plekhanov and Chen Du-xiu, the first leaders of the Communist Parties of both Russia and China, had to be transient figures in the political arena.

More generally, there are plenty of Western-educated men and women in the underdeveloped societies who are not revolutionary, but liberal or even conservative. In terms of their educational background, interestingly, those persons usually hold higher degrees than the revolutionaries. Should we thus strictly modify the statement to read "the intellectuals who hold relatively lower education degree in the underdeveloped countries become revolutionary, and then after the revolution/coup, form the ruling class, while the higher-degree-holders do not"? Supposing that all leaders of all underdeveloped countries were intellectuals, and there were no other kind of intellectuals at all, that is to say, all leaders were intellectuals, and all intellectuals were revolutionary, should we thus say intellectuals in these countries formed the ruling class?

The identification of the members of a class is carried out according to their common relationship with the means of production rather than their educational background or their ideological orientation. It is possible in any society at any time in general, and in modern society, developed or underdeveloped, at the present time in particular, that the members of the ruling class are all or almost all educated people. But we can not thus say that

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*Hunan Labor Movement*, and Li Rui's *The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung*.



educated people or intellectuals, or their "elites", form the ruling class. There is no causality here.

The second variant of the approach to intellectuals, which sees them as an independent class, is elaborated by Alvin Gouldner in his *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*. Gouldner claims that in both the West and the East intellectuals are forming a New Class, which he labels the "cultural bourgeoisie", because they have the same relationship with the means of production, and share a common cultural background.<sup>36</sup>

Let us examine the common cultural background first. The common cultural background is, according to Gouldner, the culture of critical discourse (CCD). The CCD is "a historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse which (1) is concerned to justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode of justification does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed solely on the basis of arguments adduced." In a word, CCD "is centred on a specific speech act: justification."<sup>37</sup> The CCD as the deep structure of the common ideology of discourse, Gouldner claims, is shared by both humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia through education, or to be precise, through public school. This kind of education in public school proceeds at a distance from close parental supervision, and through the medium of a special group—"teachers", who train their students to believe that the value of their discourse does not depend upon their differing class origins. "All public schools

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<sup>36</sup> A. Gouldner, 1979. Also A. Gouldner, 1985.

<sup>37</sup> Gouldner, 1979: 28.

therefore are schools for a linguistic conversion, moving their charges away from the ordinary languages of their everyday life and moving them towards the CCD."<sup>38</sup>

Secondly, let us explore intellectuals' common relationship with the means of production. Gouldner asserts that this common relationship is determined by the fact that, intellectuals as a whole, integrated by sharing the CCD, control the production and distribution of "cultural capital". Unlike money capital, cultural capital is not material but symbolic; but like money capital, can be used to command income, status, and power. According to Gouldner, classical capital, or the 'capital' defined by classical political economists, is actually merely one kind of capital. More abstractly speaking, capital should be

any produced object used to make saleable utilities, thus providing its processor with incomes, or claims to incomes defined as legitimate because of their imputed contribution to economic productivity; these claims to income are enforced normally by withholding, or threatening to withhold, the capital object.<sup>39</sup>

Because of this, Gouldner insists that anything can be defined as capital when it serves as the basis of enforceable claims to the private appropriation of incomes which are legitimated by their contribution to the production of economic valuables and wealth. From this Gouldner concludes that education is capital

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<sup>38</sup> Gouldner, 1979: 44. Cf., Gouldner, 1985: 30-33, 37-38.

<sup>39</sup> Gouldner, 1979: 21.

"simply because it provides incomes, because these incomes are enforceable, and because they are legitimated intrinsically, depending on the continued availability or withholding of their services and activities."<sup>40</sup>

Now, humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia form one class. It is a class which, like other classes, uses its special culture, language, and technique to advance its own interests and power, and to control its own work situation. But it is also a specific class, a "cultural bourgeoisie", which privately appropriates the advantages of a historically and collectively produced cultural capital.

It seems to me that the importance of education in the process of teachers' imbuing students with the CCD and thus forming a New Class, is over-exaggerated by Gouldner. In order for this to take place, if it indeed takes place, first, there should be a *prior* autonomous, or at least semi-autonomous, group of teachers who take the standpoint of the collectivity as a whole and speak in the name of the nation or even the universe without any obligation to preserve specific class privileges in the new public education system. Second, if this was so, when children went to school, their and their parents' ideologies would begin to grow more divergent, and their parents would no longer be able to reproduce the values of their own class in their own children. And third, following Gouldner's logic, as soon as these children received the CCD "in one word, one meaning," it would be efficacious "for every one and forever."

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<sup>40</sup> Gouldner, 1979: 23.

Yet, all these three factors have not existed, and we cannot find such an education in reality. It has not happened that both teachers and students have been able to isolate themselves from the society and then transcend it. Moreover, and not surprisingly, teachers and students from the same school could simultaneously divide ideologically or politically into diverse sub-groups. Gouldner's emphasis on education in forming a cultural bourgeoisie can hardly approved.

The more heated argument is centred on Gouldner's conceptions of capital and cultural capital. Firstly, as we have showed, the key to his capital is that it is the source of income. Gouldner asserted that "any produced objects used with the intention of augmenting utilities or wealth whether hardware or skills may be capital."<sup>41</sup> In this sense both money and education can be used as capital. But unlike money capital or economic capital, Gouldner's cultural capital, as Martin and Szelenyi point out, cannot be detached from the individual who owns it. Does this mean that the owner of cultural capital must thus put his capital into action himself each time when it is used in the process of production? If so, how can his cultural capital be used as the "means of production" by others?<sup>42</sup>

Secondly and more problematically, cultural capital, unlike economic capital, is inconvertible: it is unlike economic capital which can be converted into money or its equivalent and therefore used in the process of accumulation which makes such valuation and convertibility of capital goods

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<sup>41</sup> Gouldner, 1979:23.

<sup>42</sup> B. Martin & I. Szelenyi, 1987: 34-36.

possible. A holder of economic capital could, of course, convert his capital by using money primarily invested in a shoe factory to a cap factory, for instance, whereas a holder of an engineering degree could hardly use his cultural capital in the field of political sociology of intellectuals. Should we still treat this degree as capital?

Thirdly, as Gouldner himself said, all classes possess cultural capital in some degree. Then the problem is: how does the New Class differ from others? Gouldner thought that the New Class could be differentiated in two ways: quantitatively, it possesses a relatively greater stock of cultural capital, and a relatively larger part of its income derives from it; qualitatively, its culture is a special one, that is, the CCD.

There are some problems here. The first is Gouldner's "quantitatively greater stock of cultural capital". It seems that Gouldner forgot that quantitatively we can only stratify people into different strata rather than differentiate them into various classes. The difference between a capitalist and a worker is that the former possesses economic capital but the latter does not. Thus quantitatively we cannot differentiate a class from others. The second problem is, we do not know how much cultural capital can be calculated as "relatively greater stock". Should we say that a man who receives higher education possesses a relatively greater stock of cultural capital? If so, how should we treat those great intellectuals, for instance, some literary writers, who either never went to university or did not finish their studies at college? The final problem is, qualitatively, Gouldner did not show enough evidence that only the members of his New Class, *i.e.*, humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia, possess CCD. As we have

argued, while some members of other classes may also have critical discourse, some members of humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia may not necessarily possess it.

Gouldner really realises that things like science, knowledge, technology, *etc.*, are becoming central to production in contemporary societies. However, we cannot conclude because of this that humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia who specialise in the creation and sustaining of such things will thereby eventually become dominant. Gouldner's theory does not elaborate why and how intellectuals could appropriate and dominate the rest of society by using their "cultural capital".

As far as intellectuals in the so-called "Communist" societies are concerned, we must recognise that here the social system causes a fundamental difference. There will be further discussions on this later in this chapter and in the following chapters when taking China's established intellectuals as an example, but here a few words from A. Giddens are necessary and pertinent:

Rather than being based primarily upon control of the means of production, the Party in such societies seem to derive their preeminent position much more from bureaucratic power. ... Yet power which derives from participation in a governmental apparatus is clearly not market power and the notion of "cultural capital" seems largely irrelevant to it. <sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> A. Giddens, 1987: 272-273.

### (3). Antonio Gramsci's Organic and Traditional Intellectuals

The third kind of approach towards identifying the social position of intellectuals' social locations and their political ideas is originally found in *The Prison Notebooks* of Antonio Gramsci. He deals with the problem idiosyncratically while the questions he asks at the beginning of the essay on intellectuals are more or less the same. That is: "Are intellectuals an autonomous and independent social class, or does every social class have its own particular specialised category of intellectuals?"<sup>44</sup>

Gramsci notes that there is a widespread error among social scientists. They define intellectuals by emphasising the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities rather than the *ensemble* of the system of relations. But, Gramsci argues, it is in the *ensemble* of social system intellectual activities, and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them, have their place. As a matter of fact, in any physical work, even the most degraded and mechanical, there exists a minimum of creative intellectual activity. In this sense, we could thereby declare: "all men are intellectuals." However, as Gramsci points out, not all men have the function of intellectuals in society. The function of intellectuals, according to Gramsci, should not be limited simply to the field of culture, and thus the term "intellectuals" should not be understood to apply to those strata commonly described by this term, but more generally, to the entire social stratum which exercises an organisational function in the widest sense—not only in the field of culture, but also in the fields of political administration and production.

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<sup>44</sup> A. Gramsci, 1971: 5.

The question is not who and how many kinds of professional people should be listed under the name of intellectuals. But rather, according to Gramsci, the questions should be: what is their organisational function? And accordingly, what is the relationship between these intellectuals and social classes? "Do they have a 'paternalistic' attitude towards the instrumental classes? Or do they think they are an organic expression of them? Do they have a 'servile' attitude towards the ruling classes, or do they think that they themselves are leaders, an integral part of the ruling classes?"<sup>45</sup>

Gramsci recognises that the reality of intellectuals in the real historical process is complex: there are different categories of intellectuals. Or strictly speaking, every class,

coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.<sup>46</sup>

Gramsci names such a kind of intellectuals "organic intellectuals". In other words, organic intellectuals are directly related to the economic and political structure and therefore closely tied themselves to the class they represent. Obviously, they are by no means an autonomous classless stratum.

There is another category of intellectuals, however. Gramsci calls them "traditional intellectuals". This category consists further of two elements: (1) the creative artists and scholars, men of letters, who are traditionally

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<sup>45</sup> Gramsci, 1971: 97.

<sup>46</sup> Gramsci, 1971: 5.



regarded as "true intellectuals"; and (2) the vestiges of the former organic intellectuals, who used to belong to a previous social formation. They are together called "traditional intellectuals" because they experience through an *esprit de corps*, an uninterrupted historical continuity and a special qualification. These traditional intellectuals presume that they themselves are autonomous and independent of the dominant social class.

Here exists a 'novel' relationship which has not been discussed before: the relationship between "organic intellectuals" and "traditional intellectuals". It in fact results from the relationship between the dominant class and traditional intellectuals. The dominant class does not willingly let these traditional intellectuals run their own course. Any class that is developing towards dominance tries to assimilate and "ideologically" conquer the traditional intellectuals. Furthermore, the quicker and more efficacious this assimilation and conquest, the more the class in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals.

According to Gramsci, on the one hand, traditional intellectuals, or at least some of them, used to be members, as organic intellectuals, of the former ruling class. On the other hand, organic intellectuals, or at least some of them, are assimilated from traditional ones. From this, Gramsci really opens up a new path towards the sociological understanding of intellectuals by examining their patterns of historically shifting positions.

This process cannot be thoroughly understood without studying political parties. It is the political party which, Gramsci points out, elaborates its own component parts and turns them into qualified political intellectuals, and it is

the political party as well which welds together the organic and the traditional intellectuals. As far as the process of the transition to socialism is concerned, the political party is the most important and crucial factor. Its members as "collective intellectuals" are leaders and organisers of all the activities and functions inherent in the organic development of an integral society, both civil and political.

Like Mannheim and Gouldner, Gramsci also discusses education and the school. But for him, school is not a fictitious land apart from society. For instance, he claims that the traditional school is oligarchic, because it is intended to train the new generation of the ruling class, destined to rule in its turn. However, there is another kind of school—the vocational establishment, in which the labourer could become a skilled worker, the peasant a surveyor. "It gives the impression of being democratic in tendency". But in fact, Gramsci argues, it is just an illusion, because democracy cannot mean merely that an unskilled worker can become skilled, and because the vocational school restricts recruitment to the technically qualified governing stratum. The key to such schools is not their curricula, nor their teachers, but the entire social complex.<sup>47</sup>

It is impossible to agree with Gramsci completely. For example, his denotation of intellectuals seems too wide, and maybe the classification of intellectuals into two kinds is still too simple. R. Simon even thinks that the 'traditional intellectuals' as a term is unnecessary.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Gramsci, 1971: 36-41.

<sup>48</sup> R. Simon, 1985: 97-98.

Nevertheless, Gramsci's theory of intellectuals is regarded as one of his most significant contributions to modern sociology and he is considered to have been the first to recognise and analyse the complexity and malleability of intellectuals' social-structural ties and the way that these ties influence their ideological outlooks.<sup>49</sup>

### III. Intellectuals in "Communist" Societies

Gramsci did not have the opportunity to conduct empirical research into the complex relation between intellectuals and social structure, nor could he see the socialist societies in which, he thought, that a new kind of intellectuals would play a great part, and a new relationship between intellectuals and the masses of the people would replace the old one. According to Gramsci, the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, "but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, 'permanent persuader', and not just a simple orator". He supposed that in a socialist society, all members of the Communist party would be organic intellectuals (*i.e.*, organisers and leaders of the people) functionally. They would not only win the traditional intellectuals over, but also feel the elementary passions of the masses of the people, understand them, and therefore, explain and justify them in the particular situation, and connect them to "knowledge".<sup>50</sup>

Gramsci's work, including his notes on intellectuals, as he himself said, is based on the following fundamental principles:

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<sup>49</sup> Cf., A. Swingewood, 1984: 211; Brym, 1987: 204-205.

<sup>50</sup> Gramsci, 1971: 10, 16, 418.

"1. that no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces which have developed within it still find room for further forward movement; 2. that a society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the necessary conditions have not already been incubated, etc."<sup>51</sup>

### **(1). Soviet-type "Communist" Societies**

The historical praxis, ironically, is that nearly all the "Communist" societies, from Soviet Union to China, did not develop from industrial capitalism, but rather, they came from so-called "Asiatic society"(for instance, China) or "Semi-Asiatic society"(Russia, for example).<sup>52</sup> These societies are called "Communist societies" not because they have already reached the Communist stage, but because the founders of these societies were considered to be Communists rather than "Social Democrats". In this thesis, I continue to call them "Communist", or "Soviet-type Communist", to describe those societies established following the model of the Soviet Union, although the authorities of these societies usually claimed that their societies were "Socialist".

Before the Communist revolution, in these societies, the centralising power of government had played a commanding role, which had interfered in both social and economic life since ancient time. State officials, bureaucrats, military officers, and mandarins, constituted a vast privileged hierarchical ruling and exploiting group. Of course, there are many traditional and cultural differences between these societies. For instance, unlike Russia, China had for a long time been a society without native religion while Confucianism became orthodox ideology. Even geographically and economically, we can easily point out some

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<sup>51</sup> Gramsci, 1971: 106.

<sup>52</sup> Cf., Umberto Melotti: 1982, esp., chapters 14, 17.

differences, for example, the variety of population, although both Russia and China were huge countries whose production was mainly agriculture. Whatever the differences, before their revolutions, these societies were economically undeveloped, and accordingly, both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were qualitatively weaker and quantitatively fewer than those in the West.

The revolution in these societies resulted more from the conflict between the people in general and their rulers, and the conflict with Western imperialist countries. However unavoidable and justified, it was not the revolution based on the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and the conflict between the high-speed developing forces of production and the existing relations of production, though there were short-lasting period of bourgeois government in both Russia and China.

The revolution in these societies went through a very similar process. Generally speaking, (1) some radical members of intelligentsia believed in Marxism, (2) they formed a Leninist party, (3) which established its own army recruited from workers and peasants, and (4) finally took power after severe military battles with both alien and home forces.

After the revolution, even before basic means of production were nationalised or collectivised, a one-party state was established in the name of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". Three characteristics could be generally summarised as: (1) state or collective ownership under which not only the means of production, but also labourers themselves become parts of the state or collective; (2) the dictatorship of the Communist party which controls not only state organs, but also social and individual lives; and (3) official ideology (Stalinism, or Mao Ze-dong Thought, for

instance) becomes the one and the only one ideology which can be exclusively elaborated and developed by the authorities, but can never be criticised or argued against by others.<sup>53</sup>

One of the main questions we may ask from Gramsci's theory and the praxis in these "Communist" societies is, as Swingewood points out, how a "Soviet-type Communist" society, based on state-ownership, centralised power, and collectivist ideology, can retain an independent civil society and thus autonomous intellectuals.<sup>54</sup> As a matter of fact, the relationships between organic and traditional intellectuals, between the intellectual and the Communist party, between intellectuals and the masses of the people, which Gramsci thought would be totally new in a socialist society, become real "new" problems.

After the revolution, both organic and traditional intellectuals should no longer be considered to belong to the "free professionals". The majority of the former traditional intellectuals, especially those scientists and technicians, were recruited by the state as salary-earning scientific workers, while politically and ideologically, according to the Communist party, they had been serving the old regime, and were still holding conservative and reactionary views to varied extents. As to the minority of the traditional intellectuals, for instance, some famous scientists, artists, and writers, although their "bourgeois background" was by no means less obvious and important, they were given the privileged positions and living conditions for the sake of pragmatic purpose of "construction".<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Cf., M. Djilas, 1957: 164-172.

<sup>54</sup> A. Swingewood, 1984: 214-215.

<sup>55</sup> Cf., Nicholas Lampert, 1979.

At the same time, though the term "intelligentsia" remained in official vocabulary, and some of the former revolutionary intelligentsia remained to be critical towards the *status quo*, the classical intelligentsia as a social group disappeared, and its function, *i.e.*, the function of being critics of the current time and independent spiritual leaders of the nation, was gone. This was simply because most members of the former revolutionary intelligentsia now became officials, or "cadres", of the ruling party and the state. In name and in reality, the Communist party insisted that the classical intelligentsia should be replaced by the party's "new intellectual working men", who could be still critical, but, according to the party, only towards the past and the West.<sup>56</sup>

And more significantly, beyond Gramsci's expectation, not all the Communist party members are the organisers or leaders of the masses, nor should all of them be considered as intellectuals. But instead, they were the core elements of officialdom, more or less bureaucratised and privileged, and even in conflict with the people in many cases. In both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, many of them were actually anti-intellectualist.

## (2). Djilas and "New Class"

Nearly all these "Communist" societies thus faced a new serious problem: the bureaucratisation of the former revolutionaries. Interestingly, like Gouldner, Milovan Djilas also tried to develop the concept of a "new class". According to Djilas, this "new class" was different from earlier ones because it did not come to power to *complete* a new economic order

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<sup>56</sup> Cf., Gella, 1987a.

but to *establish* its own, because it was formed only after it attained power, and because it could only be created in an organisation of a special type, the Bolshevik type. It is a special class which is "made up of those who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold."<sup>57</sup>

But unlike Gouldner, Djilas claimed that it was not a cultural bourgeoisie, but a political bureaucracy. In other words, instead of intellectuals, it was political bureaucratic officials who formed the "new class" in these Communist societies. Djilas asserted that the social origin of his "new class" lies in the proletariat which, in economically underdeveloped countries, being backward, constitutes the raw material from which the new class arises. However, when the new class establishes its power and authority, it is interested in the proletariat only to the extent necessary for developing production, and "the monopoly which the new class establishes in the name of the working class over the whole of society is, primarily, a monopoly over the working class itself".<sup>58</sup>

Djilas considered it a class because in this "Soviet-type Communist" system the political bureaucracy uses, enjoys, and disposes of nationalised property. In the name of the nation and society, it distributes the national income, sets wages, directs economic development.<sup>59</sup> It is called the "new class" not only because it is newly born after the revolution, but also because it is a new type of class. In the name of the ownership of all of the people, the political bureaucracy actually enjoys the ownership privilege, which grants itself both an exclusive right to use and dispose of

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<sup>57</sup> Djilas, 1957: 37-41.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp.41-43.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., pp. 44-47.



nationalised property, and an absolute power to dictate state organs, control social life, and oppress human mind.

According to Djilas, the core and the basis of the new class is created in the party and at its top, as well as in the state organs. Djilas further claimed that in these "Communist" societies the party in fact replaced the state functionally. In other words, in such a society, the government is a party government, the army is a party army, and the state is a party state.<sup>60</sup> Djilas asserted that under such a party state, every action depends on the party, which makes independent thinking impossible.

Djilas' analysis of political bureaucracy in "Soviet-type Communist" societies is mainly based on his own experience in, and observation of, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Though he did pay attention to ownership, he did not carefully examine the differences between control, use, and ownership, and he emphasised aspects of the central control and power of the party rather than ownership. The problem remains unresolved when he said that to be an owner of the nationalised property in a "Communist" system "means that one enters the ranks of the ruling political bureaucracy and nothing else". Also he did not explain why "not every member of the party is a member of the new class", and why "only a special stratum of bureaucrats, those who are not administrative officials, make up the core of new class. Other officials are only the apparatus under the control of the new class".<sup>61</sup> How can a person be an owner of the nationalised property when he/she joins the rank of the political bureaucracy? Why are certain party members of the new class while

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<sup>60</sup> Djilas, 1957: 39-41, 70-72.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp. 40, 43, 61.

others are not? why do political bureaucrats belong to the new class while administrative bureaucrats do not?

Michael Lustig correctly points out that Djilas' analysis would have made a lot more sense if he had claimed merely that the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has unrestrained control over the economic life. "He could not stop at this point, however, because of his ideologically imposed task of demonstrating that the new elite was a new class."<sup>62</sup> In spite of this, however, Djilas is one of the first generation who critically analysed the problem of bureaucracy in "Communist" societies and many of his criticisms turn out to be valid.

For instance, Djilas found that great scientific discovery in this kind of "Communist" society is difficult, and the main reasons for this are not technical, but social. If there is any scientific achievement, it would be declared as a result of the correct leadership of the party, and of the changed view of the world in the mind of the discoverer under such a leadership. Thus scientists must make discoveries "confirming" the formulas of official ideology. What can the unfortunate biologists do if plants do not behave according to the Lysenko-Stalinist biological theory? They have to be

"in a constant dilemma as to whether their ideas and discoveries will injure official dogma. They are therefore forced into opportunism and compromises with regard to science."<sup>63</sup>

Comparatively, there is lesser control over the fields of natural sciences and technology than over the fields of humanities and social sciences, for

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<sup>62</sup> M.M. Lustig, 1989: 128.

<sup>63</sup> Djilas, 1957: 129-130

it is clear to the leaders of the ruling party that industrialisation cannot be accomplished without the scientists and technicians. As far as literature and art are concerned, the situation is much worse. And "of all the sciences and all thought, social sciences and the consideration of social problems fare the worst; they scarcely manage to exist."<sup>64</sup> And if there is social science, it must be expressed through very indirect ways, usually by the way of literature and certain forms of art.

More significantly, in a "Communist" society, all newspapers and other media are official in the final analysis, and journalists, ideologists, paid writers, are all enlisted and engaged in "uplifting of socialism". As a result, people's thinking has two faces: one is for themselves, for their own private purpose; the other is for the public, for official purpose.<sup>65</sup>

The reality of these "Soviet-type Communist" societies is, of course, more complicated than any theoretical generalisation. As we have said, Djilas' analysis is mainly based on his own experience. Nowadays, it is easy to tell the differences between different "Communist" societies in different periods. For instance, the post-Stalin Era is different from Stalinist Era, and China is different from the USSR. Moreover, intellectuals in "Communist" societies, either Soviet-type or Chinese-type, are not just passively and totally controlled by the party, but instead, they are still playing different intellectual roles in various fields to varied degrees.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Djilas, 1957: 134-136.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p.133.

<sup>66</sup> Intellectuals' various roles in the Soviet Union have been studied by scholars like L.G. Churchward (1973). And I shall discuss the roles of China's different intellectuals in this thesis.

### (3). Do Intellectuals and Bureaucrats Combine into One?

Noticeably, many critics of "Communist" societies are from these societies. These include former leaders Trotsky, Djilas, scientists Sarkharov, Fang Li-zhi, and literary writers Solzhenitsyn, Liu Bin-yan. Amongst their numerous criticisms, the book *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, written by the Hungarian sociologists **G. Konrad and I. Szelenyi**, is directly relevant to our interest.

Konrad and Szelenyi claimed that in "Soviet-type Communist" societies, or in their own term, in "Eastern European state socialist" societies, since the 1960s, "the difference between intellectuals and bureaucrats were gradually disappearing", and, as a result, a new dominant class "has been composed of the intelligentsia as a whole rather than just the bureaucracy narrowly defined."<sup>67</sup>

Konrad's and Szelenyi's approach to intellectuals is interesting, though they did not differentiate intellectual from intelligentsia very clearly. Firstly, it was not automatically acceptable that an intellectual could be anyone who had a defined store of knowledge and engaged in one of a number of defined occupations, for it is always difficult to know how much knowledge is necessary for someone to be an intellectual, and what sort of occupations are considered to be intellectual jobs. According to them, "intellectuals" should be understood both generically and genetically, both functionally and structurally. That is to say, a man was treated as an intellectual in his time not because he had some general knowledge, but because he had certain specific knowledge, which was

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<sup>67</sup> G. Konrad and I Szelenyi, 1979: XIV-XV, 3.

widely recognised necessary for an intellectual at that time, and by which he obtains his status.<sup>68</sup>

Secondly, like Gramsci, they claimed that everybody has certain knowledge, but not everyone should be thus considered an intellectual. A king probably needs to know a great deal to occupy his throne, a capitalist may need advanced economic, legal, and technical knowledge to run his enterprise, yet they are not intellectuals. "It is not merely knowledge which makes someone an intellectual, but the fact that he has no other title to his status except for his knowledge."<sup>69</sup> Therefore a man should not be an intellectual if he obtains his status because of his money capital however much knowledge he has.

Obviously it is true that different societies define intellectual knowledge in different ways. The question is: why was the intellectual knowledge so different and important that it made those who possess it a dominant class under "Eastern European state socialism" in the 1960s? The authors of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* thought that the most important reason is the changing society itself. They agreed that in market economies intellectuals did not form an independent class, but a stratum between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. However, when capitalism developed into state-monopoly capitalism, intellectuals started being polarised, and even before the "Soviet-type Communist" state was established, intellectuals began to seek power.<sup>70</sup> But all of these did not make intellectuals form a class. The social basis of the emergence of a new

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<sup>68</sup> Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 24-25, 29-32.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., pp.28-29.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., pp. 63-85.

intellectual class in Eastern European socialist societies is: "rational redistribution".

In such a redistributive system, it is the rationality of the redistributors' activity which legitimates their authority. Konrad and Szelenyi claimed that, unlike bureaucracy in market economy, "there is no longer any distinction between the political and economic spheres (or any division of power spheres at all), no dualism of policy making and execution, no pluralism ends" under rational redistribution. Under this condition "there appears the circulation of the bureaucratic elite, an important indication that the intelligentsia is being formed into a class."<sup>71</sup>

Here again, like Mannheim and Gouldner, they thought that education diplomas make intellectuals homogeneous and their intellectual knowledge easily convertible, which is thus "almost as neutral as capital itself."<sup>72</sup> When we examined Mannheim's and Gouldner's theories, we already pointed out that, unlike money capital, education degrees or so-called "cultural capital" cannot be converted in the market, and unlike property, education does not make those who received it socio-economically homogeneous to such a extent that they form a specific class. As a matter of fact, Szelenyi realised this problem when analysing Gouldner's "cultural capital", and clearly claimed that education degree is inconvertible more than ten years later.<sup>73</sup> Logically, we may ask: if education had indeed played such a important part in forming an intellectual class, why would this class not have emerged before the "Communist" period?

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<sup>71</sup> Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 147-150.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., pp.150-151.

<sup>73</sup> Martin and Szelenyi, 1987.

Another problem is that Konrad and Szelenyi, like Djilas again, did not explain why all the members of the intelligentsia should be seen as members of the intellectual class when "the functions of central redistribution in the strict sense are carried out not by the intelligentsia as a whole but by a narrower segment of it—the state and party bureaucracy", and this party bureaucracy could even carry out "the vast, bloody purges" of intellectuals. Are these purges necessary in order to "make the intellectuals understand that early socialism did not mean their direct class rule"?<sup>74</sup>

Also like Djilas, they found that in these "Soviet-type Communist" societies, the ruling Communist party is not just one factor, for example, the most important factor, in the political mechanism, but rather, it *is* the political mechanism. Furthermore, they correctly pointed out that, though there are conflicts between individual bureaucrats, collectively they share a common interest, and the apex of the bureaucracy represents this collective interest.<sup>75</sup> This is very clear when it is pointed out that a "Communist" state is a one-party state in which the ruling party enjoys totalitarian authority, and all important political and economic decisions are made on the upper level of the party bureaucracy.

In contrast, it is not clear at all to say that thus the party members and cadres, that is, the party bureaucrats, consist of intellectuals who, accordingly, form the class basis of the party, and those upper-level

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<sup>74</sup> Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 147, 185-186.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., pp. 152-163.

positions must be occupied by intellectual-officials.<sup>76</sup> Even following Konrad's and Szelenyi's own definition, namely, a man is an intellectual only if "he has no other title to his status except for his intellectual knowledge", we cannot reach such a conclusion, because in those "Soviet-type Communist" societies, including the Eastern European countries in the 1960s, it is not merely intellectual knowledge which makes party officials be elite bureaucrats on the upper level. Revolutionary experiences before the party took power, political achievements before and after that, official positions in the power structure, and even personal relations to the top leadership, are all considerably significant factors.

In spite of some rash generalisations and conclusions, Konrad and Szelenyi did find many specific political-intellectual phenomena in those "Soviet-type Communist" societies. For instance, they found that most intellectuals in fact never join the party, and of those who do turn up in the party many remain to be critical. They also pointed out that, under such a "Communist" system, intellectuals with party membership are privileged and receive advantages, while non-party intellectuals are underprivileged. And therefore, those "intellectuals join the party not in order to advance with it, but in order to acquire (or keep) the status which their professional achievements entitle them to and which in any non-political competition they would attain in any case."<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> It is even more misleading to say that the Communist party should be considered a mass party of the intellectual class and at the same time a cadre party of the working class. Is this because intellectuals make up a higher percentage of the party membership than workers while the proportion of officials who were once workers or whose parents were workers is much higher? Cf., Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 147, 179-180.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., pp.180, 190.



More significantly, they systematically demonstrated the differences between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras, and showed us that, after Stalin's death, the leadership of the party had to realise if it wished to stabilise its power it must reach a compromise with the intellectuals.<sup>78</sup>

#### **IV. Intellectuals and Social Class: Theory and Method**

It seems to me that all the above theoretical approaches to the problem of intellectuals and intelligentsia, except Gramsci's perhaps, share one thing in common: simplistic generalisation. Intellectuals/intelligentsia were either considered "free-floating stratum", "cultural bourgeoisie", or "new ruling bureaucrats". Whatever differences, various kinds of intellectuals were put into *one* certain specific social place.

My own approach towards intellectuals will be different. To focus more on their social positions within a complex of economically and historically given social relations in a certain period of each society than on any other factors, I would argue that intellectuals should not be treated as members of a specific social class or stratum, but instead, they are varied in both socio-economic positions and political/ideological orientations.

The general definition of **intellectuals** can be briefly stated as: all men and women who are occupationally and functionally producers of the ideas concerning nature, society, human beings, and cosmos, by virtue of any types of symbols in every given society. Accordingly, any person could be regarded to be an intellectual if she or he is a member of such a

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<sup>78</sup> Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 186-187, 192-200.

category, regardless of whether she/he has received higher education or obtained a degree, and irrespective of her/his family background. Intellectuals can be either conservative, or liberal, or radical, or critical; whatever ideological orientation one prefers, it is not entirely a matter of free choice, but rather, it is conditioned by the position in the given social structure. In addition, of course, political orientation is more or less influenced by relations from one's past, such as social origin, educational background and work experience. What is more, social relations, to which intellectuals as well as others actually connect, are always changing. And, as a result, the various ideological or political outlooks of different intellectuals are not always immutable and invariable.

**Intelligentsia**, in contrast, may still be defined in the classical sense. It is a specific kind of intellectuals, whose members are always critical towards the *status quo*, feeling a responsibility to change, or at least politically influence, the minds of the leaders and citizens of their society and hence their society itself. Such an intelligentsia does not necessarily exist in every society in every period. And if it does, it is just a minority of intellectuals. How and why its members are critical results greatly from their particular social and cultural surroundings and their specific intellectual and political experiences. However critical, they are not innately so.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> To avoid confusion of this intelligentsia with others, especially with widely-called "technical intelligentsia" (which covers those scientific or technical experts who apply knowledge into practice), I will in this thesis call it either classical intelligentsia, or critical intelligentsia, or simply intelligentsia.

Intellectuals in different societies during different historical periods can be different to such an extent that we cannot sociologically treat them as the same by only using a general definition or description. On the other hand, however great the differences amongst various intellectuals, they are all conditioned or bound by their social relations. Intellectuals are not privileged free-floating members of a special social stratum, nor do they form a specific independent class.

Based on this hypothesis, this research examines the participation of China's established intellectuals in the continual political campaigns from 1949 to 1976. "Established intellectuals" mean those intellectuals who are well-known because of both their professional achievements in natural and social sciences, literature and art, philosophy, etc., and their social involvement in politics. These established intellectuals can be either Gramsci's "organic intellectuals" of the establishment or "traditional intellectuals", either members of intelligentsia or individual intellectuals from other social groups. By "political campaigns", I mean those the CCP and Mao launched to criticise intellectuals or their works from 1949 to 1976, no matter whether they were called "political campaigns" by the CCP at that time. I shall not pay much attention to those so-called "political campaigns", for example, Aid-Korean Campaign (1950), which have little to do with intellectuals. The period of 1949-1976 is the time from Mao's taking power over China to his death.

Based on this examination of the participation of China's established intellectuals in political campaigns, the relations between their political roles and their social positions, and between the Chinese Communist Party and various kinds of established intellectuals, will be analysed. The major hypothesis of this thesis is: the more posts intellectuals hold in the socio-

political structure, the less choices (or "freedoms") they enjoy in political campaigns.

This work will be a piece of sociological research and thus should not be read as a historical record of the People's Republic under Mao Ze-dong. However, this will be the first systematic sociological research on China's established intellectuals in political campaigns both in the West and in China, which at the same time includes a careful historical survey and detailed documentary analysis of the whole process of those political campaigns. But unless it is impossible to ignore them, factors beyond the written words, for instance, economic development, and international relations, will not be detailed.

The methods I shall use will be mainly documentary analysis. The documents and materials I shall use are mainly selected from the articles concerning socio-political affairs written by these established intellectuals themselves during the period of 1949-1976. Of course, their professional works before 1949, and those recollections, memoirs, biographies, and autobiographies by either these established intellectuals themselves or their friends, students, and relatives after 1976, will not be ignored. I shall also refer to official papers and other sources, including the academic research outside China.

People may reasonably question the reliability of these articles published in the official press within the periods of political campaigns. My answer is that, firstly, and most importantly, my interest is not what intellectuals really *felt* when they wrote these articles, but the fact that they *did* write them. From here we will get a picture of how intellectuals under the "Communist" system behave, willingly or unwillingly.

Secondly, I choose these articles as the first hand materials because the official media were the only channels through which intellectuals could express their opinions to the public, and these articles are the only original records of their public show during those years. When I say that they were the *only* channels and the *only* original records, I do not deny that literary works may be perhaps seen as exceptions which also could be considered as channels and records. However, literary works too had no way to be made known without going through the official censorship and printing by the official publishing houses.

As to those unofficial publications or "underground press", I must point out, firstly, unlike in the Soviet Union, hardly have we heard of such things in China under Mao even if they existed; secondly, even after Mao, for instance, on 1979's "Democratic Wall" in Peking, we could rarely find big-character posters written by any established intellectuals who are the subjects of this thesis; and thirdly, there were indeed some intellectual dissidents from China in the West who wrote certain numbers of works since 1949, and especially after 1980, but their publications are not sufficient for this research, though I will not ignore them entirely.

Another question that may be asked is: should we consider these articles in the official press reflections of the social reality or just "carefully-painted pictures" of society by the authorities? The answer is not simply yes or no, because, as we have said, in a "Communist" society all the media are official. I would rather say it is both. Firstly, these articles will tell us how the CCP controls intellectuals' social involvement in political campaigns, for it is the CCP which decides who can publish articles in the official

press, what kind of articles can be published, and which page/how many pages will be given to these articles.

Secondly, from these articles we are also able to know how intellectuals get involved in political campaigns, for intellectuals in a "Communist" society have no way to participate in socio-political development except this kind of involvement with the permission of the ruling party. Therefore intellectuals' activities under the control of the ruling party is the real picture of intellectuals' activities in a "Communist" one-party state, and the official press indeed reflects the social reality of such a control and of such intellectual activities. Since my interest is intellectuals' participation in politics under the "Communist" system, to look into their articles in official press in detail for me is not only necessary, but also exciting, and, moreover, meaningful.

By looking through these articles we can know their different political performances and voices, no matter whether they willingly or rather unwillingly did/thought so. It does not mean, however, that their complex feelings can be simply forgotten. On the contrary, despite the fact that it is by no means a psychological search for their inner world, the thesis will reveal their personal experiences.

Chapter Two will briefly give a necessary historical background of China's intellectuals since Confucius. It will also generally outline the socio-institutional conditions China's intellectuals as well as other citizens have been living in and by since 1949. In Chapters Three and Four, while the whole process of continual political campaigns will be examined carefully, the various roles of the established intellectuals in different social groups will be analysed. Through such an analysis, the relationship

between the socio-political posts of China's established intellectuals and their ideological functions will be seen clearly. And what is more, the question of intellectuals' social location, that is, the question whether they are members of a "free-floating stratum", or of an independent class, or even of a ruling bourgeoisie or ruling bureaucracy, can be answered as far as China's established intellectuals during the period 1949-1976 are concerned.

Based on this, Chapters Five and Six will present some further case studies, in which four individual established intellectuals have been chosen from different groups, according to both their great professional achievement and their deep involvement in the political campaigns. From these case studies, we will further get a detailed picture indicating that different kinds of intellectuals under the "Communist" systems have different positions, functions, opinions, and results.

In Chapter Seven, I shall critically analyse Mao Ze-dong's thought and practice on China's intellectuals, and end with my own conclusion.

## **CHAPTER 2: China's Intellectuals & Intelligentsia:** **Their Historical Background & Social Conditions**

Literati in China, since the Spring-Autumn Annals(722-481B.C.), if not earlier, have played significant social, political and economic roles. By becoming scholar-officials through the Civil Service Examinations since Han Dynasty(206B.C.-A.D.220), they were further to be legalised to participate in socio-political development. As time went on to the late Qing Dynasty since the 1840s, especially since the beginning of the twentieth century, there appeared in the Chinese political arena a new kind of educated men, *i.e.* , the Western-educated intellectuals who, being either liberal or radical or even revolutionary, played a so-called "vanguard" role, whilst the traditional literati lost their privilege to be officials because of the abolition of the Civil Examination System in 1904.

On the other hand, in the historical process of the social transformation of China from the imperial society to the current one, it was intellectuals themselves, who, as either initiators, advocates, or participants of this transformation, suffered psychologically or even physically, many of them were severely punished. Why did intellectuals rather than any other social group play such an important role? How have they played it? Should we thus treat them as an independent stratum? Such questions can not be satisfactorily answered without surveying and analysing the background from which they came and developed, and the general situations under which they lived and worked.



## I. Traditional Literati

In this thesis, I will adopt a basic theoretical approach to Chinese history, especially the history since the nineteenth century. Like many other scholars, for instance, Benjamin Schwartz, I will consider the socio-political history of twentieth-century China as essentially a consequence of the social conflict within Chinese society itself. That is to say, the social change in twentieth-century China, including the "Communist Revolution" since the 1920s, was resulted more from internal development of Chinese society than any other external intervention, for instance, the Russian Revolution of 1917, though the later played by no means an unimportant part.<sup>1</sup>

In traditional Chinese society, an educated man was called SHU SHENG("scholar") or WEN REN("literatus"), but never ZHI SHI FEN ZI("intellectual"). ZHI SHI FEN ZI was translated from the Japanese word for intelligentsia or intellectual. Originally there was no word for "intelligentsia" or "intellectual" in Chinese. Precisely, ZHI SHI FEN ZI as a term in Chinese means "members of the people who know" or "elements of the people who have knowledge". Even though every person in some degree knows something or has some knowledge, ZHI SHI FEN ZI to common Chinese people denote exclusively the men and women who have received formal education in schools.

Traditionally, China's scholars or literati were chiefly cultivated by Confucianism for most of the two thousand years since the Han Dynasty

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., B. I. Schwartz, 1951; M. Meisner, 1967; and A. Dirlik, 1989.

(206 B.C.-A.D.220). Yet Confucianism in Confucius' time (551-479 B.C.) was merely one of the "hundred schools of thought". Among these schools the other two influential but opposite ones were: Legalist School (FA JIA), which insisted that social order should be imposed on a society and its people, for human nature was motivated merely by self-interest which could destroy the social whole; and Taoist School (DAO JIA), which claimed that everything man-made, including government, law, *etc.*, could only create confusion, for people, being by nature without these systems, are parts of the universe and are harmonious *per se*. Confucianism stood in the middle of these two schools, emphasising that only by the Golden Mean (ZHONG YONG ZHI DAO) could human beings successfully deal with social disorders and thus achieve harmony. On the one hand, Confucianism asserts that a society can never be in order unless people abide by some established disciplines which divide people into superior and inferior, noble and lowly categories, namely, the rulers and the ruled. It sets such great store by social order that loyalty and obedience to the authorities become an overwhelming factor. That is to say, for the sake of keeping society in order, it is more necessary for a son to be filial to his father; for a wife, obedient to her husband; for the younger, faithful to the older; for a subordinate, submissive to his ruler; and for all, loyal to the emperor, than to be innovative, creative, intellectual and critical.

On the other hand, according to Confucianism, a society cannot be harmonious unless the rulers are well-educated and therefore love their people. Confucius and his followers divided people into JUN ZI ("gentlemen") and XIAO REN ("mean persons"). A "gentleman" is one who knows the disciplines and rules of the Zhou Dynasty (about 1100-221 B.C.)

from reading the classics, whereas a "mean person" is one who does not, for he cannot read. Gradually, a man was seen in turn as a "gentleman" if he could read, but a "mean person" if he could not. However, it is not enough for literati to have knowledge or to know how to read. What is more important is that they do their best to perfect their conduct. Human beings, Confucianism teaches the Chinese, are by nature good; but if a person is not educated his nature will deteriorate. Accordingly human beings can be moulded into moral perfection only through education including, more significantly, self-cultivation. It is education which makes people divergent: gentlemen versus mean people. A gentleman is superior to a mean person not only because he has the capacity to read and write, but also, more importantly, because he puts good conduct above all other considerations. In this sense, a gentlemen should know not only things but, more importantly, people as well; further, he should not only simply know people, but above all, love them, as Confucius said, knowledge means to know people, and benevolence means to love them.<sup>2</sup> A government which has such gentlemen as its officials is a good government, a society ruled by such a government is a good society.

Confucianism dominated the minds of the Chinese for thousands of years until the end of the last century. Even nowadays the following quotations from Mencius (about 372-289 B.C.) are well-known amongst both educated and uneducated Chinese: "Some labour with their minds, some labour with their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others, those who

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<sup>2</sup> Confucius, 1979: 116.

labour with their strength are governed by others."<sup>3</sup> Although social reality is much more complex than Mencius described, one thing is clear: literati with knowledge and high moral standards should, according to Mencius, be the governors.

For thousands of years China's scholars, influenced by Confucian ideology, took it for granted that no one except themselves had the capacity to run the country well, make society peaceful, and bring order to the land. At the same time, Chinese society was characterised by the simplicity of the organisation of material production in isolated, fragmentary and self-sufficient communities in the rural areas. Here the majority of the Chinese people lived quietly from generation to generation. Another characteristic of Chinese society was the interference of the centralising power of government, with a large bureaucracy affecting all social life in urban areas.

As time went on, China's Confucian scholars recognised that their proud grasp of the Confucian classics and their superior moral conduct could only be socially acknowledged if they occupied certain positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy. For an ambitious youth, to be an official meant to share actual power, which could be more important to him than being a scholar. However, it was still necessary to be a scholar because, as Confucius said, only "a good scholar can make an official".<sup>4</sup> As a result, a special kind of group with a double personality came onto the stage: SHI DA FU (scholar-officials).

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<sup>3</sup> Mencius, 1983: 101.

<sup>4</sup> Confucius also said that "a good official can make a scholar". For him, a man should be both a good scholar and a good official. Confucius, 1979: 155.

The existence of scholar-officials was justified and legitimatised by the establishment of the Civil Service Examination System (KE JU ZHI DU) in A.D.585, which lasted more than a thousand years until 1905. Under this system, every man, except members of families of slaves, servants, prostitutes, entertainers, and so on, could theoretically be recruited as an administrator if he showed his mastery of the official classical texts by passing the Civil Service Examinations. Consequently, both private and state schools were designed specifically to prepare youths to pass the examinations. Tutors and teachers taught chiefly "the classics and the histories" especially the Confucian canon, rather than applied knowledge and skills. Meanwhile, both parents and sons, who realised that to pass the examinations and thereby fill the requirements of the state was more useful than to seek truth and have an independent status, accepted the guidance towards an official career. Without doubt, not all scholars could be scholar-officials, but for many, being a scholar was just the means to become an official. Reading the Confucian classics became the key to open the door of officialdom.

It seems that social rank and political position in China were determined more by qualifications than by wealth. And it was education and success in examinations which determined qualifications. Was it a "real democratic" examination system for it offered an equal opportunity to all who wanted to enter positions of officialdom? In practice, however, outstanding scholars were seldom recruited to be officials purely as a result of their ability. Needless to say, poor parents could not afford to give their sons an education

based on the lengthy study of official texts which was required to pass the examinations.

As a matter of fact, education in traditional China was socio-economically restricted to the sons of rich families whose patriarchs had already been scholar-officials in most cases. In a society where agriculture had always been the basic and foremost form of material production the rich families were of course mainly the landlords. The relations between economic property, academic status and political position in traditional Chinese society could, as J.K.Fairbank elucidated, be briefly summarised as following: with agricultural surplus, landlords could give their sons time and money for studying classical texts to become scholars; with a mastery of classical texts, scholars could pass the examinations and then become officials; and with the perquisites and profits of bureaucratic government, officials could protect and increase their landholdings.<sup>5</sup> Academic study in traditional China thus became the necessary intermediary connecting economic property and political power, and the Chinese ruling class was therefore made up of the tripod of landlords, scholars, and officials, who were called SHEN SHI (the Gentry).

Because of these economic, political and academic advantages, the gentry could stand above the majority of the commoners, have recognised political power and privileges, and enjoy social prestige. The gentry as the ruling class should not be simply understood as a category of individuals; on the

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<sup>5</sup> J.K. Fairbank, 1979:32-46.

contrary, they came into social being and played their economic and political roles in the form of families, clans, or even larger social groups.

Accordingly, it was not necessary for each member of the gentry to be a landlord, a scholar, and an official simultaneously. In practice, a landlord might be too lazy to study the classics, a scholar could fail in the examinations, and an official might by chance come from a poor peasant family. Generally speaking, not all landlords were scholars, and not all scholars were officials, but all officials must be "scholars" (*i.e.*, the men who passed the Civil Examinations), and all "scholars" must be landlords (*i.e.*, the men who had their own pieces of land<sup>6</sup>).

The gentry as a whole, however, owned the main means of material production (land), controlled the production of ideas and governed the state. Therefore it was necessary for each family or clan of the gentry to have a member who passed the examinations and became a scholar-official. China had been a society in which the emperor, whose word was to be said "law", theoretically had absolute power. And, as a result, members of other families or clans could only be shielded from the unchecked power of the monarch when there was at least one member who had a post in the political structure and could thereby use his power and privilege to keep the back door always open for his relatives. Without a strong man in officialdom, it could never be easy to protect the members of a family or clan and their properties. On the contrary, as a Chinese saying describes, "if one man rises to officialdom, then

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<sup>6</sup> Some of them of course could first pass the Examination and then bought their property.

all his dogs and chickens will be promoted." (YI REN DE DAO, JI QUAN SHENG TIAN.)

The price a scholar-official paid for keeping his position was very high: to bend his back. He had to be compliant towards the emperor while being severe towards the commoners. He was constantly faced by a dilemma: as a scholar nurtured by Confucianism he should be straight and honest in performing his duties, and kind-hearted and benevolent in his treatment of the common people; as an official under the rule of an autocratic monarchy, which was justified by Confucianism, he should follow the emperor's whims, abide by his authorities, and sometimes he had to give up his beliefs, break his promises, and sell out his friends. Obviously "scholar-official" is a terminologically self-contradictory concept which describes the double face of the Chinese literati in officialdom. The two elements were not always balanced, and when scholar-officials had to make the choice between rebellion against the established settings and giving up their beliefs, they found in most cases that there was no alternative but to be realistic. As Fei Xiao-tong said, "since Chinese scholars were never in any sense revolutionary, they naturally chose the latter".<sup>7</sup>

Needless to point out, the social reality is never as simple as any generalisation summarises. During the long course of Chinese history, there always were some literati who either remained unattached to any office, for instance, Buddhists and Taoists, or critical towards the *status quo* because it was contrary to their ideals whatever school they belonged to. There were

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<sup>7</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1953:17-74.



also some realistic Confucian literati who either failed to pass the examinations or were frustrated in their ambitions to be promoted to higher political positions. Furthermore, there were even some scholar-officials who enjoyed success in officialdom but continued to behave as scholars and thus were able to keep to their moral code. And finally, there were also many non-official literati, for instance, Chinese traditional doctors, some leaders of secret societies.<sup>8</sup> Because of these circumstances some of the Chinese literati could be individually respected as men who lived for truth, or considered themselves as the bearers of the homogeneous culture of China.

As far as the social position of China's *established* literati and/or scholar-officials is concerned, however, they were economically tied to their land on the one hand, and politically bound to their positions in officialdom on the other. Their relationship with office was so close that they cannot be simply regarded as relatively independent intellectuals in Western sense.<sup>9</sup>

## II. The Emergence of the Modern Chinese Intelligentsia

For thousands of years China's basic social structure within which the gentry dominated social life, ruled the state and controlled the production of ideas through scholar-officials, their representatives in office, had never been fundamentally shaken by the continual palace coups, the numerous peasant

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<sup>8</sup> Cf., D. Johnson, et al, 1985: 37-72; E. Shils, 1990: 268-269.

<sup>9</sup> Weber in his research even concluded that "the educated stratum of China has never been an autonomous status group of scholars, ... but rather a stratum of officials and aspirants to office." (M. Weber, 1964: 122.) Such a conclusion, however, seems a little simplistic.

uprisings, and the occasional alien invasions or even occupations. A successful palace coup without the support of other social classes could only change the personnel of the government individually; a peasant uprising lacking the necessary development of the economy could not shift basic social relations from the old to the new; and occupation by aliens did often result in a paradoxical phenomenon: the foreign military invaders in the end might themselves be culturally conquered.

However, in the nineteenth century, the situation in China changed dramatically. Throughout the nineteenth century, China encountered new problems which the Chinese had never met before, and which, in the end, brought the Qing Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China, to an end. Such a predicament resulted from a series of connected factors: peasant migration from the land; over-population in urban areas; the unemployment of literati; official corruption; local or national rebellions; and Western encroachment. Corruption had always existed, but it had become so serious that administrative incompetence, moral disintegration, economic recession, and social upheaval also erupted. Rebellion alone could never usher in a new society but it could, together with other factors, destroy the old one. And foreign invaders could hardly impose a new social system onto the conquered but might hasten the collapse of the old structure if it was in decline. In nineteenth-century China, the social structure seemed unfortunately to be in such a state. The Tai-ping Rebellion, the biggest and best-known of the Qing Dynasty rebel movement, is a good example of the coming together of these factors. This rebellion, called TAI PING TIAN GUO (Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace), led by a failed scholar Hong Xiu-quang (1814-1864), was an inevitable outcome of social conflicts within China on the one hand, and

influence from the West, especially Christianity, on the other.<sup>10</sup> The Tai-ping Rebellion was eventually put down by the provincial army, Hunan Troops, rather than the army of the central government. The rebellion and the way it ended signalled the shift of political power from the centre and the challenge to the Confucian ideology for which the gentry had stood for centuries. As Zeng Guo-fan (1811-1872), one of the Qing Dynasty's most prominent Confucian scholar-officials, who financed, organised and led the Hunan Troops to suppress the Tai-ping Rebellion, recognised when he began his "Ten-year Struggle" to save the declining imperial dynasty: the Tai-ping Rebellion marked not merely a crisis for the Qing Dynasty, but rather "an unprecedented crisis in the history of Confucian moral principles."<sup>11</sup>

If the Tai-ping Rebellion showed the crisis of the political and ideological authority of the imperial dynasty, the Western invasion from the 1840s marked the internal weakness of such authority. To the Qing authorities, both the Manchurian princes and the Chinese scholar-officials, nothing was more frightening than the West. Economic plunder, military aggression, and cultural infiltration from the Western countries, including Britain, France, Germany, America, Russia, and Japan, not only forced the Qing Government repeatedly to cede territory and pay indemnities, but also caused China's gentry and their scholar-officials to lose the psychological confidence and feeling of cultural superiority which they had maintained for tens of centuries.

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<sup>10</sup> Cf., V.C. Shih, 1967; S.Y. Teng, 1971; E.P. Boardman, 1972; and Y. Jen, 1973.

<sup>11</sup> Cf., J.B.Grieder, 1981: 66.

As a matter of fact, it took time for the Chinese literati to be taught that China was no longer the "Central Kingdom of the World". At the outset they looked down on Westerners, seeing them as uncivilised "long haired barbarians", but, after successive military defeats, they recognised that China should at least learn about technology from the West. The scholar-officials of insight launched Western Affairs Movement, aiming at Self-strengthening & Restoration (ZI QIANG FU XIN). Li Hong-zhang (1823-1901), another outstanding scholar-official and a follower of Zeng Guo-fan, claimed that China could not continue to be conservative when foreign countries were undertaking reforms one after another, day by day the nation would be reduced and weakened otherwise.<sup>12</sup>

The initiators of this movement, however, never tried to create a new society, nor to challenge Confucianism, but rather, they dreamt of restoring China's power and strength. In the eyes of these scholar-officials, what China needed was only skills and techniques while the classical ideology of rule by virtue was still unquestionable. As the well-known slogan put forward by Zhang Zhi-dong (1837-1909) said: "Chinese learning for the fundamentals, Western learning for practical application." (ZHONG XUE WEI TI, XI XUE WEI YONG.)<sup>13</sup>

The most influential effort to save China from domestic troubles and foreign invasion in the nineteenth century was the "Hundred Days Reform of 1898" promoted by Kang You-wei (1858-1927), the most famous reformer of the

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<sup>12</sup> Cf., Grieder, 1981: 22; S.Teng, J.K.Fairbank (ed.), 1964:18; and S. Spector, 1964.

<sup>13</sup> Cf., W. Ayers, 1971; M. Bastid, 1988.

late Qing Dynasty. He was known as "Kang the Modern Sage and Reformer", and sponsored by the open-minded Emperor Guang Xu (1875-1908). The Reform of 1898 added an illustrious page to Chinese history because it was the first time that China's literati, represented by Kang You-wei and his disciple Liang Qi-chao (1873-1929), took the initiative in trying to save their nation by systematic reform. They wanted to modernise the Chinese state and its administration, military and police systems, law, education, technology and economy on the one hand, and on the other to seek a way to open the minds of the Chinese towards the world (*i.e.*, the West), to weave new relationships between China and the West, the governor and the governed, and the past and the present.<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately, this Reform lasted less than a hundred days and the dream of changing society by reform ended with 1898's Coup of September. It could be suggested that the period of the Reform was short because it came too late. However, we should remember that, down to the end of the nineteenth century, the scholar-officials as reformers at no point sought to overthrow the imperial authority by arousing the masses of the Chinese, in spite of perceiving the great gap dividing the rulers from the ruled. Rather, they were convinced that a conscientious elite minority with a broader vision, supported by an opened-minded emperor, could save the nation. It is not surprising that for these literati the problem was not the social system, but right rulership. Such reform, launched by scholars, and relying on this or that emperor, but without the support of society, could have little future.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Cf., J.R. Levenson, 1953; J. Lo, 1967; H. Chang, 1971; P.C. Huang, 1972; and Hsiao Kungchuan, 1975.

<sup>15</sup> Cf., F. Wakeman, 1973; L.S.K. Kwong, 1984.

The failure of the Reform of 1898, however, was a sign that China had to undertake a more profound social change during which not only the policies of the government, and the personnel of officialdom, but also the social system, the relationship of the governor to the governed, must be replaced. Now it was no longer a question of China keeping its power and strength, but a question of catching up with the West. The ideas, efforts, and failure of Kang You-wei and Liang Qi-chao enlightened the minds of China's new generation of intelligentsia.

The first generation of China's modern intellectuals emerged during the Revolution of 1911. They were called "modern intelligentsia" not merely because they translated the term "intelligentsia" from Japanese to describe themselves when studying in Japan, but also, more meaningfully, because they were more or less Westernised, and shared a critical or even revolutionary attitude towards Chinese society and its rulers. Aiming at overthrowing the imperial authority and establishing a Western-type republic, they indeed made a revolution which destroyed the Qing Dynasty in 1911.

Ironically, the first generation of China's modern intelligentsia was created by the Qing Government itself. Educational reform was the major concern of the reformers serving the state in the late Qing Dynasty. It included the abolition of the Eight-legged Essay (BA GU WEN)<sup>16</sup> in 1898 and of the Civil

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<sup>16</sup> Eight-legged Essay is a literary composition, best-known for its strict rigidity of form (eight parts/legs), which each candidate must write for the Civil Service Examination.

Service Examination System in 1905, and the establishment of professional schools during the last years of the nineteenth century. In these newly-established schools, students could learn not only traditional Chinese classics but foreign languages, military science, navigation and shipbuilding as well. In 1904 a full-fledged education system was set up, patterned after Western models and consisting of primary school, middle school and college.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, some outstanding students were even sent to Western countries such as Britain, Germany, the United States, and above all, to Japan. Amongst them there were people who, sooner or later, characterised the process of the transformation of China. Here two men should be mentioned briefly: Yan Fu (1853-1921) and Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). The former was the pioneer in the translation of Western works into Chinese, including T.H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* in 1898 and H. Spencer's *A Study of Sociology* in 1903. These two books greatly influenced the minds of the first generation of China's modern intelligentsia. The latter was the founder of the Revolution Alliance (TON MENG HUI), the predecessor of the Kuomintang (KMT). Initially, the purpose of the Revolution Alliance was simply to free the Han people from the rule of the Qing Dynasty ruled by the alien Manchurians. Ultimately, this organisation established the first republic in Chinese history: the Republic of China.<sup>18</sup>

Returned students from Japan and the West played a significant socio-political role in the Revolution of 1911. These students, who had absorbed various Western ideas, especially evolutionary and revolutionary ones,

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<sup>17</sup> W. Ayers, 1971; P.A. Cohen, 1974.

<sup>18</sup> B. Schwartz, 1964; H.Z. Schiffrin, 1968; and C.M. Wilbur, 1976; and K. Laitinen, 1990.

believed that China must be changed to a Western-type republic through revolution in order to elevate it to a position of freedom and equality among nations. At first, however, they were merely a minority of radicals who even sought to change society through terrorism, such as the assassination of the emperor.

The Revolution of 1911 was led by Dr Sun Yet-sen and his friends, a group of radical intelligentsia, but socially based on the conflicts within society. It did topple the throne of the emperor and end autocratic monarchy, and therefore Dr Sun Yet-sen came to be remembered as "the Father of the Nation".<sup>19</sup> Yet a social revolution, the goal of which was to change traditional society by creating a new kind of people, was much more complicated than the establishment of a new kind of governmental system, which, at most, could be seen as the first step of a "long march". The young intellectual revolutionaries at that time were mentally ill-prepared for it. As a result, the period after the establishment of the Republic was marked by a series of events such as Yuan Shi-kai's proclaiming himself emperor, Zhang Xun's restoration of the dethroned monarch, and, more serious and long-lasting, the emergence of separatist war-lord regimes.<sup>20</sup> In the meantime, China and its people fell into chaos, and the revolutionary intelligentsia was increasingly disappointed at the situation. In the Revolution, they thought that they had achieved two of the three great goals of the Revolution. These three were: to free the Han Chinese from the Manchurian rules, to establish a democratic government, and to improve the living conditions of the

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<sup>19</sup> Cf., Y.C. Wang, 1966; L. Bianco, 1971; M.B. Rankin, 1971; H. Chang, 1987; L.E. Ma, 1990.

<sup>20</sup> Cf., L.W. Pye, 1971; S.R. MacKinnon, 1980.



commoners. But after that, they found things different from what they expected. They were now far less optimistic than they had been in the days of the Revolution. Dr Sun Yet-sen even admitted that "the Revolution has not accomplished yet".<sup>21</sup>

The scholar-officials of the Qing Dynasty, whether conservatives or radicals, whether Zeng Guo-fan and Li Hong-zhang or Kang You-wei and Liang Qichao, were nevertheless traditional literati, nurtured by Confucianism and bound to the ruling class. On the contrary, the first generation of the modern intelligentsia, whether nationalists or "bourgeois revolutionaries", were educated abroad, especially in Japan, and attached not to officialdom but financially dependent on overseas Chinese merchants.<sup>22</sup> Therefore the fundamental disagreement on the way to strengthen the nation could be easily identified: reform or revolution. It resulted from their different socio-economic positions rather than their own personal orientations: all reformers in the late Qing Dynasty occupied some posts in officialdom, while all revolutionaries did not. In spite of this, they still shared something in common: both groups tried to save the nation but both, thinking themselves geniuses and the masses fools, kept their distance from the commoners and thus lacked the mass support of other social classes. The leaders of the Revolution of 1911 first tried to overthrow the Qing Dynasty by forming a secret society (the Revolutionary Alliance), and when they realised that the reactionary forces were too strong, they then turned to local warlords who too wanted to destroy the central government of the Qing Dynasty. Only

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<sup>21</sup> Sun Yet-sen, 1927:I. English translation is modified.

<sup>22</sup> Cf., Yen Ching Hwang, 1976.

before his death in 1925, did Dr Sun Yet-sen recognise that to save the nation "we must bring about a thorough awakening of *the masses of our own people*."<sup>23</sup> (My emphasis)

The idea that the enlightenment of the common people was the prerequisite of the salvation of the nation was not widespread until the May Fourth Movement in 1919, during which the second generation of China's modern intelligentsia grew up. This generation, unlike the first, was composed not only of students returned from the West, but, greater in number, of students and teachers within China as well. Among them there were several varieties of leading figures, differentiated by their various roles at that time, and/or by their influence on Chinese history afterwards. Among these were: Hu Shi (1891-1962) and Lu Xun (1881-1936), the foremost advocates of the New Culture Movement which ensured that the vernacular language gradually replaced classical Chinese. Chen Du-xiu (1880-1942) and Li Da-zhao (1889-1927), the pioneers of intellectuals who introduced Marxism into China and the the founders of the CCP. Zhou En-lai (1898-1976) and Mao Ze-dong (1893-1976), two of the young activists who later became the leaders of the CCP and the People's Republic of China.<sup>24</sup>

The May Fourth Movement was remarkable not only because it created the second generation of China's revolutionary intelligentsia, but also because this intelligentsia, as educated people, resolutely rejected Confucianism,

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<sup>23</sup> Sun Yat-sen, 1927:I. English translation is modified.

<sup>24</sup> M. Meisner, 1967; S.R. Schram, 1967; J.B. Grieder, 1970; Hsueh Chun-tu, 1971; B. Schwartz, 1972; L. Feigon, 1983; D. Wilson, 1984; V. Schwarcz, 1986; A. Dirlik, 1988; and Jin Cong-ji, 1989.

which had been the dominant ideology for tens of centuries. It was the first time that Confucian doctrine had been rejected in public when the May Fourth intelligentsia called for "DE XIAN SHENG" (Mr Democracy) and "SAI XIAN SHENG" (Mr Science), and cried "down with Confucianism!" Lu Xun in his short story *The Diary of A Madman*, the first written in the vernacular, declared that behind the mask of virtue and benevolence of the Confucian classics, which were full of words like "loving people", there were only two words: killing people (CHI REN).<sup>25</sup>

But the most politically significant characteristic of China's revolutionary intelligentsia was its connection with the masses of Chinese people. Unprecedentedly they went down to the masses of workers and then of peasants instead of being bound within the literati and standing above the commoners. From the beginning of the May Fourth Movement in 1919 onwards there were more and more educated youths who learned to integrate themselves with the masses, which changed both the masses and the intelligentsia itself to a certain extent. Needless to say, the historical process of the integration of the intelligentsia with the masses of workers and peasants was a lengthy process. In the first stage, the May Fourth intelligentsia, unlike the first generation, recognised that it should be the foremost task to enlighten the masses. Thus they went down to the masses, first to the workers and then to the peasants, "to disseminate truth"; yet like the first generation, they saw themselves as teachers of the masses and the masses as their pupils. This only changed after 1927, the year the KMT and

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<sup>25</sup> Lu Xun, 1980: 54. Cf., P.H. Chen, 1976. Lu Xun's attitude towards Confucian tradition seems too radical. Cf., Lin Yu-shen, 1979.

the CCP split up into their respective political factions, when the latter was weak and had to escape to the countryside. As a result of waging a long and painful guerrilla war in the remote mountain areas, the intelligentsia in the CCP gradually began to recognise that, on the one hand, the advanced elements of the intelligentsia could never change the old society into something new unless they enlightened and mobilised the masses of the people; on the other hand, and more importantly, the intelligentsia should take the masses as their teachers, drawing on the wisdom of the masses. Otherwise they might change their original intention and themselves slip back into the old rut of being intellectual aristocrats. As a matter of fact, until 1939 when Mao made a speech marking the twentieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, nobody had clarified the point that, although they are usually the first sector of people to be awakened and thus play the role of vanguard, standing at the head of the revolutionary rank, "if intellectuals do not become one with the masses of workers and peasants, then they will accomplish nothing" as far as revolution is concerned.<sup>26</sup>

In praxis, this process of integration with the masses was full of conflicts, misunderstandings, political quagmires, and spiritual troubles. As we have mentioned, this process came about partly because of the unexpected KMT-CCP conflict in 1927. What is more, an unforeseen consequence resulted from this happened. That is: when Mao and his intellectual colleagues took power after more than twenty years' struggle in 1949, most of their soldiers were illiterate "peasants in uniform". Because of this, thereafter, the relationship of the revolutionary intelligentsia to those peasants in uniform

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<sup>26</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1954<sup>b</sup>: 10-17.

became one of the serious problems that the CCP had to face. This was dramatically demonstrated in the political campaigns from 1949 to 1976. Was it that peasants in uniform distrust these intellectuals, as Mannheim generalised that when intellectuals attach themselves to a class the original members of this class can still distrust these intellectuals?<sup>27</sup> Or was there a class struggle, as Mao asserted, because most of the members of the intelligentsia originally came from rich families and thus still represented the interests of the middle and/or upper classes as far as their world outlooks were concerned?

When the May Fourth generation intelligentsia and their followers participated in the struggle against the warlords and foreign invaders, and in the process of integration with the masses, there also existed another kind of educated people: the "traditional intellectuals", if we use Gramsci's term. It was not necessary for these traditional intellectuals to be Confucian literati. As a matter of fact, since the beginning of the twentieth century, many of China's educated people were not really traditional, but, more or less, Westernised, no matter whether they had studied abroad or not, for the education system, as we have said, was reformed along the lines of the Western systems after 1898. This category of "traditional intellectuals" covered most of the scientists, scholars, writers and artists. Comparatively speaking, they were more liberal in terms of their political views, but less active in the political arena; more successful in their professional accomplishments, but less capable in practical fields; more aloof from social affairs, but less courageous in adhering to their beliefs, than the

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<sup>27</sup> K.Mannheim, 1979:141.

revolutionary intelligentsia, or, "organic intellectuals". On the one hand, like the revolutionary intelligentsia, traditional intellectuals were dissatisfied with the situation that had existed in China since the 1840s, and dreamed of a new China with power, wealth and independence; on the other hand, like the traditional scholar-officials, they were tied to the gentry in many ways and separated themselves from the commoners, thinking themselves the "elite of the nation". The relationship between these two kinds of educated people, *i.e.*, revolutionary intelligentsia and traditional intellectuals, became another serious problem after 1949. For the former, the problem was, as Gramsci predicted<sup>28</sup>, how to assimilate and conquer the traditional intellectuals ideologically and/or institutionally; but for the latter, the problem was how to adapt themselves to new social circumstances while keeping their traditional ways of living and thinking.

Without doubt, these two problems were in fact interweaved. The "peasants in uniform" had a distrust of, and a conflict with, both the revolutionary intelligentsia and traditional intellectuals, who were considered to be either bourgeois or petty bourgeois elements, for they both had received school education which, in the eyes of the "peasants in uniform", was a kind of privilege, which exclusively belonged to the bourgeoisie in China before 1949. Moreover, it was not only traditional intellectuals who were separated from the commoners, but also, perhaps more significantly, the former revolutionary intelligentsia who, together with the "peasants in uniform", occupied important socio-political positions after 1949, and thus stood above the masses of Chinese workers, peasants, and other educated persons (for

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<sup>28</sup> A.Gramsci, 1971:10.

example, school teachers). They became newly-born bureaucratic officials. What is more, both the traditional intellectuals and revolutionary intelligentsia, to various extents, looked down on the "peasants in uniform". These peasants in uniform were called "Worker-peasant Cadres"(GONG NONG GAN BU), which meant that they were laymen of science, technology, and education. In the meantime, the traditional intellectuals further thought themselves qualified "real intellectuals" for they had finished formal education from primary school to university, and had been intellectual professionals for years. They considered the revolutionary intelligentsia only "little intellectuals"(XIAO ZHI SHI FEN ZI), because most of them did not go to university, and achieved little in science and academic research.

Such a complex of social conflicts, rooted in their various social positions and their different cultural backgrounds, resulted in a series of events during Mao's era, especially in the continual political campaigns from 1949 to 1976, as we shall see in following chapters.

### III. Organisational Network of the New System

After 1949, two main problems confronted the new Government: first, the economic one of how to develop China from one of the poorest countries to an industrialised society. This had to be done within the limits of the international arena, *i.e.*, the economic blockade from the West on the one hand, and on the other assistance from the Soviet Union.<sup>29</sup> This aim was also hampered by the fact that several hundreds of millions of peasants, who made up more than 80 per cent of the whole population, as Table 2.1 shows, were amongst the poorest people in the face of the earth.

Table 2.1. The proportion of rural population to urban population.

Year	All Population	Rural Area	Urban Area
1953	601,138,035	86.74 %	13.26 %
1964	723,070,269	81.60 %	18.40 %
1982	1,008,175,288	79.40 %	20.60 %

Source: *1982 Population Census of China*, Beijing, 1985:535-551.

The new Government therefore adopted a strategy of "Independence and Self-reliance"(DU LI ZI ZHU, ZI LI GENG SHENG) as its basic policy of economic development. The second of the two main problems was how to recreate a social order in the most populous nation in the world after a century's chaos. As we have mentioned above, for thousands of years Chinese rulers had always put social order above all else. When the CCP took power, social order and stability were still emphasised and, as much as possible, they

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<sup>29</sup> This latter might have threatened China's independence too, and even if it did not, was not alone sufficient to develop China into an advanced society.



maintained China as a unitary multinational state facing the great task of construction in a hostile environment of international threats.

Accordingly, to deal with these two problems, the CCP established a series of institutions and organisations. One was the **Residence Registration System** (HU KOU ZHI). It is a system of administration organised on the basis of households whose members (1) had to register at local police stations as permanent residents, then (2) were given HU KOU, the Residential Card, and after that, (3) more importantly, could not change their domiciles at will.<sup>30</sup> HU KOU System could be traced back originally to the Song Dynasty (A.D. 960-1279)<sup>31</sup>, yet it was the KMT which set up the BAO JIA, a special kind of HU KOU System, in which each JIA was made up of 10 households and each BAO of 10 JIA, in 1932. Afterwards, in both the Japanese occupied areas and CCP areas, various sorts of HU KOU system were established. After 1949, especially after the setting-up of the Advanced Agricultural Producer's Co-operative (in which the land and other chief means of production were collectively owned by the co-operative) in 1956, it was necessary for the Government to register people in order to prevent the emigration of peasants from rural areas to urban areas, and of townspeople from one place to another. Moreover, HU KOU made it easier for the CCP and its Government to check on residents, to control the birth rate, to keep eyes on people's day-to-day activities, to look into their personal/social connections, and to ferret out various kinds of offenders: hooligans, bandits,

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<sup>30</sup> *ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE GUE ZU ZHI FA GUI XUAN BIAN* (Selected Documents of Regulations of Organisation Law in the PRC), 1985: 268.

<sup>31</sup> Lu Si-mian, 1985: 507-544.

and so-called "counter-revolutionaries". In a word, HU KOU is an effective tool to control residents.

According to the Regulations of Residence Registration promulgated in 1958, each person must register as a permanent resident at the place where he/she lives for most of his/her time, and if a person wants to move to an urban area from the countryside, he/she must have an official certificate such as an employment offer from a factory or an admission offer from a university.<sup>32</sup> It is an unreasonable demand for those peasants who tries to leave their land for a town or city: without an employment offer they can not apply for an urban HU KOU, but without an urban HU KOU booklet peasants could rarely get the opportunity to obtain an employment offer from an urban enterprise. As a matter of fact, after the HU KOU System, Chinese peasants could hardly leave for urban areas. Even nowadays, in the most open areas such as the Special Economic Zones, it is still impossible for those without urban HU KOU to find permanent jobs.<sup>33</sup> In practice, HU KOU limited vertically those who could leave rural areas for urban areas, towns for cities, or cities for metropolitan areas, and, horizontally, those who wanted to move from village to village, town to town, city to city, metropolis to metropolis, and even community to community within a town or city.

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<sup>32</sup> *ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE GUE FA GUI XUAN JI[XU YI]* (Selected Documents of Laws and Regulations of the PRC, Vol.II), 1958:53-54.

<sup>33</sup> Of course, there are more and more "illegal migrant persons" in Shenzhen and other Special Zones along the South coast of China which has been the "open areas" towards the West since the 1980s. But these persons, mostly peasants from near countryside, are to be "grasped" and sent back by the local government, or, if they were lucky, to be given "illegal jobs" from time to time. Cf., *SZTQB*, 1987-1991.

Another system was the **Unit System** (DAN WEI ZHI). When the PRC was established there were plenty of people in urban areas who were either unemployed or, it was decided, should be re-employed, for the new Government needed more and more people to participate in the "Construction of a New China". The policy thus adopted by the CCP and the Government was: Low Salaries, High Employment (DI GONG ZI, GAO JIU YE). The leaders of the CCP and PRC knew that China at that time was a very poor country but they wanted to lead the Chinese people into an economically advanced society. What is more, such a society had to be a socialist one. A socialist country, as understood by the CCP leaders, was basically more a society in which the economic and social lives of the majority of the population could be taken care of collectively, rather than a society in which individual freedom was the basic principle. Therefore, the Government should not merely offer jobs to the people but also be responsible to them for their lives "from their birth to old age, including illness and burial arrangements" (SHENG LAO BING SI). In a unit such an idea was partly turned into practice. A unit could be a factory, a school, a hospital, a shop, or a government organ. Whatever it was, essentially it became a triply integrated unit, from which individuals as employees drew their wages, within which they as social members were administered, and under which they were politically organised and ideologically supervised.

The employment system in China since the 1950s was called "Iron Rice Bowl" (TIE FAN WAN). It meant that as soon as a person was employed by a state-run or collective unit he had a secure job, so long as he/she did not either commit a crime or make a serious political mistake. Such an Iron Rice Bowl guaranteed no further worry about unemployment on the one hand,

and bound this person economically and socially to the unit on the other. Whereas people could apply for a job to a unit if they held HU KOU, in most cases, it was foolish to resign. Since a job was an Iron Rice Bowl it was not readily available. And more importantly, since an employee would not be discharged from employment unless he/she broke the law or was accused of making serious political mistakes, a resignation hinted that he/she had done something wrong or at least was undisciplined, which signalled that it would be much more difficult for this person to find a new job in another unit within the area where they had HU KOU registration.<sup>34</sup>

A unit is not merely an economic unit of production, but further, a complex unit of social life. Taking the university as an example, we find that it is responsible for public welfare, it supplies living quarters for staff and dormitories for students. It also has its own *crèche*, primary and middle schools for the children of its staffs, a shopping centre, public places of entertainment, post office, bank branch, and police station, all within the university. A university as a unit was a small society.

No doubt not all units were as large as a university. Those people who worked in smaller units, which had no capacity to supply so many facilities, had to go shopping in other public markets, send their children to public schools, and live outside their units. For them the Neighbourhood Committee, led by the Subdistrict Office, was a key organisation which administered residents from one hundred to six hundred families as an

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<sup>34</sup> Again, even today it is not easy for those who rashly resign their permanent jobs from their units in inland to find a suitable posts in the "open areas" unless they have certain specific connections with officialdom. Cf., *SZYQB*, 1989.

integrated group.<sup>35</sup> But no matter whether it was large or small, a unit was by no means simply economic in its function, but rather, a social complex as well. As a Chinese saying describes, "A large one is a whole, a small one is also a whole." (DA ER QUAN, XIAO ER QUAN.)

Politically a unit was a basic organisation which united its staff to complete their political tasks: to mobilise youth to join the army, to call employees to expose and denounce "bad elements" and "counter-revolutionaries", and to organise people to participate in political campaigns, for instance. Without such a unit political mission could hardly be accomplished.

In each unit, everybody had a "Dossier" (DANG AN), a specific personal file. The Dossier recorded not only a person's technical experience but also, much more significantly, his/her political behaviour and attitudes in political campaigns and in day-to-day life. The Dossier followed people all their lives, despite the fact that they themselves did not have right to read it, and therefore did not know what exactly was recorded in it.

China, as a well-organised society since 1949, was divided into numerous units, to which individuals belonged economically as well as socio-politically, and from which they could not subjectively separate themselves. Yet in any unit, the last and most powerful organ was undoubtedly the **Primary Party Organisation** (JI CENG DANG ZU ZHI).

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<sup>35</sup> *ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE GUE ZU ZHI FA GUI XUAN BIAN* (Selected Documents of Regulations of Organisation Law in the PRC), 1985: 254-257.

Some further historical explanations are necessary before we examine its structure and the functions of social control in units. After the May Fourth Movement of 1919, during which Marxism as a solution to China's social problems was accepted by the revolutionary intelligentsia, a Communist Party based on Leninist principles was introduced into China in 1921. Gradually it became the most important collective actor in effecting fundamental social change and in 1949 the new ruling party built an actual one-party state, although there were also eight small "Democratic Parties".<sup>36</sup> But why did the revolutionary intelligentsia accept Marxism rather than any other Western idea as their leading ideology? Why did they organise a Communist Party based on Leninist principles which followed Russian Bolsheviks instead of liberal parties on the Western democratic model? How could such a Leninist Party and its army drive out the KMT, which was supported by the USA, from the mainland to Taiwan and take power in 1949?

Historically, many specific explanations could be explored in the process of the social transformation of China since 1840. For instance, if the Reform of 1898 had not failed there could have been no the Revolution of 1911. If there had not been the disappointing situation under the warlords after the Revolution of 1911, nor the Russian Revolution of 1917, the young impetuous students and intellectuals might have chosen other ways to save China from chaos. They might have just followed Dr Sun Yat-sen's way, continuing with his so-called "bourgeois democratic revolution". Moreover, if there had not been the Second World War, the Red Army of the CCP might

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<sup>36</sup> More discussions about these "democratic parties" and their relations to the CCP will be seen in Chapter Three.

have still been a small contingent of roving rebel bands in the remote mountain areas.

As we have showed above, however, China had been in decline since the nineteenth century when the gentry and scholars-officials, their representatives in officialdom, could no longer run the state well against Western technical and military superiority. Furthermore, China was still socio-economically a pre-industrial society where neither a powerful bourgeoisie nor a strong proletariat had developed.<sup>37</sup> In addition, the role of the West, which invaded China, exploited Chinese resources and markets, secured special privileges under the unequal treaties, and suppressed the stirrings of Chinese capitalism, was little more than a colonialist one. Under such circumstances, it was very reasonable that the younger generation of China's radical and revolutionary intelligentsia was so fascinated with the Russian Revolution of 1917. For the same reason, we can see why, within an agrarian society such as China, where the majority of the population were unorganised peasants scattered in the vast countryside, the revolutionary intelligentsia, who were composed of only a minority of the educated men/women, but whose goal now was the total transformation of society, could achieve little without forming a special political organisation with strict discipline, specific criteria of recruitment, and a hierarchical structure, namely, a Leninist Party.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Cf., B. Schwartz, 1951; M. Meisner, 1967; Kamal Sheel, 1989; and Arif Dirlik, 1989.

<sup>38</sup> Cf., Tang Tsou, 1987:257-262; J.K. Fairbank, 1988: 104-105; and C.A. Johnson, 1970.

However much resulted from internal social development than simply introduced from Russia by radical intelligentsia, when it was founded in 1921, the CCP was merely a very small secret political clique of radical intellectuals. Four years later, when the working class had begun to participate massively and more significantly in politics, and then when the Northern Expedition Against the Warlords (1926-1927) began, the CCP expanded its force, as table 2.2. shows.

Table 2.2. CCP Membership in its First Seven Years:

Party congress	Year	Number
First Congress	1921	57
Second Congress	1922	195
Third Congress	1923	432
Fourth Congress	1925	994
Fifth Congress	1927	57,967

Sources: Lewis, J. W. 1963: 108-120; He Meng-bi, 1984.

Yet only in 1929, when Mao found that it was essential to practise his principle that "the Party commands the gun"(DANG ZHI HUI QIANG), was the Party Branch (DANG ZHI BU), the most basic and effective Primary Party Organisation, organised on the Red Army's company basis.<sup>39</sup>

After 1949, such a method of Party control gradually spread all over the country. A Primary Party Organisation was set up in every factory, mine,

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<sup>39</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1954<sup>a</sup>: 81-83. Scholars are arguing whether the "Communist Revolution" led by the CCP is a special kind of Communist movement or just a nationalist peasant movement. (Cf., C.A. Johnson, 1970.) As shown in Chapter One, my point is more based on analysis of internal causes of the Revolution rather than argument of its nature.



and other enterprise; in every XIANG (*i.e.*, a Rural Administrative Unit, or later, the People's Commune); in every town; in every Agricultural Co-operative (or later, Production Brigade); in every office, school and street; in every company of the People's Liberation Army (PLA); and in every other primary unit if there were three or more full members of the CCP.<sup>40</sup>

The Primary Party Organisation has three levels. These are:

- (1). the Primary Party Committee (JI CENG DANG WEI HUI), an organisation which leads a hundred or more Party members in units as large as a university, factory, people's commune, district of a community, or battalion of the PLA;
- (2). the General Branch (DANG ZONG ZHI), which organises fifty or more Party members in units such as the department of a college or university, or workshop; and
- (3). the Party Branch (DANG ZHI BU), which is composed of less than fifty Party members on the level of small workshop, production brigade, street, or company of the PLA.

Among these three levels of Primary Party Organisations, the Party Branch is of course the most basic one, "the bridge which links the Party leadership with the masses," it was said. According to the Constitution of the CCP, the Party Branch puts into practice the decisions of the Central Committee or of higher Party organisations on the one hand, and reports what happens at the basic level to the higher organisations on the other. It not only recruits new

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<sup>40</sup> "The Constitution of the CCP", Adopted at the 8th National Congress of the CCP on September 26, 1956, in *Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee: Sept.,1956 - April,1969,Vol.I*, Hong Kong, 1971: 23.

members, examines, appraises, criticises and even punishes its members, but educates, organises and leads the masses of non-Party members as well.<sup>41</sup> Each of these Primary Party Organisations and their Party secretaries has a decisive role at their various levels of operation.

Individuals in the PRC, including the so-called "intellectuals", *i.e.*, those educated and skilled people, are thus geographically tied by their Resident System, socio-economically bound by their "units", and politically ruled by the Primary Party Organisations.

#### IV. Intellectuals under the New System

Under such a well-organised system of institutions, a key problem is how, as the CCP wished, individuals could use their initiative creativity and critical spirits for the purpose of developing China into an industrialised society and at the same time keep it on the "Communist" road.

This problem gets considerably more serious and meaningful if we look closely at intellectuals who, like others, lived and worked under these institutions and organisations. Because of HU KOU, intellectuals could not move so easily from place to place as they had done before 1949. Further, being bound by various units, they could not transfer to other workplaces and occupations as they pleased. The units for traditional intellectuals were

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<sup>41</sup> "The Constitution of the CCP", in *Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee: Sept., 1956 - April, 1969, Vol. I*, Hong Kong, 1971: 23-26.

mainly universities and schools, the Academy of Sciences, and the Associations of Writers and Artists. In each of these units, there was a Primary Party Organisation which decided what these intellectuals should/could do and what they should/could not do. The Party bosses in these units could be so powerful that they might brutally treat those intellectuals whom Mao and Zhou respected.<sup>42</sup>

To take professional writers and artists as examples, these people used to be the most undisciplined individuals who enjoyed lots of "freedoms" professionally and socially. But under the New System, they were all registered with their units (usually the Associations of Writers and Artists), and therefore were economically and politically tied to these units. Amongst hundreds of thousands of them, there is only one exceptional individual, Ba Jin, who has no economic relation to his unit (Shanghai Branch of China's Writers Association). That is to say, Ba Jin had no salary from any state-run unit. But like others, he was also restricted through holding posts in his unit: he must go there to participate in "ideological studies", public meetings, and political campaigns.<sup>43</sup>

A significant transformation of China's intellectuals followed the victory of the CCP. On the one hand, all members of the former revolutionary intelligentsia, together with the "peasants in uniform", became State Cadres (GUO JIA GAN BU) at various levels of government or Party organisation after 1949. On the other hand, until 1956, nearly all traditional intellectuals,

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<sup>42</sup> Cf., Chen Yi, 1979.

<sup>43</sup> Ba Jin, 1987.

except those who were accused of being counter-revolutionaries and thus arrested in Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign (1950-1952), and the Elimination of Counter-revolutionaries Campaign (1955), were given jobs by the Government in different units.<sup>44</sup> The transformation of intellectuals from rebels or professionals into officials or salaried specialists structurally changed their position within society, and thus their relationships to material production and the state organs were altered. Intellectuals were now no longer "free professionals" in any sense; rather, they had become some sort of intellectual-official or intellectual-aristocrat.

After a century of chaos, China in the early years of the People's Republic was in an economic mess, and thus the CCP faced a huge task of construction or reconstruction. But there was a great shortage of intellectual and professional personnel. There were only some 185,400 university graduates within China between 1928 and 1947<sup>45</sup>, for instance. Since 1949, there have been more and more graduates and post-graduates, as table 2.3. shows, but the number of educated people was still not sufficient as far as the economic construction is concerned. For instance, only 0.39 per cent of the whole population were university graduates or undergraduates in 1964 (and 0.59 per cent in 1982).<sup>46</sup>

"When a thing is scarce, it is precious"(WU YI XI WEI GUI). As a result, the CCP and the Government firstly honoured all of the people who received

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<sup>44</sup> Zhou En-lai, 1984:158-167.

<sup>45</sup> *ZHONG GUE GAO DENG XUE XIAO JIAN JIE* (A Brief Introduction to Chinese Universities and Colleges), 1982:7.

<sup>46</sup> *1982 Population Census of China*, 1985: 542-551.

mid-school education or higher with the title of ZHI SHI FEN ZI("the members of people who have knowledge", or more simply, "intellectuals"). Secondly, they were divided into three categories according to their levels of education: (1). "Senior Intellectuals" (GAO JI ZHI SHI FEN ZI), including university professors, research fellows in the Chinese Academy and other institutes, well-known writers, artists and scientists; (2). "Ordinary Intellectuals"(PU TONG ZHI SHI FEN ZI), covering those people who received a university education(whether they finished it or not); and (3). "Little Intellectuals"(XIAO ZHI SHI FEN ZI), referring to the men and women who reached the second level of middle school education.

**Table 2.3.** Number of Graduates and Post-graduates in the PRC from 1949 to 1966.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Graduate</b>	<b>Post-graduate</b>
1949	21,353	107
1950	17,607	159
1951	18,712	166
1952	32,002	627
1953	48,091	1,177
1954	47,096	660
1955	54,466	1,730
1956	63,214	2,349
1957	56,180	1,723
1958	72,424	1,113
1959	69,839	727
1960	136,138	589
1961	151,283	179
1962	177,255	1,019
1963	198,754	1,512
1964	204,499	895
1965	185,521	1,665
1966	140,670	1,137
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,695,104</b>	<b>17,534</b>

Source: *The Yearbook Of China [Education]: 1949-1981, 1982: 964-971.*

These educated people were then treated as a special social group whose knowledge and skills should be effectively used in the process of the "Construction of a New China". The problem for the CCP and the Government was not only that intellectuals were quantitatively few, but also, more seriously, that the traditional intellectuals from the old society should not<sup>be</sup> simply used. Instead, they should mould themselves into a new kind of intellectual: intellectual workers with "socialist consciousness" (or in Mao's words, with the consciousness of "serving the people"). Thus the CCP on the one hand needed intellectuals technically; on the other hand, it wanted to change them ideologically. The policy of the CCP toward intellectuals was accordingly "to unite, educate, and reform"(TUAN JIE, JIAO YU, GAI ZAO) them.

In praxis, to stroke and strike intellectuals alternately, as Merle Goldman suggested, was a contradictory policy: While the CCP tried to stimulate intellectuals to carry on creatively and productively within their professions, it also indoctrinated them in official orthodoxy.<sup>47</sup>

But China's intellectuals, whether we define them as educated people following the CCP or strictly as producers of ideas, in fact are scattered throughout society. Some may be members or officials of the ruling party, some may be just academics without any socio-political post, while others may be even in gaol. Following Gramsci, we have simply divided China's intellectuals into revolutionary intelligentsia and traditional intellectuals.

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<sup>47</sup> M. Goldman, 1971:1-2;1981: 9-10; 1985: 285-286. Also Cf., J.D. Seymour, 1968. As this research will show, the CCP has never got out of such a contradiction.

Their actual situations are much more complicated than this theoretical classification suggests. China's intellectuals since 1949 can be further divided into at least four smaller groups.

The first group can be called "the Revolutionary Intellectuals"(GE MING ZHI SHI FEN ZI). They are those who used to be university students (graduated or not graduated) before they became professional revolutionaries, and who were still either doing their academic research, artistic creation or literary criticism, from time to time, or at least were in charge of ideological affairs, including propaganda, culture, education, *etc.*, after they became Party cadres. That they are called "revolutionary intellectuals" does not mean that they still had a critical attitude towards the *status quo* and further demanded a revolutionary change of the establishment after 1949. They are called so because they got deeply involved in the Revolution led by the CCP before 1949, and thus, after the victory of the CCP, like those "peasants in uniform", they were considered "revolutionaries". For the sake of remembering their past experience, they will be still named as "revolutionary intellectuals" in this thesis.

The second group is given the title of "the Patriotic Democratic Personages"(AI GUO MIN ZHU REN SHI) by the CCP, and will be simply called "Democratic Personages" in this research. This group includes those who were the leading figures of the eight small organisations which followed or co-operated with the CCP to different extents before 1949. Nearly all members of this group led privileged lives after 1949 and some of them might symbolically occupy high positions in officialdom without possessing real power.

That the members of these small organisations were called "democratic personages" while these organisations were called "democratic parties" is not only because they were in favour of democracy in the Western sense, but also, more meaningfully, because the CCP thought these organisations were potentially co-operative in the Revolution before 1949, which was called by the CCP "new democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie led by the proletariat". After 1949, that these organisations were still called "democratic parties" hints that they were neither Communist organisations like the CCP nor reactionary organisations like Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party(KMT), but progressive bourgeois or petty-bourgeoisie organisations which actually belonged to the past. Therefore, "democratic personages" were thought to be neither comrades nor enemies, but "the fellow travellers" (TONG LU REN), that is to say, the people who were, and could still be seen as, friends.

The Party named the third group the "Old-type Intellectuals"(JIU ZHI SHI FEN ZI), and I will continue to use it, referring to China's old generation (*i.e.*, the generation of pre-1949 China) of scholars, natural and social scientists, philosophers, historians, literary writers and artists in the fields of education, culture, science, technology, and literature and art. As we have pointed out, due to the Western influence since the Reform of 1898, this group of intellectuals should be no longer simply considered "traditional literati". Socio-economically they did not attached themselves to the establishment, becoming a kind of "free professionals". Ideologically they were partly Westernised and partly traditional, while politically they either maintained a position between the CCP and the KMT (some of them were



members of the "democratic parties") or tried to remain separate from politics.

The last of these four groups is "the New Generation of Intellectuals" (XIN YI DAI ZHI SHI FEN ZI). This is the generation whose members receive education after 1949. They were expected to be "New-type Intellectual Workers" who would eventually replace the Old-type Intellectuals.

Obviously these four groups of educated people, or "intellectuals", were socio-politically so different that they should not be regarded as the same. The CCP elite was partly composed of the members of the first group themselves. During the first decade of the PRC, they supplied the staff the CCP relied on in cultural and educational circles to carry out the CCP's policies. The second group, in the eyes of the CCP, had co-operated with the CCP before 1949, and contributed to the establishment of the PRC, and thus were repaid with social prestige and comfortable living conditions but need not really participate in leadership and state affairs. The last group was guided by the CCP and educated under the New System, and thus, there was little problem, the CCP thought. And if there was, it would be at most a problem of some individuals rather than the Generation as a whole, because, until the Cultural Revolution in 1966, this generation was not "old" as well as "big" enough yet, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The main problem for the CCP at the beginning of the PRC was, obviously, the problem of the third group—the "Old-type Intellectuals". The CCP wanted to use them for their technical skills while criticising them ideologically. As it has been showed, due to the great need of educated and

skilled personnel for the sake of economic construction, the CCP in the 1950s managed to give almost all the Old-type Intellectuals jobs in either state-run or collective units. This kind of job in unit under the New System is, as we described earlier, an "Iron Rice Bowl", which would not be lost unless one broke the law or made a serious political mistake. Yet such a job no longer makes educated and skilled people greatly different from other state-employed people as far as their economic position is concerned. Except for a tiny group of privileged "famous personages"(ZHU MING REN SHI) or "senior intellectuals", nearly all the educated and skilled people lead a life of "eating enough but never too good" (JI YAO CHI BAO, DAN BU NENG CHI HAO), a life other urban commoners obtain.<sup>48</sup> This is partially because of the ideal of building up a socialist society in which the difference between mental and manual workers will eventually disappear, partially because of the reality of the poor China where too many people need to be looked after, and thus because of the policy of "Low Salary, High Employment".

The CCP tried to reach a socio-economic egalitarianism in its "great course of socialist construction". Such an egalitarianism could be seen amongst various fields of employment in state-run units as far as employees' annual income is concerned. However, there were still differences. As Table 2.4. shows, in the PRC, from 1952 to 1978, in most years (except 1958 and 1959), the average income of employees in state-run scientific, cultural, educational, and hygienic units was usually lower than the average annual income of all employees in the state-run units. It was also lower than the average income of

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<sup>48</sup> Comparatively, the peasants' life is described as "eating porridge in slack season but dry food in busy season"(XIAN SHI CHI XI, MANG SHI CHI GAN).

employees in all other state-run units, except that of employees in agricultural (from 1956) and trade ones.

**Table 2.4.** Average annual income of personnel in different state-run units.

YEAR	Emple- yee 10,000	Av. Income ¥1.00	1*	2*	3*	4*	5*	6*	7*	8*	9*
1952	1,580	<b>446</b>	515	564	375	583	360	634	368	458	376
1953	1,826	<b>496</b>	576	591	433	643	381	650	392	498	423
1954	1,881	<b>519</b>	597	612	459	648	403	672	422	521	451
1955	1,908	<b>534</b>	600	612	461	645	443	610	448	532	479
1956	2,423	<b>610</b>	674	698	498	746	490	661	548	586	597
1957	2,451	<b>637</b>	690	744	501	752	529	651	580	613	631
1958	4,532	<b>550</b>	526	595	471	673	489	642	557	586	639
1959	4,561	<b>524</b>	514	554	411	627	454	589	542	583	631
1960	5,044	<b>528</b>	538	581	365	618	449	564	519	543	615
1961	4,171	<b>537</b>	560	596	362	620	455	582	519	553	605
1962	3,309	<b>592</b>	652	705	392	702	494	631	542	559	626
1963	3,293	<b>641</b>	720	775	421	760	550	672	574	604	658
1964	3,465	<b>661</b>	741	765	433	782	581	683	596	614	688
1965	3,738	<b>652</b>	729	730	433	774	579	687	598	624	684
1966	3,934	<b>636</b>	689	644	428	755	570	697	583	620	660
1967	4,006	<b>630</b>	701	672	426	754	563	696	578	620	681
1968	4,170	<b>621</b>	689	654	419	740	561	667	577	630	681
1969	4,335	<b>618</b>	683	661	418	734	561	660	564	611	680
1970	4,792	<b>609</b>	661	650	419	709	553	660	555	588	678
1971	5,318	<b>597</b>	635	662	426	709	539	655	554	604	668
1972	5,610	<b>622</b>	650	714	423	723	585	702	598	616	679
1973	5,758	<b>614</b>	640	715	436	714	568	680	582	602	659
1974	6,007	<b>622</b>	648	710	483	713	571	675	582	629	661
1975	6,426	<b>613</b>	644	704	460	699	562	639	574	609	645
1976	6,860	<b>605</b>	634	696	459	684	555	621	566	602	636

\*: 1. Average Income in Industry; 2. Average Income in Building Construction;  
 3. Average Income in Agriculture, Forestry, Irrigation, and Meteorological Observation;  
 4. Average Income in Transportation and Communication;  
 5. Average Income in Trade;  
 6. Average Income in Urban Public Utilities;  
 7. Average Income in Science, Culture, Education, and Public Health;  
 8. Average Income in Banking and Insurance; and  
 9. Average Income in State/Party Organs and Mass Organisations.

Source: *ZHONG GUO TONG JI NIAN JIAN*[1981] (Statistic Yearbook of China, 1981), Oversea Edition, Hong Kong, 1982: 107, 426.

Of course, it does not necessarily mean that all employees in scientific, cultural, educational, and health units were "intellectuals". For instance, even in 1982, amongst 26,457,518 employed professional and technical "experts", there were only 3,452,547 university graduates and undergraduates. That is

to say, less than one eighth of the employees in these units received higher education.

At the same time, there were "intellectuals" in other units, for example, in State/Party organs, who were 2,564,422 together, including 1,223 men and women who had not got jobs yet.<sup>49</sup> But, as the CCP authorities admitted, it is scientific, cultural, educational, and health units where most "intellectuals", *i.e.*, university graduates and undergraduates gathered.<sup>50</sup> For example, as late as 1982, there were more than 57 per cent of university graduates and undergraduates in these scientific, cultural, educational, and health units.

If we further look into some differentiated details of their salaries, we will find that, in Peking area from 1956 to 1966, professors, scientists, doctors, and engineers earned between ¥117 and ¥345 per month, a higher payment than what workers got, as Table 2.5 shows. From Table 2.5 as well we saw the great differences between intellectuals and cadres as far as their salaries are concerned. Intellectuals earned lower salaries than cadres, for instance, professors in grade 1 earned less than cadres in grade 6, and cadres in grade 8 earned as much as professors in grade 2. If we further remember that, under the "Communist System", cadres not only earned monthly salaries, but more importantly enjoyed special privileges, such as their houses, cars, telephone, secretaries, such differences would be more obvious.

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<sup>49</sup> *1982 Population Census of China*, Peking, 1985: 384-389, 404-431, 464-467, 470-471, 548-551.

<sup>50</sup> Cf., Deng Xiao-ping, 1957.

**Table 2.5.** Monthly salaries of professors, research fellows, doctors, engineers, and workers, cadres, in Peking Area from July 1956 to July 1966.

<u>Grade on the wage scale</u>	Professor*	Research fellow**	Doctor	Engineer***	Worker****	Cadre
1	¥ 345.0	¥ 345.0	¥ 333.5	¥ 333.5	¥ 107.10	¥ 644.0
2	¥ 287.5	¥ 287.5	¥ 287.5	¥ 287.5	¥ 90.88	¥ 581.0
3	¥ 241.5	¥ 241.5	¥ 253.0	¥ 247.5	¥ 77.15	¥ 517.5
4	¥ 207.0	¥ 207.0	¥ 224.5	¥ 213.0	¥ 65.48	¥ 460.0
5	¥ 177.0	¥ 177.0	¥ 200.0	¥ 183.0	¥ 55.59	¥ 414.0
6	¥ 149.5	¥ 149.5	¥ 177.0	¥ 157.5	¥ 47.19	¥ 368.0
7		¥ 126.5	¥ 155.5	¥ 135.5	¥ 40.05	¥ 322.0
8				¥ 117.5	¥ 34.00	¥ 287.5

\*: This includes vice professor and some lecturer.

\*\*: This includes associate research fellow, and some research lecturer.

\*\*\*: This includes chief engineer, deputy chief engineer, and general engineer in heavy industry.

\*\*\*\*: This means manual workers in building industry.

Source: Yao Shu-ben, 1986: 87, 102, 119, 129, 150.

It may be questioned whether such a comparison of professors/research fellows/doctors/engineers to cadres is fair enough, for cadres in grades 1-8 were actually those who occupied the highest posts of the country. These were: President and Vice-president of the State, Chairman and Vice-chairmen of the Standing Commission of the National Congress, Premier and Vice-premiers of the State Council (grades 1-3), and Ministers of the Central Government, Governors of provinces (grades 4-8). But if we just compare academics to cadres in universities, the latter still earned higher salaries than the former, as Table 2.6 shows.

**Table 2.6.** Monthly salaries of academics and cadres in universities, in Peking area, from 1956 to 1966.(¥1.00 [RMB])

Grade	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Aca- demic	345	287	241	207	177	149	126	106	89.5	78	69	62	56
Cadre	368	322	287	253	218	195	172	155	138	124	110	99	87

Source: Yao Shu-ben, 1986: 119-120.

Also we should remember that, before the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), professors and research fellows obtained a sum of remuneration if they published their books, but cadres usually did not publish their own works (Mao was an exception). The employees in literary and artistic units got almost the same amount of monthly salaries as other intellectuals due to a similar income system. And they too were not only given monthly salaries from their units, but also paid remuneration when they got their literary works published.

What is more, professors and writers consisted of a very small minority of the employees in universities and literary units. More precisely, taking professors as examples, from 1952 to 1965, as Table 2.7 shows, professors were never more than one fifth of the university academics, and since 1960, they decreased to less than 3 per cent. At the same time, the number of professors was getting lesser and lesser, from 5,223 in 1952 to 3,506 in 1965. Even if we put professors and vice-professors together, they were never more than one third of university academics. And, as time went on, the proportion of professors and vice-professors was continuously decreasing, from 30.13 per cent in 1952 to 5.71 per cent in 1965.

**Table 2.7.** The proportion of professors to other university academics in China, 1952-1965.

Year	Professor	Vice-professor	Lecturer	Tutor*	Assistant	Total
1952	5,223	2,939	6,923	-----	12,004	27,089
1953	4,792	2,981	7,495	-----	18,362	33,630
1954	4,746	3,005	8,662	-----	22,422	38,835
1955	4,522	2,977	10,095	-----	24,472	42,066
1956	4,558	3,337	15,573	-----	34,878	58,346
1957	4,615	3,453	17,464	-----	44,486	70,018
1958	4,315	3,215	13,025	17,084	47,354	84,993
1959	3,936	3,073	13,306	18,411	60,931	99,657
1960	3,674	3,089	21,274	27,550	83,555	139,142
1961	3,871	3,529	24,358	28,878	98,100	158,736
1962	3,815	3,947	27,576	20,018	89,015	144,371
1963	3,713	4,472	29,553	13,244	86,943	137,925
1964	3,653	4,416	29,489	10,879	86,739	135,176
1965	3,506	4,382	29,200	11,611	89,417	138,116

\*: Tutor here means the man/woman who has not been titled "lecturer" but already got higher payment than teaching assistant.

Source: *ZHONG GUO JIAO YU NIAN JIAN*[1949-1981] (The Yearbook of China [Education], 1949-1981), Peking, 1984: 973.

Another example is the Chinese Academy of Sciences. From 1957 to 1973, the proportion of research fellows and associate research fellows also decreased, as Table 2.8 shows.

**Table.2.8.** Research staff in the Chinese Academy of Sciences from 1957 to 1973.

Year	Research Number	Fellow* %	Research Number	Lecturer %	Research Number	Assistant %	Total
1957	753	11.70	931	14.47	4,750	73.83	6,434
1962	623	3.91	2,113	13.26	13,198	82.83	15,934
1965	688	3.14	2,874	13.10	18,375	83.76	21,937
1973	414	3.07	1,768	13.13	11,289	83.80	13,471

\*: This includes associate research fellows.

Source: *ZHONG GUO SHE HUI TONG JI ZI LAO* ( Statistical Data of Chinese Society), Peking, 1985: 197.

Accordingly, we can say that in China under Mao, despite general socio-economic equality, there was also a small socio-economic "elite" of cadres and "senior intellectuals". Further, as mentioned above, what we should remember is that from monthly salaries we cannot get a complete idea about the special privileges of state/Party cadres and some "senior intellectuals" who were given high posts (symbolically or functionally) in state organs. In spite of this, when comparing those first-grade professors and research fellows with top state/Party cadres, we can see an obvious distance from the rest as far as their income is concerned. On the other hand, if we look at the majority of university academics (lecturers and teaching assistants), of research staff in the Chinese Academy of Sciences (research lecturers and researching assistants), and of general doctors in hospitals from Table 2.9, we must draw the conclusion that the actual differences between them and manual workers still existed but the differences were quite small.

**Table 2.9.** Monthly salaries of lecturers, researchers, doctors, cadres and manual workers in Peking Area from 1956 to 1966.

Grade	Lecturer*	Research Lecturer**	Doctor***	Cadre	Worker****
7.	¥ 126.5	¥ 126.5	¥ 155.5	¥ 322.0	(1). ¥ 107.10
8.	¥ 106.0	¥ 106.0	¥ 137.0	¥ 287.5	(2). ¥ 90.88
9	¥ 89.5	¥ 89.5	¥ 121.0	¥ 253.0	(3). ¥ 77.15
10	¥ 78.0	¥ 78.0	¥ 106.0	¥ 218.5	(4). ¥ 65.48
11	¥ 69.0	¥ 69.0	¥ 91.0	¥ 195.5	(5). ¥ 55.59
12	¥ 62.0	¥ 62.0	¥ 79.5	¥ 172.5	(6). ¥ 47.19
13	¥ 56.0	¥ 56.0	¥ 69.0	¥ 155.5	(7). ¥ 40.05

\*: This includes teaching assistants who earned at most ¥ 89.50 per month.

\*\*: This includes research assistants who earned at most ¥ 78.0 per month.

\*\*\*: This includes interns who earned at most ¥ 91.0 per month.

\*\*\*\*: Manual workers in China were divided into only 8 grades, and those in grade 8 earned ¥ 34 per month. Cf., Table 2.5.

Source: Yao Shu-ben, 1986: 87,119, 129-130, 135, 150.



Politically, the "old-type intellectuals" were mostly between the KMT and the CCP before 1949, and, because of KMT's escape from the mainland, they were facing a new question of how to get used to the New System under the leadership of the CCP after 1949. Not surprisingly, most of them maintained their non-party status while quite a few were arranged or "helped"(by the CCP) to be members of the "democratic parties".

For instance, 2,110 out of the 7,499 professors and associate professors at the end of 1955 were members of the "democratic parties" (28 per cent), but the CCP members were less than five per cent. At the same time, amongst more than 3,840,000 so-called "intellectuals" (including about 100,000 "senior intellectuals") in scientific, engineering, educational, cultural, and health circles, only seven per cent of them were CCP members.<sup>51</sup>

As showed above, at the beginning of 1956, the CCP most optimistically judged that most educated people had already been members of the working class and thus supported its "socialist policies", therefore there should be more and more "intellectuals" to be recruited in the party.<sup>52</sup> But six months later, the proportion of educated people in the CCP, including those who received secondary education, either finished or unfinished, was still less than 12 per cent, as Table 2.10. shows.

In fact, as late as 1985, seven years after the dramatic change of policy towards educated people who were again titled "members of the working class", the proportion of university graduates and undergraduates in the CCP

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<sup>51</sup> Li Wei-han, 1986: 803-810.

<sup>52</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 348-349, 355; Zhou En-lai, 1984:179-180.

was only four per cent while at the same time that of illiterate people was 10.1 per cent, and that of "little intellectuals", i.e., the people who received secondary education, was still less than 14 per cent.<sup>53</sup>

Table 2.10. Class background of CCP members in June, 1956.

<b>Background</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>%</b>
Peasants	7,417,459	69.10
Workers	1,502,814	14.00
<b>Intellectuals*</b>	<b>1,255,923</b>	<b>11.70</b>
Others	558,188	5.20
Total	10,734,384	100.00

\*: "Intellectuals" include those Party members who ever received secondary education, either finished or unfinished, either before or after joining the Party.

Source: Deng Xiao-ping, 1956.

To win over the majority of the non-Communist intellectuals was therefore one of the greatest and most difficult tasks for the CCP, for it needed educated and skilled people for the sake of economic construction on the one hand, and, on the other hand, these "intellectuals" were not as easy to subjugate ideologically as they were to organise and to deal with economically. To change these old-type intellectuals ideologically, the CCP in the early years of the PRC launched the Thought Reform Campaign.

By the mid 1950s, however, the CCP and its leaders, especially Mao, recognised that some intellectuals belonging to the second group ("Democratic Personages") were dissatisfied with their high positions without actual influence on policy-making and thus itched for the right to participate in political affairs, or, at least, to have a say in politics.

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<sup>53</sup> Cf., *TONG YI ZHAN XIAN GONG ZUO SHOU ZE* (Handbook of United Front Work), Nanjing University Press, 1986: 140.

Furthermore, even in the 1950s, and especially after the Great Leap Forward in 1958, quite a few members of the first group ("Revolutionary Intellectuals") did not want just to abide by the CCP passively; they were still critical of the *status quo*, and therefore, for the CCP, could be threatening to the establishment, for nearly all of them were Party members and some were high officials.<sup>54</sup>

To conquer those different groups of intellectuals ideologically, the CCP and Mao launched a series of political campaigns since the 1950s. The next two chapters will look into the whole process of the continual political campaigns in Mao's time, by which we will not only take a panorama of these political campaigns continuously, but also analyse the various roles of different groups of China's established intellectuals, and, furthermore, examine the problem of intellectuals' social locations in a "Soviet-type Communist" society, seeing whether they form a new ruling class, an independent stratum, or belong to some other classes or strata.

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<sup>54</sup> Without any doubt, the CCP has never been a monolithic bloc, but rather, there are always various factions within it, which are always fighting over this or that. In this research, when I examine the relationship between the intellectual and the CCP, I will consider inner-party conflict a significant factor in those political campaigns, and further, in the relationship between the intellectual and the CCP, though such an inner-party conflict itself should be another subject of research. When I study various kinds of China's established intellectuals, of whom those intellectuals within the CCP (*i.e.*, most "revolutionary intellectuals") consist of a considerably great number, I will notice that those revolutionary intellectuals, as well as some of other kinds of intellectuals, are of course greatly affected by such inner-party conflict. As a result, there are always various individual intellectuals who become victims, for they historically or ideologically identified themselves with certain factions which lost.

### **CHAPTER 3: China's Established Intellectuals in Political Campaigns(I)**

YUN DONG in Chinese used by the CCP means either mass movement or political campaign, for instance, student movement, labour movement, and peasant movement in general; or reading campaign, aid-army campaign, and land-reform campaign in particular. To carry on a particular campaign, the leadership of the CCP usually first makes a decision, chooses the purpose, and puts forward the proposal; then sends work-teams to basic levels of units to communicate the Party's instructions, to mobilise the masses, and to practise the Party's decisions; and finally, examines the procedure of the campaign to see if the aim has been achieved, by finishing a work-report in which all successful or unsuccessful working experiences should be listed.<sup>1</sup> The following two chapters will focus on those political campaigns whose purpose was to criticise intellectuals or their works through thought reform, labour reform, or other means, by which the leadership of the CCP assumed that the old-type intellectuals could be remoulded ideologically while a new type of intellectual workers could be created. By systematically examining the process of the continual campaigns, we will have a clearer idea whether China's intellectuals in a "Soviet-type Communist" society form an independent stratum, and, if they do not, whether they can/cannot freely float up and down amongst various classes.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. G. Bennett, 1976: 38-45; C.P. Cell, 1977: 43-73.

## **I. The "Old-type Intellectuals" in the Thought Reform Campaign**

As we have seen in Chapter Two, when the CCP took power in 1949, there was a great task of economic construction and a great lack of intellectuals to carry it out. Besides those revolutionary intellectuals and "democratic personages", the majority of educated people were thought to be the "Old-type Intellectuals" who had some kind of specific knowledge or skill. The problem for the CCP was how to stimulate these old-type intellectuals to work creatively in their disciplines for the sake of "rebuilding China".

As we have mentioned in Chapter Two, by 1952, these old-type intellectuals were mostly given "Iron Rice Bowls": permanent jobs. However, in the eyes of Mao and his comrades, to rebuild China did not mean to restore the old China with its ancient ways, but rather it meant to create "a new China following the socialist road". According to the CCP, the old-type intellectuals used to attach themselves to landlords, national capitalists, comprador bourgeoisie, or even Western imperialists before 1949, rather than "free professionals" floating between various classes. And afterwards they were still considered to live in the "spiritual kingdom of exploiting classes' ideology". The old-type intellectuals hence should/could not be used intact as an active force. But instead, they had to be ideologically remoulded into a new kind of working man/women.

To achieve such an aim, from 1951 to 1952, the CCP launched a year-long Thought Reform Campaign amongst these old-type intellectuals. Since the old-type intellectuals were mostly teachers and university students, the campaign was firstly launched in the institutes of higher learning. On 29

September 1951, Zhou En-lai delivered a lengthy mobilisation address to three thousand professors and academic administrators of universities/colleges from Peking and Tianjin. He called for the study of Marxism, especially Mao's works, and the criticism, especially self-criticism, of various non-proletarian ideas amongst the intellectuals. He even took himself as an example, showing the necessity of thought reform.<sup>2</sup> Zhou's speech signalled the beginning of the Campaign. Shortly after that, all teachers in all levels of schools, as well as all students in universities, colleges, and high schools were involved in the Campaign. By 23 October 1951, Mao further declared that thought reform was necessary for all categories of intellectuals.<sup>3</sup> It thus spread all over the country: intellectuals in all fields of literature and art, science and technology, religion, business, democratic parties, and even governmental organs began to study Mao's works and official papers, and to criticise/self-criticise their own bourgeois ideology and other kinds of non-proletarian world outlooks.

The Thought Reform Campaign was designed with three stages, as some Chinese and Western writers have argued.<sup>4</sup> The first was the period of study. The old-type intellectuals from the elderly college dean to the newly-registered student were organised in groups, reading and discussing the prescribed works of Mao and official papers carefully and intensively: word for word, day and night. The intellectuals nevertheless could to a certain extent exchange their own opinions on the understanding of Mao's works and the Party's documents at this stage, which lasted a month or so.

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<sup>2</sup> Zhou En-lai, 1984: 59-71.

<sup>3</sup> Mao Ze-dong, in RMRB, 23 October, 1951.

<sup>4</sup> Cf., T. Chen, 1960; Yang Jiang, 1988; and R. Liften, 1961.

The second stage was different. The intellectuals started measuring themselves against the officially-given standards of the new kind of intellectual working person. They now found, or were found to have, so many "dirty" things in their minds: individualism, subjectivism, opportunism, dogmatism, bureaucratism, sectarianism, selfishness, vanity, arrogance, vacillation, and the ideal of Westernisation, especially pro-Americanism or America worship. To wash these ideas out of themselves completely, intellectuals should "take a bath in public"(DANG ZHONG XI ZAO), or in more vulgar words, "take off their trousers, then cut off their tails" (TUO KU ZI, GE WEI BA). That is to say, these old-type intellectuals should show "the evils" within their minds to the public shamelessly and then attack them mercilessly until they were thought to be cleared away. Every individual intellectual was asked to write down, to read in front of others, and to submit to authorities, the summary of his/her own personal experiences and social relations, in which the criticism was not general, but instead, specific, by demonstrating the process of his/her development. Therefore, to make a simple statement of position was not sufficient. Wrong opinions that were held must be confessed in details and then, through the study of Mao's works and examination, what his/her thought was now and why it was so must be explained by themselves, and finally it must be approved by the authorities and the audience. The numbers of listeners largely depended upon academic prestige: the more influential the subject, the larger the audience. Nationally well-known professors and scientists also published their self-criticisms in the press.

The third stage was the last one, during which these self-criticisms were formally accepted one after another by the the authorities and thus the intellectuals were considered "to have passed the test" (GUO GUAN LE). Without doubt, not everyone could smoothly pass the test. Some of them had to rewrite their self-criticisms several times, while others could be seen as diehards. No matter what kind of people they were, they all underwent a reassignment of their jobs in the end: promotion or demotion.<sup>5</sup>

It is interesting to look through the articles published in official press during the campaign. If we take the *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP, and the *Guangming Daily*, the newspaper of the intellectuals edited by the democratic parties, as examples, we can find that there were 227 signed articles relevant to the Thought Reform Campaign during the period of the campaign (30 September 1951- 26 October 1952).<sup>6</sup>

These articles were published step by step alongside the campaign. At the beginning, they were mostly about the study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Ze-dong Thought, such as *Political Study amongst Teachers in Peking University, I Hope Teachers Will Be Successful in Their Political Study, Teachers in Universities/colleges Should Attend to Their Political Study in Earnest, My Attitude towards Political Study, and Political Study Should Be*

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<sup>5</sup> R. Liften, 1961: 430-442; A.F. Thurston, 1988: 56-61; Yang Jiang, 1988: 219-292.

<sup>6</sup> As I have emphasised in Chapter One, intellectuals had no other way to express themselves except through the official press in China from 1949 to 1976. Such official media should be considered either the expression of the ruling party (through different people) or the reflection of the reality of that controlled by the Party under which intellectuals showed themselves. Or in most cases, I would argue, they should be considered both.



*Helpful to Resolve Practical Problems.* Then they were more about "thought reform", for instance, *Making Up My Mind to Reform My Thought, I Really Need Thought Reform, Why Should I Reform My Thought, On Thought Reform of Intellectuals,* and *Negating My Past, Reforming My Thought.* Finally they were concentrated on intense criticism and self-criticism, with titles like *Criticising Bourgeois Ideology, Bourgeois Fallacies Must Be Exposed without Any Reserve, We Cannot Tolerate the Savage Offensive from Bourgeoisie, Fighting against Bourgeois Ideology , Criticising My Educational Ideas which Served the Reactionary Ruling Class , Criticising My Exploiting Ideas , Criticising My Corrupt Bourgeois Ideas, Hanging My Head, Admitting My Guilt, and My Reactionary Ideas Have Harmed the People's Education .*

Table 3.1. The articles relevant to the Thought Reform Campaign, classified by subject.

	Study in General	Criticism	& Self- Criticism	Criticism	Total
		Criticism	Self-criticism	Countercriticism	
RMRB*	28	9	41		78
GMRB**	44	21	82	2	149
Total	72	30	123	2	227
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>72</b>		<b>155</b>		<b>227</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>31.72</b>		<b>68.28</b>		<b>100</b>

\*: RMRB means People's Daily;

\*\*: GMRB means Guangming Daily.

Source: *RMRB, GMRB*, 30 September 1951 - 26 October 1952.

As Table 3.1. shows, most of these articles were of criticism and self-criticism. That is to say, criticism and self-criticism was more important than just general call for study and thought reform.

These articles were, of course, carefully chosen from numerous ones according to the Party's test and the authors' reputation. The authors were respectively the revolutionary intellectuals, the democratic personages, and, above all, the old-type intellectuals, because the Campaign was aiming at them, as Table 3.2. shows.

**Table 3.2.** Articles in the Thought Reform Campaign, classified on authors' locations.

	<b>Revolutionary Intellectuals</b>	<b>Democratic Personages</b>	<b>Old-type Intellectuals</b>	<b>Total</b>
RMRB	5	7	66	78
GMRB	16	14	119	149
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>227</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>9.25</b>	<b>9.25</b>	<b>81.5</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *RMRB*, *GMRB*, 30 September, 1951 - 26 October, 1952.

All of these authors were well-known intellectuals, amongst them were CCP intellectual officials in charge of culture and education, the leaders of the democratic parties, university principals, college deans, and other leading figures in various branches of learning. Their writings varied according to their different socio-political positions: while the revolutionary intellectuals and the democratic personages were calling for the study of Mao's works and thought reform in general, the old-type intellectuals were mainly criticising themselves. As Table 3.3. shows, four out of the five articles written by the revolutionary intellectuals in the *People's Daily* were general calls for the study of Mao's works and thought reform, the remaining one was on criticism. All seven articles by the democratic personages in the same paper were about study and thought reform. In the *Guangming Daily*, there were four self-criticism articles out of the sixteen by revolutionary intellectuals.

More interestingly, there was only one self-criticism article by a democratic personage, and the author, Liang Shu-ming, wrote two counter-criticism articles as well. Most of the self-criticisms were written by the old-type intellectuals: all the 41 articles in the *People's Daily*, and 77 out of 82 in the *Guangming Daily*.

**Table 3.3.** Articles in the Thought Reform Campaign, classified on the subjects and the authors' locations.

	Study in General	Criticism Criticism	& Self- Self-criticism	criticism Counter-criticism	Total
<b><u>RMRB</u></b>					
R. I.*	4	1			5
D. P.**	7				7
O. I.***	17	8	41		66
Total	28	9	41		78
%	35.90		64.10		100
<b><u>GMRB</u></b>					
R.I.*	8	4	4		16
D.P.**	10	3	1	2	16
O. I***	26	14	77		117
Total	44	21	82	2	149
%	29.53		70.47		100

\*: "R.I." stands for Revolutionary Intellectuals;

\*\*: "D.P." stands for Democratic Personages;

\*\*\*: "O.I." means Old-type Intellectual.

Source: *RMRB*, *GMRB*, 30 September, 1951 - 26 October, 1952.

If we further divide these old-type intellectuals into smaller groups according to their professions, we find that it was scientists in both the natural and social fields who made up the majority of these self-critics as Table 3.4. shows. This could be explained by the fact that in the early years of the PRC, the main target to win over through criticism and self-criticism was not democratic personages, nor literary writers and artists amongst the old-type intellectuals, but instead, natural and social scientists, whose knowledge and skill were more urgently needed in the course of economic construction.

**Table 3.4.** Articles written by the old-type of intellectuals, classified by authors' professions and subjects of the articles.

	Study in General	Criticism	Selfcriticism	Total	%
<b><u>RMRB</u></b>					
Natural Scientist	3	5	18	26	39.40
Social Scientist	4	2	14	20	30.30
Literary Writer	6		7	13	19.70
Others	4	1	2	7	10.60
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>66</b>	
<b>%</b>	<b>25.76</b>	<b>12.12</b>	<b>62.12</b>		<b>100</b>
<b><u>GMRB</u></b>					
Natural Scientist	11	3	26	40	34.19
Social Scientist	12	2	43	57	48.72
Literary Writer	2	1	8	11	9.40
Others	1	8		9	7.69
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>117</b>	
<b>%</b>	<b>22.22</b>	<b>11.97</b>	<b>65.81</b>		<b>100</b>

Sources: *RMRB*, *GMRB*, 30 September, 1951 - 26 October, 1952.

Through thought reform, including the study of Mao's works, criticism and, more importantly, self-criticism, these old-type intellectuals could be ideologically remoulded, as both they themselves and the CCP expected, into the new kind of working men who were not only professionally like other salaried labourers but also politically like workers supporting the leadership of the CCP. Because of this expectation, there were no specific targets to be punished in the Thought Reform Campaign. In other words, while all of the intellectuals were asked to study Mao's works and other official papers seriously, and to denounce themselves sternly, nobody was politically punished. Of course many individuals were criticised. For example, amongst

30 criticism articles in the *People's Daily* and the *Guangming Daily*, seven were criticisms of Liang Shu-ming, a man well-known in China since the 1920s for both his academic career and political activities. His critics claimed that his self-criticism *What Kinds of Progress I have Made Since 1949* (in the *Guangming Daily* on 5 October 1951), was not enough.

These critics were nonetheless of the old-type intellectuals themselves. It seemed that they criticised Liang more in order to show their own successful ideological remoulding than to follow the CCP's line aiming at Liang as a target, for Liang wrote two counter-criticism articles as a reaction, and, more significantly, he still enjoyed the special privilege of being one of the tiny group of the famous non-communist personages who were interviewed by Mao regularly after the Thought Reform Campaign.<sup>7</sup>

However, there were intellectuals who underwent bad treatment, or at least, experienced psychological problems, in the Campaign, as the CCP's official textbook admitted thirty years later.<sup>8</sup> An example was Shen Cong-wen, a distinguished novelist before 1949. Even before the Campaign was launched, his novels were thought to be an expression of petty bourgeois thought and therefore his books were banned after 1949, and he was criticised severely, being no longer considered to be qualified as a writer in the new society. Shen Cong-wen could not understand this and once attempted to commit suicide. In the end, he was assigned as an instructor in the Chinese History Museum.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Liang Shu-ming, 1987:173-183. Cf. Dai Qing, 1989: 3-35.

<sup>8</sup> Hu Hua, 1985: 65-66.

<sup>9</sup> Ling Yu, 1988: 418-446; Nieh Hua-ling, 1972: 111-113; Huang Yong-yu, 1988.

In spite of individual exceptions, one thing is clear: the CCP did not launch the Thought Reform Campaign to punish China's old-type intellectuals politically, but on the contrary, to assert control over them ideologically, and to gain political support from them. At that time the CCP was confident that it had the capacity to build up a new China, while in the meantime recognising that without the cooperation of the intellectual an economically strong nation under the flag of socialism was impossible.

Of the political campaigns, the Thought Reform later turned out to be the mildest. It is doubtful whether the majority of the old-type intellectuals had really achieved the desired inner spiritual transformation through the Campaign. As far as the CCP's political control over these old-type intellectuals was concerned, however, the Campaign was indeed successful: the old-type intellectuals as a whole could no longer be a political problem for the CCP during Mao's time. There were still individuals from this group who were criticised or even punished from time to time. For instance, Feng You-lan, a great Chinese philosopher in this century, and Liang Si-cheng, an outstanding scholar in ancient Chinese architecture, were criticised.<sup>10</sup> The old-type intellectuals would be further criticised in large numbers, especially during the Anti-Rightist Campaign in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. But in these later cases they were more victims who were criticised together with other main targets rather than main targets themselves. Since the Thought Reform Campaign, China's old-type

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<sup>10</sup> Liang Si-cheng in 1955, Liang Shu-ming in 1955, Ma Ying-chu in 1958, Feng You-lan in 1958, Zhou Gu-cheng in 1964, were criticised. More details about Feng You-lan can be seen in Chapter 6.

intellectuals learned "to tuck their tails between their legs"(JIA ZHE WEI BA ZUO REN), *i.e.*, they were overdiscreet in word and deed, feeling shame or even guilt at their class origins, past experiences, and various "dirty ideas". It was widely believed that "so long as they are living, intellectuals should go on studying and remoulding." (HUO DAO LAO, XUE DAO LAO, GAI ZAO DAO LAO.)

Just after the Thought Reform Campaign of 1951-1952, the CCP and its government began its First Five-year Plan. Intellectuals were expected to contribute their knowledge and skills to the construction of the nation. The problem now was less how to wash out various non-proletarian ideas in the minds of the old-type intellectuals than how to stimulate their enthusiasm for the socio-economic development of society. There was a great scarcity of technical experts in the 1950s, as we have showed in Chapter Two. To deal with such a problem, the CCP established more schools and enrolled more students. From 1949 to 1955, there were 239,327 students who graduated from institutes of higher learning, and 794,445 from polytechnic schools.<sup>11</sup>

From the beginning of 1956, the CCP adopted a more relaxed policy toward the old-type intellectuals. In January 1956, the Central Committee of the CCP convened a special "Conference of Intellectuals". Zhou En-lai delivered an important address in which he, as a Party leader for the first time, declared that "the overwhelming majority of intellectuals had become government workers" and thus were "already a part of the working class". According to

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<sup>11</sup> *ZHONG GUO JIAO YU NIAN JIAN* (the Yearbook of China: Education), 1984: 971,984.

Zhou, intellectuals, who had passed five-years studying, working, and especially remoulding in political campaigns, should no longer be distrusted in their work. What is more, because of the fundamental change of their social locations, they should no longer be seen as members of the bourgeoisie, but instead, as members of the working class. The change of their world outlook, Zhou asserted, was a long process, and if they did not turn against the people in words and deeds, if they were prepared to devote their knowledge and energies to serving the people, the cadres of the CCP should be able to wait for the gradual awakening of their consciousness and help them patiently. Zhou even criticised Party men by complaining of certain unreasonable features in the present employment and treatment of intellectuals, and in particular certain sectarian attitudes amongst some of the CCP's officials towards intellectuals outside the Party. According to Zhou, intellectuals as members of the working class should be further recruited into the CCP, and he criticised the refusal of senior intellectuals who applied to join the CCP, blaming it "closed-doorism". In general, Zhou urged the offering of better working and living conditions to intellectuals in order to let them concentrate on their study and research.<sup>12</sup>

Without any doubt, it was still necessary for intellectuals to receive political education and ideological remoulding, because, according to both Confucianism and Maoism, everybody including the CCP leader (for instance, Zhou En-lai himself), needs remoulding. Old-type intellectuals could never be an exception. However, by locating educated people amongst

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<sup>12</sup> Zhou En-lai, 1984: 158-189.



the working class, the CCP did to a great extent change its policy towards the old-type intellectuals. Why was there such a great change?

It could be argued that it was largely motivated by economic rather than political reasons because of the great lack of technical experts and the heavy load of rebuilding the country. It could also be argued that not all the Party leaders and officials agreed with Zhou's opinion. But if there had not been the social transference of these intellectuals from the old professionals to the new salaried working men/women, if the CCP had not got the impression that the old-type intellectuals as a whole did show their submissive obedience to the authorities during the Thought Reform Campaign and other campaigns or individual events, there would have been no change of policy, and Zhou would not have been able to make that address, no matter what he personally wished.

Ironically, this relaxed policy was short-lived. There were leaders within the CCP such as Zhou who realistically wanted to give great play to intellectuals' professional knowledge and skills in the process of economic development. But there were others, especially Mao, it was believed, who further tried to use intellectuals for political ends as well as to use them as a critical or even supervisory force outside the CCP.<sup>13</sup>

When some intellectuals—this time, mainly "democratic personages"—were really stimulated to play their given socio-political role, the CCP and Mao recognised that it was too dangerous to place trust readily in "intellectuals".

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<sup>13</sup> M.Meisner, 1988: 171-174.

As a result, the CCP's policy towards educated people made a 180-degree turn: not merely the old-type intellectuals, but also, more noticeably, the democratic personages, and even some revolutionary ones, were thought to belong to the bourgeoisie, and some of them were further declared as "enemies of the people". Such a dramatic change of policy towards educated people resulted in a lot of tragic events and innocent victims in the PRC since 1957. It also revealed the fact that the CCP and its leaders, especially Mao, did not find the proper way to deal with the so-called "intellectuals".

## **II.The "Democratic Personages" in the Hundred-flower Period**

While the Thought Reform Campaign, aimed at remoulding China's old-type intellectuals ideologically, was considered successful by the CCP as far as these old-type intellectuals' political attitude and behaviour during and after the campaign were concerned, the Anti-Rightists Campaign was not. This time, however, the main targets were not the old-type intellectuals, but the democratic personages.

The so-called "democratic personages" in the PRC were those leading figures of the eight small parties. These were: (1).the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT; (2).the Democratic Construction Association; (3).the Democratic League; (4).the Association For Promoting Democracy; (5).the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers; (6).the Third September Society; (7).the Party for the Public; and (8).the Taiwan Democratic Self-government League. Amongst them, the first three were the largest ones. They respectively consisted of the left-wing KMT generals/officials, the national capitalists, and the leading intellectuals.

Besides the Democratic League, the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers and the Third September Society were also intellectuals' organisations.<sup>14</sup>

Unlike the old-type intellectuals, the democratic personages were those educated men and women who were interested, and indeed got involved, in politics before 1949. Politically, they were in the middle between the KMT and the CCP, called the "third force". As time went to the late 1940s, the CCP achieved military victory one after another, these personages and their organisations started turning to the Left. In 1948, they officially claimed that they accept the leadership of the CCP earnestly and sincerely. Because these democratic organisations and their leaders enjoyed high prestige amongst intellectuals and national bourgeoisie, their political support of the CCP greatly helped the CCP to win over many urban educated men or men of property, who might have left the mainland with the KMT in 1949.<sup>15</sup>

To repay them for their support, the CCP honoured these democratic personages high posts, high reputation, and better living conditions after 1949. But functionally, after 1949, these small organisations were political parties more in name than in reality, and their leaders became the democratic personages holding posts without real power.<sup>16</sup> What is more, the most important positions in these organisations, for instance, the

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<sup>14</sup> Cf., Jiang Ping, 1987; Yu Gang, 1987.

<sup>15</sup> Of these democratic parties, the Democratic League of China was the most influential one amongst intellectuals. More details about its history can be seen in A.J. Shaheen, 1977; and Y.C. Ting, 1978.

<sup>16</sup> Cf., M.Meisner, 1988:69; H.C. Hinton, 1973: 245-247.

secretaries-general, were even occupied by the secret members of the CCP.<sup>17</sup>

**Table 3.5.** Education background of the top leaders of the CCP, and of the Democratic League, the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers, the Third September Society in the 1950s.

	CCP	DL*	DPPW**	3rd SS***	Total
Middle School	3		1		4
College	3	1	2		6
First Degree		4	3	1	8
Msc/M.A.				3	3
PhD		1		2	3
Total	6	6	6	6	24

\*: DL stands for the Democratic League;

\*\* : DPPW stands for the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers;

\*\*\*: 3rd SS stands for the Third September Society.

Sources: 1. *REN MIN SHOU CE, 1957* ( *People's Yearbook, 1957*), the Da-gong Daily Press, Peking, 1957; 2. *MIN GUO REN WU ZHUAN* (*Biographies of China's Figures of the Republic*), Vol. 1-6, edited by Li Xing, Song Zhi-wen, et al, China Publishing House, Beijing, 1978-1987; 3. *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. I - IV*, edited by H. L. Boorman, Columbia University Press, New York/London, 1967, 1968, 1970, 1971; 4. *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, Vol. I - II*, edited by D.W. Klein, A. B. Clark, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971; 5. *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China*, edited by W. Bartke, K. G. Saur, Munchen/ New York/London/ Oxford/Paris, 1987; 6. *Who's Who in China, 1918-1950*, edited by J. Cavanaugh, Chinese Materials Center, Hong Kong, 1982; 7. *Who's Who in Modern China*, edited by M. Perleberg, Ye Olde Printerie Ltd., Hong Kong, 1954.

On the other hand, like the old-type intellectuals, these democratic personages in general were more qualified as "the people who have knowledge" than the CCP's leaders as far as their formal education and scholarly experiences are concerned. The difference of education

<sup>17</sup> Qian Jia-ju, 1986: 193. "The secret members of the CCP" were those whose membership were neither open to the public nor to other members of the CCP (except for their direct leaders) and democratic parties. Cf., Liao Meng-xing, 1987.

background between the top leaders of the CCP, and the top ones of the Democratic League, the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers, the Third September Society can be seen from Table 3.5. When they worked together, a new question arose: who are more qualified to be officials?

In 1949, when the PRC was established, the Government seemed to be a coalition, for three out of the six vice-chairmen of the Central Government, and two out of four vice-Premiers of the Government Administrative Council (the predecessor of the State Council), were democratic personages. Further, as Table 3.6. shows, the democratic personages also occupied some other important positions in the state leadership, although most of them, if not all of them, actually just "holding posts without real power".

**Table 3.6.** The political status of the personages in the State Organs in October, 1949.

	CCP	Non-CCP	Total
<b>the Central Government</b>			
Chairman	1		1
Vice-chairmen	3	3	6
Members	28	28	56
<b>the State Council*</b>			
Premier	1		1
Vice-premiers	2	2**	4
Ministers	20	15	35
Members	7	9	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>52.10</b>	<b>47.90</b>	<b>100</b>

\* It was called the Government Administrative Council then.

\*\* Of them one post was actually occupied by Guo Mo-ruo, a secret member of the CCP, who played the role of non-party personage. More details can be seen in Chapter Six.

Source: *People's Yearbook*, 1951, pp. 165-176, Dagong Daily Press, Shanghai, 1952.

At the provincial and lower levels, democratic personages also held some posts. These posts, however, were more symbolic than functional, because all the policies were exclusively made by the CCP, either by the Central Committee or, at a lower level, by the Party Committees, and the democratic personages as non-Party members, in most cases, could not attend CCP's policy-making meetings, nor could they have the privilege of reading the so-called "classified papers" or "confidential documents". In spite of this, the democratic personages in the early years of the PRC indeed obtained some positions in the State organs at least in name.

By the time of 1952-1953, when the CCP and its leaders, especially Mao, decided to leap forward to a socialist economic model, such a "coalition government in name" existed even less than it had done before. In 1954, Mao became the President of the State in the First National People's Congress, when the only Vice-President was Zhu De, Mao's old partner in the Red Army since 1927. Much more significantly, in the State Council, under Premier Zhou, all of the 10 Vice-Premiers and the 8 Heads of the eight Offices were Party officials. The non-Party personages now had to be unwillingly moved to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, which was thought to be a rubber-stamp body, for it always "approved" the Party's decision.

Nevertheless, as Table 3.7. shows, non-Party personages were amongst the leadership, and some of them even maintained ministership in the State Council, although they mostly held the posts without power. The problem is that not all of them were satisfied with such a position, as we are soon going to see.

**Table 3.7.** The leadership of the PRC in First National People's Congress of 1954.

	CCP member	Non-CCP member	Total
President	1		1
Vice-president	1		1
<b>State Council</b>			
Premier	1		1
Vice-premiers	10		10
Heads of Offices	8		8
Secretary General	1		1
Ministers	22	13	35
<b>Standing Committee</b>			
Chairman	1		1
Vice-chairmen	5	8	13
Secretary General	1		1
<b>Total</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>70.83</b>	<b>29.17</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *People's Yearbook*, 1955, PP. 216, 275-276, Dagong Daily Press, Tianjin, 1955.

In the mid-1950s too, the Government had increasing success in fulfilling the First Five-year Plan in advance. The total output value of industry and agriculture in 1956 was ¥125,200,000(RMB), an increase of 54.6 per cent over 1952, 170 per cent over 1949. During the First Five-year Plan period(1952-1957), China's industry grew very rapidly. According to official data, the actual per annum increase was 18 per cent, or 16 per cent according to Western estimates. It was anyhow more than the ambitious 14.7 per cent yearly increase set by the plan.<sup>18</sup> During this period as well, the CCP transformed private industry and commerce into state or semi-state enterprises, and self-sufficient agriculture into co-operatives or collectives. China's peasants, who had been self-supported farmers

<sup>18</sup> M.Meisner, 1988: 123.

scattered over the vast land, were organised nationwide into firstly Mutual Aid Teams, and then Cooperatives.<sup>19</sup>

Such a transformation was so fast that some figures within the leadership, such as Zhou En-lai, recognised that there was a tendency towards "rash advance"(MAO JIN) but failed to stop it or at least slow it down. Instead, Mao severely criticised these figures within the CCP as "the men who are only 50 metres from the Rightists".<sup>20</sup>

But in spite of these achievements, in spite of the Three-anti Campaign in 1952-1953 (*i.e.*, Anti-corruption, Anti-waste, & Anti-bureaucracy Campaign), by 1956, many party cadres, after 7 years in office since 1949, were becoming more and more bureaucratised. It was almost inevitable that persons, who, as governmental administrators, were in the positions that had the effect of separating themselves from the masses, should become more and more bureaucratic. Some "old cadres"<sup>21</sup> now thought that it was their turn to enjoy power and privilege when the CCP in its power increasingly attracted new comers who saw party membership as the avenue for a career in government and a stepping stone for higher posts. Such a process of revolutionaries becoming rulers

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<sup>19</sup> The Cooperative itself developed from Elementary Cooperative, in which distribution was according to the amount of land peasants contributed, to Advanced Cooperative, in which the land and other chief means of production were collectively owned by the Co-op and the distribution system was based on the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work".

<sup>20</sup> Mao, 1969: 145-154, 299-300; 1974: 138. Cf., Li Rui, 1989: 170-172.

<sup>21</sup> "Old cadre" in Chinese under the CCP does not necessarily mean a cadre in his old age. On the contrary, it means a cadre who has been a member of the CCP for a long time.



resulted in more contradictions between the cadres and the masses. How to handle these contradictions became another problem.

Theoretically, these two kinds of problems were mutually interdependent: on the one hand, the rapid development of the economy could make the former revolutionaries more bureaucratised and the contradictions between the cadres and the masses more serious; on the other hand, the bureaucratisation of the cadres and the serious contradictions between the cadres and the masses could in turn retard the development of the economy and further shake the stability of society. Hence the task in front of the CCP, whose aim was to develop China's economy rapidly while protecting society from disorder and polarisation, was to handle the contradictions between the cadres and the masses correctly.

Both the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages were not as active as the CCP expected. For the former, through the Thought Reform Campaign and the transformation of their social positions from old-style professionals to the new salaried working people, it was still bitter to be told that they were nevertheless politically different from the working class, for there would always be a bourgeois kingdom of ideology in their minds because of their social and educational background. For the latter, it seemed ironical to mount the rostrum but hold little actual power.

As we have already seen, in January 1956, Zhou delivered an important address on intellectuals in which he declared that the majority of educated people were already members of the working class, and appealed to CCP officials to respect their intellectual works and to improve their living conditions. As members of the working class, educated people, especially the established intellectuals, should therefore be recruited into the CCP.

By the end of 1955, it was said that there were around 100,000 senior intellectuals, but only 7 per cent of them were the members of the CCP. Whereas, amongst 7,499 professors and vice-professors of higher education of learning all over the country, 2,110 were the members of the democratic parties, that is, 28 per cent. If we look into those who occupied the posts of university principles, college deans, and department heads, the proportion was as high as one third.<sup>22</sup> Since Zhou declared that the majority of educated people were already members of the working class, there were more and more individual intellectuals who were recruited by the CCP. For instance, in the first two months of 1956, 110 intellectuals in Shanghai joined the Party. They consisted of "experts, scholars, writers, artists and engineers who had made great contributions in teaching, scientific research, engineering technique, and cultural and artistic pursuits". On 21 March 1956, an editorial was published in the *People's Daily*, entitled *Do Well with Our Membership Drive amongst Intellectuals*. Afterwards, more university academics were admitted to be members of the CCP. In Changchun alone, for example, in the first three months, 228 professors joined the CCP. In the first half of 1956, 300 senior intellectuals joined the CCP in Peking and Shanghai, and 2,592 senior intellectuals in the whole country.<sup>23</sup>

The most dramatic signal of the change of policy towards intellectuals was the slogans of "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" (BAI HUA QI FANG, BAI JIA ZHENG MING). "Let a hundred flowers blossom" was actually used by Mao and other CCP leaders as early as 1951 for the theatrical reform,<sup>24</sup> while "Let a hundred

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<sup>22</sup> Li Wei-han, 1986: 803-810.

<sup>23</sup> T.H.E. Chen, 1960: 111-112.

<sup>24</sup> N. Das, 1979: 2.

schools of thought contend" was borrowed from the Chinese classics of the Spring & Autumn Annals(722-481 B.C.) and Warring States(403-221 B.C.), when many schools arose including Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism. Mao in 1952 said that there should be no orthodox school within the field of historical research, including research into the history of the CCP.<sup>25</sup> On 2 May 1956, for the first time, Mao combined these two "let-a-hundred" together and adopted them as the policy for promoting progress in science and literature in his address to the Supreme State Conference. Then, on 26 May, Lu Ding-yi, director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, made a lengthy address *Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend*. He authoritatively elaborated the new policy and explained that the policy meant "freedom of independent thinking, freedom of debate, freedom of creative work, freedom to criticise, to express and to maintain one's own views" in literature, art and science. These freedoms were of course limited "within the ranks of the people themselves", according to Lu. He explained that the reason for adopting such a relaxed policy was that ideological questions could not be resolved by administrative orders, and only through open debate could right overcome wrong step by step.<sup>26</sup>

If this "Double-hundred Policy" was specially designed for creating a relatively liberal atmosphere amongst the old-type intellectuals so that they could be more enthusiastic for the nation's construction and the healthy development of literature, art, and sciences, etc., the policy of "Long-term coexistence, mutual supervision" (CHANG JI GONG CUN, HU XIANG JIAN DU) was adopted more as a political strategy in

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<sup>25</sup> Li Shu, 1989.

<sup>26</sup> Lu Ding-yi, 1956.

cooperation with the democratic parties. Mao even said that there should be two "long-lives": long live the CCP, and long live the democratic parties. Zhou explained that the CCP and the democratic parties could die at the same time in future although they were born on different dates.<sup>27</sup> That is to say, as long as the CCP exists, the democratic parties will be allowed to continue.

However, as we have said, these democratic parties were by no means opposition parties in the Western sense, but cooperative organisations under the leadership of the CCP. The question is, if these democratic parties were in theory defined as the organisations of the national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and the intellectuals belonging to them, while the CCP was the party of the proletariat, how could they co-exist for long? Did it mean that, alongside the "socialist transformation" of industry and agriculture, the national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and their intellectuals had already changed into working men as a whole, and thus the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie and their intellectuals, between the CCP and the democratic parties, no longer existed? Or did it mean that the contradiction still existed but was no longer antagonistic, instead, it was the contradiction within the rank of the people?

There has always been debate about the original intention of the change of policy towards intellectuals and the democratic parties. Some think that the policy was a "trap", *i.e.*, it deliberately encouraged intellectuals to commit themselves in order that the CCP could know what the intellectuals really thought and then might have a pretext to criticise or

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<sup>27</sup> Li Wei-han, 1986: 813, 823.

even punish those whose ideas deviated from the orthodox ideology. Those who hold the "trap theory" have strong evidence when they find that it was Mao himself who said during the Anti-Rightist Campaign that the purpose of the "unchecked" publication of the intellectuals' criticism during the Hundred Flowers period, especially the five weeks from 1 May to 7 June, was "to catch big fish", or in Chinese saying, "to lure the snake out of his lair in order to kill him easily"(YIN SHE CHU DONG).<sup>28</sup> Others insist that there was no "trap" at all because from the outset the leadership of the CCP including Mao had already clearly distinguished the Left and the Right.<sup>29</sup>

As a matter of fact, the real process is more complicated. It was suggested that in 1957 Mao could have continued his liberal policy towards intellectuals and democratic parties if there had not been the challenge from other leaders of the CCP, for instance, Liu Shao-qi.<sup>30</sup> Undoubtedly the CCP was not a monolith in the mid-1950s, as indeed it has never been. However, no evidence has been found that Liu Shao-qi and others in the highest level at that time disagreed with Mao on the CCP's policies of "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" and "Long-term coexistence, mutual supervision". On the other hand, as we have already said, the main task for the CCP in the mid-1950s was to develop China's economy as far as possible. Because of this, support from non-Party intellectuals was technically necessary. It seems that the leadership of the CCP had come to an agreement on this for the time being, which can be seen from both Mao's speeches during that period and Liu Shao-qi's *Political Report* at the Eighth Congress of the

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<sup>28</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 444.

<sup>29</sup> Deng Chu Min, 1957.

<sup>30</sup> Qian Wei-chang, in *RMRB*, 17 July, 1957; R. MacFarquhar, 1974, *passim*.

CCP in 1956, although at lower levels, Mao admitted then, as many as *eighty to ninety per cent* of CCP officials did not understand and therefore did not support this "Double-hundred Policy".<sup>31</sup>(My emphasis)

Another reason that the CCP adopted these relaxed policies towards intellectuals and democratic parties in the mid-1950s is that the leadership tried to avoid events like those happening in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Mao was warned by such events that if the contradictions within a so-called socialist society were not correctly distinguished and handled the leadership could be severely shaken. Mao divided these contradictions into two kinds: antagonistic and non-antagonistic ones.

An antagonistic contradiction is the one between the people and their enemies, whereas a non-antagonistic contradiction is the one amongst the people themselves. By "the people"(REN MIN), Mao meant the classes, strata and social groups which favour, support and work for the cause of socialist construction. The CCP and Mao thought in 1956 that the main contradictions in China were those amongst the people because the acute class struggle had in the main finished. However, if the non-antagonistic contradictions were not properly handled, Mao innovatively pointed out, they could develop into antagonistic ones, and bring chaos.

Mao thought whether or not the contradictions could be properly handled depended upon whether or not the leadership correctly distinguished the two kinds of contradictions and what kinds of methods were accordingly used. Mao insisted that, whereas the antagonistic contradictions between

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<sup>31</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 204, 210, 240-241, 337; Liu Shao-qi, 1956. Cf., Li Wei-han, 1986: 845.

the people and their enemies should, in most cases, be resolved by dictatorship, that is, by using the state machine, such as the police, to suppress "enemies of the people", the non-antagonistic contradictions among the people should be handled by democratic methods. That is to say, discussion, education, persuasion, criticism and self-criticism, rather than compulsory and coercive means, should be used. What is more, if the leadership just simply suppressed people including intellectuals, who merely expressed their opinions, greater problems like the events in Poland and Hungary would eventually result.<sup>32</sup>

Amongst various non-antagonistic contradictions, one was the contradiction between the intellectual and the CCP, or in CCP's words, "the contradiction between intellectuals and the working class". This is why the CCP convened a special conference in January 1956 to deal with the problem of intellectuals, trying to obtain the support from them.

But there was another non-antagonistic contradiction at that time: the one between the masses and the cadres, or in CCP's words, the problem of bureaucracy.<sup>33</sup> To deal with this, the CCP in 1956 launched an Open-door Rectification Campaign (KAI MEN ZHENG FENG), the aim of which was to get rid of bureaucracy within officialdom.

It was the first time since 1949 that the CCP leadership invited intellectuals, especially democratic personages, to criticise bureaucratism, subjectism, and sectarianism within the CCP. As a matter of fact, there was no campaign called "Hundred Flowers" in China at that time, but

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<sup>32</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 384-391.

<sup>33</sup> Unlike Stalin's leadership, Mao's openly admitted the existence of official bureaucracy. But unlike Djilas or Trosky, Mao thought it non-antagonistic.

"Rectification". It was a campaign during which the CCP asked both the democratic personages and the old-type intellectuals to "contend and bloom"(MING, FANG), like a hundred schools of thought or a hundred flowers of art, in order to express their critical opinions, and to help the CCP to get rid of bureaucracy.

The question is, why did the CCP invite non-Party intellectuals to criticise it? The idea that a Communist party should always listen to the masses of the people can be found in Mao's writings in the 1930s. According to him, in a rectification campaign, people should adhere to the principle of "telling all that you know, and telling it without reservation; blaming not the speaker, but heeding what you hear; correcting mistakes if you have committed them, and avoiding them if you have not." But such a principle had seldom practised, and if it had, it was only applicable within the CCP itself or between the CCP and "the masses of the people". (In the past the "people" classified mainly as workers and peasants.) In 1957, however, for the first time democratic personages and the old-type intellectuals were involved in the CCP's Open-door Rectification and were asked to play an active role, like critics. It obviously meant that, in the eyes of the CCP, educated people in both categories of the "democratic personages" and the "old-type intellectuals" were amongst the masses of the people.

One explanation of the CCP's invitation of intellectuals as critics is that the CCP leadership thought the intellectuals as a whole were trustworthy. One might cite as evidence for this Zhou En-lai's claim in January 1956 that most of the intellectuals were already members of the working class, or Mao's statement in February 1957 that most of the intellectuals had made marked progress since 1949 and had shown that they were in favour of the established system.



Moreover, in January, 1956, and March, 1957, Zhou and Mao even sought the recruitment of one third of all intellectuals into the CCP by the end of the Third Five-year Plan, that is, by the end of 1967.<sup>34</sup>

Another explanation, more complicated, is that it had always been Mao's strategy to deal with a question before it became a problem, and that the CCP's leadership, especially Mao, learned a lesson from events in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Therefore, they tried to avoid chaos by letting people speak out instead of suppressing their opinions until they developed into such a serious situation that a "Hungarian Incident" would be unavoidable. As Mao himself said later,

by launching the rectification of our own accord, we have purposely invited a possible 'Hungarian Incident', broken it down into many small 'Hungarian Incidents' staged in various organisations and colleges, and dealt with them individually. <sup>35</sup>

Nonetheless, there is no evidence at all that the CCP and Mao deliberately plotted for the punishment of the democratic personages (and the old-type intellectuals) when the slogans of "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools contend", and "Long-term coexistence, mutual supervision" were put forward. On the contrary, it seemed that Mao and the CCP were too optimistic and self-confident at the beginning.

Comparatively, both democratic personages and the old-type intellectuals hesitated about participation in the blossoming and contending when they

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<sup>34</sup> Zhou En-lai, 1984: 179-180; Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 349, 355. Cf., F.C. Teiwes, 1979:236.

<sup>35</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 450.

were just invited. On 24 March 1957, professor Fei Xiao-tong, a key figure in the Democratic League and a leading social anthropologist, in his *The Early Spring for the Intellectuals*, showed that many intellectuals saw the new official evaluation of intellectuals in Zhou En-lai's speech in January 1956 as their "re-liberation". However, they still worried about the political weather, seeing it as an early spring which could be followed by a colder wave.<sup>36</sup>

Historian Jian Bo-zhan, another well-known intellectual, wrote *Why Is There still the Feeling of Early Spring?* four weeks later. Jian saw that, after the "Double-hundred" policy was advanced for more than a half year, the socio-political atmosphere was still like a special kind of weather: "the thunder clap is loud, the raindrops are small". That is to say, people were talking about the policy everywhere, but there was no real blossoming and contending. Jian complained that "the leadership cadres in some places or establishments are limiting themselves to giving lip service to the slogan without taking action to make flowers blossom forth or relaxing their restrictions." As a result, intellectuals

"have to guess to what extent, if the call is sincere, flowers will be allowed to blossom forth and whether the call will be recalled after the flowers are in bloom. They have to guess whether the call for flowers is the end or just a means and whether the call is made for the sake of bringing prosperity to culture and science or of unearthing thoughts and rectifying individuals. They have to guess which are the problems that can be brought up for discussion and which are the problems that cannot be discussed. "<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Fei Xiao-tong, 1957<sup>b</sup>. A detailed study of Fei and his involvement in the Campaign will be seen in Chapter Five.

<sup>37</sup> Jian Bo-Zhan, 1957. English translation is adopted from MacFarquhar, 1960.

Of course there were people, especially some democratic personages, who had already bravely criticised the CCP since it put forward the slogan of "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend". For example, in speeches to the People's Political Consultative Conference, Zhang Bo-jun, a Vice-chairman of the Democratic League and Chairman of the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers, suggested that the work of the People's Political Consultative Conference (in which the democratic parties play their political roles) should be strengthened. Another example was Luo Long-ji, another Vice-Chairman of the Democratic League. Luo thought that amongst senior intellectuals, "there are many who study social sciences... have no class to teach", and some who returned from either Britain or the United States were not suitably employed but were given jobs as cart-pullers or cigarette-pedlars. Luo further pointed out that "during the past years there were not many flowers bloomed and few schools of thought contended in the academic and ideological fields... The basic cause lies in the fact that the senior intellectuals are still suspicious and are still plagued by misgivings."<sup>38</sup> As a matter of fact, as early as July 1956, Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, and Zhang Nai-qi, a Vice-Chairman of the Democratic Construction Association, complained that the CCP officials and non-CCP officials were not politically equal in governmental organs. They even claimed that the democratic parties should be like advisory bodies.<sup>39</sup>

Without doubt, Mao could not completely agree with the above opinions. As early as January 1957, he complained that in the CCP there was a tendency to stress arranging jobs for intellectuals to the neglect of

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<sup>38</sup> RMRB, 19, 23 March, 1957. English translation is partly adopted from MacFarquhar, 1960.

<sup>39</sup> Cf., Li Wei-Han, 1986: 820-821.

remoulding them. In his opinion, there was too much of the former and too little of the latter. Was he criticising Zhou En-lai indirectly here, for Zhou in his speech *On the Problem of Intellectuals* in January 1956 did emphasis the former but talk about the later not very much? In the meantime, according to Mao, there was queer talk amongst professors, "such as that the Communist Party should be done away with, the CCP cannot lead them, socialism is no good, and so on and so forth." "Before," Mao went on, "they kept these ideas to themselves, but since the policy of 'Let a hundred schools of thought contend' gave them an opportunity to speak up, these remarks have come tumbling out."<sup>40</sup>

Did he hence regret his "Double-hundred Policy" and now want to punish those professors? The answer is negative. In the same speech, for instance, Mao insisted that the policy of "Let a hundred flowers blossom" was correct. He said:

Some comrades hold that only fragrant flowers should be allowed to blossom and that poisonous weeds should not to be allowed to grow. This approach shows little understanding of the policy of 'Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.' ... We should allow democratic personages to challenge us with opposing views and give them a free hand to criticise us. Otherwise we would be a little like the KMT.

As for those who made wrong criticism such as Zhang Nai-qi,

if they want to fart, let them. ... The falser their words and the greater their mistakes, the better, and the more isolated they will become and the better they will educate the people by negative example.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 353.

<sup>41</sup> Mao, Ibid., pp. 358-359, 375-376.

A month later, on 27 February, 1957, Mao made one of his most important and famous speeches entitled *On the Correct Handling of the contradictions among the People* to about 1,800 high officials, including the leading democratic personages, at the session of the Supreme State Conference. Mao optimistically announced that "never before has our country been as united as it is today" because "the large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution has in the main *come to an end*."<sup>42</sup>(My emphasis)

In short, he was saying that there were, of course, contradictions within the Chinese society, but they were mainly non-antagonistic ones among the people, and thus should be correctly handled only through education, including criticism and self-criticism. The formula was: "From unity, through criticism, to unity".

Mao then explained why the CCP leadership put forward the slogans of "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" and of "Long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" as its policies towards the intellectuals and democratic parties. Firstly, the "Double-hundred Policy" was adopted (1) "in recognition of the continued existence of various contradictions", which were mainly non-antagonistic in China then, and (2) "in response to the country's urgent need to speed up its economic and cultural development." That is to say, on the one hand, it would be harmful to simply suppress people's opinions by administrative measures, which, in the long run, would result in bigger problems. On the other hand, for the sake of the development of economy

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<sup>42</sup> According to Mao, even "the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people" in China, although he did not fully explain why and how it could be. Mao, 1977: 386.

and culture, the CCP needed a relatively mild atmosphere under which intellectuals in various schools of thought would willingly contribute their knowledge and skills.

Secondly, "why should the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democratic parties be allowed to exist side by side with the CCP?" Because, Mao answered, the CCP had no reason to reject those democratic parties or to deny them the opportunity of making a living service to the country. As to mutual supervision, Mao thought that the CCP had a great need to hear opinions different from its own, in order to get rid of bureaucracy.<sup>43</sup>

Obviously, there were three reasons for the policy:

- (1). For the purpose of the economic and cultural development, the CCP needed the contribution of the non-Communist intellectuals either in democratic parties or in the fields of art and science;
- (2). For the sake of social stability, the CCP preferred that the people including intellectuals should express their opinions rather than be suppressed; and
- (3). For the CCP itself, Mao required the democratic parties and their personages to play a critical and even supervisory role.

Two weeks later, on 12 March, Mao made another important speech at the CCP's National Conference on Propaganda Work, which about 150 to 160 non-Party personages attended. Mao estimated that there were five million so-called "intellectuals" (educated people) in China at that time. "The

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<sup>43</sup> Mao, 1977: 386, 395, 408-414.

overwhelming majority," Mao said, "or well over 90 per cent, of the total of five million, support the socialist system in various degrees." That is, intellectuals as a whole could be trusted. What is more, "for a vast country like ours," Mao pointed out, "five million intellectuals are too few," and "*without intellectuals our work can not be done well.*" (My emphasis) Therefore the CCP should do a good job of uniting them. Mao again justified the "Double-hundred Policy", and further claimed that "the policy is not only a good method for developing science and the arts, but, applied more widely, it is a good method for *all* our work."<sup>44</sup> (My emphasis)

Never has a Communist party leader legitimatised the expression of non-Communist (or even anti-Communist) ideas in a "Soviet-type Communist" society before. However, neither of his 27 February and 12 March 1957 speeches were published at that time, nor could they be seen even in part in the official press. Was that because the CCP cadres in charge of the press did not agree with Mao's idea, or because they did not know whether the speeches were sincere, or just a strategy on Mao's part? Whatever its cause Mao himself was very dissatisfied with the silence of the *People's Daily*. As a result, Deng Tuo, the chief-editor of the *People's Daily*, and others like Chen Qi-tong, an army high official in charge of propaganda, who wrote an article in the *People's Daily* to question the "Double-hundred Policy", were sternly criticised.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Mao, 1977: 423-424, 433.

<sup>45</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1989 168-169, 252; Cf. M.Goldman, 1989: 50-51; T. Cheek, 1986: 193-196.

From the beginning of March to the end of April, 1957, Mao was busy at meeting and talking with Party officials in charge of propaganda, education, literature, art, press and publication, with local cadres and army officials, as well as writers and artists. These meetings and talks were from group to group, in both Peking and other cities. Mao explained the reasons of adopting the "Double-hundred Policy" to them repeatedly.

Above all, on 30 April, 1957, Mao met almost all leaders of the democratic parties on the rostrum of Tian An Men Square. He announced that the "class struggle had ended" and Chinese people were now entering upon another type of war: "the war on nature". As he explained many times before, Mao said that the contradictions within Chinese society were mainly non-antagonistic, although it was still necessary for the democratic personages and old-type intellectuals to be remoulded ideologically, for their minds had not yet changed from bourgeois world views to working class ones. For Mao, however, a more problematic non-antagonistic contradiction was the one between the ruling party and the people because of bureaucracy within the CCP, and that was why the CCP launched the Rectification Campaign. When Mao met the leaders of the democratic parties on the Rostrum, he asked the democratic leaders "to attack more, attack earnestly" the CCP's work including higher education, general education, literature and art, science, and health matters. Mao ordered that these attacks should be published in the newspapers, where they could arouse the readers' attention. Mao was even saying that the system of Party committees in schools/universities was



perhaps inappropriate, and that he was thus considering professors be allowed to run schools/universities.<sup>46</sup>

It now seemed that the "early spring" had passed. More and more intellectuals began blossoming and contending either at various forums or in official newspapers. For instance, in Peking alone, there were 350,000 democratic party members who participated in forums by the end of April.<sup>47</sup> Amongst these forums, the most important and critical ones were the two from 8 to 16 May for the leading democratic personages and 21 May to 1 June for the well-known businessmen.

These forums were convened by the United Front Department of the CCP, a special organ to supervise the democratic parties, their leading figures, and other well-known non-Communist intellectuals. According to Li Wei-han, head of the United Front Department, there were respectively 70 and 108 persons who made speeches at the two forums.<sup>48</sup> Their speeches were summarily published in the *People's Daily*, the CCP's official newspaper, with no comment. It was the first time that the Party's newspaper looked like a independent paper in a non-Communist society. There were also critical articles written by democratic personages and other well-known intellectuals in the *People's Daily*, *Guangming Daily*, and other newspapers during this unique period.

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<sup>46</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 363-372.

<sup>47</sup> RMRB, 22, 26 April, 1957.

<sup>48</sup> Li Wei-han, 1986: 831.

The intellectuals who expressed their opinions during this unique five-week period were by no means a single organised group, thus they did not speak with one voice. The following points were the main issues raised during the blooming period of May, 1957, and they were also the ones later severely criticised by the CCP in the Anti-Rightist Campaign:<sup>49</sup>

**(1). The question that "the world belongs to the Party".**

The democratic personages complained that "the Party has replaced the Government". Zhang Bo-jun pointed out that the CCP's organisation exercised control over virtually everything. He alluded to the necessity of drawing a clear line between the authority of the state administrative organs and the duties of the CCP organisations. Chu An-ping, editor-in-chief of the *Guangming Daily*, further wrote an article entitled *Allow Me to Criticise Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou* in the *Guangming Daily*. After pointing out the fact that all 12 vice-Premiers in the State Council were Party-men, Chu asked: "Could it be that there is not a single person amongst the non-Party people who can sit in a vice-premier's chair, or that none of them can be groomed to hold this chair?" "Isn't it too much that within the scope of the nation, there must be a Party man as leader in every unit, big or small, whether section or subsection; or that nothing, big or small, can be done without a nod from a Party man?" According to him, "a party leading a nation is not the same thing as a party owning a nation; the public supports the Party, but members of the public have not forgotten that they are masters of

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<sup>49</sup> All direct quotations are originally from RMRB, GMRB, 8 May-4 June, 1957. English translation of them is partly adopted from MacFarquhar: 1960:40-53, 226; and N. Das, 1979: 56-69.

the nation." Chu strongly opposed the idea that "the world belongs to the Party"(DANG TIAN XIA).

**(2). The problem of "holding a post without power".**

Many democratic personages who were appointed as cadres at different levels of government felt that they held posts in name but were without actual power (YOU ZHI WU QUAN). Zhang Bo-jun complained that "while some CCP cadres got promoted very fast, non-CCP cadres rarely had similar opportunities." Others pointed out that "the CCP members might get promoted over three classes a year, but the non-CCP men, however assiduous in work, were not promoted for three to five years." They described the democratic parties as mere "eyebrows", that is, an ornament, of the CCP. Zhang Bo-jun said that "some adult members of the democratic parties and groups had not had a chance to play their due role in state affairs". It was said that Huang Yan-pei, Chairman of the Democratic Construction Association, was refused a list of the directors of the departments of industry of different provinces for security reasons, while Huang was a Vice-Premier and Minister of Light Industry of the Government Administrative Council. If Huang was treated like this, would it be impossible for other democratic personages who occupied lower posts than Huang's to expect to have the authority to go with those posts? Zhang Nai-qi added that he himself as the Minister of Food in the State Council "acquired power only through a series of struggles". Luo Long-ji complained that "at the standing committee meetings of the National People's Congress and the People's Political Consultative Conference, the democratic parties and groups could not voice any effective opinion on matters under discussion because they were not informed in advance of the matters to be discussed, and they had no time to

study them at the moment of discussion." Zhang Bo-jun said that "many industrial units have their own design departments nowadays, but there is not a single design department for political work. The Standing Committee of the People's National Congress, the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference, the democratic parties, and the mass organisations should make as four of this kind of political design department, and the major projects of political construction should be discussed in these four departments before they are put into effect."

### **(3). The question that "the layman leads the expert".**

The democratic personages, together with the old-type of intellectuals, saw themselves as experts in scientific, technical, educational and cultural fields while they viewed the CCP cadres as laymen. They believed that "a layman cannot lead an expert" (WAI HANG BU NENG LING DAO NEI HANG). But in practice, Luo Long-ji complained, in the Eight Offices of the State Council, and in addition in the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, and the National Construction Commission, all the responsible cadres were CCP members. Luo thought these departments should take in more non-Party intellectuals with technical and field experience to work in them. Some figures, for instance, Luo Long-ji, and Chen Ming-shu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, insisted that the unqualified Party members, *i.e.*, the Party men with a low level of knowledge and a lack of experience (in the relevant fields), should be removed from their present position in, for example, institutions of higher education. Some of them even further voiced opposition to the running of institutions of higher education by the Party Committees.

**(4). The question of legal system.**

The democratic personages thought it was necessary to improve the legal system. They complained that the democratic parties were not notified of the reason when some of their members were arrested in the Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries Campaign in 1955. Another case was of a man who had been under arrest since 1951, "but so far there had been no definite announcement made as to the conclusion of his case." Chen Qi-you, Chairman of the Party for the Public, urged promulgation of a civil and criminal code, and conduct of business according to legal procedure. Luo Long-ji proposed that "the two Standing Committees of the National People's Congress and of the People's Political Consultative Conference should jointly establish a special organisation to inspect the deviations during the past campaigns and at the same time to provide a guarantee that people who dare to bloom and contend would not be subject to attack and retaliation." He suggested that all of those who were wrongly accused or criticised in the past should be rehabilitated, and insisted that the CCP should not take part in this rehabilitation procedure because it was the CCP which made those wrong cases.

**(5). The question of "wall and moat".**

Some people found that since 1949 there was a "wall" or a "moat" (QIANG, GOU) between the CCP and the masses of the people. Chang Yun-chuan, a member of the Executive Bureau of the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers, expressed his opinion that the "wall and moat" between the CCP and the masses was due to CCP members' sense of particularity and of superiority. "In leading the masses to carry through the revolution in the

past," Zhang said, "the Party stood amongst the masses; after Liberation, it felt the position had changed and, instead of standing amongst the masses, it stood on the back of the masses and ruled the masses." Zhang Xi-ruo, a well-known non-party intellectual, Minister of Education, complained that some Party members thought "that they were the first people on earth, and treated themselves as meritorious contributors to the revolution. ... In this way there grew in them the thought of authority, and they acted like those with authority in the days of old, 'once authority is in his hands, he starts issuing orders'." Further, Zhang criticised some CCP members in their dealings with the masses. He pointed out that "when it was absolutely necessary they sought the co-operation of the masses. At the critical moment, they adopted the Confucian philosophy, 'tell the masses what to do, but not why to do it'." Huang Yao-mian, professor of Chinese literature, member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic League, found that "sometimes a Party member made a mistake, but it was taken as right; and a non-Party man did right, but it was taken as wrong." Moreover, "when a Party member committed a mistake, his case was dealt with behind closed doors. If not punished by the Party organisation, he was reinstated with the same powers. When a non-Party man committed a mistake, the Party organisation did not let him know where he was wrong, nor did it extend assistance to him, but it let him drift along, and punished the organisation to which he belonged."

**(6). On the Thought Reform and other political campaigns.**

Some democratic figures questioned the past political campaigns. One was Zhang Nai-qi. He objected to the demand that the national bourgeoisie should undergo further thought reform. According to him, the national bourgeoisie had already passed through several thought reform processes, and subjecting

them to any further ideological remoulding would only increase their inferiority complex, which would do no one any good. Zhang also talked about the question of "fixed rate of interest". After the CCP took power, China's businessmen as members of the national bourgeoisie invested their capital in joint state-private enterprises and drew a fixed rate of interest on it. Since then, the CCP had always regarded this fixed rate of interest as exploitation. Zhang disagreed with that, saying that since the non-antagonistic nature of the relationship between the national bourgeoisie and the working class had already been confirmed by the CCP leadership, there was no reason to treat a fixed rate of interest as exploitation any longer. He, as Minister of Food, further thought that "the policy of state monopoly for purchase and marketing of grain, cotton, *etc.*" made the situation worse. Other figures like Luo Long-ji complained that, besides the Thought Reform Campaign, there were many cases of wrong punishment or criticism in other campaigns: the Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign in 1950-1952, the Anti-three Evils (Corruption, Waste and Bureaucracy within the Party, Government, Army and Mass Organisations) Campaign in 1951-1952, the Anti-five Evils (Bribery, Tax Evasion, Theft of State Property, Cheating on Government Contracts and Stealing of Economic Information by Owners of Private Industrial and Commercial Enterprises) Campaign in 1952, and the Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries Campaign in 1955.

#### **(7). On the Policy towards the Soviet Union.**

The democratic personages criticised the CCP's policy towards the Soviet Union, saying that the relationship between the two countries was not equal. For example, Long Yun, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, thought that it was unreasonable for China to bear all the expenses

of the "Resist-America & Aid-Korea War" , he believed that the Soviet Union should share these costs. In addition, the Soviet Army dismantled and shipped away without payment some of the machinery from Chinese factories when it liberated north-east China. Long Yun criticised policy towards the Soviet Union by saying that "the foreign aid budget of our country is too large and should be curtailed." He believed that "it will take our country more than ten years to repay the loans from the USSR, if we can ever repay them. Besides, we have to pay interest to the Soviet Union. China fought for socialism, but look at the result!"

The above criticisms were reported to Mao and other top leaders of the CCP, and at the same time published in either the *People's Daily*, or the *Guangming Daily*, or both, from 8 May to 4 June 1957. According to Li Wei-han, who chaired the forums and reported the criticisms to the leadership of the CCP, at the beginning of May 1957, Mao did not plan to launch an Anti-Rightist Campaign, nor did Li himself convene the forum for the purpose of "luring the snake out of his lair". By mid-May, however, some intellectuals began to talk about "Speakers Corner in Hyde Park", namely, the freedom of speech. Mao then changed his mind and judged that the relationship between the CCP and the intellectuals who criticised the *status quo* was not like the relationship between a man's sister and his wife in a traditional Chinese extended family in which, however often these two women were criticising each other, they were always the members of a family. But rather, it was the relationship between the people and their enemy.

Mao never explained why he had such a sudden and astonishing change of mind, which left a lot of mysteries for us. There are many stories of course



about it. For instance, it was said that Mao sent his secretaries to Peking University where hundreds of "big-character posters" criticising the CCP's bureaucracy were put up on the wall. When they came back to Mao and reported what they read from those "big-character posters", Mao was shocked and even became seriously ill.<sup>50</sup>

Were they beyond Mao's expectation? Did Mao feel wronged and angry because he thought he was cheated or even betrayed by the democratic personages and old-type intellectuals (for example, university professors), and even some young students and CCP intellectuals? Or had he known various intellectuals not trusty (but useful), thus when they went too far, Mao just simply changed his strategy, for instance, to deal with intellectuals first, and then official bureaucracy? Or Could Mao not obtain full support from other Party leaders on the issue of "let a hundred flowers bloom" and then had to victimise these "flowers"?<sup>51</sup> All of these kinds of question may find certain positive answers from detailed history directly or indirectly. What we are more interested in is that Mao's change of mind actually caused some more serious practical and theoretical problems. Let us examine practical problems first.

In mid-May, 1957, in a secret letter to CCP's other leaders and high officials, Mao located those democratic personages who were invited by the CCP to participate in blooming and contending in the category of "reactionary elements":

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<sup>50</sup> Interview with Su Shao-zhi, May, 1988.

<sup>51</sup> Cf., MacFarquhar, 1974.

Please watch out for the wild attacks of the *reactionary elements* in the democratic parties. Get each of these parties to organise forums. ... Organise forums at colleges and universities to let professors speak their minds about the Party, and as far as possible try to get the Rightists to spew out all their venom, which will be published in the newspapers. <sup>52</sup> (My emphasis)

Only now can we see here a trap or the so-called "Open Plot" (YANG MENG). In the same letter, which was later entitled *Things Are Beginning to Change*, Mao told the Party cadres:

The Rightists' pledge of support to the people's democratic dictatorship, to the People's Government, to socialism and to the leadership of the CCP is all a sham, and on no account should be given any credence. This holds true for all Rightists, whether in the democratic parties, in the fields of education, literature and art, the press, science and technology, or in industrial and commercial circles.<sup>53</sup>

But intellectuals in both democratic parties and higher institutions of education did not know that the CCP and Mao had already made the decision to launch an Anti-Rightist Campaign until 8 June. They went on blooming and contending. The following criticisms or suggestions, which were later labelled the most "vicious" attacks on the CCP, were actually expressed after 15 May and before 8 June. In other words, they were expressed later than the CCP decided to launch the Campaign but earlier than it was made known to the public. These were (1).Zhang Bo-jun's "political design department"; (2).

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<sup>52</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 449.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. pp. 441-445.

Luo Long-ji's "political rehabilitation committee"(Luo himself did not use this phrase); and (3). Chu An-ping's "the Party's world".<sup>54</sup>

On 25 May, Mao for the first time showed his attitude in public when he received the entire body of delegates to the Third National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League (China's Communist Youth, *i.e.*, the CCY). Mao announced, "any word or deed at variance with socialism is *completely wrong*." (My emphasis)<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, on 3 June, Mao added that "a considerable portion of the criticisms and views are mistaken" in Li Wei-han's closing address to the forum attended by democratic personages.<sup>56</sup> And above all, on 8 June, 1957, Mao wrote an editorial for the *People's Daily* entitled *What Is This for?* and an inner-Party directive for the Central Committee of the CCP *Muster Our Forces to Repulse the Rightists' Wild Attacks*.

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<sup>54</sup> RMRB, 21-22 May, 2 June, 1957. As a matter of fact, both Zhang Bo-jun and Luo Long-ji tried to follow either Mao's criticism of the State Council which, according to Mao, did not give any detailed explanation and background knowledge before it submitted its *Annual Report on Governmental Work* to the CCP leadership (Mao) and the National People's Congress, and ask them to approve it, or Mao's suggestion that those mistakes committed in the Eliminating Counter-revolutionaries in 1955 be corrected under the supervision of the Central Committee of the CCP, the National People's Congress, and the Political Consultative Conference. But it is obvious that, on the one hand, Zhang and Luo went too far, for neither mentioned the CCP in their suggestions, and on the other hand, they did not have the "licence" of saying what Mao said even if they said the same. Cf., Mao, 1969: 145-154; 1977: 398; 1989: 145.

<sup>55</sup> RMRB, 26 May, 1957.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 4 June, 1957; Cf. Li Wei-han, 1986: 835.

The Anti-Rightists Campaign was then officially launched. It is the largest political campaign aimed at intellectuals in the PRC, in which not only those well-known democratic personages and university professors who responded to the CCP's call and spoke out in blooming and contending, but also many other educated people, including university students and village school teachers who said nothing, were punished. Moreover, not only non-Communist intellectuals, for instance, democratic personages and old-type intellectuals, but also many Communist intellectuals, especially certain number of literary writers and artists who had been the CCP members even before 1949, were labelled as the "Rightists" and then lost jobs. Perhaps most serious is that, after the Anti-Rightist Campaign, China's educated people as a whole were considered members of the bourgeoisie by the CCP and Mao, and a great distrust between the CCP and China's educated people lasted at least for more than two decades.

### **III. The "Democratic Personages" and the Anti-Rightist Campaign**

The Anti-Rightists Campaign was divided into several stages. The first covered the period from 8 to 30 June 1957, during which the CCP called for and mobilised the masses of cadres, intellectuals, and workers to take part in the Campaign, and criticised the "Rightists" in general, and the democratic personages in particular. From 8 to 14 June, six editorials were published one after the other in the *People's Daily*, while all other newspapers were full of criticism of the "Rightists". The problem is that there were many intellectuals who responded to the CCP's call for blossoming and contending

before 8 June. Who should be labelled as the "Rightists"? How to identify them? What were the criteria?

On 18 June, when Mao's 27 February speech *On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People* was published for the first time, he added the following six criteria to distinguish between "fragrant flowers" and "poisonous weeds", which had been strict limits to both academic research and artistic creation since then, and until at least the 1980s:

(1). Words and deeds should help to unite, and not divide, the people of all the country; (2). They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction; (3). They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship; (4). They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism; (5). They should help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, the leadership of the CCP; (6). They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to international socialist unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the world. <sup>57</sup>

"Of the six criteria," Mao added, "the most important are the two about the socialist path and the leadership of the Party." Obviously, those who ever complained against the CCP or its "socialist policies" were really in danger of being labelled as the "Rightists". What they could do was to respond to the CCP, to get involved in the campaign, and to criticise or self-criticise those "Rightist opinions", as soon as possible. As a result, a series of meetings were organised by the democratic parties, in which nearly all well-known

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<sup>57</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977:412. One can compare Mao's officially published speech with his original one. The six criteria, together with many other paragraphs, for example, the one of "class struggle sometimes is very sharp", was not in the original text, which can be seen in Mao, 1989: 131-190.

democratic personages were actively involved. Amongst them, there were persons who were soon labelled as the "Biggest Rightists" such as Zhang Bo-jun. But for those democratic personages who "bloomed and contended" during the hundred flowers period, it was too late. When the CCP planned to launch the campaign, there must already have been some personages chosen as the targets. Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, Zhang Nai-qi, Chu An-ping, and Fei Xiao-tong, became the main targets.

Later on, Zhang Bo-jun's "political design department" was denounced by the CCP as a scheme of adopting a Western political system, Luo Long-ji's "political rehabilitation committee" was seen as a negation of past political campaigns, and Chu An-ping's criticism of the idea that "the world belongs to the Party" as a challenge to the CCP's leadership. Zhang Nai-qi was declared as a capitalist who dreamed of the old days he had lost, and Fei Xiao-tong as a bourgeois scholar who tried to restore bourgeois sociology which had already been abolished in 1953.

The climate at this stage, however, was relatively mild. The targets were accused of making serious political mistakes rather than committing reactionary crimes, they were called "Rightist elements", "bourgeois elements", or "bourgeois Rightist elements", rather than "reactionary Rightist elements", "counter-revolutionary elements", or "counter-revolutionary Rightist elements". Zhang Bo-jun, Zhang Nai-qi, Luo Long-ji, and Chu An-ping could, more or less, have opportunities to offer explanations or even to defend themselves in the official press.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Cf., *RMRB*, 10-29 June, 1957.

On 26 June, the National People's Congress session opened. The main issue of this session was officially announced to be the criticism of the "Rightists". Most of the well-known democratic personages were representatives. Zhou En-lai in his *Report on Governmental Work* made charges against the "Rightists". It was the first time that a CCP top leader criticised the "Rightists" in public.<sup>59</sup>

The primary charge against the "Rightists" was, according to Zhou, that they were trying to divorce state power from the CCP's leadership. Other charges included: (1). they questioned that Marxism was a universal truth; (2). they made a direct attack on the socialist economic system; and (3). they tried to belittle the significance of Soviet assistance, *etc.*.

On the other hand, perhaps more significantly, Zhou still located the Rightists "within the ranks of the people", and he called them "some people"(YOU REN) in most cases.<sup>60</sup> This was significant because Mao's *On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People* was published only a week before, and according to Mao, if a contradiction occurred among the people, it could be correctly handled only through education rather than punishment. In Zhou En-lai's mild words, did he hint that the "Rightists" should not be seen as the enemy of the people, and thus not be punished? But whatever Zhou wanted, it was Mao who would make the last decision, which, as later showed, located all the "Rightists" in the "enemy of the people".

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<sup>59</sup> Mao's *What Is This for* was published as an editorial in the *People's Daily*, but his *Muster Our Forces to Repulse the Rightists' Wild Attack* was not published at that time.

<sup>60</sup> Zhou En-lai, 1957.

Accordingly, the articles or speeches to criticise the "Rightists" during this stage were mostly general and mild. For instance, in the *People's Daily*, 49.44 per cent were mild criticisms (PI PING), 32.58 were severe criticisms (PI PAN), 11.24 were counter-criticisms, and 6.74 were self-criticisms, as Table 3.8. shows.

**Table 3.8.** The articles in the *People's Daily* during the first stage of the Anti-Rightists Campaign.

	Mild Criticism	Severe Criticism	Self-criticism	Counter criticism	Total
DP*	22	17	3	10	52
OI**	18	10	3		31
RI***	1	1			2
Others	3	1			4
<b>Total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>49.44</b>	<b>32.58</b>	<b>6.74</b>	<b>11.24</b>	<b>100</b>

\*: DP stands for the Democratic personages;

\*\*: OI stands for the Old-type Intellectuals;

\*\*\*: RI stands for the revolutionary Intellectuals.

Source: RMRB, 8-30 June 1957.

If we further survey these 44 mildly critical articles/speeches, we find from Table 3.9. that some of them were actually talking about study, rectification, contending, socialist road, and the contradiction among the people. They had titles like *Studying Chairman Mao's 27 February Speech Seriously*, *Studying Mao's Speech*, *Carrying on Rectification in Democratic Parties*, *How Should Non-Party Personages Help the Party to Rectify its Style of Work?* *Let Blossoming and Contending Develop Healthily*, *Chinese People Must Go along Socialist Road*, *Our Problem Belongs to the Contradictions among the People*, and *My Understanding on the Resolution of the Contradictions*



*among the People*. The authors of these articles were nevertheless arguing and reasoning with, rather than accusing of or attacking on, the targets. And the authors themselves were well-known established intellectuals as well, some of them in fact were close friends of the targets.

**Table 3.9.** Mild criticism articles in the *People's Daily*, 8-30 June, 1957, classified on subjects.

	DP*	O. I**	R. I***	Others	Total	%
Study	4				4	<b>9.09</b>
Rectification	8	4			12	<b>27.27</b>
Socialism	5	5		1	11	<b>25.00</b>
CAM****	2				2	<b>4.55</b>
Criticism	3	9	1	2	15	<b>34.09</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100</b>

\*: DP stands for the Democratic personages;

\*\* :OI stands for the Old-type Intellectual;

\*\*\*: RI stands for the Revolutionary Intellectual;

\*\*\*\*: CAM stands for Contradictions among the People.

Source: RMRB, 8 to 30 June 1957.

But in July, the political climate turned much hotter. On 1 July, an editorial appeared on the front page of the *People's Daily*: *Wenhuibao's Bourgeois Orientation Should Be Criticised*. It later turned out that this editorial was again written by Mao himself. In this editorial, Mao not only criticised the *Wenhui Daily*, a non-Party newspaper published in Shanghai, but also, more importantly, declaring that "the Rightists are bourgeois reactionaries who oppose the Communist Party, the people, and socialism."<sup>61</sup>

It was the first time since the Campaign was launched that the CCP in public located the Rightists in the category of "reactionaries"(FAN DONG PAI),

<sup>61</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 451.

which in Chinese used by the CCP meant, more or less, "enemies of the people", or "counter-revolutionaries". It was the first time as well that not only some individual democratic personages, such as Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, and Chu An-ping, were severely criticised, but also the Democratic League and the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers were denounced as a whole.

The accusation was that they had played a particularly vicious role in the course of the contention amongst the "hundred schools of thought" and the Rectification Campaign, and that they operated in an organised way, complete with a plan, programme and line which alienated them from the people and which was directed against the CCP and socialism. Mao even declared that there was an anti-socialist and anti-Party alliance, led by Zhang Bo-jun and Luo Long-ji, and labelled it the Zhang-Luo Alliance, which "had caused all the troubles of the spring."<sup>62</sup>

Also in July, when Mao addressed a special meeting to plan the Campaign at Qingdao Conference, he started by saying that

during the period of socialist revolution in our country the contradiction between the people and the bourgeois Rightists, who oppose the Communist Party, the people and socialism, is *one between ourselves and the enemy*, that is, *an antagonistic, irreconcilable, life-and-death contradiction*. The bourgeois Rightists who have launched wild attacks against the working class and the Communist Party are *reactionaries* or *counterrevolutionaries*.<sup>63</sup> (My emphasis)

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<sup>62</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977:451-456.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. pp. 473.

The Anti-Rightist Campaign then spread from the democratic parties and institutions of higher education to science and technology, to literature and art, to the press, and even to middle and primary schools. It became a nationwide campaign in which not only non-Party intellectuals but also some revolutionary intellectuals and CCP officials were labelled as the "Rightists", for Mao declared in his *Qingdao Speech* that the fight against the Rightists should not only take place outside the CCP, but also within it. From Table 3.10, we can see that in June only one of the named Rightists in the *People's Daily* was a CCP member and more than 60 per cent of them were members of the democratic parties. Professionally, more than 60 per cent were cadres in the democratic parties and university teachers.

Table 3.10. the labelled Rightists in the *People's Daily*, June, 1957.

	CCP/CCY*	DPS**	Non-party	Total	%
University teacher		3	10	13	23.21
University student			2	2	3.57
Mid-school staff			1	1	1.79
Journalist	1	5	2	8	14.28
Engineer			1	1	1.79
Businessman		2	1	3	5.36
Writers, Artist			2	2	3.57
Official in state organs			3	3	5.36
Official in DPS***		21		21	37.50
Others			1	1	1.79
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>56</b>	
<b>%</b>	<b>1.79</b>	<b>62.50</b>	<b>35.71</b>		<b>100</b>

\*: CCY means the Chinese Communist Youth;

\*\*: DPS stands for the democratic parties;

\*\*\*: Some of them occupied posts in State organs, or were businessmen, at the same time.

Source: RMRB, 8-30 June, 1957.

But since July, more and more CCP members were labelled as the "Rightists", especially in the fields of the press and of literature and art. As Table 3.11. shows, in July alone, 32 CCP members or members of the CCY were labelled as the "Rightists" in the *People's Daily*, and more than half of them were journalists and writers/artists. However, the proportion of the Party members called the "Rightists" was still comparatively small (24.62 per cent in July). The democratic personages were still the main targets of the Campaign (more than 50 per cent in July).

**Table 3.11.** The labelled "Rightists" in July, 1957.

	CCP/CCY	DPS	Non-party one	Total	%
University teacher	5	12	8	25	19.23
University student	1		3	4	3.08
Scholars in CAS*	1	1	1	3	2.31
Mid-school staff		3	2	5	3.85
Journalist	9	9	1	19	14.61
Engineer	1	1	4	6	4.62
Businessman		2		2	1.54
Writer, Artist	8	5	6	19	14.61
Official in state organs	6	1	7	14	10.77
Official in DPS**		32		32	24.61
Others	1			1	0.77
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>130</b>	
<b>%</b>	<b>24.62</b>	<b>50.70</b>	<b>24.62</b>		<b>100</b>

\*: CAS stands for the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

\*\* : Some of them occupied posts in state organs, or were businessmen, at the same time.

Source: RMRB, 1-31 July, 1957.

After July these personages were criticised not only because of their ideas expressed during the Hundred Flowers period, but also because of their past experiences. Some were even personally attacked. Amongst them, there were

Fei Xiao-tong and Zhang Nai-qi, whose private life or favourite hobby were included in the accusation against them. In June 1957, the official press still called them "comrades", "gentlemen", "friends", or "some people". But in July, they, as enemy of the people, were called "wolves", "foxes", "owls", "vipers", "venomous bees", "evildoers", "hypocrites", and "the scum of the nation".

In the meantime, they themselves entitled their confessions at the session of the National People's Congress *Pleading Guilt toward the People, Pleading with the People for Mercy, Surrendering Myself to the People, Admitting My Guilt to the People* or *My Guilt*. They were accused of breaking the law because of their opinions, although, according to the Constitution of the PRC adopted in 1954, every citizen enjoys the freedom of speech and of the press, etc., and although, according to the CCP's policy towards all critics, "the speakers should not be blamed"(YAN ZHE WU ZUI).

The second stage of the Campaign lasted through all of the second half of 1957. It was carried out, as Deng Xiao-ping, the General Secretary of the CCP, reported, "mainly in the masses of bourgeoisie and intellectuals, including staff and students in business circles, democratic parties, education circles, press circles, literary and art circles, science and technology circles, public health circles and the departments of the state."<sup>64</sup>

In Peking University alone, for example, it was said that 10 per cent of the students were labelled as the "Rightists". Some other examples of labelling

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<sup>64</sup> Deng Xiao-ping, 1957.

the "Rightists" could be seen as following: in Shanghai's Fudan University, 8.5 per cent of teachers; in the Democratic League, 6.6 per cent of members; and in Shanghai business circles, over 5 per cent of businessmen.<sup>65</sup>

The Campaign went into its third stage in early 1958 when Mao issued a decree dismissing Zhang Bo-jun, Zhang Nai-qi, and Luo Long-ji from their ministerial posts in the State Council. A series of dismissals and expulsions followed until October 1958. As a result, nearly all leading democratic personages, intellectuals, and state officials who were labelled as the "Rightists" lost their posts in either state organs, leading bodies of the democratic parties, or professional occupations in institutes of higher education, the Academy of Sciences, and the Association of Writers and Artists. Amongst them, whereas there were none of the members of the Central Committee of the CCP, there were many leaders of the democratic parties. Taking the Democratic League as an example, 36 per cent of its Standing Committee members were labelled the "Rightists", as table 3.12 shows.

Table 3.12. The percentage of those labelled "Rightists" in the leading bodies of the Democratic League.

	%
Standing Committee members	36
Central Committee members	29
Central Committee alternate members	43
Provincial committee chairmen	46
Municipal/county committee chairmen	35.4

Source: F. C. Teiwes: *Politics and Purges in China*, pp.305.

<sup>65</sup> F.C. Teiwes, 1979:291, 297.

If we look at those labelled "Rightists" who used to be ministers or vice ministers in the State Council, we will find that seven out of eight were democratic personages. These seven were:

**Zhang Bo-jun**, Minister of communication, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Peasants and Workers, Vice-chairman of the Democratic League;

**Luo Long-ji**, Minister of Timber Industry, Vice-chairman of the Democratic League;

**Zhang Nai-qi**, Minister of Food, Vice-chairman of the Democratic Construction Association;

**Lin Han-da**, Vice-minister of Education, Vice-chairman of the Association for Promoting Democracy;

**Zen Zhao-lun**, Vice minister of Higher Education, Standing Committee member of Democratic League;

**Huang Qi-xiang**, Vice-chairman of Physical Education and Sports Commission, Vice-chairman of the Democratic Party of Peasants and Workers; and

**Fei Xiao-tong**, Vice-chairman of Nationality Affairs Commission, Standing Committee member of the Democratic League.<sup>66</sup>

In December 1957, the CCP listed more than a hundred democratic personages as labelled "Rightists", who were mostly dismissed or demoted with few individual exceptions. In January 1958, the CCP further chose 96 well-known individuals as typical "Rightists". All of them lost their jobs,

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<sup>66</sup> The only exception was **Wang Han**, a CCP member who held the post of vice-minister of Supervision Ministry before being labelled as "Rightist".

some of them were sent to labour camps, others had to do manual jobs under supervision while they remained in their units, and only two of them did not suffer such an organisational punishment.

By the end of 1958, there were more than 550,000 people who were labelled as the "Rightists". According to Li Wei-han, the man who was in charge of the United Front Department of the CCP in the 1950s and thus one of the leading cadres dealing with the democratic personages and intellectuals, these "Rightists" were mostly democratic personages, businessmen, engineers and technicians, university teachers and students, writers and artists. Amongst these over 550,000 Rightists, "more than a half of them lost their jobs in their state-run units, many of them were sentenced to labour camps as criminals, some of them became destitute and homeless while their families were ruined or dead, and the small numbers who could stay in their original units mostly could not do their professional jobs."<sup>67</sup> China's "democratic personages" were socio-politically destroyed while most non-Party intellectuals learned from the Anti-Rightist Campaign that they must keep silence over political issues.

#### IV. Conclusion

From 1957-58 onwards, there was another type of "enemy of the people" in Chinese society next to landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements: the Rightists. They were together called "the Five Categories of

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<sup>67</sup> Li Wei-han, 1986: 838-839.



Persons" (WU ZHONG REN).<sup>68</sup> China's democratic parties could no longer play their past socio-political role, although they still existed in name, and some democratic personages still occupied posts in the state organs until 1966. China's intellectuals as a whole were again considered as members of the bourgeoisie, until 1978.

It is obvious that such a result was far from the expectations of Mao and the CCP. In 1951, when the CCP launched the Thought Reform Campaign, it sought to establish a new relationship to the old-type intellectuals through mild criticism and self-criticism. By such a "thought reform" (or "brain-washing"), the CCP expected that the old-type intellectuals would in the end remould themselves into a new kind of intellectual workers. No matter whether these old-type intellectuals really changed or not in terms of their ideological view of the world, they at least understood that, in the New System under the rule of the CCP, they should go on remoulding so long as they lived, and they could do certain limited scientific and academic research so long as they were politically obedient to the CCP.

So what was wrong when dealing with the democratic personages? Why could the CCP not win them over but rather pushed them away from it, and made them the "enemies of the people"? How could the old-type intellectuals, who had shown their political loyalty in 1951-1952, be victims of the conflict between the CCP and the democratic personages? Were there democratic personages who really tried to overthrow the "Communist" system? If there

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<sup>68</sup> Cf., Mao Ze-dong, 1969: 180-182, 418-419; 1974: 181-182. They were even called "the Five Black Categories" (HEI WU LEI) in the Cultural Revolution.

were, did they form a 550,000-member group? Why did the CCP and Mao dramatically change its policy towards educated people from locating them as members of the working class to members of the bourgeoisie?

As I have mentioned, we can find many historical details to answer such questions. Whatever details we found, I would argue, the key reason for all of these is that when the CCP and Mao dealt with China's educated people, including their established intellectuals, it treated them too simplistically at both theoretical and practical levels. As a matter of fact, the CCP misjudged intellectuals in both 1956 and 1957. That is to say, either locating them all as members of the working class or as members of the bourgeoisie is oversimplistic. It seems that after the Thought Reform Campaign and after the CCP made its economic achievements in its First Five-year Plan, it was too optimistic and confident, and when some leading democratic personages criticised the CCP's bureaucracy, it was too sensitive and intolerant.

The point is that China's educated people, including their established intellectuals, are socially in different positions and thus politically and ideologically in various groups. Traditional intellectuals are mainly scholars, scientists, and writers who have been absorbed in "pure" academic, scientific, and literary work for years, and paid little attention to politics. That was the reason why they were called "traditional intellectuals", also that was the reason why they could pass the "political test" in the Thought Reform Campaign without enduring heavier pressure and more sufferings.

But the democratic personages are very different. The fact itself that they became leaders of the democratic parties (or the "third force") between the

KMT and the CCP before 1949 showed that they were not "scholars ignoring whatever went on outside the window", but rather, they were not only interested in socio-political development, but also, more significantly, independent of both the KMT and the CCP. This kind of intellectuals can never be satisfied with good living conditions and high posts without real power. The latter in fact could be even worse: they would feel deprived by being given such posts. Whatever system they were living in, for instance, under the KMT or under the CCP, they would feel responsible to speak out if there was anything wrong. They belonged to the category of critical intelligentsia.

The problem for the CCP is that it has never differentiated intelligentsia from general intellectuals,<sup>69</sup> while it always widely used the term "intellectual" to cover all the educated people. Thus when many traditional intellectuals showed their ideological obedience to the CCP, it thought that all educated people should be seen as members of the working class, but when certain number of critical intelligentsia spoke out to criticise it, it felt hostile to all the educated people.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> As a matter of fact, in Chinese even nowadays there is no such difference at all between intellectuals and intelligentsia, although intelligentsia has indeed existed since 1919, if not earlier. Cf., Chapter Two.

<sup>70</sup> As we have said, Mao indeed tried to tell the difference of the Left from the Right, but this is more a political strategy to control all of them rather than social analysis of intellectuals' locations. If he did such an analysis, he usually just put them into the bourgeoisie, especially since 1957. More details about Mao's treatment of intellectuals will be discussed in Chapters Four and Seven.

At the same time, members of the former intelligentsia in the democratic parties, who have never been in great numbers, did not understand that, under the "Soviet-type Communist" system, they could no longer play their former critical role until they were labelled as the "Rightists". As a result, the critical intelligentsia in the democratic parties was basically destroyed, and the democratic parties remained more in name than in substance afterwards.

Since 1957, however, the problem of intellectuals in Chinese society became more and more a problem of the revolutionary intellectuals within the CCP, for both the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages then were forced to be passive in socio-political development because of the Anti-Rightists Campaign. The next chapter will continue to survey China's intellectuals in political campaigns, focusing on some groups of the "revolutionary intellectuals" since 1949. Through examining these revolutionary established intellectuals in political campaigns, we will further see clearer that there is indeed great difference between various intellectuals, and that the members of the intelligentsia, even within the establishment, are always critical towards the *status quo*, although they have to pay very much, including their lives, for such critical spirits.

## **CHAPTER 4: China's Established Intellectuals in Political Campaigns(II)**

After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the CCP dramatically changed its evaluation of China's intellectuals. They ceased to be regarded as members of the working class and were classified once more as the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the main task of the People's Republic set by the CCP remained unchanged: to develop the economy. Moreover, the CCP set forth a "General Guide-line"(ZONG LU XIAN) for China's socio-economic development in January, 1958, which was summed up with a nationwide slogan: "Go All Out, Aim High and Achieve Greater, Faster, Better, and More Economical Results in Building Socialism". This General Guide-line resulted in one of the most significant events in the history of the PRC: the Great Leap Forward. By such a "great leap", the CCP leadership expected that in both industry and agriculture China would catch up with the West within one or two decades, and in the meantime, a rapid process of social and ideological change would accompany this economic growth. According to this ambitious strategy, China's main industrial production would overtake that of the United Kingdom in three years, and that of the United States in ten years. And hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants would lead a Communist or semi-Communist life in the People's Communes.<sup>1</sup>

This time, intellectuals were no longer considered as knowledgeable people without whom the Great Leap Forward could not be successful. Instead, the masses of common people, especially peasants, became the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., Chen Bo-da, 1958; Hu Hua, 1985: 167-169; Li Rui, 1989: 3-4; R. MacFarquhar, 1983: 15-19; and passim; M. Meisner, 1988:204-215.

main force. "The masses' tide of enthusiasm", Mao declared, "is like atomic energy". Ironically, the Great Leap Forward resulted in disaster for China's economy, and the Chinese people, especially peasants, suffered the aftermath for at least three years from 1960 to 1962, during which millions of people, especially peasants, suffered from, or even died of, starvation or malnutrition.<sup>2</sup>

Neither the old-type intellectuals nor the democratic personages could play a critical role when faced by this economic disaster. It was the revolutionary intellectuals' turn to show their independent thinking. It turned out later that it was these revolutionary intellectuals within the CCP who were the most difficult people to control. Mao himself gradually recognised that the main problem since 1949 actually existed within the CCP, especially in the fields of culture, education, literature, art, and sciences, or in a word, in the field of ideology.<sup>3</sup> As a matter of fact, in the succession of political campaigns after 1949, especially in the Cultural Revolution, these revolutionary intellectuals became the main target.

## **I. A Brief Introduction to the "Revolutionary Intellectuals"**

China's revolutionary intellectuals, like the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages, were strongly influenced by Western culture. Many of them had either studied or worked in the West (or Japan), or read Western writings in their early careers. But unlike the old-type

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<sup>2</sup> J.K.Fairbank, 1988: 302-305; R. MacFarquhar, 1983: 322-325; S. R. Shalom, 1984: 46-63; Hu Hua, 1985:172-176.

<sup>3</sup> Mao, 1977: 409. Cf., HQ, 1967, Vol.7; 1969, Vol.5; 1976, Vol.4.

intellectuals who continued with their studies, or the democratic personages who believed in parliamentary politics, China's revolutionary intellectuals were involved from the outset in the military struggle against the old regime or foreign imperialists.

Moreover, there is a basic difference between the two generations of revolutionary intellectuals, as we have mentioned in Chapter 2: the first generation, following the French Revolution model, tried to establish a Western-style republic, but the second was more fascinated by the Russian Revolution of 1917, believing that only through a people's (workers' and/or peasants') revolution could China and its people, including intellectuals, be released from chaos and oppression.

As we have argued in Chapter One, it is the Revolution which made these intellectuals be revolutionaries. Before joining the Revolution, they were either young educated individuals or, at most, radical members of the intelligentsia. Of course, it is considerably important to note the difference of these revolutionary intellectuals from the intellectuals who did not get involved in politics (old-type intellectuals), or the ones who did but did not join the "Communist Revolution" (democratic personages). It is also important to notice the variety between these educated youth or radical intelligentsia, who joined the Revolution consciously, and those "peasants in uniform", who mostly had no other option except "raising the standard of revolt". The revolutionary intellectuals are those members of intelligentsia who could no longer continue their study when Chinese society was so unbearably poor and unequal that they had to defend the poor against the rich, defend the weak against the strong, and defend China against the West, following their own understanding of the Russian Revolution Model.

Because of both their educated background and critical spirits, during the process of the fight against the KMT, the second generation of revolutionary intellectuals as a whole was considered a "valuable asset" by the CCP and Mao, and indeed its members became the nucleus of the Chinese "Communist Revolution" in Yan'an, in other Red areas, and in the cities under the rule of the KMT. However, there already existed various conflicts. One was the conflict between these revolutionary intellectuals and the "peasants in uniform". In the Red Army, the majority of the soldiers were of course the "peasants in uniform", and they did not fully trust the members of the "valuable asset". This is partially because these revolutionary intellectuals were mostly from rich or middle class families, and partially because they had mostly received traditional or Western "bourgeois" education before joining the Revolution. Whereas, the "peasants in uniform" were mainly children of poor families who received little school education and thus could read few words.

Another conflict was the one between these intellectuals and the old-type intellectuals and/or the democratic personages. The revolutionary intellectuals thought only they themselves were revolutionary, while considering the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages were either non-revolutionary or even counter-revolutionary. On the other hand, the revolutionary intellectuals as a whole had less scholarly or professional achievements than the other two kinds of intellectuals, therefore the latter considered themselves to be more qualified as the "people who have knowledge".<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For example, Feng You-lan, the number one Chinese philosopher since the 1930s, thought in 1949 that revolutionary intellectuals could change the society, but only scholars had the capability to explain it. More discussions about Feng You-lan will be



The third conflict was the one between those revolutionary intellectuals who worked in the Communist Base Areas, such as Yan'an, and those revolutionary intellectuals who worked, or had worked, in the KMT areas, such as Shanghai. These two kinds of revolutionary intellectuals had various differences not merely in style, manner, language, *etc.*, but also in their relationship with the leadership, the cadres, and the soldiers.

The last one was amongst the revolutionary intellectuals who lived in the KMT areas, which were by no means unimportant. One of the most important example can be traced back to the 1930s, when most of the established revolutionary writers and artists lived in Shanghai. This conflict used to be simply generalised as the conflict between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang, two of the main leaders of the Left-wing Association of Writers. Many people were involved in this conflict. For example, on Lu Xun's side, there were Mao Dun, Ba Jin, Xiao Jun, Hu Feng, and Feng Xue-feng, and on Zhou Yang's side, there were Guo Mo-ruo, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng. In 1936, however, Lu Xun died. Shortly after that, the CCP and the KMT agreed to form a United Front to fight against Japan. Because of these two events, the disagreement between Lu Xun's and Zhou Yang's groups reached no definite conclusion, as nearly all of the participants either went to Yan'an or joined in the United Front

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seen in Chapter Six. Another example is Luo Long-ji, one of the top "Rightists", who claimed in 1956 that the main problem in China was the conflict between petty intellectuals of the proletariat (i.e., the revolutionary intellectuals) and great intellectuals of the petty bourgeoisie (i.e., the democratic personages, and perhaps, the old-type intellectuals). Mao once pointed out that many revolutionary intellectuals and CCP cadres were very afraid of university professors, especially since the CCP went into urban areas in 1949. Mao, 1974: 116.Cf., Feng You-lan, 1973<sup>b</sup>, and Luo Long-ji, in Mao, 1977: 496, 501.

in KMT areas.<sup>5</sup> Since 1942, the CCP had considered Lu Xun to be the greatest revolutionary writer. Zhou Yang, and his friends Tian Han, Xia Yan, as well as Guo Mo-ruo and many others, had hence felt ashamed to have argued with Lu Xun.

Another example developed in 1942 in Yan'an. At the beginning, some of Lu Xun's friends or followers, including Wang Shi-wei, Ding Ling, Ai Qing, and Xiao Jun, started criticising "the dark side" of Yan'an, such as cadres' privileges, the lower position of women, *etc.* By that time, Zhou Yang had already become an important cadre in literature and education in Yan'an. He and some other well-known Party intellectuals, including philosopher Ai Si-qi and historian Fan Wen-lan, argued that it was not fair to emphasise Yan'an's faults, because, compared with other parts of China under the KMT, it had reached a relatively high level of democracy. Later, Mao and other high officials of the CCP, including several army generals who were seen as the "peasants in uniform", got involved in the argument as well. As a result, Mao made his famous *Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art*, in which he concluded that writers and artists "*must* take the class stand of the proletariat and not that of the petty bourgeoisie", "*they must* gradually move their feet over to the side of the workers, peasants and soldiers, to the side of the proletariat, by going into their very midst and into the thick of practical struggles."<sup>6</sup>(My emphasis) After that, Mao's *Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art* became the "Revolutionary Bible" for all China's literary writers, artists, and other intellectuals including natural scientists for more than three

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<sup>5</sup> Feng Xue-feng, 1979; Mao Dun, 1979;1983 ;1984:307-347; Xia Yan, 1985:296-335; Hu Feng, 1987: 3-9, 99-110; Zhao Hao-sheng, 1979;W. J. F. Jenner, 1982:424-445.

<sup>6</sup> Mao, 1965: 75-79.

decades. In the end, those who insisted on exposing Yan'an's "dark side" were criticised; Wang Shi-wei was even arrested and executed.<sup>7</sup>

However, the CCP and Mao considered the problem of revolutionary intellectuals as a problem which should be resolved by self-education and self-remoulding in the process of revolution. Therefore, the conflicts amongst revolutionary intellectuals, and the conflict between revolutionary intellectuals and the "peasants in uniform", were contradictions which existed within the revolutionary ranks. Consequently, in 1949, nearly all revolutionary intellectuals, including Ding Ling and Ai Qing, were given jobs as high officials in charge of educational, cultural and ideological work in various levels of the CCP organs or different governmental departments.

This is a fundamental change of their social positions. As appointed officials in CCP/state organs, how could they keep their critical or even revolutionary spirits became a serious question in both theoretical and practical levels. Because of the great shift in their socio-political position, it would be hard to still label them "revolutionary intellectuals"; instead, Gramsci's "organic intellectuals", or the concept of "establishment intellectuals", as used by Timothy Cheek, Carol Lee Hamrin and others, would seem more suitable. Here, establishment intellectuals means the intellectuals who are "serving and operating within the governing institutions of the People's Republic". But all of China's intellectuals are state employees in "Communist" China. As John Israel points out, "if you are not some kind of establishment intellectual, you are not a legitimate

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<sup>7</sup> Ding Ling, 1982; Wang De-fen, 1987; Dai Qing, 1989:41-110; M. Goldman, 1964: 205-228; 1971:18-48.

intellectual at all."<sup>8</sup> Then how can we differentiate these former revolutionary intellectuals who now occupied high posts in the CCP from those who did not? And if we choose "organic intellectuals", we will later find that, because quite a few of these intellectuals after 1949 were usually critics of, or even dissenters against, the status quo, they were not always "organic" in Gramsci's sense.

Such being the case, I will continue to call them "revolutionary intellectuals", just to remind us that this type of intellectual was deeply involved in the Revolution before 1949, but not define them as necessarily revolutionary since then.

After 1949, these revolutionary intellectuals on the one hand occupied official posts in both the Party and the state institutions, mostly being in charge of science and technology, literature and art, education and propaganda. On the other hand, as we will show later, many of them seemed to be reluctant to obey the CCP's instructions and to be the CCP's "parrot-type spokesmen" passively. They still belonged to certain kinds of critical intelligentsia. But unlike the intelligentsia in the democratic parties, they held *real* power, which made them the most difficult men and women for the CCP and Mao.

To deal with them, Mao launched a series of political campaigns. According to Zhou Yang, China's so-called "Cultural Tsar" from 1949 to 1966, or Yao Wen-yuan, the main ideological spokesman for the CCP and Mao from 1966 to 1976, there were four great political campaigns in the field of ideology before the Cultural Revolution: the Criticism of *The*

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<sup>8</sup> C.L. Hamrin, T. Cheek, and J. Israel, 1986: x, 3-4, and passim.

*Life of Wu Xun*, the Criticism of Hu Shi, the Criticism of Hu Feng, and the Anti-Rightist Campaign.<sup>9</sup>

## II. The Criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun*

The first was launched in 1951 when a film *The Life of Wu Xun* was shown all over the country. Wu Xun (1838-1896) was a popular figure in Shandong Province, who came from a poor family and could not afford to go to school. Realising that the children of the vast majority of poor Chinese peasants could not improve themselves through education because their parents could not afford the fees, he collected money, sometimes by begging, and eventually established three free schools in the countryside in order to offer these children the opportunity of an education.

The film was so touching that when it was shown to audiences, including more than a hundred Party high officials and leaders, many of them were moved to tears. From February to May, 1951, 45 articles appeared in the *Guangming Daily*, the *Wenhui Daily*, and the *Dagong Daily*, the three main newspapers which were not directly controlled by the CCP yet, praising the film. At the same time, there were also some articles criticising the film in the official press. At this time praise and criticism could be more or less freely given.

On 20 May, 1951, however, the *People's Daily* published an editorial, criticising the film and particularly the spate of praise lavished on Wu Xun and the film, seeing Wu Xun as "a fellow who did not lift a finger

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<sup>9</sup> Zhou Yang, 1966; Yao Wen-yuan, 1971: 89.

against the old economic base or its superstructure. On the contrary, he strove fanatically to spread the old ideology and, in order to gain a position for this purpose previously beyond his reach, fawned in every way on the reactionary rulers."<sup>10</sup> The problem, according to the author of the editorial, was not Wu Xun himself, nor the film including its director and actor, but the phenomenon that there were so many people including not only writers and critics, but also, more seriously, a certain number of Party members and even high officials (many of them were revolutionary intellectuals), who "claimed to have allegedly grasped Marxism but, when it came to specific historical figures (like Wu Xun) and specific ideas which ran counter to the trend of history (as in the film and the writings about Wu Xun), lost their critical faculties, and even capitulated to these reactionary ideas."<sup>11</sup>

The *People's Daily* on the same day ordered that "all who ever praised Wu Xun or the film *The Life of Wu Xun* must make serious self-criticism in public; Party cadres amongst them would be further given organisational conclusion."<sup>12</sup>

The Campaign was then launched. The two-sided discussion became an one-sided criticism. In the *People's Daily* alone, there were 97 critical articles and 40 articles of self-criticism between May and September, 1951, as Table 4.1. shows.

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<sup>10</sup> RMRB, 20 May, 1951. Also Mao, 1977:57-58.

<sup>11</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 57-58; RMRB, 20 May, 1951.

<sup>12</sup> RMRB, 20 May, 1951. "Organisational Conclusion" (ZU ZHI JIE LUN) is a special phrase in the PRC which means an official judgment, usually negative, on a person's behaviour in , and attitude toward, a political campaign , written by the cadre in charge of CCP organisational matter in his unit and kept in his personal record. Cf. Chapter Two.

Table 4.1. The articles of criticism and self-criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun* in the *People's Daily* from 16 May to the end of September, 1951.

	Criticism	Self-criticism	Total
May	35	21	56
June	37	6	43
July	7	4	11
August	15	8	23
September	3	1	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>137</b>

Source: RMRB, 16 May to 30 September, 1951.

Among those who made self-criticisms in public, were:

**Zhao Dan**, China's best film star who played Wu Xun in the film;

**Sun Yu**, an American-trained director who directed the film;

**Yu Ling**, a well-known literary critic and writer;

**Tian Han**, one of the foremost communist dramatists in China since the 1930s;

**Xia Yan**, a prominent writer covering plays, films, novels, essays, and literary criticism;

**Zhou Yang**, a literary theorist and translator of Russian literature, and one of CCP's main ideological spokesmen in charge of literature and art since 1942; and

**Guo Mo-ruo**, one of the most famous revolutionary intellectuals who wrote a great number of classical and modern poems, many historical dramas, and numerous works on history, archaeology, and theory from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 .

All of them were revolutionary intellectuals, and the last four had been playing leading roles for more than two decades. To examine their official posts in 1951, we find that:

**Guo Mo-ruo** was Vice-Premier of the Government Administrative Council, vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles,<sup>13</sup> and Chairman of the All-China Historians Association;

**Zhou Yang** was a deputy-Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, a deputy-minister of, and Party secretary in, the Culture Department of the Government Administrative Council, a vice-Chairman of, and Party secretary in, the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, a member of the Committee for Cultural & Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council, and Director of *Wenyibao* (the *Literary Gazette*);

**Tian Han** was a member of the Committee for Cultural & Educational Affairs of the Government Administrative Council, Director of the Art Administrative Bureau of the Culture Department, the Government Administrative Council, a board member of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles, and Chairman of the All-China Dramatists Association; and

**Xia Yan** was a board member, and Chairman of the Shanghai Section, of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles, Director of the Propaganda Department of the Shanghai Committee of the CCP, and Director of the Shanghai Culture Bureau.

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<sup>13</sup> It is one of the first organisations to be formed by the Party after 1949 to which all professionals in literary and art circles belonged.



Guo Mo-ruo became the first famous intellectual, occupying high posts in the state organs, to make a public self-criticism since the establishment of the PRC. Guo Mo-ruo self-criticised that he had made "a typical mistake arising from the petty bourgeois habit of speaking and writing without previously making a serious study of the subject."<sup>14</sup> Zhou Yang criticised himself for not thoroughly recognising and pointing out the serious reactionary political nature of the film, and Tian Han and Xia Yan also criticised themselves severely.<sup>15</sup>

That such high officials made self-criticism in public hinted that this campaign had been launched by the top leadership. On 4 June, 1951, Ma Xu-lun, Minister of Education, recommended that criticism of the film should be organised at all levels for a fortnight. Moreover, a special fact-finding mission was formed and sent to Wu Xun's birthplace to investigate his life story. In *A Report on Wu Xun's History*, this mission declared: Wu Xun had never been a popular figure who tried his best to help poor children to be educated as he had been previously presented. Instead, he was nothing more than "a big landlord, big creditor and big rogue".<sup>16</sup> When the *Report* was published, Guo Mo-ruo had to write another self-criticism, blaming himself for praising Wu Xun since 1945.<sup>17</sup>

Only fifteen years later, when the Cultural Revolution was launched, could people know through the official press that in 1951 it was Mao himself who launched the campaign to criticise *The Life of Wu Xun*, and

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<sup>14</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1951<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Zhou Yang, 1985: 91; Tian Han, in RMRB, 10 June, 1951; Xia Yan, in RMRB, 26 Aug., 1951.

<sup>16</sup> *A Report on Wu Xun's History*, in RMRB, 23-28, July, 1951.

<sup>17</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1951<sup>b</sup>.

who wrote the editorial for the *People's Daily* on 20 May, 1951; it was Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, who, ordered by Mao, led the fact-finding mission to go to Wu Xun's birthplace and to write *A Report on Wu Xun's History*.<sup>18</sup> More than thirty-five years later, when some of Mao's manuscripts were carefully chosen and then partly published, it was revealed that it was Mao who not only wrote the editorial for the *People's Daily* on 20 May, 1951, but also revised, in his own handwritings, and in many paragraphs, *A Report on Wu Xun's History* and other articles of criticism. It was also revealed that even Zhou En-lai made self-criticism and Zhu De, the father of the Red Army, praised the film too in 1951.<sup>19</sup>

If the criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun* was the first campaign to criticise China's revolutionary intellectuals since 1949, it was in fact a very mild political campaign. No well-known revolutionary intellectuals were demoted or suffered any other kind of organisational punishment for their praise of the film, although there were indeed some individuals who were arrested as a result of the campaign.<sup>20</sup>

The criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun*, however, was a signal that there were certain differences within the leadership over literature and art, and that China's revolutionary intellectuals, especially revolutionary writers and artists, were not an exceptional group which could escape criticism by the CCP and Mao. As a matter of fact, as we will see next, these revolutionary writers, artists, poets and literary critics were criticised more than any other groups of China's established intellectuals in Mao's time.

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<sup>18</sup> Cf., Yao Wen-yuan, 1971; GMRB, 25 June, 25 July, 1967.

<sup>19</sup> Mao, 1988: 374-376, 723-728. Cf., Sun Yu, 1987.

<sup>20</sup> Sun Yu, 1987.

But in 1951, both Mao and those revolutionary intellectuals as his targets did not know this. The criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun* was considered only an individual case. Both Mao and those revolutionary intellectuals, who tried to maintain their own independent thinking and critical spirits, and thus to maintain their status of critical intelligentsia, did not realise that it was a sign that these intellectuals would be paradoxically but essentially in conflict with not only certain individual leaders of the CCP, but, more significantly, the new "Communist" System which they helped to establish as well.

### III. The Accusation of Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng, and Ding Ling

In China, since the Warring States period(475 - 221, B.C.), there has been a long tradition of using literature as a political instrument. This could be typically seen in *LI SAO* , one of the greatest Chinese classical literary works. In the Ming and Qing periods(1368 - 1911), literati had become more and more active in politics, and critical of the *status quo*.<sup>21</sup> Yet it was during the May Fourth Movement of 1919, that China's second generation of revolutionary intellectuals appeared and since then they have played a major role in socio-political development. And, as a result, they have themselves become the focus of politics.

Before 1949, literature and art were not only a key battle ground fought over by the CCP and the KMT, but a main stage for conflict among the Left-wing or revolutionary intellectuals as well. A typical case, for example, is the conflict between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang, as we mentioned

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<sup>21</sup> R.Wagner,1987: 183-231; F.Wakeman, 1973: 35-70.

above. After the escape of the KMT from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, literature began to reflect the conflict within the CCP. It turned out that those revolutionary writers and artists, as well as the revolutionary social scientists, became the group most reluctant to give up their ideas to pressure from the CCP and Mao, some even sacrificed their lives.

Mao correctly distinguished them from technical experts and natural scientists, but he simply blamed them for being divorced from reality and reluctant to accept socialist ideas.<sup>22</sup> He continued to watch over them since the case *The Life of Wu Xun* (if not earlier, for instance, 1942), but he just labelled them as "spokesmen of the bourgeoisie in the CCP", and chose increasingly great number of individuals or groups as targets to be criticised and punished in the succession of political campaigns.

The first group to be punished after 1949 were followers of Lu Xun. They were punished one by one from 1954 to 1957 in the Criticism of Hu Shi, the Criticism of Hu Feng, and the Anti-Rightist Campaign. These are: **Feng Xue-feng**, an essayist and literary critic, and one of the famous "Lake Poets"; **Hu Feng**, a poet and well-known Left-wing literary theorist; and **Ding Ling**, China's foremost revolutionary woman-novelist, a Stalin Prize winner.

Some scholars claimed that these writers were punished mainly because of the personal conflict between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang.<sup>23</sup> But I would argue in this research that they were criticised and punished more

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<sup>22</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1980: 245, 248. I will discuss the theoretical problem of Mao's treatment of revolutionary and other intellectuals in Chapter Seven.

<sup>23</sup> Cf., M. Goldman, 1971.

essentially because they sought to maintain their critical spirits after the "Soviet-type Communist" system was established. If there had not been Zhou Yang, they would have experienced more or less the same, sooner or later.

It was true that Feng Xue-feng and Hu Feng were Lu Xun's closest friends and that they were with Lu Xun when Lu criticised Zhou Yang in the 1930s. Nevertheless, such a conflict was seen by the CCP leadership as being within the revolutionary ranks, and thus a non-antagonistic contradiction. Therefore, Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, and Hu Feng were still considered as outstanding revolutionary writers and appointed as leading cadres in literary and art circles in 1949. When the Criticism of Hu Shi was launched in 1954, Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng and Ding Ling were members of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles, both Feng Xue-feng and Ding Ling were vice-chairpersons of the All-China Writers Association, Ding was deputy chief-editor of the magazine *People's Literature*, Feng was chief-editor of the *Literary Gazette*, and director and chief-editor of the People's Literature Press.

Feng Xue-feng (1903- 1976) became a poet in the early 1920s, known as one of the "Lake Poets". He joined the CCP in 1927, and became a key figure in the China Left-wing Association of Writers in the 1930s. He was considered to be a close friend and follower of Lu Xun, who was strongly influenced by his mentor's ideas.<sup>24</sup> Feng also was one of the three established writers when they participated in the Red Army's 12,500 km Long March from 1934 to 1935.<sup>25</sup> Feng showed his independent way of

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<sup>24</sup> Xu Guang-ping, 1978: 87-89; Tang Tao, 1986.

<sup>25</sup> The other two are Li Yi-mang and Cheng Fang-wu, two of the key figures of the Creation Society in the 1920s. Cf. Chapter 6.

thinking and doing even in the 1930s when the CCP and the KMT set up the United Front again in order to fight against the Japanese. Like Lu Xun, Feng Xue-feng did not fully agree the CCP's policy towards the KMT. And, moreover, as a CCP member, he even left the so-called "United Front" for his hometown "to take a rest". After that, he spent many years in a KMT jail.

In 1954, it was said that Feng Xue-feng, as chief-editor of the *Literary Gazette*, rejected an article written by two young university graduates Li Xi-fan and Lan Ling. These two in their article criticised Yu Ping-bo, a well-known scholar who shared Hu Shi's opinions regarding *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, one of China's greatest classic novels. After the rejection, the two young graduates wrote to their teacher at Shangdong University, their alma mater, and received support. As a result, their article was published in *Literature, History, Philosophy*, the academic journal of Shangdong University. Then in Peking, the *Literary Gazette* reprinted the article on 30 September 1954, with Feng Xue-feng's editorial remark stating that "the views of these writers are not thorough enough nor complete enough in certain areas."<sup>26</sup>

Then it was suggested that the *People's Daily* should reprint the article in order to start a debate. But, as with the first submission to the *Literary Gazette*, it came to nothing because, according to "certain people", the article was written by two "nobodies" and the CCP's newspaper was not a platform for free debate.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> WYB, 30 September, 1954.

<sup>27</sup> Feng Xue-feng, in WYB, 1954, Vol.18. Cf. Mao, 1977: 150-151; Ding Ling, 1986.

This time, it was Mao again who launched the nationwide campaign, the Criticism of Hu Shi, in which not only Hu Shi's (and Yu Ping-bo's) philosophy (and literary theory) was criticised as bourgeois idealism and pragmatism, but also Feng Xue-feng's attitude towards Li Xi-fan and Lan Ling, the two young literary critics, was sternly condemned.

From October, 1954, to June, 1955, there were 76 articles in the *People's Daily* and *Guangming Daily* on this subject. Amongst the authors there were the Party's theoreticians, including Ai Si-qi, Hu Sheng, Deng Tuo, and Wang Ro-shui; well-known revolutionary writers and literary critics, such as Guo Mo-ruo, Mao Dun, Zhou Yang, and He Qi-fang; and old-type philosophers and social scientists, for example, Feng You-lan, Jin Yue-ling, Li Da, and Wu Jing-chao.

The problem was not Yu Ping-bo's and/or Hu Shi's ideas themselves, according to Mao, but, as in the case of *The Life of Wu Xun*, certain people within the CCP, especially certain "bigwigs", who "go in for a united front with bourgeois writers on the question of idealism and become willing captives of the bourgeoisie."<sup>28</sup> On 16 October, 1954, Mao wrote a letter to all members of the Politburo and those cadres in charge of ideological affairs, asking them to pay attention to the case. In Mao's letter, certain persons were blamed as "bigwigs", who ignored and distrusted "nobodies" and suppressed their articles. Amongst these, of course, was Feng Xue-feng.

On 28 October, 1954, the *People's Daily* and the *Literary Gazette* published an article *Interrogate the Editors of the Literary Gazette*. In

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<sup>28</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 150-151.

this article, the author accused Feng Xue-feng and Chen Qi-xia, the deputy chief-editor of the *Literary Gazette*, of having an "aristocratic attitude" towards new critics, surrendering to bourgeois ideas, and suppressing lively critical essays. This article, signed by Yuan Shui-pai, was believed to have expressed Mao's opinions, for before its publication Mao had read and corrected it. Shortly after that a series of sessions was held to criticise Feng Xue-feng and the *Literary Gazette*, attended by nearly all the well-known writers in Peking, including Guo Mo-ruo, Zhou Yang, Ding Ling, and Hu Feng. In November, 1954, Feng Xue-feng made a self-criticism. He admitted that he had made an unforgivable anti-Marxist mistake. In December, Feng Xue-feng and Chen Qi-xia lost their posts in the *Literary Gazette*.<sup>29</sup>

Did Feng Xue-feng really make an anti-Marxist mistake and surrender to the bourgeois ideas? Did he refuse Li's and Lan's article only because they were "nobodies" and their critical target was an leading scholar? Or, more significantly, did he still try to show his own independent literary and academic judgement in dealing with the article written by Li Xi-fan and Lan Ling, and in running the *Literary Gazette* ?

As we have seen, Feng Xue-feng is more an independent writer than a snobbish editor. He dared argue not merely with persons like Zhou Yang in 1936, but also with the CCP leadership in 1938, and even left for home. In 1954, it was said thirty years later, when Feng Xue-feng refused to publish Li's and Lan's article, he did not show any "aristocratic attitude", but rather, personally he treated them very kindly. He saw them

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<sup>29</sup> Feng Xue-feng, 1954 . Cf. M. Goldman, 1971:106-128; Lin Mo-han, 1989; Hou Jin-jing, 1957.



off and even booked a rickshaw and paid the fee for them.<sup>30</sup> More importantly, even if Feng Xue-feng had really treated the two young critics badly, is it only because Feng thought the two were nobodies while the target they aimed at was a leading scholar? Or, more profoundly, is it because Feng had his own literary judgement which was essentially different from the viewpoint of the two critics, and of Mao? From Feng's past experience the CCP and Mao should have known that Feng had had his own independent way of thinking and doing since the 1930s. Persons like Feng Xue-feng actually belonged to the critical intelligentsia who should not have been simply blamed for being members of the bourgeoisie or surrendering to bourgeois ideas.

Interestingly, Hu Feng was very active in the criticism of Feng Xue-feng. Hu Feng (1902-1985) was also seen as a close friend and follower of Lu Xun in the 1930s and another key figure who played a major role in the conflict between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang. Hu Feng's literary theory, which emphasised subjective spirit, was considered to be profound and distinguished understanding of literature and art, and Hu Feng himself thus became an outstanding figure in the Left-wing literary circles.

However, after Lu Xun's death (in 1936), especially after Mao made his famous *Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art* (in 1942), Hu Feng's independent literary theory was criticised as petty-bourgeois idealism by the CCP, although politically he was seen as a Left-wing writer. From 1948, there were already critical articles published in Hong Kong by other revolutionary intellectuals. They argued with Hu Feng about literature and its relationship to reality. In July 1949, Mao Dun,

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<sup>30</sup> Cf., Ding Ling, 1986.

Chairman of the All-China Writers Association, made a lengthy report at the First National Congress of the All-China Literary and Art Workers. In Mao Dun's report, Hu Feng's literary theory was criticised but without mentioning Hu's name. This was the first time that Hu Feng's literary theory had been criticised in public since the CCP took over Peking.

As an independent literary figure, Hu Feng refused these criticisms, and his relation to CCP leading cadres in charge of ideology was thus in crisis. Theoretically, Hu Feng was still considered, or claimed, a revolutionary writer. But in practice, he could not get on well with most of the CCP's ideologues. What is more, unlike most intellectuals, Hu Feng even did not obtain a job after 1949.<sup>31</sup>

In April 1952, Zhou Yang had a long talk with Hu Feng in Shanghai, telling Hu that he should not consider the CCP as an abstract thing. That is to say, Hu Feng had been supporting Marxism and the CCP's policies in theory, but it was not enough, he should be further subordinated to the CCP officials in practice. Zhou Yang's suggestion was certainly not acceptable for Hu Feng. He saw those leading cadres sectarians who actually did not understand literature.

To show his disagreement, on 4 May, 1952, Hu Feng wrote a letter to Mao Ze-dong and Zhou En-lai, reporting the content of his talk with Zhou Yang and expressing his feelings. It seemed that Zhou En-lai tried to deal with this problem mildly and quietly, for he then told the cadres in charge of ideology that Hu Feng's problem was not the same as the problem of

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<sup>31</sup> The CCP arranged jobs for him, but he thought, before getting an official conclusion on the difference between Hu's and his critics' literary theories, it was not the time to receive the CCP's arrangement and to take these jobs. Cf., Hu Feng, 1988.

*The Life of Wu Xun*, and thus it was not necessary to criticise him in public, although it would be good to have a small-scale discussion meeting. Only if Hu Feng was not willing to write self-criticism, could one or two articles criticising him be then published, for Hu's literary theory was still influential.<sup>32</sup> But Hu Feng, as an independent literary critic, did refuse to write self-criticism. As a result, in 1953, two critical articles written by He Qi-fang and Lin Mo-han, two of the leading figures in charge of literature and art, were published in the *Literary Gazette*. As it later turned out, these two articles made the issue more complicated.

In July 1954, in response to the two articles in the *Literary Gazette*, Hu Feng, in cooperation with several others, wrote his famous *A Report on Literary Practice since 1949* (namely, the 300,000-word Report) to the Central Committee of the CCP. In this 300,000-word Report, Hu Feng made his counter-criticism of He Qi-fang's and Lin Mo-han's criticisms. More importantly, he systematically expressing his independent ideas on literature and art. Hu Feng accused He Qi-fang and Li Mo-han of putting "five daggers over the heads of writers and readers". These were:

- (1). Writers who wanted to practise creative writing *must first acquire a perfect* Communist world outlook;
- (2). Since *only* the livelihood of workers, peasants, and soldiers is *real*, writers should be required to penetrate their lives;
- (3). *Only after* writers had *successfully* remoulded themselves could they engage in literary creation;
- (4). *Only* the traditional Chinese form of literature and art could be considered the national form, and writers *must* carry it forward; and

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<sup>32</sup> Hu Feng 1988:16. Cf. Lin Mo-han, 1989; Lu Yuan, 1989; Li Hui, 1989: 152.

(5). There is a great difference between various themes: some are important, others are not. The value of literary production is determined by the theme. Therefore, writers *must choose important themes* as their range of subjects, and such important themes *must be "the bright side of the society "*.<sup>33</sup> (My emphasis)

Hu Feng insisted that under these "five daggers" there would be no real literary and artistic creation at all. The problem, according to Hu Feng, was not only these five daggers, but also, more seriously and harmfully, the sectarians (i.e., those ideologues of the CCP in charge of literature and art, for example, Zhou Yang), who could freely brandish them.

Hu Feng did not realise what a disaster he brought. When he forwarded his *300,000-word Report* to the Central Committee of the CCP, he thought he just complained about those CCP cadres like Zhou Yang, Lin Mo-han, and He Qi-fang, to the "wisest leaders". But in fact he criticised Mao's literary theory and CCP's leadership over literature and art.

Three months later, when the Criticism of Hu Shi was launched, Hu Feng wrongly thought that the campaign was partly because of his *300,000-word Report*, and the leadership of the CCP, especially Mao, agreed with his opinions, and now decided to deal with the sectarianism within literary and artistic circles. Thus, when he was invited to attend the sessions to criticise Feng Xue-feng and the *Literary Gazette*, he strongly criticised not only Feng Xue-feng, but also the leading cadres in literary and artistic circles, especially Zhou Yang; Hu criticised not only Feng Xue-feng's

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<sup>33</sup> Hu Feng, 1988: 104. Cf. He Qi-fang, 1953; Lin Mo-han, 1953; Guo Mo-ruo, 1963: 216-225; Mei Zhi, 1990; and Zhang Guo-min, 1990.

attitude towards the two young critics, but also the CCP's policy on literature and art. Unfortunately Hu Feng did not realise that, as Zhou Yang once told him, even if he were ninety-nine per cent right, he could be totally wrong if he were not right about the most fundamental point.<sup>34</sup>

Hu's criticism of the *Literary Gazette* could not be accepted by the CCP. After Hu's speech, many revolutionary intellectuals, for instance, Yuan Shui-pai and He Qi-fang, criticised Hu Feng immediately. Moreover, on 8 December, 1954, Zhou Yang made a lengthy speech to conclude the Criticism of Hu Shi. Zhou Yang in his speech officially demonstrated the great differences between the CCP and Hu Feng in the cases of the *Literary Gazette* and *The Dream of the Red Camber*, and further, in the entire matter of literature and art. Zhou Yang started and ended his speech with a slogan: *We Must Fight* !

By now, another political campaign, the Criticism of Hu Feng, had begun. It turned out to be the most horrifying political campaign in the 1950s, and thousands of intellectuals were accused of counter-revolutionaries, nearly a hundred of them were even arrested, because they shared similar opinions with, or had personal relationship to, Hu Feng.

At first, to carry on the campaign, the CCP decided to publish Hu Feng's 300,000-word *Report* in the *Literary Gazette*. Hearing this, Hu Feng went to see Zhou Yang, admitting his fault and asking Zhou Yang to

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<sup>34</sup> Until Hu had spent more than 20 years in gaol he did not understand that the so-called "most fundamental point" was that one must keep in line with Mao's *Talks at the Yan'an Forum On Literature and Art*. That is to say, however great and profound Hu's understanding of literature, he cannot deviate from the leadership of the CCP and Mao. Cf., Hu Feng, 1954; 1988:16; Lu Yuan, 1989; and Xiao Shan, 1990.

publish his own declaration as well, in which Hu wrote that he had already recognised that his own attitude toward the CCP and toward literature in the *300,000-word Report* was wrong and harmful. But it was too late.

In response to Hu Feng's requirement, Mao wrote to Zhou Yang: "(1) Such a declaration cannot be published; (2) We must never permit Hu Feng's bourgeois idealism and his literary theory, which stand in opposition to the people and to the Party, to get away from us under the cover of being merely regarded as a 'petty bourgeois viewpoint'. Instead, we ought to criticise and repudiate them thoroughly."<sup>35</sup>

Accordingly, on 5 and 7 February, 1955, the All-China Writers Association held sessions to criticise Hu's theory. Many prominent writers and leading cadres in charge of literature and art attended the sessions, including Mao Dun, Zhou Yang, Ding Ling, and Feng Xue-feng.

Nevertheless, during this period (December, 1954 - April, 1955), Hu's problem was treated as an ideological rather than a political one. All the criticisms focused on his literary theory, which was attacked for its deviation from Mao's *Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art*. Hu's literary theory was considered as "bourgeois idea", "idealist viewpoint", and "anti-Marxist theory".

However, in April 1955, some of Hu Feng's private letters were handed in to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP via the *People's Daily* by one of his former close friends. This was the turning point of the Campaign. Because of these letters, Hu Feng was then

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<sup>35</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1986: 518. Cf. Lin Mo-han, 1989.

considered not merely an ideologically bourgeois writer, but the head of an anti-Party clique as well.

Parts of his private letters were published in three instalments with many severe editorial remarks in the *People's Daily*. Only in the Cultural Revolution did it become apparent that these editorial remarks were in fact written by Mao himself. After reading Hu's letters, Mao judged him and his friends to have already been an anti-Party clique and a counter-revolutionary clique in the 1940s. Hu Feng and his friends were declared to be "spokesmen for all counter-revolutionary classes, groups and individuals". Furthermore, they were accused of being "imperialist and KMT secret agents, Trotskyists, reactionary army officers, or renegades from the CCP."<sup>36</sup>

Table 4.2. Articles criticising Hu Feng in the *People's Daily*, 1955 .

	Academic & ideological	Criticism	Political & personal	Selfcriticism	Total
1955					
Jan.	4				4
Feb.	3		1		4
March	5		1		6
April	3				3
May	1		83	2	86
June			151		151
July			29		29
Aug.			6		6
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>		<b>271</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>289</b>

Source: RMRB, 1 January - 23 August, 1955.

From then on, Hu Feng was described as "robber", "snake", "wolf", "mouse", "termite", "bad man", and "enemy of the people". Amongst Hu's

<sup>36</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 176-180. Cf., Mei Zhi, 1990.

critics, there were not only those former foes of Lu Xun and Hu Feng of the 1930s, such as Zhou Yang, Guo Mo-ruo, and Mao Dun, but also Hu's former friends, such as Zhou Jian-ren (Lu Xun's brother), and Xu Guang-ping (Lu Xun's widow). Hu Feng's followers in the provinces, for instance, Lu Yuan, Zeng Zuo, Peng Bo-shan, and Wang Yuan-hua, also had to get involved in criticising him. As table 4.2 shows, of the 83 articles published in the *People's Daily* in May, only one was by an academic critic or was an ideological criticism. All the rest were political accusations and/or personal attacks.

Before May, 1955, the criticism of Hu Feng was limited to literary and art circles. But from May, when Mao had decided that Hu Feng and his friends had formed a counter-revolutionary cliquem, ideological criticism changed to political accusation. Not merely literary writers and critics, but also social scientists, natural scientists, democratic personages, businessmen, the leaders of the CCY and mass organisations, and even PLA generals got involved in the campaign as Table 4.3. shows.

**Table 4.3.** Participants in the Criticism of Hu Feng, 1955.

	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Total	%
Writer/ Artist	1	46	47	2	2	98	35.64
Social scientist	1	9	12	3		25	9.09
Natural scientist		2	6	2		10	3.64
DP*		4	31	6		41	14.91
Leader of CCY**			10			10	3.04
CCP ideologue	1	2	6	2		11	4.0
PLA generals			2			2	0.73
Others		22	38	14	4	78	28.36
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>100</b>

\*: DP stands for the Democratic Personage, including businessman.

\*\*: This includes leaders of other mass organisations.

Source: RMRB, 1 April - 23 August, 1955.



Now, according to the CCP, Hu Feng's problem should be no longer considered as a ideological problem within the revolutionary literary and artistic circles, but rather, an antagonistic contradiction between the people and their enemies. Hence it could be only resolved by using instrument of dictatorship like the police. There appeared articles in the *People's Daily* and *Guangming Daily*, written by well-known leading figures of the Left-wing literary and artistic circles, like Guo Mo-ruo, which required to punish Hu Feng and his "clique" mercilessly. It was said that Hu Feng's "counter-revolutionary clique" consisted of not only literary writers, but also some CCP cadres in other circles. Consequently, from mid-May, 1955, Hu Feng, as a deputy to the National People's Congress, along with 91 his friends and relatives, was sent to gaol, while more than 2,000 people were criticised or punished all over the country, as Table 4.4. shows.

Table 4.4. Numbers of " elements of the Hu Feng Clique"and types of punishment.

	1955	1956	1965
Criticised/ implicated	2,100		
Relieved of posts for self-examination	73		
Investigated in isolation	62		
Taken into custody	92		
Labelled as "Hu Feng Element"		78*	
"Core Element"		23	
Sentenced to more than 12-year imprisonment			3

\*: Amongst them 32 were CCP members.

Source: Li Hui, *Historical Tragedy*, pp.3, 354, Hong Kong, 1989.

Thirty years later, when Hu Feng and all of his friends were told by the CCP that they had been wrongly accused in 1955 and thus should be rehabilitated politically, he was already mentally ill, and some of his friends, such as A Long, Fang Ran, and Peng Bo-sha, had died.<sup>37</sup> And only in 1989, when Hu Feng had already died, could Hu Feng's literary theory be officially acknowledged as an independent and original idea, which should not be simply criticised or ignored.

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<sup>37</sup> Amongst those who were arrested in 1955 as "Elements of the Hu Feng Clique", were:

**Lu Ling**, writer, member of the Presidium of the All-China Association;

**Fang Ran**, writer, chief of the Editorial and Research Department, the All-China Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles;

**A Long**, writer, member of the Standing Committee of the Tianjin Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles;

**Lu Li**, writer, director of the Tianjin Association of Writers;

**Lu Dian**, writer, chief secretary of the Tianjin Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles;

**Liu Xue Wei**, president of the New Literature and Art Publishing House;

**Wang Yuan-hua**, vice-president of the New Literature and Art Publishing House;

**Zhang Zhong-xiao**, editor, the New Literature and Art Publishing House;

**Luo Luo**, editor, the New Literature and Art Publishing House;

**Zeng Zhuo**, assistant director of the *Zhangjiang Daily*;

**Lu Yuan**, editor of the *Zhangjiang Daily*;

**Jia Zhi-fang**, professor at Fudan University;

**Mei Lin**, dean of the Chinese Literature Department, Aurora University;

**Xie Tao**, assistant director of Department of Research and Teaching on Marxism and Leninism, People's University of China; and

**Peng Bo-shan**, assistant director of the Culture Department of the Eastern China Military and Administrative Commission.

Cf. Yang Yi-fang, 1956: 161-167; Li Hui, 1989: 225; Lin Mo-han, 1989. Hu was released in 1978. About his life from 1965-1978, Cf. Mei Zhi, 1986-1989. Also Cf. Li Hui, 1989: 331-357.

The Hu Feng Case clearly showed how deeply the CCP and the revolutionary intellectuals like Hu Feng misunderstood each other. On the one hand, the CCP and Mao did not know that these intellectuals held their own independent views of literature and art although being politically committed to the Revolution. On the other hand, these intellectuals had hardly understood that under the newly established "Soviet-type Communist System" to disagree with the establishment ideologically was under taboo, no matter how correct and profound they were. If Hu Feng was naive when he tried to argue with the leadership of the CCP in his *300,000-word Report*, then the CCP was not wise when it used Hu Feng's private letters to accuse Hu Feng of being the KMT's spy and counter-revolutionary. Intellectuals are producers of ideas, which cannot be simply forbidden by using administrative and military means.

However, for the time being, it was horrible. And almost all well-known established intellectuals were forced to show their political support to the CCP and its decision to arrest Hu Feng. Possibly that is why by that time Feng Xue-feng and Ding Ling were also involved in the political accusations against Hu Feng.

Feng Xue-feng admitted in the *People's Daily* on 27 May, 1955, that he had been for a long time deceived by Hu Feng. Feng Xue-feng further accused Hu Feng of driving a wedge between Lu Xun and the CCP in the 1930s. Four days earlier Ding Ling wrote: "I can no longer do my daily work after reading some of Hu Feng's private letters. Where are the enemies? They are right here! They are in front of us, amongst us, and

beside us."<sup>38</sup> But for Ding Ling, it turned out that such a simple show of her political attitude was not enough.

Ding Ling (1904-1986) began her literary career in 1927. She was involved in the Left-wing Literary Movement in the early 1930s and became a CCP member in 1932. Like Feng Xue-feng, Zhou Yang and Mao Dun, she was once the secretary of the China Left-wing Association of Writers. In the 1940s, she played an active role within the literary and art circles in Yan'an, and had a very good relationship with Mao and other top leaders of the CCP. Ding Ling was also the only writer whom Mao wrote a poem to, although Mao pointed out that she, as well as many other writers, lacked the experience of being together with the common masses.<sup>39</sup>

However, in 1942, Ding Ling got involved in criticising Yan'an's "dark side". She published an article *Random Thoughts on Women's Day* on 8 March, 1942, in the *Liberation Daily*, the CCP's newspaper in Yan'an during the 1940s. In this article, Ding Ling sympathised with those divorced Red Armywomen whose ex-husbands married younger girls from the urban areas. Ding Ling concluded that in Yan'an women had not enjoyed equal positions with men yet. It was a really sensitive subject because many high officials and generals did so. This was the first time that Ding Ling showed her critical attitude towards the CCP. Dramatically, Ding Ling quickly re-obtained the trust from the leadership of the CCP, and even became an activist in the criticism of Wang Shi-wei.

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<sup>38</sup> Feng Xue-feng, 1955; Ding Ling, 1955.

<sup>39</sup> Cf., Ding Ling, 1984:249; Zhu Zheng-ming, 1982; Gan Lu, 1987.

From 1949 to 1954, Ding Ling occupied the following posts:

A member of the Cultural & Educational Commission of the Government Administrative Council;

A vice-chairwoman of , and a deputy Party secretary in, the All-China Writers Association (called the All-China Association of Literary Workers before 1953);

Head of the Literature Bureau of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee;

Director of the Thought Reform Commission of Literary and Art Circles in Peking;

Director of the Central Literary Institute, chief-editor of the *Literary Gazette* (1949-1952); and

Deputy chief-editor of the *People's Literature* (1952-1953).

In 1954, when the Criticism of Hu Shi was launched, Ding Ling was also criticised for her work in the *Literary Gazette* , though she had left the *Literary Gazette* in 1952. The problematic figure was Chen Qi-xia, deputy chief-editor of the *Literary Gazette*. Chen had been Ding Ling's associate when they worked for the *Liberation Daily* in Yan'an. In 1949, it was Ding Ling who asked the CCP to appoint Chen Qi-xia as her deputy chief-editor at the *Literary Gazette*. When Ding left the *Literary Gazette* for the *People's Literature*, she recommended Feng Xue-feng for her post while Chen Qi-xia remained as deputy chief-editor. In 1954, Feng Xue-feng was charged with "surrendering to bourgeois ideas and suppressing Marxist interpretations of literary questions by new critics", and Chen Qi-xia was charged with "dogmatism and the suppression of new voices". Ding Ling at the beginning spoke for Chen Qi-xia, later she herself was attacked because of her connection with Chen , her defence of Chen, and her work in the *Literary Gazette*. In January 1955, the Party Committee

of the All-China Writers Association convened a meeting to criticise Chen Qi-xia, ending with an official resolution. Ding Ling also wrote self-criticisms at least twice. It seemed that Ding and Chen accepted the resolution against them meekly at that time. In April, 1955, however, three anonymous letters were sent to the leadership of the CCP. In these letters, the author, who, it was believed, was either Chen Qi-xia himself or one of his close friends, insisted that Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia had been wrongly criticised, and that the case of the *Literary Gazette* should be re-examined.<sup>40</sup>

Like Hu Feng's *300,000-word Report*, these letters made matters worse. From August to September, 1955, the Party Committee of the All-China Writers Association held 16 enlarged meetings to deal with Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia. It resulted in a report to the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee, in which Ding and Chen were attacked for "their activities in forming an anti-Party clique". In December 1955, the Central Committee of the CCP decided that Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia did form an anti-party clique, and they were accused of (1) refusing the CCP's supervision and instruction, (2) disrupting unity and trying to cause a split within the literary and art circles, (3) building up a personality cult around Ding Ling and (4) promoting bourgeois individualism. Chen Qi-xia was even detained for nine months.<sup>41</sup> None of this was made known to the public until 1957.

During the Hundred Flowers period, encouraged by the CCP's new policy towards intellectuals, some writers in the All-China Writers Association

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. Chen Qi-xia, 1987; Chen Gong-huai, 1989; and WYB, 1957, Vol. 24, pp.7.

<sup>41</sup> Li Zi-lian, 1989 ; Chen Gong-huai, 1989.

wrote letters to the authorities at various levels, expressing their disagreement with the resolution on Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia in 1955. This time the leadership of the CCP did send a fact-finding team, led by Zhang Ji-chun, a Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department, to re-examine the case. Based on careful investigations, this team almost reached the conclusion that the resolution on Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia in 1955 was not fair.

On 6 June, 1957, the Party Commission of the All-China Writers Association held another enlarged meeting. At the meeting, several CCP officials including Zhou Yang, who had been in charge of criticising Ding and Chen since 1952 and was now a member of the fact-finding team, declared that Ding and Chen had been wrongly accused in 1955. He said that the so-called "Anti-Party Clique" did not exist, and the officials made a public apology to Ding Ling.<sup>42</sup> However, when the political climate changed and the leadership of the CCP launched the Anti-rightist Campaign, Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia were once again accused of organising an Anti-Party Clique in which, it was said then, Feng Xue-feng had been a key figure.

Writers in various groups from August 1957 started condemning Ding Ling, Feng Xue-feng, and Chen Qi-xia in public. Amongst them, there were: (1). Zhou Yang's colleagues, such as Shao Quan-lin, Lin Mo-han, Yuan Shui-pai, and He Qi-fang; (2). Lu Xun's relatives Xu Guang-ping and Zhou Jian-ren; and (3). prominent Chinese writers, for example, Guo Mo-ruo, Mao Dun, Lao She, Ba Jin, and many others.

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<sup>42</sup> Li Zi-lian, 1989; Chen Gong-huai, 1989.

What is more, in January, 1958, the CCP called for the "re-criticism of the poisonous weeds" written by Ding Ling, Ai Qing, Xiao Jun, Luo Feng, and Wang Shi-wei in 1942. The *Literary Gazette* reprinted Wang Shi-wei's *Wild Lily*, Ding Ling's *Random Thoughts on Women's Day*, Ai Qing's *Understanding Writers & Respecting Writers*, Xiao Jun's *On 'Love' and 'Forbearance' amongst Comrades*, and Luo Feng's *It Is still the Time for the Satiric Essay*. All of them were originally printed in the *Liberation Daily* in Yan'an when Ding Ling worked there as the editor of its *Literary Supplement*. The purpose of reprinting these articles, according to the editorial remarks, was to let people know how Ding Ling and others "wrote counter-revolutionary articles under the name of the Revolution."<sup>43</sup> In February, 1958, Zhou Yang made the concluding report: *A Great Debate in Literary and Art Circles*, which signalled the end of the criticism.

Both Ding Ling and Feng Xue-feng were described by their critics as being anti-Party elements since the 1930s. It was said that Ding Ling in 1933 actually surrendered to the KMT when she was arrested, that in 1942 she wrote an anti-Party article *Random Thoughts on Women's Day*, and that she published Wang Shi-wei's *Wild Lily* and others' articles mentioned above. Feng Xue-feng was attacked for creating, like Hu Feng, a split between Lu Xun and the CCP in 1936, and for deserting the Revolution and the CCP in 1937 and 1939. Many other writers were also labelled as members of the "Anti-Party Clique of Ding-Chen", and Feng. The numbers increased from 2 (Ding and Chen Qi-xia) in 1955 to more

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<sup>43</sup> WYB, 1958, Vol.2. This later turned out to be written by Mao. See below.



than 400 in 1957.<sup>44</sup> Were they really anti-Party elements? Or were they wrongly labelled, like Hu Feng, just because of their personal conflict with Zhou Yang, or more importantly, besides such conflict, because of their independent ideas and critical spirits which could no longer accepted by the authorities under the New "Communist" System?

It is certainly true that, before they were punished, they had been attacking, or at least, complaining about, Zhou Yang and his group since the 1930s. When the PRC was established, it became common knowledge within the literary and art circles that Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, and Ding Ling did not respect Zhou Yang. Because of such a conflict, in 1949 when Zhou En-lai appointed Feng Xue-feng as director of the People's Literature Press, Feng complained that it was hard to work effectively under Zhou Yang, who was a deputy director of the Propaganda Department which controlled ideology including publication. Another example is that, when the Central Committee of the CCP sent a fact-finding team to look into Ding Ling Case in 1956, Zhou En-lai emphatically instructed the team that because Zhou Yang and Ding Ling had had serious personal conflicts, Zhou Yang as a member of the team should not directly take part in the interviews with Ding Ling. As far as Hu Feng Case is concerned, it has been widely known that Hu Feng was

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<sup>44</sup> Amongst them, were: **Ai Qing**, one of China's most eminent poets, and one of those who were criticised in Yan'an in 1942, together with Ding Ling and Wang Shi-wei;

**Xiao Jun**, novelist, one of Lu Xun's close friends in the 1930s, and one of those criticised in Yan'an in 1942;

**Luo Feng**, writer, one of those criticised in Yan'an in 1942;

**Li You-ran**, writer;

**Chen Ming**, Ding Ling's husband; and

**Bai Lang**, Luo Feng's wife.

always critical towards Zhou Yang since the 1930s when Zhou Yang and Lu Xun argued each other. In the 1950s, such a critical attitude could be clearly seen in both his speech to criticise the *Literary Gazette* in 1954 and his 300,000-word *Report*. Later on, Zhou Yang and his friends had indeed played a very active role in the criticism of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng and Ding Ling. It was Zhou Yang who in 1957 told the director of the Propaganda Department that he did not agree with the report in which the fact-finding team concluded that Ding Ling was not a traitor. It was Zhou Yang as well who in 1955 decided to send Hu Feng's private letters to Mao and to publish them.<sup>45</sup> If it were not for Zhou Yang, we may suppose, Ding Ling, Hu Feng, and Feng Xue-feng would have suffered much less.

On the other hand, in a "Soviet-type Communist" society, ruled by a Leninist Party which always considered ideology as a crucial factor of its leadership, it is hard to imagine that any nationwide political campaign, such as the Criticism of Hu Shi, the Criticism of Hu Feng, or the Anti-Rightist Campaign, could be launched without the permission of the top leaders, and it is difficult to suppose that members of the critical intelligentsia such as Hu Feng could escape from criticism and/or punishment.

As a matter of fact, it was Mao himself who not only launched those political campaigns, but also decided that Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Feng Xue-feng were labelled heads of counter-revolutionary or anti-Party cliques, and then criticised and punished. Mao not only made decisions at

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<sup>45</sup> Bao Zi-yan & Yuan Shao-fa, 1986:75; Li Zi-lian, 1989; Hu Feng, 1954, 1988; WYB, 1958, Vol.2; Ding Ling, 1984: 280-281.

the high level in general, but also directed the campaign in particular. For instance, it was Mao who in 1958 decided to re-criticise the articles written by Ding Ling and others in 1942 as negative examples, and Mao himself wrote the editorial remarks.<sup>46</sup>

Zhou Yang, as a key leading cadre with direct control over literature and art, took part in carrying out the CCP's policies in each of these political campaigns on the one hand, but on the other, as an official who was thought to be partly responsible for all of the "mistakes" within the literary and art circles, he was also required on each occasion to make self-criticism. The relationship between Zhou Yang and those targets of criticism was more complicated than it seemed.

For example, in 1954, when the Criticism of Hu Shi was launched, Zhou Yang told Mao that Feng Xue-feng suffered a lot from the criticism, but Mao answered: "That is what I wanted!" Zhou Yang tried to share Feng's responsibility, saying that he himself was not on the alert against Hu Shi's bourgeois idealism which still dominated research into Chinese classical literature. Mao angrily answered:

"It is not true that you are not on the alert. You are very much on the alert. Your inclination is very clear: you protect bourgeois ideas, you like anti-Marxist things, but hate Marxism."<sup>47</sup>

Then Zhou Yang had to admit that "the problem of the *Literary Gazette* was not only with one or two editors. We gave up the criticism and struggle against bourgeois idealism, it in fact means that we surrendered

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<sup>46</sup> WYB, 1958, Vol. 2. Cf., *WEN YI SI XIANG ZHAN XIAN SAN SHI NIAN*, pp.60; Li Rui, 1987.

<sup>47</sup> Cf., Li Hui, 1989: 174.

to the bourgeoisie. This is the biggest mistake we made. I myself am the man who made it."<sup>48</sup>

In the Cultural Revolution, when Zhou Yang was criticised, this self-criticism on the part of Zhou Yang was even accused of pleading for Feng Xue-feng. More interestingly, in 1975 when Zhou was just released from gaol after staying there for more than eight years, Feng Xue-feng was the first man he visited. The two old men were so pleased and touched that they burst into tears when they saw each other. After their meeting, Zhou Yang wrote a letter to Mao in which he insisted that Feng Xue-feng was a good Communist and thus should be re-recruited as a CCP member, although Zhou Yang himself at that time was still considered as the head of a revisionist line in literature and art, and therefore had not yet been reinstated to the CCP.<sup>49</sup>

Was Zhou Yang indeed Feng Xue-feng's friend, and thus did he try to help Feng, as Zhou was accused by Yao Wen-yuan in the Cultural Revolution? Or more likely, did Zhou Yang, after being in gaol for eight years, just feel guilty for Feng Xue-feng's experience since 1954-57 mainly because of Feng's critical spirits? It is hard to see Zhou and Feng as friends though Zhou Yang indeed tried to help Feng even in 1954 when Mao decided to criticise Feng. The more important factor is that, no matter whether Feng Xue-feng had personal conflict with Zhou Yang, he would have few opportunities to escape from criticism if he tried to show his own independent thinking under the "Soviet-type Communist" System.

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<sup>48</sup> Zhou Yang , 1985:312; Lin Mo-han,1989.

<sup>49</sup> Zhou Yang, 1980 ; Tang Tao, in Bao & Yuan, 1986: 122; Zhen Yu-zhi, 1986: 78.

Just after Zhou Yang's visit, Feng Xue-feng wrote his last fable in which he described their meeting as following:

A golden pheasant called on another one. When they said goodbye to each other, both sent the most beautiful plumages of their own to the other in memory of their time together. A crowd of sparrows saw it, laughing at them: "Is it nothing but lauding each other?" "No! sparrows," I must say, "you are totally wrong. Whatever their shortcomings they are golden pheasants which belong to beautiful birds, and their plumages are gorgeous indeed."<sup>50</sup>

By this Feng Xue-feng tried to tell his readers indirectly that his relationship to Zhou Yang was, unlike many people thought, more complicated than personal conflict, and in fact, in spite of such conflicts, they shared something in common intellectually, which those non-intellectuals could not understand. As we shall see later, they did share certain sorts of critical spirits in common.

Another evidence that Zhou Yang should not be blamed to be totally responsible for the punishment of Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, and Hu Feng can be seen from the relationship between Zhou Yang and Hu Feng. As early as 1945, Zhou Yang, who was already a high official in charge of literature and art in Yan'an, had justified Hu Feng's literary practice when he deliberately called to see Hu Feng in Shanghai. In the 1950s, when the CCP decided to criticise Hu Feng's literary theory, it was Zhou Yang who insisted on limiting the definition of Hu Feng's problem to a "petty bourgeois viewpoint" while considering Hu as a man who politically supported Mao and was with the CCP in its major political struggles. Zhou Yang even named Hu Feng as a "non-Party Communist ". And when

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<sup>50</sup> Feng Xue-feng , 1981: 553.

Mao decided that Hu's theory should no longer be seen as a petty bourgeois viewpoint, but instead, as the anti-Party idealism of the bourgeoisie, Zhou Yang still instructed: "Do not deal with Hu's pre-1949 publications, it is enough to criticise Hu's articles since 1949. But Hu's counter-criticism should also be published."<sup>51</sup>

Zhou Yang never expected that Hu's problem in the end would be dealt with as that of a counter-revolutionary clique, this is why Mao criticised Zhou Yang as bookish and naive in 1955. More than twenty years later, when both men were released from imprisonment, Zhou Yang told Hu Feng and Hu's friends that in China nobody has ever understood literature more profoundly than Hu Feng, and that Zhou himself personally admired Hu very much.<sup>52</sup>

More significantly, even if Zhou Yang had not had such a complicated relationship to Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, and Hu Feng, even if they had been best friends of Zhou Yang, could they have escaped being criticised and punished under a "Soviet-type Communist System"? As we will see soon, even Zhou Yang's best friends, for example, Xia Yan, Tian Han, Hang Han-sheng, and Zhou Yang himself, could not have a narrow escape from criticism and punishment if they wanted to show their independent thinking. The experiences of critical intelligentsia within the CCP under the "New System" resulted more from the system itself than from their personal relationship to certain important persons.

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<sup>51</sup> Cf., Yao Wen-Yuan, 1971:101; and *WEN YI SI XIANG ZHAN XIAN SAN SHI NIAN*, pp.143.

<sup>52</sup> Hu Feng, 1990; Lin Mo-han, 1989. Lu Yuan, 1989 ; Mao Ze-dong, 1977:180; Li Hui, 1989: 417-420; Zhou Yang, in Xiao Shan, 1990.

#### IV. The Purge of Zhou Yang and the "Four Villains"

As a Japanese-trained student, Zhou Yang (1907-1989) got involved in the Left-wing literary movement in the late 1920s. Concentrating on literary theories, Zhou Yang, unlike most other intellectuals in literary and art circles, never published a novel, short story, poem, or play, although he did many translations from Western literature, especially from Russian literature, such as Tolstoy and Chernyshevsky.

Zhou Yang became Party secretary of the China Left-wing Association of Writers in Shanghai in the 1930s, where he could not successfully co-operate with Lu Xun. Partly because of Lu Xun's merciless criticism of Zhou Yang, especially the criticism made in public before Lu Xun's death in 1936, he had to leave Shanghai for Yan'an next year in 1937. In Yan'an, he became one of the high officials in charge of education and literature whom Mao trusted very much then.

Since the establishment of the PRC, as showed before, Zhou Yang occupied several key posts in the CCP in charge of literature and art until the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966. Zhou Yang's posts since 1949 in no way signified the power he wielded, as M. Goldman points out, for not until 1956 was he appointed to his highest post: that of alternate member of the Central Committee of the CCP.<sup>53</sup>

However, Zhou Yang should not be considered as China's "Cultural Tsar". Above him, the high officials in charge of ideology and propaganda were: Chen Bo-da and Hu Qiao-mu, who had both been

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<sup>53</sup> M. Goldman, 1966: 133; 1981: 39.

Mao's secretaries and ghost-writers since the early 1940s, and the CCP's ideological spokesmen since 1949; and Lu Ding-yi, who occupied the post of Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP during the entire period from 1942 to 1966. They not only held much more powerful posts than Zhou Yang, for instance, members of the Politburo, and/or Vice-premier, but also had much more say in policy-making.

Nevertheless, since the Anti-Rightist Campaign(1957-1958), especially after the Great Leap Forward(1958-1959), Zhou Yang was getting more critical towards Mao's radical policies. During the Hundred Flowers period, Zhou Yang in his official speeches agreed that the democratic personages had posts in the state organs but without real power, that citizens had the right to publicise idealist and bourgeois ideas, and that laymen cannot lead experts.<sup>54</sup>

After the Great Leap Forward, Zhou Yang and his colleagues started openly criticising Mao's radical policy towards literature and art. One example was Yang Han-sheng.<sup>55</sup> As a CCP member since 1925, Yang Han-sheng had been writing a great number of Left-wing dramas, scripts under the supervision of the CCP. But in the 1960s he began openly to complain about the CCP's strict limits on literary creation. Like Hu Feng who described such limits as "Five Daggers", Yang Han-sheng summarised the leadership of the CCP in the kingdom of literature and art

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<sup>54</sup> He even declared that a man should not been necessarily labelled as a counter-revolutionary if he said something counter-revolutionary. Zhou Yang, 1985: 500-508.

<sup>55</sup> Yang Han-sheng got actively involved in both Communist Revolution and literature. He was one of the initiators of China Left-wing Association of Writers, and, before Ding Ling and Zhou Yang, became its Party secretary in the 1930s.



as "Ten Strings"(SHI TIAO SHENG ZI): "five 'Musts'" and "five 'Cannots'". More precisely, limited by these "ten strings", literary writers

- (1) must write on significant subject such as the Revolution;
- (2) must eulogise revolutionary heroes;
- (3) must join collective creation;
- (4) must finish their works within the given period, and
- (5) must get permission from the leadership.

While at the same time, they

- (1) cannot write about the conflict among the people, especially the conflict between leaders and the led;
- (2) cannot write satirical works;
- (3) cannot write tragedy;
- (4) cannot write about failure and weakness of heroes; and
- (5) cannot write on the shortcomings of CCP members and leaders.<sup>56</sup>

Under such limits, Yang Han-sheng claimed, there would be no real literary creation, and the so-called "literary works" were actually produced by collective power: leaders who decided ideas, masses of workers and peasants who supplied details, and writers who used their techniques. as a result, everybody got involved in creating nothing.<sup>57</sup>

To change this, Zhou Yang ordered Lin Mo-han (who was the key critic of Hu Feng in 1948-1955) and others to draft *Some Proposals concerning the Current Situation in Literary and Art Circles*. In this *Some Proposals*, the authors listed eight suggestions, which were later called "Black Eight Suggestions". These were:

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<sup>56</sup> Cf., RMRB, 27 December, 1966.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

- (1). Literature and art should be considered as something with its own *independence*, rather than simple means to publicise certain specific policies of the CCP;
- (2). There should be no limits in terms of range of subjects, and literature was mainly based on *individual creation*;
- (3). Socialist literary workers should assimilate the cultural heritage *created by the bourgeoisie*;
- (4). Literary writers and artists should not take part in *too much manual work and too many social activities*, in order to concentrate on their professional creation, and if it was necessary, they should have "creation-holidays", *i.e.*, have time away from their units;
- (5). Literary critics should not pay their attention exclusively to politics when they viewed literary works, but instead, they should carefully *distinguish between matters of politics, ideology, and literature*;
- (6). Those people who were absorbed in their professional creation should not be criticised as "experts without red colour";
- (7). Writers and artists with CCP membership should co-operate with, and learn from, non-Party writers and artists; and
- (8). The Party Branches in literary units *should not be in charge of everything*, and CCP cadres in these units should study harder in order to *change themselves from laymen to experts*; ...<sup>58</sup> (My emphasis)

It is interesting to compare this *Eight Proposals*, or Yang Han-sheng's "Ten Strings", with Hu Feng's *300,000-word Report*, or those opinions of the democratic personages during the Hundred Flowers period.

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<sup>58</sup> Cf., Hsuan Mou, 1978: 204-208.

Firstly, like Hu Feng, both Yang Han-sheng and the authors of the *Eight Suggestions* complained that, under the CCP's ideological limits, "real literary creation" was hardly possible. Secondly, like some "Rightist appeals for scientists" in 1957, the *Eight Suggestions* asked the CCP to give literary writers more individual freedom and independence, but less social activities and manual work. Thirdly, like the "Rightists", Yang Han-sheng and the authors of the *Eight Suggestions* claimed that "laymen" ("peasants in uniform", or more generally, CCP cadres) should not lead "experts" (literary writers and artists, or in general, "intellectuals"), and that the leadership of the CCP did not mean it could/should be in charge of everything. And finally, they demanded to draw a line between politics and literary creation (for the "Rightists", scientific research).<sup>59</sup>

But unlike Hu Feng and the "Rightists", Yang Han-sheng's criticism was more acrimonious and incisive, and the *Eight Suggestions* were more systematic. What is more, such criticism and suggestions were made *after* the stern punishment of Hu Feng (and his friends) and hundreds of thousands of the "Rightists".

Did they learn any lesson from the Hu Feng Case and Anti-Rightist Campaign? Why were they still so brave? Is that only because, unlike Hu Feng who had no post and the "Rightists" who held posts without real power, they occupied certain high posts and had real power? Or, perhaps more importantly, is it also because they were the ones who, taking advantage of holding power, could play the critical role of intelligentsia after the punishment of "Hu Feng Clique" and the "Rightists"?

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<sup>59</sup> Cf., Chapters Three and Five.

Whatever answers, Zhou Yang and his friends' criticism of the CCP in the end resulted in Mao's distrust of Zhou Yang and Zhou Yang's dismissal from all his posts.

Mao had been very angry with the Ministry of Culture, accusing it of portraying emperors, generals, ministers, gifted scholars, beautiful ladies, or foreign figures, instead of workers, peasants and soldiers, in the theatre, cinema, dance and opera. In 1963, Mao said that if they were not changed, the Ministry of Culture should then be named as the Ministry of Emperors and Generals, of Gifted Scholars and Beautiful Ladies, or of the Foreign Dead. In December, 1963, and June, 1964, Mao wrote two pieces of instruction:

Problems abound in all forms of art, such as the opera, ballads, music and fine arts, dance, the cinema, poetry and literature, and the people involved are numerous; in many units [in literary and art circles] very little has been achieved so far in socialist transformation. 'The dead' still dominate in many units. ... Is it a monstrous absurdity that many Communists are enthusiastic about promoting feudalist and capitalist arts rather than socialist ones?

In the last fifteen years, Associations of Literature and Art, most of their publications, and by and large the people in them (but not all of them) have not carried out the Party's policies. They have acted as high and mighty bureaucrats and overlords who have stood above workers, peasants and soldiers, and who have not reflected socialist revolution and socialist construction. In recent years, they slid right down to the brink of revisionism. Unless they remould themselves in real earnest, at some future date they are bound to become like the Hungarian *Petofi Club*.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> HQ, 1967, Vol.9, P.8-9.

Mao thought that the cinema and theatre were entirely in the service of the bourgeoisie and not in the service of the majority of the people. He angrily asked: "Who is in charge of the Ministry of Culture?"<sup>61</sup> As a result, many of Zhou Yang's closest colleagues in literary and art circles, including Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng, were dismissed, together with Mao Dun, the Minister of Culture, and China's foremost Left-wing (but non-Party) novelist. In the meantime, there was nationwide criticism of their literary works, especially Xia Yan's film *The Lin Family Shop* (based on Mao Dun's novel), Tian Han's play *Miss Xie Yao-huan*, and Yang Han-sheng's film *The Rich Land in the North*.

This time, in the eyes of Mao, it was not a problem of several individual cases, but instead, a problem that encompassed *all literature and art circles*. In February, 1966, Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, went to Shanghai, where she held a forum on the work in literature and art. Consequently, a summary of the forum was sent to Mao, and then, after Mao's careful correction and full agreement, it was read nationwide as an official document. In this summary, Jiang Qing concluded that China's literature and art circles "have been under the dictatorship of a black anti-Party and anti-socialist line, which is diametrically opposed to Chairman Mao's thought."<sup>62</sup>

In the summer of 1966, when the Cultural Revolution was launched, Zhou Yang and his group, including Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng, the so-called "Four Villains", as they were named by Lu Xun in 1936, became the main public targets. The CCP declared that since 1942, "for

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<sup>61</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1974: 243.

<sup>62</sup> Jiang Qing, 1968:7. Cf., Hu Hua, 1985: 262; M. Goldman, 1981: 125.

24 years Zhou Yang and company have consistently refused to carry out Chairman Mao's line on literature and art, and stubbornly adhered to the bourgeois revisionist black line on literature and art."<sup>63</sup>

Yao Wen-yuan, who then became an ideological spokesman for Mao, further accused Zhou Yang of being the head of this "black line". Under Zhou Yang, Yao Wen-yuan declared, Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, Xia Yan, Tian Han, Yang Han-sheng, and many others gathered and were protected. It was said that in all the past four great political campaigns, *i.e.*, the Criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun*, the Criticism of Hu Shi, the Criticism of Hu Feng, and the Anti-rightist Campaign, Zhou Yang refused to carry out Mao's policies on each occasion. Yao Wen-yuan even revealed that in 1951 and 1954, when Mao decided to criticise *The Life of Wu Xun* and the *Literary Gazette*, it was Zhou Yang whom Mao criticised as the head of "certain numbers of Communists who claimed to have grasped Marxism but had lost their critical faculties and even capitulated to reactionary ideas", and the head of "certain bigwigs who go in for a united front with bourgeois writers on the question of idealism and have become willing captives of the bourgeoisie". Yao Wen-yuan also described Zhou Yang as the man who shared the ideas of Hu Feng and the Rightists. Yao Wen-Yuan concluded that Zhou Yang had been a "Counter-revolutionary Double-dealer".<sup>64</sup> Yao's article, corrected and approved by Mao, officially announced that Zhou Yang's political career was end.

In 1966, Zhou Yang's activities in his conflict with Lu Xun were also condemned in public. On 31 October, 1966, more than seventy thousand

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<sup>63</sup> HQ, 1966, Vol.7.

<sup>64</sup> Yao Wen-yuan, 1971: 89-135; Cf., Mao, 1977: 57-58, 150-151; Li Hui, 1989: 174; Zhou Yang, 1985: 486-512.

people, including nearly all the CCP leaders at that time except Mao, attended a meeting in memory of Lu Xun in Peking. Amongst the speakers, there were:

**Xu Guang-ping**, Lu Xun's widow;

**Guo Mo-ruo**, the only famous writer who had not been criticised in public during the Cultural Revolution;

**Yao Wen-yuan**, a young literary critic who now became one of Mao's main ideological spokesmen; and

**Chen Bo-da**, Mao's secretary and one of the CCP's top ideologues since the 1940s, and now the Director of the Central Commission of the Cultural Revolution, the number four man in the CCP's leadership.

Since 1966, Zhou Yang's and his group's activities and ideas were denounced as *criminal* behaviour, including their :

- (1). flattery of the Western literary theories, for example, those from the Renaissance, from the Enlightenment, and especially, from Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and Dobrolyubov;
- (2). attack on Lu Xun in the 1930s;
- (3). co-operation with Ding Ling, Wang Shi-wei, and others, to write anti-Party "poisonous weeds" in Yan'an in the 1940s;
- (4). protection of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, Ding Ling, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and many others during all past political campaigns;
- (5). advertisement of Rightist opinions during the Hundred Flowers period, such as the idea that "a layman cannot lead an expert";
- (6). deviation from Mao's *Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art* , for instance, the maintenance of "the literature of the whole people", objection to the repeated mentioning of Mao's name in literary and artistic works, vilification of the CCP's policies over literature and art as "ten strings", and advocating the "depiction of middle man (waverer between

the old and new societies)", "departing from the classics and rebelling against orthodoxy", and "widening the range of subjects"; ... <sup>65</sup>

Zhou Yang and other members of the so-called "Four Villains", that is, Xia Yan, Tian Han and Yang Han-sheng, were then called "traitors", "spies", and "counter-revolutionaries". Moreover, they were arrested and put into gaol. Not until 1975, when Mao wrote that "it seems to me that the Zhou Yang Case could be handled leniently", could they be released, by which time Tian Han was already dead, and Xia Yan was crippled.

Before Zhou Yang and his associates, all targets in the past four great political campaigns had nevertheless been treated as individual cases. Although they could be accused of forming an anti-Party clique like Ding Ling and Feng Xue-feng, or even operating a counter-revolutionary clique like Hu Feng, and consequently be sternly denounced all over the country and even put into gaol(Hu Feng), the literary and artistic circles as a whole, however, had never previously been denounced by the CCP. But when Zhou Yang was condemned, he was not seen as an individual or a head of a small clique, but instead, as a representative of the whole literary and art kingdom ruled by so-called "revisionists".

Even now no one knows the exact number of writers, artists, literary critics, and officials in charge of literature and art, who were punished as followers of Zhou Yang throughout the whole country. <sup>66</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Cf., *CHE DI PI PAN ZHOU YANG DE FAN GE MING XU ZHENG ZHU YI WEN YI HEI XIAN*.

<sup>66</sup> Those whom we can list here were some of Zhou Yang's close friends:

Xia Yan, playwright and journalist, vice-chairman of All-China Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles, and vice-minister of Culture Department, the State Council;



Why was Zhou Yang, who since 1942 had been carrying out Mao's policies in literary and art circles, accused of being "the head of an anti-Party & anti-socialist revisionist line over literature and art"? How could Zhou Yang, who at least since 1942 had been deeply involved in directing the political campaigns in literary and art circles, be attacked as the key figure who protected Hu Feng, Ding Ling, Feng Xue-feng, and others?

One of the reasons can be found in the conflict between Jiang Qing and the "Four Villains" in the 1930s, when Jiang Qing was only a young actress who felt her gifted talent in performances was not fully appreciated by the "Four Villains". Jiang Qing herself repeatedly emphasised her personal hostility towards the "Four Villains" because of their lack of great attention to her in the 1930s when she was interviewed by Witke in 1972.<sup>67</sup>

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**Yang Han-sheng**, writer, vice-chairman of All-China Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles;

**Tian Han**, playwright, chairman of All-China Association of the Stage Artists;

**Lin Mo-han**, literary critic, deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, CCP;

**Shao Quan-lin**, literary critic, deputy director of the Propaganda Department;

**Chen Huang-mei**, writer, director of Film Bureau, and vice-minister of Culture Department, the State Council;

**Qi Yan-ming**, vice-minister of Culture Department, the State Council;

**Zhang Guang-nian**, poet, chief-editor of the Literary Gazette;

**He Qi-fang**, poet, chief-editor of the Literary Review;

**Zhao Shu-li**, novelist;

**Zhou Li-bo**, novelist; and

**Meng Chao**, playwright.

<sup>67</sup> Witke, 1977: 108 -115, 158-159, 310-311, 327-328, 337-338, etc.; Cf. Xia Yan, 1985: 335-336.

Such a personal desire for revenge, however, cannot explain the facts that, besides the "Four Villains", there were so many other writers, artists, literary critics who were punished, and that all literary and art circles were denounced as led by a counter-revolutionary black line. There must be other explanations beyond that of personal animosity.

The first lies in the fact that, as M. Goldman points out, after almost twenty-five years of unceasing indoctrination and thought reform since 1942, China's intellectuals, especially those revolutionary intellectuals in literary and artistic circles, were still reluctant to remould themselves into the new model of working men/women: intellectual workers who share common language with manual workers and peasants. Zhou Yang as the key official in charge of the entire literary kingdom should hence be responsible according to the CCP's discipline, no matter whether he was really "a loyal chief guardian of Mao's literary policies" or a "big red umbrella covering all monsters".<sup>68</sup>

Another reason is that Zhou Yang, at least since the Hundred Flowers period (1956-1957), and especially after the Great Leap Forward Campaign (1958-1959), became more and more openly critical towards the *status quo*. Therefore, most of the criticisms of Zhou Yang focused on his words and deeds during the period 1957-1965. He and his associates were described as the men who, facing the economic disaster that resulted from the Great Leap Forward, gradually began to realise that Mao's radical ideas were the cause of the failure in both economic and cultural development, and thus, taking advantage of their powerful positions, *i.e.*,

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<sup>68</sup> M. Goldman, 1966, 132-148; 1981: 129-130.

officials in charge of literary and art, started playing the critical role of intellectual dissidents.<sup>69</sup>

The third reason was that Zhou Yang had indeed had his independent literary ideas which deviated from Mao's directions for a long time. Because of his political position and thus his influence on literary and art circles, however, Zhou Yang was not so easily punished as Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Feng Xue-feng. Political position did protect him for years. But when such a protection was gone, he had to receive heavier attacks. Firstly we can compare the length of the criticisms of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains". Each of the criticisms, except that of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains", lasted less than a year. By contrast, the criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains" continued for at least 7 years as Table 4.5. shows.

**Table 4.5.** The length of the public Criticisms of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains" in the *People's Daily*.

<b>The Criticism of</b>	<b>Length</b>	<b>Date/Month/Year</b>
Feng Xue-feng	3 months	28 Oct., - 9 Dec., 1954
Hu Feng	8 months	2 Jan., - 23 Aug., 1955
Ding Ling & Feng Xue-feng	8 months	11 Aug.,1957-9 April, 1958
Zhou Yang&"Four Villains"	7 years	Jan., 1966 - Jan., 1973

Source: RMRB, 1954 - 1973.

Secondly, we can compare the Criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains" with other criticisms before/during/after the Cultural Revolution since 1960. Of course Zhou Yang and his group were not the only targets in the Cultural Revolution: above them, there were Liu Shao-qi, Deng Xiao-ping, Peng Zhen, and Lu Ding-yi, and many others; at the

<sup>69</sup> Hsuan Mou,1978: 201-204; Yao Wen-yuan, 1971:110-127; Goldman, 1981:39-42.

same level, there were large numbers of officials; and at lower levels, local cadres, university professors, writers and artists, and even scientists, were criticised as well. Before/during/after the Cultural Revolution, besides the Criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains", there were numerous public criticisms, including mainly:

1. the Criticism of **Yang Xian-zhen** [CCP philosopher], 1962, 1964;
2. the Criticism of **Zhou Gu-cheng** [old-type historian], 1964;
3. the Criticism of **Feng Ding** [CCP philosopher], 1964;
4. the Criticism of **Shao Quan-lin** [CCP literary critic, Zhou Yang's close friend], 1964;
5. the Criticism of the "Three Family Village" (**Wu Han**, **Deng Tuo**, **Liao Mo-sha** [CCP historian, journalist, and essayist]), 1966;
6. the Criticism of the "Bourgeois Leading Scholars" (**Jian Bo-zhan** [CCP historian], **Li Da** [CCP philosopher], **Sun Ye-fang** [CCP economist], and others), 1966;
7. the Criticism of **Peng Zhen** [CCP leader], 1966;
8. the Criticism of **Tao Zhu** [CCP leader], 1967;
9. the Criticism of **Liu Shao-qi** [CCP leader], 1968 -1970;
10. the Criticism of **Chen Bo-da** [CCP top ideologue and leader], 1970;
11. the Criticism of **Lin Biao** [CCP leader] (and Confucius), 1973-1974;
12. the Criticism of **Deng Xiao-ping** [CCP leader], 1976; and
13. the Criticism of the "Gang of Four" (**Jiang Qing**, **Zhang Chun-qiao**, **Yao Wen-yuan**, **Wang Hong-wen** [CCP leaders]), 1977.

Compared with these, the Criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains" was still a long-lasting campaign, although it was never as nationwide as the criticisms of Liu Shao-qi, of Lin Biao, of Deng Xiao-ping, and of the "Gang of Four". Nevertheless, Zhou Yang, or the "Four Villains", had

been denounced as main targets all over the country throughout the Cultural Revolution. They were considered not only to have influenced literary and artistic circles, but also the press, historical and educational fields, and even scientific and technical circles. For instance, the *People's Daily* in 1970 declared that "the colleges of humanities and social sciences are still controlled by the ideology of the ruling class which dominated people's minds for thousands of years, and by an anti-party, anti-socialist black line, which opposes Mao's Thought. The main representatives of this black line are the 'Four Villains' Zhou Yang, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng."<sup>70</sup>

Thirdly, we can make comparisons between the critics who got involved in the criticisms of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains". As we have shown, when Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Feng Xue-feng were criticised in 1954, 1955, and 1957-58, their critics were mainly China's established writers, artists, literary critics, the CCP's theorists, social scientists, and (especially when Hu Feng was accused of being the head of a counter-revolutionary clique) even democratic personages and natural scientists. In the *People's Daily* and the *Literary Gazette* alone, their critics numbered more than 40 (Feng Xue-feng in 1954), 50 (Ding Ling, Feng Xue-feng, Ai Qing, Xiao Jun, *et al* in 1957-58) and 100 (Hu Feng in 1955). In contrast, as Table 4. 6.shows, during the long period (1966-1973) of the criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains", amongst 169 articles, less than 10 were written by well-known intellectuals in the *People's Daily*, and the *Literary Gazette* was banned.

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<sup>70</sup> *RMRB*, 11 Feb., 1970. Even in 1976, when Mao was already dead and his wife Jiang Qing and her fellows were arrested, Zhou Yang was still accused of ordering Zhang Chun-qiao, one of the "Gang of Four", to attack Lu Xun in the 1930s. Cf., *RMRB*, 26, October, 1976.

**Table 4.6.** The critics of Zhou Yang and "Four Villains" in the *People's Daily*, January 1966 - January 1973.

	Criticism	Accusation	Total
Writer, Artist	2		2
Democratic personages		2	2
CCP ideologue		5	5
Unknown persons		160	160
Total	2	267	169

Source: RMRB, January, 1966 - January, 1973.

Examining these critics more carefully, we find that besides He Qi-fang, who wrote two articles to criticise Xia Yan and Tian Han in February and April of 1966 when the Cultural Revolution had not yet been launched (and who was then himself accused of sham denunciations but real protection of the "Four Villains" and thus purged as a member in Zhou Yang's black line in the Cultural Revolution), and Xu Guang-ping and Zhou Jian-ren, who were Lu Xun's relatives, all other well-known critics were actually members of the Central Commission of the Cultural Revolution, that is to say, the ideological spokesmen of the CCP and Mao. These were: Chen Bo-da, Yao Wen-yuan, Qi Ben-yu, and others. Guo Mo-ruo did make a speech at the meeting in memory of Lu Xun in 1966, but, unlike others, he did not specifically attack Zhou Yang and the other "Four Villains".

Where were the well-known established intellectuals, who had been actively involved in the criticisms of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, and Ding Ling? Were they all unwilling to co-operate with the Party this time? Or were they all now unqualified as revolutionary critics?

The answer is simple: they were not qualified. If they were unwilling to comply, they could be forced to do so, as in the case of Ding Ling's and Feng Xue-feng's criticism of Hu Feng, or He Qi-fang's criticism of Xia Yan and Yang Han-sheng. As a matter of fact, even if they had been willing, they would not have had the "right" to show their attitude. During the Cultural Revolution, all the well-known established intellectuals, especially writers, artists, and social scientists, were labelled as either members of the black counter-revolutionary revisionist line led by Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains", or members of the bourgeoisie who must remould themselves completely through integrating themselves with workers, peasants, and soldiers. The consequence is that, whereas in previous political campaigns writers, artists, literary critics, and social scientists were generally called to remould themselves, or to participate in those campaigns, in the Cultural Revolution they were sent to the countryside.

The idea that intellectuals should be integrated with the masses of workers and peasants could be found in Mao's writings in the 1930s. But only in 1964, when most intellectuals, especially writers and artists, had been "state cadres" who remained in office for more than 10 years, did Mao get angry with them, instructing that

we must drive actors, poets, dramatists, and writers out of the cities, and pack them all off to the countryside. ... Only when they go down will they be fed.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> According to Mao, only when intellectuals get down to reality can writers write novels, historians produce history, and philosophers turn out philosophy. Mao Zedong, 1969: 624-626; 1974: 207, 237.

In the Cultural Revolution, Mao's instruction was put into practice. Consequently, intellectuals, as well as many officials, were sent to the countryside, if not to gaol, either as members of the People's Commune, or members of the "May 7 School" (a special kind of labour camp where cadres and intellectuals did manual work).<sup>72</sup>

Ironically, during this period, China's intellectuals as a whole lost their right or opportunity to create intellectual works, or even to co-operate with the CCP with their words in political campaigns, as they did before. From 1966 to 1976, they could neither denounce Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains", and other targets, nor could they attack themselves in the official press. They simply disappeared from the official press.

The only exceptions to this, perhaps, were the Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius in 1974, and the Criticism of Deng Xiao-ping in 1976, in which several well-known intellectuals were actively or passively involved each time, as Table 4.7. shows. Comparatively, the number was too few.

**Table 4.7.** The numbers of well-known intellectuals who got actively involved in the criticisms of Lin Biao and Confucius (1973-74), and of Deng Xiao-ping (1975-76).

	Lin Biao	Criticism of Deng Xiao-ping	Total
Democratic personages		1	1
Literary writer	1	2	3
Poet	3	4	7
Literary critic	1	1	2
Social scientist	5	5	10
Natural scientist	1	8	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>32</b>

Source: RMRB, GMRB, HQ, Jan., 1974 - Oct., 1976.

<sup>72</sup> Yang Jiang, one of China's distinguished woman-intellectuals, has given an original picture of intellectuals' life in such "May 7 Schools". Cf., Yang Jiang, 1984.



From the criticism and punishment of China's established revolutionary intellectuals, we can see clearly how Mao and the CCP rashly push these intellectuals, from some individuals to nearly all of them as a whole, from "our comrades" to the "enemies of the people". Here again, if there was any problem, it would be the problem of how independent intelligentsia could play their critical role under the "New Communist System".

But such an independent intelligentsia, if it still existed, consisted of only a few intellectuals, as we have argued and showed. If it was concluded that, because these critical intelligentsia, all the revolutionary intellectuals, who were at the same time CCP officials, were anti-Party, anti-Communist revisionists, and thus the "enemies of the people", it would undoubtedly produce many self-made enemies unnecessarily. And such a simplistic and confused analysis of intellectuals would only result in "self-isolation" from its supporters in practice.

## **V. The Rise and Fall of the Radical Intellectuals around Mao**

When most revolutionary intellectuals as well as old-type intellectuals and democratic personages were either denounced as anti-Party, anti-Communist revisionists or labelled as "reactionary leading bourgeois scholars", who were thus sent to jail or labour camp, there were a few other intellectuals, however, who became key figures during the Cultural Revolution.

This was the small group in the Central Commission of the Cultural Revolution. From 1966 to 1969, it was functionally analogous to a combination of the CCP Central Secretariat (1956-1966) led by Deng

Xiao-ping and the Propaganda Department led by Lu Ding-yi. Besides Mao's wife Jiang Qing, the leaders of this Commission were persons number four and five listed in the CCP's leadership after Mao, Lin Biao, and Zhou En-lai. They were **Chen Bo-da**, and **Kang Sheng**, the man in charge of organisational affairs including public security matters since the 1930s, especially during the Yan'an Rectification in the 1940s, and of ideology and propaganda including the Sino-Soviet polemics on international Communism during the period 1956-1964.

However, **Jiang Qing** was the key figure who acted as a connection between Mao and these radical intellectuals, especially Zhang Chun-qiao and Yao Wen-yuan. Jiang Qing herself had been active in the political campaigns since the Criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun*. Under Mao's supervision, she acted as a spy in the literary and art circles. It was Jiang Qing who, instructed by Mao, told Zhou Yang that *The Life of Wu Xun* should be criticised because of its reformist tendency in 1951, and that the article to challenge Yu Ping-bo's idealist opinion about *The Dream of Red Chamber* written by Li Xi-fang and Lan Ling should be published in 1954. In both cases, Zhou Yang did not realise that Jiang Qing's suggestions were actually from Mao, and thus refused her. What is more, from 1964, Jiang Qing became more and more active in literary and artistic circles. It was she who, again instructed by Mao, plotted in Shanghai to prepare Yao Wen-yuan's article whose publication later signalled the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. She also held the literary forum in which Zhou Yang was accused of being the head of a "counter-revolutionary revisionist black line which ruled the literary and artistic circles for 17 years". Later on, she played a leading role in the

criticism of Tao Zhu, of Liu Shao-qi, of Lin Biao (and Confucius), and of Deng Xiao-ping.<sup>73</sup>

The members of the Central Commission mainly came from (1) the Chinese Academy of Science, in which Chen Bo-da had been Party Secretary and vice-president since it was established, and (2) the Shanghai Propaganda Department, with which Jiang Qing had a close connection. These members were: **Wang Li, Guang Feng, Qi Ben-yu, Zhang Chun-qiao, and Yao Wen-yuan.**

It is interesting to compare this small group of intellectuals with the others we have been discussing. Whereas Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng, and Ding Ling, or Zhou Yang, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng, and many others, had been outstanding members of both intellectual and revolutionary circles since the 1920s-1930s, most members of the Central Commission of the Cultural Revolution started their intellectual careers after 1949, and therefore did not belong to the category of the "revolutionary intellectuals". Instead, they were members of the "new generation of intellectuals". Until the Cultural Revolution (1966), they had achieved little professionally. As a matter of fact, the reason that many Chinese knew them was not because of their intellectual accomplishment, but rather, because of their political posts in the Cultural Revolution. These posts were to a great extent given by Mao. It was this small group of intellectuals in the Central Commission of the Cultural Revolution who directly obtained instructions from Mao and controlled the Red Guards. Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, Zhou Yang, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng had been joined the Revolution and

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<sup>73</sup> Cf., Witke, 1977; Yao Wen-yuan, 1971; and Jiang Qing, 1968.

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 establish<sub>ed</sub> their intellectual prestige since the 1920s or 1930s, but never been given such powerful posts and been involved in policy-making so deeply.

On the other hand, because of their lack of achievements in intellectual creation and their insufficient revolutionary careers, plus their radical policies towards the established intellectuals as well as Mao's "old guards", the radical intellectuals around Mao and Jiang Qing could neither get real reputation in the intellectual community, nor could they have actual power when faced with the bureaucracy.

As a result, even before Chen Bo-da was purged in 1970, some of them, including Wang Li, Guang Feng, and Qi Ben-yu, were dismissed. Zhang Chun-qiao and Yao Wen-yuan were able to stay in power much longer only because of Mao's personal trust. Even before Mao died, hundreds of thousands people in Peking, including many intellectuals, started complaining Zhang Chun-qiao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Jiang Qing in public. An extraordinary example is the April Fifth Event of 1976. It is extraordinary because, for the first time since Mao took power in 1949, several hundreds of thousands of masses of people in Peking, ignoring the official prohibition, gathered at Tian An Men Square in memory of Zhou En-lai, and at the same time, openly criticised Mao's wife and the "Gang of Four".

Immediately after Mao's death, Zhang Chun-qiao and Yao Wen-yuan, together with Mao's wife Jiang Qing, disappeared from officialdom. Shortly after, it was officially announced that they were "under investigation", namely, arrested. The immediate and direct response to

this piece of news was a nationwide celebration, both official and, more significantly, non-official.

From 1977, China's intellectuals as a whole were again officially declared members of the working class, while nearly all the targets in the past political campaigns were gradually rehabilitated. They included:

Ding Ling, Feng Xue-feng, Ai Qing, Xiao Jun, *et al*;

Hu Feng, and all the members of "Hu Feng Clique";

Zhou Yang, Xia Yan, Tian Han, Yang Han-sheng, and many others; and

Most of so-called "Elements of the Rightists" ( more than 540,000 out of 550,000 ); ...<sup>74</sup>

From 1979 onwards, "rehabilitation of wrong cases" became a popular phrase in Chinese, while most of the well-known established intellectuals gradually reappeared if they were still alive.

## VI. Conclusion

Like the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages, the revolutionary intellectuals in China since 1949 were bound to the unit system. But more importantly, unlike the former two kinds of intellectuals, these revolutionary intellectuals usually held important posts and thus enjoyed actual power under the "New System". Because of such an important difference, simply to treat these three kinds of intellectuals

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<sup>74</sup> RMRB, 1978-1989. Zhang Bo-jun, Lo Long-ji, Chu An-ping were amongst the exceptional individuals who were not rehabilitated. The CCP insisted that, despite that more than ninety per cent of the "Rightists" were actually wrong labelled, the Anti-Rightist Campaign was still basically necessary.

the same, as the CCP did in most cases, will cause confusions theoretically and practically.

As CCP officials, the revolutionary intellectuals obtained position, power, reputation, and other vested interests from the system, and thus they had to obey the CCP and carry out its policies and instructions. But at the same time, as intellectuals or even members of the critical intelligentsia, they cannot just simply abide by the CCP's discipline without their own judgement. Paradoxically, there is a structural contradiction between their political and intellectual roles. Officials under any system, especially the "Soviet-type Communist System", should symbolically represent the interests of officialdom and functionally carry out decisions made by the ruling party. But intellectuals are producers of ideas, which cannot be in accordance with officialdom or the establishment in any case. Moreover, members of the critical intelligentsia are always critical towards the status quo, and thus they are essentially isolated from the establishment. How an intellectual-official could maintain his/her critical spirits in a "Soviet-type Communist" society while still keeping his/her position thus becomes a real dilemma. Official and intellectual are essentially contradictory.

On the other hand, the revolutionary intellectuals, when they still keep their posts and power, can take more opportunities to pursue and practise their intellectual and political ideas. Under a "Soviet-type Communist" system, the more and higher posts an intellectual obtains, the more active and influential he/she is. Not all intellectuals within the establishment are just the parrots of the ruling party. But not all intellectuals within the establishment should be considered members of the critical intelligentsia. Only those who still maintain a critical perspective after the revolution should be considered as such. These usually consisted of a small number.

There is little need to point out that it is more difficult for the ruling party to deal with such revolutionary intellectuals because of their double face. If the CCP had successfully controlled the old-type intellectuals by only launching a relatively short and mild campaign (Thought Reform in 1951-1952) as far as their political behaviour was concerned, and if the CCP had socially destroyed the democratic personages after a stormy Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-1958) in terms of their socio-political influence on intellectuals, then it had never managed to force the revolutionary intellectuals within the CCP to stop criticising its "dark side", although it had carried out a series of criticisms and purges since 1951. In the end, it was Mao who was, nationwide, criticised and blamed. One of the most serious mistakes Mao committed in the Cultural Revolution is that he simply ignored the great difference amongst different kinds of intellectuals, and labelled almost all of the revolutionary intellectuals as the "enemies of the people".

In the post-Mao period since 1978, China's intellectuals are still the most problematic people to deal with for the CCP, though it relocated them as members of the working class. Theoretically, there is no great difference if they were considered as members of one class, no matter what class it is. Can they thus be united or won over more easily? If it is so, how can we explain the most tragic event that happened in Tian An Men Square in 1989? This research stops at 1976. The developments following will be the subject of another piece of research, although logically it is closely connected with the present one. The next two chapters will focus on several individual intellectuals, from whom we will further get some details of several kinds of established intellectuals in political campaigns in Mao's China.

## **CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDIES(I): Natural and Social Scientists as "Democratic Personages"**

In Chapters Three and Four we have examined the various roles of China's different kinds of established intellectuals, especially those of "democratic personages" during the Hundred Flowers period and the Anti-Rightist Campaign period, and those of "revolutionary intellectuals" (Hu Feng's and Zhou Yang's groups in particular) in and after the 1950s.

Based on this, I shall in the following two chapters choose some individual intellectuals as the objects of my case studies. The purpose of these case studies is, through exploring several individual established intellectuals' experiences, especially their experience in those political campaigns, to examine further in detail whether China's established intellectuals, in Mao's time at least, should be considered members of one certain specific social class or stratum.

These individual established intellectuals were

- (1) chosen from various social groups: the old-type intellectuals, the democratic personages, and the revolutionary intellectuals;
- (2) involved in one or more of the continual political campaigns during the period of 1949-1976, and played different roles in those campaigns: from activists, through yes-men, to targets;
- (3) already recognised, nationally, if not internationally, as famous established natural and social scientists, traditional scholar, or modern literary writer, before 1949; and
- (4). still alive and thus had the opportunity to re-explain themselves after 1976.



Very rarely have these established intellectuals been sociologically studied in both China and the West, and much more seldom have they been studied comparatively.<sup>1</sup> However, such a sociological comparative study is necessary for us to have a better understanding of intellectuals' socio-political variability.

This chapter will focus on the naturalist Hua Luo-geng and the social scientist Fei Xiao-tong, both of whom were given the title of "Democratic Personages" by the Chinese authorities, but, as we will see soon, had very different experiences.

## **I. Natural Scientist HUA LUO-GENG**

Hua Luo-geng (1910-1985) was one of China's foremost natural scientists in mathematics from the 1930s. Unlike most well-known scientists in his time, he had not even finished his secondary education when he had to leave school, for his father was reluctant to pay for his studying. Unluckily, when he was twenty years old, Hua contracted rheumatic fever, which left him lame.

About 1929, however, his independent papers on mathematics attracted the attention of professor Xiong Qing-lai of Qinghua University in Peking. Like Peking University, Qinghua is one of the most famous universities in China. As head of the Department of Mathematics at

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<sup>1</sup> Fei Xiao-tong perhaps is an exceptional one, for he, as a social anthropologist well-known in West, has been given attention by some Western sociologists. There were also Guo Mo-ruo's biographies in both China and the West, but these are mainly about his literary career.

Qinghua, Xiong Qing-lai invited Hua Luo-geng to serve as departmental librarian and act as research assistant to Xiong himself. Within five years, Hua had become a lecturer at Qinghua, and after 1934 he began to publish papers on algebra, number-theory, and functions of several complex variables, in mathematical journals such as the *Transactions of the Science Society of China*, the *Tohoku Mathematical Journal*, the *Bulletin of the Calcutta Mathematical Society*, the *Mathematische Zeitschrift*, the *Journal of the London Mathematical Society*, and the *Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR*.

In 1936 Hua Luo-geng went to England to continue his studies under G.H. Hardy at Cambridge. Hua returned to China in 1938 and became a professor at the National Southwest Associated University at Kunming, a united university made up of Peking University, Qinghua University of Peking, and Nankai University of Tianjin. In 1945, he went to the Soviet Union by invitation for a two-month visit, and in the spring of 1946 he was invited to the United States by the Department of State. Hua stayed in the U.S.A. for four years, where he was a member of the institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey, and a visiting research professor in mathematics at the University of Illinois.

As a mathematician, Hua Luo-geng published a great number of papers which won him international recognition. From 1934 to 1944, he dealt almost exclusively with number-theory. Because of the war, his important treatise in this field, completed in 1941, did not appear until 1947 when it was published in Leningrad after being translated into Russian. This work was translated from Russian into English and published in 1965 by the American Mathematical Society as *Additive Theory of Prime Numbers*. The work was a detailed exposition of the Waring-Goldbach problem of

representing positive integers as the sum of a given number of  $k^{th}$  powers of primes. He improved the Vinogradou mean-value theorem and extended the Waring problem to the representation of integers as the sum of polynomials with integral coefficients. After 1944, Hua concentrated on the geometry of matrices. He also contributed a supplement to Jean Dieudonné's *On the Automorphisms of the Classical Groups*, which was published by the American Mathematical Society in 1951.

After World War II, many of China's old-type intellectuals including scholars and scientists were getting more and more disappointed with the Chinese Nationalist Government due to its incapacity to decrease inflation and to restrain its officials from corruption. Unlike their predecessors, ever since the time of Confucius, who saw employment as officials or close connection with officialdom as the token of their superior morality and intelligence, these intellectuals tried to hold themselves aloof from politics. They either continued their studies in China or went abroad. But when the CCP and its Red Army gained one military victory after another and prepared to take over China, these intellectuals were enthusiastic, thinking that a new China was to be born. Hua Luo-geng was one of them. Shortly after the victory of Mao's armies throughout China, Hua returned to Peking where he was reappointed professor of mathematics at Qinghua University, and, a year later, at Peking University.

Like most of the Chinese scientists who came back from the West before and after the Revolution of 1949, Hua Luo-geng was highly praised by the CCP. He was immediately appointed head of the Mathematics Department at Qinghua University, director of the Institute of Mathematics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and president of the China Mathematics Society. Yet he, like others, was not considered a "red expert". He had to

get involved in "taking a bath in front of others" in the Thought Reform Campaign. Nonetheless, he was not criticised in public in the Campaign. Amongst the 123 self-critical articles by leading intellectuals (listed in Chapter Three) in the *People's Daily* and the *Guangming Daily* during the Thought Reform period, none of them was written by Hua Luo-geng. In contrast, Hua published an article in both the *People's Daily* and the *Guangming Daily* to criticise the so-called "Qinghua Tradition", entitled *We Should Have A Single Tradition: to Serve the People*. Hua Luo-geng claimed that "there are a lot of filthy dregs in the Qinghua Tradition: there is no struggle spirit, not to speak of the ardent love of our motherland. Frankly speaking, it is by no means the one to serve the people." Taking the Mathematics Department as an example, Hua pointed out that, for nearly twenty years since it was set up, there were only 61 graduates and 7 post-graduates from it. From this Hua concluded that "the old Qinghua was designed to serve the minority."<sup>2</sup>

Another problem of the Qinghua Tradition, Hua maintained, was its "comprador spirit". As a former missionary school for talented young Chinese candidates to study in the U.S.A., and then a university ruled by the American Embassy and the Chinese Foreign Office, instead of the Chinese Education Ministry, "hardly had students been admitted to Qinghua University when they started dreaming of studying in the West", and "few teachers had not received doctoral degrees in the West." Moreover, "look at how we taught our post-graduates and teaching assistants: it was nothing more than semi-colonialist research. For instance, we drew materials from foreign magazines, we plagiarised foreign methods, we sent our research results to foreign journals, and if

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<sup>2</sup> Hua Luo-geng, 1951.

they were published, we were smug and complacent." Since the idea of Westernisation, especially pro-Americanism, was the main target set to be wiped out from Western-educated intellectuals through the campaign, Hua's article must have been very satisfactory to the CCP. Hua's criticism of the Qinghua Tradition was considered as the beginning of his transformation of attitude towards the people.

During the Thought Reform Campaign, the CCP did not consider that Hua was a person who could not be changed, but instead, it wanted to win him over. At the beginning, Hua resented being asked to remould himself, believing that he had already made up his mind to follow the Party when he decided to return from the United States in 1950 while many others were still waiting to see what would happen. He even saw those cadres who were in charge of the Thought Reform Campaign as men who brought problems to him rather than resolved his own problems. "For quite a period," Hua later recalled, "when I saw them, I felt nervous and antagonistic." As to other colleagues, "I saw their good intention was evil intention, exposing was slandering, and criticising attacking."<sup>3</sup> There was a story that he attempted to commit suicide when his colleagues found that he still kept the old passport given to him by the Nationalist Government. "Does this mean that Hua still thinks of leaving for the West?" asked the colleagues. But the CCP did not criticise him, and only after the Thought Reform Campaign, did Hua recognise that the CCP in fact trusted him.

Hua Luo-geng joined the Democratic League in 1951 and became a deputy director of its Commission of Culture, Education, Science, and Technology in 1953. Of the four articles he published in the *Guangming*

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<sup>3</sup> Hua Luo-geng, 1958.

*Daily* in 1954, only one concerned mathematics, entitled *How Did I Gradually Understand Mathematics?* In the other three articles he talked about "some reflections from the study of the Party's General Guide", about "collectivism which educates me", and about "the heroic People's Liberation Army I love". In 1955, he was one of the 10 famous natural scientists who joined the massive campaign of accusations against Hu Feng.<sup>4</sup>

Hua's tone was not as sharp as many others, however. He demanded that "natural scientists should not ignore politics". According to Hua, "when scientists are absorbed in their research, they are very likely to ignore politics and lose their vigilance." Hua admitted that he used to think that the Hu Feng Case had nothing to do with natural scientists, but rather, it was a business of literary and artistic workers. For example, he wrote, "I do not know Hu Feng personally, nor do I read Hu's works. ... Not until the publication of Hu Feng's counter-revolutionary materials, did I realise angrily the features of Hu Feng's group."<sup>5</sup> Such articles were written in support of the CCP and its policies but were not meant to be actively political.

In 1956, Hua Luo-geng was appointed as a member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic League, and a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. As a famous scientist, as well as a well-known democratic personage, he was invited to join in "blooming and contending" and to help the CCP to rectify its bureaucracy. This time, however, it seemed that he was on the verge of being labelled the "Rightist".

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<sup>4</sup> Cf., Chapter Four.

<sup>5</sup> Hua Luo-geng, 1955.

After Mao's invitation to the democratic parties and its personages "to help the Party to rectify its mistakes" on May Day 1957 in Tian An Men Square, the Democratic League decided to set up four specific teams concerning "long co-existence and mutual supervision", "the Party system in higher institutes of learning", "the posts of democratic personages with actual power", and "the development programme of sciences". The members of the Science Programme Team were:

**Zeng Zhao-lun**, chemist, deputy minister of Higher Education of the State Council, a member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic League and director of its Propaganda Department, and a member of the Department of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry under the Chinese Academy of Sciences;

**Qian Wei-chang**, physician, vice-president of Qinghua University, a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League, a member of the Commission for Science Planning under the State Council, and a member of the Department of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry under the Chinese Academy of Sciences;

**Qian Jia-ju**, economist, deputy director of the State Administration Bureau of Industry and Commerce under the State Council, a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League, a member of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and deputy director of the Socialist Institute;

**Tong Di-zhou**, biologist, a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League, a member of the Department of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and director of its Biology Section; and

**Hua Luo-geng**, a member of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress, a member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic

League, a member of the Department of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and director of its Mathematics Section.

During several discussions, they wrote a proposal: *Several Suggestions Concerning the System of Science in China*. In these suggestions, they put forward the following points to the Commission for Science Planning Commission under the State Council:<sup>6</sup>

#### **A. The "Protection of Scientists".**

The first suggestion was that that scientists, or more strictly, natural scientists, should be *protected*. This included: (1) scientists should have a definite period each year to do their scientific research work *uninterruptedly*; (2) they should be granted a *long-term holiday* from social activities and administrative work; (3) all scientists should have professional jobs related to their specific researches; (4) all scientific materials, except those concerning military and diplomatic matters, or new discoveries, should not be kept secret from scientists; (5) the leading scientists should as far as possible avoid administrative work; (6) they should be provided with suitable assistants of *their own choosing*; ...

#### **B. The "Attitude towards Social Sciences".**

The second suggestion was about social sciences and the attitude towards them. According to the authors of the *Several Suggestions*, it was all right to consider the development of natural sciences as a question of the first importance for the sake of industrialisation. However, it did not mean that

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<sup>6</sup> The following content is selected from this *Several Suggestions*, which was in Hua Luo-geng, et al, 1957<sup>a</sup>. English translation is partly adopted from MacFarquhar (ed.), 1960: 112-113.



social sciences were not important. Moreover, it was wrong to say that there were no social sciences in capitalist society at all, and that, hence, the social sciences in socialist society must be established from the beginning. Otherwise, as it happened, some branches of learning, for instance, sociology, political science, and law, either have been in fact dispensed with since the early 1950s, or have ceased to be independent subjects; and those scholars in these fields had to transfer to other fields when they were more or less depressed. In the *Several Suggestions*, the authors claimed that treatment of the social sciences in capitalist society should be *question of reform* rather than of abolition. Therefore they suggested to take appropriate steps to *reinstate* these subjects. Another problem in social sciences was that the official policies were usually considered as truths and therefore scholars could *only* explain or publicise these policies. This was not good enough.

### C. The "Equal Treatment of Students".

The third suggestion was that all students, no matter how different in terms of their social background, should be treated *equally*. They complained that in the past there was a tendency to overemphasise political qualifications in the enrolment of university students and the recruitment of postgraduates. They suggested that, within the rank of the people, as much importance should be laid on specialised subjects as on politics, and the students, whatever family backgrounds they had, should have *equal opportunities* to be selected.

### D. The "Leadership of Scientific Research".

The last suggestion was more sensitive. The authors of the *Several Suggestions* even complained the CCP, which appointed the leadership of scientific and academic circles. They maintained that the leadership of

scientific research should be *naturally* set up during the process of actual scientific and academic practice. They thought it was harmful to stipulate a prior leadership. (My emphasis.)

This *Several Suggestions* was unexpectedly published in the *Guangming Daily* with positive remarks after the Anti-Rightist Campaign was launched. However, shortly after its publication, the CCP decided to criticise it. The question for the CCP was whether or not all the five members of this team should be labelled as the "Rightist". They were all famous scientists, some of them had been co-operative with the CCP for years, and since the beginning of the Anti-Rightist Campaign people like Hua Luo-geng and Qian Jia-ju had already followed the CCP in criticising the "Rightist" opinions. In the end, the CCP decided to save three of them: Hua Luo-geng, Tong Di-zhou, and Qian Jia-ju.

Just before Lu Ding-yi, director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP's Central Committee, made a speech to condemn the *Several Suggestions* in front of all the representatives of the National People's Congress, Hua Luo-geng, Tong Di-zhou, and Qian Jia-ju were informed that they could be saved. But as a recompense, they had to write a declaration in the official press. Consequently, *We too Were Used Once by the Rightists* was published in the *Guangming Daily* on 26 June.<sup>7</sup>

In this declaration, on the one hand, they criticised the suggestions that scientists be protected, that some branches of social sciences be reestablished, and that students be treated equally. On the other hand, they explained that the "leadership of scientific research" did not mean the

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<sup>7</sup> Hua Luo-geng, et al, 1957<sup>c</sup>. Cf., Jian Jia-ju, 1987: 248-251.

leadership of the CCP, but of the concrete direction of scientists themselves.

They also claimed that they did not attend all the discussions of the proposal because of either illness or business, nor did they get involved in writing the proposal. They even revealed that it was Fei Xiao-tong who was invited to write the final draft and who used words which were not in the first draft such as "reestablish the branches of social learning".<sup>8</sup>

On 6 July, 1957, Guo Mo-ruo, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, made a speech in the People's Congress, in which he judged the *Several Suggestions* "an anti-socialist proposal".<sup>9</sup> The suggestion that scientists be protected was seen as a complaint that the Party did not protect them, the suggestion that some branches of social learning be reestablished as an attempt to restore bourgeois social sciences, the suggestion that students be treated equally as a slander against the Party's policy of giving priority to the enrolment of workers, peasants, worker-peasant cadres, demobilised soldiers, and the children of revolutionary martyrs. And above all, the suggestion that the leadership be set up naturally was seen as a scheme to get rid of the leadership of the CCP.

It then seemed that the declaration of Hua Luo-geng, Qian Jia-ju, and Tong Di-zhou that they "too were used once by the Rightists" was not enough. As a matter of fact, before the *Several Suggestions* was criticised, Hua Luo-geng had already published *Some Words on Common Sense* in the *People's Daily*. In this article, Hua accused some leaders of

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<sup>8</sup> More details about Fei Xiao-tong's role in drafting the *Several Suggestions* will be seen in section "Social Scientist Fei Xiao-tong".

<sup>9</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1957<sup>b</sup>.

democratic parties such as Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, Zhang Nai-qi, and Chu An-ping of trying to challenge the leadership of the CCP. "Even natural scientists who did not pay attention to politics before the Liberation now realise that the leadership of the CCP results from Chinese history since 1840s."<sup>10</sup>

After Guo Mo-ruo's speech, Hua published another article in the *People's Daily* with a long title: *The Party is capable of leading sciences, of leading education, and of leading intellectuals*. In his article, Hua not only repeated what Lu Ding-yi and Guo Mo-ruo said earlier, but also admitted having committed a mistake, by not voting against the draft proposal of the *Several Suggestions* when he read it, although he had already realised that there were some serious mistakes in it. Hua further used his own experiences during the War of Resistance against Japan period in the National Southwest Associated University in Kunming, where both research and living conditions were terrible because of the war, to justify that only under the leadership of the CCP could scientists have books, magazines, assistants, and opportunities to publish their research, an opportunity which they did not have under the Nationalist Government.<sup>11</sup>

Hua Luo-geng luckily escaped from being labelled as the "Rightist". This is partially because he "trimmed his sails" in time, but more importantly, as we will see soon, because the CCP decided not to punish him, hoping that he would be a "red scientist" who may make a mistake but, more significantly, as soon as the CCP pointed it out, would correct it and go on following the CCP more firmly.

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<sup>10</sup> Hu Luo-geng, 1957<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> Hua Luo-geng, 1957<sup>d</sup>.

After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, in 1958 the CCP called on those intellectuals who had survived it to be both red and professional. Hua Luo-geng then became an example of the old-type intellectuals who had successfully remoulded themselves into "red experts". In June, 1958, Hua Luo-geng published *I Will Firmly Be of One Mind with the Party* in the *People's Daily*. He ended up his article with his declaration that "I am determined to be an intellectual of the working class, to be both red and professional, ... and to join the CCP."<sup>12</sup>

For Hua Luo-geng, as well as other intellectuals who were said to have been changed into "new-type mental workers", the next task to be undertaken was to devote his life to building a new China. At the end of the 1950s, Hua transferred his research from pure to applied mathematics, linking theoretical mathematics with practical production problems in China's economic development. In 1960, he became the head of Department of Applied Mathematics and Electronic Calculating Machines at China University of Science & Technology, and director of the Institute of Electronic Calculating Techniques at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. A year later, he was appointed vice-president of China University of Science & Technology. He invented the optimum seeking method and overall planning method, both of which were directly used in production. While the reasons for his transformation could be various, one is clear: following the CCP's call to serve the people and serve the nation, Hua decided to contribute to China's construction with something more empirically practical and useful.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Hua Luo-geng, 1958.

<sup>13</sup> Hua Luo-geng, 1986: 392-393.

Yet the CCP did not let Hua Luo-geng join in the 1960s. However, Hua became one of the privileged persons who had mail communications with Mao. We still do not know at what time Hua and Mao started writing to each other and how long it lasted. But in 1964, Hua wrote a letter to Mao in which he confessed that, although he had changed in the processes of political campaigns, there were filthy bourgeois ideas in the recesses of his heart. Hua promised that he would study Mao's works diligently and remould himself completely. Mao was pleased to read Hua's letter and replied: "congratulating you on having cherished soaring aspirations." In 1965, Mao replied to another letter of Hua's: "I am very happy to know that you are now exerting yourself and making great progress to serve the people rather than yourself."<sup>14</sup> "To Serve the People" then became Hua Luo-geng's motto.

During the Cultural Revolution, China's well-known natural scientists were not the main targets although many of them were labelled as the "leading bourgeois scholars" and hence forced to do manual work. An example was Tong Di-zhou, the biologist who joined the team to write the *Several Suggestions* in 1957. Tong became a toilet cleaner for years. Hua was luckily protected by Mao and Zhou En-lai. At the beginning, he was criticised at China University of Science & Technology, but under Mao's direction, Hua was released from the attack. He was then amongst the several scientists whose names appeared in the press from time to time, especially during the period when May Day or National Day were celebrated. Furthermore, Hua even published an article in the *People's Daily* in 1969, in which he expressed his great gratefulness to Mao, who

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<sup>14</sup> Hua Luo-geng, 1986: 5; Mao Ze-dong, 1983: 595, 606.

"released me and asked me to study from the beginning." Hua repeated the official accusation that education including intellectuals' self-education and thought reform during the period of 1949-1966 was ruled by Liu Shao-qi's reactionary line. "Under such a rule," Hua further said, "people like me in fact had no real future."<sup>15</sup> This article showed clearly that Hua Luo-geng "had passed the test".

In 1970, Hua's original mathematical manuscript was stolen. Such a case could have been one of those during the Cultural Revolution which were too common to be noticed by the top leadership. But because of Hua's privileged position, no sooner did Zhou En-lai hear about this than he wrote the following instruction:

Firstly, Hua Luo-geng should be protected from being persecuted by evildoers. Secondly, the clue to the loss of his manuscript should be sought, and if possible, found. Thirdly, Hua Luo-geng's materials sealed up by the Institute of Mathematics under the Academy of Sciences should be checked to see if anything has been stolen, and then, as far as they are safe, they should be returned to him. Finally, Hua Luo-geng is no longer suitable to go down to " May 7 School " or anywhere outside Peking.<sup>16</sup>

After Zhou's instruction, Hua's personal files including his payroll were transferred to the Personnel Department of the Administrative Bureau of the State Council, and thus Hua stayed in Peking to do his research. Whereas most of his colleagues had to either move to Hefei in Anhui Province along with the China University of Science & Technology, or go down to the so-called "May 7 Schools", the special labour camps for cadres and intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution because of Mao's

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<sup>15</sup> Hua Luo-geng, 1969.

<sup>16</sup> Zhou En-lai, 1984: 455.

letter of May 7, 1966, in which Mao demanded that everybody should undertake manual work.

In 1978, Hua became vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and a year later, vice-chairman of the Democratic League. He was only permitted to join the Communist Party in June of 1979. Six years later, he died.

Hua Luo-geng's experience typically illustrated that in "Communist" China under Mao, natural scientists in most occasions were considered the ones who should/could be won over. On the one hand, the CCP needed these "experts" in its economic construction, on the other hand, these scientists were comparatively more obedient, and less dangerous, to the authorities.

Carefully analysing, we should notice that Hua Luo-geng was not like those "democratic personages" who had been deeply involved in politics since 1945 (if not earlier) and had their own independent political orientation between the CCP and the KMT. It was arranged for Hua Luo-geng to be a member, and then leader, of the Democratic League by the CCP after 1949. Hua Luo-geng and the like were essentially non-political scientists, who should be considered more members of the "old-type intellectuals" than members of the "democratic personages".



## II. Social Scientist FEI XIAO-TONG

Social scientists were functionally different from natural scientists in socio-political development and political campaigns. Among them of course there were people who, like natural scientists, belonged to the old-type intellectuals. But generally speaking, they were instinctively close to politics. Accordingly, they usually held their own independent understanding of society, and that is why they were more problematic for the CCP than natural scientists.

One example is Fei Xiao-tong (1910- ), one of China's most prominent social scientists and the best known in the West. In 1922, Fei attended an American missionary school in Suzhou where he studied for six years. And then, after two years of study at Suzhou University, Fei became a sociology student at Yanjing University in Peking. Yanjing was another university well-known in China like Peking University and Qinghua University (in 1953 it became a part of Peking University). At Yanjing, Fei studied under both Wu Wen-zao, head of the Department of Sociology there, and Robert E. Park, a visiting Chicago sociologist at the time. In 1933, Fei finished his study at Yanjing and went on to Qinghua University, where he studied physical anthropology under S. M. Shirokogoroff, a Russian Manchu specialist.

After getting his M.A., Fei and his new wife went to Guangxi Province to do field research amongst minority nationalities. The tragic price of this field work was that Fei's wife died and Fei himself was seriously injured.

In 1936, Fei was given a Qinghua University Fellowship to pursue anthropological studies at the London School of Economics. Under the

supervision of Bronislaw Malinowski, Fei got a doctorate in 1938 and published his *Peasant Life in China* in 1939. It was *Peasant Life in China* for which Malinowski expressed his genuine admiration, and by which Fei obtained his international reputation.

During the war, Fei was in Yunnan Province where he joined his former teacher Wu Wen-zao, doing field work for the Yanjing-Yunnan Station for Sociological Research near Kunming from 1939 to 1943. Fei was a visiting scholar at Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York from 1943 to 1944, and a professor of anthropology at Qinghua University afterwards. In 1946, he went to England again for a three-month visit.

Fei had been a man who had kept a distance from politics for decades. In the 1940s, however, like many other Chinese scholars, Fei Xiao-tong started watching political situation under the KMT, and shifted to the Left. As R. David Arkush, his biographer, summarises, "Fei and many others became increasingly repelled by the Nationalists - by their pursuit of civil war instead of a negotiated settlement and economic reconstruction; by their corruption, brutality, and suppression of dissent; and by their seeming unconcern for the suffering of the masses."<sup>17</sup> In 1946, Fei Xiao-tong joined the Democratic League.

Since then, publishing articles, making public speeches, and signing open letters, Fei was getting more outspoken and critical over political issues under the KMT. When Li Gong-pu and Wen Yi-duo, professors of the Southwest Associated University, two active Left-wing and professionally

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<sup>17</sup> R. D. Arkush, 1981: 175.

outstanding scholars, and Fei's close friends, were assassinated on 11 and 15 July, 1946, Fei lost all hope that under the Nationalist Government there could be a democratic China.

Nonetheless, he was neither a Communist Party member, nor a Marxist, despite the fact that, as he admitted, he had "always been sympathetic with their ideals".<sup>18</sup> In 1948, Fei, like most intellectuals, awaited the coming of Mao's army to Qinghua University with hope: "I hope I will not be lost to social science, instead I do think the future is rather bright."<sup>19</sup>

With the establishment of the PRC, Fei Xiao-tong was highly appreciated by the CCP for his Left-wing activities since 1945. He was appointed a member of the Culture and Education Commission of the Government Administration Council, a member of the Congress of Representatives of Various Circles in Peking, a delegate to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, director of the Chinese People's Foreign Affairs Institute, and a deputy director of the Commission of Culture, Education, Science, and Technology of the Democratic League.

Shortly after the CCP came to power, Fei began publishing articles in newspapers and magazines. As a leading social scientist, he was asked to remould himself through the study of Marxism and participation in the administrative affairs of Qinghua University. In January, 1950, two years before the Thought Reform Campaign, Fei Xiao-tong published *This Year for Me* in the *People's Daily*, concerning his own thought reform.

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<sup>18</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, in Arkush, 1981: 208-210.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 210.

A half year earlier, Fei wrote to Margaret Park Redfield, the editor of Fei's *China's Gentry* :

I think my decision to stay at Beiping was correct. I have been gaining much, very fundamental, precious experience from the process of liberation. It is altogether unusual and marvellous. It at least gives me an opportunity to reflect on my many fundamental problems and criticise my own work that I had done before. I have again become a student and enjoyed deeply the 'reintegration' process of my own thought reform.<sup>20</sup>

In *This Year for Me* , Fei expressed his feelings in 1949. Before the Red Army came to Peking (called Beiping then), Fei went to Shijiazhuang, the temporary capital of the CCP, where he was introduced to Mao, and where he, for the first time, realised the strength of the people:

The great potentialities [among the people] was unfamiliar, unclear, and even non-understandable to the intellectuals like me who did not ever actively participate in the Revolution. Thus I was not sure about the historical development, and also lacked confidence in the emancipation of the people. A miss is as good as a mile. Such a miss made me fail to foresee the situation of the world, and made me feel conceited as well, ... <sup>21</sup>

But when he saw the strength of the people, Fei continued, he suddenly felt confused and self-worthless. In the past, he spoke with fervour and assurance, but at that time he was tongue-tied. After a period of struggle, he made up his mind: to remould himself.

It seemed that Fei remoulded himself very sincerely. He not only criticised the selfish individualism of China's intellectuals including himself, and explained the necessity of the political study of Marxism, but

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<sup>20</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, in Arkush, 1981: 215.

<sup>21</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1950<sup>a</sup>.

also actively got involved in the reform and arrangement of the universities/departments, and participated in the criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun*. Above all, during the Thought Reform Campaign, unlike many others, he did not have to criticise himself in public. Thirty five years later, when Fei talked about his writing on the thought reform of intellectuals in the early 1950s, he still thought that those articles indeed reflected intellectuals' feelings during that period.<sup>22</sup>

In late 1956, under the slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend", intellectuals including Fei were for the first time since 1949 outspoken over the *status quo*. Fei wrote an article *Old Friends and A New Understanding* in the *People's China*, a magazine published in English by the authorities, in which he explained the thought reform amongst China's intellectuals to his foreign friends:

After 'thought reform' we found that many of our ideas and views were wrong, that is to say, not in the interests of our country and people. ... When people talk about loss of freedom of thought, they really mean that rulers arrest, imprison, humiliate and even kill those who think in their own way. ... In New China such a thing is impermissible and unthinkable, and nothing of the sort has ever happened. Nobody, be he never so much an 'expert', can cite a single case of any Chinese intellectual being persecuted for his beliefs or thoughts. ...<sup>23</sup>

Fei here took Liang Shu-ming, the man who challenged Mao and his industrialisation policy in front of nearly all the other state-level leaders including democratic personages in 1953, as an example. It is still not clear why Fei did not mention the Hu Feng Case in 1955. Did Fei lack the

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<sup>22</sup> Cf., Fei Xiao-tong, 1950<sup>b</sup>; 1950<sup>c</sup>; 1951; 1988: 398.

<sup>23</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1956.

courage to mention Hu Feng, or did he think that Hu Feng's problem was not a matter of freedom of thought?<sup>24</sup>

Anyhow, as a result of the reform of the universities and the rearrangement of departments and colleges, sociology (including anthropology in China) as a branch of learning was eliminated from university curriculums in 1952, and even before that time, Fei, as well as Wu Wen-zao and some others, was already transferred to the Central Institute of National Minorities, becoming its vice-president.

But Fei's hope that sociology could be used to serve the New China had not yet completely vanished. During the Hundred Flowers period, Fei in February of 1957 published an article in the *Wenhui Daily*, *A Few Words on Sociology*. Following Wu Jing-chao, his colleague in the Department of Sociology at Qinghua University, Fei made a suggestion that sociological research in China would be helpful, not because the Soviet Union had sent a delegate to the International Sociology Society, but because the new relationships between the people would be developed and new questions would arise in the process of social change within Chinese society. Therefore, Fei cautiously suggested, scientific knowledge was needed, specialised research was needed. It did not matter if it was named "sociology" or something else, for example, "social survey". What is more, because the old sociologists had carried out this kind of research

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<sup>24</sup> The answer is most likely both. Hu Feng was accused of committing "counter-revolutionary crime", the most horrible accusation in Mao's China (and even nowadays). Whatever intellectuals thought about Hu, nobody ever spoke for him. On the other hand, many intellectuals, including Fei Xiao-tong, really believed what the CCP said in the early 1950s, and that Hu Feng was a KMT spy. Therefore, it was not only a matter of freedom of thought. Cf., Chapter Four.

work in the past, the techniques of their original profession, interviewing, observation, recording, statistics, analysis, etc., were still useful.<sup>25</sup>

After March, 1957, Fei became more audacious: he openly called for a change in the official attitude towards old sociology at the National Propaganda Conference of the CCP on 12 March; he chaired a forum on problems connected with restoring sociology, which was attended by nearly all of the well-known old sociologists, in April; he wrote several short articles, arguing for the usefulness of the old sociologists in April and May; he went back to Jiangcun, the small village where he did field research in the 1930s (after which he wrote *The Peasant Life in China*), to do his anthropological research; and above all, he got involved in drafting the *Several Suggestions Concerning the System of Sciences*, contributing the main ideas about social sciences.<sup>26</sup>

Fei's most significant article during this period is the one entitled *The Early Spring for Intellectuals*. Before he wrote the article, he had already done some research on the problem of intellectuals. As both an intellectual leader representing the Democratic League and later as a high official in charge of solving administrative questions concerning the treatment of intellectuals (*i.e.*, deputy director of the Experts Bureau under the State Council), Fei travelled through many parts of the country, especially the Southwest, to investigate the problems of intellectuals since late 1955.

In early February, 1957, after coming back from the Southwest, Fei was asked to give talks about his investigation to the Central Committee of the

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<sup>25</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1957<sup>a</sup>; Cf., McGough, 1979.

<sup>26</sup> See Hu Luo-geng Section above.

Democratic League. In these talks, Fei said that there were two "lids" or constrictions on intellectuals: the one under which intellectuals' initiative in academic research was restricted, and the one under which their zeal for politics was suppressed. Fei thought that the policy of "Let a hundred schools of thought contend" could take the first lid off, and the policy of "Mutual supervision" between the CCP and the democratic parties could remove the second.<sup>27</sup> However, Fei continued, "the first lid has not been completely taken off, for many CCP's leading comrades are not interested in it, whilst the second lid seems still there,..." Fei called the resulting situation "the cold in the spring". By mid February, he finished drafting the *Early Spring*, but, as he said later, "had no courage to send it to the press." Instead, he rewrote it several times, and then sent quite a few copies to his friends in the Democratic League including Zhang Bo-jun, asking them to give critiques. In the end, on the day Mao made his famous speech *On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People*, Fei sent the article to the *People's Daily*.<sup>28</sup>

In this article, Fei on the one hand said that Zhou En-lai's speech *On the Problems of Intellectuals* in January 1956 was like thunder in the spring, and some intellectuals even saw Zhou's speech as "re-liberation". Since then, the living conditions of intellectuals had improved. On the other hand, intellectuals still had problems. The first was their academic research. Although around 75 per cent of them could already use five sixth of their time in the week to do their research, *i.e.*, the political study and other social activities should only occupy one day from Monday to

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<sup>27</sup> More details about these two policies can be seen in Chapter Three.

<sup>28</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1957c.



Saturday, the intellectuals needed concrete support and direction from the leaders and cadres of the CCP.

The second problem concerned "Let a hundred schools of thought contend". On the one hand, most intellectuals welcomed this policy in their hearts whilst their lips were still shut. Many of them were afraid of losing face if they opened their mouths and were then labelled as backward elements or idealists. Moreover, it was not just a question of saving face, but a question of ensuring their actual lives: salary, promotion, going abroad, and even getting married. Some further feared that the policy was just a trap by which intellectuals would be later punished. On the other hand, the cadres who directly supervised intellectuals either limited the contending exclusively to academic questions in classroom only, or thought that the policy was all right but not suitable to their units.

The third problem was that intellectuals, especially those "senior intellectuals"(GAO JI ZHI SHI FEN ZI) or, as Fei called them, "old intellectuals"(LAO ZHI SHI FEN ZI), who were old not only in terms of their age, but also in terms of their social location ("old-type intellectuals") and their intellectual reputation, had been for a long time treating political matters in both China and the outside world with indifference. For instance, in 1956, they talked about the incidents in Poland and Hungary apathetically. The reason was not that these "old intellectuals" simply concentrated on their "pure academic research", and ignored socio-political development, but that they thought they were not qualified in the "New Communist Society" under the leadership of the CCP:

The old intellectuals yearn for socialism warmheartedly when they understand what it is, but they found that it is a bit too late, and that it seems there is no place for them in the masses moving forward , therefore they cannot help feeling lonely. <sup>29</sup>

In a word, the political climate was like the early spring in which intellectuals felt uncertain. The article was published in the *People's Daily* on 24 March, 1957, when the political climate had already changed and seemed unusually mild. In April, Zhou En-lai spoke approvingly of Fei's *Early Spring*, in which, Zhou said, Fei "expressed all the opinions inside intellectuals' hearts". Zhou even further complained that "there are quite a few intellectuals who are capable of writing within the Communist Party too, but I do not think they are able to write such an article, even they share Fei's opinions."<sup>30</sup> After Zhou's speech, Fei was appointed vice-chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission under the State Council in May, 1957.

Interestingly, during the period from late April to the end of May, that is, the period during which China's intellectuals for the first time and the only time since 1949 got involved in open criticism of the CCP's policies, Fei was not in Peking. Only on 31 May, 1957, did Fei return from Jiangcun where he did his anthropological field research. At this time, Mao had made up his mind to launch a campaign "to counterattack the Rightists". Like many others, Fei did not know Mao's decision until 8 June, on which day Mao's *What Is This for* was published in the *People's Daily*. But two days earlier, on 6 June, Fei attended a meeting with another five professors convened by Zhang Bo-jun, the first vice-

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<sup>29</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1957b.

<sup>30</sup> Zhou En-lai, 1985: 349.

chairman of the Democratic League. It was later called "6-6-6 Anti-Party Meeting" (six professors on the sixth of June). It was said that Fei, talking about the student movement at Peking University and other colleges, pointed out that the problems which resulted in the student movement was "not a question of some individuals' style of work, but a question of system." Further, said Fei, "of course it is easy to put it [the student movement] down. Three million soldiers would put it down, but public support [of the Party] would evaporate and the Party's prestige amongst the masses would be finished." He even declared that he would not join the Communist Party as an expression of his attitude.<sup>31</sup>

At the beginning, Fei could still suggest that freedom of speech should be protected and intellectuals should continue to speak out. But a week later, he had to start criticising himself and others, and a month later, he was accused of being a hard-core leader of the so-called Zhang-Luo Alliance. He was nationally denounced for speaking out for intellectuals in *The Early Spring for the Intellectuals*, for talking at the 6-6-6 Meeting, for attempting to restore sociology, for involvement in the drafting of the *Several Suggestions On Sciences*, for social anthropological research before and after 1949, for connections with Western scholars, and even for his personality and his private life. *The Early Spring* was seen as the first anti-Party and anti-socialist shell fired from the Zhang-Luo Alliance, and Fei became the strategist of the Alliance. He was labelled "a bourgeois, individualistic, political opportunist, posing as a 'scholar', and an obsequious loyal stooge of imperialism". There are about a hundred articles criticising him, and amongst his critics, there were not only Party

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<sup>31</sup> *RMRB*, 4 July, 1957. Cf., MacFarquhar, (ed.), 1960: 167-168.

intellectual men, but also well-known scholars, his colleagues, and close friends.<sup>32</sup>

On 13 July, 1957, Fei had to make a confession to the National People's Congress, entitled *Admitting My Guilt to the People* :

I was serving the interests of those two adventurers Zhang [Bo-jun] and Luo [Long-ji], and I was serving the interests of the bourgeoisie, of the ghosts of that already defunct class. I endangered the Party, and I endangered the masses. Under the direction and influence of the Zhang-Luo Alliance, I made use of the organisation of the Democratic League, and from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie I followed the anti-Party, anti-socialist political road, committing a series of crimes endangering the Party and the masses.<sup>33</sup>

After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Fei was relieved of all his posts in the National People's Congress, the State Council, the Democratic League, and the Central Institute of Nationalities.

However, like many other democratic personages and well-known scholars who were labelled as the "Rightist", Fei was not put in gaol, nor was he sent down to the countryside to receive labour reform. Was he protected by his high reputation or by some leaders, for example, Mao and Zhou?

As we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, the democratic personages held high posts without real power before they were purged, and they suffered less than those targets from the revolutionary intellectuals. No

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<sup>32</sup> Cf., Li Da, 1957; Lin Yue-hua, 1957. Also Cf., McGough, 1979: 113-151; and Arkush, 1981: 260-275.

<sup>33</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1957<sup>d</sup>. Cf., McGough, 1979: 83.

matter what personal relations of Fei to Mao and Zhou, Fei's and other democratic personages' escape from being sent to jail to labour camp was more because for the CCP it was not necessary. To let them be silent was enough.

Nevertheless, once in early June, 1957, Mao asked Fei to reject his group of two hundred friends within the circles of high intellectuals and seek another two hundred friends amongst workers and peasants. Mao told the CCP officials that it was good for them to have some Rightist friends in order to understand their psychological state. After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Mao himself invited Fei and other well-known Rightist for dinner twice, saying that "you are the Rightists, but it does not matter, we are still friends."<sup>34</sup>

On 4 December, 1959, Fei Xiao-tong's label of the "Rightist" was removed, for he, as well as some others, it was said, had corrected his mistakes and reformed. In the same year, Fei was reelected a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League, and appointed as a member of the Third National Committee of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference.

From 1959 to 1966, Fei was a member of the National Minorities Research Team under the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Working with Wu Wen-zao, he proofread and revised several historical annals of minority nationalities, and collected English materials on history,

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<sup>34</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 505. Cf., 1980: 136-137; Arkush, 1981: 320. Arkush asked: "Did Mao then consider Fei a friend, and have talks with him from time to time?" As a matter of fact, Fei had never become one of Mao's friends, although he was indeed invited by Mao to have dinners and talks after 1957.

geography, and custom around the Pamirs area. Nearly all of them were for restricted reference only.<sup>35</sup>

During the Cultural Revolution, Fei, like many other well-known scholars, suffered from being wrongly treated, although they were not amongst the main targets. Fei became a street-cleaner, and he also did Pan Guang-dan's "job": to clean a public toilet.<sup>36</sup> Fei survived but Pan committed suicide. Fei later said he attempted to do so too during that period, but he failed. Fei was then sent to a "May 7 School" where he spent two years doing manual work in the fields.<sup>37</sup>

In 1972, under the protection and arrangement of Zhou En-lai, Fei Xiaotong came back to Peking and reemerged. In an interview with John King Fairbank and other visitors from the United States in 1972, Fei looked cheerful and ebullient, but what he said seemed not so simple:

We have to adopt an attitude of criticising the bourgeois anthropology that we learned in the past. ... I can't even read the works I have written on the Chinese peasant in the past. ... My ideas and feelings were different from the labouring people. ... What they want to know is how to make their lives better. <sup>38</sup>

Noticeably, however, Fei still insisted, as he did in 1957, that sociological methods he learned from the West could be useful to serve the working class and the New China. "Everything can be good if it serves the working class."<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Cf., Wu Wen-zao, 1985: 135.

<sup>36</sup> Fei's former teacher in Yanjing University.

<sup>37</sup> Cf., Fei, 1988:I; Arkush, 1981: 277-278.

<sup>38</sup> Fei Xiaotong, in Cooper, 1973: 480-482, and in Mirsky, 1972: 89-90.

<sup>39</sup> Cf., Liu Xiao-xiao, 1972.

From 1972 to 1976, Fei received visits of dozens of foreigners, together with Wu Wen-zao and Bing Xin, Wu's wife and Fei's close friend, an outstanding woman writer before 1949. During that period, these three friends mainly stayed in Peking, doing translations of H.G. Wells' *Outline of History* (published in 1920) and *World History* (by C.J.H. Hayes, *et al*, 1932), into Chinese.

In 1980, Fei's designation as the "Rightist" was finally declared to have been in error. Since then, Fei had been more and more active in both academic and social activities. Even before that, in 1979, sociology as a branch of learning was officially declared to be reestablished, and Fei became president of the Chinese Society of Sociology. After the remove of his "Rightist" label, Fei was appointed director of the Institute of Sociology under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In the meantime, he became a vice-chairman of the Democratic League, and a vice-chairman of the Central Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. In short, after Mao's death, Fei reappeared as a leading social scientist and a well-known "democratic personage".

From 1981 onwards, Fei Xiao-tong published his works of collected writings almost every year. These works were mainly on sociology and social anthropology.<sup>40</sup> Fei Xiao-tong again became a key sociologist whose works were seen as text-books for sociology and anthropology students in China. Talking about his writing career, Fei said,

Since 1924, my writing has not been interrupted for a very long period.  
Even during the detestable two decades, I had to write 'confessions',

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<sup>40</sup> Cf., Fei Xiao-tong, 1981<sup>a</sup>, 1981<sup>b</sup>, 1983, 1984, 1985<sup>a</sup>, 1985<sup>b</sup>, 1986, 1987, 1988<sup>b</sup>.

'thought reports', and posters criticising others frequently. When I really could not write, I did translations. I never stopped writing. <sup>41</sup>

Of course writing in the "two detestable decades" for Fei was not relaxing. Instead, Fei later recalled,

I could not gain ground in the torrent of society. What is worse, I lost my spiritual pillar, being confused and even lost in seeking for truth. 'An aspiration of an intellectual should never be taken away by force'. But my aspiration was taken away. Year after year, the criticism of my writings from all quarters made me lose self-confidence: at the beginning, I had to 'admit my guilt to the people'; then I really felt that my writings were poisonous weeds; in the end I even learned to attack others, using the expressions and logic which were used by others to criticise me. ... I had a twenty-year nightmare, without knowing anything. ... I hate my life, my words and deeds, in those twenty years, ... <sup>42</sup>

Fei is now chairman of the Democratic League and a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China. People may ask if "democratic personages" like Fei can still play a role in Chinese politics now. One thing should be mentioned here before we leave this question: in 1989, when students went on a hunger strike in Tian An Men Square, Fei called the Chairmen of three democratic parties together to discuss the situation. As a result, these four Chairmen signed an open letter to the CCP, in which they asked its leaders to have a direct dialogue with the students as soon as possible.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1988a: VI.

<sup>42</sup> Fei Xiao-tong, 1988a: III-IV.

<sup>43</sup> RMRB, May, 1989.



### III. Conclusion

The democratic personages and their critical function, or in CCP's words, "supervisory" role, socially ended as a result of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957-1958, though the so-called "democratic parties" still existed in name. Personages (like Fei Xiao-tong) whom we named as members of the critical intelligentsia outside the CCP were either labelled as the "Rightists" and then lost their posts in state organs, or forced to be silent over political and ideological issues if they could keep their posts in officialdom. The democratic parties were no longer "supervisory bodies", if they used to be to a certain extent, of the CCP. After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the democratic personages in Mao's time could hardly voice any critical sound in Chinese socio-economic and political development. The critical intelligentsia outside the ruling party was socially damaged.

At the same time, persons (like Hua Luo-geng) who had scientific knowledge and skills and therefore used to be considered old-type intellectuals rather than democratic personages either joined the democratic parties or the CCP, or were promoted in state/party organs. This kind of persons then were honoured "democratic personages" but in fact were more yesmen than activists in political campaigns. They had seldom been critical of the *status quo*, and had never been politically problematic for the CCP. When the CCP tried to win over Hua Lo-geng-type natural scientists (i.e., passive yesmen with scientific skills and knowledge) through a relatively mild criticism and self-criticism in the Thought Reform Campaign of 1951-1952, it successfully obtained positive response from them afterwards. And when the CCP distinguished these natural scientists and technicians from Fei Xiao-tong-type social

scientists (*i.e.*, active non-CCP intellectuals with critical spirits) in the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958, sociologically and politically it was quite right, for the former were more useful as far as the "economic construction of a New China" was concerned, but the latter might be more dangerous in terms of their critical spirits.

However, since the 1960s, especially in the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao simply put these two groups together and named them "reactionary bourgeois leading scholars". Like social scientists, most natural scientists were also sent to the "May 7 Schools" in the countryside, where they had to forget their scientific research and do peasants' manual work. Personages like Hua Luo-geng were excused from it only because of Zhou En-lai's personal protection.

In this chapter, we saw the great difference between Hua Luo-geng and Fei Xiao-tong. The former was a non-political person while the later was engaged in politics but tried to maintain his own independent point of view about it. To treat them simply as members of the bourgeoisie would only lead confusion in both theory and practice.

The next chapter will further look at some cases chosen from traditional scholars and revolutionary intellectuals, who, as we will see soon, were socio-politically different not only from one another, but also from both Hua Luo-geng-type natural scientists and Fei Xiao-tong-type social scientists.

## **CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDIES(II): Traditional Scholar and Left-wing Writer as Old-type & Revolutionary Intellectuals**

As we have seen in previous chapters, the critical intelligentsia in the democratic parties was socially destroyed as a consequence of the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958. Since 1958, it was revolutionary intellectuals within the CCP, especially Zhou Yang and his friends, who continued to speak out, following Hu Feng, and the "Rightists". Unlike those democratic personages like Fei Xiao-tong, these revolutionary intellectuals held actual power and thus played a more influential role.

However, these revolutionary intellectuals had a problem which those democratic personages did not share. That is: they were also real officials of the establishment. As we saw in Chapter Four, they were actually in the dilemma of being officials and intellectuals/intelligentsia. Facing this, like the so-called "democratic personages" whose members did not all necessarily belong to the intelligentsia, not all the "revolutionary intellectuals" remained critical.

From this chapter, we will further see that there was another kind of revolutionary intellectuals who were actually playing a double role of being ideologue and target during the period of 1949-1976. Of course, we cannot say that Ding Ling and Zhou Yang did not have such a position. But in Chapter Four we saw that they were punished mainly because of their critical spirits. In this chapter, however, we will see that, from the case of Guo Mo-ruo, there were revolutionary intellectuals in those political campaigns who suffered not just from being critical but also from their double positions of being both official and intellectual.

Before we start following Guo Mo-ruo's tracks, the experience of philosopher Feng You-lan will be first explored. This is not only for the sake of comparison, but also for the sake of some more detailed exploration of the Chinese traditional scholar, to whom we paid a little attention in Chapter Three when looking through the Thought Reform Campaign in 1951-1952. By studying Feng You-lan, we will further find that this kind of traditional scholar is different not only from members of the critical intelligentsia such as literary figure Zhou Yang, and social scientist Fei Xiao-tong, but also from natural scientist Hua Luo-geng.

## **I. Philosopher FENG YOU-LAN**

Feng You-lan(1895-1990) is one of the most noted Chinese philosophers this century, best known in the West for his New Neo-Confucianist System, which combined the Chen-Zhu School's Neo-Confucianism with Western Neo-Positivist ideas and logic, and for his profound study on the history of Chinese philosophy.

Like Fei Xiao-tong, Feng You-lan was born into a gentry family. His father was a scholar-official, who supervised Feng's study on Chinese classics. In 1915, Feng You-lan became a philosophy student at Peking University, where he began to study Chinese philosophy and Western logic.

After graduating in 1918, Feng was granted a scholarship by the Chinese government in 1919, to continue his philosophical study abroad. To join his brother who was already in the United States, Feng chose Columbia University and was admitted to its graduate school. From 1920 to 1923,

Feng studied Western philosophy and did his research at Columbia, receiving instruction from John Dewey and Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, two of America's most eminent philosophers of that time. In 1923, Feng obtained a doctorate degree and then went back to China.

In 1927, Feng taught Chinese philosophical history at Yanjing University, and the following year he was appointed as director of the Philosophy Department, and then dean of the College of Arts, at Qinghua University. From 1931 to 1934, he published his widely-recognised *A History of Chinese Philosophy (I-II)*.<sup>1</sup> In 1934, Feng visited England where he taught Chinese philosophy at several universities or colleges. On his way home, Feng visited the Soviet Union.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, Feng You-lan was dean of the College of Arts at the National Southwest Associated University in Kunming. During this period as well, Feng became an established philosopher, *i.e.*, a New Neo-Confucianist, by systematically publishing his six books, in which his own philosophical system was expressed. These are: *New Neo-Confucianism* (1939), *New Culture and Society* (1940), *New Teachings of the World* (1940), *New Origin of Men* (1943), *New Origin of Truth* (1944), and *New Scholarship* (1946).<sup>2</sup> From 1946 to 1947, Feng You-lan was a visiting professor on a Rockefeller Grant at the University of Pennsylvania. He came back to Qinghua University in Peking in 1948, and waited there for the coming of the Red Army.

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<sup>1</sup> Feng You-lan, 1961.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., Feng You-lan, 1986.

Feng You-lan was a man who was politically caught up with the Nationalist Government. He was one of those scholars who were invited to be senior lecturers by the KMT, and to be Chiang Kai-shek's guests to have dinner after lectures during the period 1937-1945. In 1945, Feng became a delegate to the Fifth National Congress of the KMT and was even considered to be a member of its Central Committee.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, when Mao and his army reached Peking, Feng was thought to be one of those great scholars whom the CCP should win over through criticism and self-criticism. Feng was firstly appointed chairman of the Administrative Commission of Qinghua University, but at the same time, his New Neo-Confucianist philosophy was denounced as an idealistic system. Secondly, in September, 1949, like many other well-known distinguished old-type intellectuals, Feng You-lan wrote a letter to Mao, in which he admitted that in the past he preached feudalism philosophy. And Feng now realised that his New Neo-Confucianism was actually in the service of the KMT. Feng said that he had made up his mind to remould himself, to learn Marxism, and to plan on finishing a *New History of Chinese Philosophy* according to Marxist stand, viewpoint, and method within five years.

Several days later, Feng received a letter from Mao, in which Feng was told:

Personages' progress is welcome to us. It is fine that people like you who made mistakes in the past hope to correct them now, if they can carry that out in practice. However, they should not be overanxious for quick results.

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<sup>3</sup> Feng was also arrested once in 1935 for his visit to the Soviet Union and for his lecture on the "historical philosophy of the Qin-Han period(221 B.C-A.D.220)", which

They can correct their mistakes gradually. Anyway, it is better to adopt an honest attitude.<sup>4</sup>

The first step Feng You-lan adopted "to correct his mistakes in practice" was to participate in the Land Reform Campaign. He signed up for land reform work in the countryside, and joined a work team in a suburb of Peking from the winter of 1949 to the spring of 1950. Through the Land Reform Campaign, Feng for the first time understood the real meaning of exploitation as a Marxist concept, and realised that he, in his sentiments, shared the feelings of the landowners, and belonged more to them than to the labouring people, though he had been a salary-earning professor for more than two decades. He admitted that it was wrong to consider his academic work as a thing transcending class. Secondly, he recognised the necessity for "thought reform". He used to think that old-type intellectuals did not have to remould themselves, and if they had to do so, they could quickly attain enlightenment. There was no reason to ask them to undergo a long and even painful process of tempering. Looking back on these ideas, Feng found that they were idealistic, for a person could continue discovering his ideological defects for an indefinite period. Finally, Feng acknowledged that it was nonsense to boast of finishing *A New History of Chinese Philosophy* according to Marxism within five years, because Marxism as a "guide to action" should be applied to society and to self-criticism, the mere manipulation of words and phrases was a waste of time

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expressed something like Marxist historical materialism. Cf. Feng You-lan, 1984: 92-95, 110-116, 234-241.

<sup>4</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1983: 344. Feng was not very pleased to receive Mao's letter then. "Am I not honest?" he asked to himself. Feng also did not fully understand the meaning of "cooperation" used by the CCP when he was asked to be co-operated in 1949 by Xu Te-li, one of the five personages who were respected as CCP's old generation of revolutionary intellectuals. Cf. Feng You-lan, 1985: 124-125, 147.

and effort. Feng admitted that he himself, equipped with mere bookish knowledge, was not qualified to write it.<sup>5</sup>

By participating in the Land Reform Campaign, Feng You-lan declared that he "had joined the Revolution" (CAN JIA GE MING LE) and "discovered Marxism-Leninism". He started criticising his New Neo-Confucianism, saying that there was nothing new in his so-called "'New' philosophical system", which was in fact trammelled within the old Confucianist scheme. He admitted that his philosophy was basically idealistic and resistant to the Revolution. On the other hand, he explained that his philosophical system was at least partly influenced by Marxist historical materialism. Feng used to think that the difference of cultures between East and West resulted from the difference of philosophies. Then, in the 1920s, he considered that it was a question of time: modernisation meant Westernisation, today's West would be tomorrow's China. In 1933, however, Feng read some Marxist books when he was in England. After that, he no longer saw the difference between West and East as a question of national tradition of philosophies, nor a question of time, but a question of socio-economic formations. In 1950, Feng admitted that his understanding of Marxism was superficial in the 1930s, but his New Neo-Confucianism was indeed inspired by this understanding.<sup>6</sup>

Obviously, in the view of the CCP, as far as the thought reform of an old type intellectual was concerned, a three-month participation in the Land Reform and the self-criticism based on this was insufficient. The second

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<sup>5</sup> Feng You-lan, 1950<sup>a</sup>, 1950<sup>b</sup>, Cf. Feng You-lan, 1985: 148.

<sup>6</sup> Feng You-lan, 1950<sup>a</sup>, 1950<sup>b</sup>, 1950<sup>c</sup>, and 1985: 240-242.



step Feng You-lan should adopt was to be active in a series of political campaigns. When *The Life of Wu Xun* was criticised in 1951, Feng wrote an article in which he admitted that he, like a lot of university academics and middle school teachers, made mistakes similar to those of Wu Xun from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 till the Revolution of 1949. That is to say, not only did he not directly or indirectly join the Revolution, but he also serviced the reactionary rulers. "Using the methods of bourgeois science of history and bourgeois philosophy, I went from doing research on Chinese feudalism philosophy to developing it, and as a result, I got to the place where the Chinese idealism of feudalism and the Western idealism of capitalism were combined as a double idealism."<sup>7</sup> Feng said that his work therefore became an obstruction to the Revolution, and that it was the reason why the reactionary government flattered him so much and backward readers supported him so much.

In the Thought Reform Campaign, Feng You-lan further criticised himself not only academically, but also politically. "Through Thought Reform," wrote Feng You-lan, "I gradually realised what I used to call 'my academic research' is in fact the most reactionary political action. ... I was a key war criminal in the ideological battlefield between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries."<sup>8</sup> Feng accused himself of writing books to support the Anti-Japanese forces in words, but to oppose the Communist forces in deeds in the period of 1937-1945.

Feng recalled that, when he wrote those books to elaborate his New Neo-Confucianist System in the 1940s, he was wildly arrogant, thinking that his philosophy was not only the theoretical basis for fighting the Japanese

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<sup>7</sup> Feng You-lan, 1951.

<sup>8</sup> Feng You-lan, 1952.

and building up a new China, but an absolute truth of all ages and all lands as well. With such a feeling, Feng lectured and tutored in the KMT's senior class for its key figures, and became Chiang Kai-shek's guest, regarding himself "teacher of the emperor", as the ancient Chinese philosophers dreamt of being. Feng also admitted that in 1949, when he was told to be a student of Mao, he felt uncomfortable, wondering why a political leader should automatically be a great master of philosophy. But now he was grateful to Mao for launching the Thought Reform and other political campaigns, by which Feng realised that his deeds and words in the past were reactionary and pernicious.<sup>9</sup>

After the Thought Reform Campaign, it seemed that Feng You-lan was ideologically obedient to the CCP. He was not criticised by the authorities from 1952 to 1956, in the meantime, he wrote articles to criticise Liang Shu-ming, Hu Shi, and Hu Feng.<sup>10</sup> Of these political targets, Liang Shu-ming and Hu Shi were his teachers in the 1920s. Without doubt, this kind of criticism was more a passive attitude show than an active political involvement. In this period, Feng mainly stayed at Peking University, doing his academic research, though little of it was published.

Feng got a little more active after the Hundred Flowers policy was put forward. He advocated letting a hundred schools of thought contend, and carefully joined the speakers. On the one hand, he insisted that the leadership of the CCP over scientific research and artistic creation was necessary and correct, on the other hand, he explained that it did not mean the Party could guide scientists on how to go through a concrete

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<sup>9</sup> Feng You-lan, 1952.

<sup>10</sup> Cf., Feng You-lan, 1955a, 1955b, 1955c, 1955d, 1955e, 1955f, 1955g.

procedure of specific research, or direct writers on how to begin writing a piece of work. It was necessary to learn dialectical materialism and historical materialism, to read the works of Marx and Lenin, but this was not enough. On the one hand, there could be some side effects during the process of airing of views, for instance, some opinions might be incorrect, and some bad labels might be wrongly put on some speakers, on the other hand, there was no need to worry about such things. Enjoying freedom of speech, people would be no longer frightened by being wrongly labelled. If there was something wrong, it would be very natural, and only through equal discussion and free contention could it be corrected.<sup>11</sup>

These ideas of Feng's were not attacked during the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Feng even denounced some other labelled "Rightists". For example, Luo Long-ji, Feng's superior in the Democratic League. However, just after the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Feng You-lan was criticised for his articles on the inheritance of China's philosophical legacy and on the relationship between theory and practice.

On 8 January, 1957, Feng You-lan published an article in the *Guangming Daily*, entitled *On the Question of Inheriting China's Philosophical Legacy*. In this article, he complained that for several years China's ancient philosophy seemed to have been negated in teaching and studying. The more it was negated, the less it could be inherited. Feng claimed that China's ancient philosophical ideas should be viewed from all angles. According to Feng, some propositions of Chinese philosophy have abstract meaning on the one hand, and concrete meaning on the other. He

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<sup>11</sup> Feng You-lan, 1957<sup>b</sup>, 1957<sup>c</sup>.

took the proposition of 'It is a pleasure, having learned something, to try it out at due intervals' as an example. In terms of its concrete meaning, Confucius asked his students to learn the traditional knowledge such as *The Five Classics*. In this sense, this proposition was not very meaningful, nor should people inherit it, for they did not learn the traditional knowledge in Mao's China. However, if its abstract meaning was considered, Feng argued, this proposition means that people would be pleased if they reviewed whatever they learned promptly and regularly. Thus abstractly the proposition was still correct and useful to people under the New System.<sup>12</sup>

From here Feng You-lan further maintained that there is something universally applicable in Chinese philosophy. That is to say, it can be used by all classes. If it was true, Feng argued, that could mean those propositions did not belong to Marx's superstructure or ideology.

Some Party ideologues wrote articles to disagree with Feng. For example, Hu Sheng published a lengthy piece in the *People's Daily* on 29-30 March, 1957: *On the Research of Philosophical History*. But this should not be seen as evidence that Mao had already decided to launch a criticism of Feng You-lan. Firstly, after the publication of Hu Sheng's article, Feng too wrote a lengthy piece in the *Philosophical Research*, entitled *Once Again on the Question of Inheriting China's Philosophical Legacy*. In this article, Feng You-lan pointed out that the reason for Hu Sheng's disagreement was partially due to Hu's misunderstanding of the concept of

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<sup>12</sup> Feng You-lan, 1957<sup>a</sup>. The Five Classics are: *The Book of Songs*, *The Book of History*, *The Book of Changes*, *The Book of Rites*, and *The Spring and Autumn Annals*. Confucius' quotation is in *The Analects*. Cf. Lau's English translation (Confucius, 1979: 59 ).

*abstract*, and partially due to Hu's confusion of the question of what we should inherit with the question of how we should inherit it.<sup>13</sup>

Secondly, and more convincingly, in February, 1957, Feng as a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference attended the meeting, in which Mao made his famous speech *On the Correct Handling of the Conflicts among the People*; in March, as a non-Party personage Feng was invited to take part in the National Conference of Propaganda Works of the CCP. In this conference, both Feng and Mao were members of a small group which held its group discussion at Mao's home. When he saw Feng coming, Mao quoted the passage of Confucius which Feng used as an example in his article: "Is it not a pleasure, having learned something, to try it out at due intervals?" Asked by Mao, Feng gave a talk about the research on the history of Chinese philosophy. Feng complained that it was too difficult to understand some philosophical problems according to prevalent theories at that time. Mao commented that "it was a simplistic way, but we cannot treat these problems too simplistically." Shaking Feng's hands, Mao encouraged him: "Do speak out in contending please. Yours is one of the hundred schools of thought, and I have been reading whatever you write." Moreover, in April, 1957, Mao invited Feng You-lan and other leading scholars to have dinner with him, accompanied by Hu Sheng. Mao said to Feng and Hu that "you have fought each other with pens."<sup>14</sup> But Mao did not imply who was right and who was not.

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<sup>13</sup> Hu Sheng, 1957; Feng You-lan, 1957d .

<sup>14</sup> Feng You-lan, 1984: 158-161; 1985: 149-150.

In late April, that is, just after the dinner, Mao dramatically changed his attitude towards intellectuals and their opinions, as we have seen in Chapter Three. As a result, thousands of intellectuals were labelled as elements of the Rightist. Luckily, Feng You-lan survived the Campaign: he was not labelled as the "Rightist", nor was he criticised. In January, 1958, however, Mao asked all members of the Central Committee of the CCP to read Feng's *Once again on the Question of Inheriting China's Legacy*.<sup>15</sup> It seemed that Mao did not agree with Feng on the question of inheritance, for just after Mao asked people to read Feng's article, the criticism of Feng You-lan was launched in the press, especially in the *Philosophical Research*. When Feng listened to these criticisms, he thought that "I should not have responded to the Party's call and should have written nothing." In May, Feng had to make a self-criticism, in which he located himself amongst "the hidden hibernated animals who attempted to start showing themselves in the early spring since the policy of letting a hundred schools of thought contend was put forward". He saw his idea as a reactionary one, which pretended to be one of the hundred school of thought, and which was used to contend against Marxism and to "correct" Marxism. He even accused himself of being used by the Rightists at Peking University, who declared that they (abstractly, Feng thought) inherited the May Fourth Tradition, a tradition of fighting for freedom and democracy.<sup>16</sup>

Unlike the former criticisms of Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and of the Rightists, Feng You-lan was not politically accused this time. He even published another article on the relationship between theory and practice in the

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<sup>15</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 382.

<sup>16</sup> Feng You-lan, 1958<sup>a</sup>.

*Guangming Daily* on 8 June, 1958: *Create an Antithesis*. Before Feng, Mao wrote his *On Practice* in 1937 and published it in 1950. Mao summarised that knowledge starts with practice, reaches the theoretical plane via practice, and then has to return to practice: to serve practice on the one hand, and through practice, to verify and develop theory on the other.<sup>17</sup> In 1950, Feng You-lan praised Mao for his *On Practice*, which, Feng claimed, developed Marxism and solved the traditional problem of Chinese philosophy, *i.e.*, the relationship between generality and specificity, which lasted through the history of Chinese philosophy.<sup>18</sup> But in 1958, Feng put forward the question on the relationship between theory and practice from another angle: Who are philosophers? Whom should be trained in the philosophy department at universities?

Firstly, Feng agreed that a Marxist should both grasp theory and apply theory to practical problems. But, Feng argued, there was still a division of labour in Chinese society, and thus some people would specifically, or mainly, be doing theoretical work, while some others would specifically, or mainly, be doing practical work.

Secondly, there were various jobs under the name of theoretical work. Feng distinguished 'philosopher' from 'philosophical worker' by defining the former as a person who has his own philosophical system and the latter as someone who has not. Therefore, a philosopher does not have to be a philosophical worker, and a philosophical worker by no means is necessarily a philosopher. There was a difference between a person's ideas and his profession. A philosophical worker could be a good

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<sup>17</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1954<sup>a</sup>: 284, 292, 297.

<sup>18</sup> Feng You-lan, 1950<sup>d</sup>.

professor in philosophy, but he may not qualify as a philosopher under Feng's definition. Philosophers cannot be trained or fostered, they are gifted geniuses.

Thirdly, a philosophy department at a university should accordingly train and foster philosophical workers. The main task of these philosophical workers was not to carry out ideological education or political propaganda in a village or a factory, but instead, to study theories assiduously.

Finally, Feng insisted that Chinese society did need a large number of this kind of philosophical workers, who should be trained over a comparatively long time and thus should be trained as soon as they enrolled as first-year students.<sup>19</sup>

After Feng published his article on practice and theory, the CCP decided to criticise him severely. On 30 June, 1958, Chen Bo-da, Mao's ghost-writer and secretary in charge of ideology, made a public speech at the Conference to Celebrate the CCP's 37th Anniversary at Peking University. In front of thousands of students and staff, Chen Bo-da declared that Feng You-lan actually put forward a formula of "from theory, via practice, to theory ", in order to oppose Mao's formula of "from practice, via theory, to practice ". Chen Bo-da told his audience:

Having been emancipated for eight years, you are still shackled by idealism. You are being trained to be armchair philosophers who, from the theory to the theory which is meditated in study, are useless to the people

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<sup>19</sup> Feng You-lan, 1958b.



at all . Does Mr Feng You-lan's anti-materialist formula not actually express such an attempt? <sup>20</sup>

Chen Bo-da's speech was entitled *Under Comrade Mao Ze-dong's Flag* and published in the *Red Flag*, a theoretical magazine of the Central Committee of the CCP whose chief-editor was, appointed by Mao, Chen Bo-da himself.<sup>21</sup> Chen Bo-da also criticised Feng's idea on the inheritance of China's philosophical legacy in the *Red Flag* a year later. He attacked Feng as a man who "sought to reserve the ancient Chinese idealist system in a certain form, and to inherit the Chinese feudal morality of the ruling class as an eternal morality".<sup>22</sup>

After Chen Bo-da's speech at Peking University, Feng You-lan had to criticise himself more sternly. He admitted that he had tried to qualify the fact of philosophers being divorced from practice in his article on theory and practice, and to reserve a place for idealism in his article on inheriting China's legacy. It was not only a serious struggle in philosophical and educational fields, "but a grim class struggle as well." He accused himself of being a key figure amongst Chinese bourgeois philosophers who, being unwilling to see their philosophical and educational ideas dying, launched a counter-attack against Marxism during the Hundred Flowers Period.<sup>23</sup>

Only in the 1980s, was Feng You-lan able to say that, of all his articles since 1949, the majority of which were mainly taken up with reporting

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<sup>20</sup> Chen Bo-da, 1958.

<sup>21</sup> Cf., Mao Ze-dong, 1969:173-175.

<sup>22</sup> Chen Bo-da, 1959.

<sup>23</sup> Feng You-lan, 1958<sup>c</sup>, 1958<sup>d</sup>.

what he had written in the 1940s, only the exceptional ones on "theory and practice" and on "inheritance of China's legacy" expressed his ideas.<sup>24</sup>

But in those days, he could not make any counter-criticism. On the other hand, unlike the criticism of Hu Feng, of Ding Ling, of Zhou Yang, or the criticism of the Rightists, the criticism of Feng You-lan never developed into a real political campaign. From 1959 to 1966, Feng You-lan was still officially treated as a distinguished scholar, who could attend certain high level meetings and talk to Mao and other CCP leaders from time to time, and who could also write his *A New History of Chinese Philosophy*, and publish his academic research, including 2-volume of his *A New History of Chinese Philosophy*.<sup>25</sup>

In 1966, like many others, Feng You-lan became labelled as one of the "reactionary bourgeois leading scholars" at Peking University, although he was not a main target of the Cultural Revolution. Like many other well-known intellectuals, Feng underwent a series of punishments: his salary was cut down from ¥335 to ¥24 per month, another five families moved into his house, his private collection of books was sealed up (but fortunately, not damaged), and he himself was denounced at public meetings and kept apart from his family and society to receive the so-called "isolated examination".

In 1968, Mao mentioned Feng You-lan once in a speech at a high level meeting. Mao said: "There is a man called Feng You-lan at Peking University, who teaches idealist philosophy. We only know materialism,

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<sup>24</sup> Feng You-lan, 1985: 261-291.

<sup>25</sup> Cf., Feng You-lan, 1963, 1964.

but not idealism. If we want to know a little bit of the latter, we should go to see him [Feng You-lan]. ... Feng is still useful. Intellectuals should be esteemed as far as their dignity is concerned."<sup>26</sup> Feng You-lan was thus released and went home. He was asked to write a letter of thanks to Mao.

In 1971, Xie Jing-yi, one of Mao's favourites during the Cultural Revolution and then one of his "commissioners" at Peking University, visited Feng You-lan. Xie told Feng that Mao was thankful for Feng's letter of 1968, and Mao also asked Xie to send his regards to Feng. Responding to Mao's concern with another letter of thanks, Feng eulogised Mao as "the philanthropist who does not abandon anyone," and promised that he, as a rotten stump, would germinate under the influence of Mao's "spring wind".<sup>27</sup>

Feng did germinate. In 1973, Mao decided to launch another campaign, the Criticism of Lin Biao & Confucius. The purpose of the campaign was not simply as the campaign-makers including the Gang of Four declared, to criticise Confucius who had died thousands of years before, or to criticise Lin Biao who had died two years previously. But instead, its purpose was to criticise "the Modern Confucian", which was Zhou En-lai, as later known. People like Guo Mo-ruo came under fire first.

Thinking that he would be targetted for his pro-Confucianist ideas since the 1920s, Feng You-lan was initially nervous about the Campaign. He remembered that when Mao saw him in 1964, he had pointed out that "you and Guo Mo-ruo are on one side in terms of your attitude towards

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<sup>26</sup> Feng You-lan, 1985: 172-173.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 174.

Confucius."<sup>28</sup> To escape the fire, Feng made up his mind to join in with the Criticism of Confucius. He made two speeches at public meetings, which were later published in the *Journal of Peking University*. Feng You-lan in his articles criticised not only Confucianism and his own New Neo-Confucianism, but also his "abstract inheritance". He considered Confucianism as a reactionary ideological system even in Confucius' time, and his own pro-Confucianism as "a series of ideas which was in the service of the big landlord class, the big bourgeoisie, the KMT's reactionaries, before 1949, and in the service of the counter-revolutionary revisionists like Liu Shao-qi after 1949". As to his "abstract inheritance", Feng admitted that, despite some superficial self-criticisms, he actually abided by it when he wrote his *A New History of Chinese Philosophy*.<sup>29</sup>

Feng's articles attracted Mao's attention. After a careful reading of them including several changes in wording and marking, Mao ordered that Feng's articles be printed in the *Guangming Daily* with a short editorial note on 3-4 December, 1973. The day after, they were reprinted in nearly all newspapers. Feeling that the editorial note must be written by Mao himself or some other important person such as Jiang Qing, Feng You-lan was really grateful and became more and more active in the Campaign.<sup>30</sup> Whereas nearly all China's established intellectuals kept their distance from politics or were forced to be silent on it in those days, Feng became a new star who, unfortunately, came onto the stage too late. He wrote

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<sup>28</sup> Feng You-lan, 1985:151, 174-175.

<sup>29</sup> Feng You-lan, 1973<sup>a</sup>, 1973<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> Cf., Feng You-lan, 1975<sup>b</sup>: 1-6; 1976; also Feng You-lan, 1985: 174-176. Feng You-lan was actually misled, that editorial note was written by a deputy chief-editor of the *Guangming Daily* rather than Mao or Jiang Qing or any other important person.

articles, he composed poetry *On History*, he published a new book *On Confucius*, and above all, he became a high-level consultant of the famous *Liang Xiao* (Two Universities), *i.e.*, the Critical Writer Team of Peking University and Qinghua University.<sup>31</sup>

From 1974 to 1976, Feng You-lan was a unique privileged intellectual who was visited by Jiang Qing, and even accompanied her on a trip to Tianjin. Following Jiang Qing, Feng You-lan claimed that "whether pro-Confucianism or anti-Confucianism was not a question of academic research, but rather, a question of current political struggle."<sup>32</sup>

It is not clear if Feng knew that Jiang Qing and others were actually criticising Zhou En-lai, but Feng did know that "Jiang Qing is on behalf of, and speaks for, Chairman Mao".<sup>33</sup> In his poetry, Feng expressed his deep thankfulness to Mao who brought a spring wind.

It turned out that Feng was not absolutely right, for once the campaign had started Mao said that "Jiang Qing does not speak for me." Anyway Mao's or Jiang Qing's spring wind did not blow onto everyone. One example was Liang Shu-ming. Like Feng You-lan, Liang was one of the few traditional Confucians to survive in modern China. In the Criticism of Confucius, he was asked to follow Feng You-lan to change his attitude towards Confucianism. But unlike Feng, he refused, quoting Confucius that "the Three Armies can be deprived of their commanding officer, but even a common man cannot be deprived of his purpose." As a result,

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<sup>31</sup> Feng You-lan, 1974, 1975<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> Feng You-lan, 1973<sup>b</sup>, 1975<sup>a</sup>, 1975<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> Cf., Feng You-lan, 1975<sup>a</sup>; 1975<sup>b</sup>: 1-6; 1985: 176, 180-182.

Liang was nearly accused of being a counter-revolutionary.<sup>34</sup> Ironically, when the Gang of Four were arrested in October, 1976, Feng You-lan lost face while Liang Shu-ming was highly praised. Feng himself admitted in 1985 that in fact he just tried to "please the public and the leaders with claptrap" during the period of the Criticism of Confucius.<sup>35</sup>

For a certain period after 1977, Feng's words and deeds were not acceptable to most of China's intellectuals and to the regime, though even then Feng You-lan was recognised as China's most outstanding philosopher this century by China's intellectuals and the Chinese authorities. Before his death in December 1990, Feng at last finished his 8-volume *A New History of Chinese Philosophy*, which had been rewritten after 1977.<sup>36</sup>

From Feng You-lan's experience, we can see that he, as a member of the old-type intellectuals, had been always passively following the CCP, except one or two occasions. The CCP, on the other hand, indeed used

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<sup>34</sup> Liang Shu-ming, in Wang Dong-lin, 1987, Vol.5, pp. 102-108; Cf., Alitto, 1979: 332. The English translation of Confucius' quotation is adopted from Confucius, 1979: 99.

<sup>35</sup> Feng You-lan, 1985: 148, 176, 183.

<sup>36</sup> Feng had begun rewriting his *The History of Chinese Philosophy* since 1950, according to orthodox ideas. But because of continual political and ideological struggle, the "orthodox ideas" were always changing, and until 1966, Feng could only finish two volumes of it. In the Criticism of Confucius (1974-1975), Feng had to rewrite it, and published Volume One, in which Feng greatly pandered to the Gang of Four. Therefore, after 1978, he had to rewrite it again. In the newly finished *A New History of Chinese Philosophy*, Feng still declared that he followed Marxist philosophy rather than his New Neo-Confucianism. But totally unlike the two volumes published in the 1960s, and the one published in 1975, it adopted a critical attitude towards Mao's ideas. Cf., Feng You-lan, 1963, 1964, 1975<sup>c</sup>, 1982-1989.

Feng when he was thought useful, but never actually treated him as dangerous as Fei Xiao-tong, Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, and as Hu Feng, Ding Ling, Zhou Yang. The old-type intellectuals could be useful for the CCP both technically and politically, like the cases of Hua Luo-geng and Feng You-lan, but they experienced less trouble than the revolutionary intellectuals.

## II. Left-wing Writer GUO MO-RUO

Guo Mo-ruo (1892-1978) was a prolific man of letters in modern China who was active and prominent in both academic research and literary creation, especially in ancient Chinese history, palaeography, archaeology, in poetry, drama, and also in translation of foreign literature. Since the 1930s, he had been playing the role of the CCP's mouthpiece in ideological and cultural circles, and in 1938, suggested by Zhou En-lai, Guo Mo-ruo became CCP set-up number one intellectual.

After being strictly trained in Chinese classics at the family school, 13-year-old Guo Mo-ruo attended a newly established Western-style school, and in 1914, when he was twenty he left China for Japan, where he stayed for ten years to study medicine. It was in Japan that he started reading Western literature, especially the works of Whitman, Goethe, and Nietzsche, which affected him so deeply that before he finished his medical study he had already become a famous poet for his fresh and original free verse written in the vernacular. In 1921, Guo published *The Goddesses*, the first collection of his poems written in 1919-1921. *The Goddesses* was widely considered amongst the modern classics of Chinese

poetry, which made Guo Mo-ruo a pioneer of romantic poetry during the May Fourth Era.<sup>37</sup>

Also in 1921, Guo Mo-ruo and his close Chinese friends in Japan formed the *Creation Society*, a romantic and individualistic literary group to promote the slogan of "art for art's sake".<sup>38</sup> Its key figures included Cheng Fang-wu, Yu Da-fu, Zhang Zi-ping, Tian Han, and Zhen Bo-qi. All became famous men of letters. At the suggestion of Guo Mo-ruo, the Society published the *Creation Quarterly* in 1922, and the *Creation Weekly* in 1923.

In 1924, by reading and translating Japanese Marxist Kawakami Hajime's *Social Organisation and Social Revolution*, Guo Mo-ruo claimed to be converted to Marxism, and then the *Creation Society* turned to the Left. Guo Mo-ruo felt it ridiculous for intellectuals to appeal for individual freedom for themselves in a society where the majority of the people had no freedom at all. He maintained that intellectuals had to sacrifice their own individuality and freedom temporarily in order to plead the case for the freedom of the masses. After that, Guo Mo-ruo and his friends in the *Creation Society* became more and more radical, in either criticising intellectuals as members of the bourgeoisie, appealing to them to "aufheben"(sublate) themselves to leave the bourgeoisie and to identify themselves with the proletariat, or in arguing that everything that was

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<sup>37</sup> Cf., "My Childhood", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1958<sup>b</sup>; "Before and after the Revolution", "Student Days", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1958<sup>c</sup>; "The Goddesses", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1957<sup>f</sup>. Also Cf., Roy, 1971; Yuan, 1979; Sun Dang-bo, 1987: 10-170.

<sup>38</sup> "Ten Creative Years", Guo Mo-ruo, 1961; Zheng Bo-qi, 1959.



revolutionary was good, and that, therefore, a good piece of literary work should be revolutionary.<sup>39</sup>

In February, 1926, Guo Mo-ruo left Shanghai for Canton, the revolutionary centre at that time. Guo Mo-ruo obtained the post of dean of the Faculty of Arts at Guangzhou University. Later, he abandoned his liberal individualistic career and became the first writer to get involved in the Northern Expedition against warlords in North China. He was appointed as chief of the Propaganda Section, and then, deputy director of the General Political Department, in the Northern Expedition Army led by Chiang Kai-shek. Guo left his family for the Northern Expedition. However, during the Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek started cleaning up the Army by getting rid of all Communists. As a result, Zhou En-lai and others had to withdraw from the Army. Guo Mo-ruo was becoming angry with what Chiang had done, and on 31 March, 1927, that is, two weeks before Chiang butchered Communists in Shanghai, published his widely-read *Please Look at Today's Chiang Kai-shek* in the *Central Daily*. Guo accused Chiang of being "the key figure at the core of counter-revolutionary forces: gangsters and local ruffians, local tyrants and evil gentry, corrupt officials and traitorous warlords, all kinds of reactionaries."<sup>40</sup> In May, Chiang issued a wanted circular to arrest and punish Guo Mo-ruo.

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<sup>39</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, "A Preface to Collected Literary Essays", "The Awakening of Artists and Writers", and "Revolution and Literature", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1959 c: 3-4, 302-311, 312-322; Cheng Fang-wu, 1981. Also Cf., Yuan, 1979, chapter II; Schuarcz, 1986: 174-175, 190; Lee, in Fairbank and Feuerwerker(ed.), 1986: 422-423; and Sun, 1987: 250-256.

<sup>40</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, " Please Look at Today's Chiang Kai-shek ", 1958d: 122.

In August, 1927, Guo joined the communist Nanchang Uprising led by Zhou En-lai, and was elected as one of the seven leading members. Introduced by Zhou, Guo became a CCP member. If he had not had a serious case of typhus, Guo might have been sent to the USSR by the CCP. In the end, he left China for Japan, where he spent another ten years.<sup>41</sup> But this time, his career was changed into academic research on ancient Chinese history, on interpreting inscriptions on bones, tortoise shells, or bronze objects. By writing plenty of academic works, including *A Study of Ancient Chinese Society* (1929), *A Study of the Writing of Oracle Bones* (1929), and *A Collection of the Studies on Bronze Inscriptions* (1932), from 1928 to 1937, Guo Mo-ruo was known not only a romantic poet, a revolutionary figure, but also a scholar who, for the first time in China, tried to do research on Chinese ancient history from the Marxist point of view.

In Japan, Guo also wrote four volumes of his own autobiography, some satire, essays on Chinese literary affairs, especially on the argument between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang, and translated literary and academic works, including Marx's *German Ideology*. Guo's scholarly life was interrupted when the Japanese army invaded China and the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out in 1937. He could no longer stay at his study, and, with the assistance of his friends, quietly left his Japanese wife and children, and escaped from Japan. "Once again it is my turn to renounce the pen for the sword and to request a cord for a military assignment, I have to leave my wife and children and to cut my sentimental ties with them." Nobody knows how many Chinese intellectuals were deeply moved by Guo's sentences at that time.

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<sup>41</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, "A Night at Nanchang", 1958<sup>d</sup>: 213-226; Sun, 1987: 290-297.

Shortly after his arrival, the CCP got in touch with him and he became a secret Party member. Persuaded by Zhou En-lai on behalf of the CCP, Guo in the end unwillingly agreed to take up the post of the head of the Culture Section in the Nationalist Government. Guo Mo-ruo then played the role of a non-party personage occupying the middle ground between the CCP and the KMT in appearance, but in fact, he was an intellectual leader within Left-wing literary and cultural circles appointed by the CCP.<sup>42</sup> During the Resistance against Japan, Guo Mo-ruo gathered nearly all of the prominent Left-wing writers and artists in the KMT area to follow the CCP. Guo's house became the place where Zhou En-lai met these intellectuals frequently, instructing them and listening to them.

Guo himself as China's best-known intellectual became a high official in the Nationalist Government. He spread the KMT's propaganda about its policy in the course of the Resistance against Japan on the one hand, and acted as the CCP's loudspeaker to criticise the KMT on the other. He wrote historical plays, published historical works, considering the past as an illumination of the present. His works and plays were highly praised by the CCP including Mao and Zhou, who not only generally considered that Guo's historical plays and researches were greatly beneficial to the people and the revolution, but also concretely polished his works,

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<sup>42</sup> Cf., Zhou En-lai, 1988: 140-143; Guo Mo-ruo, " Song of the Rolling Billows " in Guo Mo-ruo, 1959<sup>b</sup>:16-26, 37-44; Xia Yian, 1985: 375-392. Guo's Party membership was not revealed to the public until 1958 when it was announced that he had joined the CCP, and only in 1978, when he died, were people told that he had been a CCP member since 1927. Cf., RMRB, 28 December, 1958; Deng Xiao-ping, 1978; Wu Qi-ru, 1980; and Wang Ting-fang, 1986.

attended the performances, and publicised them.<sup>43</sup> Amongst Guo's works in the 1940s, the most influential ones were the historical play *Qu Yuan* and the academic work *Ten Critical Treatises*.

After Japan's surrender in 1945, the conflict between the CCP and the KMT was further intensified. Guo Mo-ruo became more outspoken for the CCP during the KMT-CCP negotiation period in KMT areas, and, together with some other well-known personages, he was even beaten up by the KMT's plainclothes men at public meetings. When civil war broke out in 1946, Guo and many other revolutionary intellectuals in the KMT area were in danger, and he was still playing his unique role, *i.e.*, on the surface a non-party personage but in fact a loudspeaker for the CCP, who was trying to win over those intellectuals in the middle, and help to build up the so-called "patriotic democratic front". In 1946 when he had to leave the KMT area because the negotiations between the CCP and the KMT broke down, Zhou En-lai wrote to Guo Mo-ruo,

to isolate the reactionary dictator [Chiang Kai-shek], we need to strike from both within and without, and it is you [Guo Mo-ruo] who strikes from within.<sup>44</sup>

Guo Mo-ruo's revolutionary career made him so outstanding amongst China's left-wing intellectuals that in 1949, when the People's Republic was established, he, still as a non-party personage, became one of the four vice premiers under Zhou and one of the chairmen of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference next to Mao and Zhou.

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<sup>43</sup> Cf., Mao Ze-dong, 1956: 169; 1983: 221, 241-242; Zhou En-lai, 1988: 205-209; 216-217.

<sup>44</sup> Zhou En-lai, 1988: 371-372.

After 1949, however, Guo Mo-ruo became more like a symbolic "piece of furnishing" than a functional ideologue for the CCP. Unlike Zhou Yang and Lu Ding-yi, Guo Mo-ruo did not get involved in organising political campaigns to criticise intellectuals, though he should be considered a committed intellectual. He wrote volumes of poems to sing the praises of the CCP, in which the slogan of "Long Live Chairman Mao!" could be frequently read. Until 1974, every time the Party launched a political campaign, Guo would speak out to justify it.

Guo Mo-ruo was the person who wrote the article *Reading A Report on Wu Xun's History in the Criticism of The Life of Wu Xun*, and he was also the man who made his *Three Suggestions* in the Criticism of Hu Shi. In 1955, he participated in attacking Hu Feng. At first, he wrote a lengthy article to criticise Hu Feng's 300,000-word *Report*, in which Guo argued with Hu more or less reasonably. For instance, Guo refuted Hu's complaint that the Party put five daggers over writers' head, by arguing that, as a matter of fact, none of the Party men had ever said that writers must have already obtained a perfect Communist world outlook, or successfully remoulded themselves into Communists, before they could create literary works.<sup>45</sup> But when Mao identified Hu and his friends as counter-revolutionaries, Guo changed his tone, describing Hu Feng as a wolf and asking to punish him more severely than those in the Suppress Counter-revolutionaries Campaign in 1950.<sup>46</sup>

Guo Mo-ruo also actively got involved in the Anti-Rightists Campaign in 1957. At the beginning of the Campaign, he justified the punishment of

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<sup>45</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1955<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>46</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1955<sup>b</sup>, 1955<sup>c</sup>.

intellectuals who were asked to speak out by the CCP during the Hundred Flowers period, punning upon Mao's famous slogan "Do not blame speakers". His own revision was: "Do not blame innocent speakers". He also added that, in spite of Mao's request for "gentle wind and mild rain" in the Campaign, the targets had to be soaked, and even if the wind and rain were not gentle and mild, they should endure them.<sup>47</sup> Along with the Campaign, Guo Mo-ruo appeared everywhere. As chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles, he made a caustic speech about Ding Ling and Feng Xue-feng. Guo told his audience that as early as the 1940s he had already felt something wrong in Ding Ling's literary writing, and in the 1950s he found that Feng Xue-feng's self-declaration of being a disciple of Lu Xun was actually a falsehood. As president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, he systematically criticised the *Several Suggestions* drafted by Hua Luo-geng, Fei Xiao-tong, and others, naming it an out-and-out anti-Party and anti-socialist proposal. Guo accused its drafters of driving a wedge between the CCP and scientists by concocting the proposal. As director of the Social Science Section at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, he called for carrying on the Campaign thoroughly within social science circles.<sup>48</sup>

After the Campaign, the CCP required China's intellectuals to be both red in politics and outstanding in profession. Guo Mo-ruo was chosen as the number one amongst the good examples and his double personality ended with the CCP's declaration that Guo Mo-ruo was to be recruited as a member of the CCP. But in fact, as I have shown, Guo had been a secret member of the CCP since 1927.

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<sup>47</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1957a.

<sup>48</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1957c, 1957b, 1957d.

All of this should not be superficially interpreted to mean that Guo Mo-ruo had been simply the CCP's parrot. As we have seen, he was the first well-known intellectual who made a self-criticism in the Campaign to Criticise the Film *The Life of Wu Xun* in 1951. In the campaign to criticise Hu Shi, Guo admitted that he did not care about the ideological struggle, and could not apply Marxism-Leninism correctly. As a result, he was "sluggish at struggling against bourgeois idealism, let it pass unchecked, and even encouraged it, being its ideological captive." Surprisingly, Guo concluded that to struggle against bourgeois idealism, there should be freedom of academic research:

Historical experiences tell us, whenever there is a living atmosphere of free discussion, there is flourishing academic development, otherwise there is not.<sup>49</sup>

In January, 1956, Guo Mo-ruo joined Zhou En-lai in praising China's educated people as members of the working class, and, earlier than Hua Luo-geng and others, Guo complained that since 1949, some high intellectuals left their professional jobs and became civil servants. But, Guo Mo-ruo went on, because what they did was not what they learned, they could not give full play to both their professional knowledge and their administrative skill. Many experts could not concentrate on their professional work because of too many posts, too many social activities, too many public meetings, and too many short-noticed tasks. Some of them got very unsuitable jobs, others were transferred too frequently; some had professional posts but no work to do, others had no post at all. Following Zhou En-lai, Guo Mo-ruo insisted that in a six-day week an

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<sup>49</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1954.

intellectual should spend five on his job and not have to spend more than one on political study, social events and meetings.

Guo criticised some people as dogmatists who used quotations from Marx and Lenin as a sort of panacea, and who read only a few books by Marx or from the Soviet Union, but seldom or never read anything else. Guo Mo-ruo claimed that Marxism-Leninism was no substitute for hammering out a conclusion on any given academic question. Instead, such a conclusion could only be reached by letting a hundred schools of thought contend. Therefore, free discussion should be encouraged, different opinions should be fully expressed, and independent thinking should be promoted. "Of course," Guo continued, "idealists opposed to Marxism-Leninism can voice their ideas too – they have every right to say what they like." As to scientific development in the West, Guo thought that in those years, science in the capitalist countries had made new progress, and China's scientists should learn from the West gladly. They should also study the classics and contemporary writings in the capitalist world, including idealist theories and so on.<sup>50</sup>

In 1956, it was Guo Mo-ruo who asked Lu Ding-yi, director of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP, to make the lengthy speech in which Lu fully elaborated the policy of "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred school of thought contend". Being asked why he required Lu Ding-yi to make that speech, Guo Mo-ruo answered: the progress of science and literature was badly affected by commandism, dogmatism, and formulism, which intervened in the work of scientists and writers too much. For instance, some Chinese local operas were banned, traditional

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<sup>50</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1956<sup>a</sup>, 1956<sup>b</sup>. Cf., Zhou En-lai, 1988: 524-525.



Chinese painting was despised, traditional Chinese medical science was labelled as "feudalist medicine", and Chinese biologists could not disagree with the Soviet experts. According to Guo Mo-ruo, both artistic creation and scientific research were the result of voluntary and independent thinking, and there should not be too much intervention from the authorities. However, since the CCP put forward the slogan of "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred school of thought contend", many scientists and writers still had some misgivings, thus Guo thought it was necessary to have a speech made by an important person such as Lu Ding-yi.<sup>51</sup>

It could be argued that, in fact, all of this was carefully engineered by the CCP behind the scenes, and Guo Mo-ruo was, at most, a good actor. If it was the case, there will still be some difficulties to explain the fact that almost every time Guo Mo-ruo was asked to play his loudspeaker role, he explained himself to his readers and listeners. In 1954, for example, he said that, as a matter of fact, he had never read Yu Ping-bo's works on *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, nor had he read Li Xi-fang's article and Feng Xue-feng's editorial note until Mao got angry. Another example is that, in 1955, when he attacked Hu Feng, he admitted that he had not realised that Hu Feng was a counter-revolutionary, instead, he had treated him as a friend for more than twenty years. In 1957, he also told people that he was shocked every time he read newspapers in which some writers and artists were announced as newly-found members of the "Rightist", and he always thought that Ding Ling and Feng Xue-feng had no problem in their ideological ideas and political stand.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1963: 318-321.

<sup>52</sup> Cf., Guo Mo-ruo, 1954, 1955<sup>b</sup>, 1955<sup>c</sup>, 1957<sup>e</sup>.

What is more, Guo Mo-ruo's complex personality, mixed feelings, and his relatively independent thinking could be further seen in his literary creations. In Guo's play *Madam Cai Wen-ji*,<sup>53</sup> Guo Mo-ruo portrayed her as a patriot who, on the one hand had been missing her country and dreaming of going back all the time; while on the other hand, she was a virtuous family member who suffered too much when she was asked by the Premier Cao Cao to leave her husband and children and return to the Han. When Guo Mo-ruo saw his play in performance, he shed tears, saying that in the play, "the Premier Cao Cao was the CCP and Cai Wen-ji was me!"<sup>54</sup> As we can see, Guo Mo-ruo not only had to be a exile in Japan for ten years, but also did have the experience of leaving his wife and children when the Sino-Japanese War broke out. Furthermore, we can see here, he not only had been a secret CCP member among the intellectual circles, playing the part of a non-party personage for decades while hoping that one day he could "go back to the Party", but also felt lost when he left his non-party intellectual friends and did go back to the Party in 1958, a year before he wrote *Madam Cai Wen-ji*.

Without doubt, from his private talking or writing, we can more easily penetrate his heart of hearts. In Guo Mo-ruo's personal letters to unknown friends in the 1950s, he wrote:

In recent years I threw my pen away altogether. I wrote almost nothing. Other people still consider me both 'literary writer' and 'scholar', but I, as an amphibian, really feel ashamed. ...Making a self-examination, I have actually achieved nothing. To look at my literary works, I find not even

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<sup>53</sup> Cai Wen-ji was a Chinese woman during the Han Dynasty, who wandered destitute far from her homeland and was then married off to a member of the Hun Nationality.

one single piece satisfactory; as to my academic research, I do not have a good grounding in it. I feel terribly aimless since the Liberation. I can do nothing in politics, while academic research has been totally left aside too. Facing the passing of time, I cannot help but feel dumbfounded and lost.<sup>55</sup>

Only in 1958, when Mao published some of his old-style Chinese poems, could Guo Mo-ruo dare to say that "I am a romantic!" And then he restarted his romantic literary creation, as a result, *Madam Cai Wen-ji*, *Empress Wu Ze-tian*, and other dramas were written and put on the stage. From 1959 to 1964, Mao even asked Guo Mo-ruo to examine Mao's poems and, if necessary, to revise them.<sup>56</sup> During this period, Mao and Guo also wrote old-style Chinese poems in reply to one another, using the same rhyme sequence.

However, as we have seen, after the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward, especially after 1962, Mao became more and more sensitive about the differences within the CCP and gradually decided that they were the reflection of the life-and-death class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. He specifically emphasised the problems in literary and historical circles. In December, 1963, when he criticised the "dead" (Zhou Yang and Xia Yan, Tian Han, Yang Han-sheng) who, according to Mao, "still dominate in many units of the literary and artistic circles", Mao added specifically that "there are more problems in dramatic circles".<sup>57</sup> As a result, as we have shown in Chapter Four, two outstanding play wrights, Tian Han and Xia Yan, were purged, and Mao

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<sup>54</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, "Preface of *Madam Cai Wen-ji*", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1959a; Cf. Cao Yu, 1978.

<sup>55</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1979.

<sup>56</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1958a; Mao Ze-dong, 1983: 566.

<sup>57</sup> Mao Ze-dong, in *HQ*, 1967, Vol. 9, pp.8-9.

Dun, the foremost Chinese novelist since the 1930s and the Culture Minister of the State Council since 1949, was dismissed. In the meantime, Mao started engineering the Cultural Revolution by sending his wife Jiang Qing secretly to Shanghai where she organised Zhang Chun-qiao and Yao Wen-yuan to draft the article *On the Newly-written Historical Play The Dismissal of Hai Rui*, a play written by the historian Wu Han.

In 1966, when talking about academic and educational circles, which, Mao judged, had been dominated by the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, he unequivocally said that

Guo Lao [Guo Mo-ruo] and Fan Lao [Fan Wen-lan] were members of the 'Emperor, King, General, and Official School' too. Fan Lao is interested on emperors, kings, generals, and officials. They object to talking big, but insist in examining historical details. ... It is a serious class struggle, and in future, it will be these people who practise revisionism. Wu Han, Jian Bo-zhan are both CCP members, but oppose the Communist Party and materialism.<sup>58</sup>

It was the first time that Mao had located Guo Mo-ruo among the bourgeois or petty bourgeois intellectuals who had Communist designation but practised revisionism, although Mao's words were not made to the public. Guo Mo-ruo would nevertheless had felt nervous if he had been informed of what Mao had said about him. About a year earlier, Guo received a letter from Mao in which he was told that Mao approved the academic criticism of Guo Mo-ruo from some other intellectuals.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1969: 634-635.. "Lao" in Chinese is a respectful form of address, thus "Guo Lao" means "the Venerable Guo". The "Emperor, King, General, and Official School" (Di Wang Jiang Xiang Pai) means those historians and writers who, it was said, exclusively wrote about members of the ruling class rather than common people. Jian Bo-zhan is another historian.

<sup>59</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1983 : 602-604.

It seemed that Guo Mo-ruo felt that there would be another political campaign following in which he might be involved as a target. In January 1966, Guo wrote a letter to the Party chief of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, asking to be allowed to resign all his posts there: President of the Academy, Director of the Social Science Section, Head of the History Institute, and President of the China University of Science & Technology. The reasons Guo listed in the letter were "private" and "pure": deafness and poor eyesight.<sup>60</sup> Guo even considered going down to the local areas and being a middle-school teacher.

From April 1966, academic criticism developed into political accusation, more and more scholars, writers and artists were labelled as the "reactionary bourgeois leading scholars". In both private and public, Guo told his friends, listeners, and foreigners that all that he had written in the past should be burnt because it was worthless.<sup>61</sup> It turned out that Guo Mo-ruo worried too much. Indeed, Guo Mo-ruo might have been criticised or attacked without the protection of Mao and Zhou En-lai, as Zhou Yang later pointed out. Mao ordered the publishing of Guo's speech about burning his works, and when one of his letters of the 1940s on the matter of literature and art in 1967 was republished, Mao deleted his original judgment that "Guo Mo-ruo has done very well in his historical plays". But nevertheless, it was Mao who told others that Guo and Fan Wen-lan should be protected from being criticised, when he named them as members of the 'Emperor, King, General, and Official School'. In Zhou En-lai's list of those who should be protected, Guo's name appeared

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<sup>60</sup> Cf., Chen Ming-yuan, 1982.

<sup>61</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1966<sup>a</sup>, 1966<sup>b</sup>; Chen Ming-yuan, 1982; Wang Ting-fang, 1986: 423-425.

second, just next to Madam Sun Yet-sen.<sup>62</sup> Guo Mo-ruo thus survived in those days whilst a great number of others, including two of his sons, did not.

From 1966 to 1972, Guo Mo-ruo mainly played a symbolic role of a well-known personage in the leadership instead of an outstanding intellectual in academic and artistic circles. Despite several poems written but fewer published, which were mostly occasional verses to please the leadership including one praising Jiang Qing, Guo's name appeared in the press often when he received foreign visitors from Japan or other countries. Guo Mo-ruo nevertheless took advantage of this opportunity to let some scientists who were under attack in their units show themselves in public, and Guo's appearances also encouraged some writers, for example, Ba Jin, who lost their personal freedom in those years to keep hopes of survival.<sup>63</sup> From 1972, partly because of the fall of Lin Biao, Mao's legal successor since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Guo Mo-ruo got involved in scientific policy-making under Zhou En-lai, who was in charge of the Party, State, and Army matters then. Unfortunately, this lasted only a short period.

In 1973, Mao criticised the Foreign Ministry, which had been supervised by Zhou En-lai since 1949 and was even a little shaken during the 1966-1969 period. Mao said that it ignored class struggle in ideological fields and instead, only paid attention to daily affairs. He warned that if such a tendency went on, there must be revisionism. Zhang Chun-qiao then displaced Zhou En-lai as the man in charge of the Political Bureau. In the

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<sup>62</sup> Mao Ze-dong, 1980: 257; Zhou En-lai, 1984: 450-451; Cf., Zhou Yang, in Jiang Qing-fu, 1990; Sun Dang-bo, 1987: 537.

<sup>63</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, 1967; 1977: 346-387; Cf., Li Yi-mang, 1985; and Ba Jin, 1978.

meantime, as he had done before the Cultural Revolution, Mao called in Jiang Qing, reciting his new poem for Guo Mo-ruo exclusively to her:

Guo Lao was a Communist in name, but who worships Confucius.  
 ...Gentleman, I advise you [Guo Mo-ruo] not to blame the First Emperor  
 of Qin so much,...The highly-praised Confucianism is in fact equal to  
 worthless chaff, ...Your *Ten Critical Treatises* are not great works. ... <sup>64</sup>

Acting on the orders of Mao or, as she declared, on behalf of Mao, Jiang Qing went to Peking University and Qinghua University where she organised the later notorious LIANG XIAO (the Critical Writer Team of Peking University and Qinghua University) to prepare another campaign, the "Criticism of Confucius", and to select and print Guo's works and articles as negative materials. From August 1973, the CCP's *Red Flag* and other newspapers such as the *Guangming Daily* began publishing critical articles written by Liang Xiao or others including Feng You-lan, and just after New Year's Day of 1974, a nationwide political campaign, the "Criticism of Confucius and Lin Biao", was launched.

Departing from his normal behaviour since 1949, if not 1938 or even 1927, Guo Mo-ruo kept silence this time. Guo's attitude provoked Jiang Qing and others among the leadership. On 25 January, 1974, in front of thousands of Party and State officials, including Zhou En-lai and Guo's family members, she ordered Guo to stand up, declared that Mao judged that Guo's attitude towards Confucius was exactly the same as Lin Biao's. She and Zhang Chun-qiao also called at Guo's house and asked him to criticise Confucianism or make self-criticism several times. Guo realised that the Campaign was actually aimed at Zhou En-lai, and therefore refused to write anything. He even told them that his *Ten Treatises* were

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<sup>64</sup> Mao Ze-dong, in Jin Chun-ming, 1985: 200.

written in the 1940s to allude to Chiang Kai-shek. That is to say, there was nothing wrong with them.

It cannot be denied that it must be very hard for a person who lived under the "Soviet-type Communist" one-party state with the specific unit system (as described in Chapter Two) to act entirely freely, not to speak of Guo Mo-ruo, who, in his eighties then, had been following the CCP and obeying Mao's order all the time. In fact, with a few exceptions, for instance, Liang Shu-ming, China's established intellectuals had to make self-criticism whenever they were asked by the CCP since 1949. Guo Mo-ruo thus wept at home, saying that he had implicated Zhou En-lai because of his attitude towards Confucius in his *Ten Treatises*, which were first published in Chongqing in the 1940s when Zhou was in charge of CCP and Left-wing circles in that area. Furthermore, after being visited by Jiang Qing who stayed for more than three hours, Guo contracted pneumonia, and was sent into hospital. It was said that Mao limited the criticism of Guo Mo-ruo, and Zhou En-lai told Guo not to make any self-criticism before carefully examining his works, it was also said that Guo Mo-ruo in the end admitted that his *Ten Treatises* was "obviously wrong".<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, Guo Mo-ruo was not criticised in the press, nor was his self-criticism, if there was any, published.

After the fall of the Gang of Four, Guo Mo-ruo was again considered as the first amongst China's revolutionary intellectuals and he enjoyed a high position in the state. The CCP declared that it wanted to put scientific, educational, and economic development above other matters. In

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<sup>65</sup> Wang Ting-fang, 1980.



March, 1978, several months before he died, Guo claimed with a high spirit that the "spring for sciences" had come at last:

From all of my experiences , I awaken to an absolute truth: only socialism could free the development of sciences, but also, only based on sciences could we build up socialism; sciences need socialism, but more importantly, socialism needs sciences. <sup>66</sup>

Shortly after Guo's death, the CCP dramatically changed its attitude towards intellectuals, which again became a part of the working class. The Cultural Revolution was then officially declared completely negative, nearly all the former political campaigns were considered either wrong or unnecessary, and those people who were put into gaol or sent down to labour camp such as Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Zhou Yang, were released and given important posts and/or a high reputation.

### III. Conclusion

For Feng You-lan, the question was how to get the trust from the ruling party, how to be recognised as a leading philosopher by the authorities, and how to find his place under the new "Communist" system. He always tried to please the CCP and its leaders, especially Mao, but in the end, he failed.

Unlike Feng You-lan, Guo Mo-ruo got his place and knew his status: he was a secret CCP member pretending to be a "non-party democratic personage", and he was also set up by the CCP in the 1940s as the "leading revolutionary intellectual of China's Left-wing writers and artists". For

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<sup>66</sup> Guo Mo-ruo, "The Spring for Sciences", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1978.

Guo Mo-ruo, the question was, bound to such status, how to be an intellectual who could have and express his own ideas.

Unlike Feng You-lan and Fei Xiao-tong, who were criticised or even purged, also unlike Zhou Yang and Hu Feng, who were further arrested and sent to jail for years, Guo Mo-ruo had never been criticised in any political campaign (in public, at least). To repay the CCP's kindness, Guo Mo-ruo abided by the authorities all the time.

In China, as a matter of fact, not only Guo Mo-ruo, but all the so-called "revolutionary intellectuals" as well, had such a double face in varying degrees: members of the ruling party and members of the intelligentsia. Unlike other kinds of intellectuals, for instance, the old-type intellectuals, they were party members; but unlike other Party members, for instance, the peasants in uniform, they were intellectuals. Had there not been contradictions between the Party and their intellectual ideals, they would have experienced their lives differently.

Of course, they were not exactly the same in the political campaigns. As we have said, intellectuals can be either conservative, liberal, critical, and radical. Some are Left-wing members, some are in the middle, and some others can be on the Right. In our case studies, we saw Hua Luo-geng as a natural scientist was politically passive in those campaigns, but Fei Xiao-tong was the social scientist in the democratic parties who tried to show his independence if it was possible. We also found that Feng You-lan as a traditional scholar hardly obtained as important a position as Guo Mo-ruo and even Zhou Yang, while Guo Mo-ruo as a CCP-appointed intellectual leader could have little opportunities to express his real feelings and ideas. Their problem cannot be simply explained from their personal

characteristics, but instead, their structural positions forced them to act as they did.

From these case studies, we have to conclude that simply to consider them the same is wrong. Even amongst one kind of intellectuals, for instance, the revolutionary intellectuals, there are still some differences. Hu Feng was the most unorthodox Left-wing writer in this period (1949-1976), while Zhou Yang changed from conservative to critical, and Guo Mo-ruo always suffered from being a double-speaker.

Above these differences, one question arising from our research is: under the "Soviet-type Communist" system, in which the ruling party replaces the state and the party's (and leader's) ideas become the only allowed ideological views, how could intellectuals as producers of ideas play their part in social life, and how could critical intelligentsia exist and continue to criticise the "dark side" of society?

From Guo Mo-ruo's experiences, we can realise that such a question in practice torments the intellectuals (who used to be critical towards the *status quo* and thus joined the Communist Party in order to change the *status quo*) all the time as long as the System itself is unchanged. Another way of getting rid of such torment for this kind of intelligentsia is: give up. Do they want to do so?

If we go on further with our research on China's established intellectuals in the post-Mao period, we will find the answer is not simple. But that would be another piece of work.

## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION**

Having explored the historical background of China's intellectuals, analysed the social conditions in which they lived and worked, examined the whole process of the political campaigns Mao and the CCP launched to criticise intellectuals, and having considered those established intellectuals who were targets of the campaigns, and further presented detailed case studies of four of the top established intellectuals, and demonstrated their various roles in the campaigns, from activists to targets, now we can draw our conclusions. The aim is to decide whether China's intellectuals should be considered to belong to a certain single class, whether they can freely move, or "float", up and down, and whether the number of their posts limited their political orientation and ideological expression, that is to say, whether it is true that the more and higher posts they occupy, the more passive they are.

### **I.**

In this research, I have deliberately written no special chapter on Mao, one of the greatest intellectuals in modern China since 1919. The reason is not rooted in the fact that, in spite of publishing five volumes of works carefully chosen from his massive writings and speeches, Mao spent most of his time engaged in practice rather than in theory, he was more of a revolutionary than a scholar, more of a politician than a political scientist, as Dick Wilson points out.<sup>1</sup> Neither have I excluded him because there have already been plenty of specific research studies on his ideas and

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<sup>1</sup> D. Wilson, 1980: 446.

practice, for example, a great and detailed work about the development of his thought by Stuart Schram.<sup>2</sup> In fact, I have written no special chapter on Mao because he, like many other great figures in history, is so complicated and controversial that without being giving considerable attention he can hardly be understood. However, if it had not been for Mao, the history of the PRC, if indeed such a republic had ever been established, would have been written in different words. The political campaigns, if they had existed, would have proceeded differently, and the research on China's intellectuals during this period, sociologically or non-sociologically, would have been done in another way, if indeed it was still necessary. Accordingly, to draw conclusions from the above research, I shall simply give some brief critical analyses of Mao's ideas on intellectuals and the practical implementation of these ideas.

In a country such as China where for thousands of years the majority of the population had no opportunity for an education, it was quite reasonable for that majority to consider the minority of educated "elites" as a privileged class or stratum, especially when these educated "elites" were the exclusive legal members of the officialdom, as it was in China before 1904.

A closer study of these people, however, would show a very different picture. Mao recognised this and correctly asserted that, before 1949, rather than forming a single class, China's educated people attached themselves both economically and politically to various social classes in

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<sup>2</sup> S. Schram, 1989.

general and to the ruling ones in particular.<sup>3</sup> Mao also found that the greatest weakness of China's educated "elites" was their isolation from, and contempt for, the masses of Chinese people.<sup>4</sup> As we have said in Chapter Three, Mao as the man who tried to lead his people, of whom more than 80 per cent were peasants without the capacity to read or write, to change the face of their nation and hence themselves within a few short decades, needed the educated people to aid in watering his so-called "poor and blank" garden. But in the meantime he demanded that educated people remould themselves into a new type of "intellectual workers with socialist consciousness". Without doubt, Mao's original attempt was not simply to criticise or punish China's educated people, but to win them over politically and further to change them into a new type of individual. He recognised that it would take a long time, and therefore asked his comrades in the CCP to be patient and to spare no pains in helping the educated people to remould themselves gradually.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> According to Mao, these classes were: Western capitalists, Chinese landlords, Chinese bureaucrat-capitalists, Chinese national capitalists, and Chinese small producers. Mao, 1977: 469- 470; 506-507.

<sup>4</sup> In this sense, Mao paradoxically considered that the more books people read, the more stupid they are. He even once said that "it is intellectuals who are most ignorant", and that "it is those who can hardly read and write that know better", and claimed that "only laymen can lead experts". Mao, 1954<sup>b</sup>: 10-11; 16-19; 1956: 32-34; 66-68; 1974: 204-211; 1969: 210-211; 1977: 468-470.

<sup>5</sup> Mao, 1977: 404-405. Even when he decided to launch the Anti-Rightist Campaign Mao insisted that the transformation of intellectuals would take quite a long time, and most of them should be considered kind-hearted, honest persons and hence ideologically changeable. And as late as December, 1958, he still tried to correct a widespread feeling in the CCP that "intellectuals are objects of the socialist revolution" because they were members of the bourgeoisie. Mao, 1969: 269-271; 1977: 443-444, 457-458; 1983: 554-555. Cf., Schram, 1989: 126-127.

The reason why Mao was sure that the educated people could be transformed into his new "intellectual workers" was because all those classes to whom they had attached themselves had been socially destroyed. In other words, "with the skin [old classes] gone, to what can the hair [the educated people] attach itself?"(PI ZHI BU CUN, MAO JIANG YAN FU) Mao therefore believed that there was no other way for China's educated people except to remould themselves into the "new intellectual workers with socialist consciousness" under the supervision of the CCP.

However, Mao recognised that this would never be easy for these educated people. They came over from the old society, and were nostalgic for their old habits, old orbits, and ways of life. They still looked with disdain on the "new skin" (new system) and had a very low opinion of the workers and peasants. Because of this, Mao labelled these educated people "gentlemen in mid-air" for the time being: on the one hand, they were unable to go back because their "old home" (those old classes) were already gone; on the other hand, they were still unwilling to attach themselves to the new system. But without a social basis, they could not fly in the air for ever. This was why Mao was confident that China's educated "elites" would eventually be transformed.

The problem is not that there are contradictions here. It was obvious that Mao needed these educated people but they could not be used without changing their world outlook; or that they would have to attach themselves to the new system in the end but it would take a long time for the CCP to win them over politically and ideologically. Mao indeed realised such contradictions. But the problem is that, when Mao realised these contradictions, he treated them in a very simplistic way. Firstly, he named all those who had received secondary or higher education,

"intellectuals" (ZHI SHI FEN ZI). For the sake of statistical analysis, all educated people can be categorised together, but it is dangerous to treat them as members of the same social group. Indeed, Mao always tried to differentiate the right-wingers from the left-wingers among intellectuals very carefully, but this was more of a political strategy to win them over. Secondly, after 1957, Mao further located them in the same class, or more strictly, the bourgeoisie, no matter if they were considered left-wing or right-wing. According to Mao, even those who came from the families of the working class and poor peasants, or those who joined the Revolution before 1949, were also members of the bourgeoisie, or at least, shared a bourgeois world outlook. This was because the former received a bourgeois education when they were at school, and the latter were mostly members of rich families before they got involved in the Revolution.<sup>6</sup>

It seems that Mao used the concept of "bourgeoisie" too widely. A possible explanation for this is that Mao had his own understanding of class. For instance, in the 1950s, when he considered Chinese educated people members of the bourgeoisie, he did not pay much attention to their socio-economic position, but talked about their family background and the education they had received. And further, in the 1960s, he shifted his approach to class from combining family background and education to emphasising political power and social privilege, which were seen as the key factors in the creation of the newly-born bourgeoisie from CCP cadres and intellectual "elites".

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<sup>6</sup> Mao, 1977: 424-427; 1989: 225, 228, 312, 354.



According to Mao, these people, among whom the so-called "intellectuals" were numerous, were called members of the CCP but were in fact members of the KMT. In his late years, Mao even declared that "the bourgeoisie are within the Communist Party indeed".<sup>7</sup>

Another explanation for Mao's wide use of the term "bourgeoisie" was that Mao, as a politician, always realised that the the majority of the supporters of, and participants in, his revolution were actually peasants and the "peasants in uniform" who could hardly read and write. Mao attempted to popularise scholarly knowledge and make it simplified and thus understandable for the common Chinese who could then apply it in practice.<sup>8</sup>

The third explanation, which is held by many scholars, both within and outside China today, is that Mao, again as a politician who declared his revolution "socialist" or "communist", used the label of "bourgeoisie" as the easiest weapon against those intellectuals and cadres who did not share his ideas. As a result, no matter what social group they belonged to, whether they were old-type intellectuals, the democratic personages, revolutionary intellectuals, or whatever, if they did not agree with him, they could be labelled members of the bourgeoisie and thus, sooner or later, be criticised or punished in the political campaigns.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Mao, 1969: 424-426; also Mao, in *HQ*, No.5, 1976. Cf., Schram, 1989: 158-171.

<sup>8</sup> Ding Ling, after having suffered from political punishment for two decades, insisted that Mao maintained that literature and art should be understandable and enjoyable for the masses of Chinese peasants and workers not because Mao himself could not appreciate the so-called "pure literature and art", but rather because he knew very clearly that his revolution was mainly made by and for the common people. Ding Ling, 1984<sup>b</sup>: 251, 262-266. Also Cf., D. Wilson, 1980: 446.

<sup>9</sup> Cf., Schram, 1989: 169-171.

All these explanations are in some degree reasonable and correct, but through examining the whole process of those political campaigns I would consider that the first is the strongest, and Mao's practice of launching political campaigns to criticise intellectuals is really based on his idea of class and class struggle.

The problem is that Mao's concept of "class" is too simplistic and at the same time ambiguous. When I say it is too simplistic I mean that, when he denied that intellectuals could be members of the petty bourgeoisie, and when he declared that in fact there are only two schools of thought among the so-called "hundred schools of thought" (the proletarian, or the bourgeois),<sup>10</sup> it seemed that he forgot or, perhaps more precisely, did not pay enough attention to, the fact that Chinese society before 1949 was pre-capitalist. He also ignored the fact that many educated people actually lost their positions due to the abolition of the Civil Examination System. Some became self-employed, and thus independent, writers and artists.<sup>11</sup>

Mao's concept of "class" is also ambiguous because, when he labelled all the educated people members of the bourgeoisie, he considered their family background, education, political behaviour, and ideological orientation as key factors without examining their relation with, and their position in, production. The concept of the bourgeoisie can hardly be applied to the educated people in a state such as China where the ruling party controls all the means of production, including educated people themselves.

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<sup>10</sup> Mao, 1977: 427; 1989: 228, 286, 301, 332, 369.

<sup>11</sup> As a matter of fact, even in an advanced capitalist society there are plenty of social members who fall between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

As to the officials ("cadres") within the CCP, Mao never made it clear whether all of them should be seen as members of the newly-born bourgeoisie because of their privileged positions, or whether just some of them should be seen so because of their political stand. From his practice, it seemed he meant the latter, which theoretically is more confusing.

The failure of Mao's practice to win China's educated people over is, of course, partially because his aim was too ambitious: to entirely transform their world outlook within a comparatively short period. Mao clearly realised that an educated person who lost his/her former location and was given a new job in a unit run by the state would not necessarily "share socialist consciousness with the proletariat". His way of dealing with this, that is, launching a series of political campaigns to criticise and punish them, was contradictory to his aim, however.

And worse, he became more and more impatient, and accordingly his political campaigns were more and more tense. The number of targets increased, attention shifted from unknown to distinguished figures, from non-Party to Party intellectuals. And what is more, every time, ideological criticism turned out to be political attack, and theoretical difference was resolved through disciplinary punishment. As a result, many educated individuals including established ones were labelled as "bourgeois individualists", "elements of the Rightist", "members of the Hu Feng Clique", "followers of Zhou Yang", *etc.*, and then criticised and punished. This partly explains the fact Mao was complained against so much and widely by China's intellectuals after his death.

Nevertheless, Mao is considered the greatest among Chinese politicians and intellectuals. His theory of Chinese society and Chinese revolution was generally considered the most profound idea to emerge this century in China and was widely received as the guiding ideology of the CCP in 1942 and of the PRC in 1949. As a politician in a "Soviet-type Communist" one-party state, Mao's power needed to be justified and legitimised ideologically by so-called "Mao Ze-dong Thought". In the meantime, as an intellectual who tried to change that society according to his ideas, Mao needed to preserve and protect his ideas from any suspicion and challenge by his authorised position. Such an intellectual-political hegemony is practically possible only if the man who enjoys it is both intellectually pre-eminent and politically superior.

## II.

The first conclusion we can draw from this research is that, after 1949, as well as before that time, China's educated people were in fact not in the same position and thus should not have been treated as members of the same social group. As to the established intellectuals, it is also difficult to locate them in the same social stratum. In the period of 1949-1976, as we have seen, these people belonged to at least three different strata: the "revolutionary intellectuals" who were ruling officials, the "democratic personages" who were the privileged group without real power, and the "old-type intellectuals" who were the state-employed professionals. It is all right to call these three kinds of people "intellectuals", but socio-politically they were in different positions and thus had different functions or roles.

As far as their ideological orientations are concerned, Zhou Yang and Ding Ling were, or at least claimed to be, Marxists, while Fei Xiao-tong and Zhang Bo-jun were, to a certain extent, Western-style democrats and liberals, and Feng You-lan and Liang Shu-ming were traditional Confucians. If we divided them ideologically in general, the difference of "intelligentsia" to "intellectuals" would be more convincing. But a simple and one-sided theoretical approach to China's educated people only makes the matter more confusing.

As we have seen in Chapter Two, China's traditional literati used to attach themselves to the state institutionally because of the Civil Examination System, but lost their privileged access to officialdom at the beginning of this century. From 1904 to 1949, there appeared a new kind of educated man and woman: the revolutionary intellectuals, who became the vanguards of both the KMT and the CCP. This kind of intellectuals should be considered more members of critical, or even radical, intelligentsia than just intellectuals in general.

In the meantime, there was another kind of educated people: the individual intellectuals who kept a distance from politics. Though I call them "old-type intellectuals" in this research, they were in fact not just the traditional Chinese literati, for they were no longer tied to officialdom due to the abolition of the Civil Examination System, and most of them were, in varying degrees, Westernised through either going abroad or studying modern Western natural and social sciences. Most members of this group can be seen as Gramsci's "traditional intellectuals".

Both the revolutionary intellectuals and the old-type intellectuals in this period (1904-1949) shared one thing in common: unlike both their

ancestors and descendants they were neither members of the officialdom due to the expiry of their "privileged pass" (the Civil Examination System), nor employed by the state unit under which it was hard to transfer from teaching to researching, to move from the north to the south, and to express their own independent opinions through the official press. Living in the society ruled by the KMT, intellectuals could be arrested or murdered, but they could also organise their own intellectual societies or publish their academic and even political works. Chinese society under the KMT was never as well-organised as under the CCP. Therefore, after publishing *Please Look at Today's Chiang Kai-shek* Guo Mo-ruo could escape to Japan. While they were on KMT's "blacklist", Zhou Yang and Feng Xue-feng could travel to Yan'an or other "Red Areas". Even in KMT areas, Ding Ling and Xia Yan could publish their Left-wing magazines or newspapers, Feng You-lan and Fei Xiao-tong could do their "pure academic" research.

After 1949, the situation in China was changed institutionally. The educated people, like the commoners, lived in a specific, if not unique, system in which they were no longer considered as "free professionals", and less considered as "intellectuals" than they had been before. While they were scattered over all levels of society and therefore should not be seen as members of one specific class, they were all tied both socially and individually to their units.

And moreover, people's political positions were largely decided according to their "revolutionary" or "non-revolutionary" or even "counter-revolutionary" experiences before 1949 and their relations to the CCP before and after. And their specific role in political campaigns was accordingly predetermined by their position rather than their will or

choice. As we have shown, Hua Luo-geng took almost thirty years to join the CCP, and he was at most considered a red scientist in the end. Feng You-lan who tried his best to follow the CCP's policy all the time, but when he died in December, 1990, he was remembered as no more than an outstanding philosopher, a title which he had already been honoured in the 1940s. Guo Mo-ruo suffered from not being an independent writer for decades, while he could only express his desire in private. And Hu Feng tried to challenge the dominating post of the Party men, but after being in jail for nearly thirty years, he won the title of Left-wing Writer, which he had already obtained in the 1930s.<sup>12</sup> From here we reach the second conclusion: China's intellectuals in the PRC(1949-1976), no matter how established, could not freely move, or "float", up and down. As social members, they were bound to their specific social relations.

This should not be understood to mean that they were all passively given their fate in the same degree. As we have shown, the CCP quite easily and relatively mildly carried on its Thought Reform Campaign to deal with the old-type intellectuals, but only by launching a stormy Anti-Rightist Campaign could it make the democratic personages recognise that the CCP's dictatorship could in no sense be challenged. As to those established revolutionary intellectuals within the CCP who had their own independent thinking, a series of campaigns including the Cultural Revolution could only force them into silence for the time being. For the CCP, it was much easier to lead people like Hua Luo-geng than those like Fei Xiao-tong, to

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<sup>12</sup> Another example is Ba Jin, one of China's foremost novelists since the 1930s. In his widely-read *Collected Random Thinkings*, he said that he did not play an active role in the Cultural Revolution not because he did not want to, but because he was not qualified. Cf., Ba Jin, 1987: 468, 785, 841.

control those like Feng You-lan rather than those like Guo Mo-ruo. People like Zhou Yang were the most difficult ones to deal with.

Generally speaking, we can say that, for the CCP, the old-type intellectuals were the easiest ones to educate. Then it was the democratic personages who were not so easy to deal with. And finally the revolutionary intellectuals were the most difficult people to control. More specifically, it is old-type intellectuals in natural sciences and technology, such as Hua Luo-geng, who were the easiest established intellectuals to "win over". The old-type intellectuals in the humanities, such as Feng You-lan, were less easy than Hua Luo-geng and Hua-type natural scientists and technicians. It was getting more and more difficult when dealing with the following kinds of established intellectuals one after another: from the democratic personages in social sciences, such as Fei Xiao-tong, to the democratic personages in the state organs, such as Luo Long-ji; and then to the revolutionary intellectuals in social sciences, such as Guo Mo-ruo. The revolutionary intellectuals in the CCP hierarchy, such as Zhou Yang, were the most difficult intellectuals because they held real power.

In other words, under the specific "New System" in China, intellectuals could be more active in political campaigns as well as in other social activities if they do obtain high posts in state/Party organs. From here, we get our third conclusion. It is that, contrary to our hypothesis, the more and the higher posts China's intellectuals occupy, the more active and influential they are.

The key to explain this phenomenon is deeply rooted in the fact that in China, since the 1950s, everything including individual life has been institutionally organised and politicised, and there is no "civil society"



where intellectuals could enjoy some sort of individual freedom. In contrast, China's educated people, whatever they were called and whatever group they belonged to, were all employed by the state-run or collective units in which, without being politically recognised by the CCP, one can achieve few things.<sup>13</sup> Hence the more posts they were given, the more "freedoms " they obtained. For the CCP, no matter how Confucian Feng You-lan's ideas, they were never as problematic or dangerous as Hu Feng's, even though Hu was undoubtedly a left-wing writer; no matter how distinguished Hua Luo-geng was in his professional research, he was by no means as influential as Zhou Yang in intellectual as well as political circles, though Zhou's creative talent was acknowledged to be lower than Hua's.

The leading figures of the Democracy Movement in China since 1979, including Fang Li-zhi, now simply blame China's intellectuals during the period of 1949-1976 for seeking posts in officialdom rather than forming an independent stratum, and for justifying the official ideology rather than developing their own consciousness.<sup>14</sup> It seems that these figures forget that, in a "Soviet-type Communist" society in general, and in China under Mao in particular, educated people have no socio-economic basis to form an independent stratum, let alone their own intellectual consciousness. In a "Soviet-type Communist" society, where the ruling party replaced the state, and the state replaced the society, the more

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<sup>13</sup> As we have said, amongst hundreds of thousands of literary men and women (writers, artists, and literary critics), Ba Jin is the unique exceptional one who has not received any salary from any unit. But it should be noted that Ba still had to register as a professional novelist at Shanghai Branch of China's Writers Association, and in literature he achieved little during the period of 1949-1976. Cf., Ba Jin, 1987: 585.

<sup>14</sup> Fang Li-zhi, 1989.

identified the established intellectuals were with that party the safer they were. For them, it is more realistic to identify themselves with the establishment or the ruling party than to be independent or even critical. This is why every time there were so many established intellectuals who became political and ideological supporters of the CCP when it launched a political campaign.<sup>15</sup>

This also explains why nearly every established intellectual got at least one post in the Party/state organs or semi-official units, such as All-China Federation of Literary & Art Circles. Amongst these posts, the strongest ones are, of course, those within the CCP. Comparatively, those of China's established intellectuals with CCP membership were more qualified to speak out on politics in various ways. As Hu Feng in the end realised from his own painful experience: "Feng Xue-feng used to think that, without being recognised as an important figure in literary circles, a writer cannot be an influential man in the CCP. But in fact, if you have no power in the CCP, your position in literary circles is not stable, and can be easily displaced."<sup>16</sup>

Intellectuals with CCP membership or recognised by the CCP have more opportunities to show themselves, both politically and socially, and they endure greater pressure, both psychologically and physically. It would be naive to conclude that in a "Communist" one-party state like China, membership of the ruling party is a sort of guarantee by which intellectuals can happily play their intellectual role as they pleased. As

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<sup>15</sup> The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was different because, as we have shown, at that time, China's established intellectuals as a whole were not qualified to be supporters of the establishment, even they wished to be so. Cf., Chapters Four, Six.

<sup>16</sup> Cf., Xiao Shan, 1990.

intellectuals they dreamed of being realised as the so-called "engineers of the nation's soul" by the public, but as Party members, they must always submit to the CCP leadership. Such a position makes those "revolutionary intellectuals" have a double face and play a double role in social life: in the eyes of the "old-type intellectuals" and "democratic personages", they, like those "peasants in uniform", are official cadres; but in the eyes of the "peasants in uniform", they, like those "old-type intellectuals" and "democratic personages", are bourgeois intellectuals. As Guo Mo-ruo said: "I am an amphibian."

Without doubt, it is more difficult for an intellectual within the ruling party. He should not only abide by the Party's rules if he wants to keep his political position, but also follow the standard of the intellectual community if he tries to retain his intellectual identity. When there is conflict between them, he will really be in trouble: if he abides by the Party, the intellectual will blame him; if he follow the intellectual, the Party will punish him; and if he is wandering about between the Party and the intellectual, he will displease both.

Such is the case especially in political campaigns. As a party man, he should get actively involved in criticising other intellectuals who were chosen as targets; but as an intellectual, he should protect his colleagues who may be his teachers, students, and friends. Undertaking such a thankless task, the "revolutionary intellectuals" in the end became the ones Mao disliked most and, after Mao's death, people accord them less sympathy than is given to the "old-type intellectuals" and "democratic personages".

Comparatively, both democratic personages and old-type intellectuals bear less responsibility. If democratic personages know their place, that is, if they enjoy their high posts without real power, and if old-type intellectuals behave themselves, namely, if they follow the Party, in most cases they will not be in trouble. Only if they try to obtain actual power, or speak out in their own voices, will they be criticised and punished. Unlike these two kinds of intellectuals, revolutionary ones are by instinct trouble-makers and trouble-sufferers because of their double position.

Unless one day the ruling party becomes practically intellectualised, or the intellectual becomes almost officialised, this conflict could not be fundamentally resolved, no matter who was in charge of the ruling party and who was playing the double role of the revolutionary intellectuals. Our fourth conclusion is: it is inexorable that intellectuals within the establishment have to experience or even suffer from conflicts between the roles of the official and of the intellectual, or more strictly, between the role of a member of the ruling party and a member of the critical intelligentsia.

### III.

After Mao's death, the CCP changed its policy towards China's educated people dramatically back to that promulgated at the beginning of 1956 by Zhou En-lai: educated people in China are members of the working class. This change shows that, after a series of failures to win educated people over through political campaigns, the leadership became more realistic and pragmatic. But it also shows that CCP still treated educated people in a very simplistic way: they were members of a specific class. The only

difference is, instead of being members of the bourgeoisie, this time, they were officially located in "members of the working class". The question is: if all the educated people should not have been considered members of the bourgeoisie, how could they subsequently be considered members of the working class? The theoretical problem here remains more or less the same.

In practice, since 1978, China's intellectuals, especially established ones, have been recruited in great number into the officialdom rather than into the working class. As a result, the CCP started its intellectualisation again while intellectuals restarted its officialisation. It is however still an open question as to who in the end will assimilate whom, or whether the two will combine into one.

Ironically, shortly after the promulgation of the decision that located all educated people in the working class, the CCP started criticising intellectuals. Firstly in 1979, some young intellectuals, including several poets who belonged to the "New Generation of Intellectuals", were in trouble: some were arrested, others lost their jobs, and their intellectual societies such as "Today", together with the famous Democratic Wall, were banned in Peking. Then in 1981 the CCP launched the Criticism of "Bourgeois Liberalisation" in the circles of literature, art, education, and propaganda, in which some well-known intellectuals, including a 1957 "Rightist" Bai Hua (poet, play-writer, and novelist), were severely criticised.

Furthermore, in 1983, a nationwide campaign to "Clear out the Spiritual Pollution" was carried out. This time, Zhou Yang became the number-one target for his lengthy address at the centenary of Karl Marx. Zhou Yang

in his address argued that Marx's humanist approach and his alienation theory should not be excluded from Marxism. Next, in 1987, the CCP once more launched another Criticism of "Bourgeois Liberalisation" in both intellectual circles and in the CCP itself, which resulted in the resignation of Hu Yao-bang, the Party's General Secretary, and the elimination of several leading intellectuals, including journalist Liu Binyan, novelist Wang Ruo-wang, and scientist Fang Li-zhi from the CCP. Finally, in 1989, the conflict between the CCP and the intellectual, including intellectuals in general and intelligentsia in particular, developed into one of the key factors of the June Fourth event, and many members of intellectuals and intelligentsia had to escaped from China, taking exile in the West.

In today's China, not only the leadership of the CCP is losing its intellectual-political hegemony, but also intellectuals both within and outside the establishment are becoming more and more open-minded and critical towards the *status quo*. But the CCP still can not be legally challenged and educated people as well as others remain men and women living under the specific "Unit System". The fate of China's intellectuals in the future largely depends upon the development of Chinese society and the change of social relations.

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