THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GLORY
IN THE POLITICAL THEORY
OF THOMAS HOBBES

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by

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation is divided into three parts:

Part I: It is suggested that Thucydides' *History* provides useful insights into Hobbes's political theory in so far as the link between glory, fear, and conflict postulated by Thucydides affords a deeper understanding of the role of glory and fear in Hobbes's political construct. In particular, it is suggested that the distinction between ultimate and proximate causes of the Peloponnesian War underlying Thucydides' argument is used by Hobbes in all three of his political works in order to explain conflict in the state of nature.

Part II: The meaning of 'Glory' in *Elements of Law*, *De Cive*, and *Leviathan* is examined in detail and it is argued that, in spite of some changes in Hobbes's philosophy of man, the role assigned by Hobbes to glory in both pre-political and political associations is identical in all three works. The significance of Glory is emphasised and its role in Hobbes's theory is defined and explained in relation to other key elements of his political discourse, such as self-preservation, rationality, felicity, profit, power, etc. It is also stressed that Hobbes's definition of glory makes it compatible with a concern for self-preservation and thus differs from the current meaning of glory (that allows one to speak of 'glorious death').

Part III: Hobbes's political theory is axiomatised as a model resting on a small set of assumptions common to all three works. Contrary to current views, it is argued that glory, and not the concern for self-preservation, is the pivotal assumption of Hobbes's theory and that indeed the assumption of an over-riding concern for self-preservation is logically redundant to derive the state of war and the conditions for peace as described by Hobbes. Finally it is suggested that Hobbes's model can be interpreted as implying the incompatibility within a state-of-nature approach of glory-seeking behaviour and a rich set of political rights and thus can be used to expose a problem of consistency in some liberal theories of the State.
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There is a story about a British economist who had been given a text of mathematical economics for a review. She opened and closed the book in a matter of seconds, saying that she was not prepared to review yet another tome of conservative views. The reviews editor wondered how she could have reached her (correct, as it happens) verdict on a highly technical work in such a short time. The reviewer modestly pointed to the preface, where the writer thanked his wife for her "Invaluable support over the years" and for her "help of a deeper sort".

With the British economist I agree at least in one respect: prefaces tell us much about writers and can discourage potential readers. Over the past years I have read many prefaces to books on Hobbes and none seemed appealing. This is one reason why I felt that I should write a preface myself, and add a thesis to it.

What I object to in prefaces to books on Hobbes is not the vain glory of the authors, since I myself have much in common with the Hobbesian fly sitting on the axle tree and proclaiming "what a dust do I raise". Thus, although only mildly interested in knowing that Jean Hampton's husband is also her best friend, that all Hobbes's interpreters are happily married, have wonderful parents, patient children, and dedicated secretaries, I am truly sympathetic with their need to divulgate their private life and admire their ability to convince their sponsors that no serious book on Hobbes can ever be written without a pilgrimage to the rare books room of the University.
What does irritate me in many prefaces of books on Hobbes, though, is their lack of passion. I dislike the patronising attitude of many interpreters, the majestic way in which they concede that Hobbes has still something to tell us, the detachment and professionalism in justifying the fact that they have written a book about him. If one were to judge from the prefaces to their books, one would have to conclude that if Hobbes's interpreters had not had platoons of spurring friends, urging publishers, and magnanimous sponsors, all anxious to read, comment, discuss, and learn from them, they would have never dreamt of devoting their precious time to understanding Hobbes.

My case is different. The origin of the present dissertation lies entirely with my passions. Nobody sponsored me. Nobody insisted that I should study Hobbes. Nobody urged me to write a thesis about him. Nobody relieved me of my other commitments so that I could think and write at ease. My whole research proceeded from my uneasiness and apprehension towards people in power, culminating in my deep-rooted fear of the State.

Although I have no personal reasons for feeling threatened by Police, Magistrates, Prison Officers, and the Army, I have always been afraid of them and felt often sympathetic with those groups and individuals in society who claim that, without any fault of their own, they are systematically wronged by people in power. Such groups and individuals seem to exist under all forms of government, in liberal states and socialist countries alike. In Britain, for example, sections of the black community and homosexuals feel vulnerable to
Police, Magistrates, and Prison Officers; in the Soviet Union, despite perestroika, homosexuals and Jews feel vulnerable; and the list could continue. If the above groups are sincere in saying that, in spite of their posing no threat to the State, they do not enjoy the rights of everybody else and in particular suffer more intrusion in their private life than is usually experienced and accepted, on what ground can anybody assume that the same treatment will not be meted out to her in the future?

To some this question might sound preposterous; however if we believe that the complaints voiced by some minorities are grounded, then what is preposterous is any debate, not uncommon among liberals, on the determination of the extent of the private sphere of individuals, or, more precisely, on the point where the barrier between public authority and private liberty should be erected. Could it not be the case, in fact, that the very idea of an inviolable private sphere of the individual against the State be merely a figment of liberal imagination?

This problem originated my interest in Hobbes, who, of course, thinks that there can be no such thing as a protected domain. He feels strongly that in political associations, whereas we have rights in relation to other citizens, we have no rights against the State. Even self-preservation, he argues, is not strictly speaking a right, in so far as we can be put to death without any reason whatsoever. Hobbes acknowledges that we can bring to court corrupted judges or policemen. But this, he adds, should not be taken to imply that we have rights against the State. It means merely that the State is so powerful that it can afford to be magnanimous. Hobbes, however,
thinks that the State is unlikely to be systematically iniquitous, because he feels that in so doing the sovereign power would go against the natural laws given by God and against his own interests that depend on the well-being of his citizens. This argument, however, gives me hardly any reassurance, firstly because people in power are likely to disregard divine injunctions, and secondly because to ill-treat minorities is not necessarily damaging to the ruling class, but on the contrary can be a means to capture the favour of the majority. Thus I felt that if Hobbes were correct in saying that in principle we cannot have any protected sphere against the State, then in principle within any State a minority is inevitably very vulnerable. If this were so, considering that each of us (being short-sighted, or tall, or fat) is the potential member of a minority, my fear of the State would be well grounded. Thus, I concentrated my attention on Hobbes's contention of the impossibility of a protected sphere of citizens against the State and proceeded backwards to his description of the state of nature, and hence to his description of human nature. I found that his argument of the inadmissibility of a private domain derives from his description of the state of war, and that this in turn is a logical conclusion of a number of assumptions made about man, on his relation to other men and to the environment. Of all these assumptions I found that one was peculiar to Hobbes (and not to be found in the writings of the father of British Liberalism, i.e. Locke) and thus I decided to focus on it — the assumption that some men are glory-seekers, namely consider superiority to others as the greatest of all pleasures. And this finally explains my interest in the
Hobbesian concept of "glory" and why I decided to write a dissertation about it. The final result of my inquiry is that until liberals address the problem posed by Hobbes in his own terms and argue that either the state-of-nature approach is incorrect or Hobbes's assumption on glory is untenable (or both) and that his final conclusion is therefore incorrect, then there are good reasons for each of us (as potential members of a minority) to be fearful of the State.

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INTRODUCTION

Professor Michael Oakeshott once said that he realized that he was not a philosopher whenever reading Plato; in my case, I realize that I am not a philosopher whenever reading my own writings. As I see it, philosophers produce ideas and theories that have many depths and facets, that have an independent life of their own, that can be read and appreciated either considering or abstracting from the historical circumstances in which they were written, that express what philosophers themselves had thought, and more beside. In my view this explains why the work of philosophers is an inexhaustible source of new interpretations, each of which can claim to be grounded in the text.

Although the above criterion taken on its own is insufficient to characterize a philosophical work, and some may even find it questionable, I have stated my conviction that philosophical writings are amenable to different interpretations because it may be useful to appraise the claims made in the present dissertation.

On the one hand, I claim that the interpretation of Hobbes's political theory offered in this dissertation is based entirely on a careful reading of Hobbes's political works; more specifically, my thesis is that in *Elements of Law*, *De Cive*, and *Leviathan* one can find a common model that can be used to explain why citizens have the obligation of obedience to the State, conditional exclusively on the preservation of their lives. This model is based on a small number of
assumptions, all but one of which Hobbes shares with those liberal thinkers (e.g. Locke) who are prepared to deploy a state-of-nature approach to the justification of rights. The specifically Hobbesian assumption is the idea that some people may seek "glory", i.e., the pleasure of dominion of others. I argue that Hobbes's belief that all men attach an over-riding priority to their self-preservation, is redundant to his argument for uni-conditional obedience. This model is examined in Part III of the dissertation, which closes with some suggestions for the research agenda of some liberal theorists.

Whereas Part III puts forward an interpretation of Hobbes's political theory with the aim of providing a heuristic tool to understand some contemporary problems of justice, Part II is meant to be a detailed examination of the meaning of "glory" in *Elements of Law*, *De Cive*, and *Leviathan*, in relation to other key Hobbesian concepts, such as honour, power, felicity, self-preservation, rationality, scarce resources, etc. In this part of the dissertation I have tried to keep quite distinct what Hobbes says from my own explanations or interpretations. When, in the course of my analysis, I have brought to the light some problems in his argument, I have sometimes refrained from attempting to provide my own solution or explanation. A case in point is my treatment of the problem of the minority of non-glory-seekers in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*. An instance in Part II where instead I highlight an apparent contradiction in Hobbes's works and try to put forward my own explanation for it is when I deal with Hobbes's argument on the differences between apian and human associations and compare it with his account of the state of nature. In this case, I argue, a careful examination of Thucydides' History
may offer the key to solve the incongruity in Hobbes's text. It will be noticed that my Thucydidean interpretation of Hobbes, although not a supporting pillar of my thesis in so far as the latter stands even if the validity of the former is denied, provides nevertheless a unifying idea of the whole dissertation. In fact, it underlies both part III, in so far as it provides the reader with a tool to understand the dynamics of the state of war and Part I, where I try to show the striking similarity between Thucydides' and Hobbes's works in singling out fear and glory as the main motivations of people and in considering fear as the pillar of social order and ambition, or glory, as the origin of its corrosion. In Part I it is also claimed that Thucydides poses political philosophy two dilemmas and that Hobbes's work can be seen as the attempt to solve them.

On the other hand, although in my view the interpretation put forward in this dissertation can be firmly traced back to Hobbes's writings, no claim is made that the present work offers a reading of Hobbes's theory that is somehow more correct than that put forward by other Hobbes's readers. I am aware that, as seen from different viewpoints, Hobbes's theory conveys different messages from the one highlighted here. Indeed, as I pointed out in the preface, the motivation behind this thesis is not to challenge the scholarship on Hobbes, but to try to argue that Hobbes's theory can help understanding a problem of justice existing in our society.

Because of my specific interest in Hobbes's philosophy, the scholarship on Hobbes has a low profile in this thesis. This has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that in so doing
I managed to avoid the criticism levelled some time ago by Professor Barry against authors from departments of Politics, i.e. that they are prone to padding. The disadvantage is that I have been unable to steer clear of the mistake that in his view is common among authors from departments of Philosophy, namely to forget the background. Indeed a look at this dissertation and at the references might give the impression that I do not believe that before me there had been a prehistory. Although this is not the case, I must accept that my work is in this respect open to criticism. An ideal dissertation, of course, would have tried to place my contribution to the understanding of the Hobbesian concept of glory in the context of the existing scholarship on Hobbes. I have two reasons for solace for having failed to do so, one for my three readers, the other for myself. The consolation for my readers is that such an "ideal" dissertation would have been 200 pages longer and perhaps more than twice as tedious to read; my own consolation is that a description of the route I followed to reach my small detached cottage in the countryside, detailing how I walked along Strauss Strasse, turned right at Macpherson Junction, passed by Oakeshott Park, crossed Watkins Lane, carefully avoided McNeilly cul-de-sac, and systematically ignored Gauthier one-way signs would have left no marks on the landscape of the history of political thought.
A NOTE ON TEXTS

In this dissertation the following notation is used to refer to Hobbes's texts:


Also referred to in the text is the following work:

PART I

The two chapters forming this part of the dissertation, although dealing with different subject-matters, serve the same purpose, namely that of introducing the analysis on glory carried out in Part II.

In particular, Chapter I aims at explaining the significance of fear and ambition in Thucydides' History and suggests that in his political writings Hobbes endorses and develops Thucydides' insights on the function of glory and fear in political associations and on the relationship between desire of power and concern for self-preservation in the dynamics of war.

Chapter II offers a brief account of Hobbes's conception of man, thus providing the background in which glory as a human passion can be understood.
CHAPTER I

THUCYDIDES' HISTORY AS AN INTRODUCTION TO HOBBES'S POLITICAL WORKS

1.1 INTRODUCTION; 1.2 THE THREE GREATEST THINGS; 1.3 ON FEAR: 1.3.1. Fear and Uncertainty; 1.3.2 Fear and Anticipation; 1.3.3 Fear and Deliberation; 1.3.4 Fear and Social Order; 1.4 ON HONOUR: 1.4.1 Human nature and ambition to rule; 1.4.2 Ambition to rule and political associations; 1.5 ON PROFIT; 1.6 CONCLUSION.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years there seems to have been a revival of interest in the similarities between Thucydides' and Hobbes's thought. In 1987, for example, Brown (1) highlighted a significant convergence of ideas between the two authors on an extremely wide range of topics; in 1988 Orwin (2) pointed to some striking parallels between Thucydides' stasis and Hobbes's state of nature and in 1989 Brown (3) urged scholars to regard Hobbes's translation of Thucydides as "an integral part of his offerings to the public on the nature of man and society".

In this chapter I shall show that Thucydides' work provides an

Invaluable starting-point to examine Hobbes's theory and to assess the fundamental role of fear and glory within it. In particular, I shall suggest that Hobbes's political theory develops some of Thucydides' insights on the function of fear and the effect of ambition on political associations and provides an escape from the dilemmas raised by Thucydides on the conditions under which fear and ambition can either promote or subvert civilisation.

1.2 THE THREE GREATEST THINGS

In the early stages of the Peloponnesian war, Athens' ambassadors are reported in Thucydides' History (4) to have justified their expansionist policy in their oration to the Corinthians in the following terms:

- we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is, out of the nature of the thing itself; as chiefly for fear, next for honour and lastly for profit. (5)

They imputed their behaviour to the very essence of human nature, thus suggesting that there was no need for excusing it.

We read:

(4) All references are to Hobbes's own translation of the History; the reason why I shall refer neither to more accurate recent translations nor to the original Greek text is that my main concern is to examine Hobbes's understanding of Thucydides, rather than an assessment of the History in general. Moreover, it seems to me that none of the passages examined or quoted in this Chapter is controversial (with perhaps one exception, noted later in sec. 1.4.2). It can be safely assumed that on the subjects of fear, honour, and profit we are dealing with a translation and not a misinterpretation of Thucydides' views.

(5) History, I, p. 81.
So that, though overcome by three the greatest things, honour, fear and profit, — we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor besides the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed, for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger.(6)

In the History the reference to honour, fear, and profit is not incidental, nor are the Athenians the only ones who consider them as the “three greatest things” that motivate human behaviour. Indeed, it can be argued that Thucydides himself deploys these three fundamental concepts to explain the mechanics and the dynamics of the whole Peloponnesian war.

Direct references to fear, power, dominion, and reputation occur at least once in almost every page of the first twentythree paragraphs of the First Book of the History where Thucydides tries to establish the true causes of the war, as opposed to the pretext that sparked off the conflict. He concludes that in the last analysis the war arose chiefly because of the Lacedæmonians' fear of Athens' increasing power and desire to rule and that all the other partecipants formed alliances either for fear or for hope of profit.

The causes why they brake the same [league], and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedæmonians into fear necessitated the war. (7)

(6) Ibid., p. 82.
(7) Ibid., p. 27.
No student of Hobbes can fail to notice the striking similarity between the three motivations that according to Thucydides brought the ancient world to its greatest and longest war and the three causes of conflict described by Hobbes in Chapter 13 of *Leviathan*:

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel — The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. (*8*)

Hobbes's concept of gain reminds us of Thucydides' profit; safety recalls fear; honour, reputation. Although these parallels have not been ignored by Hobbes's commentators (*9*), to my knowledge there is no detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between Thucydides' and Hobbes's views on fear, glory, and profit.

The purpose of this chapter is to offer such a comparison and to argue that an understanding of Thucydides' views on human psychology provides useful insights into Hobbes's political thought.

The similarities examined in what follows can be grouped into three broad categories:

(i) in many cases the affinity of views is so striking that it extends to textual concordance;

(ii) in other instances a minimum of philosophical analysis reveals that Thucydides' position on human passions finds an unmistakeable echo in Hobbes's works;

(iii) finally, the common concerns of the two authors on the topics of fear, glory, and profit inevitably generate similarities

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(*8*) *Leviathan*, p.112.

(*9*) See, for example, Clifford W. Brown, 'Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Derivation of Anarchy', cit.
that are not specific to Hobbes and Thucydides, but can also be found in many other writers on political and historical matters.

It should be stressed that the aim of the present chapter is not that of establishing by means of historical comparative analysis to what extent and depth Hobbes's works can be said to resonate of the Thucydidean legacy, nor is that of merely adding another voice to the chorus of Hobbes's readers that have been puzzled and impressed by the similarities between the two writers and cannot help feeling that Hobbes, who spent much time and labour to produce his brilliant translation of Thucydides' work, must have found in the way of thinking of the "most politic historiographer that ever writ" a powerful inspiration for his own thought, at a time — the 1620s — when his attention was turning to political philosophy.(10)

The deeper purpose of this chapter is to argue that by examining in some detail Thucydides's views on "the three greatest things" one can lay the groundwork for an interpretation of Hobbes's political theory that on the one hand develops some of Thucydides' insights on the function of fear and the effect of ambition on the political state and on the other hand provides a solution to the problems raised and left open by Thucydides on the conditions under which fear and ambition can either promote or hinder civilisation.

1.3 ON FEAR

In this section I shall argue that Hobbes's and Thucydides' analyses of fear share two fundamental aspects:

(i) on the one hand they provide a remarkably similar characterization of fear, both viewing it as deriving from uncertainty, resulting in anticipation, and affecting human judgment in a either beneficial or detrimental way depending on its time-horizon;

(ii) on the other hand, they both assign to fear the role of cornerstone of political order.

1.3.1 Fear and Uncertainty

In Thucydides' History fear is not only one of the key concepts that explain the causes and the dynamics of the Peloponnesian war, but also the passion that permeated all ancient Greece before it grew "civil". The account of ancient Greece given by Thucydides and the description of the natural conditions of mankind made by Hobbes in Elements of Law and Leviathan have one fundamental common feature - they both depict a world dominated by fear, although in Thucydides' case what is described is a historical period and in Hobbes's a hypothetical situation.(11)

In his description of ancient Greece Thucydides links fear to

(11) On the Hobbesian state of nature as a hypothetical world, see Chapter 6.
uncertainty. He suggests that in the old days people were in a constant state of anxiety and apprehension because they could have no firm expectations on the behaviour of others and thus could make no long-term plans about the future. He writes:

- whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse but with fear, neither by sea nor land; and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live upon it, without any stock of riches, and planted nothing; (because it was uncertain when another should invade them and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls); but made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day. (12)

Both the main idea and the specific details of the above quotation remind one of a well-known passage of *Leviathan*, in which Hobbes describes the state of nature:

In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all continual fear. (13)

Like Thucydides, Hobbes too establishes a clear connection between fear and uncertainty: the people of ancient Greece and the Hobbesian individuals of the state of nature live in fear because they do not

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(12) *History*, I, p. 2; emphasis added.
(13) *Leviathan*, p. 113; emphasis added.
know what to expect from others. They do not know who the others are and what they want and if they want the same things from one day to the next. This complete ignorance about the world in which they live prevents everyone, as rational being, from setting and pursuing his own objectives. Under conditions of complete uncertainty, each individual is deprived of his intrinsically human ability and need to plan his own future and is compelled instead to live in, and for, the present. The outcome is that the life of people becomes indistinguishable from that of beasts. Only when uncertainty is limited and circumscribed, i.e. within the framework of social conventions created in the civil state, will the Athenians (first among all Greeks) be able to concentrate on those things that distinguish human beings from animals and will the Hobbesian people be able to live a worthwhile life.

1.3.2 Fear and Anticipation

In Thucydides' narration the link between fear and uncertainty is not confined to the description of the people who lived in the murderous ancient world but applies to, and indeed explains, the relationships between cities after they have grown "civil".

In describing the causes of the war Thucydides stresses the point that it had been fear generated by uncertainty about the intentions of a strong Athens what had driven weaker cities to unite against her and anticipate her attack.

Thus Alcibiades:

- when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use not only to
defend themselves against him when he shall invade, but to anticipate him, that he invade not at all (14)

Uncertainty about the intention of others, and fear that they may attack are in Thucydides' argument the foundations of his concept of anticipation and first strike. Thus in the History while uncertainty can be seen as the main cause of fear, anticipation is its most important outcome.

On this point, too, Hobbes can be seen to follow Thucydides' steps. In chapter 13 of Leviathan he develops an argument in which anticipation is construed as the result of diffidence, which in turn is derived from fear and uncertainty.

We read:

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable as anticipation. (15)

— fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate. (16)

Although the intermediate step — i.e., diffidence — is missing in Thucydides' reasoning, the logic of the argument that starts from fear and uncertainty and ends with anticipation and preemptive strike is essentially the same as Hobbes's.

1.3.3 Fear and Deliberation

In addition to their shared views on the connection between fear, uncertainty, and anticipation, Thucydides' and Hobbes's arguments

(14) History, II, pp. 133-4; emphasis added.
(15) Leviathan, p. 111; emphasis added.
(16) Ibid., p. 88; emphasis added.
contain another conspicuous affinity: they both ascribe to fear either a positive or a negative effect on human deliberation, depending on its time-dimension.

In Thucydides' *History*, the fear felt by the individual towards future enterprises is a positive passion, in the sense that it engenders beneficial effects — it alerts the mind to the problems ahead and drives people to deliberate prudently and wisely. Thus we find the generals of different cities urging their troops not to undervalue either the enemy or the circumstances, but to prepare themselves to face great dangers, since this is the only way to prepare rationally for victory.

Conversely, fear as a passion that dominates the individual in the present plays a negative and destructive role in Thucydides' narration. Indeed, as soon as the hostilities have commenced, soldiers are urged to attack without fear, since the key to victory lies in their courage. Fear in the present brings people to defeat, it makes them overestimate the difficulties and overvalue the enemy, it leads to rushed and irrational decision-making.

Hermocrates speaks thus to the Syracusians:

- and every man to remember, that though to show contempt of the enemy be best in the heat of fight, yet those preparations are the surest, that are made with fear and opinion of danger (17)

And Archidamus says to the Lacedæmonians:

- though the soldiers ought always to have bold hearts, yet for action they ought to make their preparations as if they were

(17) *History*, 11, p. 152.
afraid. (18)

In a passage of his "Of the Life and History of Thucydides" that precedes his translation of the History, Hobbes echoes the view that fear has either a positive or negative effect depending on its temporal dimension:

... fear (which for the most part adviseth well, though it execute not so). (19)

In his later political works Hobbes elaborates a fully developed conception of fear that encompasses the Thucydidean view on the ambiguous effects of that passion on human behaviour, depending on whether it inspires deliberations regarding the future or the present.

Leaving a detailed analysis of this topic to later chapters, here it suffices to anticipate that under the effects of immediate fear Hobbesian people in the state of nature resort to killing, without realising that in the long run in a battle between equals, nobody is going to be safe.

In other words, decision-making under conditions of immediate fear leads to an outcome — to try to kill all others — that is against reason (for "equal powers opposed destroy one another" (20)).

Conversely, fear of future dangers is the first passion mentioned by Hobbes as responsible for making people understand the necessity to escape from the state of nature and thus decide to create a political state. In his words:

(18) History, I, p. 165.
(19) Ibid., p. xvi.
(20) Elements of Law, p. 34.
The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. (21)

1.3.4 Fear and social order

Finally there is a deeper affinity between Hobbes's and Thucydides' views on fear which does not rest on mere textual similarity but resides in the very role played by fear in the two authors' works. The role played by fear in Thucydides' History can be appreciated in all its implications by examining in some detail his account of the plague that had gripped Athens since the second year of the war. In a narration that has become deservedly a classic, Thucydides highlights the terrifying effects brought about by a complete lack of fear.

People who know that are going to die do not show fear, but react instead with utter dejection and desperation. People who live with the only certainty that, be they honest or not, pious or not, imminent death awaits them cannot be restrained by either human or divine punishment from behaving in whichever way they wish.

Thucydides stresses repeatedly that the certainty of impending death frees totally individuals from any fear of either gods or men and precipitates a social organization into a state of complete social chaos. When the natural restraint provided by fear is removed, the fundamental binding element of social order is lost and with it all

laws, conventions, customs, and rules simply crumble away. (22)

In Thucydides' words, as brilliantly rendered by Hobbes:

And the great licentiousness, which also in other kinds was used in the city, began at first from this disease. For that which a man before would dissemble, and not acknowledge to be done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely; seeing before his eyes such quick revolution, of the rich dying, and men worth nothing inheriting their estates. Insomuch as they justified a speedy fruition of their goods, even for their pleasure; as men that thought they held their lives but by the day. As for pains, no man was forward in any action of honour to take any; because they thought it uncertain whether they should die or not before they achieved it. But what any man knew to be delightful, and to be profitable to pleasure, that was made both profitable and honourable. Neither the fear of the gods, nor laws of men, awed any man: not the former, because they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship, from seeing that alike they all perished: nor the latter, because no man expected that lives would last till he received punishment of his crimes by judgment. But they thought, there was now over their heads some far greater judgment decreed against them; before which fell, they thought to enjoy some little part of their lives. (23)

(22) For an analysis of the plague and stasis, see Clifford Orwin, 'Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of Society', cit.

(23) History, I, pp. 208-9; emphasis added. "All supplications to the gods, and enquiries to oracles, and whatsoever other means they used of that kind, proved all unprofitable; insomuch as subdued with the greatness of the evil, they gave them all over", ibid., p. 202.
From Thucydides' account of the plague in Athens it emerges clearly that the function of fear within a political organization is to provide a powerful restraint to the behaviour of the individual.

By keeping in mind the Thucydidean equation between lack of fear and social chaos, we can understand more fully why in his political writings Hobbes stresses the paramount importance of fear. From his translation of Thucydides' description of the plague, undertaken at a time — the 1620s — when he was beginning to turn his attention to political matters, Hobbes must have learned that in a world without fear there can be no Leviathan, no law and order, no peace. And thus in De Cive he points to fear not only as the origin of societies but also as the basis of "lasting Societies" (24), the unrenounceable condition of social stability.

In all his political works Hobbes stresses repeatedly the idea that "there is in every man a certain high degree of fear" (25): his insistence that fear is a constituent part of our psychology is not to be taken as a merely incidental reference, but rather as underlying the fact that the assumption of fear is a fundamental proviso of his whole political construct.

Indeed it could be argued that not only Hobbes, but most political philosophers in the Western tradition would have no advice to offer that would be relevant to a world without fear, such as the limit-case of the plague of Athens. However, it may be surmised that the reason why Hobbes is so extraordinarily aware both of the crucial function of fear in political associations and of the validity of his

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(24) De Cive, p. 44.
(25) Ibid., p. 58.
whole political theory being dependent on the assumption of fear-inspired behaviour, may be due to his careful translation of the History, that alerted him to the strong connection between lack of fear and social chaos.

However, the function of fear in political associations is not the only insight that Hobbes learned from Thucydides. Thucydides' twin descriptions of ancient Greece and of the plague in Athens implicitly set political philosophy the task of solving the following dilemma: given that a world where fear is the overwhelming passion (as in ancient Greece) is as unbearable and as ungovernable as a world without fear altogether (such as Athens during the plague), how is fear to be channelled so as to result in a stable social order?

In his political works Hobbes provides an answer to the above question. He singles out in a strong political state the instrument whereby uncertainty can be controlled, thus removing a major source of fear. In fact, within a strong political state, people can form firm expectations on the behaviour of others, for fear of punishment channels people's actions into definite and stable patterns, thus rendering individuals' behaviour predictable. As a result, both anticipation and rushed deliberation are no longer inevitable.

Through the artifice of the political state people are able to circumscribe fear by means of fear itself (in the form of fear of punishment).

Of course, the political state envisaged by Hobbes can only remove the uncertainty (and thus the fear) generated by the lack of conventions and rules (as in the state of nature) or caused by their unreliability (as under a weak political arrangement) but cannot cope
with the social chaos deriving from major natural or artificial disasters (like the plague of Athens) when the fear of punishment vanishes in everyone.

To summarize: in this section it has been argued that Hobbes's and Thucydides' arguments on fear share four fundamental points: both (i) connect fear to uncertainty, (ii) point to anticipation and first strike as the natural outcome of fear, (iii) establish a relationship between fear and deliberation, and most importantly, (iv) single out fear as the necessary condition for a stable social order.

I.4 ON HONOUR

In this section I shall argue that Thucydides and Hobbes, apart from sharing the view that in natural conditions (such as exist between individuals before the establishment of the political state or between states at all times) most individuals have a restless desire of power and that moderate people are compelled to join the power struggle for the sake of their survival, agree in another crucial respect, namely in pointing to ambition as the core of any sedition, the dormant cancer of political societies.

After some preliminary terminological remarks, I shall consider their parallel arguments on ambition and human nature and then move on to the substantive issue of the effect of ambition on political associations.

While referring to chapters III, IV, and V for an exhaustive analysis of glory/honour/power in Hobbes's theory, it may be useful to sketch here the relationships between these key terms. For Hobbes "honour"
is but the public recognition of one's superiority; "glory" is both the desire and the pleasure of achieving one's superiority; "power" is the basic ingredient of superiority and glory.

Unlike Hobbes, Thucydides of course does not provide the reader with a definition of the words that he uses. However, given their key role and frequency in the History, it is easy to work out that, as in Hobbes, glory and honour are respectively the response of the individual towards his own achievements and the reaction by others to the achievements of the individual. Again as in Hobbes, Thucydides sees glory and honour as deriving mainly from the ability of the individual (or city) to exercise his own power and impose his rule on others and are considered the main drive behind the actions (policies) of most individuals (cities).

1.4.1 Human nature and ambition to rule

In the context of their characterization of human nature, the correspondence between Hobbes's and Thucydides' views on power, glory and honour ranges from shared fundamental beliefs to matters of detail. Especially relevant to our argument are their remarks on the restlessness and inner insatiability of individuals.

Through the words of Corinth's ambassadors, Thucydides offers to the reader the following portrait of his own fellow citizens:

What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy, for continual getting of more: nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter profitable; nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment than labourious business. So that, in a word, to
say they are men born neither to rest themselves, nor suffer
others, is to say the truth. (26)
The compulsion to act and restlessness of the Athenian people are
shared by the Hobbesian individual for whom "to have no desire is to
be dead" (27) and for whom felicity never lies in resting but in
continually proceeding. (28)
It should be noted here that the true object of the Athenians' desire
is not the acquisition of riches for their own sake but the
attainment of power: they "...think themselves worthy to have the
command of others" (29) and feel "how honourable a thing it would be
for them ... to be inferior to none". (30) They are ready to acknowledge
their own desire to rule and ascribe it to a natural inclination of
mankind. Referring to themselves they say:
Those men are worthy of commendation, who following the natural
inclination of man in desiring rule over others, are juster than for
their own power they need. (31)
The competitive spirit of the Athenians is not confined to their
relationship with the outside world, but extends to their own social
intercourse where "they claimed every one, not to be equal, but to
be by far the chief". (32)
In his political works Hobbes, too, acknowledges the human desire of
acquiring power over others and calls it "glory":

(26) History, I, pp. 75-6.
(27) Leviathan, p. 62.
(28) See, for example, Elements of Law, p. 48.
(29) History, I, p. 166.
(30) History, II, p. 82.
(31) History, I, p. 82.
Glory, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is that passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him that contendeth with us. (33)

As will be explained at length in later chapters, the objective of most Hobbesian people is to surpass others in power: their life can be compared to a "race" that "has no other goal, but be foremost" (34). As Hobbes puts it in *Leviathan*:

- I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. (35)

Apart from agreeing with Thucydides on the observation that people have a restless ambition to rule the life of others, and a visceral abhorrence at being ruled by them, Hobbes follows Thucydides' steps in another respect, namely in noticing that even those that do not have by nature the drive to dominate others, must join in the race after power for the sake of their own survival.

In the *History*, the people who are not prepared to go to war for the mere desire of imposing their rule are the Lacedæmonians. Thucydides describes them as quiet by nature, minding their own business, with no wish to interfere in other people's. And yet they cannot be oblivious to the power struggle between the other cities and are unable to carry on with their lives as nothing happened. On the contrary, as the Corinthians make them realize, as long as they are surrounded by glory-seeking neighbours — especially as voracious as the Athenians — they cannot concern themselves merely with their

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(33) *Elements of Law*, pp. 36-7.
Internal affairs but must instead take sides in the war, for the sake of their own self-preservation:

- neither do any harm to others, nor receive it - is a thing you hardly could attain, though the states about you were of the same conditions. But, as we have before declared, your customs are in respect of theirs [the Athenians'] antiquated; and of necessity - the new ones will prevail.(36)

In all his three main political works Hobbes, too, observes that there exists a minority of people who, although "temperate" and "moderate" by nature, are unable to follow their inclination and must instead join the race of the ambitious if they want to remain alive.

And the cause of this [desire of power after power] is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.(37)

While Thucydides and Hobbes agree in considering the desire of power as contagious, in the sense that eventually it affects all, moderates and ambitious alike, they refer to two different contexts in which the power struggle takes place: Thucydides describes the relations between cities whereas Hobbes examines primarily the relationships between individuals in the state of nature.

Finally, as to underline the affinity of thought between Hobbes and Thucydides on the subject of honour, it may be interesting to note that they make a number of surprisingly similar and specific

(36) History, I, p. 76.
(37) Leviathan, p. 86.
observations on honour and human nature.

One detail that can be found in the works of both authors is the notation that people tend to honour and praise the dead for these, having passed away, are not deemed to be a threat to the glory of the living; as Pericles puts it in thes funeral oration:

For every man useth to praise the dead ... For men envy their competitors in glory, while they live; but to stand out of their way, is a thing honoured with an affection free from opposition.(38)

And Hobbes echoes in Leviathan:

For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.(39)

A related point on which both Hobbes and Thucydides agree is the observation that people are as unwilling to admire the achievements of others as they are ready to discount them as false. Thus Pericles:

For to hear another man praised finds patience so long only as each man shall think he could himself have done somewhat of that he hears. And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently through envy thinks it false.(40)

And Hobbes notices in Elements of Law:

everyman thinking well of himself and hating to see the same in others.(41)

(38) History, I, p. 200.
(39) Leviathan, p. 86.
(40) History, I, p. 189.
(41) Elements of Law, p. 71.
As a final example of the extent to which Thucydides' views on honour permeate Hobbes's own thoughts on the topic, one can point to their interpretation of friendship and enmity merely as signs of power.

In the History the Athenians quite openly admit to the Melians that they are not going to treat them mercifully since to act friendly towards them would be construed by their other subjects as a sign of weakness:

your friendship will be an argument of our weakness, and your hatred of our power, amongst those we have rule over. (42)

In a very similar vein, Hobbes in chapter 10 of Leviathan lists friendship and enmity among the "signs of power", whereby an individual makes others aware of his power.

1.4.2 Ambition to rule and political associations

In the epistle in which he dedicates his translation of Thucydides' History to Sir William Cavendish, Hobbes notices that "in history, actions of honour and dishonour do appear plainly and distinctly, which are which". (43)

Indeed, Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian war establishes unambiguously which actions are glory-yielding — victory is honourable and defeat shameful. However, the meaning of honour becomes ambiguous in a specific case, namely during a civil war. During the sedition of Corcyra, all words (honour included) lose their

(42) History, II, pp. 100-1.
(43) History, I, p. vi.
established meanings and are given new definitions:

The received value of names imposed for signification of things, was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness, was counted true-hearted manliness: provident deliberation, a handsome fear: modesty, the cloak of cowardice. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. (44)

Although the translation of the first sentence of this passage is debatable (45), it should be noted that Hobbes's rendition, irrespectively of its accuracy, is completely in tune with his own description of the arbitrariness in the field of language and signification existing in natural conditions. In Elements of Law he laments that "scarse two men agree[...] what is to be called good, and what evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what temerity." (46)

As various critics have pointed out, it is the sedition of Corcyra, even more than the description of either ancient Greece or of the relationships between cities, that provides the most striking similarities with the Hobbesian state of war of all against all.

The concordance between Hobbes and Thucydides goes well beyond the common recognition that the effect of political anarchy is the collapse of all shared values, from social values, to religion and even language itself. Both authors agree also and more importantly on the ultimate cause of anarchy. Both identify in ambition and the desire to rule the origin of civil war, or generalised conflict of all against all.

(44) Ibid., p. 348.
(45) On this see C. Orwin, cit., p. 834, footnote 5.
(46) Elements of Law, p. 23.
Thus Thucydides:

The cause of all this [sedition] is desire of rule, out of avarice and ambition; and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding. (47)

And Hobbes repeats, almost verbatim, in all his three political works the following diagnosis of civil war:

It is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live sociably one with another — and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer, .. that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war. (48)

Thus for the attainment of peace Hobbes stipulates the following Law of Nature that is an open renouncement to ambition and pride: "... that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride." (49)

It is interesting to note that in the ancient world as presented by Thucydides it was taken as self-evident that ambition and pride were the root causes of sedition. This view in fact was shared by people as different as the Syracusians and the Lacedaemonians and explains why the otherwise peaceful and cautious Lacedaemonians were prepared to take the most extreme measures to prevent glory-seekers from

(47) History, I, p. 350 (emphasis added).
(48) Leviathan, p. 156; see also Elements of Law, p. 102, De Cive, p. 87.
(49) Leviathan, p. 141; see also Elements of Law, p. 88, De Cive, p. 68.
undermining their political institutions.\(^{(50)}\)

Much in the same way in which from Thucydides' description of the plague Hobbes learned that fear provides the foundation for social and political order, so from the narration of the sedition of Corcyra he must have drawn the idea that uncontrolled ambition spells the end of political order — an idea that was undoubtedly re-inforced by the political events which he himself witnessed. From this perspective Hobbes's political construct can be interpreted as an attempt to provide the theoretical underpinnings for Thucydides' powerful insight that whilst fear is the glue of political associations, ambition to rule is the dangerous heat that may cause it to melt and thus destroy civilization.

But Thucydides' insight in the effect of ambition on human life is not limited to the observation that it can cause seditions. In the History ambition is also the passion that led the Athenians to surpass all others, that drove them to "grow civil" and "to pass in a more tender kind of life"\(^{(51)}\), that helped them to reach the peak of civilisation. Therefore, as in the previous section it was shown how from Thucydides' account of ancient time (when fear was overwhelming)

\(^{(50)}\) To see to what length the Lacedœmonians were prepared to go to protect their political integrity, it suffices to recall the treatment that was meted out to the most ambitious among the Helotes so as to prevent them from destabilizing Sparta:

They caused proclamation to be made, that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedaemonians best service in their wars, should be made free: feeling them in this manner, and conceiving that, as they should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also with crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples as to receive their liberty, they no long after made them away: and no man knew how they perished. \((\text{History, I, pp. 464-5})\)

\(^{(51)}\) \textit{History, I, p. 6.}
and of the plague (when fear was suppressed by the very deadliness of the disease) one can deduce a paradox of fear, now we can perform a similar exercise with regard to ambition.

Thucydides' description of the civilized Athenians and his narration of the *stasis* of Corcyra indirectly raise the following dilemma: to what extent and under what conditions is ambition a beneficial passion that can foster civilisation and when does it instead become the very cause of political dissolution?

Hobbes set out to provide an answer to this dilemma, too. Again he identifies a strong political state as the artificial instrument whereby individuals can channel, restrain, and direct their natural desire to surpass others. He notices that the state, by the introduction of common rules and laws provides common standards of what is right and wrong, what is *meum* and *tuum*, what is honourable and dishonourable:

... it belongeth to the judgement of the sovereign power, to set forth and make known the common measure by which every man is to know what is his, and what another's; what is good and what bad; and what he ought to do, and what not ... And these measures of the actions of the subjects are those which men call LAWS POLITIC, or civil. (52)

Laws and rules make the pursuit of glory possible in two ways: on the one hand they put an end to the arbitrariness in the field of language and values that characterizes the state of nature and thus, by setting common criteria, enable individuals to agree on what is

(52) *Elements of Law*, p. 112 (capitals in the original).
better or worse, more or less, valuable or not. On the other hand, laws and regulations (in particular those regarding private property) allow competition to take place in those fields (such as science, arts and, above all, riches) where abilities vary across individuals, thus freeing people from having to compete only in the one field in which they are by nature equal, namely in their ability to preserve and control their own lives. He writes:

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of mere nature; ... where has been shewn before, all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. (53)

As a strong state can defend society as a whole from the evil of ambition by creating rules that turn ambition to the service of society itself, so the state can protect those individuals who by nature are not glory-seekers. The moderate, the temperate, the people who are not interested in power and that in natural conditions are compelled to join the race of the glory-seekers can now lead a tranquil life.

Finally it should be noted that Thucydides' deep observations on the effects of fear and glory on political association come from the analysis of two of the most dramatic events of the war, namely the plague of Athens and the sedition of Corcyra. This is so because according to Thucydides war and adversities teach more than times of peace: "war ... is a most violent master". (54)

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(53) Leviathan, p. 140; see Elements of Law, p. 87 and De Cive, p. 68.

(54) History, p. 348.
In his introduction ("On the Life and History of Thucydides"), Hobbes endorses wholeheartedly this view:

men profit more by looking on adverse events, than on prosperity. (55)

Not only did Hobbes not change his stand on this matter for the rest of his life (we find the very same conviction re-iterated at the beginning of the Behemot), but more importantly in his political works he developed and built on the Thucydidean insight that in order to explain the political state one should start from its negation, i.e. from the anarchy of the state of nature where the categories of fear and ambition can be observed at their most unrestrained and their effects derived most directly.

To conclude, apart from agreeing that most human beings have a restless desire to rule the life of others and that moderate people are compelled to join the struggle of power for the sake of their survival, Hobbes and Thucydides agree in another crucial respect, namely in pointing to ambition as the core of any sedition, the spark of any civil war, the dormant cancer of political societies.

1.5 ON PROFIT

As on fear and honour, so on profit there are some striking similarities between Thucydides' and Hobbes's thought: while ranking the pursuit of profit below the desire for honour as motivating forces of human behaviour, they both consider the unrestrained desire

(55) Ibid., p. xxiv.
for riches a potentially destabilizing force of political society.

Thucydides, in his diagnosis of the causes of sedition, quoted in the previous section, mentions avarice (μαλακεία) as the human passion which, besides ambition, can cause stasis. (56)

In *Elements of Law*, *De Cive*, and *Leviathan* Hobbes, too, notices that one of the causes of conflict in the state of nature is covetousness and for the sake of peace stipulates a law of nature regarding "distributive justice" that explicitly forbids what "the Greeks call μαλακεία which is commonly rendered covetousness." (57)

In the *History* the desire of profit is unambiguously a weaker motivational force than the desire of honours, as is explained by Pericles in the funeral oration: "For the love of honour never groweth old: nor doth that unprofitable part of our life take delight (as some have said) in gathering of wealth, so much as it doth in being honoured". (58)

However, in the *History* the distinction between glory and profit is at times only apparent, in so far as profit is often described as the safest means to achieve glory. Thucydides shows that this is so even at times of war, for wars are won by money as much as by courage. (59)

In *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* Hobbes too ranks the desire of glory above profit and proclaims that "all the mindes pleasure is either Glory, ... or refers to Glory in the end." (60) Although in *Leviathan* Hobbes does not provide a simple hierarchy of human passions, the

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(57) *Elements of Law*, p. 89; see *Leviathan*, p. 142, *De Cive*, p. 69.
(59) See, for example, Archidamus' orations.
(60) *De Cive*, p. 43.
distinction between glory and profit is as blurred as it is in the
*History*, in so far as riches are considered as a sign of power (61)
and therefore profit itself becomes a source of glory and honour. (62)

1.6 CONCLUSION

In his letter to the readers which precedes his translation of
Thucydides Hobbes notices and endorses the view, that in his times
was widespread (63), that Thucydides was "the most politic
historiographer that ever writ". (64) In *Leviathan* he explains that a
fundamental ingredient of a "good history" is "the choice of the
actions that are more profitable to be known". (65)

In this chapter it has been argued that the reason why Hobbes saw
the *History* as a work of the highest political significance lies in
the fact that in it Thucydides spells out both the necessary
condition for a stable political order and the causes of civil wars.
More specifically, it has been shown that Thucydides identified in
controlled fear the cornerstone of political order: whenever fear is
removed from the gamut of human passions, as during the plague in
Athens, the outcome is social and political chaos. Conversely, when
fear is so overwhelming that all other human passions are

(61) *Leviathan*, p. 64; *Elements of Law*, p. 35.
(62) On this see Clifford Orwin 'The Just and the Advantageous in
Thucydides: The Case of the Mytilenean Debate', *American
(63) On this see Richard Schlatter, 'Introduction', in R. Schlatter
(64) *History*, I, p. viii.
(65) *Leviathan*, p. 58.
obliterated, as in the case of ancient Greece before it "grew civil", then uncertainty reigns supreme, anticipation and first strike are the only strategy, decisions are taken under stress and, again, the outcome is political chaos.

In Thucydides' characterization of human nature people have in themselves not only the possibility to create a stable political order — by turning to their advantage their natural fear — but also the potential source of its destruction. In fact, there are two human passions that, if allowed to over-ride fear, can undermine social and political associations: ambition to rule and avarice. In this chapter it has been suggested that in his political works Hobbes develops the above insights and tries to find an escape from a dual paradox implicit in Thucydides' History, namely the paradox that fear can disrupt peace both when it is excessive (as in ancient times) and when it is lacking altogether (as during the plague of Athens) and ambition can either promote civilisation (as in the case of the Athenians) or cause civil war (as in Corcyra).

It can be safely assumed that Thucydides did not believe either that his dual dilemma could ever be solved or that the mere understanding of the function of fear and ambition in political associations were sufficient to preserve future generations from war and the dissolution of society. Indeed in the History one can find numerous hints of his belief that history is bound to repeat itself and that no final salvation will ever be attainable.

In this respect, Hobbes's position is diametrically opposed to

(66) On this see Clifford Orwin, 'Stasis and Plague', cit.
Thucydides'. In fact, Hobbes's pessimism does not extend either to the ability of the political philosopher to decipher human interactions or to the ability of mankind to heed his message. In the Epistle Dedicatory that prefaces \textit{De Clive}, Hobbes goes as far as suggesting to have found the formula for eternal peace:

If the Morall Philosophers had ... discharged their duty ... [if] the nature of human actions [were] distinctly knowne ... the strength of Avarice and Ambition ... would presently faint and languish; And Mankinde should enjoy such an Immortall Peace, that ... there would hardly be left any pretence for war. (67)

Thus, despite the striking similarities in their diagnosis of the ultimate causes of the dissolution of society and of the necessary conditions for its stability, Thucydides and Hobbes show a different attitude towards the material under scrutiny, that can perhaps be explained in terms of the different \textit{tasks} of the historian and of the political philosopher: the former wants to explain the course of history, the latter aims at directing it.

Whereas in Thucydides' account fear, ambition, and gain are strong passions that keep the souls of the protagonists of the \textit{History} in permanent turmoil and the reader is never allowed to hope that controlled fear will eventually prevail and order triumph, Hobbes's writings exude the confidence of the political philosopher that true understanding can alter human behaviour and that mankind will

\begin{flushright}
(67) \textit{De Clive}, pp. 25-6 (emphasis in the original); in \textit{Leviathan} Hobbes notices that "though nothing can be immortal, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their commonwealths might be secured, at least from perishing from internal diseases.", p. 308.
\end{flushright}
eventually realise that political salvation is feasible through the artifice of a powerful State that exploits the natural fear of people to restrain pride and greed, thus preventing the collapse into anarchy.
CHAPTER II
MOTION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY

II.1 INTRODUCTION; II.2 TOWARDS A POLITICAL DEFINITION OF MAN: II.2.1 Comparative analysis; II.2.2 Time-series analysis; II.2.3 The identity of Man; II.2.4 On voluntary motion and Politics; II.2.5 On the distinctive voluntary motion of man; II.3 EQUALITY OF MOTIONS: II.3.1 On Power; II.3.2 Equality of wisdom, wit, and other forms of equality; II.3.3 Equality to kill in De Cive, Elements of Law, and Leviathan; II.3.4 Equality to kill as a fundamental equality; II.3.5 Equality to kill as the basis of the social contract.

II.1 INTRODUCTION

Hobbes's ambition as expressed in De Cive and elsewhere was to create a philosophical system that organized and explained everything that could be explained, from cosmology to morals, from natural science to politics (1). His contemporaries tended to think that in this respect Hobbes had been successful: both his few admirers and his many detractors seemed to agree that his materialism, theology (or lack of it) and politics were all components of a single whole (2). From the end of the last century though, since G.C. Robertson has argued that Hobbes's political view derives in fact from "his personal circumstances and the events of his time" (3), the bearing of Hobbes's cosmology and theory of motion on his political thought

(1) De Cive, Preface to the reader, p. 35.
has become a matter of controversy. On the one hand, Strauss (4), Taylor (5), and Warrender (6) have led the camp that maintains that, despite Hobbes's claims to the contrary, his political theory is completely unrelated to his natural science. On the other hand, Oakeshott (7), Watkins (8), and Spragens (9) have led the opposite camp that believes that although Hobbes's political theory was not (and could not be) logically deduced from his cosmology, yet it

(4) In the preface to his The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Its basis and its genesis, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1963 (first published in 1936), Leo Strauss notices that the "particular object" of his study is to show "that the real basis of Hobbes's political philosophy is not modern science" (p. ix).

(5) In 'The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes', Philosophy, vol. 13, 1938, pp. 406-24, A.E. Taylor contends that Hobbes's ethical theory is a very strict deontology "disengaged" from the rest of his philosophy "with which it has no logically necessary connection", p. 408.

(6) In The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. His theory of Obligation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970 (first published 1957), Howard Warrender argues that Hobbes's theory of political obligation must be separated analytically from his natural philosophy and his psychology and that if in fact Hobbes wanted to derive his moral theory from an empirical theory "he must be held to have failed in his main enterprise", p. 6.

(7) Unlike Watkins and Spragens who argue that the very content of some of Hobbes's political ideas was significantly influenced by his scientific views, Oakeshott indicates in a distinctive form of reasoning the common thread that unifies the entire Hobbesian construction, see: 'Introduction to Leviathan', in Hobbes on civil association, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975 (first published in 1946 and revised in 1974), pp. 1-74.


(9) Thomas A. Spragens considers his book on The Politics of Motion. The World of Thomas Hobbes, London, Croom Helm, 1973, as a study of "the relationship of natural philosophy and political philosophy in Hobbes" and summarises his position as follows: "My view, like that of Watkins, is that there is considerable interaction between the two and that the results of this interaction are significant for the final content of Hobbes's political theory" (p. 36).
should not be considered as a self-contained whole totally independent from the rest of Hobbes's philosophy.

Without taking sides on such a major interpretative issue (which would require a dissertation to itself) this chapter will examine Hobbes's definition of man as motion with a two-fold objective: on the one hand, an attempt will be made to piece together, on the basis of some observations made by Hobbes in *Elements of Philosophy*, some of the possible reasons that may have led him to regard such definition as an appropriate starting point of his political theory; on the other hand, by examining his argument on the power of men-motion, I shall try to extrapolate a specific notion of equality, that will then be used in Part III of this dissertation as one of the building-blocks of the proposed axiomatization of Hobbes's political theory.

II.2 TOWARDS A POLITICAL DEFINITION OF MAN

In this section it will be argued that the concept of motion, when used to define man, had for Hobbes a strong "political" appeal (spelt out in unambiguous terms in Chapter XI of *Elements of Philosophy*), in the sense that, in Hobbes's view, it had all the required characteristics to make it the appropriate starting point of his political theory.

II.2.1 Comparative analysis

As a first step in the attempt to find out why Hobbes found
politically appealing the definition of man as motion, it may be profitably recalled that in his view “man” is a “universal name”, which, as such has no direct counterpart in the world (10), but refers to an abstraction, or mental image.

Since “one universal name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident” (11) and “a man denotes any one of a multitude of men ... by reason of their similitude” (12), it follows that in Hobbes's view in order to define man we have to compare all individuals at the same time: whatever can be found in “every particular of mankind” (13), that is man.

Whereas it is beyond doubt that what can be termed a comparative analysis of individuals was considered by Hobbes as a necessary exercise to formulate the definition of man, it is more difficult to establish whether in his opinion such an exercise would be also sufficient.

Indeed, one could refer to a wealth of passages in Hobbes's works (especially in his analysis of universal and compound names, and in his explanation of the compositive nature of our mental processes) where Hobbes conveys the strong impression that the above-mentioned comparison across men at a given point in time is all that is needed to arrive at the definition of man.

However, the view that a comparative criterion be sufficient to define man is repudiated altogether by Hobbes himself in what I

(10) “there being nothing in the world universal but names”, Leviathan, p. 21; "There is nothing universal but names", Elements of Law, p. 20.
(11) Leviathan, p. 21; emphasis added.
(12) Elements of Law, p. 18; emphasis added.
believe to be a corner-stone of his reflections on the definition of man — I refer to section 7 of Chapter XI of *Elements of Philosophy.* Here Hobbes specifies an additional criterion that should be deployed to capture the identity of man. By focusing attention on this criterion in the next two sections I shall be able to provide a possible explanation as to why Hobbes defined man as motion, or, more precisely, why he believed that such a definition provided the appropriate starting point for his political theory.

II.2.1 Time-series analysis

We may begin by noticing that in *Elements of Philosophy* Hobbes rejects unambiguously the identification of man with body, or unity of matter; he observes that a man's body changes over time and so, if we were to identify Man and Body, we would be bound to conclude that young and old Socrates are not the same man. He writes:

For it is one thing to ask concerning Socrates, whether he be the same man, and another to ask whether he be the same body; for his body, when he is old, cannot be the same it was when he was an infant, by reason of the difference of magnitude: for one body has always one and the same magnitude; yet, nevertheless, he may be the same man (14)

Hobbes rejects in equally strong terms the identification of man with "aggregate of accidents", for, he argues, if we were to accept it, we would be bound to say "that a man standing is not the same he was

(14) *Elements of Philosophy*, p. 137.
sitting" (15).
The consequence of identifying Man with either body or aggregate of accidents, and therefore of being unable to capture the continuity between young and old Socrates would, in Hobbes's view, be disastrous
in so far as it would lead to a complete confusion of all civil rights:

... he that sins, and he that is punished, should not be the same man, by reason of the perpetual flux and change of man's body — which were to confound all civil rights. (16)

From the above quotations it can be seen quite clearly that according to Hobbes a comparative analysis is not sufficient to arrive at a definition of man that would enable him to found (and not to confound) civil rights. Another necessary condition for that definition is that it must capture the self-sameness of persons over time. Hence a comparative criterion has to be combined with what can be called a time-series comparison that pinpoints what is permanent in the same individual at different times. If a definition of man as either body in perpetual change or as developing self can suit well the needs of natural scientists and psychologists, it is altogether inadequate, at least in Hobbes's view, for a political theorist (17).

(16) *Elements of Philosophy*, p. 136, emphasis added.
(17) It will be noticed that the comparative criterion and a time-series criterion are but an application to the specific case of the definition of man of the two types of comparisons examined in Chapter XI of *Elements of Philosophy* (entitled "Of Identity and Difference") where Hobbes differentiates between:
- the comparison of many objects at the same time so to discover equalities and differences (pars 1-6);
- the comparison of the same body with itself at different times (par 7) so to find its identity (i.e. what is permanent in it).
II.2.3 The identity of man

Having thus ascertained the compound criterion necessary and sufficient to arrive at a politically relevant definition of man, we can interpret the early chapters of Elements of Law and Leviathan as an attempt to answer the following question: what is common to all men and constant in each of them over time?

Hobbes leads the reader to realize that people are different from one another not only in their appearances, tastes, and physical characteristics but also in their desires, aversions, thoughts, judgments, and values. In Elements of Law he notices:

- while every man differeth from other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. (18)

In De Cive he stresses the different desires and aversions of people and consequently their different values:

- such is the nature of man, that every one calls that Good which he desires, and evil, which he eschewes; and therefore through the diversity of our affections, it happens that one counts that good, which another counts evil (19)

- what this man commends, (that is to say, calls Good) the other undervalues, as being Evil (20)

- the same Action is prais'd by these, and call'd Vertue, and displeased by those, and termed vice (21)

(18) Elements of Law, p. 29.
(19) De Cive, p. 177.
(20) Ibid, p. 74.
(21) Ibid, p. 75.
In *Leviathan* Hobbes combines the notation that people are different in their perception of the external world with the observation that they differ in their evaluation of it:

And divers men, differ not only in their judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of common life (22)

... for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidity (23)

Hobbes is as keen to stress that there are considerable variations across people as he is to point out that the same individual is different at different times, with different values, desires, thoughts.

In *Leviathan* we read:

... the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is calleth good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth evil (24)

... all men [are] ... not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times (25)

In *De Cive*:

... very often the same man at diverse times, *praises*, and *dispraises* the same thing (26)

... and the same man what now he esteem'd for good, he immediately looks on as evil (27)

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(22) *Leviathan*, p. 146.
(26) *De Cive*, p. 74.
By means of his dual criterion, Hobbes establishes that what men have in common and is permanent in each of them is but the very way of functioning of their bodies (vital motion) and their mind (voluntary motion). The identity of man is the summation of vital and voluntary motion:

that man will be always the same, whose actions and thoughts proceed all from the same beginning of motion, namely, that which was in his generation (28)

To conclude, the description of man as motion is the only definition that according to Hobbes satisfies both the comparative and the times-series criteria and thus allows him to found and not to "confound all civil rights".

II.2.4 Voluntary motion and politics

Although the concept of vital motion is omnipresent in Hobbes's argument as it forms a fundamental part of the "self", or identity, that Hobbesian men want to preserve, Hobbes never gives an exhaustive account of it in his political writings; he felt that it is not "the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion &c" (29) of people that have a bearing on politics, but rather those actions that proceed from their thoughts and passions. Thus Hobbes concentrates entirely on voluntary motion and describes moral and political philosophy as the study of that specific motion:

(28) *Elements of Philosophy*, p. 137.
(29) *Leviathan*, p. 38.
moral philosophy studies the motions of the mind, namely appetite and aversion ... what causes they have and of what they be causes (30)

... the principles of the politics consist in the knowledge of the motions of the mind (31).

11.2.5 On the distinctive voluntary motion of man

In his quest for the identity of man, Hobbes, both in Elements of Law and in Leviathan, points to certain differences that exist between the voluntary motion in man and in animals. In these dissimilarities lies the distinctive identity of man. (Consistently with his lack of emphasis on vital motion, no comparisons are made between vital motion in man and in animals.)

In order to unravel the intricacies of Hobbes's position on this issue, it may be useful to distinguish between two types of differences in human and animal voluntary motion, namely differences in kind and differences of degree.

Differences in kind refer to those characteristics that are present in man and absent in animals, like the ability to develop language (32) and reason (33), the capability of thinking deductively (34), and a number of passions that range from curiosity (35) to glory (36), from

(30) Elements of Philosophy, p. 72.
(31) Ibid., p. 74.
(32) Leviathan, Ch. 4.; Elements of Law, p. 18.
(33) Ibid., Ch. 5; on language and science: Elements of Law, p. 19.
(34) Ibid., pp. 13–4.
(35) Ibid., p. 44.
(36) Ibid., p. 156.
the desire to communicate to others one's wisdom, knowledge and opinions (37) to the desire "to innovate" the world (38).

Differences of degree refer to those faculties — like imagination, memory, prudence, and inductive thought — that although shared by both men and animals, are nevertheless more developed in man. (39) Hobbes's argument seems to suggest that what I termed differences in degree are in fact brought about by differences in kind: it is man's unique ability to develop language that helps him to surpass animals in imagination, memory, knowledge and inductive thought; it is man's capacity to think deductively and to reason that helps him to envisage the future and therefore to be more prudent than animals.

As we will see in later chapters, in order to explain the reason why men unlike animals live in political states, Hobbes focuses his attention on the differences of kind, namely on that part of man's nature that is specific to him and absent in animals.

Before turning to that issue, though, in the next section we shall try to establish whether there are significant variations across individuals as motions.

II.3 THE EQUALITY OF MOTIONS

In this section I shall introduce Hobbes's notion that people are equally dangerous for one another and his contention that this form of equality is of fundamental importance in political philosophy.

(37) Elements of Law, p. 23.
(38) Leviathan, p. 156.
(39) Elements of Law, Chapters 4 and 5; Leviathan, Ch. 3.
The emphasis of the section is on the presentation and elucidation of Hobbes's stand on equality rather than on a critical examination and evaluation of his position. (For my own view on why Hobbes was indeed correct in considering the equal ability of people to kill as a sufficient ground for the justification of equal rights, the reader is referred to Chapter 6.)

11.3.1 On power

Having shown that the feature of man that is permanent in each individual and common to all is but the functioning of his body and mind (namely the way in which his body and mind respond and interact with the external world), the next step is for Hobbes to establish whether some people "function" better than others.

As for Hobbes, motion generates power which, in turn, is the origin of new motion (40), and thus comparing men-motions involves comparing their power, it may be useful to clarify briefly the meaning of power.

In his works Hobbes explains that one's power is one's ability to achieve an objective (41) and referring to individuals he draws a distinction between two forms of power: "natural" (or "original") and "acquired" (or "instrumental").

In Elements of Law he describes as natural

the powers - of the body, nutritive, generative, motive and of the mind, knowledge (42)

(40) Motion is also defined as "actual power" and power as "future motion", Elements of Philosophy, p. 131.
(41) Leviathan, p. 74.
(42) Elements of Law, p. 34.
whereas by "acquired powers" he means
such farther powers, as by them are acquired (viz.) riches, place of
authority, friendship or favour, and good fortune (43)

Similarly, in *Leviathan*, he denotes as "original" (or "natural")
- the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind: as extraordinary
  strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality and
  nobility (44)
whereas he classifies as "instrumental"
- those powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means or
  instruments to acquire more: as riches reputation, friends and -
good luck (45)

Although in a passage of *Leviathan* Hobbes seems to suggest that the
above-mentioned instrumental (or acquired) powers - namely riches,
places of authority, friends, science - can exist "as well within, as
without commonwealths" (46), given his characterization of the state
of nature this seems unlikely. Indeed since the Hobbesian state of
nature is a world characterized by the complete lack of property
rights, of any social or political hierarchy, of leisure-time to devote
to sciences and industry, of common values etc. (47), it follows that
most powers that Hobbes defines in *Elements of Law* as "acquired" and
in *Leviathan* as "instrumental" are completely missing. (48)

(43) *Ibid*
(44) *Leviathan*, p. 74.
(45) *Ibid*
(47) For a discussion of this topic, see Chapters III-V.
(48) Of the above list of "acquired powers" the only item that can
be found also in the state of nature is of course "good
fortune"; as to the power acquired by having friends, Hobbes
thought that in natural conditions it was very unreliable (see
later chapters).
This explains why, in order to establish the equality of men in natural conditions, Hobbes concentrates entirely on the natural (or original) powers of their bodies and minds. This is the form of power we shall consider in this section, leaving the discussion of acquired powers to later chapters.

11.3.2 Hobbes on equality of wisdom, wit, and other natural powers

Hobbes’s position on the equality of natural powers of individuals is not as clear and straightforward as one would have liked and there appears to be some variations not only from Elements of Law to De Cive and Leviathan but also within the same work.

For example, in places Hobbes suggests that the experience, prudence, and wisdom of people of the same age is little different (49), whereas elsewhere he notices that some people are more prudent and wiser than the rest because their imagination is quicker and thus in the same amount of time they register more things (and consequently accumulate more experience, prudence and wisdom) (50).

At times Hobbes requires individuals “to acknowledge” the equality that exists between them (51); in other places he argues that even if people were unequal, equality should be presumed and “admitted” for

(49) "... if we consider how little odds there is of strength or knowledge between men of mature age", Elements of Law, p. 70.
   "... prudence ... experience of men equal in age is not much unequal as to the quantity", Leviathan, p. 60.
   "Prudence is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto", ibid., p. 110.

(50) "Men of quick imagination, ceteris paribus, are more prudent than those whose imagination is slow; for they observe more in less time", Elements of Law, p. 16.

(51) The recognition (and not the mere supposition) of equality is necessary for accepting the first Law of nature; see infra p. 69.
the sake of peace (52).

On the one hand he notices that since all people are satisfied with their own share of wisdom and wit, it must follow that wisdom and wit are distributed equally (53); on the other hand he points out that some people do not trust their own wit (54) and that the wit of people is widely different in so far as it depends on which of their passions are dominant (55).

The list of apparently contradictory statements made by Hobbes on equality could continue.

This situation has prompted one unsympathetic reader to allege that Hobbes's entire argument on natural equality is "conspicuously unsound" and to claim that the differences on the topic that exist between Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan "contribute to the erosion of its credibility" (56).

(52) Consider the 9th Law of nature: "... if nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged; or if nature have made men unequal yet because men that think themselves equal, will not enter into conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted", Leviathan, p. 141; De Cive, p. 39; Elements of Law, p. 103.

(53) "[men] will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share", Leviathan, p. 111.

(54) Ibid

(55) "The causes of the difference of wits, are in the passions; and the difference of passions proceedeth, partly from the different constitution of the body, and partly from different education", Leviathan, p. 61.

"The difference therefore of wit hath its original from the different passions, and from the ends to which their appetite leadeth them", Elements of Law, p. 49.

Other critics instead have attempted (and to some extent succeeded) to organize different statements that Hobbes makes on equality in a coherent discourse "by making a rather generous interpretation of what is being said, or by augmenting it with hypotheses in the spirit of his philosophy" (57).

However the prevailing tendency among Hobbes's commentators - followed by scholars as different as Gauthier (58) and Tronti (59) - has been to concentrate on a particular claim on equality that Hobbes made consistently and repeatedly in all his political works - namely the equal ability of men to kill - and to ignore all his other statements on equality.

On this point this dissertation shall not deviate from the mainstream and thus shall focus all the attention on the equality to kill of Hobbesian men. The justification for this choice is that Hobbes was convinced, as we will show later on, that the equal dangerousness of people is an essential form of equality, the basis of all equalities.

11.3.3 Equality to kill in Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan

Whereas on people's equality of prudence, wisdom and wit Hobbes made some contradictory remarks throughout the pages of his works, he

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he never wavered on the equal vulnerability of men. He maintained consistently and decisively that in a state of war no man, however strong, can feel safe.

In *Elements of Law* he points out the "great facility" of — and "the little force" needed in — killing a man and derives from it the equality of men. He writes:

... if we consider with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength or in wit, or in both, may utterly destroy the power of the stronger, since there needeth but little force to the taking away of a man's life; we may conclude that men considered in mere nature, ought to admit amongst themselves equality; and that he that claimeth no more, may be esteemed moderate (60).

In *De Cive*, too, Hobbes highlights the fragility of the human frame and makes the equality of people depend on it:

if we look on men full grown, and consider how brittle the frame of our human body is — and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest, there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others (61).

The same view that people can easily kill each other is repeated in Chapter XIII of *Leviathan*:

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so

(60) *Elements of Law*, p. 70.
(61) *De Cive*, p. 45.
considerable ... the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest (62)

The above quotations, taken respectively from *Elements of Law*, *De Cive*, and *Leviathan*, show that Hobbes never doubted that people in nature are equally able to kill each other. Thus in Chapter 6 of this dissertation this view will be taken as one of the assumptions common to all three his political works.

11.3.4 Equality to kill as a fundamental form of equality

Hobbes felt that the equality to kill was the equality that really mattered, the basis of all equalities. In the *De Cive* he writes:

... they are equal Is who can doe equall things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest thing, (namely kill) can doe equall things (63)

*Prima facie* Hobbes's claim that "they who can do the greatest thing (namely kill) can doe equall things" sounds rather strange. Although it may be accepted that people are equally vulnerable, it may be contended that inequalities in other fields of comparison (such as science, wisdom, sport, etc.) are more decisive thereby lending support to the Aristotelian view of natural masters and slaves.

However, from the vantage point afforded by sec. II.2, it is possible to explain Hobbes's claim that the equal dangerousness of people is the basis of all equality.

In fact, since the identity of the Hobbesian man is motion, which

(62) *Leviathan*, p. 110.
(63) *De Cive*, p. 45.
generates all cognitive and physical powers, it follows that the power of not losing his identity (i.e. the source of all his other powers) is the most basic power of man.

Therefore killing is the "greatest thing" that a man-motion can perpetrate against another, not because it implies the greatest of powers in the murderer (on the contrary, as we saw above, according to Hobbes killing takes very little effort) but because it entails the annihilation of motion (and thus of identity) in the victim and thus prevents the production of any further form of power.

II.3.5 Equality to kill as the precondition of the social contract

Having argued why Hobbes the Philosopher maintained that the equality to kill was a fundamental form of equality for men-motion, what remains to be clarified is why Hobbes the Political Theorist agreed in considering men's equal dangerousness as crucial.

The reason is plain: if people were not equally dangerous - as Hobbes presumed - the state of nature would be a state of peace, ruled by the most powerful; stronger people would never agree to lay down their right to all things, there would be no social contract, no basis for equal rights, no Hobbes's theory.

There are many passages in Hobbes's works in which he recognizes that his theory of the social contract is predicated on the hypothesis of the equal dangerousness and vulnerability of men.

Hobbes openly acknowledged that if some people were stronger than the rest there would be "no cause" (i.e. rational justification) for them to lay down their natural right to all things:
Now if any man had so farre exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joined forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that right that nature had given him (64).

In all three political works, the first law of nature (from which all other laws of nature follow (65)) rests entirely on the hypothesis of people's equal dangerousness. We read first in Elements of Law:

But since it is supposed from the equality of strength and other natural faculties of men, that no man is of might sufficient, to assure himself for any long time, of preserving himself thereby, whilst he remaineth in the state of hostility and war; reason therefore dictateth to every man, for his own good, to seek after peace, as far forth as there is hope to attain the same (66).

then in De Cive:

... yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature (i.e.) of War; by reason of that equality of power, and other humane faculties they are endued with all. Wherefore to seek Peace ... is the dictate of right Reason (67)

and finally in Leviathan

... [in the state of nature] there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out of the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man ought to endeavour peace,

(64) De Cive, p. 186; emphasis added.
(65) "... the rest [of the laws of nature] are deriv'd from this [fundamental law], and they direct the wayes either to Peace, or self-defence", ibid, p. 53.
(66) Elements of Law, p. 74.
(67) De Cive, p. 50.
consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every
man oughth to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining
it (68).
From the above quotations, we can see that if people were unequal in
their ability to kill, it would not be rational for them either to lay
down their right to all things or to enter the social contract. Such
is the dependence of Hobbes's theory of equal rights on the
hypothesis of equal dangerousness.

To summarize this section, as far as the fundamental power of men-
motion is concerned — namely the power to maintain one's motion and
to oppose and destroy other motions, Hobbes finds no differences
across individuals. In some men power comes to a larger extent from
the strength of their body, in others from their minds, but the
outcome is the same; men- motion are equally vulnerable and equally
dangerous one for the other.

(68) Leviathan, p. 117.
Part II

THE MEANING OF GLORY IN HOBBES'S

POLITICAL WRITINGS

It may be useful to think of critics as people directing search lights at philosophers' theories — for any feature that their beams reveal, many others are put in the shadow. I feel that in this century three critics have been largely responsible for the illumination and eclipse of Hobbes's concept of glory: Leo Strauss highlighted it in 1936 (1) whereas Macpherson (2) and McNeilly (3) obfuscated it in the 1960s. While it is easy to notice what features an interpreter's torch has put into relief, it is much more difficult to assess what other aspects it has obscured.

Thus, whereas there is little disagreement in recognizing Strauss as the most perceptive scholar of Hobbes's concept of glory, I fear that there is much less consensus in imputing to McNeilly and Macpherson the responsibility of obscuring that concept.

Yet in my view their responsibility has been considerable.

On the one hand Macpherson has had the merit to make us aware of some bourgeois traits of the Hobbesian man — and this is no little

merit. However, as glory is not an exclusively bourgeois value, but instead has Thucydidean and even biblical aspects and can even be considered as a feature of timeless human nature, Macpherson belittles its significance in Hobbes's construction and shifts the emphasis from glory (thus moving it from the centre-stage position in which Strauss had placed it) to gain, property, greed, and accumulation.

On his part, McNeilly has had the merit to warn Hobbes's readers that they should not make "marvellous omelettes" of Hobbes's "broken eggs" and should acknowledge some changes that exist between Hobbes's political works. The considerable limitation of his book is that it seems more interested in scoring interpretative points against scholars like Laird and Peters than in attempting to offer the reader an objective account of the variations that exist between Hobbes's works. As a result, McNeilly has exaggerated the differences on glory between the Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan and has been sometimes highly selective in his choice of quotations.

In this part of the dissertation I shall not provide a blow-by-blow account of the points where I believe Macpherson's and McNeilly's interpretations to be incorrect. The criticism of their views will be implied rather than explicitly stated. In the next chapters it shall be argued, in indirect contraposition to Macpherson, that Hobbes had placed far more emphasis on the human desire of glory than on greed and that indeed in many instances he considered the striving for possession as a mere means for the experiencing of glory. It shall also be argued, in contrast to McNeilly's thesis, that although in the Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan one can detect some
differences on glory that may suggest a change in Hobbes's philosophy of man, there are conspicuous and substantial similarities in the role assigned by Hobbes to glory in his political theory. (4)

(4) In the following three chapters I shall refer again to the distinction between Hobbes's "philosophy" and "political theory". By the former I mean Hobbes's conception of man and especially his theory of the passions, as presented in the first thirteen chapters of *Elements of Law* and in the first twelve chapters of *Leviathan*, by the latter instead I mean Hobbes's justification of political obligation, his diagnosis of the causes of conflict, sedition, and civil war and his view on the functions of the State.
CHAPTER III

GLORY IN ELEMENTS OF LAW

III.1 INTRODUCTION; III.2 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF GLORY: III.2.1 Glory, Vain Glory, and False Glory; III.2.2 Glory as Pleasure and Glory as Appetite; III.2.3 Beneficial and Detrimental Glory; III.2.4 Descriptive and Value-Loaded Terms; III.2.5 Glory and Felicity; III.2.6 Glory, Honour, Use, and Worth; III.2.7 Glory and Self-Preservation; III.3 VARIATIONS ON GLORY: III.3.1 Glory, Madness, and Melancholy; III.3.2 Glory, Sensualities, Riches, and Knowledge; III.3.3 Glory, Magnanimity, Charity, and Laughter; III.3.4 Are There Non-Glory-Seekers? III.4 GLORY AND POLITICS: III.4.1 Glory, Men, and Bees; III.4.2 Glory and the State of Nature; III.4.3 Glory, Honour, and the Political State; III.4.4 Glory, Ambition, and Civil War; III.5 CONCLUSION.

III.1 INTRODUCTION

Even considering the lengthy passages devoted to the elucidation of man's passions and happiness in Thomas White's De Mundo Examined (1) and in De Homine, the most complete exposition of Hobbes's philosophy of man is still to be found in Elements of Law.

Resuming my account of Hobbes's philosophy of man from where I had left it in Chapter II — namely from the definition of man-motion — we may notice that according to Hobbes the direction of each man-motion is determined by two opposing forces: an attractive force (called "appetite") that leads men towards what they perceive as

being conducive to either maintaining or augmenting their power (thereby ensuring their identity as men-motions) and a repulsive force (called "aversion") that drives them away from what they see as causing either stillness or loss of power (thereby destroying their identity). The focus of this Chapter is the analysis of the Hobbesian individual's appetite to increase his power — what in *Elements of Law* Hobbes calls "glory". Other key components of Hobbes's philosophy of man, such as man's aversion for death, his rationality, etc, shall also be examined here, but only in so far as they are relevant for a full understanding of the human desire for glory and thus in a cursory way.

III.2 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF GLORY

In *Elements of Law* the pleasure of observing one's power in attaining one's objectives is called by Hobbes "glory".

As the speed of a horse running on a beach depends on the opposing powers that hinder its movements (surface, wind, etc.), so Hobbes maintains that the power of man-motion to achieve his objectives is not absolute, but determined by the difference with the power of other men:

And because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another. For equal powers opposed, destroy one another... (2)

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(2) *Elements of Law*, p. 34.
Thus, a more precise description of glory is the pleasure of superior power with respect to others; in Hobbes's words:

GLORY, or internal glorification or triumph of the mind, is that passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him that contendeth with us (3)

The aim of this section is to establish the meaning of glory in Elements of Law. This entails clarifying the distinction between glory, false glory, vain glory (III.2.1), establishing when glory is a pleasure and when an appetite (III.2.2), discussing beneficial and detrimental glory (III.2.3), distinguishing pride from just esteem (III.2.4); describing glory and felicity (III.2.4); characterising glory vis-à-vis such concepts as honour, use, and worth (III.2.6), explaining the relation between glory, reason, and self-preservation (III.2.7).

III.2.1 Glory, Vain Glory, and False Glory

In Elements of Law Hobbes compares three forms of glory, namely "glory", "vain glory", and "false glory" and provides two criteria to distinguish between them. As both criteria are relevant not only for the discussion of glory as opposed to vain and false glory, but also for the distinction between glory as pleasure and glory as appetite, it is worth examining them in some detail.

One criterion suggested by Hobbes to distinguish between glory, vain glory, and false glory is by considering whether these passions are

(3) Ibid., pp. 36-7.
based on either real or imaginary actions; if one's feeling of superiority is grounded on real achievements, Hobbes says, the deriving pleasure is "glory"; if actions are not real, and thus power is merely imagined either by the glory-seeker or by his admirators, then the resulting pleasure is fictitious and is either "vain glory" (if it derives entirely from one's indulging in fanciful thoughts) or "false glory" (if it stems from adulation by others). He writes:

This imagination of our power and worth, may be an assured and certain experience of our own actions, and then is that glorying just and well grounded. The same passion may proceed not from any conscience of our own actions, but from fame and trust of others, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived; and this is FALSE GLORY. The fiction (which also is imagination) of actions done by ourselves, which never were done, is called VAIN GLORY: and it is esemplified in the fable by the fly sitting on the axle tree, and saying to himself, What a dust do I raise! (4)

A second criterion indicated by Hobbes to differentiate between glory and vain and false glory refers to "aspiring". Aspiring is the urge to act and to augment one's power in the world. Hobbes observes that whereas glory engenders aspiring, namely spurs people to act so as to experience new glory, vain glory instead induces inaction since no effort or achievement in the world is needed in order to repeat at one's will the mental pleasure of vain glory.

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(4) Ibid., p. 37.
the appetite which we call ASPIRING, or proceeding from one degree of power to another — [vain glory] begetteth no appetite nor endeavour to any further attempt, it is merely vain and unprofitable (5)

False glory on the other hand, although inducing aspiring like glory, brings about insuccess because the ability of the agent is only imagined and not real:

false glory ... the aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill-success (6)

III.2.2 Glory as pleasure and glory as appetite

The two criteria of "real actions" and "aspiring" examined above are useful not just for the reason indicated by Hobbes, namely for differentiating between glory, vain glory, and false glory; they are also relevant for recognising in the Hobbesian concept of glory the dual aspect of both a pleasure and an appetite. The criterion of "aspiring" tells us that glory consists in desiring future victories, in attempting to obtain them. It characterizes glory as an appetite. On the other hand, the criterion of "real actions" tells us that glory consists in looking back at our achievements, in admiring our own past performances. In other words, it characterizes glory as a pleasure.

Thus for Hobbes glory means both the pleasure and the desire of superiority. This may be confusing at times (see below the discussion

(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
of glory and felicity), but by referring to the two criteria of "aspiring" and "real actions" it is possible to solve some ambiguities of Hobbes's text.

III.2.3 Beneficial and Detrimental Glory

Although the words "beneficial" and "detrimental" glory do not occur in Hobbes's writings, from a reading of Elements of Law it appears that Hobbes considered some forms of glory as detrimental for the human race, others as beneficial.

In Chapters 4 and 10, for example, the desire of glory and honour is shown to spur people to perform to their best thereby developing those passions and faculties that are specific to man, ranging from curiosity to reason, from language to deductive thought. Here is how Hobbes describes the mechanics whereby a man can be induced to better himself by the desire of honour:

As when a man, from the thought of honour to which he has an appetite, cometh to the thought of wisdom, which is the next means thereto; and from thence to the thought of study, which is the next means to wisdom, etc. [...] where honour, to which a man hath appetite, maketh him to think upon the next means of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. as men hunt after riches, place or knowledge (7)

For Hobbes the pleasures of the senses are deleterious in so far as they distract the mind from the desire of honour and glory (on glory

(7) Ibid., pp. 13-4.
and honour, see infra) and thus hinder the development of man's
cognitive powers:

Sensuality ... taketh away the inclination to observe such things as
conduce to honour; and consequently maketh men less curious, and
less ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to
knowledge or to other power; in which two consisteth all the
excellency of power cognitive (8)

On the other hand, the type of glory that Hobbes seems to
disapprove of is vain and false glory; in particular he seems to
condemn the vain or false glory of those who without effort or
labour think themselves wiser than the rest, and thus entitled to
rule the life of others, to instruct them about what is right and
wrong, to correct, change, and "innovate" the government of a country.
This form of glory, Hobbes maintains, is the source of civil war (9).

III.2.4 Descriptive and Value-Loaded Terms

Although in Elements of Law Hobbes shows to consider vain and false
glory as detrimental to the human race, when he speaks of glory tout
court there is no suggestion that he is referring to a form of glory
that is unreservedly beneficial to men.

In Chapter 9 of Elements of Law he explains that "glory" is a
descriptive and value-free word that simply describes the
relationship between one's feelings and one's actions; and he notices
that "pride" and "just esteem" are its value-loaded counterparts

(8) Ibid., p. 49.
(9) See infra, section III.4.4.
that describe either the approving or the disapproving judgment of a
man about other people’s glorying. In his words:

and this passion [glory], by them whom it displeaseth is called
pride: by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a just valuation of
himself (10)

Keeping in mind the above distinction between glory, pride, and just
esteem, we may notice that Hobbes usually resorts to the value-free
term (i.e. "glory") and reserves the (negative) value-loaded version
("pride") only for special occasions, as in the description of the
following law of nature:

for peace sake nature hath ordained this law, That every man
acknowledge other for his equal. And the breach of this law, is
that we call PRIDE (11)

III.2.5 Glory and Felicity

In Elements of Law the unambiguous objective of Hobbesian men is to
try to obtain the pleasure of superior power; their life is compared
by Hobbes to a race which has "no other goal, nor other garland but
being foremost" (12).

According to Hobbes once people have achieved excellence in one field
they will turn to another "as long as in any kind they think
themselves behind any other":

as men attain to more riches, honours, or other power; so their
appetite continually groweth more and more; and when they are come

(10) Ibid., p. 37.
(11) Ibid., p. 88.
(12) Ibid., p. 47.
to the utmost degree of one kind of power, they pursue some other, as long as in any kind they think themselves behind any other. Of those therefore that have attained to the highest of honour and riches, some have affected mastery in some art; as Nero in music and poetry, Commodus in the art of a gladiator (13)

The link between glory and human happiness is explained by Hobbes in terms of the above mentioned race: while "glory" is "to consider [others] behind", human "felicity" consists in "continually out-going] the next before" (14).

If we were to judge the relationship between glory and felicity entirely on the basis of the above quotation, we would be bound to say that the difference between the two is that glory is the pleasure of looking back at a success that has already been obtained and thus belongs to the past; felicity instead is the pleasure of present successes and as the present becomes inexorably the past, for the Hobbesian man there can be no felicity "but in proceeding" (15).

However, from our discussion of the dual aspect of glory as pleasure and desire, we may see that in the above quotation what Hobbes is comparing with felicity is only one facet of glory, namely glory as pleasure — glory-pleasure does mean resting on past victories, while felicity is the striving for future victories.

But if we consider that glory is also an appetite, that although based on past actions it engenders "aspiring", i.e., the desire for new actions (and new glory), the distinction between glory and felicity

(13) Ibid., p. 30.
(14) Ibid., p. 48.
(15) Ibid., p. 30.
captured by Hobbes's analogy with a race is incomplete. Indeed, like felicity, glory too derives from "out-going the next before".
The clue to distinguishing between glory and felicity is not that the former consists in looking back at our achievements and the latter in looking ahead at future victories, but rather in the key word "continually".
Whereas felicity describes the continuous succession of actions that forms a way of life, glory explains each single action; whereas the latter is the motivational force behind any specific action and as such is taken by Hobbes as being the greatest appetite and pleasure of each agent, the former refers to the observation of a series of actions by an external observer (or by the agent himself while taking a detached and reflective stand-back) and, significantly, is never described by Hobbes as an end.

III.2.6 Glory, Honour, Use, and Worth

Although in *Elements of Law* Hobbes never defines explicitly the relationship between glory and honour, their connection can be reconstructed quite straightforwardly from his argument.

The link between glory and honour is given by "power". Whereas glory is the recognition by the agent of his own power, honour is for Hobbes the recognition of an agent's power by other individuals. Thus glory and honour are two types of reaction to an agent's power (respectively by the agent himself and by others):

the acknowledgement of power is called HONOUR — and to honour a man (inwardly in the mind) is to conceive or acknowledge, that that
man hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself. [...] The signs of honour are those by which we perceive that one man acknowledgeth the power and worth of another (16)

Although they are both mirrors that reflect the power of a person, glory and honour are different mirrors in so far as glory tends to enlarge the projection of one's power while honour tends to reduce it, because every man's passion weigheth heavy in his own scale, but not in the scale of his neighbour (17)

Hobbes does not suggest anywhere that the mirror of honour is truer than the mirror of glory, nor that the true image of the power of a person lies in some sort of average of the two images. What he does is to describe a criterion to be used to explain different degrees of honour. The honour that we give to a man, he says, depends on his value, and his value on the use that we can make of his natural or acquired powers ("strength", "beauty of person", "knowledge", "riches", "nobility", "good fortune", "authority", etc.):

and according to the signs of honour and dishonour, so we estimate and make the value and WORTH of a man. For so much worth is every thing, as a man will give for the use of all it can do (18)

This suggests that the more useful are deemed by people certain natural characteristics or acquired skills, the higher is the value socially attributed to those individuals who possess them and the greater is their honour.

(16) Ibid., pp. 34-5.
(17) Ibid., p. 92.
(18) Ibid., p. 35.
According to this line of reasoning, the worth and honour of an ugly, poor and weak fool is nil. Hobbes does not show concern for his existence nor does he seem critical of the above criterion which grounds honour and value on use. In many of his works (Anti-White included) though, Hobbes appears to be skeptical of the people's ability to apply the above criterion correctly, namely to discern what is truly profitable and unprofitable; he notices that people recognize small power and attach little honour to men of science and philosophy because they wrongly attribute little usefulness to their activities.

While the complete chain that relates the individual to others in Elements of Law goes from glory to power, from power to use, from use to worth, and finally from worth to honour, each link in the chain is not given equal prominence in Hobbes's argument which instead emphasizes three concepts (glory, honour, and power) and does not lay much stress on the remaining two (worth and use).

III.2.7 Glory and Self-Preservation

In Chapter xxxiii of Anti-White Hobbes states:

Of the good things experienced by men, however, none can outweigh the greatest of the evil ones, namely sudden death (19)

In all his political writings Hobbes repeats the above view which implies that self-preservation is more important than glory.

In Anti-White Hobbes does not spell out whether it is the agent's or

(19) Anti-White, p. 408.
the external observer's viewpoint that is being taken in asserting that glory cannot compensate for death, nor does he specify whether people are driven away from lethal dangers by their passion, by reason, or by both.

In *Elements of Law*, instead, Hobbes's stand on this point is clearer; he maintains that it is the whole "nature" of a man (by which he means both passions and reason since "reason is no less of the nature of man than passion" (20)) that usually drives him to avoid death:

>necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire *bonum sibi*, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all that terrible enemy of nature, death, from whom we expect both the loss of all power, and also the greatest bodily pains in the losing (21)

However, he notices that passions can sometime lead man to reach a different conclusion, in which case it is reason that helps him understand that death is the greatest evil. He writes:

>and this [the whole way to one's preservation] is that good and [its contrary] that evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason (22)

In *Elements of Law* I could find only a couple of examples given by Hobbes in which passions would lead a man to die rather than endure humiliation:

>inasmuch as life itself with the condition of enduring scorn, is not

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(20) *Elements of Law*, p. 75.
(22) *Ibid*, p. 94.
esteemed worth the enjoying, much less peace (23)
for though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make one's adversary displeased with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a man had rather die than do it (24)
The above quotations provide instances of people willing to die to avoid dishonour, but in Elements of Law there are no examples of men prepared to die in order to attain glory and honour. This is no accident, but an implication of Hobbes's definition of glory. In fact, as glory is defined as the pleasure of superior power, it follows that one must be alive in order to experience it. Thus, whereas in the common use of language we speak of glorious and noble deaths and dying seems sometimes the only available means for achieving glory, the notion of glorious death makes no sense in Hobbes's terminology and is indeed never mentioned by Hobbes himself. Although Hobbes never thinks that honour can compensate for loss of life, in an important passage of Part II of Elements of Law he suggests that the "danger" or risk to one's self-preservation can be offset by "honour, riches, and means whereby to delight the mind". Referring to the sovereign power, he says:

the inconvenience arising from government in general to him that governeth, consisteth partly in the continual care and trouble about the business of other men, that are his subjects; and partly in the danger of his person. For the head always is that part, not only where the care resideth, but also against which the stroke of

(23) Ibid., p. 86.
(24) Ibid., p. 39.
an enemy most commonly is directed. To balance this incommodity, the sovereignty, together with the necessity of this care and danger, comprehendeth so much honour, riches, and means whereby to delight the mind, as no private man's wealth can attain unto (25)

III.3 VARIATIONS ON GLORY

In *Elements of Law* Hobbes argues that all key human passions, as described in Chapter 9, derive from the pleasure or displeasure that a man obtains in being honoured or dishonoured, namely in glorying or in dejection:

In the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour or dishonour done unto them, consisteth the nature of the passions in particular, whereof we are to speak in the next chapter (26)

This view combined with the detailed comparison of the life of man to a race with "no other goal, nor other garland, but being foremost" and added to the idea that human happiness consists in continuously surpassing others seems to imply that glory is the major appetite of man and that he who is neither excited by the thought of some form of glory nor dejected by the fear of dishonour falls short of humanity. However, there are passages in *Elements of Law* that contradict the above view, in so far as Hobbes suggests that some people do not seek superiority, but would be content with natural equality. As this ambiguity persists in Hobbes's later political works, it is worth paying some attention to its first appearance in *Elements*  

of Law.

In this section the precise terms of this ambiguity will be explained; to this end, and without presuming to offer an exhaustive account of the whole range of individuals described by Hobbes in *Elements of Law*, Hobbesian men will be classified according to the following criteria:

(i) the varying degree of intensity of their glorying;
(ii) the different fields, or activities, which their desire of honour directs them to;
(iii) the different ways in which they express their superiority, once they have achieved it.

III.3.1 Glory and Madness

A criterion to differentiate among Hobbesian individuals is provided by the varying degree of intensity of their glorying. Hobbes maintains that glorying is more intense in some people than in others and accounts for this entirely on physiological grounds, namely on the basis of the more or less adequate working of the vital motion.

He calls "madness" an excessive degree of glory and "melancholy" an excessive degree of dejection. We may presume that between these opposite lies the entire range of human character. He writes:

MADNESS ... is nothing else but excessive vain glory, or vain dejection (27)

madness, and the degrees thereof proceed[s] from the excess of self opinion; so also there be other examples of madness, and the degrees thereof proceeding from too much vain fear and dejection (28)

III.3.2 Glory, Riches, Places of Power, Knowledge, and Sensualities

Another criterion to classify Hobbesian men refers to the different fields, or activities, to which they are directed by their desire of honour.

In *Elements of Law* three such fields are mentioned repeatedly, namely riches, places of authority, and knowledge. The way in which the desire for honour leads men to acquire knowledge and wisdom is described thus:

> from the thought of honour to which he has an appetite, [a man] cometh to the thought of wisdom, which is the next means thereto; and from thence to the thought of study, which is the next means to wisdom, etc. [...] where honour, to which a man hath appetite, maketh him to think upon the next means of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. as men hunt after riches, place or knowledge (29)

Sensualities occupy a special place in *Elements of Law*; in so far as they refer to pleasures of the body, they distract the human mind from the desire for honour. In Hobbes's words:

Sensuality ... taketh away the inclination to observe such things as

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cordue to honour; and consequently maketh men less curious, and less ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to knowledge or to other power; in which two consisteth all the excellency of power cognitive (30).

On the other hand, in so far as sensualities involve also a pleasure of the mind, they too (like riches, places of authority, and knowledge) are explained by Hobbes in terms of glorying. Lust, or love, says Hobbes, is the pleasure of observing our power in delighting another.

Lust is a sensual pleasure, but not only that; there is in it also a delight of the mind: for it consisteth of two appetites together, to please, and to be pleased; and the delight men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind, consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please (31).

As to the problem why some people seek sensualities and others knowledge, Hobbes's stand seems to be that these differences derive from the different working of the vital motion (32). He writes:

And it may well be conjectured, that such passion [for sensual pleasure] hath his beginning from a grossness and difficulty of the motion of the spirits about the heart (33).

(30) Ibid., p. 49.
(31) Ibid., p. 43.
(32) In Elements of Philosophy instead Hobbes seems to put down the difference in interests to a difference in education - at least if we are allowed to take seriously the following statement: Neither do voluptuous men neglect philosophy, but only because they know not how great a pleasure it is to the mind of man to be ravished in the vigorous and perpetual embraces of the most beauteous world (Epistle to the Reader, p. xiv).
(33) Elements of Law, p. 50.
As in *Elements of Philosophy* Hobbes uses time to measure and compare different motions, so in *Elements of Law* Hobbes resorts to the time-dimension to illustrate the dissimilarities between the vital motions of people and their attractions towards pleasures as different as sensualities, riches, and knowledge. He argues that while some men are driven by their nature to look for easily obtainable pleasures and thus to indulge in sensualities, which "please only for the present" (34); others aim at less fleeting pleasures and thus aspire at riches, authority, reputation which "have respect to the future" (35) and the attainment of which requires long-term projects and effort; others finally aim at philosophy and knowledge which are everlasting pleasures which can be obtained only with great labours and time, in comparison to which riches and places of authority "are but sensuality ... a diversion of little pleasure" (36).

III.3.3 Glory, Magnanimity, Charity, and Laughter

Yet another criterion to distinguish between Hobbesian individuals is by considering the different way in which they express their feeling of superiority over others. In this respect Hobbes describes various types of behaviour whose extremes seem to me to be captured in Hobbes's concepts of laughter on the one hand and magnanimity and charity on the other.

Of magnanimity, he says

*MAGNANIMITY is no more than glory ... but glory well grounded upon*

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certain experience of power sufficient to attain his end in open
manner (37)

Charity is explained in *Elements of Law* as the strongest argument
showing the superiority of a man above another. In Hobbes's words:

CHARITY ... there can be no greater argument to a man of his own
power, than to find himself able, not only to accomplish his own
desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that
conception wherein consisteth charity (38)

At the other extreme of the range of possible attitudes of Hobbesian
people when they feel superior to others we find "laughter". In
*Elements of Law* laughter is described as a sudden reaction to the
realisation of our superiority above either others or past images of
ourselves:

LAUGHTER The passion of laughter proceedeth from a sudden
conception of some ability in himself that laugheth (39)

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(37) *Ibid.* , p. 47. In Chapter 19 he suggests that magnanimity and
courage in the state of nature consist in respecting the life of
others "unless fear suggest anything to the contrary" (*ibid.* , p. 101) and in refraining from unnecessary cruelty. Magnanimity and courage are at the core of "the law of nature [which] in war, is nothing but honour" (*ibid.* , p. 99); Hobbes explains: "the law of nature commandeth in war: that men
satiate not the cruelty of their present passions, whereby in
their own conscience they foresee no benefit to come" (*ibid.* , p.
100). And he comments: "though there be in war no law, the
breach whereof is injury, yet there are those laws, the breach
whereof is dishonour. In one word, therefore, the only law of
actions in war is honour; and the right of war, providence"

(38) *Ibid.* , p. 44. Hobbes recommends charity in the following law of
nature: "For seeing the causes of war and desolation proceed
from those passions, by which we strive to accommodate
ourselves, and to leave others as far as we can behind us: it
followeth that that passion by which we strive mutually to
accommodate each other, must be the cause of peace ... charity"
(*ibid.* , p. 85).

the passion of laughter proceedeth from the sudden imagination of our own odds and eminence. The passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our own formerly (40).

In Hobbes’s view “men cannot abstain from provoking one another” (41) and laughter is one of the greatest forms of provocation. Although never in his writings Hobbes investigates the mechanics of the provocation inherent in derision and laughter, he consistently regards this passion as an enemy of peace and tranquillity (42).

III.2.8 Are there Non-Glory-Seekers?

Having noticed that the desire of honour can motivate people to chase


(41) *Elements of Law*, p. 85.

(42) “Since men by natural passion are divers ways offensive one to another, every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison; till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body”, *ibid.*, p. 71. Thus as he recommends charity and magnanimity with a law of nature, so he forbids derision with the following law of nature: “because all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and contempt, provoke in the highest degree to quarrel and battle (nasmuch as life itself, with the condition of enduring scorn, is not esteemed worth the enjoying, much less peace); it must necessarily be implied as a law of nature, THAT NO MAN REPROACH, REVILE, DERIDE, OR ANY OTHERWISE DECLARE HIS HATRED, CONTEMPT, OR DISESTEEM OF ANY OTHER. But this law is very little practised” (*ibid.*, p. 86).
riches, wisdom, and knowledge, that all the passions described in
*Elements of Law* depend on the pleasure (displeasure) that people
derive from honouring (dishonouring), that the life of men is a race
to surpass others, that honour is the basis of curiosity and
curiosity is the cause of advancement, that happiness consists in
continually outgoing the next before, one would expect that there
could not be non-glory-seekers.

And yet in some passages of *Elements of Law* Hobbes mentions the
existence of people who would be contented with their share of power,
who do not seem interested in surpassing others and who would be
happy to accept equality if only others would not try to subdue them.

For example we read:

> considering the great difference there is in men, from the
diversity of their passions, how some are vainly glorious, and
hope for precedence and superiority above their fellows, not only
when they are equal in power, but also when they are inferior ... it
must necessarily follow, that those men who are moderate, and look
for no more but equality of nature, shall be obnoxious to the force
of others, that will attempt to subdue them [...] and thus the
greatest part of men, upon no assurance of odds, do nevertheless,
through vanity, or comparison, or appetite, provoke the rest that
otherwise would be contented with equality (43)

From the above passage it emerges that although glory-seekers are
"the greatest part of men", still there exists a minority of non-
glory-seekers. Hobbes does not dwell on portraying this minority and

simply describes it as being made up by "moderate" men. As a result one is left wondering as to their psychological and motivational make-up: as they do not seek superiority, what is the meaning of happiness for them? as they do not seem interested in excelling over others, what motivates their curiosity, what drives them to improve their cognitive power, to acquire wisdom and knowledge? Hobbes does not provide answers to these questions. A possible and plausible explanation could be that this minority of "moderates", although "contented with equality" in some fields of human endeavour (such as riches and places of authority), may still wish to compete and excel in other spheres of life. However, this interpretation cannot be grounded on any specific textual reference, and thus must be taken as speculative. It should be acknowledged that *Elements of Law* simply do not address the problem.

III.4 GLORY AND POLITICS

In this section I shall discuss the effect of glory on politics; sec. III.4.1 shall examine Hobbes's claim that the fact that sociable animals, such as bees, can live peacefully in natural conditions whilst men have to resort to artificially-created political states can be accounted for in terms of glory. In the next three sections I shall analyse Hobbes's argument on glory in the state of nature (III.4.2), on glory in the political state (III.4.3) and on the relationship between glory and civil war (III.4.4).
III.4.1 Glory, Men, and Bees

In the concluding chapter of the first part of *Elements of Law* Hobbes addresses the question "why concord remaineth in a multitude of some irrational creatures [like bees], and not of men" (44). It is worth quoting his answer at length, as we will find it repeated almost verbatim in *De Cive* and *Leviathan*:

I answer that amongst other living creatures, there is no question of precedence in their own species, nor strife about honour or acknowledgement of one another's wisdom, as there is amongst men; from whence arise envy and hatred of one towards another, and from thence sedition and war. Secondly, those living creatures aim every one at peace and food common to them all; men aim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth, which are distinct in every man, and breed contention. Thirdly, those living creatures that are without reason, have not learning enough to espy, or to think they espy, any defect in the government; and therefore are contented therewith; but in a multitude of men, there are always some that think themselves wiser than the rest, and strive to alter what they think amiss; and divers of them strive to alter divers ways; and causeth war. Fourthly, they want speech and are therefore unable to instigate one another to faction, which men want not. Fifthly, they have no conception of right and wrong, but only of pleasure and pain, and therefore also no censure of one another, nor of their commander, as long as they are themselves at ease; whereas men

that make themselves judges of right and wrong, are then least at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, natural concord, such is amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of nature; but concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of covenant (45).

As it can be seen from the above quotation, glory is viewed as the unequivocal source of competition, sedition, and war. In the long list of causes of conflict between men, all words used by Hobbes (bar one) are glory-related: "precedence", "honour", "acknowledgement of one another's wisdom", "dominion", "superiority", the thought "to be wiser than the rest", to know better than others what is "right and wrong". The only non-glory-related word in the above list is "private wealth", which is mentioned rather cursorily. As we shall see later, in the parallel passage in De Cive Hobbes mentions again the desire of possessions as a cause of conflict, but links this idea firmly to glory; in the corresponding passage in Leviathan, instead, the concept of private wealth as cause of conflict is dropped altogether. It is worth noting that neither the apprehension for self-preservation nor the concern for scarce resources are mentioned at all as causes of war. On the contrary, on the problem of resources Hobbes anticipates what he will argue in a later chapter in Elements of Law, namely that the minds of men "are least at quiet" and more propense to discontent and sedition "when they are most at ease" (46).

As to self-preservation, Hobbes seems to suggest that if the sole concern of men were their survival, they would cooperate like bees

(45) Ibid., p. 102.
(46) On the relation between lack of want and political discontent see infra, sec. III.4.4.
and live peacefully without the need for artificial covenants and bonds.

III.4.2 Glory and the State of Nature

Whereas in the above passage aimed at explaining the causes of competition, sedition, and war Hobbes does not mention self-preservation altogether, in Chapter 14 where the state of nature is analysed Hobbes shows that the concern for self-preservation is what triggers off war. It is of crucial importance to realize why Hobbes can maintain consistently both propositions. For this purpose, I shall sketch the various steps that make up Hobbes's argument as set out in Chapter 14: firstly he argues that men are equal (secs. 1-2); secondly, he points out that some men "are vainly glorious, and hope for precedence and superiority above their fellows" (47). He devotes three sections (2-4) to illustrate how these people are "by vain glory indisposed to allow equality with themselves to others" and are "apt to provoke one another by comparisons ... and to encroach one upon another" (48). Thirdly, in sec. 3 he introduces the concept of diffidence and fear, as experienced by moderate men towards the vain glorious. Fourthly, in sec. 5 he notices that "many men" want the same thing, which often cannot be enjoyed in common or divided. From the context it is clear that he is referring not to the means of survival (otherwise he would not have specified that many, and not

(47) Ibid., p. 71.
(48) Ibid., p. 70.
all, men want them), but to the best land and resources. Finally, he concludes that life is in danger and turns to describe the right of nature and the state of war.

As we can see from this account, the first cause of conflict is vain glory; the fact that some people are vainglorious explains why all feel diffident and concerned about resources and self-preservation. In other words, whereas diffidence and fear of death are the proximate causes of war in the state of nature, vain glory is the ultimate cause. At this stage it may be recalled that in Chapter 1 we established that Thucydides in his explanation of the Peloponnesian war had deployed a very similar line of reasoning, distinguishing between ultimate and proximate causes of war: the *ambition* of the Athenians to augment further their dominion is seen at the origin of the *fear* of the Lacedœmonians to be subdued which, in turn, sparks off the war.

In conclusion, it can be said that there is no contradiction between Hobbes's position that glory alone is the origin of competition, war, and sedition and his description of the state of nature where the concern for self-preservation and resources triggers off the conflict. In the passage examined in the previous section Hobbes is examining the ultimate cause of conflict, whereas in Chapter 14 analysed in this section he is spelling out the dynamics of war.

As we shall see in the next Chapter, Hobbes will employ again the Thucididean scheme of ultimate and proximate causes of war in all his political writings, with only minor modifications.
III.4.3 Glory, Honour, and the Political State

It is significant to note that in his description of the state of nature in Chapter 14 Hobbes never uses the term glory, but vain glory instead. This is because throughout his writings Hobbes maintains consistently that there can be no glory nor superiority between men outside a political state. He writes:

The question, which is the better man, is determinable only in the estate of government and policy (49). In Hobbes's argument one can find the explanation for the impossibility of glory in natural conditions, which proceeds in two steps.

Firstly, Hobbes notices that "in the state of nature" there are no common values, no agreement "of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what meum and tuum, what a pound, what a quart, &c." (50). As a result, vainglorious people, instead of competing by producing better, or more, things than others, compete in defining "better" and "more" and to impose to others their own conception of what belongs to whom and why. Hence violence arises:

all violence proceedeth from controversies that arise between men concerning meum and tuum, right and wrong, good and bad, and the like, which men use every one to measure by their own judgments (51)

(49) Ibid., p. 87.
(50) Ibid., p. 188.
(51) Ibid., p. 112.
The same idea is reiterated in the last chapter of *Elements of Law*:

In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from other concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels, and breach of peace (52)

Secondly, it is obvious that, as soon as the state of nature is turned into a state of war, people cannot achieve superiority and experience glory; in fact, as men are assumed by Hobbes to be by nature equally able to kill each other (see *supra*, Chapter II), it follows that, as long as competition is for life and not in other fields of endeavour, nobody can prove himself superior to anybody else.

In complete contrast, in the political state civil laws define common measures of *meum* and *tuum*, right and wrong, good and bad, etc.:

it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things that might fall in controversy; as for example: of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what *meum* and *tuum*, what a pound, what a quart, &c. [...] civil laws are to all subjects the measures of their actions, whereby to determine, whether they be right or wrong, profitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious; and by them the use and definition of all names not agreed upon, and tending to controversy, shall be established (53)

Although Hobbes does not discuss the effect of civil laws on glory, the implications for glory-seeking behaviour are obvious in so far as

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(52) *Ibid.*, p. 188.
implications for glory-seeking behaviour are obvious in so far as the civil laws reverse completely the situation existing in the state of nature. On the one hand, they protect everybody's life and thus exclude the form of competition between men in the one field in which men abilities are equal; on the other hand, they establish common measures of meum and tuum, quart and pound, right and wrong, good and bad, virtues and vices, thereby opening up new fields of comparison between people, ranging from property to arts, from butterfly collecting to public morality.

There is, however, a form of glory, or ambition, that is forbidden to citizens in the political state, and consists in the attempt to "innovate" the laws, to put once again in discussion all values and all measures. Hobbes warns the sovereign against this form of ambition (54) and connects it firmly to sedition and civil war (see next section).

While in the Hobbesian state of nature nobody could experience glory, in the political state everybody can – the citizens by competing within the bounds of civil laws and the sovereign by making civil laws, deciding and enforcing the rules and measures of competition among his subjects. Hobbes writes:

To balance this incommodity [the inconvenience arising from government], the sovereignty, together with the necessity of this care and danger, comprehendeth so much honour, riches and means whereby to delight the mind, as no private man's wealth can attain unto" (55)

(54) Ibid., pp. 182-3.
(55) Ibid., p. 138.
III.4.4 Glory, Ambition, and Civil War

Hobbes discusses the relationship between honour, ambition, and civil war in part II of Elements of Law. In Chapter 5 he shows that monarchy is less subject to dissolution than other forms of government because the man in charge does not need to compete with others to see his will obeyed; in assemblies, instead, people compete to have the honour to see their advice followed and "when they cannot have the honour of making good their own devices, they yet seek the honour to make the counsel of their adversaries to prove vain" (56). This generates factions, which are the origin of civil war. In Chapter 8 he examines "the things that dispose to rebellion" (57). He lists three necessary and sufficient causes "to dispose men to sedition", namely "discontent", "pretence of right", and "hope of success". He distinguishes two sorts of discontent, namely "fear of want or punishment" on the one hand and "ambition" on the other. He writes:

the first thing that disposeth to rebellion, namely, discontent, consist[s] in fear and ambition (58)

He connects ambition with living "at ease, without fear of want, or danger of violence" and says:

the other sort of discontent which troubleth the mind of them who otherwise live at ease, without fear of want, or danger of violence, ariseth only from a sense of their want of that power, and that honour and testimony thereof, which they think is due unto them.

(56) Ibid., p. 143.
(57) Ibid., p. 168.
(58) Ibid., p. 170.
For all joy and grief of mind consisting (as hath been said, Part I, Chap. 9, sect. 21) — in a contention for precedence to them with whom they compare themselves; such men must needs take it ill, and be grieved with the state, as find themselves postponed to those in honour, whom they think they excel in virtue and ability to govern.

While in his description of the state of nature as a state of war he follows Thucydides' description of the origin of the Peloponnesian war, in his description of dissolution and sedition he follows Thucydides' diagnosis of the sedition of Corcyra.

In this respect it may be recalled what Thucydides says of seditions:

The cause of all this [sedition] is desire of rule, out of avarice and ambition; and the zeal of contention from those two proceeding.

III.5 CONCLUSION

In The Needs Of Strangers, Ignatief observes:

Philosophers have called man the political animal, the language maker, the tool maker, the rational animal, even the laughing animal. To define man in this way is to define what it means to be human in terms of the best of us. And the worst? (61)

From the above discussion we have seen that in Elements of Law there is no dichotomy between the best and the worst of human nature.

(59) Ibid., p. 169.
(60) History, I, p. 350.
Hobbes concentrates on the worst in man, on the laughing animal that despises and provokes all others and in the worst he finds the drive for men to develop reason, language, industry, and to become political. Without the worst, for Hobbes, there would not be the best.
CHAPTER IV

GLORY IN DE CIVE

IV.1 INTRODUCTION; IV.2 THE MEANING OF GLORY: IV.2.1 Glory, Reason, and Self-Preservation; IV.2.2 Glory, Honour, Power, and Opinion; IV.3 GLORY AND HUMAN NATURE; IV.4 GLORY AND POLITICS: IV.4.1 Glory, Men, and Bees; IV.4.2 Glory and the State of Nature; IV.4.3 Glory, Honour, and the Political State; IV.4.4 Ambition and Civil War.

IV.1 INTRODUCTION

The first obvious difficulty in comparing Elements of Law with De Cive is that whereas the former contains a detailed examination of human nature, the latter does not. The reason for this is that Hobbes had planned De Cive as the last book of a trilogy; the second book of the series was to contain his account of man (1). If allowance is made for the different topics analysed in the two works, the underlying philosophy of man is largely the same. In this chapter I shall show that in De Cive Hobbes presumes the philosophical views on glory described in Elements of Law and sharpens the ideas on the relationships between glory and politics discussed in his previous work. I shall argue that the fact that in De Cive (as in Leviathan and Elements of Law) Hobbes maintains on the one hand that the origin of competition, sedition, and war is to be found in glory alone and on the other hand singles out scarce resources and concern for self-preservation as causes of conflict need not give rise to a

(1) De Cive, p. 35.
contradiction. By resorting to the Thucydidean distinction between ultimate and proximate causes of war, Hobbes's argument will be shown to be fully consistent.

IV.2 THE MEANING OF GLORY

As in *Elements of Law*, so in *De Cive* Hobbes calls "glory" the joy of superiority and describes it as the dominant passion of man:

all the pleasure, and jollity of the mind, consists in this; even to get some, with whom comparing, it may find somewhat wherein to Triumph, and Vant it self (2)

all the mind's pleasure is either glory, or refers to glory in the end (3).

Unlike in *Elements of Law*, though, in *De Cive* Hobbes does not discuss the differences between glory, vain glory, and false glory; nor does he offer any criteria to distinguish between glory as pleasure and glory as appetite; nor does he separate beneficial from detrimental glory; nor does he characterize pride and just esteem as the value-loaded versions of glory; nor does he explore the relationship between glory and felicity. This notwithstanding, on these topics he endorses the definitions and criteria of *Elements of Law*.

As an example of Hobbes's unchanged belief in a form of glory beneficial to mankind, we read in *De Cive*:

I have not [written *De Cive*] ... out of a desire of praise (although if I had, I might have defended myself with this faire excuse,

that very few doe things laudably, who are not affected with commendation) (4)

Examples of detrimental glory will be discussed below in the section on the state of nature. In *De Cive*, as well as in *Elements of Law*, Hobbes appears to resort to the term "vain glory" to signify a form of glory grounded on fancies and not on real actions and uses it whenever referring to glory in the state of nature. In both works Hobbes refers rarely to "pride", and only in contexts where glory is clearly condemned, as in the following Law of Nature:

In the eight - Law of nature, That every man be accounted by nature equall to another, the contrary to which Law is PRIDE (5)

It can be seen, thus, that as far as the topics examined in the first section of the previous chapter are concerned, there are no contradictions between *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, for the slight variations that exist between the two works can be explained entirely on account of their different nature, philosophical and political the former, exclusively political the latter.

However, we can find some interesting developments regarding two topics dealt with in sec. III.2.6-7: I am referring to Hobbes's discussion of self-preservation and rationality and to some of his reflections on honour.

IV.2.1 Glory, Reason, and Self-Preservation

In *De Cive* we find the clearest and neatest presentation of the

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(4) Ibid., p. 36.
(5) Ibid., p. 68.
relationship between glory, self-preservation, and reason to be found in Hobbes's writings.

On the one hand, glory (or pleasure of superiority) is described as the ultimate end of man:

all the mind's pleasure is either glory, or refers to glory in the end (6)

On the other hand, reason is defined as the method whereby each man tries to attain his goals; more precisely, "reasoning" is said to consist in the seeking out of the means for the attainment of any given end.

ey every man by reasoning seeks out the means to the end which he propounds to himself (7)

If we combine the definition of glory as end of man with Hobbes's definition of reason as the study of the means to an end, we arrive at the Hobbesian concept of self-preservation as a means found out by reason for the attainment of one's end (glory). In fact, a man cannot feel superior, and thus achieve glory in the Hobbesian sense of the word (8), unless he is alive.

We are now in a position to appreciate fully the following statement made by Hobbes in the Epistle Dedicatory which opens De Clive, where he notices that whereas glory is found by examining human psychology, the relevance of self-preservation to political science is pointed out by reason:

(6) Ibid., p. 43.
(7) Ibid., p. 177.
(8) As noted in sec. 111.2.7, whereas in the common parlance 'glorious death' is not a contradictio in terminis, in Hobbes's dictionary it is, in so far as being alive is a necessary condition for experiencing the pleasure of dominion, namely glory.
Having therefore thus arrived at two maximes of humane Nature, the one arising from the *concupiscible* part, which desires to appropriate to it selfe the use of those things in which all others have a joynt interest, the other proceeding from the *rationall*, which teaches every man to fly to contre-naturall Dissolution, as the greatest mischiefe that can arrive to Nature; Which Principles being laid down, I seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion, in this little work of mine, first the absolute necessity of Leagues and Contracts, and thence the rudiments both of morall and civilli Prudence.(9)

In *De Cive*, as in *Elements of Law*, Hobbes points out that it is reason what helps man recognize and avoid the actions that can endanger his life:

- the Dictate of right Reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done, or omitted for the constant preservation of Life (10)

On the other hand, in both works Hobbes maintains that when people follow blindly their passions and fail to act rationally, they may at times risk their life rather than "suffer reproach":

because all signes of hatred, and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives, (that I say not their Peace) then suffer reproach (11)

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 27. The "use of those things in which all others have a joynt interest" does not refer to either covetousness or desire of profit, but to glory, as Hobbes himself makes clear in the very same page: "And I found the reason was, that from a Community of Goods, there must needs arise Contention whose enjoyment should be greatest, and from that contention all kind of Calamities must unavoidably ensure".


However, it should be recalled that in all his works Hobbes emphasises quite strongly that fear of death is generally instinctive:

for every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is Death (12)

for every man, by natural necessity endeavours to defend his body, and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his body (13)

It can be said in conclusion that both in De Cive and in Elements of Law Hobbes maintains that fear of death and desire of glory are passions that every man feels strongly and that, although most men would be driven to risk their lives for the sake of honour, reason helps them understand that there can be no glory or superiority unless they are alive. Therefore whenever these two passions lead to conflicting courses of actions, it is rational to give priority to self-preservation. Self-preservation, in fact, is the unrenounceable constraint that glory-seekers must meet in order to achieve their end (glory).

IV.2.2 Glory, Honour, Power, and Opinion

As in Elements of Law, so in De Cive, glory and honour are twin concepts that "consist in comparison and preceHence":

Glory is like Honour, if all men have it, no man hath it, for they

(12) Ibid., p. 47.
(13) Ibid., p. 53.
consist in comparison and precellence (14)

However, on this topic two interesting changes can be noticed in the transition from *Elements of Law* to *De Cive*. Firstly, whereas in *Elements of Law* Hobbes describes honour as the acknowledgement of an individual's power by others and says:

> the acknowledgement of power is called HONOUR — and to honour a man (inwardly in the mind) is to conceive or acknowledge, that that man hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself (15)

In *De Cive* instead, honour is defined as the "opinion of another's power". We read:

> honour, to speak properly, is nothing else but an opinion of another's power — honour — placed in opinion (16)

> honour — is nothing else but the estimation of another's power; and therefore he that hath least power hath always least honour (17)

Secondly, whereas in *Elements of Law* honour is the passive mirror of power, in *De Cive* it acquires the additional role of generating power itself — from the opinion of power, in which honour consists, actual power is derived:

> Now because men believe him to be powerfull whom they see honoured (that is to say, esteemed powerful by others) it falls out that honour is increased by worship; and by the opinion of power, true power is acquired (18))

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(15) *Elements of Law*, pp. 34-35.
(16) *De Cive*, p. 188.
IV.3 GLORY AND HUMAN NATURE

Although in his writings (De Cive included) Hobbes often remarks that people are different from one another and that "the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe" (19), in fact in De Cive he portrays only one man, and of that man he describes only one feature — his desire of dominion over others, his inclination to deride, provoke, scorn others "either by deeds, or words, countenance, or laughter", his tendency to seek others only for his profit or vain glory, his propensity to hurt the absent (20).

One can offer two complementary explanations for the lack of emphasis on more agreeable human traits such as love, charity, generosity, etc. that characterizes De Cive (even to a larger extent than Elements of Law and Leviathan).

On the one hand, it should be recalled that De Cive was for Hobbes the work in which he intended to found political science and that a requirement of reason (and science) is for Hobbes to proceed directly from premises to consequences, without "go[ing] astray":

if therefore he reason right (that is to say, beginning from most

(19) Leviathan, p. 146 and pp. 28–9; De Cive, p. 74 and p. 177.
(20) Here is a selection of unflattering remarks on human nature made by Hobbes in De Cive: "we doe not by nature seek Society for its own sake, but that we may receive some Honour or Profit from it; these we desire Primarily, that Secondly"; when men meet "for Pleasure, and Recreation of mind, every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stirre up laughter, whence he may . . . by comparison of another mans Defects and Infirmities, passe the more current in his owne opinion . . . but for the most part, in these kind of meetings, we wound the absent . . . his reason was not ill, who was wont alwayes at parting to goe out last". "It is manifest [men] are not so much delighted with the Society, as their own Vain glory"; De Cive, pp. 42–3.
evident principles, he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary) he will proceede in a most direct way; otherwise hee'l goe astray, that is to say, he will either doe, say, or endeavour somewhat against his proper end (21)

As qualities such as generosity, magnanimity, loyalty, charity, etc. cannot explain why men, unlike bees and ants, are unable to live in peace without the sword, they are of scarce interest to a political theorist.

The same 'scientific' requirement of economy calls for an assumption of non-generalized glory-seeking behaviour, since (as will be argued in part III of the dissertation) for Hobbes's argument to stand, it suffices that an unidentifiable minority of people be glory-seekers. Indeed, in the Preface to the Reader Hobbes shows himself aware that his theory holds even if glory-seekers were only a minority:

for though the wicked were fewer then the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest, and fairest condition'd (22)

and in various places of De Cive he mentions, as in Elements of Law and Leviathan, the existence of non-glory-seekers.

All men in the State of nature have a desire, and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemn'd - this man's will to hurt ariseth from Vain glory - the other's from the necessity of defending himselfe, his liberty, and his goods(23)
On the other hand, one cannot fail to notice that the whole *De Cive* is permeated by the view that self-concern and overwhelming ambition are a universal trait of man. This belief can only be accounted for as a sign of Hobbes's own disenchantment with mankind and not as a scientific requirement of his theory.

IV.4 GLORY AND POLITICS

IV.4.1 Glory, Men, and Bees

In the previous chapter it was noted that in *Elements of Law* Hobbes singles out “glory” as the reason why men, unlike bees, are unable to live in peace in natural conditions. A parallel argument can be found also in *De Cive* where Hobbes contrasts again bees and ants with men. These creatures, he argues, “living only by sense and appetite”, following “barely their natural inclination”, live in constant peace among themselves. But, he adds, “among men the case is otherwise”. It is important to list fully the reasons why men cannot manage to live peacefully outside political states:

first among [men] there is a contestation of honour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and warre, is among men, among beasts no such matter. Next, the natural appetite of Bees, and the like creatures, is conformable, and they desire the common good which among them differs not from their private; but man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more then that which others doe possesse. Thirdly, those creatures which
are void of reason, see no defect, or think they see none, in the administration of their Common-weales; but in a multitude of men there are many who supposing themselves wiser then others, endeavour to innovate, and divers Innovators innovate divers ways, which is a meer distraction, and civill warre. Fourthly, these brute creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voyce to signify their affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse then in truth it is; But the tongue of man is a trumpet of warre, and sedition (\ldots) Fiftly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harme; Thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellowes: But those men are of most trouble to the Republique, who have most leasure to be idle; for they use not to contend for publique places before they have gotten the victory over hunger, and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutall creatures is naturall, that of men by compact onely, (that is to say) artificiall; it is therefore no matter of wonder if somewhat more be needfull for men to the end they may live in peace (24)

As in *Elements of Law*, so in *De Cive* the differences in behaviour between men and bees are ascribed almost exclusively to glory; virtually all words used by Hobbes to explain conflict, sedition and civil war are glory-related: "honour", "preferment", "eminence", belief in one's superior wisdom, contention for places of authority. Unlike

In *Elements of Law*, even the desire of possessions is derived from the desire of glory: "man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more then that which others doe possesse". Again it is worth emphasising that no mention is made of either self-preservation or scarce resources as primary causes of conflict among men. On the contrary, as in *Elements of Law*, so in *De Cive* it is noticed that men strive for "publique places" when they are "idle" and "have gotten victory over hunger and cold". Here Hobbes implies that ambition become paramount only when the most basic desires (of food and shelter) have been satisfied, thus suggesting that there exists a natural hierarchy between desires. The same view is put forward later on in Chapter XII of *De Cive* where we read:

All men naturally strive for Honour and Preferment, but chiefly they who are least troubled with caring for necessary things (25)

As to the issue of scarce resources, in the above passage Hobbes makes no mention of it in his explanation of the reasons why men are prone to competition, sedition, and war. In *De Cive* Hobbes is well aware that his whole argument is conditional on resources *not* being insufficient to sustain the entire population: in the Epistle to the Reader he warns us that he can provide us with a recipe for Immortal Peace, _ unless _ it were for habitation, on supposition that the Earth should grow too narrow for her Inhabitants (26).

It is worth emphasising that Hobbes, while assuming that resources are not insufficient to sustain the entire population, believes them

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not to be plentiful, even to the point of suggesting that, unless evenly shared, they could not meet everyone's needs, as indicated in the fourth law of nature:

so a man, who for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself, and detaining of necessaries from others, and being incorrigible ... is commonly said to be ... troublesome unto others ... if any man will contend ... for superfluities, by his default there will arise a Warre ... [It is a law of nature] that every man accommodate himself to others (27).

IV.4.2 Glory and the State of Nature

In Chapter V of *De Cive* Hobbes mentions glory as the sole cause of competition, sedition, and war, whilst in Chapter I of the same book, where he describes how the state of nature collapses into a state of war, he refers not only to vain glory but also to fear of death and concern for scarce resources as reasons of conflict among men.

In particular, although in Chapter I he still maintains that "the combate of Wits is the fiercest" (28) and that men have a "naturall proclivity ... to hurt each other, which they derive from the passions, but chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves" (29) he departs from his views as expressed in Chapter V by pointing to scarce resources as a source of conflict:

the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other,

(27) Ibid., pp. 66-7.
(28) Ibid., p. 46.
(29) Ibid., p. 49.
arisen hence, that many men at the same time have an Appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it (30)

and by observing that some people who are temperate and not glory-seekers are led to war by their concern for self-preservation:

all the in the state of nature have a desire, and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause ... This mans will to hurt arisen from Vain glory - the other's, from the necessity of defending himselfe (31)

We have already noticed the same problem of apparent inconsistency in *Elements of Law* and shall find it again in *Leviathan*. The common practice among readers of Hobbes to solve this difficulty has been to ignore it by overlooking the passage on bees and ants and focusing instead exclusively on Hobbes's description of the state of nature, and thus considering vain glory, fear, and scarce resources as concomitant causes of conflict. In my view, to neglect Hobbes's argument on the difference between apian and human society, which recurs in all three works in an almost identical wording, is not merely a sin of omission, but may lead to misinterpreting the state of nature itself. As suggested in the previous chapter, there is no contradiction in maintaining both that glory is the sole cause of competition, sedition, and war and that in the state of nature glory, fear of death, and concern of scarce resources all concur to trigger off the war. In fact, by applying to Hobbes the Thucydidean distinction between ultimate and proximate causes of war, both views

(30) Ibid., p. 46.
(31) Ibid.
can be accommodated in a single consistent argument. It may be recalled that in Chapter I it was argued that according to Thucydides the dynamics of the Peloponnesian war proceeds from the Athenians' ambition to augment their power to the fear of the Lacedœmonians, which eventually sparks off the war:

The causes why they brake the [peace], and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first ... and the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedœmonians into fear necessitated the war (32)

If the same pattern of ultimate and proximate causes of war is applied to Hobbes, then the desire of glory can be seen as the spur that leads men to invade each other territory, the scarcity of resources as the factor that engenders fear, and fear as providing the spark that triggers off a state of war.

IV.4.3 Glory, Honour, and the Political State

In De Cive Hobbes adheres to the practice established in Elements of Law of never referring to glory in the context of the state of nature, but to vain glory instead. This shows that he had not changed his view that no true glory (i.e. based on true achievements and not on fancies) is attainable in the state of nature, as the following quotations demonstrate:

The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the natural, but civill state ... all men by nature are equall, and

(32) Thucydides, History, I, p. 27.
therefore the inequality that now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civil Law (33)

all men therefore among themselves are by nature equall; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the Civil Law (34)
The fact that no glory can exist in the state of nature can be explained by noticing firstly that according to Hobbes in natural conditions there are no common values, no agreement on what is meum et tuum, useful or detrimental, just or unjust. On meum et tuum under natural conditions he writes:

[in] the state of nature — all things belong to all men; and there is no place for meum and tuum, which is call'd Dominion, and propriety (35);

propriety receiv'd its beginning when Cities receiv'd theirs (36);
what is ours, and what anothers, is a question belonging to the civil Law (37)

Secondly, because of the lack of common standards, vainglorious people, instead of competing by producing better or more things than others, compete in defining better and worse, more and less so as to impose their own standards to others. This breeds violence:

all controversies are bred from hence, that the opinion of men differ concerning Meum and Tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evill, honest and dishonest, and the like,

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(33) Ibid., p. 68.
(34) Ibid., p. 35.
(35) Ibid., p. 91. Hobbes treats with some irony the idea that meum et tuum could exist before the introduction of civil laws; "as if it were of it selfe evident, that what is begotten by me, is mine", Ibid., p. 122.
(36) Ibid., p. 100.
(37) Ibid., p. 101.
which every man esteems according to his own judgment (38); when every man followes his owne opinion, it's necessary that the controversies that arise among them will become innumerable and indeterm inable; whence there will breed among men (who by their own naturall inclination doe account all dissention an affront) first hatred, then brawles and warres, and thus all manner of peace and society would vanish (39); all the world knows that such is the nature of men that dissenting in questions which concern their power, or profit, or preminence of wit, they slander and curse each other (40)

Finally, it is clear that, as soon as the state of nature is turned into a state of war, no glory is possible. As people are by nature equal in their power to kill each other (see Chapter II) and honour and glory derive from excess of power of one above another, it follows that no glory is attainable as long as men are in a state of war.

In a political state, instead, glory is possible; Hobbes's argument on this topic is more detailed in De Cive than in Elements of Law. Hobbes remarks that rulers cannot remove ambition from human nature:

because ambition and greedinesse of honours cannot be rooted out of the mindes of men, it is not the duty of Rulers to endeavour nor should they try to do so, but rather to steer men's actions in a

(38) Ibid., p. 95.
(39) Ibid., p. 246.
(40) Ibid., p. 264.
(41) Ibid., p. 162.
socially beneficial direction:

lawes were not invented to take away, but to direct mens actions (42)

the end of punishment is not to compell the will of man, but to fashion it (43)

In other words, in Hobbes's opinion the sovereign's task is to allow people to achieve glory, while channelling it in ways that benefit the State. This channelling is feasible by means of rewards and punishments, relying on the natural ambition and fear of men so as to put honour and glory at the service of the community instead than allowing them to harm it:

but by constant application of rewards, and punishment, [Rulers] may so order it, that men may know that the way to honour is, not by contempt of the present government, not by factions, and the popular ayre, but by the contraries (44)

Whereas in *Elements of Law* Hobbes suggests that there are two kinds of glory (detrimental and beneficial) but is unable to promise to the reader that an invisible hand will direct individuals to achieve the good of the whole by pursuing their own ambition, in *De Civie* he claims that this socially beneficial outcome is achievable by the very visible hands of the sovereign, who sets the rules and allows his citizens to compete within the rules:

it belongs to the same chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men, and to declare them publiquely, by which every man may know what may be called his, what anothers, what just, what unjust,

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what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil, that is
summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common
course of life. But those Rules and measures are usually called the
civill Lawes (45);
what therefore Theft, what Murther, what Adultery and in generall
what injury is, must be known by the civill Lawes (46);
subjects and citizens should absolutely obey their princes in all
questions concerning meum and tuum, their own and others right (47)
In conclusion, according to Hobbes's argument, the pursuit of glory is
feasible within a set of rules determined by the sovereign, whereas
no glory is possible under natural conditions where competition takes
the form of attempting to impose one's own rules on others. Any
attempt at rule-making by individuals is mere evidence of vain glory
and may bring about the collapse of civil society and the fall into
the abyss of the state of nature.

IV.4.4 Ambition and Civil War
In Chapter XII of De Cive Hobbes examines "the internall causes,
tending to the dissolution of any Government". He examines "first the
Doctrines and the Passions contrary to Peace, wherewith the mindes of
men are fitted and disposed; next their quality and condition who
solicite, assemble, and direct them already thus disposed, to take up
arms ... Last, the manner of how this is done" (48).

(45) Ibid., p. 95.
(46) Ibid., p. 102.
(47) Ibid., p. 227.
(48) Ibid., p. 146.
Private opinion as a seditious doctrine.

Among the seven doctrines considered by Hobbes as "seditious", the first listed in *De Cive* is particularly interesting from our perspective for it concerns pride and consists in the belief that not only in the state of nature but also in a political state it is up to each individual to decide what is good and evil. In Hobbes's words:

one, and the first [doctrine] which disposeth [men] to sedition, is this, *That the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man* (49).

"In the state of nature indeed - Hobbes remarks - ... we have granted this to be true ... But - he adds - in the civill state it is false. For it was shown ... that the civill Lawes were the Rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest". (50)

He cites the Bible as authoritative evidence that the pride of Adam to decide good and evil, thus challenging God, has been mankind's ruin:

the most ancient of all God's commands is, ... thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; and the most ancient of all diabolicall tentations ... Yee shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil; and Gods first expostulation with man ... Who told thee that thou wert naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? (51)

This passage of Genesis is mentioned again in the III part of *De Cive* and recurs in other Hobbes's writings:

(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Ibid., p. 147.
by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil - God did require a most simple obedience to his
commands, without dispute whether that were good, or evil, which
was commanded; for the fruit of the tree, if the command be
wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it
could be morally evil, that is to say, a sinne (52)

The discussion of the ill-effects on civil associations of private
opinion is a central theme in De Cive and is not confined to Chapter
XII; Hobbes often stresses how different are the judgments of people
and the judgment of the same man at different times:

what this man commends, (that is to say, calls Good) the other
undervalues, as being Evil; Nay, very often the same man at diverse
times, praises, and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they doe,
necessary it is there should be discord, and strife : They are
therefore so long in the state of War, as by reason of the
diversity of the present appetites, they mete Good and Evil by
diverse measures (54).

He argues that different opinions engender contest and violence and
that this is a cause of quarrels and war in the state of nature and
of the collapse of the political state:

when every man followes his owne opinion, it's necessary that the
controversies that arise among them will becaome innumerable and
indeterminable; whence there will breed among men (who by their
own naturall inclination doe account all dissention an affront)
first hatred, then brawles and warres, and thus all manner of peace

(52) Ibid., p. 201.
(53) Ibid., p. 74; see also pp. 26, 52, 75.
and society would vanish (54).
And he dwells at length on the items that make up the forbidden diet from which citizens must abstain in order to enjoy the privilege of peace:

subjects and citizens should absolutely obey their princes in all questions concerning meum and tuum, their own and others right (55)
no subject can privately determine who is a publique friend, who an enemy when warre, when peace, when truce is to be made; nor yet what subjects, what authority, and of what men, are commodious or prejudiciall to the safety of the common-weale. These, and all like matters therefore are to be learned, if need be, from the city, that is to say, from the sovereign powers (56)
determination of what just, and unjust, the cognizance of all controversies about the means of peace and publique defence; and the examination of doctrines, and books in all manner rationall science depends upon the temporall right (57)

Ambition and Hope as seditious states of mind
In Chapter XII of De Cive, after having examined the seven doctrines that in his view are seditious, Hobbes considers the passions, or states of mind, that incline men to civil war. Two of these passions are interesting for us, "ambition" and "hope".
As to "ambition", we have already noticed in two previous chapters (I and IV) the striking similarity between Hobbes's and Thucydides' arguments in considering it as a passion that "dispeth men to

(54) Ibid., p. 246.
(55) Ibid., p. 227.
(56) Ibid., p. 228.
(57) Ibid., p. 230; "it belongs to the civil authority ... what definitions and inferences are true ", ibid., p. 229.
Sedition". On this there is no change in *De Cive* with respect to *Elements of Law*.

On "hope" of success as a passion "to be numbred among seditious inclinations", again Hobbes follows Thucydides. As was argued in Chapter I, Thucydides thought that men are guided in life more by hope of success than by fear of failure and that this intrinsic optimism of human nature in disregarding difficulties sometimes leads men to ruin. In Book III of the *History*, for example, it is argued by Diodotus that capital punishment cannot work as a deterrent because the hope of people to achieve what they want without being caught is usually stronger than their fear to be apprehended, found guilty, or punished (58). In his discussion of sedition, Hobbes agrees with Thucydides that hope of success (as opposed to fear) is an attitude of mind that is necessary to lead men to turn a state of peace into civil war. He writes:

The hope of overcoming is also to be numbred among other seditious inclinations. For let there be as many men as you will, infected with opinion repugnant to Peace, and civil Government; let there be as many as there can, never so much wounded and torne with affronts, and calumnies, by them who are in Authority; yet if there

(58) "... death hath been in states ordained for a punishment of many offences ... Yet encouraged by hope, men hazard themselves: not did any man ever yet enter not a practice, which he knew he could not go through with ... for men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augmenting them still ... hope and desire work this effect in all estates ... this as the leader, that as the companion; this contriving the enterprize, that suggesting the success, are the cause of most crimes that are committed: and being least discerned, are more mischievous than evil seen", *History*, I, pp. 311-12.
be no hope of having the better of them, ... there will no sedition follow; every man will dissemble his thoughts, and rather content himself with the present burthen, then hazard an heavier weight. [59]

However, as it was argued in Chapter I, in his political writings Hobbes generally rejects Thucydides' position that as a rule hope of success prevails on fear of failure in determining behaviour; in fact, although Hobbes accepts that both hope and fear direct human action: "the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope, and fear" [60] and agrees that hope leads people to fight ("The hope therefore which each man hath of his security, and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem" [61]), yet he maintains that fear is stronger than hope and is indeed instrumental in making people political:

the Originall of all great, and lasting Societies, consisted ... in the mutuall fear [men] had of each other [62]... through fear of each other we think it fit to rid ourselves of [the state of nature] [63]... the reason why [the right of ruling over all] was abolisht among men, was no other but mutuall fear [64]

Eloquence as a seditious faculty

Finally, after having listed the doctrines and mental attitudes that incline men to sedition Hobbes mentions "eloquence without wisdom" [65]

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[60] Ibid., p. 85.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid., p. 44.
[63] Ibid., p. 50.
[64] Ibid., p. 185.
[65] Ibid., p. 154.
as the most effective means of inciting people against the State. This theme recurs in Hobbes's writings and can be found in the passage on Bees quoted in section IV.4.1 where it is said that people use language to make things look different from what they are and it is proclaimed that "the tongue of man is trumpet of warre, and sedition" (66).

Combining the points made above, it can be seen that, since most men (i) believe that they know better than others what is bad and good for the community; (ii) are ambitious and always hope to change and innovate the world to their advantage; and (iii) use eloquence to confound others about their real ends, according to Hobbes it follows that on the one hand the form of government preferred by people is democracy for where all men have a hand in publique businesses, there all have an opportunity to shew their wisedome, knowledge, eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature is to them who excell in such like faculties, and seeme to themselves to exceed others, the most delightfull of all things(67) there is no reason why every man should not naturally rather minde his own private, then the publique businesse, but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenuous, and wise, and returning home to his

(66) Ibid., p. 88.
(67) Ibid., p. 136.
friends, to his Parents, to his wife, and children, rejoice, and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour: as of old all the delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was, to see his praises so well pleasing to his Mother (68).

On the other hand, since in "Democracy", to a larger extent than under "Monarchie" and "Aristocracy", men can "mutually give way to each others appetite" (69), the democratic government is for Hobbes the most likely to be troubled by factions, seditions, and civil war.

(68) Ibid., p. 138.
(69) Ibid., p. 134.
CHAPTER V

THE MEANING OF GLORY IN LEVIATHAN

V.1 INTRODUCTION

In Volume 7 of the English Works of the Molesworth edition, in the section on LETTERS AND OTHER PIECES we find the concluding passage to a treatise on Optics in which Hobbes describes his De Cive as the "most profitable of all other" books written on politics:

Butt if it [this treatise] bee found true doctrine, (though yett it wanteth polishing), I shall deserve the reputation of having beene ye first to lay the grounds of two sciences; this of Optiques, ye most curious, and yt other of Natural Justice, which I have done in my book De Cive, ye most profitable of all other.(1)

(1) English Works, vol. VII, p. 471. Of the above Treatise, entitled "A minute or first draught of the Optiques. In two parts. By Thomas Hobbes. At Paris 1646" we have in Latin, in De Homine the second part on Vision, whereas the first part on illumination was never published.
As the above statement was made in 1646, it is clear that Hobbes considered *De Cive* more "profitable" than *Elements of Law*, written in 1640-42. And on this there is no disagreement among critics in accepting Hobbes's judgment. What is more controversial, though, is whether Hobbes considered *De Cive* superior also to *Leviathan* and whether he would have been correct in thinking so.

On the 23rd of April 1655 when Hobbes dedicated his *Elements of Philosophy* to William, Earl of Devonshire, all his three political writings were already circulating in print (in English) in London. Here Hobbes mentioned *De Cive* and not *Leviathan* as the foundation of political science. We read:

> Natural Philosophy is therefore but young; but Civil Philosophy yet much younger, as being no older ... than my own book *De Cive*. (3)

It seems obvious to me that if Hobbes had felt that the changes between *De Cive* and *Leviathan* were significant and that *Leviathan* showed a clear improvement in relation to *De Cive*, in the above passage he would have mentioned his latest work and not *De Cive* as his legacy to mankind.

However, the great majority of Hobbes's readers seem to agree that even if Hobbes himself had judged *De Cive* as superior to *Leviathan*, he would have been wrong. Most critics have no doubt in considering *Leviathan* as Hobbes's political masterpiece. And this seems to them so obvious that Jean Hampton, writing in 1986, feels entitled to state that *Leviathan* is the "most sophisticated" of Hobbes's works.

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(2) Taking as his source Macdonald and Hargreaves, Rogow dates the publication in London of both *Leviathan* and *De Cive* in 1651, and *Human Nature* in 1650; Rogow, op. cit., p. 183.

(3) *Elements of Philosophy*, p. ix.
without volunteering a word of explanation or justification. (4) Among the exceptions that consider De Cive superior to Leviathan, one could mention Warrender, Johnston, and Gert. (5)

On my part, I think that the answer to the question of whether Leviathan surpasses or not De Cive depends entirely on the taste of the reader. If one, like myself, is mainly concerned with Hobbes's foundation of political obligation, one is bound to consider De Cive as Hobbes's masterpiece, for here his argument reaches an unparalleled degree of precision and clarity. If instead one is more interested in Hobbes's philosophy of man, in his theory of passions and desires, in his insight into human behaviour and social interactions, then Leviathan is the clear winner. I am inclined to believe that Hobbes, as judge of his own works, may well have preferred De Cive to any other of his books, because in that work he managed to explain in an impeccable and — by his standards — "scientific" way what mattered most to him, namely the origin and nature of political obligation.

Like the previous two chapters, this chapter, too, will be divided into two main parts, one examining the meaning of glory in Hobbes's philosophy, and the other analysing the relationship between glory and politics. As far as the latter is concerned, it will be pointed

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(4) "The first presentation of Hobbes's argument was in Elements of Law... The second presentation was made in De Cive... However, Hobbes's final and most sophisticated presentation of the argument was in Leviathan." J. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 5.

(5) "Although as literature De Cive does not rival Leviathan, which is a masterpiece of English prose style, it is superior to it as philosophy", Bernard Gert, "Introduction" to Man and Citizen, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1972, p. 3.
out that Hobbes's argument in Leviathan is extraordinarily similar to De Cive's, as is his theory of obligation, in which this dissertation is mainly interested. However, in the transition from De Cive to Leviathan Hobbes's philosophy of man seems to have changed in some intriguing ways and become far more complex and stimulating. In particular, the concept of glory turns from a genus of human passions in De Cive into a species in Leviathan. Moreover, although Hobbes is still interested in the motivation of people, in the transition to Leviathan the emphasis shifts to people's behaviour and actions.

V.2 EXPRESSION AND COMPRESSION IN LEVIATHAN

In his Introduction to Elements of Law, Goldsmith argues that Hobbes's earlier work "is often plainer than Leviathan; occasionally it expresses a point that Leviathan compresses". In this section we shall see that Goldsmith's comment does apply to some aspects of the definitions of glory, honour, and power, but does not hold in other respects.

V.2.1 Definition of Honour

In previous chapters we noticed that in Elements of Law "honour" is the "acknowledgement of power", whereas in De Cive honour is "opinion" of power. In Leviathan Hobbes develops the view introduced in De Cive and links honour to "judgment" and says that "honour
consisteth only in the opinion of power". (7) He argues that to honour a man is to value him (8), pointing out that the value that we give to a man is his price, namely what we are prepared to pay for the use of his abilities or powers, and that, as such, it is not absolute but depends on our needs which in turn depend on our judgments:

The value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgment of another. (9)

As the needs and judgments of people vary with the circumstances, so vary the value and honour of individuals:

An able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in time of war present, or imminent; but in peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war. And as in other things, so in men not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others. (10)

As in Elements of Law every form of power is honourable, so is in Leviathan:

dominion and victory, honourable — good fortune — riches are honourable; for they are power — magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence, are honourable; for they proceed from the

(7) Leviathan, p. 80.
(8) "To value a man — is to honour him", Ibid., p. 76.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid.
conscience of power - timely resolutions - honourable - experience, science, discretion or wit - gravity - honourable - to be known for wealth, office, great actions, or any eminent good - honourable - conspicuous parents - honourable - covetousness - ambition of great honours are honourable - private duels - honourable. Nor does it alter the case of honour whether an action, so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power, be just or unjust: for honour consisteth only in the opinion of power (11)

In this respect therefore Hobbes does not compress in *Leviathan* what he had said previously but on the contrary on the one hand he reiterates the view expressed in *De Clive* that honour is based on opinion maintaining, as in *Elements of Law*, that all forms of power are honourable, on the other hand he analyses in more detail the chain that links a man to society. In fact, whereas in *Elements of Law* we found a honour-value-power chain (see Ch. III, sec. III.2.6), in *Leviathan* the full chain is from honour to value, from value to price, from price to power, from power to need and, finally, from need to judgment. However, there is in *Leviathan* a "compression" of one aspect of the concept of honour explained in some detail in *Elements of Law*: I am referring to the fact that while in his previous works Hobbes explains that honour derives from excess of power of a man above another and says:

"to honour a man - is to conceive or acknowledge, that that man hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself" (12)

(12) *Elements of Law*, p. 34.
in *Leviathan* instead he simply notices that honour is given to people with power, without explicitly introducing the notion of "excess of power":

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and sign of power (13)

This notwithstanding, it emerges from Book IV of *Leviathan* that honour does imply comparison, as it had been argued in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*:

> to honour, is to value highly the power of any person: and that such value is measured, by our comparing him with others (14)

It is clear from Hobbes's list of the ways in which people honour others (Chapter X of Book I) that he has not changed his view that for a person to honour another is an admission of inferiority:

Ways of honouring — to pray to another — to obey — to give great gifts (15)

— to flatter — to give way — to show love (or fear) — to praise —

— humility — to believe — to trust — to harken to a man's council (16)

In conclusion, although in *Leviathan* — unlike in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* — Hobbes, when speaking of honour, never spells out that people honour individuals more powerful than themselves, he still maintains that comparison and excess of power are the necessary ingredients of honour. Although in this context this example of a "compression" of an argument may appear unimportant, its significance will become apparent later on when the differences between the

(13) *Leviathan*, p. 79.
concept of power in Elements of Law and Leviathan will be examined.

V.2.2 Definition of Glory, Vain Glory, Desire of Fame, and Desire of Praise

In Chapter 6 of Leviathan we read:

"Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is the exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING (17)

Unlike the detailed descriptions of glory in Elements of Law and De Cive, the above definition does not make immediate reference to other individuals and thus might convey the impression that glorifying is a pleasure of the mind which the Hobbesian individual can experience abstracting himself completely from all others.

This impression, however, would be incorrect, because in Leviathan Hobbes often uses glorifying as synonymous of triumph of a man over another.(18) Moreover in his Treatise on Human Nature, written after Leviathan and considered by some as his last word on human nature (19), the idea that others are essential for one's glorifying is stated again:

Sometimes the animal spirits are in concert transported by a certain joy that ariseth from their thinking themselves to be honoured ... this elation of the mind is called glory (20)

The fact that in Elements of Law Hobbes says explicitly that glory is the pleasure of comparing ourselves with others and of noticing our

(17) Ibid., p. 45.
(18) "[R]evenge ... is a triumph, or glorifying in the hurt of another", ibid., p. 140.
(19) See, for example, Bernard Gert, cit.
superiority, whereas in *Leviathan* he states simply that glory is the pleasure of power, is merely a compression of an idea and not a change of philosophy. As in the case of honour discussed above, this compression should not be overlooked for it is relevant for the assessment of the differences between *Elements of Law, De Clive* and *Leviathan* on the concept of power (see next section).

Another obvious, but perhaps less interesting, compression of an idea is Hobbes's definition of vain glory, which is shorter and less precise than in *Elements of Law*:

GLORYING — if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAIN-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well grounded confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called vain.\(^{(21)}\)

vain-glorious men — are inclined only to ostentation, but not to attempt\(^{(22)}\)

If we compare the above definition with that given in *Elements of Law* and examined in Ch. III, we may notice that in *Leviathan* vain glory incorporates the concepts of false glory and vain glory discussed separately in the previous work. However, Hobbes's view on vain glory shows no change; as in *Elements of Law* vain glory is distinguished from glory in so far is not grounded on actions but on fancies, and in so far as it generates wishful thinking rather than

\(^{(21)}\) *Leviathan*, p. 45.  
attempts: "the language of vain glory [is] optative". (23)
The term "aspiring" used in *Elements of Law* as a criterion to
distinguish between vain glory and glory is replaced by 'attempt' and
the choice of a term more immediately related to actions can
be seen perhaps as a sign of the general shift in *Leviathan* (to be
examined below) from the analysis of the inner thoughts of people to
the description of their actions and behaviour.

Although in *Leviathan* glory is defined in some respect less precisely
than in *Elements of Law*, for our purposes it is interesting to note
that in *Leviathan* Hobbes adds a qualification on the meaning of glory
that was missing in his previous works. In sec III.2.7 it was noticed
that whereas in current language it makes sense to speak of glorious
deaths and to consider death as a possible route to glory, the
combination of glory and death is a logical impossibility in Hobbes's
terminological world. In fact as glory is the pleasure of superior
power and dominion, it follows that no Hobbesian man can experience
true glory (as opposed to vain glory based on fancies) unless he is
alive. Like power, pleasure in glory vanishes at one's death. In
*Leviathan* Hobbes spells out this point, distinguishing clearly the
desire of honour, glory, and power on the one hand and the desire of
fame after death and desire of praise on the other. The former
desires, he argues in the chapter on the manners of men, lead people
to competition, sedition and war. Desire of fame after death and
desire of praise, instead, drive people to obey to the common power
and to avoid conflict:

Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war (24)

Desire of praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value. Desire of fame after death does the same. (25)

Although Hobbes does not go as far as suggesting that the desire of fame after death may lead people to lose their lives for fame, this form of desire could in principle be compatible with risking one's life. For glory- or power-seekers, instead, death would nullify their chances of achieving their ultimate end, namely the dominion over others.

V.2.3 Definition of Power

In Leviathan we find the following definition of power:

THE POWER of a man, to take it universally, is his present means; to obtain some future apparent good; and is either original or instrumental. (26)

On the ground of the above quotation some of Hobbes's readers (e.g. McNeilly) have concluded that in Leviathan power is no longer a relational concept (as it was in Elements of Law and De Cive) but on the contrary has become a human characteristic that can be defined in absolute terms. However, one can point to a wealth of passages in Leviathan showing that this interpretation is incorrect and that over

(24) Ibid., p. 86.
(25) Ibid., p. 87.
(26) Ibid., p. 74.
the years Hobbes had not changed his view that the power of a man is 
ever absolute but dependent on the power of others.

First of all we may notice that a few lines below the above 
quotation Hobbes defines "natural power" as "eminence of the faculty 
of body and mind", thus suggesting that the idea of a comparison 
with others is implicit in the very term "power" and that a man 
cannot be said to have natural powers such as strength, form, 
prudence, eloquence, etc if there are no other men around him who 
are weaker, uglier, less prudent, less articulate:

natural power = eminence of the faculty of body or mind = 
strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility (27)

In the same passage Hobbes notices that "reputation of power, is 
power". This view, which was tentatively introduced for the first time 
in De Cive in the context of the analysis of honour (see supra sec. 
IV.2.2), and is consistently maintained throughout Leviathan implies 
that in Hobbes's view the power of a man, as his value, price, and 
honour (see supra sec. V.2.1) is not absolute, but depends on the 
opinion of his fellows:

reputation of power, is power... reputation of love of a man's 
country... what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or 
feared by many; or the reputation of such quality, is power...good 
success is power; because it maketh reputation of wisdom...
reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power...
eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence...form is power; 
because being a promise of good (28)

(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid., pp. 74-75.
Moreover in the opening sentence of Chapter VIII of the First Book of *Leviathan*, where the intellectual powers of men are listed and discussed, Hobbes makes the reader aware that a man can be said to have wit, judgment, fancy, etc. only if he excels as compared with others:

VIRTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equal in all men, nothing would be prized. (29)

Finally, we may recall from the discussion of honour and glory of the previous sections that in *Leviathan* Hobbes, although attributing to those terms the very same meaning given in his previous works, does not state explicitly that honour and glory imply "more power" but simply remarks that they entail "power". This is another instance of the practice followed by Hobbes in *Leviathan*, that I have tried to highlight in this section, of using "power" as an implicitly relational concept.

In conclusion, in the transition from *Elements of Law* to *Leviathan* Hobbes deviates in some respects from a mechanical definition of power, developing the insight firstly introduced in *De Cive* that power in human associations is not something objective like the power of the wind, but depends on people's "reputation", "opinion", and "judgment". However, he still holds the view that power, in politics as well as in mechanics, is a relational concept. While in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* Hobbes expresses this point repeatedly and makes the reader aware that, like the power of a horse running on the

beach is given by the difference with the opposing powers of the wind and the surface, so the power of a man is never absolute but given by his excess of power over others, in *Leviathan* he finds unnecessary to make this elucidation. Thus in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* the concept of power is explicitly a concept of relation, whereas in *Leviathan* it is so only implicitly.

As a final remark on power, we may notice that in *Leviathan* Hobbes resorts once again to an example taken from mechanics to illustrate the fact that power in human associations generates new power:

For the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste. (30)

V.2.4 Self-preservation and Rationality.

Although the relationship between self-preservation and rationality is not explained in *Leviathan* in the clear and unambiguous terms of *De Cive*, Hobbes repeats here the view expressed in his previous works that as a rule men consider death as the greatest of all evils and tend to conserve their lives by all means:

Of things - those that are dearest to a man are his own life, and limbs (31)

As in *De Cive*, so in *Leviathan* Hobbes considers reason as a method of finding out the appropriate means for the achievement of one's ends. Indeed all the natural laws that recommend Hobbesian men "to follow

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peace" as the only means available to them to preserve their lives are called by Hobbes "theorems of reason"; and the use of the right of nature as the only means to defend one's life when there is no hope of achieving peace is also indicated by reason.

It is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man, ought to endeavour peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war (32)

V.3 A CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE?

In this section it will be argued that the role played by glory in the philosophy of man in Leviathan is not the same as in previous works. More precisely, it will be shown that in the transition from Elements of Law and De Cive to Leviathan, glory is no longer the genus of all motivations but has become a species among the various possible motivations of human actions. Moreover, a number of arguments (see sections V.3.1-4) will be provided to illustrate the point that in Leviathan Hobbes becomes more interested than before in the behaviour of people rather than in their inner thoughts and renounces his previous attempt to find a unifying principle of motivation, concentrating instead in singling out a unifying principle of action. It should be stressed, however, that although a shift of interest from motivation to behaviour seems to be the general trend of Leviathan, in Hobbes's argument (and especially in the Introduction:

(32) Ibid., p. 117.
to Leviathan) there are exceptions that weaken the case for a definitive and complete change of perspective.

V.3.1 Human Passions, Ultimate Motivation, and Behaviour

In *Elements of Law* Hobbes lists about thirty human passions and maintains that the "nature" of all of them "(consisteth) in the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour or dishonour done into them". Then he comes to define all these passions as variations of glory and finally offers "a view of the passions represented in a race " (see supra sec. III.3). In *Leviathan* Hobbes's set of human passions is larger (about forty passions are mentioned) and contains all the passions first introduced in *Elements of Law*. The novelty, though, is not in the new additions, but rather in the new definitions of some of the passions discussed in his previous work.

As an example one can compare the definition of magnanimity given in *Elements of Law*:

MAGNANIMITY is no more than glory... but glory well grounded upon certain experience of power sufficient to attain his end in open manner.(34)

with the definition of the same passion given in *Leviathan*:

Contempt of little helps and hindrances, [is] MAGNANIMITY. Magnanimity, in danger of death and wounds, [is called] valour, fortitude. Magnanimity in the use of riches [is called] liberality.(35)

(35) *Leviathan*, p. 44.
The main difference between the two definitions is that in *Elements of Law* Hobbes tries to describe the inner feelings of a man who is magnanimous, whereas in *Leviathan* instead he simply describes the external behaviour of people who are magnanimous. Although it is clear from the chapter of *Leviathan* in which he discusses honour that Hobbes still maintains that magnanimity is an attribute of individuals who are conscious of their power and as such it is perceived by all as honourable:

Magnanimity, liberality, hope, courage, confidence, are honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of power (36). He never states that people are magnanimous or generous for the sake of honour. Indeed in the chapter where human passions are examined, Hobbes does not speculate, unlike in *Elements of Law*, on what ultimate motivation drives people to be magnanimous, covetous, ambitious, pusillanimous, but simply points to the external object of desire characteristic of each passion:

Desire of riches, COVETOUSNESS;— Desire of office, or precedence, AMBITION (37).

This shift of emphasis from the enquiry on the inner thoughts and ultimate motivations of people to the careful study of their external behaviour and of the external objects of their desires is a general characteristic of *Leviathan* (although by no means a constant one) and can help explaining the different role of glory and power in the transition from *Elements of Law* to *Leviathan*.

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(36) Ibid., p. 79.  
(37) Ibid., p. 44.
V.3.2 The Role of Glory: from Genus to Species

In Chapter 6 of the First Book of *Leviathan* Hobbes defines about forty passions. As we noticed above, unlike in *Elements of Law*, Hobbes never says that these passions derive from the pleasure or displeasure that a man obtains from honouring nor does he suggest, as he did in *De Cive* that "all the minds pleasures refer to glory in the end". This is a significant change in Hobbes's philosophy of man, because glory from genus, or ultimate motivation of all desires becomes a species, or an instance of human passions.

To this general rule there are exceptions. In Chapter 6 laughter, weeping, shame, emulation, and envy are still defined in terms of glorying or dejection:

Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those grimaces called LAUGHTER; — sudden dejection, is the passion that causeth WEEPING; — SHAME — consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; — grief, for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good — is called EMULATION — [or] envy (38)

In Chapter 8 the defect of the mind called by Hobbes "madness" is once again put down as in *Elements of Law* to excessive vain glory or excessive dejection:

The passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh madness, is either great vain-glory, which is commonly called pride, and self-conceit; or great dejection of mind (39)

Moreover, throughout *Leviathan* and especially in Book II there are

various instances in which Hobbes restates the view typical of his previous writings that "men naturally love liberty, and dominion over others" (40) that "men are continually in competition for honour and dignity" (41) and that "man whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent" (42). However, on the whole Hobbes seems no longer convinced that glory is the ultimate motivation of all men and this view is confirmed by his treatment of human passions in his Treatise on Human Nature, written after Leviathan. Thus it can be safely said that the role of glory has changed in Hobbes's philosophy of man but, as we shall see later in this chapter, not in his political theory.

V.3.3 The Role of Power: A Unifying Principle of Action?

In reading Leviathan one may have the impression that whereas glory has been turned from a genus into a species of human passions, the desire of power instead has risen from a species to a genus of all human motivation. To support this view one can find a number of statements made by Hobbes:

desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honour — all which may be reduced to the first, that is, desire of power. For riches, knowledge, and honour, are but several sorts of power. (43)

I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. (44)

(43) Ibid., p. 61.
(44) Ibid., pp. 85-86.
It may be noticed, though, that in so far as the desire of power was implicit in the definition of glory given in previous works (glory, it may be recalled, is the pleasure of power and thus to seek glory implies to seek power) it follows that already in *Elements of Law*, albeit only implicitly, the desire of power is the spring of all individual actions. Thus, the fact that in *Leviathan* power is explicitly the genus of all human motivations does not seem to offer ground to suggest that on this topic there is a significant change between Hobbes's political works. However, on my part I think that in fact *Leviathan* does mark a change of perspective from Hobbes's previous works, in as much as power, while not replacing glory as the principle of motivation, plays a different role from the one previously performed by glory. Although on this problem there is ample room for debate, the balance of evidence seems to me to suggest that whereas glory in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* was the unifying principle of motivation, power in *Leviathan* is rather a unifying principle of actions that explains the behaviour of people with different motivation, such as moderates and glory-seekers. This is how Hobbes qualifies the statements quoted at the beginning of this section:

The cause of this [restless desire of power after power], is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.(45)

In the above quotation (which, it ought to be noted, is taken from Hobbes's discussion of the different "manners" of men in Chapter XI and not from his description of the dynamics of the state of nature), Hobbes remarks that all people act in such a way as to augment their power, even if their motivation may be different. Thus power in *Leviathan*, unlike glory in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, is not the ultimate pleasure of the mind to which all the other pleasures refer in the end, but rather a common principle of action motivated by different passions and desires. Power, in other words, is the concept on the basis of which the behaviour of all sorts of people can be compared, related and interpreted. The shift of emphasis from the study of the inner thoughts and desires of men to the analysis of the objects of their desires and to their behaviour (already mentioned in our discussion of the passions, see *supra* sec. V.3.1) seems to me to be a general feature of *Leviathan*, in spite of various exceptions.

V.3.4 Felicity, and the External Observer

Whereas in *Leviathan* as a general rule Hobbes describes passions and desires in less detail than in *Elements of Law*, he devotes to the definition of "felicity" much more attention that before. Its meaning is explained first in Ch 6 where it is said that

*Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering is that men call FELICITY; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here;*
because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense. (46)

and repeated in Chapter 11

the felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied — felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object of man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure forever, the way of his future desire. (47)

We may notice that both in Elements of Law and in Leviathan, what characterizes felicity is the continuous proceeding from desires to achievements and from achievements to new desires. As in Elements of Law, felicity is not described in Leviathan as the end, or motivation, of the Hobbesian agent but it is rather explained as the key for interpreting the way of life of the Hobbesian people, as seen from an external observer or from an agent taking a reflective and detached stand-back from his everyday struggle to augment his power.

The space and thought devoted by Hobbes in Leviathan to the description of felicity can be interpreted once again along the lines taken in this section according to which Hobbes in his later work is more concerned than before to describe the behaviour of people as seen from an external observer than to describe the inner thoughts of each agent.

(46) Ibid., p. 51.
(47) Ibid., p. 85.
V.1 A REMARK

In *Leviathan*, as in previous works, glory is the pleasure of superior power or dominion over others. Here this desire is put in sharper focus, by distinguishing it from more innocent desires such as desire of fame or of praise. Although in *Leviathan* Hobbes still maintains in places that the desire of dominion is common to each and everyone, his general tendency is to underline that glory is only one possible motivation of people and is overwhelming only in some. Therefore the existence of non-glory-seekers is consistent with the general tenor of the argument of *Leviathan*, unlike in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, where their existence was puzzling and did not fit in Hobbes's general discourse.

We have argued that while in previous works Hobbes concentrated on the motivation of people and found in glory a unifying principle of their desires, in *Leviathan* instead he tends to be more interested in the behaviour of people and in the external objects of their desires. More than ever before in *Leviathan* Hobbes believes that the motivation of people is various, inconstant and often unknown. Passions like liberality and magnanimity, that in *Elements of Law* had been described in terms of their motivation (i.e., in terms of glory and honour) in *Leviathan* are described in terms of the behaviour that they inspire and although related to honour, honour is not said to be their ultimate motivation. In his later work Hobbes seems to give up the quest for the common ultimate drive of all people, probably because he has become unsure of its existence and/or because his interest as a political philosopher in the study of the
inner nature of man has been superseded by his interest as a political theorist in individual action and behaviour. We have suggested that despite the exceptions, the balance of evidence seems to suggest that power in *Leviathan* is a common principle of action rather than a principle of motivation. We have thus hinted that Hobbes's advice to the reader to know himself given in the Introduction to *Leviathan* would have been more appropriate in the opening pages of *Elements of Law*.

V. GLORY AND POLITICS

Whereas we have noticed that there are some significant changes in the place occupied by glory in Hobbes's philosophy of man, in this section we shall see that the role played by glory in Hobbes's political theory is the same in *Leviathan* as in earlier works. As previously, Hobbes singles out glory, desire of honour, and ambition as the major sources of competition, sedition, and war, and regards as one of the main tasks of the sovereign power the channelling of glory not for the detriment, but for the benefit of the community of men.

V.5.1 Men, Bees, and Ants

As in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, so in the opening chapter of the Book II of *Leviathan* Hobbes addresses the problem of why men, unlike bees and ants, cannot live in peace outside political states. In order
to appreciate the extraordinary similarity between Hobbes's argument in *Leviathan* with his views expressed in his earlier works, it is worth citing this passage in full:

It is true, that certain living creatures, as bees and ants, live sociably one with another— and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer, First, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity — and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war. Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the common good differeth not from the private — but man whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent. Thirdly, that these creatures, having not as man, the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common business; whereas amongst men there are very many, that think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war. Fourthly, that these creatures — want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure. Fifthly, irrational creatures — as long as they be at ease they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and
control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth. (48)

We may notice that even more forcibly than in earlier works, all arguments used by Hobbes in the above passage to indicate the causes of competition, sedition, and war, are glory-related: "honour and dignity", the joy of comparing oneself with others, the tendency to "relish nothing but what is eminent", the opinion of being "wiser", "abler", "better" than the rest, the strife "to reform and innovate", the propensity to misuse language as to "represent to others that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good", man's "love... to shew his wisdom and control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth".

Whereas in *Elements of Law*, the desire of possessions was listed among the causes of conflict, in the parallel argument in *Leviathan* no mention is made of man's greed (although desire of profit is mentioned among the "reasons of quarrel" in the chapter on the state of nature examined in the next section). As in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, in *Leviathan* Hobbes does not mention fear for one's self-preservation, nor concern for scarce resources as possible origins of competition and war. On the contrary, he repeats his remark that whereas bees and ants "are not offended by their fellows" as long as they are at ease and their life is safe, "man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease". As in *De Cive* he maintained that he could promise "immortal peace" as long as resources were sufficient for the sustainment of all population so in *Leviathan* he points out that if resources were to become insufficient, no political

alchemy could save mankind from war:

And when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is war; which provideth for every man, by victory, or death (49)

V.5.2 A Thucydidean Interpretation of the state of nature

Hobbes's presentation of the state of nature in *Leviathan* echoes Thucydides's *History* so much more closely than the corresponding passages in *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* to make this reader wonder whether Hobbes, before writing his most comprehensive description of the natural conditions of mankind, may have not re-read the "most politic" of historiographers. There are three main similarities between Hobbes's and Thucydides' argument.

First, in *History* the three greatest things that move the human world are said to be honour, fear, and profit:

though overcome by three the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit ... we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor besides the manner of men (50)

and in *Leviathan* Hobbes singles out the same three passions to explain the interaction between men outside political states:

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. (51)

(50) *History*, I, p. 82.
(51) *Leviathan*, p. 112.
Hobbes's gain echoes Thucydides' profit, safety fear, and reputation honour.

It is worth noting that in Hobbes's argument, as outlined in Chapter XIII, the three passions listed as "reasons of quarrel" namely gain, safety, and reputation do not share the same status: whereas glory and greed are said by Hobbes to drive to violence and conflict independently from the consideration of whether or not other people are fearful:

[gain leads men to] use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle ... [reputation leads men to] use violence ... for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name (52) fear, instead, is said by Hobbes to drive men "to use violence" and "to quarrel" in order "to defend themselves and their kindred!", on the assumption that they they will be attacked by individuals seeking profit or glory.

In other words, in Hobbes's argument, concern for survival, if not combined with the expectation of future evil at the hand of glory-seekers and greedy people, does not lead to competition and war. Indeed, as it has emerged from the previous section, in Hobbes's opinion if men were merely concerned with their self-preservation, they would live in peace like bees and ants. At this point we can see that there is a second parallel between Hobbes's and Thucydides'

(52) Ibid.
argument, already highlighted in two previous chapters. As Thucydides thought that the Peloponnesian war had been triggered off by fear in the Lacedæmonians, which in turn had been generated by the desire of power of the Athenians:

The cause why they broke the [peace], and their quarrels I have therefore set down first— and the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war (53)

so in Hobbes’s description of the state of nature in *Leviathan* fear is the proximate cause of conflict, whereas desire of profit and glory are its ultimate origins. Fear induces diffidence, anticipation and first strike (54), but the ultimate causes of fear (and thence of conflict) are the glory and the greed of some men. Hobbes writes:

because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue further than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist.(55)

The above quotation reminds us of the speech of the Corinthians to the Lacedæmonians, in which it is said that as long as Lacedæmonians are surrounded by neighbours as voracious as the Athenians they cannot concern themselves merely with their internal affairs but must take sides in the war, for the sake of their self-preservation:

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(53) *History*, p. 27.
(54) "[F]ear of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipation", *Leviathan*, p. 88.
neither do any harm to others nor receive it is a thing you hardly
could attain, though the states around you were of the same
conditions (56)
A third aspect which Chapter XIII of Leviathan shares with
Thucydides' History is the contraposition between hope and fear. In
both arguments hope of success drives men to risky enterprises, while
fear leads them to peace and self-restraint.
Thus, as in Deodotus' speech reported in the previous chapter it is
said that hope of escaping punishment drives men to crime, so
Hobbes, in the opening paragraphs of Chapter XIII argues that from
"equality of hope in the attaining of [their] end" derives the
"endeavour [of men] to destroy, or subdue one another"; as in
Deodotus' speech the function of fear is to restrain men, so in the
last paragraphs of the same chapter Hobbes points to fear of death
as the main passion that inclines men to peace and to enter the
social contract.
However, the convergence of views between Hobbes and Thucydides on
hope and fear is not complete; as it was noticed earlier in this
dissertation (see supra Chapters I and IV), Hobbes, in so far as he
believes that fear is stronger in men than hope of success (which he
calls sometimes vain glory)(57), distantly states himself from the
pessimistic view that emerges from Thucydides' History and can
promise the reader that "peace" and "commodious living" can be
eventually achieved within the political state.

(56) History, p. 76.
(57) See Leviathan, pp. 311-312.
V.5.3 Glory and the Political State

Although "commonwealth" is examined in much more detail in *Leviathan* than in earlier works, on the relationship between glory and politics there are no major changes or new ideas. Hobbes simply reiterates or sometimes explains in more detail the views expressed in *De Cive*.

Hobbes in *Leviathan* does not depart from *Elements of Law* and *De Cive* in maintaining that

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of mere nature; where, as has been shewn before, all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. (58)

The explanation for the impossibility of true glory in the state of nature proceeds, as before, in two steps in Hobbes's argument: first it is pointed out that in the state of nature there are no common measures of good and evil, meum and tuum, just and unjust, and that this breeds contention and war (59). Secondly, it is established that


(59) "[F]or one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidity, &c.," *ibid.*, pp. 28-29; "for these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so. Nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth from the person that representeth it.", *ibid.*, p. 41; "for as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods, or lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every particular man", *ibid.*, p. 201.
as long as individuals compete for survival, since they are equally able to kill each other (see supra Chapter II), there can be no winners and thus no true glory can be experienced.

In both De Cive and Leviathan it is argued that the task of the sovereign power is to create and enforce rules of good and evil, right and wrong, meum and tuum (60) — called "civil laws" (61) — that regulate the competition between men and, thanks to a system of punishment and rewards that relies on the natural fear and ambition of men, channel glory in a way that is beneficial instead than detrimental to the community of men. (62)

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(60) "[T]he constitution of mine and thine and his; that is to say, in one word propriety — belongeth in all kinds of commonwealth to the sovereign power. For where there is no commonwealth there is — a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour; and therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither propriety, nor community; but uncertainty", ibid., p. 233; "— is annexed to the sovereignty, that all power of prescribing the rules whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do — and this is it men call propriety. For before constitution of sovereign power, has hath already been shown, all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth war: and therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace, and depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety, or meum and tuum, and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects are the civil laws.", ibid., p. 165; "considering what value men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise among them, emulation, quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against the common enemy; it is necessary that there be laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the commonwealth; and there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those laws in execution.", ibid., p. 167.

(61) "Civil law is to every subject those rules which the commonwealth hath commanded him — to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong", ibid., p. 251.

(62) "Reward and punishment, by which — every joint and member is moved to perform his duty", ibid., p. x; "For in the differences between private men, to declare, what is equity, what is justice
remarkable dual status in the political state: on the one hand it poses a limit to competition in so far as appropriation via theft becomes an unacceptable mechanism for the transfer of wealth; on the other hand, it opens up new and enlarged fields to competition itself. Because of the introduction of private property rights, the competition for riches can take the form of "industry", i.e. men can compete by producing things. Unlike competition on existing things which is highly conflictual (so much so that it leads to competition for survival), competition through industry has a socially stabilizing role: thanks to the production of goods, society becomes a non-zero-sum-game, i.e. gains by some do not necessarily imply corresponding losses by others, for the dimensions of wealth are no longer fixed, but have become augmentable. Moreover the introduction of private property brings about even more important changes. In fact, if the establishment of common values (of good and evil, better and worse, more and less) implies that in the political state things and people can be evaluated according to shared criteria, it is the existence of exclusive property rights that enables individuals to compete in fields other than wealth accumulation. People interested in the "arts upon words", in "science", in "arts of public use", and,

and what is moral virtue and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishment to be ordained for such as shall break them", *ibid.*, p. 253; "to the sovereign is committed a power of rewarding with riches, of honour, and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath formally made; or if there be no law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth, or deterring of them from doing disservice to the same.", *ibid.*, p. 166; "to [the sovereign power] it belongeth to determine of rewards, and punishments, honour, and order", *ibid.*, p. 186.
we may add, in butterfly collection, in sport or in any activity other than the accumulation of wealth, can compete in their chosen fields, because their means of survival are no longer threatened.

In conclusion, whereas the unrestricted competition of the Hobbesian state of nature (which because of its very unrestrictiveness collapsed to competition on a single level, namely that of survival) allowed the emergence of individuals whose only characteristic was to be alive, the regulated competition within the political state is multi-dimensional — it can take place at all levels and in all spheres, thus allowing the emergence of different and sophisticated personalities.

V.5.4 Ambition and Civil war

In Chapter XXIX of Book II of Leviathan, Hobbes examines "those things that weaken, or tend to the dissolution of a commonwealth" (63). After having noticed that "nothing can be immortal, which mortals make" he remarks that commonwealths "might be secured, at least from perishing by internal diseases". Among the "diseases" that can afflict a commonwealth, he lists in second place "seditious doctrines", the first of which is "that every private man is judge of good and evil actions". This theme was already discussed by Hobbes in detail in De Cive; in Leviathan we find no new insights:

That every private man is judge of good and evil actions — is true

(63) Ibid., p. 308.
in the conditions of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also under civil government, in such cases as are no determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evil actions, is the civil law (64).

The next two doctrines "repugnant to civil society" consisting in the belief that a man cannot go against his conscience and that some men are supernaturally inspired, are also ascribed by Hobbes to "the presumption" and "fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil". In Chapter XX, where he reiterates his view that it belongeth to the sovereign ... to prescribe the rules of discerning good and evil: which rules are laws (65).

Hobbes cites Genesis as he did in De Cive as authorative evidence that the pride of Adam in eating "the fruit of the tree of knowledge" of good and evil, thereby challenging God, ruined mankind (66). In Chapter XVIII where he discusses "the rights of sovereigns by institution", after having remarked that "the end of this institution, is the peace and defend of them all" and that "whosoever has right to the end, has rights to the means", he quite consistently proclaims that it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducive to peace; and consequently who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from their opinion; and in the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of opinion, consisteth the well-governing of

(64) Ibid., p. 310.
(65) Ibid., p. 192.
(66) Ibid., p. 194.
governing of mens' actions, in order to their peace and concord.(67) As in Elements of Law and De Cive, in Leviathan too Hobbes follows Thucydides (68) in singling out ambition as the main drive to sedition and civil war(69); as in De Cive he follows Thucydides in pointing to "hope of success" as the disposition of mind that inclines men to risky enterprises and to crime(70) (see previous chapter).

Unlike Thucydides, who in the portrait of Pericles presents to the reader a perfect marriage of eloquence and wisdom, Hobbes in Leviathan, as in De Cive, tends to consider eloquence a seditious faculty and never fails to remark that "eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition; for eloquence seemeth wisdom, both to themselves and others".(71)

Unlike Thucydides, who seems sympathetic to democracy — despite Hobbes's claims to the contrary — Hobbes points out that only ambition and the hope to participate in the government drive men to prefer democracy to other forms of government, and he argues that frustrated ambition and desire to excel one upon the other make this

(67) Ibid., p. 164. This view is repeated throughout Leviathan: "ill belongeth ... to him that hath the sovereign power, to be jugde, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace; thereby to prevent discord and civil war." ibid., p. 165; "he is judge of what is necessary fo r peace; and judge of doctrines", ibid., p. 186.
(68) History, I, p. 350.
(69) Leviathan, p. 156.
(70) "of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime, one, is vainglory, or a foolish overrating of their own worth — hope of escaping punishment — hope of oppressing the power — hope of not being observed", ibid., p. 283. see also History, I, pp. 311-2.
(71) Leviathan, p. 89; see also p. 248.
form of government more vulnerable than monarchy and more prone to
dissolution. (72)

(72) "[A]mbition of some — kinder to the government of an assembly,
whereof they may hope to participate than of a monarchy, which
they despair to enjoy", ibid., p. 162; "the monarch cannot
disagree with himself out of envy or interest, but an assembly
may; and that to such a height, as may produce a civil war", ibid., p. 175.
PART III

GLORY-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR AND PRIVATE DOMAIN

The publication of Gauthier's *The Logic of Leviathan* (1969) (1) and of Watkins' 'Imperfect Rationality' (1970) (2) marked the beginning of a whole industry of papers and books that apply criteria and concepts drawn from the armoury of game theory to Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*. Although this industry has grown fast over the years and has found in Kavka (3) and Hampton (4) prolific producers, it has not taken over the entire Hobbesian market. Many consumers have found the product unpalatable and felt that they could gain a better insight into Hobbes's theory by looking through Oakeshott's kaleidoscope than by wearing the perfectly graded non-scratch lenses manufactured by Gauthier. In a passionate attack against Gauthier, Taylor, McLean, Laver, Kavka, Brams, and Hampton, Patrick Neal has recently argued that "rational choice theory reaps a good less than Hobbes attempted to sow and serves to obscure more than illuminate his teaching". (5)

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Although an assessment of the contribution of game theory to the understanding of Hobbes falls outside the scope of this dissertation, as in the next chapter I shall put forward an interpretation of Hobbes's political theory as a model resting on a well-defined set of assumptions, I feel I should spell out what the purpose of the model is, so as to avoid misunderstandings. I unashamedly belong to the camp of those who believe that there is no better way of understanding Hobbes than by reading what he wrote, the way he wrote it. All models, both those constructed according to the strict rules of game theory (e.g. Gauthier, Kavka, Hampton) or following one's imagination and intuition (e.g. McNeilly, Brown) inevitably partition Hobbes's complex argument into sub-arguments and may make the reader lose sight of the whole construct. They often illuminate his theory to the extent to which they trivialize it. With this premise it should be clear that I am well aware that my own attempt at axiomatising Hobbes's thought (in Chapter VI) makes no justice to the wealth of ideas that can be found in his writings. The reason why I have nevertheless attempted to axiomatize Hobbes's argument is that I believe that the resulting model can be profitably used to address the main question that underlies the present dissertation and outlined in the Preface, namely whether citizens can claim a right to a guaranteed private sphere against the State. I shall suggest that my Hobbesian model, by denying the possibility of a private domain within political States poses a challenge to those liberal theorists who accept the state-of-nature approach for the justification of rights and are not prepared to restrict individual preferences so to exclude that some people may feel superior and
desire glory.

As a final introductory remark, I should stress that in outlining my model I shall rely on intuition rather than formal logic, providing in the Appendix a description of the games that can be used to support my main point for the benefit of those readers who have no objections to reading Hobbesian arguments couched in game theory terms.
CHAPTER VI

GLORY-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR, STATE OF NATURE, AND POLITICAL STATE

VI.1 AN OUTLINE OF HOBBES'S ARGUMENT

In the following pages the analysis of the state of nature will be carried out by interpreting the latter as a hypothesis, a thought experiment. Of course, the exercise of imagining abstract individuals in abstract circumstances is not alien to the spirit of Hobbes's philosophy. In *De Cive* Hobbes suggests unambiguously that the state of nature is a mental exercise:

Let us return again to the state of nature and imagine men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly (like Mushromes) come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other (1)

To characterise with a modicum of precision this world of abstract men, I suggest to bestow the status of assumption onto some of

(1) *De Cive*, p. 117.
Hobbes's many ideas on human nature and the state of nature that we found to be common to *Elements of Law*, *De Cive*, and *Leviathan* and discussed in some detail in Chapters II, III, IV, and V.

**Assumption R (Rationality)**

Reason is the same in all men and singles out the most effective means for the attainment of any given end (2).

**Assumption S (Self-preservation)**

All men try to avoid their death by all available means (3).

**Assumption E (Equality)**

Individuals are equal in their ability to kill each other in the sense that "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest" (4).

**Assumption LR (Limited Resources)**

In natural conditions resources are very limited but sufficient to sustain the entire population (5).

**Assumption UL (Unrestricted Liberty)**

In natural conditions there is no power superior to individuals

(2) "... for every man by reasoning seeks out the means to the end which he propound to himselfe", *De Cive*, p. 177; on how reason works, see *Leviathan*, Chapter V; on rationality as part of man, see *Elements of Law*, Chapter 1.

(3) See, for example, *De Cive*, p. 47, *Elements of Law*, pp. 71-72, *Leviathan*, p. 129 and also p. 329.

(4) *Leviathan*, p. 110; see also *De Cive*, p. 45, *Elements of Law*, 70.

(5) On "necessaries" and "superfluities", see *De Cive*, p. 66 and *Leviathan*, p. 139; on limited resources, see *De Cive*, p. 46, *Leviathan*, p. 111, *Elements of Law*, p. 71; see also *Leviathan*, p. 335.
capable of enforcing common rules of behaviour (6).

Assumption G (Glory)
Some men like glory, or the pleasure of superiority.

Prima facie assumption G might seem to contradict assumption S for in the common use of language we speak of noble and glorious deaths and dying seems sometimes the only available means for achieving glory. However, as it has been argued in previous chapters, thanks to his specific definition of glory Hobbes can consistently hold both views; indeed, as glory is defined as the pleasure of superior power and dominion over others, it follows that self-preservation is the precondition for its attainment and enjoyment.

Our assumptions therefore are six in number and can be grouped in pairs: Rationality (R) and Self-preservation (S) refer to the nature of each person; Equality (E) and Glory (G) concern the relationships between people; Limited Resources (LR) and Unrestricted Liberty (UL) characterize the natural (i.e., non-political) environment in which individuals live.

VI.2 HOBBS'S "CONCLUSION OF REASON"

Having introduced a selection of Hobbes's ideas as assumptions of a model, the next step is to derive their implications.

(6) On the absence of an arbitrator, see De Cive, p. 70, Elements of Law, p. 90, Leviathan, p. 143. On the "right to all things", see De Cive, p. 47, Elements of Law, p. 72, Leviathan, p. 116.
First, consider all assumptions except glory (G) and thus imagine equal people (E) all preoccupied with their own survival (S), living in a world where resources are limited but not insufficient to sustain the entire population (LR) (7). It can be seen that, as they could have a better chance of augmenting natural resources (and thus of ensuring their future safety) through cooperation, then it would be rational for each and everyone to engage in joint activities to their mutual benefit and live peacefully, like bees and ants.

However, as soon as the remaining assumption on glory-seeking behaviour (G) is introduced, the idyllic picture described above is suddenly shattered — as Hobbes himself does not fail to point out in Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan:

It is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live sociably one with another — and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer, First, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity... and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war. Secondly — man, whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent(8).

In order to see how G alters the equilibrium that otherwise would have emerged from the other assumptions of the model, attention should be focused on the courses of action available to glory-seekers in the state of nature. It may be noticed that these are determined,

(7) Of course, if the earth's resources were insufficient for the survival of the entire population, no political alchemy could ensure the preservation of all "inhabitants", as Hobbes is well aware (De Cive, p. 25; see also Leviathan, p. 335)

(8) Leviathan, p. 156, see also Elements of Law, p. 102, De Cive, p. 87.
among other things, by UL, i.e. by the assumption that in natural conditions there is no superior power to individuals to enforce common rules of behaviour and thus to restrict their liberty.

On the one hand, UL rules out a large class of activities that in civil society provide glory-seekers with paths to power and glory in so far as it entails, for example, the lack of private property rights(9); on the other hand, it allows forms of superiority and dominion that in civil society no glory-seeker can hope to pursue unpunished, such as the superiority that a person can acquire over others by depriving them of access to their means of survival (wells, land, etc.) and by predating them of what they have saved for their subsistence.

Thus, because of UL, people's means of survival are an available target for glory-seekers. At this point it is easy to see why the assumption on glory-seeking behaviour has a destabilising effect on the model.

In fact, in a world where resources are strictly limited (LR), the presence of predators puts everybody's self-preservation at risk. Assumption S states that this danger must be removed by all people (glory-seekers and non-glory-seekers alike) and R prescribes the use of the most appropriate means to this effect. As killing others is both feasible (because of UL) and a more effective way of protecting one's life than any temporary measures (e.g., the enslavement of others), assumption R points unambiguously to the selection of that strategy.

(9) Leviathan, p. 115, De Cive, p. 49.
To summarize the argument so far, we can say that the combined effect of UL, R, LR, G and S is that glory-seekers in the state of nature can be expected to be predators and that everyone's rational response to this expectation cannot but be the decision to kill. If we were to imagine people in action at this point, the resulting picture would be a state of war:

...I demonstrate in the first place that the state of men without civil society (which state we may properly call the state of nature) is nothing else but a mere warre of all against all.(10)

The drama reaches its climax when we focus our attention on assumption E. As soon as it is recognized that all contenders are equal in their ability to kill, in the sense that the weakest has strength enough to eliminate the strongest, it is easily understood that from the ensuing war no winner can emerge:

[w]ar is perpetuall in its own nature, because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by Victory.(11)

In a war between equals not only no lasting glory is possible but also nobody's life is safe "for equal powers opposed destroy one another" (12).

The contradiction inherent in Hobbes's state of nature should now be evident: on the basis of assumptions UL, LR, R, G, and S it is rational to decide to kill others, which decision, because of the remaining assumption on equality (E) is against reason (~R).

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(10) De Cive, p. 34.
(11) De Cive, p. 49.
(12) Elements of Law, p. 34.
VI.3 UNI-CONDITIONAL OBEDIENCE

There is no doubt that Hobbes was aware of the contradiction inherent in his characterization of the state of nature:

He therefore that desireth to live in such an estate, as is the state of liberty and right of all to all, contradicteth himself. For every man by natural necessity desireth his own good, to which this estate is contrary, wherein we suppose contention between men by nature equal, and able to destroy one another. (13)

The purpose of this section is to examine how the assumption(s) of the model \((R, S, E, G, LR, UL)\) should be altered in order to avoid the contradiction highlighted above.

It will be shown that there is only one formula of escape and that it coincides with the conditions of peace indicated by Hobbes. Any other (more liberal) formula would not provide a solution to the problem.

At this stage a qualification should be made regarding the assumptions introduced in sec. VI.1, namely that according to Hobbes all of them but one define unalterable characteristics either of human nature \((R, S, G, E)\) or of the natural environment \((LR)\).

Thus, if there is a way out of the contradiction, it must be through relaxing the sixth assumption, i.e. Unrestricted Liberty.

In Hobbes's words:

I demonstrate ... that all men as soone as they arrive to

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(13) *Elements of Law*, p. 73 (emphasis added); "Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawfull for all men, he contradicts himself", *De Cive*, p. 49 (emphasis added).
understanding of this hatefull condition, doe desire (even nature it selfe compelling them) to be freed from this misery. But that this cannot be done except by compact, they all quitt that right they have unto all things. (14)

Having established that UL has to be altered, the problem arises how to change it so to avoid the above contradiction.

It may be recalled that UL states that in natural conditions there exists no power superior to individuals to restrict their liberty. It follows that any modification of this assumption necessarily entails the existence of some such power. Hence we can reformulate our problem as that of defining what the function of this superior power (that we can call the State) should be in order to prevent the occurrence of the contradiction.

As the tension within Hobbes's "conclusion of reason" disappears if and only if people feel safe and thus not motivated to kill, the function of the State is obvious: it must be in charge of the protection of everybody's self-preservation.

What is exactly the "self" that the State has the task to "preserve" can be established as follows.

If self-preservation were defined in a broad way as the preservation of one's life, property, and liberty, the State would find itself encumbered with a variety of ends that could conceivably enter in mutual conflict. No Hobbesian individual, who by assumption seeks unconditionally to avoid death at the hands of others (S), could rationally enter (R) into such a State, for circumstances could arise

(14) De Cive, p. 34; see also, Elements of Law, p. 75, Leviathan, p. 118.
in which the State would decide against the unconditional preservation of its subjects' physical lives. Thus, in our model, because of assumptions S and R, the unambiguous function of the State must be the self-preservation of its subjects in a strict sense, namely the protection of their physical integrity.

Having thus defined the task of the State, we can establish the necessary means to carry it out, i.e. the extent of the restraints to be imposed on individual liberties.

As Hobbes himself puts it:

... the obligation, and liberty of the subject, is to be derived from the end of the institution of sovereignty, namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy. (15)

In establishing the citizens' obligation to the State, assumptions S and R are again crucial in so far as they jointly imply that as in the state of nature it was rational for Hobbesian individuals to make full use of their unrestricted liberty for their self-preservation, so it is rational for them to acknowledge the same unrestricted liberty to the State to which they entrust their lives. Any restriction, however mild, to the State's activities would impose limits also to its ability to defend them.

It follows that as long as the State maintains peace, its citizens owe obedience to it even if it invades their private sphere or denies them the attainment of prosperity, glory, or any other aim they may have. Of course, in order to protect its subjects' self-preservation

(15) Leviathan, p. 203.
the State is likely to introduce rules of good and bad, right and wrong, *meum et tuum*, thus indirectly enabling its citizens, for example, to surpass each other and therefore attain glory.

As Hobbes notices:

>The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of mere nature; where ... all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. (16)

However, the pursuits of glory, property, etc. are not rights, but merely incidental by-products of the measures introduced by the State to implement its security task and therefore can be taken away from people at any time, without the latter being ever entitled to resist.

In Hobbes's model, because of S and R, if and only if the State attempts to deprive its citizens of their life, are the latter entitled to refuse obedience; in other words, the citizens' obedience to the State is conditional exclusively on the protection of their physical integrity (*Uni-conditional Obedience, UO*).

When therefore our refusal to obey, frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained [namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy]; then there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise there is. (17)

To summarise the argument of this section - the only way of solving the contradiction inherent in Hobbes's state of nature and therefore of ensuring that it is never rational for anyone to decide to kill is

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(16) *Leviathan*, p. 140; see also *Elements of Law*, p. 87, *De Cive*, p. 68.
(17) *Leviathan*, p. 205.
by replacing the unrestricted liberty (UL) of natural people with their Uni-conditional Obedience (UO) to a State with the sole task of protecting everybody's physical existence.

VI.4 HOBBES'S REDUCED MODEL

As it stands, Hobbes's model sketched above is open to the serious charge of being of limited relevance, for it is based on a set of axioms that includes a highly questionable assumption. I am referring, of course, to what was defined in sec. VI.1 as assumption S, namely the controversial and restrictive Hobbesian idea that all people regard their death at the hand of others as the greatest mischief possible and are willing to defend themselves by all available means. In this section, I shall try to argue that Hobbes's belief in the universal value of self-preservation, however strongly felt by him, is in fact redundant to support his political argument.

Firstly, suppose that S be replaced with a far less demanding proposition:

Minimal Self-preservation (MS): If not everyone, at least glory-seekers try to avoid their death by all available means.

It is worthy of note that, unlike S, MS is not an assumption in its own right, but a mere implication of assumptions R and G. Indeed, in view of Hobbes's definition of glory as the pleasure of superior power and dominion, it is rational for glory-seekers to consider their self-preservation as the unrenounceable precondition or constraint for the attainment and enjoyment of their end and thus to avoid death by all available means (MS).
Next, it may be recalled that in the state of nature, as presented in sec. VI.2, what endangers everyone's self-preservation is the existence of predatory glory-seekers (G). Substituting MS for S simply implies that if not everyone at least glory-seekers will react to this state of affairs by killing others. The obvious result is that non-self-preservation-conscious people will drop (dead) out of the game and Hobbes's conclusion of reason and UO will still haunt all the remaining self-preservation-conscious players.

In conclusion, even after having removed assumption S, the remaining assumptions of what we can call Hobbes's reduced model (based on Hobbes's ideas as defined by R, G, LR, UL, and E) are still sufficient to generate both the contradictory situation outlined in sec. VI.2 and the escape from it outlined in sec. VI.3.

VI.5 HOBBES'S CHALLENGE

Finally, Hobbes's reduced model can now be used to expose a problem of consistency that lies at the root of some liberal theories. Liberal theories (from Locke to Nozick) indirectly reject the conditions of peace described by Hobbes (UO) in so far as they maintain that citizens' obedience to the State ought to be conditional on the non-infringement of either multiple rights or a single right defined more comprehensively than the preservation of one's physical integrity.

However, as the only solution to Hobbes's "conclusion of reason" has been shown to be Uni-conditional Obedience, Liberalism can justifiably reject it only by denying the acceptability of one or more of the
assumptions on which it rests. Having removed from the hit list as redundant to Hobbes's argument the conspicuous target furnished by his restrictive idea of generalized over-riding concern for self-preservation (S), the resulting reduced model does not appear to be obviously vulnerable.

It could be safely argued that four of its five assumptions are most undemanding and should be easily acceptable to anyone who (like Locke or Nozick) is willing to deploy the state-of-nature approach for the justification of rights: I refer to the assumptions on Limited Resources (the state of nature as a state of non-abundance), Unrestricted Liberty (the state of nature as one characterized by the lack of enforced rules of behaviour), Rationality (in pursuing one's end) and Equality (in the weak form that even the weakest person can be a lethal danger for the strongest).

Therefore, if Uni-conditional Obedience is unacceptable to Liberalism it must be because the assumption on glory-seeking behaviour (G) is deemed to be unreasonable.

Indeed, Glory plays a crucial role in Hobbes's model as presented in this dissertation: in sec. VI.2 it was shown that without Glory all the remaining assumptions would not have produced a state of war and in sec. VI.4 we have just seen that, even by relaxing the assumption on self-preservation (S), Glory (in conjunction with the remaining axioms) precipitates the state of nature into a state of war and warrants Uni-conditional Obedience as the only escape from the latter.

Of course, if one could reject the idea that there exist people who seek the pleasure of superior power (G), then the spark for conflict
would disappear from the model and neither Hobbes's "conclusion of reason" nor the need for Unconditional Obedience could be derived. However, in order to reject the assumption that some individuals are glory-seekers (G), Liberalism would have to impose a most severe restriction on individual preferences. But then, if none of the five assumptions of the reduced model is objectionable from a liberal perspective, how can Liberalism reject the implication of these assumptions, i.e., uni-conditional obedience? While Hobbes's reduced model has been instrumental in raising this question, it offers no clues as to the appropriate answer. Nor, indeed, does this dissertation. One could speculate that the paradox just described arises because the state-of-nature approach is far from innocuous and in fact is unsuitable as a building block for the foundation of multiple rights unless severe restrictions are imposed on individual preferences so that the possibility of conflict is assumed away. Alternatively, it could be surmised that the state-of-nature hypothesis is not the cause of the paradox but rather highlights a deeper problem. It could be argued that the conjunction of the state-of-nature approach and the assumption of glory-seeking behaviour gives rise to an exemplary case of generalized and perennial conflict and that it is the latter that Liberalism is theoretically unable to accommodate within its framework. According to this alternative interpretation, to jettison the state-of-nature hypothesis would not solve but merely disguise an inherent problem of liberal theories. Although this dissertation is unable to suggest an unambiguous interpretation of the problem posed to Liberalism by Hobbes' model,
It is undeniable that such a problem exists and that is not so trivial to be ignored.
APPENDIX

A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Hobbes's model

A.1 Introduction

In this Appendix I shall provide a complementary explanation of the interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature as a contradictory world put forward in Chapter VI by resorting to a game-theoretic argument. Although the games involved are presented in a non-technical fashion, the underlying reasoning could be formalized rigorously — so I am informed.

By choosing two partially overlapping sets of ideas, I shall analyse two very different states of affairs, one of which bears a strong resemblance to Hobbes's description of the state of nature.

A.2 A Non-Hobbesian World

In this section I shall bestow the status of assumption onto the following Hobbes's ideas that we found to be common to Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan:

Assumption R (Rationality) : Reason is the same in all men and
singles out the most effective means for the attainment of any given end.

**Assumption S (Self-preservation):** All men try to avoid their death by all available means.

**Assumption E (Equality):** Individuals are equal in their ability to kill each other in the sense that "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest".

**Assumption LR (Limited Resources):** In natural conditions resources are very limited but sufficient to sustain the entire population.

**Assumption UL (Unrestricted Liberty):** In natural conditions there is no power superior to individuals capable of enforcing common rules of behaviour.

The analysis proceeds in increasing order of complexity; first, it will be shown that the five above assumptions do not generate a Hobbesian state of war. This is hardly surprising, for they convey little information about the range of behaviour by individuals: the five assumptions simply ensure that a very high negative value is attached by all individuals to loss of life (S), that all men are equal in their killing-related skills (E), that the most appropriate means for the attainment of any given end will be chosen (R), that resources are limited but not insufficient to sustain all (LR), and that there are no enforced rules of behaviour (UL). As the aim is to ascertain whether individual behaviour would generate the state of conflict described by Hobbes, I suggest all possible actions be partitioned in two broad categories:

(i) actions that lead to open conflict (and that we can group under
the heading "seek fight"), including activities such as
dispossessing, attacking, scorning, and provoking others "by deeds
or words", etc.;

(ii) actions intended to avoid conflict ("avoid fight") that include
activities such as hiding, running away, birdwatching, etc.

Since each individual in the world that we are describing knows that
he is equal to others in his ability to kill, and rationally
understands that "equal powers opposed destroy each other", he is
aware that if he were to attack his neighbour and the latter fought
back, they both would die; if he sought fight and his neighbour
managed to escape, they both would survive, as they would if their
actions were reversed; finally if neither sought fight, they both
would survive. This situation can be illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual A</th>
<th>Individual B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>seek fight</td>
<td>dead, dead</td>
<td>seek fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoid fight</td>
<td>alive, alive</td>
<td>avoid fight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the circumstances described by the above matrix it is clear
that each and every individual would decide to avoid fighting ("avoid
fight" is a dominant strategy). In fact, this strategy can preserve
their life whatever the others do, whereas if they decided to fight,
no additional benefits would follow and the possibility would arise that they would lose what most matters to them, namely their life. The resulting state of affairs is one where everybody avoids fighting and confrontation and knows that everybody else does the same. In Hobbes’s view this mutual “disposition” to avoid fighting is what characterises a state of peace:

the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance of the contrary. All other time is PEACE. (1)

The fact that the joint outcome of the five assumptions on rationality, self-preservation, limited resources, equality to kill, and unrestricted liberty is to generate the opposite of the Hobbesian state of nature is relevant to assess the importance of the sixth and final assumption, introduced in the next section.

A.3 The Hobbesian World

In this section I shall give the status of assumption to the central idea discussed in this dissertation, namely glory, so as to ascertain whether glory-seeking behaviour can shatter the peaceful state of affairs described above, as maintained by Hobbes in three parallel passages of Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan cited in Chapter VI. Although in many passages of Elements of Law and De Cive and in Book II of Leviathan Hobbes asserts that all men want dominion over others, in other places he suggests that only some men are glory-

(1) Leviathan, p. 113.
seekers. I shall take this latter view, which is predominant in *Leviathan*, as my final assumption:

**Glory (G):** Some men seek glory, namely the pleasure of superiority.

The example examined here is based on six assumptions, Rationality (R), Self-preservation (S), Equality (E), Glory (G), Limited Resources (LR) and Unrestricted Liberty (UL). Let the partition of all available actions be as above.

The relevant case to analyse is the rational course of action to be taken by a glory-seeker when faced by a similarly disposed individual: would he choose to seek or avoid fighting? Because "reason is the same in all men", a glory-seeker cannot expect a fellow glory-seeker to take (abstain from) a course of action that he himself would abstain from (take) in identical circumstances.

Each glory-seeker knows that all other glory-seekers derive pleasure from seeking fights against people who flee in terror; he is aware that, if faced by someone who provokes, scorns, or attacks him, his rational response should be to avoid fighting, for a collision between equally efficient killing machines would yield no present glory for either and would deprive both of their lives, thus preventing the attainment of future glory. The same argument applies, in reverse, when a glory-seeker disposed to seek fights considers the rational response by fellow glory-seekers to his aggression.

This establishes that a glory-seeker will always choose to seek (avoid) fight on the supposition that his rival avoids (seeks) fight. This is because anything is preferable to certain death and fighting against an 'avoider' is preferable to mutual acquiescence.
The underlying game can be described as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seek fight</th>
<th>Avoid fight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seek fight</td>
<td>dead, dead</td>
<td>proud, dejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid fight</td>
<td>dejected, proud</td>
<td>alive, alive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is simple to confirm that the above game has two asymmetric Nash equilibria: (avoid fight, seek fight) and (seek fight, avoid fight). The fact that reason suggests two different courses of action, depending on the expected behaviour of your opponent, does not mean, of course, that people should renounce rationality in their choices.

The way out of the above impasse has to involve a random choice between the two available options of 'seek fight' and 'avoid fight'. Suppose to the contrary that rational calculations suggested that a given strategy A be strictly preferable to strategy B and thus ought to be pursued; in view of the identical psychological make-up of the two individuals, one's opponent would also have to be assumed to have selected the same strategy. But then a player would have an incentive to switch to strategy B (i.e. avoid fight if aggressed, seek fight if unaggressed), thus showing that strategy A could not have been selected as 'best' in the first place. Therefore, in general, the only solution is never to choose any one strategy with certainty.

It is cardinal to realize that whereas in general there will always exist (at least) one Nash equilibrium if players use mixed strategies, randomized strategies offer no way out of the above dilemma. Because
self-preservation is the precondition for experiencing glory and thus must be unconditionally guaranteed by a rational glory-seeker, any strategy that envisages a however small chance of seeking fight has to be rejected as unfeasible, for it entails a positive chance of self-destruction. But this would leave as the only candidate the 'avoid fight' strategy, which will never be adhered to by glory-seekers: if a glory-seeker knew that his opponent would always refrain from seeking fight, he would always attack, for this would yield the pleasure of (vain) glory. The fact that rationality demands that glory-seekers could never contemplate the possibility of endangering their self-preservation (seen as the precondition for glory) destroys the argument for randomized choice and produces an unbreakable circularity: if it is rational to avoid fighting then it is rational to seek fight, etc. The usual argument deployed to prove the existence of mixed-strategies equilibria does not apply here, for the payoffs are not bounded from below, i.e. 'death' has a payoff of minus infinity.

As glory-seekers must take an action (for inaction itself is an action) and their reason is mute, they can only resort to their irrational nature as the inspiration for action. This conclusion supports Hobbes's view that the state of nature is the realm of passions and that only the political state is the realm of reason:

Out of [the political state], there is a Dominion of Passions ... in [the political state], the Dominion of reason (2)

(2) De Cive, p. 130.
The above interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature has also another advantage: it can account for Hobbes's claim that the war in the state of nature is "perennial". Our argument suggests that in the very same way in which the state of nature is a thought experiment, so the perennial war that according to Hobbes characterizes it should not be taken literally, as some of Hobbes's readers have seemed to suggest: as men are equally efficient at murdering each other, an open conflict would soon end with the extinction of the combatants. In our last example glory-seekers can never be expected not to seek fight — their very existence generates the constant menace, if not the rational expectation, of imminent conflict:

The nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. (3)

The mental state of war is perennial ("[war] is perpetuall in its own nature") because the contradiction between the rationality and the irrationality of fighting cannot be ended as long as one or more of the assumptions of the model are relaxed.

And this confirms the result obtained in Chapter 6.

(3) Leviathan, p. 113.
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