Non-Governmental Interactions Among Social Formations as a Bridge between the Structuralist Theory of the State and the Study of International Relations

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ABSTRACT

There is a wealth of theoretical as well as empirical society-oriented research which is generally discussed under the rubric of sociological theories of the State and which, unfortunately, at present is not made full use of in the study of International Relations. The thesis aims to create the conditions that will enable us to 'tap' this material for the benefit of the study of international relationships.

The thesis provides evidence that analyzing politics in terms of 'the State' directs our attention to a single central problem, the interrelation between the governing institutions of a country and other aspects of that society. Modern theories of the State discuss the nature of the political process which is the process by which societies organize themselves. Therefore, the political process itself is located at the centre of the analysis. International interactions are then classified into two categories: formal interactions which are defined as all those emanating from the governing institutions of a country, and informal interactions, which encompass all other types of interactions.

'Informal interactions', that is, private trade and investment, the flow of ideas, immigration, the dissemination of techniques and technologies, etc. create a substratum of unmeditated links among what appear on the surface as independent, separate societies. Although varied and chaotic in their origins, they are much more predictable in their social effects. A significant portion of them conform to two simple patterns, named respectively horizontal and vertical links. The first pertains to cases whereby, in one form or another, a group of people residing in one formation are linked directly to a group residing in another, thus resulting in an 'informal' vertical tie between the two social formations. Horizontal links are links of competition. They are based on the principle that competitors tend to modify their behaviour to improve their competitive position. Both ties effect structural changes within social formations that reverberate through their 'domestic' political processes. These links are the principal channels by which 'domestic' political processes are 'externalized' and in turn 'internalized' on a world scale -- they are the primary forms by which International Relations and the domestic political processes are inter-linked.
FOR OLIVIA AND DOV PALAN.
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# TABLE OF CONTENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>p.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 — State Centred Schemes: Realism</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. The Realist Theory of the State</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2. The French Liberal Tradition and Dynastic Politics</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3. The Social Contract</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4. The State as an organism</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.5. The State as a legal person</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.6. The State as a person</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. The Road to Neo-Realism</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 — Class-Based Schemes of International Relations</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Marx latent theory of International Relations</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Social Classes and Political Structures</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. The levels of society in an international context</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Wallerstein's radical approach</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 — The Political Process in International Relations</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. How 'units' are determined</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2. Problems in articulating the 'unity' of any social formation</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. The State, Politics, and the Political Process</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. The State</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. What is politics?</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. The State and the modern political process</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. The State, the political process and Sovereignty</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. A new 'unit' in the making?</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 — Society as a discrete/Indiscrete Entity</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Durkheimians and Weberians</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. How 'system' has become the vehicle for the introduction of machinist and organic metaphor</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. The problem of visualisation</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4. Techniques of Separation</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5. Propositions</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 — Formal and Informal Interactions</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1. Action theory and International Relations</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2. International interactions and theories of the State</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3. Informal Interactions in International Relations literature</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4. Formal/informal and the distinction between domestic and foreign policies</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5. The limitations of the distinction between formal and informal interactions</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1. Formal/Informal</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2. Discrete/Non-discrete</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3. Cultural Contacts in the Northern territories of the Gold Coast</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.4. The Iroquois and the population of the Great Lakes</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.5. The 'Modern Men'</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.6. Direct Bombardment</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six -- Description and Typology of Informal Interactions</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1. What are informal interactions?</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2. The mechanisms of transmission of informal interactions</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1. War and Conquest: Direct Transmission</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2. War and Conquest: Induced transmission</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3. Learning and Cultural transmission</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.4. Models</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.5. Tourism, emigration and immigration</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3. Summary</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7 -- Poulantzas’ Scheme</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1. Political Process and Global Analysis</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2. Social Structures</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3. The relativity of the social structure</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8 -- The Vertical Links and the Principle of the 'Middlemen'</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1. A brief Survey of The Principle of the 'middlemen'</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2. Restructurations affect both sides</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3. Dependency and vertical links</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4. The links as structurations</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5. Annex</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9 -- The Horizontal Structurations, The European Ballet, 1450-</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1. The Hundred Years' War and the constitutional frenzy at the end</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the fifteenth century</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2. The Habsburg-Valois struggle</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3. The Seventeenth century</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4. The wars of Louis XIV, the technique of balance of power and the</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financial revolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Ten -- Informal Interactions and Poulantzas’ Scheme</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1. Vertical links -- the level of the structures</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2. Horizontal links -- the level of the structures</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3 Class structure</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4. The political Scene</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5. Some concrete cases</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography of Cited Works</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IN\textsc{troduction}

In a recent issue of Time magazine, the president of Columbia, Mr. Virgilio Barco Vargas, sought to defend Columbia’s appalling record in narcotics control by attributing at least part of the blame to the United States. "The consumption of drugs in the United States" he argued "has become one of the fuels for violence in Colombia... Every time a North American youngster pays for his vice in the streets of New York, Miami or Chicago, he becomes a link in the chain of crime, terror and violence that has caused us so much damage and pain." If not totally convincing, there is nothing unusual about this remark. It is framed within the conventional language of politics; Barco’s rhetoric and political aims are fairly transparent; the 'informal' links between states which are suggested appear to be common knowledge; and it emanates from a decision-maker, a favourite oracle of truth for traditional International Relations.

And yet, this remark is interesting because in its unassuming way, it coincides with the three principal themes of these work:

a. criticism of the three main orthodoxies of International Relations: Realism, pluralism and structuralism.

b. criticism which is based not on any new research or chance discovery, but rather, as I shall argue, is implied in the vast literature of sociological theories of the State, development studies, social history, political geography and political anthropology -- to name some of disciplines I shall be drawing upon.

c. the suggestion that much of this research can be organised in such a way as to constitute an alternative framework for the study of international relationships. Consequently, inspite of the implied criticism of the current frameworks, this work will not develop as a critique but will suggest an alternative framework for the study of international relationships.

Barco’s comment is of particular interest to the student of International Relations, not least because there is nothing unusual about it. For whereas it appears unambiguous, the links between states which are suggested far exceed current theoretical frameworks. Consequently, through its analysis it is possible to see both the accomplishments as
well as the inadequacies of existing theories of International Relations.

At one level, Barco's utterance may be slotted into the dominant frame of reference of the discipline. For Columbia -- by this the readers of Time magazine understand a bounded territorial entity with population and government -- is a sovereign State. And president Barco is speaking as the person who is currently invested with this sovereignty. As such he is responsible in the eyes of the 'international community' for whatever happens within the territorial boundaries of this country. When it has detrimental effects upon the population of another country, as is currently the case with drug trafficking, the issue becomes 'political'. Since now the decision-makers of the United States must become involved -- and indeed, dutifully, Time magazine presents its readers with the official response of 'Washington'. The solution to the problem, it is suggested, lies in the hands of the two governments and they will argue their case the best they can, hopefully, through the medium of diplomacy. However, the ultimate resolution of the problem lies in the hands of the Colombian state, that is, Colombian governing institutions: the Colombian army, its judiciary, bureaucracy, treasury, etc.. These institutions will have to implement any agreement that might be reached.

This is the 'political' world of clearly demarcated collective entities. There is apparently no particular difficulty in sliding from one meaning of the term 'Colombia' (or the 'United States') to another. And Time magazine provides good examples of a sophisticated language packed with subtle meanings which has developed in modern political sciences. In some situations 'Colombia', 'Bogota' and president Barco are considered to be equivalents, in others, they are quite distinct. The reason for this lies in the distinction between domestic and international politics. Within the domestic sphere, 'society', 'government' and 'president' are distinct qualities. The president may have difficulties in controlling the army; he may be a dictator and therefore an exploiter of his own society, the government in Bogota might be considered as an illegitimate régime, and so on. However, in international politics these distinctions do not matter. The State and
its régime coalesce into one unity.

But if the practice of separating politics is perhaps dubious, it has proved valuable in explaining certain phenomena. The dominant theory of International Relations probes into the nature of the relations between States. It accepts the existence of sovereign and absolute social entities who recognise no authority beyond their own and become legitimate in the eyes of others simply by the recognition other states accord them. These unities possess an inherent will, or logic, the reason of State, and they pursue their aims which are primarily the remorseless aggrandizement of their power. Since the reason of State is the sole guide to their policy, the interests of the state are the only guarantee of its undertakings -- which means that there is no guarantee. The result an anarchic and dangerous 'system of states'. And indeed, the discussion in Time magazine renders support to the theory of power politics. Since clearly, a decision-maker of one country is trying to score a propaganda point against another and he uses all available means at his disposal to do so. Politics, it appears, is a struggle for power.

Barco's remark may be also interpreted by the theories of Interdependence. An enormous growth in communication and transportation and hence, the establishment of a world market, revolutionized the nature of politics, domestically and internationally alike. Consequently, there is barely a political issue left purely 'domestic' because of the advent of interdependence, and drug trafficking is a case in point: as long as governments try to deal with problems independently under the pretence that their countries are (still) exclusive domains, there can be no solution. The only viable alternative is the one proposed by Barco, namely, an international approach to a transnational problem.

Interdependence and transnationalism, question the territorial exclusivity of social units, and hence of the separation of politics and the autonomy of international politics which underpins the Realist theory. The issue was seen initially in terms of a "world crisis of authority" (Rosenau). That is, the erosion of traditional loci of sovereignty (Goodwin, 1974) and the emergence of new political units.
However, these initial observations were never translated into a fully-fledged theory of International Relations. According to Ernest Haas, Interdependence theories did not try to create a general theory, but simply aimed to elaborate and describe modern 'patterns of interdependence'. In that sense, régime theory is only the next logical step. However, from description and empiricism this branch of post-realism slides into voyeurism. The theoretical link between technology and interdependence was never discussed fully, so there was no exploration of any structural processes.

This is more or less as far as traditional theories of International Relations enable us to illuminate Barco's utterance. On another level, it may be interpreted further according to dependency and world-system theories: Barco describes familiar relationships between poor and rich countries in a capitalist world-economy. The poor country, Colombia in this case, is virtually destroyed as it becomes the supplier of cocaine to the 'rich kids' of its giant neighbour. The essential link in this sad tale is money, or -- as some would have it, capitalism. In a capitalist market, where everything can be bought and sold, the poor may lose everything, including their dignity. The links of crime that Barco is talking about is only another instance of the catastrophic effects of the capitalist mode of production and the insatiable search for profit.

Theories of imperialism and dependency present, therefore, an alternative framework for the study of international relationships. Instead of the rigid partition of the globe into national societies possessing inherent wills, they point towards a series of 'structural' relationships on a world scale which in their view are far more important than the formal conduct of politics. Within this global environment there are political groupings which aim to corner and distort the free flow of commodities and goods. In Wallerstein's words:

"The structure of historical capitalism has been such that the most effective levers of political adjustment were the state-structures, whose very construction was itself, as we have seen, one of the central institutional achievement of historical capitalism. It is thus no accident that the control of state power, the conquest of state power if necessary, has
been the central strategic objective of all the major actors in the political arena throughout the history of modern capitalism" (1974, p.48).

Thus, the apparent 'will' of States is nothing but a mask for purely class interest. Consequently, the relations between States and international politics is of secondary importance.

The issues which are raised in this literature are important, as witnessed by the growing number of marxist and liberal writers involved in it. However, as I shall demonstrate later in the dissertation, both dependency and world-system theories offer only a partial framework for the analysis of international relationships.

However, the hidden complexities in Barco's remark are not exhausted yet, let us, therefore, analyze it in greater details. As a statement of facts, Barco recounts two stories. He relates individuals' activities in separate geographical areas to each other. But these are not activities of the type we ordinarily associate with International Relations, these are mere kids paying for their vices, i.e. politically unaware individuals whose vices result, according to Barco, in a chain of 'international' crime. The activities themselves have no 'meaning' within the Weberian Sociology which still dominates the theories of International Relations. As a result, there is no place for them in the traditional literature. It is when they are repeated frequently, that these activities become politically and socially significant. They then create a chain, an international 'chain of crime'. The implied suggestions is that only when 'societal' activities become a problem, then they become 'political'. Which in turn indicates the existence of a problem of 'demarcation' between the political and non-political types of International Relations. An issue we virtually hear nothing about in traditional literature. Furthermore, it is also suggested, in contrast to the Realist position according to which politics is an autonomous sphere of activity, that in fact social and political activities are indistinguishable.
This notion is braided into another complaint. The behaviour of depraved American kids, caused by the breakdown of American society, precipitates the collapse of Columbian society. Thus a symptom of decadence in one society is 'exported' through the medium of money to another, where it fuels an intrinsic propensity for violence. The story, however, can be reversed: Columbia's history of violence and anarchy threatens now to engulf its more powerful and prosperous neighbour. But the narcotic trade did not simply forge a static link, a mere connection between the two societies. This chain of crime is like a channel through which many things are passed. The chain is a medium, an informal link, which attaches the fate of different societies to each other. It is the persistent reference to the realm of 'informal' relations and ties between societies which is the real significance of Barco's utterance. And this is precisely the area neglected by traditional International Relations.

As we have seen, the various schools of International Relations have sensed many, but not all of the aspects mentioned above. Nevertheless, no comprehensive framework capable of dealing with all of them has emerged. Furthermore, it should be appreciated that Barco's remark by no means covers all of what we would like to know about international relationships. But considering that there is barely a discipline left in the natural sciences and social sciences that can boast a general framework, this cannot be considered as one of the major problems facing the study of International Relations.

More significant perhaps, there is no dearth of theoretical research, nor for that matter, is there any lack of fresh new angles to discuss the phenomena of international relationships, however, achievements of one school of thought are accomplished at the price of the internal consistency of another: each fresh approach posits itself as an alternative to the previous ones. In other words, the various approaches that we do possess are incommensurable.

If that was not enough, the real significance of Barco's remark -- and that is why we went to the trouble of discussing it in some detail and to emphasise that there is nothing unusual about it -- lies principally
in his ability to shift effortlessly from one mode of thought to another, surpassing within the space of a few sentences the very boundaries of the theories of International Relations. Present research in theories of International Relations cannot do this. In actual fact, where theoretical research have split into 'islands of theories', analyses of concrete situations encounter no such difficulties. In International Relations, therefore, the cleavage is not simply between theory and theory, nor is it simply between theory and practice, but between two types of theories: the tacit theoretical frameworks which underlay the more pragmatic analyses and the abstract generalisations which are ultimately based upon them.

Theory is not simply a series of generalisations and abstractions, it is also a way of 'seeing' the world. Consequently, all thought is implicitly or explicitly theoretical i.e. it is impossible to think beyond the boundaries of theory. The split between tacit and analytical theories of International Relations therefore signifies a failure on the part of the theoreticians to heed and follow empirical research. This is perhaps the real problem that faces the theory of International Relations. It suggests a series of unpleasant implications.

1. It suggests that analytical theories do not function as a guide to policy for the ruling classes, nor for the dominated class’s organisation. Decision-makers, in other words, make use of other theories.

2. If that is so, what function do current analytical theories do have? There has always been the irritating suspicion that theories of International Relations are nothing but ideological cloaks for certain interests.

3. Above all we need to understand the purpose of generalisations and abstractions in order to appreciate what is missing when they are unsuccessful: while the human brain is perfectly capable of deducing and digesting extremely complex relationships on a tacit level, formalisation and generalisation are tools for transcending and extending this level. In the words of one of the vehement critics of this methodology "we may agree that abstract notions and principles can be connected more easily than practical (empirical) concepts" (Feyerabend, 1987, p.67). In other words, the methodology proved enormously successful because it is eminently useful.
Thus, the formalisation of tacit knowledge allows us to examine our direct experience carefully and then to transcend and perhaps enrich it. The same urge informs this work, which may be defined in the most general terms as an attempt to create a formal framework which permits us an extensive treatment of international relationships.\footnote{16}

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The definition of the 'problematic' of this work is of course far too vague and general to prescribe any specific route for investigation. Let us return, therefore, to International Relations theory. I argued that current theoretical interpretations fail on three accounts:

a. the lack of an overall framework;

b. theories that we do possess are incommensurable;

c. Tacit theories of International Relations are far more advanced than analytical theories.
On the face of it these are three distinct issues, in reality they are one and the same. My argument is that an incorrect concept of the State is at the heart of them all. Let us begin with the incommensurability of present theories of International Relations.

We may divide the discipline of International Relations into four, perhaps five schools of thought.

a. Realism and neo-realism (Aron, Bull, Carr, Krasner, Morgenthau, Northedge, Schwarzenberger, Waltz, Wight)

b. Neo-Marxist or the structural approaches (Braudel, Emmanuel, Frank, Wallerstein).

c. What I will describe as annexes to Realism: Interdependence, transnationalism and régime analysis, as well as the large majority of textbooks of international political economy. They are defined here as annexes to Realism because they accept Realist conclusions but strive to add, modify, or adjust them to contemporary conditions (Cooper, Gilpin, Hanrieder, Keohane & Nye, Skocpol, Strange).

d. Individual works whose methodologies have not been developed into schools of thought. (Burton, Deutsch, Kelman and Mansbach and Vasquez).

e. Historical sociology. (Eisendstadt, Hall, Mann, McNell).

Since a brief analysis of the last two would necessitates a large part of this work, I will have to limit myself to a short discussion of the three main traditions, namely, realism, pluralism and structuralism. My point is that none of the above mentioned groups, including to two concluding ones, have treated the concept of State adequately.

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A) Realism and Neo-Realism: Realism and its recent manifestation, Neo-Realism, boast two great achievements. The first can be measured when contrasted with what might be branded as pre-Realist literature. The great moral and theoretical problem faced by political thinkers in the nineteenth century was defined by Hegel. Willke explains:

"Rejecting all the theories of the social contract as a way to restructure and organize the resulting complexity, Hegel rigorously presents the problem: What is there to represent the identity of society in the face of the diversity of its parts? And he comes up with his famous (and many say: infamous) answer: the State as the sphere of universal altruism" (1986, p.458).
Hegel regarded the State as both the epitome of rationality and its essence as power (Hegel, 1952; 1975). As Rupert Emerson observed; "Hegel's state is held together not by force but by the spirit of order. It is a spiritual structure, the highest embodiment of reason, the guardian of liberty." (1928, p.11). At the same time, in its external relations the State must assert its individuality:

"the primary absolute right of the State is that its sovereign independence be recognized, and the relations between States is that of Powers whose difficulties must ultimately find solution on the battlefield" (Ibid, pp. 14-15).

However, Hegel's solution to the problems inherited from the social contract theories occasioned new difficulties: The 'spiritual' State conflicted with its concrete and rather brutal manifestations. Jacob Burkhardt, in his Reflection on History (first published 1905, but consisting of lectures delivered from 1868 -1885) puzzles over the paradox in German political thought in the nineteenth century. His conclusions are less favourable:

"Utterly regardless of all religion, the privilege of egoism, which is denied to the individual is bestowed on the state. Weaker neighbours are subjected and annexed, or in some way deprived of their interdependence, not in order to forestall hostilities on their part, for that hardly costs a thought, but to prevent another taking them and turning them to its own political ends. and once on that road, there is no stopping, there is an excuse for everything.... The next step is that things are done in advance, without any real motive, on the principle: 'If we take it in time, we shall avert the danger of war in the future'. Ultimately a permanent appetite for territorial 'rounding off' is created, which devours whatever happens to lie convenient and can be laid hands on" (1943, pp. 67-8).

Thus, in contrast to Hegel and the German theorists of power such as Fichte, Treitschke, Gumplovitz and Meinecke who saw the quest for power as the natural and justifiable posture of the state-person in world politics, liberal thinkers such as Burkhardt and Sorel regarded it as an immoral activity. They noticed moreover the systemic pressures in international politics. However, they remained vague on the fundamental question of whether these immoral activities are inherent in the State
-- which paradoxically, seem to have been implied in the Idealist interpretation -- or whether they are grounded in the system of State.

It was left to Morgenthau (1967) to present a solution to the problem: politics is about power and power only because (and this is the real significance of his assertion) in international politics all interests, whether good or bad, are translated into power. Morgenthau demonstrated then, that noble as the motives might be, in the international arena they are transformed into a brutish struggle for power. He succeeded in generalising and presenting a logical sequence which compels states to behave in a particular manner. The great achievement of Realism, therefore, was the demonstration that the struggle for power is inherent in a system lacking an overall legitimate authority. The moral drama evident in so much of nineteenth century literature was not solved, it was simply forgotten. In the light of the experience of the two world wars, morality was now equated with 'realism' (which came to denote pragmatism) in world politics.

Furthermore, in shifting the onus firmly onto the 'system of states' Morgenthau's Realism presented the discipline of International Relations with a second achievement, or, as I shall argue in a moment, an apparent achievement. Like any other discipline, the study of International Relations seeks to define its uniqueness vis-a-vis others. Intuitively it seems that international relationships are different from domestic politics, but how exactly should we define this distinction? Nineteenth century Prussian thinkers discussed international relationships but did not create a separate field of International Relations because for them politics was by and large international affairs. In contrast, through the same ingenious device Morgenthau was able to agree with his predecessor and yet to demonstrate the viability of a separate field of international politics. All politics is a struggle for power, he argued (1967, p.2) in that sense International Relations are not unique. But there are different types of 'units' struggling for power, individuals and groups, on the one hand, and States on the other. It follows, he argued, that there are two types of politics, domestic and international. With this ingenious formula Morgenthau was able to separate what he himself considers to be
one and the same.

It is the distinction between internal and external politics that countenance, it is generally believed, a separate study of International Relations.\(^1\) It also sanctions the definition of the field as an investigation into the nature of the relations between states.\(^2\) The aim of the theories of International Relations -- at least as they were formulated by its eminent proponents -- was to uncover general patterns or laws of politics (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1964) i.e. general patterns for the relations between these entities. However, this formula, so essential to Realist thought, begets a series of insurmountable complications. One unfortunate consequence is that the very notion of politics acquires a new meaning. In International Relations politics is regarded as a struggle for power, whereas in domestic politics it is defined invariably as the "authoritative allocation of values for a society" (Easton, 1953, p.129).\(^3\) In other words, whereas in International Relations politics is a unique practice, in political science it is a structure or a level, a particular type of activity which is defined in term of other activities.\(^4\)

Since in International Relations politics was severed from other social processes, it came to be thought of as an intractable and immutable social activity. Thus the practice of international politics is represented as a game in which both the rules and the goals are known in advance. In other words, there is no evolution in the system.\(^5\) But in order to support the contention that politics is immutable, the units that interact must also possess an unchanging nature. In turn, if the units do not change, then internal politics is of no significance. Thus we end up with a study priding itself on its realism and pragmatism being forced to replace the concrete acts of states with an abstract world where all States are unitary entities endowed with similar needs and wants.

This in turn has led to a series of other problems, The unity of the State and politics on one hand, and the denial of internal politics on the other, implies that non-state activities must either be denied or relegated to the realm of insignificance. (After all, the State, which
is an abstraction, cannot be conceived as a unitary phenomena, possessing its own unique goals, while elements which reside in it are not part of this unity). We arrive therefore at a position where Realism, while capable of explaining one element of Barco’s remark, does so by denying and excluding the various levels of informal activities on a world scale. Thus Realism works only by denying all the other approaches in International Relations. Once we accept any idea from one of the alternatives, a basic tenet of Realism is bound to be questioned.

It might be argued that, on the contrary, the great majority of post-realist studies in International Relations have in facts broken up the 'billiard ball' model of the State and consequently have been heavily involved in an attempt to grapple with the chain of informal interactions among societies. To a certain extent this is true. To the exclusion of neo-realist, the prevailing view in International Relations have been that Realism:

i. fails to appreciate the intimate relation between domestic and international politics; and

ii. fails to account for the interrelationships between politics, economics and culture on the international plane.

Thus successive approaches aimed at developing a larger framework for the study of international relationships. They failed, however, as mentioned before, to produce an overall framework for the study of international relationships. Why is that?

An overall framework for the study of politics must, even if it is premised upon the separation of politics, as a minimum rely on a consistent and congruent concept of society, or to use modern terminology, a coherent theory of the State. It is this crucial point which has eluded practically all subsequent approaches. Now, it is true that whereas traditional studies of International Relations paid little attention to theories of the State, modern scholars make a point of clarifying their ideas about it.25 However, this does not mean that the underlying theory of the state has improved. As will be demonstrated in the chapter one, traditional realists possessed a clear, if now judged erroneous concept of the State.
Realism is strongly influenced by the Romantic and idealist theories which held sway in the nineteenth century. These theories found their way into International Relations' literature via the English neo-Hegelians (Greene, Bousanquet, Figgis) and through major figures such as Emerson and Sabine into American political science. In the idealist and Romantic traditions, the State is seen as a person (although the notion of personality varies from writer to writer). Only when viewed as such does the Hobbesian theory which applies to individuals and their place in society appear to be relevant to the study of international relationships (MacPherson, 1951). Hence the prevalent interpretation of international politics is that it is a struggle among personalised entities and, hence, the notion of a synthetic 'society of States'.

As we have seen, this perception does not allow for non-state activities. It is probably because of this that the underlying theory of the State underwent an important if largely overlooked transformation in the last two decades. Doubts over the choice of the State as the unit of analysis of International Relations used to generate puzzlement marred with resentment among traditional Realists. For they accepted without question the division of the world into States as one of its basic attributes. In recent versions the puzzlement has been replaced by an argument. The claim now is that the State is (still) the major international actor by virtue of its monopoly over the means of violence. In other words, in contrast to the organic image typical of the idealist sociology of the nineteenth century which emphasise the will of the State, modern International Relations' scholars elect to call upon the Weberian sociology in order to justify a similar position. As well known, in Weberian sociology politics is only one type of activity (Weber, 1978, p.54) and therefore there are no difficulties in accounting for the variety of non-state activities.

However, if the division of the world into States is interpreted as a 'political' division, why should we define International Relations as the study of the relations between States? In other words, what is uniquely international? The Weberian categories are notoriously static, and the notions of politics and economy, when viewed from this
perspective becomes truly stultified. On top of that, whereas the employment of Weberian categories cannot aid much in political analysis, the Realist theory of International Relations becomes incoherent. For as long as the State is seen as a person, the Hobbesian analogy is relevant, but when the State is conceived merely as a set of institutions claiming legitimacy and monopoly over the means of power, there is nothing intrinsic about relations between States.

But perhaps the most serious criticism of the theories of Interdependence is that they fail to pierce through the 'surface' phenomena of interdependence. It is not very difficult to see why: many of the phenomena which precipitate what appears on the surface as interdependence are located at the informal interactions level. Traditional International Relations has neglected these links concentrating instead upon the activities of decision-makers. But even if the informal links are neglected, their effects cannot be ignored. The empirical evidence suggests that some processes in one social formation trigger similar processes in others: It points towards certain correlations, and 'interdependence' was the term chosen to describe these correlations. However, without a clear understanding of the underlying links, it is impossible to explain the dynamics of these correlations, and the mechanism by which one 'polity' affects the other cannot be isolated.

All in all, the attempt to superimpose a complexity upon Realism is bound either to fall upon itself -- as many have ended back in the realist fold -- or it is incoherent. Pluralists are unable to account for what Realists have already achieved, but they are incapable of further developing the study of informal interactions in International Relations.

II

In the last two or three decades interesting 'structural' approaches to the study of international relationships were developed. Here the location of a country within the matrix of the world-economy takes precedence over the formal conduct of politics. Braudel, Frank and Wallerstein, to name the most prominent figures, succeeded in relating within a coherent conceptual framework what historians knew for a long time but were unable to articulate, namely, the relationship between
geographical location, trade routes and social structure on the one hand and prosperity and poverty on the other. Consequently, the notions of a centre and periphery, and in particular of the intimate relations between them proved popular.

The great achievement of the structural approaches was to locate underlying, unsuspected, patterned relationships between social formations. More specifically, these writers re-activated the old link between politics and economy. In the words of Chase-Dunn "What many theorists understand to be simple resource flows between largely unconnected societies are considered by other theorists to be control structures which link superordinate to subordinate units in the same interactive system" (1980, pp.132,3). The neo-classical concept of the division of labour, held Frank, when seen in a wider social context, may not be as favourable to full social and economic development as believed by liberal thinkers. For the division of labour spawns powerful groups whose interests lay with underdevelopment.

It is interesting to note that this contention of Dependency thinkers, which, as recent research has demonstrated\(^3\) cannot be posed in such simple terms, nevertheless is the direct opposite of the Realist interpretation which locates international politics at the level of the State. There is by now enough research which proves beyond a shade of a doubt that there is no inherent connection between States, power and economic development or underdevelopment. There is, however, definitely a correlation between States' policies -- internal and external -- and their ruling classes.\(^4\)

Nonetheless, if the issues are real, the representation from a theoretical point of view is rather weak.\(^5\) In the liberal tradition, international political economy quite simply supplements the formal realm of international politics.\(^6\) Same occurs in the Neo-marxist tradition, although in more elaborate guise. In the works of Frank (1967;1978b) and Wallerstein (1974;1980) the laws of capitalism and class struggle are simply transferred from the societal to the global level. This is particularly obvious in the work of Wallerstein who does not merely transfer the theory of class struggle to the centre-
periphery complex, but adds to it the notion of the semi-periphery which is quite clearly analogous Kornhauser's (1967) middle strata as the 'shock absorbers' of the social system.

When the theory of societal development is transposed to the global level the result can be no other than the dissolution of society as a unit of analysis. The reason is that politics, economics and ideology, which are essentially theoretical concepts and make sense only in relation to each other, are now regrouped instead of the societal level at the global level. They loose therefore, their heuristic value on the societal level, and so society itself loses its theoretical significance. We are again faced with the fundamental problem of defining the uniquely international. If Realism was able to do so, but at some cost, the structural approaches require an even heavier price, they discuss informal interactions but are unable to account for non-International Relations. This is perhaps the fundamental problem. The result is that whatever was gained in structural analysis is immediately lost in political analysis.³⁷

The dissolution of the state/society complex as a unit of analysis has in turn hindered Neo-Marxist in pursuing their ideas further.³⁸ For while they were able to demonstrate the socio-political context of certain 'economics' ideas, they were incapable of pursuing the matter to its logical conclusion, namely, linking it with the domestic political process. This statement needs to be qualified:

a. That initially the link was not made should not come as a total surprise, for in the nineteenth sixties theories of the State were as yet undeveloped and could not therefore be of much assistance. However, with the publication of Nicos Poulantzas' *Political Power and Social Classes* (1973 <1968>) this has changed. Poulantzas' structuralist theory of the State made an explicit connection between the level of the structures, i.e. the economic structure of societies and their class structure, and the political scene. It offered therefore a conceptual scheme which could be incorporated into dependency theory.³⁹

b. In more recent times the French theorists of the school of regulation⁴¹ undertook to extend, develop and relate the structuralist message (heavily peppered with cybernetics) to dependency theory,⁴² they
conceived the nation-state, therefore, as a self-regulating machine. The French school of regulation, however, is primarily concerned with the specific success of capitalism in various stages, and International Relations while acknowledged, are treated as an auxiliary device. The suggestion is that a 'successful' mode of regulation tend to be 'exported' all over the world.

Moreover, dependency and imperialism by no means provide a complete portrait of the structural relationships on a world-scale. The international division of labour is a static concept, for it refers to a state of affairs and not to the dynamic process that caused it. Left alone, therefore, the notion lacks internal dynamism, and theories of dependency remain sterile and static and are unable to account for any fundamental changes in relations of dependency. The division of labour is of course a corollary development to capitalist competition on a world-scale. And so we need to incorporate the notion of competition in a structural scheme.

When all is said and done, the many issues remain half-baked. There are three related shortcomings to the Neo-Marxist literature:

i) They concentrate only of one type of structural relationships on a world scale,

ii) No comprehensive attempt to relate even these relationships to the theories of the State.

iii) Consequently, no articulation of their relationships with the global political structure.

It goes without saying that unless these issues are resolved there can be no comprehensive theory of International Relations.

An analysis of the three main schools of thought of International Relations, Realism, pluralism and neo-Marxism, reveals that they have mishandled the concept of the State. This does not constitute a proof that an incorrect theory of the State is the sole cause of their incommensurability, but it does point to a common denominator. Let us move to the essential problem, namely, the nature of international relationships.
The relationships which were revealed in the examination of Barco's remark are not restricted to cocaine dealers. In fact, a large majority of commercial, cultural or spiritual, hence political relationships on a world scale belong to this variety. It appears, indeed, that the large majority of international relationships are not conducted among clear-cut, coherent social units (or societies), nor do they take place simply within an empty shell of the world-economy, world-society, or whatever term is in fashion. They are conducted by and large -- and in due course we shall have to explain the expression 'by and large' -- in some 'in-between' zone. Where societies are not truly discrete, within a divided and yet global context and by individuals, companies and groups profoundly influenced by their societies. Thus, at least on the level of appearance, it seems that on one dimension the world is truly divided among social entities and groupings, and this is significant and fundamental. On another the international setting behaves as one unit, there is a world-market, a certain world culture, etc. and then, there are many other types of unities, all superimposed upon each other.

But as I write these words one may already suspect that this superimposition of so many dimensions and levels is more likely to be evidence of the difficulties encountered by an observer, than an intrinsic property of the phenomena. This somewhat disjointed representation is the effect of the tools of analysis we possess in order to explain and simplify what appears to be something and its opposite: closeness and separations which are not radical; an amorphism which is not complete. Nothing seems to be as clear-cut and easily adaptable to the division of labour among the branches of the social sciences. There is no simple, self-enclosed 'society' amenable to sociological inquiries which relates to other societies through its governing institutions and therefore receptive to the eyes of International Relations' scholars. Nor does the partition into economics, politics and culture (or ideology), creates discrete systems that can be examined separately by economists, political scientists and anthropologists.

The problem, then, is to deal with the relativity of social phenomena. And we need to do so with minds which are habitually attracted to
simple, clear cut phenomena and things. Where even the grammatical structure of our language presents them, as Bohm demonstrated, as if "action arises in a separate entity, the subject, and that, in cases described by a transitive verb, this action crosses over the space between them to another separate entity, the object" (1980, p.29). Hence we tend to clear up the rough lines, to amend the ambiguity. We adopt the methods of abstraction, generalisation, simplification and dissection in order to construct them mentally into approximations of the amorphous configurations they possess in reality. Mathematically, we do not conceive of a circle as a ring, but as an infinite progression of angles. And this is a paradigm for all sciences.

Thus, the first issue that faces us here is how to study the International Relations of units which are discrete only to a degree. But this is only one facet of the problem. In actual fact, this clear-cut representation of the world typical to traditional International Relations boasts its own history and its own rationale. It essentially relates to what I call the 'nationalistic' perspective of the current social sciences, The excessively partisan view which centres upon the unit, the nation-state. Nationalistic perspectives perceive international relationships essentially as constraining the freedom of the national entity. And duly, the notion of constraint is woven through all major discussions in International Relations: Realism portrays the international system as a constraint upon individual government action; Interdependence theories represent it as a limited ability to decide; dependency and world-system as the external constraint upon development. The international system is glanced through parochial eyes and consequently, it should not come as a total surprise that contributions to the understanding of the dynamics of international relations are limited.  

The nationalistic perspective defines the 'problematic' of traditional International Relations. In traditional political analysis the concept of 'State' is regarded as sufficient, if somewhat flawed and schematic, not because the effects of the external world are unknown or ignored, but because it was believed, if only implicitly, that the effects of the external world do not follow any universal pattern and therefore
they are not open to generalisations. Thus political scientists believed that both domestic political processes and international politics may be thought of as 'systems' hence allowing for theorisation. However, the links between them being so elusive, there can only be a study of both realms as if they were external to each other.

Thus from a nationalistic point of view, the terms of reference were defined as a search for generalisation within the bounds of society. And as the external world was conceived as constraint, the study of International Relations aimed to generalise the nature of this constraint. Consequently, the system of states or the world-economy are discussed as if they are external to the localised political system. In spatial terms this is evidently absurd. For the world economy as well as the territorial dimension of world politics comprise precisely the areas of the national territories which are left out of the discourse. One may argue, of course, that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. i.e. that the world-economy, or the system of states, are more than mere aggregates of national-economies and world-politics. I happily go along with such a view. However, one should not forget that the parts have to be seen in terms of this whole. This relation between the parts and whole in International Relations has remained, to all intent and purpose, an unknown quality.

The relation of the parts to the whole cannot be discussed as long as we perceive a veritable partition between the two: it is impossible to overcome the 'nationalistic' perspective without transcending the separation of politics which underpins the theories of International Relations as well as the majority of political science. In fact, the three issues, namely, the relativity of the units, the nationalistic perspective and the partition of politics support each other. The relativity of the units is not confronted as long as the separation of politics is taken for granted and as long as the nationalistic perspective prevails. In its turn the 'nationalistic' perspective is not challenged if the cohesiveness of the social unities and the splitting of politics is accepted. Whereas the separation of politics is sanctioned by the solidity of the social units and the prejudices of the nationalistic perspective.
But, theoretically speaking, in this interdependence of issues the separation of politics holds the key. It may be taken as the cause, as well as holding the ultimate solution to these three problems. It is the cause because it led to separate development of the two disciplines of political science; it holds the key to the solution because it points, just as the analysis of the incommensurability of present theories of International Relations did, towards a blind spot in the theories of International Relations.

It is now possible to define the aims of this work more accurately: It aims to surmount this blind spot in modern theories of International Relations. In other words, it aims to create the conditions that will enable us to appreciate the dynamics of societal development within the global context and, conversely, to enable us to understand the dynamics of global development as the manifold accumulation of the dynamics of these individual societies. Or to put it in another way, it aims to create a bridge between localised theories of politics i.e. modern theories of the State, and globalised theories of politics, e.g., the study of International Relations.

A theoretical bridge between the theories of the State and the study of International Relations can succeed provided two conditions are fulfilled: First, the two fields of study, domestic and international politics, must share the same basic concepts of 'State', 'politics', 'power', etc. Second, the relations between the 'internal' and the 'external' should be open to generalisation. In fact if the second condition is not met there is no point in going to the trouble of examining the first. However, the order of exposition is not necessarily the same as the order of thought. Consequently, the dissertation will be divided roughly into two parts, the first discusses general questions pertaining to an attempt to create a bridge between the theories. The second elaborates a series of concrete suggestions that bring about such a link.

At this point we may summarize the main contentions of this work. There are basically three options for forging this link: either to commence
on the basis of the theories of the State and propose a new framework for International Relations. Conversely to modify the theories of the State on the basis of current International Relations theories. Or to formulate a wholly new framework which does not rely on either of the two. It is already clear from the preceding discussion that the preference here is for the first approach. The second is rejected because in my estimation political sociology is more advanced stage than International Relations. And the third because there is far too much precious material in the two fields to be simply discarded. In any case the third approach is not truly feasible. We shall therefore present a framework for the study of international relationships as it appears from the perspective of modern theories of the State.

As noted above, a unified conceptual framework requires a certain homogeneity in its concepts. In contrast to the current situation, we need to arrive at a point where both Political Sociology and International Relations share in the same basic concepts. However, concepts are not mere representation on an abstract plane of the world as it is, concepts (in one of their complex functions) create in our mind the possibility of 'seeing' things. Therefore, such a state of affair, can be achieved only through a radical change in our notion of what constitutes the bulk of international relationships, what the 'problematics' of International Relations are, and indeed what International Relations are.

But no less importantly, modern theories of the State emphasise the overall social structure as their starting point. By and large, they are, as Skocpol termed them 'society oriented' (Skocpol, 1979). In spite of some serious controversies, politics is still regarded essentially as a practice with a particular function within the overall social structure. This 'function', or rather functions, is not intrinsic to the political system — if anything it is the reverse, politics is defined in terms of its function in relation to economics, ideology and social organisation. Thus, modern theories of the State emphasise a relationship and not a state of affairs, they take the relationship between rulers and ruled as their starting point, and they lay strong emphasise upon the overall socio-economic conditions of a
bounded entity. As a corollary to this, a 'society-oriented' study of international relations must put the onus on what will be dubbed here 'informal interactions' — all those interactions between societies which do not work their way through the conscious application of policy by governments. Societies are not truly discrete entities. In the words of Lipietz, "there is no metaphysical distinction between internal and external conditions"(1987,p.18). Hence, instead of the state/society and world-system units of analysis I propose to regard modern societies as essentially localised political processes — nothing more, nothing less. These political processes are tied through the informal links by millions of fasteners.

My argument is that as long as the political process and informal interactions are discussed separately, the sphere of informal interactions appears chaotic and disorderly. However, when they are seen in conjunction, in their interaction with the domestic political process the informal links form simple patterns. Once the patterns of interactions of the political processes and the informal links are properly charted, there is no need to speak of a world-market, or civilisation in meta-physical terms. The vertical and horizontal patterns of informal interactions present us with the concrete and quantifiable manifestation of this 'globalisation'.

But here again the issue is complex, for a study that aims to create a bridge between the two sets of theories cannot replace one simplistic view of the world as divided among clearly sealed social entities, with another where 'politics' and 'economics' 'occur' internationally. The very concepts politics, economics, and ideology are in themselves very much 'society-bound' and lose some of their meanings when applied to a global context. Furthermore, such a global perspective contradicts the very starting point of the theories of the State; the localised, and regular conduct of interactions. Thus, the notion of causation and determination (of politics over economy, of the global over the national, etc.) must be set aside. Nonetheless, it is impermissible to commence by attributing some a
priori reasons for the state's behaviour. On the contrary, if there are
indeed recurrent patterns in international politics, we need to arrive
at them on the basis of theories of the State. Consequently, we cannot
accept that State or societies are naturally competitive, cooperative,
etc. Nor can we regard their posture as an attribute of sovereignty or
statehood. We shall assume, therefore, although we are unable to prove
it at this point, and it will remain as an assumption throughout this
work, that the concrete postures of States -- their competition,
cooperation, interdependence, dependency, etc. are the global summation
of the dynamic interrelation of the informal links, the domestic
political process and formal politics.

The problem, however, is how to create such a framework. So far the
tendency in social investigation was to discuss any one of the
conceptual tools, political process, or one of the two types of
informal links independently. Thus, for instance, in Dependency theory
the various vertical ties, on their levels, the economic, political and
ideological, are all conflated into one link which is named 'depende-
cy'. Conversely, the relations of competition or interdependence,
there is generally no attempt to articulate precisely which element or
level in the social formation is actually in competition with which
level in another. However, apart from a few theoretical works, there is
an enormous number of political and social analyses -- too many to
mention, which have already overcome this hurdle, but which unfor-
tunately have not enjoyed enough consideration in the theory of
International Relations. This is the raw material of this work.
NOTES


2. Barco modified his argument. The fault lies, he argued latter, not only with the producers, but also with transit and consumer states, they all need to agree on some unified preventive measures. He added in Le Monde "confortablement installes dans la tranqullité d'un salon sophistique de cet élégant quartier de New-York ...contributent a l'assassinat du peuple colombien". Le Monde, 2 oct, 1989.


4. Prof. Ernest Haas in personal communication.

5. Interdependence paved the way to what has become to be known as regime analysis, a framework which aims to deal with the complexity of International Relations by arguing that issues, or areas of activities, create international regimes. International relations is the sum total of these regimes at any particular moment. See Ashely, 1986; Keohane, 1984; Kransner, 1983; Jackson, 1987. The heuristic value of regime analysis cannot, however, extend beyond the boundaries of the regime. The world is seen as an amalgamation of regimes, but because this theory is not connected to the theories of the State, it is impossible to develop a coherent and concise framework of political analysis on their basis. For criticism of the concept see: Strange, 1983.

6. The expression 'traditional International Relations' will refer henceforth to all those approaches which define their subject-matter the study of the relations between States. The reasons for this definition will become progressively clear as the work unfolds.


9. Burdeau in fact defines the domain of politics as the area of insoluble problems: "La spécificité du politique ne ressort pas seulement de sa finalité; elle se révèle aussi a travers la nature des problèmes qu'il est appelé a aborder... si le groupe de peut pas, par le jeu de ses mécanismes spontanés, planar les difficultés qu'il rencontre, c'est parce qu'elles ne comportent pas de solutions. Par conséquent, ce qu'il transfère au poli­rique, ce sont des problèmes insolubles" (1980, vol.I, p.144).
10. The subject will be discussed below.

11. Those claiming to extend and elaborate the current perspectives (Interdependence, transnationalism, and régime analysis), have in fact undermined what they have sought to extend. That is why Gourevitch, 1978 and Waltz, 1979 are so insistent that Interdependence adds nothing to the discipline of International Relations.


15. Paul Feyerabend's Farewell to Reason (1987) is interesting in this respect precisely because Feyerabend is very suspicious of this 'new' method. The 'rise' of rationalism in ancient Greece he explains "is fascinating example of this attempt to transcend, devalue, and push aside complex forms of thought and experience" However, he admits "<f>urther help came form the discovery (which seems to have occurred some time between Xenophanes and Parmenides) that statements composed of concepts lacking in details could be used to build new kinds of stories" (p.66-7)

16. I will remain on the whole at a general theoretical level, only occasionally discussing the concrete implication of the suggested framework. This is not because there are no concrete implications, on the contrary. there are. However, it will be wise to devote a whole work just for the theoretical implications of such a framework.

17. On neo-Realism see the collection in Keohane (1986). As I believe that a true understanding of the Realist tenets can be found only in a detailed examination of its historical evolution, neo-realism only confuse the issue by adding another layer which then needs to be peeled off. Elaboration in chapter one.


19. The subject will be discussed in greater detail in chapter one.


21. In the words of Strange and Tooze: "It is generally accepted that the original justification for international relations as a separate discipline - if there was one at all- rested on the presumption of the separability of domestic politics and foreign politics" (1981, p.4).

22. Typical in this respect is Raymond Aron: "International Relations is the science of peace and war and should be the basis for
diplomacy and strategy... states are the focus because they monopolise the means of violence" (1966, p.6).

According to Holsti, "nation-states are the essential actors not only because they share legal attribute of sovereignty and because many norms and practices are designed to protect their independence, but because they are the actors that engage in war and are essential in organising the norms and institutions which provide more or less stability, security, order, and peace for the system." (K.J. Holsti, 1981, p.9).

For Bull, "the starting point of international relations is the existence of states, or independent political communities, each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population." (1977, p.16).

Northedge reiterates the same point: "Our focus will lie upon the state and its official controlling authorities....Governments representing sovereign states, however, deal with one another at many levels: the political, economic, commercial, financial, cultural and so on. We are proposing in this book to abstract their mutual dealings at one level only, the political" (Northedge, 1976, p.15).

The subject will be discussed further in chapter three.

23. "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres." (Morgenthau, 1967, p.5). Michael Mann concurs "modern (Western) state is not single but dual. Its domestic life separable from its geo-political" (1987, p.59).

24. "Il faut entendre par la qu'il n'y a pas de fait politique qui ne soit, en meme temps, un fait social et qu'il n'y a pas davantage de phenomenon social qui ne soit susceptible de revetir un caracter politique. Par consequent, aucun criterre objectif ne permet de distinguer les faits politiques de ceux qui ne le sont pas"(Burdeau, 1980, vol.I, p.136). See also Easton, 1953.

25. Martin Wight is typical, he picks up from history three 'ideal type' examples of 'systems of States' and goes on and elaborate a whole theory of International Relations based on this ideal type representation. see Wight, 1977.

26. Of the ten most popular works mentioned in Vasquez' (1983) survey, some do not even have entries on the state in their index, and none discusses it in any length.

27. "Hegel went further in asserting the real, organic, independent personality of the State. Not only was the State not a contractual relationship between a number of individuals, but it was itself an individuality, independent and superior to all other individuals (p.11) .... Rarely in post-reformation Germany are writers to be found denying the formal validity of this conception of the State as a sovereign person" (p.32) (Emerson, 1928).
28. I cannot but concur with Bienkowski's judgement "Weber's work undoubtedly broadened our knowledge of social development and contributed to the systematization of several problems. It should be noted, however, that Weber's fundamental work, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, did not play the role in the development of the social sciences which he hoped it would. Although there are frequent references to Weber's definitions, he did not create the basis for a continuation of his approach .... One reasons for this is undoubtedly his failure to perceive the motive forces of social development, which is revealed clearly in his treatment of institutional forms, in the fact that he could see neither the essence of the dynamic forces not the internal contradictions of capitalism which he considered the final, rational stage of social development" (1981; p.83).

29. Discussion of the interrelation between informal and formal interactions will be delayed to chapter ten.


31. More detailed examination of these contention is found in chapter five.

32. It is important not to confuse the structuralism of dependency and world-system approaches with Waltz's branch of structuralism. The structuralism in International Relations generally denotes the first group whereas members of the second are named neorealists.

33. Interesting works on the subject were done in particular Canada, an advanced country part of the group of Seven (G-7) which nevertheless exhibits many of the attributes of dependency. For a useful summary see Brym, 1989.

34. As difficult as it may to articulate the concept of ruling class and define it in concrete situations. For a recent thorough discussions see: Bottomore and Brym, 1989; Wright, 1985.

35. Braudel's suggestion do not fall into this trap. his work will be discussed in chapter two.

36. The modern theories of International Political Economy tend to superimpose a more complex world upon the simplistic picture presented by Realism. Keohane and Nye (1977) say as much, Gilpin (1981) views the issue as if we possessed already a satisfactory 'static' theory of International Relations and we need now simply to add to it the dimension of change, Strange (1988) presents the problem as if 'politics' needs to be peppered into the study of economics. They all accept therefore the Realist portrayal International Relations.

37. At the same time it is quite clear in the case of both Frank and Wallerstein that centre and periphery are references to social formations. In other words, they dissolve society and yet use it
38. "imperialism is not a notion that can form the object of any explicit definition that originates from economic concepts. Imperialism can only be grasped on the basis of a fully developed theory of a state, capable of studying the significance of inter-state relations in all these mediation and showing that these express the most complex form of capitalist socialization. Marx interpretation of the wage relation predicted a frontal struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat that would spill over national frontiers and break up state institutions. The study of imperialism must involve analysis of the networks of asymmetrical political influences between states, the conditions of their reproduction or disappearance, and their roots in the most general determinants of the wage relation" (Aglietta, 1979, p.30).

39. The term structuralism or structure greatly varies in use. I will employ the traditional connotations as it developed in linguistics. Structuralism stems from the famous distinction of De-Saussure (1959) between diachrony and synchrony. De Saussure argued that language is a living system and should be investigated as a structure separately from its evolution. Structuralism then aims to discover the necessary relations between components that make a system into a system (whether language, literary text, religion or society).

Structuralism is at an epistemological impasse: If one concentrates on the relations between components (say of a social system) than i. who or what assures that these relations remain constant? where, in other words, are the genes or the codes of the social system? b. Even more difficult, who is to assure, in an a priori fashion that the change of components will follow a prescribed route so that the relations between them remain constant? Conversely, by banishing the subject and discussing 'relations' structuralism excluded, from the outset the agent of change. In other words, without 'telos' of some sorts, the system is total abstraction.

The problem however is compounded because at present only structuralism is capable of dealing with the basic, and generally accepted as valid, principles of the synchronic unity of components in a system. The only viable and effective solution which currently holds is to accept the abstraction of the structuralist enterprise and supplement it with notions such as 'conjuncture' or 'analysis'. Structuralism then is basically a framework of discussion, it discusses processes and not a state of affair. Poulantzas theory of the State (1973; 1979) is essentially a structuralist enterprise in the sense that it elaborate a scheme for the study of the political process. This theory underpins the effort in this work.


40. See John Taylor (1979) for an attempt to make this connection explicit. Much is made of the inconsistencies and circularity of
Poulantzas' structuralism (See Brym, 1989, for a summary). However, the important elements of Poulantzas' for this work are his overall scheme for the study of the political process and not any one of his admittedly more problematic contentions. The issue will be discussed in chapter seven.

41. "The term mode of regulation refers to the ensemble of institutional forms, networks and explicit or implicit norms which assure compatibility of market behaviour within a regime of accumulation, in keeping with the actual pattern of social relations, and beyond (or even through) the contradictory, conflictual nature of relations among economic agents and social groups." On the French school of regulation. Aglietta, op. cit. Boyer, 1986, Lipietz, op. cit.

42. "There are fundamental reasons for thinking that the cohesion of social relations under the rule of wage relations necessarily involves the framework of the nation. Contrary to the illusions of general theorist the equilibrium cannot be without the rule of law, it is not by the economic itself the organization of the capitalist class within the bourgeoisie state, and the development of the structural forms in which it is expressed are indispensable for the expanded reproduction of capital across society as a whole. It remains no less true that the international expansion of capital forms part of this expanded reproduction, and that a gap is left if this is not studies in detail. Such a study demands knowledge of the general tendencies of capitalist development within the different nations, and careful attention to the relations between states" (Aglietta, op. cit.p.22)

43. "The state is in fact the archetypal form of all regulation. It is at the level of the State that the class struggle is resolved; the State is the institutional form which condenses the compromises which prevent the different groups making up the national (or at least territorial) community from destroying one another in an endless struggle (the point is not that struggles come to an end, but that they rarely destroy classes). (Lipietz, op. cit. p.19).

44. "Regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are chance discoveries made in the course of human struggles ... So the history of capitalism is full of experiments which led nowhere: aborted revolutions, abandoned prototypes and all sorts of monstrosities."(Lipietz,op. cit, p.15). On regulation and International Relations see Jessop, 1987.

45. "The central issue of the Marxist conception of the capitalist system is the articulation of the laws of capitalist accumulation and the laws of competition" (Aglietta,1979,p.17).

46. For the historical roots of this view see Kreiger (1977) discussion of Ranke. See the survey of Strasser and Randall, 1981 and Black, 1987.
47. Historically, transnationalism and the fragmentation of Europe into localised political structures went hand in hand. In other words, the dissolution of a universal legitimate powers such as the church and the Holy Roman Empires and the emergence of unities with the ultimate ability to rule and decide their fate occurred at roughly the same period. And it corresponded to a leap in international trade. That does not constitute a proof that European States can be understood only in a transnational context. However, it appears that arguments about the recent 'erosion of sovereignty' are simplistic.

48. This has been the aim of a new sociological school of thought which include Skocpol (1979), Mann (1986) and Hall and Ikenberry (1989) among others. For a sophisticated and intriguing statement see Michael Mann's chapter three in the second volume two of the Sources of Social Power (to be published). This school of thought will be discussed in chapter one.

49. Wallerstein, (1974; 1980) and Burton (1965) are cases in point. Wallerstein will be discussed in chapter two.

50. I have discussed the subject more fully in Palan, 1988.

51. The issue will be discussed in chapter three.


53. There is a myth fuelled by Kenneth Waltz (1954) that in International Relations we may chose among three levels of analysis, individual, state and system of states. Here, In this context Hegel's intuition holds firm. The 'individual' as a unit defines the State (or the nation) as a complementary unit. And these two define the totality or the system of State. In other words, individual/state/system of states are of the same matrix: the State defines, or points towards some smaller frameworks of analysis, call them individuals, and larger units of analysis.

Now, if we would like to ask questions such as why there is war, peace, diplomatic activity, etc, instead of asking why there is violence or harmony. In other words, if we ask questions about decisions of statesmen and not about social activity in general and we would like to answer them in general why should decision-makers decide on going to war, the answer will probably be located at the level of the system of states. It is not a truism, but it is almost predicated given the nature of the question.
There are basically two methods of research in International Relations: the majority of International Relations scholars adopt state-centred schemes, others prefer economic groupings, or social classes, as their units of analysis. It will be argued in the two opening chapters that whereas both approaches offer important insights, their choice of units of analysis results in an analytic cul-de-sac. In chapter three I shall present an alternative definition of the unities in International Relations which enable us to conceive of States and classes concomitantly.

In traditional International Relations, international relationships are interpreted on the basis of State's needs and will. As States are essentially abstractions, the real subjects of State-centred schemes are decision-makers or statesmen. And indeed, it is not difficult to see that State-centred schemes draw on the work of Nicolo Machiavelli and more generally on the tradition of the 'mirror-for-princes' (Skinner, 1978) writers, who were pre-occupied by questions such as how should a prince maintain his state and achieve honour, glory and fame (Skinner, 1978, chpt.5). Realism presents the logical outcome of a system of States based on such premises. Hence, in the final analysis the Realist interpretation of events is only as good as its premises.

In International Relations the tendency has been to regard the concrete activities of statesmen as evidence of the goals of 'States'. Consequently, the aim of honour and glory, typical to medieval and post-medieval aristocracy, assume ontological attributes when they are transferred from flesh and blood princes to abstract State. That States (by that we may provisionally understand modern socio-political units) are fundamental to any discussion of social life is not denied, Nor do I wish to deny the existence of power politics -- quite the contrary. But I question whether interpretation of international relationships on the basis of the intrinsic properties of the State is admissible.

The contention of this chapter is that the concept of State (and consequently the definition of the discipline as 'the study of the
relations between States') is in principle not a very good starting point for the study of international relationships because States are not discrete entities and therefore however one wishes to define them they do not exhaust all conceivable forms of international relationships. Thus, a theory of the 'relations between States' of necessity oscillates between one illegitimate position whereby State are effectively equated with their societies, and another illegitimate position whereby States are equated with governments. The result in both cases is the denial of the domestic political process.

There are two versions of Realism which may differ in their premises, but are identical in their conclusions. According to classical Realism States' activities on the international scene spring directly from the very essence of the political community. The State is thought of as an organic entity, a person, and International Relations is understood by analogy as a 'society' of these person-States. Modern realism or Neo-Realism, on the other hand, conceives of the State in Weberian action-based categories as an autonomous social actor. Both traditions arrive at similar conclusions in respect to their interpretation of international politics because they agree on the fundamental point that States tend to behave uniformly and in a predictable manner on the international front. In the Waltz' words: "The differences (among states) are of capability, not of function. States perform or try to perform tasks, most of which are common to all of them" (Waltz, 1979, p.96).

1.1. The Realist Theory of the State

The Realist interpretation of world politics makes sense provided we accept certain notions concerning the relations between rulers and ruled, politics and economics, etc. In other words, it is implicit a theory of the State boasting four distinct traits:

i) The State and its population share in the same aspirations, therefore;

ii) the State/society complex may be thought of as a unitary being;

iii) The unitary character of the State/society is invested in the official arm of the State. Consequently the 'State' in International Relations is in fact its decision makers;
iv) The State is a teleological device 'programmed' to realize the 'common good' or the 'national interest'. International politics is the realm of interactions of self-propelled entities.

How Realists arrive at such an unconventional theory of the State? Unfortunately, there has never been a truly penetrating inquiry into the intellectual origins of the discipline of International Relations. The convention has it as a uniform intellectual tradition spanning from the work of Thucydides to the present era (Carr, 1946; J.M. Smith, 1986) without any attempt to situate Realist thought in dialectical relationship to contemporary events. Thus, the Greek response to the Persian menace, the failure of the Italian city-state system to repel the French and Spanish armies, the English 'Glorious Revolution', the ancien regime's dynastic rivalries and modern nuclear age politics, are all encompassed under one homogeneous and universal experience. Naturally, the notion of thought developing according to its own rhythm and yet reflecting historical circumstance is absent.

In contrast, I will presently argue that the realist theory of International Relations was the natural continuation of the Idealistic and Romantic traditions prevailing in nineteenth century Germany. And it makes perfect sense only as long as the assumption of the organic materiality of the State, linked as it were through the concept of individual freedom to its population is accepted.

The modern Realist theory assembles under one roof various traditions of theories of the State: to schematise somewhat, we may say that the first attribute originates in the 'organic' tradition stretching from Aristotle through the medieval ages (Gierke, 1900, chpt.4) to the late nineteenth century (Treitscke, 1916; Meinecke, 1962; Spencer, 1971); the second and third are derived from legal theories and the Romantic tradition; and the fourth is obtained from a rather convoluted interpretation of the 'social contract'. The following discussion is not meant as a detailed account of the historical origins of Realist thought. Many prominent figures such as Spinoza and Kant will be absent, while others will be mentioned only in passing. The point is to demonstrate some unsuspected connections between the Realist theory
and other philosophical traditions.

1.1.2. The French Liberal Tradition and Dynastic Politics

The French revolution exerted a tremendous impact all over Europe, it forced political philosophers to reconsider their positions, and in this turmoil the roots of modern Realism were laid. There were two diametrically opposed reactions to the revolution: the French liberals who were in favour of it and the German Idealist and Romantic thinkers (very much influence by Burke) who, if admired Napoleon, were generally against the 'rule of the multitude' which in their view it generated (Aris, 1965).

Liberals were well aware of the practice of power politics and felt an aversion towards it. Carlyle judgement is typical:

"Wars" he says "are not memorable, however big they may have been, whatever rages and miseries they may have occasioned, or however many hundreds of thousands they have been the death of, ... If they are found to have been the travail-throes of great or considerable changes, which continue permanent in the world, men of some curiosity cannot but enquire into them, keep memory of them. But if they were travail-throes that had no birth, who of mortals would remember them? Unless, perhaps, they feats of prowess, virtue, valour and endurance they might accidentally give rise to, were very great indeed ... Wars, otherwise, are mere futile transitory dust-whirlwinds stilled in blood; extensive fits of human insanity, such as we know we are too apt to break out" (Carlyle, Frederick the Great, Bk. XII. c. xi, as quoted in Davis, 1914, p.148).

I have already mentioned Burkhardt similar contentions (Introduction, p.14). But it was left to the French liberals to establish with remarkable clarity the international component of Realist thought (in contrast to Hobbes and Machiavelli who uttered only scattered remarks on the subject). Indeed, Albert Sorel's chapter 'The way of Politics' in his Europe and the French Revolution (1969, first published in 1885), is still one of the finest expositions of the tenets of Realism. Sorel anticipated the current theory with one vital difference, he understands power politics to be a fair description of the international politics of the ancien régime, but of the ancien régime only. Thus
in contrast to modern Realism he locates the practice of power politics in specific historical context. What was it? To Sorel the answer seemed obvious. Contrary to the mambo-jumbo dispensed so eagerly by the social contract theoreticians, States of the ancien régime were undemocratic and, as a result, totally irresponsible both in their internal affairs as well as in their external policies. This accounts for the chaotic nature of international politics.

"In the public law of the ancient régime there was one fundamental conception, that of the State; it dominated and governed politics (p.37) .... The State is an end in itself. It is sovereign; it recognises no authority beyond its own (p.42) .... If raison d'état was the rule of policy aggrandizement was its object .... Thus the idea of the greatness of the State was closely linked with that of its extent .... The principle and the object of politics thus posited, rules of conduct can be deduced from them. The chief is that one must always be fit and prepared for action and ready to seize any opportunity" (p.45).

The originality of Sorel lies in outlining the relation between the nature of the State of the ancien régime and the type of international relationships which it generates. For him power politics is a disease afflicting irresponsible régimes. Modern Realism 'transcended' Sorel's suggestions in three respects. First, the character of the system of states is now thought to determine the nature of the States (Waltz, 1979). Second, power struggles which to Sorel were typical of the ancien régime, are regarded now as an imminent quality of any system of states. In other words, it is no more associated with the non-democratic nature of the state. Thirdly, the humanist notion of 'virtue' is played down nowadays and is replaced instead by a much narrower evaluation of the nature of power.

Liberalism represented one possible avenue of development of the theory of International Relations. It is quite conceivable that were this avenue to develop, modern theories of International Relations have paid greater attention to the relationships between domestic and international politics, and not insist on their separation. In contrast, the modern theories have chosen to draw largely from the nineteenth century reactionaries who have neglected the study of domestic politics.
1.1.3. The Social Contract

It should be recognized at the outset that the domestic political process is not simply a neglected area of International Relations, it is rather a suppressed area. The theoretical ploy which sanctions this manoeuvre can be pinpointed with some accuracy. It has to do with the assumption, or better, presumption, that States participate in international politics for specific purposes. The implications are that international politics are external to the domestic political process, and that States possess some quasi-ontological needs and wants which compel them to participate in an exoteric domain. Because of the combination of the two, it appears as if the study of domestic politics is irrelevant for the discipline of International Relations.

The idea of an intrinsic 'will' of the State coincided with a major shift in attitude towards it. (Machiavelli's notion of reason of State developed slowly towards their contemporary meaning (Meinecke, 1962)). Whereas classic liberals such as Sorel distrusted the State, modern Realism descends from a tradition which elevates the State and regards it as a positive social force. Thus, Northedge, for instance, defines international politics as follows:

"We define international politics as those mutual dealings of governments representing sovereign States which involve considerations of status, standing, power and prestige of the States vis-a-vis each other and which concern the general welfare of peoples as an object of governmental action" (Northedge, 1976, p.19).

Gilpin argues that:

"the primary external function of the State is to protect the property rights and personal security of its members vis-a-vis the citizens and actions of other states" (Gilpin, 1981, p.16).

And Krasner if more restrained, agrees nevertheless with the fundamentals:

"the national interest is defined inductively as the preferences of American central decision-makers. Such a set of
objectives must be related to general societal goals, persisting over time, and have a consistent ranking of importance in order to justify using the term 'national interest'" (p.13).

A careful examination of Realism reveals more intricate and unsuspected lines of connections: The playing down of the connection between the domestic structure and international politics coincides with a teleological conception of the State. In turn, the teleological conception of the State is associated with the rise of a positive image of the State. Conversely we may trace this development in the opposite direction: it may not come as a total surprise to discover that the positive image of the State corresponds to the suppression of politics. (A theoretical manoeuvre which incidentally possesses its own unique and interesting history: it used to be thought that small states are less quarrelsome than big ones because they consist of fewer factions and groups. Nowadays it is almost the opposite, and indeed the acceptance of pluralism within clearly defined 'rules of the game' is thought to be the best guarantee for long-term success). The suppression of politics is preparatory to the teleological conception.

It is important to realize that the ideas of the quasi-ontological properties of the State do not rise from a realistic observation of day to day politics, but originate in the rich literature of the social contract, to which, indeed, it bears an uncanny resemblance.

According to Otto Gierke the earliest mention of the social contract was at the Council of Paris and Worms at Paris 829 A.D. (Ullmann (1975) and Nisbeth (1974) date it much earlier), where it was stated that the ruler's mandate was "to rule the Folk with rightouseness and equity, to preserve peace and unity" (1900, p.142 n,125). Similarly, Guilelmus Occam contends "a plenitudo potestatis incompatible with the best Form of Government, which should promote the liberty and exclude the slavery of the subjects" (cited in Gierke, p.142, op. cit.). And in the same fashion, Jean Bodin, who is credited as the father of the modern doctrine of sovereignty, makes a clear distinction between legitimate and illegitimate rulers:

"When Samuel told the Hebrews in his speeches: do you want to
know what the customs of tyrants are? It is to take your goods for their own pleasure, and take your women and children, abuse and enslave them" (Bodin, 1986, p.195,). A good prince, however, "takes account of the wishes of the people in the task that God entrusted to him" (Ibid. p.196, my translation).

Sarpi concludes in words echoed four hundred years later by Hedley Bull: The duties of the ruler consist of "vigorous defense of 'the life, honour, and property' of his subjects" (Quoted in Bouwsma, 1968, p.437).

The Realist theory of the State undoubtedly draws on the ideas of the social contract philosophers. Nonetheless, it is highly significant that only specific elements from the social contract tradition are discussed. In contrast to early Renaissance Humanists such as Marsiglio and Bartolous who in the context of the republican city-states developed a rudimentary theory of popular sovereignty (Skinner, 1978, p.65), International Relations scholar prefer the later 'mirror-for-princes' thinkers who have changed the priorities and "contended that the essential business of government consists of maintaining the people not so much in a state of liberty as in security and peace." (Ibid. p.123). At the same time the later thinkers peddled around the dangerous notion that "the qualities which deserve admiration in a prince may be different from those which deserve admiration in a private citizen" (Ibid. p.125).

But above all, it is significant that whereas the social contract theories presented an earlier catalogue of the attributes of the State which we find in modern Realism, generally speaking, these theories were not meant as information about the nature of the State, rather, they were prescriptive propositions concerning the responsibilities of rulers and ruled. They may be the ideological cloaks in a long and protracted struggle over the definition of the modern political formation, a struggle that can certainly be dated back to Renaissance humanism. But no one was foolish enough to believe that their societies were actually a social contract. Consequently, to present the social contract as a fair description of politics perverts the very essence of these theories -- which take for granted the division
between rulers and ruled. It was this component of the social contract which had to be brushed aside in order to fit into Realist schema.

1.1.4. The State as an organism

The second source of Realist thought, now emptied of the radical components of the social contract, consisted in the consolidation of the State into a monolithic whole and in investing its unity with its formal apparatus. This could be achieved only when the dichotomy between rulers and ruled as well as between individuals and their societies was scaled down. The first prerequisite was accomplished when the State was imbued with teleological properties. The second underwent a more tortuous journey. The principle by which the suppression of the cleavage between individuals and their societies could be postulated had been demonstrated already by Plato and Aristotle. The new version recalled their ideas. But it was left to the German conservatives, beginning with Kant, to forge an alternative interpretation of the role of the State which at once posed it in a positive light and at the same time attributed to it the quasi-ontological properties mentioned above.13

The German political philosophers, and particularly the nineteenth century Prussian thinkers, were faced with two related items. First, in contrast to the English and French who were already well on their way in confronting the theoretical problems posed by Bodin's doctrine of sovereignty, the German thinkers were still thinking of sovereignty in terms of the divine right of kings (Sabine & Shephard, 1928, p.xxiv). In the aftermath of the French Revolution they had to confront the emerging Rechtsstaat where anyone, including the king, was governed at least in theory by the law.

Second, before the revolution the conventional wisdom, not least nourished by the achievements of Prussia-Brandenburg, was that power derived of the ability to gather indifferent peasants, preferably from distant lands, detach them from civil life, train and drill and march them on to the battlefield (M.S. Anderson, 1988). Thus an authoritarian State seemed to be the best political arrangement. The French revolu-
tion, and in particular the astonishing success of the Napoleonic armies, changed all this because proved the depth of national feeling and exposed an unsuspected source of social power 'bottled' somehow in the 'spirit' of the people. The question was how to uncork it. Hegel provided the most coherent and comprehensive solution, although he was only following the precepts of the Romantic thinkers before him.

Hegel argued that there were points in history when States and societies coalesced and became similar to organic unities. In these unusual events individuals gain the utmost freedom and States achieve greatness.\textsuperscript{14} Hegel was particularly interested in these unique events and aimed to derive his whole philosophy of history on their basis. But this is beyond our interest here. The significant point is that for Hegel States and societies were \textit{potentially} united as one.\textsuperscript{15} It is important to understand this idea. It is usually thought that Hegel conceived of the State as an organic unity, and there are countless citations to corroborate this view. However, as he himself points out in a revealing statement:

"If we stop for a moment to consider the political implications -- that a state will be well constituted and internally powerful if the private interest of its citizens coincides with the general end of the state, so that the one can be satisfied and realised through the other .... But for the state to achieve this unity, numerous institutions must be set up and appropriate mechanisms invented, and the understanding must go through prolonged struggles before it discovers what is in fact appropriate .... the moment at which the state attains \textit{this unity marks the most flourishing period in its history, when its virtue, strength, and prosperity are at their height}" (1975, p.73, my emphasis).

Hegel not only elaborated a theory of the State, he also defined the 'problematic' of International Relations for nineteenth century Prussian thinkers. Rivalries, wars and competition among states were, according to him, one of the instruments by which States achieved their coveted unity. It was also one of the ways by which Reason asserted itself in historical conditions. Consequently, they were potentially positive events in world history.
Hegel himself, as already mentioned, was deeply influenced by the Romantic tradition. According to Aris,

"(t)he true propagator of the idea of the State as an organism was ... Friedrich Schleiermacher, whose thought expressed the fundamental change in the general attitude towards the State as well (p.291).... Schleiermacher, like all the Romantics, strongly denounced those thinkers who conceived of the State as an artifice or a makeshift to secure the greatest measure of happiness. In a typically Romantic way he viewed the State under the metaphor of a work of art. This led him to the conviction that individual and community are dependent on and mutually determined by one another. To give oneself to the community becomes the ethical duty and the individual feels that life in the community enhances his own strength. The State is not a creation of men, it is an organic part of the process of culture and presupposes a strong desire for unity among its members "(Aris, 1965, p.300).

Here, the connection between teleology and the will of the State becomes evident.

1.1.5. The State as a legal person

The Romantics, however, were isolated in the Prussian intellectual scene. They are important in as much as they constitute a vital link between the old social contract theories and the more influential Idealist and, in particular, the historical juridical schools which were closer to the conception of the State as a person. The Juristic school marked a new way of thinking about the problem of sovereignty. The starting point of earlier juridical schools of thought was an image of the State in term of power. Thus sovereignty was thought to reside in specific agencies of government. The juristic theoreticians denied this line of reasoning. They recognised that

"the powers exercised by governments vary from time and place, that the agencies in which government is organised are matters of historical circumstances and therefore from the point of view of logic largely accidental. .... The study of political organisations is therefore empirical through and through ... This empirical study, however, is controlled by the intellectual necessity of assuming the unity of the subject of the study. The state therefore must be conceived as a unity, this unity being, as Jellinek says 'a form of synthesis necessarily imposed upon us by our consciousness' it points toward a unity
behind the empirical agencies of government. This is the state itself, a collective person, to which alone ultimate authority belongs and whose being consists solely in the fact that it is the repository of political and legal authority" (Sabine & Shephard, 1928, p.xxxi).

As Labland concludes:

"From the conception of the state as a juristic person in the eye of public law, it follows that the possessor of the state's authority is the state itself" (quoted in Sabine and Shephard, Ibid., p.xxxii, my emphasis).

This is perhaps the first time when an abstract entity which is recognized as such is endowed nonetheless with concrete political will. The Juridical school therefore signals a fundamental shift in the theory of the State which led eventually to the modern Realist theory of International Relations. According to this school, it is the State -- not the people, the prince, or select institutions -- which is acting in the political sphere. Politics therefore does not involves humans struggling to achieve their interests, but States aiming at asserting their 'individuality'.

Let us pause for a moment and reflect upon this development. From purely juridical perspective the theory makes sense because the reception of the Roman law entailed an acceptance of the State as a legal person. However, the juridical historical theoreticians aimed to overcome the irritating situation whereby the sociological and juridical conceptions of the State vary. By a clever line of argumentation they strove to consolidate the State into a unified whole and invest this unity with the decision-makers. A relatively recent statement of this position was delivered by Hans Kelsen (1945).

The problem, says Kelsen, is that according to the traditional view

"The relation law and State is regarded as analogous to that law and the individual. Law -- although created by the State -- is assumed to regulate the behaviour of the State .... <the result is that> just as there is the juristic concept of person beside the biological-physical concept of man, a sociological concept of State is believed to exist beside its
juristic concept and even to be logically and historically prior to the latter" (p.182).

Like the historical jurists of the nineteenth century, Kelsen aims to demonstrate that underlying and in fact propping the sociological conception of the State, there is a unified conception. He defines the State as follows:

"a community created by a national legal order. The State as juristic person is a personification of this community or the national legal order constituting this community" (1945, p.182).

He claims, then, that the State is essentially a national legal order - or in short, the law. This view is quite similar to some sociological positions. For instance Gumplowitz defines the State as follows:

"The State is a social phenomenon consisting of social elements behaving according to social laws"

However, Gumplowitz goes on immediately to say

"<t>he first step is the subjection of one social group by another and the establishment of sovereignty; and the sovereign body is always the less numerous. But numerical inferiority is supplemented by mental superiority and greater military discipline " (1899, p.199).

Thus, in Gumplowitz work, the legal unity of the State is superimposed -- by force that is -- upon the plurality of society. The State is essentially a format of class-society.

Kelsen does not accept this. He therefore denies, to all intent and purposes, the plurality of society. Furthermore, he suggests that the decision-makers who act in the name of the State constitute the 'personification' of the legal community and, therefore, effectively as the State. Thus he is faced with a theoretical difficulty: if the State is an intangible 'legal person', where its powers come from? Translated into legal discourse, the problem takes on this dimension:
"If the State is the authority from which the legal order emanates, how can the State be subject to this order and, like the individual, receive obligations and rights therefore?" (Kelsen, 1945, p.197).

To solve this, Kelsen contrives a clever play on the two meanings associated with the term State. The socio-economic unit he labels the 'formal' State and the State apparatus is termed the 'material' State (ibid, p.194). In doing so, he creates an internal dualism which he seems to think solves the problem:

"law is created by the State only in so far as it is created by a State organ, and that means, as law is created according to law. The statement that law is created by the State means only that law regulates its own creation" (Ibid, p.198).

Once the problem appears to have been solved, Kelsen is able to demonstrate that the juristic conception of the State underlies all sociological theories because they take for granted the existence of some unity. But the logic is circular. In Kelsen's conception, the State is the legal order, and, therefore, whatever the State does is presumed to be legal. In other words, the 'fiction' of legality, which doubtless anyone who is acting in the name of the State will naturally uphold, is taken at face value and thus the unitary character of the State cannot be questioned. In the words of Schmidt:

"The state is nothing else than the legal order itself, which is conceived as a unity, to be sure....The state, meaning the legal order, is a system of ascriptions to a last point of ascription and to a last basic norm. The hierarchical order that is legally valid in the state rests on the premise that authorizations and competence emanate from the uniform central point to the lowest point...The basis for the validity of a norm can only be a norm; in juristic terms the state is therefore identical with its constitution, with the uniform basic norm. The catchword of this deduction is unity..." (1933, pp.18,19).

Kelsen therefore arrives at precisely the same complications which plagued the nineteenth century juristic school. Sabine and Shephard's conclusion therefore is an apt description of his position:
"In the end there is no solution except to permit the adjective to set up as a substantive on its own account. Sovereignty inheres only in the state, and the state is merely a personification of sovereignty. The personality of the state is exhausted in the attribute, since the state-person has no reality except as a juristic or political entity" (1928, p.xxxii).

1.1.6. The State as a person

The conception of the State, Rupert Emerson once remarked, "pass through three stages of fiction, hypothesis, and dogma" (1928, p.29). From the Juristic theory it was only a small step to the assertion that the State is a real person. Blutschili (1885), an influential thinker at the time but largely forgotten today, went in this direction. For him,

"<t>he State is in no way a lifeless instrument, a dead machine; it is a living and therefore organised being" (p.18).

If one ever wondered why precisely States in international politics seek power and prestige. Blutschili has a firm answer:

"To extend the reputation and the power of the State, to further its welfare and its happiness, has universally been regarded as one of the most honourable duties of gifted men" (p.22).

Nowhere among the German thinkers is the progression of this logic more evident than in Heinrich von Treitschke's *Politics* (1915). Treitschke's work provides a graphic illustration of the debt owed by Realism to the theory of the State as a person. Its exceptional coherence, furthermore clarifies some of the ambiguities of modern Realism.

Treitschke defines the State as follows:

"The State is the people, legally united as an independent entity (p.3)....<it is> broadly speaking, nothing but the necessary outward form which the inner life of a people bestows upon itself" (p.12).
He aims to distance himself from the social contract and in particular from the Manchester school of Political Economy which celebrates this revolting notion of individuals busy with their own little affairs:

"If we simply look upon the State as intended to secure life and property to the individual", he asks "how comes it that the individual will also sacrifice life and property to the State?" (p.14).

It is rather the other way around, the State has its own personality

"primarily in the juridical, and secondly in the politico—moral sense" (p.15).

Treitschke takes rather seriously the age-old organic metaphor:

"Treat the State as a person", he says, "and the necessary and rational multiplicity of States follows ... Just as in individual life the ego implies the existence of the non-ego, so it does in the State. The State is power, precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers. War and the administration of justice are the chief tasks of even the most barbaric States (p.19).

Thus, he concludes "The State is the public force for Offence and Defence. It is, above all, Power which makes its will to prevail....The nation is not entirely comprised in the State, but the State protects and embraces the people's life, regulating its external aspects on every side" (p.22).

These are the familiar themes of Realism in raw form. Meinecke21 reiterates the same ideas in somewhat more refined way:

"Raison d'état is the fundamental principle of national conduct, the State's first Law of Motion. It tells the statesman what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State. The State is an organic structure whose full power can only be maintained by allowing it in some way to continue growing; and raison d'état indicates both the path and the goal for such a growth" (Meinecke, 1962, p.1).

And again, "the well-being of the State and of its population is held to be the ultimate value and the goal; and power, maintenance of power, extension of power, is the indispensable means which must - without any qualification - be procured (Ibid, pp.2,3).... (thus) power belongs to the essence of the State; without it the State cannot carry out its task of upholding justice and protecting the community" (Ibid. p.13).
These words are echoed by another twentieth century 'Prussian' thinker:

"Protection of the nation against destruction from without and disruption from within is the over-riding concern of all citizens. Likewise, loyalty to the nation is a paramount commitment of all citizens .... nothing can be tolerated that might threaten the coherence of the nation. Interests, ideas, and loyalties which might not be compatible with the concern for the unity of the nation must yield to that concern .... This concern imposes an ever present limitation upon the kind of issues which will be allowed to separate A and B .... All conflicts within a nation are thus limited as to objectives pursued and means employed" (Morgenthau, 1967, p.486).

We arrive then at a theory of the State which is wholly commensurable with the theory of international politics. The true origins of the Realist theory of the State is precisely this German Idealist's synthesis of spirit and power. The domestic political process is denied because the Prussian thinkers did not acknowledge, nor did they wish to recognize, the political process which they associated with the rule of the multitude and factionalism. They preferred rather to think of politics as the manifestation of immutable laws of motion -- a reactionary world of political thought finally shattered with the demise of Nazism as both the careers of Meinecke and Schmitt have demonstrated.

The ultimate organic metaphor, however, is to be found in the work of Hedley Bull. For him, not only are States persons, but international politics is principally about the survival of the species. What are the goals of the system of States he asks?

"First, there is the goal of preservation of the system and society of States itself ... The society of States has sought to ensure that it will remain the prevailing form of universal political organisation, in fact and in right" (Bull, 1977, p.16 emphasis mine).

In Bull's work, not only socio-economic units are endowed with organic attributes, but their system also is an organic system.

Kenneth Dyson (1980) presents three traditions of theories of the State which he calls might, law and legitimacy. The Realist theory of the State is an assemblage of select elements from the three traditions:
Might -- The state is a 'person'
Law -- The State is a legal person
Legitimacy -- The legal person is the unifying organ of society, the 'state' is the 'people' and the people are the state. The State therefore is an organic entity.

Once the State is seen as an organic unity. The logic unfolds in the opposite direction:

Legitimacy -- an organism's basic intuition is the survival instinct and more generally its overall welfare. The State functions accordingly
Law -- The state does so by upholding the law
Might -- The state does so by defending the territory.

1.2. The Road to Neo-Realism

Machtstaate theories may be correct or incorrect, but their portrait of international relationships is wholly compatible with their conception of State and politics. Modern thinkers, on the other hand, have sought to maintain the theory of International Relations but to replace the theory of the State which underpins it. Many reasons may be cited for this, not least among them was the defeat of Germany in the two World Wars. There are other reasons which, indeed, may account for the differences the so-called English school of International Relations (Manning, White, Bull, Northedge) and the (dominant) American version. The English school draws heavily upon the Neo-Hegelians (T.H.Green, Bousanquet, Figgis), and carries a peculiar 'idealist' tinge to its 'realism'. The Americans, on the other hand, partly due to the federal structure of the American State and partly to their more pragmatic, less speculative attitude are inclined to regard the 'international system' with less respect.

The process of concealment of the origins of the present Realist theory of international politics can be traced back to the work of Max Weber. A firm Realist in his international outlook, Weber was convinced that
the State was not an organic entity but an 'artificial' construction.\textsuperscript{22} He retained therefore the international component of Realist theory but replaced the theory of the State which underpins it. Unfortunately, in his own work there are only cursory remarks concerning international politics and consequently the viability and coherence of such a view is not discussed.\textsuperscript{23}

Action sociology dominates modern International Relations literature first and foremost because it commands the American intellectual scene. It offers, nevertheless, two great advantages. Weber rejected metaphysical theories of the State because he rejected metaphysics in general. Thus, instead of speculating about the role and functions of the State he prefers to follow natural scientists and deal only with what we definitely know about them, namely, that they are organisations executing certain social functions and operating in a prescribed manner. In his own words,

"the primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: it possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis" (1978, p.56).

These known characteristics of the modern State may not exhaust our knowledge of it — Weber never denied, for instance, Marx's claims, but they are, according to Weber, the only truly scientific tools of analysis. It so happens that this definition of the State also ascribes certain 'international' functions to it and as a result sets Realist logic rolling again. Modern Realism, therefore, can deny its affiliation with metaphysical theories of the State and maintain that, on the contrary, a realistic theory of the State is at the root of the realist theory of International Relations.

The predilection towards dry empiricism instead of speculative philosophy enhanced a more pragmatic attitude to the study of international politics. It was George Schwarzenberger of all people who
provided the basic formula:

"In order to include in the term international affairs all matters which are relevant for the purposes of international studies, a simple test has to be applied. We have to ask ourselves whether, and to what extent, these matters are relevant from the point of view of international society as a whole" (Schwarzenberger, 1951, p.4).

In this self-congratulatory empiricist formula (Ibid, p.5), it is the 'international society'—whatever that expression might mean—that determines the 'units' that are significant to international politics. What is the basis for such determination? It is up to the individual to decide; some happen to think that States are by far the most important 'social actors' and grant only cursory treatment to other 'units'; others may wish to include transnational corporations and international organisations (Keohane and Nye, 1977); others again (Burton, 1965) refuse to make any such value judgement and include under the rubric of 'international society' all possible social actors.

Leaving aside the epistemological difficulties associated with action methodology, its significance (at least in the manner by which it was incorporated into the study of International Relations) lies in the denial of the uniqueness of States as a social actor. Thus States are regarded as if they were commensurable with say, multinational corporations, transnational organisations or even to the 'market' (Strange, 1988). It is curious that both Idealist and hyper-real conceptions of the State arrive at precisely the same conclusions concerning their activities in the international scene. However, as I will presently argue, it is not totally surprising, for both theories share one thing in common, and this is the denial of internal politics.

The theory that the State is just another type of social actor is, of course, a theory of the State, a theory in which 'the State' is an identifiable social group. It implies, therefore, the rejection of all other theories of the State discussed in the previous section and a fresh assemblage from the three traditions of theories of the State. Theda Skocpol (1979), among others (Austen & Silver, 1979; Block, 1977;
Halliday, 1987; Krasner, 1978; Mann, 1984) advocates this. She claims that:

i. "The state properly conceived is no mere arena in which socioecon- 
omic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, a set of administrative, 
policing, and military organisations headed, and more or less well 
coordinated by, an executive authority" (1979, p.29).

ii. States derive their autonomy because they "stand at the intersec­ 
tions domestic sociopolitical orders and transnational relations within 
which they must manoeuvre for survival and advantage in relation to 
other states" (1985, p.8).

The 'autonomy of the State' school therefore appropriates from each 
tradition the following characteristics:

Might -- The domination of a large group by a small one.

Law -- The State is "a compulsory political organisation ... 
whose ... administration successfully upholds the 
claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force in the enforcement of its order" 

Legitimacy -- an act of trickery or 'false consciousness'.

Let us examine these contentions one by one. My aim is to demonstrate 
that this theory cannot account for domestic political process and to 
ask why that is. Michael Mann (1984) discussed the theory in some 
detail and it is best to turn to his work. The autonomy of the State 
must stand in relation to something or someone. Accordingly, Mann poses 
it in relation to 'civil society'. Unfortunately, the concept of civil 
society is ambivalent, to say the least. For one, it is bound up with 
the notion of an 'original contract' and 'state of nature' (Hume;1947; 
Poulantzas, 1973). Secondly, the modern notion of 'society' is 
tailored, historically as well as analytically, to the matrices of the 
nation-state (Hall, 1985, p.29). Indeed, Mann himself rejects "a simple 
antithesis, common to ideologies of our own time, the state and civil
society, public and private property." On the contrary, he sees "the two as continuously, temporarily entwined" (1984, p.130).

In other words, identification of the State as a separate group cannot be sanctioned on an empirical basis, it is rather, a theoretical device. Who then is 'the State'? The question does not make sense because the State is not really an identifiable social group. We should therefore expect a theory to explain precisely why we should regard the State as a separate social group. Here we are presented with an ambiguity, for at one and the same time the State is identified with a 'real' social group, the 'states elites', on the other hand, the group 'emerges' and constitutes itself not by real power struggle but through analytical reconstruction. According to Mann, the State (and presumably the State's elite) gains power by performing some useful tasks:

"The four most persistent types of state activities are:
1. The maintenance of internal order....
2. Military defence/aggression, directed against foreign foes....
3. The maintenance of communications infrastructures....
4. Economic redistribution: the authoritative distribution of scarce material resources different ecological niches, age-groups, sexes, regions, classes etc." (pp.120,121).

In other words, the State is a separate social entity because of its social functions. This theory may be disputed on two points. First what about States that do not perform these tasks? African States have been carefully examined in the context of the theory by Jackson and Rosberg (1987a;1987b) and their conclusion was that according to the Weberian theory African states are not real states. Secondly, while many modern States certainly perform the tasks listed by Mann, they also perform other tasks, perhaps even more persistently. According to Braudel,

"<t>he state was there to preserve inequality, the cornerstone of the social order. Culture and its spokesmen were generally on hand to preach resignation to one’s lot...the desirable solution was for the 'organic' mass of society to evolve peacefully" (1979, II, p. 515).

And Poulantzas adds "<the> global role of the state is a political role. The state relates to a 'society divided into classes' and to political class domination, precisely in so far as it maintains, in the ensemble of structures, that place and role
which have the effect (in their unity) of dividing a formation into classes and producing political class domination" (1973, p.51).

We are presented with conflicting theories. They both, however, provide a fair representation of some aspects of the State. The crux of the matter, nonetheless, is that to all intents and purposes, the Skocpol-Mann argument expel what was perhaps Marx's greatest achievement: the location of relations of exploitation at the centre of the social vortex (Casanova, 1978). To Marxists, and indeed to all of the theories surveyed so far, the state (or the political system) plays a pivotal role in a class-divided society because it is not distinct from it; for the theories of the autonomy of the State, the State is external to the play of forces in 'civil society'. The latter invent, or rather recalls, if implicitly, The Hegelian sense of two separate analytical 'spaces': the space of civil-society where class struggle (and other struggles) is conducted; and the 'proper' space of the state (Willke, 1986).

There is, of course, nothing new about this separation. Indeed, it is as old as liberal thought itself, which always opted to regard the development of the State as the development of an 'idea'. Correspondingly, in one form or another, it always entrusted the 'cultural system' (Parsons, 1961; Sorokin, 1941b) with the task of maintaining the homeostatic aspects of society. However, the 'autonomy of the State' school is unique in that it consciously aims to permeate Marxist concepts with liberal thought (and vice versa). The mixture turns to 'pharmakon' when the relations social classes and the States are discussed. Because Skocpol and Mann are forced to reduce the play of force to an opportunistic coming together of social groups in tentative alliances. Thus Skocpol agrees that "states usually do function to preserve existing economic and class structures". However, unlike the primary functions of the State, the reasons are that it is

"normally the smoothest way to enforce order. Nevertheless, the state has its own distinct interests vis-a-vis subordinate classes. Although both the state and the dominant class(es) share a broad interest in keeping subordinate classes in place in society and at work in the existing economy" (Skocpol,
In contrast to that Once the historical scope is widened we can see that:

a. The State was always associated with stratification. There is a debate among political anthropologists as to whether pristine states developed as class states or whether stratification occurred later. They all agree, however, that once this format appeared it always remained, as Braudel puts it, on the side of 'order'.

b. The State was invariably associated with a class rule. In Marxist writings it is customary to differentiate between Instrumentalists (Miliband), and Structuralists (Poulantzas). The Instrumentalists demonstrate the close connection between ruling classes and political power. Structuralists argue that society is structured so it facilitates hierarchical ordering and exploitation.

What does the association of the ruling classes with the State mean in practical terms? The association of the State with the ruling classes means, according to Poulantzas, that the State is structurally determined to operate for the benefit of the 'strategic interests' of these classes (Poulantzas, 1973, pp.229-254). Indeed, he argues, the State (i.e. the state apparatus) is 'relatively autonomous' so that it can articulate the strategic interests of the ruling classes even if it has to do so sometimes against their own immediate interests or apparent interests (Ibid., pp. 255-324).

What are the strategic interests of a class? That depends, of course, on which class we have in mind. In Absolutist Europe, to take one example, the ruling classes consisted of the landed warrior class. They were supplemented, abetted or resisted by the courtiers, the low nobility, the various noblesse de robe, hidalgos, the emerging middle classes: financiers, lawyers, long-distance traders, etc. And this whole edifice of the 'supporting classes' (Ibid, pp.240-5) exploited the working classes: peasants, free-holders, journeymen, small-time merchants, proletariat, etc. One thing was agreed by all, these multitude had to be kept in their place. The working classes therefore, constituted the 'background' of the political process, but a very
active and menacing background, without which nothing in the foreground could be understood. The working classes were rarely part of the 'political scene', but they were not absent from the picture.

Now, the high nobility, a remnant of the middle ages, were nobility because they fought, and they were hankering for a fight (Anderson, 1974). But due to changing circumstances: improvement in techniques of firearms, organisation and defense coupled with qualitative increase in trade, the stakes were constantly spiralling upwards. The nobility, in order to assume their traditional role, had to be associated with larger and larger political frameworks (Elias, 1939), i.e. there were fewer kings, princes, dukes and military orders to chose from. Each of these framework was headed by a family. These families became stronger not because they simply wanted to (though they certainly did), but because with the escalation of costs, they needed to stabilise their financial resources (in this they were abetted by the estates. Much is made of the haggling process and the general hostility between estates and kings (Hintze, 1975), shadowing the fact that the estates were on the whole supportive of the enterprises). Gradually, as will be demonstrated in the ninth chapter, the logic of a competitive system asserted itself: The 'States' which catered to the original aims of their ruling classes, namely fighting wars of conquests and loot, were transformed, precisely in order to fight their wars into organisations that could subdue their very own 'ruling classes'. They did so first because they had now the means to do so. They acquired the finances to support a standing army and a bureaucracy that replaced, or attempted to replace, the traditional role of the nobility. Secondly, since the constant need for more money, meant sooner or later that the State would have to 'tap' the nobility's finances, either directly in the form of a tax or indirectly by expropriation. Thirdly, by co-opting these classes into the State through the massive sale of offices.

In all these instances, the exquisite 'war machines' were transforming themselves, unwittingly, unconsciously, and apparently against the wishes of those who mattered, into something akin to economic corporations. Does it mean that the State has intrinsic interests? I do not think so. It is precisely the outcome of society-based organisations
competing with one another, which permits, and indeed forced these states to take initiatives beyond the narrow pressures from inside. Since competition is fuelled by—and must ultimately rely on—a sound economic foundation, it assures that the organisations that have managed to operate for the long term interests of their ruling classes will be the ones which generally come out on top. At the same time the competition assures that the others will have sooner or later imitate the successful ones. Thus ultimately these developments can be explained only within the framework of a society-oriented research, if modified by the theory of informal interactions.

Turning to the study of international relations, if states are regarded as identifiable social groups, then they form a relatively small part of the overall international milieu. By the same token, relations between states constitute a limited chunk of International Relations. The international context is an agglomeration of inter-state and transnational relations, wherein transnational interactions are the significant factor. It appears therefore that, paradoxically, Skocpol's version of the 'Realist' theory of the State hinges upon the viability of a theory of 'transnational relations', a fit which other realists are eager to denounce as futile (Waltz, 1979, p.95).

The State-centric approach then, is able to deal only with a select number of phenomena. It is important, nonetheless, to examine Skocpol's reasons for rejecting society-oriented theories. The contention is that "when pluralists focused on the determinants of particular public policy decisions, they often found that governmental leaders took initiatives well beyond the demands of social groups or electorates" (Skocpol, 1985, p.4). Krasner makes a similar point.

"A statist paradigm views the state as an autonomous actor. The objective sought by the state cannot be reduced to some summation of private desires. These objectives can be called appropriately the national interest. For a statist approach explanation and description involve (a) demonstrating empirically that American central decision-makers have sought a consistent set of goals— for this study, in the area of foreign raw materials investments" (1978, p.5).
It is still to be demonstrated that such initiatives are taken well beyond the demands of at least some social groups, however, it is true that many important decisions are made by policy-makers against the wishes of at least some important segments in society. But is this a proof of the failing of society-oriented theories? Practically all modern society-centred theories from elitist to pluralist to modern Marxist accept and indeed, argue, that the State apparatus must maintain a certain distance, or a 'relative autonomy' from any one single class. Furthermore, they all take it for granted that in normal cases, policies whether internal or external, exhibit a certain continuity.11

Sociological theories nevertheless fail to deal with the international links. At this point it is possible to demonstrate only the principle that lies behind an alternative to Skocpol's. I shall return back to this subject in chapter ten. The work of Nicos Poulantzas (1973) is a good starting point. Poulantzas, who was trained as a lawyer and not as a sociologist (Jessop, 1985, chpt.1), was well aware of the legal theories of the State. But in contrast to their excessive formalism, he strove to distinguish the ability to act autonomously and the condition of being autonomous. He opines that the capitalist state can successfully perform its task as a class state precisely by maintaining a certain autonomy (Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 125-141). But this relative autonomy is no mere appearance, the autonomy of the State apparatus is inscribed in its institutional framework. It is consequent upon the separation of politics from economics, which in itself resulted from the separation of the workers from the means of production. This autonomy, according to Poulantzas, permits the State to unite otherwise pugnacious and quarrelsome ruling classes and at the same time divide the working classes. In other words, it is precisely this apparent autonomy of the state apparatus which belies the class nature of the State.

Thus, Poulantzas is able to demonstrate that the class nature of modern States takes on the appearance of impartiality which is then thought of by the theoreticians of the autonomy of the State as a true nature of the State. In other words he demonstrates that the supposed impar-
tiality and functionality of the State serves the purpose of class rule."

To sum up, under close examination the theory of the 'autonomy of the State' creates more theoretical difficulties than it actually solves. Indeed, both versions of the primacy of the State fail to come up with decisive arguments for

i. the primacy of the State, and

ii. the separation of domestic from international politics.
NOTES

1. It is useful to distinguish in theoretical research between hypotheses which require empirical corroborations and schemes which are merely conceptual tools. In this chapter I ask whether any of the frameworks, the or schemes, which take the concept of State as their unit of analysis are useful to the study of International Relations.

2. The equation of statesmen or decision-makers with the States is common. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin argue that "<t>o rid ourselves of the troublesome abstraction "state". It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official Decision makers. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state" (Snyder,Bruck & Sapin, 1962 p. 65). For Gilpin "the state is 'an organisation that provides protection and (welfare)...in return for revenue" (1981, p.15). However, soon enough we hear that the State is really those in authority: "The state i.e. those particular individuals who hold authority" (ibid. p.16).

Holsti aims to transcend this schematisation by presenting three levels of analysis, in the third he maintains "we may study international politics and foreign policy by concentrating on the actions and behaviour of individual statesmen. This is the usual approach of diplomatic historians, based on the sound point that when we say that 'states' behave, we really mean that policy makers are defining purposes, choosing among courses of action, and utilising national capabilities to achieve objectives in the name of the State" (1977, p.18). Nonetheless, the relations between these levels is never explained and the State therefore is treated for all intent and purpose as the decision-makers.

Keohane and Nye argue that "traditionally the state regarded as an actor with purpose and power, the basic unit of action; its main agents are the diplomat and soldiers. Yet... a good deal of intersocietal intercourse, with significant political importance, takes place without government control" (1972, p.X). In other words, the State is still equated with its decision-makers.

One of the best exposition of the 'decision-makers' approach is outlined by D.C. Watt: "Historically speaking, the study of international history originated in the study of the relations between states; in particular, of the relations between the major European states in the nineteenth century and of the culmination of these relations in the First World War...Their preoccupation with the concept of the nation state, however, proved inadequate in itself to sustain the wight they wished to put upon it. Their successors, particularly since the Second World War, have come to look behind these formal constitution- al-legal structures to the realities which underlay them, the sociopolitical groups which exercise power within individual states and maintain linkages with each other and with their supposed political rivals, both within their boundaries and across them. Once historians began to concentrate on the so-called decision-makers and their political alternatives, their attention was increasingly drawn to the exploration not only of what divided them from their presumed opponents but of what they
shared in common.... The distinguishing mark of the international historian, however,.... has been a bias towards the study of international crises, and towards the role and responsibility of individual decision-makers in those crises.... The international historian today is concerned to understand why, at given moments in time, identifiable individuals in positions of power, authority or influence chose, recommended or advocated one course of action rather than another" (Watt, 1984, pp.2,3).

Watt explains very well the merit of such approach for historical investigations. Indeed, his description may also clarify why it is not a particularly useful as a theoretical framework. The international historian has a bias, he says, towards crises and the role and responsibility of individual decision-makers. When enough of these investigations are compared, it might be possible -- if that is of any interest -- to come up with more general statements about the sort of responses one may expect decision-makers to make in particular situations. However, these tendencies are only statistical, that is, they can only tell us that in a large proportion of cases up to now, such and such was done. Such an investigation can never link these crises, as well as the actions of decision-makers, to an overall dynamism of international relationships.

3. Traditional Realism holds to the view of the ontological unity of the State. Modern Neo-Realism, on the contrary, maintains the ontological separation of State from society. However, both view the State essentially as an actor endowed with intrinsic will and goals and arrive ultimately to the same conclusions in respects to State's activities in International Relations.

4. In a recent book Hall and Ikenberry (1989) have outlined their version of the Realist theory of the State. Unfortunately, their realist state is nothing but an eclectic aggregation from a variety of sources of all those ideas about the State which do not conform with their notions of the liberal and Marxist traditions. This is not sufficient as a theory of the State.

5. It is impossible to present here the full richness of this tradition as it spans from Rousseau to the Nineteenth century, On Hegel see Charles Taylor, 1979. See also Aris, 1965; Droz, 1963; Schmitt, 1986. On some of the conceptions of the State as a person in International Relations see Waltz, 1953.

6. "There is one prejudice which must be put aside in setting out this history (The French Revolution in European politics) It is the representation of Europe under the ancien régime as a regularly constituted community of States, in which each directed its conduct by principles recognised by all, where respect for established law government International Relations and treaties, and good faith marked their implementation" (1969, p.35). See Wight, 1977, for contrasting view.

7. "Conquest, the starting-point and the goal of these enterprises, is limited only by the conditions necessary for success. The abuse of force frustrates its purpose. To conquer requires strength; to keep what is conquered requires justice and wisdom"
(Sorel, 1969, p.57). Thus, power-politics maybe the starting point, but it requires concomitant 'virtue' on the part of those in authority. On 'virtue' in Renaissance political thought see Meinecke, 1962 and Skinner, 1978, chpt.5.

8. In the definition, the international political system is supposedly an 'abstraction' (Ibid, p.18) of governments dealings in International Relations. However, only foreign policies of specific types, those allegedly concerned with the general welfare of peoples are considered by Northedge to be part of what he calls international politics. He presents therefore implicitly a sequential picture whereby International Politics is a procession of States entering when they wish to further "the general welfare of peoples" and presumably exiting when they have concluded their business.

But why should we define International Politics on such narrow grounds? What about, for instance, all those foreign policies which do not fit into this narrow definition? Harold Laski, by no means a radical, for instance maintains that: "There has been no State in history in which the consistent effort has been towards the unique realisation of the common good" (Laski, 1968, p.41). If Laski is correct, than Northedge has virtually depleted International Politics of its content and discusses some imaginary or ideological realm.

9. "Que Samuel dis au peuple en sa harangue: Voulez vous s'avoir, dit-il, la coutume des tyrans? c'est de prendre les biens des sujets pour disposer leur plaisir, prendre leurs femmes et leurs enfants pour en abuser, et en faire leurs esclaves... Autrement ce bon Prince Samuel se fust dementi soymesme: car il rendit compte au peuple de la charge que Dieu avoit donnee" (Bodin, 1986, pp.295,6).

10. "Machieavelli ... repeatedly asserts that the chief duty of a ruler must be to attend to his own 'security and strength', while ensuring at the same time that his subjects are 'stabilised and made secure'" (Skinner, 1978, p.123).

11. It must be understood that I am simplifying and schematising considerably a rich tradition. Humanism has to be seen in the context of the crisis of feudalism and the emerging new mode of production. For their part, Renaissance thinkers were defining, perhaps for the first time in human history, a positivist cosmology which contrasted with the medieval (and other pre-capitalist cosmologies) hierarchical and all-embracing cosmologies (Balandier, 1988; Mumford, 1964).

The historical significance of Renaissance humanism, says Bouswma "lies in the fact that it reflected this set of essentially sceptical attitudes ... it rejected the possibility of systematic knowledge in favour of a kind of intellectual pluralism" (1968, p.9). He adds "Renaissance humanism adapted this vision of man to politics; it tried to solve the problem of adjustment to a reality that was.... beyond human grasp.... It saw no absolute structure in the nature of things, no clear gradations of ultimate value, thus, the belief emerged that the republic, that is self-rule, was the most appropriate form of


13. "It became obvious very soon that this negative attitude towards the State was untenable since it was in contrast to the economic and social development. The French revolution and its heir Napoleon taught the nations that the State which abolished the last remnants of feudalism and relied on its national forces developed a particular strength which the states, which still retained the ancien regime, could not withstand. The revolutionary onslaught on Germany brought home to the people the fact that they were inextricably bound up with the fate of the State" (Aris, 1965, pp.291,2). On the subject see Willke, 1986.

14. "A nation consists on the one hand of distinct moments which combine to give it its general character; on the other, it also embodies the opposite principle of individuality, and these two principles together constitute the reality of the Idea. In a nation or state, everything depends on the nature of these two elements" (Hegel, 1975, p.76).

15. On similar Rousseau's rather similar position, see in Waltz, 1954.

16. Schelling was the first thinker to present the State as an organic being: "By viewing life as a work of art in which divine reason revealed itself, Schelling came to consider the State as an organisation in which each member was just as indispensable a part of the whole as any part in a work of art. .... <he> began by describing the State as a mechanism and as a mere means to an end, but soon proceeded to a mystical concept according to which 'the constitution of the State was the image of the constitution of the realm of ideas' ... The State is according to this view not a means to the realisation of an end but an end in itself" (Aris, 1965, 289).

17. On the Romantic tradition. See Aris, op. cit; Droz, op. cit; Emerson, 1928; Schmitt, 1986.

18. Unfortunately much of the discussion is in German and I was able to use only secondary sources and translations. Among the juridical school included are Savigny, von Gerber, Labland, Rosin, Preuss and Jellinek. For brief discussion See: Sabine and Shepherds (1922). On the work of Savigny see Klenner, 1989, Toews, 1989.

19. Sabine and Shepherds (1922) provide an admirable exposition of what was really at stake in the debate between those who favoured the metaphor of the person (Treitschke, 1916) over the organic metaphor. See also Spencer, 'The Social Organism' in Spencer (1981) and Strasser & Randall (1981).
20. But make no mistake, "In calling the State an organism .... We are thinking rather of the following characteristic of natural organisms:
(a) Every organism is a union of soul and body, i.e. of material elements and vital forces.
(b) Although an organism is and remains a whole, yet in its parts it has members, which are animated by special motives and capacities, in order to satisfy the various ways the varying needs of the whole itself.
(c) the organism develops itself outwards from within, and has an external growth. (p.19) ...The constitution is likewise the articulation of the body politic. Every office and every political assembly is a particular member with its own proper functions..... Its functions have a spiritual character .... they serve life, and are themselves living" (Blutschili, 1885,p.20).


22. "Whether or not an organisation exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person of authority, with or without an administrative staff. More precisely, it exists so far as there is a probability that certain persons will act in such a way as to carry out the order governing the organisation" (Weber, 1978, p.49).


24. The presentation of the issue as if it was between the State as an actor and the State as an arena is highly misleading but typical of Skocpol's approach. these two versions belong to an empiricist tradition that not all follow. Thus, she poses Marxists like Poulantzas on a manufactured empiricist plane as if he is moving towards a conception of the State as an autonomous actor (Skocpol, 1979). Furthermore, the only political theorists who conceive of the political process as an arena are the structural fundtionalists, but they have specifically rejected the concept of State (see Easton, 1953 and 1981).


26. "The basic functions of the 'state' are: the enactment of law (legislative function); the protection of personal safety and public order (police); the protection of vested rights (administration and justice); the cultivation of hygienic, educational, social-welfare, and other cultural interests (of various branches of administration); and, last but not least, the organised armed protection against outside attack (military administration)" (Weber, 1978, p.905).

27. Other advocates of the theory have encountered the same difficulties and come up with the same answers. According to Strange, "<t>he protectors -- those who provide the security -- acquire a
certain kind of power which lets them determine, and perhaps limit, the range of choices, or options available to others. By exercising this power, the providers of security may *incidentally* acquire for themselves special advantages in the production, or consumption of wealth and special rights or privileges in social relations" (Strange, 1988, p.45 emphasis mine).

There is no need to demonstrate here that the so-called 'protectors' from the old European aristocracy, to the Hausa in the Hausa-Falani co-federations, to the security forces of Ceaucescu, are *political* as much as they are *economic* ruling classes.


29. "When we talk of established order, this means the state, the foundation of society, cultural reflexes and economic structure, plus the cumulative weight of the multiform development of the whole" (Braudel, 1979, II, p.503).

30. That is precisely the term she uses to describe her theory (1979, p.31).

31. See Dunleavy and O'Leary op. cit on the subject. Also Bottomore, 1964; Nisbeth, 1974.

32. The notion of relative autonomy of the State makes no sense, because in Poulantzas view the State is not an actor. It should be read therefore the relative autonomy of the state apparatus. For a historical research on the subject see, Friedmann, 1984.

33. In any case, it was always agreed, at least with Mann's, that the autonomy of the state is qualified: "The organisational autonomy of the state is only partial; indeed in many particular cases it may be rather small. General Motors and the capitalist class in general, or the Catholic Church, or the feudal lords and knights, or the US military, are or were quite capable of keeping watch on states they have propped up (Mann, 1984, p.125).
CHAPTER TWO — CLASS-BASED SCHEMES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

It is generally agreed that no distinct Marxist theory of International Relations exists (Berki, 1971). By default, the various fragments of Marxists thought which touch upon issues of international relationships (or appear to touch upon issues of international relationships), such as imperialism, super-imperialism, uneven development, unequal exchange, under-consumption, international division of labour, subsumption theories, etc., have come to be thought of as the Marxist theory of International Relations. However, lacking a distinct international perspective, when added up they naturally emphasise the traditional preoccupation with social classed and therefore create the impression that the Marxist theory of International Relations is nothing but an extension into the International sphere of the theory of the class struggle.

We may divide the various class-based theories of International Relations into two groups. Among traditional Marxists, international politics is understood to be essentially a contest between ruling-classes. Thus according to Therborn "foreign policy may be defined as the external pursuit of the policies of a given class" (1980, p.97), a claim which he then qualifies by saying that "capitalist foreign policy is not only modelled on the internal relations of the bourgeoisie ... the capitalist state is a representative of the national public, and strictly nationalist factors play a role in the formation of foreign policy alongside the dominant contradiction between different national capitals" (Ibid. p.98). This view is echoed by Mary Kaldor who writes: "Political conflict, that is to say conflict between nation states, arise out of economic and social conflict.... Political conflict, therefore, in so far as it occurs, must be treated as the externalisation of domestic conflict" (Kaldor, 1981,p.10).1

One group of Marxist thinkers, then, accepts the division of the world into nation-states, but presents a rather simple picture in which class struggle is encamped, so to speak, within the geographical area of the social formations and overflows national boundaries in the form of
political struggle. This view as it stands offends two precepts of modern Marxist thought. To begin with, modern Marxist theories of the State do no longer accept such theories of the State. Secondly, modern capitalism is as transnational as it is national and therefore does not conform to any simple dichotomy between domestic politics and international relations.

Neo-marxists, in contrast, commence from the opposite direction. They follow Marx's lead and assign a central place in the evolution of capitalism to the world-market (Frank, 1967, 1978; Harris, 1983; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980). However, an equally important component of Marx's thought, namely, the function of political superstructure and 'civil society' dissolves in the process. With the result that the State is regarded in purely economic and deterministic terms.

Without devoting too much time to the details of their suggestions, it is interesting to note that both groups find themselves holding views far more radical than they bargained for. Thus sophisticated thinkers such as Therborn, Kaldor and Mandel are forced to present a rudimentary image of International Relations, knowing very well that the State is not merely the 'executive committee of the bourgeoisie'. Neo-marxists are compelled by the logic of their own theoretical framework to present a uni-dimensional world economy and yet discuss it along the lines of central and peripheral States, i.e., on the basis of the division into political unities. While it is not easy to understand why this occurs, it is quite clear that the relation between the concepts of social classes and political structures are at the root of the problem.

The issue we are faced with is how to incorporate Marxist perspicacity into the study of international relationships. I shall contend in this chapter that the theory of class struggle is essentially, but not exclusively, society-based. Consequently, it is important to retain a society-centred research. Such a framework, however, should not prejudge in any way (a) the insights of Neo-Marxism, and (b) the fact that class alliances and class relationships extend far beyond national borders. The second point will be discussed in the latter half of
the dissertation. This chapter is intended to demonstrate that exclusively class-based theories of International Relations are incoherent in principle. In demonstrating this I will be drawing heavily on Mark's own work. Although Marx never articulated a theory of International Relations, his philosophy and methodology contain ideas which, in my view, warrant a rejection of simple class-based schemes for the discipline. Nonetheless, a full-scale discussion is totally out of the question here, and it is therefore possible to present only negative conclusions: that social classes and societal unities are inseparable in Marx's thought and therefore cannot be posed as alternative 'units of analysis' for the study of International Relations.

2.1. Marx latent theory of International Relations

It is not immediately evident quite what is wrong with the view that relations between States represent no more than the outward manifestation of ruling-classes competition. Admittedly, there is nothing distinctively Marxist about it: the economic causes of wars were already proposed by anthropologists of whom Marx, and especially Engels, were so fond at the end of their lives (Bloch, 1983); Mao's theory of the laws of war (Mao, 1975) is nothing but Clausewitz's ideas wrapped in class struggle garb; And while no one ever accused Mr. Ludwig Gumplowicz of espousing Marxism, he is by far the most forceful exponent of the 'Marxist' theory of foreign policy. In his view,

"the activities of the state as a whole originate in the sovereign class which acts with the assistance or with the compulsory acquiescence of the subject class. The movement is from within out; it is directed against other states and social groups. Its object is always defence against attacks, increase of power and territory, that is, conquest in one form or another" (Gumplowicz, 1899, p,117).

As Gumplowicz happened to be an important Realist thinker, it is no wonder that this allegedly Marxist theory of International Relations resembles the Realist theory.

The origins of this simplistic Marxist approach, it must be admitted, may easily be traced back to the work of Karl Marx himself. It does not
appear in any full-fledged discussion, but can be discerned in his general attitude towards the topic (which, incidentally, was often left to the 'expertise' of Engels). Marx's many scattered remarks on international relationships seem to fall into four categories:

i. To begin with, much of his thought on the subject developed as reaction to specific events. He was prompted by his fellow Marxists to formulate responses to contemporary issues of war, foreign policy and colonialism. In this, his position was that of an interested observer: wars are evil and more often than not the affairs of the bourgeoisie.

The working classes, however, are caught in the cross fire and need to give their support to one of two unpalatable alternatives. Thus, when Napoleon III's troops attacked Prussia, he supported Liebknecht's absenteeism. (Letter Engels to Marx in Ramsgate, August 15, 1870; Marx to Engels in Manchester, August 17, 1870, in Marx & Engels, (1975)).

ii. Whenever Marx formulated general statements concerning international affairs, more often than not he compared them to domestic affairs. In so doing he facilitated a candid treatment of International Relations in Marxist circles. Accordingly, in the Communist Manifesto he says that

"In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end" (1973b, p.85).

And again, in one of his India articles: correspondingly

"Here have been in Asia, generally, from immemorial times, but three departments of Government: that of Finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of War, or the plunder of the exterior; and finally, the department of Public Works" (1968, p.37).

iii. Nevertheless, he often emphasised that any serious study of Capitalism requires an understanding of the dynamics of the world market. In his words, the
"...three cardinal facts of capitalist production: 1) Concentration of means of production in few hands 2) Organisation of labour itself into social labour 3) Creation of the world market" (Capital, III, 1971, p.266).

Indeed, the world market was the subject to be of the sixth and final volume of Capital (Mandel,1970, p.28). The relations between the world-market and capitalism are developed on a dialectical basis:

"The world market itself forms the basis for this mode of production. On the other hand, the immanent necessity of this mode of production to produce on an ever-enlarged scale tends to extend the world market continually, so that it is not commerce in this case which revolutionize industry, but industry which constantly revolutionizes commerce. Commercial supremacy now connected to large industry" (Capital III, p.333).

And again,"Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages" (Manifesto, 1973, p.69).

At the same time, he maintains that the 'historical task' of capitalism is to complete the transformation of the globe into an homogenous economic system for the eventual socialist transformation.

"The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood...... the bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralisation. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation ... A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers the
powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells" (Manifesto, 1973, pp.71,2).

iv. Consequently, a fourth and perhaps most important element of Marx's thought lies dormant. This latent theory of International Relations places the whole issue in a different light. First, it is clear that for Marx both the Capitalist and the Socialist modes of production are intrinsically 'international' or 'transnational'. As a result it became a paradigm among socialists to presume that the revolution must be international. Second, since Marx holds the view that one of the 'historical missions' of capitalism was the creation of a system of states, he appears to be arguing that International Relations of the capitalist era, which are relations between states, prepare the way for the next stage whereby the state will wither away, and a new global arrangement based on 'communities' will prevail. In his words,

"National differences, and antagonisms, between peoples, are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat." (Manifesto, 1973, p.85)

Taken together, these two propositions, namely, the transnational character of modes of production and the transiency of the State, form the core of what amounts to a latent theory of International Relations, a perspective according to which the type, quality, unities, hence the definition of International Relations are historically determined and reflect the predominant mode of production. In the work of Marx these assertions stand as axioms, yet it is not clear what their place in his overall theoretical framework is. We may begin investigating these propositions by asking why the new socialist world order will not be simply a homogenous world system, but will consist of a new arrangement of communities.
2.2. Social Classes and Political Structures.

The question is particularly interesting because of the socialist context. In Marxist literature, the relations between social classes and the State are usually discussed in functional terms. The State is regarded as the regulator of class struggle, the 'executive committee' of the ruling classes, or as an alienated form of social relationships. On this basis as Wallerstein proposed, it may easily be seen to be in essence a tool for augmenting one's share in the profits generated world-wide. However, in Marx's vision of socialism, there is no need for an external and alienated form of regulation. Why then does society itself not dissolve and only the State wither away? Marx seems to take it for granted that the socialist world will be fragmented into enlightened social entities. In other words, social entities are seen by him to be in some way more fundamental components of social life than modes of production.

This is, of course, very significant for the student of International Relations, for it implies that the societies are fundamental to the Marxist theory of International Relations. To grasp the significance of societies in Marx's thought, one needs to shift attention to an area little discussed by Marxists, namely, to social integration, because this is precisely the area of study which should enlighten us on the relation between social classes and societal unities.

Is there a distinct Marxist theory of social integration? The answer is probably both yes and no. Marx's main text, namely Capital, is an abstract study of the capitalist mode of production. However, it remains unclear what precisely the spatial matrix of this mode is? Where does 'capitalism' occur? In Capital there are numerous references to a 'capitalist society', however, no indication is given as for the nature of this society. Is it the modern nation-states? Is it the capitalist world-market? Or is it an abstraction? At times Marx adds that the study of capitalism also requires a corresponding discussion of the national debt and the State, as well as the world market. On this basis it appears that this 'capitalist society' is in fact the modern nation-state. However, since Capital remains incomplete, it is
difficult to determine what Marx thought about the relationship between capitalism and society are.

A different line of investigation is required. Were we to understand Marx's methodological stance, perhaps his sociological theories would become more explicit. According to one interpretation, *Capital* is a theory of 'pure' or 'ideal-type' capitalism (Uno, 1980; Albirton, 1986). What is the rationale behind such a theory? There are two reasons, one historical the other theoretical. In retrospect we can now see that the capitalist system emerged in complete isolation from its social base. In the words of Bienkowski:

"The capitalist system of production did not originally arise, nor was it formed, as a national economic system. It emerged as a method of accumulating capital from profits acquired by individual capitalists .... What is currently referred to as the 'growth of the national economy', 'the process of industrialization', etc., was only a side-product .... Thus for the first hundred years it was possible to speak of the capitalist mode of production, but there was no such thing as the capitalist economic system on a global, national level" (1981, p.139).

'Capitalism', then, began its career as a relatively autonomous system. This in turn made it easier to perceive its special attributes. The uniqueness of the Capitalist mode of production, and that was already clear in Marx's lifetime, was that for the first time in history an autochthonous system of growth had emerged. In the words of Albirton:

"The commodity-form has located its source of profit within a production process controlled by itself. This gives to capitalism a great dynamism since now that its source of self-expansion is internal. It can penetrate pre-capitalist economies and transform them together with itself into an economy that is more capitalist in a world that is also becoming more capitalist. The limit would be a global society in which all production is the production of commodities by commodified labour-power as regulated by the self-regulating market. This is what Uno calls 'a purely capitalist society'. ...

... The self-purifying and self-abstracting tendencies inherent in reification mean that they can theorise the laws of motion of capitalism as laws working with 'iron necessity'. Total reification achieves a level of abstraction that sheds all contingencies associated with the historical concrete so that capital can be theorised as having an inner logic of necessary relations" (1986, pp.10-12).
Albirtton follows Kozo Uno (1980) who argued convincingly that in Capital there are in fact three distinct levels of analysis which Uno calls respectively the theory of a purely capitalist society, the stage theory, and the analysis of history. Uno argues that the theory of purely Capitalist society is the main theme of Capital. Its function is to reveal how capitalism operates when it is allowed to be most fully itself. The point is that

"With the concept of a purely capitalist society, it is possible to understand the working of capitalism entirely in accord with its own economic principles without any interference of extraeconomic force or other alien forces (either non-capitalist or non-economic)" (Albirtton, 1986, p.38).

When capitalism is discussed as a pure system it is in fact posed as a closed system and its dynamics can be interpreted therefore, with the aid of the Hegelian system of dialectic (Sekine, 1980). In other words, it can seem to evolve on the basis of its own internal contradictions. However, whereas Hegel's cosmology encompasses the whole universe, which can be assumed closed, Marx, in contrast, had to devise a theoretically closed system in order to utilize the methodology. The study of capitalism, therefore, as least as it is handled in Capital, is not a full scale study of society, it is only the study of an elements of it, so it presumes other social theories!

What are they? Or to pose the same question differently: how did Marx conceive of Capitalism within the overall social context? Marx defined the Capitalist mode of production in the final pages of the third volume of Capital:

"Capitalist production is distinguished from the outset by two characteristic features. First. It produces its products as commodities. The fact that it produces commodities does not differentiate it from other modes of production; but rather the fact that being a commodity is the dominant and determining characteristic of its products. This implies, first and foremost, that the labourer himself comes forward merely as a seller of commodities, and thus as a free wage-labourer, so that labourer appears in general as wage-labour. In view of what has already been said, it is superfluous to demonstrate anew that the relation between capital and wage-labour determines the entire character of the mode of production. The principal agents of this mode of production itself, the
capitalist and the wage-labourer, are as such merely embodiments, personifications of capital and wage-labour... Furthermore, already implicit in the commodity, and even more so in the commodity as a product of capital, is the materialisation of the social features of production and the personification of the material foundations of productions ... The second distinctive feature of the capitalist mode of production is the production of surplus value as the direct aim an determining motive of production" (pp.??).

Capitalism then is defined primarily as an 'economic' system.

At the same time, Marx never tired to repeat that

"This mode of production should not be regarded simply as the reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. It is already a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite way of expressing their life, a definite mode of life." (1963, p.69).

It would be misleading to impute any chronology or determinism to these statements. Let us just say that a certain economic system presupposes a corresponding social system and vice versa. In Marxist literature, however, this is taken a step further -- it is argued, indeed, asserted, that the 'economic' structure of society determines its superstructure. In other words, there is a determinism, (not least fuelled by Engels himself).

Here, I would like to present a new idea: a distinction between analytical causality and real causality. I would like to argue that Marx did not conceive of the economic system as the engine of social evolution, but he saw it as the most promising area of study of the social system. If this point is agreed upon we may take it that Marx did not envisage determinism in the real world. He merely saw a totality 'in thought', which, he argued, was best approached by political economy. (In his words,"The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can" (Grundrisse, 1973, p.101)). The point is that although Marx spent most of his days studying political economy, this does not constitute a proof that the 'economy' is the centre core of Marxism.
There is no better place to see this than in the famous Preface, which is ordinarily regarded as evidence of Marx the determinist. The terminology is important:

"I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of State could neither be understood by themselves, nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human mind, but that they are rooted in the material conditions of life, which are summed up by Hegel after the fashion of the English and French writers of the eighteenth century under the name civil society, and that the anatomy of civil society is to be thought in political economy" (1963, p.67, my emphasis).

In this paragraph Marx presents three distinct areas of social activities: politics and legal relations, civil society, political economy. But these are truly an odd trio: legal relations and forms of State are empirically validated social categories; 'civil society' on the other hand is an abstract concept; and political economy is a discipline. How these apparently incommensurable concepts relate to each other? Marx says that he was led by his studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of State could not be understood by themselves — in other words, he argues in contrast to the Romantics that the State is not a person endowed with organic-like qualities; nor he adds, and this time he aims his words against Hegel and the Idealists, is it the outward manifestation of the progress of Reason. But he does not say that the State and legal relationships are in any way less important than other social phenomena. Marx, indeed, does not tell us what the State is, he shifts the discussion to a different plane altogether. He talks not of the State as such — he talks about the form of the State, he talks about it as a comparative political scientist would. He maintains that the best way to understand these relationships, i.e. the best way to understand the form of the State, lies in the area which Hegel calls — after the fashion of the English and French writers — civil society.

The point for Marx is that the explanation of the form of the State is 'rooted' — an interesting metaphor — in the material conditions which Hegel calls 'civil society'. Now, in Marxism after Marx 'materialism' has come to denote not 'civil society' but the 'economy'. For Marx, it
is the other way around: 'material' life is 'civil society', whereas "the categories of the bourgeois economics ...are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective" (Capital, I, p.169, my emphasis). He appears to be saying that the 'material' life of the 'economic' world is nothing but social relationships under a veil: "the social relations between their private labours appear as what they are i.e. they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather as material relations between persons and social relations between things" (Ibid, p.166).

It is now clear how the three apparently incommensurable categories of state, civil society and political economy are interrelated. The area of 'economics' in Capitalism is an alienated and coded form of 'material life'. It is not a separate world. But precisely because it is so, it is the area which holds the greatest potential for unlocking the mysteries of this mode of production. However, 'economics' cannot be thought of as an inert category, it is perceived here purely as an heuristic device, enabling us to chart the 'anatomy' of material life.

Marx's scheme therefore, centres not on political economy nor on the State, but rather on 'material life' which he calls 'civil society'. 'Civil society' is the core, the basis. But Civil society is precisely the area least discussed by Marx and Marxists alike. Why is that? Civil society is at the heart of Marxist thought because Marxism is not a philosophy, doctrine or a science as sometimes postulated, but a sociology, the sociology of exploitation. Thus, what sets Marxism apart from any other social philosophies, and gives support and rationale to the enterprise in Capital, is the believe that the process of exploitation holds the key to the dynamics of social life.

Marx never bothered to explain and elaborate precisely why exploitation is at the core of the social process -- he took it almost for granted. And instead of a theory he presents a metaphor, the famous metaphor of base and superstructure. However, this metaphor neglects the area which lay in between the infrastructure and the superstructure, namely, the structure itself, which is what he calls civil society. In The German
Ideology Marx defines civil society as follows:

"Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality, and inwardly must organise itself as State" (1970, p.57).

The relations between the structure, the superstructure and the infrastructure are far from clear. On the relation between the infrastructure and the structure Marx says:

"The form of intercourse determined by the existing productive forces at all previous historical stages, and in its turn determining these, is civil society".

By some interpretations this social area in fact determines the economic and nor the other way around (Sahlins, 1976) but that is taking it one step too far. In fact, it seems that Marx is saying that they are mutually determined.

The State, according to Marx, is not separate from 'civil society', it is rather the concentration and condensation of this society. Thus, about the programme of the German socialist party to have a 'free state' he ironically asks

"Free state — what is this? It is by no means the aim of the workers, who have got rid of the narrow mentality of humble subjects, to set the state free.... Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ standing above society into one completely subordinate to it" (Critique of the Gotha Programme, 1976, p.26).

The State is the 'condensation' of civil society, whereas political economy provides the anatomy the same civil society. Civil society, or material life, are therefore at the heart of the Marxist analysis. In other words, for Marx, the three categories were not independent or separate. They are in fact one and the same. The separation is made for heuristic purposes and precisely because 'civil society' is the most
general concept, it is least fruitful as a unit of analysis.

But let us return to International Relations. If 'civil society' (or society) is the core of Marxist thought, if Marxism is a sociology of exploitation, can we simply dispose of the notion of society in International Relations? Obviously not. However, nor can we simply incorporate the Marxist theory as it stands without considerable modification. For the location of contradiction at the heart of the social process presupposes another force which balances it and form society as "a going concern" (Aberele, et. al., 1967) to begin with. In other words, the Marxist theory pre-supposes social integration but offers no unique insight into it.

As a result, the Marxist theory is essentially society-based, it is so to speak, land-locked and cannot be mindlessly transferred to a global context. It implicitly presupposes a bounded societal context and consequently social classes (the "motor force of history") need to be defined in conjunction with politics and ideology. Or rather, they should be defined as external to these structures. This, it will be remembered, was precisely the claim of Nicos Poulantzas (1974a), who distinguished between the level of the structures and the level of class struggle, and refused to define social classes purely on the basis of their place in the production process."

2.3. The levels of society in an international context

Whatever one wishes to call it, it is clear that Marxism has had little to say about the social interactions which constitute the 'structure' apart from some vague affirmation that they are determined 'in the last instance' by the infrastructure. Now, most crucially, the three levels are certainly interdependent and to that extent they may be investigated synchronically. However, if we broaden our scope beyond the frontiers of any one society, these synchronic 'levels' reveal themselves as components of other 'systems'. Indeed, from a wider angle, there is no necessary temporal or spatial overlap between the three levels. Each 'system' possess its own unique history: the history of exploitation may be recounted in terms of successive modes and
stages of production; the history of the structures (society), as admirably laid down by Braudel (1979), obeys its own rhythm, or rather, rhythms. The same with the history of various power organisations (Mann, 1986). It is clear, therefore, to take one example, that the 'ideology' of the bourgeoisie or whatever one wishes to call it, has not developed historically, nor is it now, simply a 'level' of one society. Rather, its origins can be traced back to a time when these societies did not exist as such. The same can be said of the 'juridico-political' superstructural forms which more often than not are borrowed from other formations (Watson, 1977, chpt.9).

Now, and this is the crux of the matter, as long as one operates on the premise of a closed 'political unit', be it State, society, tribe, clan, etc., or more seriously, as long as one's horizons are limited by these boundaries, emphasis is naturally laid upon the synchronic properties of this unity, if only because the various 'levels' (Althusser, 1969) or 'functional systems' and 'subsystems' (Parsons, 1961; 1971) are cut off from their natural 'transnational' habitat and appear therefore as 'levels', 'systems' of the social context. Within this confined space, it is difficult to resist deterministic theories, for there must be some sort of relation of causality between these levels. But how is it possible to think of causality which is not absolute and complete? How can we describe, within the narrow confines of a society, the observation that the levels (economic, politic, culture) permeate and influence each other, 'but not always' and 'not always in the same way'. Indeed, it is very difficult to do so and consequently it is far easier to present some schematic and reductionist theory.

Conversely, once emphasis is laid upon large structures such 'civilisations' or 'world-economies', investigation is pulled towards the diachronic pole, if only because in the wider context the various 'sets' or 'systems' appear to be merely superimposed one upon the other. Within the larger context, the semblance of direct causality and determinism is all but gone. However, whatever may be said about the relation between the levels at that context, they are not simply a 'heap' of social relations.
Thus the problem facing the study of International Relations -- or indeed, *the problematic of International Relations* -- is that at the global context both synchronic and diachronic research face each other directly. It is simply impossible to separate them. As mentioned in the Introduction, the relativity of the units is something of which we are painfully aware in International Relations.

In the light of the foregoing, we need, at least for the purpose of this thesis:

1) to re-define the study of International Relations now that the notion of 'relations between states' has been found wanting; and

2) to locate the nexus around which contemporary international relationships are located.

To begin with the first point, it is clear that the definition of International Relations has to address the analytical problem caused by the failure of the levels to overlap. In other words, it has to address the 'artificiality' of political constructions. The notion of 'society' emphasises synchronic and homeostatic characteristics. However, the study of International Relations is superimposed precisely at the point where the synchronic level does not correspond (or apparently does not correspond) to the diachronic one. It is fitting therefore to define International Relations as *an investigation into the implications for any single society of its being in a world inhabited by many societies*. In other words, we define it as a study that aims to transcend (not replace) the societal-synchronic dimension. It takes societies to be relatively discrete entities (or as I shall define in chapter four, discrete/indiscrete entities), and investigates both its discreteness and indiscretion within a global context.

How should we approach contemporary international relationships? Following in the same vein, we have first to define the nature of modern society, and then the implications of its associations with other societies. The first of these tasks will be carried out in the third and fourth chapters. It will be argued that unlike tribes or clans, modern societies are not cohesive or 'organic' socio-economic
systems. They are essentially artificial constructions whose nodal point is the modern concept of sovereignty. The significant ingredient of modern sovereignty was recognised already in the sixteenth century; it was the exclusive ability to make rules or, as Carl Schmitt (1933) calls it, the ability to decide. Beyond this, each society is linked to others in a wide array of 'informal' (i.e. non-governmental) links. Thus, while political decisions are localised and society-bound, relations between societies develop in various dimensions which include political, trade, immigration, the flow of ideas, fashion, technologies and so on. Therefore, it will be argued, the best way to describe the nature of modern unities within the international context is not as states, nor is the world-economy, but as the political process. That will the subject of the next chapter.

2.4. Wallerstein's radical approach

There still remains the question of how it is possible to incorporate the positive components of Neo-Marxist thought within what is essentially a society-centred theory of International Relations. Perhaps the most influential of the Neo-Marxists is Immanuel Wallerstein (1974; 1980) who presents the world capitalist system as one unit and as a result relegates the state-society complex to a secondary position. In his words,

"the development of the capitalist world-economy has involved the creation of all the major institutions of the modern world: classes, ethnic/national groups, households -- and the 'states'" (1984, p.29).

Instead of pointing out what I consider to be Wallerstein's logical inconsistencies, it will be far more effective to compare his suggestions with that of a few other prominent scholars in order to demonstrate that his concept of the 'world-economy' overflowed its natural boundaries.

Wallerstein was able to relegate the State to a secondary position, and present a uni-dimensional picture of the world capitalist system by combining, and in fact reifying, three separate categories into one;
that of the world-economy, the world market and capitalism.

Wallerstein defines the global system as follows,

"A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension, and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remould it to its own advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others.... What characterises a social system in my view is the fact that life within it is largely self-contained" (1974, p.347).

One need look no farther than the work of Braudel to find a society-centred theory of the world-economy. Indeed, Braudel disagrees precisely on the fundamental point of the place of the world-economy within an overall social investigation. According to him,

"It would be a mistake to imagine that the order of the world-economy governed the whole of society, determining the shape of other orders of society. For other orders existed. An economy never exists in isolation. Its territory and expanses are also occupied by other spheres of activity -- culture, society, politics -- which are constantly reacting with the economy, either to help or as often to hinder its development .... the reality of experience or the 'really real' as François Perroux calls it -- is a totality which we already described as society par excellence, 'the set of sets'. Each set... mingled with the others.... They all nibble at frontiers, seek to extend their territory and create their own Von Thunen circles" (Braudel, 1979, III, p.45).

Thus in contrast to Wallerstein, Braudel prefers a more modest definition of the world-economy. He makes a clear distinction between the concept of 'world-economy' and of 'world economy'.

"The world economy is an expression applied to the whole world. It corresponds, as Sismondi puts it, to 'the market of the universe', to 'the human race, or that part of the human race which is engaged in trade, and which today in a sense makes up a single market'. (whereas) ... A world-economy (an expression I have used in the past as a particular meaning of the German term Weltwirtschaft) only concerns a fragment of the world, an economically autonomous section of the planet.
able to provide for most of its own needs, a section to which its internal links and exchanges give a certain organic unity" (1979, III, pp. 21,22).

I must admit to having difficulties with the concept of the world economy; however, it is clear what world-economies are all about. These are relatively self-sufficient geographical areas, not at all 'organic systems' but rather 'enormous envelopes' containing a variety of cultures, polities, societies and economies, linked together by trade which moulds them into self-sufficient (or relatively self-sufficient) 'units':

"The area", writes Braudel "is always a sum of individual economies, some poor, some modest, with a comparatively rich one in the centre. As a result, there are inequalities, differences of voltage which make possible the functioning of the whole. Hence that 'international division of labour'" (Ibid. p.26, emphasis mine).

Braudel, then, defines the world-economy as a relatively self-sufficient trading area. Thus, in contrast to Wallerstein, for whom the tension between the centre and the periphery is the life-blood of the system on all its aspects, political, economic and cultural, Braudel's still put the onus on society and presents it as a 'set of sets' (1979, II, chpt.5) of which, the 'world-economy' or world time, as he calls it, is only one, not necessarily dominant.

"World time ... might be said to concentrate above all on a kind of superstructure of world history: it represents a crowning achievement, created and supported by forces at work underneath it, although in turn its weight has an effect upon the base. Depending on place and time, this two-way exchange, from the bottom upwards and from the top down, has varied in importance. But even in advanced countries, socially and economically speaking, world time has never accounted for the whole of human existence" (Braudel, 1979, III, p,18).

The crucial difference between Braudel and Wallerstein, therefore, is that Braudel's Capitalism and Civilisation claims only to be a framework for the study of history, and the capitalist world-economy is one component in this framework. Wallerstein, on the other hand, presents
a framework and combines it with a series of hypothesis pertaining to the dynamics of the world-economy. However, his hypotheses do not require the radical framework he offers and his framework does not render essential support to his hypotheses.

When the world-economy is distinguished from the world economy (or the world market), the latter should be defined independently. There were many efforts in this direction, Ernest Mandel presents a useful formula:

"Bukharin correctly defined the world economy as 'a system of relations of production and corresponding relations of exchange on an international scale. But... he failed to emphasise... that the capitalist world economy is an articulated system of capitalist, semi-capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of production linked to each other by capitalist relations of exchange and dominated by the capitalist world market'" (1975, pp. 48, 49).

Here, the enormous 'envelope' of the world-economy is filled up with modes and stages of production one of which is the capitalist mode of production. Why then should the notion of an envelope containing the Capitalist mode of production be an improvement on the notion of a unified Capitalist world-system? On the face of it, there is little to separate the two. In the one the CMP is dominant; in the other its paramountcy warrants the appellation of the whole system as Capitalist. The issue, however, has little to do with the nature of the system as such, but is related to the heuristic value of the concept 'capitalism', which, as we have seen, is utilized by Marx in order to explore abstract tendencies and not an historical system.

Capitalism, the world market and the world-economy therefore are three different concepts, they are three distinct 'sets'. However, the various sets revolve around the primary set, the 'set of sets', or society, which in turn has to be investigated in the context of the sets that make it up -- i.e. within the global context.
NOTES

1. For example, Ernest Mandel's *The Meaning of the Second World War* (1986), powerful and interesting as it is, is nothing but crude instrumentalism. Mandel's argument develops as follows: "Capitalism implies competition. With the emergence of large corporations and cartels - i.e. the advent of monopoly capitalism - this competition assumed a new dimension. It became qualitatively more politico-economic, and therefore military-economic .... Accordingly, states and their armies involved themselves more and more directly in that competition - which became imperialist rivalry for outlets for investment in new markets, for access to cheap or rare raw materials" (p. 11). And again "Roosevelt had to manoeuvre in a more cautious way than Hitler or the Tokyo warlords, for inside the USA democracy still prevailed....But the intention to intervene at virtually any cost was not his personal choice. It was the American ruling class's option, as deliberate as those to its German or Japanese counterparts" (p.33). This type of analysis goes all the way back to Lenin's *Imperialism* and inspired many tragic miscalculation notwithstanding the infamous Soviet-German pact on the eve of the second world war.

As Richard Day (1981) has demonstrated, basing themselves on such premises, Soviet analysts anticipated a war between Great Britain and United States and could not see the greater threat posed by Fascism until it was too late. On the subject see Poulantzas, 1974 and 'Plutot Hitler que l'emancipation populaire' in 'Bettleheim (1983)).

Mandel's argument is not false, not at all, but it derives its strength precisely from its neglect of a class analysis. For the relations between the Nazi state machinery (recent research has demonstrated conclusively that the 'Nazi state machinery' was quite anarchic) and the German Bourgeois has been a subject of inconclusive debate. Nor could we reduce by any stretch of imagination the American Bourgeoisie to a homogeneous class (See Berghahn, 1986; Lauderbaugh,1980;Piji 1981). There was nothing forlorn in the decision to go into war as well as with its termination. See also CEDETIM (1978); Valdez Paz (1985).


3. Treitschke too possesses his own idiosyncratic 'Marxist' theory of International Relations: According to him, "it was at a very late stage that the State began to realise that it was something more than the tool of a particular class. The conception of the theory of High Treason is a symptom of this awakening" (1916,-p.53).

4. Plekhanov reports in 'Patriotism and Socialism' (in 1976) of a questionnaire sent to him by Harv the French socialists which goes as follows:

"1) What is your view of the statement in the *Communist Manifesto* that the workers have no fatherland?"
2) What actions and what forms of propaganda does internationalism demand from Socialists, in view of militarism, 'colonialism', and their causes and consequences?

3) What part must Socialists play in international relations (tariffs, international labour legislation, etc.?)

4) What is the duty of socialists in the event of war?" (Plekhanov, 1976, p.84)

5. See Marx, 1963 'future society' pp.249 - 263, as well as the relevant pages in the Communist Manifesto.

6. See Introduction, p.9

7. "The order (of Capital) obviously has to be
(1) the general, abstract determinants which obtain in more or less all forms of society.
(2) the categories which make up the inner structure of bourgeois society and on which the fundamental classes rest. Capital, wage labour, landed property. Their interrelation. Town and country. The three great social classes. Exchange between them. Circulation. Credit system (private).

8. "In the United States, perhaps four-fifth of the population was self-employed in the early part of the nineteenth century. By 1870 this had declined to about one-third and by 1940 to no more than one-fifth; by 1970 only about one-tenth of the population was self-employed. We are thus dealing with a social relation of extremely recent date" (Bravermann, 1974, p.53).

9. That has been the starting point for the contentions of the German school of derivation. On the subject see Holloway & Piccioto, 1978; Clarke, 1977; 1978; Jessop, 1987).

10. Different strands of Marxism came up with different answers; marxism is treated as a science, a praxis, a theoretical practice, etc. The view here, however, is that Marxism is essentially a sociology: "El concepto de la explotacion, tal y como aparece en el marxismo, constituye una ruptura muy profunda con todas las formas anteriores — idealistas y materialistas — de analizar al hombre.... La explotacion como pecado, la explotacion como accidente, eran la caracteristica o la propiedad de ciertos hombres que aparecian como explotadores, y la caracteristica de otros que aparecian como explotados" (Casanova, 1978, p. 24).

Exploitation in Marxist thought is material exploitation by that we mean the permanent transfer of surplus-product from one social class to another.
11. What is the basis of such a belief? There is, of course, massive supporting evidence to corroborate it. However, ultimately, it is based on a conviction, just as other sociologies (e.g., Parsons) which assert the primacy of the 'cultural system (1961) are.

12. "They all employ the power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production" (Capital I, 1970, p.233)

13. The subject will be discussed more fully in chapter seven.

14. Perry Anderson's judgement of Wallerstein's work may be a good starting point on the general project of Neo-Marxism: "A last word is perhaps needed on the choice of the State itself as a central theme for reflection. Today, when 'history from below' has become a watchword in both Marxists and non-Marxists circles, and has produced major gains in our understanding of the past, it is nevertheless necessary to recall one of the basic axioms of historical materialism: that secular struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the political—not at the economic or cultural—level of society. In other words, it is the construction and destruction of States which seal the basic shifts in the relations of production, so long as classes subsist. A 'history from above' -- of the intricate machinery of class domination -- is thus no less essential than a 'history from below': indeed, without it the latter in the end becomes one-sided (if the better side)" (1974, p.11).


15. It is interesting to compare that with Wallerstein who writes: "The solidarity of the system was based ultimately on this phenomenon of unequal development, since the multilayered complexity provided the possibility of multilayered identification and the constant realignment of political forces, which provided at one and the same time the underlying turbulence that permitted technological development and political transformations, and also the ideological confusion that contained the rebellions, whether they were rebellions of showdown, of force, or of flight" (Wallerstein, 1974, p.86)
CHAPTER THREE — THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The idea of 'State', says Kropotkin, may give rise to two mistakes: "There is, of course, the German school which takes pleasure in confusing State with society. This confusion is to be found among the best German thinkers and many of the French who cannot visualise Society without a concentration of the State .... On the other hand the State has also been confused with Government. Since there can be no State without government" (1987, pp.9,10). The problem, however, is that if we attempt to follow Kropotkin's definition of the State, namely, that "<t>he State idea ... not only includes the existence of a power situated above society, but also of a territorial concentration as well as the concentration in the hands of a few of many functions in the life of societies." (p.10), then it is very difficult to articulate a study of the relations between states.

Sociological, philosophical, legal and geographical theories of the State fail to define the State within a global setting and concentrate exclusively on whatever happens within the boundaries of society. The result is that in International Relations the definition of the State invariably falls back on either society or government. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the political process, which is the subject-matter of modern theories of the State, is also the most satisfying definition of the discreteness of modern societies within a global context. In other words, the political process can double as the 'unit of analysis' of International Relations.

3.1. How 'Units' are Determined

Strictly speaking, the 'political process' is not a unit at all. In the empiricist tradition, social 'units', be they individuals, classes, or states, are units of analysis because they are thought to be corporeal. That is, we have learned to think of these 'unities' in ontological terms, as pure categories. The purity of the categories is projected in an implied discreteness and impenetrability of the 'unities'. Thus we arrive at a picture of a fragmented world filled up with physically discrete objects. Sorokin argues that there are essentially three
modalities of social relationships, which he calls familial, contractual and compulsory (1941, Vol III, chpt.1). Social organisations (including political ones) are different measures of all three. Thus, for instance, Germanic tribes were principally familial; feudal entities were predominantly contractual, and modern Nation-States are on the whole compulsory organisations. In any one period there are at most two leading organisations. However, none of these organisations ever arrives at a position of exclusivity. On the contrary, these social groupings (beginning with the family, through the village, military, religious and economic organisations,) co-exist, support, and struggle with each other.

Whenever one organisation is privileged over the others, as for instance is the case with the State in International Relations, and more generally, whenever a social organisation is chosen as the 'unit of analysis', the inevitable result is the derogation and elimination of all other social groupings from the narrative. With the inevitable result that Realists are forced to consider domestic political processes as external to their system. Reification, then, tends to lead to the methodological difficulties discussed in previous chapters (Ashley, 1986).

However, we are already witnessing the emergence of a new perspective. When Wallerstein and Braudel suggested their concept of a 'world-economy', they did not merely propose a different social organisation, they shifted the whole debate to a different plane altogether. They have resurrected, if under a new name, the oldest of 'civilisation'. Here it is not the supposed corporeity of the social grouping which defines the unit of analysis, but the spatial boundaries of relatively intense social interactions, be they economic or cultural. This global context is then packed with various organisations of different shape, size and density.

Nonetheless, with all its advantages, such a conception is naturally not the best means of discussing the relations between the various groups that make up the global context. We need therefore to define the 'unit of analysis' of International Relations without
(a) reifying them,
(b) eliminating other social groups from the narrative,
(c) neglecting the global context,
(d) but retaining the centrality of the State/society complex.

This, I would argue, requires a radical shift in the manner by which the units of analysis are defined.

3.1.2. Problems in articulating the 'unity' of any social formation

Articulating the discreteness of modern societies is by no means an easy task. The problem branches into four separate issues:
A) Societies define their unity and separateness by means of images and language. Thus, for instance, the representation of England in the sixteenth century as a 'commonwealth' (Smith, 1984, p.42) shows uncustomary emphasis on the 'political individual' (Moreau, 1977): Similarly, the Hebrews kept themselves as a people by maintaining special customs and practices, all pertaining to the 'original contract' between Abraham and God. Again, the appellation of modern societies as nation-states is a condensed term conflating objectives and practices. The political organisation (the State), has created, sometimes consciously, sometimes not, a nation which in turn strives to co-habit within the boundaries of the State (the doctrine of self-determination).

Concepts may take a specifically material form. Kristof recounts that

"Historically, the word 'frontier' implied what it suggests etymologically, that is, that which is 'in front'. The frontier was not an abstract term or line; on the contrary, it designated an area which was part of a whole .... <whereas> 'Boundary' is a term appropriate to the present-day concept of the state, that is, the state as a sovereign (or autonomous) spatial unit, one among many....The modern sovereign state is bound within and confined to its legal limits. The boundaries bind together an area and a people which live under one sovereign government and law and are, at least presumably, integrated not only administratively and economically but also by means of a state idea or 'creed'" (1969, p.126, 7).

This is the politico-ideological level of representation of the
boundaries of society.*

B) The political representation is a blend of what ought to be and what is. Thus, we talk of inter-national or trans-national relations knowing full well that no nation is a clear cut, demarcated entity. The political representations may not necessarily be a true, or even accepted to be true representations of the way things are. If in political and juridical language the world is conceived as such, it is nevertheless acknowledged, and indeed, urged under the banner of 'freedom' that these entities are and should remain open to others. Again, one should be aware of the difference between the wish of those in power to control and the openness which actually exists.

C) What Foucault calls the spatio-temporal epistème supports and distorts our notions of separateness (Foucault, 1966).* The épistème is essentially a paradigm of thought. According to Sack:

"The view of earth space that predominated in the thousand years between the fall of Rome and the Age of Discovery was derived from the geographic experience of a closed feudal society and from the influence of the Catholic Church's interpretation of the Bible ....Medieval maps of land holdings were sketches containing numerous distortions and scales. When distant places were collected together within a conceptually abstract system it was in conformity with a religious cosmography" (1986, p.129).

In his view, the decisive break with the past occurred with the discovery of America:

"From the territorial perspective, what stands out so starkly to modern eyes about the very beginning of the 'Discoveries' is the abstract theoretical nature to the claims of sovereignty over area ....In its scale and intensity, no less than in its conception, this approach to people and place has a modern ring. It points to an explicit and intense territorial definition of social relations" (Ibid. p.127).

Figgis (1916) argues that the rebellion of the United Provinces in the sixteenth century led to a new perception of the relation between territory and the people. Polanyi (1954), Dodgshon (1987), and Carchedi (1983) emphasise market relationships in the emergence of this epistème. And Poulantzas (1979), in one of his most brilliant if
difficult passages, demonstrates the link between the outward perception of the spatio-temporal world and the political organisation of society. The common feature of pre-capitalist space, he argues, is that

"it is continuous, homogeneous, symmetrical, reversible and open. The space of Western Antiquity is a space with a centre: the polis (which itself has a centre: the agora). But it has no frontiers in the modern sense of the term. It is concentric, but, having no real outside, it is also open. This centre (the polis and agora) is inscribed in a space whose essential characteristics are homogeneity and symmetry, not differentiation and hierarchy" (1979, pp.100, 101).

The national territory, on the other hand is different.

"<It> has nothing to do with the natural features of the land. It is rather of an essentially political character.... The individualisation of the body-politic -- as an ensemble of identical monades separated from the State -- rests on the state framework that is inscribed in the spatial matrix implied by the labour process. Modern individuals are the components of the modern nation-State: the people-nation of the capitalist State is the content of a space whose frontiers are the pertinent contours of the material bases of power... In fact, the national territory is but the political expression of an enclosure at the level of the State as a whole" (Ibid. p.104).

The modern spatio-temporal epistème 'objectivise' phenomena so that they appear discrete. It is important to note, therefore, before we finally agree that states are indeed compact unities, that modern frame of mind is attracted to such a conception of the world.

D) These three levels of representations tend for obvious reasons, to be couched in universal terms. However, in practice none of them, or even a judicious combination of all three, provides us with an accurate description of the cleavage between societies. In reality, the cleavage, as well as the internal unity of formation is in a total state of flux. The problem, therefore, lies in the most basic tenets of our thought: language, concepts and images are not wholly vindicated by the shreds of evidence and what can be surmised by pure logic. There is a gulf between theory and practice, a gulf which is built into the
nature of theoretical thought (Polanyi, 1958), and can be apprehended by thought. The issue at hand, therefore, is quite complex. There can be no talk of a fair abstract representations of the cleavage between societies. The best one can hope for is an awareness of the representational problem and the translation of this awareness to concepts that leave, so to speak, space in our imagination for a more chaotic and fluid situation than permitted in ordinary language. The closest thing to a 'unit', i.e. a relative pole of stability in a sea of change, is the 'political process'. A model of unity which has evolved in Europe and subsequently was exported all over the globe.

3.2. The State, Politics, and the Political Process

The argument so far was that the unit of analysis of International Relations must correspond to the true nature of the cleavage between modern societies. The unit of analysis has to be also analytically effective. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that modern theoreticians of the State have selected the 'political process' as their unit of analysis. Thus, were we to construct a theory of International Relations based on this, it will greatly facilitate the transmission of information from political sociology to International Relations and vice versa.

3.2.1. The State.

Instead of a universal definition of the State, a definition which is either static or merely corresponds to the lowest common denominator shared by all states, past, present and future, it will be of far greater use to demonstrate the inter-dependence of the ingredients which make up out conception of the State. Thus it will be easier to appreciate the relativity of each individual component, as well as the tenacity of its hold over social life. Let us recount briefly the main components of the State.

The State is, first of all, an association, i.e., a form of organisation whereby people live. One of the fundamental questions in Political Philosophy has been whether the State is simply a 'political' associa-
tion, i.e. whether it is an organisation which emerges and persists around the personality of a political figure as Weber suggested. Or whether it is more intrinsic to complex societies. The question, in other words, is to what extent the State is an association or merely an aggregation of people.

It is clear that the State is not merely an aggregation of people because the population of the State becomes to a certain, if historically fluctuating degree, interdependent. The principle of association varies considerably among States in history, some employed mainly familial models, others contractual models and others again used brute force. In modern times, the principle of association which has functioned best is the law, a set of binding codes of conduct. This led many to define the State in conjunction with the law. However, as demonstrated in the work of Foucault (1973), Giddens (1984) and Mann (1986), propping up the modern State there are new types of 'extensive' and diffused (Mann, 1984, 1986) power relationships, not necessarily the law as such.

The State is a teleological device to the extent that it is an organisation serving a purpose or purposes. This, it is important to note, is quite different from the argument that people have banded together in the State in order to achieve certain purposes. In other words, the State cannot be derived from its functions, although it serves many functions. The only universal, ever-present, function of the State (as opposed to the various functions served by government) is to hold together people locked in unequal power relationships (manifest in its simplest form in the dichotomy between rulers and ruled). The State, therefore, is a class-organisation.

Historically, the association functioned at its best when it rested on sentiments of justice and love, i.e. on law and nationalism. It functions at its worst, when fear and corruption reigns. In any case, no State exists for long if it surrenders its monopoly, or at least its claim to monopoly, over the means of violence. This permanent duality in the nature of the State has led to a great deal of debate over whether the strong emotions it generates may be considered intrinsic to
the association or whether they are merely an effect of a legitimation principle. Furthermore, as the classical political philosophers never tired of arguing, individuals in the State are quite different from individuals in some supposed 'state of nature'. Thus the State and its population are united in a complex representation which defines their ideological separateness.  

None of these issues can be discussed, however, without considering the State as a territorial association. The concept of territoriality is beyond the scope of this work, but as Sack (1981) has demonstrated, territoriality is not simply the control of an area, it is a form of power relationship. In his words,  

"Territoriality neither dispenses with action by contact nor violates it. Rather it extends the particulars of action by contact to the point where a new principle relating space and action seems to emerge; and, which, in turn affects the details of action by contact .... we will use the term to mean the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions (of people, things and relationships, etc.) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographical area. This area is the territory. Territoriality makes the territory appears to be filled with power, influence, authority, or sovereignty. Territoriality can either include or exclude actions from the territory" (p.55). Thus, "an example of territoriality is an attempt at control actions by asserting control over an area" (pp.56,7).

Michael Mann (1986) has distinguished four types of 'power' structures which he terms, political, ideological, economic and military. In his typology, territorial power structures are termed 'political'. However, simply to equate territoriality with politics in the Weberian fashion does not really capture the unique dimension of territoriality. Territoriality implies that power tactics tend to operate spatially; the State, as Marx said, 'concentrates' social power, it is therefore essentially a power machine (Poulantzas, 1973; Jessop, 1985).

In its most rudimentary form, facilitating the concentration of power was attempted by a policy of racial or religious homogenization (the expulsion of the Jews and the moors from Spain, the eviction of the Huguenots from France, the counter-reformation, Jews in Israel, etc.). Today the national system of education and the various 'national'
themes, such as the flag, the national anthem, national colour, national sports teams, etc., serve the same purpose. The goal behind these policies is to supplement force with a sentiment of attachment. Nonetheless, the major tools of the concentration of social power remain as they always have been, they include systems of universal taxation, standing armies and police forces.

The territorial dimension of State power explains the inclination to claim exclusivity or paramountcy over its territory. However, there is a difference, however, as Mann puts it, between content and intent. By intent states' hold over their territory is absolute and complete, in content it varies considerably. Moreover, it would be incorrect to assume that there was a linear progression in the ability and will of the State to participate in social life. Modern States are more involved with their economies than their ancestors, but they have by and large relinquished their claim over spirituality (the law of blasphemy, restrictions on sex behaviour, the inquisition, etc.). Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, the claim to sovereignty is not an essential attribute of statehood. In fact, in European history it was long time before states found it essential to make such bold claims (Skinner, 1978).

Territorial power structures require formal organisations which define and uphold the rule. These are organs whose functions are, as Parsons puts it, goal-attainment and adaptation. In spite of the fact that a State without a government does not function properly, and government without a State does not function at all, it is important to keep the two notions separately (as demonstrated in the first chapter). Equally so, it is preferable to distinguish between forms of states, i.e. their regime and formal mode of organisation, from the notion of State itself (Palan, 1988).

It is convenient, as the discussion above shows to think of the State as an object or an actor. However, this fails to capture the essential point that society is organised as a State and therefore the State is neither society nor government. As Burdeau puts it: "Nobody has seen the state, it is not a territory, population or set of institutions,
nor is it an accumulation or synthesis of these elements, it is something that transcends them all" (1970, pp.13,14, my translation). When the State is thought of as an object in International Relations it is equated with society, and when it is thought of as actor, it is reduced to a government.

In my view, the only viable alternative was proposed by Nicos Poulantzas, it consists of thinking of the State not as an object at all, but as a form of social relationship. Thus the 'State' "is neither a thing -- instrument that may be taken away, nor a fortress that may be penetrated by a wooden horse, not yet a safe that may be cracked by burglary: it is the heart of the exercise of political power" (1978, p.81). It is a 'mode of cohesion' i.e. a form of social relationship and its strengths or weaknesses are functions of the quality of the relationships that have been forged.

This 'relational' definition of the State (Jessop, 1985) sets the tone for the tasks of modern theories of the State, namely the study of politics. In the twentieth century political science was shifted from units to processes, from normativism to structure. The modern theories of the State do not tell us that much about the State as such, nor for that matter about society, they discuss the manner by which power, classes and territoriality are articulated.

3.2.2. What is politics?

"A society consists of individuals and groups which communicate with one another .... In any society, communication operates on three levels: communication of women, communication of goods and services, communication of messages. Therefore, kingship studies, economics, and linguistics approach the same problem on different strategic levels and really pertain to the same field" (Levi-Strauss, 1953, p.536).

formal ordering of society -- and it is named the political level. Thus, the political process, to sum up in one sentence, is the process by which societies organise themselves by formal means (Clasters, 1974, p.21).
Admittedly this is a comprehensive and therefore vague definition. Ordinarily a more limited definition is favoured. Foggi (1978) claims that there are essentially two views on the subject: the one held by David Easton, that

"within a given interactions context you have 'politics' insofar as at least some value allocation take place otherwise than by custom and exchange" (1978, p.2).

The other was propounded by Carl Schmidt,

"politics is concerned with setting and maintaining the boundaries between collectivities, and in particular with protecting each collectivity's cultural identity from outside threat" (Ibid. p.6).

The attractions of a narrow definition of politics are obvious. Nonetheless, the controversy it arouses may reflect other concerns. Belnager (1984) argues that some political scientists are concerned with the unique character of politics ("politics is who gets, what, when, how" -- Lasswell); others with its function:

"political function is particularly intimately related to the collectivity component of social structure. It is essentially the facilitation of attaining collective goals and centres on the decisions about such goals and mobilisation of social resources relative to them, specially integration of the relevant collectivities for these goals" (Parsons, 1961, p.51).

Lechner (1983) locates the various interpretations of politics in the context of the wider notion of the nature of society. It appears therefore that these controversies concern the various dimensions of the formal organisation of society: the aspect of class struggle, of the search for optimal policies, and the aspect of survival. Consequently, we may take politics to be the formal ordering of society.
3.2.2. The State and the modern political process

Poulantzas (1973, pp.99-122) argues that with each mode of production politics has to be defined afresh. The political process in Mogul India, for instance, was different from the politics of the modern state (Hall, 1985). The point is supported by Clasters (1974), who argues that the social structure of 'primitive' societies does not facilitate an authoritative format. In other words, there is no point in discussing the political process in the abstract, one has to identify its matrix in modern formations.

Modern societies, as we have seen, are organised or 'cohere' in the form of states. A state is a particular form of order. Ronald Cohen contends that the State is distinguished by its 'non-fission' capabilities. Whereas all other types of societies have an inherent limit to their physical size, once a certain threshold is exceeded they 'fission' and a group wanders off, the non-fission capabilities of the State permits it to grow indefinitely in size (at least in principle). Consequently it accommodates classes, races and peoples, creating the possibility of more than rudimentary forms of stratification.

It is generally agreed that as opposed to clans and tribes, modern societies are artificial constructions whose stages of development are well documented. They started off as kings' and princes' private domains, and evolved into pervasive organisations. Very gradually, they were able to monopolise the means of violence; they nationalised money and credit (Born, 1984), they centralised social power, creating in the process the national market, the nation (Breuilly, 1982; Poulantzas, 1979, pp.93-9), and indeed our conception of society (Hall, 1985). If societies are 'organised power networks' (Mann, 1986) whose "central problems concern organisation, control, logistics, communication" (Ibid. pp.2-3), then modern states may be seen as a superior tool for the mobilisation and concentration of social power.

But the very logic, as well as the logistics of this transformation have changed the complexion of the issue. State power has become infrastructural (Mann, 1984). The State derives its legitimacy and
raison d'être from its organic links with its own society to the point where any attempt at demarcating it from society is arbitrary and misleading. Expressing the same point in a different manner, Mann (1984) argues that modern 'infrastructural' states are 'intensive-diffused' power networks. Just how much power is diffused is a matter of contention (Poulantzas, 1979). However, this pervasiveness of the State has led to the situation whereby

"all social activities directly involving the 'authoritative allocation of value' at the societal level are carried out by a single decision maker -- the state itself -- no matter how internally differentiated and extensively ramified those activities might be" (Poggi, 1978, p.92).

Thus the concept of State and the political process have become for all intent and purposes, one and the same. As Dunleavy and O'Leary put it:

"analyzing politics in terms of 'the state' directs our attention to a single central problem, the interrelation between governing institutions of a country and other aspects of that society" (1987, p.320).

If the political process is to function properly, both the organs of the State as well as society must be flexible; otherwise it is not a process, or at best it is a process with no cutting edge. Thus, the 'State' in political science is basically the regulator of social life.

3.3. The State, the political process and Sovereignty

In the study of politics, then, the State has been replaced by the political process: modern theories of the State tell us relatively little about the nature of the State as such, they describe interactions, a process, they provide a framework for thinking about the political process. It would appear, however, that in International Relations, where sovereignty is directly the issue, we cannot simply equate the State with the political process. On the contrary, the political process may be taken as the State by political scientists because they assume the sovereignty of the State (Skocpol, 1979; Mann, 1987b); in International Relations this assumption has to be made explicit and it conflicts with the State as a mere political process.
It appears, therefore, that the two disciplines cannot utilize the same 'unit of analysis'.

It should be noted, however, that in International Relations the prevalent interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty is a narrow and abstract juridical one, paying no attention, as it were, to political philosophers' views on the subject. According to the juridical interpretation, the doctrine of sovereignty is absolute, and sovereignty is understood as the supreme power at home and equality abroad (Wight, 1977). Political philosophers, however, take a different view, 'sovereignty', says Maritian

"in its historical origins is a political concept, which later became transformed in order to secure a juristic asset to the political power of the State" (1950, p.343, my emphasis).

"Sovereignty in the hands of the lawyers is absolute in form only. They have succeeded in concocting a doctrine which appears to concede everything to the politically mighty of the earth without clearly conceding much of anything to anyone. In accomplishing this minor miracle, some confusion has been inevitable" (Cole, 1948, p.16).

Indeed, Cole goes on and explains the particular function of the doctrine in European history. I will quote him at length:

"The initial idolisation of the state was to some extent forced upon the lawyers by the pressure of historical events which made it seem discreet to concede the full lawmaking potential of some political will. The first and clearest necessity which the critical events of the sixteenth century pointed to was that of shifting to a particular system of maintaining order. During the Middle Ages, there had been an attempt to establish a universal order under the aegis of the Christian faith and upon the foundation of a common European tradition reaching back to the twin classical models of Greece and Rome. This order had never worked to assure the sort of peace required for development of the economic arts of trade and commerce. Sporadic violence was chronic in the entire system. When finally, the schism within the religious community occurred, it became evident that the old order was doomed. The only alternative was to accept the dismembered parts as self-sufficient units with which to rehabilitate strong government. The principle of sovereignty was the great ideological weapon used by the nation-states in accomplishing it. Of course there were other weapons as well. Nationalism... personal loyalty to certain royal houses....

There is a sense, therefore, in which sovereignty may be said to have provided a shelter necessary for the preservation of Western civilisation after the religious wars. On the other
hand, however, we must emphasise that the kind of 'sovereignty' called for on this account does not by any means measure up to the pretensions of the sovereignty which actually came to be claimed by the nation-states. What each sovereign could reasonably claim as a prerequisite for effective local government was a finality of decision on all issues arising within his realm. This was because the responsibility for maintaining order could not be discharged without insulating the system of law enforcement within the state from all outside control. But insulation of the nation-state in the matter of law enforcement is a very different thing from insulating as respects law itself. The maintenance of order on a particularist basis requires that local interpretation of general law be final; it does not require a denial of the existence of a general law. If we want an explanation for this last increment of national isolation, we must look to a somewhat different aspect of nation-state building. This process involved the use of force against other states even more prominently than it involved the use of force internally. There have been no hermit states in the modern world.

The lack of a common superior has accordingly meant that war had to be contemplated as the principal business of states, and a prime factor in determining their internal organisation. War, in turn, demands mobility on the part of the successful contestant. It must be able to command the instant services of all within its borders, and it must — especially as effects in international relations — be in a position to adopt and change its policies without being hampered by the necessity of justifying these changes in terms of any general or universal law. Hence the definition of law which credits some determinate political agency with absolute and exclusive law-making authority is the ideal solution of the problem for the nation-state viewed as a war-making association" (pp.17,19).

The doctrine of sovereignty evolved in specific conditions. It evolved in response to a demand for 'order' at almost any price, and to legitimise those who could accomplish this. It corresponded therefore to the general drift towards insulating political communities and locating the ultimate ability to decide in their own system and law. No one in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thought of these communities as 'organic' entities. (Although some prominent ministers and kings were bent on achieving these). Contemporaries knew exactly what sovereignty was all about.

"The Venetians, like Bodin, regarded full legislative authority, the key to the maintenance of political order, as the heart of sovereignty; the right to do 'anything needful' meant above all the right to make and to enforce laws" (Bouwsma, 1968, p.438).
This opinion is shared by Carl Schmidt who maintains that Bodin's "scholarly accomplishment and the basis of his success thus reside in his having incorporated the decision into the concept of sovereignty" (1933, p.8). Therein, he argues, "resides the essence of state's sovereignty, which must be juridically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide" (ibid, p.13).

Sovereignty, therefore, does not entail a de facto division of the world into organic communities, it only meant the separation of the political processes. It is ridiculous, therefore, in particular in the case of a Europe emerging from the throes of feudalism, to talk of the 'fragmentation' principle as a great invention. In the long term, the significance of the doctrine of sovereignty lies principally in the 'legitimation' principle. The humanist postulates that no universal ordering of nature and society is possible in the abstract, that communities should decide the best order and constitution suited to them. This, and not the fragmentation principle, has been one of the main element in the gradual evolution towards a self-regulatory society as the principle factor of cleavage of modern International Relations.

Precisely what was the impact of this principle upon the course of International Relations? This is not easy to articulate. Did the emergence and acceptance of the concept of sovereignty in itself change that much? I doubt it. In the long progress towards the International Relations we know today many elements were missing. First of all, and perhaps most significant, the doctrine itself, while linked with absolutism, left the relations between rulers and ruled open. Nowhere is it more pronounced than among the European dynasties who felt no particular attachment to places and people. There were some 'enlightened' tyrants and there were many who were less so. Dynasties were trading places and moving around the European scene, but they could not persist with this activity for long. Under combined military and financial pressures, kings and princes were desperately in need of financial resources, only stumble upon what today is considered to be 'international economic relations' (Heckscher, 1934; Braudel, 1979, II pp.542-9).
Side by side, then, there grew other kinds of 'International Relations'. There were the International Relations of the struggle between the Habsburgs and the Valois, and of Europe splitting into East and West, and the other international relations, those centring upon the commercial competition between the Netherlands, England, Northern Italy, and Colbert's France. Which 'international relations' was the real one? The question is not totally beside the point. After all, traditional International Relations has already made up its mind that the first is the one worth bothering with. Moreover, it is possible with the benefit of hindsight to see that some countries were contesting anachronistic struggles. Some, countries such as 'Spain' and France were contesting super-feudal wars, working their way laboriously out of contention, others were glimpsing capitalist types of competition.

All in all, in this formative period of absolutism, 'politics' did not matter that much -- or at least not so much as it does nowadays. In the prolonged progress towards the unitary State, these formations simply did not possess the means to intervene and organise their societies into anything resembling those of the present. It was, of course, the emergence of the 'infrastructural state', which, if not a break with the past, at least marked a new level of coherence and homogeneity in the formal relations between states. In one way or another the formal apparatuses became much more responsive to their own population and the paradigmatic model of state formation has shifted from perfect war machine (Anderson, 1974) to an ideal of an economic corporation.

3.4. A new 'unit' in the making?

There are by now quite a few schools of thought which choose the political process as their preferred unit of analysis. I will mention a few of them. That does not mean that they are correct or even partly correct. The point is that the new 'unit of analysis' has already been used quite extensively.

A. The first, and perhaps most successful of all, has been the French school of regulation (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1986; Lipietz, 1983, 1987). (Regulation is understood here in its cybernetics connotations -- as a sort of auto-regulation mechanism. Society is seen as a gigantic
self-regulatory device of which three distinct moments may be distin-
guished: the technological paradigm, the regime of accumulation, and
the mode of regulation. With Aglietta (1979), and Gramsci (1971) before
him, Lipietz (1989) regards Taylorism and Fordism\(^\text{11}\) as the bearers of
modern industrial society. These new production techniques led to an
explosive rate of growth in productivity for which there was simply not
enough demand. In other words, the technological paradigm did not
synchronise with the regime of accumulation. The result was the Great
Depression to which the response in Europe (i.e. the mode of regula-
tion) took three forms, Keynesianism, fascism and Stalinism, all
offering different solutions for the problem of demand. WWII, according
to this interpretation was a 'civil war' between the different forms of
socialisation.\(^\text{12}\) Prior to WWII capitalists were competing among
themselves and squeezing labour, thus leading to the problem of demand,
the favoured solution after the war was a compromise, enshrined in the
welfare state (collective bargaining, welfare-state, minimum wages and
so on). The social democratic mode of regulation gained the upper hand,
and the accompanying regime of accumulation was able to synchronise
demand with the rate of productivity growth by allowing wages to rise
at the same time.

This interpretation, of course, is open to debate (Mandel, 1975;
Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1984). However, of particular interest to us
here is the limit of this perspective. What is the role of the State in
this view? Does the State interact with other states in order to
increase its power and prestige? Hardly.

"The state is the archetypal form of all regulation. It is at
the level of the State that the class struggle is resolved;
the State is the institutional form which condenses the
compromises which prevent the different groups making up the
national (or at least territorial) community from destroying
one another in an endless struggle (the point is not that
struggles come to an end, but that they rarely destroy
classes)" (Lipietz, 1987, p.19).

In this perspective, the state is not a compact unit; its insularity is
defined in terms of its regulatory activity i.e., the political process.
B. What about the re-emerging field of International Political Economy?

On the face of it, the rise of this field was accompanied by the discovery of the State, and seems to contradict what I am saying. For instance, Parboni declares:

"The common element of most innovative positions on international monetary analysis (although it is rarely made explicit) is probably awareness that the protagonists of the international economy consists of national states, and not families and firms. These states seek to inflect the features of the international monetary system in accordance with their efforts to safeguard what in the absence of any more precise term, we may call the 'national interest'. By shaping the monetary system, states seek to postpone, or even avoid altogether, the necessity to settle their balance of payments, to promote the international use of their own currency and to garner additional advantages" (1981, p.26).

However, what precisely is the State they have in mind? Is it a corporeity whose territory remains outside of the international political economy? In other words, is it a billiard ball State? Not at all.

After all the 'system' of one state is the environment of the other State. Subtract them all and nothing remains. International Political Economy is the aggregative area of all these States.

Is the State here an identifiable social group?

Again, no.

These 'states' are in fact self-regulating areas within the larger area of International Political Economy whose

i) separateness is defined precisely by their self-regulatory activity and ii) whose official response (the 'national interest' which Parboni talks about) is the product of the domestic political process.

C. What about the calls for 'fair trading', anti-dumping, standardization of law in the EEC, etc. Are they not within the context of relations between states albeit encumbered by interdependence. No they are not. The concept of interdependence, borrowed from a different (and I would argue more correct) context of interdependence of people all over the globe was superimposed upon the existing theoretical edifice in International Relations. It evokes, therefore, a picture of clearly defined 'units', i.e. States interacting with each other. Thus, inter-
dependence is understood as an extraneous constraint steering governments away from the real business of power. But these various calls, which are basically calls for synchronisation in the regulatory activity of the formal apparatus are nothing but the recognition that the separateness between these formations consist in their regulatory activity
NOTES

1. "In statement the underlying essent may be represented in different ways: as having such and such properties, such and such magnitude, such and such relations. Properties, magnitude, relations are determinations of being. Because, as modes of being—said, they are derived from logos — and because to state is kategorein — the determinations of the being of he essent are called kategorial, categories. Thus the doctrine of being and of the determinations of the essent as such becomes a discipline which searches for the categories and their order. The goal of all ontology is a doctrine of categories. It has long been taken for granted that the essential characteristics of being are categories." (Heidegger, 1959, p.187)

2. "The starting-point of this book was a search for fields of historical study which would be intelligible in themselves within their own limits of space and time, without reference to extraneous historical events. The search for these self-contained units led us to find them in Societies of the specie we called Civilizations"(Toynbee, 1957, p.1). See also Braudel's definition in p.90 and the discussion in Guizot (1985).

3. He adds "frontier is outer-oriented. Its main attention is directed toward the outlying areas which are both a source of danger and a coveted prize....The boundary, on the contrary, is inner-oriented. It is created and maintained by the will of the central government. It has no life of its own, not even material existence" (Kristof, 1969, pp. 126-128). See also Kratochwil (1986).

4. In the light of Schmitt's definition of politics as a purposeful activity which is aimed at the creation of a dichotomy of Us and Them, we can define this level as the political representations of the discreteness of societies. On Schmitt's definition see Strauss, 1988.


6. Poulantzas goes on "...while this serial, discontinuous and segmented space-territory implies the existence of frontiers, it is also poses the new problem of its own homogenisation and unification. Here too the State plays a role in forging national unity. Frontiers and national territory do not exist prior to the unification of that which they structure: there is no original something-inside that has later to be unified. The capitalist State does not confine itself to perfecting national unity, but sets itself up in constructing this unity -- that is, in forging the modern nation. The State marks out the frontiers of this serial space in the very process of unifying and homogenising what these frontiers enclose. It is in this way that the territory becomes national, tending to merge with the nation-State" (1979, p.105).
7. Heidegger quotes Kant approvingly: "This schematism of our understanding as regards appearances and their mere form is an art hidden at the depths of the human soul" (1962, p.45). Roger Jones puts it in less poetic terms: "The heart of our modern idolatry is quantification -- the world is reduced to quantities and the relationships between them" (1983, p.14). And Bohm asks "whether there are any features of the commonly used language which tend to sustain and propagate this fragmentation, as well as perhaps, to reflect it. A cursory examination shows that a very important feature of this kind is the subject-verb-object structure of sentences, which is common to the grammar and syntax of modern languages" (1980, p.29).

8. The three previous levels are created, sustained and projected with the aid of concepts. What are concepts? How reliable are they? P.D. Ouspensky discusses them in a simple, but devastating manner: "Let us imagine some object, say a book, outside of time and space. What will this last mean? Were we to take the book out of time and space it would mean that all books which have existed, exist now, and will exist, exist together, i.e., occupy one and the same place and exist simultaneously, forming as it were one book which includes within itself the properties, characteristics and peculiarities of all books possible in the world. When we say simply, a book, we have in mind something possessing the common characteristics of all books -- this is a concept". (P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, quoted in Jones, 1982, p.72).

When we discuss a phenomenon such as the relations between States, we articulate the concept State -- that is, something possessing the common characteristics of all States, with the concept interaction -- something possessing the common characteristics all interactions. The newly arranged set of concepts is considered nearer to the truth if it conforms to a combinative discursive pattern which is considered to be 'logical'.

9. 'Analytical usefulness' will be regarded as the ability to deal successfully with the greatest amount of information with the aid of one theory or a scheme.

10. See note 19 chapter 1.

11. "It is this relationship between the slow moving alternation of society and the faster moving and more immediate response of government, specified in a set of legal relationships and powers, <that> constitutes what is meant by the state. It is as if the generalised relationships which obtain in society with all its myriad strands and links to resources, human and material, were tied together at one point, knotted and gripped firmly" (Apter, 1973, p.104). See also discussion in chapter one on the juridical.


14. "Personee n'a jamais vu l'Etat .... Et cependant l'observation des phénomènes concrètes ne nous révèle rien qui permette d'apprêhender sa réalité. Nous voyons des gouvernements, des services, des territoires; nous voyons des règles et il nous suffit de les enseindre pour connaître de la façon la plus tangible .... Mais aucun d'eux isolément, ni leur addition ou leur synthèse, ne constitue l'Etat." (Burdeau, 1970, pp.13,14)

15. "When Poulantzas claimed to have discovered at last the Marxist theory of the state, he had in mind the view that the state is a social relation. This involved a fundamental philosophical shift for Poulantzas and a return to the revolutionary materialism of Marx, since it was Marx who elaborated the paradigm thesis (and arguably the more general claim) that capital is a social relations"(Jessop, 1985, p. 326). Jessop goes on "Poulantzas argued that the state is a social relation in exactly the same way as capital is a social relation. This approach excludes any treatment of the state either a simple instrument or as a subject (Jessop, 1985, p. 337). I do not agree that Poulantzas simply paraphrases Marx. For Poulantzas the state is the 'mode of cohesion' of modern societies i.e. a form of social relationship and its strength or weakness are functions of the quality of the relationships that have been forged. This has nothing to do with Marx's conception of capital as social relations.

16. "The State has the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation (Poulantzas, 1973, p.42). We may conclude this discussion with a formal definition of the State:

The State is "the centralised socio-political organisation for the regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified society divided into at least two basic strata, or emergent social classes -- viz. the rulers and ruled --, whose relations are characterised by political dominance of the former and tributary obligation of the latter, legitimised by a common ideology of which reciprocity is the basic principle (Claessen & Skalnik, 1978, p.640).

"The State is a non-primitive form of government. Unlike primitive forms of governments, the agencies of government obey the state are usually explicit, complex, and formal. Although the complex institutions of the state help to integrate the society out of which it arises, human society has other means of composing its integration than the state" (Krader, 1968, p.13).

17. Dahl (1976, p.8) argues that there are three traditions of political thought:
A. Relationships involving power, rule, or authority (Lasswell);
B. Relationships involving territoriality (Weber);

18. "Notre culture, depuis ses origines, pense le pouvoir politique en terme de relations hiérarchisées et autoritaires de commandement-obéissance. Toute forme, réelle ou possible, de pouvoir est par suite réductible à cetter relation privilégiée qui en exprime a priori l'essence
En un texte de 1948, R. Lowie, analysant les traits distinctifs du type de chef ci-dessus évoqué....
1) Le chef est un <<faiseur de paix>>; il est l'instance modératrice du groupe....
2) Il doit être généreux de ses biens....
3) Seul un bon orateur peut accéder a la chefferie "(Clasters, 1974, p.23).

19. About the concept of order in sociology see Dowse and Hughes, 1972. Order and the emergence of the modern State see Bouswma (1968); Cole (1948); Pockock (1975).


21. "The modern state appears as an artificial, engineered institutional complex rather than as one that has developed spontaneously by accretion...it is a 'made' reality" (Poggi, 1978, p.95). See also Giddens, 1985.

22. The monopolisation of the means of violence is one of the landmarks separating 'feudal' from capitalists social formations. It was the culmination of long and protracted struggles in which economic advances, developments in the art of war and the logistic of bureaucracies all ensured that only the most powerful and rich 'warlords' could maintain powerful armies. A fuller discussion in chapter nine.

23. "The national market. This is the term used to denote the economic coherence achieved within a given political unit - a unit that is of a certain size, essentially corresponding to what I have called 'the territorial state' or , as it might also be called 'the nation-state'. Since within such units political maturity preceded economic maturity, our problem is to discover when, how, and for what reasons these states achieved in economic terms a degree of internal coherence and the faculty of acting as a unit vis-à-vis the rest of the world" (Braudel, 1979, III p.177).

24. "From the growth of towns through communications, transport and military apparatuses and strategy, to the emergence of borders, limits and territory, we are dealing with so many mechanisms of organizing social space" (Poulantzas, 1979, pp. 99,100). "Nous voulons attirer l'attention sur ce qui donne cohérence a une formation sociale, la fluidité de la decision et de l'information, mais aussi le system de regulation des conflits. Leur canalisation doit etre comprise comme tactique spatiale" (Bernard & Ronai, 1977). On homogenization of the nation state see Maraval, 1969 and Poulantzas, 1979.


26. See Easton (1954) chapter on the historical origins of the notion of the political process. On the subject also Sabine & Shepherds.
27. It is interesting to note that International Relations scholars are, generally speaking, well aware of political philosophy but tend to overlook modern political science and political sociology. See for instance, Waltz, 1954 and Wolfers, 1962. However, only when it comes to the doctrine of sovereignty then the political philosophers' theories give way to the dry legal interpretations.

28. "The fundamental attribute of sovereignty, for Sarpi, was its adequacy. The power which the state exercised by divine right had necessarily to be sufficient to accomplish the primary purpose for which God had instituted government, namely the maintenance of that practical order which was the necessary condition of 'civil felicity'" (Bouswma, 1968, p.437)

29. For Northedge (1976) "It is clear that the modern international system can be regarded as having emerged into the light of day when two of its basic characteristics took shape: the secular principle, or the spirit of raison d'État, which first became established in the minds of thinking men about the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and, secondly, what we have called the fragmentation principle, or in other words, the waning of the idea of a united Europe as a dominant object of policy" (p.55).

Not wishing to play down the significance of these two developments, one may still ask whether these were the two (or whether there were only two) decisive moments in European history. One may insist, for instance as Marx does, that the establishment of the capitalist mode of production is the most significant development. Otherwise, the discovery of America and the colonial conquests may be cited. Moreover, one may query Northedge's interpretation of what he imagines to be the two decisive moments.

Let us discuss the first point first: while the modern doctrine of raison d'État emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries (Stegmann, 1977), it was around, as an idea much longer. Ullmann traces it at least as far back as Thomas Aquinas (Ullmann, 1975). In any case, if the idea was missing, the practice existed for a long time.

Huizinga, in his The Waning of the Middle Ages proposes that "This illusion of society based on chivalry curiously clashed with the reality of things. The chroniclers themselves, in describing the history of their time, tell us far more of covetousness, of cruelty, of cool calculation, of well-understood self-interest, and of diplomatic subtlety, than of chivalry ....<however>...the conception of chivalry constituted for these authors a sort of magic key, by the aid of which they explained to themselves the motives of politics and of history. The confused image of contemporaneous history being much too complicated for their comprehension, they simplified it, as it were, by the fiction of chivalry as a moving force (not consciously, of course). A very fantastic and rather shallow point of view, no doubt" (1924, pp.65,66).

As to the 'secular principle', which Northedge equates somewhat
impetuously with raison d'État, it certainly can be dated much before the Peace of Westphalia. The fragmentation principle, on the other hand, *anyway one wishes to look at it*, was a constant feature in European history. Indeed, the 'idea' of a united Europe itself emerged probably not before the 8th or the 9th century (Ullmann, 1975). And arguably the idea itself has not waned at all. Clearly, the church no longer holds such political ambitions. However, the 'idea' was resurrected at least three times later on, first by Napoleon, secondly by Hitler and presently by the glorified Steel and Coal cartel that has become the EEC.

It is rather curious that the two decisive moments in the establishment of the 'system of states', Northedge chooses to put an emphasis on what might be called ideological considerations. We are entitled, therefore, to ask why is it that a 'Realist' such as Northedge dates the articulation of the idea of 'raison d'État' among 'thinking men' over the practice of 'raison d'État' as the decisive moment in the emergence of the system of States? It appears to me, that the crucial component in the emergence of this particular system was not political but philosophical. It entailed a new perspective upon life and order. In short, Northedge's 'system' has to do with Renaissance Humanism. Certainly an important period, but not of such decisive break with the past to merit this special treatment.


32. A similar interpretation can be found in Giddens, 1985 and Mandel, 1986.

33. See Macinder, 1969.
Chapter Four — Society as a discrete/non-discrete entity

Since sociology emerged as a separate branch of the social sciences in the late nineteenth century, sociologists have been unable to agree on the nature of its central concept, namely, society. One does not need to probe deeply into the etymological origins of the word to see that the term 'society' corresponds to two separate phenomena. On the one hand it refers to a bounded social entity, the notion of boundary, however, is ambiguous. In some modern artificial constructions such as many African nation-states, the boundary is nothing more than a line decided upon by politicians. In other societies the boundaries may refer to a certain cleavage of social interactions (Mann, 1986). Others again regard society as a distinct cultural entity — its closure is not merely spatial closure, but also cultural, political and perhaps economic too (Durkheim, 1937; Parsons, 1971). Thus the very notion of boundary is extremely fluid. Furthermore, the concept of boundary is accompanied, and perhaps strengthened by the intuition that society is a community which acts and behaves as a unit. The notion of boundary then goes hand in hand with an idea of a collective will, consciousness, and action.

The concept of 'society', however, connotes also a place of social activity; society is the milieu of social life in the same way as 'space' is the milieu of the spatio-temporal world. In this sense the term may be replaced by social activities or any other corresponding expression.1 It is clear why the two meanings always go hand in hand, for as far as we know humans have always lived in groups. The social milieu therefore was always a bounded milieu. However, from a theoretical point of view, this duality has lead to separate agendas of research,

At the cost of some simplification, we may agree with Frsiby and Sayer (1986) that the various researches on society may be grouped into two schools of thought. The Durkheimians, on the one hand, perceive it as an objective social reality. Typically they define it as "a collection of people with a common identification, who are sufficiently organized to carry out the conditions necessary to living harmoniously together"
(Bertrand, p.22). The Weberians, on the other hand, reject any such conception and recommend concentrating instead upon "real interactions between individuals." In the light of this dichotomy one may express a wish to surpass it and come up with a unified concept.

This chapter speculates on the possibility of creating a unified research agenda. I suggest that a reformulation of the concept of society as a discrete/indiscrete system may enable us to transcend the current split in sociological thinking. It must be understood from the outset, however, that these are only suggestions for further research and not final, definitive statements.

4.1. Durkheimians and Weberians

In an attempt to combine and transcend the existing split in the research on society, the first question that comes to mind is whether there is a point in doing so. Why should we keep both lines of research open? Do they provide unique perspective on social life? If they do, why was it not possible to transcend the split before? These question go to the heart of sociological enquiry and it is possible to deal with them here only in passing.

It will be useful to note, first of all, that it is, in fact, the kinds of questions being asked which determine the concept of society and not the other way around. The Durkheimians, generally speaking, are interested in two sets of issues:

i. How coordination and division of labour among so many people is achieved within the territorial boundary of a formation. They discuss therefore "the things that must get done in any society if it is to continue as a going concern, i.e., the generalised conditions necessary for the maintenance of the system concerned" (Aberele et. al. 1967, p.317).

ii. they aim to discover the dynamics of what appears to be something reminiscent of a 'collective consciousness'. Thus, they treat society as an entity because in certain of its manifestations it appears to be cohesive.
Consequently the Durkheimian project is an enquiring into the homeostatic properties of what is thought to be a system. As Davis explains:

"Every science describes and explains phenomena from the standpoint of a system of reasoning which presumably bears a relation to a corresponding system in nature. In the case of sociology, what is distinctive is the subject, not the method; for it deals with human societies whereas other disciplines deal with other kinds of systems. Given its subject, the least it could do is to relate the parts to the whole of society and to one another" (Davis, 1959, p. 759).

In other words, the subject-matter defines the nature of society as a system.

In contrast, the Weberians begin from the opposite direction. Drawing on the works of Dilthey, Simmel and Rickert, they are painfully aware that what was called in the last century 'cultural scientist' makes choices which necessarily had as their base the investigator's own value system (Hughes, 1977). They could not accept, therefore, the appearance of society as a bounded entity at face value. They argue that, on the contrary, the vast majority of social activities occur in an amorphous, shapeless 'entity'. Society therefore is not a system but if anything an accumulation of systems and congeries (Sorokin, 1941), a 'set of sets' (Braudel, 1979) or a set of 'interacting networks' (Mann, 1986). The Weberians advice, therefore, is to regard the closure of societies as the result of specific social activities which are called 'politics' (Weber, 1978).

Both approaches, however, are deficient in some respects. In emphasizing the unitary aspect of society, the Durkheimians fail to conceptualise its open-ended characteristics. They slide easily into the belief that the boundary between societies implies a real structural separation in social activity. Societies appear as truly discrete social entities by virtue of their unique 'culture'. Easton is typical in this respect in holding that "a society is a special kind of human grouping the members of which continually interact with one another and in the process develop a sense of belonging together. This common consciousness, as it is often called, reflects the fact that the
members of the social system have a basic similarity in their culture and social structure (1953, p. 135). Such ideas may reflect the conditions of tribes or clans, but are inaccurate descriptions of modern societies (Collins, 1968).

A more sophisticated approach, perhaps an attempt to compromise between these two intransigent positions, argues that society is an 'open system' (Parsons, 1961, pp. 33-41). A term which is derived from physics (Von Bertaffany, 1981) where 'open systems' maintain their homeostatic status by drawing a large amount of energy from their environments (Lazlo, 1972, p. 36; Serra et. al. 1986; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). However, we cannot postulate similar conditions for societies, and therefore the 'open system' is vacuous and implies no more than that there are elements which do not fit well into the neat categories of a system approach. The end result is that society is seen as "a system of interdependent parts. Events taking place in one part of the system have repercussions throughout the system; hence, relations of cause and effect involve circular processes, and statements concerning these processes are extremely complex" (Collins, 1968, p. 48). The fundamental problem is the postulation of homogeneity and uni-dimensionality of social activity. And this has been rightly the main target of the Weberians' attack.

The Weberian approach, if more sophisticated, is no better. The aggregative theories tend to picture society as an amorphous, shapeless entity, a social 'heap'. The apparent discreteness of societies, the maintenance of self-identity over long periods, communal emotions and 'national characters' are typically brushed aside and assigned to two different social processes. 'Politics' maintains the discreteness of societies (Schmidt, 1988; Mann, 1986; Weber, 1978), and cultural uniqueness is reduced to a sort of false consciousness. Nationalism, warm communal sentiments are merely manifestations of a legitimation principle and consequently, and in spite of loud protestations to the contrary, societies are in fact equated with states. As will be argued later in the chapter, while investigations into the nature of the discreteness of societies are poorly developed, they have conclusively demonstrated that it goes much deeper than an artificial closure.
Why then, and how has this dichotomy occurred? Various reasons may be contemplated, of these I will mention a few:

I) Our conception of society is time-related. Some societies, such as tribes or clans, exhibit a high degree of cultural homogeneity (Malinowski, 1941), whereas others, such as the Chinese, Indians and Moslem empires have little to do with our modern notion of organic unities. Because of the great variety of social system only the most rudimentary definition based on the lowest common denominator will do. But even an elementary definition must divide among organic and non-organic types of unities. This seems to be the main force behind Randall Collins' (1968) criticism of Structural Functionalism.

However, Collins fails to acknowledge that in spite of wide disparities, it is still possible to recognize some core meaning which permits us to group communities together under the term 'society'. This core meaning transcends and indeed gathers together historical phenomena under one roof. Thus, historical arguments cannot explain the ambiguity in our conception of the object.

II) The definition of society is subjective, a variety of political, ideological and methodological elements confound the issue. Thus for instance Hayek's conception of society as a spontaneous order (1982, p.36) is only a thin disguise for his objection to state intervention. Whereas Bertrand's definition simply fits into the preoccupation of American sociologists of that period with the exigencies of what they have termed the 'cultural system'.

However, whereas different definitions of society suited for different purposes are legitimate, they mask the fact that beneath them there exist only one, perhaps, two or three core meanings. The argument again fails to deal with the problem in hand.

III) This leads me to the argument of this chapter. The problem has nothing to do with the social 'object' as such, but with our tools for investigating such objects. It has to do, in other words, with our unique epistemological posture vis-a-vis the social realm. On the one hand, as already noted by Hegel, the social realm is the only one we
have direct access to. On the other, it is precisely the realm which lays farthest from the basic tenets of our thought, which are materially based (Quine, 1981; Jones, 1982). That implies that full knowledge of the working of the society is in principle accessible to human cognition. And yet the social realm presents peculiar difficulties of conceptualisation. It is necessary to think of society with the aid of an objects-related language, or as I shall call them here -- metaphors.

The cleavage in the conception of society results when metaphors are utilised not just to visualise an intangible object, but are substituted for the object itself. Thus in many cases knowledge of the attributes of the metaphorical entity (say the working of the market or of an organic entity) 'serve' an added function of filling up gaps in knowledge of the working of society. As I shall argue, we cannot but think in metaphors, that is, we need to construct some representation in our mind of the 'object' society. However, instead of allowing these metaphors to determine the nature of the entity 'out there', we should be able to construct a representation that transcends these bodily metaphors.

4.2. How 'system' has become the vehicle for the introduction of machinist and organic metaphor.

An investigation into the nature of society begins with an attempt to visualise it. In order to visualise it we use metaphors and analogies. For the purpose of this chapter metaphors will be defined as the process by which knowledge (or presumed knowledge) relating to one set of phenomena is interpreted as information about another, separate, phenomena. The danger is that the metaphor takes the place of analysis, as indeed, is the case with the organic and machinist metaphors. We may distinguish among three realm: Engineering, Biology and Social Sciences. It is when concepts developed in the first realm find their way into the second and the third, that 'system' appears to shed its heuristic value and takes on the attributes of a metaphor.

Engineering Sciences differ from Biology and the Social Sciences in among other things, the nature of their epistemology. Quite simply, in
the case of designed machines we know the nature-purpose and working of these machines because they were designed by humans to serve a specific purpose. Whereas any such 'knowledge' concerning living organisms or social systems can only be deduced. Therefore the gap between theory and practice is reduced considerably in Engineering Science as compared with other realms. In this realm, and in this realm only, to all intents and purposes no separation exists between the concept 'system' and the machine itself.

In Engineering Science the term system connotes, therefore, the very essence of what a machine is. It implies, for instance, that its components are interdependent; that the 'whole' is a mechanical combination of parts; that the machine is a teleological device; that all elements or components of the system have a function; and that the purpose of the machine materialises as its 'output'. Likewise, it indicates that the system forges a particular relationship with its environment which may be subsumed under the concepts of 'input' and 'output'; that more sophisticated machines combine a process of 'learning' or feedback into their system, etc.

These attributes implicit in the systems of designed machines cannot mindlessly be transferred to other realms, wherein precisely the nature of the system i.e. which components are interdependent, when, and how, is called into question. Unfortunately, this has been a widespread practice. For instance, Functional Structuralist consider society to be an articulated structure. They arrive inductively, on the basis of their familiarity with designed machines, at prerequisite sub-systems of the social system (pattern-maintenance, goal-attainment, adaptation and integration Parsons, 1961). In other words, they allow themselves to utilize the attribute of a designed or biological system (Parsons was a biologist by training (Black, 1961)) as information about the social system.

In other studies the presence of a machine-like social system is postulated when something resembling 'input' and 'output' is identified (Apter, 1973). Almond (1956) and Easton (1979) take this metaphor a step further: a teleology is an integral part of mechanical systems,
they simply presume that what they have named the 'political system' is imbued with purposefulness. Political systems are considered "in dynamical terms as active agents which have capabilities, perform functions, influence their environment and are in turn influenced by it" (Ake, 1982, p.1). The metaphor, in short, is taken well beyond the boundaries of a mental construct and becomes corporeal.

There are, of course, many other examples. It is important, however, to note that the metaphor of a designed machine could not have been transferred to the social sciences unless society were seen as an entity: something we do not know for certain. We compensate for this 'deficiency' in our knowledge by projecting onto societies the characteristics of entities which we are able actually to see, namely, organisms. The organic metaphor which permeates much of Western thought serves one basic function, it enables us to discuss 'society' as an entity and thus as an articulated system.

4.3. The problem of visualisation

The first step, therefore, is to reverse this process. Instead of filling up gaps in our knowledge of society with our knowledge of the metaphor, we need perhaps to construct our own concept or metaphor from the knowledge that we do possess of it. The graphic visualisation of society is not a marginal representational problem. It is worth pondering this problem for a moment. Why is there a need for a metaphor for the visualisation of the 'entity' -- a need so great as to pervert systems approach from a method into an hypothesis?

Without venturing too deep into a fascinating but complex subject, I shall merely point out a theory which holds that all the basic tenets of our thought (space, time, matter, numbers) are structured by spatial metaphors (Jones, 1982; Quine, 1981). It is commonplace to speak in the name of 'society', to rebel against 'it', etc. However, such an 'entity' is not visible. The problem is that 'society' is not a physical object. We do not know whether it 'really' exists or whether it is a figment of our imaginations. And even if it is as such, what sort of effect does it have on the reality of everyday life? In other
words, all discussions concerned with the nature of society must solve, in one way or another the problem of visualising something which is not an object with object-related language! This is a thorny problem indeed.

In the sciences the problem was solved to a degree. There, to take an example, partly due to the immense success of Newtonian physics, atoms used to be represented as solar systems in miniature. And when this proved to be misleading (as most probably all spatial metaphors depicting atoms are (Jones, 1982; Bohm, 1983)), probability itself -- the probability of the location of an electron at any particular point in time -- was 'visualised' as a cloud surrounding the nuclei (Jones, 1982). However, Science has an advantage over the Social Sciences in that it possesses an alternative language, the language of mathematics. Thus to a certain extent it is possible to 'outmaneuuvre' so to speak, its own graphical traps.

Unfortunately, this cannot be done in the Social Sciences. We are left with no other recourse but to make do with an approximate 'bodily' representation of the 'object' (object, entity, phenomena, are all bodily analogies) and investigate by logical means what is in reality a representation we have ourselves manufactured. That should not imply that we have no way of determining which metaphor is superior - or I should say relatively superior. As each metaphor is a bodily representation of a non-bodily 'object', it may be thought of as an approximation. The metaphor is broken into its constituent parts, which are then compared with the 'parts' of the non-bodily 'object'. When we compare representations we intuitively compare the ratio of supported statements to unsupported ones. As it is logical to assume (and indeed is a necessary correlation of what has been said so far) that some of these statements will receive empirical support from the entity 'out there' and others will not, there is a method of detecting which metaphor better represents the nature of society.

Once the intuitive method of representation is understood, it is possible to improve on the spontaneous metaphors we have been using thus far. The key is the notion of approximation. Approximations may be
linear, that is, we may envisage a progressive resemblance to the non-bodily object. Thus, it may be argued that approximation 'x' provides a fairer representation of the object than approximation 'y' and so on. (i.e. that society behaves more like a 'heap' than a 'person'). However, a better way of using approximations is to consider them as emphasising different aspects of the same object. In that case, approximation 'x' is not a fairer representations than 'y', but reveals a different aspect of the same object. The 'heap' then does not represent society better than 'person', both provide a way of describing different elements of society.

If all metaphors are approximations, the basic mistake so far was to assume that any one of them is better than any other. It follows that we need not choose between metaphors, we need rather to combine them! The metaphors ('heap', 'network', 'market', 'person', 'organism') should be dissected into their constituent parts and the parts then compared with the knowledge of the non-bodily object. Instead of filling up gaps in our knowledge of society with the 'parts' of the metaphor, we should be assembling a new concept of society out of those elements of the various existing metaphors which seem to give the fairest representations. For instance, a 'heap' can be dissected into notions such as aggregations, disorder, visual discreteness, etc., however, it also implies non-dependence of the particles -- the last term clearly does not apply to society. An 'organism' implies functional dependencies between parts, but it also implies the total homogeneity of its space and absolute unity of its parts, the last two elements are not corroborated by our knowledge of society.

The issue, therefore, comes down to identifying and combining together the 'good' elements of the various metaphors of society. The organic and machinist metaphors, once shed of their irritating 'excess baggage', discuss the synchronic processes by which society become 'objective' realities. They investigate the processes by which societies remain discrete. The social 'heap' theories emphasise society's polygenetical and multifaceted nature. However, this characterisation is inherently contradictory, for it caters to their primary interest in the concept of society as the 'milieu' of social
life and leads to a conception of a shapeless and amorphous 'entity'. It would be better therefore to retain the initial conception of society as a continuous spatio-temporal matrix i.e. as a non-discrete 'entity'.

When the two metaphors are combined, we arrive at a new concept of society as a discrete/indiscrete system, a notion which appears at first sight to be something and its opposite. I will attempt to define it more precisely. A **discrete/indiscrete system is a system in which some of its activities are structured around its closure, while other activities develop along other various spatio/temporal matrices. It is a system in which the materiality of its position is only one aspect of its reality.** In contrast to physical entities which are discrete and present to the eye, as well as to the imagination, a consistent spatial plane, the discrete/non-discrete system is characterised precisely by the lack of such a consistent plane -- it is a different phenomenon altogether.

4.4. Techniques of Separation

The question we face now is in what way the conception of society as a discrete/indiscrete entity is superior to existing ones? In other words, I will have to demonstrate the superiority of the notion of discreteness as opposed to say, closure, as well as that of indiscreteness to that of the social heap.

What exactly is implied by the notion of discreteness? Discreteness connotes a spatial visualisation: it derives from 'to discern' (Klein, 1966). It entails, therefore, a unity defined in space; causing space to be seen as discontinuous. Thus, it refers to a state and the process of becoming -- both united in the act of observation. The term implies separation: separation in space and in time i.e. in the case of societies, the constitution of individuals into collectivities.

The important point is that discreteness, unlike closure, is not necessarily the opposite of indiscretion. On the contrary, the first concept implies the second, for a discrete entity 'emerges' from the throes of the non-entity. It is in fact impossible to think of a
discrete entity without its 'background'. Spatio-temporal objects 'emerge' into the light of day from a space where they are already exist as potentials. At the same time, it is impossible to think of indiscretion without some previous knowledge of shapes and forms i.e. without discreteness. Discretion, therefore, does not necessarily mean a state of affairs, it implies a process, a process by which the observer see objects as discrete phenomena. In the case of society, it implies a process by which a community becomes 'aware' of its distinctness and separateness -- which, it should be added, does not necessarily corresponds to the true nature of social interactions. In 'reality' society may be shapeless and amorphous, it may be indiscrete to a large degree; however, it structures itself in the eyes of its members as well as members of other societies with the aid of a complex set of processes.

Hence, with the concept of society as a discrete/indiscrete entity, there is no need to imagine it as a concrete entity. Quite to the contrary, we may ask by what means it 'discretises' itself? What techniques are used?

Discreteness is first and foremost a closure of society, that is, it is a conscious effort by a group of people or organisation to separate themselves from others. The practice is so widespread that many chose to define politics as the practice of creating a division between Us and Them (Andreade, 1983; Schmidt, 1988). This aspect is well documented and it is unnecessary to labour the point here. Other works discuss less conspicuous elements of closure.

Regis Debray (1983) developed a theory of discretion. Debray's thesis based on a rather free interpretation of Godel's sixth theorem is that "there can be no organised system without closure and no system can be closed by elements internal to that system alone. Contradictory as it may seem, a field can therefore only be closed by being opened up to an element external to it" (p.170). Thus, the closure of society implies its ideological opening:

"No element within a social set has its necessity within itself, and this infinite succession of successive decentrings
is an effect of the group's eccentricity with regard to itself. No element can justify its presence unless it takes the place of another. 'Kings take the place of God', presidents that of the Republic, general secretaries that of the working class, and so on. The necessary condition of representative follows from the fact that no one has actually seen God, the Republic or the Working Class: in a word, the founding absence" (Ibid, p. 179).

In Debray's opinion a fundamental technique of discretion is the creation of an internal duality: "the primary splitting of the collective body, whose cohesion is the product of dehiscence, prevents it from entering into a direct relation with itself" (Ibid,p.178). Relations of authority therefore, are not the nodal point of social life as Weber thinks, but the effect of function of splitting the collective body."

In a recent book Balandier (1988) demonstrates that the idea of 'disorder' is instrumental in the maintenance of order. Among other techniques he identifies the perpetuation of legends of a primordial organised society (p.92), social disorder is then identified with decadence and deterioration. The creation of a typology of 'good' metaphors of order and 'bad' metaphors of disorder; the dark forest versus bright civilisation, heaven and earth, etc. (p.97) also perform the same functions. Role reversals and licensed disorder are also effective techniques. In many societies, a certain period of the year is consecrated to doing the opposite of what is normally allowed. The Carnival in Europe used to serve this function. Mensnil states that

"during the carnival, all the social barriers were dropped; all distinction of age, class, parentage and sex would be abolished and a real communication between citizens would be established" (Mensnil, Marianne -- Trois essais sur la fête as quoted in Attali (1982, p.144)).

At times they went much further: "The last feast (of this kind) was celebrated in 1748 by the 'Cordeliers'. In various locations in the provincial towns as well as at the Notre Dame de Paris, priests and worshippers would cover themselves in charcoal, singing obscene songs and dancing dances of love. They ate sausages on the church's altar, played dice and other sacrilegious games and participated in sexual orgies. Sometimes the priest would be naked and holy water was poured on him. It was, according to one observer, the 'abomination of the ofactive desolation' (Shaitane, Carnaval as quoted in
Such practices served two functions: they alleviated the frustration of daily life in a rigid society, but in doing so they emphasised the orderliness of society" (Ibid, p.144).

Another remarkable thesis was advanced by Rene Girard (1972;1978). Girard maintains that imitation, or mimesis is at the origin of the most basic social institutions. It is a basic biological mechanism of learning and development. However, precisely because of its pervasiveness, the propensity to imitate holds the danger of perpetual violence as everyone desires what their neighbour desires. For society to exist social institutions must allay or re-direct this constant danger of 'mimesis breakdown' into pacific channels. Girard argues that 'sacrifice' and 'scapegoat' are the basic institutions holding societies together.

These are only few of a growing numbers of ideas on the subject. They prove that techniques of discretion are not only political. Is it possible to arrive at more general statements concerning the processes of discretion? I think so. One way of approaching the issue is to derive inductively the recurrent techniques of discretion which may be defined later as the 'structure' of a society. This is what the method of comparative politics is all about. The problem, however, is that such a method assumes that all societies are essentially the same, which, of course, they are not. Consequently it gives us only statistical information about the techniques of discretion of societies.

A systems approach suggests a different method as well as different conclusions. This approach investigates and puts forward propositions as to when, and in what form, a composite entity takes on holistic dimensions. Varela argues that "behind the simple idea of a system, stands the basic act of splitting the world into what we consider separable and significant entities ... The next question then: what is the common basis for a criterion of distinction to isolate system-wholes? my answer: the specification of forms of interaction which identify a system-whole by its stability."
<thus>.. If a certain degree of repetitiveness exists, a system can be identified by its permanence or stability" (Varela 1976 pp.3,4).

He adds that anything had been learned from the systems approach it is that

"to account for the coherence of the observed systems, their constitutive interactions must be mutual and reciprocal, so as to become an interconnected network" (Varela, 1976,p.2).

Varela suggests that not all interactions within a system have to do with its closure, only what he calls the constitutive interactions matter in this respect. If we apply these notions to society, then arguably we may derive only a certain number of social processes as a functional requisite of the homeostatic properties of the system. This is rather different from the Functional-Structuralists who derive their whole sociology from the study of systems. Furthermore, the only universal, known properties of these constitutive interactions is that they must be mutual and reciprocal so as to constitute an interconnected network. Thus, purely on the basis of systems approach, we cannot deduce systems and sub-systems of the social system, we can only suggest that the various techniques of discretion must be interconnected so that in their combination they constitute an interconnected network. In other words, it is possible to account for the discreteness of societies without recourse to any general or recurrent technique of discretion. Different societies may use completely different techniques.

In fact, the notion of discreteness perfectly allows for varieties in principles of closure as well as forms of closure because the principle refers to the condition of the whole and not to the quality of the parts.

4.5. Propositions

In view of what has been said so far, it is clear that the concept of discrete/indiscrete system cannot provide new knowledge; it may only
provide a framework within which to draw together what are at present no more than disparate and sometimes contradictory observations. We may take it as our starting point that there is nothing natural or primordial about either the discreteness or the indiscreteness of societies.

A. The definition of society as a discrete/indiscrete system confers equal significance on both aspects in the constitution of society. Any postulation of either the logical or chronological primacy of any one aspect is contrived. This proposition is generally accepted by modern sociologists and social anthropologists, but is notoriously difficult to apply. In Anthropology, for instance, there is a tendency to regard primeval groups as naturally discrete. The immediate problem then is to account for their interactions with other groups. According to Levi-Strauss

"<w> know what function is fulfilled by the incest prohibition in primitive societies. By casting, so to speak, the sisters and daughters out of the consanguine group, and by assigning to them husbands coming from other groups, the prohibition creates bonds of alliance between these natural groups, the first ones which can be called social. The incest prohibition is thus the basis of human society; in a sense it is the society" (Levi-Strauss, 1973,p.19).

In Levi-Strauss's explication there is an implicit chronology: first there was the group and then an 'opening' occurred. However, there is no particular reason not to assume that the reverse might actually have happened: first there was the prohibition of incest (which some might take to be more 'natural' than opening to other groups) and then sentiment of attachment and bellicosity developed to combat the emotional vacuum that resulted. Implicit 'chronology' suggested by Levi-Strauss may be misleading. There are no humans prior to society and a fortiori, there are no societies prior to humans. However, without the conception of a 'discrete/indiscrete system', one has no recourse but to reify one of the two aspects of society and accept this chronology. The concept, therefore, may provide an exit from the so-called 'myth of origin'.

B. The level of discreteness (or indiscreteness) of any given society
may vary considerably. It is generally accepted that until recently European societies were becoming progressively more discrete (Hall, 1975). However, political sociologists have difficulties in incorporating fluidity into their research agendas because 'definitions' in general tend to fix their subject-matter in unchanging relationships. According to John Hall, we have fixed our definition of society at a relatively high degree of discreteness:

"Our sense of society derived from Durkheim and Weber depends on the sharing of a set of norms by all citizens of a geographically bounded space capped over by a single source of authority, the state, which monopolises the use of violence. This sense of society reflects the conditions of Europeans nation-state between say 1870-1945" (Hall, 1986, p.29).

Hall concludes on this basis that agrarian societies are not 'real' societies (Ibid, p.29) -- which is absurd. However, the notion of a discrete/indiscrete system allows for the different levels of discretion (a totally indiscrete system is undiscernible). Thus society may be defined without reifying it at any given level of discreteness.

C. The concept of society as a discrete/indiscrete system has a hidden principle built into it. The principle is that there is a direct relationship between the discreteness and indiscreteness of society. (Otherwise, we should not describe it as a discrete/indiscrete system). The principle will be made clearer with concrete examples. Ronald Cohen proposed that the State format is essentially an anti-fission device -- or to use our terms, a discretion power machine. In his words:

"All political systems up to the time of the early state, have as part of their normal political and demographic process, inherent tendencies to break up and form similar units across the landscape. Barnes has aptly called this the 'snowball' effect in which the polity builds up to a critical size, then splits up, over succession disputes, land shortages, or other reasons, into smaller units that in turn grow again towards their own break-up thresholds. The state is a system that overcomes such fissiparous tendencies. This capacity creates an entirely new kind of society. One that can expand and take in other ethnic groups, one that can become more populous and more powerful without necessarily having any upper limits to its size or strength" (Cohen, 1978, p.35).
The principle above suggests a correlation between the logistical problems of discretion and the nature of the social milieu, or indiscretion. As the format of the State provides differentiated, but formal structures of discretion (army, bureaucracy, etc) it permits greater scope for cultural diversity. In contrast to this, tribes who lack such formal machineries are claustrophobic entities. Their scope for indiscrete activity is much reduced. Members of the tribe

"use similar implements and consume similar goods. They fight and hunt with the same weapons and marry according to the same tribal law and custom...They also speak the same language...As a rule, the tribe is endogamous, that is, marriage is permitted within its limits "(Malinowski, 1941, p.534).

Paradoxically, it appears that the lack of formal, alienated techniques of discretion, bites deeply into potentially indiscrete tribal activities.

D. Finally, the discretion of societies is conditioned on the closure of their 'constitutive interactions'. Is it a necessary condition that all the components of the 'constitutive interactions' reside within the boundary of their territory? Traditional approaches based on the organic metaphor automatically assume that society is an autonomous entity, hence the search for the principle of closure within its spatial boundaries. However, there is nothing about the discrete/non-discrete system to warrant such an assumption. Far from it, the principle of closure has to be individually established and should be investigated afresh in each and every case.

Indeed, it appears that some societies 'discretise' themselves with the aid of other societies. According to Jackson and Rosberg,

"When we speak of 'the state' in Tropical Africa today, we are apt to create an illusion ... in Tropical Africa, many so-called states are seriously lacking in the essentials of statehood .... The independence and survival of African states is not in jeopardy, because their sovereignty is not contingent on their credibility as authoritative and capable political structures. Instead, it is guaranteed by the world community of states" (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986, pp.1,2, my emphasise)."
Jackson and Rosberg argue, in other words, that a significant 'constitutive element' in the structural closure of some Tropical African 'societies' is external to them.

These are only a few of the issues which could be discussed more fruitfully with the new concept of society. The definition of society as a discrete/indiscrete system opens the doors for thinking of it as a process. The metaphors indicate that the relations between the two aspects are problematic, and that is precisely the line taken in this chapter. But even a brief discussion such as the one undertaken here, suggests there remains much work to be done.
NOTES

1. The term society is a conventional caption in which the various elements of a community are gathered together. In the most frequent usage it denotes "a collection of people with a common identification, who are sufficiently organized to carry out the conditions necessary to living harmoniously together" (Bertrand, 1967, p.22). However, it denotes also the added dimension of a unitary social system, thus, society may be defined as "a network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level of interaction cleavage between it and its environment. A society is a unit with boundaries" (Mann, 1986, p.13).

2. Among the 'Weberians' we may count Simmel, 1950; Weber, 1952, 1978; Sorokin, 1941; Foucault, 1979; Mann, 1986. There is of course also the Marxist tradition. However, Marx is ambiguous paradoxically because of his epistemological sophistication. He makes it clear in the Grundrisse that he does not know whether society is a whole or not, it is, as far as he is concerned "a whole in thought": "The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can" (Grundrisse, 1973, p.101). This positions permits everyone to keep to their own idiosyncratic representation of society. Thus, in effect the Durkheimian/Weberian debate is reproduced within Marxism in the form of the historical versus the structuralist schools.


4. See note (2) above.

5. A good example would be Aristotle's claim: "the state has a natural priority over the household and over any individuals among us" (Aristotle, 1981, p.60). He 'proves' the point by adding : "separate hand or foot from the whole body, and they will no longer be hand or foot except in name" (Ibid. pp.60,61). Clearly, Aristotle employs the metaphor of the human body as a substitute for the more painful, and potentially unattainable, demonstration of the precise reasons why the State should be so.

6. 'Systems approach' and 'systemic thinking' will be employed in this chapter interchangeably. Systems approach is the latest high-tech branch of systemic thinking. Of the various systemic approaches the best known are Functionalism (Benedict, 1935; Demerath & Peterson, 1967; Malinowski, 1944; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952) Structural-Functionalism (Parsons, 1937, 1961,1971; Levy,1966), Structuralism (Althusser,1972) and Cybernetics (Easton, 1979; Wiener, 1948). For a general survey of systemic thinking in the social science see Benseler (1980).

8. "Bodies are our paradigmatic objects, but analogy proceeds apace.... Bodies are assumed, yes; they are the things, first and foremost. Beyond them there is a succession of dwindling analogies" (Quine, 1981, p. 9).

9. This is not to suggest that mathematics is without its own epistemological difficulties. On that subject: Beth & Piaget (1960); Reichenbach (1958).

10. See Spencer op. cit. for an application of such method.

11. See the fascinating discussions on the concept of Space in Capek, (1976).

12. Thus, society becomes a 'system': "It is my contention that a thing is called a system to identify the unique mode by means of which it is seen. We call a thing a system when we wish to express the fact that the thing is perceived/conceived as consisting of a set of elements, of parts, that are connected to each other by at least one discernible, distinguishing principle.... A system is therefore an interaction between what is 'out there' and how we organize it 'in here'" (Jordan, 1981, p. 24).


14. But systems approach cannot determine the nature of the entity itself -- this is a matter for observation. Once it is decided whether the object is orderly or chaotic, system approach may advance some general formulae as to how it exhibits these characteristics. System approach is associated in physics with the most basic philosophical questions concerning order, chaos, and complexity (Serra et. al., 1986,; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Bohm, 1983). Hence, it should, in principle, be of interest to all traditions in Sociology.
CHAPTER FIVE — FORMAL AND INFORMAL INTERACTIONS

The theories of the State and the study of International Relations may be linked by adopting a common unit of analysis, namely, the political process. Society then is viewed as a discrete/nondiscrete entity. This chapter proposes a corresponding concept of interactions.

Some theory of interaction is necessary for the study of International Relations. It is doubtful, however, whether the concept of 'relations' is best suited for the task to the extent that it brings to mind precisely this picture of clearly demarcated 'units' relating to each other. Clearly, the 'environment' of social formations is not merely the 'actions' of foreign 'decision-makers', but is the cultural, social and economic milieu combined with the policies of other states as well as political demands from within. In other words, the environment of the State is the whole range of 'history', it is not merely 'diplomatic history'.

A conspicuous form of interactions are direct: foreign policies of social formations, or to be more exact, foreign policies which are conducted by governing institutions. But these are not the only forms of interaction. Among others, we may list trade, investment and production, migration, the dissemination of ideas, fashions, technologies, etc. In addition to that there are 'transnational' interactions which the expression 'interaction' does not capture very well. For instance, we talk of a 'domino effect' as if there were some mysterious contagious disease travelling between social formations; we seem to agree that South Africa's government will be replaced sooner or later unless it adjusts to external conditions, which it is generally agreed manifest themselves 'internally'. It appears therefore that apart of relations between States there are all sorts of methods and forms by which societies affect, modify, and influence each other. Some of them are easily recognisable, others can be perceived only by theoretical reconstruction. However, all of these methods and form are equally important to an understanding of the dynamics of international relationships. Thus, the relation between these interactions and the domestic political process is the subject matter of the study of
The current methodology and philosophy of State-based schemes in International Relations can be traced back to two highly valued traditions in the Social Sciences: Political Science and the empiricist tradition in Sociology. Since Nicolo Machiavelli, Political Science had been preoccupied with the actions and motives of the prince (Meinecke, 1962; Badie, 1987; Goulemot, 1987). It revolves around power. But not just any power, certainly not the 'social' power discussed by Foucault (1972; 1979). Rather, the discussion centres upon what Stephen Lukes called the first dimension of power -- the power to coerce. The preoccupation with this dimension of power reflects the kind of 'power' princes are interested in -- the power to coerce, both internally and externally. Thus, Political Science developed primarily as a manual for those who hold power.

This is explicit in the work of Hans Morgenthau. The raw material of International Relations, he argues, is the activities of statesmen:

"We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman -- past, present, or future -- has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts" (1964, p.5).

But Morgenthau is certainly not alone:

"To rid ourselves of the troublesome abstraction "state". Inform Snyder, Bruck & Sapin "it is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official Decision makers. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state" (1962, p.65).

From the empiricist tradition, International Relations inherited the belief that social action, whether meaningful or not, is the only truly
scientific tool of analysis. Thus it acquired the ambition which is the hallmark of the empiricist tradition, "to make the obvious unescapable" (Lasswell, 1977, p.82). 'Social action', in the Weberian sociology, may be classified in terms of roles and orientations (Weber, 1978, chapter 1). Accordingly, different 'activities' are distinguished by recalling types of orientation. This procedure produces what Weber calls 'type concepts'. Thus, for instance, "action will be said to 'economically oriented' so far as, according to its subjective meaning, it is concerned with the satisfaction of a desire for 'utilities'" (Ibid, p.63). Whereas, "(s)ocial action, especially organised action, will be spoken of as 'politically oriented' if it aims at exerting influence on the government of a political organisation" (Ibid. p.54).

The two traditions are synthesised in the concept of relations. It provides the theoretical link between social action and the activities of decision makers. Only 'actors' i.e. corporeal, motivated entities are able to relate to each other. However, by emphasising relations between unities, the study of International Relations has no other recourse but to concentrate exclusively on the interactions between supposedly well defined agencies. Thus, contrary to self-avowed claims made by Realists, namely, to be learning from the 'facts' (to 'observe' politics in Machiavellian fashion), their findings are more often than not methodologically determined

5.2. International interactions and theories of the State

As mentioned in the second chapter, modern theories of the State are concerned with a specific issue. They have the particular task of "direct<ing> our attention to a single central problem. The interrelation between the governing institutions of a country and other aspects of that society" (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1986, p.320). Since the term society here corresponds to what we have called 'social formation', theories of the State may be defined collectively as theories which describe the social interactions that occur within a bounded area and their connection to the 'governing institution' of that area -- In short, they provide analytical frameworks for the investigation of the political process.
Since the modern 'political process' is the process by which governing institutions and the society at large are related to each other, we shall distinguish between two types of interactions: those conducted by the state apparatus or the governing institutions I shall call henceforth formal interactions, and those carried by and among any non-governing agencies I shall call informal interactions. Formal interactions are so defined because 'governments' are a formal type of association. Under this heading all purposeful activities and policies of governmental and semi-governmental organs, whether domestic or foreign, will be grouped together. The definition of 'informal' interactions is simpler; they consist of all other possible forms of interactions and include the unintended consequences of governmental activities.

According to society-oriented theories of the State, formal interactions, even if they are directly a response to an external initiative, are always the 'end result', the 'outputs' of the domestic processes. 'Informal' interactions, on the other hand, constitute an element of the 'input' of the political process. Thus, in contrast to a world fragmented into unitary 'States' who interact with each other to achieve certain goals, we present here a picture of a world fragmented into political processes. Each 'State' appears from this point of view as a sort of a processing machine whose 'outputs' spurs off in many directions and become 'inputs' of other social formations where they reappears again in the form of formal and informal 'output'. Since societies confront each other as discrete entities only on the formal level, the major lines of contacts between them work their way informally. It is at this level that social formations are truly connected to each other.

This apparent expediency — a mere reformulation of the nature of interactions among social formations, permits us to create a bridge between the theories of the State and the study of International Relations. However, this simple solution reveals inadequacies both of current theories of the State as well as International Relations. As mentioned in the second chapter, one of the major problems in analyzing today's world stems from the situation whereby political practices and
the wider social context do not overlap. The political process is localised, but the cultural, economic and ideological processes are not. However, modern theories of the State deal only with the political discreteness of societies and are incapable of dealing with the reality of social formations as discrete/nondiscrete entities. They have developed therefore (just as the 'political systems' they purport to represent) this perplexing capacity to subvert and domesticate social processes of varying spatial dimensions into a familiar mould -- and what they cannot possess they simply ignore.

In these theories, factors of foreign origin are either discussed as if they were internal factors or they are not discussed at all. Hence, for the Pluralists, a foreign lobby is not differentiated from any other local lobby; elite theorists treat a foreign dominated 'elite' in the same way as a 'national' elite; and for Marxists, a dependent 'block of power' is no different from a 'national' one. At the same time, the direct effects of foreign states i.e. formal policies of foreign states, are simply ignored, shut out as if they did not exist. In this manner, the myth of a neatly defined social unit is perpetuated -- both in the real world as well as in the theoretical realm. However, this is not wrong as such, it simply implies that theories of the State are at best analytical tools of limited utility. They do not provide a full picture of societal dynamism.

5.3. Informal Interactions in International Relations literature

Informal interactions have been discussed in International Relations. Generally speaking, however, since the traditional definition of the discipline is of the study of the relations between states, informal interactions are treated inadequately. They are mentioned either in order to illustrate that the world is more complex than Realists have assumed (Keohane and Nye, 1972); to demonstrate that sovereignty is eroding (Goodwin, 1974); or to show that foreign policy is not only about the 'national interest'. Only Regime Analysis (Krasner, 1983; Jackson, 1987) discusses informal interactions for what they are. Nonetheless, here too policies of governing institutions are not separated from the actions of other agencies and consequently the
conceptual tools fail to take full measure of the informal interactions. I shall presently discuss two familiar works and ask why their concept of informal interactions is inadequate for our purposes.

The first is the work of Keohane and Nye (1972). Keohane and Nye categorised international interactions into three types: governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental or transnational relations (Ibid. p.xiv). This typology was replaced in later work (1977) by interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations. Transnational relations are defined as

"the activities of transnational organisations, except within their home states, even when some of their activities may not directly involve movements across state boundaries and may not, therefore, be transnational interactions as defined above" (1972, p.xv).

Transnational interactions, therefore, roughly correspond to our notion of informal interactions with one vital difference, they refer exclusively to the activities of multinational corporations so this definition is of limited utility from the start.

The various categories are meaningful only if they can be related to each other — otherwise, it is not a theory but merely a convenient (or inconvenient) sets of captions. The key to the whole project lies in the relations between the three agencies. Unfortunately, that is precisely where Keohane and Nye become vague. At one point they characterise the relations between these agencies as follows:

"Interstate relations are the normal channels assumed by realists. Transgovernmental applies when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units" (1977, p.24).

As it stands this version is totally unacceptable. For strictly speaking, it suggests that the category 'State' is somehow more limited in scope than the category 'government'. Furthermore, on the one hand, international interactions are categorised on the basis of the nature
of the emitting agency — when the State is posed as a coherent agency then they are named 'interstate' relations, when it is not then they are referred to as 'transgovernmental'. On the other hand, an additional criterion is introduced, this time on the basis of the channels of interactions — sometimes the State acts through the channels 'assumed by realists', sometimes it does not. Consequently, by amalgamating these two criteria they arrive at what appears on the surface to be three distinct types of interactions, which of course they are not.

But let us attempt to overcome this hurdle by renaming their state government. Now we can ask whether it is useful to discuss international politics on the basis of three different agencies: governments, international organisation and multinational corporations. Let us begin with the first two, namely, governments and International Organisations. International Organisations present a difficulty for theories of the State. Ordinarily, they are regarded as the arm of the State, a venue for conducting diplomacy. But Keohane and Nye argue with some justification that such treatment does not do justice to the true role of these organisations. Unfortunately their approach backfires. For, on the theoretical level, they present it as if the issue revolves around the degree of cohesiveness of the government. It is clear, however, that whether governments are cohesive or not has nothing to do with the relations between governments and international organisations. In actual fact, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that governments are not, and never have been, cohesive units (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1986, chpt.6). But instead of criticising this central tenet of realist thought, Keohane and Nye attempt to supplement it with another manufactured realm where governments are a collection of agencies.

What about the relation between governments and multinational corporations? Theories of the State do not regard Multinational Corporations as unique phenomena. This creates difficulties for the empiricist tradition because decision-makers are not particularly good 'units of analysis': they are agents of an abstract 'State', and at the same time they belong to a corporate body (bureaucracy). Their position is inherently contradictory: they re-enact, to use a Durkheimian notion, the concept 'State' in daily life. At the same time they represent the
parochial interest of their corporate body. Indeed, the public decision-makers, as the representative of the abstract entity 'State', are considered (and no less important, consider themselves) as the legitimate representative (admittedly among other interests) of the interests of these multinationals. At the same time as members of the corporate body of the 'state', they stand in a bargaining position to the MNC's decision makers.

Theoreticians need to choose for the sake of elegancy, one interest over the other. Otherwise total confusion reigns. Neo-Realists such as Gilpin (1981) have tried to solve the problem (unsuccesfully in my view) by maintaining that there are some intrinsic interests shared by these decision-makers in their double capacity. Keohane and Nye's concept of transnational relations, however, has done no more than introduce into the discipline of International Relations an on-going discussion in political science. They have introduced a problem, but have not solved it. It is fair to conclude therefore that Keohane and Nye's conceptual tools prevent the linking of theory of International Relations with theories of the State, as is indeed demonstrated by their utter failure to take full advantage of the vast literature of the theories of the State.

The same sort of criticism may be directed at the work of James Rosenau (1980). Rosenau proposes different categories. For him,

"some outputs, conventionally called foreign policy, are designed to bring about responses in other systems...Yet there are a host of other patterns of behaviour within a polity or its environment that are not designed to evoke boundary-crossing responses but that nevertheless do so through perceptual or emulative process" (p.382).

The second type of 'outputs' are Rosenau's way of characterising informal interactions. However, for him, the distinction revolves around the motivation of the 'actors'; their activities are categorised according to whether they were meant to evoke boundary-crossing responses. But why is this distinction so important? And for whom? Is it important for the receiving social formation? I do not think so. After all motivations should always be distinguished from consequences.
Does it forge a link with the theories of the State? Hardly. It is only significant to the observer who may now multiply the types of 'linkages' as much as s/he cares to. Combined with a dazzling array of 'domestic categories' (Ibid. p.388) the "linkage phenomena ..are combined into a matrix that yields 144 areas in which national—international linkages can be formed" (Ibid. p.387). But this number is only mentioned to keep things in proportion because in actual fact "the number of possible linkages is actually much greater than 144" (Ibid.p.387).

Rosenau and Keohane and Nye typify the neglect by International Relations's theorists of theories of the State.11 Theirs are the only consequences to be expected of faulty procedures which pile ever greater number of actors issues on a study which was designed to limit itself to the relations between decision-makers.

5.4. Formal/informal and the distinction between domestic and foreign policies

The implicit justification for a separate study of International Relations lies in the belief that both domestic and international politics may be treated as autonomous systems.12 However, in this work both domestic and foreign policies are considered as grouped together under one category, namely, formal interactions. The question then, is whether the distinction between formal and informal interactions is analytically superior to that of domestic and foreign policy.13

The distinction between foreign and domestic policies has good historical, empirical and theoretical reasons to recommend. Historically, modern European States developed through a long and protracted bargaining process between princes and estates over the distribution of resources. Partly as a result of this, monarchs were restricted by an endless array of local customs and privileges, and felt more comfortable with foreign affairs. From this, the feudal social structure from which the modern state arose, was founded on a sort of military
division of labour (McNeill, 1983). The contributions were, as the saying goes, the workers with their work, the gentry with their blood and the clergy with their prayers. Accordingly, the nobility and in particular the monarchy were accustomed to the art of war. These factors together created a situation whereby not only did the conduct of war (which is ordinarily identified with foreign policy) remain for a long time the exclusive prerogative of princes, but it was the only activity considered to be worthy of their attention (Huizinga, 1971; Mann, 1987a). In the context of a European reality of an intensely competitive state system, such traits could be only reinforced, as indeed they were.

Observation abets this view, too. Legally and politically, the globe is fragmented into sets of territories, within each resides a supreme sovereign. Indeed, the doctrine of sovereignty was devised specifically to insulate the nation-state in matters of law enforcement (see 3.3.). Since traditional International Relations is attentive to the needs and actions of those who are in control. Decision-makers, in their capacity as formal agents of the State are generally speaking uninterested in philosophical questions and overall structural trends in International Relations. Nor do they mind that the doctrine of sovereignty was devised to accommodate a particular historical situation. As legitimate agent and representative of the State, they deal with the agents and representatives of other states as if they were the other State. They accept the distinction between the domestic and the international at face value.¹¹

These are, then, the reasons for the distinction between internal and external policies. It should be noted, however, that doubts have already been creeping into traditional International Relations.¹⁵ However, the problem cannot be brushed aside when one attempts to discuss the structural analyses of the world system and the world economy,¹⁶ for the simple reason that structural analysis is premised on continuity in domestic and foreign policies. James Caporaso (1978) has attempted to grapple with the problem; it is interesting to review his approach. Caporaso proposes a distinction between 'manifest' and (presumably) 'concealed' decision makers. Manifest decision-makers, ordinarily situated in dependent formations, only appear to wield
power. Their options are so much restricted in advance that their power is illusionary. In reality Caporaso dichotomizes the 'international field' into two realms of 'decision-making': The 'manifest' realm whereby all states are sovereign and equal and a hidden realm which dominates the first one. The advantages of this formulation is clear -- it is a more realistic evaluation of the role decision-makers. The disadvantages, however, are less obvious: but this analytical exercise is attempted precisely to combat the detrimental effects of the separation between internal and external policies, an attempt which ends in failure.

The 'manifest' decision-makers of the Third World are no less 'manifest' than the decision-makers of the centre. Their options are not restricted more than those of the centre; they represent peripheral ruling classes just as their colleagues in the centre do. The only difference is that in many cases, third world ruling class are manifestly hindering social and economic development, whereas in the centre they do it less conspicuously. Ultimately, the issues raised by the structuralists transcend the decision-makers. The truth of the matter is that the two realms, foreign and domestic politics, are not 'linked' to each other, they are one and the same. 17

It is absurd, for instance, to think that when the United States of America decided in 1970 on a perfectly good 'domestic' policy, for perfectly good domestic reasons, to end subsidising small oil wells (Odell, 1983), this decision infiltrated into the 'international' arena only in 1973 (the oil embargo). Similarly, it is a mistake to think that faced with the embargo, Americans attempted to unite the 'free world' against the OPEC states. Indeed, the 'foreign' and 'domestic' policies produced an interesting play: in its official, 'foreign' policy capacity, the United States undertook to unite the western powers, but its 'domestic' policy amounted to a hurried attempt to take advantages of the situation and advance over its allies/competitors (Parboni, 1981). In fact, the 'foreign' policy was advanced with such singularity because 'internal' policy did the 'dirty' job.

Similarly, the conceptual separation between domestic and foreign
policies led many observers to interpret the relations between the USA and Saudi Arabia as hostile. Certainly, on the formal level, the two were protagonists in the early seventies. Yet it needed an analyst such as Fred Halliday (1974), unencumbered with and unhindered by the theoretical tools of Foreign Policy Analysis, to notice that conventional interpretation "exaggerates the differences between the rulers of the oil states and the major capitalist states. The ruling classes of the Middle East owe their present strength, and in some cases their very existence, to decades of support from the capitalist West" (p.5). One may conclude, therefore, with Susan Strange's (1986) that all policies (as well as 'non-policies') are potentially belong to international politics. It is fair to infer therefore that the division between domestic and foreign politics is of secondary importance.

5.5. The limitations of the distinction between formal and informal interactions

So far I was arguing in favour of the distinction into formal and informal interactions. It is now time to examine its drawbacks. The distinction is utilized in order to create a bridge between the theories of the State and the study of International Relations, however, it was argued already that the theories of the State themselves are of limited utility. The limit can be gauged by examining the manner by which a society as a discrete/indiscrete entity experiences its environment.

5.5.1. Formal/Informal

The formal/informal matrix corresponds to the distinction between the government and the country at large. And indeed, it is possible to demonstrate that the two 'agencies' respond differently to external stimuli. 'Governments' are formal systems of rule. They may be seen as

"a point in a flow of activity which is initiated by the political community ... Behavioural tensions represent 'inputs', or stimuli affecting political leaders, who by responding to them generate decision, or 'outputs'" (Apter, 1973, pp.75).
Modern government may be conceived therefore as an Input/Output (I/Os) machine (Apter, 1973; Easton, 1979, Almond, 1956). Although this is an idealisation, as governments are regarded as empty 'black boxes' with no contribution of their own, there is an element of truth in this formulation. If the relation of government/population is not of the simple linearity of the I/Os machines, at least it is a relation of correspondence: there is a direct connection between 'demands' and 'pressures' on the one hand, and 'policies' on the other.¹⁸

A stark illustrations of this sequence is provided by the plan-rational states (Johnson, 1982, chpt.1, Japan, South Korea, Singapore as opposed to the regulatory states such as the United States, Britain etc.). The economic 'success' of these societies, depends on their ability to concentrate upon single goal and in effect transform themselves into I/Os machines. (The mere absurdity and cruelty of such practice implies that there are other levels too).

Ordinarily there is one ministry or agency which takes the lead in formulating clear-cut objectives. In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) assumed this role (Johnson, 1982). Considered by many as the precursor of the phenomenal success of the Japanese economy (Johnson, 1982; Morishima, 1982), the Ministry makes a general assessment of the world (economic) situation and formulate five years plan. It targets few industries as the bearers of the next stage of development and channels capital and know-how as well as appoints a few chosen corporations to undertake this move.

The same is said of Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore. Singapore has found a niche in the rapidly growing Far East trade as an entrepot port and the provider of semi-skilled, orderly work force.¹⁹ But success, if not followed by further development might turn sour. Singapore, therefore, attempted to move up the ladder of the International Division of Labour. By combining government incentives with private industries (especially foreign companies), upgrading its education system and forcing workers wages up (to force capitalists to shift into more profitable and modern industries), it has attempted to transform itself into an industrial nation. So far this was met with varying degrees of
success.

In both instances, governments and its ministries assess 'inputs' and produce 'outputs' by abstracting the 'environment' of the social formation into clearly defined parameters. In this process the formation itself is 'flattened' into clearly defined sets of goals. The process resembles the strategic planning of corporations to such an extent, that Japan has been nicknamed 'Japan Inc.' and West Germany, Germany Ltd, etc. It would be wrong, however, to assume, as many do, that social formations are simply the equivalents of corporations operating in a world of more or less well defined parameters. On one level, and one level only, social formations operate as linear I/Os systems. But this level is compounded by the following two levels.

5.5.2. Discrete/Non-discrete

In the previous chapter it was argued that society is a discrete/indiscrete entity. Its discreteness manifest itself as an 'organic' system. Organic systems differ from an I/Os system in two respects:

i. The living system cannot deal with its environment as a set of parameters but adapts to it in its entirety (Capra, 1983, chpt. 9).

ii. The 'environment' is not felt directly by the living system, it perturbs the system (Varela, 1976; Glaserfeld, 1980). The organism reacts to the perturbation by compensating or modifying its internal structure (Maturana & Varela, 1975, 1987).

Such system may be called therefore Perturbation/Compensation machines or P/Cs in short. Unlike I/Os systems, in the case P/Cs systems one must take into account both the environment that perturbs the system and the constitution of the system itself. In contrast to the I/Os machine where outputs relate directly to Inputs, P/Cs systems compensate in a manner which on the face of it might appear unrelated and unproportionate to the external stimulus. Consequently, P/Cs system responds to its environment in somewhat erratically. I will presently examine three examples.
5.5.3. Cultural Contacts in the Northern territories of the Gold Coast

The first example derives from a discussion of M. Fortes (1936) of the dynamic of cultural contact in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. Fortes concerned himself with diffusion of cultural traits in the Northern Territories and more specifically the socio-economic effects of the missionary service. He quotes approvingly Livingstone's aphorism that "wherever a missionary lives, traders are sure to come, they are mutually dependent and each aids the other" (p. 31), and examines the mechanism of such interdependence. I will quote extensively to demonstrate the precise moment when a seemingly benign 'cultural contact' becomes decisive element in the transformation of society.

The missionary, an agent of an alien culture, inserts himself into the existing pattern of behaviour.

"A missionary in Africa is seldom merely 'a man going about with a Bible under his arm'... He generally offers essential and much desired services to the community, a school, or a hospital, or even so apparently trivial a thing as a football at the disposal of the idle youth. Such service creates links of dependence and a context of prestige which ensure a tolerant hearing for his specifically Christian teaching. The polyvancy of functions is a well-established attribute of primitive institutions" (pp. 31, 32).

Once accepted, the missionary acts like any general endowed with Clauswitzian logic. He sees a gap and seizes upon it:

"In the patrilineal and patriformal communities of the Northern Territories, young men generally seem to respond most rapidly to mission teaching. It is not merely a question of youth. The ancestor cult is the dominant religious institution there. Now young men, though always participating freely in rites and ceremonies and often as fully conversant with details of ritual as their fathers, seldom have direct ritual responsibility.... In such communities where religion is more a matter of doing than of thinking, a young man often has no religious obligations to renounce by conversion" (Ibid, pp. 32, 33).

The conversion is smooth. For a while the two 'religions' co-exist side by side, but this state of affairs cannot remain forever. The missionary essentially is attacking a strategic point of that society:
"The cult of common ancestor is one of the main sanctions of patriliean family and clan cohesion, and, on the other hand, the foundation of a solidarity between matrilineal kindred which breaks down the exclusiveness of the patrilineal group" (Ibid, p.35).

Once the fundamental beliefs of that society are undermined, the effects are devastating: the existing social order virtually melts away.

5.5.4. The Iroquois and the population of the Great Lakes

My second example is borrowed from Eric Wolfe's (1982) discussion of the fur trade in the North American continent. This trade consisted of nothing but the exchange of beaver's skin for rifles, utensils and shiny jewellery. But due to the huge disparities in power and wealth between the European powers and the native communities, the trade sparked off structural transformations of colossal magnitude. It is customary in anthropological studies to characterise social structure according to three levels, economics, linguistics and kinship (Levi-Strauss, 1953, p.536). The political structure, or the structure of order and authority is a fourth level. When any one of those four factors is modified, one is entitled to talk of a fundamental change. But when all four are transformed concomitantly, this is a tremendous structural change, a metamorphosis.

That is precisely what happened to the indigenous Indian communities of North America. We pick up the story with the Iroquois. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, the political structure of the Iroquois consisted of five distinct nations, each controlled its own settlement. They were linked in one political organisation, but were culturally and linguistically different.

"The languages of the various clusters were mutually unintelligible, and the business of the confederacy was carried on by multilingual chiefs" (Wolf, 1982, p.165).

The Iroquois had developed an interesting social and economic structure:
The economic basis of Iroquois life before the growth of the fur trade was horticulture and the hunt. Horticulture was largely in the hands of women, although the men helped in clearing land during the slash-and-burn cycle. Cultivation were carried out by the women of the village as a whole, under the guidance of the head matron of the dominant lineage and with the matrons of other family lines acting as lieutenants. Rights to use land, as well as the tools used in cultivation and food processing, passed through the female line. Distribution of produce was similarly in the hands of women. The weight of these economic roles granted women considerable authority, since they could use their ability to provide food and moccasins to exercise a veto over the activities of war parties of which they did not approve (Ibid. p.166).

In the traditional Iroquois division of labour, hunting and warfare were in the hands of men. The direct result of the trade was a marked increase in violence and warfare as each group strove to corner the market. Naturally the centre of gravity of the Iroquois 'economy' shifted from horticulture to hunt. The result was

"the separation of male and females roles increased....It is possible that they became increasingly matrilocal after the early seventeenth century, in response to this growing bifurcation of activities" (Ibid. p,167).

This led to further developments: "The evidence has some striking implications. It points to the possibility that in the course of fur trading and enhanced warfare the forms of kinship affiliation remained the same, but their meaning and function underwent a major change. When the Europeans first arrived, the Lodge extended lengthwise was primarily a league of local groups adjudicating local interests in cultivated land and other resources, as well as impeding the escalation of local quarrels into feuds and warfare. Yet increasingly the Iroquois confederacy found itself acting as an association of fur traders and warriors, sometimes of quite different origins, in relation to the translocal imperatives of the fur trade and of the political struggles between rival European state systems" (Ibid.p.167)

In the area of the Great lakes another stupendous change was witnessed. There the fur trade sparked off processes of fusion and alliances among groups that had previously entertained separate local identities:

"The feast of the Dead was replaced as the major ritual of exchange and alliance by a new religious forms, the best known of which is the Midewiwin ... The feast of the Dead had
celebrated local group identity ... The Midewiwin, in contrast, was directed more toward the individual and his integration into a hierarchical association that transcended locality and distinctive symbol groups thus yielded to the development of a translocal 'church', providing a mechanism for the local and ideological control of large aggregate population; that congregated during the winter months" (Ibid. p.172).

In all these example, native Indian communities mutated within a century or so. Yet, these transformations were sparked off by the mere trade of rifles and trinkets for bear skin and later buffalo meat.

5.5.5. The 'Modern Men'

Early development studies in the 1950s and 1960s centred upon the vagaries of the 'political system'. Political systems were conceived as active agents who perform functions, influence their environment and are in turn influenced by it. The literature reserved a special place to the psychology of 'modern men' who was after all the bearer of modernity (Porter, 1974).

The modern man has been examined studiously. S/he proved to possess an infinite characteristics and traits. But in essence these studies seem to agree on something like the following definition: "Psychological modernity can be defined as a dynamically self-seeking orientation -- aware and desirous of the benefits of life in advance countries and willing to participate and acquire the skills necessary for attaining a similar life style" (Ibid. p.259). Tempted by the notion of diffusion, developmental studies put their trust in the diffusion of modern traits to produce the desired developmental outcome.

Alas, whereas the diffusion of modernity succeeded, it failed to pull underdeveloped societies out of their misery. On the contrary, it became a factor of underdevelopment. The masses in the Third World 'internalise' to varying degrees the traits of modernity. They became self-seeking individuals desirous of the benefits of life in advance societies. But
"what occurs when there are little opportunities for social participation? ... the spirit of modernity, a dynamically self-seeking orientation, will search for other possible alternatives for fulfilling these goals .... The resulting modernity-in-underdevelopment syndrome is pathetically exemplified by many capital cities in Latin America. These cities have become flooded with modern goods satisfying a premature demonstration effect demand which far from stimulating a feeble economy, further contributes to its stagnation" (Ibid, pp. 259 - 61).

It appears to me that these studies have conflated a correct principle with the wrong theory. They attribute correctly an important role to the diffusion of cultural traits in the transformation of societies. However a theory which concentrates on the 'political system' to the exclusion of all other factors is faulty. In their definition, the political system becomes the strategic factor of cohesion of society (Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 47-8). It is both its adaptive and goal-attaining mechanism (Parsons, 1961). Hence development is the development of the political system. Unfortunately no amount of clever analytical tricks can ascribe to the 'political system' such powers in reality. What Almond (1956) calls the political structure may be transferred wholesale, on its bureaucracy, judges, etc. to another formation only to produce unintended results (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986), while the culture traits of modernity may become the vehicle of stagnation.

These development studies centre exclusively on the 'political system', they are tied therefore to the metaphors of an I/Os system. In fact, they superimpose the linearity of an I/Os system on what is in reality a P/Cs system. With an I/Os system, the relation between inputs and outputs should in principle be straightforward. An input of modernity in 'demands' and 'support' is supposed to produce an output of modernity. But a P/Cs system reacts rather differently, an 'input' (which is in fact perturbation) of say, rifles to a native society, of a new belief in salvation, or of the traits of modernity, sparks off ripple effects leading to a totally unexpected 'output'.
5.5.6. Direct Bombardment

I/Os and P/Cs systems combined warrant the treatment of social formations as bounded, discrete entities. But society is also open to its environment, many interactions do not make any particular cleavage leap when they exit one formation and enter another. For them society is not a bounded entity, it is submerged within a larger entity which may be called 'civilisation' or a 'cultural area' (Goldenwiesser, 1937). The free flow of cultural traits within the cultural area may be characterised, from the point of view of the receiving social formation as 'direct bombardment'.

The model of direct bombardment is perhaps best suited to describe the spread of the industrial revolution from the British Isle to Europe. The industrial revolution did not spread through the conscious policies of government, it is a case of 'direct bombardment' riding on the backs of private citizens. "At first sight" Pollard says,

"it is not at all clear what was distinctive about the British contribution ... the most obvious item to be transferred was the new technology" (1981, pp.85).

Technology transfer sparks off new enclaves of industry in Europe.

We may take a few other 'trivial' examples. Ordinarily they are not noticed, let alone thought to be worthy of the study of International Relations, but for some reason or other countries have felt it absolutely necessary to hamper their free flow. My first example is a pop song performed by Madonna called 'like a virgin'. Unfortunately the Kuwaiti regime does not take kindly to such overt sexual innuendoes. After all they might corrupt the tender spirits of its own subjects who might follow in the decadent 'western ways'. They devised an ingenious scheme: the song was translated in Arabic under the title 'like a virtuous person' and the possible disastrous effects were averted.22

The former sultan of Oman, the Sultan Said bin Taimur, report Fred Halliday, did not employ such refined methods.

"Under the guise of respecting Ibadhism a savage regime was upheld. Said's rule prevented Omanis from leaving the country;
discouraged education and health services, and kept from the population a whole series of objects, including medicines, radios, spectacles, trousers, cigarettes and books" (Halliday, 1974, p.275).

Malawi's customs' officials are not much better. Reputed to have taken an absolute distaste to bell bottom Jeans, guitars, long hair and the name of Carl Marx.  

These sort of commodities are normally transported along borders not because modern states are liberal or tolerant, but because the process of submersion within a larger 'cultural area' has already been long completed.

To sum up, I have reviewed a variety of studies which suggest that society receives an external stimuli in three distinct manners. The formal level of government, the level of the discrete system, and the level of the social milieu.
NOTES

1. On the concept of relations see Mitchell, 1984.

2. Some modern theoreticians of International Relations have attempted to distance themselves from the 'billiard Ball' model. See: Banks, 1984; Burton, 1965; Keohane & Nye, 1972; 1977; Mansbach, 1981. However, by keeping with the concept of 'relations', they immediately resurrect the vision of a cohesive units -- the very thing they were intent on breaking up.


5. On the historical dimension of the political process see chapter 3.3. Also Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1986; Poggi, 1978, chpt.1).

6. Weber defines a formal association as follows: "An association with a continuously and rational operating staff will be called a formal organisation (1978, p.52). In Weber's terminology religious and economic organisation are considered to be formal organisations. Nonetheless, here the term formal is reserved exclusively for the 'governing institutions'. On government as a formal system see also: Rose, 1984; Finer, 1950.

7. The reason for this definition will become progressively clearer as the dissertation unfolds.

8. Indeed, of necessity, the localisation of the political process within the confine of a territory entails that much of what we call politics will have to do with the division into Us and Them.

9. What can the 'political system' do in the light of the difference between the spatial extension of political, economic and cultural systems? It can only pretend there is no mismatch at all. The political system appropriates all within its boundary as its own, professing no concern whatsoever as to whether these processes are linked in some way or another to other social formations. Max Weber's definition of the 'political community' might be read in this light. For him, it will be remembered, "<t>he term 'political community' shall apply to a community whose social action is aimed at subordinating to orderly domination by the participants a 'territory' and the conduct of the persons within it, through the readiness to resort to physical force, including normally the force of arms" (Weber, 1978, p.901).

Weber is obviously aware that the 'State' ('political community' is his term for the State) is not a closed social unit -- it only pretends to be one.

10. The reference is to the Interdependence school. On Interdependence see note (2) of the Introduction.
11. The same analysis can be made of Hanrieder, 1978; Burton, 1965, etc. I do not think there is any point in going into greater detail.

12. See note (18) of the Introduction.

13. The first chapter outlined a partial answer.

14. For the theoretical justifications of the distinction between domestic and international politics see the Introduction.

15. Prominent is the Interdependence school. These writers base their argument on supposedly empirical grounds. They argue that with the advent of interdependence, the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is no more tenable. However, the argument is false for it implies
   a) that the European state system used to be true to the myths of sovereignty at some point in the past, while in actual fact the European state system always has been 'transnational'; and
   b) that the separation between domestic and foreign politics was conceptually relevant at some point in the past.

   Wolfram Hanrieder (1967) has grasped the theoretical difficulties presented by the distinction into foreign and domestic politics. The problem, he says, is not the separation itself, but the resulting teleological theory of the international relations. Whereby 'nations are immediately delegated to play out the roles that internal system as 'assigned' to its members' to maintain system stability or equilibrium. Domestic political variables are largely neglected in this analytical perspective. Foreign policy aspirations are assessed primarily in terms of whether a nation has adequately 'internalized' system 'rules' - that is to say, whether a polity has adjusted to the contingencies of the international system' (p.971).

   In other words, the theory assigns, in an a priori fashion a privileged position to the 'international system'. This theoretical a priori, encumbered with the empiricism of traditional International Relations, produces a meta-physical theory of the relations between States. A theory in which the possibility of investigating foreign policy is eliminated (see chapter one).

   Whereas the difficulties presented by a strict division into domestic and foreign policy have become evident to International Relations theorists. The medicine applied is conditioned by the diagnosis. First, as usual, a symptomatic treatment was attempted. The logic develops as follows: Since there is an autonomous 'international political system' then it follows that there is an autonomous 'domestic political system'. Now the two systems need to be linked somehow. In an empirical context the issue appears therefore to be as if the international system is becoming progressively better linked to the domestic system. Considering that from this perspective the 'international political system' has not changed in any fundamental way, nor did the 'domestic political system', what has changed was the link between them. Interdependence thinkers consequently take immediate steps to make 'the obvious inescapable'. They conjure up some concepts of the link.
See the discussion of Keohane and Nye and Rosenau in the previous pages.

16. As the two approaches are so diametrically opposed, it is not immediately evident that 'structuralism' poses a serious challenge to the traditional International Relations. To mention some of the ridiculous attempts at synthesising the two: Marghoori and Ramberg, 1982; Pettman, 1979; Holli... 1981.

17. Gourevich’s (1978) paper is most frustrating in this respect. In this paper, Gourevich gathers various sociological, political and economic studies which discuss the effects of the international system upon an individual formation. But his conclusion, instead of moving forward, is a return to Realism!

18. In effect, governments are regarded in the discipline of International Relations as linear I/Os machines. These machines are programmed to achieve the 'common good' or the 'national interest' (Krasner, 1978). They proceed by processing 'inputs' which include 'demands' from within and 'pressures' from outside, and produce an 'output' in the form of decisions that represent the 'national interest'. The well-known pessimism of realists stems not so much from their opinion of human nature as from their estimation of the possibility of achieving the goals for which states have 'entered' the international arena for. The reason is that once in the context of international politics, initial goals are inevitably translated into an attempt to make other states do something they would not do otherwise (Morgenthau, 1967, p.25).

In the process, the 'initial' goals are deflected and international politics takes a life of its own. Thus, the mutual interaction of these practices in effect distort State's policies of its normative goals and reduces International Relations to a crude game of power and prestige.


20. "Ontogeny is the history of structural change in a unity without loss of organisation in that unity. This ongoing structural change occurs in the unity from moment to moment, either as a change triggered by interactions coming from the environment in which it exists or as a result of its internal dynamics. As regards its continuous interactions with the environment, the cell unity classifies them and sees them in accordance with its structure at every instant" (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p.74).


22. The anecdote reported on a radio 4 programme.

Chapter Six — Description and Typology of Informal Interactions

In the previous chapter I made a distinction between formal and informal interactions. Formal interactions were defined as all those interactions which are conducted by governing institutions. Informal interactions were defined as all those interactions which do not work their way through the state apparatus. It was argued that informal interactions constitute the link between theories of the state and the study of International Relations. This chapter is intended to provide a brief, non-critical survey of the current literature which is concerned with what is dubbed here informal interactions.

We shall ask the following questions:
1. What are informal interactions?
2. What are their mechanisms of transmission?
3. Are they handled appropriately in the literature?
4. If not, why not?

6.1. What are informal interactions?

The distinction between formal and informal interactions recalls the contrast between diplomatic and social history. While the study of diplomatic history revolves around issues such as war, treaties and in particular, personalities, the study of social history possesses its own unique types of 'events. They consist of:
1. Advancement in the art of war and in the deployment of means of violence, from the instruments of war to organisation and logistic.
2. Progress in methods and techniques of transport.
3. The art of communication and transmission of information in all its variations (mathematical, lyrical and technical language).
4. Sexual and kinship relations.
5. The procurement of energy.
6. The production of food.
7. The production of tools.
8. The production of goods.
10. Development of organisational skills.
6.2. The mechanisms of transmission of informal interactions

The following is a brief compilation of the concrete methods of transmission of the various techniques and technologies. Among these, it is possible to differentiate direct modes of transmission from indirect (or induced) ones. In the previous chapter it was stated that it is not always possible to distinguish between formal and informal interactions. We may now add that these difficulties are associated only with the first category — that of direct transmission. All types of 'induced transmission' may be safely characterised as informal interactions.

6.2.1. War and Conquest: Direct Transmission

War and conquest is a major, if somewhat sporadic, means of transmission of techniques and technologies. More often than not, conquerors pass on their superior techniques and methods of organizations to the conquered. They may effect changes in the belief system of a subject population; they always force (by definition) new types of social organisation upon them; and they often create new economic structures, if only in order to extract tribute from the defeated. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. Both the Mongols (McNeill, 1983) and the Vikings (Scammel, 1981) appeared to absorb more from their enemies than they were able to teach them.

The adeptness of war as a means of transmission of techniques and technologies springs from extreme mobilisation in times of danger. The sense of urgency and desperation which accompanies war leads to a search for new and viable solutions to various problems. It is as if society were condensed and crystallised at one point allowing enormous powers to accrue to the political leadership. These are pressing times in which the very fabric of society is laid bear for all to see. The significance of empires as transmitters of techniques and technologies also stems from the ability to use direct political force. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely the use of political force in the two cases which may account for the relative superficiality of this mode of transmission. For, to begin with, political force may easily trigger
off counter-measures (Hechter, 1975, chpt.1) or anti-systemic forces (Wallerstein, 1983). And secondly, in the case of empires, as Hall argues, many were little more than huge tribute-paying machines whose ruling classes were not interested in, perhaps incapable of, penetrating the local communities (Hall, 1985, p.30).

It is worth noting that the model of wars and conquests as modes of transmission is used heavily in ancient and non-Western historiography, but progressively becomes less favoured tool of analysis as we come closer to home. Nonetheless, there are still many important works which stress the impact of modern wars as modes of transmission (Maier, 1975). Of these, the so-called revisionist interpretation of the cold war merits special attention, for it sparked off a renewed interest in the concrete activities of the victorious powers, the United States in particular, at the end of the war.

The revisionists argument is relevant to our context not only because it lays stress on what has here been dubbed 'informal interaction', but also because it amounts to a sharp rebuff to the findings of the Realist theory of International Relations. As already discussed in the first chapter, the Realist theory presents international society as the unintended consequence of the activities of egotist states. In contrast to this revisionists have drawn attention to the fact that the post-war international system bore an uncanny resemblance to the system by which the allies fought the war (Giddens, 1986, pp.236-244 & chapter. 10). That in fact, this 'international system' was premeditated up to the level of its details.

Let us pause for a moment and reflect upon the activities of the United States as an occupational force. In Japan, writes Morishima,

"In November 1945, General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, issued a directive to Prime Minister Shidehara, Laying down five major reforms; these were female suffrage, the right of labour to organise, liberal education, abolition of autocratic government and democratisation of the economy" (Morishima, 1982, p.158).

The avowed aim of the directive was to establish a
"democratic country based on the free enterprise system, whose actions would be restrained and peaceloving" (Ibid, p.161).

One of the most significant of these reforms was the break up of the highly concentrated industrial structure (the zabaitsu). Jon Halliday explains the point:

"Japan's industry has been under the control of a few great combines, supported and strengthened by the Japanese government. The concentration of control has encouraged the persistence of semi-feudal relations between employer and employee, held down wages, and blocked the development of labour unions. It has discouraged the launching of independent business ventures and thereby retarded the rise of Japanese middle class" (J. Halliday, A Political History of Japanese Capitalism, p.178 as quoted in Armstrong, et. al. 1984).

The breakup of these combines was deemed necessary because of the widespread belief that they were responsible for the aggressive policies pursued by Japan before the war. However, one cannot fail to notice that it was modelled on the American anti-trust laws and indeed, fitted the overall design of the Americans for shaping the world in their own image. The same design is reflected in the Trade Union laws enacted by the Occupation. The Occupation insisted on legalising, and indeed, organising trade unions (Armstrong et. al.1984,p.56). A line of attack was spearheaded by the American Unions themselves (Van Der Piji, 1986). It is worth noting that precisely the same policy was implemented in occupied Germany (Berghahn, 1986; Spohn & Bodemann, 1989).

In this tale, the quest for 'power' and prestige as such plays a minimal role. Power and prestige were used in order to implement a system amenable to American capitalism, and not the other way around. One could well imagine that, had Nazi Germany won the war, the structure of current international society, which to the Realists is as natural a phenomenon as rain and thunder, would have been rather different. Most probably we would have seen less emphasis placed on the formal independence of social formations and laissez-faire economics, and more on hierarchy and autarky.
6.2.2. War and Conquest - Induced transmission

Wars and conquests also transform societies indirectly. The preparation for war, and in particular the perpetual demand for better organisational skills and more sophisticated weaponry generate their own dynamism. In turn, development in the art of war provoke further changes in the social system. In the literature one finds the following linkages between military technology and the larger social context:

1. There is, generally speaking, a correlation between types of military organisation and the size and nature of the social formation.¹
2. There is an affinity between military discipline and other modern institutions such as schools, hospitals, prisons, etc. (Foucault, 1973, 1979).
3. There is always a direct link between military procurement and industrial production (McNeill, 1983).
4. There are other, more subtle forms of linkage. Alexander Gerschenkron's analysis of Russian economic situation provides a case in point:

"The main reason for the abysmal economic backwardness of Russia" writes Gerschenkron "was the preservation of serfdom until the emancipation of 1861. In a certain sense, this very fact may be attributed to the play of a curious mechanism of economic backwardness, and a few words of explanation may be in order. In the course of its process of territorial expansion, which over a few centuries transferred the small duchy of Moscow into the huge land mass of modern Russia, the country became increasingly involved in military conflicts with the west...the economic development in Russia at several important junctures assumed the form of a peculiar series of sequences : (1) Basic was the fact that the state, moved by its military interest, assumed the role of the primary agent propelling the economic progress in the country. (2) The fact that economic development thus became a function of military exigencies....(5) Precisely because of the magnitude of government exactions, a period of rapid development was very likely to give way to prolonged stagnation" (Gerschenkron, 1962, p.17).

In Gerschenkron's judgement, Russia did not simply ape its neighbours, it restructured itself completely in order to compete with them on the military front. But in doing so, its economic structure was completely destroyed.
Because of these localised affinities and correlations, the adoption of say, a particular weapon or new military organisation, tends to generate a series of secondary modifications within the social system which may be labelled as induced transmission. The consequences they generate within a given society cannot be explained adequately within exclusively society-bound models. However, as sociology does not possess an alternative models: sociological explanations are of necessity inadequate.

Similarly, these types of induced transmissions create patterns of informal linkages between societies which cannot be discerned from the traditional perspective of International Relations. They indicate the existence of another type of 'international relations' which is not discussed in the traditional literature. But the problem is only one of inadequate explanations of a particular phenomena, the very dynamism of modern politics can only be discussed in partial terms when a significant amount of it lies outside the scope of the two fields of political investigation.

6.2.3. Learning and Cultural transmission

One of the fundamental problems of sociology concerns the concepts of stability and change. The fixation and maintenance of patterns of behaviour and norms are the basis of any social system. However, social systems are constantly changing and evolving and there seem to be no general theory in sociology which is able to deal with the two phenomena concomitantly. In fact, it is precisely the methodological techniques and assumptions underling theories of stability which prevents an explanation of change (Bienkowski, 1981). By and large, theories of stability, dominated by functionalism have been the more successful this century. However, functionalism, on all its variants, have enormous difficulties dealing with social change.

It is for this reason that the functionalist school in sociology and anthropology has been attracted to exogenous explanation of change, or to use our terminology, informal interactions. In the words of G.M. Foster,
"despite the significance which local innovation and discoveries may have...the main forces for cultural change are borrowings. The members of one social group assimilate forms of behavior which they encounter in other societies...Contacts between societies are the main and most important of social change" (G.M. Foster, *Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change*, 1962, p.25 as cited in Bienkowski, 1981, p.54, my emphasis).

Nonetheless, in spite of the enormous proliferation in literature concerned with the transmission of cultural traits, in particular diffusionism and acculturation, there is a dearth of theoretical elaboration. It is possible to distinguish between two modes of diffusion, direct and indirect diffusion. Diffusion of a cultural trait will be termed *direct diffusion* when a formation (or rather elements within a formation) borrows some cultural traits or artifacts from another formation. *Induced diffusion* occurs when subjects of one formation (individuals, companies or even the State apparatus), ape the techniques and technologies which are used in another.

The first form of diffusion is a widespread phenomenon. The Japanese seem to have developed it into a fine art. Morishima recounts that

"In a search of a model for their modern state the government sent many missions to Europe and America...In each country they investigated the conditions of such things as the police, industry and finance. On the basis of the information relating to these subjects obtained from the missions the government made its decision as to which sphere should be patterned on which country. For example, the education system promulgated in 1872 was patterned on the French system of school districts. The Imperial Navy was a copy of the Royal navy. The telegraph and the railways followed the British example, universities the American. The Meiji Constitution and the Civil Code were of German origin, but the criminal Code was of French origin" (Morishima, 1982, p.88).

At the end, the Japanese State was an eclectic amalgamation of foreign ingredients superimposed one upon the other. According to Turner and Killian More important than borrowing,

"is the discovery that there is a vantage point from which one's own values no longer appear unquestionable axioms but merely one among alternative systems of values. Thus it is not
so much the particular culture with which culture contact takes place as it is the attitude toward one's culture that is induced by any serious culture contract ... Culture contact gives rise not only to borrowing but to new ideas concerning the necessity for change in the established order and the directions in which such change should go" (Turner and Killian — Collective Behaviour, 1957, as quoted in Strasser & Randall, 1981, p.75).

In this context, there is a fascinating discussion in Kroebner (1940), a major exponent of diffusionism. In this article, Kroebner examines cases of the transmission of cultural traits "in situations where a system or pattern as such encounters no resistance to its spread, but there are difficulties in regard to the transmission of the concrete content of the system" (p.1).

I will quote two of his examples. The first concerns the Phoenician alphabet:

"It is well known", he writes "that alphabetic symbols for the complete consonantal scheme occur in Egyptian as a minor factor within a system of several hundred characters ... This mixed system had been in use for two thousand years before someone hit upon the idea that ninety-five per cent of the apparatus of the Egyptian system could be discarded and any or all words could be written...In this case the essence of the invention was the discarding of what was unnecessary" (Ibid, p.6).

The Phoenicians adopted a foreign technique by developing it. In the second example Kroebner speculates on the origin of Japanese drama. Following a discussion on the probability of a Chinese influence on religious drama (the No), he concludes:

"There is, however, another possibility for the secular Japanese drama: European influence. The first origins of this drama are dated about sixty years after the arrival of the Portuguese in Japan...The policy of isolation was in force. However, there remained one permanent Dutch trading colony ... There was at any rate enough intercourse for the possibility of knowledge of lay dramatic performances being introduced ... Certain resemblances between the plays of Chikamatsu and of Shakespeare have been noted" (Ibid, p.8).

These stories relate the importance of the world-wide phenomena of
diffusion of cultural traits for any individual society. Exponent of diffusionism fail, however, to provide systematic elaborations of the relation between these societies and the external world.

6.2.4. Models

Underlying the concept of an induced transmission lies the notion of a model. The expression 'model' is mentioned frequently in the literature. We hear of the British model of industrialisation, of Maurice of Nassau's model army, etc. Yet, there is little discussion of the role of models. We know relatively little of their mechanisms of transmission; what impact they have; when they tend to be more salient, etc. This section will do no more than outline some basic propositions in relation to models as types of informal interactions.

Informal interaction models can be defined as any techniques or technologies which have been developed in one society and have been transferred, or attempted to be transferred wholesale to another society. Learning is the adaptation of 'models'. 'Models' may include the actual transfer of goods and technologies, or the induced transmission of goods and technologies which comes about as a result of the 'knowledge' of its existence in other formations.

An author who uses the concept frequently, if implicitly, is Michel Foucault (1979). Foucault argues that the modern prison is not simply a penal institution but functions as the paradigmatic model of modern techniques of power. His 'model theory', if I may name it as such, is outlined in his Discipline and Punish (1979). In Foucault's view, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the emergence of

"A 'political anatomy', which was also a 'mechanics of power' ... it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies ... Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies...The 'invention' of this new political anatomy must not be seen as a sudden discovery. It is rather a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another ... They were at work in secondary education at a very early date, later in primary schools; they restructured the military organisation. They sometimes circulated very rapidly from one point to another (between the army and the technical schools
or secondary schools), sometimes slowly and discreetly (the insidious militarisation of the large workshops). On almost every occasion they were adopted in response to particular needs: an industrial innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the invention of the rifle or the victories of Prussia" (p.138, my emphasis).

This theory defies generalisations. Nevertheless, Foucault's work demonstrates vividly the importance of 'models' to social investigations. Foucault was also the inspiration to Jacques Attali whose *Histoire du Temps* (the history of Time, 1982) discusses implicitly the role of models within an overall social context. In this work, Attali aims to tie technological developments in the measurement of time to epistemological and socio-economical changes.

The invention of the pendulum clock is a case in point. The first of these clocks was produced in England 1671. Unlike its predecessor this clock was capable of indicating minutes as well as hours. This newly found precision, argues Attali, pre-supposed (as well as begot) a serial conception of time (pp.171-220). In turn, the serial conception of time may have been one factor in the rise of a new awareness of the value of products. The social value of products was not measured in terms of quality or rarity any longer, but by the amount of necessary social labour invested in them. Furthermore, a serial conception of time (and of space) precipitated an interest in scientific management and thus may have been a factor contributing directly to the emergence of a mass consumer society.\(^\text{13}\)

As these authors have demonstrated, as with war and conquest, models reverberate and affect societies in more ways than one. We may assume that once a model is transported from one society to another, it will generate the same sort of dynamic effects there.

6.2.5. Tourism, emigration and immigration

The movement of population, as individuals or en masse, is one of the major carriers of cultural transmission. But their effects go much deeper than that. The decline of the Spanish Empire and the parallel rise of Amsterdam in the sixteenth century is believed to be related to
the expulsion of the Jews in 1492. While Frederick the Great went out of his way to attract fleeing Huguenots to Prussia and was rewarded with a highly skilled labour force who brought with them new industries (Pollard, 1981, p.152). According to Pollard's, the industrial revolution spread on the backs of immigrant (1981). Closer to home, an important role the formation of the American Federal reserve system was played by Paul Warburg who attempted to reproduce in the USA what his father had done in Germany (Attali, 1985, pp.96-99). No less important, given the mobility of population, informal 'networks' and trading circuits were formed, without which, says Braudel, the precarious European long-distance and middle-distance trade would have been inconceivable (Braudel, 1979, II, pp.138-168). Thus, for example, the proliferation of American short-term loans to Germany in the twenties may be due to excellent personal relations between German and American Jewish bankers (Van der Piji, 1986; Quigley, 1966). Indeed, Van Der Piji has demonstrated that something akin to an Atlantic ruling class had emerged through this kind of personal contact.

6.3. Summary

So far we have been able to demonstrate that informal interactions feature in practically every discussion in anthropology, political sociology, political geography and history as major causes of change. However, in all these disciplines they are utilised as auxiliary tools of analysis and there is no attempt to unite them under one analytical framework. To my knowledge, the only groups of scholars who have attempted to deal with informal interactions in their totality are the so-called historical sociologists. From their perspective, individual action, diplomatic history and even major wars pale in significance in comparison to the basic structural features that compose our notion of civilisations. They therefore concentrate upon the constituent elements of these civilisations, which are by and large not the political acts of states but the steady flow of informal interactions. However, here too the poverty of theoretical elaboration is manifest in the widely used notions of the diffusion of cultural traits and correspondingly their eventual fusion, or grouping, in one society.
In the light of all that has been said so far, what is still needed in the discussion of informal interactions is a conceptual framework which will
i) encompass informal interactions in their totality, and
ii) 'fit' into the parameters of theories of the state.
NOTES


2. Needless to say that this list is not complete and is somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, the traits are not outlines according to order of significance.

3. The following is a typology. Like all typologies, it is used for a specific purpose, to make our way through the maze of informal interactions. And like all typologies, it is somewhat contrived.

4. W.E. Moore lists the following modes of contacts and ranks them according to the frequency and the number of people involved. They include:
   1. Imperialism as colonization and indirect domination;
   2. Other wars, conquests, and military occupation;
   3. Cultural imperialism in the guise of missionary religions;
   4. Mass migration;
   5. Individual migration;
   6. Economic trade;
   7. Tourism;
   8. Transferred labour;

5. Chabod has that to say on the dismemberment of the Roman empire: "present-day thought .... seeks to prove that the barbarian invaders, far from making tabula rasa of all the achievements of ancient civilization, accepted, meekly and fully, the legacy of Rome" (1958, p.149). See also Guizot, 1985.

6. Indeed, it appears that the 'pax Americana', more than its predecessor, the 'pax Britanica', was conditioned by the fact that many of the major European powers as well as Japan were direct occupation by the end of the war. On the subject see: Armstrong et. al., 1985; Berghahn, 1986; Wall, 1989.

7. On Japan see: Johnson, 1982; Morishima, 1982; Armstrong et al. op. cit. chpts. 4 - 6.

8. "External conflict between states form the shape of the state. I am assuming this 'shape' to mean -- by contrast with internal social development -- the external configuration, size of a state, its contiguity (whether strict or loose), and even its ethnic composition" (Hintze, 1975, p.160).

The basic variables were already outlined by Aristotle: "Just as there are four chief divisions of the mass of the population -- farmers, mechanics, shopkeepers, and day-labourers -- so there are four kinds of military forces -- cavalry, heavy infantry, light armed troops, and the navy. Where the territory is suitable for the use of cavalry force for security, and it is only men of
large means who can afford to breed and keep horses. Where territory is suitable for the use of heavy infantry, the next and less exclusive form of oligarchy is natural: service in the heavy infantry is a matter for the well-to-do rather than for the poor. Light armed troops, and the navy are wholly on the side of democracy" (as quoted in Finer, 1975, p.84). See also Elias, 1939; Howard, 1976; Mann, 1986; McMeill, 1983.

9. Leading the field are the studies in anthropology: Beals, 1953; Bidney, 1946; Boaz, 1924; Coss, 1985; Hechter, 1975; Herskovits, 1937; Leslie, 1945; Gilmore, 1955; Goldenweisser, 1925, 1937; Hodgen, 1950; Jeffereys, 1948; Levi-Strauss, 1937; Mauss, 1968; Radfield et. al. 1937.

10. There are essentially two basic notions of diffusion. The notion attributed to Durkheim that the diffusion of cultural traits works their way like osmosis (Hechter, 1975, p.24), and the ideas of modernization theorists who regard diffusion as automatic and irreversible process (Ibid. p.24).

Otherwise the argument has been that diffusion is never a straightforward affair. In the words of Kingsley Davis: "Diffusion turns out to be a complex abstraction, not a separate entity. No idea, no practice, no technique ever passed from one society to another without some modification being added to it. The borrowed culture trait must be somehow modified and adapted so as to fit into the existing cultural context. It follows that diffusion and invention are always inseparably mixed" (as quoted in Strasser & Randall, 1981, p.74). On the subject see also Bertrand, 1967; Lowie, 1940.

11. The point is echoed by Alexander Gerschenkron: "The typical situation in a backward country prior to the initiation of considerable industrialization processes may be described as characterized by tension between the actual state of economic activities in the country and the existing obstacles to industrial development on the one hand, and the great promise inherent in such a development, on the other" (1962, p.8).

12. "Many disciplinary methods had long been in existence in monasteries, armies, workshops. But in the course of the seventeenth and eighteen centuries the disciplines became general formulas of domination ... I simply intend to map on a series of examples some of the essential techniques that most easily spread from one to another. These were always meticulous, often minute, techniques, but they had their importance: because they defined a certain mode of detailed political investment of the body, a 'new micro-physics!'" (Foucault, 1979, pp.137 - 144).

13. It should be understood that I am merely quoting Attali's opinion and it is not necessarily similar to mine.

14. "They (the Jews) undoubtedly contributed to Holland's increase trade with the iberian peninsula ... as well as to its trade with Italy ... Undoubtedly too, they were among the architects of the first colonial fortunes in America" (Braudel, 1979, II, p.159).
See also Battista, 1970; Maraval, 1960; On emigration see Thomas, 1972, 1973.


The series of concepts which have been presented thus far hold good, I would argue, for any attempt at creating a bridge between modern theories of the State and the study of International Relations. However, from now on it is necessary to develop the argument on the basis of more detailed propositions. In other words, it is necessary to continue on the basis of a specific theory of the state.

According to Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) there are currently five competing schools of theories of the state: pluralism, elite, marxism, neo-right and neo-pluralism, each of them boasting a series of significant thinkers. In reality, however, the choice is more restricted. Even a basic sociological anatomy of societies entails a discussion of a series of complex issues and there are very few comprehensive discussions which have attempted to synthesise them all under a unified framework. Of these, beyond a shade of a doubt the work of Nicos Poulantzas (1973, 1979) is the most important.

Poulantzas work is a milestone in political analysis. As he himself recognised, its strength lies not so much in its originality, although there is certainly no lack of that, but in his ability to synthesise modern Marxist thinking with recent developments in political science. In contrast with other major Marxist contributions of recent vintage such as the German Derivation school, and even the French school of regulation, Poulantzas dealt successfully, in my view, with the many faceted problems presented by the phenomena of state and power including what is of particular interest to students of International Relations, the geographical dimension. Although it is customary nowadays to play down Poulantzas' contribution, there is practically no major work, which has not been influenced by his it. It is for all these reasons that his work is eminently relevant to the study of International Relations.

In Poulantzas scheme, the State is not conceived as a real, organic entity, but rather as a complex process of articulation of various social practices. This permits us to conceptualise the external world
not as tangibly outside; we do not have to postulate a clear-cut division of the world into real entities. On the contrary, the very notions of internal and external become relative. The State is understood to denote simply the spatial dimension of the political process. The external world is an area which is external to the political process but which implicates it on many levels. This chapter presents the main features of this scheme.

7.1. Political Process and Global Analysis

Every scheme of inquiry into the nature of the political process reflects and derives its philosophical foundations from the more elementary normative and methodological conception of society. Therefore, a satisfactory understanding of such schemes can only be achieved once the method of construction of general social theories is understood properly.

In any global discussion of social phenomena two moments can be distinguished. The first consists of an analytical dissection of the totality of social life into more manageable practices or levels. The second involves the summation of these levels or practices into a new synthetic whole. The two practices are clearly interdependent. Nonetheless, this elementary strategy is not very well understood and is often confused with the secondary, if not less important, methodological issues which are concerned with the logical flow of conceptual arrangements.

In the work of Poulantzas the two strategies have been kept separate. However, perhaps because of the influence of Althusser, he makes explicit reference only to methodological issues. This has caused some confusion. Poulantzas distinguishes between two types of concepts which he terms 'real-concrete' and 'general-abstract' concepts Poulantzas, 1973, p.12).\textsuperscript{8} The allusion is to Marx's brief methodological discussion in the Grundrisse (1973a,p.101) which was interpreted by Althusser (1969;1970) and Poulantzas (1973) to mean that Marx prescribes a certain movement from the most abstract to the most concrete concept. Such interpretation is clearly an over-simplification and has been
subjected to scathing attacks by Mandel (1975) and Albritton (1986).

In actual fact, contrary to Poulantzas' own presentation, it appears that in his own work the real function of the progression from the abstract to the concrete is precisely the summation of various concepts into a global view. The real-concrete concepts pertain, according to Poulantzas, to objects that exist in the 'strong sense'. Of these he mentions only one, the social formation. In his words, "The only thing which really exists is a historically determined social formation, i.e. a social whole" (1973, p.15). However, the social formation is, of course, no more real than the mode of production or social classes. Thus its characterisation as existing in the 'strong sense' is not tenable. Rather, the social formation is the term chosen to depict the point of departure which is also the final aim of his analysis. This characterisation is significant and it is perhaps one of the major contributions of Poulantzas.

At the heart of the problem lies the question of what the correct unit of analysis for political science is. In the liberal tradition, the only one which developed systemic efforts on the subject, the tendency has been to pose some independent sphere of activity, the realm of political action or of the 'political system' as the proper subject matter of political analysis. The underlying aim was to locate and define, by methods of abstraction, homogenous sphere of activity which is called politics. Otherwise politics was seen simply as the study of the state (Easton, 1954).

In contrast to this, by placing the concept of the social formation at the centre, Poulantzas is not simply employing an expression used by Marx, but locates his subject-matter in a normatively neutral geographical area. The social formation, he argues, is an historically determined social whole "at a given moment in its historical existence: e.g. France under Louis Bonaparte, England during the Industrial Revolution" (1973, p.15). As a geographical area the terms suggest a conglomeration of various social practices which from a sociological point of view are not necessarily commensurable. In his words: "a social formation which is a real-concrete object and so always original
because singular, presents a particular combination, a specific over-lapping of several 'pure' modes of production" (1973, p.15).

The immediate suggestion is that this geographical unity is not of necessity homogenous. On the contrary, it is diversified and perhaps even incommensurable. It is interesting to note that of the leading thinkers only Braudel arrived at a practically similar conception of society. Braudel makes clear the significance of this conception:

"Shaped by centuries of sedimentation, destruction and germination, 'feudal' society was in fact a combination of at least five 'societies', five different hierarchies, existing side by side. The most ancient and fundamental of these, now dislocated, was seigniorial society....Less ancient, but with historical origin in the Roman Empire and spiritual roots plunging even further back, was the theocratic society constructed by the Roman church....Thirdly, a younger society...was taking shape around the territorial state....The fourth sub-sector was feudalism in the strict sense....Finally, the fifth and last system ... consisted of the towns" (1979, II, p.465).

There is no denying the important theoretical differences between Braudel and Poulantzas. Both agree, however, on the essential point that society is a 'set of sets', or an accumulation of practices.10 It is an aggregation of different people with different culture, etc. The difficulty lies in generalising upon the relationships between these various 'societies' within any given one. That is precisely the aim of Poulantzas scheme.

7.2. Social Structures

As said in the above, in any global discussion of social phenomena two moments can be distinguished. Accordingly, Poulantzas analysis sets off in two directions. The first investigates purified forms of social interactions; the second groups them together into a coherent picture. The final aim is to understand the dynamics of the social formation.

The first direction develops in a conventional manner. Poulantzas follows the methods of action theory wherein the social realm is
perceived as an infinite procession of diachronic as well as synchronic individual actions. By employing generalisation and reductionism, the aim of this methodology is to transpose these 'actions' to the realm of concepts, in the hope that they will not lose any of their essential characteristics in the process. To date, the most successful procedure consisted of the lateral mutilation of individual activities on the basis of its orientation and roles (Weber, 1978, chapter.1; Parsons, 1937). Accordingly, certain types of activities are categorized as 'political', whereas others are dubbed 'economics', 'cultural', and so on. These 'shreds' of individual action are then gathered together in what is called 'political', 'economic' or 'cultural' systems (Sorokin, 1941; Almond, 1956; Apter, 1973; Easton, 1979). The aim of the exercise is to discover the dynamics of these abstracted 'systems'.

Similarly, Poulantzas makes an original distinction between three 'practices', politics, economics, and ideology. The implication is that each of these levels is harmonised at least to a certain extent on the national plane (See Figure I, p.187). In other words, he accepts that there is something which may be described as a national economy, national ideology (or culture) and national politics or a political system. However, in contrast to traditional action theory, Poulantzas supplements these structures with a vertical framework which is called the mode of production, (See Figures II and III pp.187,8).

The gist of Marxist thought is that society is essentially a machine for the exploitation of one class by another (Casanova, 1971). That does not mean that other processes do not occur concomitantly. However, the conviction is that other processes are determined to a large extent by the exigencies of class struggle. Accordingly, the concept of the mode of production was proposed by Marx but has undergone a few changes since it is central to Marxist analysis.
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**Fig. (I)**

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**The politico-juridical superstructure**

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+-----------------+
| structure       |
+-----------------+
| mode of exploitation |
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**Fig. (II)**
The level of the structures

ruling/middle and working classes

mode of exploitation

economics

Ideology/culture

other modes of production

social formation

social formation

The Political scene

The level of class struggle

The level of the structures

Fig.(III)

politics

Fig.(I)

Fig.(IV)
In his famous Preface of 1859 Marx presents the classical definition of the mode of production:

"In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society... political consciousness arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life" (1963, p.67).

Althusser found these propositions ambiguous. The reference to "the anatomy of civil society" reflects a far too ordered and static notion of the social whole. Furthermore, the economic and social are not demarcated in precise terms. Indeed, the 'social' seems to be defining the 'economic'. In Althusser and Poulantzas' opinion a more rigorous reading reveals that Marx did not possess a simple base/superstructure metaphor of society but of an articulation of the economic, political and ideological practices in which the economic is determinant in the last resort.

Accordingly Poulantzas defines the mode of production as follows:

"Mode of production ... is a specific combination of various structures and practices which, in combination appear as so many instances or levels, i.e. as so many regional structures of this mode. A mode of production, as Engels states schematically, is composed of different levels or instances, the economic, political, ideological and theoretical... The type of unity which characterizes a mode of production is that of a complex whole dominated, in the last instance, by the economic" (1973, p.14).

The location of the mode of production at the heart of the Marxist analysis has sparked off the famous mode of production controversy (Foster-Carter, 1978; Hindess & Hirst, 1977; Wolpe, 1980). However, this debate is not central to our concern here as the principle objection to this concept lies in its applicability to the study of non-capitalist societies (Albirtton, 1986; Bailey & Llobera, 1981;
Giddens, 1973; Hindess and Hirst, 1975; Pastoral, 1979). Nonetheless, the term 'economics' has undergone major changes since the days of Marx and it is not possible to equate it any more with the process of exploitation. I will define therefore the heart of the mode of production not simply as 'economics' but as the 'mode of exploitation', the method by which surplus value or surplus product is extracted (Figure II).

A century or so after Marx, it has become clear that the capitalist mode of production underwent at least two if not three major transformations, or as Poulantzas name them, stages. Hence we distinguish the classical or competitive stage, the 'imperialist' stage whose origins can be traced back to 1870 (Lenin, 1977), and the stage of late capitalism which emerged after the Second World War (Mandel, 1975). Apart from these one may distinguish many phases of capitalist development.

Within a given social formation, these various stages and phases are articulated (or unified) by one dominant mode and stage. But as these various modes are located within one national space, they can never be pure. They are distorted and the lines of contact between them are precisely these economic, political and ideological structures (See figure III). Nonetheless, the higher visibility of the political, economic and cultural systems should not imply that they are the proper unit of analysis of social investigation as the Structural-Functionalists seem to presume. Quite to the contrary, these 'systems' exert only secondary, distorting effects upon the primary units of modes of productions. In other words, only the modes and stages of production have their own intrinsic dynamics of development, as is amply demonstrated by Marx in *Capital* (Sekine, 1980).

The relationships between the various structures within any mode of production are linear (modes of production are in fact defined in terms of the articulation of these structures), nevertheless, the distorting effect within the social formation guarantee a certain independence. Accordingly, Poulantzas defines the relationships between the various structures by the term 'relative autonomy'.
So far the scheme is static, what is missing is the subject. The process of exploitation which is at the heart of the definition of the mode of production defines also social classes as the 'bearers' of these structure. Poulantzas supplements therefore the level of the structures with another level which he terms the level of class struggle (Figure, IV). The relations between the two levels are characterized by the term 'as if': Everything happens, says Poulantzas, as if "social classes were the result of an ensemble of structures and of their relations" (1973, p.63). The idea behind such characterization is rather simple. It amount to the affirmation that there is no mode of production without its social classes, and conversely, there are no 'classes' as such without modes of production.

In actual fact, masked by an elaborate and somewhat obscure language, there lies basically Marx's exposition of the capitalist mode of production in the Manifesto. Marx presents the growth and eventual demise of the capitalist mode of production on three distinct planes. He discusses first of all what Poulantzas calls, the level of the structures:

"Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn reacted on the extension of industry" (p.69).

Evolution at the level of the Structures is accompanied by a concomitant development at the level of class structure.

"In proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages. We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange" (p.69).

The experience at the two levels is then mirrored on another plane which is dubbed by Poulantzas the 'political scene'. The political scene is the level where the interests generated at the level of the
structures and class struggle are articulated in the form of 'real' political actors (political parties, unions, lobbies, etc.).""'}

"Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the medieval commune; here an independently urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there a taxable 'third estate' of the monarchy (as in France) ...the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of modern industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway" (Ibid. p.69).

The political scene is epitomised in the state which is a condensation of the whole social formation (Jessop, 1985, pp. 337–9 and Figure IV). As social formations contain more than one mode or stage of production, the class scene becomes very complex. As a corollary to this, we cannot speak of one cohesive ruling class, nor for that matter of cohesive working and middle classes. Each of these groupings comprise various fractions and groups. However, just as social formations are unified under one dominant mode or stage of production, so the dominant classes are unified in a 'bloc of power' by a hegemonic fraction.¹⁸

The notion of the bloc of power and of the hegemonic fraction is one of the central innovations of Poulantzas scheme. He himself claims to be following Gramsci. However, it is quite clear that the major element here is in fact the debate in liberal literature between pluralism and elite theories.¹⁹ With the concept of the bloc of power Poulantzas is able to synthesise the Marxist notion of a ruling class with the pluralists and elite theories pre-occupation with the practical problems faced by such an 'elite'.

In Poulantzas view, the State does not function simply as the tool of the ruling classes, but reflects to a certain extent a wide range of interests including those of the working classes.²⁰ The State is not simply a tool of class rule, it is a condensation of a class society. It must be seen, therefore, as 'relatively autonomous' in relations to
7.3. The relativity of the social structure

In the analytical distinction between the levels of the structures, class structure and the 'political scene', there is an implied gap much exploited by Marxists and their opponents alike. In his broad exposition of history, Marx certainly suggested that the three levels evolve concomitantly. However, a friction may develop in the gap, a friction which he describes at times as a contradiction between the old and the new and which serves as a secondary source of dynamics in the Marxist scheme of things.

For instance, in the famous 'Preface' of 1859 Marx writes that:

"At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the property relations within which they had been at work before ....Then occurs a period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed" ('Preface', 1963, pp. 67,68).

This gap is utilized by Poulantzas for other purposes too. The co-existence of the various modes and stages of production in one social formation provides a plausible account for the plethora of classes and fractions. Furthermore, the 'friction' itself, claims Poulantzas, is the bearer of fractions and groups who play a political role (Poulantzas, 1974b, Introduction). In actual fact, the very mechanism of representation of the various interests in the State generates its own play of contradictions: just as two-dimensional snapshots are distortions of their three-dimensional subject-matters, so is the social formation 'distorted' in the very act of condensation (or 'representation'). Consequently, the political scene may actually reflect in a distorted manner only development in society at large.

All in all, in contrast with the rigidity of over-deterministic assertions of traditional Marxism, Poulantzas and Althusser assign a prominent place to historical contingency. The Marxist whole, argues
Althusser: "is different from the Hegelian or Leibnitz, it is a whole whose unity far from being the expressive or spiritual unity, is constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity of a structural whole containing what can be called levels or instances which are distinct and 'relatively autonomous' and co-exist within this complex structural unity, articulated with one another according to specific determination, fixed in the last instance by the level or instance of the economy" (Althusser, 1970, p.95).

The relations between all these levels are conceptualised by the term 'articulation' (Althusser, 1970a; Wolpe, 1980), with the implicit suggestion that when the 'articulation' of the level is successful the social formation is agile. When articulation is not successful the result is the various forms of 'exceptional' states: Bonapartism, military dictatorships, and Fascism (Poulantzas, 1973, 1974a, 1975).

The concept of articulation is not very well developed. However, the fault does not lie in the concept itself, but with political analysis which has not developed much since the days of publication of *Political Power and Social Classes*. The three concepts of the social formation, the bloc of power and of articulation, constitute the essential ingredients for a political analysis which does not take the State as an organic entity.

The uniqueness of the Poulantzasian scheme is that by superimposing two approaches, namely, the layered structure perspective of Action theory animated by a vertical movement from base to superstructure, all lying underneath a 'topographical' representation of society as a pile of modes and stages of production, he achieves a three dimensional idiographic 'model' of society. As a corollary to that, the lines of contacts between societies are increased exponentially. Indeed, as the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, a whole new range of 'links' become discernible under this model. On top of this, as suggested in chapter four, the 'volume' of the body 'society' (which is represented by its level of discreteness) changes constantly. The national boundary becomes only one, albeit the more visible parameter of closure.
NOTES

1. Which includes:
   a. An outline of its economic base. The ratio of industry, commerce, agriculture and finance and the relations between them;
   b. The constitution of its ruling class;
   c. Its class structure;
   d. Its dominant ideology and relation to other ideologies;
   e. Geographical analysis, the relation of city, country, the level of urbanisation etc.
   f. Its political structure, or the political system. The party system, etc.

   For an anatomy of a society see: Bottomore & Brym, 1989; Coates, Gordon and Bush, 1985;

2. Since the publication of Political Power and Social Classes there have been many developments in theory of the State. Poulantzas theory inspired the German derivation school (see note (2) chapter two) and the French school of regulation (see discussion in the Introduction) as well as major contributors such as O'Connor (1984) and Offe (1984). There are also signs of interesting syntheses between system approach and the structuralist theory of the State (Willke, 1986). Quite apart, the pluralism has been re-invigorated in a form which has been branded neo-pluralism (see Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). Similarly, elite theories found new and powerful exponents (see chapter one).

   However, none of these works and schools of thought achieved a comprehensive synthesis comparable to Poulantzas' work. Thus, in spite of its problems, it is still the best theory at hand.


4. See note (2) chapter two.

5. Both the German derivation and the French school of regulation have not aimed at a general theory of the State. On the French school see Introduction.

6. As the debate on the merit of Poulantzas' work is, and will remain unresolved, there is no need to pretend that all is well or that there are no difficulties. However, ultimately, the work here will be judged not on the basis of Poulantzas work but because it allows a link with the theories of International Relations.
7. "The State is neither a thing -- instrument that may be taken away, nor a fortress that may be penetrated by a wooden horse, not yet a safe that may be cracked by burglary; it is the heart of the exercise of political power" (p.81). Discussion in Easton op. cit and Jessop op. cit.

8. "When we consider a given country politico-economically, we begin with its population, its distribution among classes, town, country, the coast, the different branches of production, export and import annual production and consumption, commodity process etc. It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, and with the real preconditions .... However, on closer examination this proves false .... The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse ... (Marx, Grundrisse, 1973, pp.100 - 1).


10. Braudel never clarified his theory of the State. In spite of differences of language and terminology, he seemed to have share many of Poulantzas ideas. I am not aware of any study on the subject.

11. "Society ... is an abstraction. Although indispensable for practical purposes and certainly very useful for a rough and preliminary survey of the phenomena that surrounds us, it is no real object. It does not exist outside and in addition to the individuals and the processes among them" (Simmel, 1959, p.4).

   According to Weber "The empirical material which underlies the concepts of sociology consists to a very large extent, though by no means exclusively, of the same concrete processes of action which are dealt with by historians" (1978, p.4).

   Durkheim agrees, but adds that sociology is concerned only with certain activities: "On l'emploie couramment pour désigner peu près tous les phénomènes qui se passent à l'intérieur de la société, pour peu qu'ils présentent, avec une certain généralité, quelque intérêt social ... Mais, en réalité, il y a dans toute société un group déterminé de phénomènes qui se distinguent par des caractères tranchés de ceux qui étudient les autres sciences de la nature" (1937, p.3).

12. "The object of historical materialism is the study of different structures and practices (the economic, politics, ideology) which are connected yet distinct" (Poulantzas, 1973, p.12).

13. "The Marxist whole is different from the Hegelian or Leibniz, it is a whole whose unity far from being the expressive or spiritual unity, is constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity of a structural whole containing what can be called levels or instances which are distinct and "relatively autonomous" and co-exist within this complex structural unity, articulated with one another according to specific determination, fixed in the last instance by the level or instance of the economy" (Althusser, 1970, p.96).

14. On Marxism and exploitation see chapter two.
15. "The dominance of one mode of production over the others in a social formation cause the matrix of this mode of production (i.e. the particular reflection of determination by the economic elements in the last instance by which it is specified) to mark the whole of the formation" (Poulantzas, 1973, p.15).

16. *Political Power and Social Classes* is quite clearly a schematic endeavour -- it is a scheme for relating various practices within a social formation and its governing institutions. Of necessity such enterprise is static because schemes are static. The problem, however, is that the relative autonomy of the State is deduced from the scheme and is not proved. Consequently it is not clear whether the 'relative autonomy' is a concrete phenomena or whether it is a theoretical device. I take the relative autonomy to be the relative autonomy of the state apparatus vis-a-vis any one class or fraction. An historical development peculiar to the establishment of the State in the West. See note (27) chapter one.

17. It is with the introduction of the concept of the 'political scene' (Poulantzas, 1973, pp.240 -5) that Poulantzas brings into Marxist thought the ideas of the Structural-Functionalist (Almond, 1956, 1960; Apter, 1973; Easton, 1979). For further development see Mouzelis, 1986.

18. Many works since the publication of *Political Power and Social Classes* were dedicated to the study of the block of power. See Poulantzas, 1974a; Coates et. al. 1985; Mouzelis, 1986. On the bloc of power see Poulantzas, 1973 pp. 229 -254.

19. On Gramsci’s relation with the Italian elite theorists (Pareto, Mosca) see Bellamy, 1987.

20. "The line of demarcation between domination and subordination cannot be marked out from a viewpoint of dualistic struggle .... The reasons for the appearance of a bloc of power is in the structure of the capitalist state that it has as an effect the coexistence of the political domination of several classes and fractions of classes" (Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 229 - 30).
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE VERTICAL LINKS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE 'MIDDLEMEN'

As it was argued earlier, the literature concerned with informal interactions is vast but uneven. Some aspects of these interactions such as dependency, colonialism, military and economic competition, etc. have been explored in great detail, whereas others, such as cultural links, are still very much underdeveloped. The problem, however, is that each of these areas have been analyzed separately with no serious attempt at:
(a) relating them to each other, and
(b) integrating them with the domestic political process.

The argument of the Thesis is that informal interactions forge links between groups of people residing in different social formations, and a significant number of these links may be subsumed in such a way that they correspond to Poulantzas' scheme. This shared common ground may be grasped when the following steps are taken:
(a) These links are not independent of their interactions with the domestic political process. Thus, in contrast to the presentation of informal interactions in chapter six, informal links will be discussed here in the context of their effects on the domestic political process.
(b) To do this, we need to extract their form from the overall socio-political context. Theoretically speaking, a socio-economic context consist of forms, contents and power relationships. Historical studies in political economy concentrate on the content of international trade -- what is being traded, by whom, etc. (Mandel, 1975). Whereas historical political studies centre on the context of power relationships. Only structural investigations' aim at establishing relationships between abstract forms.
(c) These 'groups' of people which are gathered together here as the bearer of these links should be understood in terms of Jean-Paul Sartre's concept of a 'serie' and not of a 'nexus' (Sartre, 1960). Sartre's original example of a serie was that of the bus queue. The members of such a primitive group have only the bus as a common object of unification. They relate to each other only in so far as they all relate to a common external object (Howarth-Williams, 1977, p.34). Nexus, on the other hand is a group wherein "each member of such a
group interiorises every other members' syntheses of the group. A perfectly formed group, then, for each member is both the synthesis of the multiplicity of the members, and the synthesis of the multiplicity of the synthesis made and maintained by each member" (Ibid, pp.34,5).

The object of unification of the serie, i.e. content, will remain outside the scope of this work. Where the members, or at least some members, of a serie are aware of their object of unification, one may expect the translation of this awareness to political practice. This makes our job, as academics, who, generally speaking, prefer to deal with documents, so much easier to perceive and write about. However, wherever the serie is unable for some reason or another to organise itself into a political force, the link is nevertheless still there, although it is so much more difficult to ascertain and document.

(d) The forms themselves are nothing but schematic abstractions. They are accompanied by all sorts of residues that we shall have to neglect in order to apprehend them in their purity. The only reason to insist on these as the building blocks of the study of International Relations is their connection to Poulantzas' scheme (Chapter seven).

(e) Consequently, these links are grasped only in thought: in no case one may find the vertical or horizontal links in their purity. They may easily be perceived, and indeed, they can be quantified, but they are not like objects in nature.

Accordingly, in chapters eight and nine I shall present two, concepts of informal interactions. The first groups the research which focuses on unequal power relationships on a world scale, these are the links of dependence, but I shall call them henceforth, vertical links. The second gathers under one heading the diverse forms of equal structural relationships. These are links of competition, or horizontal links. Chapter ten will relate these two concepts with the Poulantzasian scheme for the study of the political process.

In this chapter I will aim to demonstrate that:

(a) disparate phenomena such as dependency, colonialism and trade may be discussed under the term vertical links;
(b) that vertical links modify both dominant and dominated formations
simultaneously, and;

(c) therefore vertical links, or the principle of the 'middlemen' is much more pervasive than previously imagined.

8.1. A brief Survey of The Principle of the 'middlemen'

The pervasiveness of vertical links may be appreciated when two seemingly unrelated phenomena, the centre-periphery pattern which accompanies commercial relationships, and the various forms of 'indirect rule' characteristic of the colonial period and the maritime adventures, can be shown to interact with the domestic political process in precisely the same manner. Stripped of political, ideological or moral connotations, they may be seen to link groups of people residing in different formations to another. They form therefore one type of universal link among social formations.

In his classic *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967) André Gunder Frank describes the spatial socio-economic effects of the world capitalist system. He argues that "metropolitan centre-peripheral satellite relationships, like the process of surplus expropriation/appropriation, run through the entire world capitalist system in chain-like fashion from its uppermost metropolitan world centre, through each of the various national, regional, local and enterprise centres" (1967, p.10). This description bears more than a passing resemblance to the pyramidal ideal-type representation of the medieval polity as a succession of lord-vassal personal dependencies ending ultimately with the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope.\(^5\) It is also reminiscent of the hierarchical structure of modern bureaucracy.

The resemblance is not accidental. In all three cases a complex hierarchical structure emerges on the basis of a simpler format of vertical dependencies: the complex structure is maintained by an aggregation of direct relationships between individuals or groups who function as 'middlemen', or glue, tying a larger number of people to each other. The global effect of these links is to amass an enormous social power through the vertical relationships. Karen Field explains very well the power relationships amassed through the vertical link:
"Indirect rule was a way of making the colonial state a consumer of power generated within the customary order. It did not transfer real power from the Crown to African rulers. Just the inverse: Real power issued from the ruled. Dame Margery Perham once used a metaphor that is neat, although it turns the reality upside-down: 'Chiefs took the strain of indirect rule, breaking down, like human transformers, the powerful current form above and distributing it in voltage that their people could take'. Turned right-side-up, the image of electrical power generated and distributed is apt" (Fields, 1985, pp.31,2).

Elias’s (1982) description of Charlemagne’s empire is as good a starting point as any for a survey of the principle of the 'middlemen':

"The emperor and king could not supervise the whole empire alone ... Therefore, he sent trusted friends and servants into the country to uphold the law in his stead, to ensure the payment of tributes and the performance of services, and to punish resistance. He did not pay for their services in money...The earls or dukes, or whatever the representatives of the central authority were called, also fed themselves and their retinue from the land with which the central authority had invested them" (p.16).

These 'trusted friends', then, functioned as the nucleus of a hierarchical structure which was basically an extension of the same principle. This pattern enjoyed great success all over Europe. It underpins the English political system, with its Justices of the Peace and sheriffs operating in the counties as independent and self-financing arms of the state down to the late nineteenth century (Smith, G.R., 1984). In France a different arrangement (although based on a similar principle) emerged towards the end of the Hundred Years’ Wars, a vertical bureaucratic structure (to be reformed later by Richelieu) centring around the intendants (the intendant de Justice, de Police and de Finances), functionaries dispatched with omnibus powers into the provinces (Anderson, 1974, p.96). The intendantur der Armee, again on the same principle, developed as the nucleus of a new central government in Prussia (Bruford, 1970).

The principle which served kings so well at home, was extended to be utilised in the colonial adventures. Cortes’s extraordinary exploits cannot be explained without a reference to it. In his political
astuteness, Cortes managed to enlist indigenous tribes against the Aztecs. In fact, by the time he arrived at Teothitachlan (modern Mexico City), his own army of four hundred men was augmented by a local army 40,000 strong, which, incidently, he shrewdly brushed aside for the final push into the city (Madariaga, 1942; Toscano, 1977). Pizarro, too, with his hundred and sixty men, employed native tribes against the Incas in precisely the same manner (Hemming, 1970).

The principle of the middlemen also aided other maritime powers. According to Simkin, it underpinned the Portuguese empire:

"Many Indians developed privileged partnership arrangements with Portuguese officials or merchants and, for political reasons, free licenses had to be granted to a number of Indian rulers....There were never more than 10,000 Portuguese in Asia" (1968, p.182).

In turn, the Portuguese became

"a model for the Dutch East India Company which later ousted them. Treaties were imposed on local rulers for supplying produce at prices below market levels. The pass system brought customs dues and business to Portuguese harbours, reserved trade in arms, pepper, and a few other products to Portuguese ships and excluded Indian or Moslem ships" (Ibid. pp.181,2).

The Dutch on the other hand, preferred a more formal system of 'indirect rule'

"At almost all times it has been a fundamental axiom of Dutch policy to utilise wherever possible the existing native chiefs or headmen, operating through some modified version of the existing institutions, as the intermediaries between the supreme Dutch authority and the mass of the population" (Emerson, 1964, p.411).

Indeed " throughout its long reign in Java the Company maintained the heads of the native aristocracy as the instrument by means of which it exerted its control over the populace, and on the Company's disintegration they continued to be the intermediaries between the Dutch and their native subjects"(Ibid. p.416).

Utrecht reiterates the same point and places it in its social context:

"As early in the days of the great trading companies, such as
the British East India Company (EIC) and the Dutch VOC, foreign trade helped create a new social class of middle traders, a petty bourgeoisie of Asian origin engaged in the collecting trade of commodities and the distributive commerce of consumer goods supplied by the foreign merchants. The foreign trading houses were very much in need of such a comprador class, and it happened in many an Asian and African country that they even imported the middle traders from, in particular, China and India, when it was obvious that no local middle traders were at hand or could be trusted" (1978, p.65).

The British, too, made use of the principle 'middlemen' quite extensively. According to Robinson and Gallagher,

"<i>deally, the British merchant and investor would take into partnership the portenos of the Argentine, the planters of Alabama, the railway builders of Belgium, as well as the bankers of Montreal and the shippers of Sidney; together they would develop the local and metropolitan economies. But this collaboration meant much more than profits. A common concern for peace and liberal reform would knit together the enlightened groups of all these communities" (1961, p.3).

A particularly fascinating story, which might shed light on the wider context of the vertical link, is reported by Veena Talwar Oldenburg in his fascinating book: The Making of Colonial Lucknow, 1856-1877. Oldenburg describes the new arrangement imposed by the British Raj upon Lucknow, an imperial city located about three hundred miles north of Delhi, following the 1857 revolt. The person sent to oversee the reconstruction of British power was not the sort normally associated with political tasks. He was merely a captain in the engineering corps named Napier. However, he succeeded where a political commissar would probably have failed miserably.

Napier approached his task as an engineer. First, the city had to be made safe: A "feature of the old city that proved fatal to British forces was the innumerable cul-de-sacs in which in the residential parts of the mohalla meandering lanes would abruptly end" (p.39). Napier spent, therefore, vast sums of money creating new wide streets traversing the whole city through which troops would quickly pass. The city was then parcelled into administrative cantons, and a residential area for the use of European non-military personnel was created."
The city had to be orderly too, the police were transformed, and a municipal committee, an institution that would look after the civic affairs, came to Lucknow. But by far his most controversial move was the cleaning of the city: "The high mortality rate of European troops during the mutiny retold the horror story of the Crimean War: more men died of disease than in combat" (p.96). Hence the creation of a sanitation system for which a census had to be taken. It was rumoured -- and this almost sparked off a new rebellion -- that the British were interested in the precise number of local virgins for their own use. However, the real issue was that with the sanitation system buildings were placed under municipal control.

The city was forced for the first time to pay for itself: "The citizens of Lucknow had no experience of direct taxation under the nawabs. On the contrary, the city had been supported by funds from the state coffers, which in turn had been replenished annually by the revenue from the countryside" (p.145,6). Last but not least, the city must be loyal. The spatial and morphological changes were not enough to ensure stability. The very nature of colonial rule proved precarious:

"Only a handful of British civilians replaced the Oudh court in a hostile city.... These two decades also saw the transformation of the taluqdars, the larger landowners in Oudh, into an urban elite group. Their infiltration into the civic arena was sponsored by the British, and they increasingly became absentee landlords with their political and social interests centred in the capital.... The British skilfully tried to refurbish the dwindling elite ranks with men who had a permanent stake in the stability of their Raj in Oudh" (p.182).

There is always more to the vertical link than meets the eye, as the story of Lucknow makes clear. However, like many observers before and after him, Oldenburg seems to agree that underpinning the process of colonisation was the making of a class structure amenable to British dominance: He concludes,

"The argument so far has been that under the patronage of the British, the taluqdars slowly legitimised their status as an elite group by acts of philanthropy, acquisition of property, and efforts at cultural assimilation in a city where their presence was once anathema" (p.230).
Although in a very different context and for different purposes, the principle of the middlemen is also associated with the operation of modern transnational corporations. They too, construct world-wide 'networks' of vertical links:

"For their operations in countries other than those of their parent companies," writes Utrecht, "Transnational corporations need the close co-operation of certain groups of people among the elites in the host countries of their subsidiaries...we call them compradors, and because of their dealings with foreign corporations the term 'corporate comprador' is most appropriate. Compradors are indigenous (local) persons who voluntarily serve foreign (capitalist) interests. Where it does not exist the foreign simply create it" (1978 p.87).

There is an exhaustive amount of evidence to support Utrecht's thesis. In the annex to this chapter I reproduce a translation from the French of a compilation made by Guir and Crener (1984) of the various methods of and reasons for international investments of transnational corporations.

8.2. Restructurations affect both sides

Whereas the impact of the vertical links upon the dependent social formations is well documented, their effects upon the 'dominant' formations has received less attention. In actual fact, as much as dependent formations are shaped internally into a structure of dependency, so are dominant formations moulded into a particular pattern of relationship with the world market. When circumstances change, it is more often the dominant which find it particularly difficult to re-structure and accommodate these changes. I will cite here two very well known examples.

Spain's rapid decline in the seventeenth century from a leading power in Europe to a peripheral one has been a paradigmatic case. Perry Anderson (1974) summarises the widely held view that it was precisely the success of Spain which led to her eventual downfall. From the 1560's onwards, he argues, the multiple effects of the American Empire on Spanish absolutism became increasingly determinant for its future (p.70), for it provided Hispanic Absolutism with a plentiful and
permanent extraordinary income that was wholly outside the conventional ambit of State revenues in Europe (p.71):

"For the first half of the 16th century", Anderson continues, "the moderate level of shipments <of gold and silver> (with a higher gold component) provided a stimulus to Castilian exports, which quickly responded to the price inflation that followed the advent of colonial treasure....However, there were two fatal twists in this process for the Castilian economy as a whole. Firstly, increased colonial demand led to further conversion of land away from cereal production, to wine and olives. This reinforced the already disastrous trend encouraged by the monarchy towards a contraction of wheat output at the expense of wool...The combined result of these pressures was to make Spain a major grain-importing country for the first time by the 1570's. The structure of Castilian rural society was now already unlike anything else in Western Europe....Most striking of all, the Spanish censuses of 1571 and 1586 revealed a society in which a mere one-third of the male population was engaged in agriculture at all; while no less than two-fifths were outside any direct economic production -- a premature and bloated 'tertiary sector' of Absolutism Spain which prefigured the secular stagnation to come.... Accelerating inflation drove up the costs of production of the textile industry, which operated within very rigid technical limits, to a point where Castilian cloths were eventually being priced out of both colonial and metropolitan markets. Dutch and English interlopers started to cream off the American demand" (1974, pp.72,73).

A similar tale is recounted by J.A. Hobson (1988) in relation to Great Britain. In his view,

"although the new Imperialism <of the late nineteenth century> has been bad business for the nation, it has been good business for certain classes and certain trades within the nation" (1988, p.46). "Some of these trades," he goes on,"especially the shipbuilders, boiler making, and gun and ammunition making trades, are conducted by large firms with immense capital, whose heads are well aware of the uses of political influence for trade purposes. These men are Imperialists by conviction; a pushful policy is good for them (p.49)... Still more dangerous the special interest of the financier, the general dealer in investments" (p.56).

Nairn's analysis of contemporary Britain follows in the same vein. Why is it, asks Nairn, that in Britain the development of modern industry and techniques of production were retarded? The reason, he maintains,
are to be found in

"Britain's prior involvement in an older web of external relations, in a system, now archaic, to which capitalists had adapted themselves only too well .... The role of world banker has proved the toughest, most resistant section of imperialism....The elements of this profane structure are the body of foreign sterling investments, the general employment of sterling as a trading medium.... are controlled or coordinated by the city of London, its material sources of strength are the tin and rubber of Malaysia, the oil of the Middle-East, and the gold of South Africa and, of course, the British domestic economy" (p.5).

8.3. Dependency and the Vertical links

A great deal of work on unequal structural relationships has been conducted within the frameworks of Dependency theory/imperialism and the study of colonialism. Whereas the latter are almost exclusively historical accounts of the colonial period, studies of imperialism and dependency have sought to develop general conceptual frameworks. Again, much of the literature on imperialism follows the work of Lenin (1977) and aims at identifying the particulars of the capitalist mode of production. The literature which discusses imperialism as relationships between social formations is not sufficiently distinct from that of dependency theory, to which I shall now turn.

In accordance with the 'nationalistic' perspective which permeates all social sciences, most research into unequal structural relationships tends to concentrate upon global relationships between social formations to the neglect of the much larger number of informal links between individuals, companies and social groups. Consequently, the legacy of Dependency theory is ambiguous, to say the least. The general impression one gets from reading the literature is one of crude reductionism. This is due partly to the confusion of the concept of capitalism, which is a mode of production, and dependency, which alludes to the relation between social formations. The result is that it seems as if dependent formations are dependent vis-a-vis 'capitalism', which is after all an impersonal mode of production.
However, a careful reading reveals a much subtler approach. As mentioned in the introduction, dependency theorists extended the neo-classical concept of international division of labour into the social and political realms. Their contention was that such a division of labour patterns the class relations and indeed, the class structure of each individual country. It is the domestic class structure, burdened with international alliances among classes and fraction which causes, so is believed, the underdevelopment of a large majority of the countries in the world. Thus, the message of dependency is twofold. Firstly, that there are 'informal' vertical ties linking classes residing in different social formations. Secondly, that as a result, powerful fractions of the ruling classes are excessively dependent to the detriment of their own society on their connection to the 'world-market'.

Dependency theory has attracted a lot of criticism of late. This is partly due to the spectacular success of export-led growth of the NICS on the one hand, and the utter failure of sub-Saharan African States on the other, which, for all intents and purposes, were abandoned by the main international conglomerates (Jackson, 1987). The main line of attack, nonetheless, is theoretical in nature. Most of the criticism was directed at the claim that the world-market, or the international division of labour, is more powerful than domestic class structure and so permanently blocks any possibility of development (Frank, 1978b). In the meantime, however, almost by default, the thesis of the existence of informal or structural relationship on a world scale has been generally accepted.

A similar fate befell studies of colonialism. There is an intense if unresolved debate concerning its long-term effects upon colonised peoples. As a result, much of the discussion degenerates into mutual recrimination. In this atmosphere, the international links which were forged between people residing in different formations have been almost forgotten.

I propose to replace here the concept of dependency with the more cumbersome notion of a 'vertical link'. An explanation is due.
'Dependency' is an ambiguous term, it describes a process, a relationship, a state of affairs, a condition of a formation as well as its causes and consequences. Thus, whereas the term is excellent for rhetorical uses (Warren, 1980), it is less so as an analytical tool. Let us examine the various meanings of the term 'dependency'.

Writers on dependency always stress that underdevelopment is not merely a moment in the history of a formation, but a dynamic condition, a process. This process, it is argued, is the result of a particular form of integration of a society into the world-economy. Accordingly, dependency is seen as the external condition causing underdevelopment. This external force may either take the shape of an identifiable 'dominant' formation, or where a clear candidate for such title cannot be found, the world market is considered as the external force. Although the two cases may appear to be similar, conceptually they are rather different. For whereas in the first case the condition of dependency may be defined in precise terms because the formation's socio-economic structure may be seen as an appendage to a dominant formation, in the second case the condition of dependency may be defined only by contrasting it to those countries which were fortunate enough to be 'advanced' or 'centers' at that particular conjuncture. However, the definition of the 'advanced' or 'centre' itself is not a straightforward affair, for many studies have demonstrated that the factors which go into making a particular country 'advanced' at any historical moment are conjunctural to a great extent (Aglietta, 1974; Braudel, 1979, vol. III; Lipietz, 1987; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980). Consequently, the definition of a 'dependency' condition is in fact an enumeration of various unhappy coincidences: dependency and underdevelopment are defined in relation to the 'advanced' which, in turn, is defined in contrast to dependency. We enter therefore an analytical loop that makes it difficult to examine each case on its own.

Let us move to the particulars of a dependency situation. Although dependency refers to the overall condition of a formation, one can distinguish at least three if not unrelated, at least separate situations of dependency. To begin with, virtually all those countries whose overall situation may outwardly correspond to that of 'dependen-
ncy', that is, countries which are excessively dependent on the world market, but which were able to extricate themselves from poverty, beginning with nineteenth century Prussia and the United States and twentieth century Japan, the NICs, or present-day Canada, were able to do so by utilizing the state apparatus, i.e. by a particular organisation and mobilisation of their societies. The ability or inability to do so, as far as it refers to the relationships with the external world, may be called, for lack of better terms, 'political dependency'.

Secondly, dependency is attributed largely to the penetration of a dependent formation by the agents of an advance formation, be they a colonial administration or a modern transnational corporations. The vertical links is dominated in this case by the centre. The effects of penetration by these corporations are rather different and could be resisted differently from cases of 'inverse dependency'.

Inverse dependency arise when a social formation is relatively underdeveloped because of the sort of products it exports. For instance, the production of coffee or tea requires relatively little in terms of production techniques and size of farm. Consequently, when such sectors dominate an the economy, they may hinder the development of modern industry. That is rather different from cases when a sector is dominated by a foreign company. Inverse dependency denotes therefore a vertical link dominated in the periphery.

Both types of vertical links do not imply, by themselves, that the social formation is underdeveloped. In the words of Delacroix "The idea that specialization in export of raw materials has adverse effects on economic growth and development is supported by little empirical evidence" (1980, p.155). Nor does for that matter foreign penetration necessarily inhibits local bourgeoisie (Brym, 1989). None of the matrices of dependency are necessarily correlated with underdevelopment. Indeed, vertical links are rife in the relations of the advanced to each other. Their correlation with underdevelopment can be gauged only in relations to the domestic political process of a particular society. All these factors combined, makes it rather an over--
simplification to equate excessive involvement in the world economy and/or under-development and poverty directly with dependency. In our scheme of things, 'political dependency' will not be considered as dependency at all. It may be considered as the result of the interaction between the various vertical links (horizontal included) with the domestic political process. Whereas the two types of dependency links will be considered as vertical links, albeit pointing in opposite directions. They too, make sense, i.e. become meaningful, only if considered in the context of the domestic political structure.

8.4. The links as structurations

We can elaborate at this point upon the notion of an informal link: these two patterns of informal interactions are links. That is, the fortunes of a group or groups of people residing in one formation become linked to a certain extent to the fortunes of a group residing in another. In many instances, but not invariably, members of such informal groupings may be aware of their common interest (or inversely their mutual antagonism). For instance, workers in a General Motors subsidiary in Europe or the Third World are generally well aware of their dependence on the head office, and therefore indirectly upon the American polity. Similarly, African chiefs recently endowed with new powers under the system of 'indirect rule' are very well aware of their dependence on their masters. The same applies to the workers and managers of BASF who are well aware of their competition with say, ICL. However, there seems to be only a vague awareness that the attempt to reform the health service and the education system in England is due largely to external 'uninformal' stimuli.

These links are ties: they create what Galtung calls 'bridgeheads' of interests and connections. In some cases, the links might prove to be ties stronger than loyalty to the nation-state. Thus it might be beneficial to supplement the political map of the independent, sovereign state with a 'social' map consisting of an infinite number of these ties cris-crossing these formations in all directions. Most of these are relatively weak; however, in combination they become a factor to be reckoned with.
These links may be seen as *channels of communication*: but on the whole the 'messages' that travel along these lines are not linguistic in form. Consequently, their impact is quite different from that of formal interactions which operate through cognitive gestures and verbal communications and are therefore open to 'misperception’. As they are not received on a cognitive plane, as demonstrated in the chapter four, the receiving social formation 'interprets' them through its own structure. Moreover, we may also speak of a certain 'technological determinism’ as the lines themselves may determine to a certain extent the speed and type of message run through them. For instance, in chapter nine, we shall see that military hardware and fighting techniques travelled faster than techniques of taxation along the horizontal link. This has created, in turn, a certain divergence between the levels of the social formation. In the long run, variations in speed, type and efficacy of these types of communications create a major dissonance between the three levels of mode of exploitation, society and superstructure.

Lastly, a social link is always more than a mere link -- it is also a *social structure*. That is, it does not simply link people residing in one society to another, but it also disturbs, distorts, enhances the internal structure of the two societies in question. Thus, through these links and lines of communication societies 'export' and 'import' their domestic political processes. There is an ongoing and permanent process of re-structuring which makes any investigation of a society as if it operates in isolation rather futile.
NOTES

1. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs yielded some interesting interdisciplinary studies: there is a trend in Sociology to study war in the context of State formation (Ashworth & Dandeker, 1987; Creighton & Shaw, 1987; Mann, 1986; McNeill, 1983), and in International Political Economy to develop models of international relations (Gilpin, 1981; Strange, 1988). On cultural links and International Relations see: Kelman, 1965.

2. Political histories centre on personalities classes or states. However they discuss essentially power relationships.

3. On structuralism see note (39) Introduction.

4. Chapters eight and nine will not discuss these links at length. I will aim only to concentrate on areas or aspects which have been neglected in my view in the literature.

5. "Feudalism as a mode of production was originally defined by an organic unity of economic and polity, paradoxically distributed in a chain of parcellised sovereignties throughout the social formation. The institution of serfdom as a mechanism of surplus extraction fused economic exploitation and politico-legal coercion at the molecular level of the village. The lord in his turn typically owed liege-loyalty and knight-service to a seigniorial overlord, who claimed the land as his ultimate domain" (Anderson, 1974, p.19).

6. Many writers noted on the affinity between the methods used in the expulsion of the Moores and the conquistadores: Pieterse writes: "These motives <aristocratic desire for prestige> were clearly at work in the Reconquista of southern Spain and also in overseas Hispanic expansion. The viceroyalties and audiencias established in the America were typically headed by Spanish grandees and may well be regarded as overseas forms of neofeudal vassalage...the pattern was reproduced in arrangements such as the encomienda which, under the overall authority of the crown, gave Spanish lords a similar control as in an earlier stage in Andalusia" (1989, p.200).

    On the difference between the conquest of North America and Ireland see Sack, 1987.

7. The British, could rely also on their own experience with the Moscow company (Chadrhui, 1965). See also, Morris & Read, 1972.


9. In liberal literature the activites of the MNCs in third world countries goes normally under the heading of 'networks' of relationships. See for example Schultz, 1979.

10. On the debate concerning the phenomena of globalisation or internationalisation of production. See among others: Bergesen, 1980; Berthelot, 1983; Bettleheim, 1972; Deubner, 1984; Froebel,
Reports of the Spanish case confirm this diagnosis (Braudel, 1979; Maravall, 1986). Due to its special political and economical place in the world, a bloated tertiary sector of hidalgos, and in particular the political strength of the MESA, the association of the sheepbreeders (Wallerstein, 1974) which together played the role of the 'middlemen', weighed upon the Spanish social formation. It created a social structure singularly unfitted for subsequent development.

Frank (1967) writes: "My thesis holds that the group interests which led to the continued underdevelopment of Chile and the economic development of some other countries were themselves created by the same economic structure which encompassed all these groups: the world capitalist system....The most powerful interest groups of the Chilean metropolis were interested in policies producing the underdevelopment at home because their metropolis was at the same time a satellite. The analogous interest groups of the world metropolis were not interested in policies producing such underdevelopment at home (though they did abroad), because their metropolis was not a satellite" (p.94). Elsewhere (1978a) he adds: "The indians' own hierarchical social organisation served as the principal instrument by which the Spaniards would dominate and colonise their Indian subjects and by which they would organise the division of labour that would put the indigenous population at their service" (p.43).

In the words of Alain Lipietz (1987) assessment reflects the general mood: "This thesis <dependency>...had one great advantage over the liberal argument. It concentrated upon studying the links that bound economic spaces into international relations, and it saw the world economy as a system. Its weakness was that it paid little attention to the concrete conditions of capitalist accumulation either in the centre or on the periphery.... The very notion of an 'international division of labour' (not to mention an International Economic Order) suggests that there is some Great Engineer or Supreme Entrepreneur who organises labour in terms of a pre-conceived world" (PP. 2-4).

For a recent summary see Pietrese, 1989.


It is true that political dependency results from economic dependency but it is not necessarily true the other way around.- The positive connection between economic and political dependency is summarized by Chase-Dunn: "Merchants, with their stake in the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods, combine with landed classes (which have similar interests) to
prevent the emergence of domestic manufacturing or industrial bourgeoisie. They do so by politically preventing the introduction of tariffs that would protect infant industries against the competition of already developed producers in the core states. (Chase-Dunn, 1980, p.136).


18. I use the term structuration to describe a situation by which the structure of one society has been affecting, modifying, influencing the structure of another's social structure. The medium has been defined here as 'informal interactions'. Thus the concept of structurations needs to be distinguished from Giddens, 1984, which developed in different context for different purposes.

19. About the encomienda system in the new territories Wallerstein has that to say "Not only did the landowner have the Spanish Crown behind him in creating his capital ... He normally had an arrangement with the traditional chief of the Indian community in which the latter added his authority to that of the colonial rulers to the process of coercion ... The interest of the chief or cacique becomes quite clear when we realize how laborers were in fact paid ... the Indians working on gold washing received a sixth of its value. This payment, called the sesmo, was however made not to individual Indians but to the collectivity of which they were members. One can guess at the kinds of unequal division that were consequent upon this kind of global payment system" (Wallerstein, 1974, p.94).

20. See Vogler, 1985 on class interest in the global context.

21. "Whenever a 'vertical integration' on any two links on a commodity chain occurred, it was possible to shift even more to the centre" (Wallerstein, 1983, p.32).
CHAPTER NINE: THE HORIZONTAL STRUCRURATIONS, THE EUROPEAN BALLET, 1450 - 1700

When two agents, be they individuals, companies or states are competing with each other, they tend to modify their behaviour to gain an advantage. In this way they become linked in an 'informal' link. This simple principle accounts for the horizontal channels of interaction between societies. The horizontal links, or links of competition, may be discussed under three separate headings:

a. Commercial competition between companies from different formations.
b. Commercial competition between States.
c. Military competition between states.

In contrast to the vast literature on dependency and colonialism, there is relatively little on the social effects of competition in international relations. Commercial competitions between companies as well as States are normally discussed under the heading of 'restructuring'. The questions they tend to ask is what sort of policies will aid local companies to face foreign challenges (or to be more specific how America should respond to the 'Japanese challenge'). An examination of the literature reveals an awareness that competitors either adopt techniques and technologies of their competitors, or are forced into innovative approaches, which may, in its turn, be adopted by their competitors. However, there is virtually no discussion of the global effects of these series of competitions on the study of International Relations.¹

Military competition, of course, has been the bread and butter of the study of International Relations. However, here again, there is little discussion of the social effects of competition on social formation.² In their turn, sociological studies of war emphasise the relation between war and the preparation for war and the social structure, not the horizontal links which results from these competition.³ Bearing that in mind, in contrast to the previous chapter, this one cannot summarize existing literature but needs to develop the argument. For this reason, of the three types of competitions, I will concentrate on only one of them, namely, military competition.⁴ I will present a somewhat schematic
survey of the intersection between state formation and military competitiveness from the conclusion of the Hundred years' War to the age of Louis XIV. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how this informal link operates concretely.

Military competition is only nominally competition for power and prestige. What goes into making a society into a perfect war machine is its overall social structure. In different periods different conjunctural combination of factors have led to success. If States wished to survive as a viable political forces they were forced to copy their more successful neighbours, even if that entailed unpleasant structural changes.* During the period under consideration the formations which were capable of achieving solid ententes between the aristocracy and the crown were, generally speaking, triumphant. The underlying force in this period was the so-called 'military revolution' which, coupled with continual inflationary pressure, imposed an intolerable financial burden upon the European states. Consequently, state formation in Europe was bound up with financial reforms (Braun, 1974).

European history provides a vivid example of this complex process. As in a ballet, where couples, trios and sometimes the whole company, find themselves dancing together, caught up in their own little world, and then, as if by a sign from above, the dancers disconnect, take a respite and a new dance begins and carries on the narrative. State formation in Europe was the summation of these smaller private dances. No one planned the State, there was no divine choreographer, the competition between leading polities swayed their progress to and fro in unpredictable manner. In this tale, the focus must lie not exclusively on the most advanced formation, but rather with those which came second at the time. These States were the true motor forces of constitutional and administrative developments in Europe.

The subject of this chapter is the technicalities of European state formation and not with the general picture. Consequently, the discussion is of necessity a simplification and schematisation, and thus in no way should it be seen as a history of state formation in Europe. By simplification and schematisation I mean:
A. Of the three tools of analysis, namely, the domestic political process, the vertical and horizontal links, only the third will be examine in any detail. The common attitude is to present state formation as if it were an internally propelled development -- which to a significant degree it was. In this perspective all the 'actors' are imbued with intrinsic interests which they then play out. Thus, it is postulated that kings and their ministers were forcing the pace of state formation whereas the nobility fought a rear-guard battle against it, and so on. This attitude is typical of Bendix (1980), Anderson (1974) and it informs the organisation of the New Cambridge Modern History. In these type of works the synchronisation of the European States is noted with curiosity, but never becomes a question mark, let alone a factor in the narrative.

In the seventies some authors began to discuss the role of vertical links in European history (Braudel, 1979; Frank, 1978a;1978b ; Wallerstein, 1974;1980). Thus. for instance, Wallerstein was able to present the weakness of Eastern Europe's bourgeoisie within a global context of what he called, the European world-economy (1974, pp94-6). However, these thinkers concentrated exclusively on the major vertical links, to the exclusion of the domestic political process, formal policies as well as horizontal links.

The texts that did address the issue of competition in the European context (Jones, 1981; Hall, 1985; McNeill,1974) aim to explain why European beauracracies abetted rather than inhibited economic advance. They tend to emphasise a link between the fragmentation of Europe and the unique concept of liberty which developed there.¹ I have my reservations: the concept of liberty in the European context denotes the liberties of villages and towns versus the centralised power. If anything, whenever competition was intense, as between the Habsburg and the Valois, local liberties were easily compromised. In countries where local liberties prospered, namely, the Netherlands and England, it occurred because they managed to keep themselves relatively aloof from the main dynastic rivalries.²

A comprehensive treatment of competition can be found, as far as I
know, only in the work of Hintze (1975). Hintze saw a clear need to relate international relations to the domestic political process. Unfortunately, his theory of the state is a crude form of psychologism typical of the Romantic tradition and it held him back from developing any theoretical concepts. He writes:

"The life of the internal constitution ... adjusts itself to the conditions of the external political existence, and the external shape of the state is a reflection of the situation prevailing at the time of this formation and is the consequence not only of power struggles but also of the geographical situation and of the then existing means of communications. The impact of the outside world must pass through an intellectual medium; and the only question is how strong is its refraction, to what extent it possesses independent vigour and can exert a counterweight. With this reservation we can - indeed, must - stress that in the life of peoples external events and conditions exercise a decisive influence upon the internal constitution. History does not permit progressive spiritual development, flooding its own laws, as was supposed by Hegel; there is rather a constant collaboration and interaction of the inner and the outer world. The process in which a state is shaped produces aims, habits, needs, and views, and they create among leaders and masses a distinct intellectual disposition that favours a particular type of constitutional structure. Analysis of this process of psychological type of constitutional mediation must be regarded as the main task if we want to explain these phenomena" (1975, p.62, my emphasis).

B. Statesmen learned to adopt military, financial and administrative techniques which enabled others to forge ahead. However, restructuring may be perhaps the best long term policy, but it requires a tough and sometimes unpredictable tussle with strong domestic forces. Consequently, as imitations grew faster, there also developed a variety of techniques for avoiding or at least mitigating such painful processes. The policy of 'balance of power' was a case in point. It entailed in practical terms that states could now pool their resources and consequently avoid painful restructuring.

The policy of balance of power, nonetheless, did not and could not stop the pressure of horizontal structurizations. Rather, it shifted it in a different direction as advantage could be gained no longer by simply adopting to modern military techniques. In any case, by the second half of the seventeenth century the armies of all the major European protagonists came
to resemble each other. In the situation that developed, the so-called 'balancer' state was the one able to finance armies of other states, and as a result accumulate the greatest number of soldiers and cannons on the battlefield. Hence, the series of financial reforms and innovations which amounted in England to a 'financial revolution' was tied up with the wars against Louis XIV. With that, the principal line of competition shifted from a crude military format to finance and with it, the first signs of a structural trend towards economic competition became visible.

In its turn the 'financial revolution' can be seen as the culmination of a secondary (but no less important) line of horizontal structurations which originated many centuries before. Nonetheless, I will concentrate only on the first line of competition, namely the direct military competition and decline to comment on this secondary line which included among other things, the development of the banking system, the national debt, the great trading companies, industrial policy and the colonial ventures.

C. As the discussion here is meant to illustrate a point and not to be a comprehensive account of European development, even the discussion of the horizontal structurations will remain restricted. Consequently, the Ottoman threat which, induced the so-called 'military revolution' of 1560-1700 (M.S. Anderson, 1988; McNeill, 1974), remains outside of the narrative. So will Russia, Sweden, Denmark, etc., whose dynamics of development are very similar to those experienced by the western states.

9.1. The Hundred Years' War and the constitutional frenzy at the end of the fifteenth century

The conclusion of the Hundred Years War left the two combatants, France and England, possessing rudimentary state frameworks (Elias, 1939). That should not come as a surprise. In order to fight each other effectively, both monarchs were in desperate need of permanent financial arrangements. Whenever one achieved any progress either in military technique or on the financial front the, other soon followed. Until the 1420s the English (and the Burgundians) held the field. This, according to Perry Anderson (1974) was due to two factors: first, the greater political integration of the English feudal monarchy, and second, and this goes to the heart of the ideas discussed here, in their battles with the Welshmen and the Scots
(which were non-feudal polities), the English perfected the art of using long bowmen on battle thereby proving superior on continental battlefields (Howard, 1976).

The war confirmed the limitation of knights on the field, and consequently the weaknesses of a parcelled polity more generally. The conversion of the French dominions into a centralised State undertaken by Charles VII, if not patterned exactly on the English model, was prodded by the example of its more successful neighbour. But once taken this route it led to the establishment of the most tightknit state in Europe. Like his ancestors, Charles attempted to revive all sorts of ancient taxes as well as invent new ones. But unlike his predecessors, he was able to put them on a permanent basis (Elias, 1939). This was because by the 1430s the centralisation of finance was already a good deal advanced, the enemy had been driven out, but the army was not disbanded. The king, therefore, was strong enough to declare a permanent tax, the aides, without waiting for the agreements of the estates.

In essence, what had happened was that 'England', that is, the English polity, the English style of fighting, the English pattern of relationship between king and aristocracy, proved superior to classical feudalism on the battlefield. It forced France off onto a new course of development that could never have occurred purely on the basis of its internal dynamism. It did not take many years for the new, resurgent France, to force England on precisely the same course.

Apart from France and England, the horizontal links direct attention to the Duchy of Burgundy, which fought incessantly with the French State. It was only in 1477 with the death of Charles the Bold (and 1482 with the Treaty of Arras), that the Burgundian menace was practically over for France. Huizinga's (1971) thesis is that Burgundy played a significant role in European states formation. This is substantiated here. There were quite a few interesting administrative development in the Burgundian lands which found their way through the horizontal link to the French State, and from there were transmitted all over Europe.

Already under Philip the Good (1419-67), the diverse Burgundian councils
of State were beginning to possess separate functions: control over state affairs was established through a privy council and a separate council for justice, the Grand Consel was established in the 1480s. Although Charles the Bold introduced the French fiscal method of division between ordinary and extraordinary revenues, with his death Burgundy reverted back to the old method of Philip the Good, under which income from the domain and from taxation was administered by the same officials named commis sur le fait des domaines et finances. In 1496 these chambres were compulsory united and their headquarters was set in Malines.

The last two decades of the fifteenth century were crucial years in the formation of the framework of the ancien régimes and France was taking the lead. The unprecendent rapidity of administrative changes were unquestionably related to the unfortunate decision of Charles VIII to march on Italy (1494). Following the Burgundian example, In the 1490s, the administrative and judicial arms of the State were separated, the Conseil du roi, rather similar to the Burgundian Grand Concéil, where the great officers of the crown sat, became a permanent organ for political and administrative functions. From then on, the chancellerie and the surintendences de finances, with their staffs of généraux des finances as well as the tesoires de France, administrative arms in the collection of taxes, became permanent. And a supreme court was gradually differentiated from the king’s own courts. An ordinance of 1498 recognised the existence of the Grand Conseil, a council for judicial concerns (which of course, was rather similar to the Burgundian Grand Conseil). Alongside the parlement, the chambre des comptes with their cours des aides were established to supervised the financial system.

Only two or three years later, under the reign of Henry VII, a somewhat similar structure was erected in England. The Star Chamber, resembling the French Grand Conseil was established, and held the supreme justice over the nobility. It was accompanied by a new conciliar court which became the main political weapon of the monarchy against riot or sedition. Thus the Burgundian methods have arrived to England via France.

The Burgundian example was copied in other matters too. The Burgundian princes were able to use the institution of the States General (or the
parliament) to override provincial particularism and thus give a firm foundation to the monarchy. Louis XI of France adopted the principle so that between 1468-84 there were important plenary meeting of the French estates and government seemed to evolve in the direction of the English parliamentary system. However, crucially, the French kings already had at their disposal a permanent standing army (the compagnie d'ordonnance <1445>. Therefore they did not need to call upon the Estates as often as their English counterparts. 1484 was the last time the estates general were summoned.

The French were cultivating their own administrative arrangements. One of the interesting development was the administrative partition of the kingdom in 1494 into four generalites. In due course this system became the basis for a homogenous bureaucratic structure constructed around the intendants (happened during the Thirty Years' War). Such a method of organisation overrides local particularism and its successful implementation proves how far down the road of absolutism France already was. (Six years later Maximilian I tried to introduce precisely the same system to the Holy Roman Empire and got nowhere). At the same time, in order to facilitate the collection of the taille the villages were organised into communautés d'habitats, a organisation which resembles the English system of J.P.'s and probably inspired by the success of the Spanish hermandad. Masters of requests (a system which had already proved useful in England) were appointed in 1493 to exercise a general jurisdiction on the king's behalf. The result was that by the end of the century the French kings had at their disposal an extremely flexible fiscal system.

In their turn, French administrative methods were imitated all over Europe. In the Treaty of Picquigny (1475), Louis XI promised Edward IV a subsidy which made the latter relatively independent of parliament. (Parliament was not recalled until Edward's death (1483), and between 1497 and 1509 assembled only once). The English kings were certainly learning from their French counterparts. But why did England not adopted the French model to the full? It is quite obvious that terms like 'model', 'following an example' etc. are euphemisms. When we say that England did not follow the French example, we are really asking why a visible convergence in the social structure of the two societies did not extend any further. Various
responses may be cited, and they are all versions of the horizontal structurations thesis. Most commentators seem to agree that in actual fact the English kings did try to adopt the French model; in particular they coveted the level of centralisation achieved under the French kings. As we shall see later, only with the benefit of hindsight is it possible to appreciate the significance of the French (and the Spanish) standing armies (the compagnie d'ordonance and the tercios). At that period, a standing army of 10,000 men (on paper, as was the French) was not much different from the local militia or a private army prevalent in England.

As everywhere else, so in England too, local administration was tightened up under royal control by the vigilant selection and supervision of Justices of Peace, small body of guards to patrol the highways and punish criminals were established, and royal estates were greatly enlarged by the assumption of lands. In fact, it was the manner by which Henry VIII broke with the pope, and the Anglican Church was established, and in particular the manner by which parliament was used in these proceedings, that assured the survival and indeed the development of the English parliamentary system. There were other developments too, to which we shall come later, that kept England out of the main line of European struggles.

To return to Burgundy. When Maximilian, son of Emperor Frederick III married Mary of Burgundy in 1477 and the Burgundian lands became part of the Habsburg domains, the estates were able to force upon their new rulers a special agreement, the Grand Privilegè. The Grand Privilegè distinguished between the sovereign's interests and those of his subjects. In its collective sense it was a constitutional procedure whereby a new ruler entered into contractual relations with each territory. It became an alternative model for state development for it seemed to guarantee the priviledges of the old nobility within a new framework.

It was in the Holy Roman Empire that the two 'models' of state's formation, the French and the Grand Privilègè, met each other and ended in deadlock -- sealing the fate of the Empire as a significant political force in European politics. On 19th of August 1493 Frederick III died and Maximilian I took over. Maximilian, who clearly perceived the trend in Europe, tried to establish a centralised monarchy on the French model. All the major
actors in the German scene agreed that effective organs of central governments were the essential remedy to anarchy in Germany and Maximilian enjoyed the support of some of the major towns. However, aristocratic elements led by Berthold, the archbishop of Mainz, opposed his proposals and put forward their own alternative plan which amounted to something similar to the Grand Privilegè.

Already back in 1489 Berthold of Mainz suggested a constitutional reform reminiscent of developments in other European states. It included a supreme court of justice and the permanent prohibition of private wars. In 1495 following the French victory in Fornovo, Max summoned the Reichstag and an agreement was reached for a scheme of general taxation, the Common Penny, to provide for an army for defence. Max, however, wanted to take a much more forceful stance in Italy. This gave the reformers their chance. On top of their demands from 1489 they presented a scheme for a permanent supreme executive body (the Reichstrat) without whose consent royal acts would be invalid. The emperor, however, did not agree to being reduced to the status of an executive officer (and few of the estates liked it), the Reichstrat therefore was dropped and it was agreed instead that the Reichstag itself will take over the functions of the Reichstrat. Thus, an institution of long-proven incapacity was chosen.

The only thing that came out of these proceedings was the Reichskammergericht which was the supreme court of the empire, but it was not a great success. From 1496 to 1498 Berthold of Mainz kept the Reichstag in continuous session, and Maximilian remained aloof, choosing to concentrate instead on reforming his own patrimony of Lower and Upper Austria. However, in 1500, following successful French expedition against Milan, Maximilian proposed what he rejected in Worms, the appointment of a representative supreme Executive Council, a Reichsregiment, which was to take over virtually all the functions of the monarchy. To meet defence requirements new expedients were adopted. The nobility was to provide the cavalry, whilst princes taxed their common subjects for the provision of a militia. The expenses of the regiment and Reichskammergericht would be met from the contributions of the clergy and towns. This scheme was in fact a step back from a confederation: Max's desire for a reich army was to be fulfilled, but even the military command was taken from him and entrusted to the
hands of Albert, the Duke of Bavaria. The reformers, however, were unsuccessful in conducting central government and by 1502 Maximilian was in control again. With this, the Holy Roman Empire virtually returned to its point of departure.

These disagreements over models of constitutional and administrative development were by no means abstract. They attest, first of all, to an unrelenting external pressure felt by the major combatant exhorting them towards painful self-restructurations. Furthermore, they provide a faithful representation of the conflicts all these formations were involved in. The ruling classes were still a fighting nobility and they were hankering for a fight. In that, they had a common interest with the Crown. However, the dynamics of this process passed through the emerging bourgeoisie, who as a rule preferred a strong monarchy. Accordingly, wherever the monarchy was strong, towns seem to have flourished (relatively speaking) and wherever the aristocracy had their say, as was the case in Spain and Germany, the bourgeoisie were defeated.15

9.2. The Habsburg-Valois struggle

The sixteenth century was characterised as the struggle between two dynasties, the Habsburgs and the Valois. France was potentially the undisputed power in Europe. She had a population of about eighteen to nineteen millions, her finance and bureaucracy was in better shape than any other state, and she had a standing army. Partly as a response to this potential French threat, the Habsburgs succeeded in consolidating a land mass even more massive than France through a series of opportune marriage arrangements. The sudden rise of the Habsburgs, in turn, gave rise to a genuine threat to the southern borders of France. The effect of this risk perception enhanced, in its turn, State formation in France.

By the end of the fifteenth century Spain was not yet a major power. The marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella (1469) founded what has later become known as the Monarquía: a loose confederation of states, each retaining its own parliament, political institutions, laws, courts, armed forces, taxation and coinage. None of these polities were constitutionally subject to any of the others, and the subjects of any one were aliens in the
others. In the words of Solorziano Pereira: "The Monarch who keeps all these countries together is sovereign of each rather than king of all" (cited in Batista, 1968, p.322).

Ferdinand and Isabella surrounded themselves with a constellation of councils representing the various states. Nevertheless, some features of the Spanish State paralleled the general trend in Europe. Most of the Corteses, the local parliaments, lost their character as representative national assemblies and after 1497 they were summoned only to recognise heirs. A system of taxation and a standing army of a sort was established. But perhaps the most interesting development was the adaptation of the ancient institution of the hermandad to a council of provincial delegates under the presidency of the viceroy of the sovereign, with full powers to punish robbery, and with a small constabulary force. All towns had to pay it a tribute (its success led to its suppression in 1498). The hermandad is reminiscent of the English JP system, the and the French the communautè d'habitants.

When Charles V acceded to the Spanish the throne in 1519, he brought with him some of the Burgundian methods which had already been adopted in France and England. the mixture the made Spain more powerful, if somewhat eclectic state. Thus, for instance, in 1523 Charles appointed Henry of Nassau, who had been chef et surintendant des finances in the Netherlands, to control the Castilian Contadurias heading a committee of six which the emperor refers to as the financial council (the name did not exist officially until 1568). His Piedmontese Chancellor, Mercurio Gattinara inspired by Erasmian ideals, strove to make the Habsburg's realm more compact by creating unitary institutions on the departmental type, notably the Council of Finances, a Council of War and a Council of State (the latter theoretically becoming the summit of the imperial edifice) with a trans-regional character. These councils were backed by a permanent secretariat of civil servants. Nevertheless, the old structure of territorial Councils remained in place. So the empire remained a melange of different methods of rule, with different organisations competing, implicating and permeating each other.

The text-book contention is that the very size of the Habsburg empire
overextended its capacity for integration and helped to arrest the process of administrative centralisation (Anderson, 1974; Wallerstein, 1974; Kennedy, 1986). However, the concept of over-extension is ambiguous. It harks back to the belief that kings were truly personal rulers and neglects the class relationships which underlie any political arrangement. If the Habsburg empire was 'over-extended'; it would be foolhardy to search for the causes in its geographical extension (as the case of Brandenburg/Prussia makes clear), it would be much more fruitful to investigate Charles' failure to synchronise the social structures of his domains. The result was that relations between the various ruling classes of the monarquia were always tenuous, a situation which can be traced to the Habsburg's dominant position in international politics.\(^1\)

From the point of horizontal links, the question then shifts away from the motives and wishes of the protagonists to the political and social imperatives of the time. The question then is whether Charles V was forced to modernise his empire or not. One thing is quite clear, he failed to do so not for want of trying.\(^1\)\(^7\) It appears that Charles' dominant position while embroiling him in incessant wars, nonetheless allowed him to maintain the status quo, which, as Roper-Trevor (1970) demonstrated was even fifty years later very attractive to large sections of the ruling classes. In other words, the organisation of the Habsburgs' empire if not ideal, was sufficiently strong to make Charles V the centre of European politics. As long as French energies were directed towards Italy, Charles had good allies there among the Italian city states. In spite of the total financial exhaustion experienced by both countries by 1559, they had not fought on their own lands and consequently no overriding need was felt to make any fundamental changes.

The horizontal link in fact puts the onus firmly on the French State. Powerful and relatively compact as it was, the Habsburgs had at their disposal the two financial centres of Italy and the Netherlands, the German banking houses, the American treasures and could rely on the superior financial capacities of Castille. France just could not match such resources without a radical increase of financial resources. Here over-extension was not an abstract concept. Although at the beginning of the century the French intendants were already extracting about ten times
more revenue per capita than their English neighbours, they had difficulties matching the superior financial resources of the empire. In order to raise more money, Francis I (1515-47) was moved to a massive sale of offices, a system which was in reality an ingenious extension of patronage (Briggs, 1977) since the new officials were dependent on the king and his councils for support in the exercise of their powers. It was, as Anderson (1974) had argued, a new social pact between king and magnates. However, the Habsburg-Valois antagonism took on a particular twist when the extraordinary revenues from America (especially the second half of the century) began to make their impact. There was no way by which a feudal polity, re-invigorated or not, could master enough resources. Again France was rudely ejected onto a new course.

There is a question, of course, as to what a 'feudal' polity is, and in what sense it is different from an absolutist State. The distinctions hark back to the theoretical question of what is the State. In liberal circles the tendency has been to think of the State as an identifiable social group. The State is discussed, therefore, as an administrative structure held together by political theories. However, for our purposes, the more factors that are taken into account, the better we understand the nature of a particular polity. Ultimately, the difference between the two types of States boils down to different configurations of class structure.

The essential characteristic of the feudal polity was the parcelling of sovereignty into a hierarchical structure. The king was more often than not a titular head surrounded by powerful magnates (Ranke, 1905). The 're-invigorated' feudal state (Anderson's (1974) analysis of absolutism) were, by and large, typical of a new kind of clientele system. This was a 'bureaucratic' system forged by a massive sale of offices by the French State (which, when the silver from Potosi dried up, was aped immediately by the Spanish state). It amounted, not to a sale of sovereignty, as commentators of the time feared, but to a new, more 'organic' mode of co-operation between the magnates, gentry, long-distance traders and the Crown. The State itself became perhaps one of the principal source of surplus-product extraction for the ruling classes (Comnien, 1986). Absolutism then, was a 'superstructural' form uniting the landed nobility and the bourgeoisie under one roof. In France the 'solution' eventually
took the form of a 'fusion' of the two classes into one, with the State taking the lead in expropriating the peasants. This is the classical form of absolutism.

This horizontal link forced other states to find their own solution. In Spain and Germany the 'solution' was different. By uniting their forces under the leadership of Charles V, the landed nobility (with the church as the biggest land-holder) were able to defeat the incipient bourgeoisie in both places (these policies were major causes of the revolt in the Netherlands (Geyl, 1988; Parker, 1977). Later on, once overseas revenues began to make their impact, Spain was able to incorporate what Anderson calls a "bloated tertiary sector" (Anderson, 1974) into its system. The French method proved, nonetheless, more resilient in the long run because it did not depend on an external source of income.

The northern half of the Netherlands, on the other hand, developed a different solution to the same problem through a series of insurrections. Here, the method of incorporation of the ruling classes took the form of a loose confederation of oligarchic states ruled by the high nobility (Orange, Nassau) and a merchant class. This republican solution proved viable because Holland was the economic centre of Europe (Braudel, 1979, III; Wallerstein, 1974). At the same time, it opened up a new venue for state's development which in time acquired importance through what we have termed the secondary line of horizontal structuration (Figgis, 1916).

The horizontal line, as stated above, puts the onus firmly on the French State because it was the second most powerful State in Europe. And indeed, France at that time experienced a series of measures meant to tighten the grip of the State. In 1515, under Francis I the office of controleur des communs was created to exercise a supervisory role over municipal finances. Until 1523, revenue was administered by two sets of officials, the royal lands by four treasurers of France under the chargeur de tresor and the much larger 'extraordinary' revenue (gabelles, aides, tailles, traites et impositions foraines) by four receivers general of finance. From 1523, all revenues were combined under one central treasury, the tresorier de l'epargne (This, as we have seen was already achieved in 1496 in Burgundy). In 1554 the office of the Controller-General (which one finds in England
only in the nineteenth century) was established. By 1542 a uniform system of 18 tax districts which the Spanish and English never managed to imitate was in place. From the 1550s, the masters of requests were employed as general watchdogs of the Crown with immense central and local administrative powers. They were involved with financial, military, and ideological (problems of heresy) issues.

France was forging ahead in terms of the efficiency of its bureaucracy and its ability to tax its people. The empire did not feel compelled to follow suit. If anything, it was England that came to resemble more closely the French 'model'. The series of administrative reforms explored by Thomas Cromwell are better understood in conjunction with development in France. In 1534 the English privy council was transformed much on the French model. And in 1536, Cromwell, who had made the post of the secretaryship the all important one (the same occurred in France only in 1547), apparently made plans for an English standing army (Anderson, 1974). Finance was divorced from the king's household, and in 1549 the Court of Star Chamber for administration and law was established. By 1554 the financial machinery was settled for a century or more, with control in the hands of the Exchequer, which handled nearly all royal revenues.

Nevertheless, the overall direction of the English State remained different. Some measures that can be interpreted as tending towards absolutism were agreed by Parliament: the reformation parliament greatly increased the financial resources of the monarchy by transferring to it control of the whole ecclesiastical apparatus of the Church; it also suppressed the autonomy of seigniorial franchises by depriving them of the power to designate JPs. Furthermore, the monasteries were dissolved and their properties seized by the governments. However, the crucial difference with France and Spain was the absence of substantial military apparatus. The Tudor state did not need it because it was insulated from the mainland. The absence of war allowed the English aristocracy to dispense with the machinery of war (Anderson, 1974).

At the same time, when Henry VIII became embroiled in the French wars for the third time (1543-6), the attempt backfired dangerously. To pay for the adventure the state resorted to forced loans and debasement. More
significantly, it dumped onto the market much of the agrarian property it had acquired from the monasteries, and by the end of the war the great bulk of these lands were gone. The transfer of assets weakened the state, and in the long-run strengthened the gentry who bought them up. Thus it had the most momentous consequence for the domestic balance of forces within English society.

It was the strength of the middle classes and the gentry, in itself caused partly by the massive transfer of land from the State, that forced England to part company with other European states. In Castille the revolt of the comuneros (1520/1) was crushed and with it the last vestiges of contractual relationships in the constitution of Castille were eliminated. The significant of this is that the towns and not the nobles were defeated. The French wars in Italy strengthened the French nobility which, indeed, finding themselves unemployed after the peace of Camteau-Cambresis (1559) became restless and started a religious civil war. Everything seems to support Anderson's theory that it was England special geographical position which dictated the sort of domestic development more amenable to the development of the bourgeoisie.

9.3. The Seventeenth century

The religious strife which had tormented Europe for a century finally exploded in a major pan-European conflict, the Thirty Years War, which was allegedly the catalyst leading to the creation of a new system of states. However, there were little constitutional or administrative developments in the seventeenth century. Generally speaking, it was a period of affirmation and consolidation rather than revolution (Hill, 1967; Wallerstein, 1980). All the basic 'models' of state development, the Monarquia, French absolutism, English parliamentary monarchy and the Dutch republic were left almost intact. The second half of the sixteenth century had seen the rapid spread of the new administrative and constitutional forms into Scandinavia, Eastern Europe and even Russia. In the Thirty Years War, these various organisations were pitted against each other, and the outcome was a much more synchronised Europe. What is remarkable from the point of view of the horizontal link, and indeed, this set the tone for development in the seventeenth century, was the speed by which the
combatants learned to imitate each other, particularly in military matters.

Gustav Adolf, the king of Sweden who first set the tone of the war. To play a role in European politics, the king had to create an organisation able to compete with others on the same footing. As usual it all hinged on the ability to secure finance. In an effort to convert revenues in kind into cash, he was first moved to sell off or pawn the royal domains, then imposed new direct and indirect taxes payable in coin. Lastly, he induced foreign capitalists to invest in Swedish mining and industry. And with the help of a Dutch financier, De Geer, he imported Dutch techniques to utilise Swedish iron. But perhaps more important, Gustav Adolphus imported Dutch techniques of military training. In 1619, Maurice organised the first European military academy. A graduate of the academy subsequently serviced under Gustav Adolf taking the new Dutch drill to the Swedes. Furthermore, the Swedes were first to use small field artillery pieces that could be manoeuvred by hand to create a shock effect of mass fire followed by pike and cavalry charges which they learned to use with cavalry to such an effect from the Polish. The success of the Swedes on the battlefield assured that the new drill spread to all the other European armies with any pretensions.

As war costs soared, each of the combatants had to apply new expediencies. In France the added revenues came from forced loans and the sale of offices. As a result, officials suffered the most and they became the bearer of the social unrest which eventually led to the Frond. Plans for reforming the French monarchy (on the line of the council of Castile where level of taxation arrive to a new and higher pitch) were put to the Assembly of Notables of 1626 by Richelieu. However, they were rejected, save for the project for reviving commercial and maritime strength, which was partly a response to Oliveras’ corresponding plans. The struggle against the Habsburg drove Louis XIII and Richelieu to a war dictatorship with an arbitrary, centralized, egalitarian government thereby unintentionally generating revolutionary changes. By the 1630s Richelieu had a free hand and was able to issue a declaration which effectively transferred all the duties of the financial officers, as well as ordinary jurisdictions in financial matters to the intendants. It was an opportunistic measure, but the war prolonged it and turned it into an institution. It was this new
structure which eventually became the backbone of French absolutism.

The problem of financing the war was also felt in Spain. In 1621, Oliveras found himself compelled to listen to the arbitristas, who sought to restore the economy and the crown’s credit by founding a national banking system. Plans for banks to be managed by the municipalities were approved in 1599 by the Cortes, but nothing was done. A second attempt, in 1627 was more successful. On the whole, however, the Cortes rejected the arbitristas’ plans for reform, expressing instead an explicit preference for increasing indirect taxes which fell heavily on the poorer sections, and by implication chose the strategy of debasements and arbitrary measures. Indeed, Castille’s indirect tax was much higher than France and included greater contribution from the clergy. According to Trevor-Roper (1970) this reactionary policy was the essence of the system of the pax hispanica.

The war also saw the first signs of emergence of Brandenburg as a power to be reckoned with. In 1619 there was no state of Prussia; there was only an assortment of territories united under the electorship of George William of the Hohenzollerns (and Prussia was not among them). The nobility was everywhere asserting its rights and privileges. It was a system based on orders which the Huguenots sought to introduce into France. In 1648 Frederick William I, who was educated in Holland, came back into his patrimony and began to implement a far-reaching reform plan. In 1652 he summoned a general Landtag of Brandenburg to institute a new financial system to provide for an army; the meeting ended with the 1653 Recess which consecrated the beginning of a social compact with the aristocracy and the king. The Prussian state became a curious phenomenon: a nobility based absolutist state.

How did this come about? The Recess was in fact another original ‘solution’ for the incorporation of the nobility into the state. This time by crushing the middle classes and enslaving the peasantry. As long as the electors kept to this entente they had the nobility on their side. In the meantime, through the various wars, the Great Elector was able to impose a permanent system of taxation and with each new emergency, he augmented the number of his troops so that the nobility, and in particular the towns, were less disposed to resist him until the next round arrived and the whole process
started afresh. As Brandenburg/Prussia had the population of a small state, the Swedish pattern of conscription based on effective registers was introduced. There were traces of the French system, but on the whole it was peculiarly Prussian: an army-state where the army bureaucratic organisation became the main framework of the state's bureaucracy.

9.4. The wars of Louis XIV, the technique of balance of power and the financial revolution

The defeat of the 'invincible' Spanish army at Rocroi, in 1643, by the French under Conde, marked the beginning of the decline of the Habsburgs. With the defeat of the Frond and the coming of age of Louis XIV French absolutism arrived at its pinnacle. To end this story of the European ballet I will discuss only one point in this development, the intersection of the technique of balance of power with the financial revolution. The theoreticians of International Relations seem to be right about the development of a system of balance of power in Europe (Kennedy, 1986). However, balance of power is a treacherous analytical concept. It has meant different things at different times, and has reflected different conditions. What it meant in the period under consideration has to be seen in the context of that period.

By the mid-seventeenth century all of the major European armies were more or less similar in structure. In one way or another all the major protagonists were able to incorporate both the bourgeoisie and the old nobility into their systems. The next stage of development, as Marx puts it in the Communist Manifesto, was the advancement of the bourgeoisie from a dependent ruling class to a dominant position and the emergence of a capitalist class. This trend can already be seen to a century before the French revolution which, if anything, began a new trend of incorporating elements from the working-classes into the system (Wolfe, 1977).

In any case, with a rudimentary form these States were able to incorporate only the apogee of their societies, and in some cases at an enormous costs a sizeable middle class (Spain's hidalgos) into their system. Thus while some battalions were better than others. Methods of fighting, organisation, armament, and defence, were more or less the same. Of crucial importance
was the number of men they were able to put into the fields. And perhaps more important, the number of men they were able to train for long periods. In short, it all came down to money again, but more money than ever, as armies grew in size and as hardware became more expensive. Coupled with the newly elaborated technique of balance of power, which meant that states did not really need to employ a huge army — they only needed to deploy one in times of crisis. Financial resources therefore became the true mark of a power. Thus, and in consequence of the advent of Louis XIV's wars, we see all over Europe financial and fiscal experiments, many 'financial revolutions' culminating in the famous English one.

The story of the European ballet is discussed here to illustrate the pervasiveness of horizontal links. All the major administrative, constitutional, military and structural developments in the period between 1450 and 1700 are understood quite differently in the context of the European competitive system. Just as with the vertical links, the horizontal links are never straightforward. Their effects can only be gauged through their articulation with the domestic political process. However, the two notions that were developed in the Eight and Ninth chapters permit us to penetrate into what Marx calls, the determination of the phenomena, and possibly understand it better.
NOTES


    Competition and local state: Duncan, & Goodwin, 1980.

    On competition and innovation: Binswanger et. al., 1978; Davis, 1979; Ray, 1984.


3. On war and social structure see: Ashworth, & Dandeker, 1987; Creighton & Shaw, 1987; Finer, 1975; Mann, 1986; 1987a; Marwick, 1974.


5. Thus any abstract statements concerning the relation between economics and politics, or for that matter, of the unfolding contradictions of a particular formation, need to come up against this phenomena of universal borrowing whereby the various 'superstructures' seemed to be nothing but an eclectic mixture of other formations' superstructures.

6. 'To be sure, the kings themselves cannot foresee, any more than their adversaries in this struggle, the new institution to which it will give rise. They do not really have any general intentions to 'increase their fiscal power'. To begin with they and their representatives want quite simply to extract as much money as possible from their dominion on one occasion after another, and the tasks and expenses necessitating this are always quite specific and immediate. No single man created taxes or the taxation monopoly; no individual, or series of individuals throughout the century in which this institution was slowly formed, worked towards this goal by any deliberate plan. taxation, like any other institutions, is a product of social interweaving. It arises -- as from parallelogram of forces --
from the conflicts of various social groups and interests, until sooner or later the instrument which has developed in the constant social trials of strength becomes more and more consciously understood by the interested parties and more deliberately constructed into an organisation or institution" (Elias, 1939, p. 207).

7. In most works the European concept of liberty is associated with the independent role of the Christian church. Guizot (1985) traces the it to the fusion of the Germanic tribes' traditions with the independent political power of the Church. Others, McNeill (1974) maintain that the Church had the opposite effect in particular in the are of the Mediterranean.

8. One finds this interpretation in all of the major historian of political thought. See, Nisbeth, 1974; Pockock, 1975; Ullmann, 1975.

9. For modern partial attempts in the same direction see: Ashworth & Dandeker, 1987; Hall & Ikenberry, 1989; Zolberg, 1986. See also note (2)

10. This was a slow process of learning. By the end of the eighteenth century the relation between war and constitutional and administrative reforms were clear to all. Nowhere was it more pronounced then with Maria-Theresa's reforms. On the subject see Wangermann, 1965. On the Polish reaction in the same period see Lewitter, 1965.

11. "The critical legacy of the long ordeal of the Hundred Years' War was its ultimate contribution to the fiscal and military emancipation of the monarchy from the limits of the prior medieval polity. For the war was only won by abandoning the seigniorial ban system of knightly service, which had proved disastrously ineffective against English archers, and creating a regular paid army whose artillery proved the decisive weapon for victory. To raise this army, the first important country-wide tax to be collected by the monarchy was granted by the French aristocracy--the taille royale of 1439, which became the regular taille des gens d'armes in the 1440's" (Anderson, 1974, pp.86,7).

12. "English dominance through the war....was a product of the far greater political integration and solidity of the English feudal monarchy, whose administrative capacity to exploit its patrimony and rally its nobility was until the very end of the war much greater than that of the french monarchy, harried by disloyal vassals in Brittany or Burgundy" (Anderson, 1974, pp.117,8).

In the battle of Crecy, the English used their knights as foot soldiers among the long-bowmen as they have learned to do in the wars with Scots and Welshmen. By doing so they created total havoc in the French camp. See on the subject, Howard, 1976, pp. 11,12.

13. The Star Chamber was a development of a much more ancient institution. On the debate whether it was a new institution in
old garment or whether it was merely a modification of the old one see: Anderson, 1974; Myers, 1952; Smith, 1984; Wilkinson, 1964.

14. To be discussed later in the chapter.

15. The separate destinies of these formations is related to their class structure. On the reasons for their diverging class structure see Wallerstein, 1974.

16. The contention that the Habsburgs domains were divided into two for logistical purposes as it stands by itself is not convincing. Were the territories of Philip II which included the Iberian peninsula with the low countries more compact arrangement? I doubt it. At least Charles V could co-ordinate his attacks on the Ottoman empire both from Spain, Italy and Austria as he wished. It is clear that much of Philip II difficulties in the Netherlands stem from his inability to co-ordinate his relations with the Ottomans. On the division see Elliott, 1963.

17. For different interpretation see Elliott, 1963. Elliott argues that the Spanish kings from Ferdinand and Isabella to Philip II were genuinely interested in keeping with the old privileges of each of their domains.

18. The system was invented according to Max Beloff, 1954, already in the 14th century, but came to its own because of these financial pressures.

19. It is interesting to note that Wallenstein used precisely the same methods: "Wallenstein formed what amounted to a partnership with Hans de Witte, the great international banker and merchant of Prague. De Witte advanced the needed money, and acted as supply agent and shipper for military supplies. The farms of the Friedland duchy were one of the chief sources for provisioning the army" (Beller, 1970, p.323).

20. By that time both Amsterdam (1600) and England (1601) had their own banks, Born, 1984.
Thus far a series of concepts which provide a bridge between the theories of the State and the study of International Relations have been presented. The unit of analysis of such a framework is the political process. The political process interact with the external world through vertical and horizontal structurations. The final chapter relates these three concepts together.

10.1. Vertical links -- the level of the structures

As discussed in chapter eight, situations whereby individuals, companies, and organisations residing in one formation are attached by some common purpose or interest to a group residing in another are defined as vertical links. Quite often, but by no means always, these links create ties of dependence between these groups. In order to elaborate the manner by which the vertical links interact with the Poulantzasian scheme, let us imagine a hypothetical case whereby a company 'a' residing in country 'A' and producing a product 'a' sells this product successfully in country 'B'. What are the social and political dynamics of this transaction?

In country 'A' there are individuals whose livelihood depends directly upon the fortune of this company: employees, managers, owners. Additionally there is a variety of individuals who depend indirectly upon the company for their livelihood: raw material producers (with their own employees, managers and owners), services, etc. In country 'B' there is a group of individuals who earn their living as importers, distributers, providers of related services, etc. -- a comprador class as they are ordinarily described. They are connected directly in a vertical tie to company 'A'; a distant link is maintained between the consumers and the producers.

The effect of these vertical links on the social structures of the two countries, if ordinarily imperceptible, can be seen in relation to the Poulantzasian scheme of the political process. In country 'A' one may expect the relative strengthening of the industrial sector where this
company is situated. In other words, there will be a change in the structure. The successes of this company will most probably be accompanied by an expansion of its political clout. In turn, the relative strengthening of sector 'A' in the economy will result in the relative weakening (again, imperceptible in most cases) of other sectors, 'B' and 'C', with a concomitant weakening of their political clout.

The relative strengthening (or weakening) of a sector, according to Poulantzas, entails a concomitant surge or reduction in the relative weight of the modes and stages of production within the social formation. This implies that the class structure is affected. Hence the class structure of any given society is constantly in a state of flux as it is disturbed by these informal links. The class structure is not simple modified, but becomes better attuned to class structures of other societies. It creates a world-wide process of synchronisation. The end result of these series of interactions is that countries seems to be specialising in the production of a few products; they find niches, so to speak, in the global economy.

10.2. Horizontal links -- the level of the structures

Before we pursue this analysis further it will be useful to supplement it with the dynamics of the horizontal links. Horizontal links are instances whereby groups of peoples, and indeed societies, are linked to each other by the mere fact that they are competing with each other. The idea is that the one who competes tends to modify his behaviour -- and in the case of an economic corporation or a state, its structure -- in order to improve its competitive position. Thus the competition itself becomes an 'input' into the domestic political process. The fiercer the competition is, the more it will alter the basic structure of the societies which are involved in it. Horizontal links behave, therefore, as channels by which societies structure each other -- unintentionally, and in many cases without being aware of doing so.

Let us discuss again a hypothetical case of the same company 'a', this time producing similar goods to company 'c', which is located in
country 'C'. They are competing with each other. Their economic competition may develop at various levels. There is the price of goods, their quality, the maintenance of services, prestige, and finally external factors such as political and commercial relations. Moreover, what goes into the price of goods depends on a combination of factors: productivity, the cost of labour, raw materials, capital, space, etc. In other words, the competition may be broken down into a series of tangible factors such as wages and the price of raw materials, as well as intangible factors such as willingness to work, skills, etc. In addition to this, not only capitalists are competing here, the workers too, the workers' organisations, and methods of production, and infrastructural facilities (education, transportation, financial facilities, etc.), are all important elements in commercial competition (Vogler, 1986). In essence, in each instance of competition it is the whole economic, cultural and political organisation of these societies which is ultimately involved.

It is possible to deduce certain general statements about the social effects of these links. In their competition, the companies either borrow new successful techniques and technologies and incorporate them into their formations where they spread all over their formations. Otherwise they may invent new ones which, if successful, will spread around the globe as other competitors follow suit. Thus, for example, when Japanese companies develop an advantageous system of consultation with unions, there is pressure on unions of other countries, if not to follow suit, at least to change their own arrangements in order that their companies may compete more efficiently. Once American or European Engineering or Auto workers unions agree to new arrangements, sooner or later other unions in the same countries will have to come to new arrangements. The result is that Japanese labour relations, a significant factor in the domestic political process by any account, have 'structured' by an 'invisible link' American and European politics.

Typically, the following factors are modified directly through the horizontal link:

a. models for the management and organisation of the firm;
b. organisation of the banking and credit systems;
c. labour productivity;
d. technological innovation;
e. patterns of investments;
f. definition of optimal scale;
g. restructuring of inter-branch relationships;
h. regulation of the market;
i. relations with the State (Perez, 1985a; 1985b).

As demonstrated in chapter Seven, the articulation of the various modes and stages of production eventuates on the political, ideological and economic levels concomitantly. The ascendancy of a specific sector signifies a change in the balance of forces between the political classes and fraction, as each class comes equipped, so to speak, with its own unique ideology and interests (Poulantzas, 1973; Therborn, 1980; Wright, 1985). The individuals which are directly involved in this link tend, generally speaking, to vote for friendly relations with country 'B', they support an open door policy etc. At the same time in country 'B', apart from the 'comprador' group which has gained in strength, one should expect a certain antagonism to develop towards the relations with country 'A', or protectionism on the parts of companies producing identical or similar goods, the latter try to elicit State aid in their struggle against the foreign intruders.

These connections are implicit in many empirical analyses -- the only problem is that, for one reason or another, they have not found their way into the theories of International Relations. These ideas lie behind the theories of monopoly capitalism (Jessop, 1982), they underpin Nairn's (1964) analysis of the British class structure (chapter 8). They are to be found in Bettleheim's analysis of Nazism (1979) where he attributes great importance to the difference between German heavy industries and the relative strengthening of the chemical industries afterwards.

10.3 Class structure

As social classes are not concrete social groups, it is possible to delineate how they become 'linked' to others in a 'transnational' link
only by a theoretical reconstruction. The paradigmatic case of the vertical links are of course the various 'comprador' classes which were discussed in chapter eight. According to dependency theory these classes rely on external social forces to maintain their position within. They utilise their political power to pursue their interests and in the process subvert and distort the economic, political and cultural structure of their formations. In this way the links and the ties become structurations.

The horizontal links on this level are more complex. Classes as such do not compete with each other; their competition evolves through 'proxies' such as states, corporations, religious organisations, etc., competition, therefore, may be discussed only to the extent that it alter the balance of forces within the social formation.

10.4. The Political Scene

Informal interactions may occur also on the level of the political scene. An example of a vertical link of this type was the policy of indirect rule pursued by British and Dutch colonists. Indirect rule was a policy aimed at forging 'informal' class dependencies. The idea behind it was to utilise indigenous customs and laws in order to buffer the colonial structure. For this purpose, 'chiefs' were selected and delegated a semblance of power. Thus, on the face of it indigenous societies were left untouched. However, these chiefs' source of power and revenue lay primarily with the colonial administration. At the same time, the utilization of custom and culture in the foreign administration was only a transparent mask. Consequently, native societies were torn apart, as their economy, politics and culture lay completely disarticulated as a result of the link.

The horizontal links of these types are also well documented. Since the large majority of states nowadays are controlled by a capitalist class, commercial competition has become the main line of competition among modern societies. Indeed, unlike its counterpart from the classical age, the modern State's paradigmatic model is not the army, but the economic corporation. It is for this reason that the primary concern of foreign/domestic policy is the maintenance of 'competitiv-
eness', a concept that may be broken down into a series of factors such as know-how, labour organisation, control over markets and raw materials. Thus, 'competitiveness' separate itself into a series of policy objectives which are the responsibility of various governmental and semi-governmental departments. Productivity, which has to do with wages, technology, management and in particular with labour relations is under the auspice of the departments of finance, education, labour, and trade. Knowhow or technology, under education and trade. Labour organisation, is under the jurisdiction of the home office, ministry of labour, education, justice. And competition over markets and raw-materials is a matter for finance, war, foreign affairs, trade, etc.

The changes on the political scene reverberate all over the social formations in the manner described by Poulnatzas’ scheme of political analysis. While the picture is schematic and, as I am emphasising all the time, in most cases imperceptible because one link is far too weak to affect the whole national scene, the true significance of these links is that social formations affect, and indeed, structure each other in an 'informal', i.e. unplanned, in many cases unconscious, manner. Consequently, once the two lines of links (the vertical and the horizontal) are taken into consideration as a permanent feature of any country's normal activity, the domestic political process can be discussed independently only in a manner of speaking.
10.5. Some concrete cases

It will be useful to survey briefly few examples of interaction between the informal links and the political process. The intimate connection between domestic politics and the informal interactions has been appreciated already by Marx who says

"In England the import of Netherlands commodities in the sixteenth century and at the beginning of the seventeenth century gave to the surplus of wool which England had to provide in exchange, an essential, decisive role. In order then to produce more wool, cultivated land was transformed into sheep-walks, the system of small tenant-farmers was broken up etc., clearing of estates took place etc. Agriculture thus lost the character of labour for use value... At certain points, agriculture itself became purely determined by circulation, transformed into production for exchange value. Not only was the mode of production altered thereby, but also all the old relations of population and of production, the economic relations which correspond to it, were dissolved" (Marx, Grundrisse, p.257).

Let us relate this within our framework. Marx does not tell us why England imported Dutch commodities, nor does he relates who were behind this importation. He relates one type of vertical link and describe its social consequences:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>England</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>export commodities</td>
<td>import commodities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>leads to demand for wool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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To produce more wool --> less agriculture

The system of small tenant-farmers was broken

structural change as agriculture dominated by circulation

Change of mode of production: the transformation to 'capitalism' is related to the informal link with the Dutch.
Let us take another case. Rubinson (1978) discussion of German unification is a case in point:

"Bismarck was able to unify Germany by bringing the opposing interests of Junkers and industrialists together in a compromise that was initially minimally acceptable to both. The Junkers grudgingly accepted it because it insured their political dominance within a united Germany; while the industrialists accepted Prussian rule because it gave their economic prosperity by establishing many elements of their economic goals. The peasants and urban working class, having previously learned that neither Junkers nor liberal were their allies, went along under the inducement social security and the vote ... this arrangement still very precarious, but with changes in the world economy favoured the coalition, the opening of american grain with trains etc..In order to maintain their economic position, the Junkers were forced into a policy of economic protection and political supports for grain. This worked in two ways. One, a policy of tariff protection to protect the home market; and two, a policy of grain subsidies to allow Prussian grain to compete...This shift to agriculture protection allied the economic interests of the Junkers with the industrialists, who had always been for protection... This marriage of iron and rye became economically cemented with the Great Tariff if 1879, in which both interests combined around protection" (pp. 50-53).

In this analysis, Rubinson demonstrates the conjunctural intersection of domestic developments with a competitive stance in the world economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Junkers</th>
<th>Industrialists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposing interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise accepted grudgingly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political dominance within united Germany</td>
<td>gave their economic prosperity by establishing many elements of their economic goals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security and vote for peasants and working classes</td>
<td>the opening of american grain with trains (Horizontal link)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junkers forced into a policy of economic protection:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. tariff protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. grain subsidies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industrialists always been for protection: marriage of iron and rye</td>
<td>became economically cemented with the Great Tariff if 1879</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Anderson's analysis of the fall of Spain in the seventeenth century (pp. 205-6):

**Spain dominance over America, (vertical link)**

Leads to extraordinary income, inflationary pressure

1. Increase demand leads to the conversion of land away from cereal production to wine and olives

2. Reinforced increasing tendency of monarchy to contract cereal production

Spain major grain-importer by 1570s

The structure of Spanish society becomes heavily tilted towards the tertiary sector

Accelerating inflation drives textile out of business

Dutch and English traders cream off the demand

Spain loses 'Great power' status
Nairn and Hobson’s analysis of Britain (pp. 206, 207)

City of London

Export all over the globe (vertical links)

Pax Britannica,

Britain the ‘world’s banker’

The sterling too high -->

Industrialists suffer as a result

Britain loses its privileged position in the world economy.

Many historical interpretations implicitly possess a theory of interactions of the domestic political process and one type of informal link. Once we are aware of that, we may take the theory a step further, we may regard the political process as the hub of many informal vertical and horizontal links. Indeed, such perspective is the natural extension of the modern theories of the State into the study of International Relations.
NOTES

1. The significance of that is tremendous. It implies that the class structure of one society re-structure the class structure of another. Thus the informal links may open up a study of their global effects which sustains the world-economy.


The subject will be discussed further in the Conclusions.

2. In spite of considerable work on economic and political competition within and between societies, as well as works on competition and restructurations, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to the concept 'competition' itself. That competition causes change is rooted so deeply in our thought (probably because of evolution) that (as far as I know) no one in International Relations has bothered to acknowledge that competition create these informal links between societies. On competition and economic restructuration: see: Arandt, 1982; Berthelot, 1983; Duncan & Goodwin, 1980; Harrison, 1987; Mahon, 1984; Perez, 1985a; 1985b; Peet, 1987; Tavitian, 1986; Zysman & Cohen, 1983; Zysman & Tyson, 1986. On the concept of competition see: Binswanger & Ruttain, 1978; Brenner, 1984; Burke et. al., 1988: Lodge & Vogel, 1987. Competition in International Relations see: E.L. Jones, 1981, Wesson, 1978.

3. On indirect rule see chapter 8.

4. On that subject see Braudel, 1979.
CONCLUSIONS

A bridge between the theories of the State and the study of International Relations represents international relationships quite differently from the presentation of the traditional literature. In this perspective international relationships are not simply the resulting friction of volitional self-propelled social entities. Nor are they merely class relationships as they occur within a global setting. They are these elements combined, and more.

I proposed a compromise between class-based and State-based schemes, a compromise that draws upon a vast literature which has not been utilized sufficiently in the discipline of International Relations. Because fundamental problems face the discipline of International Relations, namely the difficulties encountered in an attempt to conceptualise states and classes concomitantly, I simply adopted the solution which has already proved itself in political sociology, and concentrated on the political process.

The problem then was to articulate the status of the political process within an international setting. The political process is connected to its 'environment' through two sets of links: through a variety of informal links and through governmental policies which, in themselves, are to some extent conditioned by informal links. The interrelation of the informal links with the political processes yields two patterns, vertical and horizontal structurations.

In this perspective, the world is seen not as an aggregation of discrete entities, nor for that matter is it considered as a vast socio-economic space, but as an accumulation of discrete/indiscrete entities, sharing many aspects (thus indiscretion) fundamentally divided because of the localisation of the political process. The study of International Relations, therefore, is not the study of 'relation' between units, but the study of interrelations among processes. Ultimately, the study of 'society within societies' must investigate the interactions between the various political processes.
There is no point, however, in developing theories if they do not tell us something about the world we would otherwise not have known. It is for this that all theoretical enterprises need at some point to address the issues of prescription, determination and application. The framework presented here is no exception. Why should an abstract arrangement of concepts and ideas tell us something our sense-perception could not? In other words, why do we need the mediation of an abstract realm to know things about the concrete?

There are two reasons to justify the adoption of such methods. It may either rest on the belief that the general chaos and diversity of events is prescribed to a certain extent by an underlying structure which may be discerned through the existence of recurrent patterns. Theory in this case may be regarded as new knowledge because previously unsuspected phenomena are coming to light. Alternatively, it may be justified on the grounds that our biological capacity to deal with information is limited. Theory then, by the method of abstraction and generalisation, reduces information to manageable amounts. In this case theory does not provide new knowledge, it simply re-arranges it. It aims, as Lasswell puts it, "to make the obvious unescapable" (Lasswell, 1977, p.82).

In an ideal world we should have been able to chose between the two alternatives. However, I do not know of any theoretical enterprise which does not combine a measure of the two. Consequently, the issues of prescription, determination and application have to be advanced with great care. It is important not to mistake mere generalizations for new knowledge and vice versa.

If there is any distinctive 'new knowledge' presented in this work, it involves the discovery of the 'informal' world of International Relations. By that I do not mean the discovery of its existence; diffusionism, modernization theory, development studies, interdependence, etc. have all noticed that. But it involves shifting the balance from formal to informal interactions because informal interactions may explain the formal, but not the other way around.
To deal with the question of prescription and application, it is first of all essential to abandon the narrow pre-occupation with the activities of decision-makers. However, to do this is it imperative to understand why are they important? Is it because they are powerful? Is it because they represent society? Or perhaps is it because it is easier to write about their activities than about others? The answer contains all of these. Nonetheless, the essential point is that policy is a unique moment wherein society takes the form of a real entity. It is a moment when the concentrated power of the State, diligently accumulated through tax, monopoly over the means of violence, and ideological manoeuvres, is applied.

Thus whatever social scientists produce is ultimately directed towards the formulation of policy. But policies are not formulated in some esoteric 'cyberspace'. What Apter, Easton and Poulantzas tell us in their unique way is that the overall social milieu is concentrated in the policy, but that in fact the social milieu is the determining agent -- if that is the right term to use. The overall social milieu, therefore, should at least receive an equal treatment in the discipline of International Relations as the study of policy formulation.

The first conclusion of this work, therefore, is that the balance between formal and informal interactions should be redressed: for too long the discipline of International Relations concentrated exclusively on the activities of statesmen. As a balancing act I might be accused of having concentrated too much on the social milieu and not on policies. But the attempt was to reconcile a superimposition of two realms, of the amorphism of social life and of the discreteness of the formal world, two spheres which I felt were far more intermeshed and fluctuating than is generally acknowledged. I have tried to demonstrate that this enormous, amorphous and chaotic realm of informal interactions is best approached as a series of discrete patterns of informal interactions or restructurations. It is the informal sphere which opens the door to deeper investigations of the formal sphere, whereas, as discussed in the first chapter, the formal one is self-limiting.

Any framework for political analysis, however, suffers from one
apparent drawback: it does not tell us about the nature of the international system, it only presents a tool for analyzing politics. There is a philosophy to justify such an approach, the philosophy of structuralism according to which historical events cannot and should not be explained by a theory. Theory only presents a framework for appropriation. Some have argued that structuralism banished the subject, as indeed, in the cold, metallic world of structures, the individual appears to have no choice but to concur (Hindess and Hirst; Thompson, 1978). But nothing is farther from the truth, if the distance between theory and history is not maintained, how do generalization help us? They can only provide statistical knowledge that such and such an event has a greater tendency to occur than another event, and this is an unsatisfactory position to be in. Structuralism (that is, Althusser's structuralism, not Levi-Strauss') maintains clear boundaries beyond which only historical knowledge is appropriate.

The second conclusion of this work is that if events are to be analyzed in their historical setting, than the theory of International Relations cannot determine in advance what the action of states, individuals, companies will be -- it can, and should, however, tell us how to think about these phenomena. But in order to do this, international relationships cannot be conceived as an autonomous system, and consequently there can be no general theory of International Relations. To put it in other words, we cannot assume that all States wish to increase their power vis-a-vis others, but if they appear to do so at certain periods, we need to explain, not postulate, that.

The scheme presented here concentrated on form (the forms of the informal links and how they relate to other forms described by Poulantzas's theory of the State) to the exclusion of power relationships, as well as of the content of the transmissions. The application of the theory to historical situations requires the inclusion of the content in its historical setting.

The benefit accruing from such a scheme is that it becomes possible to articulate a 'social map' combining political, economic and perhaps cultural relationships of a given social formation in an international
context (See fig. V. p.183). The factors that need to be known are:
first, a good class analysis including an analysis of the 'political
scene'; second, it is necessary to map at least the major vertical and
horizontal links (which are potentially quantifiable); third, it is
important to relate the resulting picture to the overall global
political and economic context (only at this stage do we negotiate the
subject of the system of States, the world-market and world-economy).
By such a method, if we cannot predict what sort of policy or policies
will be undertaken, it is possible to make informed guesses as to
whether a policy once decided upon has
(a) a chance of success. As it is possible then to relate any policy
('domestic' or 'foreign') directly to both its domestic context and its
international aspect. Thus, the amount of meaningful information about
the 'environment' of a policy is increased considerably.
(b) perhaps more important, it is possible within a strict limit, to
articulate what sort of 'unintended consequences' will result because
of the policy. Here again, the channels of informal links can tell us
how it will reverberate through other formations and in turn how these
reverberation will be echoed in the emitting social formation.

The framework may therefore provide a tool for foreign policy analysis.
Yet it may be taken a step further. The same procedure may be trans­
ferred from the unit to the system: In the first chapter, I quoted
approvingly Braudel’s concept of the world-economy as an enormous
envelope. However, if the world-economy is not an 'organic' system, how
does it hold together ? Braudel asks this yet is never able give a
satisfactory answer:

"...whether one considers a world-economy in terms of its area
on the face of the globe, or in terms of its depth at the
centre, one's astonishment is the same: the machine seems to
work and yet (especially if one thinks of the earliest
outstanding cities in European history) it seems to have such
modest power supply. How was such success possible ?.... we
shall never be able to give a categorical answer.... But
perhaps I may be allowed to suggest one explanation, by the
artificial device of an image. Think of a huge block of
marble, chosen by Michelangelo or one of his contemporaries
from the quarries of Carrara, an immensely heavy weight which
was nevertheless cut out by primitive means and moved with
very modest energy sources: a little gunpowder...., two or
three levers, perhaps a dozen men if that, ropes, a haulage
team, wooden rollers if it was to be taken any distance, an inclined plane — and there it was. The whole thing was possible because the giant slab was helpless on the ground with its own weight: it represented a huge force, but one inert and neutralised. Cannot this analogy be applied to the great mass of elementary economic activities which was also trapped, imprisoned, unable to move from the ground, and therefore more easily manoeuvrable from above?" (Braudel, 1979, III, p.44).

I think that it is possible to go beyond the boundaries of the metaphor. We actually know quite well how the system holds together. Both Trevor-Roper (1970) and Wallerstein (1974), each from his own perspective, knew that ultimately it was a matching constellation of class structures all over Europe which held together disparate and quarrelsome units in some sort of order. What is lacking is precisely a knowledge of the mechanisms which cause this synchronism. These mechanisms, I would argue, are precisely these vertical and horizontal structurations as they are linked with the domestic processes. However, this will have to wait for another study.
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