THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (ECA) AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

by

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In 1988, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) celebrated its 30th anniversary amidst increasing demands from its member states that it should formulate and implement concrete and realistic programmes which give value for money, and that it should evolve a development philosophy and strategy reflecting African conditions. This thesis evaluates and analyzes the role of the ECA covering the period 1958-88, on the basis of fieldwork conducted at the ECA's headquarters and at one of its subregional offices in North Africa. Secondary materials were obtained from ECA documents, journals and books.

The argument is that the ECA has been unable to transform itself from a research-oriented institution into an operational one. The main proposition is that the ECA was unable to play a vital and effective role in development because of internal constraints. It has evolved as a complex bureaucracy without a clear mission, objectives and policies. Its scope of operations and strategies are shrouded in uncertainty. Furthermore, the demands for development have outstripped the capabilities of the Commission. As a result it has been of marginal concern to African states.

The study is in two parts. Part I consists of the introductory chapter; Chapter 2 examines the Commission's structure and organization, work programmes and resources; Chapter 3 examines its intellectual contribution to the debate on development in Africa; Chapter 4 refers to one of its major strategies for regional co-operation and integration, while Chapter 5 is an historical analysis of its efforts to decentralize. Part II consists of Chapters 6-9, covering the ECA in West, Eastern and Southern, Central and North Africa. The conclusion (Chapter 10) is unhappily pessimistic, namely that in its present form the ECA cannot play a meaningful role in development in Africa.
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DEDICATION

To
Mrs. E.B. Henshaw, (Mum I)
and
Mrs. H.B. Ekpenyong, (Mum II)
for giving me a better future
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>African Association of Cartography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AATPO</td>
<td>Association of African Trade Promotion Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Administrative Committee on Co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACMAD</td>
<td>African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIHTTR</td>
<td>African Institute for Higher Technical Training and Research</td>
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<td>APPER</td>
<td>African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery</td>
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<td>ARCC</td>
<td>African Regional Co-ordinating Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATRCW</td>
<td>African Training Research Centre for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>BADEA*</td>
<td>Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADIS</td>
<td>Central African Development Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL*</td>
<td>Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Committee for Programme and Co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECE</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Europe (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
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<td>ECWA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Western Asia (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECPWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCAP</td>
<td>Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBAR</td>
<td>Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEP</td>
<td>African Institute for Economic Development and Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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* French acronym
LPA  Lagos Plan Action
MRU  Mano River Union
MULPOC Multinational Programming and Operational Centre
NADIS North African Documentation and Information Centre
NIEO New International Economic Order
OAU  Organization of African Unity
OCAM Organization Commune Africaine et Mauricienne
PADIS Pan-African Documentation Information System
PAID Pan-African Institute for Development
PCCM Permanent Consultative Committee of the Magreb
PTA  Preferential Trade Area
RCSSMRS Regional Centre for Services in Surveying, Mapping and Remote Sensing
RECTAS Regional Centre for Training in Aerospace Surveys
RIPS Regional Institute for Population Studies
SACU South African Custom Union
SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SALC Southern African Labour Commission
TAZARA Tanzania-Zambia Railway
TEPCOW Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole
UDEAC Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale
UN  United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDATs United Nations Inter-disciplinary Development Advisory Teams
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNTFAD United Nations Trust Fund for African Development
UN-PAAERD United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WADIS West African Rice Development Association
WHO World Health Organization
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WTO World Tourism Organization
INTRODUCTION

The central argument of the thesis is that the ECA has been unable to transform itself from a research-oriented institution to an operational one. It has been unable to play a vital and effective role in development because of internal constraints. The Commission has evolved as a complex bureaucracy without a clear mission, objectives and policies. Also its scope of operations and strategies are shrouded in uncertainty. Finally, the demands for development have outstripped its capabilities. As a result, it has been of marginal concern to African states.

For the past three decades African governments have been debating about how best to solve their development problems. They want solutions indicating the best ways and means of utilizing their financial, manpower, natural and mineral resources to attain development. Development is defined as a multi-dimensional process which results in industrialization, urbanization, provision of basic amenities and infrastructures and an overall better standard of living of the people. The challenges of development remain intense and the governments are under pressure to eradicate mass poverty, unemployment and inflation. They are also expected to diversify their economies to reduce vulnerabilities in the world markets for commodities which they export.

The failure of past development strategies and the fact that there is no end in sight for the numerous economic ills in Africa has made the task of governing a daunting experience. For the people have come to depend on the government for their well-being. They see political independence opening the path to the attainment of prosperity and wealth. The search for solutions and the urge to satisfy such expectations and
aspirations have led governments and scholars to look far and wide. African governments are pursuing development objectives on three levels. Globally, there are negotiations and debates through International Organizations such as the UN, IMF and the World Bank. There are also bilateral agreements between the government and the industrialized nations. On the regional level, these are conducted through the OAU and ECA and through other bodies such as ECOWAS and SADCC. At the national level, development is co-ordinated with the help of national development plans and major policies such as the structural adjustment policies. It is difficult to state the level that is more important or effective, except to say that all the levels are inter-related and the processes are taking place at one and the same time. Increasingly too, African governments are trying to exploit the opportunities and benefits they derive from international bodies such as the UN. They now want value for money from the subscriptions they make. In the case of the ECA they are questioning its objectives and programmes.

What has the ECA done so far? According to Asfour (1960), the ECA has been able to establish itself as a focal point where the economic needs of the African people can be expressed and where action designed to meet the needs can be initiated. It was a sort of clearing house for the exchange of information and experience.

Magee (1970) studied the role of the ECA and concluded that it encountered two major problems. Externally, the problems included the sovereignty issue, Anglophone-Francophone frictions, Africanization of its staff and its clash with the OAU. On another level, the manner in which the UN system was stacked against it affected its search for a role. It was practically impossible to inject the ECA's regional
approach into the UN system's decision-making processes. The specialized agencies, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN headquarters, were all organized along functional lines. "The ECA to some extent has fallen into the very pattern that it criticizes. Its various divisions, while frequently critical of the functional, or sectoral stress in the rest of the UN system have not overcome temptations of functional organization. Each bureau often goes its own way, and internal agreements within ECA on priorities and planning are not always forthcoming." He concluded that, "given the political power of functional organizations and the apparent intractability of African political rivalries, the future of regionalism in Africa, and, therefore, of ECA is not promising."

Gruhn (1979) stated that the ECA has found it exceedingly difficult to win legitimacy as a kind of African institution in the eyes of its African clients. Also, "the ECA has been hesitant to choose a central emphasis in its work programmes ...." She concluded that "ECA's ability to fully realize its potential as a central voice in African economic development in the years to come may well rely in large measure on its willingness and ability to make some hard choices from amongst its many roles and functions and to develop its future work programmes in accordance with those choices."

Over the years, African governments have expressed dissatisfaction on the roles and activities of the Commission. His Excellency Daniel T. Arap Moi was convinced that it was time for the ECA to "move away from an institution of theoretical studies to one of political action, for concrete and meaningful development of the continent."

Mmusi (1983) concluded that, during the decades ahead, food production and the supporting of economic activities must receive top
priority in the work programme of the ECA.

Rawlings (1983)\textsuperscript{10} suggested that it was imperative on the international plane that the Commission should use its expertise and valuable data to advance action-oriented proposals within the framework of a well-defined analysis and strategy of development based on African needs and interests.

Diouf (1983)\textsuperscript{11} appealed to the ECA to help in identifying the areas in which co-operation is possible and can rapidly be put into practice.

The terms of reference of the ECA stipulate that its main role is to promote economic and social development.\textsuperscript{12} But its relations with its member states are voluntary and it cannot undertake any action with respect to any country without the prior consent of the latter.

Against this background, the thesis evaluates and analyzes the role of the Commission with special reference to its promotion of regional economic co-operation. Why its limited success? And why was it of marginal concern to African governments?

The research covered the period 1958-1988. It enables us to examine its activities over a reasonable period of time and allows for the assessment and documentation of its evolution, bearing in mind that 1975-1985 depicted an era which was the most challenging and dynamic phase in its development. It was also the period when Africa faced severe economic crisis which led them to make higher demands on the ECA than in previous times.

For the evaluation, the following assumptions were made:

(a) That the Commission was providing valuable services;
(b) That its activities and programmes contribute to the raising of
the standard of living of the African people;
(c) That the ECA was a vital forum for the exchange of ideas and
information on development.

Hypothetically, there were five major constraints responsible
for its marginality which were as follows:

(1) The peculiar status of the ECA as an arm of the UN;
(2) The lack of financial and manpower resources;
(3) The inadequacies in its organization, structures, policies and
strategies were responsible for its ineffectiveness and the lack
of participation of the member states in its programmes;
(4) The Commission did not have organs for the co-ordination,
execution and monitoring of projects;
(5) The programmes took no account of the development priorities of
the states.

To test the hypothesis, the study examines the structures,
organization, resources and work programmes of the Commission at both
the continental and subregional levels. The various objectives and
strategies were also considered at both levels.

Fieldwork was conducted at the ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, and at the Multinational Programming and Operational Centre
(MULPOC) in Tangier, Morocco. Although there are five MULPOCs in
existence, there is no reason to believe that visits to the other four
would have yielded different results since all their activities, finance,
administration, personnel and implementation of programmes were organized
and controlled by the headquarters. Also since 1986/87 most of their
programmes have been suspended until such a time that funds could be found for their implementation. Their roles have, therefore, been reduced to routine activities such as organizing the annual meetings of the policy organs. The fieldwork was augmented with publications of the ECA, statements and speeches of African Heads of State and Government, articles in journals, newspapers, books and also correspondence from ECA officials and other related institutions.

The study is in two parts. Part I, which is entitled 'The ECA's Approach to Development', deals with the roles and relevance of the Commission; its structures and resources, and also its development ideas and strategies. The evaluation refers to the work of the ECA on the continental level. Part II, entitled, 'The ECA in the Subregions', deals with the Commission at that level. The key to success depended on how effective it was at this level. It also depended on whether it understood the peculiar problems in each area and applied positive remedies. But the findings were that the ECA was less effective and had little impact in North Africa. Also the same set of internal constraints such as inadequate financial and manpower resources, administrative bottlenecks and unrealistic programmes, affecting the headquarters were present in the subregions. Because the Commission was inefficient in the subregions, its overall image, influence and impact were minimal. The conclusion is that in its present form the ECA cannot play a meaningful role in development. Its failure was attributed to the fact that it was an arm of the UN system.

It is hoped that this study will be of interest to scholars in Development Studies, Area Studies, International Organizations and International Relations as a whole. Also African development planners and officials of the UN specialized agencies should find the information
useful. The academically inclined officials of the ECA were eager to encourage this research because they pointed out that there were debates on how best to re-structure the Commission to give it a more positive image. They also remarked that it was a long time since scholarly work was done on the ECA, with none on aspects of the MULPOCs, which have been in existence since 1978.

Since the research is an evaluation work concerning the role of the Commission, a few definitions to clarify terms become vital. The role prescription includes the pattern of behaviour expected and the functions, duties, authority and responsibilities assigned to it. The structure of an organization deals with the coupling of roles, programmes and the flow of information and authority. It is important to note that in carrying out its role, the leadership and professional staff used programmes and activities to determine the mission, objectives, policies and strategies. In evaluating the past performance of the ECA, these aspects are not so clear-cut and so it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them with precision, but nonetheless, evaluation cannot proceed effectively without knowledge of these elements and how they are interrelated. There are common threads which have been traced through many of the statements by African governments and the ECA alike on the various aspects.

Programmes are defined as generalized activities that are used in response to perceived development needs. They are implemented in favour of the member states. There are also activities which pertain to the Commission itself such as its annual meetings and representation to the General Assembly. It also plays hosts to meetings of the OAU and other inter-governmental institutions.

The policy formation process involves the decision-making procedures
which have evolved over the years with wide ramifications. Policies refer to broad guidelines for programme managers, supervisors and staff for the achievement of objectives. For example, the Commission promotes regional economic co-operation. This policy is closely related to the principle of the Lagos Plan of Action which aims at the creation of an African Common Market by the year 2000. The policy also formed the basis for the Commission's role in institution building, its promotion of regional economic groupings such as ECOWAS, and efforts to decentralize to the subregions.

Strategies are broad instruments or means for action. They have also been viewed as major actions used for the attainment of set goals. Some of them have been planned in advance such as the move to set up a PTA in North Africa scheduled for 1990 (the PTA is viewed as an institutional framework for the promotion of trade and economic co-operation among the states), while others have emerged over time based on ad hoc decisions. A good example is the strategy of establishing institutions for regional co-operation.

The term mission is used to describe the scope of operations with reference to services, activities and programmes. The objectives, on the other hand, are results and targets. These are both specific and general as borne out in the chapters. The policy organs perceive, analyze and choose alternative missions, goals and strategies.
NOTES


3. Ibid., p. 51.

4. Ibid., p. 64.


6. Ibid., p. 87.

7. Ibid., p. 97.

8. Excerpt of an address by His Excellency Daniel T. Arap Moi, President of the Republic of Kenya and Chairman of the OAU, on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee Anniversary of the ECA, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 April 1983.


11. Ibid., p. 111. (Mr. Abdou Diouf is the President of Senegal.)

PART I

ECA's APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
1. **INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this chapter is to look at the history, membership and relevance of the ECA. There is also an outline of some of the economic problems facing African states. This is then followed by a summary of the ECA's strategy and approach to solving the problems. As stated in the literature review in the introduction, the member states have increasingly been criticizing the Commission for what it has done and they have made suggestions about what it should have been doing. In the light of these we ask the following questions:

(a) What is the role of the ECA?  
(b) Who are its member states?  
(c) What economic and social problems do they face? And lastly,  
(d) Why are they dissatisfied with the Commission?

Throughout its existence, the ECA has been trying to define its role in development and it has experienced difficulties. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, problems originated from its status as an arm of the United Nations. The terms of reference indicate several possibilities of what it can do – such as collection of data and analyzing the results, surveys, publication of annual reports and bulletins and the conduction of seminars and workshops. But there was no ordering of priorities or specific emphasis on aspects deemed more vital for the members. Its programmes are too broadly based, even when some states like the LDCs have peculiar needs.
requiring special attention. But the ECA is not alone, as all the regional commissions have similar structures and scope of activities.

Secondly, the degree of the economic crisis, the scale on which it has occurred and its persistent nature, further highlights the fact that the ECA will experience difficulties if it wants to play a positive and leading role in either solving them or in initiating the kind of change in development which Africa needs so badly. The Commission has developed into a complex bureaucracy which makes for difficulties in adjusting to changes in the economic conditions of the states. For example, the states have given self-sufficiency in agriculture top priority in their efforts to improve the standard of living of their populations, but the ECA programmes do not reflect this emphasis.

Finally, even though the basic aim of all the regional economic commissions was to assist in raising the level of economic activity in their respective regions and to maintain and strengthen the economic relations of the countries in each region, both among themselves and with other countries of the world, none was equipped with the necessary organs to allow them to implement project-oriented activities. By project we mean an activity with clear objectives and goals, which also has net value added, that is, that it must contribute to the national income of the respective states. It should also be possible to do a cost-benefit analysis and other forms of evaluation and we should be able to assess whether it contributes towards upgrading the physical living conditions of the people. By requesting projects rather than the general programmes offered, the member states were making demands which questioned the purpose of the Commission.
2. THE HISTORY OF THE ECA

In carrying out the pledge in Article 55 of the Charter 'to promote a higher standard of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development', the United Nations created the five regional commissions and specialized agencies. The legal basis for the establishment of the regional economic commissions rests on two provisions of the Charter. These were Article 62(1) which provides, among other things, that ECOSOC 'may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters', and Article 68 which authorized ECOSOC to set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights and such other commissions which may be required for the performance of its functions. 1

The origin of the first three regional commissions established may be traced to the United Nations' concern in 1946 with the reconstruction of war-devastated areas and other urgent economic problems arising from the war. Acting on a resolution of the General Assembly of 2 February 1946, ECOSOC established on 21 June 1946 a Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas (which was a part of the Economic and Employment Commission) to examine the nature and scope of the economic reconstruction problems of those countries which faced the great and urgent task in this field. The Sub-Commission divided itself into two working groups - one for Europe and North Africa and the other for Asia and the Far East.

On examining the reports of the two groups and in responding to General Assembly resolution 46(1) of 11 December 1946, the ECOSOC established the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE, now ESCAP), respectively, by its resolution 36(v) and 37(iv) of 28 March 1947. These resolutions also laid down their terms of reference, which are quite similar for all the commissions and will be outlined later. On 11 August 1947, the Council, by another of its resolutions - 70(v) - established the third commission - the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, now ECLAC); and, by its resolution 72(v) requested the Economic and Employment Commission to examine and report to the Council on the general questions involved in the creation of the commissions as a means for the promotion of the aims and objectives of the United Nations. The Council noted that the Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas had not reported on the reconstruction problems of North Africa and Ethiopia. After taking note of this, the Temporary Sub-Commission terminated its activities.

Once the three commissions were established, ECOSOC lost the momentum for establishing the rest. It can be said that the ECA had an uneasy birth, following years of pressure for it to be established. The first initiative to establish it was made on 11 March 1947, when the representative of India introduced a draft resolution in ECOSOC for the establishment of a special economic commission for North Africa and Ethiopia, but no action was taken. In 1950, when the request was repeated, the majority of the members of ECOSOC "thought that the establishment of such a commission would be premature, as it could be established only with the agreements of the principal governments in the area and the representatives of the governments administering the territories in Africa were not in favour of such action". Instead, the UN Secretariat was requested to prepare a review of economic conditions in Africa. Subsequent requests, in 1951 and in 1956, were also turned down by ECOSOC.
The question was raised again by Ghana at the twelfth session of the General Assembly in 1957 during the debate in the Assembly's Second (Economic and Financial) Committee. It was argued that African countries needed an organ which would help assemble information on its economic problems and to promote concerted action to solve them and help expedite economic development. The Assembly was urged to give some thought to the possibility of establishing a United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in the near future. The suggestion was supported by representatives of six countries and the discussion resulted in the introduction of a draft resolution on the subject by 29 sponsors. It recommended "that for the purpose of giving effective aid to countries and territories of Africa and in accordance with Article 68 of the Charter of the UN, ECOSOC should at its next session give prompt and favourable consideration to the establishment of the ECA".

Those holding a contrary view, for example, Belgium and the United Kingdom, claimed that Africa was not a homogeneous region and that a commission might not be able to cope with the complexities of the continent. The General Assembly finally approved the draft resolution unanimously on 26 November 1957 as resolution 1155(xii). This was perhaps the first time when the United Nations had to state as its reason for establishing a regional commission the giving of "effective aid to countries and territories". In the equivalent resolution for ECAFE it had been sufficient to request that ECOSOC should "at its next session give prompt and favourable consideration to the establishment of an ECAFE". According to Akintan (1977) the introduction of the words "for the purpose of giving effective aid to countries and territories of Africa" did not mean that the functions to be performed by the ECA were expected to be different from those being performed by the other regional economic commissions. Rather the words should
be regarded merely as a disclosure of some of the possible disadvantages emanating from the non-existence of such a commission in a particular region of the world. The argument put forward by Ghana in 1957 certainly reflected this view when it argued that Africa needed a body like the ECA for assembling information and for joint action to promote its economic development.

This view of the ECA's origins and purpose has been echoed on numerous occasions by African statesmen. For example, Rawlings (1983) stated that "because Africa was for a long time considered a mere geographical extension of Europe, whereas all the other regions had their respective commissions a year or two after World War II to help with their reconstruction and development, it took the international community thirteen odd years after World War II to establish the ECA to undertake the economic and social development of Africa". His Excellency Senator B.M. Nsibandze, Deputy Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland, spoke of the ideals that brought the Heads of State and Government together in April 1958 to formally establish the Commission. He said the ideals were the same which bound Africa together in their quest for total economic independence and development. It was their commitment to the "task of eradicating all forms of poverty and deprivation among our people". Dr. Samuel K. Doe, Head of State of the Republic of Liberia, depicted the era when it was established, when he stated thus, "it will be recalled that the birth of ECA came at a time when most African states were witnessing the intensification of the struggle for independence. At that time, African leaders were preoccupied with the problems rooted in the colonial legacy of international economic exploitation, psycho-cultural degradation and underdevelopment". The Late H.E. General Seyni Kountche, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council and Head of State of Niger, also spoke of this era, when he
said that it was established at a time "when the vast majority of states represented were still under the colonial yoke, the ECA became the first form in which inter-African solidarity was organized and the first forum within which our governments began together to ponder on the common destiny of the African people"."12

ECOSOC eventually yielded to pressure from the General Assembly. On 29 April 1958 the ECA was established. Resolution 671 A and B(xxv) also defined its geographical scope, laid down the operational policy and chose Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as the Commission's headquarters.13 The tasks assigned to the Commission were laid down in its terms of reference. Acting within the framework of the policies of the UN and subject to the general supervision of the ECOSOC, shall, provided that the Commission takes no action with respect to any country without the agreement of the Government of the country:

(a) initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic development of Africa, including its social aspects, with a view to raising the level of economic activity and levels of living in Africa, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of countries and territories of Africa, both among themselves and with other countries of the world;

(b) make and sponsor such investigations and studies of economic and technological problems and developments with the territories of Africa as the Commission deems appropriate, and disseminate the results of such investigation and studies;

(c) undertake or sponsor the collection, evaluation of such economic, technological and statistical information as the Commission deems appropriate;
(d) perform, within the available resources of its secretariat, such advisory services as the countries and territories of the region may desire, provided that such services do not overlap with those rendered by other bodies of the UN or by the specialized agencies;

(e) assist the council at its request in discharging its functions within the region in connection with any economic problems, including problems in the field of technical assistance;

(f) assist in the formulation and development of co-ordinated policies as a basis for practical action in promoting economic and technological development in the region;

(g) in carrying out the above functions, deal as appropriate with the social aspects of economic development and the interrelationship of economic and social factors. 14

Two points should be made about these terms of reference. First, they are identical with those of the other regional economic commissions. Secondly, the breadth of the terms of reference has proved to be a source of weakness for the ECA. When it came to determining the scope of its activities and its functions in Africa, the Commission has had to interpret the functions stipulated above through various measures such as the carrying out of studies, seminars and workshops. It has also attempted to act as a think-tank and created several subsidiary institutions. The wide scope made it difficult for the Commission to evolve a distinctive role in Africa. There was no clear indication about the aspects and sector in which it was to limit its activities. The wide scope of activities also meant that the ECA meant different things to different people.
Earlier indications of what the Commission could do came in speeches made during the ceremony for its establishment. Its role as a forum for the exchange of ideas was recognized at the time. In his welcoming speech the late Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, stated that

"... only a few years ago meetings to consider African problems were held outside of Africa, and the fate of its peoples was decided by non-Africans. Today, the tradition of Berlin and Algeciras has been repudiated, and it is thanks to the Conference of Accra and now of Addis Ababa that the peoples of Africa can, at long last, deliberate their own problems and future." 15

The Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, in his message, also defined the role which the United Nations expected the Commission to play:

"New states are emerging with geographic boundaries which, in most cases, are not best suited to the requirements of rapid economic growth. If such growth is to take place, concerted action and joint endeavours will be needed among countries and territories, each with its own particular political status. New economic links are to be forged among entities belonging to different monetary areas. And all of this should be achieved without losing the present advantage deriving from existing relationships with the rest of the world. These complicated processes can be greatly enhanced and facilitated by the existence of some flexible institutional arrangement such as the Commission can provide." 16

The UN recognized the fact that the new states could not achieve rapid economic growth due to their fragmented economies and the smallness of some of the populations, and it recommended joint ventures as a way forward for the attainment of development. It saw the Commission as the institutional framework to facilitate and encourage joint ventures. The UN assumed that the search for development was going to be pursued to a greater extent, through the Commission -- the then Secretary-General felt that African states faced the same problems of development as industrialized countries and therefore they must seek common solutions
to common problems. He hoped that the states will operate in the model of the EEC, where members were working towards a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), for example. He based his argument on existing theories of development which emphasized the role of industrialization, the complementaries of the economies and possible advantages of economies of scale to be obtained with joint co-operative ventures.

The objectives of development may be the same for all countries the world over, but there were factors peculiar to Africa, such as mass poverty, extensive droughts and famine, issues relating to nation-building and the uneven distribution of population, mineral and natural resources. Also, most of the states lacked the skilled manpower resources and the necessary technology which are important factors in the quest for development. Finally, the new states held on to the principle of national sovereignty and their newly acquired political independence to the extent that they were not prepared to allow either the Commission or any other institution an upper hand in determining development prospects. Each state preferred the option of devising and implementing its national development plan. In the final analysis, it has to be said that African states took full responsibility for their own development the Commission was more or less reduced to a talking shop. Secondly, the states began to question the usefulness and purpose of the Commission in the late 1970s when they realized that past development strategies adopted from the industrialized nations had failed to bring expected development to Africa. But even more disheartening was that the prospects for eliminating mass poverty remained elusive. By 1979 African governments were asking the Commission to devise a development philosophy and strategy which was tailored to their peculiar needs. They also grew tired of rhetoric and the endorsement of countless resolutions and were now putting more emphasis on actual projects. We have to remember
that the ECA drew up the agenda and programmes for the meetings of the policy organs without consultation with the states. The latter attend the meetings to deliberate on the drafts and pass the resolutions. (See Chapter 2, especially the section on work programmes.)

The effort of changing the emphasis from the collection of data and the dissemination of ideas to the implementation of projects is to question the original functions of the Commission. It also shows that the states have higher expectations of what the Commission can do than in its earlier years.

The Commission's own view of its role is also vital. To an extent this has dominated its activities and made it difficult for it to change. In other words, the Commission has always maintained that it has been providing valuable services to its member states and has defined its role in various publications. Section 4 of this chapter deals with the Commission's own claims in this regard.

3. MEMBERSHIP

The membership of the Commission is confined to independent African states. It traded its colonial links and non-white membership for an African composition and the trend was finally established with the expulsion of the Republic of South Africa in 1963 and that of Rhodesia in 1965. Zimbabwe joined after its independence in 1980.

In 1958 it had 16 full members - nine of which were African states, namely, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and United Arab Republic. The six non-African states with full membership included Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and
and the United Kingdom. (The Union of South Africa was granted full membership before the expulsion.) Nine associate members were also admitted by ECOSOC in 1958 which were: the Federation of Nigeria, Gambia, Kenya, Zanzibar, Sierra Leone, British Somaliland Protectorate, Tanganyika, Uganda and the Italian-administered trust territory of Somaliland.

The African states expressed concern over two issues which dominated the debate at the time. The first was the admission of non-African states as full members, for example, the United Kingdom and France. The second issue had to do with the idea that some non-self-governing territories were not given associate membership, for example, Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland protectorate (now Botswana) and Fernando Po. The Africans took the view that it was their collective responsibility "to take decisions affecting Africa without the said decisions being influenced by the opposing votes of non-African powers". They, then, insisted that the full membership status of the colonial powers be terminated or changed and for an African participation on behalf of the non-self-governing territories. Italy was the first to withdraw its membership in 1960 when it gave up its territorial responsibility for what has now become the Republic of Somalia.

Belgium did the same thing in 1962 when the Belgian Congo (now Zaire), Rwanda and Burundi became independent. France, Spain and the United Kingdom later agreed to the status of associate members in 1963 and the non-self-governing territories under their administration were given direct representation as associate members. In the same year, Fernando Po and Rio Muni (administered by Spain) and Mauritius, Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana), Swaziland, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland, and Gambia (all administered by
the United Kingdom) became associate members. In 1964 Fernando Po and Rio Muni were, at their own request, admitted as a single associate member under the name of Equatorial Guinea. After the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland (the Central African Federation) was dissolved - Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Nyassaland (now Malawi) attended as separate associate members in 1964.

Continued pressures were mounted on South Africa. Members were opposing its apartheid policies and were not satisfied with the fact that it had full membership status. ECOSOC eventually suspended South Africa from participating in the work of the Commission - a policy which has remained until the present. Also, in 1963, the Commission expelled Portugal from membership for non-compliance with resolutions of the Commission and the General Assembly. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Ian Smith in 1965 was not recognized by the General Assembly of the UN and consequently the associate membership status of Rhodesia was withdrawn. Thus, by 1965, the ECA had become totally African in its composition.

Apart from this change, the next remarkable thing was the growth in membership. From the initial nine members, by 1988, the ECA had a membership of 50 independent African countries, excluding South Africa. These are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, The Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea Bissau, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Republic of Cameroon, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
There are still two categories of membership: (a) full member and (b) associate member. To qualify for full membership a country must be independent, a member of the UN and belong to the African continent and its associate islands. This gives them the right to participate in the regular sessions of the Commission but they cannot vote. However, representatives of associate members may participate and hold office in the subsidiary bodies of the Commission. Namibia is presently the only associate member. The Commission may also invite any national liberation movement recognized by the OAU to send observers to participate in its consideration of issues which were of interest to the movement. Such observers have the right to submit proposals which may be voted upon at the request of any of its members. As of June 1988, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) had observer status.

Like other regional commissions, the ECA is authorized to invite any member of the UN to participate in its work in a consultative capacity especially for issues of concern to non-members. In the past, Austria, India, the USSR and the USA have attended depending on their contributions and interests in programmes of the Commission. Under a special arrangement, Switzerland is invited to sessions of the Commission as observer - this is because Switzerland is interested in ECA programmes but an observer at the UN General Assembly.

With regard to voting rights, Rule 55 stipulates that "Each member of the Commission shall have one vote". The decisions of the Commission are taken by a majority of members present and voting, while members who abstain are considered as not voting. The members usually vote by show of hands, except that any member may request a roll-call, which
is taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the state whose name was drawn by lot by the Chairman.  

The issue of membership was a thorny one in the earlier years of the Commission. It took roughly six years to settle. It was one of the reasons why it can be said that the Commission had an uneasy birth. The other was the fact that the colonial powers, especially the United Kingdom and France, did not want a Commission created for African states - the latter challenged their authorities and claims to the territories. Rather than concentrate on its precise functions, the earlier years were used to debate on issues such as: (a) whether Africa should have a Commission in the first place; (b) the composition of such an entity once established; and (c) the size and structure of its secretariat. The colonial powers - France, Spain and the United Kingdom - helped to prolong the issue of membership because of their desire to keep control of their colonies and their ill-judgement that Africa was not in need of and ready to have a Commission. But these were issues which African governments were not willing to ease up on. Their attitudes were borne out of their determination to take full responsibility and keep control over their affairs and because they were determined to hold on to their newly won political independence. Sovereignty became the key to their relationship with the outside world and a ticket to participation in the UN. It also became the basis on which they could make claims and perform duties in the international political and economic systems.

4. **THE RELEVANCE OF THE ECA**

The ECA has maintained that through its terms of reference it has been able to perform some functions. In all, it sees itself as an
institution providing six distinct services for its member states. We shall discuss these with reference to its activities. The intention is to find out whether it has been able to perform the functions successfully and the problems it has encountered. It will also be relevant to figure out whether African states recognize these functions.

First, the Commission sees itself as a useful forum for negotiations and decisions on common problems and for evolving joint positions on international issues in the economic, social and technological fields. In 1983 it stated that the realization of the goal of collective self-reliance and the establishment of an African Common Market, would require it to expand this aspect of its role. But for such negotiations to succeed the ECA needs the active participation of its member states. Its mandate does not allow the Commission to act independently of its members and it possesses no powers of enforcement. It can only operate if the states so wish.

The necessity of winning support for its programmes and action has led to its special relationship with the OAU since the 1960s. The relationship has had both elements of conflict and collaboration. Magee (1979) recorded the impact of the establishment of the OAU on the ECA. He pointed to the disinterest in, and disillusionment with, the ECA by African leaders. He stated that "the OAU, created in May 1963 at Addis Ababa, became the most prestigious African assembly of ministers and heads of government for debate on key political issues. After 1965 the ECA's biennial sessions naturally came to focus on less politically compelling and newsworthy issues". Moreover, "the decline of African interest in the ECA at the time when it became more ambitious forced the secretariat to formulate a new conception of its role. It attempted to concentrate on organizing and advocating regional and
subregional co-operation and it argued that it ought to have the
decisive role in co-ordinating the economic and social programmes of
the UN family in Africa".26

The two organizations operate in the same region and both have
their headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but rather than complement­
ing each other, the early years witnessed increased friction and clash
of interests, spearheaded by the leaders. Magee (1970) described the
bitter quarrel between the ECA and OAU as most disastrous in its
implications for African development because the executive heads of the
two organizations became bitter rivals.27 The most spectacular of those
clashes were between Diallo Telli, the first Secretary-General of the
OAU, and his counterpart of the ECA, Robert K.A. Gardiner, in the 1960s,
and Edem Kodjo (OAU) and Adebayo Adedeji (ECA) especially during the
First Economic Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern­
ment of the OAU in 1980. Kodjo (then the Secretary-General of the OAU) tried
to prevent the ECA from submitting its papers relating to economic
problems of the states. He wanted the OAU to have an upper hand during
the deliberations. The drama began when the delegates were split into
committees for detailed discussion of the OAU documents. In one of the
committees, the representative of Ethiopia wanted to find out whether
the committee had read the paper presented by its government. At the
same time, the officials of the ECA had distributed the latter's
documents to every room in the hotels occupied by delegates and a few
of them had glanced through them before attending the committees. These
persons wanted to find out if others had seen and read the ECA paper.

What eventually emerged was the fact that the two organizations
had prepared different documents for the summit. The ECA paper had
more substance and was more coherent and properly written than the OAU's.
Nigeria formally introduced that of the former and Edem Kodjo was said to have left the meeting in anger and frustration.  

The delegates continued with the discussions in the absence of Edem Kodjo. It was clear that they wanted the two organizations to work together to solve the economic problems facing Africa. The delegates eventually endorsed the ECA document, which became the Lagos Plan of Action - the blue-print for African development. In the final analysis, they were not interested in whether there was a personality clash between the leaders of the two organizations as was suspected; they were guided instead by the need to get to grips with their economic problems and the sense of duty they owed their peoples. This is perhaps the key to understanding the relationship between the OAU and the ECA. Since 1980 the situation has improved. Although conflicts may exist, they both realize that they need to collaborate.

Gruhn (1985) noted that there have been reciprocal representation and participation at meetings and some joint use of information, with many documents and working papers carrying an ECA/OAU designation. However, she pointed out that it is also the case that "most of the actual work, the writing of reports, the undertaking of feasibility studies, have been done by the staff of the ECA. So, what often appears to be joint work of the ECA and the OAU frequently is not more than a co-sponsorship of the final ECA product or activity. But while the OAU has profited by having some role and expertise in the vital economic realm, the ECA has profited from the legitimizing cover provided by the OAU. It has been a marriage of convenience."

Fieldwork for this thesis confirmed the utility of this argument. OAU officials were on friendly terms with their counterparts at the ECA. The former usually made use of the Conference Complex of the
Commission, which is popularly known as Africa Hall. The translators for both organizations were also free to use the Complex. By so doing both organizations demonstrated that the search for and the struggle for political and economic independence and development were not the exclusive preserve of any specific institution. Both have to collaborate in the interest of the continent and their roles have to be complementary. The consensus which the ECA needed is provided for through the OAU. The only problem is that the OAU seems to have more credit once the states have endorsed an ECA activity - it becomes that of the OAU. It is really the price which the ECA has been forced to pay. The other problem for the ECA was that important decisions were not only taken within the OAU, some aspects were tackled through other subregional bodies such as the ECOWAS, the PTA, the SADCC and the ADB. Depending on the issues, these other institutions were in direct competition with the OAU. Moreover, other specialized agencies such as UNIDO, UNDP and UNESCO were also competing with the ECA as fora for the exchange of ideas and where decisions are taken. The ECA has thus lost its original pre-eminence: it is only one of the avenues for discussions and not the centre or main forum for negotiations.

The second function it serves relates to its activities in the area of research, data collection, analysis and dissemination, organization of conferences, expert meetings, workshops and seminars. The ECA has concentrated on these activities and they constitute its traditional role. It has become one of the leading sources of data on socio-economic matters. But as was noted in the introduction, the member states now want less of these activities. Even the ECA recognized the need for change, when in 1983 it stated that "they will have to re-orient its activities so as to become more practical and a catalyst in the development of the member states".31 In its earlier years
this aspect of its role was both necessary and vital as there were no statistics on African economic and social conditions. The data need up-dating annually but members want the ECA to divert to projects in the 1980s.

The third function has to do with institution building for the promotion of economic co-operation amongst member states. This aspect has been treated in detail in Chapter 4. It is sufficient here to note that the ECA has established more than 30 inter-governmental institutions. It takes the position that Africa needs even more institutions but it has not been too successful obtaining agreement for them because its institutions are widely perceived as acting more like obstacles than agents of development. This is due to factors such as overlapping activities, lack of membership and non-payment of subscriptions. Member states feel that there are far too many institutions and due to their own economic problems have frequently declined to pay their subscriptions. Even some of the institutions it has created have not become fully operational. For example, the ECA is still acting as interim secretariat for at least seven, including the Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA); the Trans-East African Highway Authority (TEAHA): the Federation of African Chambers of Commerce (FACC); and the Southern African Labour Commission (SALC).

Another problem for the ECA was the fact that some of its institutions were competing with it. For example, the PTA has functions which overlap those of the ECA MULPOC based in Lusaka. Some member states have also set up alternative entities for economic co-operation which also compete with those of the ECA, for example, the SADCC in southern Africa. So in general the ECA can claim that it has established numerous institutions but they face several problems, and are sometimes
perceived as obstructing the process of co-operation. In this aspect of its role, therefore, the ECA has met with limited success.

Fourth, the ECA describes itself as the promoter of economic and technical co-operation. What this entails is technical assistance such as the drawing up of treaties and protocols for the setting up of regional economic groupings. It is true that the ECA officials drew up the documents for such organizations as the PTA and the Economic Community of Central African states (ECCAS). It also attends the meeting of ECOWAS and others in an observer status. It encourages such activities because they tie in with its ideas for the establishment of an African Common Market by the year 2000. The Commission also argues that collective self-reliance was vital and a pre-requisite for development in Africa, given some of the factors which will be treated under section 5 of this chapter. Although it plays an active part in promoting and encouraging economic and technical co-operation, it is rather difficult to quantify and assess its successes and failures. The ECA seems to be actively involved with the member states but evaluation is elusive. The Commission also faces constraints in trying to perform this role because the activities of the regional economic groupings cut across national boundaries and once established, such entities take on a life of their own as the members strive to bargain and protect their interests. The whole question of sovereignty of the states is brought to the fore and the result is that the role of the ECA dwindles to that of observer status. This status may allow the ECA to attend the meetings and be properly informed but it cannot be a party to their deliberations.

The Commission describes its fifth role as that of a regional 'think-tank'. It played an important part in the formulation and
drafting of the documents such as the **Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa 1976-1981-1986**, which formed the basis for the Monrovia Strategy and eventually the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). The main objective of the Monrovia Strategy was the establishment of self-sustaining development and economic growth based on collective self-reliance. Its aim was to improve the standard of living of the mass of the African people and reduce mass unemployment \(^{33}\) (For details of the Lagos Plan of Action, see Chapter 3). However, in this case the OAU received the credit because the final product has its designation, that is, the OAU Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000.

It is widely held in the literature that the missing ingredient in the ECA's case has been a distinct development strategy for Africa, "without which talk about priorities, co-ordination and operations makes little sense". \(^{34}\) \(^{35}\) Gruhn (1984) pointed out that under the leadership of Raul Prebisch, the ECLA (now ECLAC) developed an ideology which held that the economic disadvantage of Third World Countries stemmed from the fact that they were situated in the periphery of an international economic system that has resulted from and was perpetuated by giving the Third World unfavourable terms of trade. To attack these disadvantages, industrialized 'core' states would have to be persuaded to reverse this pattern and create in its stead a mechanism that would guarantee preferential status for the LDCs in the periphery. Latin American regional co-operation and integration was perceived as an essential step in the reorganization of centre-periphery relations. Gruhn stated that "the ECLA made it its mission to influence international thinking about, and understanding of, the nature of under-development with the aim of changing the international economic structure. In this sense the ECLA conceived of itself as a lobbyist for Latin American
interests and, more broadly, Third World interests in general". \(^{36}\)

Although a lot can be said about the ECLA's strategies, its achievements and failures, what is relevant here is that "the ECLA, unlike the ECA, was perceived both in its own region and internationally, as a truly Latin American organization, and not as an administrative arm of the UN". \(^{37}\) It is true that the ECLA was the source of dependency theory, but apart from it, no other regional economic commission has developed a distinct ideology for development in their respective regions. Nevertheless, the ECA has been the fore-runner on the principles of self-reliance and self-sustained economic growth. It may not have formulated a coherent strategy but the principles which form the basis of the LPA offer hope and a long-term strategy for development.

The last but by no means the least of the ECA's roles refers to its operational level. This refers to its efforts to decentralize to the subregions with the aim of identifying the problems of each area bringing its activities 'on the ground'. The closeness also aims at allowing the member states to participate more actively in its programmes and activities. But decentralization has not been properly implemented because its subregional organs lacked autonomy in financial, personnel and administrative matters. The ECA headquarters was in direct control of their activities. Besides, the ECA experienced all the internal constraints at the subregional level that are present at headquarters. These manifest themselves in the form of inadequate manpower and financial resources, concentration on research, workshops and seminars rather than projects, vague objectives and lack of time-frame for the programmes. In the case of North Africa, the ECA has little influence there as member states are more interested in the Arab League (see Chapter 9). This suggests that the ECA's operations are also hampered
by external factors such as competition with other existing institutions in the subregions. In effect, the Commission has not yet succeeded at the operational level.

The problem with all the functions outlined above is the fact that the ECA has tried to carry them out at the same time. With its limited resources, it is no wonder that it has been incapable of fully exploiting a particular role. The same reason is responsible for the fact that it cannot boast of perfection of any of the roles. Its mandate may have allowed it to extend its functions but such wideness has resulted in seriously undermining its ability and the extent to what it can do.

The main reason why it has failed is because it is an arm of the UN and therefore it has to operate within broad and vague guidelines. This problem applies to all the regional economic commissions because they have the same terms of reference. As has been suggested by member states of the West African subregion in 1987 (see Chapter 6), there is a great need for the redefinition of its functions and scope of activities to put it in proper shape to tackle the pressing development needs of the member states. By this request, the states were questioning the relevance of the Commission. What can it do for them? The answer to the question lies in the potential which it has. We know that it has varied functions, an established bureaucratic complex and good communication links with its member states. It also has professional staff, although limited in number. Also its terms of reference gave it broad options to choose from. Part of its potential lies in what it has done so far, but more importantly what it can do in the future. Since African states place more emphasis on projects, the Commission has to balance out its resources and re-orient itself to enable it to implement them. From its numerous surveys and studies, the Commission is conversant
with the socio-economic problems facing the states. All that remains is for the Commission to gear itself towards solving them with carefully planned and executed projects, for which it will need to establish organs for planning, execution, co-ordination and monitoring. (These are lacking at present both at the headquarters and in the subregions.)

Inspite of the handicaps of the Commission, there are advantages to being a UN affiliate. Financially, it gets its regular budget from the UN headquarters in New York and has to approach member states, industrialized countries and other specialized agencies of the UN, especially UNDP, UNIDO and FAO for its extra-budgetary funds (see Chapter 2). It also gets its volumes of stationery, communication equipment and essential transport. Such resource inputs, including expertise, would not have been possible without the financial resources from New York. Moreover, the ECA received more funds each year than is the case with the OAU. The Commission has been able to extend its resources to the OAU by allowing the latter to use its Conference Complex often - the African Hall. The ECA also provides the technical expertise for drafting documents for the OAU.

5. THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW

The survey of the economic problems facing African countries is necessary at this point because it is at the heart of the difficulties facing the ECA itself - the fact that it has not been able to carry out programmes and activities reflecting their development needs. The African economic crisis is both multi-dimensional and persistent in nature. The heavy reliance and emphasis on regional economic co-operation and integration by the ECA offers long-term hopes for development. But
the problem is what to do at present. As Africans place emphasis on projects, there is also the need for the ECA to begin to address some aspects of the crisis. The fact that the ECA seems to ignore the problems while carrying on with countless surveys and research is one of the reasons why it has remained unpopular in Africa. There is also doubt as to whether the ECA can really assist these states in any positive way, that is, in solving rather than debating their economic and social problems.

Towards the end of the 1970s, African governments were becoming concerned over the economic stagnation affecting the continent. The escalation in energy prices exacerbated inflation and gave rise to unfavourable terms of trade for their commodity prices. Then the African leadership showed their concern at the OAU and the ECA while the Governors of the African central banks requested the World Bank to undertake an investigation and analysis of the crisis. What were the components of the crisis?

There was a fiscal element to the crisis, which involved the burden of debt service and rescheduling, the conduction of negotiation with bilateral and private creditors, bargaining over conditionality packages with the IMF and World Bank, not to mention the costs of structural adjustment and devising new development policies and strategies. Factors such as the oil price rises of 1973 and 1979; drought, recession in the West forced down the demand for and price for commodity exports; increasing OECD protectionism; and generalized inflation in the world economy led to the accumulation of debt. When credits and direct foreign investment dried up, foreign aid also tapered off.

While accepting that these external factors affected African economies, there were also domestic factors which had serious effects.
The constant change in policies resulting from frequent change of governments, brought about by military intervention in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Ethiopia, merely prolonged the economic problems. Each new regime was prepared to try out something new and not enough time was given for the end results before it was time to have yet another government and another set of policies - the consequences of coups and counter-coups. Then there were incidents of mismanagement and embezzlement, especially during, for example, the Shagari regime in Nigeria. The cumulative effects of such political and economic instability was to further worsen the crisis. The real causes of the crisis, then, were domestic factors.

Even though drought, recession and generalized inflation pre-dated the OPEC oil shocks, they aggravated the effects. By the early 1980s the situation had become disastrous. Between 1980 and 1984, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of African countries declined on average by 1.4 per cent per year, with per capita Gross National Product (GNP) by an average of 4.4 per cent per year, export volume 7.4 per cent per year and import volume 5.9 per cent per year. The World Bank has recently designated 22 sub-Saharan African states as "debt distressed," meaning that their projected ex ante debt service ratios (including IMF 'repurchases') for 1988-90 are more than 30 per cent.

In 1974 the total debt of sub-Saharan Africa was about $14.8 billion, but by 1986 it had reached $102 billion according to World Bank figures. Of the $102 billion, 82.4 per cent or $84.1 billion, was public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term debt. The breakdown was as follows (as percentage of the total $102 billion): bilateral, 36.8 per cent; private bank, 22.5 per cent; World Bank, 13 per cent; other multilateral, 6.6 per cent; and
By comparison to Latin American debt, the total amount is not large: it is about 10 per cent of total developing country debt and less than that of either Mexico and Brazil. There is a low percentage of private bank debt which makes up the greater bulk of Latin American debt. Also a large percentage of Africa's private bank debt is guaranteed by OECD country public agencies, such as the US Export-Import Bank. As a consequence, this debt is rescheduled through the Paris Club mechanism rather than by the banks themselves, that is, the London Club. Finally, a greater portion of African debt is owed to the IMF and the World Bank, 6.2 and 13 per cent, respectively. This type of debt cannot be rescheduled.

The following countries are sub-Saharan Africa's major debtors (billions of US dollars, end 1984): Nigeria, 19.7; Ivory Coast, 7.4; Sudan, 7.2; Zaire, 5; Zambia, 4.8; Kenya, 3.8; Tanzania, 3.3; Cameroon, 2.7; Zimbabwe, 2.1; Senegal, 2; Ghana, 2; Madagascar, 2; Congo, 1.6; Ethiopia, 1.5. Inspite of the low percentage of debt owed to private creditors, six countries owe more than two-thirds of their 1985-87 debt service to private sources — Benin, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. According to Callaghan (1988) the African debt has grown faster than any other region in nominal terms. The annual growth rate between 1970 and 1984 was 20.4 per cent (which was slightly higher than that of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), and between 1975 and 1980
it was 25.5 per cent. Medium- and long-term debt quadrupled between 1975 and 1983.

The World Development Report 1981 indicates that overall debt-service ratios are likely to rise moderately for oil-importing Africa through the 1980s (see Table 1.1). (The debt-service ratio is the ratio of interest and amortization payments to export earnings.)

Table 1.1 Actual and Projected Sub-Saharan African Debt-Service Ratios (per cent)

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While the ratios for the low-income countries are estimated to remain unchanged at around 19 per cent, those for the middle-income countries are expected to rise from 13.6 per cent in 1980 to about 19 per cent in 1990. For oil-exporting countries the debt-service ratio is projected to rise through 1985 and then decline.

Projections of debt-service ratios are highly dependent on assumptions about trade prospects, import requirements and capital flows. According to the World Development Report 1981, some countries that
experienced severe debt-servicing difficulties during the 1970s (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Zaire and Zambia) are likely to continue to do so in the 1980s due in part to the impact of the earlier debt reschedulings and to amortization requirements for outstanding obligations. Other large borrowers in the 1970s (such as Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Tanzania) could face difficult debt-servicing problems if export performance falls. Debt-service obligations are likely to become a more important element in the balance of payments of many African countries and may compel more of them to use the Paris Club — it refers to ad hoc meetings of representatives of the governments of Western creditor countries, and other arrangements for debt relief.

The terms of borrowing also worsened over time. In 1979, 54 per cent of debt was on concessional terms; by 1981, it was only 35 per cent. In addition to these, African countries were finding it difficult to repay the debts. The low capacity to service the debt was reflected in the number and frequency of reschedulings. Between 1975 and September 1987, Zaire had rescheduled 14 times (8 Paris Club's and 6 London Club's) and Sudan rescheduled 8 times (5 and 3). By 1984, Madagascar, Senegal and Togo each rescheduled 7 times (5 and 2 each). Four countries rescheduled 5 times: Ivory Coast (3 and 2), Liberia (4 and 1), Niger (4 and 1) and Sierra Leone (4 and 1). Zambia rescheduled four times (3 and 1). The reschedulings have caused alarm both in the West and in Africa, to the point where the African debt has become a topical issue for conferences and seminar papers. But no solutions have been agreed upon by either the African countries or the creditors. The former, however, recognized the need to unite in their fight against creditors. At a conference sponsored and organized by the ECA in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1987 on the African crisis, the delegates issued a statement referred to as the Abuja Statement. It urged the African governments
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to consider "setting up an African consultative machinery to enable member states to exchange information and harmonize their position for the meetings with creditors in the Paris and London Clubs". But the governments have not yet set up such machinery.

Another dimension of the African economic crisis was the food crisis, especially of 1983-85. It led to African governments being committed to the alleviation of hunger. Food was central to African development. But the countries have been unable to produce enough to feed their populations. Per capita food production declined from 1970 to 1983 by 17 per cent. According to Hopkins (1988) this was a major factor in the general economic malaise of that period. And because of the importance of food in employment and in household expenditure, instabilities in production leads to disruption in national economic life and in that of the individuals. Those in areas hardest hit by shortages migrate, burdening other regions and causing the loss of capital resources. Terms of trade are severely altered and wealthy herdsmen become impoverished. Employment shrinks, demand for non-food goods falls and the formal economy is increasingly circumvented by informal exchanges. These effects have led to heavy dependence on food aid.

The third aspect of the crisis is reflected in the usual basic indicators such as gross income per capita, adult literacy ratios; life expectancy; distribution of GDP between agriculture, industry, manufacturing and services; urbanization; volume of exports and imports and value of manufactured exports. It has to be said that there is an absence of figures for these indicators in some African countries and a lack of proper information but, nevertheless, institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the ECA produce estimates which allow us to make some
generalized statements about the trends in development. Table 1.2 is one of such estimates used here for illustrative purposes. It shows the development standards to be found in the continent. According to the World Bank Atlas 1981, the average per captia was only US$ 810 compared with US$ 12820 in the US and US$ 2420 for the world as a whole. (This was the average for the continent as a whole and it included th oil and mineral exporting countries such as Libya, Nigeria, Gabon and Botswana. Excluding these countries the average for the rest of Africa was only US$ 381.)

As indicated on Table 1.2, some countries have fairly high per capita income, for example, Gabon with US$ 3810, Libya US$ 8450 and Algeria US$ 2180. But the high figures do not mean that they are developed or industrialized. For example, Libya has a high per capita income, but manufacturing accounted for 3 per cent of total GDP. The Libyan economy was predominantly agrarian in character, Agriculture accounted for 71 per cent of total GDP—an indication that Libya is not developed.

The existence of oil and substantial mining activity accounts for the small contribution of agriculture to the GDP of these countries. In Zambia and Libya, agricultural development was far behind the level achieved in such countries as Kenya, Malawi and Ivory Coast which have lower per capita income. Even though per capita incomes are not a reliable indicator of development, we can draw some lessons from the figures. Firstly, they indicate the lack of development or the general level of acute mass poverty. Secondly, the low per capita incomes indicate that the process of monetization of the economy has not gone very far. Many economic activities take place outside the monetary sector and are therefore not covered in statistical exercises. (For
more information on growth of GNP, see Appendix 2.)

On the whole, Africa is by far the most underdeveloped of the Third World countries. According to the Overseas Development Council (ODC) indicators of development, Africa contains the majority of the nations classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In an ECA review (1987), there are 27 LDCs in Africa, which are characterized by formidable structural deficiencies such as their extremely low per capita income estimated at an average of $158 in 1985. They find it difficult to raise adequate savings necessary for development financing. They depend on single export commodities which face inelastic demand and declining prices in international markets. Industrial production is limited to import-substitute processing activities with high import-content, a condition which exerts pressure on meagre foreign exchange resources to import raw materials and spare parts. Inadequate physical and social infrastructure present major impediments to the maximization of their economic capacities, particularly with respect to production structures.

So just as there is an unequal, asymmetrical relationship between Africa and the world economic powers, so are there increasing inequalities among African states themselves. The uneven rates of growth have resulted in steadily increasing inter-state inequalities. In the 1980s there was a further intensification of inequalities in income and wealth distribution. Ann Siedman suggests that in most African countries since political independence, a newly emergent class - sometimes referred to as the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' - has used the state political-economic machinery to enrich themselves. This has been at the cost of perpetuating and worsening income distribution and bargaining away the nation's potential benefits to outside intertests due to reliance on foreign
investment. 48 Whatever the explanation for African poverty and under-
development - legacy of colonialism, size handicaps, dependence, internal
inequalities, political conflicts and instability, natural disasters
such as drought, famine and flooding, to mention but a few - their
existence is unquestioned.

All the three executive secretaries of the ECA - Mekki Abbas (1958-
1962), Robert K.A. Gardiner (1962-1975) and Adebayo Adedeji (1975 to the
present) - have tried ideas and schemes based on a common theme - regional
economic co-operation and integration, in their efforts to serve the
states. Both Gardiner and Adedeji were constantly aware of the difficult
economic conditions facing African countries. Also given the geographical,
economic, political and social diversities, they promoted the idea that
regional economic co-operation was one of the vehicles for development.
So since the early years of the Commission, its structure, organization,
programmes and resources have been geared towards the promotion of both
regional and economic co-operation. These aspects of the Commission
are treated in Chapter 2.

In the 1970s the ECA set out to mould the opinion of African
countries with reference to the development options which were more
appropriate to their economic conditions. Even though the Commission
did not come up with a coherent and distinct philosophy, the ECA
was able to contribute to the debate by putting forward principles such
as self-reliance and self-sustained economic growth and self-sufficiency
in agriculture, which formed the basis for the Lagos Plan of Action.
The ECA's intellectual contribution to the debate on development is
treated in Chapter 3.

One of the major strategies adopted by the Commission for the
promotion of regional economic co-operation is the establishment of
inter-governmental institutions such as the African Development Bank (ADB), African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) and the Preferential Trade Area for Southern and Eastern Africa (PTA). The importance of such institutions cannot be underestimated, but the strategy met with difficulties such as states' refusal to join and pay subscriptions, competition from national equivalents of such institutions and the existence of too many inter-governmental institutions, especially in West Africa. The role of the Commission as an institution builder is treated in Chapter 4.

In an effort to respond adequately to the demands of each subregion and to provide effective and efficient service, the Commission made efforts to reorganize its secretariat and subregional structures and organs - a move it referred to as decentralization. This process was also meant to bring the work of the Commission closer to the states and to encourage the participation of the latter in its activities. The historical analysis of the Commission's efforts is discussed in Chapter 5. Its subregional structures are referred to as the Multinational Programming and Operational Centres - MULPOCs.

Chapters 6-9 form the second part of this thesis and they consist of the activities, policy organs, work programmes, resources and problems encountered in each subregion - north, south-eastern, central and west Africa. Each subregion has a MULPOC, except for central Africa which has two. The chapters illustrate that the process of development was both complex and multi-dimensional. The ECA's task of satisfying the expectations and demands of member states had to be put in the context of its organization, structure, work programmes, financial and manpower resources allocated to the subregions. The Commission faced major constraints such as lack of manpower and financial resources, heavy
reliance on the headquarters and delays in implementation of programmes.

Chapter 10 which is the conclusion deals with the summary of the thesis. The main point made here is that the ECA is an unlikely forum for the initiation of measures to combat underdevelopment in Africa. As an arm of the UN, it cannot be easily sensitized to Africa's economic and social problems. Moreover, the magnitude and persistent nature of the economic crisis are such that the ECA is neither a catalytic agent nor can it play a position role in development. 49

6. CONCLUSION

The ECA serves as one of the fora for negotiation and discussion of ideas pertaining to socio-economic development. Its mandate has given it wider scope of activities as stated earlier, but the Commission still has the tasks of choosing programmes given its limited resources. The breadth of its terms of reference has been a form of handicap, especially in west Africa where the states have requested for a re-definition of the purposes and scope of the activities of the Niamey MULPOC. The request indicates that the relevance of the ECA is in question.

The debate concerning membership dominated its earlier years, but the issue has been settled with the Commission having two sets of members - full and associate members.

The attention of the member states is now focussed on what the Commission should do for them. Africa's impact in the international political and economic settings is a negative one in that they are neither in control nor active participants in the process of decision-making.
Moreover, most of the states have debt repayment problems, political instability and balance of payments deficits, for example. Although there are differences between the 50 countries - a number of them such as Nigeria and Ghana have more economic and political weight than others - all the states face common problems. Also the ECA views the continent as a collective unit, reinforcing the similarities between the states. But the severe nature of the problems facing them and the fact that there are no definite solutions to their economic conditions make the tasks and responsibilities of the ECA both urgent and daunting.
NOTES

1. ECOSOC was established by the Charter as the principal organ to co-ordinate the economic and social work of the UN and the specialized agencies, such as UNIDO, UNDP, WHO and other institutions known as the United Nations Systems.


3. The sponsors were Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya (now Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Yugoslavia. The Second Committee approved the draft resolution by a vote of 71 to 0 with 2 abstentions (Belgium and the United Kingdom), and the resolution was passed by a vote of 78 to 0 with one abstention - Belgium. The United Kingdom which abstained in the Second Committee voted for the resolution. Lebanon, Morocco and Union of South Africa were absent - see Year Book of UN, 1957, p. 185.


7. Ibid.


10. Ibid., p. 49.

11. Ibid., p. 99.

12. Ibid., p. 104.

13. For text of the resolution, see Year Book of UN, 1958, pp. 194-5.


16. Ibid.

18. Resolutions 42(IV), 68(V), 69(V), 84(VI), 94(VI), 151(VII).

19. ECOSOC ratified these by amending the terms of reference in 1963 with resolution 974D(XXXVI).

20. ECOSOC resolution 974D.11(LXXVI).


22. Ibid., rule 57.

23. This service and five others have been outlined by the ECA in its publication - ECA and Africa's Development 1983-2008: A Preliminary Perspective Study, Addis Ababa, April 1983, pp. 100-1.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 32.

28. This incident was drafted after several ECA and OAU officials narrated and confirmed what happened at the Summit. The discussions took place during fieldwork in Addis Ababa, February 1987. They explained that this was the main reason why two documents turned up on the desks of delegates during the First Economic Summit (1980).


30. Ibid., p. 31.


32. Ibid.

33. Plan of action for the implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the economic development of Africa recommended by the ECA Conference of Ministers responsible for Economic Development at its sixth meeting held at Addis Ababa, 9-12 April 1980, Doc. E/CN.14/781/Add.1, p.2.

35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 36.
37. Ibid., p.37.
41. Ibid., p. 12.
42. West Africa, 29 June 1987, No. 3646, p. 1236.
44. Ibid.
45. Mining and oil activities are now important in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zaire, Nigeria, Gabon, Libya, Algeria, Guinea and Botswana.
49. These claims are made by the ECA in publications such as ECA 1958-1983: Silver Jubilee Anniversary, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1983, p. 312; and ECA, 25 Years of Service to African Development and Integration, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1983, pp. 87-9.
CHAPTER 2

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION, LEADERSHIP, RESOURCES
AND WORK PROGRAMMES OF THE ECA

1. INTRODUCTION

Given the economic problems facing African states, their expectations and demands on the ECA discussed in the previous chapter, in this chapter we are examining the structure and organization, as well as the leadership, programmes and resources of the Commission. For an organization to function effectively, it must be sensitive to the environment. The leadership has to provide for and encourage proper and effective management. The status and skills of its staff is also an important factor for its operations. Moreover, the organization must not only survive but grow in scope if it is to have an effect on the continent. In order to generate demands for a wider jurisdiction, the organization's output has to please the member states and inspire them to make financial contributions and more demands. On the whole, the efficiency of the ECA will depend to a large extent on the performance of its secretariat and subsidiary organs. The performance is determined by its resources both financial and manpower and how it uses them to achieve the objectives of its programmes. The quality and usefulness of the secretariat are in turn dependent upon the quality and dedication of its staff.

2. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The activities and programmes of the Commission are centred on
its secretariat while major decisions are made by its policy-making organs established at both the continental and subregional levels. But first our attention is towards the secretariat. This is an executive organ headed by the Executive Secretary, appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The functions of the secretariat are stipulated in Rule 28 of its terms of reference which states that "The Secretariat shall interpret speeches made at meetings; shall receive, translate and circulate the documents of the Commission, its committees and its subsidiary bodies; shall publish and circulate the records of the sessions, the resolutions of the Commission and the relevant documentation required. It shall have the custody of the documents in the archives of the Commission and generally perform all other work which the Commission may require." In performing these functions, the Commission has gradually established itself as a modern international civil service. The growth of the secretariat has been the subject of debate in the 1970s and 1980s especially with the recent efforts to streamline the United Nations System.

The ECA secretariat took part in the improvement exercise of the UN System in the 1970s with the aim of making the Commission more responsive to the development needs of the region and providing the basis for more effective and efficient performance. Through its Director of Administrative Management Services, the secretariat conducted a study in 1975 and recommended that the structure of the ECA be revised and streamlined. Since then the ECA has been implementing the recommendations of the study with reference to its substantive divisions, sections and units. The substantive divisions correspond to the main programmes of the Commission. Currently, the programmes are grouped into 10 areas – socio-economic research and planning; food and agriculture; industrial development; international trade and finance; social development,
environment and human settlement; natural resources and energy; transport, communication and tourism; public administration, management and manpower; statistics; and population. There is an extra division for the administration and conference services. This caters for the personnel, clinic, budget, general services, Library and communication centre. In all, the ECA currently has 11 substantive divisions (see Figure 1). Each division is in turn split into sections for specialization and efficiency. For example, the ECA/FAO agriculture division has three sections — food and agricultural policy and planning; agricultural production, institution and service; and agricultural marketing. In some cases the sections are further divided into units. For example, the transport, communication and tourism division has a section and a unit, that is, the transport and tourism section and the communications unit.

The changes that occurred during the period 1968 to 1987 are shown in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1 Organizational Changes of the ECA Secretariat

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>No. of Substantive Divisions</th>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Overall Total</th>
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<td>1987d</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>55</td>
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</table>

Source: Information compiled from:
(a) Organizational Chart of ECA 1968;
(b) Organizational Chart, reference 075-215, 1 March 1975;
(c) Organizational Chart 1982;
(d) Secretariat of the ECA, Chart 084-200, issued by the documentation unit, ECA, 1987.
Figure 1: Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Africa (1987)

Source: Secretariat of the ECA, Chart 084-200, issued by the Documentation Unit, ECA, 1987.
The major reorganization of the ECA took place in the period 1968-1975 when the divisions were expanded by three, the sections had 17 additions, while the units were reduced by 25. The period 1975-1987 saw slight variations in the number of divisions, sections and units.

In its present form the secretariat consists of the Cabinet Office of the Executive Secretary (COES), under which are the following offices: Policy and Programme Co-ordination Office (PPCO); Office of the Secretary of the Commission; Economic Co-operation Office; Technical Assistance Co-ordination and Operations Office (TACO); African Training and Research Centre for Women (ATRCW); Information Services Unit; and the Security and Safety Unit. This is followed by its 11 substantive divisions, 32 sections and 12 units as shown in the organizational chart (Figure 1). Between 1975-1982 the substantive divisions were increased from 10 to 11. The new addition was the public administration, management and manpower. The increase was justified on the grounds that the social development, environment and human settlement division was too big and also because of the importance of public administration and manpower development needs. Although the total number of divisions, sections and units has decreased somewhat, the apartments are still quite many. In 1968 the overall total for them was 67, it decreased to 58, 56 and then 55 in 1975, 1982 and 1987, respectively (see Table 2.1).

In practice its organizational structure reflects an interplay and pursuit of different patterns of operation. Each division operates with its set of objectives, goals and programmes independent of the other. The revision of the structure of the ECA has been accompanied by rigid bureaucratic rules and procedures. The results include delays, postponement and abandoning of programmes and, to an extent, the by-passing of certain aspects in order to meet datelines. For example, programme
managers draw up the programme proposals for each division without prior consultation with the states. The latter do not get to discuss the programme budgets before they are forwarded to the Secretary-General. This is because its text is prepared by the secretariat in the form which is almost final and members have neither the means nor the time to undertake major changes to the drafts.

As was indicated earlier on, the ECA has policy-making organs at both the continental and subregional levels. For the former, the Conference of Ministers is its main legislative organ. It was established in 1969 and initially held meetings biennially up to 1979 and annually thereafter. The biennial meetings created a vacuum in getting urgent economic matters dealt with. The Commission had to change the timing "so that ministers can meet more frequently to discharge their duties and responsibilities ...". It is made up of ministers of economic development and planning for all the member states. The main functions of the Conference of Ministers are to:

(a) consider matters of policy and the priorities to be assigned to the programmes and other activities of the Commission;

(b) consider intra-African and international policy issues and make recommendations on such issues to member states;

(c) review programme implementation during the preceding years and approve at every other meeting the proposed biennial programme of work and priorities;

(d) consider reports submitted to it by the Technical Preparatory Committee for the Whole;

(e) consider questions relating to the representation of the African
region on international and inter-governmental bodies dealing with economic and social matters;

(f) consider and endorse for onward transmission to the Economic and Social Council, and General Assembly proposals emanating from sectoral ministerial conferences; and,

(g) consider the work programmes of the MULPOCs and integrate these with the overall programme of work and priorities of the Commission.³

Although the Conference of Ministers has to perform these functions, they face fundamental problems in the sense that the policies and programmes of the ECA are not formulated within this major organ. In fact, the secretariat presents documents of its programmes in a semi-final draft form. The Conference of Ministers has little time to deliberate on them. But since endorsement has to be given, the ministers usually do so. They seldom deviate from ECA drafts. In effect, the ministers meet annually to endorse policies, priorities and strategies of the ECA and not those put forward by the member states.

Before 1979, the Commission had two other principal organs assisting the Conference of Ministers. These were the Technical Committee of Experts and the Executive Committee. The former was the organ through which the overall ECA work programmes were channelled to the conference of Ministers. Its meeting preceded that of the latter. The Executive Committee was originally a small body of 16 member states, representing the whole region in between the biennial meetings of the Conference of Ministers. It dealt with routine matters but lacked effective representation of the various opinions of African governments.
It was the organ which submitted the Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the NIEO in Africa 1976-1981-1986. (This was the document that formed the basis for the formulation of the Lagos Plan of Action.) Due to its unrepresentativeness, the Committee requested the Executive Secretary to circulate the document to all member states because it spelt out African strategy for development for a 10-year period and also they felt that it offered a change in approach. A second and more representative meeting was convened to discuss the document before it was finally adopted.

Despite the move to send the documents directly to all member states, the Executive Committee continued to exist. It met four times in between the biennial meetings of the Conference of Ministers but its decisions did not have the same legal basis as those of the former, even though it was the same ministers who attended both. Secondly, the Commission realized that it was better and cheaper for the Conference of Ministers meeting to be held annually and decisions to be taken on issues before it, than hold four meetings of the Executive Committee whose decisions had very limited legal basis and could not therefore be implemented until they have been approved by the Conference of Ministers. The Commission, therefore, sought to abolish the Executive Committee and it endorsed the recommendations because it felt that "not only will it lead to substantial reduction in the number of meetings, it will also enhance the Commission's effectiveness as it can take decision on issues coming before it at its annual meetings".

The Conference of Ministers at its fifth meeting in Rabat, Morocco, in 1979 decided in its resolution 330(xiv) to abolish the Executive Committee and the Technical Committee of Experts and created instead a Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole (TEPCOW). The TEPCOW
is composed of high-level officials representing member states of the Commission and deals with the various matters submitted for the consideration of the annual meetings of the Conference of Ministers. The Committee meetings still preceded those of the Conference of Ministers. After discussing the various matters to come before the ministerial conference it adopts a report reflecting its deliberations and containing its observations, conclusions and recommendations. So in effect, the Commission has two main policy organs rather than the original three.

In addition to the policy organs, the Commission established some subsidiary organs to cater for specific sectors. The first set of these are the sectoral ministerial conferences. Each conference is composed of ministers of the government of member states responsible for a particular development sector. Each conference is also assisted by a Committee of Officials drawn from the ministries responsible for such development sectors and nominated by their governments on the basis of their specialized knowledge. The meeting of the Committee of Officials immediately precedes that of the ministerial conference in question. Presently, there are at least eight sectoral conferences on industry; trade; social affairs; transport and communications; human resources planning; development and utilization; regional conference on the integration of women in development; and that on Africa's least developed countries.

The subregional policy organs are grouped under this section as well and, as at the continental level, there are two organs. At the ministerial level, the policy organ is the Council of Ministers. It is composed of the ministers for development planning of each country in the subregion. The organ acts on behalf of the regional ECA
Conference of Ministers and is the supreme policy organ of the MULPOC. The Council of Ministers is assisted by a Committee of Officials who are usually principal or permanent secretaries for development planning. The functions of the organ include the identification of programmes; preparation of a detailed work programme for the approval of the Council of Ministers; monitoring and evaluation of approved programmes; and advising on personnel and administrative structure of the MULPOCs and assisting in mobilizing resources. The organ also meets prior to that of the Council of Ministers. The Commission has the two organs established in Central, Eastern and Southern, and West Africa. In the case of North Africa it has only a Council of Plenipotentiaries, which is a meeting of envoys and officials chosen by the countries. The Council of Plenipotentiaries is different in the sense that no high-ranking officials of ministeries of development and planning attend. Ambassadors and representatives of embassies attend who may not be versed in the development issues in the area. The main reason for this state of affairs is the political conflicts between the states, for example, the Algerian-Tunisian conflict and Western Sahara dispute. (The subregional policy organs have been dealt with extensively in Chapters 6-9.)

The Commission also has specialized subsidiary bodies and currently three are in existence, namely, the joint conference of African planners, statisticians and demographers; the inter-governmental committee of experts for science and technology development; and the joint inter-governmental regional committee on human settlements and environment.

When one considers that all the major policy, subsidiary and specialized organs have to meet each year and the number of documents they have to work through, it is no wonder that hardly any concrete decisions and programmes are endorsed. Reading through the countless
reports of these meetings is an agonizing, tedious and unproductive exercise because one does not get the feeling that any vital programmes are endorsed. The secretariat produces similar reports each year. There are no set targets for programmes, neither do the documents contain estimates of the costs of the studies and research to be carried out from year to year. Another problem is the lack of time-span for the studies. And although the various decision-making organs have the function of monitoring and evaluating programmes, they are not equipped with an organ to do such things. The result is that there is no systematic monitoring and evaluation of programmes. Therefore, the Commission has no proper way of indicating whether its programmes are yielding negative or positive results. Again, the Commission is duplicating its efforts. It not only established policy organs at the continental level but also subregional and specialized ones. All these organs have done much to turn it into a meeting-machinery. Officials spend so much time preparing the drafts for the various meetings and there seems to be no end in sight for such meetings.

3. LEADERSHIP OF THE ECA

A number of articles have been written about the leadership of the ECA. In the literature the dominating aspect is the comparison of the last two Executive Secretaries of the Commission, that is, Robert K.A. Gardiner and Adebayo Adedeji. But first, let me correct an impression which flows from such writings that the former was the first Executive Secretary of the ECA.7

The first Executive Secretary in 1958 was the late Dr. Mekki Abbas of Sudanese nationality. During his term of office, he was the
acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the Congo, now Kinshasa. He served up to 1962 and in 1963 became the Assistant Director-General to the Food and Agriculture Organization's department of Economic and Social Affairs. The late Dr. Abbas served only one term of office and the point to be made is that the Commission was still in its early years and so it is difficult to assess the era and his contribution.

Robert Gardiner took over from 1962-1975, while Adebayo Adedeji has been in office since 1975. A period of 27 years has afforded authors the opportunity to assess their roles and leadership style. In summary, Gardiner has been portrayed as a moderate international civil servant, while Adedeji is seen as a dynamic and politically oriented leader. Gruhn (1979; 1984) described Gardiner's style and posture as that of a national and international civil servant, whose intention was that the "ECA should steer a neutral course and not get into the fray of inter-African and national African politics. In true UN style, studies and documents written by the ECA were not supposed to offend governments. It was to be the ECA's task to show African leaders and governments what was feasible and to provide the informational background upon which decisions could be made". She added that throughout Gardiner's tenure "his leadership and style did not produce either a well-defined organizational ideology or a sense of intellectual excitement that would inspire the dedication of the ECA staff or give its work output an identity and visibility among its clients". She concluded that "indeed, when Gardiner retired in 1975, few leaders and governments in Africa believed the ECA to be a potent instrument".

On the Adedeji era, Gruhn stated that "given his background and personality, it was assumed that he would perceive his role as Executive
Secretary of the ECA more as a lobbyist and salesman for African needs and strategies, and less as an international civil servant. Indeed, the record to date indicates that under his stewardship the ECA is more visible and activist, especially on the African continent itself. She also pointed out that in his first years in office, Adedeji appeared to have devoted more attention to generating visibility for himself and the ECA on the African continent than "attending to the badly needed organizational capacity building at the ECA headquarters itself."

The problem is that despite reorganization, the bureaucratic malaise within the organization and its functional effectiveness show no visible signs of improvement. In a sense the same criticisms made against Gardiner's era is true of Adedeji's because his style of leadership has neither produced a well-defined organizational ideology nor a sense of intellectual excitement that would inspire the dedication of the ECA staff. While discussing with a cross-section of officials at the headquarters, the impression one got was that they were happy to work at the ECA because they earned so many dollars (see Appendix 6) and the fringe benefits allowed them to send their children to the best schools in Addis Ababa and abroad. They were also able to afford good accommodation and drove expensive cars. These were the reasons why they were at the ECA and not because they believed in what the latter was all about.

The observation made during the fieldwork was that the present Executive Secretary, that is, Adedeji, spent much time outside Addis Ababa. His critics among the staff accuse him of honouring every ridiculous invitation from Africa and foreign governments and organizations. Such critics argued that he was taking advantage of the travelling allowances of about US$ 300 which he is entitled to each time he travels
out of Addis Ababa in an official capacity. Speaking to delegates attending the opening session of the 45th meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU in February 1987, they widely agreed that Adedeji was a highly articulate man who has travelled around the world and was aware of the many economic and social problems facing Africa presently but they were weary of his constant rhetoric and pessimistic warnings. What they needed most was solutions to the problems and not words. The feeling was that the ECA has failed to provide solutions, well-defined and concrete programmes in Africa. As a result, the Commission was in danger of losing its credibility in Africa.

In an interview with Professor Adebayo Adedeji, he defended his actions. He admitted that he had to travel often because there was the great need to be in touch with African governments and other specialized agencies as a means of persuading them to provide more funds for the ECA through the extra-budgetary arrangements. Through his travels he was also able to consult and advise African governments on how best to tackle their problems. On the question of the ECA not implementing tangible programmes, he said that this was due to lack of funds. He pointed out that lack of adequate finance was the greatest constraint on the Commission. As for research, this was important and necessary because of the dearth of information on socio-economic matters in Africa. He therefore saw research and studies as vital activities of the Commission.

According to West Africa, "Adebayo Adedeji has now been so long in his job that he seems a permanent fixture of the African scene, so much so that he is in danger of being taken for granted". It is now 14 years since he has been in Addis Ababa and there is a danger of this happening, especially if the ECA does not come up with tangible programmes.
But after speaking to him, the impression was that he was willing and eager to continue at his post. He sees himself as a capable salesman whose job is to tell Africa what to do. He was a very able speaker and confident of what he was doing.

But there is a problem when making comparisons of styles and leadership qualities when there is very little by way of reference point. To put the distinguishing characteristics of the personalities in a proper perspective begs the questions, (a) What is the Executive Secretary supposed to do? (b) To what extent has he done his duties? The answers to these lie partly in the stipulations in the terms of reference on the role of the Executive Secretary. What is required of the leadership is cast in a general form. The Executive Secretary "shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Commission, its committees and subsidiary bodies. He may designate another member of staff to take his place at any meeting". He shall "direct the staff provided by the Secretary-General and required by the Commission and any subsidiary bodies". He shall be "responsible for keeping the members and associate members of the Commission informed of any questions which may be brought before it for consideration". At the beginning of each session the Executive Secretary "shall present a report on the work programme of the secretariat". He may make "oral as well as written statements to the Commission, its committees and subsidiary bodies". He shall be "responsible for all the necessary arrangements for meetings of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies". The expenditure proposal has to be circulated to member states before being approved by the Commission. And most important of all "the Executive Secretary in carrying out his functions shall act under the authority and on behalf of the Secretary-General".
The functions stipulated here show that the Executive Secretary has to act within the context of the UN system. Therefore, the idea of the ECA having a dual mandate of being an arm of the UN and an African organization is absurd. Gruhn argued that under Gardiner's stewardship, the ECA rather than resolving its dual mandate, sought to serve in various capacities as an arm of the UN system. The ECA is not a truly African regional organization like the OAU. Like other regional economic commissions, it is the creation of both the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The ECA does not have an independent existence of its own outside the UN System. Its budget is part of the regular budget of the UN. The staff are recruited by the Secretary-General of the UN and are therefore subject to the UN staff rules and regulations. Under these circumstances, the Executive Secretary can only function and has been doing so within the UN system and therefore there is no question of the ECA having a dual mandate.

Both Gardiner and Adedeji have carried out their duties within the set guidelines. In fact, there are elements of conformity and continuity between the two personalities. For example, Robert Gardiner laid the foundation for unity through regional economic groupings with ECOWAS as its first creation. Adedeji took up where Gardiner left off by creating even more regional economic groupings such as the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The ECA is pressing ahead with its plans to create a similar body in North Africa by 1990. The promotion of regional economic groupings is one of the cornerstones of ECA activities. The second element of continuity has to do with the eagerness to convene meetings and the tons of documents prepared each year on research and surveys. Quoting from the West Africa, "It is the intellectual and statistical input into the formulation of Africa's own strategies that has always been a key part of the ECA's vocation
and it is this that Adedeji has maintained and developed. The Commission has thus developed as the primary source of basic socio-economic data on Africa.

But perhaps the point that has to be made about style and leadership is that within the general guidelines given, the Executive Secretaries in each case had tried to respond to environmental pressures. Put in this context, their functions and abilities can be understood. Looked at from this perspective, the executive secretaries became victims of circumstances because there is the need for them to function as part of the UN System and at the same time to be seen responding to demands of member states. For instance, Robert Gardiner was operating in an era when most African states had gained political independence and had embarked on nation-building. The ECA was in its formative years and he was getting to know the member states. Development issues and strategies were still being explored and what was considered as African interests were not clearly defined. Also there were no clear visions, expectations and demands of member states on the Commission. The setting was therefore such that the ECA was trying to cope with its teething problems as well as those of the newly emerging states. The Commission was operating with unknown variables both in terms of setting up its secretariat and the external environment.

The leader of the Commission naturally had to be cautious and experimental, a requirement which no doubt largely explains Gardiner's moderation. In Adedeji's case African governments had greater expectations of the Commission. They wanted the ECA to come up with a development philosophy with a specifically African flavour. They wanted concrete programmes which gave value for money. On the ECA's programmes, P.S. Mmusi, Vice-President of Botswana, urged that the "ECA should
establish clear priorities" and warned that "an all or nothing approach will merely add to our under-achievement". So on the whole, the present Executive Secretary is operating in an era where there is growing dissatisfaction among member states about the activities of the Commission and their unwillingness to make financial contributions. On the other hand, the Secretariat is highly developed but faces administrative and financial crisis. It seems the natural course for Adedeji to steer is in his present role as salesman and lobbyist on the continent. When we pitch the styles and leadership within the context of the operational environment, some of the allegations of Gruhn and others lose their effectiveness. As with other aspects of the Commission, the Executive Secretary faces constraints which have their origin in the UN System of which the ECA is a part. Arguments about personalities and styles may satisfy our subjective views but we cannot overlook such constraints.

In the long run, each aspect such as the Secretariat and its leadership cannot provide the complete picture of what the Commission is all about. We have to consider its financial resources. For any organization to be able to function, it must have finances. What it can do will depend on this. Also its opportunities and choices will be determined by the financial resources at its disposal at any given time.
4. FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER RESOURCES

The Commission has two main sources of finance. There is the regular budget which is usually approved by the General Assembly. The second is referred to as the extra-budgetary funds, which is a combination of funds from other IGOs and specialized agencies of the UN, bilateral arrangements and contributions from the member states. It began in 1958 with a membership of nine African states and an annual regular budget of US$ 0.5 million. This grew to US$ 4.65 million by 1968.\(^\text{33}\) The budget continued to rise, growing by about 160 per cent from US$ 13.9 million for 1974-75 to about US$ 36 million for 1982-83,\(^\text{34}\) although much of the increase was due to inflation. In real terms, the regular budget has increased only by about 1.7 per cent annually. The budget officer of the ECA pointed out that in the period 1984-87 the growth rate of the ECA's budget was about 2 per cent.\(^\text{35}\) He said that with such a minimal growth rate, it was difficult for the ECA to carry out its programmes and activities.

The ECA has the same basic programme structure, similar patterns of budgetary growth and generally similar budget size as the other regional commissions (except for the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) which is the newest and smallest of the commissions). The comparative figures in 1980-83 are given in Table 2.2.

During the decade from 1974-1983 the total ECA programme budget direct costs had grown steadily from US$ 18.3 million in 1974-75 to US$ 71.5 million for 1982-83, an increase of about 700 per cent.\(^\text{36}\) This represents a shift in the nature of ECA funding. In 1974-75 less than one-quarter of its biennial budget came from extra-budgetary sources, but for 1982-83 half the total budget was financed from this source.
Table 2.2 Comparative Budget Situation for the Regional Commissions 1980-1983

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Key: RB is Regular Budget
     XB is Extra-budgetary Funds
     ECLA is Economic Commission for Latin America
     ECWA is Economic Commission for Western Asia
     ESCAP is Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
In addition to the shift in the nature of its funding there is also a change in the sources of the fund. In the mid-1970s most of the extra-budgetary funds came from bilateral sources. But in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the UNDP has become the dominant outside source of funding. The latter provided US$ 22 million of the estimated US$ 47 million for the period 1978-81, including technical training and assistance specifically intended to help develop the ECA's programming, project management and operational capabilities and most of the funding for the MULPOCs. The United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) also provided funds to the ECA and is the second largest source. Its contribution for the period 1970-1983 was US$ 16 million, equivalent to 14 per cent of available resources. Much of its contribution goes to finance regional advisory services in demographic statistics, information gathering and national workshops in population and development.

The third source of funding since 1979 has been the contribution of African governments through the United Nations Trust Fund for African Development (UNTFAD). The governments make pledges at UNTFAD conferences held biennially and resources totaling US$ 6 million have been used to implement programmes. Governments usually make their contributions to specific programmes. For example, Nigeria provided seed money for the African Institute for Higher Technical Training and Research (AIHTRR). The Secretariat also negotiates with donor governments and institutions of the developed countries for direct grants-in-aid as well as provision of expert services under non-reimbursable loan agreements. From US$ 434,000 in 1970, this programme has increased to approximately US$ 3 million annually today.

The ECA is facing difficulties as far as its extra-budgetary funds are concerned. The summary of the pledges made at three biennial UNTFAD
Pledging Conferences 1977-81 reveal that at each conference, member states and other institutions have successfully pledged less than on previous occasions. Some states have still not paid up and the situation remained basically unchanged. The summary is as follows:

Table 2.3 Status of UNTFAD (in US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pledges</th>
<th>Payments</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagos, April 1977</td>
<td>2,963,133</td>
<td>2,807,724</td>
<td>155,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat, March 1979</td>
<td>2,344,590</td>
<td>1,437,663</td>
<td>906,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Town, April 1981</td>
<td>1,763,513</td>
<td>497,711</td>
<td>1,265,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,071,236</td>
<td>4,743,098</td>
<td>2,328,138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures show that financial support to UNTFAD was waning from US$ 2,963,133 in 1977 to US$ 1,763,513 in 1981. But perhaps more striking were the differences in pledges and actual payments - the figures reflected in the column for balance. In 1977, the outstanding balance was US$ 155,409. The amount increased to US$ 906,927 and US$ 1,265,802 in 1979 and 1981, respectively. The Executive Secretary saw no end to this trend. Out of 50 African states, 20 countries paid their pledged contributions in full.43 A total of 14 countries made partial payments,44 while 6 countries did not pay any part of their pledged contributions.45 10 countries have never pledged at any of the conferences.46 (The actual amounts pledged by each country and institutions for the period 1978-83 are shown in Appendix 3. For
pledged contributions unpaid by each country, see Appendix 4, and for a summary of unpaid pledged contributions, see Appendix 5.)

Not only are the contributions falling as indicated in the tables above, but also the ECA faces delays in processing the money pledged. The Technical Assistance Co-ordination and Operations Office (TACO) is responsible for the operational activities of the ECA and most of the funds collected through the UNTFAD are processed by this unit. TACO is also responsible for administering and monitoring of the extra-budgetary funds. The unit is supposed to invite programme managers to submit programmes for its approval before approaching the donors. But in practice, TACO gets the money first and then calls for the programmes and approves them, on the basis of money received. An officer of the unit explained that this is due to delays in processing the money. He pointed out that even when states actually pay their pledges, it takes between 3-6 months for the money to get to TACO in Addis Ababa. He explained that if a country like Nigeria makes a pledge and then remits the money, the fund has to be channelled through the Manhattan Chase Bank in New York, through Lloyds Bank in London, before getting to the ECA headquarters. Such delays hold back the recruitment of consultants and the actual implementation period for the programmes.

The priorities of the ECA's spending was another source of anxiety. The priorities have remained fairly constant over the 1974-87 period. Development issues, transportation, statistics, industrial development, food and agriculture and international trade have been the major programmes. But based on total funds, the priorities among programmes are considerably different because of factors such as donors preferred sectors and the actual extra-budgetary funds. The assessment of ECA funding priorities is complicated by whether they are measured by regular budget funds,
extra-budgetary funds, total funds or as part of total African-wide funds for development in any given sector.

The main heads of expenditure covered by the ECA budget are expenditure relating to established posts, consultancy, travel and supplies of materials. Manpower resources accounted for the largest share of its budgets. The reason is that the bulk of the Secretariat's work consisted mainly of research and studies. For example, the resources for established posts increased from US$ 639,500 in 1960 to US$ 3,362,000 million in 1970, representing a growth in professional staff from 50 in 1960 to 142 in 1970; and between 1971 and 1981, manpower resources increased from US$ 3,456,000 million to US$ 8,563,300 million respectively, which represented a growth in professional staff from 164 in 1971 to 194 in 1981. Since a greater part of its expenditure goes on administrative costs the Secretariat experiences constraints because it has less funds for its programmes. It is also operating with a regular budget with a growth rate of about 2 per cent and in an era when its extra-budgetary funds are diminishing. The officials are well aware of these financial constraints but there is an added element of uncertainty in the sense that the Commission has limited chances of improving its financial situation. In the final analysis, the ECA has inadequate funds to support its elaborate structure and organization. For the reasons stated above, the argument is that lack of finance is the most important constraint on the ECA.

Another constraint for the Commission relates to its manpower resources and its management, although it is also true that its major resource is the total number of established professional or regular budget posts. For the categories and salary scale of these posts, see Appendix 6. The top posts of Under-Secretary General and Assistant
Secretary-General are political appointments. The same applies to that of the Director. The posts of principal officers D-1 down to Assistant Officer P-1 are civil servants who are appointed through the normal recruitment procedures of the UN. Below the posts of Assistant Officer (P-1), the ECA has general service staff, employed locally. The posts are made up of administrative officers and their assistants, executive officers, secretaries, typists, drivers, cleaners, messengers and security officers. The categories of general service staff range from GS 1-9.

There has been a huge increase in the number of general service staff employed, while the number of professional posts has declined during the 1974-84 period. The professional posts increased rapidly in the 1960s but faced decline in the mid-1970s and the 1980s. The early build up of ECA staff is shown in the following figures:

Table 2.4 ECA Staff 1960-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>December</th>
<th>Professionals</th>
<th>Non-Professionals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1960-64 both the number of professional and non-professional staff increased. But between 1965-67 there was no increase in either professional or non-professional staff. The period corresponds with the time when the subregional offices were being evaluated. The Commission was about to re-organize its structure and policy organs.

By 1974-75 the ECA had 226 professional posts (of which 62 were extra-budgetary) but by 1982-83 the number had dropped to 214 posts (of which 18 were extra-budgetary). Although the total number of staff, that is, both professionals and general service staff employed, rose to about 1000 in 1987, the number of professionals is still below 300. The general service posts grew from 294 in 1974-75 to 427 in the 1982-83 period.

General ECA programme support funding and staff growth has been restricted. From the 1974-75 biennium to 1982-83 funding has grown from US$ 5.2 million to US$ 15 million (up 190 per cent). Programme support has thus fallen behind the 290 per cent total budget growth during this period, and even more drastically behind the 700 per cent growth in extra-budgetary funds mentioned earlier. The area of expenditure which has grown rapidly in the past decade is executive direction and management, which has moved from US$ 0.6 million in 1974-75 to US$ 10.8 million for 1982-83. It has become the second largest single programme element. (The first is administration and common services.) The growth has primarily been due to the addition of the Programming and Policy Co-ordination Unit (PPCO) and the MULPOCs functions to the Cabinet Office of the Executive Secretary (COES) following the restructuring of the UN System in the 1970s. The restructuring exercise saw the ECA attempting to combine its research, conferences and studies with programme implementation for UN agencies.
and its MULPOCs. But the ECA management and administrative system had been overtaken by the extra responsibilities.

Its total programme budget and activities have grown substantially but the management support systems have fallen far behind operational needs and are hamstrung by rigid bureaucratic procedures. For example, administrative rigidities affect posts in ECA joint divisions—thus although the ECA/FAO in theory operate a joint unit for agriculture and the ECA/UNIDO for industry, in practice the joint units are not administered as integrated units. Programme managers complained that this hampered programme performance. They pointed out that "savings from vacant ECA posts could not be used for short-term recruitment for FAO posts." Some ECA officials expressed dissatisfaction at the way the bureaucracy makes them conduct their affairs on an ad hoc and last minute basis; and others felt that the programmes were not responsive to changing economic situations in Africa. The catalogue of management problem areas was extensive and included factors such as lateness of reports on financial and personnel status; unsteady flow of information on extra-budgetary funds; heavy workload on divisional or headquarters staff; inadequate planning of missions from ECA headquarters; inadequate staffing for conferences, translation and reproduction services; limited equipment and considerable work backlogs; limited consultant rosters hampering operations; and restrictive recruitment practices.

There are several reasons for these administrative problems. In addition to the size and structure of the ECA, there are problems relating to limited finances. But the major reason has to do with the ECA's efforts to decentralize to the subregions A lack of careful planning and execution of programmes on behalf of the MULPOCs. Although it divided Africa into four subregions and established five MULPOCs in
Tangier, Niamey, Yaoundé, Gisenyi and Lusaka, with their respective policy organs, the ECA Secretariat actually formulates and implements the programmes of the MULPOCs. It is in control of management and personnel matters as well. Decentralization has not taken place in practice as programming, finance and authority are still centralized. The overall result is that the headquarters staff are doing the jobs for both headquarters and subregional organs.

Secondly, the JIU report puts the blame for the administrative problems on a management development vacuum within the ECA. The report states that "the Executive Secretary must travel extensively to meet the many calls for co-operative action on the continent, keep up with the current needs and problems, attend required inter-governmental meetings and consult with other development organizations. It is therefore impossible for him to give daily attention to the problems of management development within the ECA". There is also a management development gap which is due to inadequate number of senior staff. One Under-Secretary-General and one principal officer in the rank of D-2 are not sufficient to manage a US$ 71 million biennial programme with regional scope and complexity.

Thirdly, management bears some of the blame for sticking to rigid procedures. The administrative processes are often slow. The attitudes of the staff are similar to what one finds in most international organizations. They go to work and leave their offices at the required time, except for conference periods when the staff of COES especially have to endure longer hours. The respond to questioning with the usual bureaucratic jargon and are familiar with UN procedures. They do not feel that they are in an organization committed to specific goals or missions. They do not see themselves as champions of any known cause
relating to socio-economic development.

There are added problems relating to personnel and recruitment. The increasingly short-term nature of many posts creates much insecurity and disruption for the staff members involved and severe difficulties for many programme managers who are worried that key posts and related work may be abruptly terminated. It also makes the posts unattractive to potential staff, and the many categories and frequent renewals of contract create an extra burden for the ECA personnel section. The personnel records indicate that professional staff turnover in regular budget posts for 1977-80 averaged about 15 per cent, that is, about one-seventh of this staff group leaves the ECA each year. The chief, staff services unit did not see this as a serious rate of turnover, but it does exceed the UN System average of 13 per cent for the same period.

Another problem with personnel is the slow and complicated recruitment process. The ECA has the authority to recruit general service staff, some short-term staff and the experts, so long as they reside in Africa. All other recruitments, extensions, promotions and classifications are made by or shared with the UN headquarters, and are therefore subject to the rigid and slow UN recruitment procedures and rules. Recruitment of regular and expert staff currently takes six to nine months. Once people are eligible for advertised positions and have been duly selected, they are given fixed term or temporary appointments initially. After a period of two years, the Secretariat reviews their competence. After the review they are now placed on probation for three years, at the end of which they can be either retained or asked to leave. The uncertainties which result from waiting to get a permanent job after five years can be partially responsible for the staff turnover.
People will always move to jobs which require shorter probation periods.

ECA staff recruitment and retention are hampered by a modest grade structure. A 1979 post classification survey by the Office of Personnel Services (OPS) confirmed that the ECA has fewer staff at P-4 and above levels than other regional commissions. It recommended upgrading of 27 posts and only three for downgrading. About half of the recommendations were included in the 1982-83 programme budget, with the rest not yet implemented as at April 1987. Another problem is the lack of training facilities for staff. The ECA provides training in English and French languages for its predominantly Ethiopian secretaries but no technical training for others dealing with formulation of policies to keep them informed about trends in the debate on development in Africa and the world over. Moreover, the staff do not write nor publish occasional papers like those of the IMF, which can allow them to share their views with academics, students and other international civil servants. The only person who seems to be publishing material extensively is the Executive Secretary.

Finally, the personnel division faces the problem of geographical distribution. The ECA has to an extent achieved the Africanization of its Secretariat which began in the 1960s. At present about 75 per cent of its staff are Africans. The remaining 25 per cent is made up of Europeans and Americans. It instituted desirable ranges for the geographic distribution of posts in 1981 but there was still an element of over-representation. Many of its best potential candidates come from 10 of the 50 African member states. (These are Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire.) The bulk of the general staff are Ethiopians. The difficulties encountered
by the Secretariat as a result of the reticence on the part of member states to release their competent officials to work at the ECA continues to be a major barrier to its Africanization policy. Until now the Secretariat had offset this shortage by recruiting Africans as consultants when their national obligations did not allow them to work at the ECA for longer periods of time. This has enabled the Secretariat to benefit from the expertise of 262 Africans out of 447 consultants between January 1979 and November 1980. In 1982 the ECA recruited 255 Africans out of the total of 315 posts available. These data reflect the increase in the number of Africans whose skills have temporarily been placed at the ECA's disposal to reinforce the permanent staff. But it gives a patchwork effect to the personnel structure. The consultants temporarily increase the numbers but once they have submitted their reports, they disappear for now, leaving the permanent staff to conduct any follow-up work that may be required. Factors such as the patchwork personnel structure, declining regular posts, staff turnover, modest grade levels, slow recruitment and geographical distribution constraints seriously undermine the capability of the ECA's manpower resources. Moreover, the limited regular posts mean that the Secretariat has inadequate manpower resources.

5a. WORK PROGRAMMES OF THE ECA

The ECA has 10 sectoral programmes. These are in the field of food and agriculture; social development, environment and human settlement; natural resources and energy; industrial development; international trade and finance; transport, communications and tourism; population; public administration, management and manpower; statistics; and socio-economic research and planning. The substantive divisions are
established on the basis of these programmes as mentioned earlier. Each sector/division sets its objectives, goals and strategies once the Secretary-General of the UN gives the instructions and guidelines. The co-ordination of the programmes are shared between three departments, namely, the PPCO, TACO and ECO. The Policy and Programme Co-ordination Office (PPCO) is responsible for co-ordination and overseeing the work programmes of the divisions. It is also responsible for formulating basic policies and strategies. TACO, as stated earlier, is responsible mainly for co-ordinating programmes originating from extra-budgetary sources, that is, technical co-operation programmes, while the Economic Co-operation Office (ECO) deals with the overall promotion, co-ordination and appraisal of economic and technical co-operation. But there are no mechanisms for ensuring that approaches and strategies are shared and that overall programming is orderly and well co-ordinated. The PPCO issues guidelines and instructions but frequently the programme managers ignore them. This presents more problems to the Chief of PPCO as programme managers are often told to re-write their proposals. This has earned the PPCO the name "Permanent Policy Commission".62

Also the co-ordination of programmes is on an ad hoc basis and very informal. There is no formal monitoring mechanism for the programmes except the preparation of the required UN programme performance report. This is because the ECA lacks programme information and programme management plans. On top of these shortcomings it does not possess an organ to evaluate its programmes. The Commission's evaluation activity has been confined to participation in UNDP evaluation exercises. The Chief of PPCO saw the lack of the organs for co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation as major problems for the Commission. Their absence is largely explained by the fact that the ECA was not set up for the implementation of concrete programmes in the first instance. It is
not clearly stated in the terms of reference that the Commission will do so.

The ECA has a peculiar programming cycle. The complete cycle is made up of four main elements, which are: (a) Medium-term plans; (b) Programme budgets; (c) Reports on programme performance; and (d) Evaluation reports. Each of the above corresponds to one phase in the programme planning cycle and consequently serves as a framework for subsequent phases.

The medium-term plan sets out the objectives of programmes and subprogrammes, the problems to be addressed and the strategy to be adopted in their implementation. It is a six-yearly plan which is subsequently divided into three biennial programme budgets. So the 1984-89 medium-term plan provides a framework for the preparation of programme budgets for 1984-85, 1986-87 and 1988-89, respectively.

The reports on programme performance are supposed to be made up periodically to assist member states in monitoring the implementation of work and priorities during the biennium. But the ECA does not produce these often.

Evaluation reports determine the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the activities in the programme budget in relation to their objectives. The ECA carried out evaluation missions with the UNDP in 1975 and 1982.

The programme budget has two elements - the programme and the budget. The programme elements are determined and justified by the requirements of output delivery to member states in accordance with the strategy proposed in the medium-term plans. The budget elements, on the other hand, are based on the programmed activities and presented
in financial terms and work-months. The programme budget approval process is rather complicated. Firstly, the proposals are prepared by the different divisions and sent through the PPCO, to be submitted to the Secretary-General on his request. The programme data are then used as proposals in the proposed programme budget which is submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly through the Fifth Committee, the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination (CPC) and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The ACABQ advises the General Assembly through the Fifth Committee on the level of financial resources to approve. The CPC, on the other hand, examines the programme elements and advises the General Assembly through the ECOSOC on what activities to approve. In effect, we have two bodies for the two elements of the programme budget. It is then left to the General Assembly to approve the programmes and the associated budget.

The Executive Secretary of the ECA has to submit the proposals without consultation and discussion with the member states. The result is that their views are usually not available to the Secretary-General before he finalizes his proposals. This is because "the policy organs may not have met and even when they do, their views and recommendations have always arrived too late to have a serious impact on the deliberations of CPC". Although in 1986 the Secretariat gave a time-table that will assist in presenting the views of the ECA Conference of Ministers for consideration before finalizing its proposals, it has not been able to implement it. There was an added problem of programming: the medium-term plans were produced years in advance. For example, the draft medium-term plan for 1990-95 was already prepared and submitted to the Conference of Ministers in April 1987. How can the programme managers be sure that the proposals will be all right for the period envisaged? Such an approach does not allow for fluctuations in the economic
conditions in Africa.

We found that there were not much differences in the style and contents of medium-term plans. In fact, the 1985-89 plan is very similar to that of the 1990-95, with one major exception. The Secretary-General requested an extension of the former for two years to 1991 instead of presenting the proposal for 1990-95. This was due to the on-going reforms resulting from General Assembly resolution 41/213 on the review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the UN and the desire of the resolution which emphasizes the need for member states to be actively involved in the consultative process for the formulation of the medium-term plan. This is a healthy sign but it is too early to say whether this will become the norm. One is not also sure how this will work out in practice for the whole programming process. The dates for submission to the Secretary-General remain the same. This also applies to the dates for policy organ meetings of the ECA. The only point that can be made here is that the medium-term plan for 1990-95 has been suspended due to the extension of the previous one to 1991.

The bulk of the ECA's programmes centre on conferences, meetings, workshops and seminars held each year, but the dominant aspect is research. It is this aspect which has been criticized in recent times by member states. In 1986, for instance, delegates stressed the "need to go beyond problem identification studies into practical and concrete proposals ...." The only sector where the Commission has attempted to implement concrete programmes is transport and telecommunications, where it is involved with the purchase and installation of equipment and cables, and the training of technical staff. In the Eastern and Southern African sub-region, the Lusaka MULPOC purchased locomotives and shunting machines
for the railway network (see Chapter 7). This sector is used here to highlight some of the potential and problems encountered by the ECA.

The ultimate goal is the development of transport and communications as a means to expand and diversify inter- and intra-regional links, with special attention to the special problems of landlocked, island and LDCs. Although the programme is geared towards assisting the LDCs, there is no indication of the aspects of transport or communications which the ECA wants to concentrate on. The medium-term plan for 1984-89 (extended to 1991) seeks to promote the development and integration of the transport and communications network in Africa; support the development and modernization of infrastructures and equipment, and among other things, promote the development of tourism in Africa. The programmes are part of the UN Transport and Communications Decade in Africa (UNCTACDA 1978-88). The principal goals of the strategy tie in tightly with the objectives outlined above. The goals are supposed to be realized through the implementation of projects at the regional, subregional and national levels. The Secretariat adopted two phases for implementation: Phase 1 (1980-83) and Phase 2 (1984-88). It went further by creating 10 subprogrammes in the road sector; rail and maritime transport; ports; air transport, inland water transport; multimodel transport; telecommunications; broadcasting and postal services.

Roads and road transport was the largest subsector in the programme with 236 projects (see Table 2.5) for the period 1984-87. Out of these 62 projects were reported completed. For rail transport, the Secretariat planned for 84 projects but was able to obtain information on the implementation status of 70 projects. (Five projects were cancelled from the approved programmed.) 14 projects were completed. Out of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total no. of projects in programmes</th>
<th>No. of projects monitored</th>
<th>Projects completed to date</th>
<th>Projects under implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>236 74 82 155 201</td>
<td>2 14 50 62</td>
<td>27 49 64 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>84 23 31 58 70</td>
<td>0 2 16 14</td>
<td>7 19 31 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>38 3 0 11 13</td>
<td>0 0 2 7</td>
<td>0 0 9 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports</td>
<td>70 18 38 55 55</td>
<td>0 1 9 4</td>
<td>1 14 26 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>94 24 34 57 69</td>
<td>1 5 5 11</td>
<td>9 12 23 31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Water</td>
<td>45 5 7 17 19</td>
<td>0 0 1 2</td>
<td>1 3 5 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multimodal</td>
<td>11 2 4 5 7</td>
<td>1 1 3 4</td>
<td>0 2 2 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport</td>
<td>578 149 160 341 434</td>
<td>4 22 78 109</td>
<td>50 99 160 180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>215 30 102 135 149</td>
<td>2 12 22 34</td>
<td>10 45 54 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting</td>
<td>120 33 46 64 100</td>
<td>6 9 11 15</td>
<td>7 17 22 33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal</td>
<td>125 33 53 74 115</td>
<td>1 3 6 6</td>
<td>4 14 25 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Communications</td>
<td>470 104 201 273 364</td>
<td>9 24 39 55</td>
<td>30 72 102 123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Programme</td>
<td>1048 253 381 614 798</td>
<td>13 46 117 164</td>
<td>80 171 261 303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 projects in maritime transport, only 7 have been completed. For the 70 projects for ports, only 9 were completed. In air transport only 11 projects were completed out of a total of 94. The same picture runs through the whole sector, that is, the low rate of implementation and the large number of programmes in each subsector.

The Commission admitted that the prospects for achieving the objectives laid down in transport and communications programmes remained dim. Its main reason for stating thus is the falling investment rate in Africa. There was the lack of growth in assistance from major financing institutions. Its efforts to mobilize resources for the programmes were fruitless because the two co-financing meetings scheduled for the transit corridor projects of Eastern and West Africa had to be postponed to 1988-89. This meeting has still not taken place as at May 1989, the main reason being that member states are facing financial difficulties and funds from financial institutions have not been pledged. But one telecommunications subsector, the Pan-African Documentation and Information System (PADIS), offers potential both in the sense that the ECA itself purchased equipment and computers and because this service is vital in Africa. PADIS is treated under a subheading below.

5b. PADIS AS AN EXAMPLE OF A CONCRETE PROGRAMME

PADIS is an attempt by the ECA to implement a real project. It is a programme which is relatively easier to evaluate in terms of costs and benefits, something one cannot do with other ECA programmes such as research or workshops. When fully established, PADIS will play an important role in establishing communication links between states and in enhancing information-gathering. PADIS has been conceived as a
development project, continental in scope, to fill the existing void in the information needs of the member states. During the OAU Economic Summit in 1980 African Heads of State and Government requested an information system to combat the dearth in information on socio-economic issues. The ECA responded to the request with the proposal for PADIS. Its main objective is to provide ready access to information for policy-makers, technicians, planners, institutions and financiers. In terms of its operational structure, the ECA proposed three main components:

(a) PADIS-DEV which is the economic and social development information component. This is a reference file including the development plans of African countries, facts, trends and analysis, prescriptions for decision-making, operational experiences, consequences and evaluations. Information is to be stored in a computer installed at PADIS Central Co-ordination Office (CCO) and be made available through interactive computer terminals and user-oriented information retrieval software. (The CCO is at the ECA headquarters at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.)

(b) PADIS-COM which is the collection of other complementary files prepared in collaboration with regional institutions such as ADB and IDEP; subregional institutions such as ECOWAS and the PTA; national documentation centres as well as the assistance of the ECA substantive divisions.

(c) PADIS-NET, that is, the telecommunication network for systems interconnection and information dissemination throughout Africa. This will be designed in collaboration with the European Space Agency (ESA). The geographical structure of the entire project will be based on the subregions, namely, North, Central Eastern and Southern, and West Africa.

The overall budget for the 10 years of the PADIS project is
approximately US$ 160 million for which the preliminary breakdown has been tentatively estimated as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(US$m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African governments</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Research Centre (IDRC)</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank (ADB)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>141,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (1980-89)</strong></td>
<td><strong>160,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The estimated costs of the project are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(US$m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personnel</td>
<td>28,088,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Consultancy</td>
<td>820,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Training</td>
<td>2,510,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Basic equipment</td>
<td>24,932,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Telecommunication satellite</td>
<td>41,310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Development of participating computerised centres</td>
<td>30,694,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ground stations</td>
<td>31,246,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Others</td>
<td>398,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>160,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PADIS is to be implemented in three phases: Phase 1 (1980-82) is for setting up the PADIS Central Co-ordination Office; training of staff on methodology including input and output standards, the PADIS thesaurus for the PADIS-DEV, PADIS-COM components, installation of the computer centre with a HP 3000/111 and the MINISIS formation management/storage and retrieval software, preparation of a PADIS index (DEVINDEX) and issue of a preliminary test version covering development information on Africa; Phase 2 (1982-86) is the operational phase with PADIS-DEV, PADIS STAT data bases coming into existence. This involves the implementation of an integrated PAN-AFRICAN data bank with files covering sectors such as transport, energy and education, training of experts for the collaboration centres, organization of technical assistance at subregional level, installation of computer facilities at the subregional level and the design of a telecom network (PADIS-NET extension) interconnecting these centres by using satellite technology; Phase 3 (1986-90) deals with the installation of the PADIS system and network devices at the subregional, national and user level (ministeries, institutions, universities and companies). It implies the full exploitation of the PADIS telecommunications satellite extension to all African countries. The Executive Secretary of the ECA said that when completed, the system will make the storing and delivery of non-numerical data available to Africa for the first time.68 It is expected to have an integrated Pan-African data bank from which it will be able to provide decision-makers, researchers and scientists with files on such topics as transport, trade, industry, agriculture and technology. It is also expected that from 1990 PADIS will be supported completely by the African states with reference to funding.

The Commission has made considerable efforts to implement the components and phases of PADIS but it is facing problems of finance,
restricted manpower needs, the legal requirements for setting up the subregional centres to mention but a few. The implication of these problems is that the ECA is not implementing the project according to the timetable.

In terms of the staff needed to support such a big project, the PADIS Central Co-ordination Office has four professional level staff, that is, the Director, the Chief of User Services, the Chief of Computerized Data Base Development and the Chief of Training. There are also four technical staff or documentalists including a micro fiche technician, a computer technician and secretary. None of the posts is paid for from the ECA regular budget - all are paid from technical assistance project funds contributed by the UNDP and a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Canada. The funding of the former is up to 1990, while that of the IDRC will last to the end of 1988. Dependence on extra-budgetary funds for posts in PADIS creates uncertainty because once the funds run out, the ECA will have problems retaining the staff. The Chief of User Services pointed out that "clearly problems are encountered in securing funding for the staff of PADIS for the future, since the project donors cannot be expected to continue funding salaries and in view of the financial crisis at the UN, one can hardly expect the UN regular budget to take up all the posts listed above at a time when its resources are being cut". 69

For the establishment of PADIS at the subregional level, the ECA has purchased the computers and other related equipment and software for the Central Africa Documentation and Information System (CADIS) and for the others - WADIS, NADIS and ESADIS, but there are a few teething problems. (Details of the stages reached for each subregion are treated under work programmes in Chapters 6-9.) In preparing the strategy and
work plan for PADIS, the Regional Technical Committee in 1986 requested its members (recommendation 5, E/ECA/CM.12/33) to submit comments on the draft strategy by the end of September 1986. The comments received show some of the problems. They relate to the sites, purchase of equipment, legal matters, duplication of effort and reservations on the ambitious nature of the project. In its capacity as Chairman of the North Africa Regional Technical Committee, Morocco commented that the strategy presented "resembled more a work programme than an actual strategy. A detailed, timely activity plan needed to be worked out for the project". They also felt that the plans for the bibliographic data base on African development literature (PADIS-DEV) were very ambitious. Regarding this data base, both Algeria and Morocco expressed caution because "the experts were difficult to identify and the data was of short-term reliability".

There is the other problem of duplication of effort. For example, in North Africa, the Arab League is already providing similar services. In fact, an interim arrangement has been made with the Arab League Documentation Centre (ALDOC) to house the North African Documentation and Information System (NADIS) for a period of three years. The ECA hopes to benefit from the expertise, experience and training facilities provided by ALDOC by so doing. There are other systems such as the Arab Information System Network (ARIS NET) and the Resau Sahelien d'information et de documentation scientifique et technique (RESADOC). Moreover, UNESCO is providing similar services in Africa. The representative of UNESCO remarked that "the programme on PADIS was too broad and lacked focus. Part of the strategies relating to information infrastructure building, standardization, training and improvement of access to information, would create a problem of overlap and duplication with the UNESCO PGI programme". Thus, UNESCO suggested that the PADIS
programme focus on building the regional system, and that the infra­
structure building aspect be carefully considered. A mechanism should
be set up instead to co-ordinate the overall implementation of the
programme with UNESCO. But all the indications are that the ECA wants
to continue with the programme as planned because no alternative plan
has been proposed – neither has a meeting been arranged by the two
institutions.

The main threat to PADIS is lack of finance. The contributions
so far include:

(a) UNDP's (regional project reference RAF/79/078) for the
purchase of a Hewlett Packhard HP 3000/111 mini computer with the
complementnary equipment for storage and retrieval activities at the
cost of US$ 5000,000;

(b) ADB contribution of US$ 125,000 for the purchase of re­
prographic and printing material and a micro fiche laboratory;

(c) The IDRC, for the salary of the Technical Adviser of the
project and for the organization of user seminars and training at the
cost of US$ 497,000. (The MINISIS information storage and retrieval
software was also supplied free of charge);

(d) ECA allocation for salaries and additional equipment of
US$ 424,000;\textsuperscript{74} and

(e) Government of Zaire contributed US$ 30,000 for training and
advisory services to be delivered to the countries of Central Africa
in 1987.\textsuperscript{75}

The total of these contributions stands at US$ 1,576,000, which
means that the ECA has had less than US$ 2 million for PADIS. When
we remember that the total costs of the project are put at US$ 160 million and that the programme has one more year from now if it is to accomplish the implementation of phase 3, the magnitude of its financial problems becomes very obvious. It is therefore doubtful whether the ECA can implement most of the PADIS programme. However, the ECA has implemented some aspects of phases 1 and 2. PADIS-DEV data base has 1500 new references, bringing the total number to 6500. The Pan-African statistical Data Bank (PADIS-STAT) covers the period 1970-85 and it now contains more than 160,000 statistical series.

PADIS COM which is the second main component acquired the following:

(a) AGRIS-FAO data base containing references to all aspects of agriculture, including rural sociology, animal industry and food;

(b) DEVSIS-Canada-IDRC data base containing over 8000 bibliographic references on socio-economic development;

(c) ISU-data base of the UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs (DIESA) containing unpublished United Nations reports on socio-economic development; and

(d) LABORDOC - a supplementary data base from the International Labour Organization (ILO) containing 2584 references on socio-economic development.

The ECA is also going ahead with its plan to establish the sub-regional centres. Agreements were signed and site preparation undertaken for Eastern and Southern Africa centre (ESADIS) in Lusaka and that of WADIS in Niamey. The meeting of plenipotentiaries from the Yaounde and Gisenyi based MULPOCs held in April 1987 decided to accept the offer of the government of Zaire to host CADIS which covers both the Great Lake countries and the rest of Central Africa. (We must remember that
although they are two MULPOCs in Central Africa, the decision is that CADIS will cater for the member states of both.) As mentioned earlier, NADIS is going to be housed at ALDOC for three years, after which it will be at the ECA MULPOC Secretariat in Tangier, Morocco. For the third component, that is, PADIS NET, it has succeeded only in the sense that 20 African countries have been designated national centres for participation as focal points in the PADIS network by 1987. 20 countries out of a possible 50 show that the ECA still has a long way to go as its target is for the 50 states to be national centres. Although PADIS has potential, the project faces major problems - it is an ambitious project requiring huge sums of money which the ECA has little prospect of obtaining in the future. It also has limited staff to support the entire project. Even though the ECA hopes to achieve a single goal, namely, the provision of data on socio-economic development in Africa, the programme needs to be planned and areas of specialization identified. For example, PADIS can concentrate on agriculture and industry or say trade. This will be more meaningful than handling all aspects of development.

6. CONCLUSION

The ECA has developed into an elaborate international civil service structure, with 11 divisions, 32 sections and 12 units. But its growth has been marred by rigid bureaucratic rules and procedures. The lack of an identifiable organizational ideology has given rise to its expansion in all directions both at its headquarters and subregions. The Commission has too many divisions, sections and units. This is partly responsible for it not being able to focus on particular development needs and for the fact that a complex bureaucratic
procedures and rules have emerged with its expansion. There is a need for simplification and for developing clearer lines of authority, responsibility, accountability and communications, if the ECA is to react and respond favourably to the economic situation of African states. Moreover, the substantive divisions are so geared up to formulating the same programmes year in year out to the extent that the Secretariat is unable to respond to emergencies. This explains why the ECA was unable to assist African states during the periods of drought and famine 1984-86. The ECA was neither able to offer possible solutions nor deviate from its set programmes.

The institutional growth has not paid sufficient attention to overlapping of agendas and duplication of work. Management capacity has also lagged behind the institutional growth and the result is administrative inefficiency. For example, the ECA is running at least four major programmes, namely, the United Nations Industrial Decade for Africa (1980-90); the United Nations Transport and Communications Decade in Africa (1978-88); Regional Food Plan for Africa (AFPLAN) and the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-90). Each programme has its own set of goals and strategy but they are not integrated. The programme for the industrial decade is not integrated with that of AFPLAN. The two programmes run parallel, even though development in agriculture should be linked to agro-based industries, in terms of provision of raw materials.

The Commission has potential with reference to the breadth of its terms of reference; however, choosing to operate on several programmes at the same time is one of the reasons it is ineffective. The emphasis on conferences, seminars, workshops and research makes it difficult for one to assess what the ECA has done for three decades. However, a
programme with potential is PADIS but the Commission is unable to continue with the scheduled proposals for a number of reasons, ranging from the scheme being ambitious, lack of financial and manpower resources to sustain it, duplication of work as similar services are provided by ALDOC and UNESCO, and the slower pace of establishing the national centres.

The Commission's lack of effective leadership is attributed to its peculiar status. The Executive Secretary has to operate within UN guidelines and options. The only leverage to what he can do lies in the type of activities he chooses to concentrate on. We cannot therefore apportion the blame for his failures on him per se. The fault is with the UN system for not providing a clear role.

The formulation of programmes without due consultation with African governments is unrealistic. If the programmes are for the benefit of the member states, then it is essential to consult them and also device programmes relating to their priorities. Also the Commission is not equipped to implement and sustain projects because it lacks the organs for co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation. Finally, the ECA does not have a dual mandate of being an arm of the UN and an African Organization. It is an arm of the UN geared towards socio-economic development of Africa.


3. Ibid.


5. Ibid.


8. African Target, Vol. VIII, No. 1, April 1979, ECA, Addis Ababa, p. 3. While making enquiries on the possibility of getting in touch with Dr. Abbas, we were informed by the Sudanese Embassy in London that he died in 1983.

9. All efforts to locate Robert Gardiner through the Ghana Embassy in London and the African Development Bank in Abidjan failed.


11. Ibid., p. 9.

12. Ibid., p. 34.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

17. Interview with Professor Adebayo Adedeji, conducted on 4 March 1987, at the ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

18. Ibid.


21. Ibid., Rule 23.

22. Ibid., Rule 24.

23. Ibid., Rule 25.


25. Ibid., Rule 27.

26. Ibid., Rule 29.

27. Ibid., Rule 30.


32. Ibid., p. 39.


35. Ibid.

36. Interview with P.N.B. Nyangabyaki, Budget Officer, ECA headquarters, Addis Ababa, on 27 February 1987.

38. Ibid., p. 7.
39. Ibid., p. 76.
40. Ibid., p. 78.
41. Ibid.
42. Interview with Professor Adebayo Adedeji at the ECA headquarters on 4 March 1987.
43. See UNTFAD: Progress Report on Pledges and Payments by Member States and Institutions, Project Implementation and Expenditures for the Period 1981/82, E/ECA/CM.9/17, 15 March 1983, p. 1. The countries that paid were Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Mauritius, the Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Republic of Cameroon and Zimbabwe.
44. Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zaire.
45. Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, the Sudan and Zambia.
46. Angola, the Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, the Seychelles.
47. Interview with Gaoussou Troare, Programme Management Officer, TACO, ECA on 5 March 1988.
49. Ibid., p. 4.
50. Mrs. L. Tahir, Chief, Staff Services Unit, ECA, gave the figures as an estimate of staff employed by the ECA, including their field offices and institutions during a discussion on 6 March 1987, at the ECA headquarters, Addis Ababa.
51. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
55. Fieldwork at the ECA headquarters, February–March 1987. The officials though cautious at times talked freely about administrative bottlenecks and how such frustrate their efforts.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 15.

59. Ibid.


62. The Chief, PPCO, explained this point during an interview on 3 March 1987 at the ECA headquarters.


65. Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole, E/ECA/CM.12/44, 16 April 1986, p. 23. The same points have been raised in all the policy organs of the ECA.


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., p. 2.

73. Ibid., p. 3.


77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., p. 3.

CHAPTER 3

ECA AND THE DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1. INTRODUCTION

The need for the ECA to do more than it has done in the past has been expressed in the demand that the Commission should be more operational. In this regard, operational activity can be construed as a continuing search for a strategy for African development, together with increasing effort to induce African states to formulate and implement development programmes realistically. Developing Africa comprises 50 independent countries, each of which has unique features and individual country programmes for development. Within national frameworks domestic effort is supplemented by a wide range of bilateral and multilateral assistance sometimes provided in a way that is particular to individual countries, sometimes conceived, at least in principle, as part of a wider regional programme. If, however, these countries have particular characteristics, the majority have much in common. Most, for example, caught in the toils of nation building, are substantially agrarian in terms of economic structure, and relatively small in terms of population and market size. All are committed to the rapid attainment of economic and social development. In these circumstances, it is of the utmost importance that policy formulation and policy execution should have a continental perspective.

In the early 1970s, some African countries began to query the relevance and realism of the existing theories and models of development and economic growth to the objective realities of African economies. There were also disquieting voices about the theory and practice of
development planning with its emphasis on savings and investment and the concentration on monetary indicators as targets to be achieved. In general, growth targets were never achieved despite the inflow of aid and grants, foreign private capital, expatriate managerial, administrative and technical skills because of the huge outflow of foreign exchange due to external debts and payments of dividends and interest. The discussions centred on how to change the situation with reference to orientation. By 1979 Africans were redefining development. They wanted not only economic development but self-reliance, independence, control of foreign intervention in the economy and politics of the country, participation of the masses and protection of their culture and lifestyles. In essence, they wanted the right to development. Their basic economic needs involved the drive for modernization – the demand for a better life in the foreseeable future. According to His Excellency, the late Dr. William R. Tolbert Jr., President of the Republic of Liberia, "Africa wants more than mere basic human needs. She wants new assets and new stature; new capabilities and new opportunities. These, she is entitled to have. Her corporate relations must not be iniquitous. And her access to technology, no less than technical learning, must not be impeded or inhibited." The participants of the Monrovia Symposium in 1979 organized by both the ECA and OAU were convinced that Africa can embark upon a strategy that gives it complete control over its own needs and over the cultural, social, technical, economic and financial instruments that are capable of promoting appropriate action and guaranteeing success in its bid to change the life in Africa. Although the participants did not come up with a well-defined ideology and strategy, the trend of the debate during the symposium was that Africa needed a development strategy which reflected its unity, culture,
values, geopolitics and history. They wanted a strategy which would incorporate the use of its natural, mineral and human resources. Also they hoped for a development which would cater for the right type of technology and advancement in science and at the same time one which would be kind to the environment.  

The ECA has not yet come up with a coherent development philosophy incorporating these aspects, but it has nonetheless laid the foundations and played a pioneering role in the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) as the blue-print for future development in Africa. This chapter is, therefore, a consideration of its contribution to the intellectual debate on African development. With its inputs the ECA became an advocate of collective self-reliance and self-sustaining economic growth. It has not done as much as the ECLA which developed a very different and distinct development ideology based on the dependency theory under the leadership of Raul Prebisch. But it has set out broad principles which are worth considering. The significance of the LPA was the fact that most African states endorsed it. But in practice, they have not been able to implement it. Even the ECA has yet to change its priorities and programmes to reflect those of the LPA at both regional and sub-regional levels. Also the ideas in the LPA were not new but have been re-introduced at different times by the ECA. Moreover, there has not been any follow-up conference on the content of the LPA, since it was adopted in 1980, to allow African governments and scholars alike to be aware of and understand its full implications. Perhaps the main contribution of the ECA was that it continued to hammer the idea about the pessimistic economic outlook facing Africa year after year. Secondly, it provided funds, technical staff and also organized and co-sponsored
the major conferences on the African economic crisis such as the OAU Economic Summit in 1980 and the Abuja Conference on African Economic Crisis in 1987.

Much has been written about the long-term development problems of Africa. The debate on the future of Africa has centred on two sets of proposals put forward in the 1980s. The ECA with its mandate to assist in the formulation and development of co-ordinated policies as a basis for practical action in promoting economic and technological development in Africa, as stated in the already mentioned document: The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa: 1980–2000 (LPA). In 1983, the Commission issued another document - Africa's Development 1983–2008: A Preliminary Perspective Study. The other set of documents was published by the World Bank in 1981 - Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, popularly known as the Berg Report. It followed this with two more reports in 1983 and 1984, respectively. However, the aim of this chapter is to locate the ECA's inputs to the debate. The focus, then, will be on three questions:

(1) Can we identify ideas originating from the ECA?

(2) How has the ECA diffused such ideas to member states?

(3) Have such ideas led to a change in the policies on development in Africa?

The first part of the chapter deals with the ECA's diagnosis of the African economic crisis; the second deals with the ECA's ideas since 1960; part three evaluates the LPA in the light of the Berg Report and the ECLA's dependency theory; and part four is the conclusion.
2. AFRICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE ECA'S DIAGNOSIS

The nature of the crisis confronting African leaders was eloquently summarized by Ex-President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere in his Chairman's Report to the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa on 18 July 1985. He said:

"We are dealing with serious problems on which the lives of our people and the future of our nations depend. We must approach these questions with fresh minds, without being restricted by orthodoxies of left and right - or centre. Where nothing will serve except radical solutions, we must not be afraid of them. At the same time we have to be very realistic. Africa is being changed by events beyond our control, and we want to get control of that process of change so that it works for our benefits - or at least does us the minimum harm. And we have limited resources of time, of manpower, and of wealth."

Some aspects of the crises have been dealt with in Chapter 1, but it was necessary to re-state some of the points raised, especially as the development options and strategies expounded by the ECA were the product of its perception. Over the years the ECA carried out surveys and reviews of the economic and social conditions in Africa through which it has built up its own explanations and diagnoses. It found that certain characteristics were common to most African states. For example, Africa was the youngest continent in terms of political independence. For economic and social development, Africa was the least developed of all the developing regions - in fact, all but five of the countries classified by the United Nations as the poorest and least developed were in Africa. Even those African countries not in that category were very poor and weak, in terms of high-level and skilled manpower, and diversification of the foreign exchange earning base. The number of sovereign entities, also, made the continent the most divided in terms of language and ethnicity (Africa has 50 states). Their economies were for the most part small in economic terms, as a result of low average
incomes and small populations. Of the 50 states, 24 had fewer than 5 million people. Africa has specialized economies, most of them agricultural, dependent on the export of two or more primary commodities. All have tropical climatic conditions with the exception of Lesotho and Swaziland.

Africa was also a region of great diversity. It encompasses Nigeria, with about 80 million people, producing some 44 per cent of regional output. It included a number of very small countries such as Burundi, Gambia, Swaziland and Lesotho. There were countries rich in oil and mineral resources, such as Botswana, Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Then, also, there were countries of tropical rain forest and those of the semi-arid interior, in addition to landlocked countries such as Burundi, Botswana and Zimbabwe, and those fronting the ocean, e.g. Ghana, Nigeria and Togo.

The nature of the economic crisis facing the continent was similar to what was happening the world over. But, perhaps, what makes it peculiar in the case of Africa, is that the situation has continued to deteriorate, with little hope of solution. Secondly, the crisis has persisted over a relatively longer period of time when compared with other parts of the world. In the 1960s, which was the first decade of independence, African states were full of high hopes and expectations for the future. But the rates of economic growth were less encouraging, falling mainly towards the lower end of the 3-6 per cent range. With the population increasing at an average 2.5 per cent, the growth per capita GNP averaged out at 1.7 per cent for the oil importers, substantially below the 4.1 per cent for the industrial nations. In the 1970s, the pace of growth was not maintained. Annual per capita growth rates for black Africa dropped to 0.4 per cent for the low income oil importers. Current account deficits in the Sub-Saharan region rose from a modest $1.5 billion in 1970 to $8 billion in 1980.
External indebtedness climbed from $6 billion to $32 billion between 1970 to 1979, and debt service increased from 6 to 12 per cent of export earnings in the same period. Foreign exchange reserves, which were comfortable in 1970, fell sharply so that by 1979 reserves could cover only 3.3 months' imports. For the 1980s, the World Bank Report 1981 gloomily forecast no measurable growth in per capita income for Africa, and for the poorest African countries it held out the prospect of further negative growth. In 1984, the World Bank President, A.W. Clausen, described the crisis as "the worst economic crisis any region of the world has known since the Second World War". According to a study by the ECA, African countries' exports decreased in volume terms at a rate of 3 per cent a year, their overall current account deficit reached $31.8 billion in 1981, before falling to $24.5 billion in 1982, to $17.3 billion in 1983 and to an estimated $10 billion in 1984, mainly because of the drastic import curbs that most countries have had to undertake. At the same time, the continent's external debts have been rising, reaching an estimated $150 billion in 1983, and $158 billion in 1984, representing about 190 per cent of Africa's exports of goods and services. The debt service alone is estimated at about $12 billion a year, at a time when the flow of external resources into the continent is also declining. The effect of all these developments has been to accelerate the process of economic decline throughout the continent.

The ECA concluded that with no money to begin the urgently needed rehabilitation, few people see any prospect of significant improvement.

Several reasons have been advanced for the economic crisis. The recent experiences of droughts, famine, floods and civil wars have, no doubt, exacerbated the situation, but the real causes are more deep-rooted than these. As stated earlier, this chapter deals mainly with the diagnosis and explanations given by the ECA. The Commission
agrees with the general characteristics of the economic crisis and the nature of the African economies. Its annual surveys of the economic and social conditions in Africa also reveal the pessimistic and rather gloomy pictures of life in Africa but its explanations are slightly different from those of the World Bank. While the latter blames domestic policies or lack of it as the main cause of the African crisis, the ECA addresses both the issues of domestic policies and the effects of the international economic system on African economies.

The ECA said of the African economic crisis:

"The African continent is more drastically affected than the other regions of the world by the negative achievements of the development strategies adopted by most countries whose failure, aggravated by the social crises which the industrialized countries are currently undergoing, hardly needs emphasizing. Africa is unable to point to any significant growth rate or satisfactory index of general well-being. The problem of under-employment and unemployment is more and more serious. The use of resources is well below its potential. The state of inter-African co-operation is a far cry from the decisions and hopes that were clearly enunciated by the higher authorities of the countries concerned. Commitments undertaken by heads of state remain a dead letter in a great many cases where their implementation could represent an effective contribution to improve the standard of living of the people. Africa is equally familiar with the sombre reality of death - massive infant mortality, violent death in all forms. The prospect of impending disaster is not just a figment of the imagination."  

It has also continually stressed the fact that the basic economic structures of African countries have not changed fundamentally. Most countries were still dependent on the export of a narrow range of primary commodities which were subject to changes in external market conditions. Poor performance in the agricultural sector, reflected a long-term deterioration in the trend for agricultural production and per capita food production. According to the Commission, "the heart of what appears to be a veritable dilemma for policy is the low
productivity of African economies; the heavy dependency of domestic production on imports; failure to diversify into new types of exports and the absence of domestic linkages. It will thus be clear that lack of structural transformation and widespread low level productivity of the African economies are the fundamental causes of their continued underdevelopment and persistent economic crisis".13

The diagnosis by the ECA gives a striking picture of the past and current economic situation in most of the African countries. African states are aware of the points raised and have admitted the mistakes they have made through speeches and other government statements. There is also a stronger desire to make corrections through the initiation of domestic and foreign economic policies.14 But although the governments have accepted their mistakes and application of wrong domestic policies, they also blamed the unjust international economic system in which they were mere appendages of the rich countries. For example, there was a strong belief that lender's reform packages were designed to keep their countries in that role.15 As Ex-President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria explained, "We have been victims of mass exploitation and we call on the developed world to join us in working out an equitable redistribution of the world's wealth".16 Ex-President Nyerere of Tanzania, for his part, said that "it was the people of Africa who must fight the poverty of Africa. National development was not enough: it had to be part of a wider African experience".17 In the final communique issued at the end of the OAU Economic Summit held in Lagos, Nigeria, 28-29 April 1980, African leaders stated thus, "it is first and foremost incumbent upon Africa itself to define the conditions and accept direct responsibility for the rehabilitation of the economy".18 Both the ECA and African countries agreed that the overriding development problem facing the continent was the need to
reverse the decline in the living standards of the people. That challenge, they also agreed, lay solely with the African governments. They have to find the solutions to their problems, a task that requires continental, as well as individual efforts. African governments have also turned to the ECA and asked for a development strategy reflecting the African economic conditions and one that is likely to lead to an improvement in the standard of living of the people. The ECA, on the other hand, has been involved in the promotion of the ideas such as collective self-reliance, self-sustaining economic growth, regional economic co-operation and south-south co-operation as options for African development. The next section traces the origin of such ideas since the 1960s.

3. **ECA AND THE EVOLUTION OF IDEAS ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT**

The decade of the 1960s was a difficult one for the ECA because the Commission was in its formative years. It had to tackle the question of its purpose of existence and it also had to establish its organizational structure and employ the required staff for the task ahead. Then there was the issue of its membership, given that initially the colonial powers were also full members. Italy, for instance, ceased to be a member of the Commission in 1960 upon the cessation of its territorial responsibility for what has now become the Republic of Somalia. Right from the start, the African member states expressed opposition to the apartheid policies of the Republic of South Africa, which was then a full member as well. ECOSOC eventually suspended her from participation in the work of the Commission in 1963 by resolution 44(iv) and 88(v).

The ECA also had to solve the problem of the dearth of
information on African economies. As the countries gained political independence, there was the realization that very little was known about each entity. These countries were governed by different colonial powers who used different methods of management and administration, ranging from the policy of assimilation by the French to that of indirect rule by the British. Each colonial power accounted for its territories and no more. Therefore, the Commission devoted resources and energy to the task of information gathering, surveys, training and studies on various aspects of the socio-economic conditions in Africa.

On the political front, the African states were gaining their independence. The ideology of the time was Pan-Africanism, which was echoed in the ECA's deliberations. The latter became the forum for waging the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid war. It has been said that during this decade, the ECA gave priority to issues such as colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid in South Africa. The annual ECA sessions were a reflection of this emphasis. So, the ECA took on the character and direction of the Pan-African movement. 19

Apart from the task of defining its role within the context of its mandate, the Commission had another responsibility thrust upon it. It was responsible for the formulation of a strategy for development in Africa. The task required it to develop its philosophy for development. But the Commission was not able to do so in the 1960s due to its complex history and organizational structure. It had to cope with these aspects and it only echoed the ideas of the Pan-African movement. Here the activities within its environment dictated what the Commission could do and the direction it took. Even though the members were united in their views on colonialism and apartheid, the fact remained that on other issues, e.g. intervention in their domestic affairs, African Unity, boundary
disputes and the issue of secession, there were divergence of views and fundamental positions. For an organization which had been newly established, this situation made it difficult for the Commission to agree upon policy measures for the economic and social advancement of Africa. The issues took up most of the time and resources of the Commission and so the issue of African development was not given top priority. Besides, there were not many facts on the continent pulling the ECA at the time towards a continental concept of development. This was mainly because so many of the prerequisites for development on a continental scale were missing. This was one of the reasons why the Commission concentrated on research and studies of socio-economic conditions.

During the Ninth Session of the ECA, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February 1969, the African countries discussed at length the issue of development. They expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of development on the continent. They expressed doubts as to whether foreign aid and investment could carry the main burden of promoting development and economic growth. It was during this meeting that the idea of self-reliance growth was first discussed as an alternative path to development. For self-reliance, the delegates' emphasis was on the energies, imagination and competence of the African people. The ministers argued that self-reliance should constitute the foundation for long-term development and economic growth. They wanted the ECA to be involved in the search for a development strategy that would reflect this emphasis and also African conditions.

The ECA noted these demands and in 1970 it prepared a document referred to as "Africa's Strategy for Development in the 1970s". It also formed its contribution to the global International Development
Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. Indeed, it was the first time that it had made an attempt to diagnose African economic conditions and to present its own strategy for development. The document was submitted and endorsed at the Tenth Session of the Conference of Ministers, held in Tunis, Tunisia, 8-13 February 1971. In it the ECA stated that Africa's share of total assistance to developing countries was declining steadily, the decrease for the period 1960-67 was 12 per cent. At the same time the flow of investment income out of Africa had tripled. The outflow of income earned in Africa varied from 12 per cent to about 42 per cent of net official inflow. To this outflow it added Africa's increasing external debt. The total of reported external debt increased from $3.3 billion in 1960 to $8.7 billion in 1968; service payments of these debts in 1968 amounted to 6.4 per cent of total commodity exports. Repayment of debts accounted for almost a quarter of Africa's total exports of goods and services or some 24 per cent. Africa's profit on exports was far below this 24 per cent. The reason given by the ECA for this state of affairs was that Africans were not in control of economic activity; native participation in the productive sectors remained insignificant. It blamed the situation on the activities of the multinational corporations and expatriate personnel who siphoned off a large proportion of total gross income since they were the principal generators of income.

On the basis of its review of the economic conditions, the ECA concluded that the development strategy which appeared more suitable for Africa, should be based on certain guiding principles, which were as follows:

(a) reshaping the economic infrastructure so as to adapt it to suit the new independent status of the countries and the requirements
of economic growth, with special reference to new potential patterns of trade and to overcoming the dualism in African national economies by developing effective social economic and physical links between rural and urban communities;

(b) rectifying the extraordinary small size of national markets, through economic co-operation and integration;

(c) re-orientating and re-shaping socio-economic institutions in such a way as to facilitate the process of innovation and modernization; and,

(d) providing an infrastructure designed to meet the requirements of self-sustaining development, especially in the field of education, science, technology and management.  

According to the Commission, "Africa's strategy for development in the 1970s" aimed at structural changes in the continent's economy. It aimed at the creation of an association of African countries producing primary commodities which will permit the producers to take the steps necessary to protect their interests in the world market for primary commodities. Robert K.A. Gardiner, who was then the second Executive Secretary of the ECA, saw the document as a contribution towards defining Africa's options for development. He said that it provided a framework for assisting the individual countries in their sovereign task of designing strategies tailored to their own particular circumstances.

The principle of self-reliance was adopted as the central theme of the document and the ECA was also convinced that the main objective of all efforts should be towards the establishment of self-sustaining economic growth and welfare. Although no full definition was given,
the ECA saw self-sustaining growth as one which "goes on and on and reaches higher and higher limits". The ECA recommended that the strategy for individual member states should be concentrated on a limited number of key areas and activities and suggested a series of issues and measures which required special attention in the context of the economic, social and institutional development of each individual state during the 1970s. The key areas included trade, industry, agriculture, human resources development, transport, science and technology, to mention but a few. In trade, the appropriate strategy stipulated two basic objectives: (a) to generate structural changes by being a vehicle for transforming African economies from a traditional, almost exclusively primary-producing basis, to a dynamic combination of agriculture and manufacturing; (b) to provide foreign exchange earnings for the financing of development. In industry, the Commission hoped for: (a) the development of small-scale industries based on innovative technology and using local raw materials; (b) the development of agro-allied industries and those providing inputs for agriculture such as fertilizers, agricultural machinery and implements; (c) the development of export industries; and (d) the promotion of industrial research, while the objective in agriculture was to raise the growth rate from 2 per cent to a minimum of 4 per cent per annum.

The Commission felt at the time that it was in no position to devise a strategy for development for all its member states. In pointed to its limited field representation, with its regular professional staff of only 142 and some 30 regional advisers. It also felt that its limited resources made it difficult to discern an identifiable ECA impact on national development problems. It stated that, "at the very least, however, the ECA does recognize that the desire to seek a method is itself proof of the existence of method, and recognition further that,
in present African circumstances the essence of method lies in the determination of priorities". Thus, it placed emphasis on research and planning, mobilization of domestic resources, trade, industry, agricultural transformation, human resources and manpower training. Apart from the limited resources, the ECA also felt that it was not possible to have a central theme and theory of development. The Executive Secretary pointed out that a common theme could not be found for the member states because their priorities inevitably differed. That was why the document had options and it was, then, the responsibility of individual countries to determine their development policies in the light of their resources and objectives. This indicates that the Commission was not very conversant with the nature and extent of the economic problems facing its members. Secondly, it treated each as an entity in its own right and it did not try to establish whether they faced similar economic problems.

The African ministers, however, gave the document a mixed reception. They felt that the strategy was merely a set of guiding principles on specific objectives in priority areas such as planning, trade and the development of human resources. Several Committee members suggested that the strategy should be focused on a central theme. They wanted a strategy peculiar to African conditions; bearing in mind that Africa had the sole responsibility for improving the standard of living of its people. The only consensus (during that Tunis Conference of 1971) between the Commission and its member states was the fact that they agreed that African countries should harmonize their views from then on, in order to arrive at joint African positions in all international channels in which problems affecting their trade and development were being discussed.
During the second ECA Conference of Ministers held in Accra, Ghana, from 19-23 February 1973, the issue of African development was raised once again. It is worthwhile remembering that on 12 February 1971, the devaluation of the American dollar threw the financial authorities of the entire world into confusion. It resulted in a 10 per cent reduction in the value of all debts to African countries payable in dollars. It brought home to African leaders the extent to which their national economies were governed by the International Monetary System. The effects of the devaluation formed part of the background of the discussions at the conference. The delegates realized that African states might not succeed in playing their rightful role in the world economy if they continued to disperse their efforts through individual action. The idea that regional co-operation was essential to African development then took shape and was to dominate the deliberations of this and subsequent conferences. It was an idea which the ECA had put forward since the 1960s, but was not fully considered until this time. The participants spoke of co-operation in the form of establishing multi-purpose groupings and also co-operation between the OAU and the ECA to resolve African economic problems. They also re-stated the need for an African position on major development issues. But even though they wanted a central theme on development, they themselves did not propose one; nevertheless, they expected the ECA to come up with one.

In 1975 the OAU decided to convene a meeting of experts to be serviced jointly by the ECA and African Development Bank (ADB), to harmonize African views and formulate an African position on the issues before the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Development and International Economic Co-operation held in September 1975. The ECA prepared a briefing document containing
more or less the same guidelines of the previous document, that is, "Africa's Strategy for Development in the 1970's". The delegates once again were dissatisfied. The states were still worried about the fluctuating prices of their exports, and the declining terms of trade, while the rise in the price of oil provided partial explanations for the deterioration in their current account figures throughout the 1970s. It was also the case that the price elasticity of demand for most of their primary products tended to be low. That meant that lowering the price did not greatly increase the quantity sold. It also meant that Africa was unable to accelerate its growth through the expansion of exports of its primary products. The confrontation with these realities forced African leaders into a reassessment of their development options in the light of the then prevailing demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This was part of the North-South debate and the demand was based on the proposition that a rearrangement of the international economy in such a way as to remove constraints on international trade would facilitate the acceleration and diversification of economic growth in the world on an equitable and fair basis.

The main negotiation issues from the perspective of the Third World for restructuring the international economic system were:
(a) commodity stabilization; (b) discrete treatment of Third World debts; (c) restructuring of international trade and removal of protectionists policies in industrialized countries; (d) massive transfer of resources from the industrialized North to the underdeveloped South; (e) easy access to Western technology; (f) redeployment of world industrial production capability in favour of Third World Countries; and (g) the reform of the international monetary and financial system, that is, the World Bank and the IMF. Almost all of the above called on the rich countries to give away something to erode their favoured
position with its concomittant loss of economic, political and cultural hegemony. The Third World Countries believed that the establishment of a NIEO would be a great action of benevolent generosity by the rich nations and that the countries of the South should not queue up, to beg for its final emergence.

Through the OAU and ECA African leaders requested a proposal and framework for the implementation of the NIEO. The ECA having been saddled with this responsibility began to seek an alternative strategy for development. The search was for a strategy that was genuinely African-oriented, rather than one which initiated the lifestyles of existing societies in the industrialized nations. It was a necessity as the revolution of rising expectations following political independence in the 1960s, was replaced by the revulsion of unfulfilled economic dreams. Since past strategies had failed, there was the need to re-examine options so that the many potential opportunities available for higher and more stable rates of growth could be made use of.

The ECA embarked on the process of reappraising the development models which African governments have been applying since independence. Eventually it produced another document in 1976, entitled, "Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order, 1976-1981-1986", Doc. E/CN.14/ECO/90/Rev.3. (This document became the forerunner to both the Monrovia Strategy 1979 and the Lagos Plan of Action 1980.) It provided the main intellectual and theoretical foundation for the two. Its main objectives were the promotion of self-reliance; acceleration of internally located growth and diversification; the eradication of unemployment and poverty. The ECA's basic proposition was that an increasing measure of self-reliance and self-sustaining economic growth and development was the most important
counterpart to political independence since it would lead to the economic decolonization of Africa. The "Revised Framework" was approved by the ECA in 1976 and was later endorsed by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1977. Between 1976 and 1979, the ideas contained in this document were expanded and improved upon through a series of specialized meetings such as the Joint OAU/ECA Colloquium on Perspectives of Development and Economic Growth in Africa up to the year 2000, held in Monrovia, in February 1979, and the Joint ECA/UNEP Seminar on Alternative Patterns of Development and Lifestyles for the African region, held in Addis Ababa, in March 1979.

Having not participated effectively in the preparation of strategies for the earlier decades, the ECA was now more determined to ensure that its voice was heard and that it played a crucial role in determining the content and scope of the International Development Strategy (IDS). It prepared the Development Strategy for Africa during the third United Nations Development Decade (1980-1990). This document was an updated version of the text of the "Revised Framework". During the same period, there was an invitation by the Secretary-General of the OAU for a symposium on the future development prospects of Africa towards the year 2000. It was held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 12-16 February 1979. At the symposium, African leaders accepted that they were responsible for defining the elements of their own development strategy. They agreed that the time was ripe for a change of strategy, when they concluded that "without profound change, without a revolution in our aspirations, there is no possibility of political stability". The ECA agreed with the need for a change.

Following the symposium, the Commission formulated a draft Declaration of Commitment on Guidelines and Measures for National and
Collective Self-Reliance in Economic and Social Development for submission to the OAU. African leaders endorsed the draft in 1979 and it became known as the Monrovia Strategy for Economic Development in Africa. By the Monrovia Declaration they called on Africans to rally around a programme of mutual support and development, self-reliance and economic integration. To make more adjustments to the generalized framework, the two organizations prepared a more extensive document suggesting steps to be taken to achieve the objectives of the Monrovia Declaration and Strategy. The revised document was adopted at the extraordinary session of the OAU in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980 and it became known as the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000 (LPA for short).

With reference to the first question posed at the beginning of the chapter, the answer was that there were ideas on African development whose origins can be traced to the ECA. The idea of regional co-operation and integration with its ultimate objective of establishing an African Economic Community by the year 2000 dates back to the early 1960s when the ECA was about to create its subregional offices. It divided the continent into four main subregions and it also considered factors such as geography and economics, when it concluded that African economies were weak, small and too dependent to take advantage of economies of scale. It also argued that the dependence on primary products made the economies vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity markets. Therefore, it proposed that one of the keys to African development was through regional co-operation and integration. The principles of self-reliance and self-sustaining growth can also be traced to ECA papers in the 1970s especially. They were developed due to two factors. First, constant criticism from African governments and pressures by them for a development strategy which suited the African conditions.
Secondly, the ideas for a NIEO did not really materialize as there were stalemates in the various negotiations. The North has always argued that the development problems of the South were due to the implementation of wrong domestic policies. Besides the arguments of the South were based on moral grounds with reference to the injustice brought on by colonialism and the effects of the international political and economic system which failed to take account of the challenges to development in the South. Also there was a realization by African governments that even if a NIEO were established the African continent would not benefit from it because, in the League of the Third World, Africa was at the bottom with more severe economic and political problems. Therefore, African adherence to the demand for a NIEO was merely a symbolic gesture, to show solidarity with and sympathy for the Third World countries. They then turned their attention to the re-appraisal of past development strategies and why they failed, and gave ideas to the ECA of what they would like the development philosophy for Africa to contain. Through subsequent drafts, meetings and seminars, the ECA continued to put forward the ideas of self-reliance and self-sustaining economic growth and development for the long-term prospects for Africa.

On the question of how the ECA has diffused the ideas, it had done so through its annual policy organ meetings. But we must remember that here the ECA deals mainly with the Ministers responsible for development planning of member states. But it needs the consensus of the Heads of State and Government, and for this it has had to work with the OAU. Finally, on the international scene, the ECA also made presentations to the General Assembly especially through the Special Session on the Economic Crisis in Africa (1986). It also prepared documents for the first, second, third and subsequent development
decades of the United Nations. These are in addition to attending special seminars and symposiums on development sponsored by the OAU and the Commission.

4. THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION: WHAT STRATEGY FOR AFRICA?

The LPA is a genuinely historic document because it represents a continent-wide effort by Africans to forge a comprehensive and unified approach to economic development. It represents the hopes and aspirations of the drafters and the frustrations created by the failures of past and present strategies of development in Africa. In terms of structure, it consists of 13 chapters, of which seven focused on sectoral topics: food and agriculture, industry, natural resources, human resources, transport and communications, trade and finance; and, energy. The remaining six address the issues of science and technology, technical co-operation, the environment, the least developed African countries, women and development planning, statistics and population. A single theme runs through the 13 chapters, which is that Africa must strive to reduce its dependence on industrialized nations and replace this with a self-sustaining development strategy based on the maximum internal use of the continent's resources. This is referred to as a 'self-reliant' strategy for development.

The objective of the LPA is not only to provide the development of the nations and peoples of Africa, but also their progressive integration over great regional areas; and its ultimate goal is to set up an African Economic Community by the end of the century.

The strategy is collective self-reliance through a partial de-linkage of Africa from the global trading system, and great emphasis
on intra-African trading rather than on exports (although production for export remains an important secondary focus).

There is no costing of the LPA, but the source of funds includes Official Development Assistance (ODA), private loans and investments both foreign and domestic. However, it provides a growth projection target of 7 per cent for the decade of the 1980s but it does not disclose how this figure was derived nor the assumption for it.

The LPA has both international and domestic assumptions. Internationally it assumes a continuation of ODA and co-operative attitude on the part of multinational corporations (MNCs) in terms of investment, credit and technological transfer. It assumes that the decision to delink will not provoke retaliation by the industrialized nations on a scale sufficient to destabilize the effort. The final assumption is that Africa can retain its financial credibility in world capital market rates. This is one example of the inconsistency of the LPA.

The idea of delinking is in contrast with having co-operation with the MNCs. Is it possible to delink and at the same time argue for more financial assistance in the international economic system? Domestically, the assumption is that African leadership will genuinely embrace regional co-operation and integration as a prerequisite for development. They will be willing to impose the necessary austerity entailed by delinkage, and to live with the discontent precipitated thereby. On the other hand, the LPA assumes that the African public will accept the austerity and will rally to the call. Finally, it is assumed that adequate indigenous management and technological expertise will be forthcoming to carry out the bulk of the LPA without excessive reliance on expatriates.
The domestic assumptions, in particular, show how the ECA had attempted to incorporate one of the options advocated by the dependency theorists. The relationship between the Third World and the industrialized countries is basically explained by the centre-periphery analysis, in which the periphery was involved in outward-oriented development through the export of commodities. This was incapable of permitting the full development of the peripheral countries because the type and extent of their linkages to the centre depended largely on their resources and their economic and political capacities for mobilizing them. This conditioned the economic structure and dynamism of each peripheral country. The result was the siphoning of income and resources to the centre. Historically, the role of the periphery had been mainly restricted to the supply of primary products. According to Raul Prebisch (1984), the pattern of trade had been a factor in the survival of the historical hegemony of the centres over the periphery. The hegemony is buttressed by the fragmentation of the developing world and the economic and technological superiority of centres. The extreme dependency theorists, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, had recommended a radical delinking from the centres. The ECA advocated delinking in favour of intra-African trade and development. African states were to re-orientate their economies through diversification and other measures to reduce their vulnerability to fluctuating commodity prices and their dependence on industrialized nations for food and other items by developing their natural resources and applying appropriate technology for development.

In relation to key issues, the LPA gave priority to agriculture. The reason being that over the past two decades, the food and agricultural situation in Africa deteriorated to drastic proportions - food production and consumption per person fell below nutritional requirements. So
self-sufficiency in food production was top priority. For the attainment of this objective, the LPA recommended that farmers should be given strong cash incentives to produce. There should be support for farmers' co-operatives and integrated rural development approaches. Food imports were to be eliminated, while the production and consumption of local foods should be encouraged. The agricultural sector was to provide the necessary inputs to the processing industries, as well as markets for the products of the domestic industrial sector.

Since Africa was the least developed region in the world, the second priority of the LPA was industry. For this it recommended that the years 1980-90 should be the Industrial Development Decade in Africa. In the long term, that is, by the year 2000, Africa should manage to achieve 2 per cent of world industrial production, and in the short term (1980-85) 1 per cent. Initially, resource-based industries were to be developed as a support to agriculture through the supplying of necessary agricultural inputs. Subregional marketing arrangements must be negotiated to ensure that basic industries can operate at an effective scale. The local industry must be protected until it can be competitive. Also the local market should carry mainly goods to satisfy basic needs. Non-essential and other imports should be restricted, so as to conserve foreign exchange and reduce inventory costs.

In recognition of the significance of natural resources in providing a sound base for national socio-economic development, Africans were asked to acquire a thorough knowledge of their natural resource endowments, and should aim at the rational development and utilization of those resources employing technologies that are appropriate to their local conditions and paying due regard to aspects such as conservation of natural resources.

The LPA recognized that Africa's greatest asset was its human
resources, therefore, the recommendation was for the "full mobilization and effective utilization of the labour force (men, women and youth, both trained and untrained) for national development and social progress should be a major instrument of development". A primary objective of socio-economic development was the improvement of life for the entire population. Here the elimination of poverty was of high priority. For the attainment of this, the LPA argued for full participation of all segments of the population in gainful and productive employment and the provision of all essential services for the enrichment of the life of the community, plus the extension of basic services to as much of the population as possible.

How do the ideas in the LPA compare with those proposed by the World Bank - the Berg Report? We must remember that the two documents have dominated the debate on development in Africa in the 1980s.

The LPA and the Berg Report disagree fundamentally on the causes of and solution for the African crisis. In fact, the two documents were not addressing the same problem. While the LPA sketches out a strategy which Africa might use for its long-run development, the latter was a tactical programme which Africa was urged to adopt to ward off an immediate crisis. The LPA blames external dependence and advocates internal self-reliance, whereas the Berg Report blames internal deficiencies and advocates external exchange. The OAU asserts that 'modernization' can never produce development; the Bank argues that 'trickle-down' effect requires more time, care and input. The Berg Report prescribes an efficient export-led growth path as a way of getting African economies on a sound footing, but the LPA has discredited this approach and seeks for new direction and strategy - collective self-reliance via partial delinkage of Africa from the global trading system and enlarged emphasis on intra-African trading rather than on exports.
The African governments rejected the Berg Report's claim that it was compatible with and built upon the LPA. They were also dissatisfied with the paternalism: "We are ... concerned about the general tone of the report which tends to suggest that the region's problems are entirely of its own making and that unless outsiders are allowed to come with aid and new policies, the crisis would get out of hand and the result would be catastrophic." The African governors of the Bank also rejected the proposals of the report. They were particularly unhappy about its failure to recognize external causes, despite its emphasis on outward-oriented solutions. Africa alone cannot be responsible for its own condition given that it imports many of its difficulties: "... certain questions have not been dealt with in the World Bank report, problems such as the soaring of interest rates in the international financial markets, global negotiations with a view to establishing a new international economic order, and stabilization of commodity prices." Most African leaders are ambivalent over what they perceive to be their inadequate share of the benefits in the world system. They are also under domestic pressure as the recession intensifies, inflation increases, unemployment, peasants return to subsistence, scarce foreign exchange, the spectre of anarchy looms.

The World Bank has modified its stand since the publication of Accelerated Development. The aggressive expression of faith in its first report in what appeared to be textbook neo-classical economics, has been toned done in a move towards a more conciliatory approach. The theme of "getting the prices right", which dominated its early discussion, has been acknowledged as but one element of a solution that is inadequate unless accompanied by an overall reform package that includes increased inputs. Much greater attention has been given to the effects of exogeneous factors on Africa's poor economic performance, particularly the decline
in the terms of trade, which Accelerated Development appeared to go out of its way to deny.

Faith in the ability of agricultural exports to lead a recovery has also been tempered in the face of criticisms that rested in part on the Bank's own pessimistic projections of future commodity prices. Accompanying this, in Towards Sustained Development, is an acknowledgement that high priority to greater self-sufficiency in foodstuffs may be more rational than Accelerated Development allowed. In its report, Financing Adjustment with Growth, the Bank admits that "it is important to realize that the region's performance has not been uniformly poor. The region has its success stories, some of which are better than average for the developing world".\(^{45}\)

Beyond these general themes, however, there is a disagreement both on instrumentalities and on how policy reforms might best be implemented. It has been easier to reach agreement on measures which are appropriate for the immediate future rather than on long-term principles, largely because African governments have few policy alternatives available to them.

Turning to the third question posed in the introduction as to whether the ideas in the LPA have led to a change in the policies on development in Africa, the main answer was that it was now nine years since the LPA was endorsed, but it has not been implemented to a large extent. Some of the reasons for this can be found in the criticisms made about the document, but suffice to state that even the ECA has been unable to change its programmes and activities to reflect the aims and priorities of the LPA. Part of the answer was that the Commission has built up a complex bureaucracy which makes it difficult for it to adapt easily to new ideas. Most of its programmes were still based on
proposals of the 'Revised Framework', with emphasis on demand for a NIEO.

According to Browne and Cummings (1985), the LPA, in its present form, specified a destination for Africa but provided only a sketchy outline of the directions for getting there. They concluded that for the journey to take place it would require considerable refinement, which the Africans would have to carry out. Technically speaking, both also criticized the presentation of the document. They pointed out that it was not the product of a single drafter and it was apparently not subjected to even minimal editing and review. The result was the unevenness of the sections, variations in style and form, the overpowering redundancy and the disproportion in the length and treatment of the topical chapters (e.g. the chapter on science and technology was almost four times as long as any other chapter).

Another criticism of the LPA was the fact that most of its concepts were not new. For example, the concept of self-reliant development goes back at least to the sixties and shares parentage with such popular economic development formulations as the centre-periphery analysis and growth without development. But also two decades of ineffective development programming brought about a realization that even in countries where some growth seemed to be taking place, the plight of the poor people was hardly being touched. The realization of this led to the growth of the development approach of the latter 1970s, that is, the basic human needs (BHN) approach to development. It emphasized the critical importance of raising the income and improving the social conditions of the poorest segments of the population and doing so directly rather than by waiting for benefits to trickle-down to them from programmes directed toward the middle and upper classes. The
idea was that once the mass of the population became mobilized effectively for development, the whole development process would be speeded up and mass poverty would be eliminated. The BHN approach was a useful one but in the African context the governments had turned their attention to immediate problems, scarcity of foreign exchange, external debts and high servicing ratios, fall in ODA and natural disasters such as famine, drought and flooding.

The LPA offered a long-term strategy for development and did not provide answers to immediate economic problems. Four major circumstances, which were not foreseen when the LPA was adopted, added to the increasing difficulties of African countries, namely, (a) the widespread, severe and persistent drought; (b) the acceleration of the desertification process; (c) persistent and destructive cyclones in the Indian Ocean; and (d) the intensification and destabilization attempts of South Africa on neighbouring African countries, especially the Frontline states of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique. These factors dominated the minds of African leaders and they felt that something had to be done to halt the downward trend. They wanted a short-term programme geared towards recovery and some countries such as Nigeria implemented policies for Structural Adjustment of their economies.

Based on the idea of the LPA and after more deliberations and with the collaboration of the ECA, the OAU adopted the "Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990" (APPER), at its 21st Ordinary Session in July 1985. Its main priority was the rehabilitation of agriculture. APPER envisaged the spending of $115.9 billion for the implementation of priority projects of which agricultural development accounts for $55 billion. African countries were committed to mobilizing $80.1 billion or 70 per cent of the total cost of the priority programme.
The international community was expected to provide supplementary financing for the balance of $35.8 billion or 30 per cent.\textsuperscript{47}

Although APPER continues to pay lip-service to the LPA, it incorporates what are probably the two most central arguments in the Berg Report. The first is an acknowledgement in APPER that domestic policy errors have contributed to Africa's economic woes,\textsuperscript{48} whereas the LPA place the blame exclusively on historical, structural and external factors. APPER candidly acknowledges that the shortcomings in development policies have been partly responsible for the rapid and continued deterioration in the region's social and economic structures. The programme is, therefore, an unambiguous sign of full commitment on the part of the African leaders to undertake a number of policy measures that will remedy the shortcomings of past approaches.

Secondly, new emphasis has been given to improving the performance of agriculture, whereas this was treated in a perfunctory manner in the LPA, being accorded only eight pages of exhortative and often tautological statements which lacked analysis of the problems experienced. Now the OAU member states have committed themselves to raising the share of agriculture in national public investment to between 20 and 25 per cent by 1989, and have pledged $57,400 million or 44.8 per cent of the total investment under APPER to this sector.\textsuperscript{49} APPER was accepted as the general framework of international assistance to Africa. It turned out to be the heart of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD),\textsuperscript{50} which was adopted after the UN Special Session on the Economic Situation in Africa. But the international community have refused to support both APPER and the UN-PAAERD. They have not contributed the 30 per cent of the amount needed for the priority programmes. On the other hand, the economic
problems are such that the African governments have been unable to
provide for their share, that is, 70 per cent. They have turned their
attentions to the balance of payments problems. Currency devaluations
continued notably in Sierra Leone, Ghana, Tanzania and Nigeria. Most
African countries including Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi and Mauritius
have also demonstrated a capacity for effective structural adjustment.

Self-reliance has already been declared as a national strategy
among countries such as Angola, Benin, Ethiopia and Tanzania. But the
idea of collective self-reliance is yet to gain a real foothold in
Africa. This is because it requires, among other things, positive
policies of good neighbourliness, concentration on economic objectives,
willingness to accept existing country boundaries, tolerance at home
and towards other countries and effective continental organizations.
These conditions are yet to exist in Africa.

African governments are responsible for the actual implementation
of the LPA, with the OAU and ECA overseeing the process. In their
joint report in 1982 (Doc. E/ECA/CM.9/1), the Secretary-General of the
OAU and Executive Secretary of the ECA reviewed the progress towards
implementation for 1980-82 and concluded that their work was hampered
by lack of feedback by African states.

But there is another problem which has affected the LPA. Since
it was endorsed in 1980, the ECA and the OAU have not organized a
conference to publicize the ideas and to provide proper explanation
for the concepts. A review of the LPA is essential especially as it
offers the long-term path to development. Although the OAU member
states reiterate their full commitment to the principles and objectives
of the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos, which are more valid today than
ever before, they admit that these "have neither always been translated
into concrete action nor reflected in national development plans. The reasons, they conclude, lie in either ignorance of the requisites of the LPA and Final Act, or sheer inertia or lack of political will or all three in varying measures. 51

Perhaps the biggest problem of the LPA is the fact that its concepts do not form a consistent and coherent theory of development. Instead, they are a set of principles and strategy which both the OAU and ECA hope that individual states will strive to implement. It does not offer a distinct philosophy as in the case of the ECLA which developed and expounded on the dependency theory. But then, it has to be stated that apart from the ECLA, no other regional economic commission has come up with another distinctive philosophy. The case of the ECLA is therefore a unique one.

There is lack of faith in the prescription of the LPA, in particular the absence of specific short- and medium-term measures to cope with Africa's crisis, as well as the commitment to establish regional integration schemes (and ultimately a continental common market) as the principal mechanism for stimulating self-reliance and industrialization. African governments have every reason to doubt the efficacy of the latter proposal: to date, Common markets have done more to hamper rather than to promote regional co-operation in Africa. 52

5. CONCLUSION

Over the years, the ECA has made valuable contributions to the intellectual debate on African development. It played a pioneering role in the evolution of the ideas, but the role was forced on the ECA because of the failures of the past development strategies and options and the
demand by African governments for a development philosophy which was a true reflection of their socio-economic conditions. Most of the concepts such as self-reliance, self-sustaining economic growth and regional economic co-operation and integration dated back to the 1960s and 1970s. The ECA re-introduced them and they have been incorporated in the LPA.

However, the point has to be made that most African governments prefer to approach the IMF/World Bank than implement the ECA/OAU's Lagos Plan of Action. There are three main reasons for this: First, the ECA/OAU have no money and a way of assisting to implement the LPA. So the IMF triumphs because of the persuasive power of the purse.

Secondly, the depth of the African economic crisis, particularly its manifestations in balance of payments deficits and debt problems has left African governments with little practical alternative but to seek massive assistance from the World Bank and IMF, and to subordinate themselves to the conditions that the two institutions wish to apply to such finance.

And thirdly, the LPA is concerned with long-term development. African leaders are concerned with immediate problems and remedies.

Despite the lack of implementation, the LPA remains an important document in the sense that it re-orientates Africans towards another path to development. It is a regional strategy with its emphasis on African ideals, its use of natural resources and the use of appropriate technology. It also encourages African governments to utilize the human resources which the continent is endowed with. But above all, it is a reminder that the African states are arbiters of their own destiny. Therefore, the responsibility for development lies entirely in their
hands. Herein lies the significance of the LPA.

Meanwhile the plight of the continent continues to be characterized by gloom and despair. African governments were implementing structural adjustment programmes and reforms to arrest the immediate problems such as balance of payments deficits, huge external debts and debt servicing ratios, increases in oil prices and natural disasters such as famine, drought and flooding. On the continental level, the ECA may not have come up with a distinct and coherent philosophy for development, but through ideas such as self-reliance and self-sufficiency in agriculture, it has indicated the options and direction which African governments should consider.
NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 17.


5. Political independence has yet to be gained in Namibia and the Republic of South Africa. With the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia, most of the African states gained their independence in the 1960s. So they are relatively new states when compared to the industrialized nations.


10. Ibid.

11. The countries in Sub-Saharan Africa which are severely affected by famine are: Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti.


14. African policy-makers have accepted that internal policy failures are also to blame and that there must be a change of strategy. The documents adopted at the OAU meeting in July 1985, including the "Declaration on the Economic Situation in Africa", adopted by the 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and


17. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 10.


24. Mr. R.K.A. Gardiner of Ghanaian nationality was in office from 1962 to 1975. He took over from Dr. Mekki Abbas of Sudanese nationality, who was the first Executive Secretary of the ECA from 1958 to 1962. Dr. Abbas died in 1983.

25. This point was made by Mr. Gardiner at the seminar on strategy of development for Africa, held in commemoration of the death of Dag Hammarskjöld (the Secretary-General of the United Nations who was killed in an air crash on 17 September 1961 near Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia)). The seminar was organized by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Sweden, and held in Uppsala, Sweden, 29 August–4 September 1971.


29. Ibid., p. 11.


32. Ibid.

34. The desire to associate the OAU and ECA with the search for rational means of correcting the imbalance of economic development in Africa reflects the spirit of resolution 2962 of the United Nations 27th General Assembly. This resolution called for close co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU in all fields.


39. Ibid., p. 19.

40. Ibid., p. 20.

41. Ibid., p. 35.


1. INTRODUCTION

As has been stated earlier, there are three broad categories of ECA's activities, namely, (a) traditional activities relating to its status as an arm of the UN. These include, data collection and dissemination, pre-feasibility and advisory services; (b) Those relating to its role as a builder of inter-governmental institutions (IGOs). For this the ECA has concentrated on the promotion of regional economic co-operation and integration. In addition to the IGOs, it has also established its subsidiary organ with the aims of extending its activities and network to the subregions; and (c) promotional activities geared towards the formation and sustainment of subregional groupings such as ECOWAS and the River Basin Authorities.

It is on the activities of category (b) that this chapter is concerned, in particular with its establishment of the IGOs. The issues relating to the ECA's subsidiary organs are covered in detail in Part II of this thesis. The ultimate goal of the Commission is the creation of an African Common Market by the year 2000. The creation of IGOs has become one of the major strategies for the attainment of its goal. To date, the Commission has established more than 30 of the IGOs and it maintains that "all its institutions are contributing vigorously to the implementation of the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, namely, the establishment of an African Economic Community by the year 2000". The Commission further argues that "in terms of size and needs of Africa, the number of these institutions
is still grossly insufficient. Hence, the problem is now to determine ways and means of financing their activities so that the burden of financing them by member states can be lightened. But an ECA ad hoc Committee (1984) recommended that "no new institutions should be established until after a comprehensive study of existing ones has been carried out, and that no new institution be allowed to commence operation prior to the signature of the necessary headquarters agreement with the host".

But the ECA is going ahead with its arrangement to set up a PTA in North Africa (1990).

The chapter addresses three broad issues which are:

(a) the reasons for and the ECA's approach to institutional building;
(b) the types and their objectives; and
(c) the ECA's assistance to them and the problems they face.

The aim is to assess its role and whether the institutions are contributing to development in a positive way.

2. THE REASONS FOR AND THE ECA'S APPROACH TO INSTITUTION BUILDING

Regional co-operation is an old and complex phenomenon. There are no acceptable definitions for it but broadly speaking it includes any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet some commonly experienced and expressed needs. The need can be military, political, economic, social, technical or cover a residual public interest. Co-operation and unity for collective betterment have remained at the centre of African International Relations since the 1960s. As an idea and a continental movement Pan-Africanism was
predicated on co-operation and unity. The struggle to develop new patterns of post-colonial, regional co-operative arrangements were all aspects of the move to institutionalize Pan-Africanism. The desire for regional co-operation is vaguely present in all parts of the world, but in particular it is expressed by African states in their dealings in the ECA. The ECA has continued to emphasize the co-operative spirit in the economic sphere in general and through the establishment of institutions.

In establishing the institutions, the peculiar nature of the ECA has been brought to the fore, that is, the fact that it is an arm of the UN. The Commission adopts a paternalistic approach to most of its activities. It works on the basic assumption that whatever it does, it must in a broad sense be good for Africa. It also approaches regional issues in the context of the North-South debate with reference to the demand for a NIEO. Even though it stresses economic co-operation, the Commission has not been specific in terms of areas of concentration. For example, co-operation can be in the following areas - financial, trade, agriculture, industry or communications. Instead, the Commission attempted to spread its activities to cover promotional work for ECOWAS and other IGOs, setting up of the PTA and encouragement of subregional groupings. It has no clear direction in which it is operating. It rather depends on the existence of salient factors which affect and shape co-operative arrangements in Africa, that is the objective arguments that can be advanced in support of them. It is a truism that the same economic problems which plagued African countries in the 1960s prevail in the 1980s with perhaps elements of desperation and severity attached. The problems include, the vulnerability of African commodities to changes in world market prices, external debts, a rate of population growth which exceeds that of productivity, and natural disasters such as flooding,
drought and famine. So regional economic co-operation is still an attractive goal but there is the need to promote it within an established framework. For example, if the states opt for customs union, common market or free trade area, the ECA should then channel resources to such. At the moment the ECA's activities are too loosely organized and not clearly defined. The outcome is that given its limited financial and manpower resources, its impact in institution building is minimal. To start with, very little is known of the 32 inter-governmental institutions it has created (see Table 4.1).

There are two main factors which have provided the interest in, and attractiveness for, the ECA's role in institutional building. The first is the failure of Africa to devise a consistent and coherent philosophy for development which reflect African conditions. This has meant that development by and large is being carried out on a piece-meal basis. Secondly, the structure of most African economies has a wider implication for development. For example, small states have limited development options and most African states are small in population and, therefore, market size. Only six of the 50 states have a population of more than 15 million people, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania and Zaire. 24 number less than 5 million each and 12 have a population of fewer than one million. Moreover, long-term solutions to the special problems of the landlocked, usually poor, states require regional approaches. For states such as Swaziland, Lesotho, Rwanda and Burundi, their economic viability and development will best be met in a regional co-operative arrangement. Both nationally and regionally, development implies an increase in economic co-operation, so that African economies may become more reliant than at present on the abundant natural and human resources they possess. Co-operation, it is believed, will enhance their capacity to adapt to change in the international economic
system: only in this way will African states be able to overcome the limitations imposed on them by smallness of markets, geographical isolation and rigid economic structures.

When the Commission was established, the only existing inter-governmental institutions in Africa were those established by France and Britain in the colonial territories and they were designed to promote the interests of the metropolitan powers. The independent African states had no history of economic co-operation among themselves and were only then beginning to get used to each other as sovereign states. These states faced numerous economic problems. Decolonization did not lead to the expected improvement of the standard of living. The economies inherited from the colonial powers were poor and dependent - characterized by the dominance of subsistent products; fragmented national markets, which made it difficult to establish viable productive units; undeveloped and under-utilized material and human resources; and dependence on ex-colonial metropolitan countries for food, consumer goods and manufactures, technology and technical know-how. It quickly became clear that political independence by itself would not bring about the economic restructuring required for the eradication of the economic problems in the aftermath of colonialism. Therefore, the African elites and governments committed themselves to promote the idea of building a new economic order for the benefit and welfare of the peoples. From the start, the ECA saw economic co-operation as a major and indispensable vehicle for achieving this goal, that is, for the transformation of African economies and societies.

The Commission's very first session laid stress on co-operative action among African countries in practically all economic spheres. The first of its resolutions called upon the secretariat to establish liaison
with all existing IGOs in the continent working in the field of economic and social development. Then resolution 86(v) adopted at its fifth session in 1963 requested the Executive Secretary to "undertake intensive studies on major problems relating to the establishment of an African Common Market, and, having regard to balanced integration of the economic development of the African countries".

The goals of regional co-operation can be achieved through the establishment of economic groupings to create large markets, with the possibility of establishing viable production capacities in industry and the primary sector, increasing the capacity of absorption and adaptation of technology, creating viable transport networks, pooling manpower and financial resources and promoting the exploitation of natural and mineral resources. The ECA responded by arguing that to promote development in a fragmented continent, there was the need to establish institutions to assist African countries collectively to develop the capabilities and infrastructures essential for their economic and social development. The Commission has since been preoccupied with the promotion of regional co-operation. This preoccupation is derived from its mandate which, among other things enjoined the Commission "to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic development of Africa, including its social aspects, with a view to raising the level of economic activity and strengthening the economic relations of countries and territories of Africa both among themselves and with other countries of the world". In effect when it set up the IGOs the ECA was responding to the development needs of the continent and the fact that in the 1960s Africa lacked co-operative institutions.

The first two institutions to be established were the African
Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) and the African Development Bank (ADB). They were to deal with the training of staff indispensable for socio-economic development and the mobilization of capital through concerted efforts. For these and subsequent institutions the ECA justified its actions by pointing out that there was "the need for the creation of institutions which individual countries are too poor to establish and operate on their own, but which are indispensable to the accelerated economic and social development of the African continent through collective self-reliance or which for reasons of nature, scale and optimality are best established at regional level ...." For the ECA, the collective self-reliance approach to development implies a measure of delinking from those components of the international system in which a balanced relationship cannot be established. Its actions aim at reducing dependency on the industrialized countries, providing opportunity to expand productive capacity and to promote self-sustained growth, and, providing the means by which knowledge may be shared in the process of productive or trading activities, scientific works, social research and advanced education.

The IGOs were to promote long-term objectives of development and for those established to serve a particular subregion; the ECA hoped that they would have "a trickle-down effect, beyond the service area, embracing ultimately in one form or another, all states". In other words, the Commission adhered to the principal of universality as the common philosophy and bond of all its IGOs; and this idea is enshrined in their constitutions. But, in practice, there is little evidence that universality has been achieved especially as the IGOs compete with each other as will be illustrated later.
3. CATEGORIES AND OBJECTIVES OF ECA-SPONSORED INSTITUTIONS

In order to understand and distinguish the various IGOs created, we have to consider their classifications and objectives. There are three main types of IGOs established and sponsored by the ECA. In Category I, we have the subsidiary organs of the Commission, namely, the multinational programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs). (There are five MULPOCs in existence in North, Eastern and Southern, Central and West Africa. The MULPOCs are discussed extensively in Chapters 6-9 of this thesis.)

Category II are the ECA-sponsored institutions. These are IGOs established by ECA resolutions. They are conceived, planned and established by the ECA Secretariat under mandates and directions of African states through regional and subregional policy-making organs. Examples include the ADB, AATPO, IDEP and the PTA in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Category III are the ECA/OAU and ECA/United Nations System sponsored institutions. These institutions have the same constitutional relation with the ECA as those in Category II. Although they are established by the resolutions of the ECA, and are part of its work programme, the mandates for their establishment are also derived from the OAU and/or the UN General Assembly or other agencies of the UN System. Examples include the African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT) and the African Centre for Applied Research and Training in Social Development (ACARTSOD).

They are not backed by any ECA resolutions and, therefore, have no constitutional links with the Commission. In some cases, the ECA provided interim secretariat for them until such a time that they were strong enough to have their own secretariats. Examples include the West African Rice Development Agency (WARDA) and the Association of African Central Banks (AACB).
Table 4.1 Classification of ECA-Sponsored Institutions, Dates Established, Geographical Coverage and Functions

[Key:  R is for institutions with regional coverage
       SR is for institutions with subregional coverage]

A. FINANCIAL AND BANKING SERVICES

1. African Development Bank (ADB; established 1963, R). Its function is to contribute to the economic and social development of member states either individually or jointly by promoting the investment of private and public capital.

2. Association of African Central Banks (AACB; 1968; R). To promote co-operation in the monetary, banking and financial spheres in the African region and assist in the formation of guidelines along which agreements among African countries on monetary fields can proceed.

3. African Centre for Monetary Studies (ACMS; 1978; R). This is a subsidiary of the AACB and it acts as its Secretariat.

4. West African Clearing House (WACH; 1975; R). To promote the use of the currencies of the member states for subregional trade and other transactions; bring about economies in the use of foreign reserves; encourage liberalization of trade and promote monetary co-operation.

5. Association of African Tax Administrators (AATA; 1950; R). To promote co-operation in the field of taxation policy, legislation and administration among African countries.

B. EARTH RESOURCES SERVICES

6. Regional Centre for Training in Aerial Surveys (RECTAS; 1972; R). For training, research and advisory services in aerial surveys with particular emphasis on the African environment.

7. Regional Centre for Services in Surveying, Mapping and Remote Sensing (RCSSMRS; 1975; SR). To provide maintenance of surveying, mapping and remote sensing equipments; provide training for nationals of the member states; and provide advisory services.

8. African Remote Sensing Council (ARSC; 1979; R). To harmonized and co-ordinate the policies of remote sensing and to foster the use of remote sensing for the assessment and development of the natural resources of Africa.

.../cont.

10. African Association of Cartography (AAC; 1975; R). Concerned with the promotion and harmonization of cartographic activities within its member states.

11. African Regional Centre for Solar Energy (ARCSE; 1979; R). To aid member states in carrying out research in solar energy, to strengthen existing centres, to encourage co-operation with regard to the practical use of solar energy.


13. Regional Remote Sensing Centre (CRTO; 1977; SR). To receive, process and distribute satellite information and to assist African countries in the utilization of this information for development projects.

C. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICES


15. African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT; 1977; R). To generate increased consciousness of the role of technology in national development; promote development of technology within Africa and bring about a more judicious approach to the acquisition of technology.

16. African Regional Organization for Standardization (ARSO; 1977; R). To promote standardization activities in Africa, elaborate regional standards, promote common protection and human safety and harmonization of views of members in the field of standardization.

17. African Institute for Higher Technical Training and Research (AIHTTR; 1979; R). To assist member states in acquiring and developing adequate technical manpower capability for the transformation of African economies and exploitation of the region's natural resources.

18. Industrial Property Organization for English-Speaking Africa (ESARIPO; 1976; R). For the promotion and development of industrial property laws (relating to patents, industrial designs, trade marks) of member states, assistance to African countries in their acquisition and development of technologies appropriate to their national priorities and establishment of training schemes and common services.

.../cont.
D. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT

19. African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP; 1964; R). To train experts and senior officials engaged in economic development and planning and to undertake social and economic development research in support of training.

20. Regional Institute for Population Studies (RIPS; 1972; R). To provide training courses in population and related fields to persons particularly those of the English-speaking countries of Africa, organize and undertake research on all aspects of population and related fields.

21. Institute de formation et de recherche demographiques (IFORD; 1971; SR). To organize intensive training courses, refresher courses and workshop in population-related fields; undertake research in demographic trends and socio-economic development in Africa and to provide consultancy services on population-related fields.

22. African Centre for Applied Research and Training in Social Development (ACARTSOD; 1977; R). To deal with problems of social development in Africa and to undertake research and training in this field.

23. Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI; 1980; SR). To promote sound management in the public and parastatal enterprises of member states by improving the performance capabilities of administrators and managers at both national and inter-governmental levels through training consultancy services and research.


E. TRADE AND TRANSPORT

25. Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (AATPO; 1977; R). To foster regular flow of information and communication between African countries in trade matters.

26. Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA; 1972; SR). To seek the improvement, co-ordination and standardization of African ports operations, equipment and services.

27. Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA; 1973; SR). To seek the improvement, co-ordinating and standardization of African ports operations, equipment and services.

.../cont.
28. Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African Countries (PTA; 1981; SR). To promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity; to establish a common market as a first step to the creation of an economic community.

29. Federation of African Chambers of Commerce (FACC; not yet a legally constituted institution, but has interim secretariat at ECA; R). To promote activities of national and subregional chambers of commerce and the encouragement of African enterprises and joint ventures.

30. Trans-African Highway Authority (TAHA; 1981; SR). To co-ordinate the planning, improvement, construction, maintenance and efficient use of the Trans-African Highway linking Lagos to Mombasa and its feeder roads.

31. Trans-East African Highway Authority (TEAHA; 1982; SR). To co-ordinate the planning, improvement, construction, maintenance and efficient use of the Trans-East African Highway linking Cairo (Egypt) with Gaborone (Botswana) and its feeder roads.

32. African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC; 1969; R). A consultative body whose purpose is to provide a framework for the discussion of measures for the co-ordination and co-operation of the civil aviation activities of its member states and to promote the co-ordination and orderly development of African air transport.

In all, the ECA has established 32 inter-governmental institutions. Of these 17 are regionally based, while 15 are subregional. The Commission proposed two new institutions. The first was for an African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD). It stated that Africa needed a system of climatological and hydrological watch over the climate-related natural disasters such as drought, floods, cyclones and storms. Regarding the location of ACMAD, only Cairo (Egypt) and Nairobi (Kenya) had the necessary infrastructure on which to build. These two and three other regional meteorological centres (Dakar, Niamey and Oran) were considered in an ECA/WMO study. Although member states have accepted the ACMAD was needed, they have nonetheless expressed concern over the financial implications of establishing it. This concern has slowed down the setting-up of a PTA in North Africa for which
the Commission has obtained consent in principle from member states. The timetable has been drawn up and the PTA will be established in 1990.

4. ECA'S ASSISTANCE TO, AND PROBLEMS FACING, ITS INSTITUTIONS

One major assistance of the Commission to its institutions is that it has continued to act as interim secretariat. Of the 32 institutions, there are seven which are not fully established and for which the ECA is still their interim secretariat. These are: (a) the Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA); (b) the Trans-East African Highway Authority (TEAHA); (c) the Central African Mineral Resources Development Centre (CAMRDC); (d) the African Regional Centre for Solar Energy (ARCSE); (e) the Association of African Tax Administrators (AATA); (f) the Federation of African Chambers of Commerce (FACC); and (g) the Southern African Labour Commission (SALC). There is a danger of the ECA not being able to establish fully-fledged secretariats for them because of the financial demands they make on member states. So far states have not been paying the required subscriptions to existing institutions. Also the ECA has been acting for some over a long period of time. For example, the PMAESA was established in 1973, while the ARCSE came into existence in 1979. When will these two have their own secretariats?

The cost of being an interim secretariat has wider implications for the Commission. It exerts considerable pressure on its limited resources. The officials of the substantive divisions related to the institutions have to prepare and organize the meetings for their policy organs. They are also involved in promotional activities on their
behalf and draws up their annual reports. Finally, the officials have to keep the minutes and records of the meeting of each institution. (In February 1987, when the ECA organized a weekend conference in the holiday resort of Nazareth, Ethiopia, for the executives of its institutions, it gave one first-hand knowledge of the effort and preparation which go with such meetings. The ECA officials remarked that they were always busy organizing meetings and conferences. These left them with little time to handle routine tasks and workloads.\textsuperscript{11}

Still on the ECA's assistance to its institutions, there is a formal relationship existing between them. At the ministerial level the ECA deals with their chief executives directly through the Conference of the Chief Executives of the ECA-sponsored regional and sub-regional institutions, which takes place once a year. The Chief Executives in turn deal with the relevant substantive ECA divisions which have liaison officers to follow up on all matters in respect of the institutions concerned. But the ECA does not always comply with the requests of the Chief Executives. For example, it has failed to work out the staff model and financial regulations of the institutions up till the present. The Chief Executives made the request in 1980 and they asked the Commission to prepare a paper on the subject for submission to their respective governing councils for due consideration. Secondly, there was no agreed common legal administrative, management and audit service to assist all the institutions in the auditing of accounts. The request was made in 1980 as well. There is no evidence in the minutes of the meetings of the Chief Executives to suggest that the ECA has complied with the request. Thirdly, the Commission did not provide a model host government agreement which it could rely upon for establishing the institutions. There seems to be different arrangements each time. Finally, the flow of information between the ECA and the
institutions was slow. The Commission reported that "there were constraints in the form of lack of adequate human and financial resources. These hampered the effectiveness of information activities both at the ECA headquarters level and at that of the Commission's operational arms in the field and other inter-governmental organizations concerned with socio-economic development in Africa". In effect, the activities of the institutions were suffering due to manpower and financial deficiencies in the ECA.

Apart from the ECA's assistance to the institutions, the UNDP is an organization which has provided finance for some of them. It is this assistance which has enabled them to carry out their activities in the light of irregular and non-payment of subscriptions by their members. For such institutions the UNDP has been the main source of funding for the 1982-86 period. (See Table 4.2 overleaf.) The ECA has made presentations to the UNDP requesting continued assistance for the 1987-91 period. The UNDP has yet to respond and renew its commitments.

From the examples above, the assistance offered to the institutions include provision of personnel to service the meetings of their policy organs, promotional activities and acting as the interim secretariat for seven. In addition, the Commission also prepared and submitted the constitutions of all the institutions.

Most of the ECA-sponsored institutions encounter numerous problems. These range from administrative and financial to constitutional ones. We trace these problems to one main source, which is the strategy by which they were established. They were conceived, planned and established on the principle that they were necessary for economic co-operation and good for Africa. They were also established in sectors to which the ECA
Table 4.2: Estimated UNDP Funding for ECA-Sponsored Institutions (1982-1986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>UNDP Inputs (US$)</th>
<th>Approved Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. African Regional Centre for Engineering Design and Manufacturing (ARCEDEM)</td>
<td>1,051,057</td>
<td>Approved up to April 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. African Regional Organization for Standardization</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. African Regional Centre for Services in Surveying, Mapping and Remote Sensing (RCSSMRS)</td>
<td>92,750</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP)</td>
<td>1,401,746</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT)</td>
<td>106,704</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,051,357</strong></td>
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accorded priority on the basis of their usefulness to African states. Once the Commission has done the necessary studies and preparation of the constitutions, it then approaches the states for their consent on the establishing and terms of reference of each proposed new institution. The ECA persuades them to endorse the resolutions and urges them to sign the respective constitutions and protocols. By so doing, the ECA attempted to impose them on the states because it was not the latter who made the move for the institutions. And another major fault is that there is no master-plan for the establishment of the institutions. The cumulative
effect of these is that the institutions have been established in a haphazard manner. The other problem is that African states are wary of institutions created to foster inter-state co-operation because there are too many of them in existence already. So when it comes to payment of subscriptions and signing of constitutions, the states opt for those they think are necessary and in conformity with their own development priorities. In an era of limited foreign exchange earnings, the issue of choice becomes paramount. The ECA has defended its position by stating that there was nothing wrong with the institutions as such; what was wrong was the lack of political, financial and other material support of the very countries that had clamoured for their establishment. The statement also reveals the conflict of interests between the Commission and the member states. While the former argues that the states clamoured for their establishment, the latter have argued that there are far too many of the institutions. They have not perceived them as necessary and so have hesitated to join and pay subscriptions. In circumstances where the states share the ECA's perception of need with anticipated real benefits, they have not only agreed to their establishment in principle, but also gone on to support them financially and otherwise. This applies to institutions such as ADB, IDEP and ACMS.

The problem is not only related to the strategy the ECA has adopted but also to the ineffective way it has set out to promote their activities. In short, the states are not fully aware of the potential and activities of some of the institutions. To quote from the final report of the 10-member state Ad hoc Committee (Doc. E/EC/CM.II/17/Add.I): "If African countries set up multinational institutions, it is incumbent on them to make use of them. More often than not, it is the case that African countries do not seem to be aware of the institutions which have been established and seek help from foreign institutions which lure them by
supplying so-called experts free of charge.¹⁴ The quotation reveals that there is no awareness of the existence of such institutions as ESAMI and RECTAS which provide training facilities and that African states have an alternative in services rendered by non-African organizations on a free of charge basis. Such organizations include UNIDO, UNDP and UNESCO. Also if states are not aware of what is on offer by the ECA, they can neither accede nor pay their subscriptions. And so long as services are rendered free of charge, the attractiveness of ECA-sponsored institutions will be reduced.

The relevance of some institutions, such as ADB and IDEP, is not in question: they are designed to overcome genuine deficiencies, for example, in trained manpower, information dissemination and research in the economic and social sectors. The issue to be addressed is the problems arising from the proliferation of institutions. There are too many performing similar or interrelated functions and the question is whether the same results could not be achieved at less cost if their activities were better co-ordinated.

Another problem relating to the ECA's strategy has to do with the lack of focus for the institutions. The objectives of some (of the institutions) are so vague that in the wider context of their role in development it is difficult to determine their contribution. For example, the Central African Mineral Resources Development Centre (CAMRDC) was established in 1981 to provide advisory, operational and laboratory services, guidance and execution of mineral projects and training on the job. There is no mention of the type of mineral resources nor an indication as to whether the projects are designed by the states or the ECA. We know that they are instruments for promoting economic co-operation, but their ultimate goals and targets are neither very clear nor precise.
More distressing is the fact that their activities are not integrated. Each operates independent of the others even when they have similar functions. For example, the ARCEDEM, ARCT and the AIHTTR have similar objectives but their activities are neither co-ordinated nor rationalized. The consequence of non-integration of activities is that they compete directly with each other for functions and funding. For example, both the African Association of Cartography (AAC) and the African Remote Sensing Council (ARSC) have similar functions and operate in the general field of cartography. Also the AATPO and WACH share similar functions.

Apart from competition and duplication of efforts, the ECA also established the practice of creating separate institutions for the English-speaking and French-speaking countries. This is another source of problems for member states. Examples of this action is the Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Centre (ESAMRDC) and its counterpart in Central Africa - CAMRDC; the Regional Institution for Population Studies (RIPS) and the Institute de formation etude recherche demographiques (IFORD). The implication is that one institution cannot cater for all countries in Africa. The Ad hoc Committee is in favour of having one Secretariat for all the states as a way of rationalizing their activities and cutting down on costs.

The Commission's claim that its institutions were "mutually complementary in their aims and activities and should therefore help in each other's development," is an understatement. It further defends its actions by stating that "African states rejected a proposal to disband one of its institutions which was not enjoying adequate political and financial support of African governments".

This sounds like a propaganda exercise as it failed to mention the
name of the institution. The evidence points to competition, duplication of functions, inconsistency, fragmentation and great difficulties in paying assessed contributions. These factors have rendered the institutions ineffective. The problems that the foregoing pose have been recognized, particularly in West Africa where the countries have requested the ECA to prepare a study and proposals for strengthening economic co-operation which would assist in harmonizing the activities of the over 32 inter-governmental organizations operating there. Although the institutions in question are not ECA-sponsored ones, they nevertheless present the same problems to development. It is therefore worth mentioning the findings of the study team set up by the ECA in 1988 in response to the request. The team was headed by Dr. O. Adewoye, Reader in History at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

It concluded that the more than 30 economic co-operation and integration arrangements in West Africa, taken individually as well as collectively, have not contributed as much as was expected to development in the subregion. They stated that "there has been no major breakthrough in terms of a common, well-articulated programme of economic integration or even an effective machinery for its realization. Consequently, the impact of the IGOs on the development of the countries of the subregion has been marginal. West African countries are still basically poor." The team found that the most fundamental obstacle to economic integration was the fact that West African states have not genuinely accepted it as the only viable weapon for fighting poverty and economic dependence. This is illustrated by the failure of governments to implement decisions commonly arrived at in matters of economic co-operation and the failure to meet their financial obligations to the IGOs. More important, and in conformity with the central argument in this chapter, is the fact that the team considered the multiplicity of
IGOs as another obstacle to economic integration. They have overlapping membership; their objectives and integration strategies vary but "in the absence of any serious effort at ensuring that they work in harmony, they represent a considerable dissipation of energy. As they are now, they constitute multiplicity of wheels of co-operation and not a composite machinery with every part having a definite task to fulfil.\textsuperscript{19} ECOWAS will serve as the Secretariat of all the institutions while the ECA MULPOC for West Africa based in Niamey, Niger, will assist in the planning and execution of projects. They also strongly recommend the merging of institutions with similar functions such as the two research arms of the Inter-State Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel, that is, the Institute du Sahel in Bamako, Mali, and the Regional Agro-Meteorological and Hydrological Centre (AGRHMET) in Niamey, Niger Republic. But the study has led to no change. The report has ended upon shelves of government and at the ECA. The officials of the latter were quick to point out that the issue of closing down institutions has acquired political connotations. States which play host to such institutions are not prepared for closures because of job opportunities and the prestige to the governments.\textsuperscript{20} The problems highlighted by the study were similar to those affecting the ECA-sponsored institutions.

The question of lack of finance and membership of ECA institutions are both interrelated and acute. Apart from the ADB, ACMS, AACB and the WACH, the rest of the institutions suffer from lack of financial support from member states, several of whom fail to pay their subscriptions or, if they do, pay it so irregularly as to adversely affect the running and development of the institutions. This in turn militates against the mobilization of assistance from donor agencies and countries which only support viable institutions. Also several do not have the
full complement of membership. In many cases, institutions of sub-regional coverage have only about half the number of African countries as members. For example, since its inception, the Regional Centre for Training in Aerial Surveys (RECTAS), established in Ile-Ife, Nigeria, in 1972, has had only four West African member states, Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. Its potential membership is the 16 countries of West Africa. The ECA reported that the RECTAS has not had sufficient funds to undertake any curriculum or physical development. The Sister Centre for Services in Surveying, Mapping and Remote Sensing (RCSSMRS) in Nairobi, Kenya, has also suffered the same fate. Of the 18 Eastern and Southern African countries which are supposed to constitute its membership only five countries, namely, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia and Malawi, were members. Malawi expressed its intention of leaving the Centre by the end of January 1980, although the records show that at present she is still a member.

The situation is no better with the regionally-based institutions. For example, the African Remote Sensing Council (ARSC), established in 1979, has only 14 members out of a potential membership of 50. The net effect of the financial and membership problems is the growth of the institutions is limited, disillusionment sets in and the collective self-reliance of African countries is undermined.

An examination of the financial situation of the ECA institutions reveals that non-payment of subscriptions has resulted in arrears of outstanding debts for members. The budgets of 11 of the institutions were as shown in Table 4.3.

The lack of finance is borne out by the arrears indicated for each institution listed overleaf. The same problem goes for almost all of the ECA's institutions. But the solutions proposed by the ECA for this
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>AATA (up to February 1984) (US$)</td>
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<td>Assessed Contributions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Amount paid</td>
<td>73,487 (slightly above 50%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arrears</td>
<td>73,213</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>RECTAS (budget 1973/74 to 1983/84) (US$)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Expected contributions from members</td>
<td>4,601,958</td>
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<td>Amount paid</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arrears</td>
<td>1,271,597</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>RCSSMRS (budget 1975/76 to 1982/83) (US$)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Contributions expected from members</td>
<td>8,516,445</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Amount paid</td>
<td>4,448,685</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arrears</td>
<td>4,067,760</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>ESAMRDC (budget 1978/79 to 1984/85) (US$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessed contributions from members</td>
<td>2,131,660</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Actual payments</td>
<td>1,115,183</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arrears as of December 1984</td>
<td>1,016,487</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>ARCS (1985 budget)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operational budget estimated at $1,563,050. Gabon is the only member state which has made contribution of $11,123.46. (It is one of the institutions for which the ECA is acting as an interim government and is regionally based.)</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>CRTO (budget 1981 to 1984) (CFA Franc)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessed contributions</td>
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<td>Amount paid</td>
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<td>Arrears</td>
<td>700,967,154</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>ARCT (budget 1978 to 1984) (US$)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contributions expected</td>
<td>7,374,251</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Amount paid</td>
<td>1,864,937</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arrears</td>
<td>5,507,314</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>ARSO (budget 1978 to 1983) (US$)</td>
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<td>Contributions expected</td>
<td>1,491,000.00</td>
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<td>Amount paid</td>
<td>979,032.95</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arrears</td>
<td>511,967.05</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>IDEP (budget by end of 1983) (US$)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Contributions expected</td>
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<td>Amount paid</td>
<td>- 832,854.11</td>
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<td>Arrears</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>IFORD (budget 1982 to 1984) (CFA Franc)</td>
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<td>Contributions expected</td>
<td>287,500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount paid</td>
<td>76,966,687</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrears</td>
<td>210,534,313</td>
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|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 11. | AATPO | The arrears for the years 1975 to 1982 are as follows: (US$) |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|   | 1975-1977 | 109,562.59 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|   | 1978-1979 | 251,255.93 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|   | 1980-1981 | 296,859.01 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|   | 1982 | 359,058.26 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|   | Total | US$ 1,016,735.79 |   |   |   |   |   |   |

Source: Compiled from Profile of ECA- and OAU-sponsored institutions including their financial standing, Doc. E/ECA/CM.II/17/ADD.2, ECA, Addis Ababa, 11 March 1985, pp. 5-55.
and other related problems discussed so far are unrealistic. According to the Commission, "what is required is some method of ensuring that such institutions achieve full membership and that sufficient funds are available to them to ensure their effective and efficient functioning". But this cannot be achieved given their numbers, particularly as in many cases states are not aware of their existence. Even the ECA apparently accepts this diagnosis: "strange as it may seem, except for such prestigious institutions as ADB and IDEP, very little is known outside the limited circle of ministers and senior civil servants immediately concerned with the institutions sponsored by the secretariat, about those institutions, the progress they are making in implementing their objectives and the way in which they can contribute to the economic and social development of African countries." 

Even if the countries were aware they would still not be in a position to pay subscriptions because of the sheer number in existence and scarcity of foreign exchange. The solution therefore to the problems facing the institutions has to be drastic and at the same time rational. In 1980, the chief executives of the IGOs discussed the various problems and requested a review of their activities.

The ECA constituted an Ad hoc Committee in 1984 to conduct the review. In 1985 the Committee recommended that: (1) there should be better co-ordination or integration of the activities of institutions with similar or overlapping interests; (2) that careful review should be made as to the possibility of integrating the activities of those institutions temporarily located within the ECA secretariat with those of existing ones; (3) that one institution such as the ECA should collect the contributions due from members to all the IGOs sponsored by it, except the ADB, AACB and WACH, and pay them over promptly to
the respective institutions; (4) that it was essential to demonstrate
to African countries how they stand to gain by being members; (5) that
membership of the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute
(ESAMI) and the Industrial Property Organization for English-speaking
Africa (ESARIPO) should be open to all African member states, so that
their full potential could be more fully utilized; (6) that in selecting
chief executives of the institutions, the qualities of leadership and
competence rather than political considerations should be the paramount
elements to be taken into account; (7) that no new institutions should
be established unless it is absolutely necessary.26

The ECA has been slow in implementing the recommendations. However,
it has acted on one aspect, which concerned the merging of the ARSC and
the AAC - the two institutions were performing complementary roles of
co-ordinating the cartographic and remote sensing activities. The ECA
convened a meeting in February 1988, where the participants adopted an
agenda which included the signing of the constitution of the organization;
consideration of its budget for 1988 and the appointment of the Secretary
General of the 'new' organization. Algeria was recommended to host the
organization. Dr. Chedly Fezzani was appointed Secretary General and
the merged organization will be known as the African Organization for
Cartography and Remote Sensing (AOCRS). The next meeting is scheduled
for 1989 when matters relating to the AOCRS will be finalized. (The actual
date for the meeting has not yet been decided.)

5. CONCLUSION

The ECA has attempted to establish itself as a major continental
institution builder. It has set up more than 30 inter-governmental
organizations as instruments for the promotion of economic co-operation.
But increasingly they have become obstacles to development in general and economic co-operation in particular because they are too many and their activities overlap in some cases. For example, the ARCEDM, the ARCT and the AIHTTR which operate in similar areas of technology design and technical manpower training - the result is duplication of efforts. Also members have refused to accede to most of the institutions and those who have done so, have refused to pay their subscriptions. The result is arrears of outstanding debts. But most important of all is the fact that African states are not aware of their existence and that they also face competition from foreign institutions offering training facilities, free of charge.

Most of the problems encountered by the institutions can be traced to the approach and strategy adopted by the ECA to set them up. There is no integrated or master plan. The ECA has failed to tackle the problems of the IGOs relating to co-ordination, inadequate financing, lack of membership and duplication of efforts. It has largely ignored the recommendation of the Ad hoc Committee (1984) that no new institution should be established unless it was absolutely necessary by going ahead with its plan to establish a PTA in North Africa in 1990. The countries are not yet ready for the PTA especially with the political conflicts stemming from the Western Sahara dispute and issues raised by the Camp David agreement 1979. Most of the states belong to the Arab League and are hostile to Israel, for example. Secondly, there is no formal relation between the states at the ministerial level, so it is difficult to see how negotiations will be conducted. Finally, most of the countries trade with the West and there is little trade between them. Therefore, there is the absence of previous experiences and institutional framework for co-operation in trade, for instance.
The ECA was so deeply committed to the quest for economic integration but was somewhat intolerant of nationally-based regional initiatives, such as the East African Community in the 1960s and SADCC in the 1980s. The latter cross-cut the subregions defined by the ECA and is far from the standard PTA and common market theoretical model sequence. (The Lusaka MULPOC does not deal directly with SADCC.)

Due to its leadership, economic and technical emphasis, the Commission has not given adequate attention to the need to involve states more fully in designing their subregional groupings. The ECA designs the protocol, treaties and institutional structures of the institutions. The result is that the states do not identify with the latter. For these reasons, the role of the ECA as an institution builder has largely been unsuccessful.
NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 151.

3. See Report of the Ad hoc Committee established by Resolution 477 of the ECA Conference of Ministers, Doc. E/ECA/CM.10/10/Add.1, Addis Ababa, February 1984, p. 10. The Ad hoc Committee was established to evaluate the multinational institutions established under the aegis of the ECA and the OAU and to make proposals concerning their continued usefulness and effectiveness. The Committee was to find ways in which their activities can be better rationalized, co-ordinated and integrated. It was composed of Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Zaire and Zambia, with Nigeria - Chairman - and Guinea - Vice-Chairman.


5. Final Report of the Monrovia Symposium on the Future Development Prospects of Africa towards the Year 2000, Monrovia (Liberia), OAU, Addis Ababa, 12-16 February 1979, p. 27. This is one of the conclusions of the symposium.


16. Ibid., p. 55.


19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.

23. These are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire.


25. Ibid., p. 56.

CHAPTER 5
THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE ECA TO THE SUBREGIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s and 1970s, the ECA made two major attempts to de­
centralize to the subregions. Its main objective was to promote the
establishment of regional economic groupings which would eventually
lead to the creation of an African Common Market. This has remained
the central intention and emphasis of its activities since its inception.
However, it has to be stated that the two attempts failed because of
the discrepancy between stated intentions and actual practice. The sub­
regional organs established were ill-equipped to perform and they faced
serious structural problems such as spoor administration, limited funds,
inadequate manpower and the fact that they did not implement real pro­
grames.

Even more important was the fact that the ECA failed to decentralize
in terms of allowing the subregional organs to have autonomy in finance,
management, formulation and implementation of programmes. The headquarters
was in complete control of the major aspects of the organs. On the other
hand, member states continued to demand a positive image and role for
the subregional organs, as depicted in 1987 by the request of the West
African states that there should be a review of the scope and objective
of the Niamey MULPOC. The MULPOCs celebrated their tenth anniversary in
1987 without any hint from the ECA that their objectives, structure and
activities would be reviewed. In their present form they are inactive
and act as obstacles to development. This chapter seeks to examine why
this is the case. It starts by looking at the reasons for decentralization,
followed by the phases and problems encountered by the process.

2. **REASONS FOR DECENTRALIZATION**

Decentralization is identified primarily with the United Nations operational programmes. These are considered as activities undertaken with the object of sustaining or enhancing economic and social well-being. The activities generally involve the transfer of resources to developing countries. It is useful to distinguish between those operational activities of a co-operative character that seek to mobilize or increase the potential for development and increase the capabilities of countries to promote economic and social developments, and those for which the purpose is immediate sustenance, that is, activities of an emergency character. The former may be grouped into four broad categories: (a) capital assistance made available in the form of grants and loans with the intention of contributing to the financing of a capital scheme; (b) commodity assistance, including the supply of food aid; (c) technical co-operation; and (d) external finance provided on a non-project basis to support the overall development efforts of the recipient countries, for example, budgetary and balance of payments support. The ECA's efforts to decentralize are more related to technical assistance to states in the subregions than to the other categories.

Decentralization involves the removing of authority, activities and responsibility for making decisions, either *in parte* or *in toto*, from a single centre and distributing them. It embodies an examination of the ways and means of providing capabilities to the subregional offices (in terms of financial, manpower and monitoring resources) to execute programmes and projects. The idea of decentralization of the UN system
was that a greater degree of authority and responsibility should be
delegated to regional and country levels and that regional co-ordination
of activities should be strengthened. Decentralization is proposed
at two levels - one from the UN headquarters in New York to the secre­
tariats of the regional commissions with the other from the headquarters
of the latter to the subregions. In both cases the reference is to
administrative decentralization. By implication the ECA handled aspects
of both forms of decentralization and instead of strengthening its
position, the exercises were not fully understood and implemented.

Since the 1960s, the members of the UN system have demanded de­
centralization. The legislative basis for decentralization from UN
headquarters to the regional commission was set by ECOSOC resolution
793(XXX) of August 1960, which urged a change in emphasis from head­
quartes work to fieldwork, utilization of regional commission services
to plan and execute development programmes. Resolution 32/197 adopted
by the General Assembly on 20 December 1977, now commonly known as the
'restructuring resolution' constituted a step taken to define the roles
and functioning of the regional economic commissions within the United
Nations development system. It was intended to make the UN system more
fully capable of dealing with problems of international economic co­
operation and development in a comprehensive and effective manner.
Together with resolution 33/202 of 27 January, 1979 by which the commis­
sions were accorded executing agency status in their own right, the
'restructuring resolution' redefines their roles by providing about nine
guidelines. Although this chapter is not about these aspects of
decentralization, it is necessary to mention some of the guidelines
because they made the exercise more complex for the ECA. The ECA was
trying to cope with the decentralization from UN headquarters and at
the same time from its own headquarters in Addis Ababa. The 'restructuring
resolution' stipulated that the regional economic commissions exhibit team leadership and have the responsibility for co-ordination and co-operation at the regional level. The ECA is involved with building institutions for regional co-operation and it plays an advisory role in Africa, but it is not yet regarded as the team leader. It shares responsibility in promoting development with the OAU. In fact, without the consent of the OAU, it cannot carry out its programmes. It is also ineffective in implementing its programmes and various UN system officials were still sceptical that the ECA could serve as team leader without increased capabilities and improved operating performance.²

Another point made by the 'restructuring resolution' was that the regional economic commissions should provide inputs to the UN global policy organs through its regional strategies and contribute to special sessions and conferences. The ECA had been very active in this regard especially with its submission to the special session on the African economic crisis in 1986 but the inputs do not have much impact on global deliberations relative to the considerable time and effort required to prepare them. Also the executive secretaries do not participate in the ACC machinery whose activities have great implications on development co-operation at the regional level. They do not appear regularly before the Second and Fifth Committees of the General Assembly or the CPC.

The regional commissions are also urged to adopt a common definition of regions and subregions and identical location of offices. UN system regional and subregional offices in Africa were in 14 different cities and only the ILO's regional office was co-located with the ECA and OAU in Addis Ababa. The situation has not changed and a common definition of regions and subregions has not been achieved by either the ECA or any other regional economic commission. In 1979 they were given the
status of executing agency for projects of other UN agencies. For this
the ECA has had a close relationship with the UNDP. It executed the
latter’s projects to the tune of US$ 22 million in the 1978-81 period,3
but it still has to deal with managerial, personnel and subregional
office problems. The ECA has not been too successful in implementing
aspects of decentralization from UN headquarters to its secretariat.
Nonetheless, the attempt to carry them out became more complicated
because African governments were also requesting that the ECA should
in turn decentralize to the subregions. In fact, since the 1960s the
member states have supported both types of decentralization. Why was
this so? The demands made on the ECA were part of the demands made on
the UN system as a whole. As demands grew for New York to decentralize,
they trickled-down to the regional commissions and the specialized
agencies.

The ECA itself also favoured decentralization so far as it would
strengthen it and hence the authority within the UN system of those
persons most sympathetic to the developing regions and in the best
position to analyze and prescribe for their problems.4 There was also
a strong argument in favour of concerted regional and subregional attacks
on development problems. Planning, supervision and provision of services
can be better developed in the light of specific requirements of the
area served, hence a general endorsement of subregional offices of both
the regional commissions and the specialized agencies. Theoretically,
the subregional offices were viewed as units catering for the local needs
and for dealing with practical problems. They would implement projects
within the framework of the overall programmes approved for the regional
level. They were also expected to give feedback information to the
regional headquarters of the specialized agencies and commissions to
enable them to deal appropriately with the problems. In some regions,
such as Africa, it has been found necessary to decentralize because of its vastness and for other reasons, including uneven market economies, lack of communication links and infrastructures. The intention in such instances was to bring the commissions' activities closer to the problems of the countries of the subregions concerned. According to the Joint Inspection Unit Report 1975, "their purpose is to bring the work of the commissions closer to the realities and the needs of the subregions they cover".

In the replies of governments to the Secretary-General's questionnaire for the study on regional structures in the early 1970s, some governments suggested that the present regional arrangements and structures of the UN and its subsidiary organs, and of the specialized agencies, responded to needs which, in most cases, were no longer relevant to current circumstances, since they had been devised to meet much more modest needs than those which had led to the gradual establishment of the whole complex structure of the UN over the years. The activities of the UN system, according to some of the governments, "had not always kept pace with the various countries' needs". African governments re-echoed this argument through the main inter-governmental organ of the ECA in 1979. At the fifth conference of Ministers of the ECA held in Rabat, Morocco, in March 1979, resolution 255(VIV) was passed recommending that the Executive Secretary should, in the overall interest of the Commission, decentralize the operational activities and resources of the Commission to the Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs). These are subsidiary organs of the ECA designed to carry out its operational activities. Member states argued that an improved organization of the ECA secretariat with the objective of being more responsive in meeting the needs of the African region, as well as providing the basis for more effective and efficient performance, was a necessity.
Apart from this, the states were also making other kinds of demand which boosted the need for decentralization. In 1988 the ECA celebrated its thirtieth anniversary amidst increasing demands from its member states for it to formulate and implement concrete and realistic programmes which gave value for money. Flt. Lt. Jerry J. Rawlings stated that it should use its expertise and invaluable data to advance action-oriented proposals within the framework of a well-defined analysis of and strategy of development based on African needs and interests. For ECA programmes, P.S. Mmusi, Vice-President of Botswana, urged that it should establish clear priorities and warned that "an all or nothing approach will merely add to our underachievement".

The Executive Secretary pointed out that it was evident from the debate at the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly during its fortieth session that member states were more and more asking for value for money. The combination of these demands, the pressures for structural changes in the UN system, the climatic, ecological and economic reasons were responsible for the ECA's move to decentralize. However, the approach it adopted seemed to have reflected mainly the economic arguments for decentralization. The Commission responded to the vastness of the continent and the fact that national markets were small and fragmented, with human and material resources under-utilized. It therefore became imperative that one of its primary objectives was to create larger markets where economic activities could be profitably carried out because of the enormous potential for economies of scale. It was in this vein that the ECA proceeded to create subregional economic units which would be the prelude for the establishment of regional integration - a theme which became the cornerstone of its activities. Accordingly it set up the subregional offices as its first step towards decentralization.
3. **PHASES OF DECENTRALIZATION**

a. **The Subregional Offices**

The theme of economic co-operation was both part of the decentralization efforts and part of the wider context of Pan-Africanism which adopted as an ideal for African relations with the West. From the Pan-African perspective, the states talked about the need to create an African Council for Economic Co-operation, the establishment of a joint African Development Bank and an African Commercial Bank. They called for the formation of an African Common Market, an African Payment Union and an African Bank for Economic Development. The common theme was the call for continentally based economic co-operation. But the attainment of economic co-operation based on this approach met with little success due to factors such as the absence of transport and communication links, differential needs of each state and the subregions, the complexity of socio-economic problems following independence, the vastness of the continent and differential political ideologies. The ECA was well aware of these factors and they forced it to reconsider its approach. Rather than go for a continentally-based approach, it opted for a more realistic one. At its third session, it adopted resolution 23(III) which stated that the best immediate practical approach to overcoming obstacles to regional economic co-operation was to make provision for dealing with "economic problems peculiar to the subregions". Thereafter, integration at the subregional levels became the key element of the ECA's development strategy. Based on geographical factors, economic and political conditions which existed in the 1960s, the ECA, with the consent of member states divided the continent into four subregions, namely, Eastern and Southern, Central,
North and West Africa. In accordance with the division, four sub-regional offices were established in Niamey (Niger) in 1963, Tangier (Morocco) 1963, Lusaka (Zambia) 1964, Kinshasa (Congo, now Zaire) 1965. The division relied on the cultural links between the states, the common history and boundaries. It enabled the states to think of themselves as operating in the same area and sharing similar problems. The states also understood that the best way out of their economic and political predicament was to work together. Also the ECA by the division was relying on the existence of some form of on-going inter-state organizations in the subregions which might provide the nucleus for grouping together the larger number of states into a still more viable economic unit. The earlier steps taken on economic co-operation consisted of the reconstruction of arrangements which were inherited from the colonial period. For example, the defunct East African Community was rebuilt to stress the fact that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were independent states rather than colonies whose trade and economic policies were determined by a metropolitan power. The common market which France built up in its colonies in West and Central Africa were also given new institutional forms and a re-defined content.

The subregional offices were to (a) provide liaison between the ECA headquarters and the governments in the subregions; (b) provide the headquarters with direct information on the needs and problems of each subregion through the collection of statistical and other information and research; (c) provide advisory services requested by governments; (d) the organization of training courses and seminars; (e) co-ordinate development and trade policies and provide a centre for consultation with the briefing of government officials, visiting missions, regional advisers and technical assistance experts. The ECO at the headquarters was responsible for co-ordinating their activities and the offices
were funded through the regular budget of the ECA. Their directors were the representatives of the Executive Secretary. So in theory, the subregional offices were supposed to do for the subregions what the headquarters were doing at the continental level. The activities scheduled for them conformed to the traditional role of the ECA as an arm of the UN, that is, amongst other things, information gathering and dissemination, providing a forum for exchange of ideas and advisory services. The activities formed the basis of accusations and criticisms of the Commission especially as member states saw it as a research-oriented body. Even when the offices were created, the ECA had not responded to such criticism because they were mirrored images of the headquarters. There was no indication in their terms of reference that they were supposed to implement actual projects in each area. Moreover, they lacked organs for formulation, monitoring and implementation of such programmes. While the subregional offices continued to offer technical assistance and other services short of concrete projects, member states turned their attention to the formation of economic groupings and a pattern of behaviour developed towards the ECA. The practice was for the states to seek the ECA's advice and request surveys and feasibility studies, where applicable, for the creation of the economic groupings.

Once established the states tended to concentrate on the activities of the groupings rather than those of the subregional offices. This was the case with the establishment of the Union Douanière et Économique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) in 1966. In North Africa, the Maghreb Standing Consultative Committee was more effective for the states and their activities within it overshadowed that of the Tangier subregional offices. In some cases, member states initiated and established the economic groups independent of the ECA's initiatives. Two examples
were the Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) and the Mano River Union (MRU), both established in 1973.

The problems of the subregional offices were compounded by the fact that they lacked coherent work programmes. Indeed, they had no work programmes of any kind. Structurally, the offices were handicapped because the headquarters failed to give them distinctive roles in each area. The headquarters, while bowing to demands for decentralization, failed to consider its full implication. If, for instance, the object of the exercise was to bring the work of the secretariat closer to the subregional governments, how come the subregional offices had no formal inter-governmental organ to allow for the interaction of the representatives with its officials? In terms of manpower resources, the activities of the offices were organized and controlled by a relatively small number of staff sent from headquarters. Throughout their existence the headquarters only provided skeleton staff for them. The secretariat explained that budgetary limitations had prevented the posting of more ECA staff members to the subregional offices, so the few officials sent there spent long periods.\(^{14}\) Table 5.1 confirms that very few persons were sent to all the subregional offices.

For the period 1966-75, only Kinshasa and Tangier subregional offices had directors. The secretariat relied on the senior officers and general service staff to run the Lusaka and Niamey offices. There were far more general service staff than the professionals in all the offices. A similar composition was repeated for the 1968-71 period (see Table 5.2). If the subregional offices were there to emphasise fieldwork and closeness to the problems of the subregions, it became imperative that the secretariat needed professionals to run the offices instead of the skeleton staff. But for the period 1966-71 the subregional
Table 5.1  Staff Resources 1966-1978

Subregional offices

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<th>P-3</th>
<th>P-2/</th>
<th>G.S</th>
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Key

D-1 is the head of the subregion (director). He is responsible for the overall functioning of the office and the representative of the Executive Secretary.

P-5 to P-1 are the senior officers and the economic affairs officers who undertake studies and research. They assist the director in the management of the office and are the technocrats.

G.S These are staff recruited locally. They are made up of administrative officers and their assistants, secretaries, telephonists, clerical officers, drivers, cleaners and messengers.
Table 5.2 Staff Resources 1968-1971

Subregional offices

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<tr>
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Note: This table has the same key as Table 5.1.

offices had fewer professionals. However in 1971-75 the ECA increased their number - for the actual composition see Table 5.3. But even with the improved situation there were far too many countries in each sub-region: with the complexity of their socio-economic situations, it is rather difficult to see how the few professionals could have handled the situation efficiently. On the whole, the subregional offices were ineffective due to lack of manpower resources and all the other problems mentioned so far. They were not properly equipped for specific roles in integration and development. The decision to have them was logical and due to pressures from member states, but their abilities were not enhanced by appropriate decentralization of functions, such as entrusting
### Table 5.3 Organizational Chart of Sub-Regional Offices of ECA 1971-1975

#### Kinshasa (Central Africa)

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<td>Manpower training &amp; development specialist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Associate economic affairs officer</td>
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* Including 2 General Services staff for Documentation Centre (or Library)

them with specific tasks and giving them some form of autonomy and perhaps authority. Instead, they were treated as extensions of the secretariat especially with no inter-governmental organs to promote interaction with the respective governments.

The failure of the offices led to even more demands for decentralization and the states continued to express their dissatisfaction at their inactivity. Acting on a decision made during the ninth session of the ECA in 1969, the delegates agreed that the structure of the four subregional offices be re-examined with a view to making them effective and operational. They wanted them to be more effective and suggested that they should be equipped with adequate staff and financial resources which should relate to the functions to be carried out. The states also wanted a strengthening of the General Service Staff as well as the provision of a well-organized documentation centre for briefing of experts and for making information readily available to the secretariats of the subregional offices and other economic groupings. There was the great need to demonstrate in a more practical sense that the ECA seriously intends to provide concrete solutions to the problems of Africa since it operated within the continent. The demand for decentralization was not intended to imply that all UN activities or indeed that of the ECA should be decentralized. What was eventually proposed by the Executive Committee of the ECA was that the latter should consider aspects that it felt the subregional offices were more competent to deal with by virtue of their accumulated knowledge and experience in certain activities, as well as its familiarity with the socio-economic problems in the continent.

The pressures for more effective subregional offices coincided with demands for a development philosophy which reflected the true
position of African economies. The ECA continued to stress the vitality of regional co-operation, a theme which echoed the revival of the commitment of African economic development through collective action as stated in the resolutions and declaration adopted by the OAU and ECA. The African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence adopted by the African Heads of State and Government in 1973 stressed the importance attached by African countries to collective self-reliance and provided the framework for sectoral, subregional and regional economic co-operation. The ECA took up this when it formulated its strategy for the sixth and seventh special sessions of the General Assembly held in 1974 and 1975, respectively.

Although member states shared the general thrust of the ECA strategy, they really wanted the practical application of the idea. They continued to argue that the ECA should have a more positive role in development through the implementation of relevant projects. The demand was made through the policy organs of the secretariat and in the General Assembly of the UN. The latter responded by establishing the United Nations Inter-disciplinary Development and Advisory Teams (UNDATs). The UNDATs were in response to resolution 2563(XXIV) of the General Assembly of 13 December 1969, which requested the Secretary-General and the executive secretaries of the Commission to intensify their efforts to meet the requirements of the member states in development planning, public administration and management, especially by organizing continuous advisory services. They were established under the auspices of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with the collaboration of UN specialized agencies, such as UNDP, UNCTAD and UNIDO. But in a move by African governments in 1971, they resolved that the African teams be put under the direction of the ECA. The ECA was to be an overseer but was to supervise the teams without
prejudice to the normal supervision of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 19

There were three main reasons for the UNDATs. The first was to assist the countries in attacking their development problems more effectively. 20 Secondly, the ECOSOC, in resolution 1552(XLIX) of 30 July 1970 considered that the provision of such technical assistance, in the form of advisory services, through the subregional teams might be a useful way of assisting some of the developing countries to build up their own services in those fields. Thirdly, the teams were required by their mandate to sponsor and organize (at the request of individual countries), training courses at both the national and subregional levels and to participate in the execution of specific projects in the rural areas. In theory, the UNDATs were designed to complement the efforts of the subregional offices and the specialized agencies. In practice, they were competing with the latter because the ECA was also providing advisory, technical assistance and training facilities. Perhaps, the UNDATs were established to show the inadequacies of the ECA in providing such services in the past.

Three UNDATs served Africa: the Niamey-based one served seven countries in West Africa, namely, Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. Yaounde served six countries in Central Africa, namely, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Congo and Equatorial Guinea. The Lusaka-based UNDAT served 14 countries, namely, Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Burundi and Rwanda. The last two countries were included in the Eastern and Southern subregion, although they also belonged to the Central African subregion. The Lusaka UNDAT was an integral part of the ECA
subregional office for Eastern and Southern Africa. It was the only one which had this link. The lack of financial resources was responsible for the fact that no UNDATs were established for North Africa and the three states which made up the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, that is, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. The UN assumed full responsibility for the direct funding of the teams. The UNDP also agreed to provide assistance of about US$ 200,000 per annum for each UNDAT operating in countries covered by the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa.

For their manpower resources, the Yaounde UNDAT had provision for seven experts and three junior experts. A total of 16 programmes were carried out in the field of road and maritime transportation, crop development, employment, cereal in Chad, Cameroon and Central African Republic. The majority of the programmes were studies. The Niamey UNDAT had eight experts and three junior experts. Its resources had been put at the disposal of the Permanent Inter-state Committee for the Fight Against the Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) to assist in finding solutions both in the short and long terms for the ravages resulting from the cycle of drought. The Lusaka UNDAT had an initial staff strength of 10 experts and four junior experts. Its programmes consisted also of studies.

Although the creation of the UNDATs made it possible for the ECA to obtain additional resources for its programmes, they soon created additional problems for development. Since they were advisory in their orientation they could not implement projects either. Several states saw them as competing with the ECA and so were not satisfied with the duplication of efforts. The states expressed the need to define their terms of reference more clearly so as to ensure that the UNDATs were fully committed to the concept of economic co-operation and that they
did not operate at cross purpose to the ECA.\textsuperscript{24} There were other questions that remained unsolved, one of which was the issue of the precise relationship to be established at the field level between the UNDATs, the ECA and the UNDP. The UNDATs were part of the ECA secretariat but at the same time their financing was sought from sources other than the UN regular budget. Secondly, they lacked the organs to allow for effective participation by governments in the preparation, implementation and follow-up of their activities. Thirdly, there was the failure to integrate the activities of the West and Central African UNDATs with those of corresponding ECA subregional offices. Moreover, the activities of the UNDATs were purely advisory in nature, therefore, their terms of reference were more restrictive than those of the ECA subregional offices. In view of these deficiencies, the ECA Conference of Ministers recommended in resolution 24(XI) of 1973 that the terms of reference of the UNDATs should be re-oriented in such a way that they would be more operational in the identification and implementation of projects and that for this purpose additional resources should be sought both within the UN system and from donor countries.

In 1975 a joint ECA/UNDP mission was appointed at the request of member states to evaluate the performance of both UNDATs and the subregional offices and it was hoped that they would recommend the course of action for the future. The evaluation mission found that the UNDATs were more active and effective than the subregional offices and in their report submitted in 1976 they recommended that the three existing UNDATs should be strengthened and that four more be created in Africa. Their next recommendation was that the activities of the UNDATs should be integrated with those of the subregional offices, so that the former would become the operational arms of the ECA, while the subregional offices should be phased out. If the mission felt that the latter were
performing valuable services, they would not have recommended their being phased out. For each UNDAT, they recommended that policy organs at the ministerial and technical levels be established to supervise their administrative and substantive activities. It was clear that the evaluation mission wanted to give the UNDATs some sort of autonomy and practical role. The recommendations were examined by the Executive Committee and the Conference of Ministers of the ECA. In 1977, they decided to replace the subregional offices and the UNDATs with the Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs).

b. The Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs)

The MULPOCs constitute the second phase of decentralization by the ECA. It may be true that they have inter-governmental organs to allow the governments to participate, but they are not all that different from the subregional offices. They are not autonomous in any sense. Their finances, administration and programmes are controlled by the headquarters. Participation for the states is a one-sided affair because the ECA draws up the programmes and then approaches them for endorsement. The states are not consulted when the programmes are drawn up. Although they are an improvement on the subregional offices, the ECA is yet to implement actual decentralization.

Since the 1960s the strengthening of economic relations among African countries with a view to raising the level of economic activity has remained the key development strategy for improving the standard of living of the African people. This strategy was re-emphasized in the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980. It also formed the ultimate objective for the establishment of the MULPOCs. By resolution 311(XIII) of 1 March 1977 of the Conference of Ministers, the ECA established five
Map 1  The Distribution of MULPOCs in Africa

MULPOCs with headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia), Gisenyi (Rwanda), Yaounde (Cameroon), Niamey (Niger) and Tangier (Morocco). This resolution was as a consequence of the evaluation exercise by the UNDP/ECA mission. Their objectives include the following:

(a) To promote subregional economic co-operation through multinational projects with an integrationist impact potential;

(b) To promote assistance to member states and/or their intergovernmental organizations with a view to identifying areas suitable for economic co-operation and projects likely to strengthen such co-operation;

(c) To secure the commitment of the governments concerned to the projects identified;

(d) To undertake prefeasibility and feasibility studies related to such projects;

(e) To provide assistance to governments and/or intergovernmental organizations in the implementation process. For the distribution of MULPOCs see Map 1. The objectives outlined above are fairly routine stuff except that in (c) the ECA was seeking the commitment of the member states and in (e) it mentioned that it wanted to assist the states in the implementation process. However, it was not clear whether it was for implementation of ECA programmes or the development projects of the states. The rest of the objectives were rather vague. They do not tell us whether the ECA intended to formulate, implement and monitor projects either. Later on it tried to clarify the roles of the MULPOCs by stating that they have both remote and immediate objectives. Their proximate objective was to mobilize groups of African countries towards the identification and implementation of
a limited number of projects in recognition of the fact that sub-regional and regional economic integration would take many years to accomplish; their ultimate aim was to promote economic co-operation with a view to creating a common market. The MULPOC machinery was intended to be the modus operandi for achieving these objectives.  

They were different from the subregional offices in terms of their structures and policy organs. We have to remember that these features were absent in the latter. It was an attempt by the ECA to communicate with the officials of each member state, so as to understand what their economic and social problems were and it was a way of getting the states committed to the programmes - something also lacking with the subregional offices.

The structures and policy organs were established on three levels. At the ministerial level was the Council of Ministers, made up of ministers responsible for development planning of the member states. It was the supreme policy organ which made all the major decisions on and approved the programmes and activities for each MULPOC. Its meetings were held annually. Next was the Committee of Officials, a subsidiary body made up of the permanent secretaries for development planning of each state. This was the technical arm of the policy organ and its function was to identify programmes, prepare the detailed work programmes and to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers. It also had to advise on personnel and administrative matters, but of course, this was in theory. In practice, all decisions pertaining to such matters were considered by ECA headquarters alone. The meetings were also held annually but they always preceded those of the Council of Ministers. (As from 1989, however, these organs will meet once every two years.) Finally, there was the Supervisory Committee which
could be created every three months to review the activities of the MULPOC when the two main organs were not in session. But this Committee lacked a legal basis and its decisions were not binding on member states. Moreover, it was costly to have three or four such meetings and so the idea of creating supervisory committees was not very fruitful.

With the exception of North Africa, the other MULPOCs possessed the two policy organs. In the case of North Africa, the supreme policy organ was the Council of Plenipotentiaries which had a different composition from the Council of Ministers. The former was made up of ambassadors, embassy officials and any high-ranking official chosen by the respective member states. The risk of having such persons was that they were not versed in development issues and there was lack of continuity of ideas because different persons could turn up at each meeting. It also meant that instead of dealing with the correct high-ranking officials, the ECA dealt mainly with envoys who have been instructed on what to say by their governments. The North African MULPOC has not been able to establish proper policy organs up till the present. The political conflicts, such as the Western Saharan crisis, have created a high degree of political friction. The states were not relating to each other at the ministerial level. The organ they accepted back in 1978 was the Council of Plenipotentiaries and it has remained so ever since.

Since their establishment, the MULPOCs have depended on the UNDP and the UN technical assistance regular budget for funding, even though the UNDP was supposed to provide seed money. The ECA put forward the argument that because they were new structures, the MULPOCs were not yet part of the UN regular budget. The UNDP provided US$ 200,000 per
annum for each MULPOC for the period 1979-81, but warned that it would not support them for much longer. It was in 1984 that the MULPOCs were actually financed through the UN regular budget. That level of UNDP funding was sufficient for a core staff of only three professional officers per MULPOC, that is, the team leader and two experts. So for a MULPOC which had more than three officers the deficit was met from ECA resources. For example, Lusaka had five staff members, two of whom were paid from its regular budget. The contribution from the UN regular budget for technical assistance was US$ 54,200 for 1978 and US$ 58,500 for 1979; and practically all of it was absorbed in administrative expenses.

Since the MULPOCs began operation, the UNDP has contributed approximately US$ 8 million to their infrastructures as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>7.9</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The 1982 level of programming was approximately US$ 2 million. The combined budget of the four MULPOCs south of the Sahara for the period 1977-81 was US$ 2.5 million annually, with the UNDP as the largest contributor at the rate of 66 per cent while that of state members was 18 per cent. Although the former stopped financing them on 31 December 1982, it still allocated the sum of US$ 300,000 to the Lusaka and Gisenyi MULPOCs for the fourth Programming Cycle 1987-1991. The amount is to support their institutions established for manpower training and other regional economic ventures.
Most of the support by African governments to the MULPOCs was in kind in the form of buildings, equipment and provision of general level and other personnel, and in their willingness to host the annual meeting of the two policy organs. Even though the contribution from member states was the third main source of funding, the evidence in Chapter 2 of the thesis shows that the states are facing financial difficulties which have led to a fall in their financial contributions. The Executive Secretary, Adebayo Adedeji, attributes the fall primarily to problems arising from the energy crisis, inflation and the mounting burden of debt-servicing.\footnote{32}

The lack of financial resources dominated most of the meetings of the MULPOCs especially when the UNDP warned that it was no longer going to fund their programmes. The ECA prepared a document proposing that they should be funded from the regular budget of the UN and made its submission to ECOSOC and the General Assembly. A decision was taken by resolution 37/138 of December 1982 by which the General Assembly placed their financing on the regular budget. This became operational in 1984 and it was meant to cover mostly their programmes. The ECA also made provisions for their professional staff to be funded through the regular budget as shown in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 gave the picture of the staffing position of the MULPOCs before the proposal for funding through the UN regular budget. For the existing posts only the Tangier MULPOC had a director and so the proposal made provision for others to have one each. It was striking to find that the Yaounde MULPOC at the time had no staff of its own. It was hoped that the proposal would improve its situation. Up till then it depended on the officials at the headquarters for its meetings and activities. The proposal made no provisions for new posts for
### Table 5.4 Proposed Staffing of the MULPOCs through the Regular Budget of the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Existing posts</th>
<th>Proposed new posts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>P-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Tangier</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Lusaka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Gisenyi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Niamey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Yaounde</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (a) to (e)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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**Note:** This table has the same key as in Table 5.1.
the Tangier MULPOC. This was to do with the fact that it was the least active of them all. The reasons which have been treated in Chapter 9 included the fact that the political conflicts between the states was having a profound effect on the activities of the MULPOC and because not many programmes have been implemented. Also Tangier was an isolated spot and therefore communication between ECA headquarters on the one hand, and the MULPOC and member states on the other, was difficult. Delegates travelling from Sub-Saharan Africa to its meetings have to spend at least two days before getting to Tangier as there are no direct flights to the city. Table 5.4 also revealed that Niamey which was the second largest MULPOC with 16 member states only had three general service staff to run the place. The largest MULPOC was Lusaka with 18 states. The provision was for it to have four professionals and two additional G.S. staff. Lusaka, on the other hand, was to have two additional professionals and two more general level staff. Gisenyi, the smallest MULPOC with only three member states, was to have two extra professionals and one more general service staff. On the whole the MULPOCs were facing the same problems as the earlier subregional offices. They had rather few professionals to cater for all the states.

The provision of a core of 13 professional staff (four of them for Lusaka) for the MULPOCs was still not sufficient, given that they operated more or less on the same number of sectors as the ECA headquarters. In fact, the lack of manpower resources has remained as one of the major constraints on the MULPOCs up till today. Each MULPOC has been dealt with in turn in Chapters 6–9 and so to avoid repetition, the point has to be made that the skeleton of staff could not cope with the development problems in each subregion. It is true that the secretariat continued to provide technical support to the meetings of
the meetings of the MULPOCs and it was solely handling the formulation and implementation of their activities; but this was what it had done also with the subregional offices. The MULPOCs were therefore not different in their organization and management. They were completely controlled and administered by the ECA headquarters. The relationship between substantive division officers and those of the MULPOCs were not always smooth. The directors of the latter were political appointees while the former saw themselves as the professionals who were not of equal standing with such directors. Some steps were taken between 1977-79 to establish a good working relationship between the two sets of staff through a series of consultative meetings with divisional chiefs. The main decisions to come out of those meetings were, first, that the project staff of the MULPOCs should be subject to the professional guidance of appropriate divisions of the ECA and, second, that the divisions should endeavour to post some officials to work along side their MULPOC counterpart for shorter periods of 3-4 months on specific projects. For further alignment, all chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the MULPOCs were made ex-officio members of the ECA Executive Committee. In practice, these decisions were not uniformly administered especially as officials of the substantive division complained about heavy workloads which were consequences of the decisions. It was also difficult to keep track of what the latter did and also to co-ordinate the activities of staff at the headquarters especially when they left for the MULPOCs.

The MULPOCs started off with a different programming process from those of the ECA headquarters. While the former had yearly programmes the latter was implementing six-yearly medium-term and biennial programmes. It is hoped that from 1989 all the MULPOCs will run a biennial work programme for the purpose of synchronizing with the headquarters. For the moment they have to continue to face problems of inconsistency and
lack of harmonization of programmes.

Although the MULPOCs were improved a step further in that they had individual programmes which the subregional offices lacked, the states did not participate in drawing up the programmes. Moreover, the programmes were not drawn up at each of the MULPOC's offices but at the ECA headquarters. The semi-finished drafts were then presented to the two policy organs for endorsement. Such method did not allow the governments to make inputs on the programmes. Participation for the states meant accepting programmes which originated from the ECA. We have to remember that one of the reasons why the subregional offices were phased out was to ensure that states were committed to the new structures, that is, the MULPOCs and also because the ECA wanted to be closer to the states so as to understand their problems. And yet it never gave the governments the chance to state their problems nor discuss how they would want the problems solved. It barely acted as an arm of the UN providing advisory services to African states and there was no evidence to suggest that the states saw the MULPOCs or the ECA as truly African inter-governmental organizations.

Apart from the fact that the states could not identify with the work programmes of the MULPOCs, there was an added problem. The drawing up of work programmes at Addis Ababa by officials who may not have travelled to the subregions meant that the actual problems of the areas were not included. There was no chance therefore for discussion of possible solutions. And so the ECA was operating as though no problems existed. When will it really tackle the peculiar problems of each subregion? This question is important because it holds the key to the future of the ECA. If it continues to be insensitive to African problems, then it will continue to be unpopular and have little influence on the
development issues of the continent. That team leadership which the UN expects of the ECA and all other regional commissions will remain an illusion. The states of West Africa have already questioned the usefulness of the Niamey MULPOC when in 1987 they asked the ECA to review its scope of activities and to redefine its terms of reference. The ECA is yet to implement the recommendations of an ad hoc committee set up for the purpose. The main recommendations were that the ECA should narrow the scope of activities, and give the MULPOC specific objectives to be fulfilled within a given time-frame.

Finally, attention has to be drawn to the growing expectations of the member states and the limited resources, the lack of focus of the activities of the MULPOCs. The member states want projects that are cost effective and positive inputs to their economic development. The MULPOCs have no resources for such ventures, and their terms of reference make no provision for organs necessary for implementing, co-ordinating and monitoring of real projects.

4. CONCLUSION

The two attempts by the ECA to decentralize have met with little success. Although the MULPOCs were an improvement on the subregional offices in the sense that the former had inter-governmental policy organs, the ECA continued in its tradition of not granting the sub-regional structures any form of authority and autonomy. Every aspect of the MULPOC was decided upon by the ECA headquarters. In effect, the ECA has failed to decentralize.

However, it seems that amongst the UN's original commissions it is only the ECA which attempted to decentralize at all. All activities
of the ECE and ECWA are concentrated at their respective headquarters. In the case of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), it established a Pacific Liaison Office in Nauru in 1980 to ensure a more continuous presence and improved communications between the Pacific countries and territories and the ESCAP secretariat. In 1984, with the endorsement of member states and associates, the ESCAP merged the Pacific Liaison Office and the Fiji-based UNDAT into the ESCAP Pacific Operations Centre (EPOC) at Port Vila, Vanuatu. One of EPOC's major aims is to further strengthen co-ordination and co-operation with the South Pacific Commission (SPC), the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) and UNDP offices in Suva, Fiji; Apia, Samoa; and Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. Just as in the case of the MULPOCs, the EPOC activities included advisory missions, consultancy services and the provision of training programmes for member states. So when it comes to the issue of the type of services and activities provided by the ECA and other regional economic commissions the fact that they cannot carry out actual projects is due to the purposes set out for them by the UN rather than their own shortcomings. They cannot do more than provide advisory services because that is what their terms of reference allow. Perhaps it is time to review their objectives in the light of demands for them to be actively involved in the development of each region.


3. Ibid., p. 21.

4. Representative statements of the position of regional officials in 1960 are contained in UN Docs E/CN.12/599, E/CN.12/669 and E/CN.14/257.


8. Ibid., p. 39.


11. The member states of the four subregions were:
   (a) Eastern and Southern Africa - Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda - Burundi and Rwanda (also included in Central Africa).
   (b) Central African subregion - Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (now Zaire), Congo Democratic Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Rwanda.
   (c) West African subregion - Dahomey (now Benin), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (Conakry), Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso).
   (d) North African subregion - Algeria, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Egypt.


13. The Maghreb countries were Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.


16. Ibid., p. 4.


31. Ibid., p. 12.

32. During fieldwork at ECA headquarters, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the Executive Secretary, explained that these were the problems facing the states during a discussion on 4 March 1987. He said that it was for these reasons that the ECA was expecting a reduced contribution to the 1987 pledging conference of UNTFAD.
PART II

ECA IN THE SUBREGIONS
CHAPTER 6

ECA IN WEST AFRICA: THE NIAMEY MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING
AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (MULPOC)

1. INTRODUCTION

The West African MULPOC is based in Niamey, the Republic of Niger. Its geographical area of jurisdiction covers the 16 members of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (see map overleaf). It is the second largest MULPOC – the largest is the one of Lusaka with 18 countries. The 16 countries cover approximately one-fifth of the land mass of the African continent – a total area of about 6.2 million sq. km., 2.5 million sq. miles). Officials of the ECO division describe it as the most active of all the five MULPOCs.¹

2. SALIENT FEATURES OF WEST AFRICA

West Africa is one of the major geographical regions of Africa. It is bounded in the south and west by the Atlantic Ocean and in the east by the Cameroon-Adamawa highlands which separate West Africa from equatorial Africa. The northern boundary is less clearly defined and is generally considered to follow the southern limit of the Saharan Desert. It is, however, convenient to consider the northern boundaries of Mauritania, Mali and Niger as the northern boundary of West Africa.

Geographically, West Africa is an area of great contrasts. It
Map 2 General Reference Map of West Africa


* Now Burkina Faso
can be divided into three main ecological zones - the desert and sahel, the savannah and the forest zones. The sahel and desert is characterized by acute aridity of its soil accentuated by desertification and a rainfall pattern irregular both in volume and frequency. This zone includes countries like Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It has within the present decade experienced two cycles of drought. As a result food production has fallen drastically, the result has been the dependence on the import of food. The states were also affected by oil price rises and they faced other constraints having to do with transport and communications deficiencies. States such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are landlocked and Cape Verde as an Island are compelled to transit their goods through the ports of neighbouring countries. Cape Verde being one of the smallest states lacks sophisticated port facilities. This further increased the difficulty and cost of transporting goods.

The savannah zone has relatively regular rainfall albeit with pockets of occasional drought. For these countries too drought contribute to disorganize and reduce agricultural production, consequently worsening the food deficit.

The third zone is the forest with regular and heavy rainfall. At least 203 cm. (80 inches) and as much as 381 cm. (150 inches) can fall each year. The temperature rarely drops below 26.6°C (80°F) and the air is 80 per cent moisture. The countries with this type of ecological feature include Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The area represents the most heterogeneous conglomeration of states in all Africa, and has the largest number of mini-states. The 16 countries together occupy a geographical area of 6,141,151 sq. km., and shared [among themselves] a total population of almost 150 million in 1980.
However, they vary both in size and population. Cape Verde, the smallest of them, has an area of only 4,033 sq. km. and a population of less than half a million. The corresponding figures for Niger are 1,267,000 sq. km. and 5.3 million, while Nigeria has a total area of 923,768 sq. km. and an estimated population of 84.7 million, representing nearly 60 per cent of the subregion's total population.\(^2\) About half the total population of black Africa is in this subregion.

It also contains the largest number of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). There are at present about 32 such organizations dealing either with general economic integration matters, such as ECOWAS and the Mano River Union, or concerned only with limited sectoral activities, for example, the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) and the Gambia River Basin Organization (OMVG). This multiplicity of IGOs imposes a heavy burden on the budgets of individual states without necessarily providing them with corresponding benefits and it creates widespread duplication of activities.\(^3\)

Half of the countries in the region are classified as least developed (LDCs). (The General Assembly in 1981 identified 36 countries on the basis of their very low per capita income, very low literacy rate and low contribution of manufacturing industries to Gross Domestic Products (GDP).)\(^4\) These are Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. Any disturbances in their economies, either natural or manmade, inflicts immeasurable suffering on large number of their people.

Most of the countries in West Africa thrive on exports of primary commodities to the developed market economies. In most countries, with the exception of the Niger and Nigeria, the export sectors are dominated by agricultural commodities such as cocoa in Ghana, Ivory
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Year of Independence</th>
<th>km²</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Population,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
<th>Density per km²</th>
<th>Former Colonial Power***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Aug. 1, 1960</td>
<td>112,600</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3,530</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>31.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>July 5, 1975</td>
<td>3,929</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>84.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Feb. 18, 1965</td>
<td>11,295</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>53.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Mar. 6, 1957</td>
<td>238,537</td>
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<td>12,275</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Oct. 2, 1958</td>
<td>245,856</td>
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<td>5,006</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
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<td>36,125</td>
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<td>570</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
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<td>Ivory Coast</td>
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<td>322,463</td>
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<td>8,020</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
<td>July 26, 1847</td>
<td>111,369</td>
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<td>1,837</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>Sept. 22, 1960</td>
<td>1,240,142</td>
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<td>6,623</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 1960</td>
<td>1,030,700</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>1,480</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>Aug. 3, 1960</td>
<td>1,267,000</td>
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<td>5,338</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Oct. 1, 1960</td>
<td>913,073</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>76,982</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Aug. 20, 1960</td>
<td>203,793</td>
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<td>5,641</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Apr. 27, 1961</td>
<td>72,328</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3,449</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>47.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Apr. 27, 1960</td>
<td>56,785</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Volta**</td>
<td>Aug. 5, 1960</td>
<td>274,200</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6,814</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WEST AFRICA 6,140,195 100.0 141,038 100.0 3.1 55.5

* Growth rate 1975-1980
** Burkina Faso
*** Additional information not in original source

Coast and Nigeria; cotton in Mali, Benin and Burkina Faso; groundnuts in Senegal, Nigeria and the Gambia. The countries also have major mineral resources, such as petroleum in Nigeria; bauxite in Guinea; diamonds in Ghana and Sierra Leone; iron ore in Liberia and Mauritania; and uranium in Niger. Also varieties of food crops are grown for internal markets, including yams, cassava, millet, sorghum, maize, onions, kolanuts, plantains and rice among others. The marketing of export crops by state monopolies is another striking feature.

The two main languages used are English and French. The former French colonies, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo use French as their official language. The four former British colonies, the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone use the English language. Then there are Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau using Portuguese. For their dates of independence and former colonial powers, see Table 6.1. The differences in languages are reinforced by differences in politics, culture, administration, systems of education, all of which in turn affect the interaction and responses of countries in international relations. This means that there is political fragmentation of the region corresponding to former colonial links. This is a direct result of the intense competition for trade and territorial control that took place among the European powers between the 15th and 20th centuries.

3. NIAMEY MULPOC: STRUCTURES, ORGANS, FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER RESOURCES

There is an ultimate reason for the establishment of MULPOCs, which is the promotion of multinational economic co-operation at the
subregional levels with a view to the creation of some form of subregional common market or customs union as a step towards regional economic integration. The ECA argued that this objective was important because of the dominance of the subsistence sector in most African economies, the existence of small fragmented national markets, the underutilization of resources and excessive external orientation of African economies. These factors combined to make economic co-operation indispensable for the rapid and self-reliant transformation of the African region. In other words, the MULPOCs were instruments for promoting multinational co-operation through a subregional approach to development problems.

But when the member states met to decide on the terms of reference for the Niamey MULPOC they were not thinking about the long-term objective. They concentrated on short-term objectives with emphasis on the peculiar and specific needs of the region. At the inaugural meeting of the Council of Ministers of the West African MULPOC held in Niamey, Niger, on 16-17 June 1978, they established the following terms of reference for the subregion:

(a) Under the aegis of the Council of Ministers of the MULPOC, to assist in the identification, execution and harmonization of the programme of the various inter-governmental organizations in West Africa;

(b) To facilitate co-operation among the inter-governmental organizations in West Africa;

(c) To provide, on request, technical assistance and executing agency services to the member states and inter-governmental organizations in West Africa;
(d) To provide training facilities, particularly in the technical and managerial fields in the West African subregion for the benefit of member states and inter-governmental organizations;

(e) Acting through the Executive Secretary of the ECA, to endeavour to mobilize resources from outside the West African subregion, and in particular from within the UN system, for establishing the training facilities mentioned in (d) above; and if requested to do so, for implementing feasible projects by governments or inter-governmental organizations;

(f) To serve as a forum for the exchange of information and technical know-how among the IGOs in West Africa through the exchange of documents and organizations;

(g) To undertake such other tasks and perform such other functions as the Council of Ministers of the MULPOC and/or the ECA Conference of Ministers may assign to it.6

The terms of reference of this MULPOC are wide and they give an indication of what the member states at the time wanted from the ECA. The specific need of the area was to contain the proliferation of IGOs. There was, therefore, the need to co-ordinate, harmonize and control their growth, in order to avoid duplication, waste of resources and to reduce the strain on the limited resources of the states. The member states tailored the objectives of the MULPOC to reflect this need to a large extent. The MULPOC was also to act as a forum for exchange of ideas on the IGOs, in addition to providing training facilities and technical assistance to the IGOs. It has to also aid co-operation among the IGOs and above all assist in the identification, execution and harmonization of their programmes. However, the point has to be made
that a wider scope of activities had led to the lack of focus of programmes. First of all, the terms of reference are not precise as to the real content and purpose of the activities of the MULPOC. Secondly, there is no timespan for the activities. Thirdly, the lack of precision makes it difficult for the states to decide where priority should be placed. For example, there are many IGOs in West Africa with their activities ranging from manpower training and cartography to mineral research councils. The ECA did not indicate the thrust of its assistance to the IGOs. It did not have a period of time in mind for them either, that is, whether from 1978-81 the Commission would help finance IGOs or so.

Despite the wider scope of activities set out, the terms of reference indicate that the MULPOC suffers from a fundamental handicap. This has to do with the fact that it can only act with the consent of its member states. For example, it can only carry out programmes at the request of its member states. It then means that the role designed for the MULPOC in the development of the subregion is marginal. By its very nature, it can only play an indirect and marginal role by virtue of its terms of reference and by the fact that its activities consist mainly of studies and the provision of technical facilities for the IGOs. With these sort of activities, it is difficult for one to assess its tangible contribution and impact.

The concentration on the activities of the IGOs allows the MULPOC little time for other aspects of development. Since the MULPOC was established in 1978, a number of development problems have affected its member states. As in all other parts of Africa, these countries have had to face balance of payments deficits, debt problems, famine and drought, oil price increases and fluctuations in the prices of
their agricultural commodities. The ways and means of solving these problems are not provided for within the terms of reference. These problems are well beyond the ability of the MULPOC: indeed, some were not foreseen by either the ECA or the member states at the time. Presently, it has stuck to the implementation of programmes agreed upon in the late 1970s, thereby re-emphasizing that there are no provisions for the MULPOC to deal with such.

In addition to this, the problems have helped to show how inflexible the MULPOC structure is. Up to date, there have not been efforts to address and give priority to the immediate problems of the states as reflected in APPER. The realization that there are other pressing issues apart from the problems of the IGOs has led to the demand by member states for a review and redefinition of the MULPOC at a meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Lomé, Togo, from 10-12 February 1986; they decided that on account of economic development throughout Africa in general and the West African subregion in particular, the mandate and role of the MULPOC be reviewed and its scope of activity redefined in order to address the individual and collective needs of the states. To enable them to do this, the delegates established an Ad hoc Committee, made up of the Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. The proceedings of the meeting of this Committee were then circulated to all member states well in advance to enable the officials to make concrete proposals for the 1987 Council of Ministers meeting.

In the Ad hoc Committee's Report 1987, they tackled the issue of the relevance of the MULPOC. They remarked that the MULPOC's mandate and set objectives would have to be worked out on the basis not only of the socio-economic realities of the subregion and the needs of member states but also of the MULPOC's actual capacity to deliver.
recommended that the MULPOC should carry out a specific programme with precise objectives over a given timeframe. This ties in with what we said earlier on about the terms of reference not being precise and specific. It also recommended that the policy of decentralization should be pursued in favour of the MULPOCs as it is only out in the field that experts can prove and ground their competence and many types of work can be carried out more economically at the MULPOC than if done at the headquarters.

The Economic Co-operation Office at the ECA Secretariat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is responsible for all the MULPOCs. This division provides the back up services to the MULPOC to a great extent. In addition, each substantive division has staff who participate in the meetings of the organs of the MULPOC. But the relationship between the ECA and all the MULPOCs is not very clear-cut. It is not very clear as to what aspects of the work of the MULPOC should be carried out by staff from the headquarters. And because of shortages of staff at the MULPOC, most of the programmes are drafted by the experts at the headquarters. So in some cases there are staff who have to do work for the headquarters and then the work for the MULPOC – a situation that officials are not too happy about, and one which has led to further strain on the limited resources at the headquarters.

The ECA is reviewing its priorities and resource requirements for its programmes. As part of the review it has been suggested that each substantive division should consider dividing the work programme priorities into two sections. The first section will be the work programme and priorities to be implemented from the ECA headquarters. The next one will be work programmes of the MULPOCs as established by MULPOC policy organs. Each division will then indicate which proportion
of its resources will be utilized for the first section and which proportion will be devoted to the implementation of subregional projects. However, officials are still discussing these proposals and the criteria and policy for both sections have not yet been established. Therefore, there is no formal integration of the MULPOCs and the Substantive Divisions.

A number of problems have arisen because of lack of this type of integration. Since staff from the headquarters are sent to work at the MULPOC in an ad hoc and haphazard manner, each substantive division has no senior officer as the focal point for co-ordinating and keeping track of the MULPOC projects. The divisions did not send members of their professional staff, for short periods of six months to one year, to the MULPOCs as a practical demonstration of integration of the work carried out by the headquarters with the operational activities in the field.

The idea of doing the work of the MULPOC at the headquarters also means that the constraints of the substantive divisions are being transferred to the MULPOCs. They have to address many demands often with limited resources. Therefore, the assistance they can extend to the MULPOC can only be marginal. In most cases the work of the MULPOC is relegated to second place behind the concern of the divisions. In the Ad hoc Committee Report 1987, they pointed out that work done for the MULPOCs is neither accorded the priority nor the attention it deserves. On the whole, the policy of decentralization in favour of the MULPOCs has not yet been effected. The headquarters is very much at the centre of and in control of the activities of the MULPOC. In effect, the secretariat is running the activities of the MULPOC from Addis Ababa. But it is only in the field that experts can further
prove and ground their competence. Programmes can be carried out more economically at and from the MULPOC than if done at the headquarters.

As has been mentioned in Chapter 5, the structure and policy organs of the Niamey MULPOC are on three levels. At the ministerial level is the Council of Ministers, which makes the decisions on major and priority programmes; monitors the implementation of projects; makes periodic reviews of programmes. It is the policy making body which decides and approves what the MULPOC should do. It meets once a year. This body is followed by a Committee of Officials, made up of mostly permanent secretaries responsible for development planning in their respective countries. Its function is to identify projects and prepare the detailed work to be sent to the Council for approval. The Committee of Officials is also responsible for monitoring, evaluating and implementing approved projects. It advises on both personnel and administrative matters. It meets once a year also, but does so before the Council meets. In effect, this body is the technical arm of the MULPOC.

Finally, there is a supervisory committee of officials which can be created on a temporary basis to review the activities of the MULPOC/charged with the responsibility of examining technical documents as well as issues and making recommendations thereof to the Council of Ministers. An example of this is the Ad hoc Committee that was set up to review the mandate and scope of activities of the Niamey MULPOC in 1986. Finally, this MULPOC has a follow-up Committee which is a new body created as a result of the redefinition of its new role. Since the two policy organs will be meeting only every two years from 1989, this Committee will also monitor the implementation of the work programme.

Member states attended the meetings of the various organs of the MULPOC but increasingly they are complaining of lack of funds to send
## Table 6.2  Summary of the Niamey MULPOC Cost Structure, 1978-1980

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m/m US$</td>
<td>m/m US$</td>
<td>m/m US$</td>
<td>m/m US$</td>
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<td><strong>I. Personnel Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>12 60,360</td>
<td>12 59,900</td>
<td>12 64,680</td>
<td>36 184,940</td>
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<td>Trade Programme</td>
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<td>27 134,800</td>
<td>15 80,850</td>
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<td>Transport Programme</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Devn Programme</td>
<td>21 96,920</td>
<td>32 159,740</td>
<td>9 48,510</td>
<td>62 305,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>224 1,056,480</td>
<td>268 1,337,860</td>
<td>62 334,180</td>
<td>554 2,728,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Administrative Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer</td>
<td>12 52,480</td>
<td>12 41,160</td>
<td>12 46,340</td>
<td>36 142,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Support Personnel</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>64,200</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>164,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>52,430</td>
<td>34,200</td>
<td>132,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>12 194,480</td>
<td>12 192,790</td>
<td>12 150,540</td>
<td>36 537,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. Miscellaneous Operations Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Supplies &amp; Sundry</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Facilities</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>277,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

delegations. For its part, the ECA is also experiencing difficulties with organizing the annual meetings. In its Performance Report on the MULPOCs 1977-84, the ECA stated that "given the overall scarcity of resources and other constraints, the fact that the meetings of the policy organs are convened every year leaves precious little time for actual implementation of the work programmes". This annual basis of meetings had been an issue discussed during the Council of Ministers meeting of the Niamey MULPOC in February 1987 and at other meetings. At the suggestion of some representatives, the Committee took the view that the MULPOC policy organs should meet every other year. At the tenth meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 18 February 1987, the delegates endorsed the idea. It is interesting to note that the fulfilment of this request has led to its adoption by all the MULPOCs. This is one of the reasons why this MULPOC has been described by ECA officials as the most active.

Financial resources constitute a vital part of any organization. To a large extent they determine whether or not the entity can carry out its projects and activities from year to year. The lack of funds can put the programmes in jeopardy. Originally, the ECA did not have its own funds for the MULPOCs. This is due in part to the lack of full conception of the purpose of the MULPOCs. For if this was very clear from the start the ECA would have made adequate provision for funding them before they were established.

In fact, it was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which provided the initial funds. At the time the ECA pointed out that this funding was only temporary. It was to give the ECA breathing space to arrange for the permanent sources of funds for the MULPOCs. The next source of funding was the UN Regular Budget of Technical Assistance.
The money had to be approved by the General Assembly, and remained fixed up to 1982. The annual contribution from this source had been US$ 120,000.\textsuperscript{15}

The UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa agreed to provide US$ 200,000 per annum for the period 1978-81 for the Niamey MULPOC. But resources for this and the UN Regular Budget constitute only a fraction of the total resources required. The ECA drew up the cost structure for the Niamey MULPOC for 1978-80, the summary of which is on Table 6.2. It contains information on personnel costs, administrative costs and miscellaneous operations costs. The figures indicated that the Niamey MULPOC needed to spend more on key personnel matters. The personnel costs were US$ 2,728,520 as compared to administrative costs of US$ 537,810, and miscellaneous operations costs of US$ 277,000. The total amount needed for the period was US$ 3,543,330. But the actual amount received from various sources was US$ 960,000 only.\textsuperscript{16} The MULPOC still needed about US$ 2,583,330 to carry out its programmes. Table 6.3 shows a breakdown of available or required resources for the period. The table indicates the extent to which funds were lacking for the activities of the MULPOC. Even though the funds from the UNDP and the regular budget of the UN were made available, they were hardly enough. For one thing, the amounts remained constant throughout the period. Moreover, the funds were not index-linked. The contributions by member states were mostly in kind. These consisted of the provision of office space, equipment and personnel for the various programmes.

One striking feature of Table 6.3 is the contribution by the ECA which amounted to US$ 283,300 for 1978-80. Its contribution is small compared to the actual amount given which was US$ 1,866,789 for the 1977-81 period.\textsuperscript{17} Since the programmes were initiated by the ECA, it was odd that it could only provide the basic funding.
Table 6.3 Available or Required Resources from Funding Sources (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total resources required</td>
<td>1,330,960</td>
<td>1,631,650</td>
<td>580,720</td>
<td>3,543,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Contribution</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAP*</td>
<td>1,010,960</td>
<td>1,311,650</td>
<td>260,720</td>
<td>2,583,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources to be</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from ECA</td>
<td>83,200</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>283,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governments</td>
<td>54m/m&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>60m/m</td>
<td>26m/m</td>
<td>140m/m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral donors</td>
<td>680,170</td>
<td>827,190</td>
<td>60,480</td>
<td>1,612,840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note: GAP refers to the resource gap. This is the difference between the demand for and the supply of resources. It is the difference in resources which will have to be filled by other sources.

<sup>a</sup> m/m stands for man-month. It refers to manual labour and the number of months spent on particular tasks. For example, in 1978 the governments supplied staff who worked for 54 months.

The contribution from the states took the form of the supply of personnel. They provided staff for 140 man-months for 1978-80.

There were four main sources of funds for the programmes, with most of the money coming from bilateral donors. The second was the UNDP, while the third was from the UN General Assembly. Contributions through bilateral arrangements, the UNDP and member states from the extra-budgetary funds of the ECA. The amounts were donated through the UNTFAD pledging conference every two years, while the money from the General Assembly was part of its regular budget. But even with
the donations, the Commission still needed US$ 2,583,330 for 1978-80 (see gap in Table 6.3). This was quite common in the sense that the ECA in most cases does not come up with the required resources for its programmes. Even though it gets less funds every year, the Commission has not tailored its programmes to fit within its limited resources. The programmes for 1986-88 are still pending implementation because of lack of funds. Negotiations are still on with the UNDP - one of its major sources of extra-budgetary funds.

Funding of the Niamey and other MULPOCs had been a topical issue for the ECA. This is because increasingly the ECA has found itself constrained by the lack of finance. As one official stated, "our major problem at the ECA is that of lack of financial resources. We would like to carry out the demands of the states but we do not have the resources to enable us to do so". Due to pressures from the member states the matter was taken to the United Nations General Assembly. The ECA argued that to secure adequate funding, the MULPOCs should be funded from the regular budget of the UN. In December 1982 the decision was taken by the General Assembly to provide the MULPOCs with reliable and predictable resources.

But according to the ECO division report 1984, the level of these resources, at least from the standpoint of project activities, is in all lower than was the case over the preceding period, i.e. 1977-82, when the UNDP was financing the MULPOCs. On the other hand, the UNDP Governing Council requested the UNDP Administrator to continue to provide financial support to the five MULPOCs during the whole of the third programming cycle 1982-86. But the ECA officials were quick to point out that due to financial stringency the UNDP has been unable to accede to this request. With the exception of the project on
multisectoral assistance to the CEPGL and the women's programme, the UNDP has not been able to provide the expected additional resources. At the same time the secretariat has not yet succeeded in identifying an alternative source of funds. As a consequence programmes have been abandoned and postponed as the information on work programmes reveal. For example, the UNDP's withdrawal of funding led to the termination of the ECA's women programme both at the headquarters and the subregions.

Financial constraint is not the only obstacle preventing the Niamey MULPOC from carrying out its programmes. Another major constraint is to do with the manpower resources for the projects. Before 1982, the staffing of the MULPOC was grossly inadequate. In fact, apart from local level staff, this MULPOC had no professional staff for its programmes. In 1982, the ECA made proposals for financing the MULPOC through the regular budget of the UN. (See table overleaf.)

If we take a closer look at the figures for existing posts, we will find that as of 1982 the Niamey MULPOC had a permanent staff of three, and all were local level staff. There were no professionals, director and supportive senior administrative staff. The three local staff were paid from the overhead budget of the ECA, although this method of payment was abolished in December 1984. All staff were to be paid by the regular budget of the UN. The lack of professional staff working permanently in Niamey meant that for various projects, consultants were hired on a short term basis. None of the directors of the MULPOC, let alone the needed experts, had an employment contract lasting more than one year. The same was true of the general service staff - except for the secretaries and administrative assistants who had been temporarily assigned to the MULPOC from the ECA headquarters. The reason was that all the key posts were "project posts" and the contracts of project
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niamey</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expising posts</td>
<td>D-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Key:

D-1 is the Heads of MULPOCs (directors). The posts were for principal officers who would be responsible for implementing programmes approved by the ECA MULPOC policy organ. They would also consult government officials at the highest level and in the UN agencies and other IGOs. These were political posts and could be made up of ex-ministers, academics and long-standing officials of international institutions.

P-5 & P-3 is for Senior Officers. Comprises economic affairs officers to undertake sectoral and topical studies; design multi­national projects and conduct research; assist heads of the MULPOC in the management of the centres. These are Civil Servants.

Local Level is made up of General Service staff, e.g. administrative assistants, typists, drivers, messengers.

staff were such that appointments could only be guaranteed for one year at a time. It was, therefore, difficult in this case to attract a high calibre of core staff that the MULPOC needed. The turnover of professional staff in all the MULPOCs was relatively high.

The shortage of staff in Niamey and the changing of directors all the time created uncertainty for its activities. The reason for both is because appointments are on a short-term basis, usually for 6-12 months depending on the availability of funds. The short contracts are not attractive to would-be applicants. Secondly, member states are
not prepared to release top officials to work at the ECA when they
themselves need their services. In addition, directors were political
appointees and therefore those chosen had to be acceptable to the
member states. It meant longer periods before projects could be com­
pleted. In 1984 and for the first time, the professional core of the
MULPOC staff including the chiefs or directors of the MULPOCs were
given regular employment contracts made possible by the establishment
of 13 professional posts and six local level posts for all the MULPOCs.
The posts were to be financed under the regular budget of the General
Assembly Resolution 37/138 dated 17 December 1982. Since 1987 this
MULPOC has had 10 professional staff and about eight supporting staff.
The area covered by the staff includes economic integration, agriculture,
water resources, industry, trade and finance and demography. Since
there is roughly one professional in a sector the staffing level is
still rather low.

There was another dimension to the staffing problem. This had
to do with the authority attached to the higher level staff. For
example, the MULPOC director was not held in high regard by the officials
of the ECA secretariat. Since this was a political post, the ECA
secretariat staff tended to look down on the directors. This situation
was reinforced by the fact that the MULPOC director had neither the
administrative power to recruit and manage staff, nor any budget manage­
ment authority. He had to seek clearance and authorization from the
appropriate division at the secretariat for every decision that had
to be taken. Practically every conceivable personnel action has to
go through the ECA personnel section, and the MULPOC directors have
no leeway whatsoever, for instance, when it comes to making use of
surpluses that may arise under a budget line to offset shortfalls
incurred in others. Often this creates a situation of inertia that
adversely affects the running of the MULPOC. In addition, there is not delegation of authority in the day-to-day management of the MULPOC, backed up with necessary arrangements in the matter by the controlling authority vested in the ECO Division. So in effect the directors were puppets on a string to be manipulated by the officials of the ECO division and all other units of the ECA.

At the same time, the qualifications and role of the professional staff in the Niamey MULPOC as well as other MULPOCs have changed to the extent that the latter are now made up of development planners and economists, who may or may not have another field of specialization. Accordingly, they have to depend that much more on the ECA's substantive divisions than was the case before. This makes it difficult to effect actual decentralization to the subregional offices.

4. NIAMEY MULPOC: WORK PROGRAMMES

The Niamey MULPOC has had programmes of various sectors since it was established in 1978. The programmes are of a general nature consisting of studies, research, seminars, workshops, advisory and consultancy services. In short, the programmes were another example of the idea that the ECA was an arm of the UN. It implemented them without due regard for the peculiar problems affecting the states. Such problems include the proliferation of IGOs, drought and famine, problems of LDCs and land-locked states, to mention a few. For the programmes, the ECA substantive divisions draw up the proposals at the secretariat within the chosen areas of priorities, agreed upon by the Council of Ministers. The drafts of the proposals are then taken to the various organs of Ministers before they are implemented. The
work programmes of the MULPOCs are drawn on a yearly basis. This creates some form of confusion in the sense that such programmes are not integrated into the overall work programmes of the ECA. The reason is that the ECA's work programmes are designed on a medium-term basis, that is, six-yearly programmes. They are then taken in phases on a two-yearly basis and are referred to as the biennium work programmes. The lack of harmonization of the ECA work programmes with those of the MULPOC hampers progress towards implementation. The secretariat has endorsed the move to synchronize the programme with effect from 1989. The MULPOC programmes will be biennial from then on but it will have no medium-term plan.

The work programmes established at the inaugural meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Niamey MULPOC held on 16-17 June 1978 in Niamey, Niger, were considered by the appropriate organs within the framework of the ECA's strategy for the NIEO. The programmes grew out of the ECA's argument in the 1970s that Africa would be better off if the international economy was organized in such a way that resources were distributed on an equitable basis. In order to ensure political support for their implementation, the priorities chosen reflected the immediate objectives of the countries in their development plans. In other words, the work programmes were drafted by the ECA on the basis of how it interpreted the development plans of its member states and not by asking the government directly what their immediate needs were. The ECA further justified its position by pointing out that the drafted work programmes were based on the findings of exploratory missions carried out by the ECA to countries of West Africa. They were then debated in the Council of Ministers meeting. This method of arriving at an agreed work programme indicates that African governments see the ECA as an arm of the UN and not as an African organization. For one
thing the programmes originate from the ECA. The member states do not usually alter the draft proposals. They merely debate the grammar and wording of the proposal. If the ECA was truly an African organization, then it would have been up to member states to evolve their own programmes and then implement them through the organs of the MULPOC. They would decide on priorities for the programmes and greatly affect their content. But by its actions the member states see the MULPOC as an arm of the UN providing some form of advisory and technical services in the region. They do not really identify with the MULPOC. The other point that has to be made is that although the ECA is advocating the ideas in the LPA and has supported the APPER, it is still carrying out programmes based on the demand for a NIEO. For example, self-sufficiency in agriculture has been given top priority by both documents, but the ECA's programmes do not reflect this.

During the inaugural meeting in 1978, member states indicated the priority areas for which the MULPOC should operate. The sectors included trade, transport and communications, industry, agriculture, energy, human resources and assistance to IGOs. Within the sectors, two categories of specific programmes were established. Category I contained programmes for the biennium 1977-78, while Category II were programmes from which additional priorities would be selected during the period 1979-81. the MULPOC referred to these as programmes for the medium-term period, which usually lasts for six years. But inadequate funding makes long-term planning unrealistic. Also there is a discrepancy because the MULPOCs normally have annual programmes while headquarters implements medium term, that is, six yearly and biennial ones. As stated earlier the MULPOCs have decided that all the programmes should be synchronized from 1989. But so far the programmes do not reflect the real problems of the area. How could the MULPOC
be so sure back in 1977 that these programmes would be appropriate for the 1979-81 period? There is a problem with co-ordination as well. Programmes for one period spill-over to another. Officials complained of extra work resulting from unco-ordinated periods.²⁴

For both categories, the objectives of the programmes were the same. For example, for the IGOs, the aim was to provide training and technical assistance to them on request and also to identify areas suitable for co-operation among them in the field of agriculture, industry, transport, trade and natural resources based on their respective work programmes. It was also to publish periodical bulletins highlighting the major activities and programmes of the IGOs.²⁵ In the area of trade, the aim was to promote trade among the countries of West Africa, but there was no mention of the aspect of trade or what the promotion would entail. For transport and communications, the aim was to encourage and help establish a multinational coastal shipping line or company. In the area of industry, the aim was to promote industrial development with specific reference to basic industries and the establishment of multinational fertilizer plants. For human resources, there was to be preparation of a programme for the integration of women in the development process, and in agriculture, the promotion of specialization in agricultural production and research.²⁶ Again here, there was no specification of the aspect of agriculture which the promotion was intended.

The ECA argued that the criteria used by the policy organs in selecting priorities for Category I included availability of resources, expressed willingness of the governments to take collective action in their implementation, the expected impact of the projects on the economic development of the countries.²⁷
What were the specific programmes selected for 1977-78? They are treated sector-by-sector below. It suffices to point out that although the selection was done in 1978, the programmes were only approved in the 1981-83 period in most cases. Then the implementation took place in the 1983-86 period. (This ties in with the point made earlier about spill-over of programmes/periods leading to problems of co-ordination for officials.)

(a) Trade

For trade, two studies were carried out. The first one was a study on transit trade and transit facilities. It was approved in 1981 and the preliminary study was conducted in 1982. The study was finally concluded in 1985. The second one was a study on the mechanisms and institutional framework for financing trade promotion in West Africa. The study was approved in 1982 and was carried out in 1983. It has been submitted to the Association of West African Development Finance institutions. But there is no evidence in ECA literature to suggest that there was a follow-up on this programme to see whether the countries have adopted the recommendations and to what extent.

(b) Agriculture

The programmes also consisted mainly of studies. The study on climatic conditions in West Africa was approved in March 1983. It was completed and submitted in 1984. The study on the harmonization of pricing policies for agricultural products was approved in 1982. It was submitted to the policy organs in February 1984. The MULPOC, ECOWAS and the Inter-state Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) were invited to harmonize their programmes on pricing policies. But there was no mention of what aspects of agricultural products were
studied. The study on the harmonization of pricing policies for livestock was approved in 1982. The terms of reference of the preliminary study were approved in February 1984. But funding is being sought to carry out the full study estimated at US$ 500,000. Then there was the study on the status of national and subregional seed multiplication centres, approved in 1982 and completed in 1984; and also, the study on the status of national and subregional veterinary centres, approved in 1982 and completed in 1984.

(c) Industry

In the industrial sector, there was a pre-feasibility study for a second ammonia factory in West Africa, approved in March 1983. The study was completed and the policy organ of the MULPOC approved the recommendation on steps to be taken towards the implementation of the project within the framework of the Industrial Development Decade for Africa. There is no indication that this has been accomplished so far. An ECA team visited the phosphoric acid projects of Togo and Sierra Leone, a pharmaceutical plant in Sierra Leone and the Serekou quinine plant in Guinea. All the visits were in 1986.

(d) Transport and communications

For this sector, two studies were carried out, namely, (i) study on ECOWAS transport system which was approved in 1982. The study was completed in 1984. (ii) Global study on the co-ordination of activities of national and multinational airlines in West Africa. The study was approved in 1983 and was completed in 1984.
(e) **Human resources**

For human resources, the MULPOC was involved in the preparation of an inventory of specialized training institutions in the field of rural development. The move was approved in 1982 and the inventory was expected to be ready in 1986. The MULPOC has not reported that this has been done.

(f) **Water resources and irrigation**

The programmes also consisted of studies. The study on the appropriate techniques for the development and effective use of water resources for irrigation and horticulture purposes was approved in 1983. The study was done on a few West African countries initially. The MULPOC failed to give the names of the countries in its report. However, the policy organs directed at their 1984 meetings that the study should be extended to all West African countries. The study on national institutions for establishing and servicing water supply points in rural areas was approved in 1983. Here also the study covered a limited number of countries and the policy organs in 1984 requested that the study be extended to all member states. This was followed by a request for the establishment of a subregional committee on water resources. The request was approved in February 1984. The committee was established by the policy organs in 1984 and it was agreed that the MULPOC should act as a focal point in co-ordinating subregional co-operation in water resources development. The MULPOC was to submit a report to the 1985 meeting of the policy organs.

(g) **WADIS**

Lack of knowledge and information on a whole range of issues
affecting the area was discussed at various meetings. The suggestion was that there should be a West African Documentation and Information System (WADIS). The programme was approved in March 1983. The MULPOC reported that the equipment needed was already in Niamey and would be in operation as soon as the appropriate arrangements had been worked out with the government of Niger. Efforts were being made to arrange either the site offered by the government of Niger to house WADIS or the MULPOC office in Niamey by making a modest investment to accommodate the computer system already in place.

What is the implementation of the work programmes? The Economic Co-operation Office (ECO) conducted an evaluation of the programmes of all the MULPOCs for the 1977-84 period. The percentage rate of implementation per sector for Niamey was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% Rate of Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trade</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agriculture</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Irrigation &amp; Water Resources</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Industry</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Human Resources</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Assistance to IGOs</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. WADIS</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average (including women's component)</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures do not actually tell us the content of each sectoral programme implemented, nor the length of time used.
With regard to provision of technical advice, no advisory missions were programmed in this area and there was no request for assistance by the member states. At the request of the government of Niger, the experts in statistics and demography taught courses free of charge at the University of Niger. Also a national workshop to train documentalists was organized in Niamey from 9-20 January 1984. Fifty participants took part on this workshop which was fully financed by the ECA.

A closer examination of the work programme approved and executed so far shows that the MULPOC was mainly occupied with carrying out studies for the approved sectors. The programmes were not concrete projects in the sense of building a dam or irrigation canals, construction of infrastructures, for instance. The studies may be important but they cannot make the required impact on development because they do not fully address the important issues of development. Secondly, the rate of implementation given by the MULPOC is misleading in that it disguises the fact that it took a lengthy period to implement the programmes. All the studies were selected in 1978, but most were accomplished in 1984. Now if the programmes meant for the 1977-78 period were finally concluded in 1984, what has become of the programmes for subsequent years? Apart from the obvious obstacles to implementation, the MULPOC is not really equipped with organs for co-ordination, monitoring and evaluating programmes. Without these vital organs it is difficult to imagine that it can successfully implement programmes. With the type of programmes that are being carried out, one can conclude that the work of the MULPOC is to a large extent research-oriented.

It is true that the real problems in West Africa cannot be tackled without the studies. But we need different studies for different problems. The studies have to be directly related to the problems. We have to
remember that the real problems in this area include, mass poverty, dependence on the export of primary commodities, desertification, drought and famine, the burden of payment of subscriptions to IGOs. The majority of studies carried out so far have failed to address these. For example, in agriculture, the MULPOC conducted a study on climatic conditions and another on the harmonization of pricing policies for livestock between the states. Climate is only one factor which affects agriculture. Secondly, the countries sell their commodities directly to the industrialized ones and very little trade takes place between them. Another example is in the field of human resources where the MULPOC chose to prepare an inventory of specialized training institutions for rural development. This exercise offers little solution to the problem of unemployment, except perhaps in the long run. Even if states are aware of the number of such institutions, the exercise will not be useful unless they can fund them from year to year.

The programmes do not seriously address the issues of importance to African development, such as the use of appropriate technology; how best to utilize the natural and mineral resources; and the elimination of mass poverty and unemployment. The member states complained about the lack of initiative from the MULPOC in carrying out development activities, together with the lack of a more realistic approach which took into account its limitations. Moreover, the programmes are not flexible enough to accommodate immediate needs and the ideas of the LPA and APPER. This, for example, explains why the MULPOC was unable to assist the states in a meaningful manner during the drought of 1983-85.

Moreover, the member states are not properly briefed about the programmes. The Council of Ministers has recommended that starting
from 1988 the Director's Report should be concise. It should cover the activities undertaken and explain why certain activities were not undertaken, giving the reasons. The report was also to describe the human and financial resources that the MULPOC had for carrying out the activities.

5. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION AND ECA'S RESPONSE

The countries face problems of desertification, drought and famine. Their dependence on the export of primary commodities such as cocoa, cotton and ground nut meant that they were vulnerable to fluctuations in world market prices. They all face financial burdens from belonging to several IGOs - they have to pay subscriptions, especially in this era of scarce foreign exchange.

The problems stem from the fact that there are too many IGOs in the subregion. There are at least 32 such organizations at present, and they include 15 multilateral IGOs with members exclusively from West Africa; three bilateral IGOs with members exclusively from West Africa; and at least two multilateral IGOs with many members from West Africa and with their headquarters in West Africa. These IGOs were created between 1952 and 1980. For a date of creation, composition and types of IGOs, see Table 6.4. Belonging to one or two IGOs would have been less of a burden, but some states belong to more than 10. For example, Niger is a member of 25 IGOs, Burkina Faso (20), Senegal (20) and Ivory Coast (19) - see Table 6.6.

Taken individually as well as collectively, the IGOs have not contributed as much as was hoped for to collective self-reliance and self-sustaining growth and development in the area.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date of Creation</th>
<th>Total No. of Members</th>
<th>No. of Members from West Africa</th>
<th>Members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Multilateral IGOs whose members are exclusively from West Africa</td>
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<td>1. Conseil de l'Entente</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Organization for Coordination and Co-operation in the Fight Against Endemic Disease (OCCGE)</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Economic Community for Livestock and Meat (CEBV)</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo</td>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date of Creation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO)</td>
<td>1972 (but dates back to the UDAO created in 1960)</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal</td>
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<td>Organization for the development of Senegal River (OWVG)</td>
<td>1972 (but dates back to the OERS)</td>
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<td>West African Development Bank (BOAD)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>West African Health Community (WAHC)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mano River Union (MRU)</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>West African Monetary Union (UMOA)</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo</td>
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Table 6.4 (cont.)

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<tr>
<td>14. West African Clearing House (WACH)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Central Banks of all six BCEAO Countries, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone</td>
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B. Bilateral IGOs with members exclusively from West Africa

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<td>17. Senegambia Permanent Secretariat</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gambia and Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Electricity Community of Benin (CEB)</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>Benin and Togo</td>
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<th>Total No. of Members</th>
<th>No. of Members from West Africa</th>
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<tr>
<td>21. Inter-state Committee for Water Studies (CIEH)</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Gabon</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Cocoa Producers Alliance</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo, Brazil, Cameroon, Gabon</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. African Groundnut Council (AGC)</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date of Creation</td>
<td>Total No. of Members</td>
<td>No. of Members from West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Lake Chad Commission</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Common Organization for the Fight Against Locust and Fowl Pests (OCLALAV)</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Cameroon, Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. Inter-State Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS)</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Niger Basin Authority (NBA)</td>
<td>1980 (but dates back to the Niger Basin Commission created in 1963)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon</td>
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### Table 6.4 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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<th>Total No. of Members</th>
<th>No. of Members from West Africa</th>
<th>Members</th>
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<tr>
<td>D. Multilateral IGOs with many members from West Africa and with their Headquarters in West Africa</td>
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</table>

**Source:** Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, pp. 18-21.
### Table 6.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>IGOs with activities in the sector</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Natural Resources</td>
<td>OCAM, Liptako-Gourma Authority, CEAO, ECOWAS, CIEH, CILSS, Lake Chad Basin Commission, MRLI, Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for Co-operation, OCLALAV, OCGGE, OICMA, OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin Authority, Senegambia Permanent Secretariat. (Total = 16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Manpower Development</td>
<td>CAMES, CEAO, ECOWAS, CILSS, MRU, OCAM, OCGGE, WAHC, WARDA. (Total = 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Finance</td>
<td>OCAM, African Solidarity Fund, Council of Understanding, CEAO, ECOWAS, BAOD. (Total = 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Trade Liberation and Customs Union</td>
<td>CEAO, ECOWAS, MRU. (Total = 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Money</td>
<td>BCEAO, WACH, UMOA. (Total = 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, pp. 24-25.
There is also an absence of a coherent overall design or framework for achieving this objective. As a result, the more than 30 IGOs are characterized by heterogeneity in objective and diversity in membership, with many of them active in the same economic sector. Lacking any effective central co-ordinating mechanism to ensure that they all pull together in the same direction, they often work at cross-purposes and end up wasting scarce financial and human resources, stalemating their individual efforts at promoting the socio-economic development and integration of their member states. If we take the IGOs in Table 6.4, the sector-by-sector the picture that emerges is as follows: in every sector several IGOs are active. In agriculture, for example, there are 19 IGOs with programmes. Do the states need so many IGOs in each sector, especially for agriculture, natural resources, industry, transport and communications and manpower development?

The problem does not stop with duplication of programmes; there are problems involved in belonging to so many IGOs at the same time. Table 6.6 indicates the membership and types of IGOs. From the table the following ranking of membership emerges:

- Niger 25
- Burkina Faso 20
- Senegal 20
- Ivory Coast 19
- Benin 18
- Mali 17
- Togo 17
- Mauritania 12
- Gambia 10
- Nigeria 10
- Guinea 7
- Sierra Leone 6
- Ghana 5
- Liberia 5
- Guinea Bissau 3
- Cape Verde 2
Table 6.6  The West African Intergovernmental Organizations and their Membership

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
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The spread of membership is very wide, from a high of 25 in the case of Niger to a low of 2 in that of Cape Verde. The wider membership puts considerable strain on scarce foreign exchange; how can a country like Niger keep up with its subscription to 25 organizations?

With the exception of Guinea, the former French colonies belong to significantly more IGOs than other West African countries. Of the 32 IGOs the membership of 17 is made up exclusively of French-speaking countries. These are CAMES, OCAM, SADIAMIL, African Solidarity Fund, ASECNA, Liptako-Gourma Authority, OCBN, BCEAO, CEB, CIEH, OCCGE, OMVS, BOAD and UMOA. This is as a result of the geographical contiguity among the French-speaking countries and also a reflection of their unity during colonial rule and their desire to maintain many of their previous ties.

What was the demand made by the West African states concerning the IGOs? In 1978 when the ECA drafted the work programmes of this MULPOC, it was merely satisfied with acknowledging the fact that the IGOs existed. It felt that the IGOs needed assistance in the form of training facilities and promotional exercises. Because the countries were not aware of all the organizations in terms of their functions and benefits, the ECA felt that the best thing to do was the publication of a bulletin and directory on them. Finally, the ECA decided that it was best to identify areas for co-operation among the IGOs especially as regional economic integration was a theme highly popular at the time. So these aspects of the IGOs were incorporated into the work programmes. Member states went along with the ideas of the ECA by approving them in the policy organ.

The ECA did its best to carry out the programmes designed but in the early 1980s, the activities of the IGOs feature greatly
in the discussion of member states. This is still the case at present. It is now accepted by the states that the existence of rival customs unions and at least 30 other IGOs operating in varying fields such as banking and finance, food and agriculture, river basin development, health, transport and communications, clearing and payments, constitute a serious threat to rational and harmonious economic integration and, in the long run, to socio-economic development. The proliferation of relatively small IGOs, several of which rival and overlap or duplicate each other, has also led to the dispersal of manpower and financial resources, conflicts of interest and divided loyalties and an instability due to countries being members of several IGOs themselves. The cumulative result is that there is a lack of co-ordinated strategies, policies and actions at the subregional level.

The West African states complain of being called upon, in this era of recession to spend increasingly large amounts of scarce resources on the running of the IGOs, without obtaining correspondingly adequate returns and benefits. The states argue that the impact of the IGOs on the process of economic development and integration of the subregion has not only been minimal but has actually hindered that process. The member states through the decision-making organ of the ECOWAS referred to as the Authority of Heads of States and Government met to discuss the problems of the IGOs. At the sixth meeting of the policy organ of the ECOWAS held in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, in May 1983, they commissioned the ECA to prepare a study on the rationalization of economic co-operation efforts within West Africa.

A year before this decision was taken, the fifth meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Niamey MULPOC held in Banjul, Republic of the Gambia, February 1982, also commissioned the MULPOC to undertake
a comprehensive review and evaluation of multinational economic co-operation arrangements in the subregion, their structures, objectives and effectiveness in promoting subregional economic co-operation. The object of the exercise was to enable lessons to be drawn from past experiences of these bodies, so that solutions can be proposed for identified problems.

The ECA prepared the study commissioned by the sixth session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, which was entitled: Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa. The study was presented to the seventh session of ECOWAS held in Lome, Republic of Togo, in December 1984. After due consideration by this organ, the Authority requested by its decision A/DEC/2/11/84 that additional studies be carried out with the assistance of the ECA on the subject of rationalization of the IGOs. The ECA carried out the study with a team headed by Dr. O. Adewoye, Reader in History at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and submitted the proposal entitled: Proposals for the Rationalization of Intergovernmental Economic Organizations in West Africa in 1984.

The main demand from the member states concerning the IGOs is that they should be rationalized, the states want fewer IGOs and they also want their programmes co-ordinated and their strategies harmonized. Some of the IGOs themselves have taken steps to co-operate in their activities. For example, in September 1984, ECOWAS officials met in Lomé with representatives of two IGOs - the West African Health Community (WAHC) and the Organization for Co-ordination and Co-operation in the Fight Against Endemic Diseases (OCCGE). The meeting agreed on the need to create a single West African health institution which should be a specialized agency of ECOWAS. Steps are yet to be taken towards the rationalization of this objective.
A similar proposal was made by the study team. The only difference is that the latter recommended that all the IGOs should operate within the umbrella of ECOWAS. But before considering this, let us look at some of their findings. They found that the countries were not yet fully committed to the ideal of economic co-operation and collective self-reliance. With the exception of Cape Verde and Senegal, the development plans of others did not make any direct reference to collaborative efforts in the achievement of national economic goals. "West African governments were still, by and large, isolationists in their economic thinking - a situation which is at once a reflection of the minimal impact of the existing IGOs and the limited nature of the government's own commitment to the idea of economic co-operation and collective self-reliance." Also in most countries matters of economic co-operation were not accorded the same priority in the official mind as primarily national issues. Therefore at the national level more has to be done to make existing IGOs serve as effective engines of development.

However, the team did not take the view that there were too many IGOs. Their emphasis was on the relations between them. They stated that "what's fundamentally wrong with the organizations is not that they are too many, but that they are operating parallel to one another and sometimes at cross purposes. In theory each organization is a law unto itself - with its own specific mandate and functions". The organizations have not succeeded in working hand in hand. According to the team "the existing level of co-operation among the IGOs leaves much to be desired". Given the slow progress towards economic integration and the unsatisfactory and very limited gains from economic integration, the study team recommended the restructuring of the entire framework for economic co-operation. The strategy lays stress on the
integration of production rather than markets and the reduction of external dependency. The key features of the new framework will be four major community institutions - the West African Economic Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Economic Integration Planning Commission and Sectoral Commissions. The organizational structure for the new framework is as follows:

**Figure 2  Proposed Framework for Economic Integration in West Africa**


The West African Economic Summit of Heads of State and Governments is to decide on broad policies that affect the entire scope and process of economic integration. It will be in a position to decide on policies affecting all the IGOs. The Council of Ministers is to advise and assist the summit with its focus on the economy of the subregion and the role which the IGOs are playing (and should be playing) in it. It will have
the powers to recommend policies and programmes for particular IGOs. Its major function is to draw up annually specific programmes of economic development for the IGOs. The Economic Integration Planning Commission will be made up of a Chairman (Executive Secretary, ECOWAS), chief executives of developmental organs, one high level official representative of the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning of each state, a representative co-opted from the subregions solely on the basis of their expertise. It will be charged with the duty of synthesizing the programmes of the various sectoral commissions, and draw up broad prospective plans, with appropriate target sets, for the whole subregion.

The basic task of research and planning for economic integration falls on three institutions in the new scheme: ECOWAS Secretariat, the sectoral commissions and the Economic Integration Planning Commission. The ECOWAS Secretariat serves the seven proposed sectoral commissions:

(a) Agriculture and Natural Resources;
(b) Trade and Industries (chemical, engineering, mechanical and metallurgical);
(c) Energy and Water Resources;
(d) Transport and Communications;
(e) Monetary and Financial Affairs;
(f) Science and Technology (including research and development);
(g) Social and Cultural.

In serving the commissions, ECOWAS takes the initiative to prepare detailed position papers relevant to the task of each commission. The papers should take account of the work programmes of the IGOs. The commissions will be made up of appropriate IGOs and ministries of governments of the countries. The primary task of each is to see how
best to integrate the economies of the member states in its particular sector and draw up workable work programmes accordingly. The study team proposed arrangements for the headship of each commission:

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<td>1. Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
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<td>2. Energy and Water Resources</td>
<td>Niger Basin Authority</td>
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<td>3. Trade and Industries</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>4. Transport and Communications</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>5. Monetary and Financial Affairs</td>
<td>BOAD</td>
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<td>6. Science and Technology</td>
<td>CEAD</td>
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<td>7. Social and Cultural</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
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What the team proposed in effect was an arrangement for economic co-operation to be organized within one body. They based their argument on the fact that all the smaller organizations in their operation should be working within the one large organization provided they enjoy considerable autonomy in the implementation of their programmes. There are implications for this approach. First, the legal structure of the existing organizations would have to be reviewed. For example, ECOWAS would have to be given the formal powers of co-ordination as have been suggested. It is doubtful whether the present ECOWAS secretariat has the capacity to undertake an effective co-ordinating role. Secondly, there is also nothing to suggest that the IGOs will collaborate within the new framework proposed, especially as they have never done so in the past.

The study team had clearly underestimated the potential of the political implications of merging institutions or proposing for them
to collaborate. Even the smallest of the institutions will not willingly give in to such proposals. It may be in the interest of the IGOs to foster economic co-operation but it is a political move that will bring it about and, therefore, this factor should not be down-played. Even if the proposals were workable, it would seem that the team had only addressed the question of co-ordination. They overlooked the issues of overlap of functions and the fact that there were far too many IGOs. Also the member states have no financial resources to make the necessary subscriptions. It is difficult to see how one subregion can sustain more than 30 IGOs. Besides the subregion is not yet ready for the kind of ideas proposed here and so it is not surprising that their proposals have ended up like most of the other studies conducted by the ECA - on the shelves of the ECA library, that of its officials and in obscure corners of ministries of Economic Development and Planning of the member states. To a large extent, then, the ECA has not found solutions to the problems of the IGOs in West Africa.

6. CONCLUSION

The MULPOC in West Africa is a dream that has not been realized. It was established to extend the work of the secretariat to the subregions. The hope was that the impact of the secretariat would be felt by members states; that projects reflecting the needs of the subregions would be identified and implemented. But this has not happened. This is mainly because decentralization from the secretariat to the MULPOC has not been effected. The manpower and financial resources of the MULPOC are rather small.

The countries have warned that they cannot make financial
contributions because of the economic crisis they are experiencing. They asked the MULPOC to continue its search for funds without expecting money from them. The programmes are too many and consist mainly of studies and surveys. The programmes are based on a sector-by-sector approach and it means that they have independent programmes for each sector which are running parallel to each other. The periods for the execution of the projects are too long and the programmes do not reflect the immediate needs of the area - they include emergency relief action for drought and famine-stricken areas; programmes to counter the effects of desertification, to mention but two. Moreover, because they originate from the ECA instead of from the states, the latter do not identify fully with the programmes.

African states want the MULPOC to do more than carry out research and surveys. They want meaningful projects that would aid tangibly the process of socio-economic development in the region. Officials also complained that the ECA does not send them the agenda for meetings and programmes on time. So ministers arrive for conferences unprepared. They also have shorter periods to go through a mass of documents. The process of meetings becomes tiresome and in the end only a few issues are treated fully. Although the initial complaints were made in 1979, officials still felt the same about the preparations for meetings in the 1980s. It is a problem which affects all the MULPOCs and headquarter meetings as well.

A pressing problem in the region is that of proliferation of the IGOs. The idea of rationalization is being discussed, but it is doubtful whether the MULPOC will be able to cope with the rationalization issue. First, it has limited resources to carry out its own programmes, let alone those of the IGOs. Secondly, African states prefer the rationalization
to be effected under the auspices of ECOWAS. This finding of the study
team (1983) indicated that this is the case. So increasingly the states
identify more with ECOWAS than with the MULPOC. Their support for the
former was because they were in charge of its activities and took the
necessary decisions. The MULPOC was part of the UN system for which
they had very little role to play as far as drawing up and execution
of programmes were concerned. With these and other issues discussed
in this chapter, we conclude that the Niamey MULPOC is inefficient and
ineffective in the process of socio-economic development in the subregion.
It does not and cannot play a crucial role in the subregion because
of constraints in its terms of reference, structure and organs, financial
and manpower resources and above all its programmes which so far appear
to be unrealistic. These constraints are the main reasons why the Niamey
MULPOC is not a prime motivator nor a catalytic agent for subregional
development.

The member states have initiated changes to two aspects of policy.
First, they have asked for a re-definition of the purpose and scope
of the Niamey MULPOC. Secondly, they succeeded in altering the timing
of meetings of policy organs. The meetings are to be held biennially
from 1989. The decision has been adopted by all the MULPOCs. So in
terms of changes to policies the Niamey MULPOC has been both active
and a forerunner.
NOTES

1. During my field trip to the ECA in Addis Ababa in February 1987, the officials of the Economic Co-operation Office, ECA, were of the opinion that this was the most active of them all. They argue that members attend meetings and the officials reckon that they are pace-setters in terms of requests. The Niamey MULPOC was the first to request a review of the scope and structure of its organs. It was also the first to request a rescheduling of the annual meeting of its main organ. They want the meetings to be held biennially instead of the annual one.


4. For detailed features of the LDCs, see The LDC 1984 Report, prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Doc. TD/B/1027, UN, New York, 1984, pp. 1-5.


7. Report of the Ad hoc Committee set up to review the mandate of the MULPOC for West Africa and to Redefine its Scope of Activity, Doc. ECA/MULPOC/NIA/87/X/25/Rev.1, February 1987, p. 20. The terms of the Committee is set out in the Preface of this document.

8. Ibid.


11. Ibid., p. 20.


14. During my field trip to the ECA Secretariat in Addis Ababa, February 1987, officials of the ECO division confirmed that UNDP funding was not intended to be permanent.
15. Financial and Manpower Requirements for the Implementation of the Work Programme of the Niamey MULPOC, Doc. ECA/MULPOC/Niamey/3, April 1978, Table 8.

16. Ibid.


18. The problems of the MULPOC were highlighted by Mr. N.M. Mesemola, Senior Officer, ECO Division, ECA, Addis Ababa, during an interview conducted on 13 February 1987.

19. The decision was taken by the General Assembly Resolution 37/138, dated 17 December 1982.


21. Ibid.


23. Ibid.

24. Fieldwork to ECA Headquarters at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 1987. Mr. N.M. Mesemola assured us that 1989 was the date agreed upon by all the MULPOCs for the synchronization of the programmes of the Secretariat and the MULPOCs.


28. There are other kinds of activities which other MULPOCs have carried out such as workshops, seminars, symposiums. In the case of Niamey, its activities were mainly studies. In an area with problems such as desertification, droughts and famine, more promotional activities to bring the states together to discuss their plights are necessary.


31. Ibid., p. 4.


34. Ibid., p. 63.

35. Ibid., p. 64.


CHAPTER 7

ECA IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE LUSAKA MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (MULPOC)

1. INTRODUCTION

This MULPOC was established in November 1977 and serves the geographical area of Eastern and Southern Africa. Its members are Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. There are 18 countries in all, making this the largest MULPOC. It was created at a time when the impact of the 1973-74 oil crisis began to be felt by the member states. It was also a period which was to mark the beginning of a long and protracted drought in the subregion. For the countries, the decade has been characterized by the destabilization policies of South Africa.

At the international level it has been a decade marred by recession, high interest rates, protectionism and low prices of commodities. These factors have had a negative effect on the growth and development efforts of the countries. In essence, the MULPOC was operating in a hostile social and economic environment. The consequences of the adverse economic conditions served to heighten demands on the MULPOC but at best the latter was unable to provide sufficient services which were tailored to their needs. However, this MULPOC has fared better than the others because it had been able to establish the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). It is the only operating PTA in Africa so far. Before going into more details, a consideration of the
main features of the area is necessary. If the ECA is to make an impact on development, its programmes will have to reflect the peculiar needs of the countries. For it to be influential, it has to have the participation and the consent of the states.

2. **SALIENT FEATURES OF EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA**

One of the distinct features is the fact that half of the states are classified as LDCs. These are Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Somalia, Uganda and Tanzania. Their economies have structural deficiencies. With their low per capita income estimated at an average of $158 in 1985, these LDCs find it difficult to raise adequate savings necessary for development financing. They depend on single export commodities which face inelastic demand and declining prices in international markets. Industrial production is limited to a few import-substitute processing activities with very high import-content, a condition which exerts pressure on foreign exchange resources to import raw materials and spare parts. Also for most of the countries, the average level of living is far below the attainable possibilities.

The ECA defined the area both ecologically and economically as one subregion, where as in reality there are two distinct areas, that is, the Eastern and the Southern parts. So, although all the countries face the same challenge of development, namely, the urge to modernize their economies, the Eastern states have no direct links with South Africa. They are therefore not heavily dependent on the latter, neither do they suffer from its policies of destabilization. For the Southern states, their efforts are geared towards the reduction of dependency on South Africa.
South Africa as the dominant power in the subregion has used a mixture of stick and carrot policies which has enabled it to stretch friendly arms to Malawi, for instance, while engage in border raids against ANC targets. Countries like Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique have been constant targets of such raids. Its raids on Maputo, Mozambique, left six blacks and a Portuguese technician dead in 1981. In 1985, 15 people were killed in a raid on Gaborone, Botswana. Pretoria claimed that the ANC "nerve centre" was destroyed. It has been estimated that this destabilization policy has cost the Frontline States (FLS) about US$ 10 billion over the last five years in destroyed infrastructure, apart from the vast destruction of human lives. The instability weakens the economies and creates political instability and conflicts.

The economic dependence of some states on South Africa is an important issue which has dominated their relations. For Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, their main trading partner is South Africa. They depend on her for imports and exports, especially migrant labour. For details of tradeable commodities and amounts involved, see Table 7.1. The urge to modernize and this economic dependence have given rise to patterns of economic co-operation ventures. The Lusaka Declaration 1980 led to the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) for which nine states in the MULPOC are members - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. According to Mmusi (1980), SADCC "is an exercise in collective self-reliance in furtherance of the basic needs of our people for economic security and development. SADCC is a part of the broader efforts towards African co-operation and development over the period 1980-2000, adopted by Heads of State and Governments of the OAU."
The emphasis of SADCC is on co-ordination of efforts and although the strategy adopted initially was the development of physical infrastructure, especially transport and communication network, by 1987 it was broadened to include the productive sector. Its objectives include the reduction of economic dependence in general and that on South Africa in particular; the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration; the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, inter-state and regional policies; and the concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of the strategy for economic co-operation. In a wider context, these objectives bear similarities to those of the MULPOC. The only difference is the lack of emphasis on economic dependence of the states within the MULPOC. Secondly, the objectives coincide with those of a second institution in the area established by the ECA in 1982, referred to as the PTA. Its aim is to eliminate tariff barriers on selected commodities produced. Its sectors overlap those of SADCC and also both institutions serve the same states, with the exception of Angola, Botswana and Mozambique which are members of SADCC but not in the PTA. For the ECA/MULPOC, the PTA is one of the shining examples of the measure of success and achievement of regional co-operation in Africa. The PTA is treated in detail at the latter part of this chapter, but it is necessary to note the setting of regional co-operation ventures.

Both SADCC and the PTA are necessary for the development of the states, but there is the need to co-ordinate their activities with those of the MULPOC to avoid overlap and duplication of work. At the moment, SADCC has an informal relationship with the PTA and none whatsoever with the MULPOC. The PTA was an ECA's idea. Its officials drew up the protocol and treaty and also provided technicians to work with the
states during the negotiations and the conclusion of the treaty. The Commission also organized the publicity for the PTA. But once the latter took shape it strived to be an entity in its own right and at present the formal link with the Commission has been severed.

By 1983 it was obvious to the state members and the officials of the IGOs that the MULPOC, the PTA and SADCC were operating within similar sectors, such as trade, agriculture and industry. The member states requested the ECA to look into the possibility of co-ordinating efforts and the latter responded by establishing a sub-committee to consider the matter. But the committee did not operate by 1985. The state repeated the request and through the Council of Ministers meeting in 1986 they endorsed the idea that there should be a meeting of the IGOs with similar functions to iron out the modalities for co-operation. The organizations included the FAO, the PTA, SADCC, Centro Internazionale de Mejoriamento de Maize Y Trigo (CIMMYT) - the English acronym is IMWIC (the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre) - the Co-operation for Development in Africa (CDA) and the International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE). But again the IGOs have not yet met as at November 1988. It is not very clear whether the ECA has approached the IGOs from the meetings of its policy organs.

Other features of the area include the huge resources of minerals, a relatively well-developed level of agricultural technology in a few countries, especially Kenya and Zimbabwe, and the immense potential of hydro-electric power. With reference to the latter, the potential for the PTA is estimated at nearly 106,000 mw, it is capable of producing an average amount of about 600 billion kvh per annum. The current installed capacity is estimated at 6,382 mw, representing only 6 per cent of the potential available.
The major hydro-power resources are located on the Zambezi River Basin whose technically exploitable potential is estimated at 16,023 mw. Angola and Mozambique possess almost 30 per cent of this potential – Angola has the largest potential with 23,000 mw, followed by Mozambique with 15,000 mw, Zambia 12,000 mw, Tanzania 9,500 mw and Zimbabwe with 3,800 mw. (Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia are self-sufficient in electricity production.)

In terms of mineral resources, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania possess iron ore and natural gas. Uganda, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola and Rwanda also possess natural gas. Zambia and Tanzania have coal and the area is endowed with some of the highest grade bauxite, copper, cobalt, coal, gypsum and limestone. Phosphate rock deposits exist in Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, while potash deposits are found in Ethiopia. The brine used for potassium-based fertilizers is available in Botswana and Tanzania. Therefore, these states have a high potential for the production of fertilizers.

In addition to minerals the area has agricultural potentials. Even though subject to periodic droughts and desertification, Zimbabwe and Malawi produce on average more than their domestic requirements of maize, the most important staple food of the area. Botswana, Zimbabwe and Kenya are major beef producers and have been important exporters of the EEC. There is abundant agricultural land and a potential for irrigation. 60 per cent of the subregion is endowed with lakes and rivers and yet only a small percentage of their water resources is used. Also only a small proportion of their arable land is under utilization.

Robert G. Mugabe, as Chairman of the PTA in 1985, stressed the importance and potentials of the region, when he stated thus: "In our
subregion, there is a large market of about 140 million people and a gross domestic product (GDP) estimated at $60 billion. He also referred to the mineral resources of the area being the envy of many countries in the world, and pointed out that the area stretching from South Africa to North Zaire has been referred to as the "gulf of mineral or the most critical piece of ground ..." Together, they produce most of the world's diamonds, chrome, platinum and manganese, and a significant share of the world's uranium, coal, nickel, copper and cobalt.

In as much as there are similarities between the countries, we cannot ignore the diversities, especially among the nine members of the SADCC and PTA in particular and the MULPOC in general. Such diversities relate to their populations, sizes, output per capita, political ideologies and loyalties. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are committed under the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement of 1969 to seek South African approval before entering into any other trading arrangements. These states are often described as 'South Africa's economic hostages'. Customs revenue payments - handouts the three get from South Africa in return for letting in South Africa's goods free of duty - are by far Swaziland's and Lesotho's biggest source of government revenue. They are second only to mining receipts from Botswana, which (unlike the two) is a large, sparsely-populated country. The three depend on South Africa, not just for customs money. The South African company De Beers owns half of Botswana's diamond mines. The latter and Swaziland share long borders with South Africa, and Lesotho is entirely encircled. In addition to the three, South Africa is Zimbabwe's largest trading partner.

All but three of the SADCC states - Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique -
are landlocked. The three states are the natural entry and exit points for the region's trade, but their roads, rail and port facilities are inadequate. Terrorist disruptions (probably backed by South Africa) of Mozambique ports, railways, roads and oil pipelines have discouraged and sometimes prevented Zimbabwe and Malawi from moving goods through Mozambique. Much traffic, therefore, has to go through South Africa. At least 60 per cent of Zimbabwe's trade uses South African railways and ports. About half of Zambia's imports and exports travel on this southern route.

This mixture of uneasy co-existence and political dilemmas facing the states provides the uniqueness of the area. It also brings to the fore the idea of the inseparable nature of the politics and economics of the countries. We have a situation whereby, on the one hand, the states are in conflict with South Africa because of apartheid. On the other, the forces of development and the conflicts have forced the states into a tight corner by their dependence on South Africa. Although trading is first and foremost an economic venture, its political undertone is provided for by the fact that the states have to make the political decisions as to whether or not to trade with South Africa. Quett Masire, Chairman of the SADCC (1983), defined the common dilemma when he stated that "it is difficult for us to be seen championing the cause of sanctions against South Africa when in fact it is going to hurt us before it hurts South Africa". It is the same force making for the political considerations and decisions to establish co-operative ventures such as the SADCC and PTA.

A number of states have conflicting political and economic loyalties. These include the three states of the now defunct East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), the two states with a history of mutual
strife (Ethiopia and Somalia), and the three states - Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland - which as has already been mentioned are members of SACU.
Mozambique is tied to the South African economy by historical links
such as electricity supplies, railway and harbour connections, and migrant
labour remittances. Also, on 16 March 1984, the late President Samora
Machel signed a non-aggression and good neighbourliness pact with South
Africa on the Nkomati River. 20

There are also ideological divisions, with Malawi, Lesotho,
Swaziland and Zambia as sceptics in the PTA. The believers are the FLS of Angola,
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

The similarities of the states are provided for by factors such
as the problems relating to food security, animal disease control and
agricultural research exacerbated by current drought cycles, especially
in the 1982-84 period; they face constraints of the lack of foreign
exchange for the importation of food, manufactured goods and spare
parts; they all share the view that economic development necessitates
industrialization and this involves creating the capacity to convert
their raw materials into manufactured goods; they want to decrease
existing dependence on South Africa and they support the movement to-
wards political independence and majority black rule in Namibia, the
abolition of apartheid and the subsequent establishment of real
democracy in South Africa.

Two important points which cannot be ignored are: first, the fact
that the ECA is aware of the economic potentials and the problems facing
the states especially the landlocked and LDCs. But the greater part
of its programmes are wrong in the sense that they are studies not for
the immediate use by the states. The details of its programmes are treated in a separate sub-heading later on. Issues such as raids on neighbouring states by South Africa and how to go about assisting the victims on a collective basis have not been put on the agenda of any policy organ of the MULPOC, neither have they included a programme for helping the drought victims. Also they have not carried out studies on how best to overcome the drought in the long term.

The Commission has a tradition of avoiding political issues in the subregions. But as in the case of North Africa, political and economic matters are not only interrelated, but also, shape the character of each area in general but also in Southern Africa in particular. A blend of programmes reflecting both aspects is essential and necessary if the Commission wants the states to participate in its activities.

3. STRUCTURES, ORGANS, FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER RESOURCES

The main objectives of this MULPOC are similar to that of others. Its predominant role is to promote economic co-operation. By 1985 the increase in the activities of the IGOs led the secretariat to consider extending technical assistance to them if and whenever there were requests. In particular, the MULPOC wanted to execute projects on behalf of the IGOs. But although it has made its intention known it has not worked out the basis on which to operate and the sort of projects it wishes to concentrate on. But taking on additional tasks is bound to put a strain on the already limited resources of the MULPOC. It will also mean an increase on the workload of the officials at the headquarters.
The MULPOC has two policy organs, namely, the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Officials. But the main tasks they performed were the endorsement of decisions originating from the headquarters, and the servicing of the meetings. The states do not participate in the drawing up of the programmes and activities for each period. Reading through the reports we noted that the meeting of the two main policy organs will be held every two years starting with 1989. The change was initiated by the Niamey MULPOC when member states argued that they needed more time to prepare for the meetings and that the timing will allow the MULPOC to carry out its programmes and then report to them.

This MULPOC also established technical committees, such as the Inter-governmental Negotiating Team (INT) which handled the studies and negotiation for the setting up of the PTA. A similar body exists in the MULPOC of North Africa (Tangiers) where the ECA is working towards the establishment of another PTA. The other committee which existed from 1981 to December 1987 was the subregional Committee for the Women's Programme. But the ECA had to abandon the programme when the UNDP withdrew funding.

Subsequently, the Committee has been dissolved. Finally, the MULPOC has a Supervisory Committee made up of Ambassadors, Commissioners and Charges d'Affaires of the member states accredited to Zambia and a representative of the government of Zambia. It was established in 1981 and its meetings were held at least twice a year or as and when required for the review of activities and the discussion of briefings from the secretariat. The Supervisory Committee acts as a liaison between the MULPOC secretariat and the member states, thus providing regular and extra channels of communication. Since the policy organs met once a year, there was the need for it to frequently maintain the
flow of information with the secretariat.

But the Committees have not been functioning smoothly. There were instances where the activities of the INT extended to those of the Supervisory Committee. For example, the meetings of the latter at Gaborone (Botswana) in 1980 and Maseru (Lesotho) in 1981 were dominated by officials from the ministries responsible for external trade because of the INT negotiations on the PTA taking place at the time. These trade officials were then accredited to the meetings of the Committee of Officials as representatives of their countries in place of the regular officials from the Ministries of Economic Development. The evaluation mission 1982 reported that the move led to a break in continuity in follow-up and also decreased awareness in the activities of the MULPOC among officials not responsible for trade. The incidents showed lack of control by the secretariat in letting the wrong set of officials into particular meetings. It also shows that they were not serious about using normal processes.

The UNDP provided the funds for the MULPOC secretariat from 1978 to 1982 when for the MULPOCs including Niamey, Gisenyi and Yaounde were placed under the regular budget of the ECA. The Tangier MULPOC has always been financed through the regular budget. What this meant in practice was that the ECA provided for the running costs of the secretariat, while the UNDP provided the money for its programmes. In the case of the other four, they had to depend on extra-budgetary funds for running costs as well as programme costs. The total amounts allocated by the UNDP during its second programme cycle (1977-81) were as follows;
RAF/76/024 - MULPOC (Lusaka) 2,482,180
RAF/76/025 - MULPOC (Niamey) 1,866,789
RAF/76/026 - MULPOC (Yaounde) 1,916,308
RAF/76/023 - MULPOC (Gisenyi) 1,188,501

7,453,778


The UNDP increased its contributions to the MULPOCs in 1979 by US$ 1 million and the money was specifically for those projects related to the integration of women in the process of development. That increase was reflected in the figures above. It meant that Lusaka had the highest amount with US$ 2,482,180, but it is understandable being the largest MULPOC. However, the amount was quite low compared to the number of programmes which were scheduled for the period. What started out as temporary funding by the UNDP became the life-line of all the MULPOCs, with the exception of Tangiers. The ECA was unable to secure funding and when the UNDP warned that it was going to withdraw funding from the MULPOCs the ECA finally got the General Assembly to include them in the regular budget in 1982. But the growth rate of the regular budget of the former has remained the same.

Lusaka is suffering from lack of funds and so programmes have been terminated, abandoned or postponed. One of the programmes hardest hit by the withdrawal of UNDP funds was the Women's Programme which was terminated for all the MULPOCs in December 1987. Since then the Commission has made various efforts to revive this programme and has made several presentations to the UNDP.
The latter has been expressing dissatisfaction at the way the ECA was utilizing its funds. So when the secretariat asked for further increases the UNDP took the position that more funds would not be made available unless there was a review and evaluation of previous programmes. This formed the basis of the joint UNDP/ECA evaluation missions to the Gisenyi, Lusaka, Niamey and Yaounde MULPOCs in 1987. The officer-in-charge of the Lusaka MULPOC stated that "the amount to be obtained for the UNDP Fourth Programming Cycle is yet to be determined".23

The UNDP is unlikely to provide the funds for two reasons. The first has to do with the fact that it has established its own women’s programme in April 1987. Secondly, it has laid down conditions for future funding based on the finding of the evaluation missions. The report stated that money allocated was used for administrative costs such as payments of salaries of co-ordinators and travel costs, instead of the implementation of programmes. The UNDP/ECA mission, therefore, recommended that any proposal presented to the UNDP for the women’s programme should only be entertained if the ECA meets three conditions:

(a) take charge of the women’s co-ordinators' costs at the subregional level;

(b) finance the subregional committee meetings; and

(c) provide a post in the ATRCW for technical support of the programme.24

Clearly the UNDP wants the ECA to use its funds for the programmes. But with the present financial problems facing the latter, it is unlikely to meet the conditions. This makes the lack of finance a major constraint on the MULPOCs. Contributions from member states have been mostly in kind, for example, the despatch of secondment of their nationals
to the MULPOC secretariat when needed, and the provision of office
buildings by host governments. Financial contributions are mostly for
specific programmes. For example, Botswana contributed US$ 3,000 for
the women's programme and a further US$ 3,428 for the promotion of food
for the 1982-87 period.\textsuperscript{25}

Another constraint on the MULPOC concerns the staffing level.
Between 1977-82 the MULPOC had irregular staffing because the officials
were recruited on a contract basis and once the studies and reports were
made, the contracts were terminated. Then in 1982 the ECA made proposals
to the General Assembly for the financing of the MULPOC through the
regular budget. The following posts were proposed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lusaka</th>
<th>staffing</th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-1</td>
<td>P-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Report of the ECOSOC on Financing of the MULPOCs of the ECA
on an Established Basis, General Assembly A/C.5/37/92,
9 December 1982, p. 3.

Key

D-1 is the head of the MULPOC (Director), a political appointee.
He is responsible for implementing programmes approved by
the policy organization. He consults government officials
at the ministerial level and also officials of UN agencies
and other IGOs. The position is open to academics, politicians
and long-standing officials of international institutions.

P-5 and P-3 These are the senior offices/economic affairs officers who
undertake sectoral and topical studies: design programmes.
They assist the heads of the MULPOC and are usually civil
servants recruited through normal UN processes.

Local Level These are staff recruited for general service. They are made
up of administrative officers and their assistants, secretaries,
telephonists, clerical officers, drivers, cleaners and messengers.
The proposal revealed that the ECA was still aiming at providing skeleton staff. It is difficult to comprehend what four professionals can do given the size and structure of the MULPOC. It is also strange that the MULPOC reported that "during the period 1977-83 when UNDP was the major source of funding, the staffing of the Lusaka MULPOC was fairly satisfactory. But since 1983 when the General Assembly decided to incorporate the funding, the Lusaka MULPOC has only been operating with a core staff of only four professionals ..."26 Looking back at the proposals indicating that for the existing posts, the MULPOC had two professionals and four local level staff, one can hardly call this a satisfactory level of staffing.

Ironically, the staffing position since 1983 is an improvement. In addition to the four professionals, the UNDP provided for two additional staff for the women's programme under the United Nations Volunteer System (UNVS).27 Even with this increase the argument is that the level of staffing is inadequate to support the activities of the secretariat. The Commission acknowledged this when it stated that "it is obvious that with such a relatively meagre staff component, the heavy responsibilities entrusted to the Lusaka MULPOC will be difficult to achieve".28

For the 1986-87 period, the secretariat reported that its manpower resources remained the same. Even though three additional staff have been assigned there, administrative and other constraints have delayed their arrival in Lusaka.29 Low level of staffing was one problem, the other was high staff turnover. Failure to recruit and retain top level professional staff in adequate numbers militated against the MULPOC. The high turnover was due to contracts of at most 12 months at a time. The temporary appointments created a feeling of insecurity for the workers. The short periods were given because funds were guaranteed by donors on a yearly basis only. The result is low morale and despondency.
4. LUSAKA MULPOC: WORK PROGRAMMES

In 1977 the Council of Ministers adopted programmes in seven sectors - trade, transport, agriculture, human resources, integration of women in development. In the 1980s three more programmes were added, which were: assistance to liberation movements, ESADIS (1983) and industry. These were the priority areas selected by the ECA substantive division for the MULPOC and they were based on the work programme of the UNDAT. This method of selection was used in the case of the Niamey and Tangier MULPOCs which had a history of being subregional offices. It does not mean that the ECA had checked to see if the programmes were still of relevance once the UNDATs were dissolved. For each sector chosen, the secretariat had sets of objectives and strategies as will be shown later.

The work programme is formulated and to a large extent implemented by the ECA headquarters. There was no medium-term plan designed for the subregion. Between 1978-83 the programmes were drafted annually, but in 1984 a draft of planned activities for a three-year period 1985-87 was proposed. The secretariat explained this as an attempt to synchronize the work programme of the MULPOC with those of the headquarters. It maintained that the move was to avoid duplication of efforts and to secure maximum utilization of all available resources. One might question the wisdom behind such a move, bearing in mind that the headquarters operates a six-yearly programme, which is then reviewed biennially. Why go for a three-year work programme then? Until the MULPOC adopts identical programming processes with those of the headquarters, synchronization remains an illusion. There is evidence to suggest that the work programmes have been reformulated to reflect the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action with its emphasis on agriculture as a top priority for the attainment of self-sufficiency in food production. The ECA was still
carrying out programmes endorsed in 1978 as part of the demand for a NIEO.

(a) **Transport**

In this sector, the MULPOC aimed at the development of shipping services and pooling arrangements for the ocean and the coast, and the creation of national freight booking centres. It also aimed and implemented programmes related to the United Nations Transport and Communications Decade in Africa. For the latter it implemented projects for the Tanzania-Zambia Railways (TAZARA) and these took the form of the purchasing of shunting locomotives, wagons, cranes, construction of villas at the new Kapiri Mposhi Station; track rehabilitation; provision of signalling facilities and financing of training abroad in new technologies and management. Under manpower development in transport, assistance was given to ESAMI in conducting a railways improvement course for SADCC member states and in the evaluation of a course on road transport fleet operations, maintenance and management. In 1981 the policy organs recommended that the terms of the national shipper's councils be adopted and that the MULPOC should undertake missions to assist the countries in establishing their respective national freight bureau. This was not implemented and in 1984 the PTA decided to undertake a similar project. The MULPOC is no longer handling the project. An ad hoc meeting of the member states and the EEC in July 1980 adopted the terms of reference for the establishment of a multinational coastal shipping line, and again in 1984 the PTA stepped in for its implementation. A feasibility study was conducted in 1981 on the establishment of a joint inland water transport venture on the lower Zambezi river and the definition of types of vessels suitable for the Zambezi, Kafue and Kabompo rivers. It also conducted a study on the harmonization of the various transport modes
in the subregion in 1985. With the help of UNCTAD, it completed a study on a priority transport programme for the landlocked states and the copies were made available to member states.

Finally, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded a prefeasibility study on the Cairo-Gaborone Trans-East African Highway (TEAH). Apart from the studies, the MULPOC purchased equipment for the TAZARA, making the transport sector one of the areas where the ECA was active and also where it was breaking away from the usual routine of conducting research, seminars and workshops.

(b) Agriculture

The promotion of animal health through the control of animal diseases and the creation of multinational integrated rural development schemes for Tanzania/Zambia and Kenya/Ethiopia were the objectives proposed for the agriculture sector. We must remember the importance of this sector and the fact that the area had experienced spells of drought and desertification. Five programmes were considered in all. The Kenya/Ethiopia project was approved in 1977 but no action was taken. In 1982 the policy organs decided to retain it in the work programme but until the end of 1988 nothing has been done. The same applied in the case of the Tanzania/Zambia project. Reading through the ECA literature there was no mention of the areas of interest nor the details of the integrated development schemes.

The control of animal diseases was also approved in 1977 and in 1982 the policy organs endorsed the recommendation of the first meeting of the Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) Advisory Committee on the methods of control. But this was the only action taken.

On the establishment of a Maize Research Centre, the proposal was
approved in 1980 and the feasibility study was completed in 1983. In 1984, the Council of Ministers decided to establish a small co-ordinating centre for the support and training of national officials at the MULPOC premises. A project document was prepared by the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to assist in the search for funds. It was hoped that the centre will go a long way in increasing maize production of the area, thereby contributing to the achievement of self-sufficiency in food, improvement of nutrition and the income of farmers. But the secretariat reported that "due to lack of funds the programme has not been implemented".  

Finally, there was the first ECA/FAO project analysis course, approved in 1982. The aim of which was to improve the analytic capabilities of the countries. The programme did not get off the ground and the reason given was that "member states have not yet made any financial contribution to the programme in order to convince the other donors such as the FAO that the governments were serious about its implementation".

(c) Human Resources Sector

The programmes for this sector aimed at the creation of multinational indigenous consultancy agencies, the conversion of technical schools and facilities at various national universities into subregional ones and the examination of the question of migratory labour. But the MULPOC put more emphasis on migratory labour because it was one source of foreign exchange especially for the SADCC countries. In 1980 the MULPOC was instrumental in establishing the Southern African Labour Commission (SALC). This is an inter-governmental organization made up of Ministers of Labour. The MULPOC at present acts as its interim secretariat and also assists in the preparation of documents, projects
in employment creation and also advisory services. The MULPOC also offers a continuous type of activity consisting of technical guidance on the harmonization of policies concerning migrant workers to South Africa. This is provided for by the officials of the ECA headquarters participating in the meeting of the SALC.

The MULPOC also converted the Eastern African Management Institute (EAMI) into the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) based at Arusha, Tanzania, in 1980. This programme was approved by the policy organ in 1977. Although ESAMI was one of the few ECA-sponsored inter-governmental institutions which was able to generate funds to finance some of its activities, it was still short of members. In 1986 it urged more members to sign its constitution and pay subscriptions to enable it to fulfil its mandate. 34

But there has been no response to date. The reasons might be that member states were putting their resources towards the programmes of SADCC, that is, for the Southern states. On the other hand, the Eastern states such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda are facing economic problems and the scarcity of foreign exchange.

The third programme implemented was the establishment of an Association of the Eastern and Southern African Consultancy Organizations in 1979. However, the proposal failed to materialize due to lack of funds. Finally, the MULPOC established the African Institute for Higher Technical Training and Research (AIHTTR) based in Nairobi, Kenya. In this sector, the MULPOC concentrated its efforts in establishing institutions for both manpower training and for issues relating to migratory labour. But establishing institutions is one thing, their ability and capacity to operate effectively is another. As mentioned in Chapter 4 such institutions have become obstacles rather than useful instruments
for development because of duplication of their activities. For example, the activities of AIHTTR and the ESAMI are identical in the field of manpower training. Because of the sheer number of these institutions, member states are having problems in paying subscriptions. The result is that they refrain from joining and paying of subscriptions. And more importantly, most of the countries have provisions for manpower training on the national level and so do not see much point in using the subregional equivalents.

(d) Natural Resources Sector

One of its objectives in this sector was the establishment of the Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Centre (ESAMRDC) in Dodoma, Tanzania. ESAMRDC faced operational problems from its establishment in 1977. It has only six members and only three have contributed to its budgets - Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mozambique. The number is low when we realize that the figure for potential membership is 18. The assessed contribution from members was US$ 2,131,600 for the period 1978-85. Actual payments received was US$ 1,115,185, while the outstanding arrears since December 1984 was US$ 1,016,487.

The development of water resources was another programme, approved in March 1984. The Council of Ministers decided to establish a subregional committee for it. However, financial and manpower constraints have hampered progress in setting up the committee and in placing a water expert at the secretariat. It also planned the setting up of another subregional committee on energy, after the proposal was approved in March 1982. Again, it has not been able to go ahead with this and it attributed its inability to "the lack of follow-up on the part of the substantive division concerned". This is an example of what can happen when the MULPOC depends too much on headquarters to implement its programmes.
The programmes are usually delayed and sometimes abandoned. And now that the MULPOC is facing financial problems the chances of implementing these programmes by itself are slim.

(e) The Women's Programme

Since 1980, as an integral part of the MULPOC the operations of the women's programme have encompassed a wide range of activities which aimed at providing women with knowledge and skills that will enhance their contribution in development. The ECA is keen on the utilization of human resources in Africa but this programme is rather ill-defined with no specific goals relating to the various aspects of development. It makes sweeping statements such as the integration of women in the process development, but what does this mean? Also in which sectors does it intend to carry out the process of integration? The development problem envisaged to be solved by the programme relates to developing and effective utilization of human resources provided by women for the development of the countries.

The ECA took the position that development of women's potential and promoting their full participation in development would advance them socially, economically, culturally and otherwise. It addressed the problem on one level by the training of women leaders, managers and trainers for programmes that benefit women. The training was through subregional and inter-country workshops, seminars, study tours and six workshops and two surveys. The programmes were implemented during the 1980-86 period. The training courses were held at the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) with the theme, "Women, Management and Development Planning: An African Perspective" in 1982. They also included one at the Suba Centre, Khartoum, Sudan, for skills in handicraft and small-scale industries and another at the Somalia
Women's Democratic Organization Centre in Mogadiscis. One main flaw in all the training facilities provided is the fact that they were short term and were not repeated to reach a wider audience and the number of women who attended were not disclosed by the MULPOC. The programme designed to enhance the skills of senior women managers was held on 16-23 May 1983. Such a course is essential for manpower development and would have positive effect if held from time to time. If held once as in this case it is difficult to assess its impact.

Another development problem tackled by the programme related to increasing sensitivity of both men and women leaders, decision makers and planners with regard to taking women's development needs and concerns into full account in drawing national development plans and programmes, according to the ECA. The approach used to address this problem was the training of men and women leaders and planners, organizing technical meetings sharing of experiences through advocacy during various regular meetings, such as all ECA policy organs meetings. The ECA claimed that the programme "ensured consideration of gender issues in the conceptualization and the development of all relevant sectoral strategies ..." 39

The workshops organized in addition to the training were:
(a) subregional workshop on the utilization of research by national machineries for the integration of women in development, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, 1982; (b) national workshop on project planning, implementation and evaluation in Zimbabwe (1982); (c) women organizers and trainers in Swaziland (1982); (d) project formulation workshop for franco-phone countries, 15-27 February 1982. Representatives from Angola, Comoros and Madagascar attended. (e) workshop on the impact of government policies, structures and programmes on the involvement of women in development, in Kabwe, Zambia, 29 June-4 July 1981. It was co-sponsored by UNICEF,
PAID and the ECA\textsuperscript{40} but there was no mention of the amounts contributed nor the reasons why the other two organizations contributed; (f) workshop on the role of women in agriculture and rural development held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 3–8 December 1984.

The seminars conducted included one on fuel-wood and energy development for African women held in Zambia on 18–23 April 1983. It was co-sponsored by the FAO - again there was no mention of the actual contribution made. The other was on information about establishing and strengthening of national machinery for integration of women in development on 28 September–1 October 1982 in Malawi. Given the type of diagnosis the ECA made about the development problems, one cannot help but feel that the programmes implemented were unrealistic. Having pockets or small groups of women attending such activities can hardly make an impact on their needs.

Apart from being short-lived they failed to address the real issues facing the women such as lack of access to education, employment and housing to mention but a few. Moreover, the problems of women in development are multi-dimensional and culturally-bound. Therefore, organizing a workshop for technical skills will be advantageous for women already in some form of employment, but for the unemployed it is not so helpful. If the problem is, for example, lack of skills or access to skilled jobs, education or housing, then the problems have to be tackled at the national or regional levels, rather than the approach of random selection of women to attend seminars and workshops. Even the ECA admitted that its programmes for women were not very successful in achieving the stated objectives when it warned that "abrupt change and solution to the problems is not to be expected since such problems are attributed to attitudes and structural set ups".\textsuperscript{41} However,
it claimed that considerable impact has been achieved in increasing sensitivity and awareness on gender issues, though it admitted also that a lot more needs to be done through continued efforts to achieve full equity and effective participation of women in the development process. 42

In the case of assistance to liberation movements, it was unable to carry out the two studies planned because of lack of funds. The secretariat offered them assistance by way of funding their representatives at its policy organ meetings.

(e) Telecommunications

The secretariat is going ahead with its plans to establish the Eastern and Southern Africa Documentation and Information System (ESADIS) in Lusaka. The aim of ESADIS is to identify, collect, process and disseminate subregional information, to promote information exchange and to provide assistance to governments and IGOs in improving their information handling capabilities. It is part of the programme for the Transport and Telecommunications Decade in Africa. The computer and related equipments for the programme had been delivered at Lusaka in 1984. In an effort to have more people trained in its methodologies, ECA/PADIS was negotiating with the University of Botswana to have the methodologies included in the syllabus of library studies. It is also arranging with the Government of Zambia for the site and as at June 1988 ESADIS has not been operational. If established and managed properly, it will have potential because of its information data bank on the various aspects of socio-economic development of the area in particular and the whole of Africa in general. The delay is as a result of the legal matters to be cleared, the question of funds, personnel to support the programme to mention but a few.
The programmes for this sector were not included in the work programme until 1979. The aim was to establish iron and steel engineering industries. A consultant prepared the report in 1984 and recommended that the member states should provide the Zimbabwe Steel Industry (ZISCO STEEL) with the relevant data to enable it to plan and implement its rehabilitation, expansion and diversification programmes. No progress was reported and the programme was omitted from the 1985-87 work programme.

The next programme was the establishment of chemical industries, for which questionnaires were distributed to the states. The response was rather poor. The states were a bit confused with the type of questions posed. The evidence for giving this reason was the fact that the policy organs directed that the secretariat should assist the states to fill out the questionnaires in 1984. This was done. The MULPOC then went on to encourage the states to purchase their ammonia and urea from Tanzania instead of outside Africa.

In 1984 a tour of five countries was undertaken by the ECA/FAO/UNIDO Forest Industries Advisory Group for Africa (FIAG) to brief the states on the furniture market potential of the Gulf states and to agree on a follow-up export promotion programme. Potential donors, that is, the Arab League and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa were being contacted, but so far no concrete arrangements have been concluded.

The ECA gave the overall implementation rate of the work programme as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% Rate of Implementation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transport</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Natural Resources</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Human Resources</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Assistance to liberation movements</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ESADIS</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (including women's component)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the ECA does not actually state how it arrived at the figures for all the implementation rates of the MULPOCs, the following observations have been made: First, the low figure for the transport and natural resources sector was reflective of the problems it was encountering. Financial and manpower constraints prevented the implementation of the majority of the programmes in the sectors. Secondly, the figure for human resources were much too high given that the two institutions established by the ECA, that is, the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) and the African Institute for Higher Technical Training and Research (AIHTTR) were not functioning properly due to lack of members and finance. The rate for ESADIS is also very high especially as it has not yet been operational. The ECA has yet to train the staff to man the project and also conclude and sign the agreement with the host government, that is, Zambia for the establishment of ESADIS.

Another observation was that some programmes took long to implement. With the exception of industry, all other programmes were adopted in 1977. (The ones for the industrial sector were included in 1979.)
But most were implemented in the 1980-86 period. It made it difficult for one to keep track of the programmes because in the ECA reports there was no mention of dates when programmes were initiated or nearing completion. The programmes were also not adopted to the principles and strategy of the Lagos Plan of Action which was adopted by African states in 1980 as the blue-print for development.

A major problem was that some of the programmes were inappropriate to the needs of the states. For example, in agriculture the states have been stressing the need for self-reliance and self-sufficiency in food production. Drought and desertification were the major and immediate problems (see section on salient features of the area), but the MULPOC was putting emphasis on promotion of animal health through the control of animal diseases. The ECA concentrate on programmes which will be of benefit to development in the long term rather than immediate problems. This approach has its handicaps because it makes the ECA programmes less attractive and of no immediate interest to the states. When they read through the proposals and find that there is no mention of programmes which have higher priorities and requiring immediate action or possible solutions the states will turn to alternative institutions and national options. For example, the states give top priority to the idea of reducing their dependence on South Africa and they turned their attention and resources to the functioning of the SADCC. For them SADCC projects offer relative benefits and attraction than ECA ones.

Comparatively speaking, Lusaka had the second highest figure for its rate of implementation at 63%. The highest was 66% for Niamey; Gisenyi scored 54%, with Tangier and Yaounde at 47% and 23.5%, respectively. Lusaka has made considerable progress in the trade sector with the establishment of the PTA (this is treated in subsection 6 of
and it was working towards the establishment of the ESADIS which involves the purchasing of a computer and its accessories and the training of technicians to operate the centre. The MULPOC was also able to buy shunting locomotives, wagons, cranes and it constructed villas at the new Kapiri Mposhi station for the TAZARA, that is, the Tanzania Zambia Railways. These programmes indicated that the MULPOC was also able to record limited successes in the transport and telecommunications sectors.

5. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION AND ECA'S RESPONSE

At the beginning of the chapter mention was made of the challenges of development, that is, the urge to modernize, dependency on South Africa and the effects of destabilization policies of the latter, problems of the LDCs and landlocked countries. In addition, factors such as drought and desertification have served to worsen and prolong economic and social problems. It is the complexity and the combination of these factors which have made the goals of regional economic co-operation very attractive to the countries. As SADCC demonstrates, co-operation is essential especially in the transport, investment, production and trade sectors. To what extent has the ECA co-opted these challenges to development in its programme of the Lusaka MULPOC?

The Commission has been unable to implement policies and programmes to harness the hydro-electric power potentials in the area. However, it implemented programmes in the agriculture and transport and communications, as well as in the human resources sectors. But it is in the trade sector that it channelled most of its energies and succeeded in establishing the PTA. The latter is the only one of such an arrangement
in Africa and it was of importance because up to 12 states were using the credit facilities which have been created. The PTA fits into the pattern of trade which emphasises co-operation on a subregional level and the ECA wanted to create a common institution for development for the two distinct groups of states, that is, the Eastern and the Southern.

6. THE PTA: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND ORGANS, OPERATIONS AND PROBLEMS

(a) History of the PTA

The initial impetus for the PTA came from the policy organ meeting of the Lusaka MULPOC in 1977. Its origin can be traced to the determination of successive executive secretaries of the ECA to force the pace of co-operation among the states in trade, transport and industry through subregional co-ordinating bodies. Earlier attempts include the Economic Community for East and Central Africa established in 1965 for the harmonization of industrial development. This was followed by the establishment of the defunct East African Community (EAC).

The ECA began to revive the idea of a subregional economic co-operation after the collapse of the EAC. In March 1978, at the first extraordinary meeting of Ministers of Trade, Finance and Planning held in Lusaka, 12 states signed a Declaration of Intent and Commitment on the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa as a first step towards the creation of a common market and eventually an Economic Community. The meeting also established the Intergovernment Negotiating Team of Officials (INT) and a timetable for negotiation of the treaty and its protocols.

The INT had eight meetings between 1978-81, while the Ministers
of Trade, Finance and Planning had three meetings between January and October 1981. The PTA was established in 1982 with the ECA acting as its midwife during its interim period. The Commission provided technical support for the 1982-83 period. It also convened the series of preparatory meetings for the PTA policy organs. Finally, in June 1982 the Commission convened the first meeting of the inter-governmental committee of experts and of the PTA Council of Ministers in Lusaka, Zambia, during which the PTA work programme, its budget and appointment of staff were adopted.

The objective of the PTA as stated in article 3(1) of the Treaty is "to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the field of trade, customs, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, natural resources and monetary affairs with the aim of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of fostering closer relations among member states and to contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent". In essence, the PTA is not confined to trade issues alone.

By 1987 its membership stood at 15: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ehtiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. If we exclude Burundi and Rwanda which are members of the Gisenyi MULPOC (Central Africa), the potential membership of the PTA is the same as that of the Lusaka MULPOC, that is, 18. Five countries, namely, Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique and Seychelles have so far declined to join. Both Mozambique and Botswana are committed to SADCC and view the PTA as a duplication of efforts.

On the whole, the countries are interested in co-operative ventures and some of them commended the efforts of the ECA to set up the PTA. A representative of Zimbabwe stated that the process was "in no small
way due not only to the negotiating capabilities of participating states, but also to the support, encouragement and guidance that has been so readily forthcoming from the ECA". To the secretariat and especially to the Executive Secretary, Adebayo Adedeji, he expressed gratitude. In a statement by Robert G. Mugabe, in his capacity as outgoing Chairman of the PTA Authority at the third conference of the latter held at Bujumbura, Burundi, in 1984, he stated that, "the failure of the development strategies followed until now by African states leaves them with no choice other than to strengthen and intensify their regional economic co-operation". And more importantly the ECA saw the PTA as an instrument for the reduction of dependency on South Africa. It stated that "the PTA is an instrument which will enable the countries of the subregion to establish a new system of economic relationships among themselves which will eventually enable individual countries to reduce their economic dependency while enabling them at the same time to strengthen their links with other African countries ..."(b) **PTA: Structure and Organs**

The headquarters of the PTA is located in Lusaka, Zambia. The structure of the PTA comprises the PTA Authority, Council of Ministers, Secretariat, Tribunal, the Commission, the committees and such other technical and specialized bodies as may be established or provided for by the Treaty (Article 5 of the Treaty).

The PTA Authority is made up of Heads of State and Governments of the member states as stipulated in Article 6 of the Treaty. It is the supreme organ of the PTA and is responsible for considering matters of general policy and control of the executive functions and the achievement of its aims. The Authority meets once a year.
The Council of Ministers is composed of the Ministers of Trade, Development and Planning. It is responsible for keeping under constant review and for ensuring the proper functioning and development of the PTA in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. This organ makes recommendations to the Authority on matters of policy aimed at the efficient and harmonious functioning of the PTA according to Article 7 of the Treaty. It also gives directions to all other subordinate institutions of the PTA.

The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General whose appointment is for a term of four years, with a provision for renewal for a further period of four years. This is in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty. He is constitutionally empowered to act "on his own initiative" on a range of matters. He is also the principal executive officer and is responsible to the PTA Authority. The Secretary-General draws a salary in excess of $50,000 and heads a staff of 35 (reduced from 55 for the first year, 1983).

The Tribunal is its judicial organ whose function is to ensure the proper application or interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it (Article 40). The dispute has to be settled by direct agreement of the parties concerned. But in the event of failure to settle, the matter may be referred to the Tribunal by a party to such dispute and the decision of the Tribunal is final.

(c) PTA: Operation, Prospects and Problems

Although established in 1982, the operational phase of the PTA was launched in 1984. It operates through a clearing and payment facility
and its basic function is to promote the flow of goods and services. Under the scheme the countries are able to use national currencies in the settlement of day-to-day payments and only use convertible currencies for settling net balances at the end of a transaction period of two calendar months. By so doing the facility was attempting to create additional international liquidity.

The unit of account used is the PTA unit of account (UAPTA) which is equal to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the IMF. The UAPTA, like the European Currency Unit, is a notional currency used for calculating transfer between PTA members. For the exchange rate, currency arrangements vary, but the currencies of most members are pegged to the US dollar or the SDR. Sometimes it is based on a trade weighted basket system.

The clearing system operates in the manner described below:

(i) Exporter invoices goods in his local currency, UAPTA or importer's currency.

(ii) The importer pays his commercial bank in local currency for the imports.

(iii) The importer's bank approaches its central bank to purchase the exporting country's currency and instructs that the exporter's bank be credited accordingly.

(iv) The central bank in the importing country requests the central bank in the exporting country to credit the exporter's bank with its currency against credit through the Clearing House in UAPTA.

(v) Each central bank advises the Clearing House of each funding operation.
after two months (a transaction period) the Clearing House closes the books of the monetary authorities and arranges settlement in hard currency of net debtor balances in favour of holders of net creditor balances. The services of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are used to process the actual settlements and, to this end, all member monetary authorities maintain an account with this Bank in US dollars.

Each monetary authority quotes a daily spot rate of exchange against SDR/UAPTA and undertakes to buy or sell its own currency at that quoted rate to other monetary authorities against credit through the Clearing House. In the event of a debtor failing to make proper provision for settlement on the due date, interest is charged by the Clearing House on such unpaid amount at a rate of one per cent above the ruling SDR rate for the first week and thereafter it is increased by one per cent for each subsequent week that settlement remains outstanding.

On a cumulative basis, total payments channelled through the multilateral clearing facility since it began operations stand at UAPTA 217.7 million. Trade through the Clearing House was on an annual basis from UAPTA 37.2 million in December 1984, to UAPTA 48.9 million in 1985, UAPTA 59.4 million in December 1986 and to UAPTA 87.9 million in 1987. The increasing figures indicate that the states are not trading very much between themselves - the old pattern of trading with South Africa for the southern states in particular prevails, while most of the eastern ones trade with the industrialized nations. Despite the increase in the level of trade or use of the facility annually, the Clearing House is under-utilized. Intra-regional trade accounted for about 25 per cent of the total intra-regional trade in 1987.

Fourteen countries have consistently used the facility, with
Table 7.1 Statement of Contributions to the Clearing House Budget as at 30 September 1987 (UAPTA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount due</th>
<th>Amount paid</th>
<th>Amount Outstanding</th>
<th>Interest due and unpaid</th>
<th>Late payment interest received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>3,866</td>
<td>3,866</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>12,379</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,379</td>
<td>61,163</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6,718</td>
<td>6,718</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>27,817</td>
<td>27,817</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>7,997</td>
<td>7,997</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>2,392</td>
<td>2,392</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,969*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10,696</td>
<td>10,696</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1,766</td>
<td>1,766</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>7,052</td>
<td>7,052</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>22,713</td>
<td>22,713</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>13,491</td>
<td>13,491</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>15,884</td>
<td>15,884</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>139,086</strong></td>
<td><strong>126,707</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,379</strong></td>
<td><strong>61,932</strong></td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Interest due and unpaid by Mauritius includes UAPTA 2,945 accrued on contributions paid in 1986.

Source: PTA Clearing House - Executive Secretary's Report, November 1987, p. 4.
Comoros and Djibouti yet to utilize it, while Somalia has participated only by paying contributions to the PTA institutions through the Clearing House. The contributions made so far by members are noted in Table 7.1. The table shows that Djibouti was owning UAPTA 61,163, while Mauritius was also owing UAPTA 7,969. They were the only states in this situation and were unable to make payments due to financial hardship which was a consequence of the recession. The fact that most of the members have been paying up indicates that they are eager and committed to the ideas of the PTA and they were helping it to function effectively.

Apart from the Clearing System, there is a step-by-step approach built into the Treaty for its gradual up-grading to a subregional common market with a time-frame of 10 years. In 1984 tariffs on a range of goods were reduced as a first step to boosting trade (see Table 7.2). The list will be amended and expanded every three years until 1992 when the regional common market will be established.

Table 7.2 PTA Tariff Reductions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of goods</th>
<th>% cut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxury goods</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food items and highly competing consumer goods</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-durable consumer goods</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable consumer goods</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural raw materials</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate goods</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital goods and consumer goods of importance</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to economic development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1987, the member states decided on a tentative timetable for the complete elimination of tariff barriers by the year 2000. They would cut tariffs by 10 per cent every two years up to 1996, by 20 per cent in 1988 and by 30 per cent in the year 2000. The timetable is subject to review in 1996 when the PTA will decide on how to maintain equitable distribution of costs and benefits. Fiscal compensatory arrangements were to be introduced to help governments which would lose revenue as a result of the tariff cuts. Although the PTA proposes to make such payments, it was not clear where the money will come from. Discussions are still taking place and no details have emerged so far. Djibouti and Comoros, the smallest states in the PTA, stressed that they will encounter difficulties accepting the timetable unless the PTA offered such facilities.

The activities of the PTA include the establishment of a PTA Trade and Development Bank in Burundi (1984); formation of the PTA Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry to co-ordinate major investment projects; installation of a trade information network (TINET) and the co-ordination of operations and services of airlines, coastal and inland shipping as the first state towards the establishment of a PTA airline, shipping line and inland water transport system. These show its potential but also the fact that these activities are similar to those of the Lusaka MULPOC and the SADCC. This explains why there is the need to co-ordinate the activities of the three entities to overcome overlap and duplication of work. The issue has not been officially discussed by the respective secretariats. Also there is no channel of direct contact between them.

However, suffice to state that the countries devote more time and energy to the activities and progress of SADCC. They see SADCC as a more
viable co-operative arrangement which reflects the development needs and challenges in the region. SADCC is also their own creation compared to the PTA which was the ECA's brainchild and the Lusaka MULPOC which has been unable to implement attractive programmes.

Another source of problems for the PTA is pinpointed by Scott Thomas (1987) when he stated that a number of its member states have conflicting political and economic loyalties. Apart from the three states of the defunct East African Community - Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania - it includes Ethiopia and Somalia which have a long history of mutual political strife, and two states (Lesotho and Swaziland) which are members of SACU. The PTA recognizes this unique situation by granting Lesotho and Swaziland "temporary exemptions" from applying some PTA provisions while the BLS states remain parties to SACU. 55

There has also been problems with the operation of the Clearing House for settling trading accounts. The rules and regulations in the protocol on clearing and payments have not been adhered to. At least two states - Djibouti and Mauritius - are in danger of suspension for non-payment of the PTA's initial membership fees. (See Table 7.2.) Moreover, the reduction of tariffs on a number of selected goods is not sufficient to boost trade within the area to anticipated levels. Current exports of members and potential ones total only about $7,000 million a year - 5 per cent of the continent's total - and imports about $8,000 million. 56 And trade between member countries is a small proportion of these figures. Therefore, attention has to be focused on other aspects such as the competitiveness of the industries in the area, competition in agriculture, the communication networks or lack of it, to mention but a few. Development is multi-dimensional and trade is but one aspect. So an improvement in trade, say by the establishment
of the PTA cannot be sustained unless there is subsequent progress made in other areas such as agriculture, human resources and industry.

7. CONCLUSION

The Lusaka MULPOC was built on a long history of subregional activities. It was both a subregional office in the 1960s and an UNDAT in the early 1970s. The consequences of these links is in the fact that it inherited the work programme of the UNDAT, just like in the cases of the Niamey and Yaounde MULPOCs. It was the third conference of the Ministerial Council of the UNDATs which is usually referred to as the inaugural meeting of the Council of Ministers of the MULPOCs. But this history has not made for a better operation of the MULPOC. Even though the intention for establishing it had to do with decentralization to the subregion, authority and functions are still centrally defined. The Director of the MULPOC has to be in constant consultation with headquarters for most matters.

The programmes are drawn and implemented by staff of the substantive divisions, and there is no clear definition of what programmes to implement by either headquarters or the MULPOC. Also the programmes of the latter are not synchronized with those of the headquarters. While the former operates annual programmes (up to 1989 when they will be biennially), the headquarters runs medium-term and biennial programmes. The medium-term ones are drawn up for a period of six years.

Another problem is that the MULPOC has far too many programmes but its implementation rate was not impressive due to the abandonment of some, delays and postponement. For example, in the human sector, the MULPOC had to abandon its plans in 1979 for the establishment of an
Association of Eastern and Southern African Consultancy Organization due to insufficient funds.

Finally, the bulk of the programmes consisted of research, seminars, workshops and studies which in the long run will aid development. The problem with these types of programmes is that they do not provide answers to immediate development needs of the members. For example, the top priority of the Southern states is to reduce dependency on South Africa, they are worried about the rail links damaged in the region and the effects of droughts and famine and these aspects are not catered for with existing programmes. This is the reason why we stated that the states of Southern Africa were putting more energy and resources into the activities of SADCC and not those of the MULPOC. The former offers programmes which are more attractive in the sense that they are tailored to tackle immediate problems.

Member states complained about the weakness of the MULPOC especially during the 1985-86 period, when it was unable to implement its programmes. The secretariat acknowledge its weakness on grounds that it suffered because of the prolonged illness of the Director. Other problems encountered included lack of financial resources, which for example led to the termination of the women's programme in December 1987 when the UNDP withdrew the funds; inadequate manpower resources as there were only four professionals to manage the programmes for the 18 countries - so structurally, Lusaka faced the same problems as the rest of the MULPOCs.

Although the ECA officials referred to the Niamey MULPOC as the most active in terms of being at the forefront on policy matters, (for example, the changing of the annual meetings of the policy organs to biennial ones was spearheaded by it, and secondly, this MULPOC was the first to question the purposes of the MULPOCs and in 1987 asked for
a review of and redefinition of the objectives of the Niamey one), the Lusaka MULPOC could be said to be more active in terms of implementation of programmes. For example, in the transport and communications sector it was involved with the purchases of computers and the accessories, locomotives and shunting machines. But more importantly, the MULPOC recorded its greatest success with the establishment of the PTA. By so doing it has created additional liquidity as members are able to secure dollars for transactions. With the PTA the ECA/Lusaka MULPOC has been able to bring both the eastern and southern states under one co-operative venture. In terms of the present level of membership and the fact that most of them have paid their membership fees, the indication is that the countries are committed to the principles of the PTA and they find the institution of value in the field of trade in particular. This is not to deny the existence of problems of the PTA such as the fact that it has to work out its compensation schemes and the necessity of all the potential members joining.

On the whole, the MULPOC was encouraging and spearheading sub-regional economic co-operation. Its main weakness was that of being unable to carry out more programmes due to structural factors such as the lack of authority and the heavy reliance on headquarters for the drawing up and implementation of programmes; the lack of funds and manpower resources, and the fact that the programmes mainly addressed long-term development needs and therefore less attractive to those of the PTA and SADCC. The presence of the three entities - the MULPOC, the PTA and SADCC - calls for co-ordination of their activities to avoid wastages, overlap and duplication of efforts.
NOTES


3. Ibid.


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 265.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 61.
20. This is referred to as the Nkomoti Accord. The essence of the agreement was that Mozambique will prevent the underground African National Congress (ANC) from using its territory for guerrilla attacks against South Africa, while Pretoria will withdraw its covert support for the insurgents of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), though both ANC and MNR are not mentioned by name.


26. Tenth anniversary of the establishment of MULPOCs by resolution 311(XII) of 1977 by the ECA Conference of Ministers, ECA/MULPOC/Lusaka/X/15, 27 February 1987, p. 9.

27. N.M. Mesemola, Economic Officer, ECO Division, ECA, gave the information during a discussion at the headquarters in March 1987.


36. Ibid.


42. Ibid.


44. Excerpt from an address by the Minister of Finance on behalf of the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe to the Summit of Heads of State and Government of Eastern and Southern Africa, on the occasion of the signing of the treaty for the establishment of the PTA, Lusaka, Zambia, 21 December 1981.


49. The Clearing System was outlined in a letter by Mr. D.B. Marape, Assistant Manager, PTA, Clearing House, dated 5 December 1988.


51. The percentage was quoted by Mr. D.B. Marape, Assistant Manager, PTA, Clearing House, in a letter dated 5 December 1988, p. 2.


56. For more information on what the subregional office and UNDAT were, see Chapter 5. It suffice to state that they were the predecessors of the MULPOCs.


58. Information was obtained during fieldwork to Addis Ababa in April 1987. For more details on Niamey MULPOC see Chapter 6.

59. See Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 8

ECA IN CENTRAL AFRICA: THE YAOUNDE AND GISENYI
MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRES (MULPOCs)

1. INTRODUCTION

The Central African subregion is unique in the sense that it has two MULPOCs. In Central Africa I, we have the Yaounde (Cameroon) MULPOC. This has seven member states (making Central Africa I one of the smaller MULPOCs), namely, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe. In Central Africa II we have the Gisenyi (Rwanda) MULPOC. This is the smallest, with only three member states, namely, Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire.

After a brief mention of the salient features of the Central African subregion, this chapter begins with the consideration of Central Africa I, that is, the Yaounde MULPOC. The second part is devoted to Central Africa II, that is, the Gisenyi MULPOC; and the peculiar problems affecting the states. There is then a conclusion.

The central argument is that having two MULPOCs in Central Africa is duplication of efforts and a waste of resources. There are no marked improvements in the organization of the MULPOCs nor are there more benefits resulting from the arrangement. The same problems encountered in other subregions are also present in this area if we consider the organization, structure and work programmes. Also the ECA has to a large extent been unable to provide for the special needs of the landlocked states, for example.
2. **SALIENT FEATURES OF CENTRAL AFRICA**

Taken together, Central Africa I and II have 10 member states. Six, namely, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe are listed as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa. For Central Africa II, only Zaire is not listed as an LDC, so while the other two states, that is, Rwanda and Burundi are LDCs, their bargaining position with the relatively bouyant and economically stronger Zaire is weak. Do the three states have common interests? There are geographical and historical factors which suggest that such interests exist. Indeed they were the factors responsible for the establishment of two instead of one MULPOnC.

The region is disjointed in nature when we look at its geographical area. Central Africa II is virtually cut off from the remainder of the subregion, while several areas of Zaire, the largest country in the area, are handicapped by economic isolation resulting from poor transportation and communication. Burundi and Rwanda are all landlocked states. The Central African Republic and Chad also incur high transportation costs due to their landlocked position.

The states of Central Africa II also share a common history and colonial links. Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire were former Belgian colonies. The countries have had a history of civil wars and bloodshed in the past. It was for security reasons that the three states expressed the desire to be together under a separate MULPOnC. They hoped that this move would act as a stabilizing factor in their relations and thereby reduce the insecurity felt by each member.

There are in existence three overlapping economic communities in the subregion: the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), comprising Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad and Zaire; Union Douaniere et Economique de l' Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), comprising Cameroon, Central African Republic, the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad; and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), comprising Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. It should be mentioned that Burundi and Rwanda also belong to the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States. The situation warrants some mechanism for co-ordinating the activities of these bodies and for establishing a certain amount of division of labour among them. It also calls for the co-ordination of the activities of the two MULPOCs to increase the benefits to member states.

Another feature of the subregion is its tremendous hydro-electric potential. Most of this potential is concentrated in the Matadi-Kinshasa Bay of the Zaire river where within a stretch of 350 km the river drops 300 metres through 32 falls, with a potential power capacity of 93,000 mw. The Inga II project alone now produces a surplus of more than 1,600 mw of electricity. According to the ECA, a priority activity in the strategy of energy development within ECCAS is to make a systematic inventory of the hydro-electric potential and to plan development on a collective basis with grids and interconnections among the member states. But the Yaounde MULPOC has no energy programmes as part of its priority and work programme. Even in the case of Gisenyi, the energy content of its work programme is minimal. (See Gisenyi Work Programme for Energy.) Since the ECA staff were responsible for drafting the work programmes for the MULPOC and because they are aware of its energy potential, they have, however, failed to incorporate this vital piece of information in the work programme.
3. THE YAOUNDE MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (CENTRAL AFRICA I)

3a. Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower Resources

The establishment of the MULPOCs in 1977 aimed at two functions: (1) to accelerate the economic integration process and (2) to act as operational arms of the ECA. For the acceleration of the economic integration the proposed MULPOCs' role consisted of: (a) providing assistance to inter-governmental organizations to enable them to solve the technical problems they are encountering; (b) identifying and contributing to the implementation of multinational projects aimed at economic integration to the effect of establishing efficient subregional economic communities. The only kind of assistance which the Yaounde MULPOC provided was in the form of general studies as will be discussed later on. It has not been able to identify and contribute to the implementation of multinational projects. In the first instance, there were no such projects. Furthermore, the role of the MULPOC by implication was to act as an operational arm of the ECA. In practice, it was not clear what this meant. According to the UNDP/ECA evaluation mission in 1982, when they spoke to officials of the countries visited, that is, Cameroon, Central African Republic and the Congo, they stated that the operational role of the MULPOCs was not clearly defined. Also the MULPOCs did not transmit the thinking of governments to the ECA - instead it was only the "voice" of the ECA. This finding suggests that the ECA's conception of the purpose of the MULPOCs was different from the expectations of member states. The organization and procedural methods of formulating the work programmes of the MULPOCs and the flow of information to member states confirm the pattern whereby the MULPOCs
were only the "voice" of the ECA, whereas member states want them to include the "voice" of the member states. Since, in theory, the ECA has not defined precisely what it meant by stating that the MULPOCs were operational arms of the ECA, it was difficult to put the concept into practice. This explains why the MULPOCs seem to mean different things to the officials of the ECA in particular and to member states in general. No-one whom we spoke to at the ECA headquarters in February 1987 was able to define and explain what being an operational arm of the ECA meant. And this in itself presents difficulties in the sense that one cannot chart the direction of the activities of the MULPOCs. One does not really know the practical implications of the objectives of both MULPOCs. Although these present a problem for organization and administration, neither MULPOC has requested a review of the scope and objectives of the MULPOC. So far it was only in West Africa that such a request has been made. In 1987 the MULPOCs celebrated their tenth anniversary without any hint from the ECA headquarters that the role and objectives would be reviewed. The Ad hoc Committee set up to review the West African MULPOC in 1987 did recommend that its objectives should be more precise as to the real content and purpose and circumscribed within a time-frame. All the MULPOCs and the ECA have to give greater thought to this.

The Yaounde MULPOC has two main policy organs. At the ministerial level, there is the Council of Ministers and at the technical level, the Committee of Officials. As in the case of the Niamey MULPOC, this Council of Ministers is made up of ministers in charge of economic and social development planning. It acts on behalf of the ECA Conference of Ministers. Its meetings are on a yearly basis. The Committee of Officials prepares the records to be submitted to the Council of Ministers. Its meetings are also on a yearly basis but this meeting
precedes that of the Council of Ministers. Each year, the venue and chairman of these meetings change, so that each country has the opportunity to sensitize its national officials to the existence and the work of the MULPOC and to exchange views on certain aspects of the economic future of the area, the ECA maintains. But surely these states cannot sensitize their issues enough because the organs do not allow for easy implementation of the requests of the states. The delegates are always at these meetings to deliberate on semi-finished drafts of the work of the MULPOC prepared by the ECA and not on issues that might be of concern to particular states. The ECA approach is not based on a country-by-country analysis of needs but on a sectoral basis. Therefore, changing the venue of the meetings of the policy organs will not necessarily sensitize issues nor yield positive results. To come to terms with this discrepancy, member states felt the need for a common action by establishing an "Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee" for which there is a committee of officials operating on a sectoral basis. Given the limited resources of the MULPOC its role consists of identifying within the approved programme two or three priority programmes. The creation of this committee is due to the need to start implementation of the work programme by selecting a few priority areas. In addition, a follow-up committee had been created, but it is not clear what its role is. Also there is no indication of the timing of their meetings, although as from 1989 the two main policy organs will be meeting once every two years. (This decision was taken as a result of a request by the West African MULPOC. It applies to all the MULPOCs.)

In comparison with Gisenyi the Yaounde MULPOC has got more facilities. The latter inherited the structures of the Yaounde United Nations Inter-disciplinary Advisory Team (UNDAT), a body which was set
up along side the ECA subregional offices in 1973 to advise member states on matters relating to economic and social development. So it started its activities on the basis of the on-going programme of the UNDAT, without much delay. In the case of Gisenyi, the secretariat had delays due to settlement problems and the necessity to establish a cordial relationship with member states. The Yaounde MULPOC also gets political, financial and staffing support from the host country, the United Republic of Cameroon. In addition, it utilizes the facilities provided by the UDEAC secretariat. For instance, it organizes certain meetings in the UDEAC secretariat premises.

But it suffers the same fate as other MULPOCs when it comes to its financial resources. The estimates given by the ECA are shown on Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The UNDP has been the main source of funding for the Yaounde MULPOC as well. It pledged US$ 200,00 per annum for the 1978-81 period. But the ECA maintained that this amount was only sufficient to fund a core staff of three professionals, that is, the team leader and two experts.\(^5\) In 1979 the UNDP agreed to study the possibility of increasing its contributions from US$ 200,000 per annum for each MULPOC. The amount earmarked for Yaounde was US$ 350,000.\(^6\) With reference to the estimates on Table 8.1 and Table 8.2, the proposed new level of funding reduced the resource gap from US$ 299,272 (Table 8.1) to US$ 181,772 in Table 8.2. The MULPOC was to search for an alternate source of funds to cover the US$ 181,772. This is a predicament which faced all the MULPOCs with the exception of the Tangier one which was financed from the regular budget of the ECA.

The ECA makes its proposals and sets priority programmes with no funds to implement them. Then it has to keep searching for the funds, meanwhile delaying implementation, with the programmes having a high
Table 8.1  Estimated Resources Gap Assuming Current UNDP Funding Levels (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MULPOC Centre</th>
<th>Resources Available (1977-1978 levels)</th>
<th>Resources Required 1979-1980</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yaounde</td>
<td>580,500</td>
<td>881,772</td>
<td>299,272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2  Estimated Resources Gap Assuming Proposed New UNDP Earmarkings (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MULPOC Centre</th>
<th>Resources Available (new proposed UNDP levels)</th>
<th>Resources Required 1979-1980</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yaounde</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>881,772</td>
<td>181,772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


risk of not getting off the ground. For example, the UNDP has not provided funds for the fourth cycle 1987-91 and the ECA is still waiting. Otto B. Essien, Chief, Office of the Director, UNDP, revealed in a correspondence in February 1988 that the actual amount which the MULPOC received for the third cycle (1977-81) was US$ 545,014. This amount was far short of what the ECA expected and so it had to abandon some programmes as will be shown later. The contributions made by member states are minimal. Apart from financial pledges, most contributions were in kind in the form of provision of buildings, office equipment and local-level personnel. But more importantly, the contributions were on a voluntary basis and were made through the United Nations
Trust Fund for African Development (UNTFAD). The monetary contributions for the 1986-87 period amounted to US$ 120,000 and 20 million (CFA). In addition, loans worth US$ 12,000 were made available to the MULPOC by the approval of the Executive Secretary of the ECA in order to ensure the financing of certain activities. But although the ECA mentioned this amount, it failed to indicate the activities for which the loan was given. This is a common problem with its presentation of reports - it usually presents them with incomplete information.

ECA officials want member states to increase their contributions in the cases of all the MULPOCs but in reality such contributions have been diminishing. Member states in general and in the case of the Yaounde MULPOC have not contributed significantly to the financing of the MULPOCs to date. They have given various reasons for not doing so. For some, it was surprising that the ECA was asking them to finance the MULPOCs, since at their inception the countries were given the impression that financial resources were available for them. It was not stated that they needed funds. In the present economic climate and given the plight of the LDCs, they do not see how some of the member states that are in need of resources themselves can afford to finance work programmes designed by the MULPOC while a lot of national projects were not implemented due to the lack of resources. For such states especially the LDCs national projects took first place to activities of international organizations such as the ECA. Even though member states had contributed office space, equipment and local personnel, evidence suggests that they would be more interested in financing projects rather than providing for the administrative support of the MULPOC. Hence they have requested the ECA to finance all the expenses related to the functioning of the MULPOC.
Another reason why member states do not contribute to the financing of the MULPOC was because of the centralization by ECA headquarters of the financial management and the amounts involved. Member states were not aware of the amount of resources made available to the MULPOCs and how they were utilized and so they do not feel motivated to contributed financially.\textsuperscript{11} This confirms one of the major problems during the trip to the ECA headquarters. Officials were forthcoming in pointing out some of the problems they faced in their day-to-day running of the secretariat and the MULPOCs, but no one was able to disclose the actual amount made available to the ECA as a whole or to the MULPOCs in particular. The result is that it is impossible to understand and appreciate the overall magnitude of the problems facing the ECA. Also they were unable to point out the amount spent on the programmes at the headquarters and the subregions.

Finally, member states justify their attitude by the fact that the ECA is always claiming that the MULPOCs are its operational arms in the subregions. Therefore, they find it normal that the ECA regular budget should finance the expenses related to their functioning.\textsuperscript{12}

ECA officials are very much aware of the constraints resulting from lack of funds for the Central African MULPOCs in particular and indeed for the MULPOC system as a whole. As one official puts it, "the MULPOCs are a mirror of what is happening to the headquarters. The same constraints on the secretariat applies to the MULPOCs. Lack of funds exerts a financial constraint on the work programmes and functioning of the MULPOCS".\textsuperscript{13}

However, it is not only finance that has been lacking in the Yaounde MULPOC, there is also a lack of manpower resources. The estimate put forward in the ECA's proposals through the General Assembly to ECOSOC
in 1982 contains this point. It is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yaounde</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Posts</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed New Posts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Key:

D-1 is the head of the MULPOC (Director). He is the principal officer who is responsible for implementing programmes approved by the ECA MULPOC policy organ. He also consults government officials at the highest level and in the UN agencies and other IGOs. The Director could be an ex-minister, an academic or long-standing official of international institutions.

P-5 and P-3 is for senior officers. These posts are made up of economic affairs officers who undertake sectoral and topical studies; design multinational programmes and conduct research. They assist the head of the MULPOCs in the management of the centres. These are civil servants.

Local Level These are sometimes referred to as general service staff. They are recruited at the local level and are made up of administrative officers, typists, drivers, cleaners, night watchmen.

The proposal indicated that prior to 1982 the Yaounde MULPOC had no staff employed on a regular basis. During this period the MULPOC was administered and controlled by staff of the headquarters. The proposal was approved with some modification - the P-3 and local level staff were increased. In 1985 the manpower resources at the disposal of the MULPOC was made up of the following: one director, one economist, one agronomist, one administrative officer, six secretaries, three drivers,
one typist, one cleaner and one night watchman. So instead of the two P-3 and one local level staff in the proposal, the Yaounde MULPOC had 12 persons. However, only four posts were catered for by the regular budget of the ECA, that is, the posts of director, an economist, a secretary and an agronomist. The remaining posts were funded through extra-budgetary funds.

The UNDP evaluation mission 1982 found that the staffing of all the MULPOCs was not only inadequate but insecure. The situation has remained unchanged up to June 1988. None of the directors of the MULPOCs, let alone the other MULPOC experts had an employment contract lasting more than one year, and the same was true of the general service or local level staff - except for a handful of secretaries and administrative assistants who had been temporarily assigned to the MULPOC from ECA headquarters. This unsatisfactory situation stemmed from the fact that all the key posts were "project posts"; and the contracts of project staff were such that appointments could only be guaranteed for one year at a time, even if the prospects of renewal were virtually assured from year to year. These circumstances make it difficult to attract and retain the high calibre of core staff that the MULPOCs needed. The turnover of professional staff in Yaounde was relatively high.

3b. Yaounde MULPOC: Work Programmes

During its first meeting on 2-3 March 1978, the Council of Ministers identified priority areas where it would carry out its activities and programmes; these were in the field of agriculture, transport and communications, trade, industry, human resources, energy and environment. In agriculture, the MULPOC aimed at the production
and marketing of cereals; rural development; livestock and production
of meat; and, intra-subregional specialization in the field of food-
stuff.s.

(a) Industry

In the case of industry, the aims included the processing of salt
and potash resources; the establishment of a multinational cement
industry based on raw materials available in the Congo and Gabon; devel-
opment of aluminium industries based on bauxite available in the Cameroon
and the hydro-electric potential in the subregion; co-ordination and
harmonization of the production of petroleum refineries.16

(b) Energy

In the case of energy, they wanted the establishment of a sub-
regional committee on energy and the utilization of solar energy.17

The programme was abandoned because headquarters staff had no time to
consider it.

The objectives of the priority areas chosen illustrated the ways
in which the MULPOC used grand words which lacked precise scope and
content and also a timeframe. For example, the ECA aimed at the creation
of indigenous consultancy agencies in the human resources sector. There
is no information on the number of agencies to be set up; their loca-
tions and when it plans to do so. Reading through them one gets the
impression that tangible projects to aid development in the subregion
had been devised and that the MULPOC was ready to implement them. When
one examines the actual programmes carried out, it is clear that the
reality was rather different - the bulk of the programmes were studies.
Secondly, there was no evidence to suggest that the MULPOC had carried
out programmes prior to 1981 even though the selection was decided
upon as far back as 1978.
(c) **Trade**

In the field of trade, member states approved the study on competitiveness of industrial and agro-industrial products likely to be traded among the countries belonging to the Yaounde-based MULPOC back in 1978. But up to this date the study has not yet been completed. This was followed by approval for a study on non-recorded border trade in 1982. The study was scheduled for completion in 1985, according to the ECA. But due to lack of support by the trade division of ECA headquarters and also owing to financial constraint, this has not been completed so far.  

(d) **Transport and communications**

For this sector one of the aims was to establish a multinational coastal shipping line. For road transport, a pre-feasibility study of the BATA-EBEBIYIN road was approved in 1982. The project document was submitted to the UNDP for possible funding. No funds had been secured by June 1988. There was also a pre-feasibility study of the NOLA-BOMASSA-ODESSA road. Here too the project document was submitted to the UNDP for possible funding. Again this was followed by another feasibility study in 1983 for the EBOLOWA-YAOUNDE-BERTOUA-GAROUA BOULAI roads. But owing to lack of funds the physical inspection of these roads was postponed to 1985. The ECA was still waiting for the UNDP to provide the funds. With regard to telecommunications and for the improvement of information-gathering, the establishment of the Central African Documentation and Information System (CADIS) was approved in 1983. The equipment for the centre was ordered but was re-routed to Addis Ababa in 1987 to allow for training of staff for it and the working out of agreement with the government of Zaire, where CADIS will be located.
(e) **Agriculture**

In the agriculture sector, there were nine programmes approved between 1981-83. Of these, only two were implemented fully; four were abandoned; two were submitted to the UNDP for funding and one was never considered. The detail of these programmes was as follows:

(1) **Publication of CADIS directory.** This was approved in 1981. The first issue was published in 1983. But it has not been updated due to lack of funds. This means that only one issue has been published so far. (It is used for on-going agricultural research projects and was initially prepared under an FAO, inter-regional project.);

(2) **Publication of a subregional agricultural parasitism map** (approved 1982). No follow-up action was taken for this programme and the study was eventually taken out of the MULPOC work programme in 1984;

(3) **Study on agricultural pricing policies and marketing of agricultural products** (approved 1983). The project document was submitted to the UNDP for possible funding. No response has been received as at June 1988;

(4) **Publication of a booklet on simple methods of animal feeding** (approved 1983). The booklet was published in 1985;

(5) **Study on meat marketing** (approved 1982). No follow-up action was taken and eventually the study was taken out of the MULPOC work programme in 1984;

(6) **Feasibility study on the implementation of a food security programme** (approved in February 1983). The project document was submitted to the UNDP for funding but no response received;
(7) Creation of a unit for the definition of formulae for the production of pesticides and analysis of their residues (approved 1982). The programme was considered but no follow-up action was taken. It was also abandoned in 1984; and,

(8) Preparation of national phytosanitary legislation in compliance with relevant OAU convention (approved in 1982). The programme was never considered.

(f) Human resources

The ECA wanted to create indigenous consultancy agencies and also the conversion of technical schools and facilities at national universities to subregional ones. None of the approved programmes was ever carried out due mainly to lack of funds. For instance, in the case of the study on the establishment of a subregional higher business school, approved in 1982, the programme was first of all in competition with an existing proposal, that is, the one on the establishment of a subregional management institute being handled by the substantive division of the ECA - an evidence of a clash of programme of the ECA headquarters and the MULPOC. But the study was not being implemented due to lack of funds. The second programme for this sector was the study on the creation of indigenous consultancy agencies, approved in 1978. The study had never been considered. Even if it were to be implemented, no detail of the number of agencies to be created was made, neither do we know the areas which needed consultancy agencies.

Apart from a clash in programmes of the ECA headquarters and the MULPOC, the latter was actually depending too much on the headquarters to carry out its programmes. This was the case with the energy sector where the main programme was the establishment of a subregional committee
on energy, approved in 1982. The meeting of experts for this purpose was never convened due to lack of follow-up on the part of the substantive division concerned.  

(g) The women's programme

The activities implemented within the women's programme was similar to that of other MULPOCs. They included the study on the integration of women's component in development projects; feasibility study on the establishment of a women's documentation centre; training course in planning; seminar on the organization and management of co-operatives in agriculture, fishing and handicrafts (Zaire). All these activities were conducted in 1980. No programmes were carried out after that because the policy organs failed to meet in 1983 and so there was no guidance for more programmes. Moreover the programme for 1985-86 was not implemented because there was no women's co-ordinator. Finally, the women's programme was terminated in 1987 following the withdrawal of funds by the UNDP.

The rate of implementation for the MULPOC is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% Rate of Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trade</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Transport</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Agriculture</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Human resources</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Environment</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Energy</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. CADIS</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (including women's component)</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared with all the other MULPOCs, Yaounde had the lowest rate of implementation. It had to postpone or abandon a sizeable number of its programmes due to a combination of factors such as inadequate funds, limited manpower resources, dependence on headquarters for implementation, absence of a women's co-ordinator to mention but a few. Its objectives were rather vague as well. For example, in the programme for the integration of women in the process of development, there was no mention of the aspects of development, and the number of women from each country which will be involved. When the UNDP/ECA evaluation missions visited the member states, they reported that the latter expressed dissatisfaction at the low rate of implementation and complained that at each meeting they examined the same subjects and that the same studies were being initiated but never completed.

Furthermore, most of studies implemented dealt with general aspects in each sector and the member states wanted the MULPOC to go beyond the studies by implementing concrete programmes which had relevance to development. The missions also found that the UNDP Resident Representatives in the respective countries were highly regarded by national officials at any level than the MULPOC ones. The reason was that the governments were able to identify with UNDP projects which were tangible and of importance to them while the ECA was merely carrying out studies and submitting reports. But although the member states expect so much from the MULPOC, the latter was not equipped with the necessary organs for implementing real projects. Apart from vague objectives and scope of activities, Yaounde had no organ for co-ordination, evaluation, monitoring and implementation of projects. Although these could be established within the present mandate, nevertheless, the MULPOC lacks the financial and manpower resources to enable it to do so. Therefore, in its present form, it cannot deliver the goods. This makes its role
in development passive if not negligible.

4. THE GISENYI MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE
(CENTRAL AFRICA II)

Although we have outlined the salient features of Central Africa as a whole under sub-heading two, there are points to be made concerning Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. As indicated earlier on, the Gisenyi MULPOC has only these three member states.

Zaire is under the authoritarian rule of President Mobutu Sese Seko, who has been in power since 1965. The capital of Zaire is Kinshasa. Its industrial complex is in Shaba. In 1983 economic reforms and liberalization programmes were set in motion under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank. Zaire had also had its periods of political crisis in the past, notably the crisis of 1960-65, popular insurrections, mercenary revolts and the Shaba wars. It has been described as a miliary state basically governed by "Mobutu law which provides for a largely undisciplined armed force who are often terrorists at the service of the existing order, arbitrary detentions, torture ..." President Mobutu was alleged to be "one of the richest men in the world. His fortune is estimated at $5 billion". In a documentary on London Weekend Television, the commentators argued that it was difficult to distinguish between the treasury, the government and the private property of President Mobutu Sese Seko. According to them the treasury was the President's personal purse. They traced how he remitted US$ 2 million to the guardian of one of his sons studying in Europe. The child was under 18.

In contrast, Burundi has been classed among the poorest countries in the world. It has an area of 27,834 sq. km. and a population of less
than 5 million. Burundi is situated more than 1,500 kilometres from the Indian Ocean and its foreign trade is conducted through the ports of Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) and Mombasa (Kenya). 28 90 per cent of Burundi's imports come through the Tanzanian port, over 1,000 kilometres away. 29 Coffee accounts for 90 per cent of the country's earnings of foreign exchange. Burundi has had a troubled and bloody history in the past 26 years since it became independent in July 1962. The history is based on the complex ethnic relationship which existed between its Hutu majority (84 per cent of the population) being ruled by the Tutsi minority - this group make up 15 per cent of the population.

The dominance of the minority Tutsi over the majority Hutu group remains the central political and social reality in the control of Burundi's political institutions and the military. Apart from the armed forces, the security monitor dissent and signs of Hutu resistance. Power struggle between the two groups resulted in the so-called 1972 genocide. About 450 Hutu troops were massacred in early May at the request of the army high command and this has resulted in an all-Tutsi army.

Rivalry within the Tutsi elite was also frequent. For instance, it led to a bloodless coup on 3 September 1987 - President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza was removed while attending a Francophone Conference in Quebec, Canada. Bagaza sought refuge in Uganda. The new leadership is a Military Committee for National Redemption led by Major Pierre Buyoga who is a Tutsi Hima from former President Bagaza's region.

The political instability in Burundi affected its relations with its neighbours - Rwanda and Zaire. Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi is vulnerable to Zairean attacks and the latter has been known to carry out military manoeuvres along the Burundian border.
In March 1986, the government approved its Burundianization programme for two reasons: (a) it was part of a wider campaign against foreign influences; and (b) to make the Economic Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programme more easily accepted among Burundians. An aspect which directly affected Zaireans and other nationals was when Lt. Col. Melchiade Manderu, Director-General of Immigration, announced new criteria in September to apply to residency permit renewals. This included applicants contribution to the society and whether they were investing in sectors where Burundians lacked knowledge or means. Foreigners were expelled and the Zairean Community was particularly hard hit as more than 2,000 were forced to leave the Rumonge region in southern Burundi.

Just as serious is the decline of relations with Rwanda. In 1986, the Rwanda ambassador was virtually thrown out of his official residence in Bujumbura, following accusations that the Rwanda embassy was carrying out surveillance of the presidential palace. There is now only a skeleton staff and the location of the embassy is said to have been forcibly changed. Relations with Rwanda continued to be strained since the eviction of its ambassador. Brussels sources also disclosed that there was an unpublicized border clash between the two countries in 1987 which was resolved by a secret meeting between the two presidents. It is under this atmosphere of political instability affecting the three countries that the Gisenyi MULPOC has had to function. If the states are not on good terms with each other, it affects their deliberation at the policy organ meetings of the MULPOC.

The Rwandese Republic, like Burundi, is distinct among the independent states of black Africa for both the smallness of its territory and the density of its population. Covering an area of 26,338 sq. km.
(10,169 sq. miles), Rwanda had an estimated population of 5,757,000 at mid-1983, with a density of 218.6 inhabitants per sq. km.\(^{33}\)

The population is composed of Hutu (about 84 per cent), Tutsi (about 15 per cent) and Twa (one per cent).

The capital of Rwanda is Kigali and the official languages are French and Kin Yar Wanda, a Bantu language.

Like Burundi, Rwanda has two main physical handicaps to economic development: the extreme population density and the distance from the sea. The population problem is aggravated by a high rate of growth, estimated at an average annual increase of 3.7 per cent, which is placing an increasing strain on food resources.\(^{34}\)

Historically, the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi were enemies and traditional national feeling remains high in both countries. Serious ethnic strife between the Hutu and Tutsi broke out in December 1963 and in the early 1970s. In 1974 a tripartite conference was held in Burundi, attended by the heads of state of Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. It resulted in a broad agreement to take concerted action to improve border security in each state and to take steps to facilitate co-operation across national boundaries. In September 1976 they established the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries.

Relations with Zaire have been cordial until 16 May 1985 when the Libyan leader Col. Gaddafi visited Rwanda for three days. He attended Friday night prayers at the Kigali Mosque, built with Libyan funds, where he lashed out against Christianity as the "religion of colonialism". He called Islam the "religion of God" and the religion meant for Africans. In speaking of muslim brothers in Zaire, he stated that they live under the unjust law of Mobutu, a zionist agent, and that "he who kills Mobutu
will go to paradise". He called upon muslims to topple Mobutu in a holy war.

Apart from sharing the same history and a geographical fact of being landlocked states, the three countries are the only members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). The CEPGL was established a year before the establishment of the Gisenyi MULPOC. Its objectives included the creation of a security partnership, harmonization of various aspects of life in the area and the promotion of trade. Since the technical ministerial organs of the CEPGL were established before the creation of the MULPOC policy organs, an agreement was reached during the consultations held with the representatives of the three countries during the fourth and fifth meetings of the ECA Conference of Ministers in 1977 and 1979, respectively. They agreed that the CEPGL and the MULPOC should co-operate closely with a view to achieving economic co-operation and integration. In conformity with this agreement, the inaugural meeting of the MULPOC Council of Ministers in October 1977 directed that the MULPOC should provide logistic support to the CEPGL. This guideline was endorsed by the first extraordinary meeting of the MULPOC Council of Ministers held in August 1980 and by the Conference of the Heads of State and Governments of the CEPGL countries held in December 1980. This explains the ease with which some of the Gisenyi programmes were transferred to the CEPGL secretariat as will be shown later.

It should be noted that the CEPGL countries are in turn members of a larger economic grouping, namely, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). This community was initiated in October 1983. The headquarters which is in Libreville, Gabon, was opened in December 1985. The objectives were to promote and reinforce co-operation and a
sustained and balanced development in economic and social activity between member states.

It is significant for us to state that the three entities, that is, the CEPGL, the Gisenyi MULPOC and ECCAS are operated with similar objectives and sectors. The three states of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire have to make subscriptions to the three organizations, thereby reducing their abilities to make considerable contributions, given the nature of the economies of these countries. Both Burundi and Rwanda cannot afford to make financial contributions to all three.

4a. Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower Resources

The Gisenyi MULPOC has the same terms of reference and objectives as that of Yaounde. Therefore, the same problems arising from vague terminology, wider scope of activities with no time-frame affect it.

It also has similar structures and policy organs as the Yaounde MULPOC. The only exception being that, unlike the former, it does not have an Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee. The meetings of its policy organs have been held regularly, except for 1983 when the Council of Ministers did not meet. The MULPOC was still dealing with its organizational matters at the time.

The Gisenyi MULPOC also received UNDP contributions amounting to US$ 200,000 per annum for the 1977-79 period. The amount earmarked for 1980 onwards was US$ 250,000 per annum. The additional US$ 50,000 was to provide for an increase in consultancy services. The estimated resources gap assuming current UNDP funding levels were as follows:
Table 8.3 Estimated Resources Gap Assuming UNDP Funding Levels (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MULPOC Centre</th>
<th>Resources Available (1977-1978 levels)</th>
<th>Resources Required 1979-1980</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gisenyi</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>1,734,282</td>
<td>1,413,782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4 Estimated Resource Gap Assuming Proposed New UNDP Earmarking (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MULPOC Centre</th>
<th>Resources Available (new proposed UNDP levels)</th>
<th>Resources Required 1979-1980</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gisenyi</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,734,282</td>
<td>1,234,282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Column 2 does not include funding contributions from non-UNDP sources which in 1977-78 amounted to US$ 62,500.

If these funds continue to be available at the same level, the resources gap will be marginally reduced by US$ 62,500 to US$ 1,171,782. But the actual amount received for the period (1977-78) was US$ 403,719. No contribution has been made for the fourth cycle 1987-91. The MULPOC has an even bigger financial problem than either Yaounde or Niamey, because its resource gap topped the one million mark. The chances of it getting funds to cover the gap were slim according to officials of the ECO division of the ECA in February 1987. Apart from the costs of its work programmes, the reason for the huge gap is because it is the only MULPOC not carved out of a pre-existing subregional structure of the ECA. It therefore had to spend more on organizing its administrative and policy organs.
Not only did the MULPOC lack financial resources for carrying out its programmes, it also lacked manpower resources. When the ECA made a proposal for staffing to ECOSOC in 1982, it stated the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gisenyi</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Key:

D-1 is the Head of the MULPOC (Director). He is a political appointee. The post is for principal officers who are responsible for implementing programmes approved by the ECA MULPOC policy organs. He also has to consult government officials at the ministerial level and in the UN agencies and other IGOs. The post could be occupied by an ex-minister, academic or long-standing official of international institutions.

P-5 and P-3 are for senior officers. These posts are usually for economic affairs officers who undertake sectoral and topical studies; design multinational projects and conduct research. They assist heads of the MULPOCs in the management of the centres. These are civil servants.

Local Level This is made up of staff recruited at the local level or where the centres are situated. They are the general service staff, such as administrative assistants, typists, secretaries, drivers, cleaners and messengers.

From the schedule above, one can observe that prior to 1982 when the proposal was made, the MULPOC only had one member of staff in the P-3 category. This was an administrative assistant as confirmed by the ECO division. There were no local level staff either. The administrative
officer acted as a liaison officer for the MULPOC since it was the substantive division staff who were in charge of running it from Addis Ababa. When the need arose, the officer made the necessary arrangements for the policy organ meetings. The MULPOC suffered from acute staff shortages prior to 1982. Even with the ECA's proposal of four members of staff, that is, a director, an administrative officer and one local staff, the staffing level was still grossly inadequate. Given the number of studies to be carried out, the four members of staff would find the tasks too demanding. Another observation relates to the calibre of people employed. The director's post was a political appointment and could be occupied by anyone the Commission appointed. Then there is an administrative officer or two. These persons are not versed in socio-economic matters. They are not suited to research into the complex factors affecting development in Central Africa nor, indeed, any other part of Africa. The fact that the MULPOCs were provided with only skeleton staff suggests that the ECA does not want them to play leading roles in development. If this was not the intention, then why is it that the experts are all at Addis Ababa, rather than at the MULPOCs? This means that important matters were left in the hands of an officer who was in category P-3 in 1982 for example. The UNDP/ECA evaluation mission to Gisenyi in 1982 reported that the Gisenyi MULPOC encountered some problems due to its staff. In 1977 it appointed an administrative officer who was not aware of UN administrative procedures. This was because before this appointment at Gisenyi he only fulfilled low level duties. This made the functioning of the MULPOC a difficult one.\(^{38}\) In December 1979 he was transferred to another station and experts were appointed. Even so, the report argued that they lacked intellectual and technical qualifications necessary to fulfil their duties.\(^{39}\)

There has been a slight improvement in its staffing since 1987.
There are now five professionals, namely, the director, trade and finance economist, transport and communications engineer, energy specialist and an agriculture economist. 40

4b. *Gisenyi MULPOC: Work Programmes*

At the inaugural meeting of its Council of Ministers, the member states approved programmes in five sectors, namely, trade, energy, transport, human resources and tourism. Between 1980-84, four sectors were added - industry, agriculture, communications and the integration of women in the development process.

(a) *Trade*

In trade, three programmes were approved. The first was a study on the possibility of establishing a monetary clearing house arrangement in Central Africa. This was approved in October 1977. The study completed was completed in 1978 and the main finding was that there was already a Clearing House System in Central Africa. Burundi and Rwanda were expected to join the Clearing House, jointly established by the Bank of Central Africa Republic, Congo, Chad, Gabon and the Central Bank of Zaire. The second programme was a study on subregional integration (approved in 1977). This study was initially entitled 'Trade promotion among member states'. It became more specific in terms of its coverage when it was included in the UNDP financed project on 'multisectoral assistance to CEPGL' as a sub-project thereof. It included various aspects such as the statute of community enterprises, establishment of a trade documentation centre and the harmonization of investment codes. The project was still under execution. It was an attempt by the UNDP to reshape and focus a MULPOC programme. The
programmes are usually too general in nature. The study on trade promotion was carried out in 1981-82 by a consultant. (The ECA occasionally employs consultants to carry out some of the programmes when it has no experts of its own. The jobs were done on a contract basis.) The third programme was a report on administrative procedures as obstacles to trade promotion (approved in 1982). A progress report was submitted to the policy organs in March 1984 and the study is still pending. Negotiations for the elimination of identified obstacles were scheduled to start in June 1985. But the programme has not been completed due to lack of funds.

(b) Industry

Five programmes were approved for industry. The study on production of plywoods was approved in 1980. The programme was included in the work programme of the MULPOC at the request of the CEPGL secretariat and has since been incorporated into the project entitled 'Establishment of a complex of forest-based industries for CEPGL countries', funded by the UNDP and was under execution with the assistance of the ECA/FAO Forest Industries Advisory Group. The study has reached the pre-feasibility stage.

Next was the study on the creation of a fish canning factory (approved in August 1980). This was also included at the request of the CEPGL secretariat and was now part of the UNDP financed project on 'Multi-sectoral Assistance to CEPGL' under the 'Development of fisheries sub-project'. (The multisectoral assistance to CEPGL was a major exercise in which the Gisenyi MULPOC has been engaged in since 1982. As the leading agency the MULPOC has to co-ordinate the activities of the associated agencies FAO, UNIDO, UNCTAD, WTO, ITO involved in the implementation of various projects. The UNDP-funded projects are
implemented under such arrangements.) The exercise faced difficulties due to co-ordination problems which were now being overcome as a result of discussions held in October 1983 at the tripartite (that is, ECA other executing agencies and CEPGL secretariat) meeting held with the UNDP in Geneva. At the request of the CEPGL secretariat, they decided to postpone components of the project especially relating to the CEPGL until a comprehensive evaluation of the CEPGL structure, objectives and achievements had taken place. This exercise is still pending. Still on the creation of a fish canning factory, a consultant carried out the preliminary study. But in 1955 its implementation was postponed at the request of the CEPGL secretariat to allow room for the impending evaluation exercise.

There was also the study on the creation of cement plant and of small-scale sugar plants (approved in February 1981). But the programme on cement plants was taken out of the MULPOC work programme at the policy organs meeting in 1984. It was then entrusted to the CEPGL which was operating across the same sector. The policy organs also suspended the establishment of small-scale sugar plants until such a time that there were funds for carrying out the pre-feasibility study. This MULPOC faced the same problems relating to inadequate financial resources. More often than not, its programmes are deferred, suspended or transferred to the CEPGL secretariat. The fact that it lacked financial resources was one thing but the most significant consequences of this were the uncertainties relating to implementation surrounding the sources of funds, especially as member states made minimal contributions on a voluntary basis. In practice, they can only contribute if funds were available. So we have a situation where officials draw up programmes and then they have to wait for very long periods before funds can be found. In the case of Gisenyi, they have tried to come
to terms with the problems by transferring some of its programmes to the CEPGL secretariat, as the studies on production of plywood and the creation of a fish canning factory indicated. But in the long run the programmes will be in jeopardy unless money is forthcoming or the ECA curtails their numbers.

Another programme under industry was the study of protocol on harmonization of industrial policies of CEPGL member states which was approved in February 1981. The MULPOC prepared a paper on this and submitted it to the policy organs in 1984, but no further action has been taken. Finally, the study on the establishment of a subregional research centre on building materials was approved in 1981. The UNDP funding for this programme ended in 1983. Burundi had declared her willingness to host the centre which will serve both the Gisenyi and Yaounde MULPOCs. (This is the second example so far where a programme has been devised to serve both Central Africa I and II member states. The first one was with the establishment of a Clearing House by member states of Central Africa I, that is, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Chad, Gabon and Zaire.) Both Burundi and Rwanda (in Central Africa II) are expected to join shortly. (These two programmes would have prevented duplication of efforts for the two MULPOCs.) However, the study was suspended since 1983 due to lack of alternate source of funding.

(c) Energy

In the sector for energy, the MULPOC had two programmes. The first one was a study on the development of methane gas. This was approved in 1977. This programme was taken out of the MULPOC work programme mainly because of lack of funds in 1984. It was now being implemented by the CEPGL secretariat which was about to create a
demonstration centre. The second programme was a study on the development of peat resources, approved in October 1977. A consultant carried out a pre-feasibility study in 1981. Since 1983 this programme became part of the 'Multisectoral assistance project to CEPGL'. The UNDP provided funds for it.

(d) Agriculture

The MULPOC performed poorly in the agriculture sector. It had only two programmes: (1) Study on production, multiplication and dissemination of selected rice, beans and soya bean seeds (approved in 1981). The first phase of the programme which was the preliminary study was completed. The second phase involving a pre-feasibility study on food security programme for the CEPGL countries was approved in February 1981. A preliminary study has been carried out. The second and third phases have been suspended here too until funds were available. It had barely started off on each study but none has been completed up till June 1988.

(e) Human resources

The worst performance of the Gisenyi MULPOC was in this sector, where none of the three programmes was implemented. These were (1) the establishment of an indigenous consultancy centre (approved in 1977); (2) the compilation of a directory of existing training facilities (approved in 1977); and (3) the creation of a centre for the production of educational materials, also approved in 1977 but abandoned in 1980.41

(f) Transport and communications

For transport, there were two programmes also. The first was a
study on the co-ordination of the activities of national airlines and identification of viable air linkages between CEPGL countries and other subregions, approved in 1977. Originally, the study related only to the establishment of a subregional air freight company, but its scope was enlarged to include other aspects of air transport at the request of member states. The latter were invited to submit their comments on the preliminary study in 1984. The comments were considered by an ad hoc meeting of civil aviation officials before being submitted to the policy organs of the MULPOC. Subsequent reports have failed to state either the outcome of the study or the comments made. The second programme was a study on navigation on Lake Tanganyika and Lake Kivu, approved in October 1977. This programme became part of a broader one entitled, 'Study on policy for integration of CEPGL countries' transport systems with a view to alleviating the problems arising from the landlocked nature of these countries', executed under the 'Multisectoral assistance to CEPGL project'. Its report is still pending.

In the sector of communications, the programme involved the establishment of a subregional documentation and information system for CEPGL countries. It was approved in March 1984. The intention was to create a subregional centre to link up with the Central Coordinating Centre, that is, the Pan-African Documentation and Information System (PADIS). The one for Central Africa is referred to as CADIS. At the time of the approval of the programme, its location had not been determined. The argument was whether CADIS would serve only Gisenyi member states or whether it would include the Yaounde MULPOC ones. Planned field missions took place and this explains why the equipment bought for Yaounde MULPOC was re-routed to Addis Ababa. A meeting of Plenipotentiaries of state members of the Giesenyi and Yaounde MULPOCs on the creation of CADIS was held in Addis Ababa, 10-11 April 1987.
Representatives of seven states attended. They decided unanimously to accept the offer of Zaire to house CADIS. The government of Zaire accepted to pay the costs of the first phase of the project, that is, for investment and start-up costs, including the provision of office space, a computer room with appropriate infrastructure, a meeting/training room, office furniture and equipment, professional personnel, that is, a director, information scientist/data base manager and chief documentalist, and as part of the support staff a computer operator, a secretary and a guard.  

(g) Tourism

There was only one programme in this sector. This had to do with the establishment of a subregional training centre for tourism, approved in October 1977. The feasibility study was completed with the financial assistance of the World Tourism Organization (WTO) as part of the 'Multisectoral assistance to CEPGL project'.

(h) CADIS

It was also decided that all the state members of the two MULPOCs will use CADIS and thereby constitute the subregional Technical Committee. Zaire will chair the committee for two years and in that capacity represent CADIS. In December 1987 the secretariat undertook a mission to Zaire to work out the details for the establishment of CADIS with its government. Joint training of personnel was expected to commence during the first quarter of 1988.

CADIS when fully operational will be the first programme which looks any way near a tangible programme because it involves the installation of computers and costs can be calculated for instance. It will be very useful for Central Africa because of the lack of information
on development issues of the area, a situation worsened by the land-locked nature of the states. The programme will make it possible for already processed data and other materials to be made available to member states. It involves the use of equipment and technical staff which will make the calculation of costs and benefits a possibility, sometime lacking with the studies.

(i) The women's programme

The Gisenyi MULPOC was most active with reference to its programme on the integration of women in the development process. In Burundi, its government has realized that a grave mistake had been made in the past in neglecting women because they were the ones who did most of the farming work. In the UNDP-sponsored project, a special component was financed by UNICEF entirely devoted to the training of women as farmers. The best part of the project was that it generated its own income. The World Bank was so impressed that a major loan had been agreed for a much larger programme based on this Gitega (Burundi) scheme. The programme involved the training of women as farmers. This programme made a break from the monotony of studies, research, seminars and workshops on women which have dominated the programmes of other MULPOCs. The neglect of women in development was a major problem. And with the help of UNDP and UNICEF, the MULPOC was able to design and implement a more realistic and practical programme. The Gitega scheme was the only one of its kind. The ECA did not implement a similar scheme in the other MULPOCs. The Burundi authority welcomed the scheme because it tied in at the time with its campaign to encourage women to participate in development as a whole, and also to acknowledge the role they had played in agriculture in the past. It involved the use of simple skills and techniques in farming. The
training of women as farmers is a direct contribution to development. The attractiveness of the approach lies in the fact that women were not only portrayed as mothers whose places were in their homes, but also as active participants in development. Although a small step forward, this was, nevertheless, an important one because what women need most is such practical training to enable them to enter the workforce. More skills in the various sectors will mean access to jobs, housing and better working conditions. The jobs will also make the women economically independent too. Apart from the Gitega Scheme, the MULPOC also conducted a number of studies, namely:

(1) Study on needs assessment, approved and completed in 1981;

(2) Feasibility study on the establishment of a women's documentation centre, approved in 1980 and completed in 1983;

(3) Feasibility study on the needs of the Women's co-operative union in the marketing of handicrafts, approved in 1980 and completed in 1984;

(4) The study on the 'Ruhengeri Nutrition Centre', approved in 1980 and completed in 1984; and

(5) The study on women groups in the production and marketing of handicrafts, approved in 1980 and also completed in 1984.

The dates of approval and subsequent ones for the programmes indicate that the MULPOC took 3-4 years to implement its studies on women in development. The withdrawal of UNDP funds led to the termination of the women's programme, including the Gitega Scheme, in Central Africa in 1987. The withdrawal affected both programmes implemented and those under planning.

The implementation rate of the entire work programme of Gisenyi
was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% Rate of Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trade</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Energy</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Agriculture</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Human resources</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Tourism</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. CADIS</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (including women’s component)</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures for some of the sectors are misleading. First, the ECA has not explained how it derived these figures in its report. Secondly, if we look at the sector on tourism, the implementation rate is 100 per cent. This does not reflect the fact that the MULPOC only had one programme which was a study on the establishment of a subregional training centre for tourism, nor the fact that the programme had been transferred with financial assistance from the WTO to the 'Multisectoral assistance to CEPGL project'. The figures are misleading for CADIS at zero per cent because the equipment has been bought. The CADIS headquarters will be based in Kinshasa. Zaire is to provide personnel, office and other costs as a result of an agreement in 1987. In fact a lot more has been achieved for CADIS than the zero percentage will allow one to think. The only explanation for the zero recorded was that when the report was prepared, it was possible that none of the actions mentioned here had taken place.

While examining the work programme a number of observations have
been made, one of which was the dependence on consultants to carry out parts of programmes. For instance, in the case of the energy programme, that is, the development of peat resources, a consultant carried out a pre-feasibility study in 1982. The same applied to industry, with the preliminary study on the creation of a fish canning factory in 1981.

Secondly, in instances where programmes had not been implemented due mainly to lack of funds, the Gisenyi MULPOC has had to transfer some to the CEPGL secretariat in 1984. This applied to the industrial programme on the production of plywood; the creation of cement plants and of small-scale sugar plants.

There are also examples where items have been included in the work programme by the CEPGL secretariat. Because the two entities operated within the same sectors and they serve the same member states, it created a flexible atmosphere whereby programmes have been requested and transferred from one to the other and vice versa. Moreover, there is a formal agreement between the Gisenyi MULPOC and the CEPGL secretariat, which was endorsed by both in 1980 for closer co-operation.

Then there were attempts by the UNDP to re-focus the MULPOC programmes where the former was providing the funds. This was the case with the study on subregional integration. The initial study was entitled 'Trade promotion among member states'. After due consultation with the UNDP, it included various aspects such as the statute of community enterprise, establishment of trade documentation centre and harmonization of investment codes.

Finally, by comparison, the Gisenyi MULPOC implemented more programmes than that of Yaounde; this was reflected in the relatively
higher implementation rate for the former which was 54.5 per cent. The Yaounde MULPOC had 23.5 per cent. Gisenyi was more effective in the area especially, as it was dealing with only three states with common history and a determination to work together. The states indicated their willingness to work together when they requested the ECA to establish the MULPOC. They are interested in co-operation as a means of bringing stability to their respective territories. Both Burundi and Rwanda have similar compositions in their populations. Therefore, political instability in one could spill over to the other.

5. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION AND ECA'S RESPONSE

Six out of ten member states are LDCs but going through the programmes there were no indications that their problems were given special attention. All the states were treated as the same as far as the programmes were concerned.

For Central Africa II, that is, Gisenyi, the major problem related to the fact that the three states were landlocked. The ECA has not come up with a solution and so all the states were operating through bilateral arrangements with Tanzania and Kenya. The MULPOC also experienced the problems of lack of communications with ECA headquarters, CEPGL secretariat and the UNDP representation. This was mainly due to the fact that the secretariat was located in Rwanda which was geographically isolated. This was the second MULPOC located in such an area. The other was the Tangier MULPOC.

To overcome the problem, the ECA installed communications equipment in the form of a telex line in 1988. This has improved the situation for all concerned as a permanent contact has been established
with the ECA headquarters and other agencies in the area. The problem of co-ordination of activities has been achieved with an agreement between the ECA and CEPGL secretariat in 1982. But there is no formal relationship between the MULPOC, UDEAC and ECCAS.

6. CONCLUSION

There are two categories of problems encountered by the two MULPOCs. The first category relates to structural deficiencies, namely, lack of funds, manpower resources, ill-defined objectives of the MULPOCs and implementation of work programmes; with the exception of the Gitega Scheme for women farmers and the proposed CADIS, the programmes were of a general nature and most of them studies. Moreover, the programmes did not reflect the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action endorsed in 1980, because most of them were adopted in the period 1977-80 under the framework of the demand for a New International Economic Order. These structural handicaps were responsible for the ineffectiveness of the MULPOCs, although Gisenyi implemented more programmes than Yaounde.

The second category related to the external environment. These sets of problems served to undermine the effectiveness of the MULPOCs. In Central Africa I, Equatorial Guinea was still recovering from the effects of a dictatorship and a battered economy. The current political situation in Chad was making it difficult for the MULPOC to function. For example, the Director has been unable to visit Chad. Four members of Yaounde are in the UDEAC, that is, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo and Central Africa Republic. The other three, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome are not UDEAC members. The functioning of the MULPOC was hampered by a certain lack of political cohesion among its seven member
states, especially the three which were outside UDEAC. In addition, Sao Tome and Principe, which was an island, had no easy links with the continent. On the other hand, political problems in Chad and Equatorial Guinea added to physical communication problems to reduce the effectiveness of the MULPOC in general.

Although in Gisenyi there was a formal relationship between the MULPOC and CEPGL secretariat, there was no co-operation between UDEAC and the Yaounde MULPOC. No formal links existed between the MULPOC with ECCAS either.

External factors also affected the Gisenyi MULPOC. Relations between Burundi and Zaire were not cordial. Moreover, the political instability in Burundi, Zaire and to a lesser extent Rwanda affected the overall functioning of the MULPOC.

Of all the MULPOCs, the Gisenyi-based MULPOC was the only one not carved out of pre-existing subregional offices or UNDATs. Thus, it had inherited no continuity of activities at the time of its creation; this accounted for its difficulties to establish links with member states in its earlier years.

As in the case of the West and North Africa MULPOCs, Yaounde and Gisenyi suffer from the lack of effective decentralization of activities from the ECA headquarters. The MULPOCs have virtually no autonomy with respect to technical, administrative and financial decisions.

And finally, the fact that there are two MULPOCs in Central Africa has not made any significant impact on development. The two faced similar problems and in the final analysis such constraints were multiplied by two. Perhaps the only point to be made is the fact that Gisenyi was more effective than Yaounde because the former dealt with
only three states which had historical, cultural and geographical links. The constraints facing the states were similar but the rates of implementation of programmes was higher for Gisenyi at 54 per cent compared with 23.5 per cent for Yaounde. Apart from the common historical, cultural and geographical links between Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire, the three were members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes countries. This made it possible for them to switch programmes between the latter and the MULPOC. Also smallness made it easier to identify the interests of the states.

The co-operation with other specialized agencies in the case of Gisenyi MULPOC was another factor for its effectiveness. For instance, the UNICEF and World Bank financed the Gitega Scheme. The WTO financed the feasibility study on tourism, while the UNDP provided financial backing for sectors such as agriculture, industry, trade and the women's programme. Such institutions were more sympathetic to the fact that Rwanda and Burundi are LDCs.
NOTES

1. This was one of the points we discussed during our meeting with N.M. Mesemola, officer-in-charge, Economic Co-operation Office at the ECA Secretariat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 23 February 1987. He pointed out that the creation of the Gisenyi MULPOC was the granting of the wishes of the three states that the ECA felt that this was necessary.


3. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. 43.


8. Ibid.

9. During discussions with ECO division staff and officials of the Technical Assistance Co-ordination and Operations Office (TACO) who handle the contributions of member states to the MULPOCs at the ECA secretariat, March 1987, what they all seemed to agree about was the fact that they would like to see member states increasing their contributions in monetary terms to the ECA.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 15.

13. This was a view expressed by the officer-in-charge of the Technical Assistance Co-ordination and Operations Office (TACO) during an interview at the ECA secretariat on 5 March 1987.


17. Ibid., p. 5.

18. Ibid., p. 20.

19. Ibid., p. 21.

20. Ibid., p. 22.

21. Ibid., p. 33.

22. The highest rate was for that of Niamey MULPOC which is 66 per cent, followed by Lusaka at 63 per cent, Gisenyi's rate is 54.5 per cent, while Tangier had the second lowest figure of 47 per cent. See, Performance Report of the MULPOCs 1977-84, ECO Division, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, pp. 32-33.


24. Ibid.


26. Ibid.

27. ITV World in Action Programme, October 1987. There was no official response to the allegations contained in the programme. The bodyguards at the President's Mansion barred reporters from entering the place as shown on TV.


32. Ibid.


34. Ibid., p. 803.

35. Other members of ECCAS include, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principle. There are 11 members of the ECCAS in all.


38. Ibid.


40. Ibid., p. 11.

41. Ibid.


CHAPTER 9

ECA IN NORTH AFRICA: THE TANGIER MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (MULPOC)

1. INTRODUCTION

The MULPOC for North Africa based in Tangier, Morocco, replaced the ECA subregional office which was set up in 1963. Its operational venue covers the following countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan and Tunisia. Despite its long history of being a subregional structure of the ECA, this MULPOC is the least developed of all the MULPOCs, in terms of its policy organs (it does not have a fully-fledged policy organ at the ministerial level), and the fact that it has always been funded from the regular budget of the ECA. It is the only MULPOC which has been funded from this source since its inception. All the others have had to look to the UNDP for funding. Even though all the other MULPOCs have had at least one major evaluation by the joint ECA/UNDP mission, the Tangier MULPOC has never been part of the exercise. The wider implication of its isolation and non-participation in the evaluation exercises is that in the deliberations on the various aspects of the MULPOCs at the ECA secretariat, the activities and problems of the MULPOC have been omitted.

This MULPOC is also a small one with six countries (the smallest is Gisenyi with three states). In the case of Gisenyi, smallness was an advantage because it was more effective than that of Yaounde. But like Yaounde with only seven states, the Tangier MULPOC is not effective for reasons treated later in the chapter.
The Tangier MULP0C has had virtually no impact in North Africa because it has not been able to operate effectively and efficiently due to its internal constraints which have manifested themselves in the form of substandard policy organs, unrealistic programmes and the lack of financial and manpower resources for the implementation of programmes. And that is not all, the MULP0C faced major external obstacles to its operations in North Africa, the most important ones being the existence of the Arab League to which almost all the North African states belong and the political conflicts between the states. The North African states prefer to carry out their activities in the Arab League rather than in the MULP0C. Every aspect of their relationship is covered by the Arab League. In addition, the MULP0C has avoided consideration of the political conflicts in North Africa in its deliberations but this strategy is unrealistic especially when we realize that the political factors have been partly responsible for the inactivity of the MULP0C.¹

Another obstacle to the operation of the MULP0C has to do with the location of the office. The government of Morocco has built an office complex referred to as the International Pavilion for International Organizations as a way of attracting the latter to Tangier, but the gesture may have come too late. The Tangier MULP0C is situated in the International Pavilion but the ECA is, so far, the only international organization in the complex. The others which are the Centre Africain de Formation et de Recherche Administratives pour le Developpement (CAFRAD), the Association of African Trade Promotion Organization (AATPO) and the Centre d'Etudes Industrielles du Maghreb (CEIM) are all regional organizations operating in Tangier. Tangier is isolated: the city has lost its status as an international city to places like Rabat and Cassablanca. Most of the other international organizations such as the
UNDP, UNICEF and UNESCO, and embassies are situated in these cities. There are no direct flights from sub-Saharan Africa to Tangier. So delegates have to spend at least two days on their journey to meetings in Tangier. Apart from the costs of travelling, it is inconvenient. Also there is the problem of communication between the MULPOC and other organizations in North Africa and also with the ECA headquarters.

Before considering the MULPOC in detail, we shall outline some of the distinct features of the North African subregion.

2. SALIENT FEATURES OF NORTH AFRICA

North Africa is a distinct region of its own. This is borne out by the fact that in International Relations when we talk of the Middle East, North Africa is excluded. Also when we refer to Africa, the same applies especially as the Sahara Desert has created a natural demarcation between North Africa and the rest of Africa. Unless otherwise stated, we use the term sub-Saharan Africa for the rest of Africa, excluding the North.

North Africa has 30 per cent of Africa's area, 25 per cent of its population and 47 per cent of its GNP.²

Here as in sub-Saharan Africa, average income is low though income differentials are wide within and between countries. Reliance on primary production (agriculture and mining) is also heavy, not only as constituents of GNP but also as the major source of foreign exchange. Again, the economics of North Africa resemble those of other subregions in being fairly open and exhibiting a strong orientation of foreign trade towards the industrial countries.
Though having much in common with other African subregions, North Africa has its own distinct characteristics. Islam, Arabic and centuries of submission by most states to Carthaginian, Roman, Umayyed, Moravidi, Mohadi and Ottoman rule have created greater social and cultural homogeneity than in sub-Saharan Africa. These countries have their centres of population along the Mediterranean shores, to the west along the Atlantic and to the east along the Red Sea. From Morocco to Egypt, there is a similar Mediterranean civilization based on cultural, geographic, climatic, agricultural and historical affinities.

Economically, North African economies are more diversified and export-oriented than other African countries, but less integrated commercially. Unlike in other subregions, integration efforts in North Africa were mostly bilateral and involved production, infrastructure and labour, but no trade and monetary arrangements on the scale practised in the rest of the continent.

Socially, North Africa is relatively urbanized and integrated.

However, despite these similarities, there are also important differences. That part of North Africa which lies west of Egypt and north of the Sahara is called al-Maghrib in Arabic or the occidental, that is, where the sun sets, as opposed to al-Mashriq or the levant, that is, where the sun rises. Views differ as to where the Mashreq ends and the Maghreb begins, with some writers excluding Libya from the latter and using that term to refer exclusively to Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and the territory of the Western Sahara. The exclusion of Libya is due to its character as a transitional country. It is not of the Mashreq, but it is also the least Maghrebian of the North African states.
There are striking physical and cultural differences between the people of the Maghreb and those of the Mashreq, but they are markedly weaker in Libya. The undercurrent of Berber subculture gets stronger as one goes west. There are also climatic differences between Libya and the rest of North Africa. The region from Morocco to Tunisia, because it projects northwards from the continent, benefits from the moisture-laden Westerlies coming across the Atlantic, whereas Libya is on their southern fringe and gets very little rain. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have important areas of rain-fed cultivation and have population/cultivable land ratios that are favourable by Arab world standards. The ratios are 700 inhabitants per square mile to arable land in Morocco and Algeria and 300 in Tunisia, compared with about 2,000 in Egypt and 400 in Syria.5

Despite the differences, the ECA does not make a distinction between the Maghreb and the Mashreq. The Commission treats all the countries in North Africa as the same. But an official pointed out that Libya sees itself as part of the Mashreq, although some writers state otherwise.6 Even though the ECA has lumped together Egypt and the North African states, it has also ignored the historical links existing between Egypt, Central and Eastern Africa. Egypt is physically and organically tied to the latter. The Sahara Desert constitutes a physical barrier between other North African states and sub-Saharan Africa, but there is no such barrier existing between Egypt, the Sudan and countries around Lake Victoria, Lake Nyasa and its tributaries. The Nile is a bridge between the northern and southern parts of the great Nile system. It has fused the cultures, civilizations and races of Egypt, the Nile, the Sudan and Ethiopia, for instance. At present the nine Nile Basin countries, that is, the beneficiaries of the Nile - Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and
Map 3 The Map of North Africa

Zaire - have a close co-operation arrangement for the maximum utilization of the Nile. Egypt also hinted its preference for links with Central and Eastern Africa when the Ambassador of Egypt to Ethiopia stated during the Silver Jubilee Anniversary of the ECA in 1983 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that "For those whom God and the Great Nile have brought together, let no man bring asunder." So just to say that because Egypt is situated north of the Sahara is not enough to put all the North African states together. The historical and cultural links with Central Africa through the Nile system are both important and real. This partially explains why until recently Egypt has had less participation in the MULPOC than the other states. As it tries to re-establish cordial relationship with Libya, she has also given the ECA the green light to include her in future studies especially on migrant labour.

As the MULPOCs were established to reflect the peculiar needs of each subregion, the ECA seemed to be operating without due consideration of the Afro-Arab nature, nor the distinctions between the states in North Africa. It is therefore difficult for the states to identify with the ECA.

Most potent of the differences in the economic characteristics of the countries are reflected in the profile of each country. Some of the differences are reflected in figures on Table 9.1. The figures correspond with the World Bank's classification of these countries. Libya is classified as a high-income country, with a GNP per capita of $7,170; industry accounts for 57 per cent of its GDP with services at 39 per cent, but agriculture is only 4 per cent. Algeria and Tunisia are upper-middle income with GNP per capita of $2,550 and $1,190, respectively. Industry accounts for 48 per cent of GDP for Algeria and 34 per cent for Tunisia. The percentage of agriculture is relatively
Table 9.1 Basic Economic Indicators for North Africa (1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Popn (Mn)</th>
<th>GNP ($mn)</th>
<th>GNP ($)</th>
<th>A (%)</th>
<th>I (%)</th>
<th>M (%)</th>
<th>S (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>6,930</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>11,850</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>30,550</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7,240</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>58,180</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>25,240</td>
<td>7,170</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>125.1</td>
<td>133,990</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS Africa</td>
<td>396.1</td>
<td>153,730</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Key: SS is Sub-Saharan Africa  
A is Agriculture  
I is Industry  
M is Manufacturing  
S is Services

higher for Tunisia at 17, compared with 8 for Algeria. Egypt and Morocco are lower middle income countries and the corresponding figures of their basic indicator is in Table 9.1. Sudan, on the other hand, is the only low income country in the region. It is also an LDC. Compared with the rest of Africa, North Africa has only one LDC - West Africa has 8, with 9 in Southern and Eastern Africa. Central Africa has 6. Also with the exception of Sudan, the economies of North African countries are relatively stronger than those of sub-Saharan countries. (For comparisons see Table 1.2.)

With reference to the profile of each country, Algeria is one of
the countries classified as "upper middle income". (The other one is Tunisia.) They have per capita GNP of $2,100 and $1,400, respectively, estimated for 1981. The Algerian economy is more industrialized and diversified than any other economy in North Africa, although it rests on a limited base of resources consisting mainly of carbohydrates (oil and gas). The revenue from oil at present is 40 per cent. Industrialization has rendered Algeria more self-sufficient in manufactures than most countries, hence her low foreign trade-GNP ratio of only 41 per cent. Agriculture accounts for only 6 per cent of GNP due to gross inefficiency; reforms have not revitalized the sector. As a result the country is dependent on the import of food.

In the case of Egypt, its natural resources are becoming rapidly and manifestly inadequate for supporting a large and fast growing population. Fortunately, oil depletion and soil exhaustion are balanced by two inexhaustible sources income, that is, the Suez Canal and tourism. Egypt is a large exporter of labour to Europe and has thereby been able to turn surplus manpower from a liability into an asset, though not without cost. As a lasting solution, Egypt had embarked earlier than most African countries on an ambitious industrialization programme which secured for her during the period 1973-84 growth rates in the industrial sector (10.3 per cent) and the GNP (8.5 per cent) which were more than double those of the average low middle income country (4.2 per cent in both cases). But in the process Egypt became the leading debtor in the region. In May 1987, it reached an agreement with the IMF which signalled a change in IMF policy. The programme gave Egypt very favourable rescheduling terms for its estimated US$ 44 billion debt. A free market for foreign exchange was initiated which led to the depreciation of the Egyptian pound in relation to the dollar.
Libya has an area of 1,775,000 km$^2$ and is considered as being the fourth largest country in Africa. It is bordered north by the Mediterranean Sea, east by Egypt and Sudan, south and south-west by Chad and Niger, west by Algeria and finally north-west by Tunisia. Its population is estimated at 2,939,200 inhabitants, 57 per cent of whom live in the main urban centres like Tripoli (31.4 per cent), Benghazi (14.5 per cent) and Zawia (11 per cent).

Libya is unique in combining 2.9 per cent of the subregion's population with 19 per cent of its GNP. This gave it a per capita GNP of $7,170 in 1985 and made it the only country classified as high income. It is totally dependent on oil which accounts for about 60 per cent of the GNP and 99 per cent of the exports. Services, which are closely linked to the oil sector, contribute 39 per cent of the GNP, industry 5 per cent and agriculture 4 per cent.

Libya is led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who toppled King Idriss on 1 September 1969, in a bloodless coup. Once in power he created a 'state of the masses' (Jamahiriya). His philosophy is called the 'Third Universal Theory' - the land becomes the property of all since everyone can work it to meet personal needs. Economic activity is no longer orientated towards the increase in capital for the ruling class but to the meeting of everyone's needs. Production is shared out between producers. The 'Third Universal Theory' is meant to be an alternative to communism which Gaddafi saw as Godless and the capitalist system which he described as exploitative. The governmental structure consists of nationwide town meetings called congresses, which are invested with the authority to elect people's committees to run the government administration and every other state institution.

Libya and Algeria share similar revolutionary goals and they support
movements of national liberation. Thus, while there is a superficial unity of language and culture among these states, they are in fact diverse in political inclinations. They have parochial interests and rivalries. For instance, Algeria is in conflict with Morocco over the Western Sahara, while relations deteriorated between Libya and Egypt over the Camp David Accord (1979).

The Moroccan economy has a fairly wide and balanced base. The country has considerable land, mineral, animal and marine (fish) resources. It is the world's leading source of sardines which constitutes about 80 per cent of the catch. It exports about 150,000 tons annually.

GNP is divided evenly between production of goods (50 per cent) and services (50 per cent); within the former, the share of agriculture, extractive industry and manufacturing are nearly equal at 18 per cent, 15 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. (See Table 9.2.)

Alone in the region, Morocco expanded its exports at a faster rate (3.6 per cent) than imports (2.1 per cent) during the period 1973-84. Nevertheless, the country had balance of trade deficits throughout the period 1980-86 with the import/export ratio never exceeding 63 per cent. Economic policy has had to concentrate on the issue of foreign debt, relations with the EEC which is the main market for Morocco's exports, and with the need to reduce the fiscal deficit. The current adjustment programme which is supported by the IMF lays particular emphasis on the fiscal deficit, credit control and various structural measures including the public sector. The programme has been implemented despite the drought, bad crop and unfavourable phosphate prices which put pressure on the current account.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports ($mn)</th>
<th>Imports ($mn)</th>
<th>As % of GDP</th>
<th>Exports (%)</th>
<th>Imports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,156</td>
<td>3,885</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>13,034</td>
<td>9,061</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>10,841</td>
<td>6,614</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>98</td>
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<td>N Africa</td>
<td>32,293</td>
<td>24,288</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS Africa</td>
<td>31,861</td>
<td>28,004</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: op. cit.

Key: SS is Sub-Saharan Africa, mfd is Manufacture, E is Export, prim is Primary Sector, M is Import
Sudan is the best endowed but least developed of the six countries. It has 26 per cent and 67 per cent, respectively, of the cultivated and the cultivable but unused land and no more than 18 per cent of its population. (See Table 9.1 for estimates of the population.) It is the largest country in Africa with a total area of $2.5 \text{ km}^2$. It has about 200 million hectares of arable land but the area actually cultivated amounts to only 18 million hectares.\(^{17}\) Sudan is a low income country with its per capita GNP estimated at $300 in 1985. It turned into an exporter of labour to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. An influx of recycled petro-dollars helped the country to achieve a high (6.1 per cent) and inflation-free (3.4 per cent) growth during the 1970s. In the process, it accumulated a $12 billion debt which it could not service. Rescheduling under the auspices of the IMF entailed the implementation of three programmes of economic reforms and adjustment under which the Sudanese pound was devalued 13 times, the GDP fell in real terms from $\text{£S} 6.1 \text{ billion in 1981-82 to } \text{£S} 5.5 \text{ billion in 1985-86}$, whereas the balance of trade deficit rose from $\text{£S} 533 \text{ million to } \text{£S} 918 \text{ million.}^{20}$ The country also experienced more difficulties after the IMF cut its credit facility for failure to service its IMF debt, on which it had built considerable arrears. However, in 1987, the government arrived at an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank on a programme to cut inflation, reduce public expenditure and reform the public sector. A first step was taken which was the devaluation of the Sudanese pound on October 1987 by 44 per cent, relative to the US dollar.\(^{21}\) It is the only country in North Africa classified as least developed by the General Assembly of the UN.

Tunisia has fertile lands, minerals (including oil), animal wealth and tourist attractions such as bazaars, beaches, historical sites and a Mediterranean climate. The Tunisian economy is more open than any
other in North Africa. (For its export and import figures, see Table 9.2.) It relies heavily on invisibles, particularly earnings from migrant labour and tourism. These factors render the economy vulnerable to external forces. Tunisia is looking inwards for solutions to its economic problems resulting from factors such as the fall in prices of phosphates and the enlargement of the EEC to include Spain and Portugal.

Tunisia was until 1987 governed by one man since its independence - President Bourguiba who was ousted on 7 November 1987 by General Zine al-Abidine Ben ali after a team of medical specialists declared the former President incapable of doing his job. But General Ben Ali declared that no major changes were expected in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres. The declaration left Tunisia as the most open of all the countries.

It is not only in the economic sphere that differences exist between the countries of North Africa. If we look at the political sphere, we find that there are differences in the ideologies, systems of government, and the projection of national personalities. For example, Morocco is the most traditional of the world's surviving monarchies. The ruling Alaonite family have been in power since the mid-seventeenth century and they have deeply ingrained rituals of dress and behaviour characterizing the royal court. However, it is not on the differences that the ECA was relying in its dealings with these countries. The Commission sought to exploit the similarities in the economic and social aspects of life in the subregion. First, the ECA counted on the fact that the countries have similar degrees of success in meeting the basic needs of their people. The Overseas Development Council's Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is a composite index which measures infant mortality, life expectancy and basic literacy on a scale of 0 to 100. The PQLI scores
for Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are 47, 49 and 62, respectively. In 1979, a survey of 150 countries ranked Tunisia 50th, Algeria 51st and Morocco 60th in terms of the PQLI score (see Table 9.3). Apart from similarities, the ECA also relied on the common history and the fact that Islam is a unifying factor in the subregion. In Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, Islam is the state religion, while 95 per cent of the population in the Sudan are Muslims. Also the countries are Arab in culture. But unity is an illusion when we consider the relations between the states. In reality North Africa has never functioned as a single political or economic entity. Each state is profoundly suspicious of its immediate neighbours. The external problem of the Maghreb countries, for instance, have largely been with each other. There is a deep-seated mistrust between them which has its roots in ethnic and dynastic rivalries long ante-dating the coming of the Turks and the French. Tunisia has long feared Algeria and today feels threatened by Libya. In 1980 Libya supported a guerrilla raid on the Tunisian mining town of Gafsa. Also Libya expelled some 30,000 Tunisian workers in 1985. Given such incidents, and many other examples could be cited, political instability and conflict between the countries, it was unrealistic for the ECA to count so much on unity in North Africa.

The position of the ECA in North Africa is further jeopardized because the Maghrebs have a closer relationship with Europe than with sub-Saharan Africa. So while they are concerned about what goes on in sub-Saharan Africa or in intra-African politics, their concern is more likely to find verbal than physical expression. The North African countries are more inclined to the Arab League than the OAU. When the US attacked Libya in the Gulf of Sirte, Gaddafi did not appeal to either Africa or the OAU but to the Arab League. Thus, in the wider context of fostering regional economic co-operation, the role of the ECA in North
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>MOROCCO</th>
<th>ALGERIA</th>
<th>TUNISIA</th>
<th>LIBYA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (1982 estimate - millions)</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent rural (1980)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent urban</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable land exploited ('000 ha) - 1980</td>
<td>7,497</td>
<td>7,719</td>
<td>4,970</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population/arable land</td>
<td>2.9/ha</td>
<td>2.6/ha</td>
<td>1.3/ha</td>
<td>1.7/ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated land ('000 ha)</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasture, forest &amp; scrub land per rural person - 1980</td>
<td>3.4 ha</td>
<td>1.4 ha</td>
<td>1.6 ha</td>
<td>5 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of workforce in agriculture (1981 estimate)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of workforce in industry</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of workforce in services</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent unemployment (1982 estimate)</td>
<td>20+</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/capita (1981)</td>
<td>$869</td>
<td>$2,129</td>
<td>$1,417</td>
<td>$8,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP 1982 (Economic Trends Reports estimates)</td>
<td>$15 billion</td>
<td>$40 billion</td>
<td>$6.4 billion</td>
<td>$13 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP/capita growth rate (1981-82)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Quality of Life Index</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth rate per 1,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate per 1,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality per 1,000 live births</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita public education - 1979</td>
<td>$49</td>
<td>$131</td>
<td>$67</td>
<td>$358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita military expenditures - 1979</td>
<td>$44</td>
<td>$33</td>
<td>$9</td>
<td>$171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total exports for 1981- ($ millions)</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>14,056</td>
<td>2,209</td>
<td>16,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total imports cif 1981- ($ millions)</td>
<td>4,487</td>
<td>11,505</td>
<td>3,923</td>
<td>15,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt service ratio (1982 estimate)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18-25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

.../cont.
Table 9.3 (cont.)

* Based on dinar, not dollar, values.


4. Revised to reflect decrease in agricultural percentage of workforce in 1981.

Note: 1980 is the last "normal" year for Morocco for which data are available.

Africa is highly debatable. As the ECA cannot get the states to agree on issues relating to development, the Commission's claim of being a catalytic agent in development is far-fetched.25

3. TANGIER MULPOC: STRUCTURES, ORGANS, FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER RESOURCES

At the onset the terms of reference of the MULPOC were as follows:

(a) to identify areas of technical assistance for the countries of the subregion;
(b) to establish contacts with countries of the subregion;
(c) to obtain documents and information required by the ECA;
(d) to carry out studies as needed in the subregion;
(e) to brief experts and review their reports.26

When we consider these terms of reference in the context of the general theme of the MULPOCs, we notice that an important facet referring to economic co-operation had been initially omitted. The primary role of the North African MULPOC was to be a forum for the exchange of ideas and an agent for data-gathering and the publication of documents such as the annual Economic and Social Condition in North Africa. Because it had no part to play in economic co-operation, the identification, formulation and implementation of programmes was omitted from the terms of reference. It also followed that no provision was made for the MULPOC to monitor concrete programmes. The omission of such fundamental aspects meant that the ECA's role in the subregion was inevitably of a general nature. Officials of the ECA are aware of such constraining factors on the role of the Commission and feel that there is a need to change the terms of reference by making them reflect the specific characteristics
of North Africa. ECA officials agree that they cannot ignore Afro-Arab co-operation, for instance. In the last two decades, numerous funds designed to extend financial aid to the LDCs, including the Arab countries, have been established. For example, the Saudi Fund for Arab Economic Development and the Arab Fund for Afro-Arab Co-operation. Also, 25 percent of the population of Africa belong to the Arab countries and most of the population of the 20 Arab states is within the African continent. Therefore, the ECA stated that it has been an "obvious role and responsibility in the promotion of Afro-Arab co-operation in economic and social development". Although it recognized the need to play a role in this direction, it has not been able to determine the form and strategy for it. In 1981 the Commission identified two areas of activities. It can either act as intermediary in programme implementation of existing agencies for financing development programmes or it can be a depository of development data and information on socio-economic matters for Afro-Arab co-operation. In fact, the ECA has shelved the whole idea because it has neither the staff nor the financial resources to take up additional activities. Also a role in Afro-Arab co-operation suggests a link with other Afro-Arab institutions but the MULPOC has no formal agreement on co-operation with institutions such as the Arab League.

Apart from the fact that the terms of reference acts as an internal constraint on the MULPOC, there are other types of constraints. The structure of the MULPOC is itself a constraint. We stated earlier on that the MULPOC was undeveloped. This is mainly because of two reasons. First, it is the only MULPOC without a fully-fledged policy organ. While all others have a Council of Ministers as a supreme body for making decisions, from its inception the Tangier MULPOC had a Council of Plenipotentiaries. The inaugural meeting of experts held in 1978 recommended that this should be the highest policy organ. The Council of Plenipotentiaries
is made up of representatives chosen by each country and they are usually professionals and specialists who study and make recommendations on reports submitted by the ECA to their meetings. It also includes envoys given full powers to take decisions by their respective governments. The Regional Adviser of the MULPOC pointed out that initially the ECA wanted the participation of the states at its meetings. "They wanted a system to bring the states together and at the time, it was the Council of Plenipotentiaries which offered the best possibility."

The main problem here is that usually the ministers for development planning are more versed in matters relating to socio-economic development and they are not attending the meetings in the case of North Africa.

The meetings of the Council of Plenipotentiaries were usually held yearly, but the MULPOC has adopted the decision made initially by the Niamey MULPOC in 1987 that the policy organs meeting will be held every two years, with effect from 1989.

In addition to the Council of Plenipotentiaries, the MULPOC has a Committee of experts made up of technicians and specialists on aspects of development. This organ prepares the drafts of documents to be forwarded to the Council of Plenipotentiaries and it meets before the latter. In practice, at their meetings the experts go through the drafts presented to them by the ECA, checking for logic and terminologies and then they make recommendations as to the form the draft should take. The ECA will then do the write-up and make representations to the Council of Plenipotentiaries. Sometimes, the Committee of Experts will consider requests by individual states and include them in the draft. But so far the ECA has been unable to meet such requests due to lack of funds, and also because it does not deal on country-by-country basis. In addition to these two policy organs there is a sub-committee on the women's programme.
The second reason why this MULPOC is undeveloped has to do with its source of funding. It is the only MULPOC that is funded directly by the ECA. The ECA funds the MULPOC on a monthly basis. The monthly running costs being around US$ 10,000-US$ 11,000 approximately. The money is purely for administrative costs such as telephone bills, salaries, supply of stationery and electricity. The ECA also pays for its meetings and workshops, but it does not pay for the main programmes of the MULPOC. In fact, it relies solely on the UNDP for funds to carry out its programmes. This dependence on the UNDP has severe consequences. For example, at present the MULPOC has not been able to carry out any programmes because it made representation to the UNDP requesting for more funds to cover the period 1987-91. At the moment the ECA is still waiting to see if the UNDP will provide funds. The resulting uncertainty is profound, particularly as the member states themselves have not made direct financial contributions to the MULPOC. No one seems to know whether the MULPOC will carry out any programmes for the period in question if the UNDP fails to provide the funds. Lack of finance was thus one of the major constraints on the MULPOC.

The other major constraint was its manpower resources. When the ECA had to report to ECOSOC in 1982 on matters relating to the financing of the MULPOCs on an established basis, it made the following estimates for posts in Tangier:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tangier</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing posts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed new posts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:

D-l  is for the Head of the MULPOC (Director). He is a political appointee, and he is responsible for the implementation of programmes approved by the ECA policy organs. He also has to consult government officials and other inter-governmental organizations. This post is for ex-ministers, academics and long-standing officers of international institutions.

P-3 to P-5 is for senior officers. It is made up of economic affairs officers who undertake sectoral and topical studies; design multinational projects and conduct research; assist the director in the management of the centre. These are usually the international civil servants.

Local Level is made up of staff recruited at the local level, usually referred to as the General Service staff. They include the administrative assistants, secretaries, typists, drivers, messengers and cleaners.

The estimate by the ECA shows that before 1983 the MULPOC had a skeleton staff only. There were two professionals and four local level staff. Currently, there is a slight increase in the number of staff but the increase is mostly at the junior level. The present staffing position of the MULPOC is as follows:

1 Director
1 Regional Adviser
1 Finance Officer
1 Senior Administrative Assistant
1 Secretary
1 Telex/Telephone Operator
1 Driver
1 Messenger
2 Day/Night Watchmen
1 Cleaner

The total number of staff is therefore 11 of which three are professionals. The MULPOC lost two staffing positions in the last two years, these were (a) the post of the Librarian/Secretary whose appointment was terminated in May 1987 at the end of his contract. The MULPOC
had no funds to renew the contract and as a result the present staff are left to man the library in addition to their respective duties; and (b) that of the co-ordinator of the women's programme. As we shall see, this MULPOC also has wide work programmes. But its present manpower cannot cope. The result is that the ECA has used consultants to carry out most of its studies in North Africa. For example, in the agricultural sector, they carried out the study on co-operation and trade in food and agricultural production among Egypt, Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia (1983); and another concerning the expansion and strengthening of cereals and livestock production between Egypt and the Sudan (1983).

With reference to recruitment of staff, the MULPOC was responsible for recruiting local level staff, while the headquarters handled that of the professionals. We found that all the local level staff had been working there for a very long time but most of them still have temporary appointments, reviewed on a yearly basis. Two of them had worked for over 20 years but only had their appointments confirmed in the last two years, for example. The staff were well versed in the procedures of the UN and were aware of the handicaps of the ECA. However, their interests were not properly seen to by headquarters. When staff have problems, they have to write to the headquarters and it took a period of up to six months to get the replies. As with the other MULPOCs, the ECA does not send staff to the MULPOC to attend to the needs of its workers.

As in other MULPOCs, the role of the director is very limited. He has no autonomy on any matter relating to the MULPOC. All matters are referred to headquarters. The idea of using political appointees for the posts of directors has its shortcomings. If the director has no interest in what is happening in Africa, then his job is just to
be there and carry on with administrative procedures. Bringing in
directors from outside the UN system means that they have to spend
time trying to understand UN procedures. This creates tension between
the directors and other staff. For instance, the present director of
the MULPOC is an ex-minister of development planning of Libya. He is
new to UN procedures. Also he is fluent in Arabic but does not under­
stand French. Most of the documents are in French, English and to a
lesser extent in Arabic. The result is that staff spend time translating
letters and documents from English and French to Arabic. The director
took over two years ago when the former director retired in accordance
with UN regulations, he has not yet achieved a cordial relationship with
the rest of the staff, and he is having to learn about UN procedures,
something which has caused uneasiness with staff at times.

Unlike the other MULPOCs, however, we found that the Tangier MULPOC
has had a stable staff turnover. The previous directors have had on
average 8-12 years of service. The result is that it has not experienced
instability of leadership brought about by the frequent changing of
directors which the Niamey and Yaounde MULPOCs have experienced.

4. **TANGIER MULPOC: WORK PROGRAMMES**

Throughout the 1980s the MULPOC had been trying to implement a
work programme approved at its inaugural meeting of the Committee of
experts in 1978, but most of the programmes were studies, seminars and
a few workshops. The Committee of Experts selected five sectors, namely,
trade, industry, transport and communications, agriculture and human
resources. The meeting further recommended that the ECA secretariat
should prepare terms of reference and proposals on specific programmes
in each of the five sectors for submission to the policy organs to enable the latter to formulate action-oriented projects for the approval of the Council of Plenipotentiaries. This was the first indication that the member states wanted action-oriented or concrete programmes. We found very little of this throughout the ECA's programmes for North Africa. The one area where the ECA attempted to implement a concrete project is in the Transport and Communications Sector but its efforts have been plagued by major obstacles such as lack of finance and duplication of effort. Before going into details of this, we shall look at each sector in turn, bearing in mind the ECA's set of objectives and whether such were achieved.

The development objective of the work programmes was aimed at "contributing to the solution of problems through strengthening the activities of the MULPOC in the five sectors, but top priority was given to two sectors - agriculture and human resources, with specific reference to the participation of women in the development process".34

(a) **Agriculture**

The immediate objectives of the programme were to increase food and agricultural production and to strengthen and expand co-operation in trade in food and agricultural products among the countries of the subregion. According to the ECA, "one of the main problems hampering the development of agriculture and food production in North Africa is the insufficiency of existing subregional mechanisms to initiate, expand and strengthen co-operation at the subregional level".35 The programme was considered to be essential for attaining the goals of the Regional Food Plan for Africa (AFPLAN). This is a programme which the ECA adopted in 1978. In conformity with the Freetown Declaration for making the
region self-sufficient in food within the 1980s, AFPLAN provided governments with guidelines for re-orientating their agricultural development policy and increasing food production and thus the region’s self-sufficiency ratio. The Plan was prepared because of the poor performance of the agriculture sector. The average growth rate of total agricultural output was 1.4 per cent per annum during the period 1970-77, while that of food production was 1.5 per cent or less, far below the growth rate in population.\textsuperscript{36}

With reference to the implementation of AFPLAN, the ECA aimed at strengthening the institutions in agriculture and food production and in the use of the mass media for boosting food production. How did it propose to carry this out? Through the recommendations made by the policy organs we found that the ECA’s strategy was to carry out studies. The recommendations for the first study on co-operation and trade in food and agricultural production among Egypt, Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia prepared in September 1983 was endorsed by the Council of Plenipotentiaries meeting held in 1984. A second study concerning the expansion and strengthening of cereals and livestock production between Egypt and the Sudan was also completed in 1983. A third and final study on co-operation and trade in food and agricultural production among Algeria, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco and Tunisia had to be postponed to early 1985 at the request of member states. This was completed by 1986 and the report distributed to the FAO and the member states. All the studies were undertaken with the support and co-operation of the FAO. According to the Regional Adviser of the MULPOC, the FAO provided about US$ 20,000 which enabled the ECA to carry out the studies.\textsuperscript{37} What is striking is that for all the studies, the ECA used the services of consultants despite the fact that it has qualified staff at the secretariat who could have done the job, thereby reducing the costs of the studies. The other
important finding is that the heavy emphasis on studies means that in terms of actual output and impact on agriculture, it is not possible to point to concrete evidence nor does it enable us to access such. Moreover, it is difficult to see how these studies can provide solutions to the sector, even though the ECA was of the opinion that the "ways and means indicated in the programme for overcoming the problems were considered adequate, despite the fact that they were defined at a general level".³⁸

(b) Industry

For industry the ECA followed a programme which was in line with the objectives of the Industrial Development Decade Programme for Africa (IDDA). In 1980 the Lagos Economic Summit of the OAU adopted the years 1980-90 as the Industrial Development Decade for Africa. Industrial development was seen as a driving force for economic growth and overall development. For this the ECA prepared and presented a document entitled Initial Integrated Industrial Promotion Programme for the North African Subregion. The main objectives of the proposal were to promote policy measures and institutional mechanisms that would facilitate the efforts of government organs to plan, promote and implement integrated industrial programmes at both the national and subregional levels. A detailed examination of the document revealed that the proposal contained a set of feasibility and prefeasibility studies on aspects such as engineering, leather, textile and agro-based industries. The ECA hoped that the member states would approve these studies in the Council of Plenipotentiaries.

The member states indicated that they wanted an identification of multinational projects in chemicals, basic metals, engineering and agro-based industries. But the ECA was only able to make provisions for a
study to be carried out on the development of forest-based industries in 1981. It has been unable to carry this out because of the lack of funds. In addition, the ECA organized workshops such as the African regional workshop of experts on the role of private business and parastatals.

Again in terms of output and impact of its programme, the ECA was unable to achieve much in the industrial sector. There is definitely a discrepancy between the forceful and sometimes grandiose terminology adopted by the ECA and the actual output and impact of its programmes.

The Secretariat referred to the lack of follow-up activities at the national level as the "principal obstacle to the implementation of its programme" for the industrial sector.\(^{39}\) But we found that the principal obstacle was the ECA itself for proposing unrealistic programmes with very vague objectives and strategies. Secondly, the programmes are not only ambitious but the ECA lacks the manpower and financial resources for implementation. The Commission admitted later on that "during the period 1984-86 many problems were encountered in the implementation of the IDDA programme, the main one being the financial constraints especially for staff travel. The programme also suffered from a high rate of vacancies, as a result of which some activities related to the programme were postponed".\(^{40}\) As in the case of industry and indeed other sectors, the ECA has been unable to carry out any new programmes since 1986 due to the lack of funds.

(c) **Human resources**

In the field of human resources, the ECA has two main objectives, namely, (i) the establishment of genuine co-operation and co-ordination among national institutions, and (ii) the integration of women into the
process of development. For the attainment of the first objective, the ECA set out the proposal for the establishment of a North African Graduate Institute of Management. It also drew up the constitution of the entity and set out to convince member states that the institution was necessary and that they should all join it. Member states do not feel the need for this institution. Egypt refused to sign the constitution on the grounds that similar ones already exist. The constitution stipulates that once four states have signed, the institution would start to operate. But as at June 1988 only three states have indicated their interest. By their action the member states have avoided the duplication of efforts.

In the case of the second objective the ECA aimed at improving the condition of women and the programme opted for was the establishment and strengthening of national and subregional machineries for participation of women in development. As part of its strategy the ECA through the ATRCW in Addis Ababa organized three studies — Women and Co-operatives: Egypt, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Sudan, published in 1980; Study on the Condition of Women in Morocco, 1981; and the study on Women and the Mass Media in Africa: Case Study of Egypt, 1981. It also organized two workshops on participation of women in development through co-operatives, Khartoum, Sudan, 1980, and that on rural women leaders, also in Sudan 1981. Finally the Commission had a seminar for professional training in traditional and non-traditional crafts held in Tunis, May 1984.

The UNDP budget for the women's programme was US$ 231,953 for the duration of 16 months. And the Voluntary Funds of the UN for the Women's Decade approved the grant of US$ 20,000 for the training of female managers in 1985. These in effect were the funds used by the MULPOC for the programme.
The operational activities for the women's programme were very much delayed by difficulties in identifying and recruiting experts and consultants from within the subregion. This was particularly the case of the women's co-ordinator because it was required that the expert should be selected among the candidates nominated by the countries themselves. So although the programme was approved in 1980, it only became operational in September 1983 when the co-ordinator assumed her duties. According to the MULPOC the major obstacles to the production of outputs in this sector were: (1) inadequacy of logistic support; (2) difficulties of communication within the subregion; and (3) insufficiency of information on women's condition at the national level. In addition to the fact that the co-ordinator assumed duty in 1983 we found out during the fieldwork that she was unable to carry out her duties effectively because she spent so much time travelling and not enough time doing the job. No programmes were actually implemented successfully during her tenure of office. Her appointment was terminated in 1986 and since then no women's programme has been implemented by the MULPOC up to June 1988. The appointment was terminated due to lack of funds and the fact that her contract had expired. However there is an attempt to review the programme with the aims of reviving it. Egypt has offered to send in another co-ordinator on condition that the ECA will pay her rent. But as the regional adviser pointed out during a discussion there are no such provisions in the UN system. As a result of this no further action has been taken. The ECA has also submitted its proposal for this subsector to the UNDP for more funds. At present the UNDP has not yet given any favourable reply. But it is difficult to see how the programmes implemented so far can lead to the integration of women in development either directly or indirectly.
(d)人口与水资源/环境

在1980年代，MULPOC增加两个更多部门到其工作计划，即人口与水资源/环境。前者是一个因成员国家对北非和欧洲的外劳问题的关注而导致的。例如，埃及和突尼斯等国正考虑如何吸收因欧洲的经济衰退和裁员政策而失去工作的本国公民。但ECA已经放弃了有关移民的研究，因为缺乏资金。对于水资源和环境部门，仍在讨论建立一个次区域委员会的可能性。该委员会预计将为北非国家在管理和发展水资源时，并考虑相关的环境问题提供咨询。ECA在1984年提出了这个委员会的建议。到1988年4月为止，还没有做出关于这个委员会的决定。

(e)运输与通讯

如早些时候所述，ECA正在试图实施一个具体的运输和通讯部门。它在1983年3月同意建立北非文电和信息系统（NADIS）。NADIS将是非洲文电和信息系统的次区域臂。PADIS是一个基于ECA总部的非洲文电和信息系统，是为信息和数据的交流而创建的。ECA购买了NADIS的计算机和必要的设备，但决定NADIS应该建立并位于阿拉伯国家。
League Documentation System (ALDOC) for a transitional period of three years. This decision was taken for three main reasons. The first one had to do with finance. Even though the UNDP has provided some funds for NADIS, member states have to supplement the costs of running it. Secondly, the ECA at present has no trained manpower for NADIS and so they depend on the Arab League. (The Arab League is providing training facilities for ECA staff at present.) Thirdly, ALDOC has been serving member states of the MULPOC and the ECA is hoping to draw from its experience and existing knowledge. After the transitional period of three years, NADIS will be re-located at the MULPOC office in Tangier.

However, the ECA is encountering other problems in its efforts to set up NADIS. Apart from the lack of finance and trained manpower, it has been unable to solve the problem of duplication and wastage of resources liable to result from the creation of NADIS. The Egyptian delegation referred to other systems existing such as ALDOC and that of UNESCO and were of the opinion that the establishment of NADIS will create further duplication and financial repercussions for member states. Egypt further maintained that she would not associate with any financial implications arising from efforts to establish NADIS especially as she is facing economic problems and also due to the fact that NADIS is to be housed in the Arab League (Egypt is not a member). Even though Egypt expressed concern about duplication of efforts, the ECA maintained that a decision to establish NADIS had already been taken by the Council of Plenipotentiaries and the Commission was mainly concerned with the implementation of that decision. This is the second time we have found evidence of duplication of efforts, the first occurring in the human resources sector. But in both cases, the ECA did not see duplication as a problem as it pressed on with the implementation of the decision regardless of the implications.
In the case of transport, the MULPOC was able to complete studies on regional port projects of North Africa; the study on the planning and development of ports, and the study on tariff harmonization in North African ports. All studies were financed by the EEC and formed part of programmes implemented for the United Nations Transport and Communications Decade in Africa (1978-1988).

(f) Trade

The activities of the ECA in the trade sector are dealt with extensively under the next sub-heading of this chapter which relates to the peculiar problems in North Africa. The main proposal is the establishment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA). This is an attempt by the ECA to set up yet another institution in Africa and we doubt whether it has understood the real implications, especially as the member states appear not to be ready for a PTA.

The Commission estimated the implementation rate of its work programme for this MULPOC as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>% Rate of Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trade</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Water resources and environment</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Population</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Agriculture</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. NADIS</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Human resources</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (excluding women's programme component)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures show that the Tangier MULPOC had the second lowest rate of implementation. The lowest was for Yaounde at 23.5 per cent (Niamey's rate was 66 per cent, Lusaka 63 per cent and Gisenyi 54.5 per cent, respectively.) The figures confirm the non co-operation between the countries and other problems the ECA is facing in North Africa.

5. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION AND THE ECA'S RESPONSE

The political climate in North Africa is not very favourable for economic co-operation. The ECA has diagnosed the main problem areas but has put its priority on the trade sector. One of the problems here has to do with the difficulties in servicing external debts, plus the financial squeeze in the subregion. According to the ECA, external debt is emerging as the most critical development constraint. Allowing for incomplete information, debt reporting lags and definitional variations in tentative statistics, North African external debt has grown from US$ 17.5 billion in 1987 to around US$ 100 billion in 1988. The Commission is not only concerned with the sheer size of the debt but the escalation of the debt in relation to ability to manage it. Debt service ratios of 38.5 per cent and 28.9 per cent for 1986 and 1987, respectively are formidable. It pointed out that only Algeria was able to meet in full both its substantial debt services obligations estimated at about 62 per cent of exports and workers' remittances in 1986 and simultaneously cater for critical import demands.

The next facet of economic problems relate to the oil market situation. North Africa also has importers of oil and the rise in the price of this commodity has different effects: importers had to contend with an increased import bill while in 1986 many of them benefited very substantially from lower prices. Oil exporters on the other
hand, benefit through increased revenues.

Up-to-date the countries still look to the developed world for their trade. Trade among the Maghreb countries amounts to only 2 percent of their total foreign trade.\textsuperscript{50} The figure has remained around this since the late 1970s. A number of factors are responsible for the low level of subregional trade. While potentially tradeable commodities can be produced, the economies were not diversified to create complementary markets in final goods. They also lack the structure to exploit opportunities. Primary commodities are exported to Europe to be processed into final goods and then imported to the subregion. The one exception is oil where through special arrangements exporters supply their neighbours. Even where potentially tradeable goods are produced, they are likely to be sold outside the subregion on account of the lack of infrastructures and commercial barriers.

In effect, the developed market economies continue to dominate the external trade of the area. This group absorbs and supplies most of the exports and imports. There is a further consequence of this domination. The enlargement of the EEC to the Northern Mediterranean countries such as Spain and Portugal, and the emergence of the new industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia and Latin America limit the export prospects of the countries with respect to agricultural and industrial products. North Africa faces competition from the EEC and NICs because of the low maritime costs and the advancement of agricultural production. Both Tunisia and Algeria, for example, produce identical products such as phosphates with Spain and Portugal. Hence, one possible solution is the re-orientation of trade flows within an intra-subregional framework and between the subregion and sub-Saharan Africa.

But how can this be achieved when North Africa has never functioned
as one economic unit? The ECA argues that both socially and ecologically North Africa is better suited for economic integration than most other subregions. It points to the fact that the population is fairly homogeneous, and that the subregion is essentially a geographical unit surrounded by the sea and desert with no natural barrier dividing it. Furthermore, infrastructure links between most countries in the subregion are in general better than any other subregion. And although the countries are mainly primary commodity producers, economic variations among them are marked. None of the countries is self-sufficient even in basic needs. The objective indicators correspond to the ECA's findings but the evidence suggests that subjectively they are not ready for the solution proposed by the ECA. The Commission is seeking to promote trade in the area and had put forward its plan for the establishment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The drafts on the possibility and arrangements for the establishment of the PTA was approved by the Council of Plenipotentiaries in 1985. After extensive discussions the member states agreed in principle that the PTA should be established, by Resolution No. 2 of March 1987. They agreed to institute negotiations for a treaty for the PTA and a payment and clearing arrangement. They also by this resolution established an Inter-governmental Team of Experts (INT) to define steps to be taken to set up the PTA. The INT consists of Directors of Planning, Ministers of Commerce, Ministers of Co-operation and National Economy, the Deputy Executive Secretary of the ECA, the Director of International Trade and Finance (ECA) and the Chief, Economic Co-operation Office of the ECA.

The Executive Secretary of the ECA has continue in his efforts to promote the idea of a PTA. While attending the meeting of the Council of Plenipotentiaries in 1988 he described the PTA as "an innovation in
so far as it would bring together all the six countries of North Africa which were determined to create an autonomous and self-sustaining economy for the prosperity of the member countries. In all the ECA has given three main reasons for the PTA, namely, (1) to increase trade; (2) to develop their own productivity so as to equip them with resources to confront the present world crisis; and (3) to enable the subregion to tackle development problems more effectively. This is by providing an effective agency for cooperation with the aim of achieving systematic utilization of available resources in the creation of complexes within the framework of the PTA.

The ECA is poised to exploit the potential of North Africa. For example, a combined North African market would cater for nearly 58 million people rising to around 100 million by the end of the century. This would give impetus to large-scale industrial projects such as Algeria's planned car factory, as well as a major market for agricultural exporters such as Morocco and Tunisia (both threatened by the EEC). As Libya's union with Morocco indicated, closer ties could redeploy labour from regions of high unemployment to countries where migrant labour still had a role to play. Around 30,000 Moroccans were working in Libya in 1985.

The Commission has set a tentative timetable for the PTA as follows:

(1) 19-24 March 1988 - Preparation and discussion of the draft of the PTA treaty;
(2) 24-28 October 1988 - Examination of sectoral studies to identify areas of co-operation and to assemble the necessary elements for preparing the treaty and the protocols;
(3) 15-30 June 1989 - Preparation and discussion of draft protocols;

(4) 25-29 September 1989 - Finalization of treaty and protocols with the participation of legal counsellors from member states;

(5) 19-21 December 1989 - Extraordinary meeting of trade, finance and planning ministers to examine the drafts of treaties and protocols before their submission to the Plenipotentiaries;

(6) March 1990 - Meeting of Plenipotentiaries to adopt the treaty and protocols. During this meeting they will discuss the treaty, the protocols and the report of the INT group and they will decide the venue and the date of a summit of Heads of State and Government at which the treaty will be signed.  

On paper the ECA's proposals look promising. The area has potential and there is a need to restructure trade and other sectors of their economy. But the road to the PTA is paved with fundamental difficulties such as the lack of an institutional framework for economic co-operation between the states. A recent mission by the ECA to the countries of North Africa made it quite clear that the absence of institutions to involve the countries in actual deliberations and negotiations leading to the PTA was a major obstacle towards its objective. Therefore, the ECA is in the process of creating yet another institution when the governments are not yet ready for it nor do they have the facilities for processing the arrangements towards a PTA.

Moreover, the creation of a PTA in itself is not sufficient to tap market opportunities within the area. This would largely depend upon the availability of goods to be traded and on the co-ordination of production and investment policies. Food is one item which constitutes a large percentage of the import bills of many of the North African countries. Clearly, this situation cannot be rectified by trade
liberalization. Part of the solution lies in investment in this field. The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) was created in 1976 for this purpose. But its function is to encourage food production throughout the Arab world (including North Africa), but not to promote trade in food within the area. Also food exporting countries in North Africa do not offer export credit facilities. This is why Sudan cannot buy enough of Egyptian rice; instead it imports Italian rice. Solving the problem requires creating some form of import financing agency to offer export credits on a multilateral basis in the area.

There are other obstacles to the PTA, namely, the fact that their economies are competitive and not complementary to each other; high trade barriers; the fact that most of the countries have the inability to acquire sophisticated goods from each other since none of them produces these goods; and the lack of payment facilities. Also we have to consider the establishment of the PTA against the history of integration and co-operation in the area. North Africa has a poor history in this respect. The Pan-Arab integration arrangements of 1953, the Arab Common Market 1964 and Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee 1964 failed to function for political and other reasons. This brings us to the disruptive effects of political conflicts and rivalries among the countries. These conflicts take the form of shifts in axis and alliances. Thus, the rift between Sudan and Libya in the early 1980s led to the enhancement of Sudanese-Egyptian ties until the popular uprising of 1985 in Sudan prompted a shift from Egypt to Libya. Likewise, the reconciliation of Libya and Morocco which culminated in a unity pact induced Tunisia and Algeria to come closer to each other. What these show is that the political climate of constant conflict between the states present a major obstacle to any plans for integration and co-operation
and the PTA. And yet the ECA is playing down the significance of politics in the subregion. Progress towards the PTA depends to a greater extent on the political conditions of the subregion as had been the case in previous steps towards co-operation and integration. As a Tunisian delegate summed it up, "The North African countries, feeling the weight of the political problems that have divided them for so long, unfortunately marked time in terms of establishing efficient multi-lateral bodies as nuclei for promoting co-operation. After initiating economic integration measures they have remained timid". 57

6. CONCLUSION

The MULPOC in Tangier has not benefited from its long history and experience as a subregional office in the 1960s. It has basically remained as an outreach of the headquarters and was directly financed through the regular budget of the ECA. Apart from being an outpost of the headquarters it has remained largely ineffective in the subregion for various reasons attributed to its structure, functions and programmes. The MULPOC lacked the finance, the manpower and other resources to enable it to play a meaningful role in the area. It is out of touch with reality, unwieldy and incompetent to tackle development problems in the area, because it concentrated on surveys, studies and seminars without implementing concrete programmes. It has largely ignored the Afro-Arab feature of the area and also the political climate there.

One of the highlights of the achievements of this MULPOC is in the transport and communications sector, with plans to establish NADIS. It has purchased the computer and the necessary gadgets. Also a decision has been taken for NADIS to be located within the Arab League Documentation
System (ALDOC) for a transitional period of three years. ALDOC is involved with the training of staff for NADIS. When fully operational, NADIS will become an additional source of data on socio-economic factors in the area - ALDOC and UNESCO are already providing this service.

Another achievement of the MULPOC is in organizing the policy organ meetings and as one of the officials pointed out, "the single achievement of the MULPOC is that while no two or three North African countries were on speaking terms, the MULPOC was able to get most of them together through its meetings and conferences". But this achievement is marred by the fact that in going through the reports of the policy organs, states such as Egypt, Libya, Morocco to mention but three, continually made reservations to resolutions and decisions taken. In reality, the states were unable to agree. The picture which emerged is one that indicates that the very political factors which the ECA had pulled out of its agenda were affecting the relations of the states. Even the Executive Secretary of the ECA admitted that the MULPOC was encountering difficulties, when he expressed his regret that while all the other four ECA/MULPOCs established for West, Central, Eastern and Southern Africa have been well established, the Commission has since 1978 "been trying to get the North African MULPOC to become operational, but has not been successful due to the geo-political circumstances of North Africa". Other subregions have economic co-operative ventures, but none exists in North Africa. So for consistency, the ECA maintains that one, that is, the PTA has to be established.

The PTA is wholly an ECA's idea for fostering economic co-operation in the area but the ECA is taking for granted and ignoring the political relations of the state which we think will be a decisive factor for the
actual processing of the PTA. Apart from politics, there are other obstacles to the PTA such as the competitiveness of the products of the countries, lack of institutions for co-operation, and the fact that North Africa has never functioned as an economic unit. It may sound very colourful and impressive to note that the ECA has established many institutions in Africa as a whole, but it is depressing to find that the majority of its institutions are not really operating. The makings of the PTA in North Africa follows the usual pattern and approach of the ECA in such matters and it is an approach which has failed in the past. The arrangements and tentative timetable of the PTA show that the ECA has not heeded the warning by its ad hoc committee set up in 1984 to review its institutions, that no more of these entities should be created unless there was a genuine need for them. To quote from the report, "The Ad hoc Committee recommends that no new institutions should be established until after a comprehensive study, which should take account of the opinions of existing institutions in the same field as to whether the objectives of the proposed institutions can be satisfactorily achieved by existing multinational and national institutions and they should be established only after a decisions has been reached that existing ones are unsuitable and then only after obtaining declarations of intent from prospective member states of their determination to give such institutions their political, financial and other support".  

With reference to the structure of the MULPOC, we found that it had no formal link with the Arab League and its specialized agencies and therefore it has not been able to avoid duplication and wastage in its programmes. For example, the establishment of NADIS is going ahead despite the fact that the Arab League and UNESCO are providing similar services already. Moreover, the MULPOC situated in Tangier is isolated from other international organizations in Morocco and this presents
problems in the form of inadequate communication links and high costs of travel for delegates attending meetings and other activities.

We conclude that a combination of internal and external factors have led to the ineffectiveness of the MULPOC. The impact of the ECA is not felt in North Africa as most states look to the Arab League for socio-economic matters. In comparison with other MULPOCs, we found that the Tangier MULPOC was undeveloped and the most inactive of them all. Also, it implemented unrealistic programmes in the sense that its objectives and the programmes did not incorporate the lack of communication between the states at the ministerial level. The Commission underestimates the effect of political conflicts in the area. Rather than carry out studies, there is the need to concentrate on ideas and strategies to bring all parties to co-operate before turning to actual programmes. This is because the external factors combined with structural constraints to make this MULPOC to operate below expectations.

The overall conclusion is that the MULPOCs on the whole are operating sub-optimally. In the case of North Africa, it is even weaker because the ECA operates through ambassadors and senior officials, that is, the Council of Plenipotentiaries and not the real ministers responsible for economic development and planning.
NOTES

1. The Regional Adviser of the Tangier MULPOC explained that the MULPOC has concentrated purely on socio-economic matters. He argued that this has been largely responsible for the 'success' of the MULPOC in the sense that all the states send their delegates to the meetings. The point was discussed during fieldwork to Tangier on 20 April 1988.


3. In most textbooks and in English, al-Maghrib is referred to as the Maghreb (the Arab West), while al-Mashreq is known as the Mashreq (the Arab East).


6. The point was raised during a discussion with the finance officer of the Tangier MULPOC on 22 April 1988. He stated that the ECA does not make any distinction between the states.


10. Ibid., p. 5.


14. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 10.
17. Ibid., p. 6.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 10.
27. Ibid.
29. During discussion with the regional adviser of the Tangier MULPOC in February 1988, he revealed this to be the case.
30. The issue was raised during fieldwork on 20 April 1988, and this was the response of the regional adviser.
31. From the amounts paid for the various items we were able to come to this rough estimate of the running costs during fieldwork in April 1988. The figures quoted by the financial officer of the Tangier MULPOC also fall within these figures.
32. We found that this was the actual number of staff and we spoke to them during the fieldwork.
35. Ibid.
37. The amount was mentioned during a discussion on 20 April 1988 at the MULPOC in Tangier, Morocco.


40. Ibid.


44. Fieldwork in Tangier MULPOC, April 1988.


46. Ibid.


49. Ibid.


53. According to figures published in the Economist Intelligence Unit's Quarterly Economic Reviews, the population of the Maghreb states in 1984 was 22.56 million in Algeria, 22.11 million in Morocco (1983), 7 million in Tunisia, and 3.62 million in Libya.


56. Ibid.


58. The regional adviser of the ECA made this point during a discussion on 29 April 1988. He also confirmed that each country sends delegates on a regular basis.


CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

The issues of what the ECA has done or what it should have done have dominated its existence. We are not much closer to finding the right answers in the 1980s. One does not expect it to perform its functions to 100 per cent perfection, but at the same time the state members want services which are of relevance to their economic conditions such as the uneven distribution of population and natural resources, inflationary effects, mass poverty and unemployment. These economic, geographical and social factors form the basis of their demands and expectations, which have been discussed in the various chapters. For example, the states want projects which gave value for money (see Chapter 2). They want the Commission to devise a development option and strategy which is truly African in scope and content. However, they have not come up with what that might be (see Chapter 3). On the institution-building role treated in Chapter 4, the states do not want the Commission to establish any more IGOs unless it is absolutely necessary. Chapters 5-9 deal with the ECA's efforts to decentralize, but at the end of the period under study the headquarters was still in complete control of authority, programmes, finance and manpower resources. The states want effective decentralization.

The ECA has been involved in the promotional services, advisory and training of African experts in the field of demography and statistics. It also publishes annual reports and surveys on economic conditions. In the long-run such activities and services do contribute to development, but it is difficult to quantify their effects or impact. Even though it continues to defend its programmes, the states are making more demands
than ever before. The main reason is that the Commission is providing UN-type services which were not targetted to particular areas or states. Nor were they designed to solve specific problems of an area. Moreover, its studies to a large extent treat general issues (see work programmes in Chapters 6-9) while at the same time ignoring immediate economic problems such as the balance of payments deficits, huge external debts and high servicing ratios. It also lacked comprehensive programmes to cater for natural disasters such as droughts, famine and flooding.

The reason for the defense of its programmes, on the one hand, and the attack by the states, on the other, stems from the interpretation given by both sides to the terms of reference. The latter are open to all sorts of interpretations. They give the impression that there are many things which the Commission is mandated to do. What are these things? The mandate stipulates that the ECA should carry out investigations and studies of economic and technological problems and development; it should undertake the collection, evaluation and dissemination of such information to its member states; it should initiate and participate in the measures for economic reconstruction and development; and also perform advisory and training functions. It is not actually stated that the Commission should implement projects because of the absence of provisions for organs to formulate, implement, evaluate and monitor them. But it is implied that it can perform these functions. The problem then stems from the UN creating such bodies with loopholes in their mandates.

Secondly, socio-economic development is multi-dimensional; there are several sectors in an economy, such as trade, agriculture, human resources and the environment. So to say that the Commission is to aid socio-economic development, without specifying the sectors or the aspects to be considered, results in a lack of focus and precision in its programmes. This problem is common to all the Regional Economic Commissions. Surely
they cannot be involved in all aspects of socio-economic development.

The ECA has had to work out its functions since its inception. It came up with six categories. Firstly, it sees itself as a forum for negotiations and decisions. But its ability to perform this function depends on what is to be discussed. There are several avenues available to the states. On the continental level, the OAU is the platform for endorsing political and economic decisions. The ECA now acts as the technical arm by providing data and expertise. Examples of this arrangement were in the events leading up to the endorsement of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 and the UN-PAAERD in 1986 (see Chapter 3). On the international scene we have other institutions, for example, the IMF, GATT, UNCTAD and the World Bank. However, the ECA is the most effective forum for dealing with socio-economic matters, the Commission is thus one of several fora for negotiations and decisions.

Its second role deals with traditional secretariat activities, that is, research, data collection, analysis and dissemination, organization of conferences, expert meetings and workshops. Member states are very much aware of them. But although it is an important source of data, the states want it to move on to the implementation of projects which give value for money and reflect their development priorities. The states want projects such as roads, hospitals, schools, dams and clean water. But with its constraints it has been difficult for the Commission to switch to or implement programmes. Its programmes are based on a sector-by-sector approach and it had chosen to concentrate on 11 of them. All its administration and resources are geared up to the provision of secretariat activities in the chosen areas. The states have been in favour of change since the 1970s but the ECA has not yet adjusted.
Its third role is institution-building, with the aim of encouraging economic co-operation. It started off by promoting continental co-operation in the 1960s but factors such as the issue of sovereignty, boundary problems, smallness of markets and uneven distribution of population and natural resources made it change to the support of sub-regional co-operation. Another set of reasons for the change in emphasis had to do with the weakness of the ECA itself; lack of proper working relations and understanding between the secretariat and that of the OAU meant that not much was achieved. Moreover, the ECA was so deeply committed to the quest for economic integration and so involved in working out its economic rationale and possible institutional structures that it became somewhat intolerant of nationally-based regional initiatives, such as the EAC during the mid-1960s and the SADCC in the 1980s, which cross-cut the subregions defined by the ECA and deviate from the standard sequence of the preferential trade/common market theoretical model. Furthermore, its economic and technical emphases and leadership, meant that it had not given adequate attention to the need to involve states more fully in designing and participating in their own subregional groupings rather than accepting largely ECA-designed treaties and institutional structures which did not really provide for integral on-going national investment. These resulted in many members seeing the regional institutions and programmes as those of the ECA and not theirs.

The Commission describes its fourth role as the promoter of economic and technical co-operation. However, it is difficult for one to make a distinction between this and the third function. The ultimate goal for the two roles is the same, that is, the creation of an African Common Market by the year 2000. The means for achieving the goal has not really been worked out in detail at present.
Fifthly, it describes itself as a regional 'think-tank'. It sees itself as the springboard for development ideas. To some extent it can claim limited success in the sense that it provided the basic documents which were used as the foundation of the Lagos Plan of Action and the programme for the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD). African governments and the ECA's critics often point to the fact that in the 1950s the ECLA (now ECLAC) devised the dependency theory as a way of explaining the economic conditions of the Latin American states. It also offered them a strategy for development which emphasized delinking from the international economic system. These critics saw the dependency theory as a distinct and coherent ideology and wanted the ECA to emulate the ECLA. It is not an easy thing for an institution to develop a philosophy and strategy. Aside from the ECLA no other Regional Economic Commission has succeeded in doing so. We can only state that the ECA had made an intellectual contribution to the African development debate by offering guiding principles such as collective self-reliance and self-sustaining growth. They offer a different path to development.

The sixth role had to do with operational activities. It defined these as the capabilities for project-oriented activities. The document does not really describe in detail what this means. There is limited evidence of an attempt to implement projects in the field of transport and communications - PADIS (see Chapter 2). The programme involves the purchasing and installation of computers and other related equipment at the secretariat and the subregions. The programme was estimated to cost US$ 160 million. The main problems facing it include, lack of finance and the skilled manpower to man the units, plus the legal conditions for operation in the subregions. For example, signing an agreement with host government before PADIS is established.
What is perhaps striking is the fact that the Commission has been trying to perform all these roles at the same time. The obvious problem is that in the process of doing so it has not been able to perform any of them properly. Secondly, it does not possess the necessary capabilities to sustain all the roles. This brings us to the issue of constraints on the Commission.

The states in the subregions complained about the inefficiency of the secretariat in sending documents for meetings. They complained about the lack of information on its activities. It had little or no influence in West Africa, for instance. What are the reasons for this operational weakness? Some of the inhibitions are in its structures and organization. Its organizational changes were illustrated in Table 2.1, which showed that it has revised its structure to its present form of 11 divisions, 32 sections and 12 units, making a grand total of 55 apartments so to speak. It has an elaborated and modern bureaucracy with complex procedures. This makes the task of managing a large secretariat a difficult one.

There is the problem of finance. In the first instance, the financial crisis of the UN system has affected it in the sense that New York has instructed that the Commission should freeze its recruitment and the rumour is that there are plans to make some employees redundant. Secondly, in real terms, its regular budget has increased by only 1.7 per cent annually. Thirdly, the contributions from the states and other international organizations have also been falling if we look at the figures of the UNCTAD Conferences in Table 2.3. The states have not been paying as much as they have pledged in all instances. For example, in April 1981 members pledged a total of US$ 1,763,513 but the actual amount paid was US$ 497,711, leaving an outstanding balance of US$ 1,265,802.
The pattern of expenditure also reveals some problems - a large part went on administrative costs (see Chapter 2). Spending on manpower accounted for the largest share of its budget for two reasons: (1) it had to allocate resources for the support staff for the various divisions, sections and units; (2) the bulk of its work consists of research. So the Commission has to pay the salaries in addition to the costs of hiring consultants, travel and the supply of equipment and stationery. These types of expenditure were at the expense of financing its activities and programmes.

Other difficulties arise from managing a large secretariat. Because of the lack of an organizational ideology the divisions competed with each other. Their programmes were independently formulated and executed. And so we have a situation where the transport, communications and tourism division was running a programme for the UN Transport and Communications Decade in Africa (UNCTACDA 1978-1988); the ECA/UNIDO industry division was concentrating on the United Nations Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA 1980-1990); while the ECA/FAO agriculture division was running one for the Regional Food Plan for Africa (AFPLAN). These are all very grand programmes in terms of scope and objectives. Neither their strategies nor their dates are co-ordinated. In the case of the IDDA the aim is for Africa to achieve a target of 2 per cent of world industrial production, while AFPLAN aims at self-sufficiency in food production by the end of the century. There was no mention of the relationship between AFPLAN and IDDA, nor a clear indication of the aspects of the former which may sustain the latter. Since the programmes are not part of an integrated and comprehensive plan the impression has been created by the officials that each is equally as important as the other and they all have different priorities, strategies and objectives.
Apart from the size of the secretariat, the Commission also has a set of policy organs. At the continental level it has the Conference of Ministers and its technical arm - the Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole (TEPCOW). There is a counterpart of these at the subregional level, namely, the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Officials, respectively. In addition, there are eight subsidiary organs for specific sectors - industry, trade, social affairs and human resources to mention but a few. Then there are three specialized subsidiary bodies - the joint conference of African planners, statisticians and demographers; the inter-governmental committee of experts for science and technology development; and the joint inter-governmental regional committee on human settlements and environment. The volume of work connected with the servicing of these meetings is enormous. Officials have to prepare the necessary documents for each and in some cases they have to be in attendance. The typing and processing of the papers and the writing of reports including translations are also very demanding.

The quality and composition of the staff is an important factor for the smooth and effective running of an organization. A balance between professionals and non-professionals will make staffing an asset while a lack of balance results in problems thereby making it a liability. In the case of the Commission its total number of staff, that is, the professionals and non-professionals rose to 1000 by 1987, but the professionals are 300. It has more non-professionals and this is unhealthy, because it needs more of the former to carry out the research. The small number of senior staff creates a managerial gap. In the past the Commission has tried to solve this problem by using consultants. This has given its personnel structure a patchwork effect as they temporarily increase the number, but once they have submitted their reports they disappear from view, leaving the permanent staff to continue and conduct
any follow-up work that may be required.

It had the problem of high staff turnover which was a consequence of the short-term nature of many of the posts. This created insecurity and disruption for personnel. It also made the posts unattractive to would-be applicants. Some of the professional staff have worked for a long period of time but they are not undergoing any form of training in the field of development studies, for instance. Training courses are arranged for the secretaries and for those hoping to brush up in the official languages - English and French in particular. Moreover, the officials do not write occasional papers so that some of their ideas can be challenged in debate. The only person who appears to be publishing extensively is the present Executive Secretary. A staff member spoke to me about administrative procedures not permitting them to publish papers. When I insisted on the details he was worried that I might tell the Executive Secretary because the latter was my country man. Despite my reassurances he refused to say anything. Others approached were not even willing to consider the issue.

The Commission tackled the issue of geographical distribution. It has attained 75 per cent Africanization of its staff. The member states are not willing to release their competent officials to work at the ECA. Although the Commission fixed desirable ranges for the posts in 1981, there is an element of over-representation. Many of its potential candidates come from 10 of the 50 states - Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. It has tried to cope with the situation by employing Europeans, Americans and also consultants. So on the whole factors such as a patchwork personnel structure, declining regular posts, high staff turnover, modest grade levels, slow recruitment and uneven geographical distribution have undermined its manpower resources and therefore its capability.
The work programmes of the ECA are constantly criticized by the states. For the subregional programmes they have asked for re-definition to give precision. For example, the Gisenyi MULPOC has a programme with the initial title of 'Trade Promotion Among Member States' which was approved in 1977 for the trade sector. It became more specific in terms of its coverage when it was included in the UNDP financed project as a sub-project on 'Multi-Sectoral Assistance to the CEPGL'.

It included aspects such as the statute of community enterprises, the establishment of a trade documentation centre and the harmonization of investment codes. Secondly, the Commission tries to go for grand programmes that it could not really implement. For example, in the transport and communication sector it aims at developing all the modes of transport as a means of expanding inter- and intra-regional links. Within the road transport sector it planned 236 studies for the period 1984-87, but only 62 were completed. For rail transport it made plans for 84 but only 14 were completed. Out of 70 for ports, nine were completed. The low rate of implementation was quite common in all sectors. Also there were far too many sections in each of its 13 major programmes. Transport and communications alone had 10 sections, that is, seven for transport - roads, rail, maritime, ports, air, inland water and multi-modal transports; and three for telecommunications - broadcasting, postal services and telecommunications. What is perhaps striking is the fact that it has not expressed any intentions of curtailing their numbers, which is a logical move given the lack of funds and the low rate of implementation.

Apart from their sheer numbers, the nature of the programmes was also criticized. They consisted of conferences, meetings, workshops and seminars; the dominant aspect being research. Most of the reports
from these activities end up on shelves at the secretariat and the respective ministries depending on the topic. It is anybody's guess what happens once they get there. One cannot help thinking that such exercises may have been in vain. The Commission itself has no means of following up on the reports. It just assumes that the states will make good use of them. But how can this be when it was the ECA which decided in the first instance that the research will be of benefit to them? The programmes are also too general in nature. For example, the programmes for the integration of women in the process of development. One does not know what this really means and the officials are unable to explain it. However, the Commission insisted that it was going to implement the programme through training, advisory services, seminars and studies. We know that development is multi-dimensional yet there is no indication of the aspect(s) on which it intends to concentrate. The programme aimed at two targets: (a) the improvement of the conditions of women; (b) to assist member states in the formulation of policies and programmes designed to develop the capabilities of women as vital human resources for development. However laudable these objectives they have to be put in proper perspective. The Commission has failed to develop such context for its programmes and this is arguably one of its main problems.

The timing of programmes is essential as well. The findings concerning subregional programmes is such that it does not actually put them in a time framework. Most were actually approved in the 1977-78 period, but they were actually implemented in the 1982-85 period. One reason for this was that the Commission had the practice of drawing up the programmes and getting them approved by the states before scouting around for funds to implement them. Since its sources of extra-budgetary funding are never certain it has to wait for long periods, until such a
time that funds are available. This also explains why some programmes get abandoned. For example, the ECA abandoned its programme for women in North Africa in 1986 due to lack of funds. It also terminated the same programme in all the other subregions, that is, the Central, Eastern and Southern, and West Africa.

The Commission tended to concentrate on a single theme for its programmes, that is, the idea of using regional economic co-operation as a vehicle for development. Its major strategy has been to establish institutions. The ECA has gone further than most other Regional Economic Commissions in terms of the numbers in existence. All of them have established development institutes as a direct consequence of their advisory services and technical training. The Latin American Institute for Economic Development and Planning was established at Santiago, Chile, in 1962; the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning at Dakar, Senegal was established the following year. However, the ECA is the one with more institutions. The ESCAP has established about five of such - the Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology (APCTT), formerly known as the Regional Centre for Technology Transfer; the Regional Co-ordination Centre for Research and Development of Coarse Grains, Pulses, Roots and Tuber Crops in the Humid Tropis of Asia and the Pacific (CGPRT), are among them. Both the ECLAC and the ECE have less than five each. The ECA has 32 at the moment and is going ahead with its plan to establish a PTA in North Africa in 1990.

Most of the institutions are not functioning effectively due to lack of members and non-payment of subcriptions. For example, the Regional Centre for Training in Aerial Surveys (RECTAS) has had only four members since it was established in 1972 - Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, yet there are 16 countries in West Africa. The problem
stems from the ECA hoisting such institutions on the states. The latter have to look for foreign exchange to pay their subscriptions and they will only do so if they feel that the institutions are of benefit to them. The other problem is that there are far too many of them in existence. This is in addition to the fact that there are national equivalents to the ECA scheme especially in the field of manpower training, mineral and natural resources. Moreover, other organizations such as the UNESCO, UNIDO and ILO offer similar services to the states on a free of charge basis. Then there is the problem of duplication of efforts, for example, the ECA established similar institutions in Central and Southern Africa - the Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA) and the Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA). Couldn't the interest of all the states be served in a single institution? Both are facing problems of non-payment of subscriptions and lack of members. Besides African states have asked for the co-ordination and rationalization of the activities of all the ECA-sponsored institutions as a way of tackling some of their problems. But the Commission has not yet considered their suggestions. Even though they have asked it not to establish any more institutions unless it was necessary, it was still of the opinion that Africa needed more.

The Commission had made two major attempts to decentralize. Its motives were to satisfy the states which criticized it for being too distant from their problems. It was also taking part in an exercise of restructuring of the UN system. Finally, it was looking for a way to get the states interested in its programmes and activities. But not all the Regional Economic Commissions went in for decentralization by establishing subregional offices. For example, neither the ECE nor the ECWA have subregional offices. The ECLAC has six offices - in Mexico,
Bogota (Colombia), Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Montevideo (Uruguay) and Washington, but the ESCAP has only one, namely, the ESCAP Pacific Operations Centre (EPOC) at Port Vila, Vanuatu.

The ECA has six offices known as the Multinational Programme and Operational Centres (MULPOCs). It went a step further in its second attempt by allowing them to have policy organs (there was an absence of these in its subregional offices of the 1960s). It also devised programmes for each MULPOC. These were the two main advances made. Apart from them the MULPOCs are facing similar problems to those of the subregional offices, such as inadequate funding, the use of skeleton staff to man them, and ineffective programmes. Besides each office functioned without contact with the other. Nor were programmes co-ordinated.

Chapters 5-9 dealt with the history of decentralization and each of the MULPOCs in detail. The main point made in Chapter 5 was the extent of the ECA's failure in achieving its objectives as far as decentralization was concerned. As indicated earlier on the member states are not consulted before programmes are implemented and so they are not directly involved with the process of decision making. The participation of the states is therefore a passive one.

One of the reasons why the MULPOCs were established to replace the subregional offices was so that the former will have more autonomy and authority to operate. But headquarters was in control of all aspects of the MULPOCs, that is, financial and personnel, administrative matters and work programmes. In this sense the MULPOCs were not really different from the subregional offices. The only main difference between the two is that the former had policy organs, that is, the Council of Ministers and the technical arm which is the Committee of Officials.
Another reason for establishing the MULPOCs had to do with allowing the staff to be in the field so that the peculiar problems of each area can be identified and solutions sought. The finding of this research is that the ECA has not really achieved much by way of tackling the problems especially in North, West and Central Africa. In the case of West Africa, the major problems facing the states include drought, famine, desertification and the proliferation of inter-governmental institutions. The studies conducted by the ECA failed to address these problems. The member states expressed their dissatisfaction with ECA activities. In fact, the Niamey MULPOC was the first to question the relevance of the ECA. During the policy organ meetings in February 1986, the member states decided that on account of economic development throughout Africa in general and West Africa in particular, the mandate and role of the MULPOC be reviewed and its scope of activity redefined in order to address the individual and collective needs of the states. Apart from the programmes, the member states also complained about the organization of the meetings of the policy organs. Officials complained that the ECA does not send them the agendas for meetings and the drafts of programmes on time. So ministers arrive for meetings unprepared and they also have shorter periods to go through a mass of documents. They were also unhappy about the annual meetings of the policy organs. Such meetings left little time for implementation and evaluation of programmes. In 1987 the member states decided that from 1989 the policy organs will meet every two years. A decision which has been adopted by all the MULPOCs. So in terms of changes in policies, the Niamey MULPOC has been a forerunner. (More detail on the Niamey MULPOC is in Chapter 6.)

Chapter 7 dealt with the Lusaka MULPOC. This MULPOC was built on a long history of subregional activities. It was both a subregional
office in the 1960s and an UNDAT in the early 1970s. It meant that, as in the cases of Niamey and Yaounde MULPOCs, Lusaka had inherited the work programmes of previous organs. The programmes implemented were less attractive when compared with those of the SADCC and PTA because the former laid more emphasis on long-term development through its studies, research, seminars and workshops. The countries were concerned about immediate issues such as dependence on South Africa; reconstruction and rehabilitation of their railway lines; and drought. In some instances the Lusaka MULPOC was implementing the wrong set of programmes. For example, the area has hydro-electric potential but there were no programmes designed to exploit this.

In comparative terms, the Lusaka MULPOC recorded success by implementing valuable programmes such as purchasing of computers and software, locomotives and shunting machines. It also established a PTA for the member states.

Chapter 8 examined the activities of the ECA in Central Africa. The Commission established two MULPOCs in the area, that is, the Yaounde and Gisenyi. Both faced structural and external problems. In the case of Yaounde, Equatorial Guinea was still recovering from the effects of a dictatorship and a battered economy. The political situation in Chad was also making it difficult for the MULPOC to function. The Director of the MULPOC has not been able to visit Chad as a result of that. With reference to the Gisenyi MULPOC, relations between Burundi and Zaire were not cordial. Moreover, the political instability in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire makes for unstable relations in the MULPOC. Despite these problems, the Gisenyi MULPOC had a higher rate of implementation of work programmes. The rate was 54 per cent compared with 23.5 per cent for Yaounde. The reasons for the relative effectiveness of the former
include the fact that there are only three states which are prepared to work together and also specialized agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, WTO and the IBRD were more sympathetic to Burundi and Rwanda which are LDCs and willing to provide funds for the programmes. The Gisenyi MULPOC recorded limited success with its women's programme. Its Gitega scheme in Burundi for the training of women as farmers in basic skills and techniques was a real contribution to development. But the scheme was terminated in 1987 when the UNDP withdrew funds following the setting up of its women's programme. The second reason had to do with the fact that an evaluation exercise of ECA programmes by the UNDP revealed that the Commission was using funds contributed by the latter for administrative costs instead of implementation of programmes (see Chapter 5).

The MULPOC in Tangier has not benefitted from its long history and experience as a subregional office in the 1960s. It is undeveloped in the sense that it has no fully-fledged policy organ. The MULPOC operates through a Council of Plenipotentiaries which is composed of ambassadors, envoys and senior officials. All other MULPOCs have Councils of Ministers, made up of ministers of economic development and planning of each member state.

External factors such as the Western Sahara dispute and the effects of the Camp David Accord (1979) have disrupted the operations of this MULPOC. There is no formal communication between the states at the ministerial level. Therefore, the ECA's plan to establish a PTA in North Africa faces obstacles such as no communication links and the absence of institutional structures for co-operative ventures.

The overall conclusion is that all the MULPOCs are operating sub-optimally, but the ECA was most ineffective in North Africa. All the
MULPOCs faced internal constraints such as lack of funds and manpower resources. There is no clear division of labour between what headquarters and the MULPOCs should do. To an extent the ECA failed to achieve its objectives for establishing the MULPOCs because the headquarters was in control of all matters relating to finance, personnel, work programmes and administration. The MULPOCs have no authority nor autonomy. In this respect they were not really different from the subregional offices (see Chapter 5).

With the examples and illustrations given above and in the previous chapters the findings of the research are as follows:

(1) that the lack of financial and manpower resources was a serious threat to the functioning of the Commission;

(2) the inadequacies in its organization, structures, policies and strategies were responsible for its ineffective and lack of participation of the states in its activities;

(3) it did not have organs for the co-ordination, execution and monitoring of real projects;

(4) the programmes took no account of the development priorities of the states; and

(5) the constraints at the headquarters were present at the subregional level. The constraints affected the capability of the Commission to the extent that it was of marginal concern to the states. Therefore, it was neither a vital agent nor a motivator in development.

The failure of the Commission is attributed to two main factors: first, we blame it as far as it made certain choices; and secondly, its
failure in the main stems from the fact that it is an arm of the UN system. Each line of argument is considered in turn. All the Regional Economic Commissions receive instructions and guidelines from the Secretary-General for their programmes, but they can choose areas and emphasis. In the case of the ECA the leadership and management chose to concentrate on 13 major areas. Even with its limited resources it is still continuing with all of them. The ECE, for example, has 11 major programmes but they chose to concentrate on different themes which reflected the economic situations of the members for each decade. For the 1947-57 decade it dealt with setting up of its operational and subsidiary organs. For 1977-87 the theme was economic co-operation within the subregional groupings in Europe. Moreover, it did not opt for the establishment of subregional offices.

The question of choices also affects and determines the size of administration. While the ECLAC opted for a small secretariat in the 1950s, the trend in the 1970s and 1980s is for larger ones. For example, the ECA has 11 divisions, 32 sections and 12 units. The ECLAC operates through eight divisions and eight units, while the ECE has nine divisions, six units and 16 subsidiary organs.

But in as much as choices have to be made, we cannot overlook their status as arms of the UN system. The greater part of their handicaps originate from it. They were all established to promote concerted action for the economic and social development with a view to raising the level of economic activity, but in practical terms it has been difficult to implement the idea. It is not at all clear from their documents what that really means. Moreover, they are all research-oriented institutions. They all have the same basic programme structure, similar patterns of budgetary growth and budget size, except for the ECWA which is the youngest and smallest (see Table 2.2). Their purposes are
are not very clear-cut. A UN Office of Public Information pamphlet — United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Doc. OPI/235-66-22616 — stated that a Commission "can be used as extensively as its member countries desire". When speaking to delegates attending the 45th Ordinary Session of the OAU in February 1987, they all seemed to have different views about the ECA. Some did not know what it was meant for. A member of the Liberian Delegation who refused to tell me his name admitted that he had never heard of the ECA before arriving at Addis Ababa. He even thought that the Africa Hall was the conference complex of the OAU, whereas it belongs to the Commission. The Regional Economic Commissions provide services which other UN Specialized Agencies were dealing with. The bureaus of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and others such as the UNDP, UNIDO and UNCTAD are all organized along sectoral lines.

The complexity of African economic crisis is such that a sector-by-sector approach does not reflect the peculiar needs for development in each subregion; for instance, in West Africa one of the major problems facing the states is the multiplicity of IGOs. It is a problem not present in other regions and the way the ECA programmes are structured at present does not take into account the ways and means of controlling and co-ordinating the activities of the IGOs.

The development priorities of each region have to be taken into account if realistic programmes are to be formulated and implemented. The ECA has emerged with certain procedures that are ineffective. For instance, it does not have prior consultation with member states in each region before drawing up its programmes. The officials do so and also prepare the agenda and other documents in a semi-finished state and then the states carry out discussions. In effect, the states
discuss ECA programmes for each subregion and not programmes that the states have chosen. It therefore formulates and implements programmes on the basis that they are good for the areas and not necessarily what the states wanted.

One does not expect the Commission to solve every development problem. However, the states expect it to play a positive role by devising projects which are easy to assess in terms of costs and benefits. Problems given top priority by the states include the scarcity of foreign exchange, lack of technology and technical know-how, insufficient supply of capital and inability to provide basic amenities. Most of the studies conducted by the ECA ignore these.

The member states prefer projects such as the building of roads, dams, hospitals and schools. Such projects are tangible with benefits to communities which can be assessed. It is also easy for states to identify with such projects. But the ECA has yet to respond to such demands.

The ECA is therefore an unlikely forum for the initiation of measures to combat underdevelopment in Africa. As an arm of the UN it cannot be easily sensitive to African problems. For these and other reasons, the conclusion is that the ECA cannot play a meaningful role in development.
NOTES


5. Ibid.


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The focus of this bibliography is on works which usefully relate to the subject of the thesis. We have also drawn attention to those journals which have a direct interest in the developmental elements of International African Affairs. It is by no means exhaustive.


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## APPENDIX 1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Long-term debt</th>
<th>Use of IMF credit</th>
<th>Short-term debt</th>
<th>Total external debt</th>
<th>External debt as a % of GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,752.9</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>55,357.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>14,929.9</td>
<td>648.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>63,116.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>43,910.2</td>
<td>1,966.8</td>
<td>9,480.0</td>
<td>68,018.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>49,189.7</td>
<td>3,428.5</td>
<td>10,498.7</td>
<td>76,894.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>55,393.3</td>
<td>3,997.3</td>
<td>8,628.3</td>
<td>78,219.2</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>61,461.6</td>
<td>5,088.6</td>
<td>10,343.9</td>
<td>85,590.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>62,046.1</td>
<td>5,258.7</td>
<td>10,914.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>67,979.2</td>
<td>6,008.3</td>
<td>11,603.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

n.a. = figures not available

### APPENDIX 2

Growth of GNP Per Person 1960-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Groups</th>
<th>GNP per person (1980 current $)</th>
<th>Annual growth of GNP</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>1980-90</td>
<td>Low case</td>
<td>High case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income oil importers</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-income oil importers</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil exporters</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All developing countries</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

### APPENDIX 3

**Status of Pledged Contributions as of 31 December 1982**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Institutions</th>
<th>General Fund Pledges</th>
<th>Specific Fund Pledges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>1980-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Algeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Benin</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Botswana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Burundi</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Central African Republic</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cape Verde</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Chad</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Congo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ethiopia</td>
<td>73,280</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Egypt</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Gabon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Gambia</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Ghana</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Kenya</td>
<td>59,259</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Lesotho</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Liberia</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Mauritania</td>
<td>9,621</td>
<td>18,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Mauritius</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Morocco</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Niger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Collections and Unpaid amounts as of 31 December 1982.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Institutions</th>
<th>General Fund Pledges</th>
<th>Specific Fund Pledges</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. Nigeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Rwanda</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Senegal</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Sierra Leone</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Somalia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Sudan</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Swaziland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Togo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Tunisia</td>
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<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Uganda</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. United Republic of Cameroon</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Upper Volta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Zaire</td>
<td>156,976</td>
<td>87,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Zambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Zimbabwe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. African Development Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>878,038</td>
<td>1,334,789</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Zambia - $465,880 office rent and maintenance of the Eastern and Southern AFrican MULPOC (Lusaka).

aSee Appendix 4 for breakdown of unpaid balance by biennium.

Source: UNTFAD: Progress report on pledges and payments by member states and institutions, project implementation and expenditures for the period 1981-82, E/ECA/CM.9/17, 15 March 1983, pp. 3-4.
**APPENDIX 4**

*Pledged Contributions Unpaid as of 31 December 1982 (in US$)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>General fund</th>
<th>Specific fund</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Benin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Botswana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Central African Republic</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chad</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Gabon</td>
<td></td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Kenya</td>
<td>2,744</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Lesotho</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,654</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>48,610</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Sierra Leone</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Sudan</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Zaire</td>
<td>69,754</td>
<td>87,663</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                              | 155,409      | 626,927       | 364,802 | 250,000  | 931,000  | 2,328,138|
## APPENDIX 5

**Summary of Unpaid Pledged Contributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biennium</th>
<th>General fund</th>
<th>Specific fund</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>155,409</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>155,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>625,927</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>876,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>364,802</td>
<td>931,000</td>
<td>1,295,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,147,138</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,181,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,328,138</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# APPENDIX 6

Salary Scales for Professional and Higher Categories

Showing Annual Gross and the Net Equivalent after Application of Staff Assessment

(US$, effective 1 January 1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
<th>IX</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>XI</th>
<th>XII</th>
<th>XIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under-Secretary-General</td>
<td>USG Gross</td>
<td>96,765.00</td>
<td>Net D</td>
<td>55,076.65</td>
<td>Net S</td>
<td>50,011.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
<td>ASG Gross</td>
<td>85,864.00</td>
<td>Net D</td>
<td>56,524.52</td>
<td>Net S</td>
<td>50,011.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>D-2 Gross</td>
<td>77,009.00</td>
<td>84,431.00</td>
<td>91,905.00</td>
<td>99,395.00</td>
<td>106,910.00</td>
<td>114,449.00</td>
<td>121,993.00</td>
<td>129,502.00</td>
<td>136,995.00</td>
<td>144,469.00</td>
<td>151,902.00</td>
<td>159,288.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Officer</td>
<td>D-3 Gross</td>
<td>55,919.00</td>
<td>57,732.00</td>
<td>59,531.00</td>
<td>61,342.00</td>
<td>63,193.00</td>
<td>64,998.00</td>
<td>66,755.00</td>
<td>68,453.00</td>
<td>70,214.00</td>
<td>71,984.00</td>
<td>73,717.00</td>
<td>75,434.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officer</td>
<td>P-3 Gross</td>
<td>30,518.00</td>
<td>31,589.00</td>
<td>32,648.00</td>
<td>33,713.00</td>
<td>35,939.00</td>
<td>38,054.00</td>
<td>40,159.00</td>
<td>42,242.00</td>
<td>44,312.00</td>
<td>46,370.00</td>
<td>48,428.00</td>
<td>50,485.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Officer</td>
<td>P-2 Gross</td>
<td>24,233.00</td>
<td>25,097.00</td>
<td>25,967.00</td>
<td>26,832.00</td>
<td>27,696.00</td>
<td>28,560.00</td>
<td>29,424.00</td>
<td>30,288.00</td>
<td>31,152.00</td>
<td>32,016.00</td>
<td>32,880.00</td>
<td>33,744.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Officer</td>
<td>P-1 Gross</td>
<td>18,200.00</td>
<td>18,964.00</td>
<td>19,740.00</td>
<td>20,516.00</td>
<td>21,292.00</td>
<td>22,068.00</td>
<td>22,844.00</td>
<td>23,620.00</td>
<td>24,396.00</td>
<td>25,172.00</td>
<td>25,948.00</td>
<td>26,724.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D = Rate applicable to staff members with a dependent spouse or child.
S = Rate applicable to staff members with no dependent spouse or child.

Source: Staff Regulations of the United Nations and Staff Rules 200.1 to 212.7 Applicable to Technical Assistance Project Personnel, Doc. ST/SGB/Staff Rules/2/Rev.6., UN, New York, 1984, p. 87.